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.rp *9353. IA30 

V. 5: 


Given By 










boston Public Library 
Superintendent of Documents 


AUG 1 2 1SG5 

Vol. LIU, No. 1358 

July 5, 1965 


Address by Secretary Rusk 2 



Transcript of News Conference 12 

by W. W. Rostov), Counselor 21 

hy Christian A. Herter 31 


Article by Gladys A. Tillett 39 

For index see inside back cover 

The Alliance for Progress: A Partnership of Mutual Help 

Address by Secretary Rusk 

Good evening. I count it a special priv- 
ilege to be here, as you wind up your first 
day's work as delegates to the First Inter- 
American Conference of the Partners of 
the Alliance. This first conference is a mile- 
stone in a truly great enterprise : the Alliance 
for Progress. 

Nearly 4 years have passed since repre- 
sentatives of the 20 independent Republics 
of this hemisphere met in Punta del Este to 
fashion the Alliance for Progress. The Char- 
ter of Punta del Este - gave hope to the as- 
pirations of responsible and progressive 
Latin Americans. The United States helped 
in the formulation of the charter, but the 
ideas and the inspiration were profoundly 
Latin American. 

^ Made before the First Inter-American Conference 
of the Partners of the Alliance at Washington, D.C., 
on June 10 (press release 151). 

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

The signatory governments pledged to 
their own peoples — and to one another — 
that they would meet the challenges of the 
20th century. The commitment was clear : to 
change old ways so that each nation would 
become politically more democratic, econom- 
ically more developed, and socially more just. 

The ties that bind the American Repub- 
lics in the inter-American system command 
us to respect one another and to help one 
another. The Alliance for Progress was fash- 
ioned in that spirit of mutual help and re- 

The Charter of Punta del Este made it 
plain that no one nation would, or could, as- 
sume the major responsibility of carrying 
out the purposes of the alliance. Indeed, that 
historic document declared that this was to 
be a common and united effort of the peoples 
of the Americas. 

The charter of the alliance recognized 


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that the strengthening of liberty in Latin 
America required rapid and profound change. 
It declared : 

The men and women of our Hemisphere are reach- 
ing for the better life which today's skills have 
placed within their grasp. They are determined for 
themselves and their children to have decent and ever 
more abundant lives, to gain access to knowledge 
and equal opportunity for all, to end those conditions 
which benefit the few at the expense of the needs 
and dignity of the many. It is our inescapable task 
to fulfill these just desires — to demonstrate to the 
poor and forsaken of our countries, and of all lands, 
that the creative powers of free men hold the key to 
their progress and to the progress of future genera- 

Those words were a call for peaceful revo- 
lution. And, as President Johnson has said, 
those who make peaceful revolution impos- 
sible make violent revolution inevitable. 

Obviously, then, the United States wel- 
comes change in Latin America. From its 
inception, the Alliance for Progress has been 
the cornerstone of our policy in Latin Amer- 
ica. The alliance objectives — of reform and 
development in democracy — are our objec- 
tives. They are our objectives because we 
have always believed in them and because 
their attainment in each and every country 
of Latin America is in our national interest. 

Achievements of the Alliance 

The Alliance for Progress is approaching 
its fifth year. It stands at a hopeful but crit- 
ically important stage. 

The situation is hopeful for several rea- 

— Last year Latin America achieved an 
overall increase in its gross national prod- 
uct of 21/2 percent per capita — the rough 
target set in 1961. The increase varied from 
country to country but was rather well 
spread. The Inter- American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) feels there 
is a fair chance that an overall 21/2 percent 
per capita rate of grovpth will be achieved 
again in 1965. 

Let me cite a few figures on the achieve- 
ments of the alliance : 

12 countries have land reform laws ; 

10 have produced national development 
plans or sector investment programs, and 
other country programs are being com- 
pleted ; 

15 have self-help housing programs, and 
more than 300,000 dwelling units have been 
completed or are nearing completion ; 

every alliance country has improved its 
tax system or tax administration ; 9 have un- 
dertaken major tax reform ; 

42 intermediate credit institutions have 
been created ; 

6,150 miles of roads have been built; 

more than 75,000 teachers have been 
trained ; 

nearly 10 million schoolbooks have been 
circulated ; 

more than 13 million schoolchildren are 
participating in special school lunch pro- 
grams, three times the number of 21/2 years 

more than 200,000 agricultural credit loans 
have been made. 

— In most of the countries of Latin Amer- 
ica there are governments, backed by a vital 
new generation in public and private life, 
which are facing courageously the tremen- 
dous problems which must be solved to 
achieve well-balanced economic and social de- 
velopment. It is not easy to bring inflation 
to a halt. It is not easy to increase tax col- 
lections and to design and execute programs 
of land reform. It is not easy to move away 
from the protection of high tariff barriers 
and to expand manufactured exports in a 
competitive world. But these things are hap- 
pening. The language of the Charter of 
Punta del Este is being translated into 

— The Western Hemisphere has fashioned 
effective machinery for promoting sound de- 
velopment and reform, institutions such as 
the Inter-American Development Bank and 
the Inter-American Committee on the Alli- 
ance for Progress. 

— Many of our friends in Latin America 
wish to go beyond modernization of the in- 
dividual nations of the hemisphere. They 
seek to accelerate the process of economic in- 
tegration. We see the beginnings of this proc- 

JULY 5, 1965 

ess in the Central American Common Mar- 
ket and the Latin American Free Trade As- 
sociation. Economic integration offers many 
potential advantages. Investments for inte- 
grated markets can be more efficient and 
productive. Wider markets stimulate compet- 
itive attitudes and practices. Integration ac- 
celerates diversification of agriculture and 
industry. And diversification is fundamental 
to efficiency and regular self-sustained 
grovid;h. The United States has supported, 
and continues to support, economic integra- 
tion in Europe. We think integration would 
be correspondingly beneficial to Latin Amer- 
ica. We look forward to having a strong eco- 
nomic and political partner in Latin America. 
That partnership would be strengthened by 
the success of the integration movement. 

Some Problems To Be Solved 

Although we have solid grounds for satis- 
faction in the progress that has been made 
and for hope as we look to the future, we 
must not underestimate the difficulties con- 
fronting us. 

One of the most serious difficulties is the 
decline in the prices of certain traditional 
Latin American exports — exports on which 
many Latin American countries depend to 
earn foreign exchange. The drop in the price 
of sugar from 11 to 2Y2, cents was one of 
the causes of the crisis in the Dominican 
Republic. The long-range solution to over- 
dependence on the export of a few agricul- 
tural commodities lies in the diversification 
of agriculture and the development of export 

Another serious problem in several coun- 
tries is inflation. Controlling it is a searching 
test politically and socially as well as eco- 
nomically. We are full of respect for those 
governments which are dealing with the in- 
flation courageously and tenaciously. 

A third problem — and a far-reaching one 
— is the modernization of rural life. Latin 
America is at a stage of development where 
industry and urban life are moving ahead 
with high momentum. But most people in 
Latin America still live in the country- 

side, substantially untouched by modern life. 
These people need schools and roads and elec- 
tricity. They need to organize cooperatives 
to sell their products in the cities at a fair 
price. They need to learn how to improve 
and diversify their production. Above all, 
they need to hope that they will not be left 
behind as the modernization of Latin Amer- 
ica moves forward. They need to feel that not 
only their governments but their fellow citi- 
zens in the cities have an interest in im- 
proving rural life. Building a modern nation 
is more than a technical task. City folk and 
country folk, the rich and the poor, the edu- 
cated and the illiterate, must develop a sense 
of common purpose and brotherhood. 

The Dominican Republic 

The Alliance for Progress was only be- 
ginning to take hold in the Dominican Re- 
public — a little country with a great poten- 
tial to provide a good life for its people — 
when the government was overthrovim in 
April. Tragically, a hardhanded dictator had 
for three decades thwarted the development 
of the institutions required for effective de- 
mocracy and social progress. Such economic 
advance as took place was poorly balanced. 
Potential leaders in the country did not have 
an opportunity to develop mutual under- 
standing and trust. Such a legacy is indeed 
hard to overcome. 

The countries of this hemisphere must de- 
vise new mechanisms for cooperative action 
in the Dominican situation and for any 
crises which might arise in the future. And 
all of us in the Alliance for Progress must 
demonstrate our deep and lively interest in 
the welfare of the people of the Dominican 
Republic. For they want what the rest of us 
want for ourselves: representative constitu- 
tional government, economic and social prog- 
ress, hope that their children's lives will be 
happier and more fruitful than their ovsm. 

One of our jobs in this hemisphere is to 
help the Dominican people to attain these 
objectives. The machinery of the Alliance for 
Progress should set to work to build as rap- 
idly as possible on that island the founda- 
tions for a modem, democratic life. 


Above all, however, the Alliance for Prog- 
ress needs the enthusiastic and sustained 
support of the people of all the member 
countries. The people must knov? that this is 
their program. And this is where you — the 
Partners of the Alliance — are helping to 
make an invaluable contribution. You have 
established the means whereby the people 
of all our countries can join together in a 
partnership of mutual help — a partnership 
based on respect for each other's culture and 
for each other's dignity. 

One of the greatest strengths of our form 
of society is the readiness of private citizens, 
as individuals and through voluntary or- 
ganizations, to further public objectives. 
Through your efforts more and more people 
will come to see and understand that the 
alliance is a living thing and that it goes 
beyond power projects and trade conferences 
and governmental decrees. Through your ef- 

forts more and more people will come to 
realize that there are many things they can 
do for themselves, things that governments 
cannot do for them, things they can do right 
now to change their lives and to improve the 
chances of their children having better lives. 

Your work has already produced sugges- 
tions for hundreds of ways in which the peo- 
ple themselves can participate in the Alli- 
ance for Progress. 

So I think we are all entitled to regard 
this First Inter-American Conference of the 
Partners of the Alliance as a significant 
milestone. I congratulate you. Let us move 
forward, never forgetting, as President 
Johnson said recently,^ that we in North 
America and Latin America have always 
had "very special ties of interest and affec- 
tion" and that "together we share and shape 
the destiny of the new world." 

'Ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach 
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia 

Following are remarks made by President 
Johnson and Secretary Rusk after a meeting 
of the Cabinet at the White House on June 18, 
together with the transcript of a question- 
and-answer period between Secretary Rusk 
and the news correspondents. 

White House press release dated June 18 


The press office will have a statement from 
the President to the Cabinet on the passage 
of the excise tax reductions. We expect to 
receive that bill later in the day. The state- 
ment is self-explanatory, and I won't elab- 
orate on it. 

We received detailed reports this morning 
on the international situation from Secretary 

of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense, Mr. 
McNamara, in connection with the military 

Mr. McNamara had an extended press con- 
ference yesterday,! or the day before, and he 
has met with groups, and I think I will just 
ask Secretary Rusk today to review with you 
.what he said to the Cabinet and to be avail- 
able for any questions that you may care 
to ask. 

I will have to excuse myself, and certain 
other Cabinet members have planes to catch 
and luncheon appointments and so forth, 
and so if they want to, they can retire through 
the exit. Mr. Secretary, I submit you to their 

See p. 12. 

JULY 5, 1965 


Gentlemen, I reviewed for the Cabinet the 
record of efforts to reach a peaceful settle- 
ment of problems in Southeast Asia during 
this past 4 or 41/2 years. Our commitment 
there has been a simple one, a very serious 
one. For more than a decade, obviously, it 
demonstrated throughout this postwar period 
since 1945 that the United States prefers to 
find peaceful solutions rather than violent 
solutions to outstanding questions. 

I began by reviewing a series of bilateral 
talks, using normal diplomatic procedure. It 
started in a serious way at the meeting be- 
tween President Kennedy and Chairman 
Khrushchev in June of 1961.2 You will re- 
call that at that meeting the two of them 
agreed that we ought to be able to find a 
solution for Laos, based upon everyone else 
leaving Laos alone and letting the Laotians 
run their own affairs. 

There was no agreement at that time, or 
subsequently in bilateral talks as far as Viet- 
Nam is concerned, between ourselves and the 
Soviet Union. The Laotian discussion, how- 
ever, led to a conference in Geneva which 
produced the Geneva accords of 1962.^ We 
believe that those accords still represent a 
proper basis for peace insofar as Laos is con- 

The difficulty with those agreements has 
been that at no time since they were signed 
has North Viet-Nam brought itself into com- 
pliance with those agreements. At no time 
did their military personnel in Laos reduce 
below several thousand. At no time did 
North Viet-Nam quit using Laos as an infil- 
tration route into South Viet-Nam. At no 
time did they give the International Control 
Commission free access to all areas of Laos 
under Viet-Nam and Pathet Lao control. 

More recently, we have had similar bi- 
lateral talks with Peiping, in which the sub- 

' For background and text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R. 
communique of June 4, 1961, see Bulletin of June 
26, 1961, pp. 991 and 999. 

' For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of 
Laos and an accompanying protocol, see ibid., Aug. 
13, 1962, p. 259. 

ject of Southeast Asia has arisen. But those 
talks, as has been the case for the past 9 
years or more, usually start with the other 
side's insisting that there is nothing to talk 
about unless we are prepared to surrender 
Formosa and 11 million people on Formosa 
to the mainland. When it becomes apparent 
that that is not possible, then these talks 
become rather harsh and forbidding and fol- 
low the lines which you all know publicly. 

There have been contacts from time to time 
indirectly through those who are represented 
in Hanoi, or through other means, with Hanoi 
over the prospects and possibilities for peace 
in Southeast Asia. No productive result from 
such contacts as that. 

There have been other governments who 
are in contact with whom we have discussed 
this matter over a considerable period of 
time ; so the bilateral channels of diplomacy, 
or normal channels of diplomacy, have been 
fully utilized. 

Possible Use of Geneva Machinery 

Then we have, of course, considered how 
the Geneva machinery might make a con- 
tribution. I think we would want to record 
with respect the serious concern and the dili- 
gence with which the British Government, as 
cochairman, has addressed itself to this ques- 
tion throughout this period. 

The British and Soviet cochairmen have 
certain responsibilities with regard to that 
Geneva machinery. For example, they are 
supposed to report by midsummer under ar- 
ticle 19 of the Geneva accords on Laos, on 
the operations of the International Control 
Commission. The British have been prepared 
for some time to go into such discussions 
with the other cochairman, the Laotian Gov- 
ernment, and the three government members 
of the International Control Commission 
[Canada, India, and Poland], and there has 
been no activity on the other side. 

Efforts have been made to find out whether 
it is possible that a reconvening of the Lao- 
tian conference might be worth while. After 
all, when the Hanoi delegation visited Mos- 
cow some weeks ago, the joint communique 


referred, or seemed to be approving terms to 
the possibility of a conference on Cambodia 
and on Laos. 

Last year the policy proposed that the two 
cochairmen and the three ICC countries and 
the Laotians sit down for a discussion of 
these problems, looking toward the possibility 
of a Laotian conference.* We supported that 
policy initiative. Hanoi was unwilling to go 
forward with them. 

The so-called three factions in Laos — the 
Pathet Lao and the neutralists and the so- 
called right wing — have, on occasion, had 
talks among themselves, to see if some of 
these questions in Laos could be resolved, 
that would open the way for a further in- 
ternational initiative. We have encouraged 
constructive talks among the three factions. 
But more recently it appears that the Pathet 
Lao have, for all practical effect, broken 
off those three-faction discussions. 

As you know, there was an active proposal 
to convene a Cambodia conference, stimu- 
lated by a request by Prince Sihanouk, but 
a conference would be held in order to give 
international assurances with respect to the 
security and the independence and neutrality 
of Cambodia. We have agreed to such a 
conference,^ but apparently, because of prob- 
lems by Hanoi and Peiping, no motion has 
taken place in that direction. 

As far as the United Nations is concerned, 
the Vietnamese problem was taken to the 
Security Council last August in connection 
with the Gulf of Tonkin affair.« The Soviet 
representative moved that Hanoi be invited 
to the Security Council, and we supported 
that invitation, and the invitation was ex- 

Hanoi refused to come. Both Hanoi and 
Peiping have made it quite clear that a visit 
by U Thant would not be acceptable on the 
grounds that the Vietnamese question has 
nothing to do with United Nations. Or 

* For background, see ibid., July 20, 1964, p. 88, 
and Aug. 17, 1964, p. 218. 

° For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on 
Apr. 25, see ibid., May 10, 1965, p. 711. 

'Ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272. 

the United Nations intervention, as the Prime 
Minister of North Viet-Nam put it, the 
United Nations intervention in the Viet- 
namese situation is inappropriate. 

The British, as cochairman, suggested to 
the Soviet Government that the two cochair- 
men try to ascertain the views of the parties 
to the Southeast Asian problem, to see 
whether constructive suggestions might come 
from the attitudes expressed by the various 

That did not receive a response — a practi- 
cal or constructive response. The British sent 
Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker to Southeast Asia 
to explore among the capitals the possibilities 
for peace. He was not permitted to visit 
Hanoi and Peiping. 

President Johnson, on April 7,' said that 
the United States remains ready for uncon- 
ditional discussions with the Governments 
concerned. This was described in Hanoi and 
Peiping as a "hoax," as a "big swindle," and 
a "lie covered with flowers." 

The 17-Nation Appeal 

Seventeen nonalined nations issued an ap- 
peal to all parties most specifically concerned 
to seek a peaceful solution through nego- 
tiations without preconditions. * We respond- 
ed affirmatively to that appeal. No result 
from the other side. Some of the Communist 
capitals have called some of the nonalined 
backers of the 17-nation appeal "monsters" 
and "freaks." President [of India Sarvepalli] 
Radhakrishnan suggested that efforts be 
made to arrange a cease-fire and that a group 
of Afro-Asian troops be used to patrol such 
a cease-fire, to keep the peace in that area.. 
We expressed our interest in his suggestions. 
The other side rejected the Indian proposal,, 
referring to the erroneous viewpoints of In- 
dian ruling circles — as perhaps one of the 
least colorful ways of expressing their ob- 

You know that the Minister of External 
Affairs of Canada, Mr. Paul Martin, referred 

nbid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 
"For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S. 
reply, see ibid., p. 610. 

JULY 5, 1965 

at the end of May or early this month to the 
fact that his representative on the Inter- 
national Control Commission in Viet-Nam 
had gone to Hanoi to establish contact with 
North Vietnamese leaders to see whether 
there was any interest in a peaceful settle- 
ment at this point. The result there was 

Then there were those who felt that per- 
haps a bombing pause might elicit some in- 
terest in the other side in peaceful discussion 
— in peaceful processes. There were those 
who felt that a pause of 51/2 days or so was 
not long enough. 

The point is that, long before the 51/2 days 
were over, the harsh attitude of the other 
side was made very apparent and it was 
quite clear that they called it a "worn-out 
trick of deceit and threat," or "peace 
swindle," a "despicable trick," "war black- 
mail" — those are the words they used about 
the idea of a pause. 

Channels for Settlement Remain Open 

I am not suggesting that all of these chan- 
nels are closed. There are several of them 
that remain open. For example, diplomatic 
channels remain open. There remains the 
possibility of utilizing the machinery of the 
Geneva conferences. It may be that the 17 
nations that addressed their original appeal 
might find some basis on which they might 
wish to renew that appeal or to take a fur- 
ther step. Informal, indirect contacts, of 
course, are available if there is a serious in- 
terest among the various parties in finding a 
peaceful settlement. 

You are aware that the Commonwealth 
prime ministers are now discussing the pos- 
sibilities of a committee of Commonwealth 
prime ministers to visit and to ascertain the 
views of the capitals primarily concerned, to 
see whether that kind of initiative would as- 
sist in the situation. 

The President yesterday [at a news con- 
ference] indicated that he would welcome 
any such initiative and that we would co- 
operate with any such initiative which the 
Commonwealth would take. It may be that 

some initiative would come out of the Algiers 
conference, which will be meeting toward the 
end of this month. 

So there are channels, there are proce- 
dures ; but so far as we can tell at the present 
time, the problem is not one of available 
channels and procedures, but the problem is 
one of readiness on the other side to look 
at the problem here in terms of a peaceful 

We do not at the present time see much 
evidence that any such ideas are in their 
mind. They continue their actions in South 
Viet-Nam, actions aimed primarily at the 
civil structure of the countryside, aimed at 
the civilians, aimed at local officials, hamlet 
leaders or local government officials, or 
teachers, public health workers — whoever 
might be there in terms of the civic struc- 
ture of the country. 

Those acts of terrorism continue. If the 
other side thinks that they have a military 
success during these monsoon weeks and 
months ahead of us, they may be holding 
their hand and unwilling to engage in any 
serious or responsible political discussion. 

I would have to summarize by saying that 
we do not see at the moment — we do not see 
at the present time — active interest on the 
part of Hanoi and Peiping, active effort by 
Moscow, to bring this matter to a peaceful 

Southeast Asia in Context of Postwar Period 

In talking with the Cabinet, I put this 
against the framework of other events in this 
postwar period, because we tend to forget 
that context. We have had problems in Iran, 
Greece, Berlin, Korea, the Philippines, Ma- 
laya, Cuba, and other places. When you look 
back and see where the sources of violence 
are to be found, who have upset the peace, 
it was not South Korean divisions that 
marched into the North; it was not Greek 
guerrillas that moved into Bulgaria and 
Yugoslavia; we did not blockade Berlin. 

This is a part of that postwar struggle 
between those who would try to build a 
United Nations kind of world and those 
who would try to change it fundamentally 


and drastically to what they call their world 

I think it is fair to recall also that the 
free world — not speaking just of the United 
States but of our other partners in the free 
world — have tried to deal with these suc- 
cessive questions that have arisen in ways 
that are best adapted to finding a peaceful 
settlement and maintaining the peace, rather 
than to rush over the cliff in what the 
United Nations Charter calls the "scourge 
of war." 

There were no military attacks aimed at 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia while the Greek 
guerrillas were coming across the northern 
frontiers. Weeks upon weeks upon weeks 
an airlift moved supplies into Berlin, while 
an effort was made to find a peaceful settle- 
ment rather than move into an engagement 
of armed forces over that issue. 

Substantial casualties were accepted in 
Korea without moving that into a larger con- 
flict at a time when there were very impor- 
tant military advantages in the free world 
with respect to a general conflagration. 

The Cuban missile crisis was resolved in 
ways that kept open the doors of peaceful 
settlement. There has been 41/^ years of con- 
siderable patience here in Southeast Asia, 
trying to find peace in that area rather than 
inflict upon the peoples of that part of the 
world all of the suffering and devastation that 
a major conflict would involve. 

The people speak of a pause — ^there was a 
pause for 4 years. After the Gulf of Tonkin 
incident, there was another pause for another 
6 months. In other words, who wants peace 
and who wants to absorb their neighbors? 
These are the central questions. 

There is no question at all about the posi- 
tion of the United States and the principal 
members of the free world who are inter- 
ested in these problems. There is also no 
question about our commitment and the ne- 
cessity for maintaining the integrity of the 
American commitment as one of the basic 
pillars in the structure of world peace around 
the globe. 

That is a summary of the briefing that I 
gave the Cabinet this morning. 


Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ambassador to the 
U.N. spoke in a speech yesterday about trying 
to get more activity and to transfer some 
responsibility in this Southeast Asia matter 
to the U.N. Are there any specific new pro- 
posals or initiatives in mind at this time? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think, again, the 
United Nations is there, its machinery is 
there, to do what can be done at any par- 
ticular point. The principal obstacle has been 
that Hanoi and Peiping have indicated that 
the United Nations has no role to play and 
that they will not take any part in the United 
Nations effort to resolve it. Therefore this 
greatly complicates what the United Nations 
itself could do in this situation. 

Q. Can you make any reading on the Soviet 
attitude at this point beyond what it appears 
to be on the surface? 

A. No, we know nothing privately that adds 
anything to what is known publicly. I think 
at the present time on the political side they 
are relatively inactive. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did you simply report 
to the Cabinet this morning, or were there 
some decisions made? 

A. I reported to the Cabinet. We had some 
discussion around the table, but we did not 
take new decisions at the Cabinet meeting 
this morning. 

Q. Do you have any indication or any feel- 
ing that if the monsoon-season offensive is 
stopped, then the Communists might be 
ready for peace talks? 

A. We have no evidence of that. Of course, 
if they have any such thing in mind, they 
are not going to convey that under the present 

Q. What is your feeling? 

A. Let's wait until September-October and 
find out. We just don't know. Somebody else 
is helping to write the story here, and we 
just can't say with assurance what the atti- 
tude of the other side is going to be. 

JULY 5, 1965 

Question of Free Elections 

Q. Did Senator [J. W.] Fulbright reflect 
the administration's point of view in calling 
for a return to the 19 5 A accords, including 
elections ? 

A. I think that he, himself, made it clear 
that he was speaking for himself and not for 
the administration, but we have said — we 
have said more than once — that the 1954 and 
1962 agreements are a basis for peace in 
Southeast Asia. 

The question of free elections is compli- 
cated a bit by the problems of having free 
elections in both Viet-Nams, and complicated 
further by the question of possible reunifica- 
tion. It is complicated further by the strong 
impression one has that the North wishes to 
be unified only in a Communist country and 
the South wishes to be unified only in a non- 
Communist country. 

But we think those are questions — as they 
are in other places — those are questions that 
are to be arrived at by discussion and not by 
armed action and an attempt to resolve them 
by force. 

Wlio Are the Viet Cong? 

Q. Do you regard the problem of whether 
or not the Viet Cong are to be able to par- 
ticipate in any talks as, in itself, a major 
operating problem in the business of possibly 
coming to talks? 

A. There is a certain artificiality about 
this issue, because when you go dovni the 
list of these dozen or more political possi- 
bilities and find that one by one they have 
been either rejected or not utilized, then 
about the only thing that people have left 
to think of is, well, maybe the answer is to 
negotiate with the Viet Cong. 

Who are the Viet Cong? In the first place, 
as far as those tens of thousands of infiltra- 
tors are concerned, they are Hanoi — they are 
Hanoi — and it is the external infiltration that 
ia responsible for the presence of American 
forces today in South Viet-Nam. 

As far as indigenous elements of the Viet 
Cong are concerned, they are relatively few 
in number compared to the rest of the South 

Vietnamese. If South Viet-Nam can have 
some peace and normal political processes 
become possible, and the people who call 
themselves the National Liberation Front 
take their place alongside of all the other 
elements in South Viet-Nam, looking for a 
political solution in that country, that is a 
South Vietnamese problem. 

But the mere fact that there are tens of 
thousands of military personnel sent in there 
from Hanoi does not seem to us to give the 
Viet Cong any special status to be treated 
as a government or to be taken into account 
by special negotiation on the question of 
how you deal with the future of South Viet- 
Nam. I don't know of any other government 
in the world that would permit negotiations 
with a group of that sort under these cir- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, while Senator Fulbright 
said he approved the present course in Viet- 
Nam, he did say that that effort should be 
directed toward what I think he called a 
negotiated settlement involving major con- 
cessions by both sides. Does that in any way 
echo the administration's thinking? 

A. I don't know what he had in mind 
about major concessions. He didn't spell 
them out. The principal thing we want is 
for the people to stop shooting. That was 
described in a column not too long ago as a 
demand for unconditional surrender. That 
is a very strange way to describe a simple 
demand that somebody who is shooting at you 
stop shooting. 

We are not asking that an acre of ground 
or a single individual be surrendered, or 
anybody, but that those who are shooting go 
home and leave these people in peace. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on 
what effect there might be abroad in re- 
action to the use of B-52's from Guam to bomb 
suspected Viet Cong concentrations? 

A. I don't think that would make that 
much difference. As you know, we used 
SAC aircraft, not the same aircraft, on many 
missions — similar targets — in Korea, for ex- 



Q. Would the United States propose ad- 
mitting North Vietnamese to have a repre- 
sentative or a member of the Viet Cong on 
the negotiating team? 

A. I think the question of credentials at a 
conference is something that is usually dealt 
with in terms of the governments who are 
there and who they name in their delegations. 
It isn't normal for a conference to check on 
who is sitting behind me in my chair when I 
am at a conference, and I should think that 
if Hanoi wants any of these people there in 
their delegation, that is up to them. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the 
possibility you raised about a new initiative 
coming from the Algiers conference, do you 
feel that that conference is rigged against 
you already? Are you apprehensive about 
the extent of the Chinese control? 

A. I think there will be a lot of discussion 
of Viet-Nam at the Algiers conference. I 
think it depends a good deal on how the con- 
ference convenes, what its rules of procedure 
are, who will be there, who will remain there, 
whether some of these controversial ques- 
tions are resolved. I just can't predict yet 
because the shape of that conference is not 
at all clear. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Cabinet get a 
report on the SAC bombing mission? 

A. A very, very brief one. We didn't get 
into the particular military aspects of it in 
detail. It was a very brief one. 

Q. Was it successful? 

A. The ground elements are there now, 
and we will get more reports during the day. 
I would think it was worth while, myself. 

The British Mission 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what does this Govern- 
ment believe Prime Minister Wilson's ob- 
jectives are? Is it simply to arrange for a 
peace conference? 

A. I think that the Prime Minister and 
the President are interested in the possibili- 
ties of a peaceful settlement in Southeast 

Asia, to make it possible for these people to 
live their own lives without interference by 
force from the outside. 

There are some very difficult and danger- 
ous issues here, and I think the Prime Min- 
ister, as chairman of the Commonwealth 
prime ministers, as the head of the Govern- 
ment that provides one of the cochairmen for 
the Geneva conferences, and in terms of his 
general responsibility, wants to be sure that 
every possibility of peace is explored. 

Q. Have they done any advance soundings 
to indicate whether Peiping and Hanoi will 

A. I don't know. I think you better put 
that question to them. 

Vietnamese Encouraged by U.S. Support 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the 
South Vietnamese have been heartened by 
our no2v involvement in a ground war there ? 

A. I think they have been encouraged by 
the clear evidences of the United States sup- 
port and the clear evidence that we take our 
commitments seriously and that they are 
getting major assistance from us and grow- 
ing assistance from others. 

I think this has had a good deal to do with 
strengthening their hand and sustaining 
their morale in what has been a very diffi- 
cult and mean situation over a period of 

Q. Mr. Secretary, would we use B-52's to 
bomb North Viet-Nam if the tactical situ- 
ation demanded it? 

A. I am not going to get into a question 
like that. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, did I understand cor- 
rectly that you said we would not oppose 
trading ivith the North Vietnamese delega- 
tion that had Viet Cong delegates in it? 

A. What I am saying is that governments 
come to a conference and we don't look be- 
hind the head of the delegation to see who is 
sitting in the chairs in the second row. That 
is up to them. 

JULY 5, 1965 


Q. Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful and, if 
so, in what terms, as far as time is concerned, 
as to the outcome? 

A. It is not just that diplomacy is pro- 
fessionally committed to optimism, because 
that is the end objective of diplomacy. But 
if you want a personal reaction, we have 
been here before, since 1945. Don't under- 
estimate the importance of the commitment 
of free peoples to their freedom, the impor- 
tance of the United States' commitment, and 
the recognition by people all over the 
world that, whatever some of the propagan- 

dists say from time to time, the power of the 
United States is committed to the rather sim- 
ple and decent purposes of the American 
people, which is generally respected around 
the earth. 

We are not after anything or anybody. We 
don't want any territory or anything else. 
We don't want to take anything away from 
anybody that is theirs. But we do believe in 
sustaining the peace and in trying to build 
a decent world order. 

I think that is the source of common 
strength, both at home and abroad. 

The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary McNamara Discusses Buildup of Forces in Viet-Nam 

Following is the transcript of a news 
conference held by Secretary of Defense 
Robert S. McNamara at Washington on June 

Secretary McNamara: Good afternoon, 
ladies and gentlemen. 

I have two announcements I would like to 
make today, and then I will be very happy 
to take your questions. 

Air Mobile Division 

First, I have today authorized the Army to 
organize a new division, the Air Mobile Di- 
vision. This new division will be organized 
and made combat ready as expeditiously as 
possible at Fort Benning, Georgia. Its intro- 
duction will greatly increase our capability 
to meet all kinds of threats. It places the 
Army on the threshold of an entirely new 
approach to the conduct of land warfare. 

I have also asked the Chief of Staff of the 
Army to report to the Joint Chiefs and to 
me before the first of next year on possible 
conversion of other units of the Army to the 
new type of structure. 

The development of this new division was 
begun over 3 years ago. It is a result of 36 

months of study, experiment, test, and eval- 
uation by both the Army and the Air Force. 
The concept was initially established by the 
Howze Board which, as you know, was 
chaired by General [Hamilton H.] Howze of 
the Army. It has been subsequently evaluated 
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have 
tested it, using the experimental 11th Air 
Assault Division. This division will have a 
strength of about 16,000 men. That is ap- 
proximately equal to the strength of an in- 
fantry division, but it will have four times 
the number of aircraft assigned to an in- 
fantry division. 

As a result, about one-third of its combat 
elements can be moved into combat by its 
ovim aircraft ; the other two-thirds will move 
simultaneously either in air transport air- 
craft or by shuttling of the division's own 

One of the division's brigades will be ca- 
pable of airborne operation. This new type of 
division will make its greatest contributions 
to improving combat readiness in operations 
where terrain obstacles could give enemy 
guerrilla or light infantry forces an ad- 
vantage over our standard combat forma- 



The tactics, the techniques, the proce- 
dures that will be employed by this new di- 
vision will result in a markedly different ap- 
proach to the solution of tactical problems. 
The use of aircraft to bring combat person- 
nel directly to the battlefield, to remove 
them from the battlefield, provides a capa- 
bility which neither we nor any other army 
in the world possess today. 

strength of Forces in Viet-Nam 

Now I should like to bring you up to date 
upon our latest estimates of the strength of 
the Viet Cong forces in South Viet-Nam, 
and upon the strength of the U. S. combat 
forces deployed to that country to assist the 
Vietnamese Government in combating the 

According to the latest intelligence infor- 
mation available to us, the number of hard- 
core, that is the number of full-time Viet 
Cong Communists, regular combat and com- 
bat-support forces in South Viet-Nam to- 
tals approximately 65,000 men. In addition to 
that, there are between 80,000 and 100,000 
part-time or irregular guerrillas. The regu- 
lar and irregular guerrilla forces therefore 
total about 165,000. In addition, there are 
approximately 30,000 Viet Cong serving in 
political and propaganda activities in South 
Viet-Nam. As I have reported previously, 
between 1960 and the end of 1964, infiltra- 
tion of combat personnel into South Viet- 
Nam totaled approximately 39,000 men, all of 
these from North Viet-Nam. It is probable 
that the actual figure exceeded that number, 
but 39,000 represents the number of con- 
firmed infiltrees. In 1964 alone, for example, 
we believe that about 10,000 men were 
brought from North Viet-Nam to fight in 
South Viet-Nam. 

In addition, as you know, there is at least 
one regular North Vietnamese army battal- 
ion in South Viet-Nam, the 2d Battalion of 
the 325th North Vietnamese Division. That 
battalion has been located in the central 
highland region, in the plateau area around 
Pleiku and Kontum for some time. We have 
recent indications that as many as eight ad- 
ditional North Vietnamese regular army 

battalions are also in that highland area. 

Moreover, the Viet Cong forces have re- 
cently been reequipped through the infiltra- 
tion of new weapons, modern weapons from 
North Viet-Nam. The net situation at pres- 
ent is that the ratio of guerrilla to anti- 
guerrilla forces is unfavorable to the Gov- 
ernment of South Viet-Nam — unfavorable 
taking into account the hit-and-run char- 
acteristics of guerrilla war, unfavorable tak- 
ing into account the fact that the mission of 
the Viet Cong forces, the guerrilla forces, is 
to kill and terrorize the people, whereas 
the mission of the Government forces is to 
protect the populace. 

It is worth noting, I think, that in addi- 
tion to large-scale activities which have been 
reported in the news recently, the attacks by 
the Viet Cong forces on the South Viet- 
namese forces — as always, in addition to 
that, there has been a deliberate program of 
terror and harassment, actions to kill, 
maim, capture hundreds of South Vietnam- 
ese citizens every week. Today's terrorist 
bombing, for example, of the commercial 
airport at Saigon is illustrative of these 

The South Vietnamese regular and para- 
military forces facing the Viet Cong total 
something in excess of 500,000 men. They 
are facing, as I mentioned, about 165,000 
guerrillas, a ratio of something on the order 
of 4 to 1. That is considerably less than is 
recognized as required to effectively deal 
with guerrillas. 

We have made efforts to improve these 
ratios. About 100,000 men are currently be- 
ing added to the South Vietnamese forces. As 
you know, through the assistance of U. S. 
forces we increased the mobility and fire- 
power and the close air support of the South 
Vietnamese, making each of their soldiers 
more effective as a result. But this has not 
been enough. 

Therefore we are seeking to correct the 
unfavorable manpower balance by the addi- 
tion of combat forces from other nations — 
Australia, United States, and Korea. 

The United States has deployed nine 
battalions of combat troops to South Viet- 

JULY 5, 1965 


Nam. These battalions consist of approxi- 
mately 13,000 men out of the total of about 
53,000 U. S. military personnel now as- 
signed to that country. In addition, six new 
combat battalions, plus additional logistic 
and combat support, are now moving to 
South Viet-Nam from this country. They 
will be in place in a few weeks. Their de- 
ployments will bring the total number of 
combat battalions to approximately 15 from 
the United States. 

The total U. S. military strength in South 
Viet-Nam will then approximate 70,000 to 
75,000, of which number about 20,000 will 
be ground combat personnel. 

I will be very happy to take your 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will these be Army 
troops? Will they be coming from the United 
States? What will their mission be? 

A. The question is will the combat battal- 
ions moving into South Viet-Nam be Army 
troops. They will be Army and Marine 
troops, and I am not at liberty to tell you 
the units from which they will come. 

Q. Do you foresee a buildup beyond the 
70,000 to 75,000 man level? 

A. The Secretary of State and I and the 
President have repeatedly said that we will 
do whatever is necessary to achieve our ob- 
jective in South Viet-Nam and we won't do 
more than is necessary. I can only give that 
answer to your question. 

Q. Can you spell out the mission of all of 
the people in Viet-Nam you now classify as 
ground combat personnel? 

A. The mission of our troops is to protect 
the bases on which we have very heavy con- 
centrations of aircraft, helicopters, and U. S. 
personnel and supplies. In addition, if the 
Vietnamese military commanders request 
the assistance of U. S. troops — U. S. combat 
troops — ^because the Vietnamese lack the 
necessary reserves to effectively counter 
Viet Cong attacks. General [William C] 
Westmoreland has authority to send our 
combat troops to the assistance and support 
of the Vietnamese. 

I think you can realize that, if he didn't 
have that authority, a situation could arise 
in which very heavy loss of life could occur 
and in which great advantage could be won 
by the Viet Cong forces. 

Effectiveness of Bombing Raids 

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything 
further for us on the effectiveness of the 
U. S. bombing raids ? 

A. A question frequently arises as to how 
effective are the U. S. bombing raids. Let 
me repeat again to you the objective of 
these raids. 

Our objective is to affect and reduce the 
capability of the North Vietnamese to infil- 
trate men and equipment from North Viet- 
Nam into South Viet-Nam, particularly to 
reduce their ability to infiltrate into Laos 
and through the roads of Laos into South 
Viet-Nam. I think you are familiar with the 
routes they have been using. They come 
from North Viet-Nam across into the Plaines 
des Jarres area south through Laos, back 
into South Viet-Nam, or they come from the 
southern tail of North Viet-Nam into Laos 
and then into South Viet-Nam. 

Into this area in the southern portion of 
South Viet-Nam there are about 23 bridges 
on the main rail and highway lines.^ We 
have destroyed or made impassable 22 of 
those bridges. You have seen some of the 
pictures, I think, previously. I will just re- 
view some of them for you briefly. I 
think you will see some change since you 
last noticed them. 

Here is a bridge at Phuong Can, in this 
area. You can see the span was dropped as a 
result of our bombing attack. The bridge 
was destroyed, in effect. Since that was ac- 
complished, the North Vietnamese, because 
this is a primary road supporting their in- 
filtration routes, have constructed a tem- 
porary bridge across that dropped span. It 
will be necessary to take that out again. We 
have done so in several of the other areas 

' Throughout the news conference, Secretary Mc- 
Namara used maps and photographs to illustrate his 



where they have acted to replace the bomb- 
ing damage. 

Here is another bridge at Dong Hoi in the 
southern portion of North Viet-Nam, again 
on one of the main infiltration routes. You 
see it destroyed in this photograph after our 
bombing raid. You see here the action that 
the North Vietnamese are taking to estab- 
lish ferry slips in order that they may 
again use that road for infiltration. They 
have moved tens of thousands of people into 
this area to repair the bomb damage that 
has been done to the routes of infiltration. 

Here is another railroad bridge. Again you 
can see the span destroyed. 

So the first point I want to make is that 
the rail route and the road routes of infil- 
tration from North Viet-Nam into South 
Viet-Nam have been substantially damaged 
as a result of the bombing. In addition, we 
have attacked their ammunition depots and 
their barracks. Here are a few pictures of 
the bomb damage that has resulted. 

This is a barracks area, a very substantial 
one. You can see in these pictures the near 
complete destruction of certain areas of it. 
In total, about 41 percent of this large Viet- 
namese barracks — North Vietnamese bar- 
racks — was destroyed. 

This is an ammunition depot containing 
about 8 percent of the total ammunition 
stored in the country. You can see here the 
dispersed storage area covering a very wide 
geographic area. Here are the postattack 
photographs showing the destruction of the 
ammunition bunkers. About 21 percent of 
this ammunition storage area was destroyed. 

We are also attacking petroleum targets. 
One of the major targets is at Vinh, which is 
approximately in this area. This was at- 
tacked in August of last year following the 
attack on our destroyers in the Gulf of 
Tonkin. At that time we substantially dam- 
aged the center of this area. Since then the 
Vietnamese have greatly expanded the area, 
adding in this section and this section — you 
can see the new tanks. These are the post- 
attack photographs taken on the 26th of May, 
2 or 3 weeks ago, showing the destruction 
resulting from our bombing attacks. 

Here is another petroleum area at Phu 
Qui. They are expanding their petroleum 
storage in the country. This was a new pe- 
troleum storage depot that was being built. 
We waited until it was nearly completed, 
and shortly before it was in operation de- 
stroyed these tanks, as you can see here. 

As I said, we have attacked the bridges 
to reduce the flow of men and materiel 
over the roads and the railroads. We have 
attacked the ammunition storage depots to 
reduce the amount of equipment they had to 
infiltrate. We have attacked the barracks to 
reduce the number of men they could infil- 
trate. We have also attacked their supply 
depots, of which this is one of the largest at 
Phu Van. Here it is before the attack, and 
here it is afterward, with a tremendous 
amount of destruction as a result. I would 
guess about 60 percent of the area and ca- 
pacity has been destroyed. 

Here is another army supply depot in the 
southern portion of North Viet-Nam. You 
can see it before and after. 

So I think the answer is that the attacks 
have been effective. They haven't stopped 
the flow of men and materiel. They have 
reduced the flow, and they have greatly in- 
creased the cost to the North Vietnamese of 
continuing their efforts to support the in- 
surgency in South Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will these new deploy- 
ments require an additional supplemental 
request beyond the $700 million? 

A. No. 

Q. And will we need additional draft 

A. No, I don't believe that the new de- 
ployments will require any time in the near 
future an additional budget supplement. 
When we presented the budget supplement 
a few weeks ago asking for $700 million to 
be added to the fiscal '65 budget,^ we stated 
it was not possible 14 months in advance to 
predict accurately the total expenditures in 
1966 and we did not wish to foreclose, there- 

" For background, see Bulletin of May 24, 1965, 
p. 816, and June 7, 1965, p. 896. 

JULY 5, 1965 


fore, the possibility of a budget supplement 
sometime during fiscal 1966. 

But in any event, we are not prepared and 
see no requirement for submitting such a 
supplement now. Furthermore, the deploy- 
ment of the troops that I mentioned earlier 
will not affect the draft calls in any way. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if our American forces 
do join the South Vietnamese under the 
conditions that you have outlined in ground 
combat, who will be in charge of the battle- 
field, the deployment plan, the South Viet- 
namese officers or ours ? 

A. The battlefield will be split into seg- 
ments and the South Vietnamese forces will 
operate under their own commanders in one 
segment and U. S. troops under their com- 
mand in support of the Vietnamese forces 
in another segment under the command of 
U. S. officers. 

Morale of South Vietnamese Troops 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the monsoon offensive 
of the Viet Cong has made certain initial 
successes. Could you give us some assess- 
ment of the effect on the morale of the South 
Vietnamese Army and Government, and how 
do you combat it? Can we hold on before our 
reinforcements get there ? 

A. We have said previously that the Viet 
Cong were building up their strength 
throughout 1964. They had built it to a total, 
we believe, by the end of the year, greater 
than they had then deployed in combat, and 
we therefore expected that during 1965 — and 
we so stated publicly — that they would de- 
ploy these additional troops after they had 
been fully trained and fully equipped. 
We assumed that deployment of addi- 
tional Viet Cong troops would take place 
during the monsoon season, which began 
roughly the first of May and which ex- 
tends very roughly through the end of Octo- 
ber, depending upon the latitude and eleva- 
tion of the terrain. Our forecasts proved re- 
markably accurate. 

They did increase the number of troops 
assigned to combat. They did increase the 

number of overt actions. They did increase 
the intensity and level of both their harass- 
ment and their overt actions. In the month 
of May we saw, therefore, a substantial in- 
crease in terror incidents, a substantial in- 
crease in the number of attacks, and a very 
large increase in the number of casualties, 
both to Government forces and to Viet Cong 

The level of casualties absorbed by both 
the Viet Cong and the Government forces 
far exceeds in proportion to the population 
the level of casualties U. S. forces have ever 
absorbed in any war in our history. 

Under these circumstances it is remark- 
able that the morale of the Government 
troops is as good as it is. They're fighting 
well, they are fighting hard, they are fight- 
ing effectively. 

We continue to see increases in their re- 
cruitment. We are continuing to see some in- 
crease in their strength, not as rapidly as we 
would like to see, because the casualty rates 
exceed those estimated at the time the plans 
for expanding the forces were developed. 
But the fact that they can recruit, the fact 
that the men will fight under these very 
heavy strains, I think is indicative of the 
morale in those troops. 

Q. What are the latest figures on deser- 

A. The desertions are running somewhat 
less than last year, but higher than desir- 

Q. Do you not plan at all to have a co- 
ordinated command for the joint use of Viet- 
namese and U.S. troops ? 

A. There would have to be a coordinated 
command both at the field level and at the 
staff level when the troops are operating in 
combat areas adjacent to each other. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you state that the new 
1st Cavalry Division, the new Air Mobile 
Division, will be made combat ready as ex- 
peditiously as possible. Do you foresee little 
use in Viet-Nam? 

A. I don't want to predict future deploy- 



ments of any units beyond those that I 
have announced today on which decisions 
have already been made. We have made no 
decisions affecting other units than those I 
have announced. I do want to say, however, 
that because of the great amount of work 
undertaken by the Army in developing the 
11th Air Assault Division over the past 3 
years, they can quickly convert that into 
the Air Mobile Division, and I believe it 
will be combat ready for deployment, should 
that become necessary, within about 8 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if you say that the ratio 
between antiguerrilla forces and guerrilla 
forces is unfavorable now, what would you 
say would be a favorable ratio? 

A. It is difficult to develop a statistical 
objective here that relates in any way to the 
assumed requirement of a 10-to-l advan- 
tage in favor of the antiguerrilla forces. It 
is difficult because never before has there 
been as much mobility, fire power, and close 
air support brought to bear upon the guer- 
rilla units. 

Therefore I don't want to give you a statis- 
tical answer. I do want to emphasize, how- 
ever, that the Viet Cong strength has in- 
creased to such a degree that it is necessary 
to expand the South Vietnamese forces, that 
even taking account of that expansion, which 
is a very substantial one, that they presently 
have underway, it will be necessary to still 
further add to the mobility, the fire power, 
and the air support which we have been add- 
ing to recently, and beyond that it will be 
necessary to provide combat troops in re- 
serve to take care of the emergency situa- 
tions where Viet Cong in force are about to 
overrun the South Vietnamese forces. 

Under those circumstances our troops will 
be available to come to the assistance of 
the South Vietnamese. 

Q. Where does the Viet Cong get their 
petroleum supplies? 

A. The petroleum supplies for the Viet 
Cong come from several sources, some from 
China over land, some by sea. 

The U.S. Objective in Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot 
of speculation that the United States is em- 
barking on a Korean-type war. Would you 
elucidate what is the overall American 
strategy ? 

A. Well, first let me repeat again our ob- 
jective. The Secretary of State has stated 
this, I have stated it, the President has 
stated it on several occasions, but I think it 
bears repeating because it bears directly on 
the type of deployments we are making and 
the strategy we are following. 

The United States has no designs whatso- 
ever on the territory or the resources of 
Southeast Asia or any country in it. Our na- 
tional interests do not require that we intro- 
duce military bases for our forces in South- 
east Asia. They don't require that the states 
of Southeast Asia become members of West- 
ern military alliances. The ultimate goal of 
our country, therefore, in Southeast Asia is 
to help maintain free and independent na- 
tions there in which the people can develop 
politically, economically, and socially, ac- 
cording to patterns of their own choosing 
and with the objective of becoming respon- 
sible members of the world family of 

That is our objective, that is our only ob- 
jective. We are not seeking to destroy the 
government of the North. We are not seek- 
ing to acquire military bases. We are seek- 
ing to preserve the independence of those 
people to whom we are committed by treaty 
to provide protection. 

Now, with that as our objective, our strat- 
egy is to convince the North Vietnamese 
that their Communist-inspired, directed, and 
supported guerrilla action to overthrow the 
established Government in the South cannot 
be achieved, and then to negotiate for the' 
future peace and security of that country. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the precise 
nature of this war and the way it has es- 
calated, do you and the President personally 
involve yourselves with picking out targets 
beforehand to keep it on a precise way? 

A. I noticed considerable speculation in 

JULY 5, 1965 


the press in the last few days about the role 
played by myself as Secretary of Defense 
and the President and others in civilian de- 
partments of the Government in connection 
with the military operations. I thought yes- 
terday there was a very, very interesting 
article in the New York Times over the 
byline of one of your colleagues, Jack Ray- 
mond. He was reporting an interview he had 
had the day before, I think, with Admiral 

Q. Sharpe. 

A. — Admiral Sharpe, who is Commander 
in Chief of all of our forces in the Pacific. 
Admiral Sharpe, in response to this same 
question, I think, said to Jack Raymond that 
the President and the Secretary of Defense 
had never usurped the role of the military 
commanders, and he went on to say that 
certainly restrictions had been placed upon 
the military commanders and that those 
were perfectly logical, and, to use his words, 
he said the President must consider all 
political and diplomatic ramifications of his 
acts and he is, after all, Commander in Chief 
under our form of government. He then 
ended by this statement, and I quote Ad- 
miral Sharpe's words: "If I were the Presi- 
dent, with his responsibilities, I would do no 

And that is exactly the policy we are fol- 
lowing with respect to military operations. 
The decisions relating to military operations 
are made at the lowest possible echelon, 
taking account of the political ramifications. 

Introduction of North Vietnamese Army Units 

Q. Mr. McNamara, you mentioned eight 
North Vietnamese battalions have moved in. 
Does this amount to a full division, and is 
this an overt invasion of South Viet-Nam? 

A. I said that we had clear evidence of one 
regular North Vietnamese battalion in South 
Viet-Nam and there was a possibility that 
eight additional battalions were there. This 
is not a division in any normal sense of the 
word. The battalions are small in size. But it 
is, I think, an important development. It 

does indicate not that the strength of the 
guerrillas is greater than it would be if a 
comparable number of men other than from 
regular battalions was present — because I 
don't think that is the case — but, rather, 
that the North Vietnamese are having diffi- 
culty recruiting individuals to send down 
into the South as guerrillas and that, there- 
fore, to build up the strength to the level 
they believe required to achieve their end in 
South Viet-Nam they have had to call 
upon their regular army units. 

Q. And the second part: Is this an overt 
invasion from the North? 

A. No, it is further evidence of their infil- 
tration. They haven't been infiltrated as bat- 
talions. They are not uniformed. They are 
continuing to function in many cases as 

Q. Sir, you didn't say ivhere the petro- 
leum for the Viet Cong ivas coming from 
when it comes by sea, and could you say 
whether any of the supplies for the Viet 
Cong or North Vietnamese are coming from 
our allies or from ships owned by our allies ? 

A. I think it is correct to say that some of 
the seaborne commerce coming to North 
Viet-Nam is coming in bottoms chartered 
from nations of the free world. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how much would the 
war have to intensify before some sort of 
mobilization of American industry would be 

A. Mobilization of American industry? 

Q. Yes, sir. 

A. I think that it is difficult for me to 
even estimate the circumstances under 
which that would be required. We have so 
built up our supplies of equipment and ammu- 
nition in recent years that I can't conceive 
of any mobilization of American industry 
being required in connection with the opera- 
tions of South Viet-Nam. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding South Korea, 
what kind of a military contribution do 
you expect from that country ? 



A. The South Koreans presently have 
about 2,000 troops in South Viet-Nam, 
primarily logistical support and engineering 
troops but including some combat units to 
protect those troops. Whether the Vietnam- 
ese Government will request additional 
troops of South Korea and how South Korea 
would respond to that request, I can't 

Q. Mr. Secretary, has the resignation of 
the Quat government affected plans being 
made by the Defense Department to any 
measurable extent? 

A. No, it hasn't, but, needless to say, we 
are all interested in seeing the development 
of stable political institutions in South Viet- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will the increase of 
American forces necessitate a change in the 
command structure, and will the role of 
Ambassador [Maxivell D.I Taylor be in- 
volved in this ? 

A. No, I don't see any need to change 
either the command structure or the role of 
Ambassador Taylor. I do think it may be nec- 
essary to introduce intervening command 
elements, perhaps, between the U. S. field 
forces in South Viet-Nam and the com- 
mander of all forces in South Viet-Nam, all 
U. S. forces, General Westmoreland. We may 
find it necessary to introduce a field force 
headquarters, therefore, at some time in 
the future. 

Q. In that connection, sir, is it possible 
that General Krulak [Lt. Gen. Victor H. 
Krulak"] will move his headquarters from 
Hawaii to Viet-Nam? 

A. No possibility that I am aware of. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an esti- 
mate of how many of the 39,000 infiltrees 
have since become battle casualties? 

A. I can't, other than to say that the 
losses by the Viet Cong have been stagger- 
ingly large for several years. This has been 
one of the reasons why they have had to 
move toward the use of regular North Viet- 

namese army battalions as a source of in- 

Now, I can take only one more question. 
I think we are running out of time. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech yesterday. 
Senator [J. W."] Fulbright advocated a 
holding action that would avoid any escala- 
tion of the action in South Viet-Nam. Is this 
a policy to which you are committed ? 

A. I don't think you correctly quoted 
Senator Fulbright. I think yesterday in his 
speech what he said was that he supported 
the objective of preserving the independence 
of South Viet-Nam and he supported the 
military action required to meet that objec- 
tive. That is our objective. That is our 
military program. 

Thank you very much, ladies and gentle- 

The Press: Thank you. 

An Assessment of the Situation 
in tiie Dominican Republic 

Following is the text of a statement read 
by President Johnson at the opening of a 
news conference at the White House on 
June 17, together with the President's reply 
to a question regarding his assessment of the 
situation in the Dominican Republic. 


White House press release dated June 17 

In the Dominican Republic in the last 2 
days there has been renewed, repeated, and 
heavy firing on the Inter-American Force, in 
ilagrant violation of the cease-fire.i This 
sustained firing has been accepted without 
reply by the inter-American forces for peri- 
ods up to one-half hour, before the neces- 
sary replies were given under the orders of 
General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim and Gen- 

^ For background, see Bulletin of June 21, 1965, 
pp. 989, 992, 1017. 

JULY 5, 1965 


eral Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.] . In 
these actions 3 Americans have lost their 
lives, and 37 more Americans and 5 Brazil- 
ians have been wounded. These unprovoked 
attacks on the Inter-American Force appear 
to have been premeditated by elements which 
seek to prevent the establishment of peace in 
Santo Domingo. Our forces there have no 
other mission, and they will continue to ob- 
serve the same soldierly restraint they have 
shown for 7 weeks in the face of more than 
900 cease-fire violations, and they have al- 
ready suffered almost 200 casualties. 


In the Dominican Republic forces moved 
in and overthrew the government, and while 
I am not passing on the merits of the actions 
that take place many times in many places, 
where they change governments — and we be- 
lieve in change of conditions, and we are try- 
ing to obtain them through the Alliance for 
Progress — but in this particular instance, a 
fact that has been emphasized all too little, 
I think, some 1,500 innocent people were 
murdered and shot, and their heads cut off, 
and six Latin American embassies were vio- 
lated and fired upon over a period of 4 days 
before we went in. 

As we talked to our Ambassador to con- 
firm the horror and tragedy and the unbe- 
lievable fact that they were firing on 
Americans and the American Embassy, he 
was talking to us from under a desk while 
bullets were going through his windows, and 
he had a thousand American men, women, 
and children assembled in the hotel who 
were pleading with their President for help 
to preserve their lives. 

We didn't start that. We didn't intervene. 
We didn't kill anyone. We didn't violate any 
embassies. We were not the perpetrators. But 
after we saw what had happened we took 
the necessary precautions. As I have said so 
often and as I repeat again, we do not want 
to bury anyone and we don't intend to, but we 
are not going to be buried ourselves. And as 
we had to go into the Congo to preserve the 
lives of American citizens and haul them out 

when they were being shot at, we went into 
the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives 
of American citizens and citizens of a good 
many other nations — 46 to be exact, 46 na- 
tions. While some of the nations were de- 
nouncing us for going in there, their people 
were begging us to protect them. And the 
American Marines protected them. Twenty 
died. We removed 5,600 people from 46 na- 
tions, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing it. 
But we had 20 of our boys killed by the reb- 
els, who fired first and who tried to keep us 
from evacuating these people. We estab- 
lished a peace zone. 

We had only two purposes there. One, to 
get an inter-American force in there to 
bring about a cease-fire and preserve peace, 
that is all. We are not after their money or 
after their philosophy or trying to dominate 
them. We said that. And we tried our best 
to get them there as quick as we could, and 
we finally got them, and General Alvim is 
doing an excellent job under great difficul- 

Yesterday I saw one of his cables, and it 
was 23 minutes after they started shooting 
before he replied. I don't know how many 
of you are anxious to stand up and be shot at 
by tommyguns, and you ask a lot of these 
boys to do that. That is the first thing. 

The second was to have a government 
broadly based to be acceptable to the people 
of the Dominican Republic. We are not 
pointing, we are not matching a computer 
and saying here is what the government 
will be. We asked Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy, 
Mr. [Cyrus R.] Vance, Mr. [John Bart- 
low] Martin, Mr. [Jack H.] Vaughn, and 
everyone we knew to talk to the extreme 
elements — some to talk to the other side, 
some to the loyalists, the rebels — hoping 
we could have a cease-fire until we could 
have a broadly based government, and un- 
til the OAS [Organization of American 
States] could give help, counsel, and media- 

They have appointed a very fine com- 
mittee. They appointed the best men they 
could find, and they are there talking to every 
group, going all over the land. They are 



making progress, and we hope that the OAS 
will have a recommendation on the political 
matter like they did on the military matter. 
We don't want it to be unilateral. We much 
prefer that the forces of all nations go in to 
save people of 46 nations. But it is taking 
us 7 weeks to get the two things we have 
done up to now and haven't got the final 
answer yet. 

We first had a committee appointed, then 

a man, then another committee appointed 
from the OAS, and we are proud of what 
the OAS is doing, but it is not a matter that 
can save lives. As a matter of fact, we land- 
ed our people in less than one hour from 
the time the decision was made. It was a 
decision we considered from Saturday until 
Wednesday evening. But once we made it, in 
the neighborhood of 6:00 or 6:30 that even- 
ing, they landed within one hour. But they 
didn't save 1,500 lives. 

Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy 

by W. W. Rostow 

Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^ 

On an occasion of this kind it may be ap- 
propriate for a State Department planner 
to consider with you certain of the funda- 
mentals of our foreign policy and what in 
our national experience has shaped them. 

I had the great privilege recently of 
spending 9 days and nights in Japan dis- 
cussing our foreign policy with the leaders 
of almost every important group in Jap- 
anese society. One always learns from dis- 
cussions of this kind, either at home or 

As I talked with our Japanese friends, it 
became increasingly clear how deeply our 
postwar foreign policy has been shaped by 
the memory of our failures between the 
First and Second World Wars. (I concluded, 
incidentally, that Japanese attitudes toward 
foreign policy are also strongly shaped by 
their interwar experiences, notably their 
experience under military dictatorship in the 

After the First World War we failed to 

'■ Address made at commencement exercises at the 
University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla., on June 8 
(press release 142). 

join the League of Nations. We failed to 
give France security guarantees on the con- 
tinent of Europe. We failed to maintain our 
armed forces. We withdrew into a transient 

A good many Americans looked back on 
the First World War as a no doubt well- 
meant but inappropriate intervention be- 
yond our shores. We sought peace, but we 
sought it mainly by proclaiming its desir- 
ability — an attitude symbolized by the Kel- 
logg-Briand Pact. 

When the peace was challenged by the 
Japanese attack in Manchuria in 1931, we 
did nothing. When in 1936 Hitler moved in 
the Rhineland, testing the strength and 
will of the West, we did nothing. President 
Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to arouse the 
country to the danger of Hitler — notably 
in his famous "quarantine" speech of 1937 
— failed to gather adequate public support. 
The Congress fought off every effort to 
strengthen our military and diplomatic pos- 
ture in the face of growing danger in Eu- 
rope and Asia. Only with the fall of France 
did public opinion shift. 

JULY 5, 1965 


In the spring of 1940 opinion polls indi- 
cated, as they had for some time, that two- 
thirds of the American public believed it 
was more important to keep out of war than 
to aid Britain; by September less than half 
of the American public held this view; and 
by January 1941, 70 percent were prepared 
to aid Britain at the risk of war. Thus we 
came to recognize our vital interests late, in 
the midst of a dangerous war, and only 
after our friends were hard pressed or over- 

The capacity of the West to deal with the 
threatening events of the 1930's was com- 
plicated, of course, by the world depression 
which we did not prevent and which we and 
our friends managed badly. 

As a result of our whole performance in 
the generation after 1918, we had to fight 
a war that was almost certainly prevent- 
able. It yielded the terrible harvest we all 
know. As a nation we tend to agree with 
Winston Churchill's judgment that the Sec- 
ond World War was unnecessary; and we 
are intent on preventing a third world war, 
if it lies within our power to do so. 

Three Conditions for Peace 

Out of the interwar experience what we 
learned can be summarized, I believe, in 
terms of three conditions for peace. 

First, peace requires that aggression not 
pay. At every critical moment in the post- 
war years, from the Truman Doctrine for- 
ward, those responsible for the Nation's 
foreign policy have recalled our failure to 
act soon enough in the face of aggression 
during the 1930's. Deep within us is the 
judgment that a failure to deal with limited 
aggression produces not peace but a larger 
war in a not very distant future. 

Second, we learned that peace requires 
institutions and peacekeeping machinery 
capable of insuring that international agree- 
ments are kept once they are made and that 
the peace is not violated. 

In a way that baffled Churchill and 
Stalin, President Roosevelt, in his wartime 
negotiations, appeared obsessed with the 

future role of the United Nations. He had 
been, after all, the defeated candidate for 
the Vice Presidency in 1920, when the last 
hope for United States entry into the League 
was lost. He gave the greatest attention to 
building a political base at home which 
would guarantee that, this time, we would 
not fail to join the international peacekeep- 
ing organization. 

The third lesson we learned was that 
peace requires us to work with others to re- 
move the underlying causes of economic, 
political, and social instability which at- 
tract and hearten ambitious aggressors, 
while distracting and rendering vulnerable 
their potential victims. 

These are the three lessons, I believe, of 
our costly failures of the interwar years. 

These are the touchstones we still bring 
to the central task of contemporary foreign 

Task of Contemporary Foreign Policy 

How shall that task be defined ? 

That task is no less than building — day 
by day, brick by brick — a peaceful world 
community which would live by the rules 
laid down in the United Nations Charter. 

Since 1914 we have not had an orderly 
international community. We have lived for 
a half century in an environment of war 
and the danger of war, latterly with a nu- 
clear sword of Damocles over our heads. 

How have we pursued this objective of a 
peaceful world community? 

We began, of course, with high hopes 
that the United Nations could immediately 
achieve the objective. We dismantled our 
armed forces unilaterally. We laid before the 
United Nations an imaginative proposal for 
placing atomic energy under effective in- 
ternational control. 

It was Stalin who destroyed this simple, 
hopeful vision. He rejected the Baruch pro- 
posal for international control of atomic en- 
ergy and proclaimed to the world, in his 
famous speech of February 1946, that he 
judged the postwar years an interval of op- 
portunity for the expansion of communism. 



Although the cold war had earlier anteced- 
ents, that speech was an important bench- 

But it was only a year later, with the 
British inability to continue its support of 
Greece and Turkey against Moscow's pres- 
sure, that we were drawn fully back into 
the world — this time to meet aggression at 
an early rather than a late stage. 

In the period of almost 20 years that has 
followed the Truman Doctrine we have 
been engaged, almost without respite, in 
dealing with one form or another of Com- 
munist aggression — in Greece and Turkey, 
in Western Europe, twice in Berlin, in 
Korea, at Quemoy and Matsu, in Southeast 
Asia, in the Caribbean, and at many other 

Nevertheless, what I would like to make 
clear today is that we have never regarded 
the containment of aggression as a sufficient 
objective. The larger vision — of moving to- 
ward a world community at peace — has not 
changed. We have done more and we are now 
doing more than merely fending off various 
kinds of Communist efforts at expansion. 

We have been trying to meet all three of 
the conditions for peace where we can, while 
drawing those countries which now are 
ruled by Communist regimes into peaceful 
relations with us and others as fast as op- 
portunity may offer. 

The Atlantic Community 

In Europe and the Atlantic, for example, 
we first had to make sure that aggression 
did not succeed in a Western and Southern 
Europe weakened by war ; but that was only 
the beginning of our task. 

In NATO we have built an elaborate po- 
litical and military institution capable of in- 
suring an environment of stability through- 
out the area; and within that framework, 
in the Marshall Plan and afterward, we have 
maintained remarkable economic, political, 
and social stability in a critical part of the 
world community. More than that, through 
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development] we have been 
moving with the Atlantic community and 

Japan toward concert in monetary, trade, 
and aid policies. These quiet efforts have 
made a major contribution toward creating 
an environment of progress and hope in 
many parts of the world. 

The Atlantic agenda of unsolved problems 
is long, as President Johnson made clear in 
his speech of May 7 on the 20th anniversary 
of V-E Day. ^ But, if you compare what we 
have done with Western Europe and Japan 
in the 20 years after the Second World War 
with the course of events in the generation 
after 1918, the scale of our common achieve- 
ment can be perceived. We still face, for 
example, major unsolved problems with re- 
spect to the handling of international fi- 
nance and monetary reserves ; but if we had 
had in 1929 the kind of intimate day-to-day 
collaboration among the central bankers and 
monetary authorities that we now have, 
there is little doubt that much of the cata- 
strophic world depression after 1929 could 
have been avoided. 

Latin America, Asia, and Africa 

In this hemisphere, also, we have moved 
in terms of the three conditions for peace. 

We have worked — as we are working 
every day — to insure that aggression in 
this hemisphere does not pay, whether it 
takes the form of the installation of Soviet 
missiles in Cuba or indirect aggression. 

We are gradually building institutions for 
peacekeeping within the inter- American sys- 
tem capable of insuring that international 
agreements are kept and the peace is not 

Above all, in the Alliance for Progress we 
are in the midst of a great adventure, work- 
ing shoulder to shoulder with our Latin 
American friends to remove the underlying 
causes of political, social, and economic in- 
stability in that region. 

In Asia we face a region which lacks, at 
this stage in its history, the underlying sense 
of community and communal destiny that 
exists in Western Europe and Latin America. 

• Bulletin of May 24, 1965, p. 790. 

JULY 5, 1965 


Our security commitments in Asia were not 
undertaken on a regional basis but in re- 
sponse to a series of particular circum- 
stances where U.S. power and our guaran- 
tee alone could fill dangerous vacuums into 
which the Communists evidently intended 
to move. The Japanese security treaty fol- 
lowed upon our occupation responsibilities; 
our present ties with South Korea resulted 
from the North Korean aggression of 1950 
and the United Nations decision to resist 
that aggression ; our commitments in South- 
east Asia arose from the withdrawal of 
the French presence and commitment and 
were formalized in the Manila Pact as well 
as the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962. 

Nevertheless, our basic policy in Asia is 
also designed to fulfill the three conditions 
for peace. 

We are now engaged in Viet-Nam in an 
effort to demonstrate that the particular 
form of aggression being practiced there by 
Hanoi will not pay. The peacekeeping ma- 
chinery created by the Geneva accords of 
1954 and 1962 has obviously proved inade- 
quate; and we are looking toward the day 
when more effective peacekeeping machin- 
ery might insure in that region that interna- 
tional agreements are kept in the future. 

Finally, moving beyond our bilateral as- 
sistance programs, President Johnson, in his 
Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965,* 
gave new impetus to economic and social 
development in Asia, this time encouraging 
the strengthening and creation of regional 
development institutions. 

In Africa we acquired in the postwar 
years less direct responsibilities than in 
Eui-ope, Latin America, and Asia. That 
continent does not border the Communist 
world. It is, nevertheless, like most regions 
in the revolutionary transition to moderniza- 
tion, vulnerable to intrusion, subversion, 
and guerrilla warfare. These vulnerabilities 
are the object of systematic exploitation by 
Communists, and we have been called on to 
play our part to avoid the danger of indi- 
rect aggression in that area. 

We observe with interest and respect the 
efforts of the Organization of African Unity 
to develop the capacity to handle regional 
disputes, as was done in the conflicts be- 
tween Somali and Ethiopia, Morocco and 
Algeria. And, as Secretary Rusk indicated 
in his testimony of March 9 * on this year's 
foreign aid bill before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, we believe that re- 
gional institutions, such as the United Na- 
tions Economic Conunission for Africa and 
the African Development Bank, may well be 
helpful in the long, slow process of creating 
in Africa the underlying conditions for 
economic and social progress and political 

In short, despite the understandable focus- 
ing of public attention on the crises which 
stem from the Communist compulsion to ex- 
tend their power where weaknesses in the 
non-Communist world appear to permit, we 
have remained true to our vision of what the 
building of peace requires. Quiet, creative 
work goes forward in all those regions of the 
world where we have the opportunity to act 
constructively with others. 

Soviet Union and Communist China 

What about peace with the Soviet Union 
and, indeed, with Communist China? 

With respect to the Soviet Union, the 
making of a stable peace centers, of course, 
on the related issues of German unity and 
arms control arrangements backed by effec- 
tive international inspection. A divided 
Germany and a divided Europe cannot be 
the foundations for a peaceful world com- 
munity; but the ending of that division re- 
quires security arrangements judged reliable 
by East and West alike. 

We do not despair of achieving this re- 
sult by peaceful means. It is, in fact, a major 
object of our policy. But it may well take 
some time before those responsible for pol- 
icy in Moscow perceive that it is in their in- 
terest to protect the legitimate security in- 
terests of the Soviet Union, not by a tense 
confrontation in the middle of Europe, not 

•Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

' Ibid., Apr. 5, 1965, p. 482. 



by a fragile empire of uncertain satellites, 
but by a solid European security agreement 
and by granting to the German people the 
right of political self-determination. 

In the meanwhile we shall work to find 
more limited areas of agreement, helping in 
particular to bring the nations of Eastern 
Europe into a more normal and natural 
relationship to Western Europe and the 
rest of the world. 

With respect to Communist China, our 
ultimate objectives are no less pacific; 
but the issues obstructing peaceful relations 
are also no less difficult and precise. 

The Chinese Communists have not for- 
sworn the use of force in the Formosa 
Straits. They aim to take over an island 
which, through a mutual security agree- 
ment, we are committed to protect and 
which we intend to protect. 

Moreover, the men in Peiping are openly 
encouraging aggression through subversion 
and guerrilla warfare conducted across in- 
ternational frontiers in Southeast Asia and 

These positions they proclaim in public; 
and they assert them, with equal force, to 
us when we talk bilaterally in Warsaw. 

As Secretary Rusk has often said, the 
problem of peace with Communist China 
hinges on Peiping's decision to leave its 
neighbors alone. 

One cannot, therefore, promise a quick 
and definitive resolution of the issues which 
define the cold war and obstruct the build- 
ing of a peaceful world community. On the 
other hand, there is no reason to abandon 
hope or cease to pursue this large objective. 
A generation's labor by free men has pro- 
duced remarkable results in advancing each 
of the three conditions for peace. 

In working with others in many parts of 
the world, we have successfully met a wide 
range of aggressions: from nuclear black- 
mail to guerrilla warfare; from the march- 
ing of conventional forces across interna- 
tional frontiers, as in Korea, to the blockade 
of Berlin. Working with those who wish to 
maintain their independence and who un- 
derstand the mortal danger of permitting 
aggression to pay, in any form, at any place, 

we command the capacity in the interna- 
tional community to continue to frustrate 
aggressive probes against us. 

And, leaving aggression aside, it is clear 
from the historical test of this generation 
that we have nothing to fear from commu- 
nism in peaceful competition. Whether meas- 
ured in terms of economic growth, social 
justice, human freedom and creativeness, 
free men and free societies can evidently 
do more for the human race than Communist 

Second, while the international peacekeep- 
ing machinery we have created thus far is 
clearly inadequate and must be built further 
in many directions and places, the world 
community has shown a remarkable capac- 
ity to face the hard facts of interdependence 
and to create institutions which build on 
those facts — in the Atlantic world, in this 
hemisphere, and now increasingly in Africa 
and in Asia. 

Although the United Nations was, of 
course, diminished by Stalin's decision in 
1946 to initiate the cold war, and although 
it is now going through a difficult passage, 
it has performed and is performing many 
vital services. In the Middle East, in Cyprus, 
in the Congo, in Kashmir, it has helped to 
damp regional conflicts which might other- 
wise have expanded dangerously. In Korea it 
made clear the will of the international 
community to resist overt aggression with 
conventional forces. The four regional eco- 
nomic commissions of the United Nations 
go about their work steadily and may in the 
future play an even more vital role in Africa 
and in Asia as regional development pro- 
grams take hold. The Alliance for Progress 
has enlarged the opportunities for creative 
action by the Economic Commission for 
Latin America; and the President's Balti- 
more initiative has already brought about 
an acceleration of the initiatives of the Eco- 
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far 
East, in the Mekong Valley, and with respect 
to the Asian Development Bank. With the 
widening of relations between Eastern and 
Western Europe, the useful role of the Eco- 
nomic Commission for Europe in Geneva 
may also expand. And beyond these regional 

JULY 5, 1965 


functions, the United Nations must evi- 
dently remain a central part of the archi- 
tecture which, in the end, a peaceful world 
community will require. 

Lessons of Dominican and Viet-Nam Crises 

In discussing with you the approach to 
peace which underlies our foreign policy, I 
would not wish to ignore the reality of the 
crises in the Dominican Republic and in 
Viet-Nam. It may be useful to look at these 
difficult problems, however, not merely as 
isolated and dangerous clashes, involving the 
use of United States military force overseas, 
but in terms of the long, laborious job of 

As I say, deep in our experience is the 
judgment that there will be no peace to make 
if aggression in any form is permitted to 

In Southeast Asia we face an explicit 
and thoroughly professional form of aggres- 
sion concerning which the Communist par- 
ties of the world have debated for many 
years. What they debate, however, is not the 
legitimacy of what they call "wars of na- 
tional liberation." They assume their right to 
conduct such aggression. They debate only 
the appropriate degree of risk Communists 
should take in pressing against us by sub- 
version and guerrilla warfare. To them these 
techniques of subversion and guerrilla war- 
fare and the effort by a disciplined Com- 
munist minority to seize from within an 
inherently revolutionary situation are just 
as real mechanisms for the expansion of 
Communist power as the marching of troops 
across frontiers or the launching of missiles. 

Behind what may appear to be civil con- 
flict in South Viet-Nam and the chaos in 
Santo Domingo a few weeks ago are cool, 
disciplined, and purposeful men and a strat- 
egy and tactics matured from long experi- 
ence and debate. 

In meeting such indirect aggression, how- 
ever, we have not lost sight of the second 
and third conditions for peace. As President 
Johnson pointed out in his speech at Baylor 
on May 28,^ the community of nations and 

• Ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 989. 

people in this hemisphere are moving to re- 
spond to the crisis in the Dominican Repub- 
lic by refining and enlarging our common 
institutions; and, as I noted earlier, peace 
in Southeast Asia will also require on the 
part of the world community improved 
peacekeeping institutions. 

Moreover, in both areas these crises have 
heightened our determination to press for- 
ward with those constructive ventures in 
economic and social development which alone 
can help move transitional nations from 
their present state of vulnerability to in- 
direct aggression toward that modern and 
confident nationhood on which their long- 
run independence must rest. 

Architecture of Peacemaking 

Looked at in this way — in terms of the 
three conditions for peace — peacemaking is, 
indeed, the central task of our foreign 
policy. We have worked at it for a generation. 
We have made progress. There is, however, 
another generation's work ahead. 

But the scale of the task and its slow, 
laborious pace should be no cause for dis- 
couragement. We are engaged in an enor- 
mous piece of international architecture, 
which the United States is in no position, 
by itself, to impose on the world. Increas- 
ingly, responsibility must be taken by oth- 
ers, as they generate the resources, the 
political and social stability to share the 
burdens, and as their proper and under- 
standable pride moves them from depend- 
ence upon the United States to relations of 
dignified interdependence. 

Nevertheless, success in the generation 
ahead will continue to depend upon the 
strength and will and dedication of the 
United States and of Americans. There is no 
substitute for American military power in 
the protection of freedom now in existence 
or in sight. We still command the critical 
margin of economic resources for the devel- 
opment of other nations. We remain ines- 
capably the greatest single power on earth; 
and that power is evident and real and felt 
by others whether we act or fail to act. 

But more is required of us than the en- 



gagement of our military and economic re- 
sources. Peacemaking requires that we con- 
tinue to evoke out of our history and ex- 
perience the best qualities that are in us — 
the commitments made at our birth as a na- 
tion to the equality of men before God and 
the law; the sense of human fellowship 
which suffuses equally our military advisers 
in the countryside of Viet-Nam and our 
Peace Corpsmen working in the Andes; our 

genius for building and making work insti- 
tutions for common action based on the ac- 
ceptance of diversity; and, above all, the 
commitment to persevere in building, no 
matter how long it may take, a world com- 
munity in which men and nations can live at 

No less is required of us for the safety of 
the Nation and the continuity of civilized 
life on this small planet. 

Building a Decent World Order 

Address by Secretary Rusk ^ 

It is a very happy occasion indeed for me 
to be with you this morning. My remarks 
will not be too long because I am looking for- 
ward to meeting and chatting with you at 
our reception this evening. The simultaneous 
interpretation equipment you are using 
reminds me of an incident at the United 
Nations. In the early days at Lake Success, 
our equipment had seven channels. One was 
for the speaker, five were for the five working 
languages, and the seventh was for soft 
music. Finally, someone lost his sense of 
humor and eliminated the seventh channel. 

It is my very great privilege to bring to 
you the following message from President 
Johnson : 

To the International Congress of Publishers, I 
offer my greetings. 

In our exploding world of knowledge, the publisher 
has a critical mission: to choose skillfully and to 
present effectively what man must communciate to 
his fellow man. Understanding is no longer simply 
an essential for progress; it is a necessity for 
survival. Your responsibilities — and your oppor- 
tunities — are greater today than ever before. 

All of us want a world in which men are free to 

'- Made before the International Congfress of Pub- 
lishers at Washington, D.C., on June 5. 

read and free to exchange ideas — across a class- 
room, across a continent, or across an ocean. All 
of us want a world in which literate men are a 
majority and not a minority, a world in which men 
are slaves neither to tyrants nor to ignorance. 

I salute you for your efforts to achieve such a 
world. And I wish you a future of ever-increasing 

The Threads Binding People Together 

In the world of today international rela- 
tions are no longer exclusively, nor even 
primarily, relations among governments. In 
open societies international relations have 
become increasingly relations among people 
as individuals and in voluntary associations. 
These relations comprise the great interna- 
tional communities of science and the arts, 
scholarship, the exchanges of students and 
teachers, of international communications 
and broadcasting, the distribution of periodi- 
cals, newspapers, and books, international 
contacts in music and sports, international 
trade and commerce, nongovernmental con- 
ferences such as this, and of the coming and 
going of tourists. These day-by-day activ- 
ities. Dr. Raymond Fosdick used to say, help 
to spin the threads that bind people together. 

JULY 5, 1965 


On the governmental level — on every 
working day of the year — the U.S. Govern- 
ment is attending 15 to 20 intergovern- 
mental meetings throughout the world on 
such subjects as international seed testing, 
United Nations Trusteeship Council, disar- 
mament committees, FAO meetings on coco- 
nuts and coconut products, hog cholera, Afri- 
can swine fever, the standardization of 
prunes, and the carriage of dangerous goods 
by sea. This vast work of the day-to-day 
business of mankind seems to me to be one of 
the most encouraging, stimulating, and hope- 
ful events of our times. Wilfred Jenks cited 
this common law of mankind — where in spite 
of national frontiers and despite storms 
which stir the surface of the world and the 
ideological differences which divide us, men 
and women are busy at their own tasks and 
getting on with the great business of the 
race. It is our hope that in time, and not too 
slowly, this great hidden substructure of in- 
ternational cooperation can build such 
strength that it can begin to lay its hands 
upon the feverish issues of violent contro- 
versy and make a massive contribution to the 
establishment of peace. 

In our generation, where we have seen al- 
most miraculous technological development 
in communications, the book remains the 
world's chief repository of its intellectual 
heritage and there is a vastly expanded need 
for the printed word. In the context of the 
vast ideological and geographical distances 
which divide us, the theme of this Congress, 
"The World and the Book — Publishing in an 
Age of Change," has special significance. I 
would just emphasize one point — the respon- 
sibility of economically advanced people to 
provide books for those who do not have them 
or do not have as many as they need. The 
educational explosion around the world de- 
mands books. Economic development de- 
mands books. Social progress demands books. 
We should join together in a greater effort, 
during this International Cooperation Year, 
to bring textbooks to the student, readers to 
the newly literate, the latest works of science 
and medicine to members of those professions 
in the developing countries. No one country 

can fill this need. There is much to be done, 
even though resources are limited. 

The Florence Agreement 

Government and the private sector each 
has a role. The field of copyright is ob- 
viously in the field of government, as is 
the lowering of tariff barriers. In this con- 
nection I would like to mention the Florence 
Agreement, the agreement on the importa- 
tion of educational, scientific, and cultural 
materials.- The United States firmly be- 
lieves in the basic purpose of this conven- 
tion, which is to improve international un- 
derstanding by reducing trade barriers to 
knowledge. We participated in drafting it. 
In 1960 the United States Senate gave its 
advice and consent to ratification. But actual 
ratification had to await implementing 
legislation. Unfortunately, we ran into some 
complications which delayed the drafting of 
the actual bill. I understand that the most 
difficult problems have since been worked 
out, and a bill [H.R. 8664] was intro- 
duced into Congress on Tuesday [June 1] of 
this week. The President has given it his 

In the letter which he sent to both Houses 
of Congress,^ he pointed out the benefits 
this legislation would bring to schools and 
universities, science laboratories and re- 
search foundations, libraries, art galleries 
and museums. He said that the fullest free- 
dom of access to the culture of other na- 
tions is the hallmark of an open society. Ac- 
tion now rests with the Congress. We are 
encouraged to believe that Congress will 
agree with the President and act at this 
session on this important matter. 

Main Themes of American Foreign Policy 

I want to conclude my brief remarks with 
a few comments on the foreign policy of the 
American people. 

' For background and text of agreement, see 
BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422, and Feb. 16, 1960, 
p. 261. 

" For a statement by the President on June 1 and 
text of his letter, see ihid., June 21, 1965, p. 1015. 



The main themes of our foreign policy 
are relatively simple. Some may even call 
them naive. We are living in a world of as- 
tonishing change. We have relations with 115 
countries. During the last calendar year 
there were more than 50 elections and 
changes of government, and at least 12 or 
15 of those changes were unscheduled. So 
we must accept, in this complex world com- 
munity, that for as long as we can see into 
the future we are going to be confronted 
with the phenomenon of change. 

In reflecting upon that circumstance. Gen- 
eral Omar Bradley, a great general as well 
as a wise civilian, remarks that we must 
chart our course by the light of the distant 
stars rather than by the lights of every pass- 
ing ship. I would like to mention one or two 
of those distant stars which will help you 
to organize your thinking of what the 
United States is all about. 

A pillar of foreign policy for us is the no- 
tion articulated by Thomas Jefferson that 
governments derive their just powers from 
the consent of the governed. Some of the 
erudite have found philosophical weakness in 
that proposition, but it just happens that 
the American people believe it and are 
deeply dedicated to the notion. And that ex- 
plains why we have welcomed the emergence 
of the new nations of Asia and Africa to 
national independence; why we have wel- 
comed and encouraged the doubling of the 
membership in the United Nations; why 
we have the strongest attachment to the oth- 
er democracies; and why we are so deeply 
concerned about the withholding of freedom 
outside our borders, and why we are act- 
ing, even belatedly, to remove the barriers 
to freedom within our own society. 

Beyond that, I would call your attention 
to the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the 
United Nations Charter. In all sincerity, I 
would propose those as a succinct summary 
of the foreign policy attitudes of the Amer- 
ican people. It is no accident that this should 
be so. We took an important part in draft- 
ing that charter when men and women were 
dying in the second great world war of this 
century. We and others sat down to draft 

that charter when we were thinking 
long and hard and deeply and soberly about 
the kind of a world it was in which we 
wished to live. And so, in a few paragraphs, 
we sketched out such a world — a world of in- 
dependent nations, each with their own in- 
stitutions, settling their disputes by peace- 
ful means, banding together to resist aggres- 
sion, striving to establish a rule of law. 

Now these, in summary, were the lessons 
we drew from World War II. How urgent it 
is for us to remember that we shall not have 
that chance again ! We shall not have a chance 
to draw lessons from world war III in order 
to devise a decent world order. For those 
lessons must be learned before that war oc- 
curs, and therefore our attachment to these 
elementary principles of the charter is very 
deep indeed. 

Exploring the Possibilities of Peace 

In this postwar period the American 
people have been called upon to shoulder very 
heavy burdens — over $100 billion in direct 
assistance for reconstruction and economic 
and social development of those beyond our 
frontiers; massive defense budgets, calling 
on our people for resources they would much 
prefer to use for other purposes, if some- 
how we could establish peace in the world. 
Few people realize that since World War II 
the American people have been called upon 
to sustain 160,000 casualties in the defense 
of the safety and independence of other 
countries, particularly smaller countries in 
distant parts of the world. This has not 
come about through desire for a single acre 
of land or any desire for the surrender of 
anyone to anybody. It has come about 
through the simple notion that, unless there 
can come into being a decent world order in 
which nations leave their neighbors alone, it 
is hard to see how man can avoid catastrophe. 

In that effort many of you in this room 
have been involved. I think when you worry 
about distant problems where violence is pres- 
ent, when you are concerned about how far 
these explosive situations may develop — • 
whether you are yourselves directly involved 

JULY 5, 1965 


or not — when you ponder what is in the 
minds of those who have to take direct part 
in those situations, you should pause to re- 
flect upon the sources of the violence in 
this postwar period: for example, the ef-. 
forts of the Soviet Union to retain its troops 
in Iran, the guerrillas who crossed the 
northern frontiers of Greece, the stoppage of 
access to Berlin in the first Berlin block- 
ade, the organized divisions that crossed 
the demarcation line in Korea, the mas- 
sive effort to establish offensive missiles 
in Cuba, the tens of thousands of guerrillas 
and the tons of arms that have moved 
across the demarcation line from North to 
South Viet-Nam. These have been difficult 
experiences. They have been costly to the 
countries directly concerned. They have been 
costly to the American people. But we can see 
no alternative but to continue with the at- 
tempt to establish, support, and strengthen 
a decent world order. 

We believe that the integrity of the Amer- 
ican commitment in that matter is fundamen- 
tal to the maintenance of the peace of the 
world right around the globe and not just in 
some distant point. So the doors for discus- 
sion, negotiation, peacemaking, and settle- 
ment are always open — as far as Southeast 
Asia is concerned through 4 years or more 
of bilateral discussions with the principal 
capitals concerned, through efforts in the 
United Nations, through the use of the ma- 
chinery of the 1954 and 1962 agreements on 
Southeast Asia, through proposals made by 
such distinguished statesmen as President 
Radhakrishnan of India, and the attempts to 
organize conferences of the interested 
powers to review the total situation, through 
offers of unconditional discussion, through 
pauses in the military action itself, and in 
attempts, in whatever way, to explore the 
possibilities of peace. 

But peace requires two to make it. And 
if we are to have a decent world order, we 
must make it quite clear that aggression can- 
not succeed. For surely we have learned that 
successful aggression breeds further aggres- 
sion. And at the end of that trail lies a world 
that no one, in his wildest dreams, believes 

man can accept or even survive. And so we 
shall persist in our efforts to build a peace 
and in our belief that nations large and small 
have a right to live without molestation from 
their neighbors. We shall persist in our ef- 
forts to build a structure of international law 
for the peaceful settlement of disputes. And 
we think that in doing so our purposes will be 
steadily better understood and that there will 
be men and women in all parts of the earth 
who will join us in hoping for that day of 
peace which man can dream about and which "" 
is now an essential requirement for his sheer 

U.S. Interest in Free Trade 
and Peaceful Commerce 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

It has been said that traveling makes men 
wiser but less happy. I hope you return to 
Iowa after your trade mission both wiser 
and happier. Having bought a few Iowa hogs 
myself, I have full respect for your trading 

As long as we have been a nation, peace, 
commerce, and honest friendship with all 
nations have been our aims — as Thomas 
Jefferson once said. Those are still our 
aims — and will be always. 

In this world, in these times, America 
seeks no domination over foes, no domina- 
tion over friends. There is no war we want 
to fight, except to join with other nations 
to war on war itself. When you are in 
Europe, visiting the cities and the peoples 
there, I hope you will each speak from your 
own hearts to convey to them how deeply 
runs the commitment of Americans to 
peace for all mankind. 

America is a land of many interests 
around the world, for our cause is the cause 
of all mankind. But the peoples of the 
lands you will visit are ever close to our 
hearts, bound there by blood and beliefs 
forever. So, also, the heart of America's 

^ Made to the Iowa Trade Mission at the White 
House on June 9 (White House press release). 



purposes and policies is concerned with the 
strength, the safety, the stability, and the 
greater success of the Atlantic lands and 

In Europe — and in America, too — there 
are now, as there are always, those who 
would divide us and set us against one 
another. Such efforts have never suc- 
ceeded, and they will not succeed now. 

This nation, this Government, this ad- 
ministration, have no foes in the capitals 
of the free world. We have no feuds to 
follow, no vendettas to vindicate, no pro- 
found differences to pursue or prolong. We 
seek only — and always — to fashion with 
our friends in Europe and other free lands 
stronger supports for the security that 
keeps the peace and the progress that 
promises prosperity. 

Central to our purposes with Europe — • 
and all the world — is our desire to foster 
increasingly free trade and peaceful com- 
merce. You residents of Iowa know the value 
of trade. You know what trade means to 
Iowa farmers, what it means to Iowa manu- 
facturers, what it means to more than 100,- 

000 jobholders in your State. 

Last year our exports reached the record 
level of $25.2 billion — 30 percent above the 
level in 1960. Agricultural exports of the 
United States rose 14 percent in the last 
calendar year — to $6.3 billion. Foreign mar- 
kets took the output of 1 out of 4 acres of 
American farmland. 

Free trade is both sensible economics and 
sane politics. And I believe we must move 
together in that direction. 

Old obstacles are obvious. Old myths are 
many. But the time has come when all 
nations must think far beyond the thinking 
they have done before. If the people of the 
world are to raise up their incomes, step up 
their growth, and lift up the standards by 
which men live, this is essential. 

In our increasingly interdependent world 
there is no room for the restrictiveness 
that leads to counterrestriction and finally 
to the rivalries and conflict that undermine 
the foundations of free alliances and the 
pillars of peace. 

On your journey abroad, I wish you good 
luck and Godspeed. 

The Kennedy Round: A Progress Report 

by Christian A. Herter 

Special Representative for Trade Negotiations * 

I thank you most sincerely for the honor 
you have done me today. I take that honor 
as applying not so much to me personally 
as to the able and dedicated staff who have 
worked with me in the Office of the Spe- 
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations 
— and to the late President Kennedy, who 

^ Address made at a luncheon at Washington, D.C., 
on May 20, sponsored by the Metropolitan Washing- 
ton Board of Trade, at which Mr. Herter received 
the 1965 World Trade Award. 

asked me to take on this task, and to Pres- 
ident Johnson, who at all times has given 
me the firmest possible support. 

I take it, also, that you are expressing 
hope and confidence today in what we can 
accomplish in the future, rather more than 
any recognition of what we have already 
achieved. For the sixth round of trade ne- 
gotiations under the auspices of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — widely 
known as the Kennedy Round — is today 
just about in midcourse. We have at least 

JULY 5, 1965 


a year of complex and difficult negotiations 
ahead before we can hope to achieve an 

There is a New Yorker cartoon on one of 
the walls in our office. It shows a young 
man and young lady bidding a fond fare- 
well at the Geneva airport, and the caption 
says : "Don't cry, Marie — there'll be another 
round of talks." 

Well, I don't know of any Maries — at 
least, none that have been brought officially 
to my attention — but there have certainly 
been round after round after round of 
talks. You may recall that King Charles II, 
a gentleman at all times, apologized on his 
deathbed for taking an unconscionable time 
about dying. Many of you must have felt 
that the Kennedy Round has been an un- 
conscionable time coming to life. Things 
have indeed moved slowly — not at the gla- 
cial pace of disarmament negotiations, but 
slowly enough. 

I think we must bear in mind, however, 
that these negotiations involve the vital, 
bread-and-butter interests of many countries 
— over 40, at the last count, including all 
the principal trading nations of the free 
world. Where so much is at stake, the re- 
sponsible officials of all the participating 
countries must be thorough in their prepara- 
tions and painstaking in their negotiations. 

Moreover, reductions in a greater range 
of impediments to trade are being sought 
in these negotiations than in any previous 
ones — nontariff barriers as well as tariffs — 
and we are seeking the liberalization of 
agricultural as well as industrial trade. 

I think we must also bear in mind the 
special situation of one of our major ne- 
gotiating partners, the European Common 
Market. Each Kennedy Round decision re- 
quires the unanimous vote of its six mem- 
ber nations. Under these circumstances, 
such decisions can be made only after 
lengthy and difficult internal bargaining, 
and these decisions, once made, are very 
difficult to alter. Trade negotiations, by 
their very nature, require give-and-take 
flexibility of a kind it is difficult for the 
Common Market, at this stage in its evolu- 
tion, to exercise. 

Despite these problems, I am glad to say 
that we have made significant progress. I 
shall not, however, seek today to cover the- 
whole range of our negotiations in any 

I shall not say much about agriculture, 
which threatened for a long while to be a 
bottleneck in our negotiations, except to 
note that discussions on this difficult sub- 
ject began on May 10 and will be proceed- 
ing according to a definite and agreed 
timetable. On Monday of this week [May 
17] the major producers and consumers of 
wheat and feed grains — 12 nations, includ- 
ing our own — exchanged proposals in Ge- 
neva for an international grains arrange- 

With the opening of these talks on 
agriculture, an essential part of the Kennedy 
Round is now actively underway. President 
Johnson has said, for reasons I am sure you 
fully appreciate, that "the United States 
will enter into no ultimate agreement un- 
less progress is registered toward trade 
liberalization on the products of our farms 
as well as our factories." ^ 

Nor shall I say much about another im- 
portant aspect of the negotiations, the 
trade interests and aspirations of the de- 
veloping countries. We believe that the 
Kennedy Round offers them a real oppor- 
tunity to play a more substantial role in 
world trade; I am delighted to say that a 
number of these countries have already 
formally declared their intention to partic- 
ipate. Trade expansion can help them to 
achieve a 20th-century degree of economic 
development and a better life in freedom for 
their peoples. Moreover, as they succeed in 
these objectives, they will offer substantial 
and steadily expanding markets for Amer- 
ican products. 

I shall concentrate today, rather, on the 
negotiations concerning industrial products, 
because I think it is still insufficiently ap- 
preciated how much they will mean as we 
press this Kennedy Round through to suc- 

= Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 749. 



Negotiations on Industrial Products 

As you know, our major American objec- 
tive in these negotiations is a 50-percent 
linear tariff cut on as wide a range of in- 
dustrial products as possible. There will in- 
evitably be, for each nation, certain items 
so sensitive to import competition that it 
will wish to withhold them from so deep 
a reduction and be willing to offer only a 
lesser cut or none at all. In the jargon of 
the Kennedy Round, such items are called 
"exceptions" — because they are exceptions 
to the 50-percent cut which has been ac- 
cepted as a working hypothesis by the ma- 
jor trading nations participating in the ne- 
gotiations. Some 6 months ago — on Novem- 
ber 16, to be exact — the nations prepared to 
engage in the linear tariff cut exchanged 
lists of exceptions. 

These lists are confidential, and they must 
be kept so. You may have seen in the press, 
however, some criticism of the length of the 
exceptions list the European Common Mar- 
ket submitted. It is a fact that some of its 
negotiating partners, including the United 
States, consider this list to be overly large, 
particularly in relation to those submitted 
by the other principal countries. Of course 
we fully recognize the great effort made by 
the six nations of the Common Market in 
working out the complex internal agree- 
ments necessary to produce this list. At the 
same time we hope that they will take into 
account the unprecedented offers which 
have been submitted by most of the other 
countries, including our own, and which — 
if realized — would bring them major trade 
benefits. We hope these offers will prompt 
the Common Market to reduce its ovvrn ex- 
ceptions list in the course of the negotia- 
tions, and we shall seek to persuade it to do 

As for ourselves, we have held our excep- 
tions list to the bare minimum compatible 
with our overriding national interest, as we 
interpret it. And some of the smaller na- 
tions — Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Aus- 
tria — have set a good example for all of us 
by putting all their chips on the table and 
claiming, at least in the beginning, no ex- 
ceptions at all. 

However — and here is a point I want to 
emphasize very strongly — what is already 
on the bargaining table, even before we be- 
gin the effort to pare down some of the 
longer exceptions lists, is much more impor- 
tant, much more meaningful, than what is 

What is already on the bargaining table 
offers all of us the opportunity for the most 
significant reduction of industrial tariffs, 
the most substantial liberalization of world 
trade in industrial products that has ever 
been achieved in the entire history of trade 
negotiations. Thus, in the industrial area, 
we are within sight of fulfilling the intent 
of Congress in enacting the Trade Expan- 
sion Act of 1962 — that it should initiate a 
new era in our trade relations with the rest 
of the world. 

I should remind you at this point that the 
Kennedy Round is concerned not only with 
tariffs but with nontariff barriers as well. 
Many nontariff barriers — particularly the 
quantitative restrictions imposed by many 
of our trading partners after the war for 
balance-of -payments reasons — have been 
done away with. The hard core of nontariff 
barriers that remain have deep fiscal, social, 
political, or economic roots. They will not 
be easy to deal with — ^but we intend to make 
a genuine effort to tackle them. This phase 
of the negotiations has not yet really opened 
in earnest, but we are preparing for it dili- 
gently and thoroughly. 

The "Sector" Approach 

Now a word or so about what we shall be 
doing in the industrial area at Geneva in the 
coming weeks. In previous GATT rounds, 
trade negotiations were conducted in terms 
of specific offers by each participant — an 
offer to reduce tariffs on umbrellas was bal- 
anced by an offer on slippers, and so on. 

This time we are dealing with virtually- 
all goods which move in foreign commerce. 
We are proposing for most products a linear 
tariff cut of 50 percent. All of this is taking 
place in an industrial world far more com- 
petitive than that of the earlier postwar 
years. Differences in technology, know-how. 

JULY 5, 1965 


size of market, and other major determi- 
nants of competitive success are rapidly 

In this light it is perhaps not surprising 
that the problems relating to further trade 
liberalization for some products and some 
industries are often similar among partici- 
pating nations. They have sometimes felt it 
necessary to make exceptions of the same 

Eric Wyndham White, the Director-Gen- 
eral of GATT, has suggested that v^e begin 
our industrial discussions at Geneva by com- 
ing to grips with this problem. For certain 
key industries he has proposed a prelimi- 
nary "sector" approach rather than the com- 
modity-by-commodity technique of previous 
negotiations. This is a procedural technique, 
designed to elicit fuller information, rather 
than a negotiating device. 

We fully realize that certain disadvan- 
tages and dangers may lurk along this new 
path. It could give aid and comfort, for ex- 
ample, to those who would balance any re- 
sults within narrowly defined product areas 
rather than on the basis of the overall ben- 
efits given and received. It could provide a 
basis from which nations aiming at tariff 
harmonization could push their case — a case 
which usually turns out to involve a pro- 
posal that the United States should make 
greater reductions than some other nations. 

But there may be positive aspects to this 
technique, as well. It provides an opportu- 
nity to examine all the trade problems of an 
industry, including barriers other than tar- 
iffs. Further, it is certainly more meaning- 
ful to look at the broader picture — the prob- 
lems of firms and industries as a whole — 
than at the situation, perhaps atypical, in 
particular products or segments of an in- 

In some areas this approach may open up 
the possibility of greater success in further- 
ing our own export interests. We are not 
alone in being adversely affected by some 
of the major exceptions lists. By combining 
forces around the negotiating table, in a 
multilateral rather than bilateral setting, 
those of us interested in genuine trade 

liberalization might be able to bargain more 

Because of these positive aspects, we have 
agreed to try out this new approach. We are 
now busy preparing for the initial discus- 
sions on a sector basis — and, in the process, 
we are posing many questions to ourselves. 

Precisely what is our export interest in 
each of the major foreign markets in each 
of these industries — not what it was in some 
base year, not even in 1965, but what it will 
be 5 years hence when the results of the 
Kennedy Round begin to show up in the 
marketplace ? I 

How does this interest vary between firms I 
and different divisions within each Indus- " 
try? What is the comparable situation in 
this same industry abroad? 

What will be the nature of competition _ 
and world trade 5 or 10 years from now? I 
What major changes or influences can be 
expected to bear significantly upon this in- 
dustry then? 

Where do the individual products on the 
various exceptions lists fit into the broader 
industry picture, and how valid are the rea- 
sons offered for not putting them on the 
bargaining table? 

In short, we seek a clearer picture than 
we've had thus far — or in previous negotia- 
tions — of the shape and character of future 
markets and the competitive conditions 
which are likely to prevail in them, as well 
as the probable impact of evolving trade and 
tariff policies at home and abroad. 

This is a big order. To fulfill it, we need 
the kind of judgments and forecasts that 
can only come from men of seasoned experi- 
ence within industry. The facts we require 
go far beyond government statistics, com- J 
prehensive as they are. ■ 

For these and many other essentials in 
our preparations we have turned to our in- 
dustrial advisers. I am delighted to say that 
they have been extremely helpful and have 
gone to great lengths to insure that your 
American negotiators will be as well 
equipped as possible. Beginning with the ' 
roster of almost 300 technical specialists 
who were designated by industries and 



trade associations as the point of contact 
with our office, we have solicited advice and 
assistance from steadily widening areas of 
industry — and we have received it. 

I should like to express the hope — and the 
confidence — that this cooperation between 
private industry and our office will con- 
tinue. We shall need it in the areas of mul- 
tilateral industrial negotiation which lie be- 
yond the particular sectors we shall be deal- 
ing with in Geneva during the coming 
weeks. We have here, I believe, a working 
example of that creative partnership be- 
tween Government and business to which 
President Johnson has dedicated himself 
and his administration. 

Trade and the Atlantic Partnership 

I have spoken so far of your stake as 
businessmen in the success of the Kennedy 
Round negotiations. I should like, in conclu- 
sion, to refer to your stake in it as cit- 

Two weeks ago, on V-E Day, President 
Johnson said that "the heartbeat of our pol- 
icy and our expectations is with the nations 
of the Atlantic" and declared that "we must 
all — Americans and Europeans — vow never 
to repeat the errors which have led to dis- 
aster: for America to stand proud in isola- 
tion, or Europe to fall apart in rancor." * 

The success of the Kennedy Round can 
lay the solid economic foundation for the 
kind of meaningful Atlantic partnership to 
which the President rededicated America 
2 weeks ago. The negotiations may be com- 
plex and perhaps at times difficult, but I am 
prudently confident that, as reasonable men, 
we shall work out the problems which con- 
front us. Indeed, we must — for the sake of 
ourselves and of the free world. 

I welcome the honor you have done me 
today as convincing evidence that you fully 
appreciate the importance of our undertak- 
ing, and I ask, in conclusion, your continued 
support and understanding in the months 


Department Opposes Bill To Amend 
Export Control Act of 1949 

Statement by Under Secretary Ball ^ 

I appear before you today in opposition to 
S. 948, a proposed amendment to the Export 
Control Act of 1949. This legislation, if en- 
acted, would prohibit American firms from 
taking any action, including the furnishing 
of information, that would have the effect 
of furthering or supporting restrictive trade 
practices or boycotts imposed by foreign 
countries against other countries friendly to 
the United States. 

The legislation is stated in general terms, 
but as this committee knows, it has been 
put forward primarily as a means of dis- 
couraging the Arab boycott of Israel. 

I need hardly tell this committee that the 
administration is opposed to that boycott. 
We have repeatedly made our position clear 
to the Arab governments. We shall continue 
to express our opposition and to assist 
American firms affected by the boycott. 

But while we oppose the boycott, we do 
not support the legislation before this com- 
mittee. What this committee is faced with 
this morning is not so much a question of 
principle but of the practical consequences 
of the measures that are proposed. In our 
judgment those measures would not be 
helpful to American business and they 
could interfere seriously with the effective 
operation of programs of economic denial 
that we are now conducting against several 
Communist countries. 

The program of economic denial designed 
to inhibit trade with Cuba is, of course, the 
best known, but we also impose what is in 
effect an embargo on United States trade 

" For text, see ibid., May 24, 1965, p. 790. 

' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Com- 
mittee on Banking and Currency on May 24. 

JULY 5, 1965 


with Communist China, North Korea, and 
North Viet-Nam. Trade in strategic goods 
with other Communist countries is also 

Those restrictions are, in the main, im- 
posed under the authority of four laws : 

First, the Trading With the Enemy Act 
prohibits United States firms from engaging 
in virtually any transaction with Commu- 
nist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam, 
and Cuba. 

Second, the Battle Act requires the ter- 
mination of military, economic, and finan- 
cial assistance to any country that know- 
ingly permits the shipment of certain 
strategic items to Communist bloc countries. 

Third, under the Export Control Act 
special restrictions apply to the export of 
United States goods and technology. This 
act covers foreign participants in United 
States export transactions and provides for 
the imposition of sanctions against foreign 
nationals who violate the act. 

Fourth, several provisions of the Foreign 
Assistance Act require the termination of 
assistance to countries that engage in, or 
permit their nationals to engage in, certain 
kinds of transactions with Cuba. 

Fifth, as a matter of policy, no United 
States Government cargo may be shipped on 
vessels that trade with Cuba, and every ef- 
fort has been made to discourage friendly 
countries from exporting critical materials 
to Cuba. 

These programs can be effectively car- 
ried out only with the assistance and co- 
operation of foreign firms and governments. 
As an aid in policing the programs, we call 
upon foreign firms and governments to fur- 
nish a substantial amount of information 
concerning their international trade. Much 
of this information is of a kind that United 
States concerns would be prohibited from 
furnishing under the proposed legislation. 

The Export Control Act regulations, for 
example, require foreign companies to pro- 
vide detailed information on the nature of 
their business, the nature of their custom- 
ers' business, the proposed disposition of 
commodities obtained from the United 
States, the use of the commodities, and spe- 

cific certifications that the foreign firms will 
not dispose of listed commodities to any 
countries not approved for export. 

Other United States regulations require 
foreign firms and governments to provide 
other items of information. And we request 
— and receive — substantial amounts of ad- 
ditional information that are not specifically 
required by our regulations. All of this in- 
formation is essential to make our economic 
restrictions against trade with Communist 
countries effective. 

In defending the proposed bill its support- 
ers have sometimes argued that our denial 
programs apply only to American-produced 
goods and services while the Arab boycott 
affects goods and services emanating out- 
side the Arab countries. 

But under certain circumstances our en- 
forcement regulations also apply to goods 
produced outside the United States — if, for 
example, they are produced with American 
technology, if they are produced by foreign 
firms controlled by American parent firms, 
or if the foreign goods are strategic and 
are being sold to controlled destinations 
with the participation of United States firms 
or individuals. 

This extraterritorial application obviously 
creates problems — particularly when other 
countries do not fully share our own philo- 
sophical concern with the relation of trade 
to cold-war objectives. Nonetheless, it is a 
fact that in many situations the enforce- 
ment of our own programs does not stop at 
the water's edge. 

Because they interfere with the free flow 
of commerce these programs of economic 
denial are not popular in the international 
trading world and there is considerable 
complaint about them. S. 948, if adopted, 
would provide the excuse for other govern- 
ments to interfere with their effective exe- 
cution. If foreign governments were to re- 
fuse to provide information to the United 
States to assist us in the enforcement of 
these programs — and were to prohibit their 
domestic concerns from providing such in- 
formation — we would be sharply restricted 
in our ability to make these programs ef- 



This would have serious consequences, 
particularly with regard to our efforts to 
discourage trade with Cuba. And any weak- 
ening of our economic denial program 
against Cuba would, of course, affect not 
merely the United States but the interests of 
the entire Western Hemisphere. 

I urge, therefore, that this committee 

bear these practical considerations in mind 
in its consideration of S. 948. However much 
the committee may wish to express its oppo- 
sition to the Arab boycott, this measure 
would not, in our judgment, be effective for 
that purpose, and it could seriously tie our 
hands in the conduct of other Government 
programs of major importance. 


Calendar of International Conferences^ 

In Recess as of July 1, 1965 

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- 
cessed Sept. 17, 1964) Geneva . 

U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session (recessed Feb. 18 until 

September 1965) New York 

Mar. 14, 1962- 
Dec. 1, 1964- 

Scheduled July Through September 1965 

Inter-American Juridical Committee Rio de Janeiro .... July 1-Sept. 30 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . . Paris July 5-6 

BIRPI Meeting of Experts on Revision of Bern Convention Geneva July 5-14 

FAO Fertilizer Advisory Panel: 9th Meeting Rome July 6-7 

8th WHO International Conference for Revision of Classifi- 
cation of Diseases Geneva July 6-12 

FAO Working Party for Rational Utilization of Atlantic Tuna Rome July 6-13 

WMO Commission for Aerology: 4th Session Brussels July 6-20 

South Pacific Commission: 6th Conference New Guinea .... July 6-20 

OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris July 7-8 

OECD Marine Transport Committee Paris July 12-13 

UNESCO/IBE Council and 28th International Conference on 

Public Education Geneva July 12-23 

UNCTAD Committee on Commodities : 1st Session .... New York .... July 12-Aug. 6 

International Wheat Council: 41st Session ....... London July 19-21 

International Institute of Administrative Sciences: Triennial 

General Assembly Paris July 20-24 

' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 14, 1965, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period 
July-September 1965. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. 
Persons interested in these are referred to the World Last of Future International Meetings, compiled by 
the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing 
Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of 
Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commis- 
sion for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and So- 
cial Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO, 
International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Or- 
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization; 
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization; 
WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 

JULY 5, 1965 


Calendar off International Conferences 


Scheduled July Through September 1965 — Continued 

South Pacific Commission: 27th Session 

OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting 
Inter- American Travel Congress: 

New Guinea 
Paris . . . 

9th Session 

Executive Committee 

Technical Committee on Removal of Travel Barriers 
Technical Committee on Research and Organization 
Technical Committee on Tourist Travel Promotion . 
Technical Committee on Travel Plant 

IBE Council: 31st Session 

ICAO Legal Committee 

U.N, Committee of 24 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: Participation 
of Women in Public Life 

UNCTAD Conference on Transit Trade of Land-Locked Coun- 

3d U.N. Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 1st Session .... 

2d FAG/WHO International Meeting on Veterinary Education 

WMO Commission for Climatology: 4th Session 

UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 2d Session . . . . 

U.N. World Population Conference: Preparatory Committee . 

ECE Trade Committee: Subgroup on Reinsurance 

2d U.N. World Population Conference 

Inter- American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly . . 

Special Inter-American Conference 

ECAFE Committee of Experts on Asian Development Bank . 

U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session (resumed) 

BIRPI Regional Patent Meeting of Asian Countries .... 

International Scientific Meeting on Polar Bears 

U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science 
and Technology to Development 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and Planning 

UNESCO Conference on World Literacy 

International Statistical Institute: 35th Session 

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 

IMCO Assembly: 4th Session 

U.N. Sugar Conference 

U.N. Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter . 

ECE Steel Committee and Working Groups 

ILO Inter-American Advisory Committee 

UNCTAD Expert Committee on Regional Development Fund 

IAEA General Conference: 9th Session 

U.N. General Assembly: 20th Session 

OECD Interim Science Committee 

ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning 

ECE Coal Committee 

BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee 

IMCO Council: 15th Session 

BIRPI Conference of Representatives of the Paris Union for the 
Protection of Industrial Property 

BIRPI Committee of Experts on Problems of Industrial Prop- 
erty Rights 

WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 16th 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space .... 

PAHO Directing Council and Regional Committee for WHO . 

Caribbean Organization Council: 6th Meeting 

Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting 

GATT Committee III: Meeting on Trade and Development . 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems 

GATT Committee on Cotton Textiles: Meeting of Experts . 

EGA Conference on Economic Cooperation in East and Central 


ECA Conference on Economic Cooperation in Central Africa 

Bogota . . 
Bogota . . 
Panama . . 
Mexico City 
Caracas . . 
San Jose . 

Geneva . . 
Melbourne . 
New York . 

Ulan Bator, Mongolia . 
New York 

Stockholm . . . 
Geneva .... 
Copenhagen . . 
Stockholm . . . 
Geneva .... 
Belgrade . . . 
Geneva .... 
Belgrrade . . . 
Uruguay .... 
Rio de Janeiro . 
Bangkok .... 
New York . . . 
Colombo . . . 
Washington, D.C. 
Alaska . . . 


New York . 

New York . 

Tehran . . 

Paris , . . 

Geneva . . 

New York . 

Geneva . . 
Buenos Aires 

Geneva . . 

Tokyo . . 

New York . 

Paris . . . 

Geneva . . 

Geneva . . 

Paris . . . 


Manila . . 
New York . 
Buenos Aires 
Martinique . 
Quito . . . 
Geneva . . 
Rome . . . 
Geneva . . 

Lusaka, Zambia 

July 21-22 
July 22-23 

July 28-Aug. 3 







Aug. 3-17 

Aug. 3-30 

Aug. 9-18 
Aug. 12-20 
Aug. 12-21 
Aug. 12-26 
Aug. 24-Sept. 
Aug. 27-28 
Aug. 30-Sept. 3 
Aug. 30-Sept. 10 
Sept. 1-14 
Sept. 6-10 

Sept. 7-10 

Sept. 7-17 
Sept. 7-20 
Sept. 8-19 
Sept. 14-Nov. 
Sept. 14-22 
Sept. 15-29 
Sept. 15-Oct. 
Sept. 16-18 
Sept. 20-24 
Sept. 20-25 
Sept. 20-Oct. 
Sept. 21-Oct. 
Sept. 21-Dec. 
Sept. 23-24 
Sept. 27-Oct. 4 
Sept. 27-Oct. 30 
Sept. 28-Oct. 1 
Sept. 29-Oct. 6 



September or 









Expanding the Participation of Women in National Life 

TEHRAN, IRAN, MARCH 1-20, 1965 

by Gladys A. Tillett 

By invitation of the Government of Iran 
the U.N. Commission on the Status of 
Women met for its 18th session, March 1-20, 
1965, at Tehran. Meeting away from U.N. 
headquarters was a departure from the usu- 
al procedure; as a rule, Commission ses- 
sions are held at U.N. headquarters in New 
York or Geneva, and only twice before has 
the Commission met in other countries. The 
setting in a developing country highlighted 
the importance of women in the economic, 
social, and political progress of nations. 

The timing of the session also added a 
note of drama ; the delegates arrived at Teh- 
ran on the second anniversary of the grant- 
ing of the vote to the women of Iran. Some 
5,000 or more Iranian women marched in 
a parade celebrating the achievement of 
political rights. Bands played inspiring 
music. Young girls distributed handbills. The 
Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, twin sister of the 
Shah and honorary chairman of the High 
Council of Iranian Women, stood and re- 
viewed the parade. Later the women assem- 
bled in the stadium, where Princess Ashraf 
delivered a stirring address. The United 
States delegation had seats on the reviewing 
stand with the Princess. 

The anniversary celebration was our in- 
troduction to the women's movement of 
Iran. This centers in the High Council of 

Iranian Women, an organization composed of 
32 member organizations affiliated with the 
International Council of Women. 

The women's movement has the support of 
the royal family. It was the Reza Shah, fath- 
er of the present Shah, who banished the veil 
in 1936. The Empress of Iran addressed 
the opening session of the U.N. Commission. 
She received with the Princess at the recep- 
tion given in the royal palace. High-ranking 
officials of the Foreign Ministry were fre- 
quently in attendance at sessions. The High 
Council served as a committee for all ar- 

Officers and Agenda 

Princess Ashraf was unanimously elect- 
ed chairman of the Commission. Miss Helena 
Benitez of the Philippines served as first 
vice chairman and presided at many of the 
sessions. Mrs. Helvi Sipila of Finland served 
as second vice chairman and Judge Annie 
Jiagge of Ghana as rapporteur. 

Nineteen of the 21 countries serving on 

• Mrs. Tillett is the United States 
Representative on the United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women. 

JULY 5, 1965 


the Commission sent delegates to Tehran. 
They came from all regions of the world.^ 

More than 20 nongovernmental organi- 
zations sent representatives. Among them 
were the World YWCA, the International 
Federation of Business and Professional 
Women, the International Council of 
Women, the Commission of the Churches on 
International Affairs, the International Fed- 
eration of University Women, the Interna- 
tional Alliance of Women, the World Union 
of Catholic Women, St. Joan's International 
Alliance, Zonta International Council, Inter- 
national Federation of Women Lavs^ers, In- 
ternational Council of Jewish Women, the 
International Confederation of Free Trade 
Unions, International Social Service, the 
Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's 
Association, and others. 

The enthusiasm generated by Iran's prog- 
ress, with participants from all parts of the 
world, set the stage for an unusually produc- 
tive meeting. Both the discussions and reso- 
lutions adopted by the Commission served to 
implement the women's program in Iran. The 
interventions of nongovernmental organiza- 
tions also reflected this emphasis. 

The Commission gave primary attention to 
broadening the base of women's participation 
in national life. To accomplish this it voted to 
initiate a new series of seminars on civic 
education; adopted a resolution on family 
planning; began work on a Declaration for 
the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women ; recommended standards on the dis- 
solution of marriage, the emphasis not on 
the merits of divorce but on equality of 
rights for men and women ; encouraged con- 
tinued work by the ILO in meeting problems 
of women workers; recognized the vital im- 
portance of sound general education and vo- 
cational training to prepare girls for partic- 

' Austria, China, Dominican Republic, Finland, 
France, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iran, Mexico, 
Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sierra Leone, 
U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Kingdom, 
and United States. Canada and Japan sent observers. 
Representatives were present from the International 
Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Educa- 
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization 
(UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO), 
and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF). 

ipation in the social and economic progress 
of their countries; and urged the need for 
annual sessions to keep abreast of the chang- 
ing situation for women as the result of in- 
dustrial and social development. 

Let us look at these achievements one at a 

Seminars on Civic Education 

First, the new series of seminars. The 
United States initiated a resolution calling 
for regional seminars to help women use 
their political and civic rights through lead- 
ership training with the cooperation of non- 
governmental organizations. Since women 
now vote in almost all countries of the world, 
the major problem is no longer the acquisi- 
tion of political rights but the utilization 
of rights already gained. Women need to 
learn the skill and know-how to use their 
political rights as a lever to lift their status 
and to speed the economic and social prog- 
ress of their countries. 

The key is the skill of leadership. This is 
a skill which can be taught and is in fact 
continually being taught in nongovernmen- 
tal organizations. The new U.N. pamphlet on 
"Civic and Political Education of Women" 
provides guidelines for this program. 

The purpose of the new seminars pro- 
posed by the United States is to work out 
a pattern for training women in leadership 
in community affairs. These regional semi- 
nars would develop model workshops or 
training courses to show women how to plan 
and carry through community betterment 
projects. Similar workshops and training 
courses could then be established at the na- 
tional and the local level in cooperation with 
women's nongovernmental organizations. In 
its final form the resolution was cosponsored 
by the Dominican Republic, Iran, Mexico, 
Nepal, and the Philippines along with the 
United States. It will enable nations in all 
regions to draw on the resources of woman- 
power for the common good. Each country 
will have its own needs and develop its proj- 
ects accordingly. 

In presenting the resolution I pointed out 
that in the United States the Congress and 
the President rely heavily on the active par- 



ticipation of women's nongovernmental or- 
ganizations in U.S. programs to eliminate 
poverty, advance education, and promote 
social and economic progress. 

Previous seminars organized by the U.N. 
have demonstrated their value in extend- 
ing the impact and supplementing the work 
of the Commission on the Status of Women. 
Nongovernmental organizations spoke en- 
thusiastically in support, referring especially 
to the long-range value of the recent series 
of regional seminars on the Status of Women 
in Family Law. I have attended three of these 
family law seminars — in Latin America, the 
Far East, and Africa.^ Each of these meet- 
ings examined a problem in depth with spe- 
cial attention to needs and situations in the 
region. They stirred thought at the grass- 
roots level and stimulated hope for practical 
action for the progress of women. They dem- 
onstrated the need for leadership training in 
utilizing political rights for national prog- 

Our resolution calling for seminars on 
training in civic and political rights is 
therefore of far-reaching importance. The 
Philippines delegation immediately invited 
the U.N. to hold the first of this series in 
their country, for the benefit of the women 
of Asia. 

Family Planning 

The second Commission action, also of 
great importance to women, was a resolution 
on family planning. The United States spon- 
sored this resolution along with Austria, Fin- 
land, and the United Arab Republic. It ex- 
pressed appreciation of the steps already 
taken by the United Nations to strengthen 
research and information activities relating 
to population. The United States expressed 
the belief that information about family 
planning should be available on the request 

' For reports by Mrs. Tillett on seminars held at 
Bogota, Colombia, Dec. 3-17, 1963, and at Lom6, 
Togo, Aug. 18-31, 1964, see Bulletin of July 27, 
1964, p. 128, and Feb. 15, 1965, p. 229. Mrs. Tillett 
also attended the seminar at Tokyo, Japan, in 1962 
as U.S. observer. 

of governments, and that each government 
should, of course, determine its own popula- 
tion policy, taking into account its own eco- 
nomic, cultural, and religious circumstances. 
All of the sponsors emphasized that the 
resolution was of common concern. It was 
pointed out that lack of family planning may 
be detrimental to the welfare of the family 
as well as to that of the individual woman, 
and that family planning would make pos- 
sible better use of educational facilities and 
employment opportunities by women in over- 
populated countries. The delegates recog- 
nized that religious views were important, 
and it was noted that religious bodies were 
becoming more and more concerned about 
the rapid increase in population which, in 
many instances, created serious difficulties. 
The representative from Peru proposed in- 
sertion of the word "educational" so that the 
resolution stated that "married couples 
should have access to all relevant educational 
information concerning family planning." 
This amendment was accepted. All of the 
Latin American countries supported the res- 
olution, which was adopted by a substantial 
majority. No delegation voted against it, al- 
though the U.S.S.R. and several others ab- 

Advancement of Women 

As the result of a General Assembly re- 
quest in 1962 for a "unified, long-term 
United Nations programme for the advance- 
ment of women," the Commission had before 
it a series of suggestions from member 
states and analyses of the scope and effect 
of U.N. technical assistance programs in 
fields of special interest for women. Some 
of this documentation proved so valuable 
that the Commission recommended it be 
published. It was pointed out that no signifi- 
cant progress could be made unless govern- 
ments themselves gave higher priority to 
assistance projects which would prepare 
and encourage women to participate more 
fully in national life. 

In reply to a Soviet objection that tech- 
nical assistance merely "built factories," 
the United Staes pointed out that programs 

JULY 5, 1965 


already underway embraced a wide variety 
of projects dealing with health, education, 
protection of human rights, reform of fam- 
ily law, training of doctors, nurses, and 
medical technicians, professional training of 
all types, training in leadership, family plan- 
ning, community services, day nurseries, 
public administration, and many other pro- 
grams which, if put in operation on a 
broader scale, would promote the status of 
women. The United States sponsored a res- 
olution also on this point, and it was adopted 
by a large majority. The International Con- 
federation of Free Trade Unions was among 
the nongovernmental organizations speaking 
urgently on this topic, as were also the In- 
ternational Alliance of Women, the Interna- 
tional Council, the BPW, and many others. 

Declaration Against Discrimination 

At the request of the General Assembly 
the Commission began work on a Declara- 
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination 
Against Women. The Commission decided to 
continue work on the declaration at the next 
session. The former chairman of the Com- 
mission, Miss Maria Lavalle Urbina of Mex- 
ico, headed the drafting committee which 
prepared a preliminary text. The United 
States was among the 11 members of the 

When completed, the declaration will rec- 
ommend action to eliminate discrimination 
in all areas — social, educational, civic, politi- 
cal, economic, and cultural. The Human 
Rights Declaration set the pattern in 1948. 
Since then there have been two further dec- 
larations on the Rights of a Child and the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. A dec- 
laration on the elimination of discrimination 
against women will take its place with other 
great human rights declarations. 

Family Law 

In line with its regular practice the Com- 
mission considered questions in the field of 
family law. The item this year dealt with 
annulment of marriage, judicial separation, 
and divorce. Earlier Commission studies. 

and especially the seminars in each region 
on family law, had made it clear that some 
of the greatest injustices existing today are 
in this field, threatening the security of the 
family as well as of wives and mothers. The 
merits of divorce were not discussed, but 
the Commission endorsed the principle that 
rights should be equal in event of dissolu- 
tion of marriage by whatever legal or cus- 
tomary process this might come about. 
There was also consensus that facilities for 
reconciliation should be made available; the 
resolution recommends that appropriate 
steps for reconciliation be taken before the 
institution of proceedings for divorce. 

As adopted, the resolution recommends 
also that divorce or judicial separation be 
granted only by a competent judicial au- 
thority and be legally recorded and that both 
spouses have the same rights and have 
available the same legal grounds and legal 
defenses. The discussion stressed the need 
for the elimination of private one-party ac- 
tion to obtain divorces, such as the "talak" 
in Moslem countries and similar practices 
elsewhere, in which the wife does not have 
an opportunity to protect her rights. 

There were none against the resolution. 
Three countries, United Arab Republic, Iran, 
and Guinea, abstained. All others voted in 

Employment and Equal Pay 

On the economic aspects of women's sta- 
tus the ILO presented a series of reports, 
beginning with an account of ILO activities 
of special importance for the work of the ■ 
Commission. It was recognized that in the 1 
present era of rapid industrial development 
womanpower is of ever-increasing impor- 
tance for social and economic progress. Rep- 
resentatives expressed the view that the 
right to employment constituted one of the 
principal factors — if not the main factor — 
in the emancipation of women. 

All congratulated the ILO on its work 
on behalf of women with family responsibili- 
ties. The ILO conference in June 1964 agreed 
on basic principles to be incorporated in a 
recommendation, and governments had since 



commented on the proposed text. The Com- 
mission looked forward to final adoption of 
this recommendation by the ILO conference 
in June 1965. 

One of the ILO documents was the com- 
prehensive "International Survey of Part- 
Time Employment," prepared in response to 
the joint interest of the Commission and 
the ILO on this subject. With the excep- 
tion of the Soviet representative, who ex- 
plained that women in the U.S.S.R. found no 
need for part-time work, members stressed 
the importance of part-time employment 
opportunities for women. They agreed on the 
need to observe the principle of equal treat- 
ment to protect part-time workers from ex- 
ploitation and full-time workers from unfair 

The solution to many women's employ- 
ment problems was felt to lie in better voca- 
tional training and more realistic vocational 
guidance for girls during their school 
years. The ILO reports in this field noted 
both changes and progress; the fact that 
women were becoming better equipped to 
work, with better opportunities and less 
discrimination, reinforced the need for en- 
lightened guidance which would expand oc- 
cupational horizons for girls and women in 
the context of new national goals and con- 
ditions. The Commission adopted two reso- 
lutions in this field, one anticipating further 
ILO reports on this subject and the other 
encouraging priority attention to improving 
vocational training and guidance for girls 
and women. 

The ILO also presented a report on equal 
pay. It noted increasing acceptance of the 
principle but considered progress disap- 
pointingly slow, with conditions in some 
countries actually worsening. Among the 
problems mentioned were the traditional 
division of most industries into "women's 
work" and "men's work," making it difficult 
to obtain a realistic comparison of skill and 
performance; the relatively low level of wo- 
men's participation in trade unions, thus 
weakening the representation of women's 
interests in collective bargaining; and the 
unwillingness of many girls to make the 
necessary effort to develop their full voca- 

tional potential. The United States reported 
the success of our Federal Equal Pay Act 
and the progress in many of our States hav- 
ing equal-pay laws. 

Education and Literacy 

Access to education is also a regular Com- 
mission agenda item and is considered on 
the basis of information from UNESCO. 
This year discussion focused on secondary 
education. Compulsory free education was 
recognized as essential; otherwise parents 
often send boys to school and neglect the edu- 
cation of girls. The Commission repeatedly 
emphasized that education is basic to the 
solution of most problems of women in de- 
veloping countries. 

A highlight was a report on literacy cam- 
paigns conducted in Iran. It was brought out 
that the Shah had initiated a literacy cam- 
paign aimed at teaching communities to read 
with the help of soldiers in the army. It was 
so successful that a women's corps was 
formed, and now a literacy campaign for 
women is being conducted in Iran. The High 
Council of Iranian Women is taking a leading 
part and demonstrating the effective coopera- 
tion of voluntary organizations. 

National Legislation 

Perhaps the acid test of the effectiveness 
of the Commission's work is its impact on 
national legislation. The Secretary-General 
presented a report showing progress made in 
family law in line with Commission recom- 
mendations. The delegate from Nepal, Mrs. 
Kamal Rana, testified during the meeting 
to the impact of the U.N. Commission rec- 
ommendations on the status of women in her 
country. She said : 

His Majesty's Government of Nepal, and we the 
people of Nepal, have great faith in the United 
Nations establishing peace in the world — and rais- 
ing the status of women. . . . My Government has 
been very sincerely following the principles of all 
U.N. resolutions, recommendations, and conventions 
in forming its national legislation. . . . 

In accordance with the resolution 547J (XVIII) 
of ECOSOC, my Government has assured the right 
of a married woman to undertake independent work. 

JULY 5, 1965 


to carry it on and to administer and dispose of her 
earnings without the necessity of securing her hus- 
band's authorization. 

The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum 
Age of Marriage, and Registration of Marriages has 
had direct effect in forming our new legislation. 
This has in fact proved the guiding light for us. 
This Convention was opened for signature on 10th 
December 1962 at the time when we were seriously 
thinking about changing our marriage legislation. 
We had new legislation in August 1965 on consent 
to marriage and minimum age of marriage and we 
are now working towards the registration of mar- 
riages. This has, of course, abolished the caste 
restriction which was the great obstacle to the free- 
dom to choose a spouse. 

The moving statement made by the rep- 
resentative of Nepal can be documented by 
action in many other countries. To name 
a few, lavi^s establishing marriage standards 
have been enacted in Singapore by a Wom- 
en's Charter. Similar law^s have also been en- 
acted in Pakistan, Brunei, Viet-Nam, Tunisia, 
India, Morocco, Gabon, and Mali. Polygamy 
has been abolished or restricted in a number 
of countries, including Nepal, India, Israel, 
Tunisia, Viet-Nam, and Iraq. Action has also 
been taken in other fields; for example, 
Brazil has introduced important reforms in 
civil and family law, and more recently 
France has adopted new legislation advanc- 
ing the status of married women. 

Annual Meetings 

The Commission adopted unanimously a 
resolution calling for a firm policy of annual 
meetings. A number of delegates noted that 
the omission of a Commission session in 
1964 had delayed the Commission's work on 
urgent problems for the developing countries. 

The delegate from Mexico, in presenting 
the resolution, pointed out that women con- 
stitute half the people of the world and 
stressed the rapid social changes in many 
areas as they relate to women. She cited 
the force of annual recommendations on na- 
tional legislation and the urgent need to 
equip women to make their full contribution 
to social and industrial progress. All dele- 
gates emphasized the need for a session every 

The 1965 session again made it evident 
that in its almost 20 years of existence the 
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women 
has had a worldwide impact on the advance- 
ment of women. Each year it has pressed 
for the emancipation of women from ancient 
laws and customs which all too often have 
deprived women of essential human dignity 
and threatened the stability of the home. 
Recognition of the right of women to full 
partnership in the family and all aspects of 
community and public life is basic to the 
progress of national development and im- 
provement of living standards for people all 
over the world. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such us those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Situation in the Dominican Republic: 

Letters dated April 9 and 29 from the permanent 
representative of the United States. S/6278, 
April 9, 1965, 9 pp.; S/6310, April 29, 1965, 2 pp. 

Cables, letters, and notes from various countries. 
Albania, S/6354, May 13, 1965, 3 pp.; Cam- 
bodia, S/6347, May 11, 1965, 2 pp.; Cuba, S/ 
6314, April 30, 1965, 3 pp.; Mongolian People's 
Republic, S/6341, May 10, 1965, 1 p.; Poland, 
S/6339, Mav 7, 1965, 2 pp.; Soviet Union, S/ 
6317, May 1, 1965, 3 pp., S/6363, May 18, 1965, 
2 pp., S/6411, June 3, 1965, 3 pp.; Yugoslavia, 
S/6330, May 5, 1965, 2 pp. 

Letters and cables from the Assistant Secretary 
General of the Organization of American States 
transmitting documents of the Tenth Meeting of 
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the American Republics. S/6364, May 
18, 1965, 22 pp.; S/6370 and Adds. 1 and 2, 
May 19 and 26, 1965, 20 pp.; S/6372/Rev. 1. 
May 24, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6374, May 22, 1965, 1 p.; 
S/6377/Rev. 1, May 24, 1965, 1 p.; S/6381, May 
24, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6396, May 29, 1965, 7 pp.; 
S/6400, June 3, 1965, 1 p.; S/6401, June 3, 1965, 
2 pp.; S/6404 and Add. 1, June 3, 1965, 2 pp. 

Cable dated June 3 from the OAS Secretary Gen- 
eral informing the U.N. Secretary-General of 
the visit of the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights to Santo Domingo. S/6413, June 
4, 1965, 1 p. 

Reports by the U.N. Secretary-General. S/6353, 
May 14, 1965, 11 pp.; S/6358, May 15, 1965, 1 p.; 
S/6365, May 18, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6369, May 19, 
1965, 3 pp. ; S/6371 and Adds. 1 and 2, May 20, 
21, 22, 1965, 8 pp.; S/6380, May 24, 1965, 2 pp.; 
S/6386, May 27, 1965, 1 p.; S/6408, June 3, 
1965, 3 pp. 




Current Actions 



International air services transit agreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 

Acceptance deposited: Malta, June 4, 1965. 
Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of 
the convention on international civil aviation 
(TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the 
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Or- 
ganization shall be held not less than once in 3 
years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June 
14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956. 
TIAS 3756. 
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, January 11, 

1965; Malta, May 25, 1965. 
Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention 
on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to 
increase membership of the council from 21 to 27. 
Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force 
July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170. 
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, January 11, 

1965; Greece, May 26, 1965; Malta, May 25, 

1965; Turkey, May 13, 1965. 
Protocol relating to amendment to convention on 
international civil aviation (to increase number of 
parties which may request holding an e.xtraor- 
dinary meeting of the Assembly) . Adopted at 
Rome September 15, 1962.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Canada, January 22, 1965; 

Ecuador, January 11, 1965; France, December 

3, 1964; Greece, May 26, 1965; Malta, May 25, 



Additional regulations amending the international 
sanitary regulations of May 25, 1951, as amended 
(TIAS 3625, 4420, 4896, 5156), in particular with 
respect to disinfecting of ships and aircraft, and 
appendixes 3 and 4: forms of international cer- 
tificates for vaccination or revaccination against 
yellow fever and against smallpox. Adopted at 
Geneva May 12, 1965. Enters into force January 
1, 1966. 

Statute for international agency for research on 
cancer. Done at Geneva May 20, 1965. Enters 
into force when five of the states which took the 
initiative in proposing the agency have given 
notification to observe and apply provisions of 

Notification given to observe and apply provisions 
of statute: United States, June 1, 1965. 

Load Line 

International load line convention. Done at London 
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933. 
47 Stat. 2228. 

Notification of denunciation received: Niger, 
March 29, 1965. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc- 
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Accession deposited: Kenya, June 11, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London 
June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19, 
1952. TIAS 2495. 

Notification of denunciation received: Japan, May 
26, 1965; effective May 26, 1966. 

Satellite Communications System — Arbitration 

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COMSAT). 
Done at Washington June 4, 1965.' 
Signature: Department of Posts and Telegraphs 
of South Africa, June 15, 1965; Vatican City 
State, June 16, 1965. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on TariflTs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac- 
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva 
from February 8 until December 31, 1965. 
Acceptances deposited: Austria (subject to ratifi- 
cation). May 31, 1965; Japan, June 3, 1965. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 
of war; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 

Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea; 

Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force 
October 21, 1950; for the United States February 
2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respec- 
Ratification deposited: Canada," May 14, 1965. 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.' 
Ratification advised by the Senate: June 15, 1965. 
Acceptance deposited: Canada, June 18, 1965. 
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: 
Belgium, June 16, 1965. 



Agreement for issuance of nonimmigrant visas free 
of charge on a reciprocal basis to eligible na- 
tionals. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de 
Janeiro May 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26, 


Agreement relating to the loan of certain Loran-A 
equipment for use in Canadian Loran-A stations. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 7 
and 8, 1965. Entered into force June 8, 1965. 

' Not in force. 

' With notice of withdrawal of reservation made 
at time of signature. 

JULY 5, 1965 



Foreign Relations Volume for 1944 
Released by Department 

Press release 141 dated June 8, for release June 14 

The Department of State on June 14 released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19U, Volume 
V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, The Far 
East. This is the first volume to be published in the 
series covering documentation of American policy 
and diplomacy for the year 1944. It includes dip- 
lomatic correspondence with all countries of the 
Near East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East 
except China. Documentation on American policy 
toward China will appear in a subsequent volume in 
the series. 

The documentation in the volume ranges widely 
over the wartime economic and political problems of 
the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East. It also 
reveals that many problems which were to become 
acute in the postwar period were already visible in 
1944. From this perspective the coverage on Iran, 
Greece, Turkey, and Korea is of particular interest. 
Of equal interest is the documentation on the policies 
of the United States toward India and on American 
concern over the future status of Palestine. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 
1944, Volume V, The Near East, South Asia and 
Africa, The Far East (viii, 1,345 pp.; publication 
7859) may be obtained from the Superintendent of 
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D. C, 20402, for $4.25 each. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of 
Documents, except in the case of free publications, 
which may be obtained from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet 
contains a map, a list of principal government of- 
ficials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, 
and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those 
listed below are available at 5^ each, unless othei-wise 

Algeria. Pub. 7821. 8 pp. 
Argentina. Pub. 7836. 8 pp. 
Dominican Republic. Pub. 7759. 

4 pp. 

Germany, Federal Republic of. Pub. 7834. 12. dd. 

India. Pub. 7847. 8 pp. 

Indonesia. Pub. 7786. 8 pp. 

Italy. Pub. 7861. 8 pp. 

Kuwait. Pub. 7855. 4 pp. 

Lebanon. Pub. 7816. 4 pp. 

Libya. Pub. 7815. 8 pp. 

Luxembourg. Pub. 7856. 4 pp. 

Mexico. Pub. 7865. 8 pp. 

Syria. Pub. 7761. 8 pp. 

Turkey. Pub. 7850. 4 pp. 

U.S.S.R. Pub. 7842. 12 pp. 10^. 

Uruguay. Pub. 7857. 4 pp. 

Zambia. Pub. 7841. 4 pp. 
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands— 1964. 17th 
annual report to the United Nations on the ad- 
ministration of these islands from July 1, 1963 to 
June 30, 1964. Pub. 7811. International Organization 
and Conference Series 59. 304 pp. $1.25. 
Major Publications of the Department of State — An 
Annotated Bibliography. A list of publications selected 
for their lasting value in developing U.S. foreign 
policy and international relations. It includes a few 
items published by Congress or other executive 
departments and agencies because of their special 
relevance to foreign affairs. Pub. 7843. General 
Foreign Policy Series 200. Limited distribution. 
Foreign Consular Offices in the United States— 1965. 
Complete and official listing of foreign consular 
offices in the United States together with their 
jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 128. 87 pp. 

The Dangers of Nostalgia. This pamphlet is based 
on an address by Under Secretary of State George 
W. Ball before the National Foreign Policy Con- 
ference for Nongovernmental Organizations at 
Washington, D.C. Pub. 7858. General Foreign Policy 
Series 201. 15 pp. 15^. 

Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia. This is the 
text, as delivered, of an address by President Johnson 
at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. Pub. 
7872. Far Eastern Series 132. 12 pp. 10«;. 
Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War. Text of an 
address made by President Johnson to the Associa- 
tion of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White 
House. Pub. 7897. Far Eastern Series 134. 15 
pp. 15^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey, 
amending the agreement of February 21, 1963, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ankara 
January 22, 1965. Entered into force January 22, 
1965. TIAS 5760. 2 pp. 5(f. 

Experimental Communications Satellites — Inter- 
continental Testing. Agreement with Spain. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Madrid September 18, 

1964, and January 26, 1965. Entered into force 
January 26, 1965. TIAS 5761. 3 pp. 5(f. 
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Sierra Leone — Signed at Freetown 
January 29, 1965. Entered into force January 29, 

1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5762. 8 pp. 

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Australia, amend- 
ing the agreement of February 26, 1960, as amended. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Canberra February 
10, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1965. 
TIAS 5763. 3 pp. 5«(. 



INDEX July 5, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1358 

Africa. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign 
Policy (Rostow) 21 

American Principles. Building a Decent World 
Order (Rusk) 27 

American Republics 

The Alliance for Progress: A Partnership of 
Mutual Help (Rusk) 2 

Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy 
(Rostow) 21 


Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy 
(Rostow) 21 

Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach Peace- 
ful Settlement in Southeast Asia (Johnson, 
Rusk) 5 


Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy 
(Rostow) 21 

Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach 
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia (John- 
son, Rusk) 5 

Congress. Department Opposes Bill to Amend 
Export Control Act of 1949 (Ball) .... 35 

Diplomacy. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign 
Policy (Rostow) 21 

Dominican Republic. An Assessment of the 
Situation in the Dominican Republic (Johnson) 19 

Economic Affairs 

Department Opposes Bill To Amend Export 
Control Act of 1949 (Ball) 35 

The Kennedy Round: A Progress Report 
(Herter) 31 

Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy 
(Rostow) 21 

U.S. Interest in Free Trade and Peaceful Com- 
merce (Johnson) 30 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Building a 
Decent World Order (Rusk) 27 

Europe. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign 
Policy (Rostow) 21 

Foreign Aid. The Alliance for Progress: A 
Partnership of Mutual Help (Rusk) .... 2 

Human Rights. Expanding the Participation of 
Women in National Life (Tillett) .... 39 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Calendar of International Conferences ... 37 

Middle East. Department Opposes Bill To 
Amend Export Control Act of 1949 (Ball) . 35 

Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Discusses 
Buildup of Forces in Viet-Nam 12 

Presidential Documents 

An Assessment of the Situation in the Domini- 
can Republic 19 

Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach 
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia ... 5 

U.S.Interest in Free Trade and Peaceful Com- 
merce 30 


Foreign Relations Volume for 1944 Released by 

Department 46 

Recent Releases 46 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 45 

U.S.S.R. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign 
Policy (Rostow) 21 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 44 

Expanding the Participation of Women in Na- 
tional Life (Tillett) 39 


Secretary McNamara Discusses Buildup of 
Forces in Viet-Nam 12 

Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach Peace- 
ful Settlement in Southeast Asia (Johnson, 
Rusk) 5 

Name Index 

Ball, George W 35 

Herter, Christian A 31 

Johnson, President 5, 19, 30 

McNamara, Robert S 12 

Rostow, W. W 21 

Rusk, Secretary 2, 5, 27 

Tillett, Gladys A 39 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 14 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 141 
and 142 of June 8 and 151 of June 10. 

No. Date Subject 

t 153 6/14 Vaughn: American Institute of 
Architects and Pan American 
Congress of Architects. 

1 154 6/15 MacArthur: "America and Bel- 
gium — A Community of Inter- 

* 155 6/16 Leddy sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for European Affairs 
(biographic details). 

1 156 6/14 Williams: "Southern Rhodesia To- 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 











The Unending Struggle'' 

This 29-minute, 16 mm., black-and-white documentary film, photographed entirely in Ecuador, 
portrays various aspects of U.S. national interests abroad — political, economic, military, cultural 
— and shows some of the ways in which the American "country team" works to protect and ad- 
vance these interests. 

The scenes range from a meeting in the Presidential Palace between the U.S. Ambassador 
and the heads of Ecuador's Government to the jungle near Santo Domingo, where U.S. Army 
guerrilla warfare experts are training Ecuadorean soldiers in counterinsurgency techniques, to 
the steaming docks of Guayaquil, where American labor attaches are at work among workers 
and officials of the banana loaders trade union. 

The film is available for loan (the only charge is return postage) to schools and colleges, 
television stations, public service organizations, and any other interested groups. Prints can 
also be purchased for $39.54. A discussion guide to accompany the film has been prepared by 
the Department of State Film Library. 





WASHINGTON, D.C., 20520 

SALES: Please send a screening print of "The Unending Struggle." 

I am considering buying print(s) of this film. 

LOANS : I would like to borrow a print of "The Unending Struggle" 

on temporary loan for screening on . 





lioston Public Librar> 
SuPfi-ini,.,,! of Docurr 

JUL 2 9 1965 







Vol. LI II, No. 1359 

July 12, 1965 

Address by Secretary Rusk 50 


by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser 60 

by Assistant Secretary Vaughn 66 

by Assistant Secretary Williams 71 


by William C. Foster 77 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 56 

For index see inside back cover 

Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace 

Address by Secretary Rusk 

It is a very great pleasure for me to be 
here. It is a privilege for me to salute my 
colleagues, present and retired, of the For- 
eign Service and to express to you the grati- 
tude of President Johnson and of the Amer- 
ican people for a service which is marked 
by so much competence, dedication, and 
personal commitment. 

Two and a half months ago President 
Johnson spoke to the world about Viet-Nam 
at the Johns Hopkins University in Balti- 
more.2 Today I wish to talk to you on the 
same subject — ^to you who know that such 
problems have deep roots, to you who have 
lived through and worked upon such prob- 
lems before, and to you who know that such 
matters can gravely affect the future of our 
nation and the prospects for general peace. 

' Made before the American Foreign Service Asso- 
ciation at the Department of State on June 23 (press 
release 160; as-delivered text). 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

The struggle in Viet-Nam has continued 
since April and indeed has grown the more 
severe. The harsh resistance of the Com- 
munists to any form of discussions or negotia- 
tion continues. The effort to destroy the 
freedom of Viet-Nam has been expanded. 
The trial by fire of the people of Viet-Nam 
goes on. Their own resistance has been 
courageous, but the need for American resolu- 
tion and for American action has increased. 

Aggression From the North 

The root of the trouble in Viet-Nam is 
today just what it was in April and has been 
at least since 1960 — a cruel and sustained 
attack by North Viet-Nam upon the people 
of South Viet-Nam. Now, as then, it is a 
brutal war — marked by terror and sneak 
attack, and by the killing of women and 
children in the night. This campaign of ter- 
ror has continued throughout the spring. 

Those of us who have not served in Viet- 
Nam may find it hard to understand just 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
Bffenciea of the Government with infor- 
mation on developmenta in the field of 
foreifirn relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officer* of the Depart- 

ment, as well aa special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concemins treaties 
and international agrreementa to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mat^ 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
Intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbiob: 52 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

NOTS: Contents of this publication u« 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
In the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter* 



how ugly this war of aggression has been. 
From 1961 to the present date the South 
Vietnamese armed forces have lost some 
25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded. In pro- 
portion to population, these South Vietnam- 
ese losses are 10 times as great as those 
suffered by Americans in the Korean war, 
and larger than our losses in World War II. 

Even more terrible than these military 
losses are the cruelties of assassination and 
kidnaping among civilian oiRcials and ordi- 
nary citizens. In the last 18 months, for 
example, more than 2,000 local officials and 
civilians have been murdered. When an of- 
ficial is not found at home, often his wife 
and children are slain in his place. It is as 
if in our own country some 35,000 civic 
leaders or their families were to be killed 
at night by stealth and terror. 

These are the methods of the Viet Cong. 
This is the test to which the people of Viet- 
Nam have gallantly responded. 

Meanwhile, from the North, heavy infil- 
tration has continued. Intelligence now shows 
that some 40,000 had come down before the 
end of 1964. Toward the end of that year — 
well before the beginning of our own air 
operations against North Viet-Nam — the in- 
filtration of regular North Vietnamese army 
units was begun, and important elements of 
that army are now known to be in place 
in South Viet-Nam and Laos, where they 
have no right to be. 

And so we face a deliberate and long- 
matured decision by a persistent aggressor 
to raise the stakes of war. Apparently this 
was their answer to our own repeated af- 
firmation that we ourselves did not wish 
a larger war. Apparently a totalitarian re- 
gime has once again misunderstood the de- 
sire of democratic peoples for peace and has 
made the mistake of thinking that they can 
have a larger war without risks to them- 
selves. And hence the airstrikes against 
military targets in North Viet-Nam. 

These actions have made infiltration 
harder. They have increased the cost of ag- 
gression. Without them South Viet-Nam to- 
day would face still stronger forces from the 

These measured air operations have done 
what we expected them to do — neither more 
nor less. For air attack alone cannot bring 
peace. I cannot agree with those who think 
it wrong to hit the logistics of aggression. 
It is the aggression itself that is the wrong. 
Those who worry about bridges and bar- 
racks and ammunition dumps would do well 
to give their sympathy instead to the daily 
victims of terror in South Viet-Nam. 

Efforts To Negotiate 

The other side is obviously not yet ready 
for peace. In these last months, the friends 
of peace of many lands have sought to move 
this dangerous matter to the conference table. 
But one proposal after another has been 
contemptuously rejected. 

We and others, for example, have sought 
to clear a way for a conference on Laos, 
and a conference on Cambodia — two neigh- 
boring countries where progress toward 
peace might be reflected in Viet-Nam itself. 
But these efforts have been blocked by 
North Viet-Nam and by Communist China. 

Twice there has been an effort at dis- 
cussions through the United Nations — first 
in the Security Council after the August at- 
tacks in the Tonkin Gulf,^ and later this 
April, when Secretary-General U Thant con- 
sidered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to ex- 
plore the possibilities of peace. But in Au- 
gust there was a refusal by Hanoi to come to 
the Security Council. And in April both Ha- 
noi and Peiping made it clear that they would 
not receive U Thant, and both regimes made 
plain their view that the United Nations is 
not competent to deal with that matter. 

Repeatedly our friends in Britain, as a co- 
chairman of the Geneva conference, have 
sought a path to settlement — first by work- 
ing toward a new conference in Geneva and 
then by a visit of a senior British states- 
man. But the effort for a conference in 
Geneva was blocked, and the distinguished 
British traveler was told that he should stay 
away from Peiping and Hanoi. 

Twice in April we made additional ef- 

For background, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272. 

JULY 12, 1965 


forts of our own. In Baltimore the President 
offered unconditional discussions with the 
governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping 
call this offer a "hoax." At that time the 
17 nonalined nations had appealed for a 
peaceful solution, by negotiations without 
preconditions. This proposal was accepted 
on our side.* It was rejected by Hanoi and 
by Peiping. And some of its authors were 
labeled "monsters and freaks." 

The President of India made constructive 
proposals — for an end of hostilities and an 
Afro-Asian patrol force. To us this proposal 
was full of interest and hope. But by Hanoi 
and Red China it was rejected as a betrayal. 

Our own Government and the Government 
of South Viet-Nam, in May, suspended air 
attacks on North Viet-Nam. This action was 
made known to the other side to see if there 
would be a response in kind. This special 
effort for peace was denounced in Hanoi as 
a "wornout trick" and denounced in Peiping 
as a "swindle." To those who complain that 
that so-called "pause" was not long enough, 
I would simply report that the harsh reac- 
tion of the other side was fully known before 
the attacks were resumed. And I would also 
recall that we held our hand for more than 
4 years while tens of thousands of armed 
men invaded the South and every attempt 
at peaceful settlement failed. 

Hanoi's Response 

Reports in the first half of June have con- 
firmed that all these violent rejections are 
in fact what they appear to be — clear proof 
that what is wanted today in Hanoi is a mili- 
tary victory, not peace, and that Hanoi is 
not even prepared for discussions unless it 
is accepted in advance that there will be a 
Communist-dominated government in Saigon, 
and unless too — so far as we can determine 
— American forces are withdravsm in ad- 

So this record is clear. And there is sub- 
stance in Senator Fulbright's conclusion 

* For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S. 
reply, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610. 

that "It seems clear that the Communist 
powers still hope to achieve a complete vic- 
tory in South Viet-Nam and for this reason 
are at present uninterested in negotiations 
for a peaceful settlement." For the simple 
truth is that there is no lack of diplomatic 
procedures, machinery, or process by which 
a desire for peace can be registered — that 
there is no procedural miracle through 
which peace can be obtained if one side is 
determined to continue the war. 

As I have said, Hanoi is presently ada- 
mant against negotiation or any avenue to 
peace. Peiping is even more so, and one can 
plainly read the declared doctrine and pur- 
pose of the Chinese Communists. They are 
looking beyond the current conflict to the 
hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia — 
and indeed beyond. 

But one finds it harder to understand 
Hanoi's aversion to discussion. More immedi- 
ately than the Chinese, the North Vietnam- 
ese face the costs and dangers of conflict. 
They, too, must fear the ambitions of Com- 
munist China in Southeast Asia. Yet they 
are still on the path of violence, insisting 
upon the forceful communization of South 
Viet-Nam and refusing to let their brothers 
in the South work out their own destiny in 

In recent weeks, after 2 months of re- 
duced activity, the enemy has sharply quick- 
ened the tempo of his military action in the 
South. Since early May, major Viet Cong 
units have returned to the battlefield, and 
already a series of sharp engagements has 
shown us that the fighting through the sum- 
mer may be hard. Setbacks have occurred 
and serious defeats have been avoided only 
by the combination of continuing Vietnam- 
ese bravery and effective air and other types 
of support. 

Losses on both sides have been heavy. 
From April first to date, we have had con- 
firmed reports of almost 5,000 Viet Cong 
dead, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese, and 
almost 100 Americans. We must expect these 
losses to continue — and our own losses may 



Role of U.S. Forces 

Since March we have deployed nine battal- 
ions of fighting men to South Viet-Nam. 
Six more are on their way. For as the Presi- 
dent said in April, "We will not be defeated. 
We will not grow tired. . . . We will do every- 
thing necessary . . . and we will do only what 
is . . . necessary." 

Our own battalions in South Viet-Nam 
have three related tasks. Their first assign- 
ment was and is to guard such major instal- 
lations as the airfield at Da Nang. A second 
and closely related task is that of active 
patrol in nearby areas. And the third is to 
join in combat support of Vietnamese forces 
— when such help is requested and when our 
Commander, General [William C] West- 
moreland, believes it should be given. 

American forces so committed will carry 
with them the determined support of our 
people. These men know, as all our people 
know, that what they do is done for freedom 
and peace, in Viet-Nam, in other continents, 
and here at home. 

Support for U.S. Action 

In authorizing combat missions for our 
ground forces in Viet-Nam, the President 
acted to meet his constitutional responsibil- 
ities as Commander in Chief. He has recog- 
nized the obligations of this nation under 
the Southeast Asia Treaty, which the Senate 
approved by a vote of 82-1. He has acted 
under the joint resolution of August 1964,^ 
which passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2 — 
and passed the House with no opposing vote. 
This resolution expresses our national read- 
iness — as the President determines — "to 
take all necessary measures to repel any 
armed attack against the forces of the 
United States" and "all necessary steps, in- 
cluding the use of armed force" to help 
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asian members of 
the SEATO who ask for help to preserve 
their freedom. 

The President has acted on the unani- 
mous advice of the American leaders in 

Saigon and his senior civil and military ad- 
visers in Washington. 

He has acted in full consultation with the 
Government of South Viet-Nam. 

And he has acted on his own considered 
judgment of what is necessary at this time 
to stop aggression. 

This decision — like all of our decisions in 
Viet-Nam — is open to review by Members of 
the Congress and open to reversal if it does 
not have their support. But the leaders of 
the Congress have been kept in close touch 
with the situation, and no such prospect 
should stimulate the hopes of enemies or 
the fears of friends. For America is not 
divided in her determination nor weak in her 

In Viet-Nam today we face one more chal- 
lenge in the long line of dangers we have, 
unhappily, had to meet and master for a 
generation. We have had to show both 
strength and restraint — courage and cool- 
ness — for Iran and for Greece, for Berlin 
and for Korea, in the Formosa Strait, and 
in the Cuban missile crisis. We mean to 
show the same determination and coolness 

In 1954 President Eisenhower pledged our 
support to the Government of Viet-Nam, to 
assist that Government, as he put it, "in de- 
veloping and maintaining a strong, viable 
state, capable of resisting attempted subver- 
sion or aggression through military means." " 
And this determination was reaffirmed 
again and again by President Kennedy. "We 
are going to stay there," he said. "We are 
not going to withdraw from that effort." " 
And that is our position still. 

Firmness and Restraint 

Now, as in April, as the President put it, 
"We will use our power with restraint and 
with all the wisdom that we can command." 

" For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268. 

° For text of a message of Oct. 1, 1954, from Presi- 
dent Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of 
the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, see ibid., Nov. 
15, 1954, p. 735. 

'A reply made by President Kennedy at a news 
conference on July 17, 1963. 

JULY 12, 1965 


For it is others, and not we, who have in- 
creased the scale of fighting. It is others, 
and not we, who have made threats of 
gravely widened conflict. The firmness with 
which we resist aggression is matched by 
the firmness with which we will refrain 
from ill-advised adventure. 

A few — a very few — may believe that un- 
limited war can take the place of the sus- 
tained and steady effort in which we are en- 
gaged, just as there may be a few — a very 
few — who think we should pull out and leave 
a friendly people to their fate. But the Amer- 
ican people want neither rashness nor sur- 
render. They want firmness and restraint. 
They expect courage and care. They threaten 
no one. And they are not moved by the 
threats by others. 

Role of South Viet- Nam 

This contest centers in the defense of free- 
dom for the people who live in South Viet- 
Nam. The sustained and increasing infiltra- 
tion from North Viet-Nam has required the 
measured use of air attack on military targets 
in the North. We alone cannot determine the 
future — could we do so there would be a 
prompt peace. The other side, too, must decide 
about the future. And we must hope they 
know — as we do — that increased aggression 
would be costly far beyond the worth to the 

The political turmoil in South Viet-Nam 
has continued. It is easy to be impatient with 
our friends in Saigon as they struggle to 
establish and sustain a stable government 
under the stress of war. We see there the 
ferment of a society still learning to be free, 
even while under attack from beyond their 

We must remember that this ancient people 
is young in its independence, restless in its 
hopes, divided in its religions, and varied in 
its regions. The turmoil of Viet-Nam needs 
the steadfastness of America. Our friends in 
Viet-Nam know, and we know, that our peo- 
ple and our troops must work and fight 
together. Neither of us can do the work of 
the other. And the main responsibility must 

always be with, and is fully accepted by, the . 
South Vietnamese. Yet neither of us can "go 
it alone." We would not be there without the 
urgent request for assistance from those 
whose land this happens to be. We have a 
tested faith in the enduring bravery of the 
people of Viet-Nam, and they, in turn, can 
count on us with equal certainty. 

Formula for Peace 

The people of Viet-Nam long for peace. 
And the way to peace is clear. Yesterday 
the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam set 
forth the fundamental principles that can 
provide a "just and enduring peace." Those 
principles, in summary, are : 

— An end to aggression and subversion. 

— Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose 
and shape for itself its own destiny "in 
conformity with democratic principles and 
without any foreign interference from what- 
ever sources." 

— As soon as aggression has ceased, the 
ending of the military measures now neces-* 
sary by the Government of South Viet- 
Nam and the nations that have come to its 
aid to defend South Viet-Nam; and the re- 
moval of foreign military forces from South 

— And effective guarantees for the inde- 
pendence and freedom of the people of 
South Viet-Nam. 

Now these are the fundamental steps. 
This is what the arguing and the fighting 
is all about. When they are carried out, we 
can look forward, as we have stated pre- 
viously many times, to the day when rela- 
tions between North Viet-Nam and South 
Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful 
means. And this would include the question 
of a free decision by the peoples of North 
and South Viet-Nam on the matter of re- 

This forthright and simple program meets 
the hopes of all and attacks the interests 
of none. It would replace the threat of con- 
quest by the hope of free and peaceful 



A Look to the Future 

And even while these hopes of peace are 
blocked for now by aggression, we on our side 
and other nations have reaffirmed our deep 
commitment to the peaceful progress of Viet- 
Nam and Southeast Asia as a whole. In 
April the President proposed to the nations 
of Asia and to the United Nations that there 
be constructed a new program of support for 
Asian efforts and called upon Mr. Eugene 
Black to assist them. Now in June this work 
is underway. The Mekong River project has 
been given new life. A new dam is ready to 
rise in Laos. A billion-dollar bank is in the 
making for the development of Southeast 
Asia. And in Viet-Nam itself new impetus 
has been given to programs of development 
and education and health. 

So let us call again on other nations — in- 
cluding the Soviet Union — to join in turning 
this great region of the world away from the 
waste and violence of a brutal war. For the 
hope of Asia is not in relentless pressure for 
conquest. It is in unremitting hope for pro- 
gress — a progress in which rice production 
could be multiplied manyfold, where the 
expectation of life could be doubled, the edu- 
cation of the young could be tenfold what 
it is today, and there could be an end of 
cholera and tuberculosis and intestinal para- 
sites and other human afflictions. 

In April the President offered determi- 
nation against aggression, discussion for 
peace, and development for the human hopes 
of all. And in June we reaffirm that three- 
fold policy. 

Aggression has increased, so that deter- 
mination must be greater than ever. 

Discussion is rejected, but our efforts to 
find a path to peace will not be stopped. 
We have welcomed the new initiative of 
Prime Minister Wilson and the Common- 
wealth Conference and regret that it has 
received so little reception on the other side. 

Beyond the terror of the aggressor and the 
firmness of our defense, we must, neverthe- 

less, look to the day in which many new dams 
will be built, and many new schools opened, 
and fresh opportunities opened to the peoples 
of Southeast Asia. For we must look beyond 
the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and 
over the hard path of resistance to the broad 
plain of progress which must lie ahead for 
the peoples of Southeast Asia. 

U.S. Shocked at Communist 
Brutality in Viet-Nam 

Department Statement ^ 

The regime in Hanoi and their puppet Lib- 
eration Front in South Viet-Nam have 
acknowledged their responsibility for the exe- 
cution of Sergeant [Harold George] Bennett 
and for the bombing of the My Canh Restau- 
rant in Saigon, in which 44 persons — Viet- 
namese, Americans, French, Swiss, and Fili- 
pinos — were killed and many more persons 
injured. They have compounded their brutal 
conduct by publicly bragging about their ac- 
tion and making threats to carry out even 
more outrageous acts. 

We in America and people around the 
world cannot help but be appalled and re- 
volted by this show of wanton inhumanity. 

These Communist threats to intimidate, of 
course, will not succeed. Our determination 
to help the embattled people of South Viet- 
Nam to avoid their falling under a regime 
which is capable of such brutality will only 
be strengthened, 

Hanoi's recent statements have surely also 
made it clear to anyone who may have had 
any doubt that it is the power directing the 
policies and actions of the Viet Cong, its 
instrument in South Viet-Nam, and must bear 
full responsibility for these acts. 

" Read to news correspondents on June 26 by 
Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News. 

JULY 12, 1965 


The Interdependence of Mankind 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 

Woodrow Wilson once said that "every 
man sent out of a university should be a 
man of his nation as well as a man of his 

A university graduate today who would 
be both a man of his nation and a man of 
his time must understand that the moral 
unity and interdependence of mankind, 
which has for centuries been the basis of 
Western civilization, has now become a 
physical fact of our lives. 

We have long understood that the brother- 
hood of all human beings implies responsi- 
bility for our neighbor. But today, in an age 
where science and technology have shrunk 
our physical neighborhood, no crisis is wholly 
foreign to us, no curse or blessing is received 
in isolation. In this world, responsibility for 
our fellow man is inescapable. 

In this contemporary era — where technol- 
ogy has led to a rapid multiplication of social 
relationships — interdependence has replaced 
solitary individualism as the central fact of 
our lives. 

As Barbara Ward has noted : 

In a world society in which hate is institutional- 
ized in war and self-interest in our web of economic 
relations, we can hardly survive unless we also insti- 
tutionalize the moral needs of man for community, 
for compassion, for dedication, and, let us not fear 
the word, for love. 

Because the "greatness of our institu- 
tions" has not matched "the grandeur of our 
intentions," ^ we are witnessing both in our 
nation and in our world a revolution of peo- 
ples against what Emmanuel Mounier called 

the "established disorder." Everywhere we 
see populations caught between soaring 
hopes and immovable traditions. 

In our nation this has produced the Negro 
revolution, a revolution against centuries of 
indifference and neglect, of oppression and 
exploitation. It is a revolution that is not 
over — indeed it has only begun. 

But it is a revolution that we know now 
is destined to succeed. 

Its success is assured because the people 
of this nation have realized that the perpetu- 
ation of a separate Negro nation in our midst, 
a nation whose people have been "deprived 
of freedom, crippled by hatred" — in Presi- 
dent Johnson's phrase — is morally intoler- 

While peaceful protest and legal redress 
of grievances have been important, in the 
end moral indignation has been decisive in 
bringing recognition of the validity of the 
Negro revolution in the United States. 

Pursuit of justice has triumphed over nar- 
row self-interest. Justice has triumphed be- 
cause modern prophets — from John LaFarge 
to Martin Luther King — have aroused our 
consciences and incited our action against 
an "established disorder" based on racism, 
the most pernicious form of injustice to arise 
in our time. 

^ Made at commencement exercises at Fordham 
University, New York, N.Y., on June 9. 

' For the as-delivered text of remarks made by 
President Johnson at the Alfred E. Smith memorial 
dinner at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 14, 1964, see 
White House press release dated Oct. 14. 



The Revolution Against Proverty 

In pursuing justice — ^the supreme virtue 
in the political order — an equally important 
challenge for a man of our time is that posed 
by the growing disparity between rich na- 
tions and poor, the widening gap between 
the affluent minority and the impoverished 
masses of the human race. 

A central fact of this decade — which will 
loom larger and larger for graduates of the 
class of 1965 — is that Western societies are 
exceedingly rich and almost all others are 
exceedingly poor. 

A small fraction of the human race living 
around the North Atlantic enjoys per capita 
incomes of $1,000 to $2,800 per year. Two- 
thirds of humanity subsists on a per capita 
income of less than $200 per year. 

It may be accidental — but it is surely not 
irrelevant — that most of the first group are 
white and most of the second are colored. 

Since 1960 the gap between the two 
groups has accelerated. To understand why 
it has been growing, one need only recall 
that in 1964 the United States added $30 
billion to its gross national product — the 
equivalent of 50 percent of the total national 
income of Latin America and 100 percent 
of the income of Africa. 

The relevance of this problem to the uni- 
versity graduate of today, and the obliga- 
tion of nations that are rich and advanced 
toward those that are poor and undeveloped, 
was spelled out in bold language by Pope 
John XXIII in his encyclical Mater et Mag- 
istra. He stated : 

The solidarity which binds all men and makes 
them members of the same family requires political 
communities enjoying an abundance of material 
goods not to remain indifferent to those political 
communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, 
misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elemen- 
tary rights of the human person. 

This is particularly true since, given the growing 
interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is 
not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring 
economic and social inequality among them persist. 

He concluded : 

We are all equally responsible for the undernour- 
ished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to educate 
one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which 

weighs upon each and every one, especially upon 
those who are more blessed with this world's goods. 

Just as our generation has inherited the 
responsibility for bringing to fulfillment the 
Negro revolution at home, it lies with your 
generation to insure the triumph of the revo- 
lution against crushing poverty around the 

The Responsibility of the Western World 

We who live in the Western World have a 
special responsibility, for it was we who 
launched the technological revolution that 
has produced dazzling wealth in the midst 
of squalor. 

We not only initiated the technological 
revolution but we have spread it to the 
world at large. And today we tolerate — by 
limited exertion if not by inaction — incon- 
ceivable disparities of wealth and destitu- 

As we in the United States are among 
those "more blessed with this world's goods," 
to use the Pope's phrase, we have a special 
obligation to take the lead in reducing these 

It is obvious that problems of poor na- 
tions will not be solved by external efforts 
alone. No transfer of resources from the 
rich nations to the poor will alone be suf- 

It requires a massive effort by local 
leaders in a country to end the shocking in- 
equality between privileged and impover- 
ished, between glittering capitals and fester- 
ing slums, between privileged urban enclaves 
and neglected rural areas. 

It requires not only the availability of 
technical resources but vision and will and 
determination on the part of those who 
would break the tyranny of poverty and bring 
to their peoples the wonders of the modern 

But our recognition of this fact should 
not blind us to the compelling truth that 
nations that are poor and undeveloped stand 
little chance of success without the help of 
those which are rich. 

It is not necessary here to engage in a 
detailed analysis of the process of develop- 
ment in undeveloped nations. Once we recog- 

JULY 12, 1965 


nize the existence of a universal common 
good and of international social justice — 
and show a willingness to commit ourselves 
to it — the technical problems of assistance 
can be solved. Not without difficulty — but 
they can be solved. 

Trade, aid, and private investment all 
will be needed to meet the requirements of 
developing nations — ^that is, if the poor 
nations of the world are to have a chance 
of breaking the ancient cycle. 

Despite our efforts since World War II 
to accelerate economic and social develop- 
ment, we are just standing still. During the 
past 3 years we have failed to progress at all ; 
indeed, we are slowing down. 

Yet each day we learn anew that the 
disorder which persists cannot be ended by 
political maneuver or military power alone. 
We learn anew of outbreaks of violence and 
turbulence, of peaceful revolutions turned 
into violent ones. We learn anew of disorder 
which invites communism — which so often 
comes as the scavenger of ruined revolutions. 

Peace Threatened by Economic Deprivation 

We now know that peace can be threatened 
by other forces than armies crossing borders 
and bombs and missiles falling from the 
sky. Peace can be threatened by social and 
economic deprivation, by destitution and 
hunger. If we are concerned about "peace- 
keeping" in all its aspects, then we dare not 
ignore this explosive threat which can erupt 
at any time. 

And it is time we learn that peacekeep- 
ing pertains not only to military forces 
and United Nations machinery. Peacekeep- 
ing pertains to every force that disturbs or 
threatens to disturb the peace of mankind. 

We must strengthen every economic insti- 
tution we have — and develop new ones if 
need be. If our existing financial and de- 
velopment institutions — all formed two de- 
cades ago with the establishment of the 
United Nations — need to be supplemented or 
modified, we should not hesitate to do so. 

In our interdependent world, disorder due 

to economic deprivation and underdevelop- " 
ment is the concern of all — the rich nations 
and the poor. When a crisis erupts — whether 
in the Congo or in Santo Domingo — the fate 
of all is affected. 

Only by a massive assault, carefully 
planned and superbly orchestrated, can so- 
cial and economic progress be made. Only 
by a massive assault can the burden of 
hunger and disease which brings disorder 
later be lifted from the peoples of man- 

Congress must be convinced of this. The 
doubts about the foreign aid program in 
recent years must be replaced by a new in- 
sight into our obligation, a new resolution 
to do the job that needs to be done. 

Our European friends — though they have 
expanded their programs during the past 
decade — still do far less than their capacity 

Similarly, unless we and the other wealthy 
nations of the Northern Hemisphere are 
willing to do our part to revise world trad- 
ing patterns to take into account the prob- 
lems of new, developing nations, they stand 
no chance of achieving economic viability 
through peaceful means. And as we know 
better each day, if peaceful revolution is im- 
possible, violent revolution is inevitable. 

Once we recognize the dimensions of the 
problems, we must then resolve to do the job 
that needs to be done — to expend the re- 
sources necessary. And we need to do this, 
not just because it is in our own interest, not 
just because of the Communist challenge, 
but as President Kennedy said in his inau- 
gural message — "because it is right." * 

When one looks back on the landmarks 
of the Negro revolution in our time — such 
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — some of 
the causes can now be clearly delineated. 
There can be no doubt that justice triumphed 
over injustice, the conscience of the present 
over the memory of the past, because men 
and women with consciences formed by a 
Judeo-Christian tradition took their convic- 

' Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 



tions seriously and translated them into ac- 
tion. This in the end was the difference be- 
tween failure and success. 

If a peaceful revolution against world 
poverty and the chaos that follows from it 
is to be won, it will require the same aroused 
action from men and women of religious 
inspiration — and all developed countries. It 
will require men and women who are de- 
termined to lead the rich peoples of the 
world to fulfill their obligations to the poor. 

It is the task of both the graduation class 
of 1965 and of our generation to convince 
the legislatures and the executives, not only 
of the United States but of Europe as well, 
that moral imperatives as well as physical 
security require a substantial commitment 
to long-range economic and technical as- 
sistance to the developing nations of the 

We must do this out of compassion, for we 
are our brother's keeper. And we also do it 
out of self-interest as well, for our lot is their 
lot, our future their future, our peace their 

In pursuing the global war on poverty, we 
must remember that it is not just a matter 
of satisfying physical needs and raising ma- 
terial standards of living. What is equally 
important is to inspire hope among both 
the leaders and the mass of the people, hope 
of a better day to come. 

In approaching the problem of poverty 
and chaos in an interdependent world, we 
should be guided by the vision of a great 
man who died here in New York 10 years 
ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. 

Through his vision we can come to under- 
stand that the growing interdependence of 
mankind caused by the technological revolu- 
tion can lead to a world civilization in which 
both persons and nations find their indi- 
viduality enhanced, find their mutual de- 

pendence and mutual fate a condition to be 
welcomed rather than a threat to be feared. 

The Pursuit of Peace 

Our concern about economic chaos and 
disorder, about world poverty and depriva- 
tion, is a part of our larger concern about 
world peace. All men profess to seek peace. 
But peace is like a flower — it needs fertile 
soil to grow. It cannot grow in the rocks 
of bitterness and poverty, in the dry sands 
of backwardness and despair. It needs the 
fertile soil of education and food, of health 
and hope. 

Peace is too important to be the exclusive 
concern of the great powers. It requires the 
attention of all — small nations and large, old 
nations and new. 

The pursuit of peace resembles the build- 
ing of a great cathedral. It is the work of 
generations. In concept it requires a master 
architect ; in execution, the labors of many. 

The pursuit of peace requires time, but 
we must use time as a tool and not as a 

We realize that the hopes and expecta- 
tions which may be aroused cannot all be 
satisfied in the immediate future. What can 
be accomplished in a limited time will always 
fall short of expectations. 

This should not discourage us. What is 
important is that we be prepared to give 
some evidence that progress toward peace — 
progress in the global war on poverty — is 
being made, that some of the unsolved prob- 
lems of peace can be met in the future. 

It is the challenge to your generation to 
convert the hopes for peace, the hopes for 
progress, the hopes for social justice for all 
into reality. With the benefit of 4 years in a 
great university, I am confident you will suc- 

JULY 12, 1965 


The Dominican Situation in tfie Perspective of International Law 

by Leonard C. Meeker 
Legal Adviser ^ 

I should like to talk this evening about a 
subject of current interest — the recent situa- 
tion in the Dominican Republic. 

There is much to be said on the merits of 
the actions taken by the United States Gov- 
ernment and taken by the Organization of 
American States. I should like to discuss 
these actions in relation to the situation on 
the ground in Santo Domingo and in rela- 
tion to the fabric of legal rules and princi- 
ples that govern the actions of individual 
countries and of international organizations. 

I should also like to consider the Domini- 
can situation more generally in the perspec- 
tive of international law. The situation in 
Santo Domingo has, as often in great mo- 
ments of history, evoked the expression of 
fundamentalist views about the nature of 
international law. 

Some commentators have been free with 
the use of categorical imperatives in talking 
about the international legal duties of the 
United States. Others have pronounced as a 
dogma that action by the inter-American 
system is incompatible with the responsibili- 
ties and functions of the United Nations 
and that by supporting the OAS involve- 
ment we have speeded the world organiza- 
tion on a path of decline and political dis- 

' Address made before the Foreign Law Associa- 
tion at New York, N.Y., on June 9 (press release 

What I should like to suggest is that re- 
liance on absolutes for judging and evaluat- 
ing the events of our time is artificial, that 
black and white alone are inadequate to 
portray the actuality of a particular situa- 
tion in world politics, and that fundamen- 
talist views on the nature of international 
legal obligations are not very useful as a 
means to achieving practical and just so- 
lutions of difficult political, economic, and 
social problems. 

I should say at the outset that my view of 
international law, as of other institutions 
that have been devised by human society, is 
a practical view. So that there should be no 
confusion or misunderstanding — to the ef- 
fect that I am expounding a cold or cynical 
philosophy — I should go on to say that my 
approach would properly be described as 
practical idealism. 

It does not seem to me that law and other 
human institutions should be treated as ab- 
stract imperatives which must be followed 
for the sake of obeisance to some supernat- 
ural power or for the sake of some supposed 
symmetry that is enjoined upon the human 
race by external forces. Rather, it seems to 
me that law and other institutions of society 
should be seen as deliberate and hopefully 
rational efforts to order the lives of human 
communities — from small to great — in such 
a way as to permit realization by all mem- 
bers of a community of the full range of 
whatever creative powers they may possess. 



U.S. Action in the Dominican Republic 

There has been a good deal of criticism, 
from various quarters, of United States ac- 
tion in the Dominican Republic as a throw- 
back to "gunboat diplomacy." We have been 
accused of violating the Charter of the 
Organization of American States — particu- 
larly articles 15 and 17, w^hich deal with 
intervention and use of force. Let us con- 
sider for a moment what the situation was 
in the Dominican Republic in late April of 
this year and what the choices were that 
presented themselves to the United States 
during a crucial period of history. 

The revolt that began on April 24 arose 
out of an unstable political situation in the 
Dominican Republic. The government headed 
by Donald Reid Cabral did not have a popu- 
lar mandate. It was trying to deal with an 
unsatisfactory economic situation which it 
had inherited. The government's efforts to 
correct the economic situation were reason- 
ably effective, but because of that fact they 
did increase the political strain. 

Some senior military officers who had 
been removed from key positions in a re- 
form program carried out by the Reid gov- 
ernment were obviously unhappy with that 
government. At the same time, junior mili- 
tary officers were complaining that the mili- 
tary reforms were not broad enough and 
that the government was acting too slowly 
in implementing them. 

The Dominican Revolutionary Party was 
seeking to restore to power former President 
Juan Bosch, who had been deposed in Sep- 
tember 1963. 

From these elements there arose a loose 
association which set off the April 24 

The next day Reid Cabral resigned and 
went into hiding. Rebels seized the national 
palace, and a leader of the Dominican Revo- 
lutionary Party was installed as provisional 
president. For a time the rebels appeared to 
be making headway. Then, on April 26, 
elements of the armed forces began to move 
against rebel-held areas of Santo Domingo. 
They conducted air attacks on the city. 

Meanwhile, large quantities of arms were 

distributed by the rebels to civilians, and 
disorder grew rapidly. Repeated efforts by 
the United States Embassy to bring about 
a cease-fire between the opposing factions 
were unsuccessful. In the course of April 26 
a large number of American citizens had as- 
sembled at a hotel west of Santo Domingo, 
seeking safety and assistance in being 

April 27 saw a complete breakdown of 
law and order. The rebel provisional presi- 
dent of only 2 days abandoned his office and 
took asylum in a Latin American embassy. 

During the course of April 28 the anti- 
rebel forces lost their momentum after ear- 
lier progress against the rebels. The situa- 
tion in Santo Domingo became increasingly 
confused. The breakdown in public order 
resulted in indiscriminate shooting on a 
rising scale. The police were no longer ef- 
fective. Armed mobs were terrorizing the 
city, firing on homes and other buildings, 
including the United States and other em- 

During this period the activities of Com- 
munist leaders in organizing mobs and in 
directing their wanton forays increased 
markedly. With the withdrawal of a num- 
ber of moderate political leaders from the 
rebel movement, it appeared that the Com- 
munists were in a fair way to take it over. 

Late in the afternoon of April 28 the 
antirebel military and police authorities in- 
formed the United States Embassy that 
they could no longer provide any assurance 
for the safety of American lives. 

This, then, was the situation on the 
Wednesday afternoon before President John- 
son ordered the landing of Marines to the 
west of the city of Santo Domingo.^ Let 
us look at the choices confronting the United 
States Government. 

One possibility would have been to wait 
and see. There is no telling how many 
American and other foreign nationals would 
have lost their lives in mob violence if this 
course had been followed. There is no tell- 

' For background, see Bulletin of May 17, 1965, 
p. 738. 

JULY 12, 1965 


ing how many hundreds and thousands of 
Dominican lives would have been sacrificed 
needlessly in the armed civil strife that had 
exploded in Santo Domingo. There was also 
a grave risk that Communist takeover of 
the revolt would fasten a new totalitarian- 
ism on the Dominican Republic which could 
not easily be dislodged. 

Another possibility would have been to in- 
tervene in the Dominican Republic on the 
side of the antirebel forces and to put down 
the revolt, as the United States was re- 
quested to do on April 28 by the antirebel 
military junta. 

Still another possibility would have been 
to intervene on the side of the rebels and 
seek to eliminate the extremists and restore 
moderate leadership to the revolt, ultimately 
imposing this kind of political solution on 
the whole country. 

In fact, the United States Government did 
none of these things. It chose instead a 
more complicated and, I believe, a more 
constructive course. We landed troops in the 
Dominican Republic in order to preserve the 
lives of foreign nationals — nationals of the 
United States and many other countries. We 
continued our military presence in the Do- 
minican Republic for the additional purpose 
of preserving the capacity of the OAS to 
function in the manner intended by the 
OAS Charter — to achieve peace and justice 
through securing a cease-fire and through 
reestablishing orderly political processes 
vdthin which Dominicans could choose their 
own government, free from outside inter- 

The Inter-American System 

The primary purposes for which the 
American states established the OAS, set 
forth in article 1 of its charter, are "to 
achieve an order of peace and justice, to 
promote their solidarity, to strengthen their 
collaboration, and to defend their sover- 
eignty, their territorial integrity and their 
independence." The OAS thus exists to assist 
the American states to maintain their rights, 
to defend their integrity, and to provide for 

their preservation and prosperity. The ac- 
tion of the United States gave the organs 
of the OAS the essential time in which to 
consider the situation in the Dominican Re- 
public and to determine means of preserv- 
ing the rights of that country under the 
inter-American system. 

Participation in the inter-American sys- 
tem, to be meaningful, must take into ac- 
count the possibility that chaos and terror in 
the streets can make a country ripe for a con- 
spiratorial group inspired from the outside 
to assault its independence and integrity. 

In the context of Cuba, only a few miles 
away, and of the announced drive of the 
Communists to expand their control in this 
hemisphere, external threat to the Domin- 
ican Republic was by no means fancified. 
The threat of a Communist takeover had to 
be viewed as very real. 

Here was the very kind of threat which 
the Latin American foreign ministers had 
in mind when they declared at Punta del 
Este in January 1962 : ^ 

The principles of communism are incompatible 
with the principles of the Inter-American system. 
. . . (and) adherence by any member of the Organi- 
zation of Amei'ican States to Marxism-Leninism is 
incompatible with the inter-American system and the 
alignment of such a government with the communist 
bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemi- 

This meeting of foreign ministers therefore 
urged : 

. . . the member states to take those steps that 
they may consider appropriate for their individual 
or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be 
necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity 
to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subver- 
sion, or other dangers to peace and security result- 
ing from the continued intervention in this hemi- 
sphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the 
obligations established in treaties and agreements 
such as the Charter of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States and the Inter-American Treaty of Recip- 
rocal Assistance. 

' For texts of resolutions adopted by the Eighth 
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af- 
fairs of the American Republics, see ibid., Feb. 19, 
1962, p. 278. 



Actions Taken by the OAS 

Let us consider next the course of events 
in the political organs of the inter-Amer- 
ican system, which had first discussed the 
Dominican situation on April 27 and 28 and 
which have been meeting continuously since 
the morning of April 29.* 

On that day, and during the next three, 
the OAS took the following actions : It called 
for a cease-fire; it appealed for the estab- 
lishment of an international neutral zone of 
refuge in Santo Domingo; it dispatched a 
five-member commission to the Dominican 
Republic; and it called upon member gov- 
ernments to supply food and medicine to 
the people of the Dominican Republic. These 
actions were taken in the light of the pres- 
ence of United States military forces in 
Santo Domingo. Without that presence, 
none of the OAS actions would have been 
meaningful. Without it, the OAS machinery 
for seeking an orderly political settlement 
in the strife-torn Dominican Republic could 
not have become effective. 

On May 6, the Tenth Meeting of Con- 
sultation of OAS Foreign Ministers re- 
solved : 

To request governments of member states that 
are willing and capable of doing so to make contin- 
gents of their land, naval, air or police forces avail- 
able to the Organization of American States, within 
their capabilities and to the extent they can do so, 
to form an inter-American force that will operate 
under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Con- 

The resolution also provided that the Force 
would have as its sole purpose, 

. . . that of cooperating in the restoration of 
normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in 
maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the 
inviolability of human rights, and in the establish- 
ment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation 
that will permit the functioning of democratic in- 

The countries contributing contingents to 
the Force were to work out among them- 

selves the measures necessary to establish 
a unified command of the OAS for this 
Inter-American Peace Force. Regulations 
for setting up the command were agreed 
among the six countries now contributing 
national contingents to the Force, and a 
general of the Brazilian Army assumed 
command of the Force on May 31, 1965. 

Substantial United States forces, includ- 
ing all of our Marine Corps units, have been 
withdrawn from the Dominican Republic 
since the formation of the Inter-American 
Force.^ United States military units that 
remain are included in the Force under the 
unified command. Under the relevant reso- 
lutions, it will be for the OAS to determine 
when the Inter-American Force shall be 
withdrawn from the Dominican Republic. 

Later, the OAS meeting of foreign min- 
isters took further actions, which were de- 
signed to lead toward a political settlement. 
On May 20, the meeting entrusted to the 
OAS Secretary General the functions of pro- 
viding good offices to the factions and 
groups in Santo Domingo. The following 
day, the meeting urged that the truce in the 
Dominican Republic be converted into a 
permanent cease-fire. Then, on June 2, the 
Meeting of Consultation appointed an ad 
hoc committee of three to join in providing 
good offices to all the parties in Santo Do- 

. . . for the purpose of achieving the establish- 
ment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that 
will permit the functioning of democratic institu- 
tions in the Dominican Republic and its economic 
and social recovery. 

That committee, made up of Ambassador 
[Ellsworth] Bunker and representatives of 
Brazil and El Salvador, is now in Santo 
Domingo at work on its OAS mandate. 

Lesson of the Dominican Crisis 

What then is the lesson of the Dominican 
Republic crisis for international law? There 
are at least two ways of looking at the 
matter : 

* For background and texts of resolutions, see ibid., 
May 17, 1965, p. 739; May 31, 1965, p. 854; June 7, 
1965, p. 908; and June 21, 1965, p. 1017. 

° For a statement made by President Johnson on 
June 1, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 992. 

JULY 12, 1965 


On the one hand, we might take a funda- 
mentalist approach. We might say that, de- 
spite the exigencies of the situation on 
April 28, the doctrine of nonintervention 
precluded the United States from sending 
troops into Santo Domingo. Or we might say 
that a request from a Dominican govern- 
ment, if we had chosen to recognize one, 
could have served to justify the landing of 
forces. We might simply have invoked the 
Monroe Doctrine. Or we might have chosen 
from among other reasons, perhaps even 
more theoretical, for taking or not taking af- 
firmative action. 

On the other hand, if, as I have suggested, 
international law is really the story of 
man's attempt to create satisfactory and 
useful human relationships, we should be- 
gin by looking at the facts. The facts show 
that Americans in Santo Domingo were in 
imminent danger of life and limb from riot- 
ing mobs. The facts show that, had the 
United States withdrawn its forces from 
Santo Domingo after the evacuation of 
United States and other foreign civilians, 
the situation would have reverted to an- 
archy and bloodletting. Without our troops, 
the OAS would now have no foothold for 
constructive multilateral action and peace- 
making efforts. Without our presence, it is 
quite possible the Dominican Republic could 
have been thrown into another 30 years of 

It will surprise no one here if I say that 
international law which cannot deal with 
facts such as these, and in a way that has 
some hope of setting a troubled nation on 
the path of peace and reconstruction, is not 
the kind of law I believe in. 

Over the last few years we have faced 
hard sets of facts several times. In 1962 the 
United States was subjected to a direct 
threat to its security when the U.S.S.R. 
placed strategic missiles in Cuba. The 
United States and the other members of the 
OAS took action to quarantine the island 
and compel removal of the weapons. 

At that time, some commentators dusted 
off old treatises to analyze the classical in- 
ternational law of blockade. They ques- 
tioned whether the American Republics were 

fulfilling the requirements of the venerable 
doctrine of blockade. Others questioned why 
the stationing of the missiles should not be 
considered an armed attack on the United 
States so as to bring into play the doctrine 
of individual and collective self-defense. 

In fact, the United States Government 
did not resort to any absolutes in theoreti- 
cal analysis or in the actions it took. We 
did not bomb; we did not invade; we did 
not do nothing. We recognized that, regard- 
less of any fundamentalist view of interna- 
tional law, the situation then existing re- 
quired us to take action to remove the 
threat and at the same time to avoid nu- 
clear war. In the tradition of the common 
law we did not pursue some particular legal 
analysis or code, but instead sought a prac- 
tical and satisfactory solution to a pressing 

To take another and current example, we 
are engaged today in a harsh and sangui- 
nary conflict in Viet-Nam. The world has 
learned at terrible cost that countries which 
are not willing to cooperate in resisting ag- 
gression away from home will soon find that 
aggression coming closer. If we have learned 
little else in world politics in this century, 
we have learned that appeasement does not 
satisfy and stop the appetite of aggression. 

Yet, today, the policy of the United States 
in Viet-Nam is subjected to criticism on 
some fundamentalist grounds. One analy- 
sis holds that the war in South Viet-Nam is 
a "civil war" and therefore we have no 
right to conduct airstrikes against the 
North. Another asserts that United States 
actions are in violation of the Geneva ac- 
cords of 1954 and 1962. Still others hold 
there is a Gordian knot to be cut by the sup- 
posedly clear expedient of military attack on 
mainland China — the source of Communist 
infection in Asia. 

These again are arguments based on ab- 
solutes at the expense of the facts — facts 
which are not simple but extraordinarily 
complex. Such arguments, failing to recog- 
nize the world which law is trying to 
shape, cannot hope to shape that world. 

We have heard also expressed recently 
the view that the United States should have 



turned some or all of these problems over 
to the United Nations to solve — indeed that 
our international obligations required us to 
do so. Again, I suggest that we look at 
the facts. Does it seem possible that the 
United Nations, with its General Assembly 
deadlocked over constitutional and financial 
issues stemming from peacekeeping opera- 
tions in the Middle East and Congo, could at 
this time take over from the United States in 
Viet-Nam and bring to that war-torn coun- 
try a peace with freedom? Of course, to ask 
this question is not to say that we should 
relax our effort to strengthen the United 
Nations' capacity to deal with the most dif- 
ficult of world political and security prob- 

In the case of the Dominican Republic 
was there any practical alternative to our 
seeking to engage the regional organization 
of this hemisphere in the tasks of restoring 
peace and building a democratic order? 
There should be no doctrinaire assumption 
that the United Nations and its Security 
Council are the exclusive guardians of world 
peace. In fact, the United Nations and the 
OAS are mutually reinforcing. We see from 
the actions of the two organizations that 
they have worked together toward common 
purposes. The United Nations has supported 
the cease-fire appeals and peacemaking pro- 
posals of the OAS. The latter, in its own 
region, has been operating to give effect to 
charter purposes and principles — to restore 
peace and to afford to the Dominican people 
the chance to decide freely their own future. 

Process of Creating International Law 

In closing, I should like to leave this 
thought : International law is being made by 
the actions of governments and international 
organizations as they seek to devise solu- 
tions for age-old problems and present crises. 
The arrangements and relationships they de- 
velop constitute much of the new and grow- 
ing fabric of this law. 

The history of national, regional, and 
global efforts at cooperation is a record of 
practical adjustments designed to carry the 
world community toward ends upon which 

there is general, if not universal, agreement. 
The charters of the United Nations and the 
OAS are important not least for identifying 
and setting forth some political goals that 
have special meaning and relevance for our 

One may hope that from an experience 
such as the Dominican Republic crisis na- 
tions will have gained knowledge useful 
for the future. From such experience, and 
from the experiment and innovation which 
are indispensable, they may find it possible 
to be better prepared to meet the next 
contingency when it arises. 

The process of creating international law 
is continuous. It is not a job that can ever 
be finished and complete. As we progress to- 
ward the accomplishment of familiar pur- 
poses, new goals are set and human effort 
reaches toward farther horizons. 

Thus it is that law grows out of life, and 
international law out of the life of nations. 

Pilot School Lunch Program 
Begins at Bogota 

White House press release dated June 19 

President Johnson announced on June 19 a 
pilot school lunch program for 2,400 children 
in Bogota, Colombia, a program that has re- 
sulted from cooperation between U. S. busi- 
nessmen, the U. S. Government, the people 
of the United States, and the Colombian Gov- 
ernment. The new project will take place 
at Ciudad Kennedy, a low-income suburb of 
Bogota, Colombia. 

Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Free- 
man will join a group of U. S. food industry 
leaders in dedicating the new school cafe- 
teria on July 4. They will leave July 1 to 
confer with Colombian officials on possibili- 
ties of getting similar lunch programs started 
in other schools, using U. S. know-how and 
increased participation by the people of Co- 

The original idea came from the U. S. food 
industry, which pledged its support about 6 
months ago — on the occasion of Freedom 

JULY 12, 1965 


From Hunger Week — at the Academy of Food 
Marketing at St. Joseph's College at Phila- 
delphia, when Secretary Freeman visited the 
academy. James O'Connor, executive direc- 
tor of the Academy of Food Marketing, is 
also cochairman of the Citizens Committee 
on Agriculture and Food for International 
Cooperation Year. 

Equipment for the new cafeteria — pat- 
terned after school lunchrooms in the United 
States — was donated and installed by some 
30 U. S. manufacturers, who have also paid 
for transportation and training of cafeteria 
personnel. The total investment in equip- 
ment and services is almost $90,000. 

U. S. Food for Peace commodities, to be 
furnished through CARE, will be supple- 
mented with fresh meat and produce to be 

bought by the Colombian Government, which 
will also furnish space for the cafeteria in a 
new school. The children will also pay a 
small amount for their lunches. 

Fourteen businessmen and their wives will 
attend the dedication and meetings, at their 
own expense. The project committee is com- 
posed of Harvey Stephens, chairman, senior 
vice president. Automatic Retailers of Amer- 
ica; Daniel J. Hanlon, Jr., vice president, 
Horn and Hardart Baking Co.; and Edward 
J. Piszek, president, Mrs. Paul's Kitchens. 

The cafeteria will serve 480 meals at one 
time and will operate five times daily, provid- 
ing meals for 2,400 children a day. Foods 
from the United States will include powdered 
milk, wheat llour, shortening, bulgur (a 
wheat product) , and beans. 

Housing and Urban Development in Latin America 

by Jack H. Vaughn 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^ 

The process of learning to cope with the 
acceleration of rural-urban migration com- 
pounded by centuries of cumulative neglect 
of the most elementary shelter and sanitary 
requirements presents a great challenge. This 
is true even when considered only as an aca- 
demic exercise by the collective disciplines of 
a university campus. Thrust under the harsh 
light of the economic realities of Latin 
America, the problem assumes characteristics 
that stagger the imagination. The quantita- 
tive dimensions of the problem join forces 
with its structural complexities to plague all 
those unwary enough to do battle with it. 

' Address made at the opening session of a joint 
meeting of the Pan American Congress of Architects 
and the American Institute of Architects at Wash- 
ington, D.C., on June 14 (press release 153). 

How did the United States, in the pursuit 
of its foreign policy objectives, become in- 
volved in the perilous process of urban 
growth in the developing countries? What 
is the nature and extent of this involvement? 
What have we learned from our experiences? 
These are the matters I propose to review 
with you this morning. 

The history of making loans for housing 
and urban development purposes has been 
brief. Prior to 1960 it was merely technical 
assistance responding to a particular request 
and generally involving public housing agen- 
cies. The United States, for example, sup- 
ported a training center of the Organization 
of American States to develop technicians for 
the production of low-cost housing. 

Beginning about 1961, technical assist- 



ance was largely supplanted by financial as- 
sistance, but there was considerable resist- 
ance to making loans for housing purposes. 
In general the argument ran that the con- 
struction of housing was largely a matter to 
be financed by local efforts and did not in- 
volve significant dollar costs. While the in- 
ternational financial community understood 
the need for housing, it was urged that dol- 
lar loans would make a greater contribu- 
tion to the economic development of Latin 
America if they were devoted to financing 
import requirements for economic develop- 
ment. On the other hand, the Latin Ameri- 
can countries had not developed financial in- 
stitutions which would provide the savings 
necessary for housing, and thus we were 
caught in a vicious circle in which the re- 
quirements for housing increased and neither 
local nor international financial institutions 
provided the requisite funds for housing 

However, we know that economic and so- 
cial turmoil flourishes and multiplies in the 
slums which abound in every Latin Ameri- 
can city and that, without some measure of 
political and social tranquillity, orderly, bal- 
anced economic development can never be 
achieved. More importantly, the average 
Latin American himself discovered, through 
radio and newspapers, that the degradation 
in which his family was being reared was not 
the only way to live. We applauded him as 
he demanded an increasing measure of en- 
vironmental dignity to assist him in his un- 
balanced struggle with life. 

Fortunately this aspect of our social sensi- 
tivity coincided with and, in all probability, 
was significantly responsible for the orienta- 
tion of a series of inter-American declara- 
tions of policy reaching their spiritual and 
operational climax in President Kennedy's 
Alliance for Progress. The Alianza estab- 
lished, once and forever, the respectability of 
using international lending resources to 
improve the living conditions of families 
throughout the hemisphere. 

The consequences of this policy adjust- 
ment have been enormous. The United States 
in approximately 5 years, through loans and 

guarantees, has made housing assistance 
available in the staggering amount of more 
than $600 million, and the probability is 
that this figure will be increased by at least 
an additional $250 million over the next 2 
years. When loans made for sewer and water 
systems are included, the total soars well 
over $1 billion. 

By itself this is an impressive figure, but 
measured against the overwhelming dimen- 
sions of the problem, with which most of 
you here today are all too familiar, it has 
virtually no quantitative meaning. $1 billion 
over 5 years is an insignificant percentage 
of a cumulative Latin American housing de- 
ficiency estimated conservatively to exceed 
$40 billion. The statistical impact becomes 
even less impressive if we acknowledge that 
over the same 5-year period the deficiency 
increased, because of new family formations 
and progressive obsolescence of existing 
dwellings, In an amount far greater than $1 

Since we all recognize that there will never 
be enough external resources available to 
meet the total requirements of even a single 
country, we have learned that the impact of 
our efforts can be meaningful only to the 
extent that we are capable of reducing the 
problem to manageable proportions. We con- 
cluded that the only way that we could have 
a significant impact on the housing situa- 
tion in Latin America was to encourage the 
development of savings institutions that 
would provide financing for housing. It was 
our view that we could help get these insti- 
tutions started by providing the initial cap- 
ital. But over the long run, funds for housing 
construction in Latin America would have 
to be provided by increasing the level of sav- 
ings by the Latin Americans themselves. 
From the long-range point of view, we are 
interested in the building of institutions, 
public and private, which will provide the 
legal, economic, and planning know-how and 
impetus to urban development. In fact, at 
this stage of development in Latin America, 
it may be that the institution is just as im- 
portant — if not more so — than the construc- 
tion of physical structures. 

JULY 12, 1965 


An Achievable Frame of Operations 

A statement of policy which embraces the 
spirit of the alliance within an achievable 
frame of operations would consist of the fol- 
lowing components : 

1. The ownership of a decent home and 
the land on which it is located is one of 
mankind's most compelling aspirations. Its 
fulfillment adds dignity and healthfulness 
to a family's existence. To the extent that 
homeownership becomes available to more 
families, political and social stability increase 
proportionately, as does the potential for 
balanced economic development. 

2. The principal missing ingredient from 
the formula to make homeownership avail- 
able to more families is the availability of 
long-term housing loans. The creation of in- 
stitutions which mobilize private savings and 
issue housing mortgages most effectively 
fills this void. A simultaneous development 
must be the creation of a vigorous and com- 
petitive private homebuilding industry. 

3. A great many families in developing 
countries do not have sufficient income to 
purchase a home even when long-term credit 
is available at reasonable rates of interest. 
This problem must be recognized and dealt 
with by the local governments, including the 
use of subsidies of various types as circum- 
stances may require. However, external 
loans, which are very limited in amount, 
should be used for institutions whose pro- 
grams are addressed to those families which 
can "pay the freight," since such loans must 
be repaid in order to be used over and over 
again for the full multiplier effect. 

4. The public sector also has a role to play. 
National institutions must be created or 

a. to assure sound programing of public 
resources ; 

b. to undertake essential regional and ur- 
ban planning functions ; 

c. to develop programs with local resources 
for families requiring subsidies; 

d. to initiate and supervise highly special- 
ized programs such as self-help, urban re- 
newal, squatter settlement upgrading, and 
slum clearance ; 

e. to encourage and assist the performance 
and organization of such nonprofit interme- 
diary institutions as housing cooperatives 
and trade union housing groups ; 

f, to assure national or municipal govern- 
ment provision of all sanitary, health, edu- 
cation, and other facilities in the public do- 
main which housing projects require for an 
ideal urban environment. 

5. External loans must have a correspond- 
ing contribution by local sources to the total 
cost of a housing program. The local contri- 
bution may be cash, housing sites, dowoi- 
payments, value of self-help labor, resources 
of trade union or housing cooperatives, sav- 
ings attracted by thrift and homeownership 
institutions, et cetera. 

Tile U.S. Aid Program 

Together with the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank, which makes housing loans 
exclusively with resources which it admin- 
isters on behalf of the Government of the 
United States, the Latin American Bureau 
of AID [Agency for International Develop- 
ment] has amassed the aforementioned hous- 
ing portfolio of more than $600 million. This 
has been done substantially in conformance 
with these broad criteria, and thereby a 
much greater advantage from the available 
resources has been achieved than would have 
been the case if we permitted the program 
to become one of subsidies subject to political 
favoritism. Neither have we permitted it to 
become a construction program, exclusively, 
dedicated only to the superficial objective of 
adding as quickly as possible an insignifi- 
cant number of houses to the existing woe- 
fully inadequate inventory. 

Our $600 million has produced from local 
sources almost an equal additional amount 
in support of the programs. Without excep- 
tion every home has been for sale rather than 
rent and every home has been built by pri- 
vate homebuilders selected almost always by 
a sealed competitive bidding process. Inter- 
mediary institutions have included housing 
cooperatives, savings and loan associations, 
trade union organizations, and national hous- 



ing agencies. Self-help, which actually has 
the final borrower building part of his home 
with his own hands, is a feature in more 
than 25 percent of all the loans. Technical 
assistance has been provided in support of 
virtually every type of homebuilding and 
housing finance activity and is now being 
expanded into more esoteric exploi-ations of 
such subjects as the urban community as a 
functioning organism and the politics of ur- 
ban devolopment. 

Because it has become a most striking 
phenomenon of the Alliance for Progress, 
very brief special mention is necessary at 
this time of the savings and loan programs 
of the hemisphere. The concepts of thrift 
and homeownership reach their natural 
fusion in these specialized private institu- 
tions. Their dramatic successes in Peru and 
Chile have caught the imagination of the 
other countries, and already savings and loan 
systems are flourishing in nine countries 
with more scheduled to start over the next 
12 months. Seed capital loans exceeding $80 
million have already been made with U. S. 
resources, and the results have been phenom- 
enal. The associations, none of which is older 
than 4 years, have more than 250,000 depos- 
itors and have generated more than $65 mil- 
lion in savings, which have been increasing 
at a monthly rate of more than $2 million. 
Approximately 28,000 homes have already 
been fmanced, and $126 million in home 
mortgages have been recorded. 

Notwithstanding these occasional dramatic 
triumphs, the stewardship of a billion dol- 
lars in urban development loans is at best 
a nerve-racking undertaking. Because of its 
very complex nature and the imminent pros- 
pect of its early expansion, we have recently 
completed an intensive self -analysis. We have 
discovered, without it being too much of a 
surprise, that responsibility for administer- 
ing the diverse housing and urban develop- 
ment activities has become dispersed among 
too many offices. This has been a result of 
the spectacular growth of the programs. We 
are, in effect, suffering from a kind of in- 
ternal urban sprawl. 

To make our programs more effective, we 

are establishing in the Latin American Bu- 
reau a new housing and urban development 
office. I take pleasure in announcing that 
Stanley Baruch, who has been known to most 
of you as the Housing and Urban Develop- 
ment Director of the Inter-American Devel- 
opment Bank for the past 4 years and who 
has accompanied me here this morning, has 
been appointed director of the new office 
and will inaugurate its operations 1 week 
from today. 

Housing Needs of Low-Income Families 

During my earlier comments there were 
very few references to low-income families. 
This was deliberate on my part. I consider 
that obsessive concentration on attempts to 
divide each country in Latin America into 
artificial categories of low-, middle-, and 
high-income families in order to decide 
who is and who isn't eligible to participate 
in the housing loans of the Alianza is com- 
pletely nonproductive. It is clear to us that 
the cost of a home and the terms of the loan 
are the only significant elements when eval- 
uating a family's ability to share in our pro- 
grams. Obviously a family which cannot af- 
ford to purchase the least expensive home 
built in a country, even under the generous 
terms and conditions of the loans of the Al- 
liance for Progress, is not eligible, in accord- 
ance with the criteria established by the 
legislative mandate under which we operate 
within the alliance, whether he be in the 
bottom 10 percent, 20 percent, or 50 percent 
of the family income groupings. 

The fact is that huge masses of families 
in newly developing countries are not able 
to afford the least expensive homes now be- 
ing produced. Some of these families never 
will be able to afford a home through their 
own efforts and will require subsidies in one 
form or another from local sources. AID has 
provided some $80 million for direct govern- 
ment action, largely for the lower income 
level. Most of the $190 million administered 
by the Social Progress Trust Fund of the 
Inter-American Development Bank is for 
low-income housing loans. At the same time, 
we are examining new means of reducing 

JULY 12, 1965 


squatter settlements that house so much of the 
urban population of Latin America and 
are exploring new ways of using Food for 
Peace for housing. 

There are many families, however, who 
are denied eligibility because no one has de- 
signed the house they can afford. We must 
be realistic in relating design standards to 
available resources rather than to the local 
editions of House Beautiful. We are in favor 
of beauty and understand that economic de- 
sign need not be ugly design. However, in 
the final analysis we must be ruthlessly prac- 
tical. Has a problem been solved, or has it 

We feel that the accumulated genius, ex- 
perience, and creativity here gathered must 
focus to its full capacity on the reduction of 
housing costs and that there must be ade- 
quate communication between the architects 
and those responsible for executing rational 
housing programs. 

We implore you to fulfill your natural role 
of leadership in seeking methods of dealing 
with these fundamental issues. We pledge 
you our full support in any reasonable joint 
venture to accomplish our common purpose 
of making improved housing conditions avail- 
able to an ever-increasing number of this 
hemisphere's population. 

President Asks for Funds 
for Canal Commission 

White House preas release dated June 22 

President Johnson transmitted to Congress 
on June 22 an amendment to the 1966 budget 
amounting to $7.5 million for the Interoceanic 
Canal Commission. 

The funds are needed for a study to de- 
termine the feasibility of, and the most suit- 
able site for, construction of a sea-level 
canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific 

Most of the funds will be used to initiate 
the collection of basic information on the 

topography, geology, and hydrology of po- 
tential canal sites. Studies, based on the 
data to be gathered by the on-site surveys, 
will be undertaken to determine the feasi- 
bility of both nuclear and conventional meth- 
ods of construction. Funds are also provided 
for administrative and operating expenses. 

The Commission must initiate its work in 
the fiscal year 1966 if it is to complete a 
final report prior to the statutory deadline 
of June 30, 1968. 

A tentative estimate of $7.5 million for the 
Interoceanic Canal Commission was specifi- 
cally included in the 1966 budget, but the 
formal request for an appropriation was 
withheld pending a review by the Commis- 
sion of its financial requirements. That re- 
view has now been completed and an appro- 
priation is needed to allow surveys, studies, 
and investigations to get underway. 

President Decides To Complete 
P.L. 480 Commitment to U.A.R. 

Department Statement ^ 

The President has determined that it is in 
the United States interest to fulfill remaining 
commitments under the Public Law 480 
agreement entered into with the United Arab 
Kepublic in October 1962, and which ends 
June 30, 1965. 

Accordingly, the Department of Agricul- 
ture is proceeding with the issuances of pur- 
chase authorizations totaling approximately 
$37 million, consisting of wheat, $22.4 mil- « 
lion; vegetable oil, $5.6 million; dried milk, | 
$0.1 million; tobacco, $8.9 million. 

In connection with the agreement, the 
U.A.R. Government has undertaken to enter 
into discussions with us on any outstanding 
differences and to resolve these to our mutual 

^ Read to news correspondents on June 22 by 
Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News. 



Southern Rhodesia Today 

by G. Mennen Williams 

Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^ 

Cecil John Rhodes, who gave his name to 
a segment of south-central Africa and pro- 
claimed his belief in "equal rights for all 
civilized men," probably would have diffi- 
culty adjusting to Southern Rhodesia in 
1965. Large numbers of that country's edu- 
cated African citizens are imprisoned or un- 
der detention for seeking elementary human 
rights long accepted as man's birthright else- 
where in the world. Southern Rhodesia, a 
self-governing British colony since 1923 un- 
der a white minority government, has en- 
acted stringent legislation designed to per- 
petuate control of nearly 4 million Africans 
by 215,000 whites. Nearly all of its black 
African leaders are either restricted to re- 
mote, primitive camps or are in voluntary 
exile. More than 2,000 black Africans have 
been arrested (restricted) under 1964 secu- 
rity legislation. 

The Government of Southern Rhodesia 
has stated publicly on numerous recent occa- 
sions that it is considering a unilateral dec- 
laration of independence from the United 
Kingdom, if current negotiations for inde- 
pendence are not successful. This indicates 
the extent of white Southern Rhodesian op- 
position to the British position that inde- 
pendence for the colony will be granted only 
with the consent of the majority of the in- 
habitants. The United States has given, and 
will continue to give, its support to a peace- 
ful transition to independence for Southern 

^ Address made before the Chicago chapter of 
the Federal Bar Association at Chicago, 111., on 
June 15 (press release 156 dated June 14). 

Rhodesia under a government based upon 
the consent of the governed. 

Tonight I would like to discuss some as- 
pects of the current difficulties in Southern 
Rhodesia. First, however, a brief review of 
some of the basic elements leading to the 
present problem will help put current diffi- 
culties in a more meaningful setting. 

Southern Rhodesia's high, fertile plateaus, 
rising from 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea 
level, have attracted many white immigrants. 
The country's major agricultural commod- 
ities are sugar, citrus fruit, corn, cotton, 
beef and dairy cattle, and tobacco. 

The mineral wealth Rhodes hoped to find 
in the country does not approach the value 
of that in South Africa or Zambia (formerly 
Northern Rhodesia), but there are impor- 
tant deposits of chrome, asbestos, gold, cop- 
per, coal, and some precious stones. There 
are well-developed processing and consumer 
industries, based on local raw materials, 
which have given Southern Rhodesia a so- 
phisticated and diversified economy. 

United States investment in Southern 
Rhodesia is estimated at $56 million in in- 
dustry, mining, and agriculture, a figure 
considerably smaller than that of the Brit- 
ish. British trade with the colony is about 
six times greater than ours. Last year 
Southern Rhodesia exports to the United 
States were $11 million, while imports 
from here were $21 million. In the same 
period British exports to Southern Rhodesia 
amounted to about $95 million, and imports 
from Southern Rhodesia to Britain were 
about $93 million. 

JULY 12, 1965 


There are 1,825 Americans resident in 
Southern Rhodesia, of whom half are mis- 
sionaries and their families. 

Southern Rhodesia was inhabited origi- 
nally by African Bantu peoples, now called 
Mashonas, who are generally believed to have 
established a flourishing and impressive 
civilization at Zimbabwe, in the southeast- 
ern part of the country, well before America 
was discovered. Today African nationalists 
call Southern Rhodesia by this old name of 
Zimbabwe. About 150 years ago a Zulu in- 
vasion by Matabele peoples moved north into 
Southern Rhodesia from South Africa. Some 
time later the first British explorers and 
missionaries arrived, following the explora- 
tory travels of David Livingstone. 

Expanding from his base in South Africa, 
Cecil Rhodes obtained a mineral concession 
in Southern Rhodesia and organized the 
British South Africa Company in 1889. The 
company founded the present capital city of 
Salisbury the next year. In 1895 the country 
was formally named Rhodesia in honor of 
Rhodes. It was administered under charter 
by the British South Africa Company until 
1923, when Southern Rhodesia became a full 
British colony after its white citizens re- 
jected union with South Africa and chose 
internal self-government. 

The Political Background 

An unsuccessful 10-year attempt at pool- 
ing the resources and manpower of the 
protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern 
Rhodesia and the colony of Southern Rho- 
desia in the Federation of Rhodesia and 
Nyasaland, or the Central African Federa- 
tion, collapsed at the end of 1963. Actually 
the outstanding black African political lead- 
ers had opposed the Federation from the be- 
ginning as a tool of white domination, and 
the African opposition in Nyasaland and 
Northern Rhodesia to policies determined in 
Salisbury, the federal capital, became more 
and more pronounced. African nationalists 
had great confidence in the British but none 
in Salisbury. In 1964 Nyasaland and North- 
ern Rhodesia came to independence under 
African governments as Malawi (Nyasa- 

land) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia). 
Southern Rhodesia remained a self-govern- 
ing British colony. 

During the last years of the Federation, 
and in preparation for its dissolution, new 
constitutions were adopted in each of the 
three countries. The December 1961 South- 
ern Rhodesian constitution established a 
technically nonracial franchise. However, 
the franchise was so surrounded with eco- 
nomic and educational qualifications for 
each elector that the "A" roll of 50 seats 
was primarily white and the "B" roll of 15 
seats was primarily black. The way was left 
open constitutionally for an eventual black 
African majority in the 65-seat parliament, 
as the economic and educational level of the 
black Africans advanced. This, according to 
the Southern Rhodesian Government at that 
time, would have taken 15 years. 

African nationalists, led by Joshua Nkomo 
and U.S.-educated Reverend Ndabaningi 
Sithole, however, refused to cooperate. They , 
launched a political boycott of the new con- I 
stitution by declining to register to vote or 
to run for parliament. African nationalists 
demanded that Great Britain give them "one 
man, one vote" immediately, without wait- 
ing for a rise in the economic and educa- 
tional level of the black Africans to meet the 
franchise qualifications. 

The United States was not satisfied that 
the December 1961 constitution went far 
enough in responsible progress toward self- 
government and so told the Southern Rho- 
desian Government. However, the United 
States also regretted the decision by the 
African nationalist leaders to withhold their 
political cooperation under the new consti- 
tution, and we urged them to reconsider 
their position. We continue to believe in the 
importance of black African participation in 
government as a normal development toward 

In the December 1962 election the pre- 
dominantly white voters, alarmed at what 
they regarded as unreasonable black African 
demands for equality and by events in the 
Congo, ousted the relatively moderate White- 
head government, which had negotiated the 



new constitution and certain civil rights 
measures in the hopes of developing racial 
partnership. They replaced it with the right- 
ist Rhodesian Front (RF) under Winston 
Field. When Prime Minister Field failed to 
move rapidly enough for the white extrem- 
ists in independence negotiations with the 
United Kingdom, he, in turn, was replaced 
in an April 1964 party revolt by his deputy, 
Ian Smith. Prime Minister Smith launched 
a vigorous and highly publicized drive to 
win independence from the United Kingdom 
through negotiation. 

The two African nationalist parties have 
been banned by the Southern Rhodesian 
Government. Both leaders, Nkomo of the 
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) 
and Sithole of the Zimbabwe African Na- 
tional Union (ZANU), are under detention, 
along with more than 2,000 of their support- 
ers — most without trial. This action was 
taken because of scattered African disorders 
and violence in mid-1964, after the Smith 
government came to power. 

Independence Movement of White Minority 

The increasingly strong threats of Prime 
Minister Smith's government to make a uni- 
lateral declaration of independence, if nego- 
tiations with the United Kingdom failed, 
and Prime Minister Smith's rejection of a 
British invitation to London caused concern 
in Britain. The Southern Rhodesian actions 
prompted Prime Minister Harold Wilson, on 
October 27, 1964, to issue a public warning 
to Southern Rhodesia that a unilateral dec- 
laration of independence would be "an open 
act of defiance and rebellion and it would be 
treasonable to take steps to give effect to it." 
Prime Minister Wilson concluded his warn- 
ing with these words : 

In short, an illegal declaration of independence in 
Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relation- 
ships between her and Britain; would cut her off 
from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most for- 
eign Governments and from international organiza- 
tions; would inflict disastrous economic damage 
upon her; and would leave her isolated and virtually 
friendless in a largely hostile continent. 

The next day, October 28, 1964, the U.S. 

Government issued a statement supporting 
Prime Minister Wilson's message. Our state- 
ment said : ^ 

We have on frequent occasions expressed our hope 
that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian 
problem acceptable to the majority of the people. 
We continue to hope that Rhodesia will gain in- 
dependence as a united nation with a government 
based upon the consent of the governed. We have 
been encouraged by the forthright position taken 
by the British Government in insisting that it would 
not sanction independence for Rhodesia until satis- 
fied that the people have been allowed the full exer- 
cise of self-determination. Prime Minister Wilson's 
message to the Rhodesian Prime Minister, published 
yesterday, makes clear some of the serious conse- 
quences which could befall all Rhodesians should 
their Government continue to follow its present 

Following the British warning of the con- 
sequences of a unilateral declaration of inde- 
pendence, the issue subsided for several 
months. The Rhodesian Government began 
to consolidate its position. It introduced 
more stringent security legislation to cur- 
tail the few political gains the black Afri- 
cans made in the closing years of the White- 
head administration. It also found ways of 
watering down the effectiveness of the dec- 
laration of rights in the 1961 constitution. 
The British Government, for its part, con- 
tinued to seek ways to work out a solution 
to the problem. 

In late February 1965 Commonwealth Re- 
lations Secretary [Arthur] Bottomley and 
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, paid a 
10-day factfinding visit to Southern Rho- 
desia. In his March 8 statement on the trip 
to the House of Commons, Mr. Bottomley 
said he returned with the main impression 
of a hardening of attitudes among both 
Europeans and Africans. He declared that 
the Southern Rhodesian problem must be 
resolved by negotiation to achieve a settle- 
ment acceptable to the majority of the popu- 
lation, and he stressed his Government's 
steadfast opposition to unconstitutional ac- 
tion. The Bottomley report pointed out that 
African nationalists also had responsibilities 
in the matter and couldn't simply sit back 

' Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1964, p. 721. 

JULY 12, 1965 


and await independence and control of the 

Southern Rhodesians thought the British 
were taking a tough, but not altogether un- 
reasonable, position. There was an indication 
they were somewhat reassured that the Brit- 
ish were acting in good faith. 

During the subsequent campaign for the 
Southern Rhodesian election held on May 7, 
heavy emphasis was placed by the governing 
Rhodesian Front on independence, not ex- 
cluding the possibility of a unilateral dec- 
laration of independence. In response to an 
official Southern Rhodesian Government 
white paper on the economic effects of such 
a declaration and the probable decisions of 
the British Government, Prime Minister Wil- 
son made a statement concerning the white 
paper on April 29 of this year. He said the 
paper completely misrepresented the likely 
economic effect on Southern Rhodesia of a 
unilateral declaration of independence. The 
British Prime Minister stressed the continu- 
ing validity of his October 27, 1964, state- 
ment concerning the disastrous economic 
consequences of such a declaration and the 
approval of that statement by the entire 
Commonwealth. He declared that Southern 
Rhodesia "cannot hope to defy Britain, the 
whole of the Commonwealth, nearly the 
whole of Africa and the United Nations." 

On May 6, during the United Nations Se- 
curity Council discussion of the Southern 
Rhodesian problem, Ambassador Stevenson 
pledged U.S. support for British efforts to 
reach a solution.^ He stated firmly that "the 
United States will not recognize a unilateral 
declaration of independence" by Southern 
Rhodesia. The next day, in the May 7 elec- 
tion, the Rhodesian Front won an over- 
whelming vote of confidence and captured 
all 50 of the "A" roll seats from the almost 
exclusively white electorate. 

This gave Prime Minister Smith better 
than the two-thirds majority he sought and 
has put him in the position of being able to 

•U.S./U.N. press release 4546/Corr.l; for other 
U.S. statements, see Bulletin of June 28, 1965, p. 

make fairly extensive amendments to the 
constitution. There are, however, certain 
"entrenched clauses" in the constitution 
which cannot be tampered with except by a 
series of referendums among all races of 
Southern Rhodesia voting separately. 

Following the election Prime Minister 
Smith made a number of conciliatory state- 
ments indicating his desire to obtain inde- 
pendence through negotiation, while holding 
a possible unilateral declaration of independ- 
ence as a last-ditch move if negotiated in- 
dependence proved to be impossible. African 
nationalists for their part have declared 
their intention, in the event of a declara- 
tion, to establish a government-in-exile. 

Deterioration of Conditions 

The United States has watched with re- 
gret the rapid deterioration of Southern 
Rhodesia's opportunity to build a viable mul- 
tiracial society. On my first visit to that 
country in 1961 there was considerable hope 
that problems of constitutional transition 
and accommodation between races could be 
worked out. Speaking to the Rhodesia Na- 
tional Affairs Association, before an inter- 
racial meeting in Salisbury, I expressed the 
position the United States held at that time : * 

... It is our genuine hope that political, social, 
and economic progress will occur without reference 
to the race of individual citizens and certainly with- 
out the derogation of the full rights of any element 
of the population. There are some who feel you 
are going too fast, and there are some who feel you 
are going too slow. But the important thing is that 
you have not set your face against the course of 
history. You are working toward the commendable 
goals of self-government by all the people and an 
interracial society. It is the speed with which you 
approach these goals which is the substance of 
your political dialog. We take it that it is your in- 
tention to get on with the job. 

Since that time conditions in Southern 
Rhodesia have deteriorated. We continue to 
follow the situation with keen interest, how- 
ever, and we are maintaining our contacts 
with the British and with all Southern Rho- 
desian factions. 

* Ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 600. 



Although we recognize the legal and con- 
stitutional limitations upon the British, we 
have stated publicly in the United Nations 
and told them privately that we believe they 
must be the catalyst in this situation. We be- 
lieve that their undoubted influence — polit- 
ical, financial, psychological, and moral — is 
the most effective means to bring all the 
parties together to negotiate a settlement of 
the problem by peaceful means. We also have 
appealed to all parties concerned not to re- 
sort to force and violence in seeking a solu- 

We have gone on record at the United 
Nations several times in favor of the appli- 
cation of the right of self-determination to 
Southern Rhodesia in a way that will (a) 
lead to timely universal adult suffrage and 
(b) preserve the rights of all the country's 
inhabitants, regardless of their color. Fur- 
thermore, and most importantly, we have 
supported Britain's determination not to re- 
linquish sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia 
until the government of that country is rep- 
resentative of the majority of its population. 

Legal and Policy Views of United States 

A unilateral declaration of independence 
could not alter the basic legal or policy views 
of the United States. Southern Rhodesia is 
a British colony accorded internal autonomy 
by the United Kingdom. The American con- 
sulate general in Salisbury deals with the 
Southern Rhodesian Government on this 
basis. Our relations may be characterized as 
"correct but cool." We continue to support 
all reasonable proposals for a peaceful solu- 
tion of Southern Rhodesia's problems that 
will be satisfactory to all parties. 

Neither a unilateral declaration of inde- 
pendence by the Southern Rhodesian Gov- 
ernment nor the establishment by African 
nationalists of a government-in-exile would 
warrant a different position regarding the 
legal status of Southern Rhodesia. Nor would 
they change the policy we follow of support- 
ing peaceful and agreed achievement of inde- 
pendence under a government established by 
the consent of the governed and ready to 
honor its international obligations. 

Let me make our position crystal clear, so 
there will be no misunderstanding. The 
United States will support the British Gov- 
ernment to the fullest extent, if asked to do 
so, in its efforts to reach a solution of the 
Southern Rhodesian problem. We would also 
support the British Government to the full- 
est extent in case of a unilateral declara- 
tion of independence in Southern Rhodesia. 
A unilateral break in the constitutional rela- 
tions of Southern Rhodesia with the United 
Kingdom by the Southern Rhodesian Gov- 
ernment would cause inevitable political, eco- 
nomic, and social chaos in the country. I am 
firmly convinced that an illegal minority 
government in Southern Rhodesia would not 
find international support or recognition. I 
therefore urge in the most serious manner, 
and with the utmost of good will, that the 
Southern Rhodesian Government recognize 
the full consequences of an act of rebellion. 

On another matter, the United States has 
been charged recently with supplying arms 
to the Southern Rhodesian Government. I 
would like to set the record straight on this 
point once and for all. The United States is 
not, I repeat not, supplying military arms or 
equipment to Southern Rhodesia. Nor have 
we supplied these items since the dissolution 
of the Federation in December 1963. 

The operations of the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development in Southern Rhodesia, 
which were never very large, were termi- 
nated completely on June 30, 1964. 

We do, however, maintain an active and 
successful information program in Southern 
Rhodesia. Recently a pioneer effort in a 4- 
day science fair for young students — both 
black and white — attracted 400 entries, more 
than 15,000 visitors, and widespread inter- 
est. There is a well-used U.S. Information 
Service library in Salisbury. We have stu- 
dent scholarship programs that bring about 
50 qualified young people of both major 
races to the United States to study annually. 
The first group of students is now finishing 
its studies and will be returning to Southern 
Rhodesia in the near future. There is also a 
small program to bring leaders and special- 
ists to visit the United States to keep pace 

JULY 12, 1965 


with the latest developments in their fields 
of specialization. 

U.S. Hopes That Reason Will Prevail 

Obviously many of the actions that would 
be forced upon the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and other governments in the 
event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral 
declaration of independence would not be 
happy ones for any of the parties concerned. 
I would like to conclude these remarks, 
therefore, with yet another expression of our 
Government's hope that reason can prevail 
in Southern Rhodesia. 

We firmly believe that the British Gov- 
ernment, with its broad experience in mat- 
ters of decolonization and with its determi- 
nation to see justice done for all the inhabit- 
ants of Southern Rhodesia, will do all it can 
to ameliorate the situation, and we hope that 
Southern Rhodesia and its people of all races 
will recognize the seriousness of the world's 
concern with events in that country. 

The United States has no special formula 
to advance for the solution of this complex 
problem beyond the only rightful and nat- 
ural one of timely majority rule. The ways, 
the means, and the pace at which this goal 
is achieved is for Southern Rhodesians — 
black and white — to work out for themselves 
with the help of the British Government. The 
country is big enough and rich enough for 
all its inhabitants to enjoy a full life with 
high living standards. It is a place where it 
is still possible to develop a successful ex- 
ample of how black Africans and white 
Africans can live and work in harmony for 
their mutual advantage. It is heartbreaking 
to see this goal in danger of being lost. 

For one thing, failure to find a solution to 
the problem of Southern Rhodesia's future 
could result in the formation of a tragic 
line drawn across Africa between the newly 
independent states and a white-minority-con- 
trolled region in southern Africa. We would 
find ourselves with a bitter confrontation 
drawn on racial lines which might require 
years to end. Such a situation would not be 
in the long-term interests of either black 
Africans or white Africans. 

The United States Government has been 
concerned for years with the question of 
Southern Rhodesia, not only because of our 
interest in the welfare of the people of that 
country but because the solution found 
there — whether bad or good — will have an 
extensive impact for a generation to come 
on the destiny of southern Africa and, in- 
deed, all of Africa. We have never been able 
to see the problem as one existing in a 
vacuum. Its impact also will have an im- 
portant effect upon the structure of the 
British Commonwealth and upon the United 

We have followed sympathetically the ef- 
forts of the British to prepare for independ- 
ence with majority rule. We have been 
confident that, despite the obstacles en- 
countered, the British— with the support of 
white and black Southern Rhodesians of 
good will — would develop a formula for a 
mutually agreeable, peaceful transition to 
government by the consent of the governed. 

We believe wholeheartedly in the correct- 
ness and validity of the present British 
position and are prepared to support it to the 
extent requested. 

United States Welcomes Japanese- 
Korean Agreements 

Following is the text of a statement by 
Secretary Rusk regarding the signing at 
Tokyo on June 22 of agreements between 
Japan and the Republic of Korea for nor- ■ 
malization of relations between the two coun- 
tries. Mr. Ruck's statement ivas read to news 
correspondents on June 22 by Robert J. Mc- 
Closkey, Director of the Office of News. 

The United States is pleased that Japan 
and the Republic of Korea have decided to 
take this highly constructive and important 
step. We believe that in addition to its mu- 
tual benefit to the two countries, the agree- 
ment will contribute to the strengthening of 
the free nations of Asia. 



Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations 

by William C. Foster 

Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^ 

My appearance before you today is the 
culmination of negotiations which, I believe, 
began about a year and a half ago. During 
that time exigencies in Washington, my at- 
tendance at the United Nations General 
Assembly in New York, and reconvenings of 
the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in 
Geneva, have forced me reluctantly more 
than once to postpone planned appearances 
before your distinguished group. 

And at this moment the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission is in session in 
New York. Although the Commission is now 
in perhaps the most important phase of its 
deliberations, I felt that I could not again 
deprive myself of the pleasure of being 
with you. 

I am not unaware of the possibility that 
when I have concluded my remarks you might 
ask, "Why not?" 

The patience shown by the Common- 
wealth Club in booking me for this occasion 
is a most necessary ingredient in my busi- 
ness, too. Patience has never been more im- 
portant than at this moment of time in our 
efforts to negotiate arms control and dis- 
armament agreements with the Soviet 

It was just 2 years ago to the week, and 5 
years after the opening of negotiations, 
that the then-Chairman Khrushchev ac- 
ceded to the late President Kennedy's urgent 
requests that the Soviet Union, the United 

Kingdom, and the United States sit down 
together once again to attempt to reach 
agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. You 
may recall that the President announced 
Soviet acceptance for discussions on this 
possibility in his memorable speech at 
American University in Washington on June 
10, 1963.2 

During the following month, the limited 
nuclear test ban treaty was negotiated in 
Moscow.^ It was signed in that city by the 
United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Soviet Union on August 5, 1963. 

I have delved briefly into history because, 
significant as the limited nuclear test ban 
treaty is to arms control and disarmament, 
what was even more significant was the 
basic decision by the Soviet leadership which 
led to the successful conclusion of those 

It seems to me that the outcome of the 
Cuban missile crisis led the Soviet Union to 
an important shift in its international poli- 
cies, bringing about a decided letup in the 
cold war and a major thrust forward of the 
policy of peaceful coexistence. That shift, of 
course, made possible the agreement on the 
limited nuclear test ban treaty. 

There have been other steps, too, which I 
would define as progress in arms control as 
a result of this shift in policy. I refer to the 
so-called "hot line" between Moscow and 

* Address made before the Commonwealth Club 
of California at San Francisco, Calif., on June 4. 

' Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2. 
' For background and text of the treaty, see ibid., 
Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314. 

JULY 12, 1965 


Washington; the United Nations resolution 
expressing the intention of all members to 
refrain from placing weapons of mass de- 
struction in space; and the simultaneous 
announcements of planned cutbacks in the 
production of fissionable materials for weap- 
ons use. 

The Soviet Union's shift in its interna- 
tional policies, I would suggest, was long- 
range in scope, designed for at least limited 
accommodation with the West without com- 
promising its goal of eventual world domi- 
nation. The new approach appeared also 
to represent a strategic move, in the face of 
Communist China's challenge to Soviet lead- 
ership of the Communist world, to prove that 
useful results can be attained from what the 
Soviet Union calls the policy of "peaceful 
coexistence" with the West. 

Finally, it probably represented recogni- 
tion of the need to pay greater attention to 
pressures for faster, increased internal de- 

The Problem of the Kremlin Leaders 

The Soviet Union is not on a smooth 
course, obviously. The contradictions in ide- 
ology between East and West, the struggle 
to maintain Communist world leadership 
against Communist China's open challenge, 
and other international situations — such as 
the one in Viet-Nam — all tend to make more 
difficult the efforts gradually to establish a 
relationship that would promote further 
progress in arms control and disarmament. 

The Soviet policy shift of 1963 may not 
have changed in 1965, but I would suggest 
that the course of history in the meantime 
has created problems of considerable magni- 
tude for the Soviet Union, and also for the 
United States and the rest of the world, in 
the area of arms control and disarmament. 

You probably are aware that the United 
States and the Soviet Union act as cochair- 
men of the 18-Nation Disarmament Com- 
mittee in Geneva. This is a good arrange- 
ment because, in addition to the plenary ses- 
sions of the conference, the cochairmen have 
the opportunity to discuss privately, free 
from public limelight, arms control and dis- 

armament proposals of either side. We 
have considered this a valuable opportunity 
for both sides. 

But it is precisely this function, shared 
in by the United States and the Soviet Un- 
ion, that presently creates a worrisome prob- 
lem for the Kremlin leaders at a time when 
they are being attacked by the Chinese 
Communists for collaborating with the 
United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union 
has found need to be as strident in tone as 
Communist China in attacking the United 
States' actions in Viet-Nam, the Congo, and 
lately the Dominican Republic. 

I suspect this is one of the reasons why 
the Soviet Union, on March 31, called for the 
reconvening of the United Nations Disarma- 
ment Commission, rather than the ENDC, as 
we call the 18-Nation Disarmament Conmiit- 
tee. The Commission is made up of 114 na- 
tions, the full membership of the General 

Neither the Soviet Union nor the United 
States is a cochairman of the Commission, 
and therefore the Soviets cannot be charged 
with collaboration with the United States. 
Also, the meetings of the Commission are 
public, with full opportunity for sounding 
the propaganda drums, particularly on its 
alleged distress at so-called "U.S. imperial- 
ist aggression" around the globe. 

Finally, perhaps the Soviet Union sought 
to preempt a world stage from Communist 
China through a meeting of the Disarma- 
ment Commission. You see, Communist 
China has no voice in the Commission. But on 
June 29 the mainland Chinese will attend 
the Bandung II Conference in Algiers, and 
the Soviet Union, so far as is presently 
known, has not been invited. Arms control _ 
and disarmament discussions almost cer- f 
tainly will occur at Algiers, but they are apt 
to be anticlimactic — or so the Soviets may - 
hope — in light of the various presentations f 
of those subjects in New York. 

The United States frankly was skeptical 
that a meeting of a large body, such as the 
UNDC, would produce any concrete re- 
sults. We wanted to go back to the ENDC at 
Geneva last February. We much prefer the 
smaller ENDC forum because, among other 



things, the delegates there, over the years, 
have become the foremost experts in the 
world in this highly complex field. 

However, since many nations accepted the 
invitation to convene the Disarmament Com- 
mission, the United States determined to 
participate in as constructive a manner as 

Soviet Proposals Unrealistic 

The Soviet Union and its allies have per- 
formed in the forum as we expected. They 
have all, in orchestrated fashion, seized the 
opportunity to attack the United States' 
presence in Viet-Nam, the Dominican Re- 
public, and elsewhere, distorting facts and 
maligning our motives with complete aban- 

The Soviet Union came up with its shop- 
worn, unrealistic, and nonnegotiable pro- 
posals. It was obvious from the start that 
the Soviet Union was flatly refusing even 
to discuss meaningful arrangements to halt 
the arms race at this time. On the other 
hand, the United States was — and is — pre- 
pared and willing to participate in the search 
for a mutually acceptable basis for progress 
in this most important field. 

In the light of present Soviet attitudes, 
it was not unexpected when, a week ago 
today, the Soviet Union submitted two 
draft resolutions ^ of a purely propagandistic 
nature. One of them called upon "all States 
maintaining military bases in other coun- 
tries to liquidate them forthwith and re- 
frain henceforth from establishing such 
bases"; and further called upon "the States 
concerned to conclude an agreement provid- 
ing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops 
within their national frontiers." The other 
called upon "all States to take steps to 
bring about the conclusion of a convention 
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and 

* For a statement made in the Disarmament Com- 
mission on Apr. 26 by U.S. Representative Adlai E. 
Stevenson, see ibid., May 17, 1965, p. 762. 

"U.N. docs. DC/218 and DC/219; the Soviet rep- 
resentative announced on June 15 that he would 
not insist on a vote on the Soviet draft resolutions 
at the current session of the Commission. 

thermonuclear weapons as soon as possible, 
convening for this purpose a special confer- 
ence of all States in the world not later 
than the first half of 1966," and it went on 
to invite "States possessing nuclear weap- 
ons to declare, pending the conclusion of 
such a convention, that they will not use 
them first." 

These are not realistic resolutions, and I 
so declared in my statement at the Dis- 
armament Commission last Tuesday [June 
1].* The political environment in which we 
have lived since World War II, in which na- 
tions have been threatened with Commu- 
nist aggression — in fact, sometimes have ex- 
perienced Communist aggression — has forced 
nations to establish alliances for defensive 
purposes. Our alliances are in keeping with 
the United Nations Charter. When and if the 
Soviet Union, Communist China, and their 
satellites decide to refrain from aggressive 
bent, then perhaps it will no longer be neces- 
sary to maintain our bases or troops on for- 
eign soil. The United States has a whole- 
hearted desire to see that time come. 

The ban-the-bomb proposal is just as un- 
realistic. The United States has already 
pledged itself in the Charter of the United 
Nations not to use any kind of force to com- 
mit aggression against the territorial integ- 
rity or political independence of any state. 
We have, on many occasions, offered full 
assurance never to use any weapon, large or 
small, with aggressive intent. What we have 
attempted to do is to reach meaningful, veri- 
fied agreements whereby these weapons, 
nuclear and conventional, could be reduced 
and ultimately eliminated. 

Declaratory statements of good intention 
are dangerous because they create false 
illusions. I believe we all remember that, 
although the Soviet Union and the United 
States at one time had an understanding on 
what some referred to as a "moratorium" 
on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the 
Russians breached that understanding in 
September 1961. In that series of tests, de- 
plored by the United Nations General As- 
sembly, the Soviet Union tested the biggest 

• For text, see U.S. /U.N. press release 4571. 

JULY 12, 1965 


bomb ever exploded in the history of man- 

The Soviet Union has refused to consider 
a nonproliferation agreement without a prior 
commitment from the West to abandon 
plans for a NATO multilateral force or for 
the British-proposed Allied nuclear force. 
Negotiations on a comprehensive test ban 
treaty, according to the Soviet representa- 
tive, can take place only on Russian terms — 
which are no on-site inspections. Other pro- 
posals were shrugged off as demands for 
control and espionage — without disarma- 

U.S. Proposals 

The United States, on the other hand, has 
again offered to negotiate a comprehensive 
test ban treaty, taking account of modifica- 
tions in its on-site inspection requirements. 
This has been made possible by a research 
program in which the United States has now 
invested about $300 million since 1959. Nev- 
ertheless, we believe some on-site inspec- 
tions still are necessary. Although the So- 
viet Union insists that unilateral means are 
adequate to detect possible violations, it has 
refused, despite our many invitations, to 
give any scientific proof of such a capabil- 
ity or agree to scientific exchanges in this 

The United States considers it a matter of 
great urgency that a nondissemination/ 
nonacquisition agreement be attained to pre- 
vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 
The Soviet objection to the MLF and ANF 
proposals is largely aimed at weakening and 
dividing NATO, a policy they have never 
ceased to follow. The Russians insist that 
the MLF/ANF proposals would constitute 
proliferation and would give control of nu- 
clear weapons to nations — particularly the 
Federal Republic of Germany — which do not 
now have them. 

The suggested Western ideas for nuclear 
arrangements within the alliance actually 
support nonproliferation, since no single 
participant would gain control of the weap- 
ons or, under the safeguards we propose. 

increase the ability to develop its own nu- 
clear weapons. 

We have, therefore, urged the Soviet Un- 
ion not to delay longer in reaching agree- 
ment with us, since we believe such an 
agreement should remove any genuine con- 
cern they may have regarding the MLF. 
The Soviet Union would then have further 
assurance that we mean what we say in pro- 
claiming that we are opposed to the dissem- 
ination of nuclear weapons. 

We also have urged that the Soviet Union 
join with us in stopping further production 
of fissionable materials for weapons use. 
Coupled with this proposal of ours is an- 
other, suggesting that the two nuclear pow- 
ers transfer a combined total of 100,000 kilo- 
grams of fissionable materials for peaceful 
purposes. The U.S. share would be 60,000 
kilograms, reflecting our superiority in this 

This is a more significant proposal than 
many people realize. Not only would it put 
the lid on all further production of fission- 
able materials for weapons use, but it would, 
of course, automatically limit general in- 
creases in nuclear arsenals. I might add that 
the transfer of 100,000 kilograms of fission- 
able material would represent, in terms of 
electric energy potential, about two-thirds as 
much as the entire electrical production of 
the United States in 1963. 

The Soviets show no interest. They say 
this is not disarmament but that it is con- 
trol for the purpose of espionage. 

Another important measure, introduced 
both in Geneva and again in New York, is 
President Johnson's proposal to explore a 
verified freeze on the number and characteris- 
tics of strategic nuclear offensive and defen- i 
sive delivery vehicles.'' An agreement on this ! 
measure would enable us to halt the 
most potentially destructive segment of the 
arms race and would prove to the world 
that the two major nuclear powers were in- 
deed serious in their intentions to halt and 
reduce the arms race. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 223. 



Agreement on the proposal would signifi- 
cantly reduce military expenditures. I leave 
to your imagination the constructive pur- 
poses to which these released funds might 
be put for the benefit of our people and of 
mankind generally. 

The United States is concerned that, as 
more power reactors are developed around 
the world, the byproducts of peaceful nu- 
clear activities could be diverted to weapons 
development. We consider it vital that such 
activities be under international safeguards. 
Accordingly, the United States has proposed 
and given its strongest support to the de- 
velopment of an international system of 
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by 
the International Atomic Energy Agency. We 
have offered some of our reactors for in- 
spection by the IAEA in the hope that the 
Soviet Union will do the same. We also are 
gradually transferring to the IAEA the ad- 
ministration of safeguards under our exist- 
ing bilateral agreements throughout the 

You will note that the United States pro- 
posals I have set forth in the foregoing 
represent a carefully developed program of 
related measures, designed to halt the fur- 
ther spread of nuclear weapons. Any one, 
or all, would contribute to this vital goal. 

Usefulness of Commission Sessions 

Skeptical as we were regarding the Soviet 
Union's motives for requesting the recon- 
vening of the Commission, and despite our 
doubt concerning a constructive outcome, I do 
not believe that the sessions have been a com- 
plete waste. Not only did Vv?e have the op- 
portunity to present our views and sug- 
gestions before every member nation of the 
United Nations General Assembly, but all 
other member nations, as well, had the op- 
portunity to be heard. 

Aside from the Communist orchestration, 
many of the other participants, both large 
and small, presented intelligent, constructive 
views. It provided us the opportunity to as- 
sess at firsthand those issues to which they 
gave greatest priority. And we found con- 

sensus on a number of issues. 

I have studied carefully the remarks made 
by the many delegations which spoke, and 
I believe that the following matters were 
given the widest area of support: 

Nearly every nation said that the 18-Na- 
tion Disarmament Committee should resume 
deliberations in Geneva as soon as possible. 
None, not even the Communist countries, 
openly opposed resumption of the ENDC. 

Many wanted a comprehensive test ban 

Many wanted a nondissemination/nonac- 
quisition agreement. 

Many wanted an agreement to halt the 
further production of fissionable materials 
for weapons use and the conversion of such 
materials to peaceful purposes. 

Many of the nations supported the veri- 
fied freeze proposal. 

We were heartened by the serious interest 
shown in our proposals and by the aware- 
ness of the need to curb proliferation of 
nuclear weapons now. 

One proposal which has been pressed by 
the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia is that of 
convening a world disarmament conference. 
The idea of convening a world conference 
appears to stem from the feeling on the part 
of many that Communist China, as a mili- 
tarily significant state, would have to be a 
party to arms control and disarmament 

However, it is also our view that further 
consideration should be given to the advis- 
ability and timeliness of a world conference. 
Consideration should also be given to the 
motives of Communist China if it were to 
attend such a meeting. Would that nation 
participate in an obstructive or constructive 
manner? Would Communist China seriously 
consider forgoing its present militarily ag- 
gressive posture to conduct itself within the 
framework of the United Nations Charter? 

These are indeed important considerations. 
There is no doubt but that at some stage in 
disarmament Communist China must enter 
as a party to agreements, or there can be no 
further disarmament. But until the Chi- 
nese exhibit a more constructive interest in 

JULY 12, 1965 


world peace and stability, I would suggest 
that such important first steps as can be 
taken now should not be deferred pending 
a change in the Chinese attitude. 

Present arms control requirements, with- 
out question, center around the imperative 
need to stop the further spread of nuclear 
weapons. Communist China's second nuclear 
weapons test, conducted at the very time the 
Disarmament Commission was in session in 
New York, highlighted the immediacy of this 

As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, the 
Soviet Union, following the Cuban missile 
crisis, apparently decided that its long-term 
interests might best be served by a relaxa- 
tion of the cold war and a more positive in- 
terest in its policy of peaceful coexistence. 

But during the past year, and reaching a 
climactic pitch during the present session 
of the Disarmament Commission, another 
change of attitude among nations has be- 
come markedly apparent. That change is the 
drastically increased feeling of the urgency 
in dealing with this problem of prolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons capabilities. 

The United States has long been aware of 
this and, in fact, first attempted to put the 
atom under peaceful control through the 
Baruch Plan of June 1946. Today, however, 
with a fifth country having tested nuclear de- 
vices and a number of others weighing de- 
cisions to develop a nuclear weapons capa- 
bility, the urgency of the problem has be- 
come crystal clear to almost all nations. 

And where time might be a factor in favor 
of improved Soviet-American relations, time 
definitely is not on humanity's side in our ef- 
forts to prevent the spread of nuclear weap- 
ons capabilities. 

Concern About Communist China's Tests 

While two tests have not made Communist 
China a nuclear power — and she will not 
be one of any significance for years to come 
— those tests had an unsettling effect 
throughout Asia, and particularly in India. 

There was obvious concern regarding the 
military threat implicit in the tests, but per- 

haps even greater concern that the prestige 
and influence of such countries as India and 
Japan would suffer. Indian prestige had al- 
ready suffered as a consequence of the mili- 
tary attack by China in 1962. There is the 
other factor that India is well advanced in 
the development of the peaceful uses of the 
atom — indeed further advanced than Com- 
munist China — and Japan is not far behind. 
But the psychological impact of China's test 
magnified her nuclear achievements beyond 
proper proportion. Furthermore, the success 
of the Chinese program was largely due to 
the considerable assistance supplied by the 
Soviet Union in the late 1950's. 

Fortunately, the Governments of India 
and of Japan have made the decision not to 
go nuclear in the weapons field. They are 
to be commended for making the decision. 
We believe it is wise on both political and 
military grounds. A reversal of this decision 
could start an unfortunate chain reaction, 
leading to similar decisions by other gov- 

It would be a fearful world, indeed, that 
housed not 5 but 10, 15, or 20 nuclear 
powers in the next decade or so. And among 
them, there might well be the unstable as 
well as the stable, the irresponsible as well as 
the responsible. 

The rapidly expanding peaceful uses of 
the atom program contributes to the dangers 
of proliferation. Significant quantities of 
Plutonium are being produced in peaceful 
nuclear power reactors around the world. 
Those quantities, of course, will be increased 
as more power reactors are built. It is es- 
sential that international safeguards be ap- 
plied to the operation of such reactors. 

I hope that you will agree that the prob- 
lem of proliferation is urgent. The steps that 
can be taken in this area must be taken now 
if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be 
stopped. The dreadful consequences of delay 
are all too obvious. 

The United States has proposed such steps. 
Our proposals are simple, easily verified, 
widely supported. 

Our proposals are embraced in a resolu- 



tion, tabled with the UNDC last Monday 
[May 31] .« That resolution urges the ENDC 
to reconvene as soon as possible, and to : 

A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority 
on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear 
weapon tests; 

B. Undertake without further delay drafting of 
an international non-proliferation agreement as 
called for in General Assembly resolution 1665 
(XVI) . . .; 

C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to 
halt all production of fissionable material for 
weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use 
sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and 

D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on 
the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear 
offensive and defensive vehicles which would open 
the path to early reductions in such vehicles. 

This draft resolution was tabled because — 
and I would like to reemphasize : 

1. The ENDC represents the most skilled 
body of disarmament experts in the world 
today ; 

2. The problem of proliferation is the most 
urgent one we face ; 

3. Nearly all the nations represented at 
the UNDC have given recognition both to 
the competency of the ENDC and to the 
urgency of negotiating the proposals set forth 
in our resolution ; and 

4. These are proposals possible of agree- 
ment. Not only do they serve the mutual in- 
terests of the Soviet Union and ourselves, 
but they are in the interest of all other na- 
tions as well. 

We would like to get back to Geneva and 
renew negotiations. 

Responsibility of Great Nuclear Powers 

It is to be regretted that the struggle for 
leadership of the Communist world going on 
now between Communist China and the 
Soviet Union is injected into important 
world affairs, such as the deliberations of 
the UNDC. 

It would be most regrettable if the strug- 
gle between these two nations should have 
a serious inhibiting effect when time is run- 
ning out on the possible solution of the prob- 
lem of proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

The overwhelming desire of nearly all the 
nations of the world to reach agreements on 
arms control and disarmament measures 
must not be subordinated by them to that 

Last night the President told the world 

The common interests of the peoples of Russia and 
the peoples of the United States are many, and this 
I would say to the people of the Soviet Union to- 
night: There is no American interest in conflict 
with the Soviet people anywhere. . . . We of the 
United States of America stand ready tonight as 
always to go with you onto the fields of peace, to 
plow new furrows, to plant new seed, to tend new 
growth, so that we and so that all mankind may 
some day share together a new and a bountiful 
harvest of happiness and hope on this earth. 

The Soviet Union is a powerful nation. It 
is one of the two great nuclear powers. It 
must then share with us the same respon- 
sibility to meet the just desires of our own 
people and those of other nations to reach 
balanced, verified arms control and disarma- 
ment agreement, by which all can benefit and 
none will suffer. 

Instead of a world conference as a plat- 
form for further Soviet Union vilification of 
the United States and its allies, we need to 
get back to the smaller, expert forum of 
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee for 
concentrated work on the many problems of 
arms control and disarmament. 

For our part, we are prepared to study 
seriously any proposals which will curb the 
spread of nuclear weapons. Our ovm propos- 
als are worthy of closest attention. 

Time is against us in this struggle. These 
matters demand urgent attention now. We 
think that the Soviet Union knows this. What 

'U.N. doc. DC/220/Rev. 1.; the U.S. representa- 
tive announced on June 15 that he would not insist 
on a vote on the U.S. draft resolution at the current 
session of the Commission. 

" For the substantive portion of an address by 
President Johnson before the Cook County Demo- 
cratic Party at Chicago, 111., on June 3, see Bulletin 
of June 21, 1965, p. 986. 

JULY 12, 1965 


is needed now is a decision on their 
part to act on that knowledge so that we 
may yet utilize the little time remaining to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The na- 
tions of the world have a right to demand 
this of the great nuclear powers.^" 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Continuation of the Use of Mobile Trade Fairs in 
Promoting the Foreign Commerce of the United 
States. Report to accompany H.R. 4525, H. Kept. 
343. May 12, 1965. 8 pp. 

Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American 
Organizations. Report No. 3 on "Winning the Cold 
War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive" by the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations and 
Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Com- 
mittee. H. Rept. 368. May 25, 1965. 565 pp. 

Implementing the Convention for the Safety of Life 
at Sea, London (1960). Report to accompany H.R. 
7954. H. Rept. 380. May 26, 1965. 18 pp. 

Balance of Payments Voluntary Agreements. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 5280. H. Rept. 385. May 
27, 1965. 9 pp. 

Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the 
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation 
Bill, Fiscal Year 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 
8639. H. Rept. 427. May 27, 1965. 41 pp. 

Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report to ac- 
company S. 2054. S. Rept. 267. May 27, 1965. 21 pp. 

Extension of the Export Control Act. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 7105. H. Rept. 434. May 29, 1965. 
22 pp. 

Proposed Supplemental Appropriation To Increase 
United States Quota to the International Mone- 
tary Fund. Communication from the President. 
S. Doc. 31. June 1, 1965. 2 pp. 

Southeast Asia Aid Program. Message from the 
President. H. Doc. 196. June 1, 1965. 3 pp. 

Mutual Defense and Development Programs, 1966. 
Communication from the President. H. Doc. 197. 
June 3, 1965. 2 pp. 


'° The U.N. Disarmament Commission concluded 
its session on June 16 after adopting two resolutions. 
One (U.N. doc. DC/224), adopted on June 11 by a 
vote of 89-0-16 (U.S.), recommended that the Gen- 
eral Assembly at its 20th session give "urgent 
consideration" to the "proposal adopted at the 
Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in 
October 1964 for the convening of a world disarma- 
ment conference"; the other (U.N. doc. DC/225), 
adopted on June 15 by a vote of 83 (U.S.)-1-18, 
recommended that the 18-Nation Disarmament Com- 
mittee should "reconvene as early as possible." 

U.S. Denies Plaque Violates 
U.N. Headquarters Agreement 

Following are the texts of two exchanges 
of notes (U.S./U.N. press release Jf57Jt dated 
June 3) between the U.S. and U.S.S R. Mis- 
sions to the United Nations concerning a 
bronze plaque on a building opposite the So- 
viet Mission. 


U.S. Note of February 24 

February 24, 1965 

The Permanent Mission of the United 
States to the United Nations presents its 
compliments to the Permanent Mission of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to 
the United Nations and refers to the latter's 
note No. 19 of January 15, 1965, protesting 
the unveiling by Congregation Zichron Eph- 
raim, a synagogue in the vicinity of the 
Soviet Mission to the United Nations, of 
a bronze plaque affixed to the wall of that 
synagogue reading : "Hear the cry of the op- 
pressed — the Jewish community in the So- 
viet Union". 

The United States Government recognizes 
and discharges the international obligation 
to accord foreign embassies and missions 
within its territories absolute protection 
against any form of violence or physical 
interference with performance of the em- 
bassy's or mission's legitimate function. In 
furtherance of its firm respect for this ob- 
ligation, the United States Government 
took all appropriate measures to ensure that 
the meeting to which the Soviet Mission 
refers was completely orderly, that no vio- 
lence occurred, and that there was no physi- 
cal interference with entry or exit into the 



Soviet Mission or with its performance of it^ 
normal functions. 

The Soviet Mission must also be aware 
that this scrupulous regard for international 
law and comity on the part of the United 
States Government, and the orderly and 
peaceful nature of the meeting held by the 
American citizens involved, were in strong 
contrast with occurrences of organized mob 
violence recently directed against official 
United States Government buildings in the 
Soviet Union, where inadequate protective 
measures by the local authorities resulted 
in damage to the embassy property, danger 
to embassy officials, and interference with 
the work of the embassy.^ 

The Soviet Mission should be aware of 
the fact that the erection of the plaque 
in question was a private action, with which 
the United States Government has had no 
association of any kind. The plaque is on 
private property belonging to the group of 
persons involved. Its erection has not re- 
sulted in violence against the mission or in 
impediment in any way to the fulfillment by 
the Soviet Mission of its functions. The 
plaque on the wall of the synagogue does not 
in any way violate, as claimed in the Soviet 
note of January 15, the Charter of the 
United Nations, the Headquarters Agreement 
of June 26, 1947, or principles of interna- 
tional law, since the privileges and immu- 
nities assured to the Soviet Mission thereun- 
der are not impaired by the plaque's erec- 

Soviet Note of January 15 

Official translation 

No. 19 January 15, 1965 

The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN 
presents its compliments to the US Mission to the 
UN and has the honor to communicate the following: 
As has been reported in the press, certain circles 
in the United States, which are kindling feelings of 
hostility among the American people toward the 
Soviet people and the USSR Government, are plotting 

' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, 
p. 289. 

a new provocation against the Soviet Union. Accord- 
ing to a press report, these circles are planning to 
organize an anti-Soviet demonstration and to dis- 
play, across the street from the building of the USSR 
Mission to the UN in New York, a provocative and 
insulting plaque regarding the Soviet people and 

This step cannot be assessed otherwise than as 
an integral part of that campaign of calumny which 
is being conducted in the US with the open con- 
nivance and sympathy of US officials. 

The USSR Mission to the UN considers it neces- 
sary to draw the attention of the US Mission to the 
illegality of such activities, which are in flagrant 
contradiction with diplomatic practice and with the 
generally recognized norms of international law. 
These provocative activities are also a gross viola- 
tion of the obligations undertaken by the US Gov- 
ernment under the UN Charter and also under the 
Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947. 


U.S. Note of May 28 

May 28, 1965 
The Permanent Mission of the United 
States to the United Nations acknowledges 
receipt of note number 225, dated April 24, 
1965, concerning a bronze plaque on a build- 
ing opposite the premises of the Permanent 
Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics to the United Nations. 

In this connection, the Government of the 
United States in its note of February 24, 
1965, made it clear that the erection of the 
plaque on Congregation Zichron Ephraim 
Synagogue in no way violates the privileges 
and immunities of the Soviet Mission to the 
United Nations. The Government of the 
United States has nothing to add to that note. 

Soviet Note of April 24 

Official translation 

No. 225 April 24, 1965 

The Mission of The Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics to the United Nations deems it necessary to 
inform the United States Mission to the UN of the 

On January 17, 1965, in New York, in spite of the 
appeal of the USSR Mission to the UN to the US 
Mission with the request to adopt measures to pre- 
vent the provocations being plotted, an anti-Soviet 

JULY 12, 1965 


demonstration was organized in front of the USSR 
Mission's building, in which the Mayor of New York, 
Wagner, and other official persons took part. At the 
same time a bronze plaque was installed opposite 
the Mission with an inscription which is slanderous 
and hostile to the Soviet Union. 

Such acts violate the normal conditions required 
by the USSR Mission to the UN for the perform- 
ance of its functions, and represent an impermis- 
sible violation of the privileges and immunities of 
the Mission, which are its due in accordance with 
the Agreement dated June 26, 1946 [sic] between the 
UN and the government of the USA regarding the 
location of the central offices of the United Nations, 
as well as of universally recognized principles of in- 
ternational law on diplomatic relations, which were 
laid down in the Vienna Convention of 1961. 

The US Mission's references to the fact that the 
above-mentioned plaque is installed on a building 
which is private property, do not in any way alter 
the substance of this matter, inasmuch as interna- 
tional law, as is well known, imposes on each state 
the obligation not to permit and to prevent the com- 
mission of unlawful acts on its territory against rep- 
resentatives of foreign countries on the part of pri- 
vate persons. The inaction of the American authori- 
ties in this case is still less understandable since the 
national laws of the USA directly provide that "it 
is unlawful to display any kind of flags, banners, 
posters or devices intended to intimidate, exert 
pressure or publicly present any foreign government 
in an unfavorable light . . ., closer than 600 feet 
from any building in the District of Columbia 
which is used or occupied by any foreign govern- 
ment or its representatives, such as: an embassy, a 
mission, a consulate . . ." (Law of Feb. 15, 1938, 
Chapter 29, par. 1). 

The conduct of the anti-Soviet assemblage in 
front of the USSR Mission, as well as the fact that 
the plaque bearing an anti-Soviet inscription is 
still in place a few steps from the building of the 
USSR Mission, run counter to the assurances given 
by US Ambassador Foy Kohler to the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of the USSR on February 9, 1965, 
to the effect that "effective measures are being 
taken in the USA to guard buildings relating to 
the Soviet Embassy or to the USSR Mission to 
the UN, specifically: a rule exists prohibiting dem- 
onstrations at a distance of less than 500 feet from 
embassy or mission buildings." 

In this connection the Mission of the USSR enters 
a protest against the negligence of the American 
authorities in permitting the above-mentioned pro- 
vocative acts and insists on the immediate removal 
of the slanderous inscription as well as on the 
prevention of similar provocations against the 
USSR Mission to the UN in the future. 

54 Nations To Attend October 
Meeting on Water Desalting 

White House press release dated June 20 

White House Announcement 

President Johnson announced on June 20 
that an international meeting on water de- 
salting, with delegates from more than 50 
countries, will be held at Washington next 
October. Planned for October 3-9, it will 
be one of the major events during the observ' 
ance of International Cooperation Year. 

Statement by President Johnson 

A shortage of fresh water is one of the 
most critical problems facing the nations of 
the world. Developing nations which face 
rapid population growth must establish ade- 
quate fresh water supplies if they are to 
achieve their potential. The world's seas and 
oceans offer an inexhaustible supply of fresh 
water — if economically feasible methods of 
desalting can be developed. 

The United States has been deeply in- 
volved in recent years in desalination re- 
search, sharing the results of this research 
with other nations : 

— A study is underway, supported jointly 
by the U. S. and Israel, to determine the 
feasibility of a large dual-purpose, power- 
water plant for construction on the Medi- 
terranean coast south of Tel Aviv.^ 

— American experts have visited the United 
Arab Republic and Tunisia to review water 
needs there and to study possible ways of 
solving water supply problems through de- 

— The United States has offered the serv- 
ices of the Office of Saline Water, an agency 
of the Department of the Interior, to the 
Government of Saudi Arabia as it works to 
bring water to the arid Jidda area. 

— Teams of visitors from Greece, Italy, 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, 
p. 635. 



Spain, Mexico, and other nations have visited 
U. S. desalting facilities and shared infor- 
mation with this nation's experts in the field. 
And the United States recently agreed with 
the Soviet Union to exchange information 
and visits by specialists in the water desalt- 
ing field.2 

Much of the information about desalting 
provided to other nations has been based on 
government and industrial work in desalting 
to solve domestic water supply problems: 

The largest water desalting plant operat- 
ing in the United States produces over a 
million gallons of fresh water a day, and 
even more efficient forms of desalting are 
under study. The Interior Department's Of- 
fice of Saline Water has award 15 contracts 
for design studies aimed at achieving a de- 
salting plant which would produce up to 50 
million gallons of water per day. 

The State of California, the city of San 
Diego, and the Interior Department cooper- 
ated in the construction of the Point Loma 
Desalting Plant, which was moved to Guan- 
tanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1964 to meet U. S. 
Navy water needs there. 

Discussions have begun between the In- 
terior Department and the State of California 
for a joint Federal-State research station in 
California to test components of multimillion- 
gallon-per-day desalting plants. Studies by 
the Atomic Energy Commission and the In- 
terior Depai-tment are inquiring into the 
possibility of building a nuclear desalting in- 
stallation in southern California. 

The knowledge developed through these 
programs will be available at the October 
symposium to all nations which need it and 
can benefit from work in the area of salt- 
water conversion. 

Countries Scheduled To Attend Symposium 

















El Salvador 



Saudi Arabia 




South Africa 








Syrian Arab Republic 






Trinidad and Tobago 





Malagasy Republic 

U. S. S. R. 


United Arab Republic 


United Kingdom 







President Assigns Functions 
for Participation in Coffee Group 


Participation in the International Coffee 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Constitution of the United States of America, the 
International Coffee Agreement Act of 1965 (Public 
Law 89-23, approved May 22, 1965, hereinafter re- 
ferred to as the Act), the International Coffee Agree- 
ment, 1962, ratified December 20, 1963, and pro- 
claimed January 17, 1964 (TIAS 5505, hereinafter 
referred to as the Agreement) , and Section 301 of 
Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President 
of the United States, it is ordered as follows: 

Section l. Secretary of State. Subject to the pro- 
visions of this Order, the powers of the President 
involved in the participation of the United States of 
America in the Agreement, including so much of the 
functions conferred upon the President by the Act 
as is neither reserved nor delegated to other officers 
herein, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of 

Sec. 2. Secnetary of the Treasury. The functions 
conferred upon the President by subsections (1) and 
(2) of Section 2 of the Act, together with the au- 
thority to issue and enforce such rules and regula- 
tions as may be necessary to perform such functions, 
are hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treas- 

Sec. 3. Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agri- 
culture, Commerce, and Labor. The functions con- 

■ Ibid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828. 

^ No. 11229; 30 Fed. Reg. 7741. 

JULY 12, 1965 


f erred upon the President by subsection (3) of 
Section 2 of the Act, together with the authority to 
issue and enforce such rules and regulations as may 
be necessary to perform these functions, are hereby 
delegated to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, 
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, severally. 

Sec. 4. Functions reserved. There are hereby re- 
served to the President the functions conferred upon 
him by Sections 5 and 8, and by the first sentence 
of Section 4, of the Act. 

Sec. 5. Coordination. The functions assigned by 
the provisions of this Order shall be performed under 
effective coordination. The measures of coordination 
hereunder shall include the following: 

(1) In effecting and carrying out the participa- 
tion of the United States of America in the Agree- 
ment, the Secretary of State shall consult with the 
appropriate heads of Federal agencies, including the 
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agri- 
culture, the Secretary of Conamerce, and the Secre- 
tary of Labor. 

(2) The delegates under Section 3 of this Order 
shall use the functions delegated thereunder as they 
and the Secretary of State shall mutually agree. 

Sec. 6. Redelegation. Each Secretary mentioned 
in this Order is hereby authorized to redelegate 
within his Department the functions hereinabove 
assigned to him. 

The White House, 
June H, 1965 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed beloiv) may be consulted at depository librae 
ries in the United States. U.N. printed publications 
may be purchased from the Sales Section of the 
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated May 27 from the deputy permanent 
representative of Turkey concerning Cyprus. S/ 
6384. May 27, 1965. 4 pp. 

Letter dated May 26 from the permanent represent- 
ative of Cyprus concerning "acts of provocation 
and aggression committed by the Turkish Cjrpriot 
rebels." S/6383. May 26, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated May 25 from the permanent represent- 
ative of Syria concerning "repeated aggressive at- 
tacks by Israel on the Syrian borders." S/6382. 
May 25, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated June 1 from the Charge d'Affairee a.i. 
of Australia enclosing a statement of the Govern- 
ment of Australia in reply to the Soviet Govern- 
ment concerning the dispatch of Australian forces 
to South Viet-Nam. S/6399. June 1, 1965. 4 pp. 

Letter dated May 25 from the representatives of 
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, 
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nica- 
ragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru concerning 
the OAS as a peacekeeping instrument. S/6409. 
June 3, 1965. 2 pp. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Letter dated February 24 from the deputy perma- 
nent representative of the United States re- 
garding Ranger VII moon photographs. A/ AC. 
105/25/Rev. 1. March 11, 1965. 2 pp. 
Letters dated March 24, April 7, and May 6 from 
the United States enclosing registration data 
concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond 
by the United States. As of December 31, 1964, 
A/AC.105/INF.93, March 30, 1965, 2 pp.; as 
of January 15, 1965, A/AC.105/INF.94, April 
13, 1965, 2 pp.; comprehensive report of all 
U.S. space vehicles as of December 31, 1964, 
A/AC.105/INF.95, May 11, 1965, 12 pp. 
Letters dated April 13 and May 15 from the per- 
manent representative of the Soviet Union 
transmitting registration data of its artificial 
earth satellites. For the period March 1-25, 1965, 
A/AC.105/INF.96, May 18, 1965, 2 pp.; for 
the period April 17-May 7, 1965, A/AC.105/ 
INF.97, May 18, 1965, 2 pp. 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations: 
Letter dated March 25 from the permanent rep- 
resentative of the Soviet Union transmitting a 
memorandum "regarding certain measures to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the United Na- 
tions in the safeguard of international peace 
and security." A/AC.121/2. March 26, 1965. 
6 pp. 
Report of the Secretary-General and the President ■ 
of the General Assembly. A/AC.121/4. May 31, ■ 
1965. 25 pp. ' 

Letter dated April 14 from the permanent represent- 
ative of Brazil transmitting a copy of the Final 
Act of the first session of the Preparatory Com- 
mission for the Denuclearization of Latin Amer- 
ica. A/5912. April 15, 1965. 9 pp. 
Note verbale dated May 13 from the permanent rep- 
resentative of Italy concerning Indonesia's with- 
drawal from the United Nations. A/5914. May 17, 
1965. 4 pp. 
1964 United Nations Pledging Conference on the 
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and 
the Special Fund. Statement of contributions 
pledged for 1965, as of April 15. A/CONF.29/2. 
May 20, 1965. 4 pp. 

Disarmament Commission 

Letter dated April 28 (U.N. doc. DC/213) from the 
permanent representative of the Soviet Union re- 
questing circulation of two Soviet documents on 
arms control and disarmament. Treaty on gen- 
eral and complete disarmament under strict in- 
ternational control, DC/213/Add. 1, April 28, 1965, 
31 pp.; memorandum on measures for the further 
reduction on international tension and limitation 
of the arms race, DC/213/Add. 2, April 28, 1965, 
9 pp. 




U.S. and Colombia Conclude 
Cotton Textile Agreement 

Press release 144 dated June 9 

The Governments of the United States 
and Colombia announced on June 9 the con- 
clusion of a bilateral agreement covering 
trade in cotton textiles between the two 
countries for a 4-year period extending 
from July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1969. 

The agreement is designed to promote the 
orderly development of Colombian cotton 
textile exports to the United States. It was 
negotiated under article 4 of the Long-Term 
Arrangement Regarding International Trade 
in Cotton Textiles, done at Geneva on Feb- 
ruary 9, 1962,1 and was concluded by an 
exchange of notes between U.S. Ambassador 
Covey T. Oliver and the Colombian Min- 
ister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Gomez 

The agreement results from bilateral 
talks held at Bogota between representa- 
tives of Colombia and the U.S. Departments 
of Commerce, Labor, and State. The talks 
led to a complete understanding between the 
two Governments on the future pattern of 
cotton textile trade between Colombia and 
the United States. 

The principal features of the agreement 
are as follows : 

1. The agreement covers all 64 categories 
of cotton textiles and continues in force for 
the period July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1969. 

2. During the first year of the agreement, 
Colombia will limit its exports of cotton tex- 
tiles to an aggregate of 24 million square 
yards equivalent and, within this limit, to 

^ For text of the long-term arrangement, see 
Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431. 

the following levels: a. yarn (Categories 
1-4), 12 million square yards equivalent; b. 
fabrics (Categories 5-27), 11,500,000 square 
yards; and c. made-up goods, apparel, and 
miscellaneous items (Categories 28-64), 
500,000 square yards. 

3. Within the aggregate and group limits, 
the agreement also provides export ceilings 
for seven specific categories of cotton fab- 

4. Colombia may exceed any of the group 
ceilings by 5 percent so long as the ag- 
gregate volume of exports does not exceed 
the aggregate limit of 24 million square 
yards. Similarly, Colombia may exceed any 
of the specific category ceilings by 5 per- 
cent so long as the aggregate of the exports 
does not exceed the applicable limits for the 
fabric group. 

5. During the first year of the agree- 
ment only, Colombia will be entitled to ex- 
port the following additional quantities to 
the United States: Categories 5 and 6, 1 
million square yards (not more than 25 
percent shall be in Category 6) ; Category 22, 
4 million square yards ; and Category 26, ex- 
cluding duck, 2 million square yards. 

6. A set of conversion factors is specified 
in the annex to the agreement to express 
various textile units in terms of a square 
yard equivalent. 

7. The two Governments agreed on con- 
sultation procedures to be followed in the 
event of an undue concentration of Colom- 
bia's exports to the United States in cate- 
gories for which the agreement provides no 
specific ceilings at this time. 

8. The aggregate, group, and category 
limits and ceilings will be increased by 5 
percent for the second 12-month period be- 
ginning July 1, 1966. For each subsequent 
year, each of the limits and ceilings will 
be increased by a further 5 percent over 
those of the immediately preceding 12-month 

9. The Government of Colombia will en- 
deavor to space exports evenly over each 
agreement year. 

10. The two Governments will exchange 
statistical information on cotton textiles as is 

JULY 12, 1965 


required for the effective implementation of 
the agreement. 

11. The export levels established by the 
bilateral agreement supersede the restraint 
actions taken by the U.S. Government over 
the past 12 months with respect to cotton 
textile exports from Colombia pursuant to 
article 3 of the Long-Term Cotton Textile 


Bogota, June 9, 1965 

U.S. Note 

No. 699 

Excellency: I have the honor to refer to recent 
discussions in Bogota between representatives of the 
Government of the United States of America and of 
the Government of Colombia concerning exports of 
cotton textiles from Colombia to the United States 
and to the Long Term Arrangements Regarding 
International Trade in Cotton Textiles done in 
Geneva on February 9, 1962. 

As a result of these discussions, I have the honor 
to propose the following Agreement relating to trade 
in cotton textiles between Colombia and the United 
States : 

1. For the first agreement year, constituting the 
twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1965, the 
Government of Colombia shall limit exports of cot- 
ton textiles from Colombia to the United States as 
follows : 

A. The aggregate limit shall be 24 million square 
yards equivalent. 

B. The following group ceilings shall apply: 

Thousand Square Tards 
Group Equivalent 

I. Yarn (Categories 1-4) 12,000 

II. Fabrics (Categories 5-27) 11,500 
III. Made-up Goods, Apparel, and 

Miscellaneous (Categories 28-64) 500 

Provided: That any of these group ceilings may 
be increased by five percent so long as the aggre- 
gate of all group ceilings does not exceed the 
aggregate limit. 

C. The following specific ceilings shall apply: 


or Categories 

Thousand Square Yards 

5 and 6 

1,000, of which not more than 25 

percent shall be in category 6 










2,000, of which not more than 350 

thousand square yards shall be in 


Providied: That any of these specific ceilings may 
be increased by five percent so long as the aggre- 
gate of all specific ceilings does not exceed the 
group ceiling for fabrics. 

2. In the event of undue concentration in exports 
from Colombia to the United States of cotton textiles 
for which no specific ceilings are stated in paragraph 
IC, the Government of the United States of America 
may request consultation with the Government of 
Colombia in order to reach a mutually satisfactory 
solution to the problem. The Government of Colom- 
bia shall enter into such consultations when re- 
quested, and until a mutually satisfactory solution 
is reached, the Government of Colombia shall limit 
the exports from Colombia to the United States of 
the item in question to an annual level not exceeding 
one hundred five percent of such exports during the 
most recent twelve-month period for which statistics 
are available to both Governments. 

3. Each of the limitations on exports established 
for the first agreement year in paragraphs 1 and 2 
of this Agreement shall be increased by five percent 
for the second agreement year, beginning July 1, 
1966. For each subsequent agreement year each of 
these limitations shall be increased by a further five 
percent over those of the immediately preceding 
agreement year. 

4. The Government of Colombia shall use its best 
efforts to space exports from Colombia to the United 
States within each category evenly throughout the 
agreement year, taking into consideration normal 
seasonal factors. 

5. The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica shall promptly supply the Government of Colom- 
bia with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles 
from Colombia, and the Government of Colombia 
shall promptly supply the Government of the United 
States of America with data on monthly exports on 
cotton textiles to the United States of America. 
Each Government agrees to supply promptly any 
other available statistical data requested by the other J 
Government. 1 

6. In the implementation of this Agreement the 
system of categories and the rates of conversion 
into square yard equivalents listed in the annex 
hereto shall apply. 

7. The Government of the United States of Amer- 
ica and the Government of Colombia agree to con- 
sult on any question arising in the implementation 
of this Agreement or with regard to trade in cotton 

8. All relevant provisions of the Long Term Ar- 
rangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton 
Textiles shall remain in effect between the two Gov- 
ernments except that the Government of the United 
States of America shall not exercise its rights under 
Article 3 of the Long Term Arrangements while ■ 
this bilateral Agreement remains in force. ■ 

9. This Agreement shall become effective on July 



1, 1965, and continue in force through June 30, 1969, 
provided that either Government may terminate this 
Agreement effective at the end of an agreement year 
by written notice to the other Government to be 
given at least ninety days prior to the end of such 
agreement year. Either Government may also pro- 
pose revisions in the terms of the Agreement no 
later than ninety days prior to the beginning of an 
agreement year. 

If these proposals are acceptable to the Govern- 
ment of Colombia, this note and Your Excellency's 
note of acceptance on behalf of the Government of 
Colombia shall constitute an agreement between our 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 



Vnit Factor 

CovEY T. Oliver 


List of Cotton Textile Categories and 

Conversion Factors foe Fabrics and 

Made Up Goods 




Yarn, carded, singles 
Yarn, carded, plied 
Yarn, combed, singles 
Yarn, combed, plied 











Ginghams, carded yarn 

Ginghams, combed yarn 



Sheeting, carded yarn 

Sheeting, combed yarn 

Lawns, carded yarn 

Lawns, combed yarn 

Voiles, carded yarn 

14 Voiles, combed yarn 

15 Poplin and broadcloth, 

carded yarn 

16 Poplin and broadcloth, 

combed yarn 

17 Typewriter ribbon cloth 

18 Print cloth, shirting type, 
80 X 80 type, carded yarn 

Print cloth, shirting type, 

other than 80 x 80 type, 

carded yarn 
Shirting, carded yarn 
Shirting, combed yarn 
Twill and sateen, carded yarn 
Twill and sateen, combed yarn 
Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., 

carded yarn 
Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s., 

combed yarn 
Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn 
Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yam 






sq yds 1.0 

Made Up Goods 

28 Pillowcases, plain, 

carded yarn 

29 Pillowcases, plain, 

combed yarn 

30 Dish towels 

sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 








31 Towels, other than dish 


32 Handkerchiefs 

33 Table damasks and 


34 Sheets, carded yarn 

35 Sheets, combed yarn 

36 Bedspreads, including quilts 

37 Braided and woven elastics 

38 Fishing nets 

Apparel ' 























sq yds 


sq yds 



sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 



sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 


sq yds 



sq yds 



sq yds 



sq yds 


sq yds 







Gloves and mittens 

Hose and half hose 

T-shirts, all white, knit, 
men's and boys' 

T-shirts, other, knit 

Shirts, knit, other than 
T-shirts and sweatshirts 

Sweaters and cardigans 

Shirts, dress, not knit, 
men's and boys' 

Shirts, sport, not knit, 
men's and boys' 

Shirts, work, not knit, 
men's and boys' 

Raincoats, % length or 
longer, not knit 

Other coats, not knit 

Trousers, slacks and shorts 
(outer), not knit, men's 
and boys' 

Trousers, slacks and shorts 
(outer) , not knit, women's, 
girls' and infants' 

Blouses, not knit 

Dresses (including uni- 
forms) , not knit 

Playsuits, washsuits, sun- 
suits, creepers, rompers, 
etc., not knit, n.e.s. 

Dressing gowns, including 
bathrobes, beach robes. 

not knit 

and boys' 

Briefs and 

and dusters, 
knit, men's 

men's and boys' 

Drawers, shorts and briefs, 
knit, n.e.s. 

All other underwear, not 

Pajamas and other night- 

Brassieres and other body- 
supporting garments 

Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s. 

Wearing apparel, not knit, 

All other cotton textiles 








doz. prs. 
doz. prs. 











































Colombian Note 

Unofficial translation 

Bogota, June 9, 1965 

Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge 
receipt of your note No. 699, of today's date, pro- 
posing a bilateral agreement relating to trade in 

^ Each component of apparel items imported in sets 
shall be recorded separately under its appropriate 

JULY 12, 1965 


cotton textiles between Colombia and the United 
States, which reads as follows: 

[text of U.S. note] 
I have the honor to inform you that this proposal 
is acceptable to the Government of Colombia. It is 
therefore agreed that your note and this note of 
acceptance shall form a bilateral agreement between 
our two Governments. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Fernando Gomez Martinez 

U.S. Letter 

Bogota, June 9, 1965 
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the 
Agreement between our two Governments concern- 
ing trade in cotton textiles signed today and to 
confirm my Government's understanding with respect 
to the exports of cotton textiles which are to be 
counted against the limitations in that Agreement. 
In view of the special circumstances described by 
the representatives of the Government of Colombia 
during the discussions from which this Agreement 
resulted, the Government of the United States 
agrees that during the first year of the Agreement 
only, exports of cotton textiles in the following 
categories and amounts shall not be counted against 
the limitations specified in paragraph 1 of the Agree- 

Current Actions 

Category or Categories 

Categories 5 and 6 

Category 22 
Category 26, 
excluding duck 

Thousand Square Yards 
1,000 of which not more than 
25 percent shall be in cate- 
gory 6 


I shall appreciate receiving your Excellency's con- 
firmation of the above understanding. Accept, Ex- 
cellency, the renewed assurances of my highest 

Covey T. Oliver 
Colombian Letter 

Unofficial translation 

Bogota, June 9, 1965 
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge 
receipt of your note of today's date which refers to 
the Agreement between our two Governments con- 
cerning trade in cotton textiles signed today and 
which reads as follows: 

[text of U.S. letter] 

I have the honor to confirm that this is also the 
understanding of the Government of Colombia. 

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my 
highest consideration. 

Fernando Gomez Martinez 


Satellite Communications System — Arbitration 

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COMSAT). 
Done at Washington June 4, 1965.^ 
Signature : Ministry of Communications of Jordan, 
June 22, 1965. 


Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) an- 
nexed to the international telecommunication con- 
vention, 1952, with appendixes and final protocol. 
Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into 
force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390. 
Notification of approval: Turkey, April 28, 1965. 

Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done 
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force 
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603. 

Notifications of approval: Byelorussian Soviet So- 
cialist Republic, May 10, 1965; Mexico, April 
28, 1965. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development and to amend annex I. Open for 
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva 
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.^ 
Notification of de facto implementation: Cyprus, 
June 4, 1965. 


Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature 
at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.' 
Acceptances deposited: Australia, June 22, 1965; 

United States, June 21, 1965. 
Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance: 
Cuba, June 14, 1965; Greece, June 21, 1965. 



Agrreement extending the agreement of June 14, 1960 
(TIAS 4524), relating to conditions governing the 
maintenance and operation of upper-atmosphere 
and cold-weather testing facilities at Fort Church- 
ill, Manitoba, with annex. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Ottawa June 11, 1965. Entered into 
force June 14, 1965. 

Agreement relating to the further joint use, opera- 
tion, maintenance, and support of the research 
range at Fort (IHiurchill, Manitoba, with annex. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 11, 
1965. Enters into force January 1, 1966. 


Agreement amending agreement concerning trade 
in cotton textiles of October 19, 1963, as amended 
(TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington June 22, 1965. Entered into 
force June 22, 1965. 

* Not in force. 




Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS 
5220, 5490, 5557, 5596, 5610, 5808). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Washington June 22, 1965. 
Entered in force June 22, 1965. 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Kampala May 29, 
1965. Entered into force May 29, 1965. 


Foreign Relations Voiume on Britisii 
Common weaitli, Europe for 1944 

Press release 157 dated June 21, for release June 28 

The Department of State on June 28 released 
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19ii, Volume 
III, The British Commonwealth and Europe, the 
second in the series of annual volumes for the year 

This volume includes documentation on the rela- 
tions of the United States with the United Kingdom 
and nations of the Commonwealth in the year that 
saw the Normandy landings, the successful invasion 
of Hitler's Europe, and American recognition of the 
provisional government of France under General 
de Gaulle. Volume III also covers American diplo- 
macy with respect to the nations of Europe, begin- 
ning with Albania and proceeding in alphabetical 
order through Poland. Documentation on the re- 
maining European nations will be included in a sub- 
sequent volume of the series. 

Students of American diplomacy will find of par- 
ticular interest the negotiations leading to the sign- 
ing of armistices with Bulgaria and Hungary and 
the postarmistice problems of occupation and control 
occasioned by Soviet policy regarding Eastern Eu- 
rope. There is full documentation, likewise, on 
American concern over Soviet policies and actions 
in the liberated areas of Poland. The volume also 
includes papers on the difficulties caused by the fail- 
ure of American efforts to persuade Finland to with- 
draw from the war and the consequent rupture of 
Finnish-American relations. 

Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States, 
19U, Volume HI, The British Commonwealth and 
Europe (viii, 1,478 pp.; publication 7889) may be 
obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, 
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402, for $4.75 each. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20A02. 
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc- 
uments, except in the case of free publications, which 
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services, 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 

Sovereignty of the Sea. Background and reference 
data on oceanography and its increasing implications 
for national security in U.S. foreign affairs. This 
publication, which includes discussions, technical ex- 
planations, tables and diagrams, is primarily con- 
cerned with rights the United States and other coun- 
tries have on, over and under the surfaces of the 
oceans. Geographic Bulletin No. 3. Pub. 7849. 31 
pp. 25(f. 

Status of the World's Nations. A revision of the con- 
cise reference guide prepared by The Geographer 
which gives the official nomenclature, area popula- 
tion, and capital city of all independent states. 
Quasi-independent states and "irregular categories" 
of political areas and regimes are also discussed. 
Geographic Bulletin No. 2 (Revised May 1965). Pub. 
7862. 21 pp. 25<f. 

Protocol for Prolongation of International Sugar 
Agreement of 1958. Agreement with other Govern- 
ments—Done at London August 1, 1963 — Signed 
subject to ratification, for United States September 
27, 1963. Entered into force with respect to the 
United States February 27, 1964. TIAS 5744. 35 
pp. 15«(. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Cen- 
tral African Republic. Exchange of notes— Dated at 
Bangui December 31, 1964. Entered into force Janu- 
ary 1, 1965. TIAS 5747. 5 pp. 6(t. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan. 
on .^M^ of notes— Signed at Washington February 
TT A l^^h^ E"*ered into force February 26, 1965. 
liAb5764. 9 pp. 10^. 

Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agiee- 

ment with Thailand, amending the agreement of 

March 13 1956, as amended— Signed at Washington 

^T a'^c I'nJ-^^'^k Entered into force March 5, 1965. 
ilAt> 5765. 2pp. 50. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes— Signed at 
banto Dommgo January 28 and February 2, 1965 
li-ntered into force February 2, 1965. TIAS 5766 
4 pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia 
—Signed at Tunis February 17, 1965. Entered into 

^°/f o ^nnr^^V ^'^' 1^65- With exchange of notes. 
llAb 5767. 11 pp. 100. 

North Atlantic Treaty: Co-operation Regarding 
Atomic Information. Agreement with parties to the 
North Atlantic Treaty— Done at Paris June 18, 1964. 
Entered into force March 12, 1965. TIAS 5768. 13 
pp. 10«(. 

Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of 
December 7, 1964. Exchange of notes— Signed at 
Nairobi February 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb- 
ruary 15, 1965. TIAS 5769. 2 pp. 5^. 

Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels to Argen- 
tina. Agreement with Argentina. Exchange of notes 
— Signed at Buenos Aires February 1 and 17, 1965. 
Entered into force February 17, 1965. TIAS 5770. 
2 pp. 5«!. 

JULY 12, 1965 


Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels to China. 

Agreement with China. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Taipei February 23, 1965. Entered into force 
February 23, 1965. TIAS 5771. 8 pp. 10(*. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade 
March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965. 
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5772. 6 pp. 5«f. 

Mutual Waiver of Certain Claims. Agreement with 
Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon 
February 9, 1965. Entered into force February 9, 
1065. TIAS 5773. 3 pp. 54. 

Tracking and Communications Station — Continua- 
tion of Expanded Use of Station at Empalme-Guay- 
mas, Sonora. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Mexico February 27, 1965. En- 
tered into force February 27, 1965. TIAS 5774. 11 
pp. 10«(. 

Education — Financing of Exchange Programs. 

Agreement with Denmark, amending agreement of 
May 28, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Copen- 
hagen February 18 and 25, 1965. Entered into force 
February 25, 1965. TIAS 5775. 4 pp. 5<t. 

Defense — U.S. Communications Facility on Military 
Reservation at Mount Cabuyao. Agreement with the 
Philippines. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila 
March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965. 
TIAS 5776. 7 pp. 10«(. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Bolivia. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz 
March 16, 1965. Entered into force April 15, 1965. 
TIAS 5777. 3 pp. 5<t. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at Quito March 
26, 1965. Entered into force March 26, 1965. TIAS 
5779. 4 pp. 5(f. 

Safety of Life at Sea. Convention, with regulations, 
vdth Other Governments — Signed at London June 17, 
1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. With proces- 
verbal of rectification — Done at London July 5, 1962. 
TIAS 5780. 396 pp. $1.25. 

Relief Supplies and Packages. Agreement with India 
amending agreement of July 9, 1951, as extended. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi January 
21, 1965. Entered into force January 21, 1965. TIAS 
5781. 3 pp. 6(?. 



Edward R. Fried as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for International Resources, Bureau of Economic 
Affairs, effective June 22. 

Joseph A. Greenwald, as Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Trade Policy and Economic 
Defense, Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective June 

Ciieck List of Department of State 
Press Releases: June 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to June 21 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
144 and 147 of June 9 and 153 and 156 of 
June 14. 
No. Date Subject 

157 6/21 Foreign Relations volume re- 

*158 6/21 Jova sworn in as Ambassador to 
Honduras (biographic details). 

*159 6/21 Osborn designated Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary for Educational 
and Cultural Affairs (bio- 
graphic details). 
160 6/23 Rusk: American Foreign Service 
Association (as-delivered text). 

*161 6/25 Harriman: African-American 
Chamber of Commerce, Inc., 
New York, N.Y. (excerpts). 

* Not printed. 



INDEX July 12, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1S59 


Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota 65 

President Decides To Complete P.L. 480 Commit- 
ment to U.A.R. (Department statement) . . 70 

American Republics. Housing and Urban De- 
velopment in Latin America (Vaughn) . . 66 

Asia. Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace (Rusk) . 50 

Atomic Energy. Roadblock to Arms Control and 
Disarmament Negotiations (Foster) ... 77 

China. Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarma- 
ment Negotiations (Foster) 77 


Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota . 65 

U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile 
Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 84 

President Asks for Funds for Canal Commission 70 

Department and Foreign Service. Designations 
(Pried, Greenwald) 94 

Disarmament. Roadblock to Arms Control and 
Disarmament Negotiations (Foster) .... 77 

Dominican Republic. The Dominican Situation 
in the Perspective of International Law 
(Meeker) 60 

Economic Affairs 

Fried and Greenwald designated Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretaries 94 

Housing and Urban Development in Latin Amer- 
ica (Vaughn) 66 

The Interdependence of Mankind (Humphrey) . 56 

President Asks for Funds for Canal Commission 70 

President Assigns Functions for Participation in 
Coffee Group (Executive order) 87 

U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile 
Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89 

Europe. Foreign Relations Volume on British 
Commonwealth, Europe for 1944 93 

Foreign Aid 

Housing and Urban Development in Latin Amer- 
ica (Vaughn) 66 

The Interdependence of Mankind (Humphrey) . 56 

Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota . 65 

Human Rights. The Interdependence of Mankind 
(Humphrey) 56 

International Law. The Dominican Situation in 
the Perspective of International Law (Meeker) 60 

International Organizations and Conferences 

The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of 
International Law (Meeker) 60 

54 Nations To Attend October Meeting on Water 
Desalting (Johnson) 86 

President Assigns Functions for Participation in 
Coffee Group (Executive order) 87 

Japan. United States Welcomes Japanese- 
Korean Agreements (Rusk) 76 

Korea. United States Welcomes Japanese- 
Korean Agreements (Rusk) 76 

Non-Self-Governing Territories. Southern Rho- 
desia Today (Williams) 71 

Presidential Documents 

54 Nations To Attend October Meeting on Water 
Desalting 86 

President Assigns Functions for Participation in 
Coffee Group 87 


Foreign Relations Volume on British Common- 
wealth, Europe for 1944 93 

Recent Releases 93 

Science. 54 Nations To Attend October Meeting 
on Water Desalting 86 

Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia Today 
(Williams) 71 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 92 

U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile 

Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89 
Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament 

Negotiations (Poster) 77 

U.S. Denies Plaque Violates U.N. Headquarters 

Agreement (exchange of U.S. and Soviet 

notes) 84 

United Arab Republic. President Decides To 
Complete P.L. 480 Commitment to U.A.R. (De- 
partment statement) 70 

United Kingdom 

Foreign Relations Volume on British Common- 
wealth, Europe for 1944 93 

Southern Rhodesia Today (Williams) .... 71 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 88 

Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament 
Negotiations (Foster) 77 

U.S. Denies Plaque Violates U.N. Headquarters 
Agreement (exchange of U.S. and Soviet 
notes) 84 


U.S. Shocked at Communist Brutality in Viet- 
Nam (Department statement) 55 

Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace (Rusk) ... 50 

Name Index 

Foster, William C 77 

Fried, Edward R 94 

Greenwald, Joseph A 94 

Humphrey, Vice President 56 

Johnson, President 86, 87 

Meeker, Leonard C 60 

Rusk, Secretary 60, 76 

Vaughn, Jack H 66 

Williams, G. Mennen 71 









Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace 

This 18-page pamphlet is the text of a major address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk be- 
fore the American Foreign Service Association on June 23. The Secretary describes the recent in- 
crease in aggression from North Viet-Nam, reviews the many efforts that have been made, unsuc- 
cessfully, to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table for negotiations, and repeats 
President Johnson's call for a new program of support for Asian development efforts. In closing 
Mr. Rusk says, "We must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard 
path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast 



PUBLICATION 7919 15 cents 



Please send me copies of Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace. 


Enclosed find $ 


(cash, check, or money order 
payable to Supt. of Documents) 









Boston Public Library 
S>uperintendent of 

Vol. LIII, No. 1360 

July 19, 1965 

Addresses by President Johnson and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 98 

by Ambassador Stevenson 123 

Transcript of Interview 105 

by Assistant Secretary Mac Arthur 118 



Special Article by Henry Brodie 111 

For index see inside back cover 

Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations 

Following is the text of an address made 
by President Johnson at the opening of the 
U.N. 20th anniversary commemorative ses- 
sion at San Francisco June 25, together with 
the text of an address made at the close of 
the session on June 26 by Adlai E. Steven- 
son, U.S. Representative to the United 


"White House press release (San Francisco, Calif.) dated June 
25; as-delivered text 

On my journey across the continent I 
stopped in the State of Missouri, and there I 
met with the man who made the first such 
pilgrimage here 20 years ago as the 33d 
President of the United States — Harry S. 

Mr. Truman sent to this assembly his 
greetings and good wishes on this anniver- 
sary commemoration. He asked that I ex- 
press to you for him — as for myself and for 
my countrymen — the faith which we of the 
United States hold firmly in the United Na- 
tions and in the ultimate success of its mis- 
sion among men. 

On this historic and happy occasion we 
have met to celebrate 20 years of achieve- 
ment and to look together at the work that 
we face in future meetings. I come to this 
anniversary not to speak of futility or fail- 
ure nor of doubt and despair. I come to raise 
a voice of confidence in both the future of 
these United Nations and the fate of the 
human race. 

The movement of history is glacial. On 
two decades of experience, none can presume 
to speak with certainty of the direction or 
the destiny of man's affairs. But this we do 
know, and this we do believe: Futility and 
failure are not the truth of this organization 
brought into being here 20 years ago. 

Where, historically, man has moved fit- 
fully from war toward war, in these last two 
decades man has moved steadily away from 
war as either an instrument of national 
policy or a means of international decision. 

Many factors have contributed to this 
change. But no one single factor has con- 
tributed more than the existence and the 
enterprise of the United Nations itself. For 
there can be no doubt that the United Na- 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation ia included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States la or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of tte Department. TJnlted 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currentiy. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Psiob: 52 issues, domestio 910, 
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of tb« 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

notb: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed 
in the Keadeis' Guide to Periodical Uter- 



tions has taken root in human need and has 
estabhshed a shape, and a purpose, and a 
meaning of its own. 

By providing a forum for the opinions 
of the world, the United Nations has given 
them a force and an influence that they have 
never had before. By shining the light of 
inquiry and discussion upon very dark and 
isolated conflicts, it has pressed the nations 
of the world to conform their courses to the 
requirements of the United Nations Charter. 

And let all remember — and none forget — 
that now more than 50 times in these 20 
years the United Nations has acted to keep 
the peace. 

By persuading nations to justify their own 
conduct before all countries, it has helped, 
at many times and in many places, to soften 
the harshness of man to his fellow man. 

By confronting the rich with the misery 
of the poor and the privileged with the de- 
spair of the oppressed, it has removed the 
excuse of ignorance, unmasked the evil of in- 
difference, and has placed an insistent, even 
though still unfulfilled, responsibility upon 
the more fortunate of the earth. 

By insisting upon the political dignity of 
man, it has welcomed 63 nations to take their 
places alongside the 51 original members — a 
historical development of dramatic import, 
achieved mainly through peaceful means. 

And by binding countries together in the 
great declarations of the charter, it has 
given those principles a strengthened vitality 
in the conduct of the affairs of man. 

Today, then, at this time of anniversary, 
let us not occupy ourselves with parochial 
doubts or with passing despair. The United 
Nations — after 20 years — does not draw its 
life from the assembly halls or the committee 
rooms. It lives in the conscience and the rea- 
son of mankind. 

Dangers to Peace in Southeast Asia 

The most urgent problem we face is the 
keeping of the peace. 

Today, as I speak, clear and present dan- 
gers in Southeast Asia cast their shadow 
across the path of all mankind. The United 
Nations must be concerned. 

The most elementary principle of the 
United Nations is that neighbors must not 
attack their neighbors — and that principle 
today is under challenge. 

The processes of peaceful settlement today 
are blocked by willful aggressors contemptu- 
ous of the opinion and the will of mankind. 

Bilateral diplomacy has yielded no result. 

The machinery of the Geneva conference 
has been paralyzed. 

Resort to the Security Council has been 

The efforts of the distinguished Secretary- 
General have been rebuffed. 

An appeal for unconditional discussion 
was met with contempt. 

A pause in bombing operations was called 
an insult. 

The concern for peace of the Common- 
wealth prime ministers has received little 
and very disappointing results. 

Therefore, today I put to this world as- 
sembly the facts of aggression, the right of 
a people to be free from attack, the interest 
of every member in safety against molesta- 
tion, the duty of this organization to reduce 
the dangers to peace, and the unhesitating 
readiness of the United States of America 
to find a peaceful solution. 

I now call upon this gathering of the na- 
tions of the world to use all their influence, 
individually and collectively, to bring to the 
tables those who seem determined to make 
war. We will support your efforts, as we will 
support effective action by any agent or 
agency of these United Nations. 

Agenda of Peace Not a Single Item 

But the agenda of peace is not a single 

Around the world, there are many disputes 
that are filled with dangers, many tensions 
that are taut with peril, many arms races 
that are fraught with folly, among small na- 
tions as well as large. 

And the first purpose of the United Na- 
tions is peacekeeping. The first work of all 
members now, then, just must be peacemak- 
ing. For this organization exists to resolve 
quarrels outside the confines of its headquar- 

JULY 19, 1965 


ters — and not to prolong quarrels within. 

Where there are disputes, let us try to find 
the means to resolve them — through what- 
ever machinery is available or is possible. 

Where the United Nations requires readily 
available peace forces in hours and days — 
and not in weeks or months — let all pledge 
to provide those forces. And my country is 

On another front of our common endeav- 
ors, I think nothing is more urgent than the 
effort to diminish danger by bringing the 
armaments of the world under increasing 
control. Nations rich and poor are burdened 
down by excessive and competitive and 
frightening arms. So let us all urgently 
commit ourselves to the rational reduction 
of those arms burdens. We of the United 
States would hope that others will join with 
us in coming to our next negotiations with 
proposals for effective attack upon these 
deadly dangers to mankind. 

International War on Poverty 

And after peace, high on the agenda of 
man is devotion to the dignity and to the 
worth of the human person — and the promo- 
tion of better standards of life in larger free- 
dom for all of the human race. 

We in this country are committing our- 
selves to great tasks in our own great so- 
ciety. We are committed to narrow the gap 
between promise and performance, between 
equality in law and equality in fact, between 
opportunity for the numerous well-to-do and 
the still too numerous poor, between educa- 
tion for the successful and education for all 
of the people. 

It is no longer a community or a nation 
or a continent but a whole generation of 
mankind for whom our promises must be 
kept — and kept within the next two decades. 

If those promises are not kept, it will be 
less and less possible to keep them for any. 

And that is why — on this anniversary — I 
would call upon all member nations to re- 
dedicate themselves to wage together an in- 
ternational war on poverty. 

So let us then together : raise the goal for 
technical aid and investment through the 

United Nations; increase our food, and 
health, and education programs to make a 
serious and a successful attack upon hunger, 
and disease, and ignorance — the ancient 
enemies of all mankind. 

Let us in all our lands — including this 
land — face forthrightly the multiplying 
problems of our multiplying populations and 
seek the answers to this most profound chal- 
lenge to the future of all the world. Let us 
act on the fact that less than $5 invested in 
population control is worth a hundred dollars 
invested in economic growth. 

For our wars together on the poverty and 
privation, the hunger and sickness, the de- 
spair and the futility of mankind, let us 
mark this International Cooperation Year by 
joining together in an Alliance for Man. 

Realizing the Promise of the Future 

The promise of the future lies in what 
science, the ever more productive industrial 
machine, the ever more productive fertile 
and usable land, the computer, the miracle 
drug, and the man in space all spread before 
us. The promise of the future lies in what 
the religions and the philosophies, the cul- 
tures and the wisdoms of 5,000 years of 
civilization have finally distilled and confided 
to us — the promise of the abundant life and 
the brotherhood of man. 

The heritage that we share together is a 
fragile heritage. 

A world war would certainly destroy it. 
Pride and arrogance could destroy it. Neg- 
lect and indifference could destroy it. It 
could be destroyed by narrow nationalism 
or ideological intolerance — or rabid extrem- 
ism of either the left or the right. 

So we must find the way as a community 
of nations, as a United Nations, to keep the 
peace among and between all of us. We must 
restrain by joint and effective action any 
who place their ambitions or their dogmas 
or their prestige above the peace of all the 
world. And we just must find a way to do 
that. It is the most profound and the most 
urgent imperative of the time in which we 

So I say to you as my personal belief, and 



the belief, I think, of the great American 
majority, that the world must finish once and 
for all the myth of inequality of races and 
peoples, with the scandal of discrimination, 
with the shocking violation of human rights 
and the cynical violation of political rights. 
We must stop preaching hatred, we must 
stop bringing up entire new generations to 
preserve and to carry out the lethal fantasies 
of the old generation, stop believing that the 
gun or the bomb can solve all problems or 
that a revolution is of any value if it closes 
doors and limits choices instead of opening 
both as wide as possible. 

As far back as we can look — until the light 
of history fades into the dusk of legend — 
such aspirations of man have been sub- 
merged and swallowed by the violence and 
the weakness of man at his worst. 

Generations have come and gone, and gen- 
erations have tried and failed. 

Will we succeed? 

I do not know. But I dare to be hopeful 
and confident. 

And I do know this : Whether we look for 
the judgment to God, or to history, or to 
mankind, this is the age, and we are the men, 
and this is the place to give reality to our 
commitments under the United Nations 
Charter. For what was for other genera- 
tions just a hope is for this generation a sim- 
ple necessity. 

Thank you very much. 

JUNE 26 

U.S./U.N. press release 4697 

This is the end of a commemorative occa- 
sion. Some of us here today who were mid- 
wives at the birth of the United Nations can 
never forget those days here in San Fran- 
cisco in the twilight of the war, when an old 
world was dying and a new world was com- 
ing to birth. 

We shared an audacious dream — and 
launched a brave enterprise. 

It seemed so easy then — when all was hope 
and expectation. I remember my own sense 
of pride, of history, of exultation — and the 

special responsibility that fell upon the host 
country to that historic conference. 

Inescapably I remember, too, both the tri- 
umphs and the failures. For over these 
churning, fearful, and expectant years, we 
have been up and we have been down. 

But up or down, my Government and my 
people have never lost faith in the United 

The hope, the expectation, was mirrored 
by the vote — 89 to 2 — by which the United 
States Senate approved the ratification of the 
Charter of the United Nations in 1945, a few 
weeks after the charter was signed here in 
San Francisco in this very hall. 

And our Congress only this week — in a 
rare mood of unanimity — reaffirmed that 
support and dedicated this country, once 
again, to the principles of this organization. 

This concurrent resolution^ referred spe- 
cifically to this 20th anniversary event, to 
International Cooperation Year, to the "im- 
portant, and at times crucial, role" which the 
United Nations has played in defense of the 
peace and to its other "valuable service" to 
human rights and the fight against hunger, 
poverty, disease, and ignorance. 

The resolution then stated: 

Now, therefore, be it 

Resolved . . . That it is the sense of the Con- 
gress that the United States of America rededicates 
itself to the principles of the United Nations and 
to the furtherance of international cooperation 
within the framework of law and order. . . . 

Thus in this week of memory and antici- 
pation did the representatives of our demo- 
cratic diversity declare again our unity and 
our commitment in matters that touch the 
peace of the world. 

We welcome the counsel of all our breth- 
ren, large and small, on this long, rough 
voyage to world community. 

We make no claim to omniscience or om- 
nipotence; we, too, believe that to the humble 
many things are revealed that are obscure to 
the mighty. 

Out of 20 years of humbling experience, 
we all know that we need the United Na- 
tions more today than we needed it 20 years 

1 See p. 103. 

JULY 19, 1965 


ago — that we shall need it more 20 years 
from now than we do today — that the United 
Nations is a simple necessity of our times. 

We know that the issue therefore is not 
one of survival but of how rapidly or how 
slowly, how surely or how hesitantly, how 
skillfully or how clumsily, we shall get on 
with the work we took up here so short a 
time ago. 

What the United Nations Has Done 

And the record of the United Nations is 
full of evidence of skillful action by men and 
women of many nations. 

There is time, even in a short address, to 
salute the Secretary-General and the inter- 
national civil servants of the U.N. family of 
agencies who pioneer day in and day out in 
our emerging world community. 

We have time to extend our congratula- 
tions to those delegates from the younger 
nations who have joined our ranks since the 
charter first was signed, who have added 
diversity to our company, who have given us 
all an intimate sense of wider community, 
who have contributed their minds and tal- 
ents, their vision and wisdom, to the conduct 
of our affairs. 

We have time, too, to pay our respects to 
those hundreds of men of the United Nations 
who have given their lives in the cause of 
peace, to those tens of thousands from 54 
countries who have helped the United Na- 
tions keep the peace, and to those other thou- 
sands of Blue Berets who at this moment 
stand guard for peace in Gaza, Cyprus, and 
Kashmir, even as we meet here, peacefully, 
in San Francisco. 

We have time here to offer thanks to those 
unsung heroes of the United Nations who 
are responsible for curing 37 million children 
of the yaws, and 11 million more of tra- 
choma, and another million of leprosy — and 
to those who have protected 162 million peo- 
ple against tuberculosis, and lowered the in- 
cidence of malaria by over a hundred million 
people a year — and to those nameless men 
and women of the United Nations who have 
helped find new homes and new lives for 
more than a million refugees. 

These are a few — and only a few — of the 
things that we the people of the United 
Nations have done together in the time speck 
of two tearing decades. 

Symptoms of an Unstable World 

In the bright glow of 1945 too many 
looked to the United Nations for the full and 
final answer to world peace. And in retro- 
spect that day may seem to have opened with 
the hint of a false dawn. 

Certainly we have learned the hard way 
how elusive is peace, how durable is man's 
destructive drive, how various are the forms 
of his aggressions. 

We have learned, too, how distant is the 
dream of those better standards of life in 
larger freedom, how qualified our capacity 
to practice tolerance, how conditional our 
claims to the dignity and worth of the hu- 
man person, how reserved our respect for 
the obligations of law. 

Our world is still as brave, though not so 
new, as it seemed in this place two decades 
past. But the world's leaders, and their 
peoples, are deeply troubled — and with 

There is war in Viet-Nam — and in other 
places, too. 

There has been revolution and bloody vio- 
lence in the Dominican Republic — and in 
other places, too. 

There are still border troubles in Kashmir, 
communal bitterness in Cyprus, violence in 
the Congo. 

There is shattering ideological conflict; 
there is subversion and aggression, overt and 
clandestine; there is tension and mistrust 
and fear. 

The nuclear threat is spreading, and the 
means of self-destruction are still uncon- 

Meanwhile, the economic gap between the 
developed and developing nations grows 
wider. Human rights and political rights 
and self-determination are cynically denied. 
Hunger, disease, and ignorance still afflict 
the majority of God's children. 

I agree with Ambassador [Benoit] Bindzi 
of the Cameroon that these are symptoms of 




Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th Anniversary 
of United Nations 


Whereas the year 1965 marks the twentieth an- 
niversary of the United Nations, which will 
be celebrated in San Francisco on June 26, 
1965; and 

Whereas the United Nations General Assembly 
has designated the year 1965 as "International 
Cooperation Year"; and 

Whereas the President of the United States has 
proclaimed 1965 as "International Cooperation 
Year", and has set up a broad program within 
the executive branch to review our present 
international policies in cooperation with a 
bipartisan group of distinguished private 
citizens; ^ and 

Whereas the President has charged those par- 
ticipating in the International Cooperation 
Year program to "search and explore and 
canvass and thoroughly discuss every con- 
ceivable approach and avenue of cooperation 
that could lead to peace"; and 

Whereas the International Cooperation Year pro- 
gram will culminate in a White House Con- 
ference on International Cooperation which the 
President has announced he will convene in 
November 1965 ; and 

Whereas during the twenty years of its existence 
the United Nations has played an important, 
and at times crucial, role in pursuit of one of 
its stated purposes "to save succeeding genera- 
tions from the scourge of war, which twice in 
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to man- 
kind"; and 

Whereas during that time the United Nations has 
also performed a valuable service through the 
specialized agencies and otherwise in helping 

^ S. Con. Res. 36; passed by the Senate on June 
16 and by the House on June 22. 

2 For remarks made by President Johnson at 
White House ceremonies on Oct. 2, 1964, and text 
of the proclamation, see Bulletin of Oct. 19, 
1964, p. 555. 

to establish human rights and to eliminate 
those ancient enemies of mankind — hunger, 
poverty, disease, and ignorance: Now, there- 
fore, be it 

Resolved by the Senate (the House of Repre- 
sentatives concurring), That it is the sense of 
the Congress that the United States of America 
rededicates itself to the principles of the United 
Nations and to the furtherance of international 
cooperation within the framework of law and 
order; and that all other members of the 
United Nations are urged to do likewise. 

Sec. 2. It is further the sense of the Con- 
gress that in connection with the examination 
for International Cooperation Year of United 
States participation in international coopera- 
tive activities, the executive branch should — 

(1) review with a high sense of urgency the 
current state of international peacekeeping 
machinery with a view to making specific sug- 
gestions for strengthening this machinery, (2) 
review other major elements of international 
community and cooperation with a view to 
making specific suggestions to promote the 
growth of institutions of international coopera- 
tion and law and order, and (3) review ur- 
gently the status of disarmament negotiations 
with a view to further progress in reducing 
the dangers and burden of competitive national 

Sec. 3. In order to provide for participa- 
tion by the Congress in the White House 
Conference on International Cooperation, sub- 
ject to an invitation by the President, there 
is hereby created a congressional delegation 
of twelve members to be composed of six mem- 
bers of the Senate appointed by the President 
pro tempore of the Senate and six members of 
the House of Representatives appointed by the 
Speaker of the House of Representatives. Any 
vacancy in the membership of the delegation 
shall be filled in the same manner as in the 
case of the original appointments. 

an unstable, dangerous world — ^too danger- 
ous and too unstable for the General Assem- 
bly to remain in its present deadlock. We 
all know that the deadlock must be broken 
before we sit down again in the General As- 
sembly 9 weeks hence. 

Common Enterprise in World Community 

If there be disputes which keep us apart, 
there is much, much more to be done which 
draws us together. 

Change, guaranteed by the inventions of 
science and the innovations of technology, 

JULY 19, 1965 


accelerates, threatens, and promises. 

Already science has destroyed any rational 
excuse for war between states. 

Already science induces statesmen to reach 
for national prestige, not in the conquest of 
someone's territory but in the conquest of 
everyone's environment. 

Already science and technology are inte- 
grating our world into an open workshop 
where each new invention defines a new task, 
and reveals a shared interest, and invites 
yet another common venture. 

In our sprawling workshop of the world 
community, nations are joined in cooperative 
endeavor: improving soils, purifying water, 
harnessing rivers, eradicating disease, feed- 
ing children, diffusing knowledge, spreading 
technology, surveying resources, lending 
capital, probing the seas, forecasting the 
weather, setting standards, developing law, 
and working away at a near infinitude of 
down-to-earth tasks — tasks for which science 
has given us the knowledge, and technology 
has given us the tools, and conmion sense has 
given us the wit to perceive that common 
interest impels us to common enterprise. 

Common enterprise is the pulse of world 
community, the heartbeat of a working 
peace, the way to the great society. 

"A Truce to Terror" 

Yet we are all impatient. We are all con- 
cerned that the scope of our work is still too 
narrow, that the pace of our work is still 
too slow, that our best efforts to date risk 
being overwhelmed by the enormity of the 
tasks and challenges that press upon us from 
all sides. 

We need time to perfect our peacekeeping 
machinery to the point where no nation need 
use its own armed forces save in the service 
of the international community. 

We need time to adjust to the thundering 
impact of science and technology upon hu- 
man society and human tradition. 

We need time to get on with international 
cooperation toward disarmament, toward a 
decent world diet, toward peaceful explora- 
tion of outer space, toward international de- 

And we the members of the United Na- 
tions need time at home to struggle with all 
those great domestic tasks of welfare and 
justice and human rights which cry out for 
the priority attention of all national leaders, 
regardless of the size or the wealth or the 
social system of any particular country. 

Is there no way to quicken the pulsebeat 
of our common enterprise? Is there no short- 
cut to a better world society? Is there no 
way to make time our ally — and use it better 
to serve us all ? 

Of course there is. For the enemy is not 
change but violence. To induce needed 
change without needless murder, what we 
require above all is a truce to terror. We 
need a moratorium — a breathing spell free 
from acts of international violence. 

We need — all of us — a respite from the 
malignant claims which violence levies upon 
our energy and our attention and our re- 

There is not a single dispute in this world, 
however sharply the issues may be drawn, 
which would not look different two decades 
from now, after time and change have done 
their erosive work on the sharpest corners 
of conflict. 

If we could somehow bring about a truce 
to terror we would soon discover that world 
order will come, not through the purity of 
the human heart nor the purge of the human 
soul, but will be wrought from a thousand 
common ventures that are at once possible 
and imperative. 

Our Shield Against International Folly 

Mr. President, on behalf of myself, on be- 
half of my Government, on behalf of the vast 
bulk of my countrymen, let me say this : 

We believe in the United Nations; we sup- 
port the United Nations; and we shall work 
in the future, as we have worked in the past, 
to add strength and influence and perma- 
nence to all that the organization stands for 
in this, our tempestuous, tormented, talented 
world of diversity in which all men are 
brothers and all brothers are somehow, won- 
drously, different — save in their need for 



For all our desperate dangers, I do not be- 
lieve, as Winston Churchill did not believe, 
that "God has despaired of His children." 

For man in his civil society has learned 
how to live under the law with the institu- 
tions of justice and with a controlled 
strength that can protect rich and poor alike. 
This has been done, I say, within domestic 
society. And in this century, for the first 
time in human history, we are attempting 
similar safeguards, a similar framework of 
justice, a similar sense of law and impartial 
protection, in the whole wide society of man. 

This is the profound, the fundamental, the 
audacious meaning of the United Nations. It 
is our shield against international folly in an 
age of ultimate weapons. Either we shall 
make it grow and flourish, arbitrator of our 
disputes, mediator of our conflicts, impartial 
protector against arbitrary violence, or I do 
not know what power or institution can en- 
able us to save ourselves. 

We have the United Nations. We have set 
it bravely up. And we will carry it bravely 

Secretary Discusses Viet-Nam 
on USIA Television 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Riisk by members of the in- 
ternational press, videotaped at Washington 
on June 2U for broadcast on July U on the 
U.S. Information Agency television service. 

Press release 167 dated July 3, for release July 4 

Commentator: This is a conversation with 
the Honorable Dean Rusk, United States 
Secretary of State, as he speaks to members 
of the international press, about the Amer- 
ican position in Viet-Nam. His distinguished 
interviewers are Mr. Werner Imhoof, Wash- 
ington correspondent for Switzerland's Neue 
Zuercher Zeitung, and Mr. H. R. Vohra, 
Washington correspondent for the Times of 

Mr. Vohra has the first question for Secre- 
tary Rusk. 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, one proposal 
made by the Commonwealth ministers in 

London, that they ought to go and meet the 
leaders of the concerned countries, has also 
been rejected apparently by Moscow, Hanoi, 
and Peiping. I was wondering, sir, what is 
your feeling about this? Does it amount to 
a rejection, or is there still some life left in 
this proposal? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope that 
there is some life left in the proposal. Now, 
this has been one in a series of constructive 
steps taken by many governments in many 
ways over the last several months to try to 
find a way to bring the dangers of the Viet- 
Nam problem to the conference table. I can 
assure you that bilateral diplomacy has been 
used to the utmost during the past 41/^ years. 
The Geneva machinery has been attempted. 
Britain, as cochairman, is trying to stimu- 
late that machinery. And that has been re- 
jected. U Thant has tried to play a construc- 
tive role. He tried to visit Hanoi and 
Peiping; they wouldn't let him come. The 
Security Council — Hanoi refused. 

You remember, when Mr. Patrick Gordon 
Walker visited in Southeast Asia, he could 
not go to Hanoi and Peiping. Your own 
President, Mr. [Sarvepalli] Radhakrishnan, 
made a very constructive proposal in which 
we found considerable interest and prospect. 
That was brushed aside by the other side 
rather rudely. 

Now, the Commonwealth prime ministers 
felt that they ought to make another try. We 
expressed our pleasure that they were mak- 
ing such an effort. We would hope that the 
other side would find some way to come to 
the table, because the situation is very dan- 
gerous and it takes two to make a peace. 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, would you care 
to tell us, that is, if there is any proposal 
now in the hopper or is it now empty? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that I would 
have to say that there is not much going on 
at the present time that points the way to 
discussions and a peaceful settlement. The 
machinery is all there. There are a dozen 
ways of moving toward peace if there is a 
willingness to do so. The problem is not a 
lack of channels, or a lack of diplomatic 
procedure, or a lack of contact. The prob- 

JULY 19, 1965 


lem is that we see no evidence on the other 
side that they are interested in bringing this 
matter to a peaceful conclusion. 

Mr. Imhoof: This being so, Mr. Secretary, 
what then is the outlook on the military 
side? Are we moving toward a perhaps 
Korea-type war? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that exact 
analogies are difficult to apply in matters of 
this sort. There are many differences be- 
tween Korea and Southeast Asia. But I 
think that it is true that the situation is 
dangerous. I think the summer will see some 
sharp engagements there in Southeast Asia. 
Much will depend upon what Hanoi and 
Peiping themselves elect to do. We ourselves 
have a very direct and simple commitment 
to South Viet-Nam. We are going to meet 
that commitment. The North will not be 
permitted to achieve a military victory. And 
so I think we have some difficult weeks 
ahead of us. 

Mr. Imhoof: In a recent speech, Mr. Secre- 
tary, you were talking about Hanoi's atti- 
tude and you were expressing some surprise 
at the aversion of Hanoi to negotiations. 
Were you thinking there in terms of poten- 
tial Titoism in North Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I was thinking of 
what might be considered the objective in- 
terests of North Viet-Nam, not so much how 
they might look at it from an ideological 
point of view. But surely the North Viet- 
namese need peace. Surely they want a 
chance to build up their own country. Surely 
the North Vietnamese as Vietnamese do not 
want to be overrun by the Chinese. Surely 
they'd like to look forward to a time when 
they have peaceful relations with their 
brothers in the South — and perhaps at some 
future time get into a discussion at the table 
on the question of the reunification of the 
country. That is what all Vietnamese want. 
But these objective factors seem to be 
brushed aside by the present leadership in 
Hanoi, and they feel committed to that 
militant doctrine of world revolution that 
has been proclaimed by Peiping with a 
harshness that has caused serious problems 
even within the Communist world. On 

ideological grounds they are undertaking an 
effort which is very costly to them and which 
cannot have success at the end of the trail. 

The "Second Pause" Proposal 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, one proposal 
which has remained untried and is still cur- 
rent is — has come from Mr. Pearson [Lester 
B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada] and 
Mr. Shastri [Lai Bahadur Shastri, Prime 
Minister of India], that there ought to be a 
second pause longer than the first in which 
they could operate and possibly exercise an 
influence in Hanoi and Peiping, among other 
places. Are you giving thought to this? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we are giving 
thought always to any possibility of bring- 
ing peace into that part of the world, but 
let me remind you that we held our hand for 
41/2 years after the infiltration started from 
the North. That was a 41/2-year pause, dur- 
ing which we were probing continually 
through diplomacy and Geneva conferences 
and other means for a peaceful settlement 
of Southeast Asia. Now it is true that the 
pause of a few weeks ago was short, about 
51/^ days, but the other side was made aware 
that that pause was coming and I can assure 
you that we already had their replies before 
the bombing was resumed and their replies 
were very harsh, very harsh. 

Now, the other side has not indicated that 
a pause would make any difference. As a 
matter of fact there have been public state- 
ments from Peiping that if we stopped 
bombing North Viet-Nam they still would 
not enter into negotiations for a peaceful 
settlement. So this is a possibility, but we 
need to look at it in terms of whether in 
fact it will contribute to a peaceful settle- 
ment. We've asked the other side on more 
than one occasion what else would stop if 
we stopped the bombing. What else will 
stop? Are you going to stop sending those 
tens of thousands of men from North Viet- 
Nam into South Viet-Nam? Are you going 
to stop attacking these villages and killing 
off thousands of innocent civilians? What 
else will stop? And we've never had any 
reply. So the direct answer to your question 



is yes, these matters are being considered, 
but we need to find a path to peace and not 
some — merely a gesture which will make no 
contribution to the peace. 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be 
an advantage, at least a political advantage 
if not a military advantage, to have a sec- 
ond pause as suggested by not only these two 
heads of government but by a number of 
others — the political advantage — possible po- 
litical advantage — being that your own argu- 
ment might be strengthened, that here you 
are, you tried your best, and yet the other 
side has been against it? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I should think that 
the record of refusal and rejection of peace- 
ful means by the other side is long and, I 
would think, rather convincing at this point. 
As far as this postwar period is concerned, 
I think it is worth recalling where the 
sources of violence have come from since 
1945, in Iran, and Greece, and Berlin, and 
Korea, Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Philip- 
pines, Malaya. Violence has appeared first 
from those who want to change the United 
Nations kind of world and impose upon it 
a world revolution based upon another pre- 
scription. Now, in dealing with these at- 
tempts in the postwar period to impose a 
solution by force, we and others have had 
to meet those threats with very considerable 
costs; in our case, 160,000 casualties since 
the end of World War II. 

We have also tried to meet them with very 
considerable restraint in order to maintain 
the peace. For example, when the guerrillas 
moved into Greece, we didn't attack Bulgaria 
and Yugoslavia. When Berlin was blockaded, 
for weeks upon end we flew supplies to Ber- 
lin rather than engage in large-scale fight- 
ing on the ground. At the time of Korea we 
had a nuclear monopoly. We took 100,000 
casualties without using a nuclear weapon. 
In handling the Cuban missile crisis, great 
care was exercised to leave open the door to 
peaceful settlement. And we waited 4^/^ 
years before we attacked North Viet-Nam 
because of what they're doing in South Viet- 

So restraint has been a mark of our policy 

in this postwar period, and in dealing with 
the violence which has come from the other 
side against smaller countries, in an attempt 
to impose their system by force. 

Mr. Imhoof: Are you saying then there 
would have to be a degree of reciprocity, so 
to speak, about any new pause? 

Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to be 
specific on that or talk about the particular 
circumstances. All I was saying is that we 
don't exclude the possibility on doctrinal 
grounds — as I say, we paused for years, and 
we did pause not long ago, but what we want 
is a peaceful settlement. Now it takes two 
to make the peace. We'd like to see somebody 
come to the table, but the empty chairs have 
never been filled. 

Question of Viet Cong Representation 

Mr. Imhoof: If, finally, Hanoi is ready to 
come to the table, would — what would the 
position of the Viet Cong be? This is a ques- 
tion that's often discussed. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we don't know what 
kind of delegation Hanoi would bring to the 
table. But it is quite clear that Hanoi is 
the spokesman for tens of thousands of 
people that they have sent into South Viet- 
Nam. Some of these are elements of the 
regular North Vietnamese army, so that 
negotiating with Hanoi is negotiating with 
those who are responsible for the primary 
problem in South Viet-Nam. Now, of course, 
there are some Viet Cong who are southern- 
ers, who have lived in the South, but they 
are part of a population of 14 million — there 
may be, what, 100,000 of them. 

Now, there are many other groups among 
the South Vietnamese population. There are 
the sects — there are the Catholics, and the 
Buddhists, and there are about a million 
Cambodians who have lived for a long time 
in South Viet-Nam. There are the monta- 
gnards; there are other groups. 

Now, the southerners, the genuine south- 
ern members of the Viet Cong, should estab- 
lish their contacts and take their place in 
the general structure of South Viet-Nam. 
They're not entitled to be counted on a ratio 
of 1,000 to 1, merely because they have rifles 

JULY 19, 1965 


in their hands. No country in the world 
would permit this to happen, but they can 
take their place peacefully in South Viet- 
namese society. But these people, these in- 
digenous Viet Cong, cannot insure the re- 
moval of those tens of thousands who have 
come down from the North. That is for 
Hanoi to do, and Hanoi can be at the table. 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, did you imply 
by your answer now that the North Viet- 
Nam people would be permitted or would be 
free to have any kind of delegation they 
like, that is to say, they would be free to 
include the Viet Cong as members of the 
delegation — is that the implication? 

Secretary Rusk: That's correct. When we 
come to the table, the head of the delegation 
will have his credentials, and I wouldn't ex- 
pect to look behind the chief Hanoi delegate 
to determine who is sitting behind him, any 
more than I would expect him to look behind 
our representative to see who was sitting for 
us. That's up to Hanoi. 

Mr. Vohra: I'm sorry, sir. Is it the same 
thing as Mr. Martin's [Paul Martin, Cana- 
dian Secretary of State for External 
Affairs] proposal, who has said something 
similar but possibly not the same thing? Is 
there a measure of difference between your 
reply — 

Secretary Rusk: I doubt it. I think — 
Mr. Vohra: — and Mr. Martin's proposal? 
Secretary Rusk: You see, we've said that 
we're prepared to discuss this problem with 
the governments concerned, because it is the 
governments who have been responsible for 
the problem and governments can make 
themselves responsible for the solution. Now, 
who represents governments, who sits for 
governments, will be for those governments 
to determine. If they want to bring some 
Viet Cong or National Liberation Front 
people with them, that's fine, we have no ob- 

Mr. Vohra: I see. 

Mr. Imhoof: As far as the solution is con- 
cerned, Mr. Secretary, Senator [J. W.] Ful- 
bright recently in a speech suggested that 
perhaps the solution would be to go back to 

the — what you call it, the essentials of the 
1954 Geneva agreements. Would you care 
to comment on that? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes. We have believed 
all along that the Geneva agreements of 1954 
and 1962 are an adequate base for peace in 
Southeast Asia. The agreement of 1962 was 
negotiated with great care and as late as 
1962 — just 3 years ago. It has never been 
complied with. Hanoi has refused to live up 
to it. Now, in 1954 they worked out a settle- 
ment which appeared to be a permanent 
settlement for Southeast Asia, but the Viet 
Minh moved from North Viet-Nam into 
Laos; they attempted to settle these issues 
between North and South Viet-Nam by 
force. Now, that's not the way to have peace. 
If there are differences, they should be talked 
about at a conference table. They should be 
explored by peaceful means. That is what is 
required in all parts of the world, and 
there's no need to think that that is not 
the way to proceed in Southeast Asia. 

Mr. Vohra: The Viet Cong problem will 
continue, it seems now, to make their repre- 
sentation effective; if they cannot come in 
directly, how are they going to come in at 
all? Is there any way of overcoming this 
obstacle at all? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes, they can walk into 
the capital tomorrow and say, "We are pre- 
pared to be like other South Vietnamese and 
discuss problems of South Viet-Nam on a 
political basis, rather than by arms." They 
can do that tomorrow, and their voices un- 
doubtedly would be heard as the voices of 
other groups in South Viet-Nam are heard. 
I don't know why they are entitled to a 
special status merely because they've taken 
up arms and merely because they've been 
reinforced by tens of thousands of armed 
militaiy men from the outside. 

Now, they can make their views known. 
They do it in many ways, in public state- 
ments and things of that sort. But I wouldn't 
see that they are entitled to be a primary 
party in international negotiations merely 
because they've acted as they've acted. You 
wouldn't let that happen in your country, or 
your country. You wouldn't let it happen for 



a moment if the same thing happened in 
your country. 

Wider Context of Viet-Nam Conflict 

Mr. Imhoof: Mr. Secretary, I would like 
to ask you two questions about the wider 
context of the Viet-Nam conflict. One, it is 
often said here that you would like to see as 
many flags in Viet-Nam as possible. Are you 
satisfled with the number of flags you have 
presently there? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the more the bet- 
ter, Mr. Imhoof. At the present time there 
are about 30 countries that are providing 
direct assistance to South Viet-Nam. Per- 
haps 12 to 15 of those are providing people, 
either in uniform or civilians to work as 
engineers and doctors and teachers in the 

There will be — there are others that are 
providing economic assistance and financial 
assistance of various types. We think there 
are another 10 countries or so that will soon 
be joining that group in providing direct 

Yes, we think that this is important not 
just because of its practical assistance to 
South Viet-Nam but also because it sends a 
signal to Hanoi that there are a large num- 
ber of countries who believe that South Viet- 
Nam should be left alone in peace and that 
Hanoi should not count upon any develop- 
ment of a large international public opinion 
in support of what they're trying to do 
against their neighbors in the South. 

Mr. Imhoof: I think many countries feel 
that they are irl the same boat with you in 
this conflict, however — and this leads to the 
second question — many also appear to be 
concerned about how this might affect your 
East-West relationship, that is, the U.S.- 
Soviet relationship. I wonder whether you 
would care to say something about that? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I have no doubt 
that it has a direct effect on Easf>-West 
relationships. So did the guerrilla problem 
in Greece, and the blockade in Berlin, and 
the invasion of Korea, and the Cuban missile 
crisis. Here was a very brutal attempt on 
the part of a Communist country, with its 

capital in Hanoi, to take over a neighbor by 
force, against existing international agree- 
ments and against general principles of in- 
ternational law. 

Well, of course, if we stand in the way, 
the other side is not going to like it. And 
in this sort of an affair, general relation- 
ships cool and become difficult and even 
dangerous. Oh, no, this has a direct bearing 
upon the East-West relations, but it also has 
a direct bearing on the safety of every small 
country in the world that is within the reach 
of any great power, because unless we can 
establish and maintain the principle that 
small countries have a right to be left alone 
— then there are a hundred small countries 
that are safe no longer and are — and their 
futures are at the whims of great powers. 
We can't have that situation. That would 
be utterly dangerous and disastrous for the 
smaller countries. 

Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, is there any 
difference of opinion between Hanoi and 
Peiping on their approach to peace negotia- 
tions which could be made use of? 

Secretary Ru^k: I think if you would look 
at the situation objectively as seen by a man 
from Mars you could suppose that there are 
differences of interest between Peiping and 
Hanoi in this situation, but for all practical 
purposes we have not seen such differences 
reflected in the policies of Hanoi and Peiping 
at the present time. Once in a while they 
will say things which appear to have in them 
some shades of difference, but over time 
these tend to balance out and we find that 
these two capitals seem to be very close to- 
gether on this matter. 

Mr. Vohra: Another point which bothers 
some people is that there is in fact not a 
community of views as expressed by you and 
as expressed by Hanoi in its four-point pro- 

Secretary Rusk: Yes? 

Mr. Vohra: Both have emphasized going 
back to the Geneva agreement. Now is that 
broad enough — 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the four-point pro- 
gram — 

JULY 19, 1966 


Mr. Vohra: — broad enough agreement be- 
tween the two sides? 

Secretary Rusk: The four points an- 
nounced by Hanoi include the point that 
South Viet-Nam should be organized and 
resolved in accordance with the program of 
the Liberation Front. And, of course, that 
is not acceptable to the South Vietnamese 
or to the friends of South Viet-Nam. But we 
would be glad to go to the conference table 
to take up these agreements of 1954 and 
1962 to see where things went wrong, to try- 
to bring the situation back to those basic 
agreements, but these people on the other 
side won't even come to the conference table. 
You remember when Hanoi sent a delegation 
to Moscow some weeks ago, in their joint 
communique they expressed their interest in 
conferences on Cambodia and Laos. All 
right, why not have such conferences? Let's 
get started. Let's get to the table. There's 
plenty to talk about. There's a great job to 
accomplish of restoring peace in Southeast 
Asia, to remove the dangers that are there 
at the present time. But you can't do it un- 
less you get started, and that is why it's 
so puzzling to know why the other side won't 
come to a table, won't receive visits, won't 
let anyone discuss these problems with them, 
won't take any part in the process of discus- 

Mr. Vohra: Would it include, Mr. Secre- 
tary, the freedom to form any kind of gov- 
ernment in South Viet-Nam, coming back to 
the Geneva agreements? 

Secretary Rusk: Yes, but people usually 
somehow shy away from making the same 
statement about North Viet-Nam. North 
Viet-Nam has had no chance for free elec- 
tions. We'd be in favor of free elections in 
both places. Let elected governments be in 
touch with each other by peaceful discussion 
to see how they can work out their common 

Mr. Imhoof: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if 
you would give us now a brief summary of 
your assessment of the present situation in 

Secretary Rusk: It seems to me that we 
have, once again, Mr. Imhoof, the problem 
of a country that is under attack from a 
neighbor, by force, a country to whom others 
have important commitments. We ourselves 
have important commitments to South Viet- 
Nam. Our choice is, broadly speaking, to 
fail to meet those commitments with all the 
consequences which that would entail right 
around the world. I happen to believe that 
the integrity of the American commitment 
is a primary support for the peace in many 

We do not see at the present time an in- 
clination on the part of Hanoi and Peiping 
to move toward a peaceful settlement of this 
problem. The doors are open. The channels 
are there. We would be glad to go to the 
table and begin the process of building the 
peace in Southeast Asia. But I think we and 
those who think like us would find ourselves 
alone there at the table. There would be no 
one to talk to. And, therefore, an early 
peace is rather difficult to anticipate. I think 
we shall have some serious weeks and 
months in the immediate future. 

Mr. Imhoof: Thank you very much. 

Mr. Vohra: Thank you very much, Mr. 

Secretary Rusk: Thank you, gentlemen. 

Commentator : This has been a conversa- 
tion with United States Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk about the American position in 
Viet-Nam. Interviewing Secretary Rusk 
were Mr. Werner Imhoof, Washington cor- 
respondent for Switzerland's Neiie Zuercher 
Zeitung, and Mr. H. R. Vohra, Washington 
correspondent for the Times of India. 



"The United States Government is prepared to consider 
sympathetically any reasonable proposal for the improve- 
ment of commodity markets," says the Special Assistant to 
the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In 
this article, prepared especially for the Bulletin, Mr. Brodie 
examines some of the trade problems of the developing na- 
tions and explains the U.S. position in response to their in- 
creasing pressure for international action to help correct the 
problems of world commodity markets. 

Commodity Agreements— A Partial Answer to tiie Trade Problems 
of Developing Countries 

by Henry Brodie 

The economic growth of the developing 
countries is intimately linked to the exploita- 
tion of their natural resources for export. 
A substantial share of the national income 
of the developing countries is derived from 
the production of primary products, both 
mineral and agricultural, for sale abroad. 
Such exports also provide the principal means 
of financing imports of industrial equipment 
and supplies essential for their economic de- 

It is not surprising, therefore, that the de- 
veloping countries have become increasingly 
concerned about the sluggish growth of their 
exports relative to their import needs and 
the wide short-term fluctuations in the prices 
of their principal exports. The instability and 
slow growi;h of their export earnings, result- 
ing from forces they feel powerless to control, 
have seriously hampered their efforts to 
achieve and maintain satisfactory rates of 
economic growth. 

As they look ahead, the developing coun- 
tries see little prospect of a change for the 
better. Consequently they have been pressing 
in various international forums for new pol- 
icies to strengthen the markets for their tra- 

ditional exports. They have placed particular 
emphasis on the need for international action 
to organize world commodity markets, both 
to reduce short-term price fluctuations and 
to achieve more favorable prices. 

This article examines the trade problems of 
the developing countries and the role that 
international commodity arrangements might 
play in relieving them. 

In varying degrees the less developed coun- 
tries are all afflicted with the economic mal- 
aise of low productivity, low incomes, low 
savings, and low investment. They all are 
caught up in the same vicious cycle of self- 
perpetuating poverty. 

To help them help themselves break out of 
this cycle, the United States and other ad- 
vanced countries are providing the developing 
countries with technical assistance to improve 
the skills of their rapidly growing popula- 
tions. We are supplementing domestic capital 
for investment in basic industries: agricul- 
ture, industry, power, and transportation. 
Vital as it is to their grovrth, this foreign 
aid accounts for only a relatively small pro- 
portion of the foreign exchange available to 
low-income countries to finance essential im- 

JULY 19, 1965 


ports. The overwhelming proportion of the 
foreign exchange needed for development 
comes from their merchandise exports. 

In the decade of the fifties the low-income 
countries derived about 12 percent of their 
foreign exchange receipts from long-term 
capital flows from abroad and about 88 per- 
cent from their own export trade. Whether 
or not the flow of aid and private foreign 
investment increases in the years ahead, ex- 
port earnings undoubtedly will continue to 
be the main support of their import require- 

Almost 90 percent of the trade receipts of 
the lower income countries as a group is de- 
rived from exports of food, agricultural raw 
materials, metals, and fuel. Unlike the in- 
dustrialized countries, whose trade involves 
primarily the exchange of manufactured 
goods with each other, the trade of the low- 
income countries is predominantly the ex- 
change of primary products for manufac- 
tured goods. 

One or two commodities usually account 
for the bulk of the exports of each of the 
developing countries. Some 30 depend upon 
a single product for at least half of their ex- 
port earnings. Colombia, for example, de- 
pends on coffee for 70 percent of its export 
earnings. Ghana depends on cocoa for 60 
percent of its earnings; Chile depends on 
copper for 68 percent; Malaysia depends on 
rubber for 53 percent; the Sudan depends 
on cotton and cottonseed for 60 percent ; and 
so on. This heavy dependence on trade in 
one or a few commodities, particularly agri- 
cultural commodities, makes the low-income 
countries peculiarly vulnerable to world 
market developments over which they have 
little control. Prices for their exports fluc- 
tuate widely over short periods of time. 

Effects of Price Fluctuations 

Let us look at the recent fluctuations in 
the prices of some of the more important of 
these commodities. The wholesale price for 
green (i.e., before roasting) Santos coffee 
from Brazil has been as high as 90 cents a 
pound and as low as 32 cents in the past 
decade. Cocoa was as high as 58 cents a 
pound in 1954; it was 27 cents in 1956; 44 

cents in 1958. It is today 13 cents, the lowest 
price in two decades. Within the last year 
alone it dropped 10 cents a pound. Natural 
rubber was 22 cents a pound in 1954, 37 cents 
in 1955, 26 cents in 1958, 35 cents in 1960, 
and 27 cents today. Sugar was about 3 cents 
a pound in 1960 ; it exceeded 13 cents in 1963 ; 
it is currently 2 cents. Tin was 95 cents a 
pound in 1956; 90 cents in 1958; $1.12 in 
1963 ; and $1.94 currently. 

These fluctuations in price cause varia- 
tions in the foreign exchange receipts of the 
developing countries amounting to hundreds 
of millions of dollars. A 1-cent-a-pound 
change in the price of coffee, for example, 
means $65 million per annum to the export- 
ing countries as a whole ; a 1-cent change in 
the price of tea means $15 million ; in cocoa, 
$25 million; in natural rubber, $45 million; 
in rice, $100 million. 

In the period 1950-61 the price of rubber, 
for example, fluctuated from year to year by 
21 percent on the average. Cocoa prices fluc- 
tuated from year to year by 20 percent on the 

Year-to-year price and earnings fluctua- 
tions of other commodities of the less devel- 
oped countries for the period 1950-61 are 
shown below. 




fluctuation in 

fluctuation in 


foreign exchange 













Palm oil 









Impact of Changes in Supply and Demand 

There are a variety of reasons why the 
prices and volume of the exports of the de- 
veloping countries fluctuate more sharply 
and more frequently than those of manu- 
factured goods. On the supply side, varia- 
tions in weather and disease cause fluctua- 
tions in the output of agricultural commod- 
ities which cannot be turned off when it is 
excessive or readily increased when it falls 
short. On the demand side, small changes in 
final demand induce large changes in inven- 



Moreover, the world market for some pri- 
mary commodities is a residual market, rep- 
resenting only a small proportion of total 
production and consumption. As a result, 
this market bears the full impact of changes 
in supply and demand. A small decrease in 
production in an exporting country may re- 
sult in a significant percentage decrease in 
supply on the world market. Conversely, a 
small increase in domestic production in an 
importing country may result in a significant 
percentage decline in imports. 

Instability in commodity markets feeds on 
itself. Excessively high prices in periods of 
shortage lead to overproduction ; overproduc- 
tion to glut and excessively low prices; low 
prices to underproduction, and so on in a 
continuous cycle of exaggerated ups and 

Because exports typically account for such 
a large proportion of total production as well 
as foreign exchange earnings in the low- 
income countries, instability in commodity 
markets has widespread repercussions 
throughout their economies. When prices are 
good, the economy is buoyant to the point 
where serious internal inflationary pressures 
often develop, with the usual accompanying 
economic distortions. When prices drop, so 
too do government revenues, private invest- 
ment, imports, and the level of economic ac- 
tivity generally. Development programs are 
interrupted, and development projects grind 
to a halt. 

Characteristics of Primary Commodity Trade 

More serious perhaps than the instability 
of their trade receipts is the longer range 
problem that the traditional commodity ex- 
ports of the low-income countries are not 
dynamic. They have not been increasing and 
are unlikely to keep pace with the increase 
in world trade and world income generally. 
Demand for many primary products is 
sluggish for a variety of reasons, including 
saturation of per capita demand in the main 
consuming centers (e.g., grains), the com- 
petition of synthetics (e.g., cotton and 
rubber), technological improvements that 
have led to economies in the use of raw mate- 
rials (e.g., tin), and increasing agricultural 

self-sufficiency in the industrial countries 
(e.g., sugar). 

Despite unpromising market prospects, 
producers have great difficulty in bringing 
their production into line with demand. They 
continue to produce what they have been 
accustomed to producing, largely because 
their economies lack flexibility and their eco- 
nomic alternatives are few. Increasing sup- 
plies in the face of sluggish demand have led 
to weak and falling prices, often reinforced 
in the case of agricultural products by the 
efi'orts of farmers to compensate for lower 
unit returns through increased volume. 

In the 1952-61 period the value of exports 
(excluding petroleum, which affects only a 
few countries) increased by only 19 percent, 
not even keeping pace with population 
growth, let alone providing resources for 
development at satisfactory rates. In the 
same period the export receipts of the indus- 
trial countries increased by about 70 percent. 
In the decade of the fifties the export re- 
ceipts of Latin America — excluding Vene- 
zuela and Cuba — increased only 10 percent, 
while the unit value of imports rose 12.5 per- 
cent. In other words, in terms of real pur- 
chasing power Latin America's export earn- 
ings were less at the end of the decade than 
at the beginning. 

In 1963 and 1964 higher prices for sugar, 
coffee, and nonferrous metals improved the 
earnings of the developing countries sig- 
nificantly, but this temporary improvement 
has not been sustained. The sharp drop in 
sugar prices, weakness in coffee prices, and 
plummeting cocoa prices have combined to 
depress export earnings once again. 

These characteristics of primary commod- 
ity trade — inherent price instability, slow 
growth in demand, a persistent tendency to 
oversupply — have greatly hampered the ef- 
forts of the developing countries to carry out 
their development programs and have led 
them to press for international corrective ac- 
tion. It is easy to brush off these pressures 
by reaffirming the basic answer to the trade 
problems of the low-income countries: di- 
versify output and exports and thus reduce 
excessive dependence on a few traditional 
commodities. But this easy response ignores 

JULY 19, 1965 


the fact that the process of diversification is 
the process of growth itself. It is necessarily 
a long and difllicult process. In the mean- 
time the developing countries have no alter- 
native but to seek whatever practicable meas- 
ures are available to moderate their trade 

Functions of Cominodity Agreements 

Commodity agreements offer one such 
measure though by no means the only one. 
Commodity agreements, if effectively imple- 
mented, can perform two useful functions: 
They can reduce short-term price fluctu- 
ations, and they can help arrest the decline 
in raw material prices. They can do this, 
however, only if countries participating in 
commodity agreements cooperate to regulate 
their exports and to adjust their production 
policies in accordance with anticipated mar- 
ket demand. 

Today's commodity agreements — in tin, 
wheat, sugar, and coffee — are of recent 
origin, but the first efforts to influence world 
market prices for primary commodities date 
back to the early part of the century. These 
initial attempts were largely unsuccessful in 
accomplishing their objectives and indeed 
account for some of the lingering doubt as- 
sociated with commodity agreements as in- 
struments of international economic policy. 

Serious interest in international agree- 
ments developed again in the late 1940's and 
early 1950's, first, with the drafting of the 
1948 Havana charter and, secondly, with the 
persistent downtrend in the prices of pri- 
mary commodities after the Korean war. 

The Havana charter laid down certain 
basic principles 

... to prevent or moderate pronounced fluctua- 
tions in the price of a primary commodity with a 
view to achieving a reasonable degree of stability 
on a basis of such prices as are fair to consumers 
and provide a reasonable return to producers. 

While the charter was never formally 
adopted, these principles gained general ac- 
ceptance as guidelines in subsequent com- 
modity negotiations. 

Stabilization arrangements can take a va- 
riety of forms. They can be export quota 

agreements to hold stocks oflt the market when 
production is excessive and release stocks 
when supply is short. The agreement can be 
a simple export-quota arrangement, like the 
coffee agreement, where each producing coun- 
try is responsible for holding its own stock- 
pile supplies in excess of its quota. It can 
be combined with an international buffer 
stock arrangement, like that of the tin agree- 
ment, where the buffer buys when the market 
is weak and sells when the market is strong. 
It can be an international contract arrange- 
ment, like the wheat agreement, in which im- 
porting countries undertake to buy agreed 
quantities at a specified minimum price when 
the market slips below that price, and ex- 
porting countries undertake to sell agreed 
quantities at a fixed maximum price when 
the market moves above that maximum. 
There are a variety of other possible arrange- 
ments. The object, however, is the same; 
that is, to keep price fluctuations within 
agreed limits. 

For a number of primary commodities, 
however, the problem is not simply to reduce 
year-to-year swings in price. It is a struc- 
tural one of persistent overproduction and 
depressed prices. For such commodities, an 
international agreement must attack the root 
cause of depressed prices by measures to 
bring production back into line with demand. 
If this is done, commodity agreements can 
be effective within certain limits in achieving 
more remunerative prices and earnings for 

One authority, John A. Pincus, in an 
article published in the January 1964 issue of 
Foreign Affairs, estimated that if fully ef- 
fective commodity agreements had existed in 
1961 for coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, and ba- 
nanas, the earnings of producing countries, 
as a result of better prices, could have been 
$700 million higher than they were. He goes 
on to point out, however, the great diffi- 
culties producers would have had in meeting 
the necessary conditions for an effective 
agreement. Because of these difficulties, 
some of which are outlined below, he con- 
cludes that the process of achieving effective 
commodity agreements may be slow. 

Not all commodities, of course, lend them- 



selves to formal agreements. It would be 
difficult to develop an effective agreement 
for perishable commodities like bananas; or 
for certain oils and oilseeds vi^ithout embrac- 
ing the whole range of fish and animal fats 
and vegetable oils that are close substitutes ; 
or for natural rubber without embracing 
synthetics; or for those metals where scrap 
is a major element of supply. For these 
reasons, agreements could work for only a 
limited number of commodities. 

Problems of Negotiation and Implementation 

Economics textbook discussions generally 
focus on the economic argument against com- 
modity agreements, stressing that such ar- 
rangements may create more difficulties than 
they solve because of the problems of produc- 
tion controls, competition from substitutes, 
the handling of stocks, etc. Much less atten- 
tion has been paid to the no less difficult 
problem of negotiation and implementation. 

Agreement among the participants on a 
realistic price range within which it can be 
expected to confine price fluctuations must 
be obtained before negotiations have a chance 
for successful conclusion. The exercise can 
also penalize the most dynamic and progres- 
sive producers because quotas generally are 
set on the basis of past export performance 
and not with an eye to relative efficiency. 
As a result, low-cost producers become res- 
tive in time and are tempted to violate agree- 
ments so as to capture a larger share of the 
market for themselves. 

But the principal problem is living by 
agreements once they are established. Sup- 
plying countries find it hard to limit exports 
to their quotas so long as some additional 
sales offer the immediate prospect of extra 
earnings. Coffee-producing countries tried 
to regulate supplies to the coffee market in 
the late 1950's but failed because members 
were unable or unwilling to abide by the 
quotas limiting their exports. Each sought to 
evade the burden of export control at his 
neighbor's expense. But the result of such 
widespread evasion was to place more coffee 
on the market than it could absorb at prevail- 
ing prices and to force down prices for all. 

Clearly, an agreement that depends on 
supply control cannot protect producers un- 
less they are prepared to hold back supplies 
when the market is weak. Nor can it protect 
consumers if exporting countries are not pre- 
pared to release supplies when prices are 
pushing through the ceiling. 

The task of setting production goals for 
each supplying country so as to bring world 
production into line with estimated world 
consumption is an especially delicate and 
difficult problem. Countries not only have to 
agree on which among them should expand 
production and which should curtail but, 
having agreed, are then obliged to act. Cur- 
tailing production and finding alternative 
employment for displaced labor is acutely 
difficult. We know this only too well from 
experience with our own farm programs. 
The problems we in the United States face 
in this regard are compounded many times 
in the developing countries. However, unless 
such action is taken in the case of commod- 
ities in persistent oversupply, a commodity 
agreement is bound to fail as stocks build up 
and the cost of holding them becomes in- 

U.S. Position on Commodity Agreements 

The United States was for many years re- 
luctant to support commodity agreements, 
although we participated in agreements in 
sugar and wheat — commodities we produce 
at home. 

A combination of factors recently has led 
us to adopt a more positive and constructive 
position: (1) our recognition that the insta- 
bility in commodity trade makes orderly 
growth and development for the low-income 
countries virtually impossible ; (2) our desire 
to help the developing countries become more 
self-supporting through trade; (3) the emer- 
gence of new independent countries heavily 
dependent on commodity trade, and their in- 
sistent pressure for the cooperation of the in- 
dustrialized countries to help them with their 
commodity problems; (4) the increasing 
realization that the economic ups and downs 
caused by commodity price fluctuation in- 
spire and nurture political unrest. 

JULY 19, 1965 


Mr. Brodie's article is one of a series being 
written especially for the Bulletin by officers 
of the Department and the Foreign Service. 
Officers who may be interested in submitting 
original bylined articles are invited to call the 
editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton, 
extension 5806, room 5536. 

The participation of consumer countries in 
agreements is essential. Without them there 
is no satisfactory way to police an agreement 
or to apply penalties against producers un- 
willing to join. This lack of enforcible sanc- 
tions was one of the main reasons why the 
producers' coffee agreements of 1958-62 did 
not work well. With consumers as members, 
the possibilities for insuring compliance with 
producers' obligations under an agreement 
are greatly increased. 

The United States Government is prepared 
to consider sympathetically any reasonable 
proposal for the improvement of commodity 
markets. We are prepared to help develop 
and support agreements which have the po- 
tential for dealing effectively with the short- 
run and the long-run difficulties of particu- 
lar commodities important to the trade of the 
developing countries. 

We are today members of the International 
Wheat Agreement ; we helped to develop and 
negotiate the International Coffee Agree- 
ment ; we hope to participate in developing a 
new sugar agreement ; we participated in the 
spring of 1964 in the negotiation of a new 
tin agreement ; we would be prepared to sup- 
port a cocoa agreement if a realistic one 
were negotiable. In short, although we are 
fully aware of the technical and political as 
well as economic difficulties of devising and 
operating effective agreements, we are never- 
theless willing to examine all proposals on 
their merit in a positive spirit. 

Such commodity agreements as we have 
had in the postwar period have helped some- 
what to moderate sharp swings in prices. 
They have not been effective, however, in 
solving the basic problem of oversupply. 
Thus the wheat agreement has kept prices 
within the target range but only because the 
United States and Canada have been pre- 

pared to hold large stocks. The sugar agree- 
ment kept prices reasonably stable, but it was 
necessary to lower the price range at each 
renewal of the agreement because of persist- 
ent oversupply. The tin agreement may 
have moderated short-term price movements 
somewhat, but the buffer stock never had the 
resources needed to enable it to function with 
full effectiveness as a price stabilizer. The 
coffee agreement did help to moderate the 
recent price rise, caused by a crop failure in 
Brazil, but it is too early to tell whether it 
will be able to meet the test ahead, that is, 
to keep prices from plummeting again be- 
cause of oversupply. 

Agreements cannot for long sustain prices 
out of line with the underlying forces of 
supply and demand, unless, as in the case of 
the wheat agreement, the producing coun- 
tries are rich enough to continue to hold 
burdensome stocks. If the producing coun- 
tries are weak and poor, they cannot afford to 
hold ever-growing stocks and the price range 
must be continuously adjusted to accommo- 
date supply or the agreement will fall apart. 
The basic solution of tailoring production, 
and not just exports, to world demand has not 
yet been undertaken in any agreement, al- 
though the coffee agreement contemplates 
this as a longrun objective. 

other Techniques To Ease Commodity Problems 

Because of their limitations we do not rely 
on commodity agreements alone to cope with 
the commodity problems of developing coun- 
tries. We use a variety of techniques in com- 
bination. We are trying to expand the mar- 
kets for the commodity exports of the low- 
income countries by removing artificial im- 
pediments to trade and consumption. Thus 
we have urged the other industrial coun- « 
tries to join with us in eliminating tariffs, | 
quotas, and excise and consumption taxes 
on tropical products. Undoubtedly high taxes 
do inhibit the consumption of some of these 
commodities. Our Trade Expansion Act of 
1962 authorizes us to eliminate duties and 
other restrictions on tropical agricultural 
and forestry products not produced in sig- 
nificant quantities in the United States, pro- 
vided the European Economic Community 



takes comparable action. 

We are supporting the program developed 
by the International Monetary Fund to pro- 
vide compensatory credits to offset short- 
term declines in the export earnings of the 
low-income countries. If prices and sales of 
basic commodities are depressed for 1 or 2 
years, compensatory credits can alleviate 
distress and help sustain a continuing flow 
of imports. When prices and sales recover, 
the credits can be repaid. The new IMF com- 
pensatory financing program is an important 
facility to help the low-income countries cope 
with the problem of short-term market in- 

We are participants in international study 
groups for individual commodities. These 
study groups perform a variety of valuable 
services. They improve statistics, make short- 
term forecasts and long-term projections of 
supply and demand, and provide a useful 
forum for intergovernmental consultations 
on the specific problems facing specific com- 
modity markets. They can be a valuable aid 
to governments in this forward planning. 

To sum up, commodity agreements can 
play a useful though limited role in helping 
the developing countries with their trade 
problems. However, they are essentially an 
interim measure which provides the develop- 
ing countries time to come to grips with their 
underlying structural problems. Only a 
limited number of commodities can be con- 
trolled because of problems of substitutes, 
both natural and synthetic, perishability, etc. 
For such commodities, agreements can re- 
duce short-run price fluctuations and achieve 
moderately more remunerative prices over 
the long run. To improve prices, however, 
the developing countries will have to demon- 
strate much more discipline than they have 
in the past with regard to regulating their 
exports and bringing their production into 
line with demand. This is likely to be a slow 
and difficult process. But the rewards would 
be worth the effort. 

• Reprints of the above article will soon be 
available upon request from the Office of 
Media Services, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

President Inaugurates Commercial 
Telephone Service by Satellite 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

This moment marks a milestone in the 
history of communications between peoples 
and nations. 

For the first time a manmade satellite of 
earth is being put into commercial service as 
a means of communications between conti- 
nents. The occasion is as happy as it is his- 
toric, and that is for many reasons. 

This is, first of all, a very tangible and 
valuable realization of the promise and 
potential of man's exploration of space. On 
ahead, we shall take many more and, I think, 
many longer strides forward. But we can 
know, from this step today, that mankind's 
growing knowledge of space will bring grow- 
ing improvement for life on this earth. 

So it is especially fitting that this historic 
step comes not as the achievement of any 
single nation but as the work of many 
nations. This represents a joint venture of 
44 countries, with still more participants in 
prospect. For us in the United States, that is 
especially gratifying. Since the earliest days 
of the Age of Space, we have urged — as we 
still do — that all nations join together to ex- 
plore space together and to develop together 
its peaceful uses. 

Finally, for us — and, I am sure, for our 
friends in Europe as well — it is a particu- 
larly happy circumstance that this service is 
another bond in the many ties that join us 
together across the North Atlantic. 

Other satellites, in days to come, will open 
new communications pathways for all the 
world. But we are especially pleased that 
this first service brings closer together lands 
and people who share not only a common 
heritage but a common destiny — and a com- 
mon determination to preserve peace, to 
uphold freedom, to achieve together a just 

1 Made on June 28 at the beginning of a six-nation 
telephone ceremony marking the opening for com- 
mercial use of the circuits of the Communications 
Satellite Corp. (White House press release). For 
background, see Bulletin of Mar. 8, 1965, p. 340. 

JULY 19, 1965 


and a decent society for all mankind. 

In these times the choice of mankind is a 
very clear choice between cooperation or 
catastrophe. Cooperation begins in the better 
understanding that better communications 

On this occasion, then, I am pleased to 
extend my congratulations to all the inter- 

national participants in this system and to 
the Communications Satellite Corporation. 
And I would express the hope that all na- 
tions may become willing to join in such 
great enterprises for the good of mankind, 
and that all of our labors may be blessed by 
a rich and a bountiful harvest of peace on 
this earth. 

America and Belgium— A Community of Interests 

by Douglas MacArthur II 

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations ^ 

First, let me say that it is an honor and 
a pleasure for me to be able to meet with 
you today. And I say this, not just for the 
usual reasons of courtesy, but from a very 
full heart. I have, to begin with, just re- 
turned to the United States from a 4-year 
assignment in your country, where, as Amer- 
ican Ambassador, I had the privilege of 
working closely and intimately, not only with 
the outstanding members of your Govern- 
ment but with other distinguished Belgians 
— members of the hard-working and highly 
creative industrial and business community 
of your homeland. 

But the friendship and affection I shall 
always feel for Belgium and the Belgian 
people has even deeper roots than the mem- 
ories of my two tours of duty in your beau- 
tiful country. Indeed, my daughter — my 
only daughter, I shall add — found the 
Belgian people in general quite as attractive 
as I did, and one young Belgian in particular 
she found attractive enough to marry. In 
fact, let me frankly state that the most de- 
lightful and totally irresistible woman in my 

' Address made before the Belgian Chamber of 
Commerce in the United States at New York, N.Y., 
on June 16 (press release 154 dated June 15). 

own life is a Belgian — my 7 months' old 
granddaughter. And, with the slightest prov- 
ocation, I could spend the rest of your time 
talking about her. But I am sure you have 
all heard new grandfathers before. 

The Bonds Between the U.S. and Belgium 

Let me, with some effort, then, turn to 
another subject. I want to talk, instead, of 
the relations between our two countries and 
the community of interests that have bound 
us together and will, I believe, continue to 
do so in an ever more constructive relation- 
ship in the future. 

We have shared much over the years. We 
share, of course, the common heritage of 
Western civilization. We share an unbroken 
history of friendly relations from the very 
birth of our two countries. We have a bond 
in the shared experience of two world wars, 
in which Americans fought side by side with 
their valiant Belgian allies and mingled their 
blood in defense of liberty. And most re- 
cently our United States Air Force joined 
with Belgium's legendary and gallant berets 
rouges in saving the lives of hundreds of for- 
eign hostages in the Congo. I think it is fair 
to say that the seal of history has been 



placed on the bonds that unite our countries. 

But our sharing has not been restricted 
to the military sphere and to the blood 
spilled in the fields of Flanders and the 
forest of the Ardennes. We share, too, in 
the works of peace. Both our nations sup- 
port and encourage continued progress 
toward European integration. And when 
Americans speak of this, we think irresist- 
ibly of the creation of Benelux, of the im- 
measurable contribution which Belgium has 
made to the New Europe and the role that 
your distinguished Foreign Minister, Paul- 
Henri Spaak — a great European — ^has played 
in the development of the Treaty of Rome 
and the European Communities. 

Nor has our sharing been confined to Eu- 
rope. Both our countries have recognized that 
one of the major unfinished tasks on the 
agenda of the century is the reduction in the 
immense disparity in income and living con- 
ditions between the industrialized nations 
and the newly emerging, developing coun- 
tries. Through the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development], 
through the U.N., and through the individual 
efforts of both countries, we have sought 
ways to bring our national wealth and our 
technical skills to bear on this problem. 

Both our countries are contributing sub- 
stantial resources to this end. And I cannot 
touch on this subject without paying a spe- 
cial tribute to the Belgian contribution to 
the development of the Congo. Belgium left 
to the people of the Congo an economic in- 
frastructure unsurpassed elsewhere among 
the newly independent African states, and 
we believe that the Congo stands to benefit 
greatly from continued close ties with Bel- 
gium. In particular, I want to mention not 
only the economic and technical assistance 
which is supplied to the Congo by the Bel- 
gian Government but also the tremendous 
and invaluable contribution that Belgian in- 
dustries which operate there have made and 
are making to the development of schools, 
hospitals, and the other essential economic 
underpinnings which are necessary for eco- 
nomic and social progress. 

But I need not further belabor the point 
that Belgium and the United States have 

much in common — a common heritage, com- 
mon goals, common values. Above all, the 
American people, like the Belgian people, 
are dedicated to the cause of freedom and 
to the quest for peace. 

The Aggression in Viet-Nam 

I want to spend the remaining few min- 
utes I have with you in discussing the most 
crucial present challenge to our common 
principles — the aggression that the free 
world faces in Viet-Nam. 

In no other part of the world today is 
there such immediate peril to the security 
of free peoples and to the cause of peace 
with freedom and justice for which we 

The history of Viet-Nam and the struggle 
there is a complicated one. But the issue is 
simple. Bluntly stated, the question is, can 
aggression be made profitable? 

Let there be no mistake on this point. 
What is happening in Viet-Nam is not a civil 
war. It is not an insurrection. It is not a 
popular uprising, nor is it, in the terms 
Hanoi and Peiping prefer to use, a "war of 
national liberation." It is aggression, pure 
and simple. 

I was in France in 1940 when hundreds 
of thousands of German troops smashed into 
Belgium and Holland and Luxembourg and 
then into France. I remember debates as to 
what America's reaction should be — but I 
cannot remember any debates as to whether 
or not Nazi Germany was committing ag- 
gression against its neighbors. 

In 1950 North Korean soldiers in great 
numbers rolled across the 38th parallel, 
where for 3 bloody years men from Korea, 
the United States, and other free nations — 
including the heroic Belgian unit — resisted 
their aggression so that a small nation that 
was minding its own business could remain 
free. I can recall that there were differ- 
ences over how to cope with that aggression. 
But I do not remember any respected seg- 
ment of opinion which denied that aggres- 
sion had indeed taken place. 

Aggression does not lose its character be- 
cause efforts are made to conceal its naked 
face — or because the time schedule is drawn 

JULY 19, 1965 


out — or because trained men and weapons 
of war are introduced by stealth across 
frontiers and then unleashed in a savage as- 
sault on free peoples — or because the ag- 
gressor's troops speak the same language as 
their victims. 

Viet-Nam is not the first arena of this 
kind of aggression. In 1948 the motherland 
of Western civilization — Greece — was torn 
by what superficial observers called a "civil 
war." Greeks, fighting for the ideals of free 
government which had motivated their an- 
cestors over twenty centuries before, found 
themselves fighting Communist Greeks for 
the freedom and independence of their coun- 
try. It was not a large-scale military action. 
Bands of Communist guerrillas armed and 
equipped from abroad would cross the fron- 
tier into Greece to strike and disrupt the 
life of the country. When, as often hap- 
pened, they needed supplies or when they 
were cornered by troops of the Greek Army, 
they melted into the landscape or recrossed 
borders into a Communist country next door. 
The fate of Greece, and the security, per- 
haps, of the entire Mediterranean world, 
hung in the same delicate balance as at 
Marathon and Thermopylae. 

But this great Communist effort to take 
over Greece and then the rest of the Med- 
iterranean was frustrated by the courageous 
Greek people, aided by the United States, 
which supplied military advisers and equip- 
ment under the Truman Doctrine to help a 
small, gallant country remain free. 

What we are facing in Viet-Nam today is 
the same type of operation the Communists 
tried against Greece, although on a greatly 
expanded scale. 

We are, in short, confronted with ag- 
gression by the Communist regime in Hanoi, 
spurred on by Peiping, against the Govern- 
ment and people of South Viet-Nam. The 
United States is helping the South Viet- 
namese at their request, in their interest, in 
our own clear, unmistakable national inter- 
est, and in the interest of the free peoples of 
Southeast Asia and all the world. 

The North Vietnamese have repeatedly re- 
ferred to their attack upon South Viet-Nam 
as a "war of national liberation." Some have 

implied that Hanoi and Peiping are react- 
ing only to our presence in South Viet-Nam — 
that the Viet Cong represent an armed 
popular rebellion in South Viet-Nam against 
an unpopular government and army. 

But the facts demonstrate that the Viet 
Cong has spent most of its energy in at- 
tacks, not upon the Vietnamese army, but 
upon unarmed, inoffensive civilian men, 
women, and children in the provinces. What 
Hanoi calls a "war of national liberation" is 
actually simple thuggery, directed from 
North Viet-Nam against the people of South 
Viet-Nam in an effort to terrorize them into 

The State Department white paper of 
February - shows conclusively what the 
SEATO Council meeting in London stated — I 
that the struggle in Viet-Nam is "an aggres- 
sion organized, directed, supplied and sup- 
ported by the Communist regime in North 
Viet-Nam in contravention of the basic ob- 
ligations of international law and in fla- 
grant violation of the Geneva Agreements 
of 1954 and 1962." ^ 

And 3 years ago — in 1962 — the Interna- 
tional Control Commission, consisting of 
India, Poland, and Canada, reached a similar 
conclusion in a majority report. 

The Question of Negotiations 

I have heard some people say, "Even if 
this is aggression, we should end it by ne- 
gotiation, not by war. Why isn't the United 
States willing to negotiate?" 

The answer to that is very simple. We are 
willing to negotiate, and we have been will- 
ing to negotiate for over 10 years. 

In 1954 the United States and eight 
other nations, including the Soviet Union, 
Communist China, and the North Vietnam- 
ese, were together at the conference table 
in Geneva where agreements were ham- 

' Aggression From the North: The Record of 
North Viet-Nam' s Campaign To Conquer South Viet- 
Nam, Department of State publication 7839 ; for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (40 

=> Bulletin of June 7, 1965, p. 923. 



mered out to protect the freedom and in- 
dependence of the South Vietnamese, Lao- 
tian, and Cambodian peoples. 

We agreed to respect that agreement. 

The Hanoi regime was also committed to 
respect it. However, the ink was hardly dry 
before Hanoi began to violate it by ordering 
its agents to go underground, caching arms 
in South Viet-Nam, and organizing secret 
bases for future aggression. The aggression 
itself began almost at once and had reached 
massive proportions by 1962. 

Again, in 1962, the United States sat 
down at the conference table with 13 other 
countries in our effort to preserve the in- 
dependence of Laos. Again, the Soviet Union, 
the Chinese Communists, the North Viet- 
namese were present with representatives 
of Laos, South Viet-Nam, and other countries 
immediately involved. Again agreements 
were hammered out that, if observed, would 
have brought peace to Laos and preserved 
its freedom. Once again, the ink on the agree- 
ment was not dry when Hanoi proceeded 
to violate the prohibitions on the presence 
of foreign forces and then directed the Com- 
munist Pathet Lao to resume their savage as- 
sault on the forces of the peaceful little 
Kingdom of Laos. 

And more recently, with what I believe 
must be considered commendable patience, 
we have invited Hanoi to enter into uncon- 
ditional discussions, only to have that offer, 
up until this time, rebuffed. 

But even if the other side proves willing 
to negotiate — and we hope it will — I would 
emphasize that negotiations and peace are 
not the same thing, as our experience in 
1954 and 1962 makes quite clear. Negotia- 
tions are not an end unto themselves. For 
us they are a means to reach an honorable 
settlement that will respect the freedom and 
independence of a small country — the Re- 
public of Viet-Nam — that asks only to be 
left alone. 

For the other side negotiations in the 
past have meant something different. They 
have served as a smokescreen behind which 
stealthy and concealed aggression has con- 

Let me emphasize that the United States 

insists upon an honorable settlement for the 
Republic of Viet-Nam that will preserve its 
independence. We will not resort to negotia- 
tions as a cloak for capitulation. 

I have heard it said the so-called "loss of 
face" we might suffer in simply withdraw- 
ing from Viet-Nam "is not worth the death 
of one American." I agree. "Face" is not 
worth the death of one American or one 
Vietnamese or one old mule. But we are not 
talking about "saving face." We are talking 
about the fate of the people of South Viet- 
Nam — and, what is even more important, 
about the people of every nation in the free 

Indeed, it is the Hanoi regime itself that 
makes this clear. General [Vo Nguyen] 
Giap, Commander of the North Vietnamese 
Communist Army, has stated publicly, 
"South Viet-Nam is the model of the na- 
tional liberation movement of our time. . . . 
If the special warfare that the U.S. im- 
perialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is 
overcome, then it can be defeated every- 
where in the world." Let me repeat — "every- 
where in the world." 

The Lessons of the 1930's 

In the 1930's young men marched through 
German streets singing, "Today Germany 
is ours. Tomorrow the whole world." Many 
did not take them seriously. Some of Nazi 
Germany's neighbors, including Belgium and 
Holland, sought refuge in neutrality. The 
United States, thinking itself secure behind 
the shields of two oceans, also sought the 
will-of-the-wisp of neutrality. Many looked 
the other way when the Rhineland was 
reoccupied, when first Austria and then 
Czechoslovakia and then Poland were de- 
voured. Even then many thought that the 
storm would pass by without touching them. 

We all learned otherwise. We learned the 
deep wisdom of the comments of a great 
Englishman who told his countrymen, after 
Munich : 

Do not suppose that this is the end. This is only 
the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first 
sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be 
proffered to us year by year unless, by a supreme 
recovery of moral health and martial vigor, we arise 

JULY 19, 1965 


again and take our stand for freedom as in the 
olden time. 

We learned eventually — but at what tragic 
cost — that Winston Churchill was right. 
Today we have been given full warning of 
Hanoi's and Peiping's intentions as clear as 
Hitler gave in Mein Kampf. If the free world 
withdraws its support of South Viet-Nam, 
whose only desire is to remain free and who 
asks help to do so, we will encourage the be- 
lief that aggression pays off. 

And if we show that we are not prepared 
to stand by our commitments to South Viet- 
Nam, no one else is likely to believe that 
our commitments anywhere else can be de- 
pended on. 

In 1939 Germany finally went to war — 
her appetite having grown by what it fed 
upon since 1936. Every historian of the cru- 
cial days just prior to the invasion of Poland 
agrees that the German Government went 
to war secure in the assumption — solidly 
based on the history of the preceding 3 
years — that Britain and France would not 
abide by their commitments. 

From the lessons of the thirties we have 
learned, I believe, that freedom is indivis- 
ible — that as the area of freedom shrinks 
under aggression's blows, our own security 
and our own freedom are threatened. We 
have learned that when aggressors succeed 
they are encouraged to commit further ag- 
gressions. We have learned that if aggres- 
sion is not halted it will spread until once 
again we will see a world in flames. 

The South Vietnamese people are not alone. 
The United States is not alone in coming to 
their aid. More than 30 other nations have 
offered aid of varying kinds to South Viet- 
Nam. The struggle will be a long and a dif- 
ficult one, and the end is far from view. But 
the cause of freedom will eventually triumph. 

So let us all renew our commitment to the 
defense of freedom in the world today. Let 
us show that this commitment is credible. 
But at the same time, let us continue to 
make clear that we are prepared to discuss 
without conditions an honorable settlement 
that asks nothing for the United States and 

seeks only the continued freedom and in- 
dependence for the people of the Republic 
of Viet-Nam. 

United States and Israel Sign 
Income Tax Convention 

Press release 164 dated June 29 

On June 29 Secretary Rusk and Israeli 
Ambassador Avraham Harman signed a con- 
vention between the United States and Israel 
for the avoidance of double taxation and for 
the encouragement of international trade 
and investment. 

The purpose of the convention is similar 
to that of income tax conventions presently 
in force between the United States and nu- 
merous other countries, namely, to eliminate 
as far as possible double taxation resulting 
from the taxation of the same item or items 
of income by both countries. 

The provisions of the convention deal with 
exemptions or credits with respect to taxes 
on various types of income, including com- 
mercial and industrial profits, earnings from 
the operation of ships and aircraft, divi- 
dends, interest, royalties, income from real 
property, personal service income, remunera- 
tion of teachers, remittances and certain 
payments to students and trainees, and gov- 
ernment salaries or wages. The convention 
also contains provisions for cooperation be- 
tween officials of the two countries in the 
exchange of information and for the pre- | 
vention of fiscal evasion. 

Certain provisions of the convention will 
reduce U.S. taxes and thereby the overall 
cost of financing with respect to certain | 
business activities in Israel. Certain U.S. 
investors are offered a credit against U.S. 
taxes amounting to 7 percent of investments 
made during the tax year, subject to pre- 
scribed conditions. The convention also al- 
lows deferral of tax payment on shares re- 
ceived in return for the transfer of technical 
know-how and the performance of related 
services. Recipients of such shares may 



postpone payment of both the Israel and 
U.S. taxes until the shares are disposed of. 

As usual in the income tax conventions, 
the convention with Israel contains a precise 
definition of the term "permanent establish- 
ment" as that term is used in the articles 
relating to the taxation of business and in- 
vestment income. 

The taxes covered by the convention are, 
in the case of the United States, the Federal 
income tax, including surtax, imposed by the 
Internal Revenue Code, and, in the case of 
Israel, the income tax, the company profits 

tax, and the tax on gains from the sale of 
land under the Land Appreciation Tax Law. 
However, one of the articles of the conven- 
tion provides for nondiscriminatory treat- 
ment for nationals and corporations of 
either country resident in the other country 
in regard to taxes of every kind, national, 
state, or local. 

According to its terms, the convention will 
be brought into force by the exchange of in- 
struments of ratification. It will be sub- 
mitted to the United States Senate for ad- 
vice and consent to ratification. 

Partnership in World Affairs 

by Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

Goethe said there are many echoes in the 
world but only a few voices. These days 
everyone is voicing or echoing their views 
about Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic, 
and student demonstrations and picketing. I 
claim without shame that I am really a 
battle-scarred, if not scared, veteran of the 
demonstrators and picketers. I've been pick- 
eted, applauded, and abused from right and 
left and center everywhere from Texas to 
Toronto for more years than I like to remem- 
ber. Indeed my honorary degree should have 
a P.D.— a "Doctor of Pickets." 

I don't share the concern of some of my 
contemporaries about student demonstra- 
tions. I like their involvement in great is- 
sues. But if I could offer them one word 
of advice, I would say that to state goals is 
easy; to tell us how to get there is not so 

' Address made before the Harvard Alumni Asso- 
ciation at Cambridge, Mass., on June 17 (U.S./U.N. 
press release 4588 dated June 16). 

easy. A moral commitment is hardly mean- 
ingful without a practical hope of improving 
the human condition. 

But now I must speak a bit, and you must 
listen. I hope we both finish our work at 
about the same time. I will suggest how we 
might — I say "might" advisedly — get to 
some of our goals in the world. 

Twenty years have passed since we made 
the last peace — exactly the same span of 
time as from Versailles to Hitler's war. This 
is the sobering fact which today overshad- 
ows our troubled world. Last time, not all 
our good intentions, not all our last-minute 
efforts and improvisations, could stave off 
catastrophe. Can we be sure that on this 
grim anniversary we may not be failing once 
again? This question dwarfs all others, for 
in the nuclear age we have peace — or we 
have nothing. 

We know all about our errors in 1919. 
They were, simply, to repeat the policies of 
the last century: high moral tone and non- 

JULY 19, 1965 


involvement. President Wilson attempted 
through the League of Nations to bring our 
idealism down to earth in the first sketch of 
a functioning world society based on law, on 
self-determination, on the organized institu- 
tions of peace. But this dive into reality 
was too much for us. We retreated to an old 
isolation and continued to mistake exhorta- 
tion for power. 

Could we have repeated this error 
in 1945? Perhaps. But in fact we were pre- 
sented with the opposite temptation. What a 
heyday of conquest we could have had — 
alone with the atom bomb, alone with i 
healthy economy in a shattered world, alone 
with our energy unleashed and unbroken by 
the ordeal of war. 

But we are not conquerors. We are per- 
haps the most unwilling great power in his- 
tory. And certainly no great power has been 
plunged so suddenly from the temptations 
of lofty noninvolvement to the opposite 
temptations of almost total power. 

Yet we did not lose our idealism. We set 
up the United Nations on the basis of equal- 
ity and self-determination, and have helped 
mightily to make it work ever since. We 
have pressed for decolonization. We offered 
to internationalize atomic energy. We gave 
Europe the Marshall Plan — first proposed 
from this platform. We preached the ideal 
of unity and federation to Europe. All this 
was very far from a selfish exercise of our 

But of course it tvas power. The United 
States was dominant. The Western alliance 
was guided by us. The United Nations ma- 
jorities voted with us. The economic assist- 
ance was all from us. The Communists were 
largely contained by us. 

It is a great record of magnanimous and 
responsible leadership. But I suspect we be- 
came used to the idea that, although all na- 
tions are equal, we were somehow a little 
more equal than anyone else. And, of course, 
for any nation this sense of leadership is 
very heady stuff! I have myself said of 
flattery that "it is fine provided you don't 
inhale." The same is true of leadership. It's 
fine — and we did inhale. 

Today's New Conditions 

Today, however, we face entirely new con- 
ditions. Preponderant power is a thing of the 
past. Western Europe has recovered its eco- 
nomic strength and military potential. 
Russia commands a vast war machine with 
a full nuclear arsenal. China adds incipi- 
ent nuclear power to massive armies. And 
both exploit the new techniques of covert 
aggression, the so-called "wars of national 
liberation" — which have nothing to do with 
nation or liberation and can be stretched to 
cover any use of outside interference to re- 
move any government, whatever its policies, 
that is anti-Communist or even non-Commu- 

Our idealism is frustrated, too. The "third 
world" of postcolonial states seems to have 
much less stability and staying power than 
we expected. Just as Western colonialism 
ends, some of them seem ready to fight it 
all over again under the guise of "neoco- 
lonialism." Meanwhile, the new tactics of 
subversion, infiltration, deception, and con- 
fusion seem to be little understood, to say 
the least. Even in Europe the partnership 
we looked for from a unified continent has 
been challenged and circumscribed by reas- 
sertions of national power. 

So we face a new situation, less manage- 
able and less appealing. What do we do about 
it? There are those who would bid us accept 
the inevitable. If Europe is strong enough to 
defend itself, let it do so. If China is recov- 
ering its ancient influence in Asia, so what ! 
We can't stop it. If weak, developing nations 
want to try communism, let them learn the 
hard way. We've done the best we could with 
aid and advice. 

In these arguments we can detect some of 
the old isolationist overtones and assump- 
tions. But in a world much less closely knit 
than this, isolation has not saved us from 
two global wars. It launched us on a world- 
wide depression. It saw the Far East all but 
devoured by a single military clique. 

Would we now keep the peace by leaving . 
the levers of power largely in the hands of | 
vast imperial systems whose ideological aim 
is still to dominate the world? And at what 



point should we cry "halt" — and probably 
confront a nuclear holocaust? 

The old isolationism was always too naive 
about power and about the pretensions of 
power. We must not make that mistake 

But equally we must not make the op- 
posite mistake and put too much faith in 
power. We have among us advocates of 
much stronger action. For them, it is the 
idealism of America that is at fault. Get 
the Allies back into line. Confront Russia 
over Berlin and East Germany. Bomb 
China's nuclear capacity before it increases. 
Back any anti-Communist government any- 
where. Teach everyone they can't push us 

But this won't work either. What power 
have we to coerce our friends in Europe? 
What assurance have we that direct action 
against either Communist giant will not un- 
leash the nuclear war from which we would 
suffer as much as they? How can we be sure 
that unlimited support of any authoritar- 
ian anti-Communist government may not 
merely hasten the day when their citizens 
become Communists as the only means to 

If total isolationism is no answer, total 
interventionism is no answer either. In fact 
the clear, quick, definable, measurable an- 
swers are all ruled out. In this new twilight 
of power there is no quick path to a con- 
venient light switch. 

What Are the Options? 

What then can we do? What are the op- 
tions? I want to suggest that the extremes 
are not exhaustive. In between — less exciting 
perhaps, less nationally satisfying, but safer 
and more humane — are other routes and 
methods which recognize the limits of our 
power, allow for our traditional idealism, 
take account of the world's ideological strug- 
gle, and include no fantasies of either total 
withdrawal or total control. But they are all 
paths which demand a high degree of gen- 
uine partnership, of genuine cooperation. 
As such they will often seem more arduous 
and more tedious than the old pursuits — for 

it is easier to command than to persuade. 

How do we apply a new sense of partner- 
ship and cooperation to the dilemmas of our 
time? In Europe we have to help defend 
against renewed Soviet pressure westward. 
Equally, we have to remove the grievance 
of a divided Germany which obstructs gen- 
uine peace in Central Europe. And, to com- 
pound the problem, to defend the West we 
must take a hard line with Russia. But our 
only hope of reunifying Germany peacefully 
is with Russian good will. I do not believe 
a divided, splintered, nationalist Europe cut 
off from America can accomplish this com- 
plicated balance. Either its divisions will 
enfeeble it militarily, or a resurgence of 
German nationalism will postpone possible 
reconciliation with the East. 

Our best policy is, I think, on the one 
hand to keep our defense commitment to 
Europe unequivocal and to explore all rea- 
sonable ways of transferring greater re- 
sponsibility to them — by joint planning, by 
joint purchasing, by joint burden sharing, 
by our readiness to consider any pattern of 
cooperation the Europeans care to suggest. 
And if, at some future time, they move 
toward political union, then, clearly, the ques- 
tion of nuclear responsibility will have to be 

But at the same time let us seek all pos- 
sible ways, together with our European al- 
lies, to increase peaceful and profitable 
contacts with Eastern Europe and the So- 
viet Union. There were small signs not long 
ago of a modest thaw in the dead winter 
of the old cold war. We should be ready 
for all such signs — in trade, in scientific 
research, in cultural exchanges, in tourism, 
in anything, in short, that opens the two 
systems to each other and substitutes knowl- 
edge and reality for myths and fears. Just 
the other day President Johnson said di- 
rectly to the Soviet people: "There is no 
American interest in conflict with the So- 
viet people anywhere." ^ 

' For the substantive portion of an address made 
by President Johnson before the Cook County Demo- 
cratic Party at Chicago, 111., on June 3, see Bulletin 
of June 21, 1965, p. 986. 

JULY 19, 1965 


Had I been talking with you even a year 
ago, I would have been more optimistic about 
these possibilities. Today the drama in 
Southeast Asia and the dilemmas faced by 
Russia in its relations with its stubborn, 
dogmatic Chinese associate have shrouded 
our hopes of yesterday. But the aim is not 
at fault — to prove that we at least want to 
end this tragic breach in human society, 
want to overcome the barriers that unnat- 
urally divide an ancient continent and cul- 
ture, want to explore with our fellow citizens 
of a threatened world the dilemmas and the 
possibilities of a stable peace. 

The Principle of Self-Determination 

In Asia, too, I do not believe our aims are 
false. The right we seek to defend is the 
right of people, be it in Korea or South 
Viet-Nam, not to have their future decided 
by violence. I do not believe this right can 
be secured by retreat. Retreat leads to re- 
treat just as aggression leads to aggression 
in this still primitive international com- 
munity. Already an active apparatus of sub- 
version has begun its work in Thailand. 
And it is only a few years since Malaya 
beat down a long and murderous attempt to 
impose communism by force. The Tibetans 
were not so fortunate. And the Indians have 
found the neighborhood of 800 million 
Chinese hardly a guarantee of peace and 

So the aim of reinforcing the right of 
peoples, large and small, to determine their 
own destiny does not seem one that we dare 
allow to go by default. The old, old principle 
that powerful neighbors, for reasons of power 
alone, must prevail never gave the world 
peace in the past. I question whether it will 
do so even in the nuclear age. 

But if you ask me whether the task of 
defending and upholding this right should 
be the responsibility of any one power, 
particularly of a large white Western power 
whose past behavior in its own hemisphere 
has not, shall we say, been wholly without 
"imperialist" overtones, then I say emphat- 
ically "No." 

Let us be quite clear about this. The 

United States has no desire to dominate. 
We have no delusion of omnipotence or 
omniscience. We do not cheat ourselves with 
the purple rhetoric of "manifest destiny." 
We do not see ourselves as self-appointed 
gendarmes of this very troubled world. And 
we do not rely on muscle instead of diplo- 

But although we are not even a direct 
party to most of the world's disputes, we 
have had to take a disproportionate share of 
the burden because the international com- 
munity is not prepared or ready to do so, or 
to do so fast and far enough in a given 

In South Viet-Nam the task of upholding 
the principle of self-determination and popu- 
lar sovereignty is ours in part by the 
chances of history, but in part by default. 
We should use every persuasion, every in- 
strument available, to put responsibility 
where it belongs — in the international com- 
munity, with international guarantees and 
policing, and in a long-term settlement rest- 
ing not only on our arms but on the will 
and authority of the United Nations. 

This is what we seek. That the Commu- 
nists have rejected every overture from 
every quarter — more than 13 — for negotia- 
tions without preconditions does not alter 
our aim: to stop the fighting, to create the 
international machinery to safeguard the 
people's right to peaceful choice and to un- 
derpin the whole postcolonial settlement. 
Only the right of self-determination brought 
it into being. Only that right, properly rein- 
forced, can defend it now. 

The Way of Consultation and Joint Action 

So I am suggesting that our role is not 
absolute responsibility. Rather, it is to seek 
patiently, yes, and modestly, to persuade our 
fellow nations to take on the indispensable 
tasks of peace and law. And if we want the 
new nations to recognize the reality of the 
threat to self-determination in Southeast 
Asia, for example, we must be ready to rec- 
ognize the reality to them, for example, of 
the threat of continued colonialism in south- 
ern Africa. We can hardly proclaim the duty 



to safeguard the right of free choice in the 
Caribbean and deny its validity on the other 
side of the Atlantic. The credibility of our 
posture rests on its consistency. 

Safeguards for the right of choice, like 
safeguards for peace itself, must depend 
ultimately on multilateral foundations and 
the concept of collective security enshrined 
in the United Nations Charter. 

At a time when peace is so precarious, it 
is shameful that the great peacekeeping in- 
stitution must beg for the means of keeping 
the peace. But I believe its financial troubles 
may soon be over. It has been on a sickbed 
long enough. But it is not a deathbed. It 
is suffering not from death pangs but from 
growing pains. 

The simple truth is that as long as the 
world is in crisis, the United Nations will be 
in crisis. That's what it is there for. As long 
as there is global tension, there will be ten- 
sion at the global headquarters. When it 
ceases to reflect the troubles of the world, 
then you can start worrying about its de- 

But external pressure is not the only 
threat to self-determination. Of the U.N.'s 
114 members, perhaps two-thirds are vul- 
nerable and unstable. Not because of great- 
power ambitions and rivalries — the instabil- 
ity springs from the growing gap between 
their aspirations and the hard economic real- 
ity of making their way in the postcolonial 
world. The fact that sugar prices fell by half 
last winter is not unconnected with the crisis 
in the Dominican Republic. Nor has the sta- 
bility in Latin America been reinforced by 
a 10-year decline in primary prices that 
wiped out the effect of all incoming capital, 
public or private. 

These are roots of disorders exploited by 
external subversion. To suppose that our 
world can continue half affluent and half 
desperate is to assume a patience on the part 
of the needy for which — to put it mildly — 
history gives us no warrant at all. 

But, like peacekeeping, this vast global 
task is not a task for one nation or for na- 
tions acting singly. The developed states to- 

gether must redress the imbalance. While 
America can give and has given a generous 
lead, we have to accept once again the pa- 
tient, modest, unsensational tasks of con- 
sulting and persuading. 

The developing nations have started to act 
together in the framework of the United 
Nations Trade and Development Conference. 
The developed nations' policies should also 
be internationalized more and more by 
working in and through the United Nations 

If only one government is giving a country 
aid, it easily comes to play too pervasive a 
part on the local scene. Suspicions of 
neocolonialism arise. Issues of prestige, of 
paternalism, of dependence begin to obtrude. 

The answer to these dilemmas is once 
again the way of consultation and joint ac- 
tion to bring a sizable part of the needed 
flow of capital under international bodies 
in which donors and recipients can work out 
their problems together. 

No doubt much of this seems more diffi- 
cult than the role of direct benefaction. But 
our readiness to act not as benefactor but 
as partner could lead to increasing respect, 
closer understanding, the sense of commu- 
nity, and perhaps, at last, enough confi- 
dence to dissipate the myths of "neocolonial- 
ism" and erase the memories of earlier ser- 
vitudes and humiliations. 

In short, what I believe we should seek in 
this new age of more limited power but still 
unlimited challenge is not so much new pol- 
icies but a new emphasis, a new tone. We 
should be readier to listen than to instruct 
— with that curiosity which is the beginning 
of wisdom. It will take a greater effort of 
imagination for us to see the world through 
others' eyes, to judge our policies as they 
impinge on others' interests. 

For what we attempt today is to extend 
to the whole society of man the techniques, 
the methods, the habits — if you will, the 
courtesies — upon which our own sense of 
citizenship is based. In our free society we 
ask that citizens participate as equals. We 
accept their views and interests as signifi- 
cant. We struggle for unforced consensus. We 

JULY 19, 1965 


tolerate conflict and accept dissent. But we 
believe that because each citizen knows he is 
valued and has his chance for comment and 
influence, his final loyalty to the social order 
will be more deeply rooted and secure. 

As heirs to the tradition of free govern- 
ment, what else can we do? Our founders 
had the audacity to proclaim their ideals 
"self-evident" for all mankind. We can 
hardly be less bold when "all mankind" is 
no longer an abstraction but a political fact 
in the United Nations, a physical fact for 
the circling astronaut. 

Nor should we despair. The art of open 
government has grown from its seeds in the 
tiny city-states of Greece to become the 
political mode of half the world. So let us 
dream of a world in which all states, great 
and small, work together for the peaceful 
flowering of the republic of man. 

United States and Mexico Agree 
To Extend Civil Air Talks 

Joint Statement 

Press release 165 dated July 1 

Delegations representing the Government 
of the United States of America and the 
Government of the United Mexican States 
have been conducting air transport discus- 
sions in Mexico City to consider the manner 
in which United States and Mexican sched- 
uled airlines would provide international air 
services between the two countries in the fu- 

Having reached an understanding on a 
majority of the elements of a new agree- 
ment which, if concluded, will further ex- 
pand the network of air routes and air 
services between the two countries, the dele- 
gations have agreed on an extension of the 
present agreement ^ without change, through 
July 15, 1965, to permit conclusion of the 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
4675, 5513, and 5648. 

Importance of Scientific Exchanges 
With U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 

Following is the text of a report made to 
the Cabinet on June 18 by Glenn T. Seaborg, 
Chairman, U, S. Atomic Energy Commission. 

White House press release dated June 19 for release June 20 

Report to the Cabinet 

From: Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy 

Subject : Scientific-Technological Exchanges 
in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic 
Energy with the Soviet Union and 
Countries of Eastern Europe 

I believe that the visit last week to the 
United States of a group of Soviet scientists 
offers us a concrete example of that common 
bond of science about which the President 
has spoken. Though this visit received little 
public attention, it was a noteworthy ex- 
ample of the way in which scientific exchange 
can add significantly to better international 

This was the fourth group of Soviet sci- 
entists to visit the United States in the last 
year or so, balanced by the visits of four 
similar American groups to the Soviet Union. 

These visits which I will review later con- 
firm our hopes that science can serve as a 
possible bridge to span the gap which con- 
tinues to exist between many countries. The 
language of science has increasingly become 
identified as a common tongue that tran- 
scends regular language barriers and politi- 
cal differences. I strongly believe that to be 
understood is essential to peace, and no un- 
derstanding is possible where there is a want 
of communication. The field of science is an 
area in which incipient understanding can 
take root and grow. 

I should like to take this opportunity to tell 
you of our experience in the scientific-tech- 
nological exchanges in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy. 

In May 1963, I visited the U.S.S.R. as the 
head of a U. S. delegation at the invitation 
of Mr. A. M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the 
State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic 


department op state bulletin 

Energy. Our delegation was warmly re- 
ceived at a number of civilian research lab- 
oratories and reactor plants, including several 
which had never before been open to foreign 
scientists from either the East or West. 

During the visit, Mr. Petrosyants and I 
reached agreement on a new Memorandum of 
Cooperation ^ which provided for an expan- 
sion of the exchanges previously conducted, 
as well as a program of new exchanges in- 
volving the assignment of researchers in each 
other's unclassified facilities. This Memo- 
randum of Cooperation represents part of 
more inclusive agreement negotiated between 
our Department of State and the U.S.S.R. 

Later that year a team of ten Soviet tech- 
nical personnel under the leadership of Mr, 
Petrosyants visited U. S. installations com- 
parable to those we had visited. In a coast- 
to-coast tour the Soviet visitors were shown 
many of our most recent advances in those 
areas in which we believe it is to our mutual 
advantage to exchange information. 

Important mutual benefits were derived 
from this initial exchange. In our visit to 
the Soviet Union and in their visit to the U.S. 
each was able to obtain a more detailed pic- 
ture of the comparative status of our two 
countries in reactor development, controlled 
fusion, nuclear chemistry, high energy 
physics and other disciplines. 

In addition to opening many aspects of 
the Soviet nuclear energy program to U. S. 
scientists, a large amount of good will was 
engendered between responsible American 
and Soviet scientists. After the initial ex- 
change of senior program administrators was 
completed, the way was clear for more de- 
tailed exchanges under the Memorandum of 

I am pleased to report that in the past year 
or so we have achieved considerable success 
in implementing the Memorandum. This has 
led to a substantial improvement of our 
knowledge of Soviet scientific research in the 
fields of controlled fusion, solid state physics, 
civilian power reactors, and the disposal of 
radioactive wastes. Delegations of up to ten 

'■ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5582, 

scientists in each of these fields have spent 
two weeks visiting the leading facilities in 
each other's countries. The opportunity for 
U. S. scientists to examine in detail Soviet 
research, development, and operating facili- 
ties has permitted the AEC, and U, S. science 
in general, to make more accurate appraisals 
of the relative standing of American and 
Soviet science in these fields. 

I have had the pleasure of meeting with 
each of the Soviet delegations upon comple- 
tion of their tours of U. S. facilities, and in 
every instance they have expressed their 
appreciation for the hospitality received 
throughout their travels, their admiration of 
the achievements of U. S. science and tech- 
nology, and their earnest desire to continue 
this program. 

A ' recently implemented feature of the 
Memorandum of Cooperation is the exchange 
of a number of research specialists to work 
and study in each other's installations for 
periods of up to one year. In the past few 
weeks, two Soviet scientists from the Yerevan 
Physics Institute completed a three-month as- 
signment at the Cambridge Electron Acceler- 
ator while Dr. and Mrs. [Gerhardt E.] 
Fischer, from our Cambridge program, com- 
pleted three months of work in Yerevan. 
(Incidentally, Mrs. Fischer is the daughter of 
former Presidential Scientific Advisor, Dr. 
George Kistiakowsky, and a competent sci- 
entist in her own right.) 

A scientist from Moscow spent six months 
with the high energy physics group at the 
AEC's Brookhaven National Laboratory on 
Long Island, and, in return, a Brookhaven 
scientist is currently participating in the re- 
search of the Moscow Institute of Theoretical 
and Experimental Physics, The participants 
of these exchanges have been provided broad 
opportunities for professional and personal 
travel, in addition to having the rather unique 
distinction of being the first actually to con- 
duct research in each other's nuclear energy 

Last month, Foy D, Kohler, our Ambassa- 
dor in Moscow, confirmed our belief in the 
international importance of these exchange 

JULY 19, 1965 


programs when he informed me that he is 
looking forward to the arrival of more AEC 
delegations this summer. In his opinion, 
these scientific exchanges are especially use- 
ful in improving our bilateral political re- 
lationships during these troubled times. High 
Soviet officials have expressed similar senti- 

We are maintaining a continuous flow, in 
both directions, of reports and doctoral dis- 
sertations on recent research in the peaceful 
uses of atomic energy. The number of docu- 
ments exchanged to date has exceeded 500. 
As a result of this and other informal ex- 
changes of information, the U.S.S.R. is one 
of the leading foreign contributors to our 
compilation of reports in the nuclear sciences. 
The Memorandum provides for further ex- 
changes of delegations in the use of tracer 
compounds in medicine, radioneurological re- 
search, nuclear physics, high and low energy 
physics, and accelerator design, as well as 
the long-term exchanges of research special- 
ists in controlled fusion and reactor tech- 
niques. In addition, we plan to hold joint 
conferences on specific scientific problems 
of mutual interest. 

One specific area of exchange which I wish 
to bring to your attention is in the field of 
desalination, including the use of nuclear 
energy. This program is carried out by the 
Department of the Interior, and the AEC. 
As a result of President Johnson's invitation 
for cooperative efforts in this very important 
field, a Soviet group toured U. S. desalination 
facilities and reactor plants last summer.- 
In November an agreement to cooperate in 
the field of desalting was signed in Moscow ^ 
and a U. S. group made a return visit to 
Soviet installations engaged in this work. 
We have made a good start in exchanging 
information in this area and look forward to 
further exchanges as the programs develop. 
Of course not all exchanges in the peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy are carried out under 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 13, 1964, 
p. 60, and Aug. 3, 1964, p. 144. 

' For background and text of agreement, see ibid., 
Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828. 

the Memorandum or the Desalination Agree- 
ment, for there are other programs which 
involve AEC facilities and permit AEC and 
other scientists to visit Soviet scientific cen- 
ters. Both sides have also facilitated par- 
ticipation at professional meetings and, for 
example, AEC scientists have recently par- 
ticipated in scientific symposia and seminars 
in Minsk, Novosibirsk, and Yerevan. A large 
group of U. S. scientists also will attend a 
meeting in Moscow later this month of the 
International Union of Pure and Applied 
Chemistry. It might also be of interest to 
note that there are currently several dozen 
Soviet scientists in the United States at work 
in many areas of study and at many facilities 
across the country. 

In addition to our exchanges with the 
Soviet Union we engaged in similar ac- 
tivities with a number of the countries in 
Eastern Europe. For example, Polish sci- 
entists are working in a number of atomic 
energy installations and universities in areas 
which do not involve national security. 
Among a number of such projects, a young 
Polish scientist, sponsored by the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, is now spend- 
ing a year at the Brookhaven National 
Laboratory studying theoretical physics and 
another is participating for four months in 
the Laboratory's medical research program. 
Other young Polish scientists are participat- 
ing in unclassified AEC-sponsored research 
at various universities such as Stanford, 
Notre Dame, Marquette, and the California 
Institute of Technology. U. S. scientists visit 
Polish institutes and the AEC supported a 
post-graduate researcher who spent a full 
year at the leading Polish nuclear energy 
research center. A very important aspect of 
our exchange program with Poland is the 
AEC depository library which is maintained 
in Warsaw. In return, we receive a substan- 
tial number of Polish reports, mostly in Eng- 
lish, in sufficient copies to supply all of the 
domestic depository libraries. 

AEC Commissioner, Dr. Mary I. Bunting, 
recently completed a trip to Poland at the 
invitation of the Polish AEC. As both a 



scientist and appointee of President Johnson 
to a high-level position in his administration, 
her visit is worthy of special note. 

I would hope that the wider exchange of 
information and ideas in the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy will continue and expand 
the desire for constructive cooperation. 
While the Soviet scientists live in a society 
different from ours in many ways — a society 
whose political principles clash with our na- 
tional ideals — in the laboratory, the Soviet 
scientist behaves in much the same way as 
the American scientist. It is our hope that 
the message of free inquiry which the sci- 
entists around the world must apply in their 
work will increasingly contribute to better 

Science certainly will not remove all of 
the differences and resolve all the conflicts 
between East and West, but it is an approach 
that offers some promise of results. And in 
this nuclear age, I do not think that we can 
afford to neglect any path that offers hope of 
increasing international understanding. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Export Controls on Black Walnut Logs. Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Commerce. March 
16 and 31, 1965. 213 pp. 

Antireligious Activities in the Soviet Union and in 
Eastern Europe. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on Europe of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs. May 10-12, 1965. 190 pp. 

Planning for Peace. Hearings before the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. Ees. 
32. May 11 and 12, 1965. 190 pp. 

Safety of Life at Sea. Hearing before the Subcom- 
mittee on Communications and Power of the 
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com- 
merce on H.R. 7954, a bill to amend the Com- 
munications Act of 1934 to conform to the Con- 
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London 
(1960). May 19, 1965. 16 pp. 

Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention. Hearings 
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations 
on Executive H, 86th Congress, 1st session. May 
26 and 27, 1965. 126 pp. 

Report of the National Advisory Council on Inter- 
national Monetary and Financial Problems on pro- 
posed increase in International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development assistance to private 
enterprise through the International Finance 
Corporation and associated matters. H. Doc. 198. 
June 3, 1965. 22 pp. 

The Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of 
1965. Report to accompany H.R. 4170. H. Rept. 
500. June 10, 1965. 20 pp. 

Accelerated Program To Advance Desalting Tech- 
nology. Report to accompany S. 24. S. Rept. 319. 
June 14, 1965. 11 pp. 

Tenth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report 
of the House delegation to the conference held at 
Paris, November 16-20, 1964. H. Rept. 510. June 
14, 1965. 33 pp. 

International Council of Scientific Unions and Cer- 
tain Associated Unions. Report to accompany 
H.R. 8862. H. Rept. 518. June 15, 1965. 7 pp. 

Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam (revised edition). Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations. June 16, 1965. 233 pp. 
[Committee print.] 

The Baltic States. Report to accompany H. Con. 
Res. 416. H. Rept. 526. June 17, 1965. 5 pp. 

South Pacific Commission. Report to accompany 
H.J. Res. 503. H. Rept. 531. June 21, 1965. 10 pp. 

International Cooperation Year. Report to accom- 
pany S. Con. Res. 36. H. Rept. 533. June 21, 
1965. 4 pp. 

Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. Report of 
the House Committee on Ways and Means to ac- 
company H.R. 9042, a bill to provide for the imple- 
mentation of the agreement concerning automotive 
products between the Government of the United 
States and the Government of Canada. H. Rept. 
537. June 21, 1965. 58 pp. 

United Nations Participation Act Amendments. Re- 
port to accompany S. 1903. S. Rept. 360. June 23, 
1965. 17 pp. 

U. S. Contributions to the South Pacific Commission. 
Report to accompany S.J. Res. 71. S. Rept. 361. 
June 23, 1965. 18 pp. 

Greek Loan of 1929 Settlement Act. Report to ac- 
company S. 1760. S. Rept. 362. June 23, 1965. 
23 pp. 

Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany 
H.R. 7105. S. Rept. 363. June 23, 1965. 12 pp. 

International Committee of the Red Cross. Report 
to accompany H.R. 8715. H. Rept. 548. June 23, 
1965. 10 pp. 

Refugees and Escapees. Report of the Senate Com- 
mittee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee 
To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees 
and Escapees. S. Rept. 371. June 25, 1965. 8 pp. 



Samuel D. Berger as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Far Eastern Affairs, effective July 6. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press 
release dated June 30.) 

David L. Osborn as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective July 
4. (For biographic details, see Department of State 
press release 159 dated June 21.) 

JULY 19, 1965 



U.S. Submits to U.N. Security Council OAS Documents 
on Dominican Republic 

statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^ 

Mr. President, I have asked to speak at 
this point in order to bring promptly to the 
Council's attention the proposals which the 
Organization of American States Ad Hoe 
Committee in the Dominican Republic^ has 
made public today in behalf of a peaceful 
and democratic solution of the Dominican 
crisis. These documents have, as you have 
announced, been transmitted to the United 
Nations by the Organization of American 
States and, as you have also informed the 
Council, will be circulated before the day is 

However, in view of their importance and 
their significance to our consideration of the 
item before us, I will read them to the Coun- 
cil because they contain positive and for- 
ward-looking contributions to the restoration 
of normal conditions of life in the Dominican 
Republic. They look, indeed, beyond the 
very limited sights and the sterile invective 
which I am told has been reflected by some 
speakers here during our immediately pre- 
ceding meetings. They are the product of 
an effort not to assess blame or to engage in 

1 Made in the Security Council on June 18 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 4594) ; for previous statements on 
the Dominican situation made in the Council by 
Ambassador Stevenson, see Bulletin of May 31, 
1965, p. 869; June 7, 1965, p. 913; and June 14, 1965, 
p. 975. 

2 For background, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 1017. 

recriminations about what has happened in 
the Dominican Republic but rather to find a 
lasting solution which will truly benefit the 
Dominican people. 

I hope that the members of the Council 
will give these proposals their thoughtful at- 
tention after they have been distributed in 
the official languages. 

Proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee 

The first is a document entitled "Proposal 
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Solution 
of the Dominican Crisis." And I quote it 
as follows : 

In carrying out the mandate entrusted to it, the 
Ad Hoc Committee, composed of representatives of 
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs of the American Eepublics, has, 
since its arrival in the Dominican Republic on June 
3, undertaken extensive exploratory conversations 
with both contending sides, and with a large number 
of groups and individuals from various sectors of 
the population and various sections of the country. 
Despite existing divergencies, the Committee has 
been able to observe a general revulsion against 
possible resumption of fighting and a widespread 
yearning for the restoration of a climate of peace 
and conciliation and for a return of the country to 
normal democratic institutional life so that the 
Dominican people may freely express their will and 
shape their own destiny. The Organization of Amer- 
ican States is sincerely devoted to helping the 
Dominican people achieve this vital objective. 



As a result of its conversations and study of the 
present situation, the Committee is convinced that 
the best way of achieving this objective is through 
free, democratic elections. For this purpose, the 
Committee herewith presents for the consideration 
of the parties and of the Dominican people as a 
whole the following plan of action: 

1. Elections 

General elections for the President and Vice Presi- 
dent of the Republic, members of the National Con- 
gress and for municipal authorities shall be held 
throughout the country. In order to allow sufficient 
time for the restoration of a climate of peace and 
tranquility necessary for carrying out the electoral 
process, the date set for these elections will be no 
earlier than six months but no later than nine 
months from the present date, so the period referred 
to will be as short as possible with an assured 
termination date. 

In these elections all political parties and their 
candidates who register with the electoral board will 
be able to participate and all will enjoy full free- 
dom of speech and assembly. 

2. Preparation for the Electoral Process and OAS 

In order that such elections might be free and 
reflect the will of the Dominican people, the Orga- 
nization of American States, through its competent 
organs, will cooperate fully in the preparation and 
holding of the elections and will provide the assist- 
ance which may be indicated. 

An OAS Technical Advisory Election Commission 
will be established immediately, composed of jurists 
and experts from the member states of the Orga- 
nization. In its work, the Committee may draw upon 
the experience of the OAS Electoral Commission 
which assisted in the preparation and holding of the 
elections of December, 1962. The Committee will 
cooperate in all aspects of the technical preparations 
that may be necessary. The Committee will observe 
the entire electoral process, including the elections 
themselves, as well as the verification of the results 
of the voting. 

The Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights, provided with an adequate staff, will main- 
tain a headquarters in Santo Domingo throughout 
the pre-electoral period and will be available to all 
Dominicans to receive and investigate any com- 
plaints of violations of the basic civil and political 
rights of the people. The appropriate provisions of 
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties 
of Man, which both parties have already pledged 
themselves to observe, will be accepted by all civilian 
and military authorities and all political parties and 
candidates who participate in the election. 

During the electoral process, the Inter-American 
Peace Force, reduced to the number strictly neces- 

sary to carry out its mission, will supplement the 
efforts of the Dominican authorities in the mainte- 
nance of peace. 

3. General Amnesty and Restoration of Peace 

In a spirit of reconciliation, full amnesty will be 
granted to all who have participated in the civil 
strife, provided that they will lay down their arms 
and acknowledge a willingness to live at peace and 
in harmony with their fellow citizens. The Orga- 
nization of American States will give assistance to 
any who wish to leave the country and wiU take 
the necessary action to obtain safe conducts for 

The Dominican armed forces will return to their 
quarters and will remain subject to the authority of 
the provisional government which will be estab- 
lished. They will refrain from any political activity. 

The Organization of American States and all 
responsible authorities will call upon the irregular 
forces on both sides to lay down their arms and 
return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. The 
Organization of American States will receive cus- 
tody of all arms surrendered and will establish arms 
collection stations. 

4. Provisional Government 

In order to carry the country to the elections 
there must necessarily be a provisional government 
which will exercise authority throughout the entire 
Dominican territory until the elected government 
assumes office, and which will : 

A. Assume immediate responsibility for the main- 
tenance of law and order, and insure respect for 
human rights; 

B. Restore the normal functioning of public 
administration ; 

C. Institute urgent and necessary programs for 
the rehabilitation and development of the economic 
and social Life of the country ; and 

D. Represent the Dominican nation in the inter- 
national community. 

In order for the provisional government to carry 
out its caretaker functions and insure an impartial 
atmosphere during the electoral process, it should 
represent all sectors of the country. The Commis- 
sion will hold conversations with political groups 
and community leaders in order to contribute to 
the formation of the provisional government. 

5. OAS Assistance for the Provisional Government 

Once the provisional government is established, 
the Ad Hoc Committee will recommend to the 10th 
Meeting of Foreign Ministers that the governments 
of the member states of the Organization of Ameri- 
can States grant it immediate diplomatic recogni- 

The provisional government will then be in a 

JULY 19, 1965 


position to receive through the Organization, major 
technical and economic assistance, in order to insti- 
tute immediately programs of national rehabilita- 

6. Institutional Act 

Without prejudice to the constitutional instru- 
ment under which the Dominican people will wish to 
be governed following elections, the provisional gov- 
ernment can best be provided with the basis for 
exercising its political and administrative authority 
through putting into effect temporarily of an Insti- 
tutional Act, drawn from the relevant provisions 
of the 1963 constitution, which are essentially those 
of the 1962 constitution in these respects. 

A group of distinguished Dominican jurists could 
be entrusted with the immediate preparation of the 
draft of the Institutional Act. 

7. Constitutional Assembly 

It is the conviction of the Committee that it is 
up to the Dominican people to decide the constitu- 
tional issue. In accordance with this principle a 
constitutional assembly will be convoked within six 
months following assumption of office by the elected 
government. The Congress, once elected, shall deter- 
mine the method by which the constitutional assem- 
bly shall be composed. 

8. The Committee hopes that, in a spirit of 
democracy and patriotism, this plan will receive the 
support of the leaders of the contending forces and 
of all the Dominican people. 

Signed at Santo Domingo, June 18, 1965, 
by Ilmar Penna Marinho, Ambassador Rep- 
resentative of Brazil, Ambassador Ramon de 
Clairmont Duefias, Representative of El Sal- 
vador, and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker, 
Representative of the United States of Amer- 

Declaration to the Dominican People 

Together with this document and this ap- 
peal there is a Declaration to the Dominican 
People agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the Organization of American States, 
which I should also like to take the liberty 
of reading to the members of the Security 
Council. It is as follows: 

The Representatives of the Organization of Amer- 
ican States in the Dominican Republic, speaking on 
behalf of the regional community, address the fol- 
lowing declaration and appeal to the Dominican 
people : 

The American Republics comprise a family of 
nations. They are bound together by close spiritual 
and material ties. What affects one member of the 

family necessarily affects all the other members. 

The American conmiunity has been deeply dis- 
turbed by the fratricidal strife in the Dominican 
Republic. We are here because of this concern. We 
have not come to take sides in the struggle. The 
reestablishment of peace is what we seek. Our 
mission is not intervention, but rather conciliation. 

The Organization of American States is no 
stranger to the Dominican people: It has shared in 
the struggle for freedom which you have sustained 
for so many years. In cities and hamlets through- 
out the land the Organization of American States 
stands for impartiality, respect for human rights, 
assistance to the needy and defense of the demo- 
cratic process. We come in the same spirit to help 
the Dominican people in this moment of crisis. 

In an effort to understand the current situation 
we have spoken to Dominicans from all walks of 
life and of all persuasions. We recognize the patri- 
otism and valor that have gone into the struggle. 
We understand the causes and objectives which have 
brought Dominicans to take up arms. We know the 
price that has been paid in human lives. We ap- 
preciate the fact that those who live do not want 
to break faith with those who have died. We realize 
that convictions are passionately held and that 
divisions run deep. 

But we also sense the longings of countless num- 
bers of Dominicans not actively engaged in the 
struggle. They do not want a solution imposed by 
force of arms. Their desire is for a peaceful solu- 
tion emanating from the will of the people. At this 
moment they ask for peace to resume their normal 
lives, assurances of respect for individual rights, 
and guarantees for democratic institutions to func- 
tion again. We interpret these to be the aspirations 
of the great majority of the Dominican people. We 
are confident that these aspirations have the support 
of the peoples of the hemisphere. 

We have examined many different possibilities in 
an effort to find a basis for understanding between 
the contending sides. We have also held extensive 
conversations with the leaders of the two groups in 
an effort to determine the possibility of reaching a 
formula satisfactory to both. We regret to say that 
we have not found agreement on the fundamental 

We are confident, however, that there is a solution 
that all democratic men and women of good will can 
support. This is to let the Dominican people decide 
the crucial issues for themselves through early 
general elections. The Organization of American 
States stands ready and willing to play a major role 
in this undertaking, as it did in 1962. 

We, therefore, propose to the Dominican people 
the following: 

1. The holding of general elections with Organi- 
zation of American States supervision in a period 
of six to nine months, the minimum time required to 
make the necessary arrangements. 



2. The opportunity for all leaders of democratic 
political parties abroad to return to the Dominican 
Republic under safeguards of the Organization of 
American States in order that they may participate 
in the political life of the nation, including the elec- 

3. The immediate termination of the armed strug- 
gle, with the return of all members of the regular 
armed forces to their barracks and irregular forces 
to their homes under the supervision of the Organi- 
zation of American States. 

4. The surrender to the Organization of American 
States of all arms in the hands of the civil popula- 
tion. For this purpose there will be established arms 
collection stations of the Organization of American 

5. The reopening of all commercial and industrial 
establishments throughout the country and the 
return of all employees to their customary places 
of work. 

6. The formation of a provisional government 
which will carry the country to elections and the 
preparation of an Institutional Act which will serve 
as a provisional charter until the people decide the 
constitutional issue through a constitutional assem- 
bly which will meet following elections. 

The Organization of American States for its part 
assures the Dominican people that it stands ready 
to carry out the program described below in estab- 
lishing a climate propitious for the holding of free 
elections and thereby helping the country to return 
to political normalcy and to initiate economic re- 

1. The creation of a new OAS Electoral Commis- 
sion to work closely with the central electoral board 
in organizing and supervising the electoral process. 

2. The continuation of the Inter-American Com- 
mission on Human Rights in the Dominican Repub- 
lic to assure respect for political rights throughout 
the electoral period. 

3. The immediate establishment of an expanded 
program of economic and technical assistance to 
promote the recovery of the nation and to help it 
solve its most urgent economic and social problems. 

In making the foregoing proposals we do not ask 
the Dominican people to cease in their struggle to 
win political freedom. What we ask is that the 
solution not be imposed by force of arms — by hatred, 
by imprisonment, by persecution or by death. We 
want no one to surrender his ideals under the threat 
of force. We desire, instead, that the political strug- 
gle continue but that it be decided by ballots, not 
bullets. Let the will of the people freely expressed 
deteiTiiine the destiny of the nation. In this way 
the decision of the majority will prevail and the 
rights of the minority will be respected. Violence 
will give way to reason ! 

In making this proposal we appeal to all Domini- 

cans to help save their country from further suffer- 
ing and bloodshed. 

We ask those who fight to lay down their arms 
and return to their barracks or to their homes. 

We ask public employees to return to their posts 
to reestablish all public services. 

We ask labor and management to restore the 
economic life of the nation. 

We ask political leaders to rally their followers 
to the cause of peace through free elections. 

We ask teachers to instiU in their students Domin- 
ican brotherhood. 

We ask the clerg:y to heal the spiritual wounds 
caused by civil strife. 

In conclusion, we address a sincere, urgent appeal 
to all patriotic Dominicans of democratic conviction 
and good will to take this path to national reconcili- 

The Dominican people long for peace and freedom. 

This is the hour of decision ! 

Santo Domingo, June 18, 1965, and signed 
by the same members of the Ad Hoc Com- 
mittee, including Jose A. Mora, Secretary- 
General of the Organization of American 

ANZUS Ministers Excliange Views 
on World Problems 

Following is the text of a communique of 
the lUth ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, 
and United States Security Treaty) Council 
meeting, which tvas held at Washington on 
June 28. 

Press release 162 dated June 28 

The ANZUS Council held its annual meet- 
ing in Washington on June 28, 1965. The 
Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime 
Minister and Minister for External Affairs, 
represented New Zealand; the Honorable 
Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs, 
represented Australia; and the Honorable 
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, represented 
the United States. 

This annual meeting, like its predecessors, 
was the occasion for a full and candid ex- 
change of views on world problems of direct 
concern to the ANZUS partners. This ex- 
change further broadened and deepened the 
community of interests felt by the ANZUS 

JULY 19, 1965 


countries, which have fought side by side in 
two World Wars and in Korea, and once 
again in South Viet-Nam are comrades in 
arms in the defense of freedom. 

The Council discussed the serious situa- 
tion in Southeast Asia caused by the aggres- 
sive actions of North Viet-Nam, with the 
support of Communist China, in flagrant 
violation of basic obligations of international 
law and of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and 
1962. It noted that the infiltration of arms 
and combat personnel from North Viet-Nam 
into South Viet-Nam has been substantially 
increased and that this infiltration includes 
units of the regular armed forces of North 

The Council noted that North Viet-Nam 
continues to flout the 1962 Geneva agree- 
ment by maintaining military forces and 
supplies in Laos and by moving armed men 
and weapons through Laos into South Viet- 
Nam. It noted also the increasing Com- 
munist threat to Thailand, which has been 
clearly identified by the Communist Chinese 
as the next target. 

The Council noted that the Communists 
themselves regard the war in South Viet- 
Nam as a critical test of the technique of 
infiltrating arms and trained men across na- 
tional frontiers. It afl!irmed its conclusion 
of a year ago "that the defeat of this ag- 
gression is necessary not only to the security 
of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific 
but as a demonstration that Communist ex- 
pansion by such tactics will not be allowed 
to succeed." ^ 

The Council agreed, at the same tune, that 
every effort should be made to achieve a 
peaceful settlement which would enable the 
people of South Viet-Nam to choose and 
shape for themselves their own destiny "in 
conformity with democratic principles and 
without any foreign interference from what- 
ever sources." ^ 
It was noted with regret that the Com- 

1 For text of a communique of the 13th ANZUS 
Council meeting dated July 18, 1964, see Bulletin 
of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146. 

2 From an address by Tran Van Do, Foreign Min- 
ister of the Republic of Viet-Nam, June 22, 1965. 

munist side had rejected many moves in the 
direction of such a settlement by negotia- 
tion. Such moves included those made by 
the United Kingdom as Co-Chairman of the 
Geneva Conferences, by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral of the United Nations, by the President 
of India, by a group of seventeen non-aligned 
nations,^ and by President Johnson in his 
speech at Baltimore on 7 April.* The Council 
nevertheless agreed that such efforts should 
continue, including the recent initiative of 
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers. 

With the same objective in view, the 
Council also agreed that more intensive 
efforts should be made to promote the eco- 
nomic and social development of Southeast 
Asia as a means of helping to remove some 
of the basic causes of instability in the area. 
In this respect the Australian and New 
Zealand Ministers welcomed the readiness of 
the United States, as announced by Presi- 
dent Johnson on 7 April, to contribute a bil- 
lion dollars to an expanded program of 
economic assistance under the leadership of 
Asian nations and the United Nations. It 
was hoped that North Viet-Nam would co- 
operate in such a program as soon as peace 
is restored. 

The Council expressed serious concern at 
the situation resulting from Indonesia's con- 
tinuing confrontation of Malaysia, which 
has created a major threat to peace in 
Southeast Asia. It reaffirmed its support 
for the territorial integrity and independ- 
ence of Malaysia. The Council hoped that 
peaceful relationships would soon be re- 
stored so that the Asian nations concerned 
would be allowed to pursue the advancement 
of their peoples. 

The Council noted with concern that Com- 
munist China, in the past year, has twice 
tested nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in 
defiance of world public opinion as expressed 
in the nuclear test ban treaty. The Council 
urges all nations to consider the dangers in- 
herent in further proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and the threat to the health and 

8 For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, 
p. 610. 
* For text, see ibid., p. 606. 



well-being of mankind which results from 
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons. 

The Ministers expressed a keen awareness 
of the value to Council Members of regular 
exchanges of views within the context of the 
ANZUS Council and stated their intention 
to meet again in about one year, at a place 
to be determined. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be p^irchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y, 

Disarmament Commission 

Memorandum of the United States on measures to 
stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn 
down the arms race, and reduce international ten- 
sion. DC/214/ Add. 1. April 29, 1965. 51 pp. 

Letter dated May 3 from the permanent represent- 
ative of Yugoslavia transmitting a memorandum 
on "necessary immediate measures in the field of 
disarmament." DC/216. May 3, 1965. 6 pp. 

Letter dated May 20 from the deputy permanent 
representative of the Soviet Union concerning a 
letter from Portugal (DC/215). DC/217. May 21, 
1965. 2 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

United Nations Children's Fund: 
Review of UNICEF/WHO-assisted leprosy control 
projects. Report by the Director-General of the 
World Health Organization. E/ICEF/513. April 
20, 1965. 52 pp. 
Recommendations of the 14th session of the 
UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on Health Pol- 
icy. E/ICEF/515. May 17, 1965. 3 pp. 
General progress report of the Acting Executive 
Director, program trends and prospects. E/ 
ICEF/511/Add. 1. May 20, 1965. 42 pp. 
Growth and development of the young child from 
one to six years. Prepared for submission to 
the UNICEF Executive Board by the Interna- 
tional Children's Centre. E/ICEF/521. May 21, 
1965. 65 pp. 
Reaching the young child. Note and recommenda- 
tions by the Acting Executive Director. E/ 
ICEF/520. May 24, 1965. 20 pp. 
Summary of project recommendations by the Act- 
ing Executive Director to the June 1965 session 
of the Executive Board. E/ICEF/P/L.550. May 
25, 1965. 39 pp. 
Technical assistance activities of the United Na- 
tions. E/4016. May 10, 1965. 200 pp. 
Advisory services in the field of human rights. E/ 

4023. May 12, 1965. 3 pp. 
Coordination of international assistance in cases of 

natural disaster. E/4036. May 12, 1965. 8 pp. 
Economic and social consequences of disarmament. 
Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources re- 
leased by disarmament. E/4042. May 12, 1965. 49 


Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi- 
lateral agreement between the United States and 
Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311, 
4407, 4507, 5079, 5723), for cooperation concern- 
ing civil uses of atomic energy. Done at Vienna 
June 18, 1965. Enters into force on the date on 
which the Agency accepts the initial inventory. 
Signatures: Israel, International Atomic Energy 
Agency, United States. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a 
global commercial communications satellite sys- 
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. 
Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 
Accessions deposited: Pakistan, June 30, 1965; 
Yemen Arab Republic, June 29, 1965. 
Special agreement. Done at Washington AugTist 20, 
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 

Signatures: Pakistan, June 30, 1965; Ministry of 
Communications of Yemen AJrab Republic, June 
29, 1965. 
Supplementary agrreement on arbitration (COM- 
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.» 
Signature : Ministry of Communications of Yemen 
Arab Republic, June 29, 1965. 


Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to 
the General Ag:reement on Tariffs and Trade. 
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into 
force April 19, 1964; for the United States No- 
vember 20, 1964. TIAS 5687. 
Acceptances deposited: Argentina, May 11, 1965; 
Canada, April 15, 1965. 


Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners 

of war; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field; 
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of 
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed 
forces at sea; 
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian 
persons in time of war. 

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into 
force October 21, 1950; for the United States 
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 
3365, respectively. 
Accession deposited: Mali, May 24, 1965. 

^ Not in force. 

JULY 19, 1966 



Protocol for the extension of the International 
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at 
Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.i 
Acceptances deposited: New Zealand, June 30, 

1965; South Africa, July 1, 1965. 
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: 
Portugal, July 1. 1965. 



Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of 
authorizations to permit licensed amateur opera- 
tors of either country to operate their stations in 
the other country. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Brussels June 15 and 18, 1965. Entered into 
force June 18, 1965. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed 
at Cotonou December 31, 1964. Entered into force 
December 31, 1964. TIAS 5759. 
Terminated: May 21, 1965 (notice given by 
Dahomey pursuant to art. I, par. 3, of agree- 
ment) . 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Quito June 25, 1965. Entered into force 
June 25, 1965. 


Agreement providing for parcel post insurance. 
Signed at Suva April 12, 1965, and at Washington 
April 22, 1965. Entered into force July 1, 1965. 


Convention for avoidance of double taxation and for 
encouragement of international trade and invest- 
ment. Signed at Washington June 29, 1965. 
Enters into force after exchange of instruments 
of ratification. 


Agreement relating to certain additions to the agree- 
ment of December 4, 1964 (TIAS 5724), for a 
joint cost-sharing program for the base air de- 
fense ground environment (BADGE) system. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 18, 
1965. Entered into force June 18, 1965. 

Saudi Arabia 

Agreement relating to the construction of certain 
military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Jidda May 24 and June 5, 
1965. Entered into force May 24, 1965. 

Upper Volta 

Agreement relating to investment g:uaranties. 
Effected by exchange of notes at Ouagadougou 
June 18, 1965. Entered into force June 18, 1965. 


Agreement for financing certain educational ex- 
change programs. Effected by exchange of notes 
at Montevideo March 22 and May 17, 1965. 
Entered into force May 17, 1965. 

1 Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 


Releases: June 2S-July 4 



may be obtained from the 

Office of News, 

Department of State, Wash- 


D.C., 205 


Release issued 

prior to June 28 which ap- 

pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. | 

154 of June 15. 






ANZUS communique. 



Heroism award to vsddow of 
Indian exchange student. 



Income tax convention with 



U.S.-Mexico civil aviation 



Cleveland: "The View From 
Up There." 



Rusk: USIA television inter- 



t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




INDEX July 19, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1360 

American Republics. U.S. Submits to U.N. Se- 
curity Council OAS Documents on Domini- 
can Republic (Stevenson) 132 


ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views on World 
Problems (communique) 135 

Berger desigTiated Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Far Eastern Affairs 131 

Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations 
(Johnson, Stevenson) 98 

Atomic Energy. Importance of Scientific Ex- 
changes With U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe 
(Seaborg) 128 

Australia. ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views 
on World Problems (communique) .... 135 

Aviation. United States and Mexico Agree To 
Extend Civil Air Talks 128 

Belgium. America and Belgium — A Community 
of Interests (Mac Arthur) 118 


Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th 
Anniversary of United Nations (text) . . 103 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 131 

Department and Foreign Service. Designations 
(Berger, Osbom) 131 

Dominican Republic. U.S. Submits to U.N. Se- 
curity Council OAS Documents on Dominican 
Republic (Stevenson) 132 

Economic Affairs 

Commodity Agreements — A Partial Answer to 
the Trade Problems of Developing Countries 
(Brodie) Ill 

Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123 

United States and Israel Sign Income Tax 
Convention 122 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Osbom desig- 
nated Deputy Assistant Secretary .... 131 


Importance of Scientific Exchanges With 
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128 

Partnership In World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123 

International Information. Secretary Discusses 
Viet-Nam on USIA Television 105 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views on World 
Problems (communique) 135 

Israel. United States and Israel Sign Income 
Tax Convention 122 

Mexico. United States and Mexico Agree To 
Extend Civil Air Talks 128 

New Zealand. ANZUS Ministers Exchange 
Views on World Problems (communique) . 135 

Presidential Documents 

President Inaugurates Commercial Telephone 
Service by Satellite 117 

Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations . 98 


Importance of Scientific Exchanges With 
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128 

President Inaugurates Commercial Telephone 
Service by Satellite (text of remarks) . . 117 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 137 

United States and Israel Sign Income Tax 
Convention 122 

United States and Mexico Agree To Extend 
Civil Air Talks 128 


Importance of Scientific Exchanges With 
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128 

Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123 

United Nations 

Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th 
Anniversary of United Nations (text) . . . 103 

Current U.N. Documents 137 

Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123 

Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations 
(Johnson, Stevenson) 98 

U.S. Submits to U.N. Security Council OAS 
Documents on Dominican Republic (Steven- 
son) 132 


America and Belgium — A Community of In- 
terests (MacArthur) 118 

Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123 
Secretary Discusses Viet-Nam on USIA Tele- 
vision 105 

Name Index 

Berger, Samuel D 131 

Brodie, Henry Ill 

Imhoof, Werner 105 

Johnson, President 98, 117 

MacArthur, Douglas, II 118 

Osbom, David L 131 

Rusk, Secretary 105 

Seaborg, Glenn T 128 

Stevenson, Adlai E 98, 123, 132 

Vohra, H. R 105 




WASHINaTON, o.e. *040a 





Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace 

This 18-page pamphlet is the text of a major address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk be-' 
fore the American Foreign Service Association on June 23. The Secretary describes the recent in- 
crease in aggression from North Viet-Nam, reviews the many efforts that have been made, unsuc- 
cessfully, to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table for negotiations, and repeats 
President Johnson's call for a new program of support for Asian development efforts. In closing 
Mr. Rusk says, "We must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard 
path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast 



PUBLICATION 7919 15 cents 





(cash, check, or money order 
payable to Supt. of Documents) 








Vol. LIII, No. 1361 

July 26, 1965 

Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 1U2 

hy David E. Bell 173 

hy Assistant Secretary Cleveland 151 

by Ambassador George C. McGhee 157 


by J. Robert Schaetzel 161 

For index see inside back cover 

strengthening the International Development Institutions 

statement by Adlai E. Stevenson 

V.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

We meet here in Geneva at the midpoint 
of the Year of International Cooperation 
and the midpoint of the Decade of Develop- 
ment. Let us be neither cynical nor de- 
spondent about the gap between these brave 
titles and the fact that at the moment our 
M^orld community is in fact chiefly notable 
for minimal cooperation and very lopsided 
development. Our aspirations are there to 
spur us on, to incite us to better efforts. 
They are emphatically not there as a blind 
or a cover or as rhetoric to suggest that we 
are really doing very well. 

I take as the understood premise of 

^ Made before the 39th session of the U.N. Eco- 
nomic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, 
on July 9 (press release 170). 

everything I say that as a world community 
we are not developing as we should and that 
our record of cooperation is inadequate, to 
say the least. But I believe — I hope — we can 
do better and that the nations meeting in 
1970 will say : "Ah, yes, 1965 was a kind of 
turning point. That was the moment at 
which we began to realize how much better 
our performance has to be." 

How much better can best be registered 
by a glance at where we are now. 

We launched the Decade of Development 
because we realized, as a world community, 
that while our wealth was growing, its dis- 
tribution had become increasingly unbal- 
anced. I need hardly repeat the figures — the 
developed market economies and the devel- 
oped centrally planned economies make up 


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about a quarter of the world's population 
and account for three-quarters of the world's 
trade, production, and investment. 

By the chances of history and geography, 
these developed nations are largely to be 
found to the north of the Tropic of Cancer. 
Ideology makes no difference here. Soviet 
Russia belongs by income and growth to the 
developed "north," Ghana to the developing 
"south" in our new economic geography. 

These facts we knew in 1960. In the last 
5 years the contrasts have grown more 
vivid. The developed nations with per capita 
incomes of above $700 a year have grown — 
the index I use is gross national product 
per head of population — by not less than 3 
percent a year. 

Below them a smaller group of nations, 
which are in the range of $200 to $700 per 
capita, have grown even more rapidly — by 
4 to 8 percent a year. 

But at the bottom of the scale at a figure 
of $200 per head and less, comprising over 
a hundred nations making up over two-thirds 
of humanity, the rate of per capita growth 
has in many instances been less than the 
average of 2.3 percent of the developing 
countries as a whole. Population growth has 
swallowed up their margins, and per capita 
grovsrth hovers around zero. 

The Hidden Miseries 

This is the statistical picture which 
emerges from the present data about world 
development. But how bare and uninforma- 
tive such numbers really are. They tell us 
nothing about the rates of child mortality — 
10 times higher among poor than rich. They 
give us no picture of the homeless migrant 
living without water or shelter on the fringe 
of Asian or Latin American cities. We get no 
feel from them of the dull ache of hunger or 
the debility that comes from diets without 
enough protein and vitamins. 

These are the hidden miseries about which 
we talk with our figures of per capita gross 
national product, our statistical compari- 
sons, our impersonal percentages. We are 

Ambassador Stevenson died at London on 
July 14. 

talking about pain and grief and hunger and 
despair, and we are talking about the lot of 
half the human race. 

Expansion in tlie Developed Societies 

But we are also talking about another 
phenomenon — the extraordinary increase in 
resources available to human society taken 
as a whole. These 3- or 4-percent increases 
in the national growth of developed societies 
mean an unparalleled expansion of new re- 

Under steady and responsible economic 
management, we cannot see, and we certainly 
do not want, any end to this process of ex- 
pansion. Out of the research that is con- 
nected with weaponry, with space, and with 
the whole wide range of needs of our civil- 
ian economy, we are constantly making new 
breakthroughs — new methods, new products, 
new sources of food or energy or medical 
relief that increase our capacity to reproduce 
wealth still further. We have harnessed en- 
ergy to take us into outer space and to con- 
vert saline waters into drink for the thirsty. 
The isotopes which grow from nuclear exper- 
iments can revolutionize medical and agri- 
cultural research. And we know not what 
new, still undiscovered sources of abundance 
lie ahead. 

We have to begin to grasp and digest this 
new, astonishing liberation of our industrial 
resources, for only after such an under- 
standing can we hope to act on the scale 
and with the audacity that our profound 
problems of poverty and hopelessness and 
obstruction demand. We shall conquer, no 
doubt, the dark face of the moon. But I 
would hope we can with equal confidence 
conquer the dark face of poverty and give 
men and women new life, new hope, new 
space on this planet. 

Let's face it: We are nowhere near con- 
quering world poverty. None of us — neither 

JULY 26, 1965 


the weak nor the strong, the poor nor the 
rich, the new nations nor the old — have yet 
taken seriously enough the contrast between 
the abundance of our opportunities and the 
scarcity of our actions to grasp them. It is 
good that the rich are getting richer — that 
is what economic development is for. But it 
is bad that, despite our considerable efforts 
in the first half of this decade, the poor are 
still poor — and progressing more slowly than 
present-day society can tolerate. 

What shall we do to improve the trend 
during the next 5 years? There is something 
for everybody to do. There are tasks for all 
of us, and it won't help the poor countries 
for us to sit around this table blaming the 
state of the world on each other. There are 
clear and present tasks for the developing 
countries in doing what they know is neces- 
sary to their own economic growth and social 
progress. There are tasks, equally clear and 
equally present, for the industrialized coun- 
tries. And there are tasks — a growing num- 
ber of much larger tasks — for U.N. organi- 
zations themselves. 

I think each of us should come to this 
table vowing to bring proposals that his na- 
tion can — and intends to — do something 
about. In that spirit I will not rehearse here 
my views on how the developing nations can 
better help themselves but will suggest what 
the wealthier countries can do to help and 
how the U.N. itself can do more about de- 
velopment and do it better. 

A Convergent Strategy 

Let me suggest first the sense of a con- 
vergent strategy for the industrialized na- 
tions. Its aim should be to see to it that more 
of the wealth and purchasing power of our 
expanding world economy will be used to 
stimulate economic growth in the developing 

We can accomplish this aim only by the 
coordinate use of a variety of means : by the 
direct transfer of resources from developed 
nations to developing nations through effec- 
tive aid programs ; next, by assuring the de- 
veloping countries greater access to the ex- 
panding markets of the world; next, by 

working to reduce fluctuations in the export 
earnings of the developing countries; next, 
by working harder, doing more specific re- 
search, on what the more developed coun- 
tries can do to help the less developed create 
more wealth faster ; next, by helping to slow 
down the vertiginous growth in the numbers 
of people which the still fragile developing 
economies have to support. A steady, over- 
all, 4-percent rate of growth in national in- 
come is in itself a difficult achievement. Its 
effects are tragically nullified if the rate of 
population growth is 3 percent or even more. 

These five strands of a convergent strat- 
egy contain no mysteries. We have discussed 
them over and over again. What has been 
lacking has been an adequate urgency of 
purpose and decision and a real determina- 
tion to face the full costs. 

There is no doubt that we can afford 
whatever direct transfer of resources can 
really be put to effective use. There are so 
many manmade obstacles in the developing 
process that there is a kind of natural limit 
to the transfer of resources from the richer 
countries to the poorer countries. 

In my judgment, we are in no danger at 
all of harming our own healthy economies by 
maximizing our efforts to promote interna- 
tional development. Our problem, rather, is 
to step up the training of people, the sur- 
veying of resources, and the investigation of 
opportunities — in a word, the preinvestment 
work — which still sets the ceiling on direct 
investment, public and private, in the eco- 
nomic growth of most developing countries. 

With my next point — improved trading 
opportunities for the developing countries 
— I come to all the issues at stake in the 
continuing work of the new U.N. Trade and 
Development Board and its committees, 
and of the GATT [General Agreement on | 
Tariffs and Trade]. These are some of the 
problems we must face together. Primary 
prices are unstable, and many have tended 
downward in the last decade. The tariff : 
structures in the industrial countries hit I 
harder at the processed and manufactured 
goods than at raw materials. Internal taxes 
discourage the consumption of tropical prod- 



ucts. And finally, there is need for greater 
effort to improve production and efficiency 
in the export industries of the developing 

Many of the developing countries suffer 
enormous uncertainties and interruptions of 
trade, with their unstable, fluctuating ex- 
port earnings. The world has already put 
into effect some means of providing com- 
pensatory finance and balance-of-payments 
support to help the developing countries 
deal with such difficulties. Perhaps we will 
never find an ideal solution, but I think we 
have by no means reached the end of the 
road in dealing with these problems. We 
must continue to do everything practicable 
to provide to developing countries resources 
that are effectively related to the fluctua- 
tions in their export trade. 

When I say we need a concerted attack 
on these obstacles, I do not mean a great 
debate in which the attack is concerted 
against the governments of the wealthier 
countries. Complaints about other countries' 
policies have their place in international 
politics — they seldom change what the other 
nations actually do, but they help make the 
complainant a hero to his own countrymen — 
and that has its place in politics too. 

But when it comes to trade between the 
world's "north" and the world's "south," we 
need not a general debate about general 
principles but concrete proposals, direct nego- 
tiations, specific nose-to-nose confronta- 
tions about particular ways the developing 
countries can increase their exports and how 
the rest of us can really help, commodity 
by commodity. 

Research on Cause and Cures of Poverty 

Another vital contribution the industrial- 
ized nations can make to development is to 
expand their own research into the cause 
and cures of poverty. Partly this is a matter 
of putting extra emphasis on those fields of 
science that are especially relevant to the 
needs and possibilities of the developing 
countries. We stand here in the presence of 
exciting breakthroughs in nutrition, in farm- 
ing, in water use, in meteorology, in energy. 
All these are vital, and it is particularly 

gratifying that the United Nations Advisory 
Group of Scientists have put the develop- 
ment of water resources and the evolution 
of new high-protein diets at the top of 
their list of points needing special attack. 

Mr. President, while I am on this subject, 
I should like to say a special word about the 
work of the Advisory Committee on the 
Application of Science and Technology to 
Development. My Government will make 
known in due course its detailed views with 
respect to the specific proposals made by 
this group in the report which is before us." 
As to the report itself, I would only say at 
this time that it is clear, precise, and pro- 
fessional — high testimony to the quality of 
work that can be done in our international 
community. On behalf of my delegation, I 
should like to congratulate all members of 
the Advisory Committee, the many experts 
of the specialized agencies who contributed 
to it, and the members of the United 
Nations Secretariat under whose supervision 
the work went forward. 

But I have more in mind than the merits 
of the recommendations put forward and the 
quality of the report as a whole. I have in 
mind the background of this report and the 
process by which these proposals have taken 
shape for our consideration. 

The background of the report, as we all 
know, is the Conference on the Application 
of Science and Technology to Problems of 
the Developing Areas, held here in Geneva 
in early 1963.^ That conference was criti- 
cized by superficial observers. They said 
that the whole thing was much too big — too 
many people, too many subjects, too many 
papers, too much talk to do any good. They 
said that the whole thing was much too 
vague — too general, too unfocused, too dis- 
parate — and perhaps there was something in 
some of this criticism. 

But it was a start. And the big thing is 
that we did not let it die. We maintained 
the momentum generated at that confer- 
ence. We went on to the next step. Within 

' U.N. doc. E/4026. 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p. 
188, and Feb. 25, 1963, p. 302. 

JULY 26, 1965 


a few months after the close of that con- 
ference, this Council recommended the 
establishment of an expert committee of 
advisers to carry on — to pick up where the 
conference left off — to sort the important 
from what is merely useful. 

I have no doubt, Mr. President, that what 
followed was a difficult and tedious exercise 
for the committee of advisers. But they 
went about it systematically. They consulted 
and took evidence. They worked steadily 
and quietly. And out of thousands of things 
that might be good to do, they have derived 
a few dozen of things which it is urgent and 
necessary to do — which, in fact, it would be 
outrageous not to do. They have resisted 
dreams of tomorrow's science and thought 
hard about today's technology. They have 
refrained from proposing yet another agency 
and come to grips instead with existing 
agencies — what more they might do, what 
we know they can do better, with foreseeable 

So what began as a seemingly unmanage- 
able project has been tamed, mastered, and 
transmitted into a sensible list of specific 
proposals of priority value and manageable 
proportion. This is no small accomplish- 
ment in so short a time. And we can all 
take heart from this exercise. It bodes well 
for the work of the Council and of the U.N. 
system at large. 

Research on Urbanization 

The Advisory Committee focused of 
course on science and technology — ^that is 
what it was asked to do. But we need re- 
search and inquiry fully as much in great 
areas of social confusion and uncertainty. 

I must be content with one vital example. 
All through the developing world we face an 
increasing crisis of accelerated and un- 
controlled urbanization. Men and women and 
children are streaming into the great cities, 
generally the capital cities, from the monot- 
ony and all too often the misery of rural 
life, and they are moving, bag and baggage, 
long before farming can afford to lose their 
labor or the city is ready to put them to 

work and accommodate them properly. 

This rootless, hopeless, workless urban 
poverty is the greatest single cause of 
misery in the world. Can we lessen or re- 
direct this flow? Can we prepare the urban 
world better to receive it? Or improve the 
rural world enough to diminish the flood? 
We don't know, because we have not sought 
seriously to find out. 

We lack adequate policies, because we 
have so few facts and so few people trained 
to develop and implement programs. For 
too long we have proceeded on the false 
assumption that people would really rather 
live in villages than anywhere and that it 
is better for society if they did. The trouble 
is they don't — even when the village is 
modernized and sanitized and electrified, 
people move into larger towns and cities. 

Some countries have in fact recognized 
that the problem is not less urbanization 
but more urban areas — not just one or two 
in each country. Some are experimenting 
with regional development programs — and 
here I mean regions within countries — in an 
effort to create new urban centers which 
will not only deflect migration headed for 
already overcrowded capital cities but will 
have an impact on the surrounding country- 
side and improve rural living in a wide area 
around the new cities. But the process of 
decentralization is difficult and complex, 
and failures — temporary or permanent — are 
as common as successes. 

This is the background against which we 
helped launch the unanimous decision of the 
Social Commission to recommend a research 
training program in regional development, 
using as a laboratory the current efforts be- 
ing made in a variety of different lands, 
political systems, and cultures to deal with 
the problems of urban in-migration. 

With some systematic research perhaps 
some usable conclusions can be drawn about 
how best to encourage an appropriate pat- 
tern of urban development which will avoid 
the blight and misery so visible in so many 
cities throughout the world. This is precisely 
the kind of research we need if the full 
weight of modem discovery and modern 



resources is to be brought to bear on the 
social as well as the technical problems of 
the developing world. 

Population Control 

In this same context — of science applied 
to an explosive human and social problem — 
we have to make a wholly new attack upon 
what President Johnson has called "the 
multiplying problems of our multiplying 
populations." * It is perhaps only in the last 
5 years that we have come fully to realize 
on what scale they are proliferating. Since 
1960, under United Nations auspices, cen- 
suses have been held in scores of countries, 
in nine of them for the first time. They have 
all underlined the same fact — that popula- 
tion is increasing more rapidly than had 
previously been imagined and that this ac- 
celerating growth, in all developing lands, is 
eating into the pitiful margins needed to 
give bread and hope to those already born. 
We have to find the ways of social, moral, 
and physical control adequate to stem the 
rising, drowning flood of people. We need 
more knowledge, we need more cooperative 
effort. In fact, much that we do elsewhere 
will be undone unless we can act in this 
vital field. 

Aid, trade, research, population control — 
in all these fields we can mount a convergent 
attack upon the great gap between rich and 
poor. But we must also mount it together. 
And that brings me to some quite concrete 
suggestions about international organiza- 
tions in the development field — in what di- 
rection they should be going and how fast 
they should be growing. 

Merits of Functional Organizations 

The organizations of the U.N. family 
perform a rich variety of useful labors. At 
a moment when one of the central political 
organs in the U.N. is temporarily hung up 
on a constitutional hook, it is worth re- 
flecting on the success and growth of the 
specialized agencies and of the central 

'/6fd., July 19, 1965, p. 98. 

funds which provide a growing fraction — 
more than half in some cases — of the re- 
sources they apply to the business of de- 
velopment. These agencies are an illustra- 
tion, and a good one, of the proposition that 
international politics is not a game in which 
an inch gained by our player must mean 
an inch lost by another. 

The reality is that international agree- 
ments can be reached, and international or- 
ganizations can be formed, and international 
common law can be elaborated, on subjects 
which draw nations together even as they 
continue to quarrel about the frontiers and 
friends and ideological frenzies which keep 
them apart. 

So let's look for a moment at the political 
merits of functional organizations — the kind 
that work at peace through health, or food, 
or education, or labor, or communications, or 
meteorology, or culture, or postal service, or 
children, or money, or economic growth, or 
the exploration of outer space — organiza- 
tions, that is, for the pursuit of some spe- 
cific and definable task beyond the frontiers 
of one nation, a task for which the tech- 
nology is already conceived or conceivable, 
for which a common interest is mutually 
recognized, for which institutions can — and 
therefore must — ^be designed. 

Organizations like these begin by taking 
the world as it is. No fundamental political 
reforms are needed; no value systems have 
to be altered; no ideologies have to be seri- 
ously compromised. These organizations 
start from where we are and then take the 
next step. And that, as the ancient Chinese 
guessed long ago, is the only way to get 
from here to there. 

These organizations tackle jobs that can 
be managed through imperfect institutions 
by fallible men and women. Omniscience is 
not a prerequisite; the peace of the world 
does not stand or fall on the success of any 
one organization ; mistakes need not be fatal. 

These limited-purpose organizations by- 
pass the obstacle of sovereignty. National 
independence is not infringed when a na- 
tion voluntarily accepts in its ovra interest 
the restraints imposed by cooperation with 

JULY 26, 1965 


others. Nobody has to play who doesn't want 
to play, but for those who do play, there are 
door prizes for all. 

All these special characteristics of the 
functional agencies are important to their 
survival value and growth potential. The best 
example is also momentarily the most dra- 
matic. In the midst of the military, political, 
and diplomatic turmoil of Southeast Asia, 
the governments which are working together 
to promote the regional development of the 
Lower Mekong Basin have continued to work 
there in surprising and encouraging har- 

Political Disputes in Technical Agencies 

But a certain shadow hangs over the af- 
fairs of the technical agencies — a shadow 
which threatens to compromise the very vir- 
tues we have just been discussing. That 
shadow is political controversy, and it 
has no place on the agenda of the technical 

I shall not attempt to draw sharp lines 
along the sometimes murky borders between 
the politicoideological and the functional 
fields — between just what is doctrinal and 
just what is technical. The important dis- 
tinctions are clear enough. The difference 
between appropriate content for the general 
debate in the General Assembly and appro- 
priate content for debates on international 
labor or world literacy or world health does 
not need much elaboration. We can all recog- 
nize that the remaining problems of colonial- 
ism have practically nothing to do with the 
problem of adult literacy — and vice versa. 
We have organizational arrangements for 
dealing with both. We have times and places 
set aside, we have agenda prepared and rep- 
resentatives assigned, for dealing in sepa- 
rate and orderly ways with these and other 

Yet we cannot overlook a disturbing ten- 
dency to dilute the proceedings of the tech- 
nical agencies with ideological dispute — and 
to steal time, energy, and resources needed 
to help the developing countries, and divert 
it instead to extraneous issues calculated to 
stir everybody's emotions without raising 

anybody's per capita income. 

This limits the value, inhibits the growth, 
hurts the prestige, and crimps the resources 
of the technical agencies. It is a wasteful 
and moreover a futile exercise. It is only to 
be hoped that these diversionary tactics will 
fade from our forums so we may get along 
more promptly with the practical, useful, 
technical tasks which lie before us in such 

The great spurt in useful activity by the 
U.N. specialized and affiliated agencies has 
come about through the good sense of the 
members, expressed in a series of actions by 
the Economic and Social Council and in the 
General Assembly, and designed to provide 
new resources to break down the main ob- 
stacles to development. 

Through the Expanded Program of Tech- 
nical Assistance and the U.N. Special Fund 
the members have already provided close to 
$1 billion to help the developing countries 
organize the use of knowledge and to get 
ready to make effective use of large capital 
investments. Now these two programs, on 
the recommendation of the Council, are to 
be merged in the 20th General Assembly to 
become the U.N. Development Program. 

We are reaching this year, for the first 
time, the target of $150 million a year for 
that program. My Government believes that 
this has been a useful and efficient way to 
provide technical assistance and preinvest- 
ment capital. The target should now be 
raised. For our part, we would be glad to see 
the target set substantially higher. 

We also think that the use for development 
of noncommercial exports of food from some 
of the surplus producing countries has been 
promising. At a meeting in Rome last week 
we have already indicated that we would be 
glad to see the World Food Program con- 
tinued, with a target for the next 3-year 
period almost triple that of the 3-year exper- 
imental period which is just now coming to 
an end. We hope that other nations which 
foresee noncommercial surpluses in their 
agricultural horoscope will join in expanding 
the World Food Program as another way to 
transfer needed resources for the benefit of 



the developing countries. 

We are also pleased with the progress of 
industrial development. The establishment of 
the Center for Industrial Development in the 
U.N. Secretariat has clearly proved itself a 
sound and progressive move. We think the 
time has come to move further along this 
line and find much promise in the sugges- 
tions made by the distinguished representa- 
tive of the United Kingdom on this subject. 
We strongly agree that it will be necessary 
to secure additional resources for the pro- 
motion of industrialization. We believe, how- 
ever, that rather than to establish yet an- 
other special voluntary fund, such resources 
could best be made available by special ar- 
rangements within the framework of the 
new U.N. Development Program. 

International Development Programs 

Beyond raising the target for the Devel- 
opment Program, and expanding the World 
Food Program, and giving a special push 
to the work of industrialization, I would fore- 
see another kind of development activity to 
which I believe every government should ac- 
cord a very high priority indeed. This is the 
field which might be called truly interna- 
tional development programs. 

So far we have needed to define the word 
"development" to encompass only the ele- 
ments of an individual country's economic 
grov^rth and social progress. Some regional 
projects have gained favor as well, but 
clearly visible now on the horizon are pro- 
grams and projects in which the operating 
agency will not be a national government or 
a private company or even a small group of 
governments in a region — but rather one of 
the U.N.'s own family of worldwide organi- 

The best example — one that is already re- 
quiring our attention — is the World Weather 
Watch now being planned by the WMO 
[World Meteorological Organization] . In the 
preliminary design work already underway, 
it is proposed, for example, to : 

— probe into atmosphere from satellites in 
orbit ; 

— establish ground stations to read out 
what the satellites have to say and to proc- 
ess and communicate weather information 
throughout continental regions ; 

— establish floating weather stations to 
give more coverage to vast oceanic areas, 
particularly in the Southern Hemisphere; 

— possibly even launch balloons from in- 
ternational sites which will travel around 
the world at a constant level making weather 
observations as they go. 

The major components of the World 
Weather Watch must continue to be the na- 
tional facilities, operated primarily for na- 
tional purposes and also contributing to the 
needs of the world. But we are speaking here 
of additional facilities, some of which may 
need to be internationally operated and per- 
haps internationally owned and which may 
be very costly even at the start. Money 
would have to be raised on a voluntary basis 
and placed in the hands of an international 
agency — the WMO, perhaps, or some new op- 
erating facility. 

Here, then, is a new kind of problem for 
us to think about before it overtakes us. 
Here is a great big development project, in- 
volving activity inherently international 
which will have to be financed interna- 
tionally. We would propose that the U.N. 
Development Program start experimenting 
with this kind of development activity, mod- 
ifying as necessary the rules and procedures 
that were drafted with national development 
projects in mind. 

Maybe such large projects will have to be 
financed in some special way. But for a 
start we would like to see the new U.N. De- 
velopment Program, with its rich experience 
in financing various kinds of development, 
work on this subject and present to its own 
board, and to this Council, an analysis of 
the problem of meeting the costs of global 
international operations. 

If all these suggestions for raising our 
sights — yes, and our contributions — give the 
impression that the United States believes 
in the strengthening of international devel- 
opment institutions, you may be sure that 

JULY 26, 1965 


that impression is correct. Most of these in- 
stitutions need to be strengthened to meet, 
within their respective areas, the challenge 
of the requirements and aspirations of the 
developing countries. Equally, and perhaps 
even more important, their policies and ac- 
tions need to be harmonized, for there is no 
room left in this world for narrow parochial- 
ism. The various aspects and problems of 
economic and social development — moderni- 
zation of agriculture and industrial growth, 
health and production, education and social 
welfare, trade and transportation, human 
rights and individual freedom — have become 
so closely interrelated as to call for inter- 
locking measures and programs. 

These basic conditions in the contemporary 
world give meaning and urgency to the re- 
view and reappraisal of the Economic and 
Social Council's role and functions which U 
Thant proposed in this chamber a year ago. 
The position of my Government is set forth 
in our submission to the Secretary-General 
reproduced in document E/4052/Add.2 and 
needs no further explanation. 

But there are just a few points I want 
to stress : 

With the U.N. system as envisaged in and 
established by the charter, the General As- 
sembly and ECOSOC are the two principal 
intergovernmental organs with overall re- 
sponsibilities for U.N. policies and activities 
in the economic and social field, their or- 
derly development and effective implemen- 

Whatever the record of the Council in the 
past — and we believe that it is a good record 
— it has become evident that the Council 
faces ever-increasing difficulties in the dis- 
charge of its functions due to the ever-wid- 
ening scope of the United Nations and the 
multiplication of machinery. 

To make the Council fully representative 
of the total enlarged membership of the U.N., 
its size will soon be increased by the nec- 
essary ratifications of the charter amend- 

We believe that the role of the Council as 
a preparatory body for the General Assem- 
bly, and acting under its authority, needs to 

be clarified and strengthened. It should make ' 
a significant contribution to the work of the 
General Assembly by drawing its attention 
to major issues confronting the world econ- 
omy; by formulating proposals for relevant 
action ; by providing supporting documenta- 
tion; and in preparing and reviewing pro- 
grams with a sense of financial responsibil- 
ities — and thus assisting in the preparation 
of budget estimates by the Secretary-Gen- 
eral for appropriate action by the commit- 
tees of the General Assembly. 

In stressing the coordination function of 
ECOSOC every care needs to be taken to 
encourage rather than to hinder the work of 
functional and regional economic and social 
bodies and the activities of the specialized 
agencies and other related organizations. The 
role of these functional organizations in 
achieving coordination within their areas of 
competence needs to be more fully recog- 

The review and reappraisal proposed by 
the Secretary-General is a difficult task and 
adequate time must be allowed for it. Many 
of the constructive suggestions he made yes- 
terday regarding research, documentation, 
and sound budgeting are directly related to 
the work of the Council and deserve most 
careful thought. It is our hope that the Coun- 
cil at the present session will make the nec- 
essary arrangements to facilitate and as- 
sure such study in depth and full considera- 

We assume the review will go through sev- 
eral stages, including consideration by both 
the Council and the General Assembly. The 
Council will have to undertake thorough 
preparatory work in order to enable the 
General Assembly and its Committees II 
[Economic and Financial], III [Social, Hu- 
manitarian and Cultural], and V [Adminis- 
trative and Budgetary] to reach informed 
conclusions and to take the necessary ac- 

Last but not least, and this I cannot stress 
strongly enough, the review will require the 
closest possible cooperation between all mem- 
bers of the Council representing developed 
and developing countries. The Council will 



wither away, whatever conclusions are 
reached by the review, unless there is a will 
among all of us to make it succeed. And 
succeed it must as an indispensable organ of 
the United Nations for the achievement, be- 
yond anything we have experienced to date, 
of constructive international cooperation in 
the economic and social fields and as a 
powerful aid to the promotion of economic 

Finally, let me say that the need for 
joint action in the wide field of develop- 
ment is obvious. Whether we are talking 
about aid, or trade, or research, or urban 
development, or industrialization — whether 
we are talking about scientific discovery or 
about institution building — we hold that 
there are no monopolies of trained minds 
and disciplined imaginations in any of our 

Joint action is, after all, the final sig- 
nificance of all we do in our international 
policies today. But we are still held back by 
our old parochial nationalisms. We are still 
beset with dark prejudices. We are still 
divided by angry, conflicting ideologies. Yet 

all around us our science, our instruments, 
our technologies, our interests, and indeed 
our deepest aspirations draw us more and 
more closely into a single neighborhood. 

This must be the context of our think- 
ing — the context of human interdependence 
in the face of the vast new dimensions of 
our science and our discovery. Just as 
Europe could never again be the old closed- 
in community after the voyages of Colum- 
bus, we can never again be a squabbling band 
of nations before the awful majesty of 
outer space. 

We travel together, passengers on a lit- 
tle space ship, dependent on its vulnerable 
reserves of air and soil; all committed for 
our safety to its security and peace; pre- 
served from annihilation only by the care, 
the work, and, I will say, the love we give 
our fragile craft. We cannot maintain it 
half fortunate, half miserable, half confident, 
half despairing, half slave — to the ancient 
enemies of man — half free in a liberation 
of resources undreamed of until this day. 
No craft, no crew can travel safely with 
such vast contradictions. On their resolu- 
tion depends the survival of us all. 

The View From Up There 

hy Harlan Cleveland 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^ 

This must be the biggest teach-in of the 

But the format tonight is different — and 
easier for both of us. All I have to do is 
answer my own questions. And you are in 
the position of a passenger on a transconti- 
nental jet: You can listen to the Muzak or 
think your own thoughts, and nobody can 
tell which option you choose. 

For my part, I have every intention of 
taking full advantage of my protected posi- 

I once heard a distinguished American 
educator admonish a talkative luncheon com- 
panion this way: "Don't tell me there are 
nine men on a baseball team. I know that. 
Tell me something I don't know." 

So I am not going to tell you that nuclear 
weapons have provided us and others with 
history's most efficient and cheapest way of 

^ Address made before the National Education As- 
sociation at New York, N.Y., on July 2 (press re- 
lease 166). 

JULY 26, 1965 


killing large numbers of people — and that 
they threaten to spread from nation to na- 
tion. You know that. 

I am not going to tell you that there is 
war in Viet-Nam, and trouble in the Domini- 
can Republic, and tension along a dozen fron- 
tiers, and apostles of militant violence are 
on the prowl in near and far corners of 
Planet Earth. You know that. 

I am going to talk, instead, about some 
of the other sights and sounds in this churn- 
ing, tortured, and expectant world which are 
harder to see because conflict has thrown 
sand in our eyes and because the noise of 
violence afflicts our ears. 

Perspective on the World We Live In 

I shall start by observing that, given 
enough perspective, this world we live in is 
a lovely place. And I take as my authority 
the only men who have been far enough 
away from earth to see it whole. 

Listen to the first countryman of ours to 
look down from outer space — to the very 
first words of Astronaut [Alan B.] Shepard : 
"What a beautiful view," he said. 

Listen to Cosmonaut [Gherman] Titov: 
"Our earth is wonderful, the blue halo 
around it is very beautiful. . . ." 

And to Cosmonaut [Andrian G.] Niko- 
layev: "Our planet is uncommonly beautiful 
and looks wonderful from cosmic heights." 

And to the immediate reaction of Astro- 
naut [James A.] McDivitt from Gemini 4 
just a few weeks ago, when he first looked 
out and exclaimed : "Beautiful . . . beautiful ! 
It looks great from up here !" 

Note that this new fraternity of spacemen 
spoke not of nations, of continents, of islands, 
but of our earth, our planet, our world. 
They didn't even mention its divisions but 
found it whole and blue and beautiful — and 

I don't have to remind you that down on 
earth most nations are not open — or even, 
in their urban areas, beautiful. That's some- 
thing else you know. 

Yet have we really noticed that in a bare 
two decades about 1 billion people have been 
freed from foreign rule and given their 

chance to build decent modern societies, 
while only a bit over 1 percent remain in 

And do we listen closely enough to the 
sounds coming from within the societies still 
closed — to the poets and painters, the philos- 
ophers and composers — to the low drum- 
beat of doubts and the muffled crossfire of 
questions — to the crackling creativity of the 
open mind which no force on earth can long 

There is no dogma that can be trans- 
mitted through the genes. No child is born 
an orthodox believer; he has to be carefully 
taught. So every woman who gives birth in 
a closed society produces a potential new 
threat to tyranny. 

As teachers in an open society, you can 
well imagine the plight of teachers in a re- 
gime which pretends to know all the answers 
— and be grateful for your kinds of problems. 

"A World Community Abuilding" 

So some of the sounds coming from inside 
the closed corners of earth are at least 
mildly encouraging. 

And from outside comes another kind of 
clamor: the construction noises of a world 
community abuilding under our noses. 

It is anything but a tidy sight. This world 
community of ours has no master plan and 
no foreseeable ultimate shape. 

Few of its structures are yet complete, 
and many have not been started. 

Its law is in a primitive stage of evolu- 
tion, and lawbreakers abound. 

The police and fire departments of the 
world community are primitive and unreli- 
able, too. And the world's school system still 
has more dropouts than "stay ins." 

But there is work in progress. Around most 
of the world, most of the peoples — even as 
they hold to their weapons and cling to their 
disputes — have picked up tools in cooperative 

While they argue about some things, they 
are doing other things together because they 
share a host of common interests. 

Things like improving soils, purifying 
water, harnessing rivers, eradicating disease, 



feeding children, improving diets, resettling 
refugees, training teachers, surveying re- 
sources, probing the seas, and forecasting 
the weather. 

There is a long and grovi^ing list of things 
to do cooperatively — because science has 
shown us how, and technology has made the 
tools, and common sense impels us to the 
conclusion that they can best be done coop- 
eratively — and often cannot be done in any 
other way. 

In the course of it all, knowledge is dif- 
fused and technology spreads by contagion, 
indifferent to cultural differences. Standards 
are set, and regulations are published, and 
international law — which is the practice of 
international organizations — is growing in 
the way law grows best : organically. 

The center of this emerging community, 
this sprawling international workshop of the 
world, is that busy band of organizations 
that cluster about the United Nations. 

And this is only the beginning. The pace 
of discovery and invention accelerates. Each 
major innovation reveals a shared interest, 
defines a new task that can only be tackled 
in common, and invites still another cooper- 
ative international enterprise. 

We know that instant global communica- 
tions and long-range global weather fore- 
casting are around the corner. We know 
economic power from atomic energy is at 
last at hand and that economic conversion 
of salt water to fresh water is only a prob- 
lem of engineering. 

No New Knowledge Needed 

We don't even need new knowledge to 
make this beautiful blue planet of ours a 
decent place to live. We know enough right 

We don't need any new ideas to create a 
great society in the world community. We 
have plenty of tested ideas right now. 

We know how — right now — to grow and 
preserve enough food to conquer hunger. 

We know how — now — to multiply the yield 
of food from the seas. 

We know how to provide the average in- 
fant with a diet that gives him a fighting 

chance to develop his physical and intellec- 
tual potential — and an even crack at three 
score years and ten. 

We know how to survey and conserve 
water resources, how to develop river basins 
and valleys, how to irrigate land and build 
powerplants and develop enough industry to 
make enough goods to meet the needs of 
even the swollen population of this earth. 

Yet despite the cheerful hum of men and 
women at work in the world, the present 
outlook mocks our present knowledge — our 
poor triumphs fail to match our rich tech- 

It is appalling — it is an intolerable statis- 
tic — that the diet of two out of three people 
on earth is more likely to deteriorate than 
to improve in the years just ahead. 

It is good that the rich are getting richer 
— and fast; but it is very bad that, despite 
our considerable efforts, the poor are still 
getting poorer — absolutely in some cases, 
relatively in most, 

U.S. Commitment in World Affairs 

In these circumstances it is curious that 
some of our sounder citizens are nagged by 
the notion that the United States is overex- 
tended and overcommitted in world affairs. 
This notion is no novelty, of course. It has 
popped up with tedious frequency in recent 

In the early days of World War II there 
were many who feared that the United 
States was overextended — that our commit- 
ments would outrun our resources. 

And no wonder. When Pearl Harbor was 
attacked on that memorable Sunday, we were 
so unready for major war that we might as 
well have been starting from scratch. And 
within months we were committed to raising 
and training and equipping and sending over- 
seas a great land army, to designing and 
building the world's greatest air force and 
training the crews to fly it, to constructing 
the greatest navy ever to sail the seas — 
capable of operating for extended periods 
thousands of miles from its bases, to build- 
ing, from keel on up, the world's largest 
merchant marine, to feeding the Nation even 

JULY 26, 1965 


as young men were drained from the farms 
for fields of battle, to helping supply and 
feed our British and Soviet allies. In a word, 
we committed ourselves to fighting two 
great wars against two powerful enemies on 
opposite sides of the world at the same time, 
while providing the critical margin of sur- 
vival to our wartime partners. By any nor- 
mal standards a rational man could well 
conclude that we were dangerously, even 
desperately, overcommitted. 

The "impossible took a little longer," as 
the Seabees said, but the fact is that we did 
all of these things — and did them all at the 
same time — and found that as a byproduct 
we literally had doubled the productive ca- 
pacity of the domestic economy of the United 

Then, not long after the war, the fear re- 
turned. Some people felt that the United 
States again "overcommitted" its resources 
when it mounted the Marshall Plan for the 
recovery of Europe. The Marshall Plan is 
now considered the most enlightened act, the 
most brilliant overseas operation, and, for 
that matter, one of the wisest investments 
ever made by any nation. Those who were 
then afraid to commit American energy and 
imagination to an enormous task whose out- 
come was at first in doubt — those worriers 
now celebrate the success of the Marshall 

In the decade and a half since then the 
people who worry that America tries too 
hard and does too much had plenty of cause 
for gloomy headshaking. We fought a war 
in Korea, defended the Straits of Taiwan, 
helped set up international peacekeeping for 
the Middle East, sent the Marines to help in 
Lebanon, airlifted U.N. peacekeepers to the 
Congo, quarantined Cuba, faced down the 
Soviet Union over those Soviet missiles, 
helped set up a peacekeeping operation in 
Cyprus, and increased our commitment in 
Viet-Nam to match the increasing effort of 
the Communists to destroy the Government 
and take over the people of South Viet-Nam. 

So for a quarter of a century past the 
United States of America has been com- 
mitted and extended — and deeply engaged in 
strenuous enterprise around the world. 

At the cost of vast efforts and huge ex- 
penditures and more lives than we like to 
count, the Nazi-Fascist-militarist compact to 
conquer the world was smashed, the aggres- 
sive outward thrust of the Soviet Union was 
contained. Western Europe not only was re- 
stored but launched upon a vigorous and 
self-sustaining new life, aggression in the 
Far East was thrown back upon itself, sev- 
eral developing nations have graduated from 
dependence on outside aid and many more 
can begin to see the light of self-support at 
the end of the tunnel, the United Nations has 
survived and grown and will doubtless re- 
vive to grow some more. 

In the course of these exertions — since 
those tense days in the Caribbean in the fall 
of 1962, when the world seemed on the verge 
of the abyss — I believe we have arrived at 
something like a tacit understanding that in 
the presence of nuclear weapons, as Presi- 
dent Eisenhower used to say, "There is no 
alternative to peace." 

In the course of those exertions I believe 
the point also has been made that there is 
no nourishment either in conventional mili- 
tary aggression. Since 1950 in Korea, it has 
become more and more unfashionable for 
aggressors to raise their flags, blow the 
bugles, and march their armies across the 
frontiers of their neighbors. 

Our current exertions are designed to 
prove that there is no more mileage in clan- 
destine attack than in overt attack, that in 
this day and age aggression by any name 
cannot pay off. Our enemy is not change but 
violence; but we are committed to the prop- 
osition that those who wish to change the 
shape of society must pursue their ambitions 
by nonviolent means. When that lesson is 
learned at last by the Far Eastern Commu- 
nists as well as others, this will be a much 
safer and a much happier planet. For ad- 
venturism in world affairs is on the wane — 
if we make it so. 

These exertions have required great com- 
mitments in the past, and they still do. But 
are they greater — or even as great — today 
as they were a few years ago ? 

In our own armament we have reached 
the point where our power is so great that 



we could safely agree to a treaty banning 
all but underground nuclear tests. We could 
afford to cut back on the production of 
fissionable materials. We could afford to 
close or reduce 135 major overseas military 
bases in the past 4 years. And we could 
afford to lower our overall defense budget — 
not much, but a little bit absolutely, and a 
little bit more relatively, because our econ- 
omy keeps growing at a steady, high rate. 

In Europe our presence is still needed ; but 
our commitment is less great in relation to 
our resources and in relation to that of our 
allies than it had to be a decade or so ago. 

In Viet-Nam our commitment in man- 
power and resources is but a fraction of our 
commitment a decade and a half ago in 

For military aid to allies and friends 
around the world, our commitments have 
dropped to about one-third of what they 
were a decade ago. 

For economic development under the For- 
eign Assistance Act, our expenditures have 
dropped from liy2 percent of the Federal 
budget in 1949 to about 2 percent of our 
budget today. 

So in relation to resources, to our physical 
capacity to fulfill our commitments, we are 
significantly less extended today than at al- 
most any time since World War II. 

Sharing the Peacekeeping Responsibility 

If we are not, then, overextended in a 
physical sense, have we taken on too big a 
responsibility for keeping the peace of the 
world? Are we trying to play the world's 
gendarme? Are we tending to go it alone, as 
some anxious voices have asked ? 

The answer is that we have taken as little 
direct responsibility for the peace of the 
world as the safety of that peace would al- 
low us. We have done what we could to in- 
duce the world community to assume the 
responsibility for policing the world. We 
have tried our best to go it — not alone but 
in the largest company we could find to go 
with us. 

This is the whole meaning of our persist- 
ent and successful efforts to have the Or- 

ganization of American States assume the 
peacekeeping role in the Western Hemi- 
sphere and to relieve us as promptly as possi- 
ble when we were forced to move alone on 
an interim basis in the Dominican Republic. 

This is the whole meaning of our persist- 
ent efforts to build up the capacity of the 
United Nations to perform the policeman's 
function on a world basis — and to support it 
when it has. We have backed every one of a 
dozen peacekeeping missions by the United 
Nations and many other efforts to tamp 
down conflicts so no policeman would be 
needed at all. 

In Korea, though we provided an over- 
whelming proportion of the resources, we 
did so as executive agent of the Security 

In the Congo, when we were asked to in- 
tervene directly, we turned instead to the 
United Nations. 

And we have said over and again — and the 
President indicated once more last week in 
San Francisco ^ — we would like nothing bet- 
ter than to share with other members of the 
United Nations, or with any other relevant 
association of peacekeepers, the violent role 
of restoring order in Southeast Asia. 

And if we are extended in Viet-Nam, how 
much more extended would we find ourselves 
were the doctrine of militant violence to 
succeed there — and spread throughout Asia 
and Africa? 

If we are extended in the Dominican Re- 
public, how much more extended would we 
be if armed anarchy, promoted from the out- 
side, were to succeed and flare through 
Latin America ? 

We might well prefer to be less bothered 
by responsibility, less distracted by the 
brickbats that are the price of power. But 
if the world is to have peace, we of all peo- 
ple cannot afford to be less committed to 
world order than we are. 

Seven Lessons To Be Learned 

So I have tried to think what I would be 
trying to teach children about world af- 
fairs today, what thoughts I would be trying 

' Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 98. 

JULY 26, 1965 


to leave with them if I were back at teaching 
now. There are seven things that I think I 
would ask them to learn and to keep in their 
minds as they grow up, citizens of the 
world's greatest power — which has to mean 
responsible citizens of the world's most re- 
sponsible power. 

First, learn to love diversity. All men are 
brothers, but all brothers are different. No 
nation, no doctrine, no culture will conquer 
this planet. Our world, thank God, is and will 
remain pluralistic — and for this reason color- 
ful and interesting and exciting to live in. 

Second, learn to beware of labels and cate- 
gories. No society in this world bears any 
real resemblance to Communist society as 
seen by Marx. No society in this world 
bears much resemblance to capitalist society 
as understood by Adam Smith. And the 
struggles we see are never clear if they are 
viewed as simple, and never simple once they 
are clear. 

Third, learn to choose between sharply dif- 
ferent shades of gray. There is a real 
difference between the aggressors and the de- 
fender in armed conflict, even if the de- 
fender is not quite a saint. For if there were 
nothing to choose between the major pro- 
tagonists in the so-called cold war, then the 
whole of postwar history would make no 
sense at all. 

Fourth, learn that power is a many-sided 
thing — to be used with great care. Power 
is wealth and armed strength ; but it is also 
good deeds and good intentions and warm 
feelings, and it rests at least partly upon 
good example. Great power is inseparable 
from great responsibility, and in many ways 
the mightiest nation in the world community 
is the most involved with all other nations. 

Fifth, learn to tvatch the deeper trends of 
world events. The surface is subject to quick 
storms and sudden calms, neither of which 
tells us much of tomorrow. So keep a close 

eye on the mainstreams and on the quiet, 
lesser currents — how strong and how fast 
they flow and where and when they promise 
to converge or to veer apart. 

Sixth, learn not to worry too much about 
what other people say. To prove their inde- 
pendence — which we want them to have — 
they sometimes have to thumb their noses 
at those who have the power to act for peace. 
But fortunately, the basis for our self-esteem 
and the measure of success in our foreign 
policy are not gratitude or popularity but 
respect and results. 

Finally, learn to enlighten your judgment 
with a healthy touch of optimism. Time and 
change alter the contours of every dispute. 
The problem is never as big as the biggest 
expert thinks it is. And man always has in 
him something more, and something better, 
than appears at the moment. 

But these and other nuggets of distilled 
experience only confirm what instinct and 
freedom and faith and preference tell us in 
our bones: The wave of the future is still 
the open society, and the engine of that 
society is the open mind of the free individ- 

Just open the minds of the young Ameri- 
cans in your charge, and stand back. They 
will prove, in their time, even if we do not 
in ours, that our Declaration of Independ- 
ence was indeed written for "all men." 

Letters of Credence 

Republic of China 

The newly appointed Chinese Ambassa- 
dor, Chow Shu-kai, presented his credentials 
to President Johnson on July 8. For texts of 
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi- 
dent's reply, see Department of State press 
release dated July 8. 



A Time for Decision 

by George C. McGhee 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany i 

The time has come, I say, for the world to 
make up its mind about the Germans. I say 
this because there is evidence that many 
have not yet made up their minds. I say this 
because I believe that ample grounds for a 
decision exist. 

The free world has welcomed the Federal 
Republic as a partner in its enterprises, has 
learned to respect its counsel, has applauded 
the proven solidity of its democratic institu- 
tions, has admired its economic progress, 
and has leaned on its military strength. 
There is no question as to the high place 
Germany has attained in the Western com- 
munity of nations — with great benefits to the 
community as well as to Germany. Why, 
then, should there be any remaining doubt 
about Germany? 

Yet there are indications — some subtle, 
some quite open — that a doubt persists. A 
letter to an editor, an editorial, a threat of 
boycott, a minor demonstration against Ger- 
man NATO forces, a private conversation in 
which distrust of Germans is expressed — 
these are some of its manifestations. Taken 
individually, these phenomena are not alarm- 
ing. Collectively, they are disturbing rem- 
nants of a negative attitude that is badly 
out of date. 

For two decades the German goal has been 
to earn the world's acceptance. The Ger- 

1 Address made at commencement exercises of the 
European Division of the University of Maryland at 
the University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany, 
on May 30. 

mans have worked hard for it. They expected 
that if they made good they could win from 
the world a final verdict in their favor. They 
have made progress, but what are their gains 
worth if the world takes all the Federal 
Republic off'ers — and still denies them the 
one thing they want most? If the world 
should ever force on the Germans the con- 
viction that nothing they can do can ever 
gain them full acceptance — that there is no 
further use in their trying — then it will not 
be the Germans only who are the losers. 

Time does not change the facts of the 
Nazi past nor lighten its oppressive weight 
upon the history of humanity. Today's Ger- 
mans are fully aware of this. As a people 
they stand squarely against everything this 
past represented. 

But it is one thing for the world to decry 
the past, another to insist on continuing to 
live in it — always to see its shadow in the 
present. There is a distinction to be made 
between drawing lessons from experience 
and refusing to accept the evidence of new 
experience. If there have been profound 
changes in Germany in the last 20 years, 
it is irrational to retain habits of thought 
which ignore this fact. We asked the Ger- 
mans to put aside their past and build anew. 
If they have in fact done so, our interests, 
as well as those of the Germans, suffer if we 
fail to give recognition. 

What is needed is not forgetfulness but a 
memory which does not stop in 1945. What 
is required is not forgiveness of an account 
which must always stand in the record 

JULY 26, 1965 


against the men who compiled it, but the 
setting down in Germany's ledger of the new 
entries which bring the account up to date. 
It is high time that this be done — that the 
account be audited. 

The U.S. Decision of 1946 

The United States began early to accumu- 
late evidence on the German question. In 
1946 we took a crucial decision based on 
evidence which was then only fragmentary. 
Partly, this decision stemmed from the con- 
viction, derived from our own history, that 
the same people placed in new circumstances 
can learn new ways. We Europeans, includ- 
ing Germans, who emigrated to America, 
learned new ways. Partly, our decision was 
taken out of a determination to bring an end 
to a situation of increasing paralysis and 
despair that existed in Germany. Largely, it 
was an act of faith in the German people. 
Looking back nearly two decades later, I 
consider it to have been a faith well founded. 

In September 1946, American Secretary of 
State [James F.] Byrnes came to Stuttgart. 
He came from wearisome sessions with the 
Russians in Paris, where it had become evi- 
dent that four-power cooperation on Ger- 
many was available only on Russian terms. 
At the Opera House in Stuttgart Secretary 
Byrnes made an historic declaration. = He 
promised the German people that, if they 
undertook the reconstruction of their society 
as a democracy, they could look forward to 
the friendship and material assistance of the 
United States. For the first time since the 
war, a high American official spoke to the 
German people in terms of amity and good 

In the prosperous landscape of the Ger- 
many of today, it is hard to recall to the 
mind's eye that barren heap of rubble which 
was the image of Germany when Secretary 
Byrnes spoke — the physical rubble of cities, 
the figurative rubble of social upheaval, the 
human debris of dispossession. If faith 
moves mountains, here indeed was a need 
for strong faith. It is true that our coun- 

- For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 194C, p. 496. 

try offered much to its recent enemy. The 
world should also take note, however, that it 
was not a one-sided gift. 

There was, I believe, at that time a con- 
scious decision on the part of the German 
people. They decided to put aside those ele- 
ments in their society which had poisoned 
their past — and to make for and of them- 
selves a new nation. When they made that 
decision they had no way of knowing pre- 
cisely where their efforts would lead them. 
They had hope, but it was not an easy hope 
to hold in the confusion of those times. The 
sour smell of defeat was still in the air, 
families were disrupted, refugees in need of 
care poured into constricted living space, 
food and shelter were scarce. The future 
was uncertain. 

In the years from 1946 to 1948, the tenta- 
tive growth of a new spirit of resolution 
could be felt — but it had not yet found its 
confirmation and its release in a flood of 
achievement. That moment of release came, 
I believe, when in the year 1948 there was 
put into effect the currency reform with 
which the statesman who is with us on this 
platform today was closely associated. The 
words "currency reform" have a technical 
sound; our vocabularies have not kept pace 
with our knowledge that an action which 
bears an economic label may have a deep 
political meaning — even a moral one. The 
currency reform did have such a meaning. 
Germans suddenly became aware that talk 
of reconstruction was not chimerical, but 
practical — that German striving had an at- 
tainable goal. 

The next year brought the enactment of 
the Basic Law as the constitution of the 
Federal Republic. Thus there came into 
being the political as well as the economic 
design for a new Germany, visible to all. 
With greater energy and surer purpose the 
Germans bent again to the backbreaking 
trial of rebuilding their battered cities — 
many of which had taken a thousand years 
to build. The sheer volume of stone, mortar, 
bricks required — not to mention hard, sweaty 
labor — staggers the imagination. 

Many other difficult tasks had to be under- 



taken simultaneously. A modern economy 
cannot function efficiently if any of a number 
of essential elements are missing — goods, 
markets, communications, services, the rela- 
tionship between town and country. Progress 
was, of course, uneven. Even when the most 
urgent needs had been met, Germany still 
displayed a pattern of scattered ruins — 
standing among hopeful new growth. Yet so 
dynamically did the German people go about 
refashioning their economy that, in scarcely 
half a decade, the recovery of Germany was 

Germany Today 

Today the scars of war are gone. The 
cities are flourishing. People are prospering 
as no Germans before them have ever pros- 
pered. The democratic society that they have 
worked to create has fulfilled its promise. 
The institutions of the Federal Republic 
have proved solid by the test of experience. 
We all know well enough the signs of sick- 
ness in a democracy: a fragmentation of 
parties, an absence of consensus for action, 
internecine strife, an alienation of major 
parts of the electorate — who are persuaded 
that they have no stake in the regime. Search 
German democracy as deeply as you will. 
You will find in it none of these symptoms. 

On the contrary, the Bundestag has a 
place of respect among the world's parlia- 
ments — free in debate and competent in 
decision. The vigorous contests among the 
German political parties are of the kind 
that strengthen, rather than tear, the fabric 
of democracy. The trend has been toward 
the formation of a national consensus on 
vital issues, which finds expression by the 
individual voter in support for the party 
which he thinks best represents that con- 
sensus. The true test of a country's political 
maturity is the capacity of its citizens for 
responsible choice. The men and women who 
will vote this fall in national elections in the 
Federal Republic will meet that test. 

The only authentic spokesman for the Ger- 
man nation is the Federal Government in 
Bonn. In the years since the war, what role 
has it played in the world? What course has 

it pursued toward its friends and neighbors, 
and toward its self-appointed foes? 

A prolog preceded the formal entry of the 
Federal Republic as an independent actor on 
the stage of world affairs. Chancellor [Kon- 
rad] Adenauer and his colleagues had hoped 
that the inescapable need for a German con- 
tribution to defense against Communist ag- 
gression could be met by the creation of a 
European Defense Community — with forces 
in which Germans could serve along with 
men of other member nations. Many other 
statesmen, European and American, shared 
this hope. However, it failed. Hence, at the 
same moment that the Federal Republic 
entered the Atlantic community as a sover- 
eign power, it acquired the obligation to 
raise national forces for the conmion de- 
fense. National forces were not Germany's 
first choice. 

That was 10 years ago. Since then, a re- 
armed Germany has given the world no 
cause to fear its strength. All its forces are 
committed to NATO; the Federal Republic 
has renounced their use for national ends. 
It has faithfully kept its obligations. The 
United States, for one, is glad that these 
forces are in existence and are available for 
the common defense of freedom. 

German hopes for the creation of a united 
Europe have never flagged. The Chancellor 
of Germany [Ludwig Erhard] has been one 
of the leading spokesmen for European uni- 
fication. There have been disappointments, 
but they have been far outweighed by the 
successes. The Coal and Steel Community, 
EURATOM, and the Common Market are 
not only milestones in the history of Ger- 
many — they are also milestones on the road 
toward a united Europe. Such a united 
Europe is seen in Germany as an integral 
part of a wider Atlantic community — the 
ideal which President Kennedy set for all 
of us. 

Still, Europe or even the Atlantic area is 
not the whole world. What role has Ger- 
many — free Germany — played elsewhere? 
Although the Federal Republic is denied 
membership in the United Nations, it takes 
an active part in the global struggle against 

JULY 26, 1965 


the ancient evils of poverty, disease, and 
ignorance. Besides participating in the work 
of international organizations, the Federal 
Republic extends direct assistance on a large 
scale. Like that of the United States, its 
program of bilateral aid is truly worldwide 
in scope. 

The Question of Reunification 

Since the war the Germans plainly have 
solved many problems. How have they faced 
up to problems which have resisted solution? 
The reunification of Germany is one, and it 
is of deep concern not only to Germans but 
to the whole world. Peace cannot be secure 
while this division at the heart of Europe 
persists. The United States, as President 
Johnson pledged again in his address to 
Europe on the eve of VE-Day,^ will not 
weary in playing its full part in the un- 
finished task of bringing it to an end. 

Communist propaganda calls the German 
desire for unity "revanchism." It tries to 
present the Federal Republic's striving for 
it as evidence that those Germans not under 
Soviet control still harbor dangerous designs. 
The truth is that only the Federal Republic 
is qualified to express what Germans want. 
Germans do not seek the restoration of the 
old Germany — but the completion of a new 
Germany, where all can live in freedom. 
Here is a classic example of the notorious 
Communist technique of turning truth up- 
side down. There is, indeed, a dangerously 
anachronistic regime in Germany. It is the 
neocolonial regime the Soviets maintain in 
their zone. There is a threat to peace in 
Central Europe. It is the division that the 
Soviets have not allowed to heal. Their prop- 
aganda against the Federal Republic is but a 
thinly disguised cover to their determination 
to perpetuate this division for their own 

To repudiate a past is not to be quit of it. 

3 For text, see ibid., May 24, 1965, p. 790. 

as Germans well know. What have they done 
in retribution for their legacy from Hitler? 
First, they have sought the guilty. German 
authorities have investigated more than 
13,000 cases and have sentenced some 5,500 
individuals for Nazi war crimes. Second, 
they have assumed a national responsibility 
to rectify, insofar as possible, the evil com- 
mitted in Germany's name. What is possible 
is limited. The dead cannot be made to live. 
What can be done, however, the Germans 
are doing. 

Germany has undertaken compensation 
payments to the victims of Nazi persecution, 
including the restitution of property, which 
will amount to an estimated DM 42 billion — 
and the payment of DM 31/2 billion to the 
State of Israel. The Parliament also acted 
this year to extend the statute of limitations 
on the prosecution of war crimes. To any 
who feel that today's Germans do not suffi- 
ciently feel the burden of Germany's past, I 
recommend a reading of the debate on that 
measure. On March 10 of this year, in the 
Bundeshaus in Bonn, the soul of this country 
was laid bare. 

This is the Germany of a new generation. 
In the Federal Republic 60 percent of the 
people are under 40 years of age; few of 
them can have had any significant part in 
the Nazi period. The age group now over 
55 which furnished the most active partici- 
pants in the Nazi misdeeds constitutes only 
a small fraction of the population. Demo- 
graphically as well as in other respects, this 
nation has indeed transformed itself. 

It is understandable that an interval 
should have elapsed between Germany's 
transformation and the world's acknowledg- 
ment of it. It takes time for new facts to 
impress themselves on the consciousness of 

However, the facts have been available for 
some time now. Germany has made its case. 
It is time for the world to weigh that case — 
and to make up its mind about the Germans. 



The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on the Atlantic Partnership 

by J. Robert Schaetzel 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ' 

This conference addresses a subject — the 
interaction of East and West developments — 
which is more than ordinarily appropriate 
and timely. It is also a subject about which 
more questions can be raised than answers 
easily supplied. There can be no happier 
situation for conferees. 

The first step should be to examine what 
has been happening and try to project what 
is likely to happen in the European Com- 
munist world. As with all political analysis, 
there is bound to be disagreement. Any 
political assessment is difficult, doubly so 
with societies which have internal reasons 
for cloaking their actions and hiding their 

Perhaps the most important fact to note 
is that the Communist world is beginning 
to have to face up to objective reality — or, 
in other words, facts. 

The first objective fact that the Soviet 
bloc has had to face has been the unity of 
purpose, the economic progress, and the 
political stability achieved by the Atlantic 
nations. As we review the last 20 years of 
world history, we cannot help but speculate 
about the surprise and the ideological dis- 
may with which this situation must be seen 
by observers in the Communist countries. 
As contrasted with Marxist predictions, 

' Address made at a conference on "Esst-West 
Relations: Their Impact on the Atlantic Alliance," 
sponsored by the University of California at Los 
Angeles Institute of International and Foreign 
Studies at Lake Arrowhead, Calif., on Apr. 3. 

what has happened to the great industrial 
societies of Europe and North America? 

1. The exploitation of labor by capital has 
not increased but steadily decreased while 
living standards have risen. 

2. "Capitalist" governments have dedi- 
cated themselves to eliminate unemployment 
— and have had a substantial measure of 
success in this endeavor. 

3. Countercyclical policies give new as- 
surance against boom-and-bust crises. In- 
deed, the Eastern world seems more har- 
ried by wide cyclical swings than do the 
North Atlantic nations. 

4. High growth rates and dynamic econ- 
omies are by no means a special preserve 
of Communist societies. In fact, free 
Europe, Japan, and Formosa stand as ex- 
amples of the amazing vigor of the enter- 
prise economic system. 

5. Contrary to Marxist-Leninist dogma, the 
capitalist states have not experienced the 
series of frightful crises leading to an- 
nihilating wars that were predicted. 

6. The process of colonial exploitation by 
capitalist nations is now a thing of the 
past; energies are now directed at helping 
the newly independent nations. 

With the November 1962 Cuban missile 
crisis as a probable watershed, a second fact 
became evident to the Soviet Union and 
presumably the Eastern European states as 
well: that the West would face up to the 
most serious risk of nuclear war rather than 
be blackmailed into submission when a 
challenge to its vital interests was posed. 

JULY 26, 1965 


Hence, general war becomes an unaccept- 
able means of achieving political ends. This 
conclusion has obviously become a major 
source of deep division and disagreement 
between the Communist Chinese and the 

Third, rising internal conflicts and indeed 
basic dilemmas are floating to the surface 
of the Communist world. They include the 
irrelevance of rigidly imposed Marxist-Len- 
inist ideology to the intellectual and scien- 
tific challenges of our times, the incompat- 
ibility of totalitarian controls on personal 
freedom and choice with the development 
of a modern productive society, the absurd- 
ity of the attempt to contain the thirst for 
national independence and dignity within an 
imperial system ruled from Moscow or 

Fourth, there are the objective facts not 
only of economic theory but of acute and in 
certain cases of almost insoluble practical 
economic dilemmas. It is quite evident that 
the Soviet system, which has performed im- 
pressively at the level of heavy industry, is 
now caught up in a series of extremely dif- 
ficult theoretical and practical economic 

The economic goals and priorities set by 
the ambitions of its leaders — enormously 
costly arms and space programs, a rate of 
growth in economic capacity sufficient to 
overtake the United States in the foresee- 
able future, the modernization of a back- 
ward agriculture, improvement in the still 
deplorable living conditions of the Soviet 
people, ventures into foreign aid — all these 
have imposed immense strains in recent 
years. Growth has in fact declined sharply. 
The result has been crisis within the leader- 
ship and bitter debate over ways to overcome 
the inherent inefficiencies of the traditional 
command economy centralized in Moscow. 

There is also the practical problem of ef- 
fective economic cooperation among the Com- 
munist states. Even when the Eastern Eu- 
ropean states were in the role of docile satel- 
lites economically subservient to the Soviet 
Union, the system worked imperfectly. To- 
day, in the face of increasing independence 
of the Eastern European nations and their 

expanding economic requirements, the COM- 
ECON [Communist Economic Council] ar- 
rangements seem to be confronted by more 
problems than solutions. 

Perhaps the most portentous change, the 
change that affects all aspects of the Com- 
munist world, is the fact that there is no 
longer a monolithic bloc. There is an ex- 
panding area for maneuver, with Eastern 
European states backing Moscow against 
Peiping — but not unequivocally. 

Soviet Moves To Increase Tensions 

Despite these deep changes in the world 
which the Communist nations inhabit — and 
changes which they increasingly recognize — 
there is no reason for us to assume that 
either the Soviet Union or the other Com- 
munist states entertain any real doubts about 
the intrinsic merit of their ideology or that 
they have forsaken their goal to see the 
Communist system imposed upon a reluc- 
tant world. Nor is there any valid reason to 
assume that the tension and cross-purposes 
which exist between the East and the West 
and the complex of issues that divide us are 
due to Soviet or Communist uncertainties 
about American or Western intentions. 

Our Western democracies — political sys- 
tems composed of both reasonable people 
and interest groups in fluid conflict — look 
upon compromise as the indispensable lu- 
bricant. It is thus natural for democracies 
to work from the premise that, if the world 
is difficult and dangerous, then each of the 
contending sides should compromise toward 
some middle position. 

By definition, democratic societies are less 
well prepared by instinct and political orga- 
nization for aggression than authoritarian 
regimes. The diffusion of the power of de- 
cision — an important ingredient of democ- 
racy — reduces the chances for precipitous 

Further, political and economic forces are 
always at work within democracies eager 
to exploit any opportunity to reduce de- 
fense expenditures or to convert resources 
from military to peaceful domestic ends. 
Thus, any favorable change in the inter- 



national temperature leads almost inevitably 
to pressures to decrease military outlays 
and to weaken the tenuous lines of col- 
lective action for common security. 

What this analysis suggests is that, vi^hile 
the ambitions and goals of the Soviet state 
remain the same, they recognize at the 
same time the unacceptable dangers of 
major conflict as a road toward those goals. 
But we must, at the same time, assume they 
will use with all imagination and skill de- 
vices short of war to improve their deterio- 
rating position. 

For instance, we see in the Cyprus crisis 
a problem involving two NATO allies and 
one in which no essential Soviet interest is 
involved. Yet they have inserted themselves 
in this troubled situation to sow dissen- 
sion and hopefully to cause a deterioration 
in the Western position. This is clearly evi- 
dent in such superficially inconsistent ac- 
tions as the supplying of heavy military 
equipment to the island simultaneous with 
diplomatic gestures and maneuvers encour- 
aging to the Turks. The objective is to 
exacerbate tensions and disagreements. 

In the troubled Middle East the efforts of 
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
states are not to stabilize the area or to re- 
duce the possibility of local conflict. On the 
contrary, through the provision of arms and 
mischievous diplomatic action, the objective 
is to move in ways calculated to increase 
rather than to reduce tension. 

Another example of this technique can be 
seen in the labored and strident attacks of 
the Communist states on proposals being- 
considered among the Western nations for a 
multilateral nuclear force. This psychological 
offensive ignores, of course, the fact that an 
increase in Western nuclear missile strength 
is a belated response to the close to 800 to 
1,000 Soviet missiles now in place and tar- 
geted on Western Europe. 

The Soviets also charge that any collective 
Western nuclear force will be nothing more 
than a facade behind which the Germans 
will gain access to nuclear weapons. In fact, 
a major purpose — and indeed the essence 
of the arrangements now being considered 
— is precisely the contrary, namely to develop 

a collective Atlantic arrangement which will 
preclude the proliferation of national nuclear 
systems on the Continent. 

Nor has the Soviet Union shown any dis- 
position to strengthen the U.N. system. In- 
deed, it is hard not to be discouraged by the 
Soviet wrecking crews at work in the U.N., 
by their unwillingness to cooperate at any 
level in peacekeeping activities. 

Limits on Pace and Cliaracter of Change 

The Western World has watched with fas- 
cination and anticipation the changes going 
on within the Eastern European states and 
the Soviet Union. After the frozen Stalin 
years, this movement is of critical impor- 
tance and a source of hope for the future. 
But we must continually remind ourselves 
that, while the potential of this change is 
enormous, the full fruition will at best only 
take place over a very long period. Nor can 
we ignore the possibility that in the end the 
transformation we work and hope for may 
not take place. 

If the Western nations are to contribute 
to and benefit from this process of Commu- 
nist change, the process must be understood 
and unemotionally evaluated. We need to 
realize that there are real limits on the pace 
and character of change. For instance, we 
have seen very little movement recently as 
far as Poland is concerned. Even in Yugo- 
slavia, one of the first Communist states to 
assert its independence, there is the unhappy 
episode of the young instructor and writer 
who reported in a Yugoslav literary jour- 
nal on his summer experience in the Soviet 
Union. In telling of the literary ferment of 
Russian reaction to the years of Stalin re- 
pression he offended Moscow. The result of 
the Soviet protest has been the arrest and 
sentencing of the writer, repressive action 
threatened against the journal itself — and 
another defeat for freedom of expression. 

Obviously, one of the real quandaries 
faced by the Communist nations is how to 
reconcile nationalism with ideology. The 
renaissance of nationalism east of the Iron 
Curtain is not only tonic for the Eastern 
European states themselves, but it can well 

JULY 26, 1965 


be a stabilizing factor in East-West rela- 
tions. But one may ask, why is rising na- 
tionalism to the East a constructive develop- 
ment, while signs of similar phenomena in 
Western Europe are considered regressive? 
One explanation might be that the Eastern 
European states have been until very re- 
cently tightly locked into the Soviet empire. 
Just as the less developed countries of Africa 
and Asia, recently freed from their colonial 
ties with the West European nations, are in 
a phase of acute nationalism, in part as a 
reaction to their most immediate experience, 
so it is with the Eastern European states. 

On the other hand, the Western European 
nations, with no experience under colonial 
suppression, have no impulse for nationalism 
as a reflex reaction to colonialism. Indeed, 
the Western European nations seem to be 
in a new and more sophisticated historical 
phase in which they see, still somewhat 
dimly, that their security and economic well- 
being cannot be assured by nation states 
but only through the devising of policies and 
institutions that emphasize collective action. 

We do ourselves an injustice when we fail 
to recognize how far the Western nations 
have come in abandoning some aspects of 
national sovereignty and in building a sys- 
tem of consensus by democratic consent. 
This development is in sharp contrast to the 
technique, clearly impoverished, of compul- 
sive cohesion among the Warsaw Pact coun- 

Another significant change in the Com- 
munist bloc has been the necessity, in the 
face of economic problems, to improvise 
against Marxist dogma. Despite, for in- 
stance, the article of Communist insistence 
that the European Economic Community 
does not exist, there is accumulating evi- 
dence that the Eastern European states see 
the handwriting on the wall and realize that 
some accommodation must be made with this 
dynamic reality. Recent modest arrange- 
ments between Poland and the Community 
with respect to certain agricultural products 
are the tangible evidence that facts must be 

Another adjustment to reality is the inter- 

est of the Poles in becoming members of 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
in Geneva. There is also the recent decision 
of the Soviet Union to become a signatory 
of the patent convention,- presumably as a 
consumer to get the advantages of this in- 
ternational arrangement, but probably due 
primarily to the fact that the Soviet Union 
has now reached a level of industrial and 
scientific development where it is to their 
economic interest to gain the protection the 
convention provides. 

In considering the matter of economic re- 
lations between the Soviet Union and East- 
ern Europe with the West it must be borne 
in mind what an inherently difficult problem 
it is. The difficulty arises not so much from 
the political conflict between Communist and 
democratic societies, or from territorial dis- 
putes, or over the unsettled question of Ger- 
many, but it is rooted in certain incompati- 
bilities of the free-enterprise and the state- 
trading economic systems. There is, for in- 
stance, the difficulty of establishing rules 
which will assure equitability in the move- 
ment of goods and services between the two 
economic systems. A tariff lowered by a pri- 
vate-enterprise nation has economic mean- 
ing and has contractual characteristics ; sim- 
ilar action by a state-trading society has no 
real content. 

I can recall, back in 1946, at the first pre- 
paratory conference for an International 
Trade Organization, in London, the efforts 
we made — and which responsible econo- 
mists have been making since then — to de- 
velop rules and obligations which would deal 
fairly with this dilemma. It should be noted 
that these mid-1940 London discussions, and 
those in Geneva the following year, took 
place within an atmosphere of hope for un- 
derstanding just prior to the time that the 
Soviet Union rang down the curtain on East- 
ern Europe. 

I should think it reasonable to predict 
that, at least over the next several years, we 
may see fewer dramatic developments of a 

' For an article entitled "Soviet Adherence to In- 
ternational Patent Convention" by Harold A. Levin, 
see Bulletin of May 17, 1965, p. 758. 



political or economic nature in the Eastern 
European world, or in the relationships of 
this world to the West, than we have seen 
in the recent past. Partly this is because the 
recent changes have been dramatic in con- 
trast to the frozen years, partly because 
these changes have been played up, under- 
standably enough. What will probably occur 
in the future will be a gradual broadening 
and extending of the changes we have been 
seeing in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Hun- 
gary. Furthermore, should the increase of 
intellectual, political, and economic freedom 
threaten the authority of national Commu- 
nist regimes, we must assume that there will 
be reactions by the entrenched power struc- 
tures to curtail freedom and to protect 
vested leadership. 

Finally, just as some Western observers 
may have overdramatized the degree and 
pace of change in Eastern Europe that has 
taken place, we may have to deal with the 
reverse error in the future. If future evolu- 
tion is less dramatic, and as we become ac- 
customed to a changed Eastern Europe, the 
slow process of adjustment may be dis- 
counted and a new mood of Western dis- 
enchantment may set in. I believe this disil- 
lusionment may occur first with respect to 
economic affairs, where a rapid increase of 
trade between the East and the West is 
still anticipated. I will come to this matter 

If we may assume that our actions have 
at best a marginal effect on the policies and 
actions of the Communist world, let us none- 
theless take the foregoing analysis and see 
what it implies for the Atlantic nations. I 
intend to examine this question within the 
three rather classical subdivisions: defense, 
politics, and economics. 

Strategic and Defense Problems of NATO 

With respect to defense, one's attention 
is directed immediately at NATO. To what 
extent did the birth and viability of this 
organization depend on an unambiguous 
threat of Soviet aggression? We can cer- 
tainly agree that the change in the nature 

of the military confrontation between the 
East and the West has made the strategic 
and defense problems of the alliance more 

NATO must face complex strategic issues 
that would be difficult to solve even among 
allies undivided on other issues. On one ex- 
treme, there is the view advanced by the 
French that nuclear retaliation should fol- 
low any unambiguous act of aggression 
aimed at the conquest of substantial NATO 
territory. On the other hand, the United 
States has been patiently advancing the need 
for flexibility. We have argued that the 
West must not only have a strong strategic 
and tactical nuclear force for use if neces- 
sary but that NATO must have a backup 
of conventional military means able to deal 
with accidental or unpremeditated crisis. 
Such contingencies could occur over Berlin 
or on the flanks of NATO. 

Apart from this continuing examination 
of NATO strategy, there is, of course, the 
natural instinct within the alliance, in as- 
suming that the threat has diminished, to 
reduce defense expenditures at an even 
more rapid pace. There can be no economic 
justification for this state of affairs. Our 
affluent Western nations can in fact afford 
without strain modest increases of expend- 
itures for defense. Certainly, the ability to 
sustain such expenditures is greater today 
than when we initiated our collective action 
in 1950. The problem is the lack of political 
will, rationalized by the proposition that 
any greater effort is unnecessary. 

It is hard to see how this proposition can 
be defended when one considers the of- 
fensive Soviet missiles aimed at Western 
Europe, the 26 Soviet divisions and 400,000 
men in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland, 
supplementing almost 1,200,000 Eastern Eu- 
ropean men under arms, backed up by 32 
combat-ready Soviet divisions in the western 
U.S.S.R. Twenty-six NATO divisions face 
this force. 

Reasonable men may disagree on the ac- 
tual risk in the postwar period of outright 
Soviet military aggression against Western 
Europe. There can, however, be little ques- 

JULY 26, 1965 


tion about the fact that the Soviets have 
in the past used military power in being as 
a means of pressure or for purposes of 
blackmail — and presumably they will use it 
in the future. Nor can we afford to ignore 
the fact that there is a real threat. 

Nor can there be any reasonable doubt 
that the change in the nature of the Soviet 
threat and the sense of greater military sta- 
bility, due principally to American and 
German strength, have contributed to the 
erosion of the novel institutional and inte- 
grating factors typified by NATO, factors 
which are indeed unique in the history of 
military coalitions. Fifteen years of effort 
has gone into developing the command struc- 
ture of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters 
Allied Powers Europe] in Paris, the various 
subordinate commands, the infrastructure 
program involving millions of dollars of 
NATO pipelines, and the common-use air- 
fields and depots. 

Finally, we have evolved a political body 
in the North Atlantic Council, a means of 
consultation, which has proved itself to be of 
unique effectiveness. We have seen this proc- 
ess work well, for instance, in connection 
with the several Berlin crises. As another 
example of this process, a continuing pro- 
fessional examination has been carried on 
within NATO in an attempt to develop a 
consensus among the Allied nations on de- 
velopments in the Soviet Union and the other 
Eastern European states. This meticulous 
effort of political consultation begins among 
working-level officials but involves foreign 
ministers as well at least twice a year. The 
net effect of this consultation has been to 
enlarge the consensus among the member 

The Area of Political Activity 

Turning to the area of political activity, 
there can be little doubt but that the pre- 
vailing East-West situation offers tempta- 
tion to national maneuver in contrast to col- 
lective action. For instance, from time to 
time we hear Americans, impatient with the 
slowness of the process and the compromises 

necessary to develop common Western posi- 
tions, urge that the United States should get 
into bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R. 
in order to settle the differences between 
the East and the West. The argument runs 
that, as the danger to the world arises out 
of polarity of the Soviet Union and the 
United States military power, why should 
we allow ourselves to be needlessly encum- 
bered by our commitment to negotiate only 
on the basis of consensus among our allies? 
Indeed, the argument is sometimes given the 
further gloss that such a U.S.-Russian set- 
tlement would so benefit the free world as 
a whole that we actually owe it to the alli- 
ance to move quickly to bilateral negotia- 
tion. This seductive line of rationalization 
has been rejected out of hand by this and 
previous American administrations. 

Diminution of a direct threat and changes 
in the East, instead of stimulating a re- 
newed effort in the Western World to orga- 
nize ourselves to gain the advantages of com- 
mon action vis-a-vis the East, have encour- 
aged some national governments to see the 
new situation in the East as an opportunity 
for national virtuosity. For instance, over a 
year ago, when an effort was made to main- 
tain the 5-year Berne Union rule for credits 
to the Communist bloc, Britain indicated its 
unwillingness to accept the principle of 
common action. This has led other countries 
to follow suit. 

According to newspaper reports, at the end 
of the early March meeting of the Common 
Market Council of Ministers, France took an 
adamant position in excluding the Com- 
mon Market Commission from any responsi- 
bility in relations with the East. The argu- 
ment advanced was that these relations are 
political, hence the prerogative of national 
governments and not of the Economic Com- 

In this situation of flux and apparent op- 
portunity, is there much chance that na- 
tional governments can control their normal 
instincts to exploit the East-West issue for 
domestic political advantage? In the West- 
ern World the great bulk of public opinion 



will understandably support almost any 
proposition the purpose of which is to cre- 
ate a more secure world and opportunities 
for expanding economic relations. Thus any 
government will be drawn to an "active 
Eastern policy" no matter how real or illu- 
sory the prospects for major breakthroughs. 
This natural political impulse mitigates 
against collective policies and actions. 

Nor can we ignore the effect of changes 
in the East on the existing European and 
Atlantic institutions. In addition to NATO, 
we have, first, the Organization for Eco- 
nomic Cooperation and Development and, 
second, the European Economic Community. 
We hope and expect the European Commu- 
nity will continue to develop toward full 
economic integration and that, in time, the 
process will lead to political unity. But this 
is a long-term goal with many obstacles to 
be overcome. In the meantime the Commu- 
nity will not be able to escape the fact that 
it must address itself to the Community's 
economic relations with the East. Until the 
common external tariff is fully in effect, it 
presumably remains possible for the Six to 
avoid facing this issue. 

The notion can still be advanced that all 
relations — economic, political, and otherwise 
— between the East and the West are politi- 
cal and the province of the national govern- 
ments. I find it just as hard to see how the 
pretense can be maintained that these are 
not matters of the common commercial pol- 
icy of the Community as to see how the 
Communists much longer can pretend that 
the Community does not, in fact, exist. 

Another vague proposition is occasionally 
advanced which also grows out of the 
changes in train in the East. It is argued 
that a united — but undefined — Europe is one 
that must be open to all European states, 
presumably those in the Eastern world as 
well. Confronted by a notion of this sort, 
I cannot help but wonder at the superficial 
appreciation it demonstrates of what the six 
nations of the Common Market are about, 
the problems they have surmounted and 
those that they are now tackling. 

Uncharted Political Waters 

One of the reasons the six Western Euro- 
pean nations have been able to move so far 
so quickly in their federal experiment is 
that they started from the base of six gen- 
erally similar economic, social, and political 
structures. Levels of national and individual 
income were not too disparate. Members of 
a political party of one country sit in the 
European Parliament with members of sim- 
ilar parties from the other member states. 
Businessmen and agriculturists find it easy 
and natural to meet together in European 
conclaves. In short, the most important ele- 
ment in the mysterious chemistry of political 
integration may be the underlying fact of 
similarity of outlook, of interests, and of 

We are conscious today of matters upon 
which the Six disagree, and the extent to 
which this disagreement seems for the mo- 
ment to hold up progress. Nonetheless the 
things that hold the Six together are domi- 
nant. Contrast these common ideas with the 
disagreement on basic security and political 
policy between the neutrals — Sweden and 
Switzerland — and the NATO allies. 

I raise these points primarily so that we 
can understand what is happening. The 
North Atlantic nations are moving into un- 
charted political waters. Our purpose is to 
expand the areas of common interest and 
common actions as a means of promoting 
freedom and open societies around the world. 
Despite our similar origins, experience, and 
common political beliefs, our progress re- 
mains painfully slow. It is not a process that 
will succeed if it is broadened to include 
every political system or idea. The European 
and Atlantic experiments, which are comple- 
mentary, should have a beneficent impact on 
the East by creating Western institutions so 
strong and progressive that the Eastern 
Europeans in turn will shape and encourage 
constructive changes within and among 

This is not to say that we should ignore 
the possibility of ad hoc arrangements be- 
tween the Eastern nations and Western in- 

JULY 26, 1965 


stitutions. Indeed, the OECD has already 
had a considerable amount of experience 
with Yugoslavia, which is a full member for 
confrontation of economic policies, scientific 
and technical matters, agricultural and fish- 
eries questions, technical assistance, and pro- 

A separate issue and one deserving of 
careful attention in the future will be the 
effect of the changes in Eastern Europe on 
the Comiftunist parties in Western Europe. 
In several countries, particularly Italy and 
France, these parties retain a substantial 
hold amounting to better than 25 percent 
of the vote. The Western European Commu- 
nist parties have found it difficult to recog- 
nize the party line; they were embarrassed 
and incensed by the manner of Khrush- 
chev's ouster ; more recently they can hardly 
be sure with what dominant group within 
the Communist world they should aline 

Nonetheless, the crises, strains, and dif- 
ferences within the Communist movement 
have not adversely affected either the 
French Communist or the Italian Commu- 
nist parties to the extent we might have 
hoped. Indeed, as communism appears less 
evidently aggressive, one effect in Western 
Europe is to strengthen the Communist 
parties by giving them increased respecta- 
bility. The parties are thus able to stress 
even more that they are merely liberal pro- 
test groups, striking out at the obvious eco- 
nomic and social problems in the Western 
European countries. Further, the parties, 
particularly in Italy but also in France, re- 
main well organized, well financed, and 
with dedicated and experienced leadership. 

It would seem to behoove all of us, Euro- 
peans and Americans alike, to recognize 
these Communist parties for what they are. 
The apparent lessening of tension between 
Eastern and Western Europe should not ob- 
scure the fundamental disagreement and the 
almost unbridgeable chasm between the pur- 
poses and techniques of Communist parties 
and those of democratic societies. The divi- 
sion is over the basic issue of means and 

processes, indeed, of the meaning of freedom 

Perspective on East-West Economic Contacts 

Of the three functional areas it is perhaps 
easiest to speculate about the development 
of economic relationships between the East 
and West. Partly this is because we have had 
more experience in this area, partly because 
we deal with more objective data. The gen- 
eral conclusion I would draw about the near- 
term future of economic relations is to sug- 
gest that a rapid expansion of trade is not 
in the offing. Second, the expanding and 
mutually beneficial economic contacts will 
not be of overriding significance in altering 
the basic political relationships between the 
East and the West or in inducing changes 
in the political structure of the Communist 
states themselves. To make these points is 
not to degrade the importance of movement 
in this area — only to put it in proper per- 

This cautious, if not pessimistic, judgment 
derives from recent experience, namely the 
growing imbalance in the trade between 
East and West. For instance, under the bi- 
lateral trade agreements that have been in 
place for a number of years between the 
Soviet Union and the Eastern European 
states and several of the Western countries, 
the modest performance and disproportion- 
ately slow rate of growth have not been due 
to a lack of interest in either Eastern Eu- 
rope or in Western Europe. The problem has 
been the lack of the means on the part of 
the Eastern European countries to pay for 
desired goods. On the one hand, the tradi- 
tional raw material exports from Eastern 
Europe either are not available — this is par- 
ticularly true of agricultural goods — or they 
produce raw materials for which the market 
is no longer of the sort that existed in the 
prewar period. 

Oil may be an exception to this picture, 
although higher-than-market prices discour- 
age potential buyers. Also, the Western im- 
porting nations have been anxious to avoid 



excessive dependence on Russian petroleum. 

With regard to fabricated Communist 
goods, the problem is their noncompetitive- 
ness — in the broad connotation of the word. 
Their products are frequently overpriced, 
quality control is uneven, the terms of deliv- 
ery may be poor, and they have little experi- 
ence with the highly developed merchandis- 
ing techniques for finding and exploiting 
the Western market. In the course of trade 
agreement negotiations the Communist rep- 
resentatives frequently fail to understand 
that Western governments cannot agree to 
take Eastern manufactured goods; these are 
decisions made by private traders in our 
Western societies. 

To deal with this situation of ti'ade stag- 
nation, pressures, have quite naturally de- 
veloped in several of the Western Euro- 
pean countries and Japan, to some extent 
abetted by the Communist states, to en- 
courage Western exports by infusion of 
Western credit. The United States has 
argued, as have several other Allied nations, 
that this technique amounts to nothing more 
than subsidizing the Communist world so 
that they can postpone the time when hard 
choices of resource allocation must be made. 

Long-term credits are a form of aid which 
the West should reserve for developing 
countries. To the degree we extend aid in 
this form to the Soviet Union, we make it 
easier for them to conduct politically moti- 
vated aid programs of their own. Further- 
more, as one Western nation moves to meet 
another's offer, we are perilously close to 
a Western credit race, the beneficiaries of 
which will be the Communist nations. 

There is a murky area in economic rela- 
tions in which it is very hard to see what 
the immediate future holds for us. One 
peripheral conclusion from the UNCTAD 
[United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development] conference held in Geneva 
last summer ^ is that in certain areas the 
Soviet Union, in particular, but also several 
of the other industrialized Eastern European 

" Ibid., Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150. 

states, may find themselves less uncomfort- 
able in the company of Western developed 
countries than with the less developed 
countries of the Southern Hemisphere. As 
the less developed countries persist in their 
demands to the advanced countries, without 
too fine discrimination between state-trading 
and free-enterprise countries, the advanced 
Communist nations may find themselves, to 
their surprise, making common defensive 
cause with the North Atlantic nations. 

I find it hard to speculate with any as- 
surance on what all this means. Certainly 
it will mean no more than an uneasy and 
very limited alliance between ourselves and 
the Communist states. But it may have the 
negative effect of limiting somewhat the 
ability of the Eastern European nations to 
exploit the hopes and ambitions of the less 
developed countries without finding them- 
selves the target of new demands. 

We do know, as a footnote on this, that 
the Soviet Union in its extensive aid pro- 
gram to the less developed countries has 
had experiences which resemble very closely 
indeed the problems and frustrations which 
have surrounded our own Western foreign 
aid efforts. 

One aspect of East-West economic rela- 
tions is clear. The advanced nations of the 
North Atlantic have the opportunity to ad- 
vance their self-interest through modest 
coordination of their efforts in order to 
enhance their great potential bargaining 
position with the East. This is not a pro- 
posal for economic warfare. But if we are to 
encourage the changes in the Eastern world 
which will make our relationships more 
fruitful and tranquil, then these changes will 
be brought about by the strength and co- 
herence of the Atlantic nations, not by 
disunity and division. 

There are real limits on what we can do. 
Private enterprise means limited govern- 
mental direction of the economic life of our 
democratic societies. Western governments 
have limited ability to direct and aim in- 
dustries at specific markets. The nature of 
our Western system makes the organiza- 

JULY 26, 1965 


tion of economic resources for the broad 
political, strategic ends I suggested ex- 
tremely difficult. 

The German Problem a Central Issue 

Beyond the positive opportunities, we must 
avoid allowing Western economic relations 
with the East to become a source of division 
and contention among the Allies. As I sug- 
gested a moment ago, a credit race could 
have this effect. 

The central issue between East and West 
is the German problem. Security for Eu- 
rope and the world will always be uncertain 
as long as the German people are divided. 
While the solution to this problem will not 
come quickly, it is possible to see how 
Western and Eastern developments may con- 
tribute to its ultimate resolution. 

First, a strong Germany must live and 
grow within the framework of vital Western 
institutions. As European unity flourishes, 
German dynamism will have a constructive 
outlet. NATO is essential to the Germans' 
sense of security. In fact, there is not a 
German army in the classical sense of the 
term; there are German units committed to 
and commanded by SACEUR [Supreme 
Allied Commander Europe] ; there is no 
German general staff. 

Second, developments in the East can 
hasten the day when the Soviet Union may 
be prepared to negotiate an equitable set- 
tlement. As the other Eastern European 
states test their new independence, increase 
their trade and contacts with Western Eu- 
rope, the isolation and rigid Stalinism of the 
Ulbricht regime is bound to be cast in even 
bolder relief. The pressures that will be re- 
leased by this evolution in the East may open 
the presently closed road to German unifi- 

Impact of European Unity on the East 

In conclusion it seems to me that there 
are two basic issues that might be abstracted 
from the foregoing analysis. 

First, there is a question of the extent to 
which fear and a clear and present danger 

are necessary motivations for constructive i 
collaborative action among the Western 
nations. Is the adhesive that has bound the 
six nations of the Common Market together 
based on the chemical — fear? NATO was 
clearly born in an atmosphere of weakness 
in Europe and the threat that an aggressive 
Soviet Union would move unhindered across 
the Elbe. Can NATO survive the warm 
breezes that occasionally blow from the 
East? Can we find ways of dealing with the 
more ambiguous threats to Europe and the 
dangers to security that arise outside the 
NATO area? 

In a word, have the nations of our At- 
lantic community matured to the point 
where common interest and the instinct 
for common action derive from a recognition 
of the innate value of working together? 
Have we reached this point, as contrasted 
with an almost animal instinct for preserva- 
tion, in which we are driven to cooperate 
only by real dangers but fall into disarray 
and confusion when the evident threat re- 
cedes? This is the first basic issue. 

The second issue is whether we can agree 
among ourselves and operate on the prem- 
ise that Western strength, unity, and pur- 
pose create a situation in the world which 
induces the type of constructive change 
in the East which is our common objective. 
I am not suggesting that our Western ac- 
complishments and strength are the single 
factor which has brought about these 
changes, only that it is an important factor 
and furthermore one which we have it with- 
in our capacity to control. If this is so, it 
becomes doubly important in this period of 
transition for the Western nations to 
strengthen those elements in our society 
which have encouraged these positive changes 
in the East. 

This means to push ahead with the 
process of European unity, which is such 
a dynamic force in Europe and has caught 
as well the imagination of so many people 
in the United States. Nor should we ignore 
the impact of this process on those in the 
East who find it a challenge to their theories 
and a source of attraction. Sustained eco- 



nomic growth and prosperity of the capital- 
ist countries have given the lie to Marxist 
prediction. Even more effective has been the 
ability of democratic nation states to sub- 
merge themselves in a process of peaceful 
unification which amounts to a continuing 
and perhaps decisive reply to the theologists 
of the East that the capitalist nations have 
no alternative but to fall into internecine 
quarrels and ultimate collapse. 

To review this situation and attempt to 
look into the future is to have a tinge of 
pity when one sees the extremely rough 
road that lies ahead for the Communist 
nations and leaders. Accepted economic and 
political tenets are being challenged from 
within the Communist camp. They are fall- 
ing behind in the economic race. Young 
people show little taste for the ideology of 
their fathers and much interest in the 
bourgeois ways of the West. And as these 
young people become educated, this very 
process inevitably whets the appetite for 
freedom, for unrestricted inquiry, and for 
contact through and across the Iron Curtain. 

On the other hand, we in the West have 
no ideological barriers to break through. 
Practically all of the great political problems 
among the Western nations which existed 
20 years ago have been settled. There is no 
longer the Franco-German problem which 
contributed so heavily to the European 
civil war of the last hundred years. Nor is 
there an unsolved colonial problem. The 
colonial empires of the 19th century have 
disappeared. The new nations which have 
replaced them are in many cases politically 
and economically unprepared for the rigors 
of national existence, but their problems are 
far different from the colonial problems of 
the past. 

Most importantly, the Atlantic nations 
have begun to experiment with new institu- 
tions. The most imaginative and the most 
important is the process of creating a new 
Europe out of the old nation states on the 
Continent. At a more modest level we also 
are learning a great deal in the slow and 
steady process of consultation and of com- 

mon action within the framework of NATO 
and the OECD. 

Therefore it is not unreasonable to en- 
visage a steady degree of progress by and 
among the Western nations. This process 
should lead to their own enhanced well- 
being and greater sense of security. It should 
expand the great market of the North At- 
lantic for less developed countries of the 
world and encourage a growing flow of cap- 

Finally, there is the example this com- 
munity of Western nations offers. It is an 
example that should encourage, induce, and, 
hopefully, bring about the process of change 
and evolution in the attitudes and policies 
of the Eastern world. 

It is to this process of peaceful adjust- 
ment that we should dedicate ourselves. 

Captive Nations Week, 1965 


Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17, 
1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the 
President of the United States of America to issue 
a proclamation each year designating the third week 
in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time 
as freedom and independence shall have been 
achieved for all the captive nations of the world; 

Whereas all peoples yearn for freedom and 
justice; and 

Whereas these basic rights unfortunately are 
circumscribed or unrealized in many areas in the 
world; and 

Whereas the United States of America has an 
abiding commitment to the principles of independ- 
ence, personal liberty, and human dignity; and 

Whereas it remains a fundamental purpose and 
intention of the Government and people of the 
United States of America to recognize and encourage 
constructive actions which foster the growth and 
development of national independence and human 
freedom : 

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President 
of the United States of America, do hereby designate 
the week beginning July 18, 1965, as Captive Na- 
tions Week. 

I invite the people of the United States of America 
to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies 

'No. 3661; 30 Fed. Reg. 8663. 

JULY 26, 1965 


and activities, and I urge them to give renewed de- 
votion to the just aspirations of all people for na- 
tional independence and human liberty. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this second day 

of July in the year of our Lord 

[seal] nineteen hundred and sixty-five, 

and of the Independence of the 

United States of America the one hundred and 


By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment 
of Science Institute in Korea 

President Johnson announced on July 4 
(White House press release (Austin, Tex.)) 
that Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant 
to the President and Director of the Office 
of Science and Technology, would leave for 
Korea on July 7 to explore possibilities for 
U.S. cooperation in establishing an Institute 
for Industrial Technology and Applied 
Science in Korea. President Johnson had of- 
fered to send his science adviser to Korea 
for this purpose during President [Chung 
Hee] Park's visit to Washington in May.^ 

Dr. Hornig was accompanied by his wife. 
Dr. Lilli Hornig, of Trinity College, Wash- 
ington, and three advisers: Dr. Albert I. 
Moseman, Director, Agricultural Sciences, 
The Rockefeller Foundation of New York 
City; Dr. James B. Fisk, President, Bell 
Laboratories, Murray Hill, N. J.; and Dr. 
B. D. Thomas, President, The Battelle Me- 
morial Institute, Columbus, Ohio. 

The Presidential mission spent 1 week in 
Korea, meeting with leaders of the business 
community, scientists, industrialists, and uni- 
versity professors, as well as key Govern- 
ment officials. 

' Bulletin of June 14, 1965, p. 950. 

President Johnson expressed the hope to 
Dr. Hornig that the visit of the mission 
would produce early results, adding : 

The talents of trained Korean scientists and en- 
gineers are a rich resource for the country's de- 
velopment and progress. I believe it is important 
that efforts on their part to advance the level of 
technological achievement in Korea should receive 
encouragement and support. If the Institute con- 
tributes toward channeling Korea's talents effec- 
tively into accelerating the pace of Korean economic 
growth, it will serve as an inspiring example of 
what can be accomplished through international co- 
operation in science. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of 
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Letter dated June 5 from the U.S.S.R. representa- 
tive concerning the situation in Southern Rho- 
desia. S/6416. June 7, 1965. 2 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na- 
tions Operation in Cyprus for the period March 
11 to June 10. S/6426. June 10, 1965. 53 pp. and 

Letter dated June 14 from the U.S.S.R. representa- 
tive transmitting the text of a statement made by 
the U.S.S.R. Envoy in Wellington to the New 
Zealand Government regarding the sending of a 
New Zealand military detachment to South Viet- 
Nam. S/6435. June 14, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated June 16 from the representative of New 
Zealand transmitting the text of the New Zealand 
Government's reply to the Soviet statement. S/ 
6449. June 16, 1965. 3 pp. 

Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of 
Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of 
South Africa. S/6453. June 17, 1965. 69 pp. 

Reports by the Secretary-General regarding the situ- 
ation in the Dominican Republic. S/6420, June 7, 
1965, 1 p.; S/6432, June 11, 1965, 1 p.; S/6447, 
June 16, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6447/Add. 1, June 16, 
1965, 1 p.; S/6459, June 19, 1965, 3 pp. 

Cables from the Assistant Secretary General of the 
Organization of American States transmitting 
texts of cables received by the Tenth Meeting of 
Consultation from the Secretary General of the 
OAS regarding the situation in the Dominican 
Republic. S/6417, June 7, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6418, 
June 7, 1965, 3 pp.; S/6419, June 7, 1965, 2 pp.; 
S/6427/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965, 1 p.; S/6431, June 
11, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6433, June 11, 1965, 4 pp.; S/ 
6465, June 22, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6467, June 22, 1965, 
1 p.; S/6468, June 23, 1965, 1 p.; S/6477, June 25, 
1965, 3 pp.; S/6479, June 28, 1965, 3 pp.; S/6480, 
June 28, 1965, 1 p. 



The Challenge of the Developing Countries 

by David E. Bell 

Administrator, Agency for International Development ^ 

I am highly honored to be invited to speak 
at this commencement and to join the dis- 
tinguished company of those who hold de- 
grees from this university. 

You who are graduating here today are 
fortunate to inherit a great tradition. Ver- 
mont and New England stand in American 
history for special qualities. Well known 
among these are thrift, frugality, and the 
prudent and sparing use of resources. 

As a former Budget Director, I would be 
the last to minimize such virtues. But it is 
often overlooked that New Englanders are 
also renowned for bold initiatives and readi- 
ness to run great risks. Those were New 
Englanders, after all, who sailed the whaling 
ships to the Antarctic, and the clipper ships 
to the Far East — acts of the highest daring 
and fortitude. They were New Englanders 
who initiated our War of Independence at 
Concord and at Ticonderoga, and it was their 
revolutionary political imagination that 
helped to invent in the federal United States 
a constitutional form flexible enough to unite 
a continent — a constitutional form which is 
still fresh today and offers hope in many 
parts of the world of gaining the benefits of 
larger unities without losing the values of 
smaller diversities. 

I cite, also, one of the gi-eatest of New 
Englanders, wounded three times in the Civil 
War, who in a speech 20 years afterward 
expressed his mature judgment by saying: 

1 Address made at commencement exercises at the 
University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt., on May 23. 

"Life is action and passion" and "it is re- 
quired of a man that he should share the 
passion and action of his time at peril of 
being judged not to have lived." 

These are all elements of New England 
tradition, and they make a great legacy. 

In their spirit may I say to this graduat- 
ing class, welcome to the turmoil and the 
challenges of today's world. You will need 
all the daring and fortitude — as well as all 
the prudence — you can muster. You will 
need all the passionate commitment to free- 
dom and to progress of your forefathers. 
You are living in turbulent and perilous 
times, times which call at least as much for 
revolutionary political imagination as did the 
times of 1775. 

Like it or not, the United States has been 
flung, willy-nilly, into the center of the 
world's stage, to deal with the breakup of 
empires, the implacable thrust of Communist 
aggression, the unimaginable power of the 
atom. Since the end of World War II, our 
country has been striving to play a useful 
and constructive role all around the world — 
with very little experience and few trained 
practitioners. We can take pride in the per- 
formance of many Americans — among them 
notable Vermonters, like the late Warren 
Austin, first U.S. Representative to the 
United Nations; George Aiken, who has 
given many years of strong and sensible 
leadership in the Senate; and Ellsworth 
Bunker, who speaks for the United States 
today in the Organization of American 

JULY 26, 1965 


These men have shown us how to face the 
challenges of our times calmly and intelli- 
gently. But they would also be the first to 
say that we have far to go and much to do if 
we are to bring our country — and help bring 
others — safely through these years. 

I would like to speak briefly this afternoon 
about one facet of these times — one aspect of 
the challenge facing the United States — the 
challenge of the less developed countries of 
Asia, Africa, and Latin America. 

Why the U.S. Helps Developing Countries 

All of us know the vast changes that have 
occurred in these areas since the end of 
World War II. The European colonial em- 
pires in Asia and Africa, which had been 
built up over three or four centuries, have 
been all but liquidated in two decades. Scores 
of new nations have come into being, each 
seeking to establish its independence and to 
achieve progress for its people. Of the 37 
independent countries in Africa today, 27 
have gained nationhood since the beginning 
of 1960; only 4 were independent in 1950. 

These new nations, and older ones as well 
in Asia and Africa and Latin America, are 
aware of the potential benefits of modern 
science and technology and are fiercely deter- 
mined to accomplish overnight the economic 
and social progress that has been achieved in 
Europe and the United States in the 200 
years of the Industrial Revolution. In this 
worldwide scene of turmoil and upheaval, the 
international Communist movement has been 
continuously at work, seeking by persuasion 
and by subversion, by threat and by promise, 
to turn to Communist ends the powerful 
motivations of nationalism and progress 
which are at work in all these countries. 

What is all this to us in the United States? 
What do we care? 

We care because our own national inter- 
ests are deeply involved. We could not live 
safely in a world where the area of freedom 
was steadily shrinking. Just as our own 
security was greatly strengthened because 
the Marshall Plan saved Europe from com- 
munism, so the security of our country today 
is bound up with the survival and strength- 

ening of free countries in Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia. 

We care also for economic reasons. 
Stronger economies abroad help our own 
economy. American exports to the European 
countries have more than doubled since the 
Marshall Plan, and American investments in 
Europe have gi'OAvn even more rapidly. It is 
clear today that the Marshall Plan would 
have been worth its cost to the United States 
had it been regarded as nothing more than 
an economic investment. 

Over and above security and economic in- 
terests is still another reason why we care. 
As Americans, we are proud of our religious 
background and our ethical and moral tradi- 
tions. It would surely not be fitting for the 
wealthiest nation on earth to refuse help to 
our friends in other lands who are poor and 
hungry and ill. 

Thus the security interests, the economic 
incentives, and the humanitarian motives 
that impel us to want to help the developing 
countries are very powerful. 

This, I believe, is why the policy of the 
United States toward the less developed 
countries has been clear and consistent since 
the end of World War II and has been fol- 
lowed on a bipartisan basis under four Presi- 
dents — Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and 
Johnson. We seek to assist the less developed 
countries to establish themselves as inde- 
pendent, self-supporting nations, able to 
achieve continuing economic and social prog- 
ress for their people. We have provided bil- 
lions of dollars in economic and military as- 
sistance to these countries in pursuance of 
this policy. 

The costs of our foreign assistance efforts 
are often exaggerated. We are spending 
fewer dollars today than we were in 1950 — 
and because of the rapid growth in our econ- 
omy, foreign aid as a percentage of our gross 
national product is much less than half as 
large as it was in the days of the Marshall 
Plan. Moreover, under today's policies, over 
80 percent of the funds appropriated by Con- 
gress for foreign assistance are spent in the 
United States, for American goods and serv- 
ices — and it is those American goods and 



services, not American dollars, that are sent 
abroad under the aid program. As a result, 
our aid program has a smaller impact today 
on the United States balance of payments 
than it has ever had before. 

Nevertheless, even though our foreign aid 
costs are held to a minimum, they are still 
sizable — several billion dollars per year. Are 
we getting results for our money? I believe 
we are. 

We can cite some outstanding successes — 
for example, the Republic of free China on 
Taiwan. Fifteen years ago Taiwan looked 
as though it would be an indefinite pensioner 
of the United States. But the strong and 
sensible efforts of the Chinese, plus major 
foreign aid from the United States, have 
brought remarkable progress. As a result, 
our economic aid to Taiwan is coming to an 
end this present year. 

What has happened in Taiwan is highly 
instructive. With our help, the Chinese have 
built roads, ports, power stations. They have 
carried out a highly successful land reform 
program and raised agricultural yields per 
acre almost to the level of those in Japan. 

The United States has provided technical 
advisers, capital assistance, surplus agricul- 
tural commodities. The Chinese have taxed 
themselves, increased their own savings, 
worked hard, avoided luxury consumption. 

Today the economy of free China is ad- 
vancing very rapidly. Production, incomes, 
and exports are rising. But the crucial 
change is that now in Taiwan there is 
enough competence, enough trained leader- 
ship, enough of a capital base, so that the 
Chinese can go ahead on their own. They 
have learned how to apply modern science 
and technology to overcome their problems. 
The need for aid from the United States is 
coming to an end — because the ability to 
achieve continuing economic and social prog- 
ress has been established in Taiwan. 

By U.S. standards the Taiwanese are still 
very poor. Their per capita income is only 
about $150 per year, compared to more than 
$2,500 per year in the United States. But 
they can take it from here. Instead of a vi- 
cious downward spiral of poverty breeding 

more poverty, the Chinese on Taiwan have 
established the beginnings of the benign up- 
ward spiral of steadily larger production, 
yielding steadily larger incomes, leading to 
steadily rising living standards. 

What has happened on Taiwan is what we 
want to see happen throughout Africa and 
Asia and Latin America. Taiwan is an espe- 
cially impressive case. But major progress 
has been achieved in other countries as 
well — in India, in Pakistan, in Turkey, to 
name just a few. 

The Lessons of Experience 

We have learned a great deal over these 
last 15 years about how to provide aid effec- 

We have learned that the most important 
ingredient of success is not the aid we pro- 
vide to a country but what the people and 
the leaders of a country do for themselves. 
If the people of a poor country are willing 
to undertake strong measures to mobilize 
their own resources and to apply sensible 
priorities in their use — if they are willing to 
save and to learn and to work hard — then 
our assistance can be enormously beneficial. 
It is this concept which underlies the Alli- 
ance for Progress, a partnership in which 
the Latin American nations have agreed to 
undertake strong policies of reform and de- 
velopment — ^to stop inflation, raise taxes, 
broaden educational opportunities, and do 
whatever else is in their power — and we in 
the United States have agreed to provide 
the crucial margin of external resources — 
technical advice, capital goods, supplies and 
equipment — which will be needed to achieve 
self-sustaining progress in Latin America. 
The alliance is working now in most of the 
countries of Latin America, and you can 
begin to sense the spirit and lift of people 
on the move. 

A second lesson from our experience is the 
importance of establishing in developing 
countries conditions which permit local and 
private initiative to work. We are not so 
naive as to try to superimpose the pattern 
we have worked out here in the United 
States on countries with wholly different his- 

JULY 26, 1965 


torical and cultural traditions. But we do 
believe firmly in the efficiency, in all coun- 
tries, of giving people a maximum of free- 
dom to make their own decisions and to get 
things done. Consequently we work very 
hard, in the developing countries, to help 
establish local and private institutions, and 
we have learned to draw more and more on 
the skills and experience of local and private 
resources in the United States — of busi- 
nesses, trade unions, cooperatives, farm or- 
ganizations, savings and loan associations, 
and many more — to help accomplish this. 

A third lesson from these years of foreign 
assistance work is the crucial importance of 
trained leadership in the developing coun- 
tries. By far the most valuable foreign as- 
sistance received by the United States during 
our own developing years was the immigra- 
tion of several millions of people who had 
received their education, and often years of 
valuable practical experience, in Europe or 
elsewhere before they arrived in this coun- 
try. The United States did not have to pay 
for their education and training but bene- 
fited greatly from them. 

This particular method of obtaining skilled 
leadership is not open, except to a relatively 
small extent, to today's less developed coun- 
tries. We have been learning, however, in 
the United States and in other advanced 
countries, how to send our own trained ex- 
perts to the developing countries to help 
build competence there, and we are bringing 
thousands of young men and wom^n from 
the developing countries to the United States 
for advanced education and training — in- 
cluding, I am glad to note, several who are 
now enrolled here at UVM. 

We are seeking to apply these lessons, and 
others, in improving the effectiveness of our 
assistance to the developing countries. And, 
as I indicated earlier, we can point to con- 
siderable evidence of progress. But we also 
try to face honestly the problems we have 
not yet overcome. Food supplies around the 
world are barely keeping pace with growing 
demands. Rates of population growth in 
many countries are very high, making more 
difficult the provision of schools and health 

services, the achievement of constructive 
family life. Above all, the tactics of Com- 
munist subversion, under the leadership of 
trained and dedicated cadres, using skillfully 
the tactics of assassination and terror, have 
proven to be extremely difficult for the im- 
perfect institutions of newly independent 
countries to deal with, even with massive 
help from the United States. We have much 
still to learn and much still to do. 

The Wider Perspective 

Let us step back a pace and look at a 
wider perspective. Suppose we are success- 
ful, as I hope we can be, in helping to es- 
tablish, in country after country, economi- 
cally strong and politically independent 
nations. What then? Will this solve all the 
problems of international life? Certainly not. 
Foreign assistance, even where successful, 
is no recipe for instant paradise. 

Witness France, the largest recipient on 
record of U.S. economic and military aid — 
over $9 billion in the 10 years following 
World War II. Our aid to France was highly 
successful. It was intended to help France 
restore a vigorous, self-sustaining economy 
and to rebuild modern military forces. Those 
objectives were achieved, and our aid to 
France came to an end. 

As every day's newspapers bear witness, 
the success of our aid program in France 
did not end differences of view between the 
French Government and ours. Does this fact 
change the success of our aid into failure? 
Certainly not. We wanted a free, strong, 
and independent France, and that is what 
we have. A world of strong and independent 
nations obviously does not and should not 
insure conformity. What it does provide is 
an opportunity, if we are wise enough, to 
solve common problems in peace and free- 

And this, I suggest, is the deepest mean- 
ing of what we have been doing through our 
foreign assistance programs. We have been 
trying to establish conditions in which men 
can work together cooperatively for the ad- 
vancement and enrichment of human life 
and the free society. This has been the under- 



lying theme of the American experience — 
from the pioneers of Plymouth through the 
War of Independence, the Westward Move- 
ment, and all the other landmarks of Ameri- 
can history right down to last summer's civil 
rights legislation. 

Our purpose abroad is and must be what 
it is at home — to liberate the spirit of man, 
to open opportunities for seeking and finding 
new knowledge and applying it to human ills, 
to build cities that support life and do not 
stifle it, to create international political ar- 
rangements that will permit diversity in 
unity, to create a world society based upon 
true equality for all. These are our objec- 
tives in the world, and our foreign assistance 
programs are among the more effective 
means we have for achieving those objec- 

These are not objectives the United States 
can achieve alone, no matter how strong we 
are. Even though it is painful, we must 
continually remind ourselves that world 
leadership is not equivalent to world domi- 
nation, that while we can influence events we 
cannot control them, and that for many 
world problems there may not only be no 
solution that is satisfactory to the United 
States — there may be no solution at all for 
the foreseeable future. 

We should not delude ourselves, either, as 
to the pace at which change can be achieved. 
If India succeeds, with help from us and 
other advanced countries, in doubling her 
per capita income in 25 years — which would 
be an excellent achievement and a faster 
rate of growth than the United States has 
maintained since 1900 — India's people by 
then would have a per capita income of $150 
per year (ours in the United States by then 
would be around $4,000 per capita per year) . 
Nevertheless, small though the figure sounds, 
it could mean that all of India's children 
could be in primary school, instead of half 
only, which is the case today. It could mean 
that major diseases like malaria and cholera 
could have been wiped out. Above all it 
could mean that the conditions for steady 
and continuing progress could have been 

We should not minimize the obstacles of 
malice and folly that confront us. But also 
we should not minimize the progress that 
can be made if we stick to the job. For we 
are working vdth, not against, the deepest 
aspirations of man and leading the way 
toward the coming international civilization. 

To that civilization, with its multiple, 
potential benefits for science, for commerce, 
for the enrichment of the human spirit, I 
believe our foreign assistance programs are 
contributing a great deal. And I hope some 
of you who are graduating today from this 
university will have the opportunity in years 
to come to engage in this work, which is as 
constructive and satisfying as any that 
exists in the world today. 


Current Actions 



Convention (No. 74) concerning the certification of 
able seamen. Adopted at Seattle June 29, 1946. 
Entered into force July 14, 1951; for the United 
States April 9, 1954. TIAS 2949. 
Ratification deposited: Ghana, March 18, 1965. 

Nuclear Test Ban 

Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at 
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Octo- 
ber 10, 1963. TIAS 5433. 
Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 8, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait (with an under- 
standing). May 14, 1965. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done 
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force 
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603. 

JULY 26. 1965 


Notification of approval: Ukrainian Soviet Social- 
ist Republic, May 12, 1965. 


Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro- 
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963. 
Entered into force November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809. 
Signatures: Belgium (subject to ratification), 
June 8, 1965; Canada, April 15, 1965. 

Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
provisional accession of Switzerland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of 
November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 
4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. En- 
tered into force for the United States December 
18, 1964. TIAS 5734. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 17, 1965. 

Second proces-verbal extending period of validity 
of declaration on provisional accession of Ar- 
gentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade of November 18, 1960, as extended 
(TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 
1964. Entered into force for the United States 
December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733. 
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 17, 1965. 

Protocol amending the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on 
trade and development and to amend annex I. 
Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, 
at Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 

Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, June 9, 1965; 
Pakistan, June 15, 1965. 


Protocol for the extension of the International 
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature 
at Washington March 2 through April 23, 1965.' 
Notifications of undertaking to seek accept- 
ance: Finland, July 2, 1965; Spain, July 3, 
Acceptances deposited: Korea, July 8, 1965; 
Western Samoa, July 7, 1965. 



Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of 
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio 
operators of either country to operate their 
stations in the other country. Effected by ex- 
change of notes at Canberra June 25, 1965. 
Entered into force June 25, 1965. 


Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses 
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 8, 

1 Not in force. 

1965. Enters into force on the date on which 
each Government shall have received from the 
other written notification that it has complied 
with all statutory and constitutional require- 
ments for entry into force, 


Agreement amending the technical annex to the 
agreement of October 24, 1962 (TIAS 5205), 
concerning the coordination and use of radio 
frequencies above 30 megacycles per second, 
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Ottawa June 16 and 24, 1965. Entered into 
force June 24, 1965. 

Agreement relating to a seismic research program 
known as Project Vela Uniform. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Ottawa May 18, June 28 
and 29, 1965. Entered into force June 28, 1965. 


Agreement relating to radio communications be- 
tween amateur stations on behalf of third 
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington July 7, 1965. Enters into force August 6, 


Agreement extending through July 15, 1965, the 
air transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as 
extended and complemented (TIAS 4675, 5513, 
5647, 5648). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Mexico June 30, 1965. Entered into force July 1, 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 5-11 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D. C, 20520. 

Release issued prior to July 5 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 166 dated 
July 2. 

No. Date Subject 

*168 7/6 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Development. 

*169 7/9 Mrs. Harris sworn in as Ambassa- 
dor to Luxembourg (biographic 
170 7/9 Stevenson: 39th session of ECO- 

*171 7/9 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Development. 

*172 7/9 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Development. 

• Not printed. 



INDEX July 26, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1361 

American Principles. The View From Up There 

(Cleveland) 151 

China. Letters of Credence (Chow Shu-kai) . 156 

Economic Affairs 

The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on 
the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . . 161 

Strengthening the International Development 
Institutions (Stevenson) 142 


Captive Nations Week, 1965 (proclamation) 171 
The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on 
the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . 161 

Foreign Aid. The Challenge of the Developing 

Countries (Bell) 173 


The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on 

the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . . 161 
A Time for Decision (McGhee) 157 

Korea. Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment of 
Science Institute in Korea 172 

Military Affairs. The Impact of Change in 
Eastern Europe on the Atlantic Partnership 
(Schaetzel) 161 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Im- 
pact of Change in Eastern Europe on the 
Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) .... 161 

Presidential Documents. Captive Nations Week, 
1965 171 

Science. Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment of 
Science Institute in Korea 172 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 177 

U.S.S.R. The Impact of Change in Eastern Eu- 
rope on the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) 161 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 172 

Strengthening the International Development 

Institutions (Stevenson) 142 

The View From Up There (Cleveland) ... 151 

Name Index 

Bell, David E 173 

Chow Shu-kai 156 

Cleveland, Harlan 151 

Johnson, President 171 

McGhee, George C 157 

Schaetzel, J. Robert 161 

Stevenson, Adlai E 142 


Superintendent op Documents 
u.s. government printing office 





BOX 28a fill' 






Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy 

In this pamphlet, based on an address he made at George Washington University on June 6, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk develops a number of ideas that can serve as guidelines — "helpful 
household hints," he calls them — for the ordinary citizen who wants to understand the funda- 
mentals of U.S. foreign policy. 

The pamphlet is devoted primarily to an examination by the Secretary of a series of familiar 
concepts, some negative, some positive: "omnipotence," "diversity," "gray alternatives," "ap- 
peasement," "national liberation," "building world order," "regionalism," and so on. By keeping 
some of these principles in mind, he says, the American citizen can develop a broad perspective 
in which to consider specific foreign policy issues as they arise. 







Enclosed find $ _ _. 


(cash, check, or money order 
payable to Supt. of Documents) 








Vol. LIU, No. 1362 

August 2, 1965 



Opening Statements From News Conference of July 13 182 


by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler 209 

A Report by Livingston T. Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney 193 

For index see inside back cover 

President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, 
Dominican Republic, Disarmament 

Following are statements read by Presi- 
dent Johnson at the opening of his news 
conference at the White House on July 13. 


Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNa- 
mara and Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge 
will be leaving tomorrow evening for Sai- 
gon. When they return next week, we will 
give careful consideration to their recom- 
mendations, as well as those of Ambassador 
[Maxwell D.] Taylor and General [William 
C] Westmoreland. We will do what is neces- 

The present center of the struggle is in 
South Viet-Nam, but its root cause is a de- 
termined effort of conquest that is directed 
from Hanoi. Heavy infiltration of North 
Vietnamese forces has created new dangers 
and difficulties in South Viet-Nam. In- 
creased aggression from the North may re- 
quire an increased American response on the 
ground in South Viet-Nam. Increased ag- 

gression from the North continues to require 
very careful replies against selected mili- 
tary targets in North Viet-Nam. 

Meanwhile, General Westmoreland has the 
authority to use the American forces that 
are now in Viet-Nam in the ways which he 
considers most effective to resist the Com- 
munist aggression and the terror that is 
taking place there. These forces will defend 
their own bases. They will assist in provid- 
ing security in neighboring areas, and they 
will be available for more active combat 
missions when the Vietnamese Government 
and General Westmoreland agree that such 
active missions are needed. 

So it is quite possible that new and serious 
decisions will be necessary in the near fu- 
ture. Any substantial increase in the present 
level of our efforts to turn back the ag- 
gressors in South Viet-Nam will require 
steps to insure that our reserves of men and 
equipment of the United States remain en- 
tirely adequate for any and all emergencies. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, aa well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents. U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Peicb: 52 issues, domestic »10, 
foreign $16 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

ITOTE ; Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
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be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 



Secretary McNamara and Ambassador 
Lodge will concern themselves also with the 
political and economic situation. We have 
had Mr. Eugene Black visiting Southeast 
Asia, and he has given me an oral report 
on his encouraging visit to that area.i We 
mean to make it plain that our military ef- 
fort is only a necessary preliminary to the 
larger purpose of peace and progress. 

Dominican Republic 

In the Dominican Republic, Ambassador 
[Ellsworth] Bunker and his colleagues are 
continuing their skillful and determined ef- 
fort to find a peaceful solution.^ We believe 
as they do that it is urgent that a solution 
be found and found promptly. We are en- 
couraged by indications that leaders on 
both sides are prepared to stand aside in 
favor of a new government which will enjoy 
the confidence of the Dominican people as a 
whole. Those on both sides who show good 
will and who join a new government in the 
work of restoring peace will deserve the 
thanks of all of their countrymen. Right 
now, here, we are both cautious and hope- 

Disarmament Tall<s 

Yesterday the Soviet Government notified 
the U.S. Government that it is agreeable to 
the resumption of negotiations of the 18- 
Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva. 
The United States has suggested a date no 
later than July 27 for this resumption. Mr. 
William C. Foster now is in the process of 
inquiring whether this date is agreeable to 
the other 16 members of the Disarmament 

At the conclusion of the Geneva confer- 
ence last September ^ it was agreed that the 

^ See p. 215. 

' For background, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965, 
p. 132. 

° For a statement made at Geneva on Sept. 17, 
1964, by Mr. Foster, during which he read a mes- 
sage from President Johnson to the Conference of the 
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, see ibid., 
Oct. 12, 1964, p. 524. 

two cochairmen, the Soviet Union and the 
United States, would consult and would agree 
on a date for resumption, after which the 
other members of the Committee would be 
consulted in order to obtain their agreement 
as well. 

Mr. Foster met with the Soviet spokes- 
man in New York on June 15 and 16, on 
instructions to urge reconvening of the 
Disarmament Committee as soon as possible. 
Yesterday's Soviet response is an encourag- 
ing development. As we have stated before, 
peace is the "leading item on the agenda of 
mankind" and every effort should be made 
to lead us toward that goal. 

As I stated in San Francisco,* we will 
come to these negotiations with proposals for 
effective attack on these deadly dangers to 
mankind and we hope that others will do the 

Secretary Talks About Viet-Nam 
on "Issues and Answers'' 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
vieiv with Secretary Rusk on the American 
Broadcasting Company's radio and televi- 
sion program, "Issues and Answers" on 
July 11. Intervieiving Mr. Rusk were ABC 
correspondents William H. Lawrence and 
John Scali. 

Press release 173 dated July 12 

Announcer: This week the United States 
poured more men into Viet-Nam and suf- 
fered new casualties as the fighting in- 
creased in tempo. President Johnson said 
that more than 75,000 United States troops 
will be needed there and that the war in 
Viet-Nam is going to get worse before it 
gets better. How much worse is it going to 
get? How can we win in Viet-Nam? What 
does the appointment of Ambassador Lodge 

For the answers to the issues, the Secre- 
tary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk. 

Here to interview Secretary Rusk, ABC 

* Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


White House correspondent Bill Lawrence 
and ABC State Department correspondent 
John Scali. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Is- 
sues and Answers." Let's start off with a 
question that some critics are asking and, 
indeed, some others : Why don't we bomb the 
Soviet antiaircraft missiles that are being 
built in the Hanoi area? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, those missiles are in 
the immediate vicinity of Hanoi, presum- 
ably for the immediate defense of Hanoi. 
From a military point of view, that is a 
problem of Hanoi itself. 

I don't want to predict the future, but 
what we should like to see is to see Hanoi 
and Peiping and Moscow and the others 
come to a conference table and find a peace- 
ful solution to this problem, but if these 
matters become relevant to our commitment 
in South Viet-Nam, then we will have to 
take this into account. 

Mr. Latvrence: Do we not bomb the Soviet 
missile sites, though, because we fear we 
might kill Russians? I remember this was 
one of the reasons we didn't hit first in 
Cuba but rather took the route that we did 

Secretary Rusk: Those missile sites at the 
present time are not interfering with the 
things that we feel are required to be done, 
at the present time. 

Mr. Scali: Congressman [Gerald R.] Ford 
says the missile sites, as they are being de- 
veloped now, Mr. Secretary, are a threat to 
the Americans already in Viet-Nam. Would 
you agree? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't agree 
on that at the present time. After all, no 
American has been lost from these missile 
sites. They are not, indeed, operational at the 
present time, and this depends upon the 
course of the struggle, the attitude of the 
other side, the possibilities of a peaceful 
settlement, and the military requirements of 
of the situation. 

Mr. Scali: But is what you are saying we 
have not ruled out bombing these, if neces- 

Secretary Rusk: We can't write the future 

until we know what the other side is going 
to do about the future. What we would like 
the other side to do is to come to a confer- 
ence table and make some peace and leave 
their neighbors alone, but that does not 
mean that they have a free hand to do any- 
thing they wish to without pain to them- 

Mr. Lawrence: From a military point of 
view, do we know now that these complexes 
that have been constructed are simply for 
antiaircraft missiles, or are they adaptable 
to antipersonnel missiles — 

Secretary Rusk: Thus far, they are anti- 
aircraft missiles in character. They have a 
range of perhaps 30 miles within their own 
particular sphere. We have not encountered 
any military problem from the presence or 
the construction of these sites. As I say, 
they are not operational, and we have lost no 
Americans to these sites up to this point. 

Bombing of Military Targets 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, I know in our 
bombings so far we have very rigorously 
sought to aim the bombs strictly at military 
installations. There are some very key mili- 
tary installations around Hanoi and Hai- 
phong, including a big oil refinery which is 
supposed to produce 40 percent of the oil 
available to the North Vietnamese. Why 
don't we hit those ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, this has to do with 
the general shape of the struggle, the general 
problem of escalation. We, ourselves, have no 
desire to inflict major damage upon the 
civilian population of North Viet-Nam nor 
indeed upon the daily livelihood of these 
people. We have been hitting military tar- 
gets throughout the southern part of the 
country and, indeed, in the northwestern 
part of the country — such things as ammu- 
nition dumps, POL installations in the 
southern part of the country that can supply 
the infiltration forces, barracks, radar sites, 
and military targets of that sort. 

We are not waging war upon the civilian 
population of North Viet-Nam nor upon, in- 
deed, the regime as such. We have never un- 
dertaken to destroy that regime. What we 



want them to do is to stop bothering their 
neighbors. We hope very much that they will 
realize before this matter gets into much 
larger conflict that this is the essential 

I noticed 2 or 3 days ago that Peiping said 
that the object here is our capitulation. 
Well, we are not going to capitulate, but, on 
the other hand, we don't expect and want or 
ask for capitulation from anybody else. 

We are not asking for a surrender by 
Hanoi, or surrender by Peiping; all we are 
asking them to do is to stop shooting at 
people at whom they have no right to shoot. 
Take their people home that they have in- 
filtrated into South Viet-Nam, including 
some of their own regular armed forces, 
and live at peace with their neighbors. This 
is the object of the exercise. 

Mr. Lawrence: Well, Mr. Secretary, in 
terms of our strategy, what are the reports 
of the success of our bombing? Are we slow- 
ing down infiltration? Are we cutting off 
supplies? Are we indeed bringing them any 
closer to the peace table? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there have 
been very important results of the bombings 
in the North thus far. Ammunition dumps 
and bridges, transportation facilities, POL 
supplies in the South — 

Mr. Lawrence: What is POL? 

Secretary Rusk: Gas and oil — gasoline and 
oil — and these have had an important prac- 
tical effect upon the ability of the North to 
support or to increase the support of their 
effort in South Viet-Nam. 

We had never suspected this in itself 
would be a decisive element, but it is im- 
portant, Mr. Lawrence, that they have dis- 
covered that they are not going to be per- 
mitted to send tens of thousands of people 
into the South to attack South Viet-Nam 
and live in safety and comfort there in the 

The idea of the sanctuary is dead as far 
as this situation is concerned, and that is 
something that all of the others who may be 
supporting Hanoi must take fully into ac- 

Mr. Scali: Including the Red Chinese? 

Secretary Ru^k: Including everybody — 
including everybody who elects to get into 
this war. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, some people who 
have criticized the limited nature of our 
bombing have compared it to trying to in- 
flict a mortal wound on a man by biting 
his big toe. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, let me point out 
that we have been through many episodes 
since 1945 in which the Communist world 
has resorted to force. They left behind 
troops in Iran that they wanted to keep there 
in order to take over that country. Guerril- 
las came down from Bulgaria and Yugo- 
slavia against Greece. There was a blockade 
of Berlin. There were divisions coming 
across the North Korean frontier. There 
have been other efforts in this postwar pe- 
riod to take over neighbors by force. 

Well now, the free world — we and others 
— have had to meet this. We have met it 
with stubbornness, with determination, but 
we have also met it with a certain restraint, 
in the interests of trying to find a peaceful 
settlement that is tolerable for the liberty of 

I mean, in the case of the Berlin blockade, 
for example, we used an airlift for some 
considerable weeks there to keep open the 
doors of peaceful settlement. In the case of 
Korea, we had a monopoly for all practical 
purposes in nuclear weapons at that time, 
but we took 100,000 casualties without us- 
ing nuclear weapons. In the case of the Cuban 
missile crisis. President Kennedy went to 
great pains to keep open the doors for the 
possibility of peaceful settlement. We waited 
41/^ years in Southeast Asia to try to find a 
peaceful settlement before attacking North 
Viet-Nam military installations. 

Now, this is because the American people 
and most of our friends abroad are dedi- 
cated to the idea of building a peaceful and 
decent world order. Of course, you can go 
down the chute-the-chute to a general war in 
5 minutes. That is the easiest thing to think 
of and the easiest thing to do, but the prob- 
lem is how to bring these acts of aggression 
under control, to turn them back and in the 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


process organize a more stable peace in the 
world, and that has been the object of our 

Integrity of American Commitment 

Mr. Lawrence: Well, are we really achiev- 
ing success anywhere, or are we really being 
more or less defeated at the moment? 

Secretary Rusk: Do you mean throughout 
the world ? 

Mr. Lawrence: No, I mean in Viet-Nam. 

Secretary Rtisk: I think in Viet-Nam we 
are in a very crucial situation there. As 
you know, there has been a substantial 
buildup of Viet Cong forces in certain areas, 
particularly in the highland areas of the 2d 
Corps. The situation in the 4th Corps down 
in the delta area has improved. The situa- 
tion around Saigon is more relaxed than it 
was a few months ago. But up in the high- 
land area, where there are substantial con- 
centrations of Viet Cong, there are going to 
be some very sharp engagements and very 
severe fighting. 

But the point is that we have a simple 
commitment there. The essential facts are 
that Hanoi has been sending tens of thou- 
sands of men and arms into the South. They 
are unwilling to come to the conference 
table or talk about a peaceful settlement, 
and therefore we must meet our commitment, 
and that is going to mean during these com- 
ing weeks and months, as the President inti- 
mated the other day, that there is going to 
be trouble ahead in this next period. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, President 
Johnson said this week ^ that things would 
get worse in Viet-Nam before they get bet- 
ter and that there was a need for more 
American forces there. Some reports have 
said that we may send up to a quarter of a 
million troops in order to defeat the Com- 
munists. Do you know of any ceiling? 

Secretary Rusk: I don't know of any par- 
ticular numbers at the present time, John. 
The President made it very clear that we 
have a simple commitment there, that we will 
do what is required. We won't do more than 

' At a news conference on July 9. 

is required, but we will see this thing 
through, and I have no doubt whatever that 
what is required will be done. 

Now, the Viet Cong have been suffering 
very substantial casualties in the past few 
weeks. They have taken casualties not only 
in their infantry fighting but from bomb- 
ing. The monsoon has not had as much ef- 
fect as perhaps they had anticipated, because 
although it may rain very hard once or 
twice a day, in between those rains is a lot 
of flyable weather. So we expect some se- 
vere fighting. My guess is that the refusal 
of Hanoi and Peiping to come to the con- 
ference table is based upon their hope that 
they will achieve something substantial dur- 
ing these next weeks and months. Well, this 
isn't going to happen, and therefore we have 
to do what is required under the circum- 

Mr. Lawrence: Do you see a danger 
though, Mr. Secretary, that we are being 
drawn deeper and deeper into the kind of a 
land war that so many of our generals 
think we can't win — and, after Korea, said 
we should never fight again? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't know any 
generals who think what we did in Korea 
was not wise, but that is not the problem 
in South Viet-Nam. There is a very large 
South Vietnamese force that is operating 
there. We do not believe that the Viet Cong 
are operating on a basis such as that in 
Korea, when massive divisions came across 
the frontier — they still are attacking the 
undefended district towns, the civilian pop- 

They have not sustained a battalion in 
combat for more than a day or two at a 
time. They are basically still in what might 
be called the guerrilla stage, although a 
somewhat increased guerrilla-type of opera- 
tion. They are not in the formation, nor do 
I believe they have the capabilities, for a 
sustained conventional war of the sort that 
occurred in Korea. 

Mr. Lawrence: Yet our needs for combat 
troops keep going up and up and up. 

Now, Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] 
McNamara on at least two occasions upon 



returning from Viet-Nam said that we didn't 
need any more combat troops there; yet to- 
morrow's list is bigger than yesterday's. 

Secretary Rusk: Those judgments, of 
course, vary from time to time depending on 
what the other side is doing and what they 
have done. As you know, they have moved 
some of their regular forces from North 
Viet-Nam into Laos and into South Viet- 
Nam. That is an increase in the scale of the 
operation. That requires increased action on 
the part of the South Vietnamese and on the 
part of ourselves. But I think we need to 
keep our eyes on the central point, and that 
is that we have a commitment there. 

The integrity of that commitment has a 
major bearing upon similar commitments 
we have in other parts of the world, and the 
integrity of the American commitment is 
the principal pillar of peace in the present 
world situation. That is the essence of it. 

Hanoi's Attitude Toward Peace Talks 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, are you at all 
optimistic that the unofficial British peace 
mission that Mr. [Harold] Davies is conduct- 
ing now in Hanoi, that this will succeed in 
encouraging Hanoi to come to the conference 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have no real 
knowledge of what might come out of that. 
We were informed that he was about to go 
there. He is not carrying any mandate from 
us, and he has no authority to negotiate for 
us or for the South Vietnamese. If he learns 
anything of interest, of course, we will be 
glad to know what that might be, but from 
what has been said publicly by Hanoi in con- 
nection with his visit, I think the prospect 
now is that that will not make much differ- 
ence to Hanoi's attitude toward discussions 
and negotiations or conferences or any meth- 
ods of peaceful settlement. 

Mr. Scali: You said earlier, Mr. Secre- 
tary, that the results of the Communist 
monsoon offensive perhaps are not as big or 
as important as Hanoi might have wished. 
Do you mean to say that thus far we are 
winning this battle — 

Secretary Rusk: What I said was that the 

actual effect of the monsoon weather has 
not been as important as perhaps the Viet 
Cong supposed. 

We had some indication, for example, 
they were concentrating in the highlands 
area, the 2d Corps area, the north-central 
part of South Viet-Nam, in order to escape 
the effect of air power. Well now, air power 
has been used effectively during the mon- 
soon period, and it may be the other side 
has overestimated the monsoon effect on the 
actual operations. 

Mr. Lawrence: Well, what is it we do next 
to try to bring these people to the peace 
table? Might we try another lull in the 
bombing as we tried — 

Secretary Rusk: I think the principal 
thing, Mr. Lawrence, is that they must dis- 
cover — which they will surely discover at 
some point — that they are not going to take 
over South Viet-Nam by armed force. That 
is the point, and when they discover that, 
either they will in fact — not at a conference 
table — in fact, cut back and withdraw in 
what they are trying to do, or they may 
come to a conference table to see what 
might be achieved in a peaceful settlement. 

Peace Proposals Rejected 

Mr. Lawrence: Well, are these positive 
steps that we take? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have taken 12 or 
15 steps in connection with possibilities of 
a peaceful settlement. We have used bilateral 
diplomacy, the machinery of the Geneva 
conferences, machinery of the United Na- 
tions, the appeal of the 17 neutral nations,* 
President Johnson's offer of unconditional 
discussion in his Baltimore speech,^ the 
Commonwealth initiative, all sorts of pri- 
vate initiatives — some of them public, such 
as President Radhakrishnan's [President 
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India] proposal 
for a cease-fire and an Afro-Asian force in 
the area. There have been a dozen or so of 

» For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, 
p. 610. 

'Ibid., p. 606. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


these suggestions leading to a peaceful 
settlement. Hanoi and Peiping have turned 
them down. 

Mr. Lawrence: What about Prime Minis- 
ter Shastri's [Prime Minister Lai Bahadur 
Shastri of India] proposal for a lull in the 
bombing? The last one was not successful, 
but perhaps we blunted it on our side by not 
being too clear about it. 

Secretary Rusk: We have been clear about 
it, and the answer on the other side was 
entirely clear before the bombing was re- 
sumed. I want to emphasize that because 
there are those who think that that pause 
was too short. Well, we had the answer be- 
fore we resumed bombing from the other 

Mr. Lawrence: Did we communicate with 
them in writing as the British "congres- 
sional record" suggested just recently? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have communi- 
cated in a variety of ways with Hanoi. 
That was one of them. 

Mr. Lawrence: What did you say in 
that message, in effect? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the idea was that 
the other side said there cannot be any 
political action of any sort so long as the 
bombing occurred. In effect, here was a 
period in which there would not be any 
bombing. What have you got to say? What 
else will stop if we stop the bombing? How 
do we move this toward a peaceful settle- 

Now, we had the answer to that very 
quickly, and it was quite clear the other side 
wasn't interested. Indeed, on the first day of 
that pause Peiping, perhaps through a co- 
incidence, made a public statement saying 
that even if we stopped bombing North 
Viet-Nam, they are not going to be inter- 
ested in any negotiations. 

Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, didn't we 
diminish somewhat the psychological impact 
of that lull by some confusion, at least in 
public announcements or in discussions with 
reporters, as to whether the lull was opera- 
tional or deliberate or indeed whether the 
lull existed at all? 

Secretary Rv£k: Well, we are not negotiat- 
ing with reporters. 

Mr. Lawrence: Sometimes we help. 

Secretary Rusk: The important thing is 
what the other side knows and thinks and 
what their reaction is. 

Mr. Scali: But the other side knew right 
at the first it was a deliberate lull, and it 
was put forward as a gesture to encour- 
age — 

Secretary Rusk: — to find out whether 
there was any substance in what they had 
been saying on this subject, and there proved 
to be no substance. 

Mr. Lawrence: In the terms of peacemak- 
ing, is there any significance in the shift 
from General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, a soldier, 
to Henry Cabot Lodge, a civilian? 

Secretary Rusk: No, there is no policy im- 
plication on that at all. General Taylor, a 
great soldier, is also a great civilian, and 
Ambassador Lodge, a great civilian, also has 
a very strong appreciation for military fac- 

No, that was a very simple matter that 
doesn't need to be complicated at all. General 
Taylor, for personal reasons, indicated that 
he could serve for about a year out there. 
Ambassador Lodge was the best qualified 
man in the President's judgment and my 
judgment to succeed him, and so we made 
the change. 

U.S. Obligation to Allies 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have men- 
tioned repeatedly, in explaining why we are 
fighting, that the credibility of American 
pledges is at stake here and that if the 
Communists succeed in overrunning South 
Viet-Nam we will have trouble elsewhere in 
the world. What, specifically, could you 
foresee in the unlikely event we did lose 

Secretary Rusk: Wall, suppose that our 
41 other allies — or 42 allies — should find 
themselves questioning the validity of the 
assurance of the United States with respect 
to their security? What would be the effect 




of that? If our commitment to South Viet- 
Nam did not mean anything, what would 
you think if you were a Thai and considered 
what our commitments meant to Thailand? 
What would you think if you were West 
Berliners and you found that our assurance 
on these matters did not amount to very 

Now, this is utterly fundamental in main- 
taining the peace of the world, utterly fun- 
damental. South Viet-Nam is important in 
itself, but Hanoi moved tens of thousands 
of people in there in the face of an Ameri- 
can commitment of 10 years' standing. Now, 
this is something that we cannot ignore be- 
cause this begins to roll things up all over the 
world if we are not careful here. 

Mr. Scali: Is the converse not also true — 
if we stop the Communists in South Viet- 
Nam that it will make it considerably easier 
to achieve an enduring peace elsewhere? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that one can 
say with reasonable confidence that both 
sides recognize that a nuclear exchange is 
not a rational instrument of policy and that 
mass divisions moving across national fron- 
tiers is far too dangerous to use as an easy 
instrument of policy, but now we have this 
problem of "wars of liberation" and we must 
find a complete answer to that, and the 
other side must realize that the use of mili- 
tancy, of men and arms across frontiers in 
pursuit of what they call "wars of libera- 
tion," also is too dangerous. 

Now, there has been a big argument be- 
tween Moscow and Peiping on this subject 
over the years, but Peiping must also begin 
to work its way back toward the idea of 
mutual coexistence. Otherwise there is going 
to be very great trouble ahead. 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. Secretary, you spoke 
of our obligation to 42 allies around the 
world. What is the prospect they may do 
something more about helping us keep our 
promise in Viet-Nam? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, there are some 36 
countries giving help of one sort or another 
in South Viet-Nam. Much of that is very 
small. Much of it is important in terms of 

people, not only military, such as Austra- 
lians, the New Zealanders, the Koreans, but 
also technicians and medical workers and ad- 
ministrators and others are out in the coun- 
tryside taking their chances and accepting 
all of the dangers involved. 

We would like to see more of that help 
because it would have very important prac- 
tical effects for the South Vietnamese and 
would have important international political 
effects and might also help to persuade 
Hanoi and Peiping that they have no chance 
of getting away with what they have under- 

Mr. Lawrence: Can you confirm the re- 
ports from Korea that we have offered to 
equip three more divisions for them if they 
will send one more battle division ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is not a mat- 
ter of a direct arrangement. We have been 
giving military assistance in substantial 
quantities to Korea right through. They are 
now considering whether they are able to 
send additional elements to South Viet-Nam 
to assist in the effort there. 

Mr. Lawrence: Mr. Secretary, when Con- 
gress adjourns, do you envisage that Presi- 
dent Johnson will be doing the traveling 
abroad that he spoke of in his state of the 
Union message ? * 

Secretary Rusk: Well, those plans are not 
in any way developed. He has no present 
plans to go abroad. He has been very much 
preoccupied with South Viet-Nam and with 
the Dominican matter and other questions. I 
just don't know what the answer to that is at 
the present time. It depends so much on the 
general situation, 

Mr. Lawrence: Are you one of those who 
is urging him to travel this year? 

Secretary Rv^k: Well, I don't think I 
should get into discussions between the 
President and myself on a matter of that 

Mr. Lawrence: What do you think, Mr. 
Secretary, of the prospects now, in the light 
of the Viet-Nam problem, of the President's 

' For text, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


earlier wish that the leaders of the Soviet 
Union might visit Washington this year and 
that he in turn might go to the Soviet 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we have — quite 
apart from the visit, which I have nothing 
to report on — we are interested in a steady 
improvement of our relations with the Com- 
munist world, but we can't do it at the ex- 
pense of their overrunning smaller countries 
to which we have commitments. So there 
definitely is a chill, a reduction in the possi- 
bilities of real progress between ourselves 
and the Soviet Union at the present time. 

We would like to see this South Vietnam- 
ese problem settled on a peaceful basis so 
that we can get on with the great tasks that 
the rest of the world is expecting us to pick 
up and move with. 

Mr. Lawrence: Thank you very much, 
Mr. Secretary, for being with us today on 
"Issues and Answers." 

Secretary McNamara Discusses 

U.S. Operations in Viet-Nam 

Following are questions and answers re- 
lating to Viet-Nam from, the transcript of a 
news conference held by Secretary of De- 
fense Robert S. McNamara at Washington 
on July 14. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you describe 
in military terms the present state of rela- 
tionships between North Viet-Nam and the 
United States in Viet-Nam? Is this war, 
undeclared war, hostility, undeclared hostil- 

Secretary McNamara: I don't wish to en- 
gage in a legal discussion. I am not a law- 
yer, but I think it is very clear what is hap- 
pening. The North Vietnamese have publicly 
and otherwise indicated their plan to subvert 
the political institutions of South Viet-Nam, 
to achieve domination over those political 
institutions, to supply whatever material and 
personnel assistance is required. 

Last night I was looking over some of the 
public statements, and I think you might be 
interested in them. In 1960, at the third 
congress of the North Vietnamese Commu- 
nist Party, Ho Chi Minh had this to say : "It 
is absolutely essential for North Viet-Nam to 
step up the national democratic people's 
revolution in the South." 

In March 1963 the Communist Party jour- 
nal of North Viet-Nam Hoc Tap frankly 
stated that the Government in South Viet- 
Nam is "well aware that North Viet-Nam is 
the firm base for the southern revolution," 
and there are page after page after page of 
quotations of this kind, frankly asserting 
the responsibility of North Viet-Nam for the 
insurgency action in the South; frankly 
stating it is their objective to supply what- 
ever men, whatever equipment, is required 
to successfully carry out that revolution to 
subvert the institutions of the South and 
achieve domination over the people of the 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been your 
method of increasing the size of our forces in 
South Viet-Nam? Have you set out with an 
approximate sense of the need earlier this 
year and then moved them in as long as 
that seemed to be justified? Or have you ac- 
tually — in the way that ive have been getting 
the news, 10,000 here, 15,000 there, dis- 
covered the need in those terms? 

A. Well, a little of both, I think. The sit- 
uation is changing, and as it changes we 
must change our plans. At any given time 
we assign forces to South Viet-Nam in rela- 
tion to a military plan that has been estab- 
lished and approved by the appropriate con- 
stitutional authorities. 

That plan remains in effect, and we sup- 
ply forces in accordance with it until the sit- 
uation changes. Changes in the situation 
are beyond our control. What action the 
North Vietnamese will take in accordance 
with these statements I have just read to 
you I can't predict. All I can say is that at 
any particular time we will have a plan to 
respond to our best estimate of their actions 



and we will modify that plan when we see 
indications that they are changing their 
own plans. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is our operation in 
Viet-Nam still primarily a counterinsur- 
gency operation, or is it gradually being 
converted into a conventional war? 

A. These are questions of semantics. I 
think what is happening out there is very 
clear to you. There are 65,000 what we call 
regular guerrillas and about 80,000 to 100,- 
000 irregulars, for a total guerrilla force of 
about 165,000, which, because of its size, is 
attacking in larger and larger concentra- 
tions. Whether you call those guerrillas or 
semiconventional, I don't know. As I say, I 
think it is a question of semantics. But the 
number of battalion-size operations is in- 
creasing, the duration of them is increasing, 
the intensity of the attack is increasing, and 
this requires that we change the tactic by 
which we respond to those operations. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the 
changing plans, the changing strength, of 
the Vietnamese and our plans being changed 
to meet them. Do we have any plans at all 
to take the initiative and get this thing in 
more manageable form? 

A. The question is do we have any plans to 
take the initiative and get the operations 
into what was termed to be more manage- 
able form. 

We have stated time and time again that 
our objective in Southeast Asia is a limited 
one. We are not seeking to destroy the people 
or the government of North Viet-Nam. We 
are not seeking to obtain military bases on 
the soil of South Viet-Nam ; we are not seek- 
ing to develop an alliance with South Viet- 
Nam, to introduce it into a relationship, a 
military relationship, vdth nations of the 

We are seeking to insure that the people 
of that country will have control of their own 
destiny and can develop politically, econom- 

ically, and socially as they choose. Our ac- 
tion is taken to achieve that end. The pri- 
mary responsibility for achieving it must, of 
course, be the South Vietnamese. We are 
there to assist them. We are there at their 

As President Johnson emphasized yester- 
day, three American Presidents have com- 
mitted us to that policy and we propose to 
continue it. 

U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets 
for Nazi War Crime iVIaterial 

Press release 178 dated July 15 

Following is the text of a note delivered 
by the American Embassy at Moscow to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July 
15, 1965. Similar notes tvere delivered to 
the Soviet Ministry by the British and 
French Governments. 

The Embassy of the United States of 
America refers to the note of March 15, 
1965 * of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the subject of making available material on 
Nazi crimes by the East German authorities 
to the Central Office for the investigation 
of Nazi crimes at Ludwigsburg in the Fed- 
eral Republic of Germany. 

The Embassy of the United States of 
America notes with regret that the Soviet 
Government has not responded to the re- 
quest made to Ambassador [Petre A.] 
Abrasimov by the American Ambassador in 
Bonn [George C. McGhee] that he use his 
influence so that any material available in 
East Germany concerning crimes of murder 
from the Nazi period will be transmitted di- 
rectly to the Central Office in Ludwigsburg. 
Instead, the Ministry's note under reference 
consists largely of unjustified accusations 
against the Federal Republic which in no 
way contribute to the objective of the prose- 

^ Not printed. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


cution of persons guilty of Nazi crimes of 

The Embassy of the United States of 
America suggests that the Government of the 
Soviet Union can best show its interest in 
the prosecution of these crimes by giving its 
assistance to the renewed efforts of the 
Federal German authorities to bring their 
perpetrators to justice. The Soviet authori- 
ties will have noted that the Federal Govern- 
ment has taken steps to enable their prosecu- 
tion to continue in the future. The law 
recently passed by the Federal German 
Bundestag allows the statutory period for 
the prosecution of crimes punishable with 
life imprisonment to run until the end of 
1969. Moreover, such prosecutions will be 
possible even after the end of 1969, in cases 
where at that date the period of limitation 
has been interrupted by any judicial action 
whatsoever against the alleged perpetrator 
of the crimes. 

The assistance of the Soviet authorities 
has been requested in this matter as a re- 
sult of the lack of cooperation by the East 
German offices in question, who have not so 
far placed the evidence in their possession 
at the disposal of the Ludwigsburg Central 
Office. The Embassy continues to hope that 
the Soviet Government will use its influence 
in order that the Ludwigsburg Office may 
have access to pertinent material held in 
East Germany. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Ma- 
lawi, Vincent H. B. Gondwe, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on July 14. 

Mission From IVIali Concludes 
Visit to United States 

Following is the text of a joint statement 
issued at Washington on July 14 at the con- 
clusion of a visit to the United States of a 
mission from the Republic of Mali. 

Press release 177 dated July 16 

A mission from the Republic of Mali vis- 
ited the United States in June-July 1965. Its 
members were Their Excellencies Hamacire 
N'Doure, Minister Delegate for Economic 
Cooperation and Technical Assistance; 
Moussa Keita, High Commissioner for Youth 
and Sports; and Moussa Leo Keita, Ambas- 
sador of Mali to the United States. 

The mission carried letters from Presi- 
dent Modibo Keita to President Johnson and 
Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen 
Williams. In addition to a series of meetings 
with the Assistant Secretary, the mission 
had talks with the Secretary of State, 
Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman, 
and other officials of the Departments of 
State and Agriculture and the Agency for In- 
ternational Development. A full and frank 
exchange of views was developed on sub- 
jects of interest to the two countries. 

Food for Peace agreements under Public 
Law 480 were signed on July 10 and July 14, 
under which the United States will provide 
5,000 tons of sorghum under the emergency 
provisions of title II and offer for sale 8,000 
tons of wheat flour under title I of the law. 

Representatives of the two Governments 
expressed gratification at the positive re- 
sults achieved by the mission in strength- 
ening the ties of friendship, comprehension, 
and cooperation between the peoples of the 
United States of America and the Republic 
of Mali. 



In this report, prepared at the request of President Johnson 
and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson, two former ambas- 
sadors, one Canadian and one American, formulate some 
guiding principles for U.S.-Canadian relations. "There are 
large opportunities," they conclude, "for mutual advantage 
in the extension of the partnership of our two countries. . . . 
For our part, we are satisfied that the process can be as 
mutually rewarding as it is inevitable." 

Canada and the United States— Principles for Partnersiiip 

A Report by Livingston T. Merchant and A. D. P. Heeney 

June 28, 1965 


1. The task assigned to us by the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister was to study 
"the practicability and desirability of work- 
ing out acceptable principles which would 
make it easier to avoid divergencies in eco- 
nomic and other policies of interest to each 
other." In our study we were asked to take 
"account of the interests of other countries 
and of existing international arrangements." 
We attach in Annex A the relevant extract 
from the communique of January 22, 1964, 
and the announcements of our subsequent 
appointments for this purpose as "a work- 
ing group." 

2. We were also asked to submit a prog- 
ress report to the Joint United States- 
Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic 
Affairs. This we did in April of last year. 
A copy of this report is attached as Annex 

3. A word is in order about the procedure 
we have followed. As we indicated in our 
progress report to the Cabinet Committee, 
we decided to adopt a "case method" and 

analyze a selected number of "cases" in 
United States-Canada affairs to explore 
the possibility of extracting useful lessons 
for the future. For this purpose we selected 
arbitrarily a dozen subjects from recent ex- 
perience. A list of these subjects is attached 
to our interim report in Annex B. 

4. Each of the topics chosen became the 
theme of an informal study within our re- 
spective governments. We pursued some- 
what different methods in the preparation 
of these studies but each of us sought from 
the authors informal suggestions as to how 
— in each case — a particular problem might 
in retrospect have been dealt with better. 
All these papers came to each of us on the 
understanding that they were for our eyes 
only. The results of this unusual exercise 
were both stimulating and helpful and we 
take this occasion to express our warm 
thanks to our colleagues for their willing 
response to our requests. 

5. We have considered the product of this 
exercise and each of us has supplemented 
his knowledge and tested his own impres- 
sions in personal conversations with senior 
officials in Ottawa and Washington. In this 
process, we have sought to discover whether 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


any discernible pattern emerged and 
whether any conclusions in principle were to 
be derived. 

6. We have not added to our working 
group nor have we retained any special 
staff. We have deliberately avoided setting 
up any interdepartmental or expert groups 
in Washington and Ottawa. We have not 
engaged in a work of "research." Our method 
has been essentially that of a dialogue be- 
tween two friends who have served together 
in both capitals and have had the good for- 
tune to have represented their respective 
governments, each for two terms in the 
country of the other. 

7. Our personal friendship, our associa- 
tion in the past in the joint affairs of Can- 
ada and the United States and our common 
concern for the maintenance and strengthen- 
ing of the partnership between our two 
countries have greatly facilitated our pres- 
ent undertaking. They have also contributed 
to our work, and to this report, an informal 
and personal quality which we believe is not 



8. The feasibility of working out accept- 
able principles to govern or guide the be- 
havior of our two countries in their dealings 
with one another must depend upon the 
possibility of agreeing on the principal facts. 
In other words, there must be, on both sides 
of the border, a common appreciation of at 
least the main features of the relationship. 

9. It is trite to refer to relations be- 
tween Canada and the United States as 
"unique." Nevertheless, this is the principal 
fact. There are elements in our situation 
which are not to be found in that of any 
other pair of independent countries in the 
world. Furthermore, the impact of the re- 
lationship, though unequal in its incidence on 
the two sides of the boundary, extends into 
virtually every aspect of the national life of 
each. This, we believe, will be increasingly 
so as the years go by. 

Mutual Involvement 

10. The volume and variety of mutual in- 
volvement of the two countries and their 
peoples are without parallel. Perhaps first in 
importance is the vast network of personal 
and family connections, the effect of which is 
incalculable but certainly great. There can 
be few Canadians who do not acknowledge 
some close American relative by blood or 
marriage, while the number of Americans 
resident in the Canadian society is substan- 
tial. The density of travel between our 
countries testifies to their interest in each 
other. Last year a total of more than 16 
million Americans and Canadians headed 
north or south for work or play, with little 
formality or inconvenience. They have both 
taken good advantage of the open border. 

11. There is a myriad of other close links 
between Canada and the United States. In 
religion, in all the professions, in business, 
in labor, in education and in the arts, the 
pattern of organization and exchange strad- 
dles the boundary. As one perceptive official 
recently put it: "From businessmen to Boy 
Scouts, women's clubs to engineers, and 
scientists to little league hockey teams, 
Canadian and American counterparts find 
fraternal interests and often organizational 
affiliation in a magnitude defying descrip- 
tion. Meetings, conventions, cross-border 
visits, and mail, telegraphic and telephone 
contacts have combined in a pattern of 
North American neighborhood so common- 
place that we rarely give it special thought." 
Within such groups the habit as well as the 
means of communication between our two 
peoples is strong and growing stronger daily. 

12. We have cooperated naturally and 
easily in measures for the conservation of 
wildlife. Wild animals, fish and birds rec- 
ognize no boundary drawn by men. Sim- 
ilarly we have worked together in the pres- 
ervation of adjacent wilderness areas and 
contiguous public parks. 

13. Competent American and Canadian 
authorities have cooperated in a number of 
mutually advantageous local interchanges of 
electric power and for the movement of oil 
and natural gas across the border. 



14. A significant proportion of trade be- 
tween our two countries moves free from 
tariffs or other restrictions and efforts are 
on foot for further improvement. Subject to 
the required legislative approval, trade by 
manufacturers of automobiles and new auto 
parts is to be free of duty in both countries 
under a special agreement concluded earlier 
this year between the two governments. ^ 

15. Much has been said and written about 
aspects of the cultural involvement of the 
two countries. In this area the preponder- 
ance of the United States is most notable. 
The stream of television and radio programs 
and of publications from hundreds of pri- 
vate sources in the United States encounters 
no natural barriers in its northward surge, 
except in French Canada. In larger meas- 
ure than any other people, Canadians share 
with Americans the mixed and massive out- 
put of the United States. 

16. In commerce and finance the situation 
is well known. Canadians and Americans re- 
mind themselves constantly that they are 
each other's best customers, that the trade 
crossing the border is the largest between 
any two countries in the world. Of recent 
years they have become especially conscious 
of the importance of their financial rela- 
tions. Americans are deeply involved in the 
strength and prosperity of the Canadian 
economy by reason of the magnitude and 
variety of their investments as well as the 
absorptive capacity of the Canadian market. 
The stability of the Canadian dollar is of 
importance to the United States. As recently 
as 1962 when the Canadian dollar was under 
serious pressure, the financial authorities of 
the United States promptly rallied — with 
others — to its support. On the other hand, 
the cooperation of Canadian financial insti- 
tutions and the continuing Canadian deficit 
in bilateral transactions has contributed 
materially to lessening the balance of pay- 
ments problem of the United States. More- 
over, the importance of the United States 
dollar as a world currency is accepted in 
Canada. Access to the United States capital 

Release of Report on United 
States-Canadian Relations 

White House Statement 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated July 12 

The President and the Prime Minister of 
Canada are making public today a Report pre- 
pared at their request by Ambassador Living- 
ston Merchant of the United States and Am- 
bassador A. D. P. Heeney of Canada. 

In their first working meeting in Washing- 
ton in January 1964, the President and the 
Prime Minister agreed on the need for a study 
of the basic principles of relations between the 
United States and Canada. Later, they com- 
missioned Ambassador Merchant and Ambassa- 
dor Heeney to make this study together. The 
two Ambassadors made their Report on Friday, 
July 9, and the President and the Prime Mini- 
ster have agreed that it deserves prompt pub- 
lication . 

The President emphasizes again the extraor- 
dinary importance of close and friendly rela- 
tions between the United States and Canada, 
which have lived together as the best of neigh- 
bors in two centuries. The President believes 
that this Report is a serious and constructive 
contribution to still better relations between 
Canada and the United States. He has asked 
Secretary of State Rusk to take the lead for 
the United States in a prompt review of the 
Report and its recommendations. The Secre- 
tary's review will be the basis for further 
United States' action on this Report. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191. 

market has been of major importance to the 
Canadian economy and private United States 
investment continues to play a significant 
role in the rate of Canadian growth. The 
existence of conditions which attract for- 
eign capital is of course an element in its 
availability. It should also be noted that 
private Canadian funds flow southward for 
investment in substantial volume. On a per 
capita basis — though not of course overall 
— Canadian investment in the United States 
exceeds the American investment in Cana- 
dian business. The financial and commercial 
stakes of each country in the other are high. 
17. In recent years the revolution of mod- 
ern technology, the consequent acceleration 
in the tendency toward specialization and 
the "internationalization" of business, with 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


technical "know how" accompanying capital 
investment, have been striking features of 
the world economic scene. They have been 
especially apparent in United States-Can- 
ada relations where their effects continue 
to multiply and extend the interdependence 
of the two economies. 

18. The changing technology of war may 
diminish the significance of geography but, 
for the years immediately ahead, Canada will 
remain of great importance to United States' 
defense while the United States is essential 
to the defense of Canada. The considera- 
tions which, since World War II, led in- 
creasingly to the integration of continental 
air defense still obtain. The logic of our 
military partnership has been extended ef- 
fectively into the fields of production and 
supply. The network of joint arrangements 
between the two governments and their 
military services is striking evidence of the 
degree to which the two countries are in- 
volved with one another in the ultimate and 
fundamental business of national security. 

Wherein Our Countries Differ 

19. Canada and the United States are — in 
Churchill's phrase — "mixed up together" 
more than any other two countries on earth 
so that the similarities in our "ways of 
life" often lead observers to erroneous con- 
clusions. For there are important differ- 
ences. Both understanding and acceptance 
of this fact are essential to the successful 
working of the partnership. Many of these 
differences have their roots in history. 

20. First and foremost in this context, 
the United States is a unicultural society, 
while Canada, founded upon the partner- 
ship of two races, is discovering anew in its 
bicultural composition a distinguishing na- 
tional quality of growing vigor and signif- 
icance. We believe that this distinction is 
likely to have increasing importance in the 
development of relations between the two 
countries. An example of its relevance in the 
cultural area is one response of Canadians 
to the northward stream of the products of 
contemporary American mass media, a re- 
cent comment on which was that "the danger 

from the United States to English-speaking 
Canada is that of cultural absorption, while 
for French Canada it is cultural destruc- 

21. The political traditions and institu- 
tions of the United States are a strong ele- 
ment in the national character which pro- 
foundly affect American attitudes. The same 
is true of Canada and Canadians. We have 
already alluded to the importance of French 
Canada in this connection. We have also 
been impressed, in our own experience, by 
the misunderstandings which can develop 
from institutional differences, for example, 
the congressional system on the one hand 
and the parliamentary on the other. The 
division of powers is a concept natural to 
every American but it is often difficult for 
Canadians, raised in the tradition of par- 
liamentary government, to appreciate its 
practical consequences. 

22. Until recent years Canadians and 
Americans have had a somewhat different 
view of the outside world. Since World War 
II, the United States has taken over the im- 
mense and necessary burden of leadership 
and protection of the free nations. The 
Canadian connection with Europe has always 
been a main influence in the development of 
Canada's national attitudes. But it is only 
in recent years that Canada has become 
deeply involved in the wider international 
context and then, with different capabilities 
and responsibilities, not as a military power 
of the first rank but as one of the leaders 
in world trade, highly developed economi- 
cally, and respected in world councils, with 
a demonstrated willingness to assume varied 
obligations around the globe. 

23. In world affairs — as in the bilateral 
relationship — the most conspicuous differ- 
ence between the United States and Canada 
is the disparity between the two countries 
in power and the responsibility that goes 
with it. Since World War II, while Canada 
has emerged as a country of importance 
and influence, in the same period the United 
States has become the most powerful nation 
on earth. 

24. The disparity is striking, whatever 
the area or terms of comparison — manpower. 



military or economic capabilities, what you 
will. By every material test other than geo- 
graphic extent, and possibly undeveloped re- 
sources, the United States is immensely 
stronger than her northern neighbor. There 
is no satisfactory factor or combination of 
factors — ten to one in population, fourteen 
to one in Gross National Product — by which 
this inequality can be measured realisti- 
cally. Degree in most areas of comparison 
becomes kind; the contrast more significant 
than the figures. 

25. The consequences of this disparity are 
among the most difficult features in the re- 
lations between our two governments and 



26. The direct and inevitable result of the 
great and growing volume and variety of 
mutual involvement is the multiplication of 
actual and potential points of friction. It is 
our impression, however, that, considering 
the extent and frequency of contact between 
our governments and peoples, the actual con- 
flicts are remarkably few. For the most part, 
our two governments seem able to settle 
their differences much as conflicts of inter- 
est are resolved within our own two countries. 
Nevertheless, because ours are independent 
countries and separate peoples whose at- 
titudes and interests do not always coincide, 
there are, and will continue to be, problems 
between them. Mutually acceptable solutions 
or accommodations to these problems re- 
quire, on both sides, wider and deeper under- 
standing of their origins. 

27. Over the course of the history of the 
two countries, there have been times of 
emotional outburst which have clouded re- 
lations between the two governments and 
peoples. We do not accept the theory that 
such phenomena are endemic or inevitable. 
Nevertheless, it is true that Canada owes 
its national existence largely to the deter- 
mined, negative response of Canadians to the 
challenge inherent in the size and power of 
the United States. The once real Canadian 

fear of military aggression from the south 
has long since passed. Current Canadian 
anxieties do not arise from warlike pressures, 
and release from them is not to be found in 
simple heroic measures. 

28. The current concern in Canada — de- 
termined as ever upon its independent 
North American future — has its roots in 
history, in its struggle to achieve its own 
destiny, and in the disparity of size and 
power. The present preoccupations of Cana- 
dians, however, relate primarily to social and 
economic developments of more recent date — 
the massive influence of American cultural 
expression upon Canadian life, the extent of 
American ownership of Canadian industry 
and resources, and the prevailing attrac- 
tions south of the border for Canadian 
scientists, engineers and professional men 
and women. Such present phenomena must 
be seen by Americans as well as Canadians 
within the context of history and national 
aspirations. If in their dealings, public and 
private, there is to be the mutual confidence 
that both desire and need, there must be con- 
scious effort on both sides to appreciate the 
historical as well as the current factors 
which tend to divide them. 

29. The mutual involvement of the two 
countries and peoples has also complicated, 
on both sides, the problems arising from the 
disparity in power. In most — though not all 
— of their bilateral affairs the capacity of 
the United States to benefit or harm Cana- 
dian interests is greater than that of Canada 
to affect the prosperity and security of the 
United States. Canadians are more conscious 
than Americans of this element in their 
dealings with the United States. On the 
other hand, the United States, preoccupied 
with the responsibilities of world power, may 
sometimes be inhibited in its bilateral deal- 
ings by considerations which do not operate 
directly on Canadian attitudes. Here restraint 
is required of both sides. 

30. Canadians sometimes feel that, be- 
cause they are so close, so "American," 
there is a disposition on the part of the 
United States to expect more of Canada 
than of other allies — as in setting other 
countries a good example — reflecting a tend- 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


ency to apply to Canada a kind of "double 
standard" of international conduct. The re- 
sult is sometimes to tempt Canadians into 
demonstrating their independence by adopt- 
ing positions divergent from those of the 
United States. In a quite different sense, 
Americans are inclined sometimes to suspect 
the application of a "double standard" on 
the part of Canada when, for example, in 
an international negotiation, the United 
States is urged to be "reasonable," to make 
unilateral concessions to break a logjam 
which has been created by the intransigence 
of others. For Canadians cannot but be 
disturbingly aware that, despite their under- 
lying confidence in the basic motives of the 
United States, Canada could be involved in- 
evitably in the consequences of United 
States' decisions in circumstances over which 
Canadians had little influence or control. 
Such tendencies, on each side, arising from 
mutual involvement, inequality and the facts 
of international life, should be recognized 
but not exaggerated. 



31. We take as basic fact the will on both 
sides of the border to live together in peace 
and prosperity and to that end to work to- 
gether. Given that fact, we believe that 
certain general conclusions can be drawn 
from the present situation and experience 
in the past. 

32. In the first place, we are convinced 
that the nature and extent of the relation- 
ship between our two countries is such as to 
require, in the interests of both, something 
more than the normal arrangement for the 
conduct of their affairs with one another. 
The reasons which lead us inexorably to this 
conclusion have been touched on in the two 
preceding sections. We will have more to say 
later as to the kind of arrangements these 
should be. Meantime, we wish to emphasize 
our conviction that the strength of the 
friendship and the value of the partnership 
— of great and increasing significance to 
both countries — depend not only upon mutual 


understanding and respect, but upon the abil- 
ity and determination on both sides to find 
solutions or accommodations to the problems 
which inevitably arise from an intimate and 
involved relationship. 

33. The majority of the issues which reach 
the government level are, in fact, resolved 
in a fashion at least reasonably satisfactory 
to both sides. The evidence we have studied 
in the course of the present exercise con- 
firms this conclusion. Indeed, the marvel is 
that, with such varied questions arising liter- 
ally every day, so many are resolved with- 
out the need for consideration at a high 
level of government. Considering the volume, 
the number of problems which have to re- 
ceive top treatment is not large. But those 
which do emerge are often very difficult and 
delicate, not only intrinsically but in terms 
of national attitudes. The intimacy, breadth 
and depth of the relationship make it certain 
that there will always be problems between 
our two countries, large as well as small. 
And, as they are resolved, new ones will re- 
place them. This is a condition of conti- 
nental cohabitation. 

34. Many of the problems which have been 
satisfactorily solved in the past are by their 
nature likely to recur. Those associated with 
wheat marketing, labor relations and de- 
fense production are examples. In this con- 
nection, it should be noted that prosperity 
acts as a lubricant. By the same token, hard 
times can exacerbate difficulties. 

35. In every case that we have examined 
where difficulties have developed, and ulti- 
mately been satisfactorily resolved or ac- 
commodated, full and timely consultation 
has been an essential element in its dispo- 
sition. Similarly, the absence of prior con- 
sultation or the fact that such consultation 

as did take place was regarded as insuf- g 
ficient, has been a feature of many cases " 
where an impasse has occurred and no ac- 
ceptable compromise has been reached. 

36. It should be frankly recognized that, 
in the future as in the past, there are bound 
to arise cases of genuine conflict of national 
interest which by their nature are, at the 
time at least, incapable of mutually accept- 
able solutions. In such matters there may 



indeed be no immediate alternative to an 
agreement to disagree. On the other hand, 
it may be that, within a larger framework 
of national interests, some solution can be 
worked out. For it is important that in- 
dividual issues should not be insulated from 
one another within the wide range of our re- 

37. We have noted a surprising number of 
areas in which our governments have adopted 
a common approach to our common advan- 
tage. Their recital is both impressive and 
reassuring. We are of the opinion that there 
are further promising possibilities which 
could and should be jointly explored with a 
view to the extension of this mutually ad- 
vantageous partnership. 


38. Given the long experience of our two 
countries in dealing with one another and 
the virtual certainty that their interdepend- 
ence will grow rather than be washed away 
by inward-looking and protectionist policies, 
we believe it is feasible to identify certain 
principles of conduct which would reduce 
the possibilities of divergencies in economic 
and other policies of interest to each other. 

39. We are convinced that the cornerstone 
of a healthy relationship between our two 
countries is timely and sufficient consulta- 
tion in candor and good faith at whatever 
level or levels of government is appropriate 
to the nature and importance of the subject. 
To consult in this fashion, however, cannot 
be taken to imply that agreement must al- 
ways result. The purpose rather is that each 
be enabled to hear and weigh the other's 
views. The outcome will depend upon the 
circumstances of the case and, ultimately, 
upon the judgment by each of its national 

40. Effective consultation depends far 
less on machinery and procedure than on the 
will to consult. This applies at all levels. In 
fact the kind of consultation which the 
breadth and intimacy of the relationship de- 

mands should develop into ineradicable habit 
in the two capitals. 

41. While manner must give place to sub- 
stance, it may be well to glance at existing 
machinery for consultation before express- 
ing further views on this topic. 

Machinery for Consultation 

42. Especially since the days of Prime 
Minister Mackenzie King and President 
Franklin Roosevelt, certain major problems 
have been the subject of informal inter- 
changes between the two heads of govern- 
ment. It is assumed that this useful per- 
sonal relationship will be maintained in the 
future. In some circumstances, there is liter- 
ally no substitute for it. 

43. Our respective Embassies, dealing in 
each case principally with the department 
charged with responsibility for foreign af- 
fairs, but also with other departments, are 
the normal and official means of communi- 
cation between the two governments. It is 
their function to conduct a continuing ex- 
change of views and information over the 
whole range of the relationship. 

44. There is a responsibility on each side 
to ensure, within its government apparatus, 
a high degree of interdepartmental coordi- 
nation and discipline. Otherwise the conduct 
of business will be inefficient and produc- 
tive of unnecessary difficulty. It should go 
without saying that our respective Em- 
bassies and the concerned divisions of the 
Department of State and the Department of 
External Affairs should be sufficiently 
staffed with officers of high quality. Among 
them should always be some who are es- 
pecially knowledgeable in Canada-United 
States affairs through actual service in the 
other country. It is evident that the situa- 
tions within the two governments are not 
identical, for various reasons. Nevertheless, 
we attach importance to these observations 
which we believe to have validity on both 

45. Over the years, and especially since 
the early days of World War II, certain 
joint bodies for the conduct of certain of our 
affairs have been created by treaty and by 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


executive action. Of the former the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission is one which has 
been of continuing importance to both coun- 
tries since its establishment by the Bound- 
ary Waters Treaty of 1909. Originally de- 
signed to prevent disputes arising between 
Canada and the United States regarding 
the use of boundary waters and to settle any 
questions involving the rights, obligations, 
or intei'ests of either party along the com- 
mon frontier, this unique institution acts as 
a single body composed equally of United 
States' and Canadian members. In our judg- 
ment, its solid foundation of law and prece- 
dent and its long and successful record in 
the disposition of problems along the bound- 
ary justify consideration of some extension 
of the Commission's functions. Accordingly, 
we recommend that the two governments ex- 
amine jointly the wisdom and feasibility of 
such a development. 

46. Among the bodies established by ex- 
ecutive agreement, the Joint Committee on 
Trade and Economic Affairs is among the 
most important. Composed of the Cabinet 
members, on both sides, responsible for for- 
eign affairs, trade and commerce, finance, 
agriculture and natural resources, it meets 
periodically to review the economic situation 
of the two countries and to consult on cur- 
rent problems.^ Under the general aegis of 
this Committee special working groups or 
other consultative arrangements have been 

47. In this connection, we recommend 
that the Joint Committee on Trade and 
Economic Affairs establish a Joint Commit- 
tee of Deputies which could meet frequently 
on behalf of their principals and be avail- 
able at short notice to consider any emer- 
gent problem. We make this recommenda- 
tion because it is unreasonable to expect 
Cabinet members with all their other re- 
sponsibilities to come together as often, as 
systematically and as quickly as is needed. 

48. In other areas of common concern 

similar joint facilities have been set up, 
among them the Committee on Joint De- 
fense ' on which sit the Cabinet members 
responsible for defense, foreign affairs and 

49. Below the Cabinet level there is the 
Permanent Joint Board on Defense estab- 
lished in 1940. Consisting as it does of both 
civilian and military members, it seems to 
us that this body could be more fully utilized 
to the mutual advantage. 

50. There is also continuing and valuable 
interchange between the military services 
of the two countries. 

51. Special mention should be made of the 
direct consultative arrangement between 
Parliament and the Congress. Founded in 
1959 this Canada-United States Interparlia- 
mentary Group is composed of representa- 
tives from both Houses in both countries. 
Any misgivings which may at first have ex- 
isted as to possible legislative intrusion into 
the conduct of foreign affairs have been dis- 
pelled by the important and positive role 
which this body has played in broadening 
understanding between our two countries. 
The members meet regularly, alternating 
between the United States and Canada. Their 
agenda cover a wide range of current topics 
and their discussions have been character- 
ized by ease, candor and enthusiasm. 

52. One could extend this enumeration, 
for there are many other joint bodies which 
have been set up to facilitate the process of 
consultation and the conduct of our joint 
affairs in different areas. Their importance 
and utility vary with circumstance. Their 
activities supplement the scores of daily con- 
tacts maintained by the official departments 
and agencies of the two governments listed 
in Annex C. Added together, all these means 
of communication must surely constitute the 
most elaborate and valuable apparatus of 
consultation existing between any two na- 
tions. Not only should these arrangements 

' For a joint communique released at the conclu- 
sion of the ninth meeting of the Committee at Ottawa 
Apr. 29-30, 1964, see ibid., May 18, 1964, p. 774. 

' For a joint communique released at the conclu- 
sion of the fourth meeting of the Committee at 
Washington June 25, 1964, see ibid., July 13, 1964, 
p. 45. 



be utilized but they should be strengthened, 
revised and expanded as need and conven- 
ience may suggest. 

53. In view of the complexity and variety 
of official relationships between the two 
governments at all levels, it is particularly 
important that there be maintained be- 
tween the capitals of Washington and Ot- 
tawa passenger air facilities with modern 
standards of equipment, rapidity and regu- 
larity. It is also important that mail deliv- 
eries between the two capitals be prompt 
and frequent. 

Guidelines for Consultation 

54. We now turn to the essence of con- 
sultation and to certain guidelines which, 
in our judgment, should be observed by our 
two governments in their dealings with each 
other : 

(a) In the first place, every effort should 
be made to begin the consultative process 
sufficiently early to provide reasonable time 
for each party to consider and give full 
weight to the views and interests of the 
other. This will help to satisfy each side 
that its position on any issue is being seri- 
ously examined. It will also improve the 
chances of resolving difficulties and, where 
no detours around roadblocks are to be 
found, it can ease the shock of impending 

(b) In certain fields where combined ef- 
forts are called for, such as continental air 
defense arrangements and joint development 
of resources, there is obvious advantage in 
having the consultative process begin at the 
planning stage so as to facilitate concurrent 
formulation of policy. 

(c) There will be in the future — as in the 
past — cases where, by reason of what is 
deemed an overriding need for speed or 
secrecy, the process of consultation must be 
telescoped. This is a fact of life which must 
be recognized, but the judgment in such cir- 
cumstances should be that of the highest au- 

(d) While all crises are not predictable, 
many — probably most — can be foreseen as 

possible. For this reason the process of con- 
sultation should provide for continuous ex- 
changes of views between the appropriate 
authorities of the two governments over the 
whole range of looming problems, including 
mutual exposure to any relevant contingency 

(e) Consultation should be initiated when- 
ever one of the two governments is in the 
process of formulating important policies or 
planning actions which would have an appre- 
ciable impact on the other. The responsibil- 
ity for initiating consultation in such cases 
rests on the party approaching decision or 
contemplating action. 

(f ) Existing mechanisms for consultation 
should be utilized in order to ensure prompt 
and continuous access by one government to 
the other. 

(g) Many problems between our two gov- 
ernments are susceptible of solution only 
through the quiet, private and patient exam- 
ination of facts in the search for accommo- 
dation. It should be regarded as incumbent 
on both parties during this time-consuming 
process to avoid, so far as possible, the 
adoption of public positions which can con- 
tribute unnecessarily to public division and 

(h) Each government has a responsibility 
to ensure that its own procedure for intra- 
governmental consideration of subjects 
which affect the other country operates 
promptly, effectively and consistently so as 
to facilitate the consultative process. 

55. We recognize that the kind of consul- 
tation which we have described has differ- 
ent implications for our respective govern- 
ments. These derive primarily from the 
wide disparity in power and international 
responsibility which we have already under- 
lined. In consultations with the United States, 
Canadian authorities must have confidence 
that the practice of quiet diplomacy is not 
only neighborly and convenient to the United 
States but that it is in fact more effective 
than the alternative of raising a row and 
being unpleasant in public. By the same 
token, the United States authorities must be 
satisfied that, in such consultations, Can- 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


ada will have sympathetic regard for the 
world-wide preoccupations and responsibil- 
ities of the United States. 

56. Such a regime of consultation is diffi- 
cult — for both sides — but we are convinced 
that it is fundamental to the maintenance 
of healthy relations between our two gov- 
ernments and peoples. We believe it can be 
most effective in the best interests of both 
if it is conducted along the above lines. 



57. President Kennedy in his address be- 
fore members of the two Houses of Parlia- 
ment in Ottawa on May 17, IQGl,* said: 

Geography has made us neighbors. History has 
made us friends. Economics has made us partners. 
And necessity has made us allies. 

A little later, in the same speech, he added : 

Thus ours is the unity of equal and independent 
nations, cotenants of the same continent, heirs of 
the same legacy, and fully sovereign associates in 
the same historic endeavor. . . . 

Prime Minister St. Laurent, some years 
earlier, in a Commencement address in the 
United States, referred to one of the con- 
ditions of the partnership in these terms : 

You in the United States obviously have the 
power and the strength to dominate our country. 
But you also have the wisdom and the respect for 
freedom to refrain from exercising that power and 
that strength. The fact that you respect our free- 
dom, the fact that you treat us as an equal partner, 
make our country a far more potent ally than any 
satellite could ever be. 

58. Wrapped in such eloquence is the core 
of the problem. How can two free political 
communities of such unequal strength, living 
side by side and with so much in common — 
though with a strong element of contrast in 
their cultural heritage — reconcile the facts 
and expanding opportunities of partnership 
with the preservation and development of 
the national identity of each? 

59. In the first place, the process of rec- 

For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 839. 

onciliation is a continuing one; it is never , 
"done." It calls for conscious and sustained 
effort on both sides and at many levels. It 
requires a large extension of mutual knowl- 
edge of one another's affairs. For one thing, 
a better and wider understanding is needed i 
in both countries of their respective national ' 
characteristics, their political institutions 
and processes, the trends of public opinion 
and the development of government policies. 
Americans and Canadians often assume that 
they know and understand one another in- 
stinctively. This is both untrue and dan- 

60. It will have been abundantly evident 
from earlier passages in our report that we 
are persuaded of the mutual advantage 
which is to be derived from the development 
of a more effective working partnership be- 
tween our two countries. If such benefits are 
to be fully realized, it will require on the 
part of both not only a willingness to exploit 
acceptable opportunities for joint under- 
takings but also the willingness of each 
government to examine existing hindrances 
to cooperation with a view to their removal. 

Mutual Respect for National Jurisdiction 

61. It is important that each country 
should avoid efforts, or apparent efforts, to 
extend its domestic law into the territory of 
the other. A case in point — the administra- 
tion of foreign assets control under the 
United States Trading with the Enemy || 
Act, as it relates to United States-owned 
branches and subsidiaries domiciled in Can- 
ada, occasionally comes into conflict with 

the laws, regulations and policies of the 
Canadian Government. We strongly recom- 
mend that the two governments examine 
promptly the means, through issuance by 
the United States of a general license or 
adoption of other appropriate measures, by 
which this irritant to our relationship may 
be removed, without encouraging the evasion 
of United States law by citizens of the 
United States. 

62. Each country should respect scrupu- 
lously the other's exercise of its sovereign 
authority in legislation and the functioning i 



of its judicial system. There are clearly iden- 
tifiable areas where good fences contribute 
to good neighborly relations. 

Projects for Partnership 

63. If such fundamentals be accepted on 
both sides, then the border need prove no 
barrier or hindrance to a common ap- 
proach, as partners, in broad areas of the 
national lives of the tvi'o countries. Indeed, 
this has already been demonstrated in many 
ways over many years, for example, in the 
great joint enterprise of the St. Lawrence 
Seaway and Power Project and in the agree- 
ment for the cooperative development of the 
water resources of the Columbia River Basin. 
Four areas where the current possibilities 
of a similar approach seem to us promising 
and important are described in the follow- 
ing paragraphs. 

A. Energy 

64. We have been impressed by the pros- 
pects of mutual benefit which might be 
realized in closer cooperation and coordina- 
tion between our two countries in the produc- 
tion and distribution of energy, especially 
electrical energy. Under appropriate condi- 
tions, joint planning and development of re- 
sources to that end in various regions would 
appear to afford promising opportunities. 
For this reason we recommend early and 
serious study of such possibilities. 

65. We have been led to this conclusion 
by a number of circumstances in the current 
and prospective situation : 

(a) the high and rapidly rising use of 
energy in the two countries and its increas- 
ing importance to our peoples and in the 
economic development of the regions in 
which they live ; 

(b) recent technological advances, espe- 
cially in extra-high voltage transmission, 
which create the potential for substantial 
future reductions in costs ; 

(c) the economic advantages to both 
countries of disregarding the boundary for 
energy purposes, that is, in the develop- 
ment and distribution of energy on a re- 
gional north-south basis where this is to 

the mutual advantage. Such an approach 
permits the "economies of scale" to operate 
to reduce costs ; planning can be coordinated 
and efficient; and mutually profitable inter- 
changes and interconnections can be effected, 
taking advantage of the different time zones 
and the diversity of climatic conditions 
which can produce important savings. 

66. In any such study, and in any subse- 
quent cooperative arrangements worked out 
between the competent authorities in the 
two countries, a number of important points 
would have to be kept in mind : 

(a) the differing situation as between the 
various sources of energy and their changing 
importance relative to one another ; 

(b) the importance of having regard to 
whole north-south regions at an early stage 
in the design and development of networks; 

(c) the need to establish jointly in ad- 
vance that significant net benefits would re- 
sult from joint projects, and that such bene- 
fits could be equitably divided ; 

(d) the wisdom of avoiding situations in 
which the entities involved in one country 
become in effect "public utilities" in the 
other ; and, 

(e) the protection of the national inter- 
ests of each country. 

67. Primary responsibility for moving 
ahead, and much of the expertise, partic- 
ularly in electricity, rests with the system 
owners — public and private — in the two 
countries, and much of the authority re- 
sides elsewhere, notably within State and 
Provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we are 
persuaded that in this area there is op- 
portunity for advantageous cooperative lead- 
ership and initiative in the two national 

68. We appreciate the variety of differing 
circumstances which affect the various en- 
ergy sources in the two countries. There 
are, for example, special conditions bearing 
on coal, oil and gas which are not all or 
equally applicable to electrical energy. Never- 
theless, we believe there would be virtue in 
having a joint look at the energy picture 
as a whole. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


69. We express no opinion as to how such 
studies can best be undertaken and advanced, 
whether under the aegis of a joint body or 
by the coordinated efforts of the appropriate 
elements and agencies of government in the 
two countries. 

B. Trade 

70. The economies of scale in production 
and the potential of larger markets justify 
continuing efforts on both sides to minimize 
barriers to trade between the two countries. 
It is to be hoped that the current Kennedy 
Round negotiations will make significant 
progress in this direction. 

71. Each government should continue to 
study, for the longer range future, the eco- 
nomic, financial, and political practicability 
of further progressive reductions in tariffs 
and other barriers to trade between the two 
countries with a view to increasing the 
market for the products of each. This study 
should go forward on a basis consistent with 
their obligations under the GATT and their 
common effort to expand and liberalize 
multilateral trade. There should be frequent 
consultations on the subject between the two 
governments. In this connection the pos- 
sibilities of working out special arrange- 
ments of mutual advantage, as was done by 
the two governments with respect to auto- 
mobiles and automotive parts, might be 
worthy of exploration. 

C. Civil Aviation 

72. For a variety of historical reasons, the 
United States-Canada network of air routes 
and services has failed to keep pace with 
either the technical development of jet 
transport or the travel needs of the peoples 
of the two countries proceeding to and from 
the other's territory. 

73. We recommend that the appropriate 
authorities of the two countries approach 
the aviation problem with a view to the de- 
velopment of a continental pattern of air 
travel which : 

(a) would be responsive to the travel re- 
quirements of the public of both countries; 

(b) would provide for the optimum utiliza- 

tion of modern equipment ; and, 

(c) would result in opportunity for equi- 
table sharing of air business between Canada 
and the United States. 

D. Cooperation in Finance 

74. The commercial and financial relation- 
ships between Canada and the United States I 
are so extensive and so intimate that each 
country is bound to be affected if the other 
finds it necessary to take steps to correct 

a deficit in its balance of international pay- 
ments. In a world of convertible currencies, 
what matters to each country is, of course, 
the maintenance of an appropriate balance 
of payments with the world as a whole. But 
the impact on the other country of the spe- 
cific measures taken by either to correct 
a disequilibrium is bound to be affected by 
the structure of their bilateral trade and 
financial relationships. Thus, the fact that 
two-thirds or more of Canada's trade is 
with the United States and that Canada has 
a very large current account deficit with the 
United States makes it inevitable that any 
measures Canada finds necessary to reduce 
its overall current account deficit if it gets 
into exchange difficulties will bear particu- 
larly heavily on the United States. On the 
other hand, if the United States finds it 
necessary on occasion to limit its exports 
of capital, or if it should ever find it neces- 
sary to curtail imports, the impact of such 
measures would, in the absence of some 
special alleviation, fall with particular sever- 
ity on Canada which is a large importer of 
capital from the United States and with 
which it does most of its trade. 

75. The very close though asymmetrical 
relationships referred to in the previous 
paragraph appear to involve two conse- 
quences. The first is that each country, in 
determining from time to time what policies 
to follow with regard to its balance of pay- 
ments with the outside world, should have 
clearly in mind its bilateral balance of pay- 
ments with the other, so that the impact 
on the other of any corrective action which 
may be needed is recognized. The second is 
that each side should keep the other fully 
informed of developments in its balance of 



payments and the underlying reasons for 
them, so as to provide opportunity for work- 
ing out constructive and imaginative solu- 
tions to difficulties that may from time to 
time arise in their bilateral trade and pay- 
ments flows. In this connection we com- 
mend the recent agreement to establish a 
joint committee to maintain continuous 
watch over the situation. 

76. Thus we see compelling reasons — based 
upon past experience and discernible op- 
portunities for the future — actively to seek 
the strengthening of the partnership, both 
by removing impediments to its better func- 
tioning and by exploring other areas in 
which the two countries can work together 
to their mutual advantage. 



77. From the foregoing analysis we con- 
clude that it is feasible to formulate certain 
guiding principles. These we set out in the 
following paragraphs. 

78. The need is clear for our two govern- 
ments to confirm the practice of intimate, 
timely and continuing consultation on all 
matters of common concern, at the ap- 
propriate level, employing such machinery 
and procedures as are most effective for this 

79. As partners in NATO, and sharing 
responsibility for the air defense of this 
continent, Canada and the United States 
have similar policies and share important 
common obligations. In the conduct and de- 
velopment of their unique bilateral relation- 
ship, however, the two countries must have 
regard for the wider responsibilities and in- 
terests of each in the world and their obli- 
gations under various treaties and other ar- 
rangements to which each is party. 

80. This principle has a particular bearing 
upon our affairs in relation to the heavy 
responsibilities borne by the United States, 
generally as the leader of the free world 
and specifically under its network of mutual 
defense treaties around the globe. It is im- 
portant and reasonable that Canadian au- 

thorities should have careful regard for the 
United States Government's position in this 
world context and, in the absence of special 
Canadian interests or obligations, avoid, so 
far as possible, public disagreement espe- 
cially upon critical issues. This is not to say 
that the Canadian Government should auto- 
matically and uniformly concur in foreign 
policy decisions taken by the United States 
Government. Different estimates of efficacy 
and appropriateness or degree of risk gen- 
erate honest differences of opinion among 
the closest allies. The Canadian Govern- 
ment cannot renounce its right to inde- 
pendent judgment and decision in the "vast 
external realm." On its part, Canada has 
special relations and obligations, some of 
which the United States does not share but 
of which it should take account, in particular 
with Great Britain and the other states of 
the Commonwealth, with France, and with 
certain other nations. 

81. It is in the abiding interest of both 
countries that, wherever possible, divergent 
views between the two governments should 
be expressed and if possible resolved in 
private, through diplomatic channels. Only 
a firm mutual resolve and the necessary 
practical arrangements to keep the totality 
of the relationship in good and friendly 
working order can enable our countries to 
avoid needless frictions and minimize the 
consequences of disagreement. 

82. It is hardly necessary to add that, in 
these remarks concerning public state- 
ments by government spokesmen, we intend 
of course no reference to all those whose 
freedom to criticize official policies at home 
and abroad is clear and equally cherished 
in both countries. 

83. There should be a conscious effort by 
the authorities on both sides to accept and 
extend a common approach to additional 
areas of the two economies where it can be 
demonstrated that joint undertakings are to 
the national advantage of each as well as to 
the common advantage of both. 

84. There is another important principle. 
This is that the United States should be 
continuously alert, throughout the entire 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


process of policy-formulation and decision- 
making, to the potential impact on Canada 
of United States' actions, especially in the 
economic area. By this we intend particularly 
commercial policy — tariffs and quantitative 
restrictions — and fiscal and monetary af- 
fairs. While the necessity for such constant 
alertness derives primarily from the eco- 
nomic inequality of the two countries, 
coupled with their close interconnection, it 
derives also from the different characteris- 
tics of the two economies. Decisions taken 
in this area by the United States can have 
a disproportionately heavy incidence upon 
Canada. This vulnerability to United States 
economic policies is increased by the per- 
sistent Canadian deficit on trading account 
with the United States and the fact that 
Canada is far more dependent on exports — 
16 percent of GNP as compared with 4 per- 
cent for the United States. Obviously the 
United States cannot renounce concern for 
the protection of its own economic inter- 
ests, but it should maintain a conscious 
awareness of Canadian interests to ensure 
that they are not violated or prejudiced 
through inadvertence or ignorance. 

85. Since Canadian actions and decisions 
can also seriously harm the United States, 
there should be a sense of reciprocal obliga- 
tion on Canadian authorities to give consid- 
eration in advance to the potential impact on 
United States' interests of decisions and ac- 
tions contemplated in the economic and fi- 
nancial fields. 

86. In conclusion, we find the evidence 
overwhelmingly in favor of a specific re- 
gime of consultation between the two gov- 
ernments. We are also convinced that there 
are large opportunities for mutual advan- 
tage in the extension of the partnership of 
our two countries. Not only is the relation- 
ship unique but Canadian-American mutual 
involvement and interdependence grow daily 
more evident. For our part, we are satisfied 
that the process can be as mutually reward- 
ing as it is inevitable. 

Livingston T. Merchant A. D. P. Heeney matter 


Terms of Reference 

1. Excerpt from Text of joint communique of 
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister 
Lester B. Pearson following discussions held in 
Washington, D.C., January 21-22, 1964. 

"The Prime Minister and the President discussed 
at some length the practicability and desirability of 
working out acceptable principles which would make 
it easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other 
policies of interest to each other. They appreciated 
that any such principles would have to take full ac- 
count of the interests of other countries and of 
existing international arrangements. The President 
and the Prime Minister considered that it would be 
worthwhile to have the possibilities examined. Ac- 
cordingly, they are arranging to establish a Working 
Group, at a senior level, to study the matter and to 
submit a progress report to the April meeting of 
the Joint Committee." 

2. White House Announcement of February 28, 

"The White House announced today that Ambas- 
sador Livingston T. Merchant has been appointed 
to represent the U.S. on a U.S.-Canadian Working 
Group charged with the task of examining the de- 
sirability and practicability of developing accept- 
able principles which would make it easier to avoid 
divergencies in economic and other policies of in- 
terest to each other. The Working Group was es- 
tablished by the President and Prime Minister 
Pearson of Canada during their meeting in Wash- 
ington January 21-22, 1964. Ambassador Merchant 
served as United States Ambassador to Canada from 
1956 to 1958 and 1961 to 1962. The Canadian Gov- 
ernment has informed the United States Government 
that the Canadian representative on the Working 
Group will be Ambassador A. D. P. Heeney who J 
served as Canadian Ambassador to the United States " 
from 1953 to 1957 and 1959 to 1962. He is presently 
Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Interna- 
tional Joint Commission, United States-Canada." 

3. Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release of 
February 28, 1964. 

"The Prime Minister announced today the appoint- 
ment of Mr. A. D. P. Heeney to an intergovern- 
mental working group which will study economic 
and other relationships between Canada and the 
United States. 

"The Prime Minister and President Johnson, at 
their meeting on January 21-22 in Washington con- 
sidered that it would be worthwhile to study the 
practicability and desirability of working out ac- 
ceptable principles which would make it easier to 
avoid divergencies in economic and other policies 
of interest to each country. They agreed to set up 
an intergovernmental working group to study this I 



"Mr. Heeney, born in Montreal, 1902, was Cana- 
dian Ambassador in Washington from 1953 to 1957 
and from 1959 to 1962. He is at present Chairman 
of the Canadian Section of the International Joint 

"Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, who was United 
States Ambassador in Ottawa from 1956 to 1958 
and from 1961 to 1962, has been appointed to the 
working group by President Johnson." 


Report to the April Meeting of the Joint United 
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and 
Economic Affairs 

April 30, 1964 

1. At the conclusion of their meeting earlier this 
year in Washington, the Prime Minister and the 
President issued a communique (on January 22, 
1964) in which they stated that they had "dis- 
cussed at some length the practicability and de- 
sirability of working out acceptable principles which 
would make it easier to avoid divergencies in eco- 
nomic and other policies of interest to each other." 
They also announced at that time that they were 
arranging to establish "a Working Group, at a 
senior level, to study the matter and to submit 
a progress report to the April meeting of the Joint 

2. On February 28 it was announced that the 
undersigned, Livingston T. Merchant and A. D. P. 
Heeney, had been appointed by the President and 
the Prime Minister respectively to constitute the 
working group as announced in the said com- 

3. We have now to report to the Joint Committee 
that we have considered together the task com- 
mitted to us and, in several personal meetings and 
in correspondence, have discussed the means by 
which practical progress could best be made. We 
have also considered the areas of study likely to 
prove most fruitful, having in mind the objectives 
stated by the Prime Minister and the President. 

4. We are in consultation with officials concerned 
in our respective Governments and, as our work pro- 
gresses, we will be calling upon them for further 
advice and assistance. 

5. The difficulties involved in the serious and 
positive effort which the President and the Prime 
Minister had in mind are substantial. At this stage, 
we are unable to say whether or not a mutually 
helpful product in the form of "acceptable princi- 
ples" is or is not feasible. 

6. It is already evident to us, however, that, if 
anything useful is to emerge, a great deal of work 
and thought will be required. For this reason, it is 
not possible for us to produce, at this time for the 
Joint Committee, anything more than this pre- 
liminary progress report. 

7. After some consideration of alternative meth- 
ods, we have come to the conclusion that analysis 
of a selected number of "cases" in recent United 
States-Canada experience could be helpful and 
should be undertaken on each side of the border, 
preferably by senior officials who have been per- 
sonally involved. 

8. We are attaching a list of such cases, reexami- 
nation of which we believe might provide useful 
lessons for the future. Each of us has made ap- 
propriate arrangements for such studies at his 
own capital. As papers are produced, we propose 
to examine them together to see what conclusions in 
principle, if any, can be derived. 

9. It will be evident that, at the outset, we were 
in complete agreement that it would be unprofitable 
to produce, in response to the direction of the Presi- 
dent and the Prime Minister, any mere statement of 
familiar generalities which would have little practi- 
cal significance. Our efforts are being directed 
rather to what were referred to in the communique 
of January 22 as "principles which would make it 
easier to avoid divergencies." 

10. It is of course self-evident that "consultation" 
between the two Governments lies at the root of our 
relations. Here the problem is complicated not only 
by marked differences in our systems of govern- 
ment but also by the striking disproportion of 
power and influence between the two countries and 
the position and responsibilities of the United States 
as a world power. We will be giving serious atten- 
tion to these factors as we consider the case studies 
and as we seek to derive mutually advantageous 
lessons therefrom. 

11. We are satisfied that consideration of any 
new "machinery" for consultation should be de- 
ferred until we are in a position to estimate with 
some confidence whether or not a statement of ac- 
ceptable principles is likely to prove feasible. 

The above, then, constitutes our "Progress Re- 
port." We are arranging to meet again personally 
as the case studies proceed. 

Livingston T. Merchant 

A. D. P. Heeney 

Working Group on "Principles" 
in United States-Canada Relations 

List of "Cases" to be Examined 

(a) U.S. interest equalization tax in conjunction 
with Canadian withholding tax; 

(b) Trade with Cuba; 

(c) Nuclear weapons (in bilateral context, i.e., 
for Canadian forces and storage for U.S.) ; 

(d) Great Lakes shipping (the labor dispute) ; 

(e) Civil aviation; 

(f) Wheat marketing; 

(g) Defense production sharing; 

(h) Extraterritorial implications of domestic legis- 
lation (including specifically U.S. Treasury Trading 
with the Enemy Act, anti-trust legislation, Securi- 
ties Exchange legislation ) ; 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


(i) U.S. magazines in Canada; 

(j) Oil and gas exports; 

(k) Fishing rights and territorial seas; 

(1) Canada-U.S. relations in the multilateral con- 

text (including examination of our working rela- 
tionships in such organizations as UN, NATO, the 
GATT, etc., and in situations such as the Geneva 
Conference on Indo-China, disarmament, etc.). 


Joint Canada-United States Entities and United States' and Canadian 
Agencies Which Deal Directly With One Another 

Joint United States-Canada Entities 

1. Cabinet Committee on Joint Defense 

2. Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Af- 

3. Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group 

4. Great Lakes Fishery Commission 

5. International Boundary Commission 

6. International Joint Commission 

7. North American Air Defense Command 

8. Pacific Halibut Commission 

9. Pacific Salmon Commission 

10. Permanent Joint Board on Defense 


United States' Agency 

11. Department of State (via Canadian Embassy) 

12. Atomic Energy Commission 

13. Bureau of Customs (Treasury) 

14. Civil Aeronautics Board 

15. Coast Guard (Treasury) 

16. Commerce Department 

(a) Great Lakes Pilotage 

(b) St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation 

(c) Office of Export Control 

17. Commissioner of Narcotics (Treasury) 

18. Department of Agriculture 

19. Department of Defense 

Department of the Army 
Department of the Navy 
Department of the Air Force 

20. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 

21. Department of Interior 

(a) Mineral Resources 

(b) Bonneville Power Administration 

(c) Park Service 

(d) Fish and Wildlife Service 

22. Department of Justice (Anti-Trust Division) 

23. Department of Labor 

24. Federal Aviation Agency 

25. Federal Bureau of Investigation 

26. Federal Communications Commission 

27. Federal Power Commission 

28. Immigration and Naturalization Service 

29. National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

30. Office of Emergency Planning 

31. Securities and Exchange Commission 

32. Treasury Department 

33. Weather Bureau 

Canadian Agency 

Department of External Affairs (via U.S. Embassy) 
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd. 
Department of National Revenue 
Air Transport Board 
Department of Transport 

Department of Transport 
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority 
Department of Trade and Commerce 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Department of Agriculture and 

Canadian Wheat Board 
Department of National Defence and 
Department of Defence Production 

Department of National Health and Welfare 

National Energy Board 

(British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority) 

Department of Northern Affairs and National 

Department of Northern Affairs and National 

Department of Justice 
Department of Labour 
Department of Transport 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
Department of Transport 
National Energy Board 

Department of Citizenship and Immigration 
National Research Council 
Emergency Measures Organization 
Various Provincial Officials 
Department of Finance and Bank of Canada 
Department of Transport 

34. Municipalities (on or near border) 

35. State of Alaska 

36. Other States 

Neighbouring Municipalities 
Department of Public Works 
Neighbouring Provinces 

Note: The above list is not to be taken as complete as regards U.S. and Canadian agencies, for it is cer- 
tain that, from time to time, other departments and representatives of the two federal governments, and local 
authorities on both sides of the border communicate with one another on matters of joint interest and con- 

• A limited number of reprints of the above report will soon be available upon request 
from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520. 



New Steps To Improve International Monetary Arrangements 

by Henry H. Fowler 
Secretary of the Treasury ^ 

We have all heard or read a great deal in 
recent months about the problem this na- 
tion faces in its balance of payments and 
about the need for the nations of the free 
world to move toward agreement on ways of 
assuring the financial resources needed to 
support increasing international trade and 

Indeed, world financial questions have 
never occupied a more prominent place in 
public discussion than they do today. But to 
most Americans, I suspect, these problems 
still seem rather remote from their daily 
lives and labors — rather unrelated, even, to 
the other national and international events 
that engage so much of our interest and our 
concern. Nor is it unnatural that they should 
pale beside events such as those in Saigon or 
in Santo Domingo. 

But we must never forget that America's 
ability to succeed in its difficult and de- 
manding role as leader of the free world — 
that all the political, diplomatic, and military 
resources at our command — depend upon a 
strong and stable American economy and a 
sound dollar. 

We must never forget that our lives can 
be vitally affected, not only by the events 
in Saigon or Santo Domingo, but by such 
apparently far removed occurrences as the 
outflow of American gold and dollars abroad. 

For the role of the dollar as the most 
widely used international currency is part 

^ Address made before the Virginia State Bar As- 
sociation at Hot Springs, Va., on July 10. 

and parcel of America's leading role in the 
free world — politically, economically, mili- 
tarily. More than any other single factor, it 
is the strength and the soundness and the 
stability of the American dollar that serves 
as the essential underpinning of the entire 
free-world monetary system through which 
the interdependent nations of the free world 
have fashioned their awesome economic ac- 
complishments of the past several decades. 

The solution of our balance-of-payments 
difficulties and the strengthening of the in- 
ternational monetary system are thus far 
more than merely arid economic exercises. 
They are crucial matters which must deeply 
concern — for, in a broad but very real sense, 
they deeply affect — not just bankers and 
businessmen and economists but every 
American in every walk of life. 

What, then, is our balance-of-payments 
problem? Why is it so important that we 
solve it ? 

The Balance-of-Payments Problem 

Since 1949 the United States has had bal- 
ance-of-payments deficits every year except 
for 1957 — when our exports soared as a re- 
sult of the Suez crisis. During that first 
postwar decade — up until 1958 — those defi- 
cits were little cause for concern, for they 
were simply the counterpart of our effort 
to help rebuild a Europe laid waste by war. 
Our vast outpouring of dollars was the es- 
sential source-spring for replenishing the 
reservoir of international reserves and li- 
quidity required by a Western Europe and a 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


Japan whose financial, as well as physical, 
resources war had drastically depleted. 

Under the Marshall Plan and other pro- 
grams, we furnished some $30 billions in 
grants and loans to help put the economies 
of Europe back on their feet again. With 
the recovery of Europe, we turned more 
and more of our dollars toward aiding the 
underdeveloped countries of the world. We 
also sent dollars abroad to support large mil- 
itary forces and furnish military aid essen- 
tial for the defense of the free world. 

These measures were eminently success- 
ful. By the midfifties the economies of 
Europe and Japan were strong and growing, 
controls and restrictions on trade and pay- 
ments were being progressively dismantled, 
and in 1958 external convertibility of the 
leading European currencies was restored. 

But this progress was accompanied by 
other developments that led to U. S. bal- 
ance-of-payments deficits far larger than 
Europe required and than we could live with 
indefinitely. Rising prices in this country 
had weakened our competitive position at a 
time when Europe and Japan had once again 
become a formidable competitive force in 
world markets. At the same time the 
strength of Europe's economic resurgence 
and its new-won financial stability began to 
attract growing amounts of American cap- 
ital abroad. 

Thus, beginning in 1958, things changed — 
and more swiftly perhaps than most people 
realized. The "dollar shortage" which Eu- 
rope had suffered in the early postwar years 
was fast disappearing. 

During the 7 years 1950-57, our deficits 
averaged only $1.5 billion a year — and at the 
end of that period our gold stock amounted 
to about $22 billion, or more than a third 
larger than the total volume of dollars held 
by all foreigners. 

Yet over the next 3 years — 1958-59- 
60 — our balance-of-payments deficits aver- 
aged almost $4 billion a year. Other coun- 
tries found their dollar holdings growing 
more rapidly than they wished, and our 
gold began flowing abroad in much greater 
volume — roughly $5 billion in 3 years. 

That was the situation that confronted us 

in early 1961, when we launched a strong 
and sustained effort to move our interna- 
tional payments into balance once more. 

Over a period of 4 years — 1961-64 — we 
achieved substantial improvements in many 
separate accounts entering into our balance 
of payments, including : 

— a $900 million gain in our commercial 
trade surplus — those not financed by gov- 
ernment — making it a record $3.7 billion in 

— a $400 million cut in the dollar outflow 
as a result of foreign aid ; 

— a cut of nearly $700 million in net mil- 
itary dollar outlays despite rising costs 
abroad ; 

— a $1.6 billion rise in our earnings from 
past private foreign investments. 

Simply as a matter of arithmetic, those 
gains were enough — all else being equal — to 
have given us virtual balance in our pay- 
ments last year. But all other things were 
not equal. Instead of approaching the van- 
ishing point, with the $3.9 billion deficit of 
1960 being absorbed by these gains in par- 
ticular sectors of our payments totaling 
$3.6 billion, our deficit in 1964 was in fact 
reduced by a net total of only $800 million 
to $3.1 billion. 

Outflow of Private Capital 

We incurred that deficit — despite 4 years 
of real and lasting progress — primarily be- 
cause of a drastic deterioration in the one 
major area of our balance of payments 
which our programs had not yet effectively 
reached in a comprehensive way — the area 
of private foreign investment outflows. 

In 1964 the outflow of private capital 
abroad reached the $61/2 billion mark — more 
than twice the size of the deficit and up 
over $2 billion from 1963 and over $21/2 bil- 
lion from 1960. That outflow reflected a 
variety of causes — including the drive by 
American business to stake out a claim in 
the rapidly growing and seemingly highly 
profitable European markets. But, to a very 
large degree, the accelerating outflow had 
its source in the marked disparity that had 



long existed between European capital mar- 
kets and our own — a disparity in size and 
scope and facilities that led borrowers in 
other countries to tap our market for a 
large share of their capital requirements. 
The United States had often enough called 
attention to this disparity and urged its 
European friends to expand and improve 
their markets. But their progress in that 
endeavor had simply not been large and 
rapid enough, and we had passed the point 
where we could sustain the huge drain of 
capital which that disparity entailed. 

We had to act. We had not only to in- 
tensify the efforts already underway in 
other sectors of our balance of payments but 
to extend those efforts to include compre- 
hensive curbs upon private capital outflows. 
It had become abundantly clear that to re- 
store balance to our payments once more we 
had to attack our deficit on all major fronts 
simultaneously. President Johnson launched 
such an attack with his February 10 mes- 
sage to Congress on the balance of pay- 
ments.2 The heart of that message was the 
call to arms of America's businesses and 
banks — the call to join voluntarily in a na- 
tional effort to curb the outflow of dollars 
abroad, while preexisting programs were in- 

That call has been heard — and heeded. 
After a bad start in January, our balance 
of payments improved in February following 
the President's message and showed a sur- 
plus in March, in April, and in May. 

Thus we are off to a good beginning, but — 
let there be no mistake — it is no more than 
a beginning. Let no one think that a few 
months of apparent surplus — a surplus pur- 
chased only through extraordinary and tem- 
porarj'^ measures — can suffice. 

Sustaining an Equilibrium 

The likelihood of a surplus in the second 
quarter of this year does tell us that we 
are moving in the right direction — that our 
current measures can turn our deficit into 
a surplus. But the big job — the job that 

" For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

remains — is for us to demonstrate that we 
can sustain equilibrium through these meas- 
ures as well as the longer term measures 
inaugurated since 1961. We must maintain 
those extraordinary measures in full force 
until rising returns from past private in- 
vestment abroad, our improved climate for 
domestic employment of capital, enlarged 
availability of capital in markets abroad and 
growth in our trade balance — which requires 
that we maintain our excellent record of 
price stability — place our accounts securely 
in equilibrium. 

It is imperative not simply to reach bal- 
ance in our payments for a quarter or two, 
or even for a year, but to sustain equilib- 
rium over time. The reasons are clear. Our 
14 years of deficits have resulted in a large 
outflow of dollars to the rest of the world. 
Because there is worldwide confidence in 
the stability of those dollars and because 
they are convertible into gold at the fixed 
price of $35 an ounce, those dollars are 
widely used to finance international trans- 
actions and other countries hold them along- 
side gold in their official reserves. 

Today those dollars — some $27 billion — ac- 
count for a major share of the international 
liquidity that sustains the growing free- 
world economy. Some $12 billion of those 
dollars are in official reserves, while the re- 
mainder serve to support growing world 
trade and investment. Thus it is essential to 
the viability of the international monetary 
system as it exists today that the usefulness 
and value of those dollars remain unques- 
tioned throughout the world. And, whatever 
changes might be introduced into that sys- 
tem, the dollar will have to continue to carry 
a heavy burden as a reserve currency. 

If we allowed our deficits to continue, or 
if we lapsed back into prolonged deficit after 
a brief period of surplus, we would under- 
mine world confidence in the dollar and im- 
pair its usefulness as a world reserve and 
leading currency. Dollars would return to 
our shores as claims on our gold, thus de- 
pleting instead of supplementing world fi- 
nancial resources. To prevent such a con- 
traction in world liquidity and the widening 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


circles of deflation and restriction that 
would surely follow, we must reach and 
maintain equilibrium in our payments as a 
matter of the highest national priority, along 
with sustaining the economic advance that 
has marked the last 53 months. 

The paradox is, therefore, that the very 
increase in official foreign dollar holdings 
that has fueled so much of the growth in 
world liquidity in the past — and has thus 
helped support the growth in world trade — 
can no longer be allowed to continue if cur- 
rent international liquidity is to be pro- 
tected. Yet, without additions to the reserve 
dollars that our deficits have so long sup- 
plied, the world will need a new and assured 
source of growing liquidity to support in- 
creasing world trade and investment. 

This, in a nutshell, is what the issue of 
world monetary reform is all about. It is to 
assure ample world liquidity for the years 
ahead that the United States, in cooperation 
with other leading financial powers, is seek- 
ing workable ways of strengthening and 
improving international financial arrange- 

For several years now the essential laying 
of the technical groundwork has been un- 
derway as the United States has joined 
with other major countries in comprehensive 
studies of the international monetary system 
— its recent evolution, its present effective- 
ness, and its future. An early conclusion was 
that there are two elements in international 
liquidity : on the one hand the more conven- 
tional reserves of gold and reserve curren- 
cies and on the other hand the ready avail- 
ability of credit facilities for countries in 
need of temporary assistance. 

As long ago as 1961 the 10 major indus- 
trial nations, now known as the Group of 
Ten, negotiated with the International Mon- 
etary Fund so-called General Arrangements 
To Borrow whereby the 10 nations agreed 
to lend to the IMF up to $6 billion should 
this be necessary "to forestall or cope with 
an impairment of the international monetary 
system." ^ That arrangement was activated 

last December and again this May in order 
to provide a part of a $2.4 billion drawing 
from the IMF on the part of the United 

On the credit side, also, the members of 
the International Monetary Fund have now 
agreed to support a 25-percent general in- 
crease in IMF quotas. This 25-percent in- 
crease, plus special increases for some 16 
countries, will raise total aggregate quotas 
from $15 billion to around $21 billion. The 
Congress last month approved a $1,035 mil- 
lion increase in the U. S. quota. 

Meanwhile, the Group of Ten and the In- 
ternational Monetary Fund have been con- 
tinuing their studies of the future course of 
world liquidity. Deputies of the Group sub- 
mitted a comprehensive report on the prob- 
lems involved last August. In their minis- 
terial statement last August,* the Group of 
Ten stated that, while supplies of gold and 
reserve currencies are fully adequate for 
the present and are likely to be for the im- 
mediate future, the continuing growth of 
world trade and payments is likely to re- 
quire larger international liquidity. While 
they said that this need might be met by an 
expansion of credit facilities, they added that 
it may possibly call for some new form of 
reserve asset. 

A study group was set up "to examine 
various proposals regarding the creation of 
reserve assets either through the I.M.F. or 
otherwise." The efforts of that group have 
culminated in the so-called Ossola report, 
submitted to the deputies of the Group of 
Ten on June 1 of this year, which exhaus- 
tively examines, with all their promises and 
pitfalls, the possible paths to the creation 
of reserve assets. 

New Steps Proposed 

Now for the first time in 4 years we are 
confronted by the happy concurrence of 
three crucial facts : 

1. The U. S. balance of payments is ap- 
proaching an equilibrium and the executive 
branch, the Congress, and the private sec- 

'Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187. 

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323. 



tor, including industry, banking, and labor, 
have mounted a program that makes unmis- 
takably manifest our determination to keep 
it that way. 

2. Evidence is accumulating of a rising 
tide of opinion in many knowledgeable and 
influential quarters in the free world, pri- 
vate and public, that our international mon- 
etary arrangements can and should be sub- 
stantially improved, building on the basis of 
the International Monetary Fund and the 
network of more informal international mon- 
etary cooperation that has marked recent 

3. The completion of technical studies 
necessary to give a thorough understanding 
of the problem and various alternative ap- 
proaches to solution on the part of those at 
the highest levels of government who must 
ultimately make these decisions. 

We have now reached the moment which 
President Johnson had in mind when, in 
speaking of new international monetary 
steps, he said : ^ 

We must press forward with our studies and be- 
yond, to action — evolving arrangements which will 
continue to meet the needs of a fast growing world 
economy. Unless we make timely progress, interna- 
tional monetary difficulties will exercise a stubborn 
and increasingly frustrating drag on our policies for 
prosperity and progress at home and throughout 
the world. 

In taking office, I described this as "the 
major task facing our Treasury and the 
financial authorities of the rest of the Free 
World in the next few years." 

In recent weeks we have moved beyond 
the plane of hope and technical studies 
toward the prospect of more conclusive ne- 
gotiations from which alone solution can 
emerge. I met last week with the British 
Chancellor of the Exchequer James Calla- 
ghan, and we exchanged preliminary and 
tentative views on the subject of interna- 
tional liquidity. Next week I hope to have 
the pleasure of informal discussions with 
the Japanese Minister of Finance, Takeo 
Fukuda, in connection with the joint Cabinet 
sessions of the U.S.-Japan Committee on 

' Ibid., Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

Trade and Economic Affairs. 

Both before and after the scheduled meet- 
ing of the International Monetary Fund and 
World Bank in late September, I expect to 
visit ranking financial officials of other 
Group of Ten countries, to ascertain first- 
hand their views on the most practical and 
promising ways of furthering progress 
toward improved international monetary ar- 
rangements. We must not only be prepared 
to advance our own proposals but to carefully 
consider and fairly weigh the merits of other 
proposals. As Congressman Robert Ellsworth 
of Kansas in discussing this subject re- 
cently remarked : 

We must appreciate that if we wish a strong 
Europe it must be a Europe strong enough to look 
upon an American proposal as merely one among 
many possible solutions — all of which will be re- 
viewed together. If we wish their partnership, we 
must treat them as partners. 

Advisory Committee 

Already your Government is engaged in 
an intensive internal preparation for these 
bilateral meetings and multilateral negotia- 
tions that should follow. In addition, so that 
the Government may have the benefit of 
some of the expertise and experience out- 
side the Government in this highly technical 
area, President Johnson has accepted my 
recommendation and announced creation of 
an Advisory Committee on International 
Monetary Arrangements, which includes as 
its chairman the former Secretary of the 
Treasury, Douglas Dillon, and a distin- 
guished group of experts including Robert 
Roosa, former Under Secretary of the Treas- 
ury for Monetary Affairs; Kermit Gordon, 
former Director of the Bureau of the Budget ; 
Edward Bernstein, economic consultant spe- 
cializing in international monetary policy; 
Andre Meyer, of the investment banking 
firm of Lazard Freres; David Rockefeller, 
president of the Chase Manhattan Bank; 
and Charles Kindleberger, professor of eco- 
nomics at Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 

With their help and that of many others 
who will be consulted, including, particu- 
larly, many well-informed members of the 

AUGUST 2. 1965 


appropriate committees of Congress, we 
shall constantly seek a comprehensive U. S. 
position and negotiating strategy designed to 
achieve substantial improvement in interna- 
tional monetary arrangements thoroughly 
compatible with our national interests. In 
the various proposals which have and will 
be made we must determine those which 
will be acceptable to the United States, those 
which are entirely unacceptable, and those 
which may well be appropriate for negotia- 

There will be an initial meeting of the 
Advisory Committee on International Mone- 
tary Arrangements on July 16. Hearings are 
planned before the International Finance 
Subcommittee of the House Banking and 
Currency Committee under the chairman- 
ship of Congressman Henry Reuss of Wis- 
consin to obtain various private and orga- 
nizational points of view. These hearings and 
the reports of the committee will be of 
great value, together with those of the 
Joint Economic Committee of Congress and 
the International Finance Subcommittee of 
the Senate Banking and Currency Com- 
mittee under the chairmanship of Senator 
Edmund Muskie of Maine. 

U.S. Prepared To Participate 

I am privileged to tell you this evening 
that the President has authorized me to an- 
nounce that the United States now stands 
prepared to attend and participate in an in- 
ternational monetary conference that would 
consider what steps we might jointly take 
to secure substantial improvements in in- 
ternational monetary arrangements. Need- 
less to say, if such a conference is to lead 
to a fruitful and creative resolution of some 
of the free world's monetary problems, it 
must be preceded by careful preparation 
and international consultation. 

To meet and not succeed would be worse 
than not meeting at all. Before any confer- 
ence takes place, there should be a reason- 
able certainty of measurable progress 
through prior agreement on basic points. 

Our suggestion is that the work of prepa- 
ration be undertaken by a preparatory com- 
mittee which could be given its terms of 

reference at the time of the annual meeting 
of the International Monetary Fund this 

The United States is not wedded to this 
procedure nor to any rigid timetable. I shall 
exchange views with my colleagues in Eu- 
rope and elsewhere, as well as with the sen- 
ior officials of the International Monetary 
Fund, on how best to proceed. The point I 
wish to emphasize here is that the United 
States is determined to move ahead — care- 
fully, deliberately — but without delay. Not 
to act when the time is ripe can be as un- 
wise as to act too soon or too hastily. 

We are, therefore, moving ahead — and we 
are making progress. But we must be aware 
that the issues involved are complex and they 
raise basic questions of national interest. 
It is not, therefore, easy to arrive at the 
degree of international consensus we must 
have for any workable reform of the inter- 
national monetary system. We can expect no 
overnight solution — but only patient explo- 
ration of the alternatives with our trading 
partners in a spirit of mutual cooperation. 
This is the course we are now pursuing. 

As we move ahead, we will do well to re- 
member that the existing international 
financial system has successfully financed 
an unparalleled expansion in world trade 
and payments. We have also done much in 
recent years to strengthen that system. The 
need now is not to start all over again, to 
move in a completely new direction. Rather, 
we must move once more to strengthen and 
improve the existing arrangements. 

And while we proceed solidly and surely 
toward international agreement on the prob- 
lems of world liquidity, we in this country 
must keep ever before us the present and 
pressing need to protect the existing inter- 
national payments system by maintaining a 
strong, sound, and stable dollar. First things 
must come first. We are bringing our own 
payments into equilibrium, and we must 
keep them in equilibrium. By resolutely 
shouldering that responsibility we will pre- 
serve the foundation upon which must rest 
all efforts to assure free-world growth in 
the years ahead — the monetary system that 
has served the free world so well in the past. 



Mr. Black Reports on Southeast 
Asia Economic Development 

White House Announcement 

White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated July 10 

Mr. Eugene Black, consultant to President 
Johnson on economic development of South- 
east Asia, telephoned the President this 
morning at the LBJ Ranch and gave him a 
full and encouraging report on his trip to 
Southeast Asia and the Far East. During 
his trip Mr. Black participated in the 
consultative committee meetings of the U.N. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East on the Asian Development Bank. He 
discussed with the leaders of Thailand, Laos, 
South Viet-Nam, and Japan the via.ys, and 
means of accelerating economic and social 
development in Southeast Asia. 

Mr. Black told the President that the 
consultative committee meetings went very- 
well and that the Bank could be in business 
by early next year. 

At the meeting Mr. Black indicated on be- 
half of the President, that — subject to con- 
gressional approval — the United States is 
prepared to provide 20 percent of the Bank's 
capital, up to $200 million, and also to con- 
tribute — if other countries will join — up to 
$100 million to the multilateral Southeast 
Asia Development Fund. The Fund would 
be administered by the Asian Bank and would 
finance regional projects in Southeast Asia. 

The President was happy to learn from 
Mr. Black that the Japanese Government 
also intends to take a 20-percent share in 
the Bank's capital. 

The President expressed to Mr. Black his 
hope that other nations, too, would make 
generous pledges soon, in order to give the 
Bank a flying start in the difficult, long- 
range task of building a more prosperous 
Southeast Asia. 

The President also expressed a hope that 
other developed countries would join the 
United States in contributing to the multi- 
lateral Southeast Asia Development Fund. 

In each of the countries he visited Mr. 
Black talked with prime ministers and 

other high-ranking officials and was 
gratified to learn that there is a strong de- 
sire to quicken the pace of economic and 
social development and to expand and 
strengthen regional cooperation. Mr. Black 
also had fruitful discussions with ECAFE 
officials and the staff of the Mekong com- 
mittee on current programs and future 
plans for regional development. 

Mr. Black's schedule was limited; he did 
not have the opportunity to visit all of the 
countries in the region. He hopes to be able 
to visit these countries in the future. 

The President asked Mr. Black to go to 
Europe next week to meet with the members 
of the Development Assistance Committee 
of the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] to review the 
results of his trip, and to enlist their sup- 
port in this cooperative effort to accelerate 
economic and social progress in Southeast 

President Sends Congress Report 
on New England Resource Program 

President Johnson announced on July 10 
(White House press release (Austin, Tex.) 
dated July 10, for release July 11) that he 
had approved and would send to the Con- 
gress on July 12 a report on the Passama- 
quoddy-Saint John River Basin develop- 
ment. ^ This report, based on studies under- 
way for the past 4 years, outlines a broad 
program for resource development in the 
New England area. 

Recommended for immediate authoriza- 
tion is a multiple-purpose project at the 
Dickey-Lincoln School site on the Saint 
John River. This project, costing a total of 
$227 million, will generate 794,000 kilowatts 
of power, more than five times larger than 

^ H. Doc. 236, 89th Cong., 1st sess. A limited num- 
ber of copies of the report, Conservation of the 
Natural Resources of New England: The Passama- 
quoddy Tidal Power Project and Upper Saint John 
River Hydroelectric Development, are available upon 
request from the Department of the Interior, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20240. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


any hydroelectric project in the area. It will 
also provide flood control and recreation 

The construction of the project would be 
contingent upon the completion of arrange- 
ments with the Government of Canada, 
which is affected because the reservoir 
would flood an area in Quebec. In addition, 
downstream power developments in the 
Province of New Brunswick will obtain ben- 
efits as a result of water storage at the 
Dickey-Lincoln School site. 

The President also approved a recommen- 
dation that early discussions be undertaken 
with Canada for an exchange of power at 
Canadian hydroelectric sites to provide addi- 
tional peaking power capability in the New 
England area. These actions would have a 
highly important effect on New England's 
current power costs, which are 28 percent 
above the national average. 

The President noted particularly the con- 
clusion in the report that "comprehensive 
development of the water and power re- 
sources of New England will take the com- 
bined efforts of public and private sectors of 
the electric utility industry working cooper- 
atively with the Federal Government." 

The report outlines a number of specific 
steps designed to provide additional and 
more economic power for the entire area, 
with major potential advantages to east- 
ern Canada as well. 

The Secretary of the Interior will con- 
tinue studies on the economic feasibility of 
the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Pow- 
er Project, taking into account the econo- 
mies resulting from advances in extra- 
high-voltage transmission technology. 

In addition to power development the 
President, in his letter transmitting the 
report to the Congress, requested that fur- 
ther actions be taken to develop the natural 
resources of the area. In this letter he 
stated, "I am requesting that the Federal 
agencies, working in full cooperation with 
State and regional groups, continue and 
accelerate the preparation of an overall plan 
for the development of the region's re- 

The report stressed the possibility of 
further development at Campobello Island, 
President Roosevelt's former summer home, 
and preservation of the Allagash River for 
recreational use, consistent with the wild- 
rivers concept. 

World Law Day 

Following are remarks made by President 
Johnson on July 8 at a ceremony during 
which he proclaimed World Law Day, to- 
gether with the text of the proclamation. 


White House press release dated July 8 

I welcome you this morning to the Rose 
Garden. By tradition and custom, and by di- 
rection of the Congress and on petition of 
the public, the President has signed many 
proclamations each year on many subjects. 
Some are of great significance, and some 
have great impact. Others are, as I am sure 
the press will agree, of somewhat lesser sig- 
nificance and import. But today we are meet- 
ing in this manner to observe the signing 
of a proclamation which, in its way, ex- 
presses something of the greatest impor- i 
tance about the purposes of the American i 
people and the purposes of the American na- 
tion. And that is our commitment to, and 
our quest toward, a world where all men 
may live in peace with the hope of justice 
under the rule of law. 

That goal cannot be made real by any 
proclamation that I issue or sign. It cannot 
be attained by the observance of any single 
day of the year. But I do believe that by ob- 
serving together one day designated as World 
Law Day we may remind ourselves, and we 
hope call to the attention of others, that a 
decent world ruled by just law is not a vain 

It can be real. It will be true — if the 
peace-loving peoples uphold the beginnings 



of world law with the same resolve as they 
defend the end of individual liberty. 

In this 20th century millions of men and 
women have fought and have died and have 
struggled and sacrificed to win or to redeem 
their liberty or freedom. The fighting and 
the dying and the struggle and sacrifice 
goes on as even we meet here today. 

But this century has really seen the be- 
ginning of a will and an effort to establish 
respect for the rule of law over the con- 
duct of the nations of the world. Those na- 
tions must not perish under the heel or by the 
hand of those who refuse to honor their 
own agreements, or refuse to keep their 
own treaties, or refuse to respect the bor- 
ders or the rights of their own neighbors. 
And this is central to the purposes of the 
American people and the policies of the gov- 
ernments around the world. 

And by faithfully honoring our agree- 
ments, by faithfully keeping our treaties to 
which we are party, we seek to assure sub- 
stance for the dream of a world that is ruled 
by law. 

This year, in September, the leaders of the 
law for many nations will assemble here in 
Washington. In observance of this Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year they will confer on 
this most vital and on this most basic subject 
of strengthening the hope for world peace by 
strengthening the rule of law among world 

And so to honor this significant occasion 
I am today proclaiming September the 13th, 
1965, as World Law Day. In so doing, I would 
call upon citizens throughout the land to join 
in appropriate observances on that day to 
reaffirm our abiding American goal of a 
world where all men live in obedience to the 
rule of laws that they have chosen, rather 
than in subjugation to the rule of men that 
they have not chosen. 

It is a great pleasure to have the lead- 
ership that we have present with us here 
this morning. 

I will now sign the proclamation. 


Whereas the year 1965 has been designated by 
the United Nations General Assembly as Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year, and I have so proclaimed 
it for the United States; and 

Whebeas international cooperation is essential to 
the achievement of a peaceful world order; and 

Whereias the foundation for the peace of mankind 
within nations and among nations is a system of 
law and legal institutions; and 

Whereas a system of law enables men and nations 
to avoid conflict, and legal institutions provide 
forums for the peaceful resolution of conflicts when 
they arise; and 

Whereas the expansion of the Rule of Law in 
the World Community requires broad agreement on 
principles and terminology for multilateral treaties 
and conventions; and 

Whereas those treaties require public support 
for the promise and potential of a world ruled by 
law; and 

Whereas it is essential that the minds and hearts 
of men of good will of all nations be focused upon 
the necessity of world peace through law: 

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, believing that 
cooperation to build a world legal system is among 
the most beneficial projects that can be advanced 
by International Cooperation Year and in order to 
further the great objectives thus noted for achieving 
world peace, do hereby proclaim September 13, 1965, 
as World Law Day and call upon all public and 
private officials, members of the legal profession, 
citizens, and all men of good will to arrange appro- 
priate observances and ceremonies in courts, schools, 
and universities, and other public places. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and caused the Seal of the United States of America 
to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this eighth 
day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen 
[seal] hundred and sixty-five, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of America 
the one hundred and ninetieth. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

*No. 3662; 30 Fed. Reg. 8773. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 



Preserving the Peacekeeping 
Powers of the General Assembly 

statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton ^ 

One of the most interesting points dis- 
cussed by the committee has been the dis- 
tinction between, on the one hand, the types 
of peacekeeping operations which have 
been carried out by the U.N. to date and, 
on the other hand, the enforcement actions 
contemplated by article 42 of the charter. 

This important distinction was lucidly ex- 
plained by our distinguished Secretary- 
General in his address on June 13, 1963, to 
the Harvard Alumni Association. ^ U Thant 
pointed out that "there has been a tacit 
transition from the concept of collective 
security, as set out in Chapter VII of the 
United Nations Charter, to a more realistic 
idea of peacekeeping. The idea that conven- 
tional military methods — or, to put it blunt- 
ly, war — can be used by or on behalf of the 
United Nations to counter aggression and 
secure the peace, seems now to be rather 

He went on to say: "The nature of these 
developments is sometimes confused, wit- 
tingly, by an attempt to relate them to the 
use of force to counter aggression by the 
Security Council provided for in Chapter 
VII of the Charter. In fact, the peacekeep- 
ing forces I am about to describe are of a 
very different kind and have little in com- 
mon with the forces foreseen in Chapter 
VII, but their existence is not in conflict with 

' Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace- 
keeping Operations on June 15 (U.S./U.N. press 
release 4586). Mr. Plimpton is Alternate U.S. Rep- 
resentative in the committee. For a statement made 
by Mr. Plimpton in the committee on Mar. 26, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 19, 1965, p. 598. 

'U.N. doc. A/3594/ Add. 1. 

Chapter VII. They are essentially peace and 
not fighting forces and they operate only 
with the consent of the parties directly con- 

The Secretary-General observed in that 
address that there has been a long history 
of peacekeeping actions which have involved 
the use of military forces but were not en- 
forcement actions: in Greece in 1947; in 
Kashmir starting in 1948; the U.N. Truce 
Supervision Organization starting in 1949; 
UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force] 
starting in 1956 ; in Lebanon in 1958 ; in the 
Congo starting in 1960; in West Irian in 
1962-68 ; and in Yemen in 1963-64. 

Most of these are outlined in paragraphs 
8-17 of the report of the Secretary-General 
and the President of the General Assembly 
in their report dated May 31, 1965. * 

As the Secretary-General and the Presi- 
dent of the General Assembly noted in their 
report, all the U.N.'s peacekeeping opera- 
tions except UNEF and UNTEA [United Na- 
tions Temporary Executive Authority] have 
been authorized by the Security Council. In 
the case of UNEF the Security Council, by a 
resolution voted for by the Soviet Union, 
referred the Suez situation to the General 
Assembly for its recommendations — a clear 
case of the General Assembly's acting pur- 
suant to Security Council action. In the case 
of UNTEA, the Soviet Union voted for the 
General Assembly resolution authorizing the 
operation — a clear case of the Soviet Union 
itself favoring the initiation by the General 
Assembly (not the Security Council, the 
General Assembly) of a peacekeeping oper- 

We believe that the way it has been is the 
way it should be, that is, the Security Coun- 
cil should normally authorize peacekeeping 
operations, but the General Assembly should 

' U.N. doc. A/AC.121/4. 



undertake such recommendatory respon- 
sibility in appropriate cases where enforce- 
ment action is not involved. 

The late Dag Hammarskjold on August 22, 
1957, expressed this distinction very well in 
his introduction to the Secretary-General's 
annual report. He said : 

In this connexion, it is worth recalling that the 
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, in establishing a 
procedure intended to safeguard the application of 
the relevant provisions of the Charter — Articles 10, 
11, 12 and 51 — in support of the maintenance of 
peace, did not constitutionally transfer to the Gen- 
eral Assembly any of the enforcement powers re- 
served to the Security Council by the Charter. En- 
forcement action by the United Nations under 
Chapter VII continues to be reserved to the Security 
Council. The relative role and significance of the 
Assembly and the Council, in practice, reflect general 
political conditions playing within the constitutional 
framework which, thus, was maintained in line with 
the basic concepts of the Charter. 

Nor is all of chapter VII concerned ex- 
clusively with enforcement action. On the 
contrary, a careful reading of that chapter 
makes it clear that other types of peace- 
keeping are envisaged. Article 50, for ex- 
ample, refers to "preventive or enforcement 
measures," and article 40 mentions pro- 
visional measures which may be taken in or- 
der to prevent aggravation of a situation 
which may become a threat to the peace. 
There are many preventive or provisional 
measures of this type which do not constitute 
enforcement action as comprehended in ar- 
ticle 42 of the charter. 

Such nonenforcement measures taken in 
compliance with chapter VII of the charter 
lie within the area where the Security 
Council has primary responsibility but where 
the General Assembly has exercised residual 
responsibility in the past. We believe that in 
the best interests of encouraging the develop- 
ment of a world of peace and order, the Gen- 
eral Assembly should continue to exercise 
its recommendatory authority in this area. 
To contend that it has no such authority, 
and that the Security Council has a monop- 
oly, means that any single permanent mem- 
ber of the Security Council could block any 
action or measure to help in maintaining 
the peace or to prevent the development of a 

situation which could threaten the peace. 
Certainly my country does not desire any 
such power. 

The arguments against such a restricted 
position were eloquently stated by the dis- 
tinguished representative of Venezuela 
[Carlos Sosa Rodriguez] to this committee 
on April 29. He said : 

However, we have felt that as between the two 
interpretations of the Charter, namely one which 
would make impossible any action by the United 
Nations to comply with its primary responsibility — ■ 
which is the maintenance of international peace and 
security — merely because of an expression of will 
of one single state, as compared with the other 
interpretation which permits of complementary ac- 
tion by the General Assembly in such cases, it is 
preferable and more in accord with the spirit and 
indeed the very raison d'etre of the United Nations 
to select that thesis which facilitates the discharge 
by this world organization of the primary task which 
has been assigned to it from the very first article 
of the United Nations Charter. 

The distinguished representative of Vene- 
zuela and several others have also pointed 
out that the International Court of Justice in 
its advisory opinion upheld the action of 
the General Assembly in recommending 
peacekeeping operations which do not con- 
stitute enforcement action. May I note also 
that 76 delegations, including the overwhelm- 
ing majority of the African, Asian, and Latin 
American delegations, accepted (not noted, 
but accepted) the opinion of the Interna- 
tional Court of Justice. 

From the foregoing it is clear that the 
present Secretary-General and his predeces- 
sor, as well as the overwhelming majority of 
delegations, have clearly supported the fol- 
lowing views: (1) that the peacekeeping 
operations carried out by the U.N. to date 
have not been enforcement actions; (2) that 
the Security Council has primary respon- 
sibility in this peacekeeping field; and (3) 
that the General Assembly has residual au- 
thority to recommend such operations. This 
view has also been held consistently by al- 
most all members of the U.N. 

It is, of course, open to a small minority 
to express the view that one or the other of 
these operations was not permitted by the 
charter. But they cannot impose their views 

AUGUST 2, 1965 


on the rest of us — surely we cannot be bound 
to accept a lower common denominator sim- 
ply because someone urges it — and here the 
someone represents only a small minority 
among us. 

The U.S. delegation is gratified to observe 
that the general trend in the committee op- 
poses any cutback in the power of the Gen- 
eral Assembly to recommend peacekeeping 
operations, and this despite stubborn op- 
position by that small minority. 

The United Nations has encountered such 
opposition before and has moved ahead any- 
way — and not just in the field of peacekeep- 

When we in the United Nations started the 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance 
in 1950, one great power denounced it as "a 
cloak for imperialism." But the program 
went forward successfully, and 3 years 
later that power joined. 

When we launched the idea of the U.N. 
Special Fund in 1957, one great power op- 
posed it. But the rest of us went ahead, and 
the program succeeded. Now all members 
have joined in, and the developing countries 
are the better off because of it. 

Then there is the matter of amending the 
charter to expand the Security Council and 
the Economic and Social Council. Almost all 
of us have been ready to take that step since 
the early fifties, but one great power ada- 
mantly objected. Finally, in 1963, the African 
and Asian members proposed, and the Gen- 
eral Assembly approved, amendments to en- 
large these bodies. Again the great power 
opposed, but now it has finally ratified 
the amendments and by the time this year 
is out those amendments will have become ef- 

We believe that the same process will take 
place if those of us who believe in the pow- 
ers of the General Assembly to recommend 
peacekeeping operations stand fast in de- 
fense of those powers. Eventually the mi- 
nority opposition will realize that its opposi- 
tion is mistaken and that the best interests 
of the United Nations and of all its mem- 
bers lie in preserving, unimpaired, the rec- 

ommendatory peacekeeping powers of the 
General Assembly which have served the 
preservation of peace so effectively. * 

U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Program 
for Training of South Africans 

Following is the text of a note from 
U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson to 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations. 

U.S./U.N. press release 4598 

June 25, 1965 
The Representative of the United States 
of America to the United Nations presents 
his compliments to the Secretary General of 
the United Nations and has the honor to re- 
fer to Security Council Resolution S/5773 of 
June 18, 1964.1 Operative paragraph 11 of 
that resolution invited the Secretary General 
"in consultation with appropriate United 
Nations specialized agencies to establish an 
educational and training program for the 
purpose of arranging for education and 
training abroad for South Africans." Pur- 
suant to that resolution, the Secretary Gen- 
eral on April 2, 1965 informally submitted 
proposals for the program of fellowships 
and grants for South Africans and re- 
quested contributions to it. These grants 
and fellowships would be in such fields as 
teacher-training, medicine, engineering, ge- 
ology, agronomy, business and industrial 
management, and constitutional law and 
would utilize in part universities and volun- 
tary agencies which have already provided a 
substantial number of scholarships to non- 
whites from South Africa. 

The Representative of the United States 

' On June 15 the committee adopted a report (U.N. 
doc. A/5915) in which it said: "The Special Commit- 
tee came to the conclusion that more time is required 
to complete the consideration of the matters covered 
by its mandate from the General Assembly and has 
decided to continue its work." 

^ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson 
on June 16, 1964, and text of the resolution, see 
Bulletin of July 6, 1964, p. 29. 



recalls that at the time Security Council 
Resolution S/5773 was adopted he stated in 
the Council that the United States was pre- 
pared to examine opportunities to contribute 
to such a program both financially and in 
terms of scholarships and other facilities at 
American educational institutions. The 
United States Government firmly believes 
that no people can grow and develop with- 
out advantages of higher education now de- 
nied so many South Africans. The United 
States, through both private and public 
resources, has already contributed to the 
education of young South Africans. Accord- 
ingly, the United States Government is 
now prepared to pledge to the Secretary 
General's program $75,000 for assistance 
to qualified South Africans with the proviso 
that the United States contribution not ex- 
ceed 40 per cent of total contributions. 

In connection with the use of funds, the 
United States Government suggests con- 
sideration be given to placement of candi- 
dates at the University of Bechuanaland, 
Basutoland, and Swaziland. The United 
States Government is also certain that edu- 
cational institutions in the United States 
which have had experience with administra- 
tion of African education programs stand 
ready to consider placement of qualified 
South African students. The United States 
will, for its part, be pleased to cooperate 
with the United Nations Secretariat regard- 
ing placement of students in the United 
States and is prepared to discuss individual 
needs and requirements. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those 
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries 
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may 
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United 
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Cables from the Secretary General and Assistant 
Secretary General of the OAS regarding the ar- 
rival of a mission of criminologists to investigate 
events pointing to violations of human rights in 

the Dominican Republic. S/6430, June 11, 1965, 

1 p.; S/6443, June 15, 1965, 1 p. 

Cable dated June 16 from the Assistant Secretary 
General of the OAS transmitting a message sent 
by the chairman of the Inter-American Commis- 
sion on Human Rights to the Tenth Meeting of 
Consultation. S/6448. June 16, 1965. 3 pp. 

Cables from the Secretary General and Assistant 
Secretary General of the OAS transmitting texts 
of messages received from the Ad Hoc Committee 
of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation which in- 
clude reports made by the Inter-American Peace 
Force in the Dominican Republic and reports of 
the Committee's interviews with representatives 
of various Dominican factions. S/6445, June 16, 
1965, 2 pp.; S/6450, June 16, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6451 
and Corr. 1, June 17, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6452, June 
17, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6455, June 17, 1965, 1 p.; 
S/6456, June 18, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6462, June 21, 1965, 

2 pp.; S/6471 and Corr. 1, June 24, 1965, 8 pp.; 
S/6472, June 24, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6475, June 25, 
1965, 5 pp. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Letters from the U.S. representative enclosing 
data concerning objects launched into orbit or 
beyond by the United States. A/AC.105/INF.98, 
June 1, 1965, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.99, June 1, 
1965, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.100, June 1, 1965, 2 
pp.; A/AC.105/INF.101, June 1, 1965, 3 pp.; 
A/AC.105/INF.102, June 21, 1965, 3 pp. 

Draft International Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Note by 
the Secretary-General. A/5921. June 16, 1965. 9 

Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information. Note 
by the Secretary-General. A/5928. June 16, 1965. 
5 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Progress in Land Reform. Fourth Report. E/4020, 
April 9, 1965, 226 pp.; E/4020/Add. 1, May 14, 
1965, 100 pp.; E/4020/ Add. 2, May 14, 1965, 108 

United Nations Development Decade. Progress re- 
port submitted in accordance with Council resolu- 
tion 984 I (XXXVI). Note by the Secretary- 
General. E/4033, May 14, 1965. 266 pp. 

Technical Assistance Committee. 15 years and 150,- 
000 skills: an anniversary review of the United 
Nations Expanded Programme of Technical As- 
sistance. E/TAC/153/Add. 1. May 19, 1965. 24 pp. 

Relationships among planning institutes. E/4035. 
May 20, 1965. 15 pp. 

Commission on Human Rights. Working paper sub- 
mitted by the Secretary-General at the request of 
the working party on the International Year for 
Human Rights. E/CN.4/AC.19/3. May 25, 1965. 
10 pp. 

Slavery. Report of the special rapporteur on slavery 
appointed under Council resolution 960 (XXXVI). 
E/4056. May 27, 1965. 259 pp. 

Inflation and Economic Development. Progress re- 
port by the Secretary-General. E/4053. June 4, 
1965. 108 pp. 

Question of Procedures for the Revision of the Con- 
vention on Road Traffic and of the Protocol on 
Road Signs and Signals, done at Geneva, Sep- 
tember 19, 1949. Report of the Secretary-General. 
E/4066. June 7, 1965. 6 pp. 

AUGUST 2, 1965 



Notifications of undertaking to seek approval: 
Philippines, July 14, 1965; United Arab Repub- 
lic, July 14, 1965. 

Entered into force: July 16, 1965, for part I and 
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II. 

Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
with annex, as amended. Done at New York 
October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957. 
TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, July 12, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions at 
sea. Approved by the International Conference on 
Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17, 
1960. Enters into force September 1, 1965. 
Acceptance deposited: Morocco, June 28, 1965. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development and to amend annex I. Open for 
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva 
from February 8 until December 31, 1965. 
Acceptance deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), June 
21, 1965. 

United Nations 

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations 
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963.^ 
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, April 29, 1965; 
Zambia, April 28, 1965. 


International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for sig- 
nature at Washington April 19 through May 15, 
1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part 
I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for 
part II. TIAS 5115. 

Accession deposited: Italy, July 15, 1965. 
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat 
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing- 
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965. 
Acceptances deposited: Austria, July 8, 1965; Ice- 
land, July 12, 1965; Israel, July 13, 1965; 
Netherlands (including Surinam and Nether- 
lands Antilles), July 12, 1965; Norway, July 9, 
1965; Southern Rhodesia, July 12, 1965; Switzer- 
land, July 14, 1965; Tunisia, July 15, 1965; 
United Kingdom, July 13, 1965. 
Accession deposited: Peru, July 12, 1965. 
Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance: 
Ecuador, July 9, 1965; Italy, July 15, 1965; 
Sweden, July 14, 1965; Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, July 14, 1965. 
Notification of undertaking to seek accession: 
Sierra Leone, July 12, 1965. 



Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1954, 
as amended (TIAS 2985, 3162, 4171, 4355), relat- 
ing to the loan of certain vessels to Japan. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 6, 1965. En- 
tered into force July 6, 1965. 


Agreement between the United States and the United 
Kingdom relating to air services. Signed at Ber- 
muda February 11, 1946. Entered into force 
February 11, 1946. TIAS 1507. 
'Twelve months' notice of termination of obligations 
received from Malaysia: June 1, 1965. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed 
at Washington July 14, 1965. Entered into force 
July 14, 1965. 


Amendment and extension of the agreement of June 
10, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3320, 4748), for co- 
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Washington June 3, 1965. 
Entered into force: July 8, 1965. 

United Kingdom 

Extension of the agreement of June 15, 1955, as 
amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078, 5397, 5693), 
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic 
energy. Signed at Washington July 15, 1965. 
Enters into force on the d;.te on which each 
Government shall have received from the other 
written notification that it has complied with all 
statutory and constitutional requirements for 
entry into force. 


^ Not in force. 


The Senate on July 15 confirmed the nomination 
of Verne B. Lewis to be the deputy representative 
of the United States to the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated June 10.) 



INDEX August 2, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1362 

Asia. Mr. Black Reports on Southeast Asia 
Economic Development (White House an- 
nouncement) 215 

Atomic Energy. Lewis confirmed as Deputy 
U.S. Representative to IAEA 222 


Canada and the United States — Principles for 
Partnership (Pleeney, Merchant) .... 193 

President Sends Congress Report on New Eng- 
land Resource Program 215 

Release of Report on United States-Canadian 
Relations (White House statement) . . . 195 


Confirmations (Lewis) 222 

President Sends Congress Report on New Eng- 
land Resource Program 215 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Lewis) 222 

Disarmament. President Johnson Discusses 
Viet-Nam, Dominican Republic, Disarmament 182 

Dominican Republic. President Johnson Dis- 
cusses Viet-Nam, Dominican Republic, Dis- 
armament 182 

Economic Affairs 

Mr. Black Reports on Southeast Asia Economic 
Development (White House announcement) 215 

New Steps To Improve International Monetary 
Arrangements (Fowler) 209 

President Sends Congress Report on New Eng- 
land Resource Program 215 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Pledges 
Funds to U.N. Program for Training of 
South Africans (U.S. note) 220 

Germany. U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets for 
Nazi War Crime Material (text of note) . 191 

International Law. World Law Day (Johnson 
proclamation) 216 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Lewis confirmed as Deputy U.S. Representa- 
tive to IAEA 222 

New Steps To Improve International Monetary 
Arrangements (Fowler) 209 

President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin- 
ican Republic, Disarmament 182 

Malawi. Letters of Credence (Gondwe) ... 192 

Mali. Mission From Mali Concludes Visit to 
United States (joint statement) .... 192 

Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Dis- 
cusses U.S. Operations in Viet-Nam (ex- 
cerpts from news conference transcript) . 190 

Presidential Documents 

President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin- 
ican Republic, Disarmament 182 

World Law Day 216 

South Africa. U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Pro- 
gram for Training of South Africans (U.S. 
note) 220 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 222 

U.S.S.R. U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets for 
Nazi War Crime Material (text of note) . . 191 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 221 

Preserving the Peacekeeping Powers of the 
General Assembly (Plimpton) 218 

U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Program for Train- 
ing of South Africans (U.S. note) .... 220 


President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin- 
ican Republic, Disarmament 182 

Secretary McNamara Discusses U.S. Opera- 
tions in Viet-Nam (excerpts from news con- 
ference transcript) 190 

Secretary Talks About Viet-Nam on "Issues 
and Answers" (transcript of interview) . 183 

Name Index 

Black, Eugene R 215 

Fowler, Henry H 209 

Gondwe, Vincent H. B 192 

Heeney, A. D. P 193 

Johnson, President 182, 216 

Lawrence, William H 183 

Lewis, Verne B 222 

McNamara, Robert S 190 

Merchant, Livingston T 193 

Plimpton, Francis T. P 218 

Ruslc, Secretary 183 

Scali, John 183 

Stevenson, Adlai E 220 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: July 12-18 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

173 7/12 Rusk: interview on "Issues and 

tl74 7/12 Rusk, Shiina: U.S.-Japan Com- 
mittee on Trade and Develop- 

tl75 7/14 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade 
and Development: joint com- 

tl76 7/14 Rusk: death of Ambassador 

177 7/15 Mission from Mali: joint state- 


178 7/15 Note to U.S.S.R. on availability of 

material from East Germany on 
Nazi war crimes. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

Superintendent of Documen 
U.S. government printing off 


BOX 286 


r OP POSTAGE, vaoo 



Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy 

In this pamphlet, based on an address he made at George Washington University on June 6, 
Secretary of State Dean Rusk develops a number of ideas that can serve as guidelines — "helpful 
household hints," he calls them — for the ordinary citizen who wants to understand the funda- 
mentals of U.S. Foreign policy. 

The pamphlet is devoted primarily to an examination by the Secretary of a series of familiar 
concepts, some negative, some positive: "omnipotence," "diversity," "gray alternatives," "ap- 
peasement," "national liberation," "building world order," "regionalism," and so on. By keeping 
some of these principles in mind, he says, the American citizen can develop a broad perspective 
in which to consider specific foreign policy issues as they arise. 



Please send me 





_ copies of Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy. 

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Vol. LIII, No. 1363 

August 9, 1965 


Exchanges of Remarks and Joint Communique 2^2 

by W. Michael Blumenthal 2^9 

For index see inside back cover 

United Nations Holds Memorial Ceremony 
for Ambassador Stevenson 

Representatives of member states of the 
United Nations held a memorial ceremony in 
the General Assembly Hall at U.N. Head- 
quarters on July 19 for U.S. Representative 
Adlai E. Stevenson, who died at London on 
July IJt. Following are texts of remarks 
made by the four speakers at the ceremony: 
U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General; Carlos 
Sosa Rodriguez, President of the 18th session 
of the General Assembly; Archibald Mac- 
Leish, American poet and playwright; and 
Secretary Rusk. 


When I first was told last Wednesday, a 
little before 1 :00 p.m., that Ambassador 
Stevenson had died in London, I could not 
believe my ears. I had seen him only re- 
cently, in Geneva, less than a week before, 
and he was so alive and looked so well. 
When the news was confirmed, it took me 

some time to accept the fact that Adlai 
Stevenson had really passed away. 

My first thought was to send a message of 
condolences to President Johnson. In my mes- 
sage I referred to the respect, admiration, 
and affection of all of his colleagues at the 
United Nations, which Ambassador Steven- 
son had earned over the last 41^ years by 
reason of his extraordinary human qualities. 

The same afternoon I referred, in a public 
statement, to my sense of grief and shock 
because, suddenly and without warning, 
death had struck and we had lost a good 
friend and a highly esteemed colleague. As 
I stated in that tribute, in his years at the 
United Nations Ambassador Stevenson had 
demonstrated with rare distinction how it 
was possible to combine the highest form of 
patriotism with loyalty to the idea of in- 
ternational peace and cooperation. 

When on 8 December 1960 it was an- 
nounced that Mr. Stevenson was to be Per- 
manent Representative of the United States 


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Service. Tiie Bulletin includes selected 
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and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

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ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerninif treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of ffeneral international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
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Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyriRhted and items contained herein 
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of America to the United Nations, it seemed 
to everybody to be such a natural and right 
appointment. He was, in truth, one of the 
founding fathers of the United Nations, hav- 
ing been present at the signing of the char- 
ter in San Francisco in June 1945, and also 
having been closely associated vs^ith the ne- 
gotiations leading up to that historic event. 

Thereafter, he was the head of the United 
States delegation to the Preparatory Com- 
mission and Executive Committee of the 
United Nations in London, and I believe his 
offices were located in Grosvenor Square, 
close to the very spot where he collapsed last 

Subsequently, of course, he had entered 
domestic politics and his direct association 
with the United Nations was only intermit- 
tent. But I have no doubt in my ovsti mind 
that his presence at the birth of the United 
Nations was an important factor in the evo- 
lution of his own political thinking and in his 
own dedication to the noble principles and 
purposes of the charter. 

I remember how many tributes were paid 
to him when he took over his duties at the 
United Nations. There were so many en- 
comiums, both within and outside these 
walls, that they could have turned the head 
of a lesser man. Not so with Ambassador 
Stevenson. On one occasion he observed: 
"Flattery is like smoking — it is not danger- 
ous so long as you do not inhale." 

During the 4i^ years that he served at the 
United Nations, he stood as the embodiment 
of dedication to the principles of the United 
Nations. His many speeches, which ex- 
pressed so well his whole mental and intel- 
lectual approach, in the championship of 
fundamental rights, in defense of the dignity 
and worth of the human person, in support 
of the equal rights of nations large and 
small, were cheered and applauded by all 
sides of the house. He not only spoke with a 
rare gift of phrase but with such an ob- 
vious sincerity that his words carried con- 

My first contact with Ambassador Ste- 
venson came about in 1952, when I was one 
of the members of the Burmese delegation 

to the seventh General Assembly. This was 
at the time when he was the Democratic 
candidate for the presidential election. His 
speeches were naturally fully reported in the 
newspapers, and I followed his campaign 
closely. His speeches were not only master- 
pieces of oratory; they were also the inci- 
sive reflections of a great man and of a great 
mind, in line with the best traditions of 
American liberal thought. 

There were some during his lifetime, of 
course, who rated him as too liberal and too 
far ahead of the times. Others sought to 
discount his effectiveness on the score that 
he was too much the idealist and therefore 
not practical enough. This does him in- 

The line of distinction between idealism 
and vision is obscure at best. Vision, cer- 
tainly, is an essential attribute of states- 
manship, and he was a fine statesman. In 
any case, what a dismal world it would be, 
and how unpromising its future, without 
spiritual lift given to mankind by the ideal- 
ists who, in the courage of their conviction, 
chart the course and mark the goals of man's 
progress ! 

At that time I did not have any personal 
acquaintance with Mr. Stevenson. For me the 
chance came a year later when he visited 
Burma in 1953. On that occasion I had the 
opportunity to talk to him and to discuss 
with him many issues of current interest. 
Again I was greatly impressed, not only by 
the depth of his intellect but equally by his 
breadth of vision. 

From the time that Mr. Stevenson became 
the Permanent Representative of his coun- 
try at the United Nations and while I was 
still the Permanent Representative of Burma, 
we developed very close ties of friendship. 
These ties became even closer toward the 
end of the year when I assumed my present 
responsibilities and continued to be so during 
the last 3V^ years. I found it easy to discuss 
with him any current issue of importance 
with complete freedom and in full frankness 
and friendliness. 

No one can serve his country in the United 
Nations for long without having his moments 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


of frustration. Ambassador Stevenson had 
his share of such moments, and on such oc- 
casions he confided to me his innermost 
thoughts and I was struck by his completely- 
human approach to our common problems. 
He seemed not only to think about them but 
also to feel about them as a human being. 
In all such discussions I was repeatedly im- 
pressed by his dedication to the basic con- 
cepts of peace, justice, and freedom. 

So many tributes have been paid to Mr. 
Stevenson since his sudden and tragic pass- 
ing away. So many of his friends and admir- 
ers have eulogized his fine intellect, his 
modesty and humility. Many have praised 
his felicitous style and his ready wit. Trib- 
utes have been paid to his great learning, 
which he carried so lightly because he was 
truly an educated man, a cultured man, a 
civilized man. 

Speaking in San Francisco on 26 June 
1965 on the 20th anniversary of the United 
Nations, Ambassador Stevenson said : ^ 

Some of us here today who were midwlves at the 
birth of the United Nations can never forget those 
days here in San Francisco in the twilight of the 
war, when an old world was dying and a new world 
was coming to birth. 

We shared an audacious dream — and launched a 
brave enterprise. 

It seemed so easy then — when all was hope and 
expectation. I remember my own sense of pride, 
of history, of exultation. . . . 

He went on to reflect : 

In the bright glow of 1945 too many looked to the 
United Nations for the full and final answer to 
world peace. And in retrospect that day may seem 
to have opened with the hint of a false dawn. 

Certainly we have learned the hard way how elu- 
sive is peace, how durable is man's destructive 
drive. . . . 

We have learned, too, how distant is the dream 
of those better standards of life in larger freedom, 
how qualified our capacity to practice tolerance, how 
conditional our claims to the dignity and worth of 
the human person, how reserved our respect for the 
obligations of law. 

He then proceeded to restate, on behalf of 
himself, his Government, and the vast bulk 
of his countrymen, his faith in the United 
Nations in the following words : 

' For text, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 101. 

We believe in the United Nations; we support the 
United Nations; and we shall work in the future, as 
we have worked in the past, to add strength and in- 
fluence and permanence to all that the organization 
stands for in this, our tempestuous, tormented, tal- 
ented world of diversity in which all men are 
brothers and all brothers are somehow, wondrously, 
different — save in their need for peace. 

And he concluded by saying : 

We have the United Nations. We have set it 
bravely up. And we will carry it bravely forward. 

Unfortunately Adlai Stevenson is no longer 
with us to keep step with us in the march 
forward to the goals he had stated so well. 

On this occasion, when we are paying hom- 
age to the memory of one who has left us so 
large a legacy, it is fitting, I believe, to give 
some thought to the momentous questions of 
war and peace which were so close to his 

In my view, many governments, while un- 
willing to wage war and at the same time 
unable to make peace, seem to have resigned 
themselves to the prospect of an interminable 
cold war. While admittedly the cold war can- 
not bring down the physical holocaust on our 
heads, it has nevertheless already inflicted on 
us a tremendous moral and psychological in- 
jury which is intangible but equally destruc- 
tive. The long, uneasy cold war has de- 
stroyed and mutilated not our bodies but our 
minds. Its weapons are the myths and the 
legends of propaganda. 

It has often been said that in war the first 
casualty is truth. The cold war is also capable 
of inflicting the same casualty. The weapons 
designed and utilized to crush and muti- 
late the human mind are as potent as any 
of the weapons designed for physical destruc- 
tion. The weapons of the cold war contami- 
nate our moral fiber, warp our thinking 
processes, and afflict us with pathological 
obsessions. These are the invisible but, never- 
theless, the most devastating effects of the 
cold war on humanity. I believe Adlai Steven- 
son, in his innermost thoughts, realized these 

There is no doubt that Adlai Stevenson has 
earned a place in history — not only a place 
in the history of his own country but a 
place in the history of this world organiza- 



President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Pay Tribute 
to Ambassador Stevenson 

statement by President Johnson, July 14 

White House press release dated July 14 

The flame which illuminated the dreams and 
expectations of an entire world is now extin- 
guished. Adlai Stevenson of Illinois is dead. 

I am sending a delegation of distinguished 
Americans headed by Vice President Humphrey to 
London to bring back his body to America, on the 
airplane of the President of the United States. 

His great hero, Abraham Lincoln, said at the 
beginning of his political career, "I have no other 
ambition so great as that of being truly esteemed 
of my fellow man, by rendering myself worthy of 
their esteem." 

And although his disappointments were many, 
in this, like Lincoln, he was vindicated. 

Like Lincoln he was rooted in America's heart- 
land, yet his voice reached across every boundary 
of nation and race and class. 

Like Lincoln he was a great emancipator. It 
was his gift to help emancipate men from narrow- 
ness of mind and the shackles which selfishness 
and ignorance place upon the human adventure. 

Like Lincoln he will be remembered more for 
what he stood for than for the offices he held, more 
for the ideals he embodied than the positions in 
which he served. For history honors men more 
for what they were than who they were. And by 
this standard Adlai Stevenson holds a permanent 
place on that tiny roster of those who will be 
remembered as long as mankind is strong enough 
to honor greatness. 

It seems such a short time ago that out of 
Illinois came that thoughtful eloquence summon- 
ing an entire nation back from its dangerous drift 
toward contentment and complacency. For an 
entire generation of Americans he imparted a 
nobility to public life and the grandeur to Ameri- 
can purpose which has already reshaped the life 
of the Nation and which will endure for many 

One by one he sounded the great themes of our 
time — peace and justice and the well-being of 
humanity. And many men will labor for many 
years toward the vision and the high purpose 
which was the generously crafted outpouring of 
this great man's heart and skills. 

He was an American. And he served America 
well. But what he saw, and what he spoke, and 
what he worked for is the shared desire of all 
humanity. He believed in us, perhaps more than 
we deserved. And so we came to believe in our- 
selves much more than we had. And if we per- 
severe, then, on the foundation of that faith, we 
can build the wondrous works of peace and of 
justice among all of the nations. 

He will not see that day. But it will be his 
day still. 

So let us therefore, adversary and friend alike, 
pause for a moment and weep for one who was a 
friend and who was a guide to all mankind. 

Statement by Secretary Rusk 

Press release 176 dated July 14 

America has lost one of her greatest sons. He 
not only served his country, but he stood for the 
best of it. He not only spoke for his country, but 
he represented the essence of it. 

Our history, our traditions, our ideals, our 
aspirations were in his mind, his heart, and his 
very bones. He never forgot that our Founding 
Fathers created for all mankind. And so the 
whole world has lost a great citizen; for being 
truly American, Adlai Stevenson was a universal 
man. We shall mourn him and miss him and be 
poorer for his passing. 

What he said in tribute to Sir Winston Church- 
ill in the U.N. General Assembly last January 
is most fitting for Adlai Stevenson: "It is plain 
that the world will be diminished by his death, as 
it has already been immeasurably enlarged by his 
life. We shall not soon see his like again." 

tion. He brought to international diplomacy, 
in his dignity, his gentility, and his style, a 
special dimension. Even more, he has earned 
the admiration and affection of millions of 
people to whom he was but a name and a 
This was so, I think, because so often his 

voice rang true as the voice of the people, 
his eloquence expressed the hopes and aspira- 
tions of the common man the world over. He 
was, in our times, in a quite unique way the 
people's friend. Equally, he has earned a per- 
manent place in the hearts of all those who 
knew him, and today I mourn his passing 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


not just as a great historical figure, a famous 
man, but as a true and trusted friend. As 
the poet says : "Friendship is a nobler thing ; 
Of friendship it is good to sing." 


Mr. Secretary-General, Mr. Secretary of 
State, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen : 

It is sometimes difficult to put into words 
the true magnitude of a feeling, the sorrow 
that takes hold of the spirit in the face of 
the irreparable, the sadness that invades the 
soul in the face of hard reality. And yet, we 
must find words to reflect the pain that grips 
us at the loss of a friend who knew how to 
win our hearts, of a colleague who knew how 
to conquer our admiration, for such was for 
us Adlai Stevenson, the Governor, as we, his 
friends, used affectionately to call him. 

The impact of the unexpected news, while 
I was on holiday in Madrid, was a hard blow 
for me: "Adlai Stevenson died suddenly in 
London." Only 3 weeks earlier we had 
been together in San Francisco at the com- 
memoration of the 20th anniversary of the 
United Nations, and he appeared so jovial, 
as ever so full of life. 

Why is it that it is the good men, the men 
necessary to mankind, that we lose so sud- 
denly? We must bow, however, before the in- 
scrutable dictates of Providence and resign 
ourselves to the will of God. Yet the vacuum 
left by the death of a friend we cannot but 
feel profoundly. We, his colleagues in the 
United Nations, have lost a dear and admired 
friend. But America has lost one of its most 
enlightened sons and the United Nations one 
of its most faithful champions. 

In this time of mourning, in which, gath- 
ered here in the General Assembly, witness 
to so many of his brilliant interventions, we 
pay tribute to his memory, it seems to us 
that we still hear the echo of his eloquent and 
tempered words, the expression of a noble 
spirit and a high culture placed at the serv- 
ice of his country but placed also at the serv- 
ice of the ideals of peace and justice advo- 
cated in the United Nations Charter. 

Of the many qualities that adorned the 
shining personality of Adlai Stevenson, per- 
haps the most outstanding were his modera- 
tion and his profound human feeling. Per- 
haps this is the reason why he never inspired 
hatred but only affection, and always re- 
spect. Adlai Stevenson, like all public men, 
has been known to have devoted admirers and 
formidable adversaries, but he has never 
been known to have enemies. And it is be- 
cause the goodness and sincerity that flowed 
from his personality could not allow for feel- 
ings of enmity to be forged against him. 

In his distinguished public life, and espe- 
cially in the United Nations where we better 
knew him, Stevenson always highlighted the 
great sense of equanimity and his constant 
preoccupation with the search for truth and 
justice. Perhaps these qualities, combined 
with so vast a culture which perforce opened 
for him horizons of doubt, at times deprived 
him of the necessary impetus for political 
triumph but gave him instead the universal 
and broad understanding of the problems of 
our time and an acute and penetrating vision 
of the future, clouded neither by prejudice 
nor by preconceived notions. 

Adlai Stevenson was a great patriot. He 
placed at the service of his country, unstint- 
ingly and unsparingly, the full fountain of 
his extraordinary intelligence, of his pro- 
found culture, and of his personal charm. 
And while in the service of his country he 
was struck down by death. 

Adlai Stevenson lived and died for his 
country. Perhaps better than any other pub- 
lic figure, Adali Stevenson gave the world an 
image of a modern and liberal North Amer- 
ica, conscious of the outstanding role it is 
called upon to play in history and conscious 
of the enormous responsibility derived for 
her from her great military and economic 
power. It would be difficult to classify 
Adlai Stevenson, from the political stand- 
point, as a man of the right or a man 
of the left. Stevenson was a liberal in 
the true sense of the word. He was a man 
free of extremism, ever respectful of the 
opinions and viewpoints of others, but al- 
ways convinced of the force of reason, not of 



the reason of force. His liberal spirit was re- 
flected in all his acts as a public figure and 
especially in his performance as a diplomat. 

For him, negotiation and conciliation were 
the methods par excellence for the attainment 
of his aspirations, and he never lacked mod- 
eration, patience, and understanding in the 
fulfillment of the delicate functions entrusted 
to him. As an orator he was brilliant, elo- 
quent, witty. When it was necessary to enter 
into polemics he could be sharp and even 
ironical but at all times courteous and con- 
siderate. Socially, he was a man of the world, 
of great personal charm, with the simplicity 
and the natural manner of great men. 

Adlai Stevenson leaves of his passage 
through life a profound imprint. He leaves 
in his country that owes him so much a pro- 
found mark. He leaves a mark in the United 
Nations, which he so vigorously defended. He 
leaves a mark in the world, which he under- 
stood so well. He leaves his imprint in the 
hearts of his friends, who will never forget 
him. The death of Adlai Stevenson opens a 
great vacuum in the intellectual world, in the 
world of letters, in the world of politics, in 
the world of diplomacy. It leaves a vacuum 
in his country, and it leaves a vacuum in the 

His understanding of the true causes of 
present-day problems, his great concern with 
social affairs, his untiring defense of peace 
and concord among nations, his knowledge of 
man and his stanch defense of the ideals in 
which he believed — all of this manifested in 
his public acts, in his words, his writing, and 
his actions — had made of him the prototype 
of the intellectual who uses his culture for 
the benefit of mankind. 

Stevenson was not happy with the egotis- 
tical pleasure of having a vast culture for 
himself. His constant preoccupation with the 
well-being of the less favored in the world 
and with the true grandeur of his country 
made him at all times place that culture at 
the service of others. That is why he will al- 
ways be remembered with admiration and re- 
spect, both by his partisans and his adver- 

The death of Adlai Stevenson will be felt 

most especially in the United Nations, where 
we had become used to having him as head of 
his country's delegation. There were those 
who agreed with the views he upheld and 
those who did not, but no one can deny that 
Stevenson, because of his great love for peace, 
his profound human feeling, and his faith in 
negotiation, was at all times a guarantee in 
the most difficult situations. It will not be 
easy to fill the void that he leaves with his 

To the great American people, to President 
Johnson, to Mr. Stevenson's family, I con- 
vey my words of condolence. May the good 
and generous man, the true and sincere 
statesman, the refined diplomat, the perfect 
gentleman, who was Adlai Stevenson rest in 

May these words of mine be accepted as 
the modest tribute of a sincere friend to the 
great man whose memory will continue to 
guide future generations in the search for 
peace and justice in our world. 


U.S./U.N. press release 4602 

I am deeply conscious of the privilege of 
speaking of Adlai Stevenson in this company 
and in this place, this room which has heard 
his remembered voice so often. 

I am conscious too of the responsibility 
and burdened by it, for it is here, and per- 
haps only here, that something might be 
said of him which would touch, or almost 
touch, the indefinable, rare thing he was. 
When Adlai Stevenson spoke at the memo- 
rial service for Eleanor Roosevelt, who had 
come home, he said, to the rose garden at 
Hyde Park for the last time, he told her 
friends that it was not her life they had 
lost — she had lived that out to the full: It 
was the thing she was — "and who can name 

Who can name what he was? Not I cer- 
tainly. But if there is a room anywhere in 
which it can be spoken of, it is this one. 
Not because — not only because — the United 
Nations was, for so many years, the center 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


of his life and of his concern, but for a dif- 
ferent reason: because the organization it- 
self, the nature of the organization, creates 
a perspective in which a life like Adlai 
Stevenson's might perhaps be seen — in 
which it might assume the nobility, the sig- 
nificance, which are its inward form. 

In the ordinary context, the context to 
which our age is increasingly accustomed, a 
life like his becomes a puzzle, a contradic- 
tion which even those who love him — and 
this room is full of those who love him — 
cannot readily resolve. Our generation — and 
not in the United States alone — not only in 
the United States— is obsessed by a view of 
human life which leaves no room for any 
human greatness or magnificence but one. 
Power fascinates us, and the exercise of 
power, and we judge our public figures by 
the power they dispose of, by the offices 
they hold which give them access to the 
thrust of power. 

Adlai Stevenson cannot be measured by 
these measures, cannot be known or recog- 
nized by them, or even named. He had no 
taste for power, no desire for it. The unfor- 
gettable speech in which he accepted the in- 
evitability of his nomination for the Presi- 
dency was a portrait of himself as ill-advised 
politically as it was personally honorable. 
And the two disastrous and superb cam- 
paigns which he conducted were proof that 
his reluctance at the start was not the re- 
luctance of political calculation but of pas- 
sionate belief. 

When he said, years afterward, that he 
would like to be remembered for those un- 
successful ventures, for those two defeats, he 
meant that there are some things in the life 
of a democracy more important than to come 
to power — more important, ultimately, than 
the possession of the power. 

And yet, as the last few days have dem- 
onstrated, it is in terms of power or of the 
failure to come to power, that his life is 
still most commonly conceived. In the shock 
and sorrow of his sudden death, the minds 
of those who wrote and spoke of him went 
back again and again, over and over, with 

admiration and regret and more sometimes 
than admiration or regret, to what were 
called the contradictions and the paradoxes 
of his history. He was, we were reminded, 
a great political figure who had never held 
a great political office; a master of the art 
of government who had governed only in his 
ovm State; a public man unsuccessful 
somehow in public life — too fine for it per- 
haps; a Hamlet who thought too long too 
deeply, who doubted too scrupulously, who 
could never permit himself to be as sure as 
an American politician in the fifties was 
supposed to be sure, that that voice beneath 
the battlements urging to violence and re- 
venge was the king his father's voice. 

Well, it was true in part of course — true 
that he thought long and deeply — ^true that 
he had the courage of his doubts — ^true, too, 
that he was skeptical of hatred and its 
prophets in a day when the great majority 
of his fellow citizens were listening to those 
prophets and believing them. But the con- 
clusions most often drav?n from these ob- 
servations are not true. Hamlet dies to those 
heartbreaking words in which the pity 
overwhelms the grief: "Good-night, sweet 
prince." In Adlai Stevenson's death there is 
no room for pity. Those of us who mourn 
him and will always mourn him think of him 
not as a man defeated in his purpose but as 
a man victorious in it; not as a man whose 
life was a contradiction and a paradox, but as 
a man whose life had a particular singleness, 
an unusual wholeness, its own law. 

And it is here in this room, I think, that 
that wholeness best appears. For the United 
Nations, though it knows and suffers from 
our contemporary trust in power, is dedi- 
cated to another end: the subordination of 
power to the hope for peace — which is to 
say the hope for humanity. Those qualities 
in Adlai Stevenson which seemed, in other 
surroundings, to be traits of character, 
attributes of personality — his warmth, his 
charm, his considerateness, his intelligence, 
his humor, his devotion, his incisiveness, 
his eloquence — were fused here, in their 
employment in the noblest of all causes, to 



compose a complete man, a man so bal- 
anced, so harmonious as a human being, that 
his greatness passed almost unnoticed 
while he lived. 

His effectiveness here, his services to 
this organization and to the country to 
which his life was given, others have 
spoken of and will speak. They were great 
services, greatly rendered. But the most im- 
portant thing about them, or so it seems to 
me, was their humanity. It is not, in the long 
history of civilization, the accomplishment 
which counts but the manner of the accom- 
plishment. Works of will are notoriously 
short-lived, and even works of intellect can 
fail when the intelligence is cynical or dry. 
It is only when the end is reached through 
the human heart as well as through the hu- 
man mind that the accomplishment is certain 
to endure. And it is for that reason that 
Adlai Stevenson seems certain of remem- 

His great achievement was not political 
triumph or, indeed, triumph of any kind. 
His great achievement was the enrichment 
of his time by the nature of his relation- 
ships with his time. If his intelligence was 
remarkable, it was remarkable, even more 
than for its clarity, by its modesty, its hu- 
mor, its total lack of vanity or arrogance. 
If he was one of the great articulators of 
his time, one of the few, true voices, it was 
because the words he spoke were the words 
of his own thought, of his deepest and 
most personal conviction. It was himself he 
gave in word and thought and action, not to 
his friends alone but to his country, to his 
world. And the gift had consequences. It 
changed the tone and temper of political 
life in the United States for a generation. 
It humanized the quality of international 
exchanges throughout a great part of the 
world. It enlightened a dark time. 

Which means, I suppose, that Adlai Ste- 
venson's great achievement was himself. 
What we have lost, as he said of his friend 
Mrs. Roosevelt, is not his life. He lived that, 
if not to the full, at least more fully than 
almost any other man. What we have lost is 

himself. And who can name the warmth 
and richness of it? 


Press release 179 dated July 19 

Colleagues and friends: His family and 
his fellow countrymen are grateful that so 
many from so many lands are gathered in 
this great hall to pay respect to Adlai Steven- 
son. Today he returns to the soil which gave 
him birth, as we gather here at the United 
Nations which had become the very fiber of 
his life. 

We have been deeply moved by what has 
been said here today and by the messages 
which have come from all over the earth. For 
these are messages which leap over the fron- 
tiers of nation, cultural tradition, or ideology, 
messages which brush aside the passing dif- 
ferences of present controversy and recall 
that Adlai Stevenson's hopes, dedication, and 
passionate concern encompassed all mankind. 

You and we who have worked alongside 
him day by day have lost a talented colleague 
in our most stimulating profession — a profes- 
sion corporately bound together in the un- 
relenting search for peace. And what an in- 
spiring colleague he was ! 

His restless conviction that things were 
never good enough sustained his zest and 
joy in public service. But his exultation in 
a further step toward peace was short-lived, 
for there was always the unfinished busi- 
ness still to be done — the next step which 
consumed his energy and imagination. 

Adlai Stevenson deeply respected the col- 
leagues with whom he labored in this United 
Nations and treasured the friendships nour- 
ished in this place. It is true that he had 
the capacity for forceful advocacy — when ad- 
vocacy was needed. But he also had the per- 
ception to see that all issues worthy of de- 
bate are complex and are seen differently — 
and honestly — from other points of view. 
Thus, if his talents blazed bright from the 
public platform, his skills were no less lumi- 
nous in the professional arts of quiet diplo- 
macy. For he had the wisdom to seek always 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


to see problems as they are seen by others, 
even though he might himself not be able to 
share their view. 

He had the discrimination to separate the 
important from the unimportant. And he 
had the endless patience — and the tolerance 
and restraining moderation — to sustain him 
through the sometimes exhausting work of 
mediation and accommodation. 

He knew, as do all who are schooled in the 
great traditions of diplomacy, that it is 
never too early to anticipate difficulty in or- 
der to prevent it and never too late to lay the 
hand of reason upon a crisis in order to solve 

His colleagues were never bored; perhaps 
it was with Adlai Stevenson in mind that one 
editor defined a liberal as "independent and 
surprising." In private this public man was 
a warm and entertaining friend, perceptive 
of the ironies of politics and statecraft, given 
to illuminating shafts of sardonic wit, ob- 
viously worried about the behavior of nations 
but deeply confident about the nature of man. 
Because he believed so thoroughly in what he 
was doing and enjoyed so immensely the 
doing of it, he poured out his energies to the 
full — and to the very end. 

In these past few days it has been said, 
over and over again, that Adlai Stevenson 
was a universal man. And so he was. But 
not merely because he was informed, well 
traveled, urbane, sophisticated, eloquent, and 
gifted. He was all of these; but his univer- 
sality did not rest upon his being a prince 
among plain men, but rather upon his being 
a plain man even among princes. His was 
the simplicity of fundamental human values 
— what is common in the midst of diversity 
— what is permanent in the midst of change : 
the love of peace, the instinct of tolerance, 
the feeling of compassion, the devotion to 
human rights, the urge to act for human 

This philosophy which animated Adlai 
Stevenson lay deep in him — permanent and 
indestructible. Perhaps this is what at- 
tracted him so powerfully, almost irresist- 
ibly, to the United Nations and its noble 
tasks. For he was committed to the principles 
of the charter before it was written. The pre- 

amble and the first two articles of the 
charter put into words what had already 
guided his life. And so it seems most natural 
that he should have spent so much of his 
energies in the cause of the United Nations. 

He began in 1945 as an assistant to the 
Secretary of State and adviser to the United 
States delegation at the charter conference in 
San Francisco. He was the chief of our dele- 
gation at the Preparatory Commission in 
London, then a delegate to the first and sec- 
ond sessions of the General Assembly. It was 
altogether fitting that his life work was 
crowned in these halls and that his last mis- 
sion was to the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council.^ 

The words of the charter — and his own 
ringing phrases which will live in literature 
— ^were more than sjrmbols to him. They were 
calls to action. He used language as few men 
have — but used it to summon himself and 
others to work. 

The work to which he summoned our rea- 
son and our feelings remains still to be done. 
The charter he kept on his desk contains 
only 5 pages of philosophy, followed by 50 
pages of procedures. 

He knew that the philosophy could lift 
men's vision and sustain their energies. But 
he also sensed that its meaning was con- 
tained not in eloquent words but in agreed 
procedures, in workable machinery, in ar- 
rangements that enabled the nations to work 
together on particular tasks — while continu- 
ing to argue about why they are working to- 
gether and why they sometimes disagree. 

He had early learned the dictum of Jus- 
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes that general prop- 
ositions do not decide concrete cases, and he 
worked hard and long to build that execu- 
tive machinery for peace which is the real 
alternative to the system of war by which 
men and nations have always lived — by 
which they no longer dare to live. 

And so we pay tribute to a working col- 
league — to a professional diplomat, to a prac- 
titioner, a craftsman, an indefatigable work- 
er for peaceful change. And in honoring him 

' For the text of a statement made by Ambassador 
Stevenson before the U.N. Economic and Social 
Council on July 9, see ibid., July 26, 1965, p. 142. 



we are affirming our determination that the 
peace of the world will be secured. 

You and I, who worked with him, will re- 
member Adlai Stevenson not only as an in- 
spired voice of the conscience of man; we 
shall remember him and miss him and honor 
him, as well, as a valued professional col- 
league — as a brilliant public servant in the 
broadest and noblest sense of that term. 

There is no institution which deserves such 
talents more than the United Nations ; it calls 
out for the best that can be produced by the 
societies of man. Three Presidents of the 
United States sent Adlai Stevenson to the 
United Nations. They sent you our best. 

Now that he is gone I think of the line 
from Pilgrim's Progress: "So he passed over, 
and all the trumpets sounded for him on the 
other side." Yet something of him remains 
with us in this great Assembly Hall. 

President Johnson Receives Book 
on tlie IVIagna Carta 

Following is an exchange of remarks be- 
tween President Johnson and the British 
Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, at the White 
House on July 22 during a ceremony in 
which the Ambassador presented to the 
President a specially bound copy of a hook 
on the Magna Carta. 

White House press release dated July 22 

Ambassador Dean 

Mr. President, it is a great honor and 
privilege for me to present to you this spe- 
cially bound copy of the book Magna Carta 
by Professor [John] Holt. A similar copy 
has been presented to Her Majesty the 

The Magna Carta is one of the many his- 
toric links that bind together so closely the 
peoples and institutions of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 

The Chief Justice of the United States, 
the Honorable Earl Warren, has written: 
"The founding fathers in America regarded 
its principles as their birthright. It is the 

very essence of the rule of law as distin- 
guished from the rule of men, even as law 
is the essence of freedom itself." 

The message of the charter is as relevant 
today as the day on which it was sealed 
750 years ago. 

On behalf of the Cambridge University 
Press, which is the press of my own univer- 
sity, I invite you, Mr. President, to accept 
this book. 

President Johnson 

Sir Patrick, I am most grateful to you. 
On behalf of the American people, I thank 
your Government and your countrymen for 
this most gracious and this very deeply ap- 
preciated act of yours this morning. 

The Magna Carta has always meant much 
to all Americans. The success of the lords 
who, shall we say, reasoned together with 
King John 750 years ago inspired the 
Americans who tried the same on King 
George HI, 189 years ago, from Philadel- 
phia. The outcome was good or bad — de- 
pending on the point of view. I think more 
than that, the principles set forth in this 
Great Charter have inspired and guided all 
of us throughout our existence — and they 
do that today. All we do at home, all we do 
throughout the world, is meant to assure 
men the right to "freedom under law" and 
the right to expect impartial justice. 

We never forget those great words of this 
charter: "To no one will we sell, to no one 
deny or delay right or justice." 

Britain's sons, like America's sons, 
stand their guard today in many distant 
lands so that these promises may be fulfilled 
for all mankind and that we may ulti- 
mately obtain our objective of a world that 
can live in peace together. 

American families, like your families. 
Sir Patrick, devotedly want peace. We are 
extremely grateful in this country to your 
leaders, to your very able Prime Minister, 
for the courageous and their very willing 
initiatives and efforts that they have made 
seeking the peace. But we also know that 
you want, as we want, peace with honor, 
and peace with freedom, and peace with dig- 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


So we are proud to stand with you this 
morning, and to work with you, and to 
strive with you as friends and allies for a 
better world and for a peaceful world. 

And while you are here, Sir Patrick, may 
I say this. I ask you to convey to your coun- 
trymen the appreciation of all the Ameri- 
cans for the very many thoughtful courtesies 
extended last week when death came in Lon- 
don to our beloved statesman Adlai Steven- 
son. By birth and loyalty Ambassador 
Stevenson was an American, but in spirit 
he was at home really in both of our lands. 
When death came to him in the midst of 
your people, your gracious understanding 
touched all Americans, and I should like for 
you to say to them, on behalf of the people 
of the United States, we are so grateful that 
in this hour of trouble for us you were so 

Conquering the Ancient Enemies 
of IVIanlcind 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

Mr. Fisher, members of the World Press 
Institute staff, outstanding young journal- 

It is a great privilege and pleasure to wel- 
come all of you, especially Mr. Johnson from 
Stockholm. You come from continents and 
countries that I have enjoyed greatly in the 
past — from the Middle East, from South 
America, from Asia and Africa, from India 
and Italy, Switzerland and Sweden, England 
and France. 

One of you has come in from Greece. Once 
I attended your Trade Fair, and I asked my 
daughter to say a few words to your 
friendly citizens. She talked long and learn- 
edly about the birthplace of Alexander the 
Great and all the rich history of northern 
Greece and Macedonia. And when she had 
finished no one in attendance was even will- 
ing to listen to me. 

'Made before the World Press Institute at the 
White House on July 22 (White House press release). 

I won't make that same mistake today. 
But I do wish that we could have a press 
conference, with me asking the questions 
and you giving the answers. 

Americans have always been the respect- 
ers of the views of our visitors. Nowhere 
are views from other lands and other peo- 
ples more respected than in this White 

Our country, our whole nation, is, after 
all, the creation of peoples of all countries, 
and cultures, and colors, and creeds. In our 
veins flows the blood of all men. And that 
is why, in our hearts, we have for 189 years 
regarded America's cause as really the cause 
of all mankind. 

The great meaning of America is that men 
of all nations can live together in under- 
standing and in peace. That is the great 
challenge and the great opportunity and the 
great responsibility that is facing you and 
facing your profession — that is, to foster 
understanding among men so that there may 
be peace among nations. 

Seventy percent of the world's people to- 
day lack the means of being informed about 
developments in their own countries, much 
less in other countries. Of Africa's 236 mil- 
lion people, less than 3 million actually re- 
ceive newspapers. Nearly half the countries 
of the Middle East have no daily press at 
all. And so it goes on all around the world. 

But we are so happy to observe that a new 
day is dawning, and you and I and all of us 
are living now the moment of one of history's 
great breakthroughs. 

In the 18th century the world was altered 
by the political revolution. In the 19th cen- 
tury it was changed by the industrial revolu- 
tion. Now, in this 20th century, the world is 
being changed as never before by the sci- 
entific revolution — the revolution of human 

It is no dim and distant dream to envi- 
sion the day when men everywhere will be 
able to receive in their homes telecasts from 
satellite stations of sessions of the United 

I was delayed for a moment in greeting 
you not by telecasts from the United Nations 




but by a telephone call from what I hope will 
be the new United States representative to 
the United Nations, who is going before the 
Foreign Relations Committee in the morning 
to be confirmed and, we hope, to be sworn 
here at the White House as soon as he has 
been confirmed. 

Yes, no technology is changing more radi- 
cally and more rapidly than the technology of 
communications, which will permit commu- 
nication between nations and people. Surely 
from these better communications will 
come better understanding between all of 

But the meaning of this revolution, and 
the meaning of this breakthrough, runs far 
beyond the impact upon any one technol- 
ogy. Advances of science are rendering ob- 
solete the old thinking, the old theories, the 
old doctrine and dogma about relations be- 
tween nations. 

Young and less developed nations have an 
opportunity today to bypass the hundred 
years of the industrial revolution and begin 
to enter the mainstream of the 20th cen- 
tury. New nations with a minimum of 
trained scientists can share, and can benefit, 
from the vast store of already existing 
scientific knowledge. 

They can benefit from modern medicine 
to free their people of diseases and of 
early death, and to extend the life expec- 
tancy. They can benefit from advances made 
in agriculture and produce more food to 
feed their growing population. And we are 
trying so hard to encourage them and to 
help them and to get them to develop their 
agriculture better. 

They have the hope nations never had 
before of building better lives for their 
people, regardless of their size or their 
power or their wealth or their past history. 

So it is a great and grand and thrilling 
vision that opens before mankind as we meet 
here this afternoon. And we of America 
are moved by that vision. We are moved by 
it in all that we do at home and all that we 
do in the world. 

For if the dream is to become the reality, 
peace must be preserved for mankind, and 

peace is the purpose of all that we do. 

There are those who would force human 
hopes and aspirations back into the darkness 
of the past by aggression, by terror, by 
oppression, by war. But we believe that 
mankind has outrun the darkness of those 
dogmas which subjugate man's body and 
which imprison man's soul. 

We believe that mankind should have a 
choice, and we believe that mankind does 
have a choice today. We think he can choose 
the way of life, the way of peace, the way 
of freedom, the way of justice through the 
liberation of his mind and of his soul. 

And we believe that is the choice that 
men of all continents and of all cultures 
and colors and creeds will really ultimately 
make if they are permitted to choose their 
way in peace. 

The strength that we have and the suc- 
cess that we enjoy and the spirit that swells 
within the soul of America is mobilized and 
committed to one end — that end is to pre- 
serve the peace so that men everywhere 
can choose for themselves the way they 
want to go in this davsming age of oppor- 
tunity in which we are privileged to live. 

I am glad that I am privileged to welcome 
you here and to make these observations. 
These are trying moments in our relations 
with other nations. 

Yesterday I talked to a thousand brilliant 
leaders of the field of education in this 
country, not just about the programs that 
will involve advancement and adventure for 
our own citizens here at home but about the 
great progress that we can make in the field 
of international education. 

While we will be true to our commit- 
ments, we will keep our treaties, we will 
join in protecting freedom in the world. And 
we think that strength will be required to 
preserve that freedom. 

At the same time we will do everything 
within our power to see that, while strength 
is maintained on the military front to pre- 
serve freedom from aggression, there will be 
equal strength on the political, and on the 
diplomatic, and on the economic front that 
will try to find ways of avoiding contests. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


At the same time, we are prepared to deal 
with them if we must. 

I want to take a moment, if you will, be- 
fore I return to my other appointments, to 
meet each of you individually. I want to ask 
you to convey to your leaders, and to your 
fellow men, our hopes and aspirations and 
best wishes for their success and their ad- 

We are not concerned just with 190 mil- 
lion people in this country. We are devotedly 
interested in all the 3 billion people of the 

We are organizing, and planning, and mo- 
bilizing to win the wars that we have de- 
clared — and we will win them. And those 
wars are wars on poverty — it was being 
fought in the House of Representatives to- 
day, and we won a while ago by five votes; 
the wars on ignorance — we are making 
great advances there — the educational pro- 
gram this year has never been equaled in 
this country before ; wars on diseases — while 
our life expectancy has improved a great deal 
with the years, we are not at all satisfied 
with it, and we have a half-dozen far- 
reaching comprehensive health measures 
that will not just confine our efforts to our 
own people but will help us to help others 
in the world and provide leadership in im- 
proving the health and in some of the prob- 
lems of population and other matters. 

So we are committed to win the wars that 
we have declared on the ancient enemies of 
mankind: ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and 

And it will be a great day in the world 
when we can say that victory is ours against 
those ancient enemies in all lands. 

Thank you very much. 

Senate Confirms Mr. Merchant 
as U.S. Executive Director of IBRD 

The Senate on July 22 confirmed the nom- 
ination of Livingston T. Merchant to be 
U.S. Executive Director of the International 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development 
for a term of 2 years. 

Advisory Committee on Monetary 
Arrangements Has First Meeting 

White House press release dated July 16 

Announcement of Meeting 

The President met on July 16 with Treas- 
ury Secretary Henry H. Fowler and the new 
Advisory Committee on International Mone- 
tary Arrangements. Former Secretary of the 
Treasury Douglas Dillon is chairman of the 
committee, which was set up to assist 
Secretary Fowler in exploring methods to 
increase international financial resources.^ 

The committee held its first meeting with 
Secretary Fowler on July 16 at the Treasury 
and later moved to the White House to meet 
with the President. 

Other members of the committee in- 
clude : 

Edward Bernstein, economic consultant specializing 
In international policy 

Kermit Gordon, until last month Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget, now at the Brookings In- 

Charles Kindleberger, professor of economics, Massa- 
chusetts Institute of Technology 

Andre Meyer, of the investment banking firm of 
Lazard Preres 

David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhat- 
tan Bank, New York, N.Y. 

Robert V. Roosa, former Under Secretary of the 
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, now a partner 
in the investment banking firm of Brown Bros. 
Harriman and Co. 

Government officials attending the meeting 
included : 

Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President's Council 
of Economic Advisers 

George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State 

Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury 

Francis Bator, White House staff 

Frederick L. Deming, Under Secretary of the Treas- 
ury for Monetary Affairs 

William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Fed- 
eral Reserve Board 

Merlyn Trued, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury 
for International Affairs 

Paul Volcker, Deputy Under Secretary of the Treas- 
ury for Monetary Affairs 

' For an announcement of the naming of the com- 
mittee by Secretary Fowler on July 3, see White 
House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated July 3. 



statement by the President 

I met today with Secretary Fowler and 
his Advisory Committee on International 
Monetary Arrangements. We had a brief 
discussion of the United States balance-of- 
payments situation and the international 
monetary system. 

There was complete agreement on the 
necessity for the United States to eliminate 
its balance-of-payments deficit quickly and 
to maintain payments equilibrium for a pro- 
longed period. 

While we were all pleased with the indi- 
cations that my balance-of-payments pro- 
gram announced February 10 ^ seems to be 
taking hold, and that the business and fi- 
nancial community is doing a splendid job 
of voluntary cooperation, we are well aware 
that it is still much too early to get an 
accurate picture of just where we stand. 

Secretary Fowler is moving ahead effec- 
tively to prepare for international agreement 
on solving any future problem of world 
liquidity which might arise after we have 
successfully maintained equilibrium for an 
extended period. He has put together an ex- 
cellent committee, and I am confident that, 
under the leadership of Douglas Dillon, they 
will provide him with the best talent and ad- 
vice available in this area to supplement the 
resources in the Government on this vital 

statement by Secretary Fowler 

I met today for the first time with my 
Advisory Committee on International Mone- 
tary Arrangements. While the meeting was 
principally an organizational one, there was 
opportunity for me to bring Chairman Dil- 
lon and the members of his committee up to 
date on the latest developments both in our 
own balance of payments and in our ef- 
forts to promote international agreement on 
strengthening the world monetary system. 

Among the things we discussed were my 
recent talks with British Chancellor of the 
Exchequer [James] Callaghan and Japanese 
Finance Minister [Takeo] Fukuda. 

The committee was in unanimous agree- 

ment that the United States' proposal for an 
international conference on the potential 
problem of world financial resources was an 
important step in the right direction.* 

I took the opportunity to set before the 
committee the general framework of our 
present policy, which includes the following 
points : 

1. The importance of the United States' 
eliminating its own deficit as promptly as 
possible as a necessary precondition to 
modification of the international monetary 

2. The importance of a flexible approach, 
not only by the United States but by other 
countries, in discussing international mone- 
tary arrangements. 

3. The need for thorough and careful 
preparation to promote fruitful negotiations 
on the international level. 

4. The need to build upon the existing sys- 
tem by making maximum use of present 
instruments of international financial co- 
operation which have served so effectively 
in the past. 

5. The necessity to maintain the dollar as 
the principal reserve currency in order to 
foster continuing stability in the interna- 
tional trade and payments system. 

Statement by Mr. Dillon 

The first meeting of the Advisory Com- 
mittee on International Monetary Arrange- 
ments went very well. 

Secretary Fowler brought us up to date 
on a number of matters, and we were able 
to settle our organizational problems with- 
out difficulty, and we expect to begin sub- 
stantive discussions in the near future. 

Secretary Fowler's advocacy of a flexible 
approach by all countries, including our ovm, 
offers great promise that the United States 
will be able to play a significant and con- 
structive role in future international discus- 
sions on possible modification of the mone- 
tary system. 

' Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

° For text of an address made by Secretary Fowler 
on July 10 before the Virginia State Bar Association, 
see ibid., Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


President Names Justice Goldberg 
as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N. 

Following is an exchange of remarks be- 
tween President Johnson and Supreme Court 
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg at the White 
House on July 20. 

White House press release dated July 20 

Remarks by President Johnson 

One week ago we, and the world, lost 
Adlai Stevenson. For all who knew him, and 
for all whose lives were touched by his rare 
gifts of inspiration, the world will seem for- 
ever poorer for his death. Yet we know that 
the world will be forever richer for his life. 

None can fill the void that his passing 
leaves in our hearts. But the vacancy left at 
the council tables of the United Nations must 
be filled. 

Our yearning for peace and for justice on 
this earth, and our quest for the dignity of 
all mankind, are not the yearning and quest 
of one heart but of 190 million. Where men 
and where nations come together to seek 
these goals, the voice of all America must be 

It is therefore my responsibility to select 
a successor to Ambassador Adlai Stevenson 
as the special representative of the United 
States of America to the United Nations. 

Since the birth of the United Nations 20 
years ago, each President has faced the 
same responsibility. Each President has re- 
flected the faith and the firmness of our 
commitment to the United Nations by al- 
ways calling upon distinguished citizens of 
very high achievement to serve in this hon- 
ored office. 

As an example, President Truman called 
upon Senator Warren Austin of Vermont. 

President Eisenhower called upon an 
outstanding American, who serves his coun- 
try faithfully and selflessly still, Henry 
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts. 

President Kennedy called the great Gov- 
ernor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois. 

To assume these responsibilities now, I 
call upon a member of the Supreme Court 
of the United States and a former member of 

the Cabinet — Justice Arthur Goldberg. 

At the insistence of the President of his 
country, he has accepted this call to duty. 

Justice Goldberg, like Governor Steven- 
son, is a son of Illinois. Where Governor 
Stevenson was descended from some of 
America's oldest settlers, Justice Goldberg 
was bom of our newest. He rose from the 
city streets to Cabinet office, and then to the 
highest court in this land. His life embodies 
the story of our open and free society as a 
fulfillment of the opportunity that we want 
all mankind to share with us. 

A counselor of the American trade union 
movement. Justice Goldberg won the es- 
teem of both labor and business. His ap- 
pointment to the Cabinet of the late Presi- 
dent Kennedy drew bipartisan approval and 
drew praise from leaders of widely diver- 
gent philosophies. His nomination to the 
Supreme Court was warmly welcomed by all 
who knew him as a lawyer of exceptional 
ability, a student and thinker of original 
and profound capacity, and, above all, a man 
of courage and independence and conviction 
and generous humanitarian compassion. 

But Justice Goldberg is a man of inter- 
national reputation, too. Before entering pub- 
lic service he was an articulate and very 
forceful champion of the international labor 
movement to preserve and extend the demo- 
cratic institutions in the free world. In the 
Cabinet he represented his President on mis- 
sions to Europe and Africa and Asia, and 
was continuously concerned with the affairs 
of the United Nations International Labor 
Organization. Since becoming a member of 
the Supreme Court, he has traveled exten- 
sively in the world, speaking in many lands 
about the problems and the issues which all 
men share. 

At different periods, over the past 20 
years, we have had varying concerns in 
our constant and continuing efforts for world 
peace. But always — and never more than 
now — we strive for a world where all men 
may live in peace with the hope of justice 
under the rule of law over the conduct of 

Committed as we are to this principle 



and this purpose, it is fitting- that we should 
ask a member of our highest court to re- 
linquish that office to speak for America 
before the nations of the world. 

Finally, let me say that Justice Goldberg 
is an old and trusted friend of mine, a 
counselor of many years. He will sit in our 
Cabinet. He will always have direct and 
ready access to, and the full and respectful 
confidence of, the President of the United 
States and the Secretary of State. In his new 
office he will speak not only for an admin- 
istration, but he will speak for an entire 
nation, firmly, earnestly, and responsibly 
committed to the strength and to the success 
of the United Nations in its works for 
peace around the world. 

Now, if Justice Goldberg would say a few 
words, we would all be pleased. 

Thank you very much. 

Justice Goldberg 

Mr. President, with the death of Adlai 
Stevenson, a great voice of America in the 
world has been stilled, but the message of 
Adlai Stevenson to the world must go on. 
That message is man's ancient supplication : 
Grant us peace. Thy most precious gift. 

What has been prayer throughout the 
ages is a necessity today. 

Adlai Stevenson was the voice of a great 
and powerful nation, at once dedicated to 
peace and implacable in its commitment to 
freedom. The eloquence of his words no more 
than reflected the richness of his spirit 
and the righteousness of his cause. 

We, and the world, are different because 
he lived. 

Of Adlai Stevenson's departure and my 
appointment, I can only borrow words ut- 
tered on a similar occasion by Thomas Jef- 

ferson: I succeed him. No one could replace 

I shall not, Mr. President, conceal the 
pain with which I leave the Court after 3 
years of service. It has been the richest and 
most satisfying period of my career. And I 
shall have more to say about this in a letter 
I am sending to the Chief Justice and my 
brethren on the Court. 

Throughout my life I have been deeply 
committed to the rule of law. The law gives 
form and substance to the spirit of liberty 
and to mankind's sacred stir for justice. 

It now comes that the President has asked 
me to join in the greatest adventure of 
man's history — the effort to bring the rule 
of law to govern the relations between 
sovereign states. It is that or doom — and we 
all know it. 

I have accepted, as one simply must. 

In my efforts at the United Nations I shall 
do my best to carry on, in my own way, the 
work of my distinguished predecessors. I 
hope to help make real and manifest the 
assertion of the charter that social justice 
and better standards of life in larger free- 
dom are indispensable to the achievement of 
world peace. 

I am grateful to the President for judging 
me capable of the effort I now commence. 
I am grateful to the Secretary of State, my 
friend and my former colleague in the Cabi- 
net, for welcoming me so warmly to this 

It is with great humility that I undertake 
the role of our nation's advocate of peace in 
the council of nations. 

My wife, my son, my daughter — who is in 
Chicago and cannot be with us today — my 
mother-in-law, all join with me in asking 
only the prayers of the American people that 
we shall succeed. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


U.S.-Japan Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs 
Holds Fourth iVIeeting at Wasiiington 

The fourth meeting of the Joint United 
States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco- 
nomic Affairs was held at Washington July 
12-1 Jf. Following are remarks made at the 
opening session on July 12 by Secretary Rusk 
and Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina, re- 
marks made at a White House luncheon on 
July IJfhy President Johnson and Mr. Shiina, 
and text of a joint communique issued on 
July 14 at the conclusion of the meeting. 


Press release 174 dated July 12 

Remarks by Secretary Rusk 

We are opening today the fourth meeting 
of the Joint United States-Japan Commit- 
tee on Trade and Economic Affairs. Presi- 
dent Johnson and Prime Minister Sato 
agreed during the Prime Minister's visit 
last January * that this Committee should 
meet again at the earliest practicable date. 
The Committee can look back to a solid 
record of accomplishment during the past 
4 years.2 On this firm base we can look 
forward confidently to further success in 
promoting and strengthening the economic 
relationships which form so important a 
part of our overall relations. 

* For text of a joint communique, see BuUiETiN 
of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134. 

' For texts of joint communiques issued at the con- 
clusion of the three previous meetings, see ibid., 
Nov. 27, 1961, p. 891; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959; and Feb. 
17, 1964, p. 235. 

Japan's exports to the United States this 
year double those of 1961, the year of our 
first meeting. United States exports to 
Japan have also increased substantially al- 
though at a slower rate. The trade balance 
in our favor has diminished steadily, until 
this year we expect our trade to be in close 
balance at levels in the neighborhood of $2 
billion each way. These are truly impressive 

During the years this Committee has been 
meeting, both countries have enjoyed vigor- 
ous economic growth. We are both much 
wealthier and stronger than we were only 4 
years ago, and we can confidently look for- 
ward to the continuance of this healthy eco- 
nomic expansion. The United States is now 
in the 53d month of steady upturn. This is 
the longest peacetime advance in our his- 
tory, and we expect it to continue. Japan has 
experienced an economic expansion during 
the past 15 years unparalleled in history for 
a major industrial nation. Even though the 
rate of growth has slowed somewhat, Japan 
maintains rates of growth in gross national 
product considerably above those which 
other industrialized countries have been able 
to achieve during periods of peak perform- 

Considering its magnitude and diversity, 
our economic relationship is remarkable for 
its cordiality and evenness. While we are 
major trading partners, we are also major 
competitors over a broad front. A wide 
variety of difficult problems is to be ex- 
pected in the economic relationships of 



virile, progressive, industrial nations. Com- 
petition brings change within as vi^ell as be- 
tvi^een national economies. As old problems 
are solved, nevi^ ones emerge. Happily most 
of the economic problems between Japan 
and the United States have proved man- 
ageable over time without too great a strain 
on the fabric of our total relationship. 

We have a full agenda for this meeting — 
one which gives us the opportunity to dis- 
cuss frankly and fully the current problems 
in our economic relationship. However, we 
must not let these bilateral problems ob- 
scure our great mutual interest in expand- 
ing trade and our common concern with 
worldwide political and economic problems. 
The United States and Japan share a con- 
cern in the welfare of the countries of the 
world which do not share our prosperity. 
We have a mutual interest in the success of 
the developing countries in modernizing their 
economies. This broader interest is rooted in 
our interest in increasing our trade but, more 
importantly, in our vital concern for the 
well-being of our fellow inhabitants of this 

We share a particular responsibility to 
the countries of Asia, especially to the coun- 
tries of Southeast Asia which are affected 
not only by chronic problems of poverty and 
underdevelopment but by aggressive neigh- 
bors. President Johnson has indicated the 
depth of the American concern and commit- 
ment, not only to the concept of the freedom 
of these countries to choose their institutions 
and guide their own destinies but to a bet- 
terment of the way of life for all the peo- 
ples of Asia. 

The Joint Committee has proved to be an 
effective instrument for expanding our 
knowledge and understanding of each other. 
This has in turn enhanced the Japanese- 
American partnership in good will, friend- 
ship, and prosperity. We look forward over 
the next 3 days to further frank, wide- 
ranging, and fruitful exchanges of views. I 
am certain that this meeting will add luster 
to the already solid accomplishments of this 

Remarks by Foreign Minister Shiina 

Mr. Secretary, distinguished members of 
the American Cabinet, gentlemen: On be- 
half of the Japanese delegation, I wish to 
express my sincere appreciation for your 
warm words of welcome. 

Our Joint Committee has met on three oc- 
casions in the past, in Hakone, in Washing- 
ton, and in Tokyo, and we have now returned 
to Washington for our fourth meeting. Dur- 
ing this time many important changes have 
taken place in the political and economic sit- 
uation in the world. With regard to eco- 
nomic development in Japan, the first major 
important steps toward the transition to an 
open economy have been completed, as sym- 
bolized by our promotion to an article 8 
status under the IMF [International Mone- 
tary Fund] and our accession to the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development]. At the same time we have 
been taking increased responsibility in the 
sphere of international economy, and par- 
ticularly in relation to our Asian neighbors. 
One of the notable facts of these years has 
been that the trade and economic inter- 
change between the United States and 
Japan has steadily continued to develop into 
a closely knit relationship of mutual cooper- 

In our view, such a strengthened relation- 
ship is characterized by two special fea- 

First : Our interchange of materials, serv- 
ices, and capital have constantly been on the 
increase, and to take trade figures alone, our 
bilateral trade amounting to $4 billion is 
next only in size to the trade between the 
United States and Canada. On the Ameri- 
can side, U.S. exports to Japan last year 
were twice U.S. exports to the United King- 
dom and amounted to half the exports to 
the six member countries of the EEC [Euro- 
pean Economic Community] taken together 
— ample evidence that our two countries have 
come to be linked by the strong tie of inter- 

The second feature is that Japan and the 
United States have strengthened the ties of 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


cooperation not only through finding solu- 
tions to specific issues between our two 
countries but also through jointly seeking 
solutions to the broader economic questions 
of international significance. In fact, as was 
recognized in the joint communique issued 
at the meeting of President Johnson and 
Prime Minister Sato this January, there are 
many diverse areas with respect to which 
our two countries could and should cooper- 
ate and coordinate policies, in addition to the 
areas presenting problems of direct mutual 
concern. I believe there is much room for 
closer and better cooperation between our 
two nations in such areas. Yet the progress 
already made in Japan-U.S. cooperative 
ties will lose its firm basis unless it is ac- 
companied by constant and strenuous efforts 
to bring about appropriate solutions to each 
and every one of such problems as may arise 
between our two countries. 

At our first meeting at Hakone, the "equal 
partnership" between our two countries was 
emphasized. Today, 4 years later, this part- 
nership has become so obvious a relation- 
ship and is so taken for granted on both 
sides that it is scarcely necessary to reiter- 
ate or reemphasize. This change brought 
about in the course of 4 years is direct 
proof that the ties of close cooperation be- 
tween our two countries have undergone a 
very sound strengthening. 

Half of the United States Cabinet mem- 
bers seated across the table have partici- 
pated in the Joint Committee since the first 
meeting, while on this side, with the excep- 
tion of Mr. Fujiyama [Aiichiro Fujiyama, 
Director General of the Economic Planning 
Agency], none of us has had experience of 
previous attendance. As a matter of fact, 
this conference is our first opportunity since 
the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet 
to tackle in earnest the various problems of 
international import facing our country. This 
being the case, we have all the more interest 
and expectation with regard to the delibera- 
tions of the current session. 

It is our sincere hope that this meeting, 
through frank exchange of views, will pro- 

duce fruitful results and contribute to the 
further consolidation of Japan-U.S. rela- 


White House press releases dated July 14 

Remarks by President Johnson, Prepared Text^ 

This is a great pleasure — and a welcome 
privilege — to welcome to this house in peace, 
friendship, and a common purpose all of 
you who have come from across the great 

This is the fourth meeting of our two 
Cabinets, and the second such meeting here 
in Washington. For me it is a meeting to 
which I have looked forward since the con- 
structive and productive meeting earlier this 
year with your Prime Minister. I was most 
impressed with him at that time, and it con- 
firms my estimate to know that he is able to 
conduct the affairs of your Government 
with so many members of his Cabinet so far 
from his side today. 

Your presence here in Washington is a 
tribute to the importance which both you 
and we attach to the close friendship be- 
tween Japan and the United States. These 
sessions between the Cabinet officers of our 
two countries are without precedent or paral- 
lel, and we can be very proud of them. 
Such meetings reflect to the world the im- 
portance our Governments and our peoples 
attach to our continuing ties as great nations 
of the free world. 

Destiny has placed before us both great 
opportunities, responsibilities, and chal- 
lenges. Together we shall meet them with 
enthusiasm, with courage, and, I am confi- 
dent, with success. 

On this day, when the genius of man has 
been able to probe the far distant planet of 
Mars, I am privileged to pledge my country 
anew to explore with vigor and imagination 
the pressing problems which confront us 
here on earth. 

' Not delivered because of the death of Ambassador 
Adlai E. Stevenson. 



As Pacific countries, we have different 
assets and — in terms of narrow economics — 
some different interests. But we share the 
common purpose of contributing to the 
peace and prosperity of that part of the 

Mankind as a whole faces a great chal- 
lenge in finding ways to restore and main- 
tain peace in Southeast Asia. We know that 
merely yearning for peace will not bring it 
about. An international effort enlisting com- 
mitments from peoples in the area — and all 
the nations interested in peace in the area — 
is needed to assure progress within that 
great region. I am confident that if Japan 
and the United States can share their wis- 
dom — and share their endeavors side by 
side — we can contribute greatly to the reali- 
zation of this noble purpose. 

We in the United States welcome your 
thoughts, your initiatives, and your coopera- 
tion in seeking objectives which are not only 
in our mutual interest but in the interests 
of peoples everywhere. 

In particular, I believe that our two great 
countries should together strive, first, to en- 
gage a broad range of developed countries 
in the task of promoting the economic de- 
velopment of Southeast Asia, to strengthen 
the foundation for stability there and for 
world peace everywhere. 

Secondly, I believe our two countries 
should together strive to help foster regional 
cooperation and a sense of common interest 
in the economic field. 

Finally, I believe we should strive to per- 
suade all countries in the area, especially 
those which are now committed to encourag- 
ing or supporting aggressive wars of na- 
tional liberation, that their own patriotic 
self-interests would be better served by par- 
ticipating with others in peaceful economic 

The basic conflict of our times is not over 
economic ideas or between economic sys- 
tems. We do not believe any one people — or 
any one nation — stand as the sole possessors 
of all the truth. We do believe, however, that 
men and nations must have the right to de- 

velop their own systems and their own so- 
cieties without fear of neighbors and with- 
out a return to the dangers and perils of the 

To end aggression as an instrument of 
national policy would bring great opportu- 
nities for progress and better welfare to un- 
happy millions throughout all of Asia. That 
is our goal in the United States — and our 
only goal. 

Between us, in your country and in ours, 
we have mutual problems and mutual con- 
cerns. But much more important are our 
great mutual opportunities. Let us hope that 
this meeting serves well the common pur- 
poses which we share together as we look to 
a broader, better, more peaceful horizon for 
ourselves and for all mankind. 

Now may I ask you to join with me in a 
toast to the sovereign whose distinguished 
Cabinet Ministers we proudly and warmly 
welcome today. Ladies and gentlemen. His 
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan. 

Remarks by President Johnson, As-Delivered Text 

Distinguished guests, gentlemen: We are 
deeply grateful for the time that the minis- 
ters of the Cabinet of Japan have given to 
this visit to our country. We have found our 
discussions to be both pleasant and pro- 

It seems that it is very difficult to avoid 
some tragedy in meetings of this kind, be- 
cause I remember almost 20 months ago 
when members of the American Cabinet were 
en route to Tokyo for discussions that we first 
learned of the death of our beloved President 
John Fitzgerald Kennedy. 

A few moments before this luncheon be- 
gan today, I received word that the great and 
good man, Adlai Stevenson, had died in 

Of course, my immediate reaction was to 
cancel this luncheon meeting, but after talk- 
ing to some of the members of my own Cabi- 
net and some of his friends, they all real- 
ized that Adlai Stevenson would not have had 
us do any such thing. He would want us to 
continue because he was first, and he was 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


foremost, concerned that the works of peace 
and the works of progress and, most im- 
portant, the works of understanding, which 
have prevailed and predominated throughout 
this meeting, must go on. 

So this, then, is our legacy from Adlai 
Stevenson — a charge to continue the quest 
for a decent world, for a better world order, 
for a life for man that is free of war and 
destruction and the oppression of his spirit. 

So this is our pledge to the memory of 
this great man who is really, as all of you 
here know, a true citizen of the world — a 
pledge to devote our energies and our tal- 
ents and our resources and our wills to the 
cause for which he died. 

We realize that America lost its foremost 
advocate and its most eloquent spirit and one 
of its finest voices for peace in the world. 
The world of freedom has lost, I think, per- 
haps its most dedicated champion. 

So I would like to ask each of you to stand 
with me in a moment of silent tribute to this 
great lover of peace, this great statesman, 
Adlai E. Stevenson. 

Remarks by Foreign Minister Shiina 

Mr. President, Your Excellencies: I am 
deeply grieved to hear of the passing of a 
truly great American, Ambassador Steven- 
son. It was last December that I had the 
privilege of meeting him for the first time 
at the United Nations when I attended the 
General Assembly meeting. His life, I be- 
lieve, symbolizes the conscience of humanity 
upon which the United Nations is built. He 
will be deeply missed by all those who 
seek peace. Let me express my heartfelt 
sympathy and condolence to the remaining 
members of his family and to the people of 
the United States. 

We are greatly pleased to be honored in 
this way, to be accorded the privilege of 
meeting and talking with you at this lunch- 
eon, and I should like to thank you very 
much for the words that you have spoken. I 
am reminded that at the beginning of this 
year, I and Mr. [Takeo] Miki, who is here 
with us today as our Minister of Interna- 
tional Trade and Industry, had the honor to 

be present on the occasion of Prime Minis- 
ter Sato's visit to you. 

One of my favorite expressions in classical 
Chinese, if I may attempt to translate it, is : 
"To the same pole, but by a different route." 
It suggests the fact that it is entirely nat- 
ural for two countries with such different 
historical and geographical background to 
pursue their respective national interests in 
a different manner, but it suggests also that 
we ultimately seek the common goal of 
world peace and prosperity. 

This is the most natural mode of coopera- 
tion between our two countries and is the 
basis of a permanent and positive relation- 
ship. The results of the conversations be- 
tween you, Mr. President, and Prime Minis- 
ter Sato have been welcomed in Japan with 
nationwide support and have been regarded 
as a demonstration that the relations be- 
tween our countries have entered an era of 
cooperation on a higher plane in the way I 
have just tried to suggest, and, to borrow 
Secretary Rusk's expression at the time of 
those talks, that we have entered into a "new 
chapter" of our relationship. 

Since the beginning of this year we have 
witnessed various developments in the inter- 
national scene, mainly in Asia. In certain 
areas the efforts we have directed toward 
achieving freedom, peace, and prosperity in 
Asia are producing fortunate results, and 
they appear to be opening the way for new 
developments conducive to future advance. 

However, the general situation in Asia 
seems to be one of persistent tension and 
strain and is growing more serious with 
each day. In such a continually changing in- 
ternational scene the close cooperation be- 
tween our two countries serves a very signif- 
icant role in sustaining a measure of inter- 
national stability and prosperity. 

This joint United States- Japan Committee 
on Trade and Economic Affairs, attended by 
Cabinet members of both Governments and 
allowing a frank exchange of views to take 
place, is a unique arrangement which sym- 
bolizes our close and cordial ties. Our present 
session has nearly been completed, and we 
believe that this fourth meeting has been as 



productive as the past three meetings. I am 
confident that this session has not only 
served to create a better and deeper under- 
standing of the problems we face in our re- 
spective countries but has contributed also 
to the promotion of peace and progress 
throughout the world. 
Thank you. 


Press release 175 dated July 14 

The Fourth Meeting of the Joint United States- 
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs 
was held in Washington on July 12, 13, and 14, 
1965 under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of 
State, Dean Rusk. The meeting was the forum for 
a major review of trade and economic relations be- 
tween the two countries, not only from a bilateral 
point of view, but also from a global perspective. 
The Committee recognized that the continuing 
strength of the Japanese and United States econo- 
mies made possible closer and more effective collabo- 
ration between the two countries in meeting their 
wider responsibilities in the world economy. The 
Committee affirmed the importance of fostering the 
growth and welfare of developing countries and gave 
special attention to countries in Asia. The Com- 
mittee first reviewed the general world situation 
in recognition of its importance for the trade and 
economic relations between Japan and the United 


The discussions covered a wide range of trade 
and economic affairs and understanding was reached 
on many points including the following: 

1. The Committee noted with satisfaction the long 
sustained expansion in the U.S. economy and pros- 
pects for its continuance. It again recognized the 
remarkable growth record of Japan and, while not- 
ing that Japan is going through a readjustment 
period, expressed confidence in the steady growth of 
its economy. As in previous meetings, the Commit- 
tee emphasized the need for further exchange of in- 
formation between the two Governments on their 
major economic problems and policies. 

2. The Committee welcomed favorable develop- 
ments in the balance of payments situation of both 
Japan and the United States but noted both coun- 
tries still face problems in their external accounts. 
The United States delegation, noting the limited 
Interest Equalization Tax exemption,' assured the 

Japanese delegation that the U.S. will continue to 
give full consideration to Japan's financial prob- 
lems. The Japanese delegation stated its willingness 
to support, whenever possible, the efforts of the 
United States to restore balance of payments equilib- 

3. The Committee noted with satisfaction the 
gratifying increase in the trade between the two 
countries which may exceed $4 billion in 1965. The 
Committee recognized that with a growing volume 
and diversity of trade, problems are bound to arise 
for both countries. Both delegations had a frank 
exchange of views on some of the pending problems 
in this field, such as the problems of United States- 
Japan textile trade. The Committee observed that 
generally expanding trade, growing economic activ- 
ity and rising living standards, and greater recipro- 
cal understanding by governments, industry and 
labor can contribute to the solution of trade problems. 

4. The U.S. delegation noted that United States 
policy encourages a free flow of Japanese private 
investment which contributes to an expansion of 
trade, economic growth, and higher living standards 
through more efficient use of capital and technology, 
and then referred to the difficulties facing Ameri- 
can enterprises desiring to set up or expand their 
industries and businesses in Japan. The Japanese 
delegation, while stating its basic attitude of welcom- 
ing sound foreign investment, cited adverse effects 
on the Japanese economy which could be produced 
by large and sudden inflow of foreign investment. 
The Committee agreed on the desirability of facili- 
tating sound direct investment between the two 
countries in an orderly and mutually beneficial man- 

5. The delegations took note of the progress made 
in recent informal talks concerning the Civil Avia- 
tion Agreement and look towards a formal negotia- 
tion commencing in Tokyo on August 10. 

6. The Committee also discussed matters relating 
to the North Pacific Fisheries Convention. It re- 
called with satisfaction that the two Governments 
reached an interim agreement on the East Bering 
Sea king crab question in November 1964,° making 
another step forward in solving problems between 
the two countries. It was agreed that, for the pur- 
poses of an early resumption of the recessed nego- 
tiations, each side should make the preparations 
needed to create an atmosphere which would ensure 
reaching an agreement based on recognition of the 
legitimate interests of the United States, Japan and 


The importance of close cooperation between Japan 
and the United States in international economic af- 
fairs was emphasized. 

' For text of an Executive order, see Bxilletin 
of May 3, 1965, p. 667. 

" For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, 
p. 892. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


1. The Committee recognized the vital importance 
to both countries of the success of the Kennedy 
Round of Tariff Negotiations at Geneva for the re- 
duction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers which re- 
strict trade. Both delegations welcomed the progress 
made so far in the negotiations and expressed the 
hope that these could proceed according to schedule 
and lead to an early successful conclusion in support 
of expanded world trade. 

2. The two delegations explained the basic policies 
of their respective Governments on trade with the 
Communist countries. Japan's policy is based on the 
principle of separating the political and economic 
aspects of Japan's relations with the countries of 
the Communist Bloc. The United States delegation 
explained the reasons for having no economic rela- 
tions with Communist China, North Korea or North 
Viet-Nam, its economic embargo of Cuba and its 
opposition to long term credits to the Communist 
Bloc. It pointed out that United States trade in non- 
strategic items with the countries of Eastern Europe 
and the U.S.S.R. has been under intense review as a 
means of enabling the United States to develop addi- 
tional avenues of communication and contact with 
these countries. 

3. The Committee recognized the significance of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop- 
ment Es a forum for systematic consideration of 
the trade problems of the developing countries. The 
two delegations confirmed their Governments' inten- 
tions to cooperate in seeking constructive solutions to 
the problems of these countries. 

4. The Committee noted with satisfaction that 
during the first year of Japan's participation in the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment, it played an increasingly active and re- 
sponsible role in that organization. 

5. The Committee agreed on the importance of as- 
suring that supplies of international liquidity over 
the long-term are adequate to support increasing 
world trade and investment. It noted that as the 
United States approaches balance in its external ac- 
counts, the world will need to consider and prepare 
for improvements in world monetary arrangements 
to assure that sources of liquidity will be made avail- 
able as may be necessary. 


The Committee noted with satisfaction the in- 
creasingly close cooperation between the two coun- 
tries in economic assistance to the developing coun- 
tries. The delegations also discussed the problem 
of creating and utilizing resources to meet the de- 
velopment requirements of the developing countries. 
The Committee agreed that the implementation of 
the Southeast Asia assistance offer which President 
Johnson made in April this year " and to which Prime 
Minister Sato promptly gave support would be a 
major contribution to social and economic progress 
in the countries of Southeast Asia. Both delegations 

welcomed progress being made in creating an Asia 
Development Bank, and saw great promise in its 
operations. The delegations agreed that Japan and 
the United States must in their assistance pro- 
grams, work closely with other countries to develop 
needed arrangements able to maximize the effective- 
ness of the resources made available for the growth 
and development of the area. The delegations hoped 
for further Asian initiatives which would make 
possible improvement of human welfare, give im- 
petus to economic growth, and lead to an environ- 
ment where the many countries of the area with their 
diverse economies and varying levels of development 
could live in peace together. 

1. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the 
United States-Japan exchange programs for trade- 
union and vocational training experts, in view of 
their significant contributions to friendship and un- 
derstanding of the two peoples. 

2. The Committee received the report of the United 
States-Japan Conference on Development and Utili- 
zation of Natural Resources. The Committee en- 
dorsed the conclusion of the Conference that the 
exchange activities have helped significantly in pro- 
moting understanding between Japanese and Ameri- 
can specialists and their agencies concerned with na- 
tural resources problems and that it is worthwhile 
to continue the program as a whole at about the pres- 
ent level of effort. 


The Committee agreed that the Fourth Meeting 
of the Joint Committee had made a meaningful 
contribution to the strengthening of relations be- 
tween the two countries. Both delegations looked 
forward to an exchange of views at the next meet- 
ing in Tokyo. 


The United States was represented by Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State; Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of 
the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the 
Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agri- 
culture; John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce; 
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor; and Gardner 
Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad- 
visors. Edwin 0. Reischauer, United States Am- 
bassador to Japan, William M. Roth, Acting Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations, David E. 
Bell, Administrator, Agency for International De- 
velopment, and senior advisers from the various 
departments concerned also were present. 

Japan was represented by Etsusaburo Shiina, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Takeo Fukuda, Minister 

" For an address made by President Johnson at 
Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see ibid., Apr. 
26, 1965, p. 606. 



of Finance; Eiichi Sakata, Minister of Agriculture 
and Forestry; Takeo Miki, Minister of International 
Trade and Industry; Hisao Kodaira, Minister of 
Labor; Torata Nakamura, Minister of Transporta- 
tion; and Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director General of 

the Economic Planning Agency. Ryuji Takeuchi, 
Japanese Ambassador to the United States, as well 
as Nobuhiko Ushiba, Deputy Vice Minister for For- 
eign Affairs, and other advisers from the various 
ministries concerned, also were present. 

World Trade and the Kennedy Round 

by W. Michael Blumenthal 

Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^ 

The Kennedy Round is the most ambitious 
effort to liberalize world trade ever under- 
taken. All the world's trading nations stand 
to gain from the success of this effort. And 
yet these negotiations involve much more 
than trade and economics. They are a unique 
and singular opportunity to give added 
strength, vitality, and meaning to the politi- 
cal as well as economic ties that unite Eu- 
rope, North America, and the other trading 
nations of the world. 

President Johnson expressed this idea re- 
cently when he said : ^ 

We in the United States look upon these nego- 
tiations as an important opening to a better world. 
If we act together with dedication and purpose, all 
can gain and none need lose. Not only the major 
commercial nations, but all the countries of this 
shrinking world — poor and rich alike — have the right 
to expect success from our endeavors. 

The importance of the Kennedy Round is 
widely recognized in many parts of the 
world and among a large number of coun- 
tries negotiating in Geneva. This is partic- 
ularly true here in the Federal Republic. No 
one is a greater champion of liberal trade 
policies than Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard, 

' Address made at the Dusseldorf Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry, Dusseldorf, Germany, on 
July 15. 

"Bulletin of June 1, 1964, p. 878. 

who as Minister of Economics participated 
in the first ministerial meeting in May of 
1963.3 He can justly be called one of the 
fathers of the negotiations. 

President [Walter] Hallstein of the Eu- 
ropean Economic Community also has given 
the Kennedy Round high priority. He has 
characterized the negotiations as ". . . prob- 
ably the most important thing that has ever 
occurred in the foreign relations of our Com- 
munity." Only recently the European Free 
Trade Association (EFTA) ministers meet- 
ing in Vienna again emphasized their view 
that the success of the negotiations is of 
vital importance to all the member countries 
of EFTA. One could go on in a similar vein 
quoting leading statesmen in important 
world trading countries, whether from the 
European Economic Community (EEC), 
Canada, Japan, or from many of the develop- 
ing nations of the world. 

There is, therefore, a remarkable degree of 
unanimity that the Kennedy Round is im- 
portant and that it is in the common inter- 
est of all nations to have the talks succeed. 
And there is a firm shared commitment 
among all the principal nations involved to 
translate the objectives of the Kennedy 
Round into concrete reality. 

When Heinrich Heine was asked why, in 

' For background, see ibid., June 24, 1963, p. 990. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


his time, they no longer built cathedrals like 
the one at Amiens, he replied, ". . . men in 
those days had convictions, the moderns 
have opinions and it requires something 
more than an opinion to build a Gothic 

There is both opinion and conviction that 
the Kennedy Round should succeed. 

Why is this so? Why the common com- 
mitment to leave no stone unturned to make 
the negotiations succeed? Why the great ef- 
fort and expense expended in Geneva for so 

Is the Kennedy Round merely another — 
the sixth in fact — in a continuing series of 
tariff talks conducted under the GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
since the end of the war? Or does this par- 
ticular negotiation differ from others? 
What is our joint stake in the success or 
failure of this effort? 

What are the basic principles underlying 
the Kennedy Round? What are the condi- 
tions, traditions, and framework of interna- 
tional trade which we are trying to preserve, 
perfect, and adapt? 

What has been accomplished in the trade 
negotiations thus far? Why has it taken us 
so long to get to the present stage of our 
negotiations? Has our progress been satis- 

The Kennedy Round has now been under- 
way for 2 years. The negotiations will be 
entering their vital phase this fall, when the 
preparations and preliminaries will have 
been completed and the offers tabled, clari- 
fied, and discussed. Countries will have to 
be ready to make important decisions. In 
other words, we will soon be moving toward 
the stage in the negotiations which will de- 
termine their success or their failure. 

With the August recess in sight, this is 
an opportune moment to answer these ques- 
tions, to take stock, to review where we 
stand, and to look frankly at where we are 
going and what problems lie ahead. 

For some of you, as leaders of German in- 
dustry, certain aspects of this review may be 
familiar. But perhaps some of the thoughts 

which I shall express today may be new and, 
hopefully, provide useful material for fruit- 
ful discussion and for illumination of the 
task still ahead of us. 

Importance of Negotiations 

What is the Kennedy Round ? 

Simply stated, it is the most ambitious 
undertaking of the postwar period to reduce 
all kinds of barriers that hamper interna- 
tional trade. The goal is to halve tariffs 
wherever possible and, at the same time, to 
attack nontariff barriers. Virtually all prod- 
ucts entering world trade — agricultural and 
industrial, raw materials, and manufac- 
tured goods — are included in this effort. 
What does this mean to the European busi- 
nessman in Germany, in France, in Italy, 
and elsewhere ? 

In the first instance, the negotiations are 
concerned with access to world markets. We 
are negotiating on the conditions of ac- 
cess to a rapidly growing American market. 
The gross national product of the United 
States last year exceeded the $600 billion 
mark and is expected to reach $1,000 billion 
by about 1975. In 1963 our trading partners 
found markets for $17 billion of their ex- 
ports in the United States. This figure has 
been rising steadily. If we cut American 
trade barriers in half, how will this affect 
opportunities for exporting to the United 
States ? Similarly at stake are the markets of 
Japan with present imports of over $5 bil- 
lion and of Britain and the rest of EFTA 
with a sum total of imports of about $24 
billion — $8 billion from the EEC alone. And, 
of course, there is the market of the Euro- 
pean Economic Community, with imports 
from third countries running at $24 billion. 
But much more is involved in the Kennedy 
Round than even these imposing trade sta- 
tistics imply — more is involved economically 
and politically — for these negotiations occur 
at a particularly important moment in world 
history, when a number of far-reaching de- 
velopments are underway. 
In particular : 



The European Economic Community is es- 
tablishing the pattern of its world trading 
relationships. This is a most significant as- 
pect of the Community's participation in the 
Kennedy Round both as an exporter and as 
an importer, for the extent to which the 
Kennedy Round succeeds in lowering world 
trade barriers must necessarily be heavily in- 
fluenced by the actions of the world's larg- 
est trading unit — the European Economic 
Community. The Community has a great in- 
terest in the development of world trade, 
and it has a responsibility to contribute to 
this development — a responsibility explicitly 
recognized in article 110 of the Treaty of 

The negotiations also occur at a moment 
when the nations of the European Free 
Trade Association are moving toward full 
implementation of their trading arrange- 
ments. A successful Kennedy Round can 
greatly facilitate the harmonious expansion 
of trade between the EFTA countries and 
other nations, not least the Community. 

The developing nations are now justly 
pressing for action to improve the expansion 
of their exports and export earnings as a 
part of their economic development efforts. 
As with so many of the world's problems 
and pressures, the trade aspirations of the 
developing nations can — with foresight and 
effort — be dealt with constructively. Other- 
wise less constructive solutions will inevita- 
bly be forced upon us. 

Finally, there are other countries, includ- 
ing some in Eastern Europe, now seeking 
to expand their commerce and to fit into a 
wider pattern of international trade. Some 
of these see in the Kennedy Round one 
means of achieving this objective. 

The outcome of the Kennedy Round may 
well set the tone for the conduct of world 
trade for many years to come. For a number 
of reasons, some accidental, these negotia- 
tions may greatly influence our longrun 
commercial, economic, and, in part, also 
political relations. That is why the stakes 
are high; that is why so many nations are 
determined that these negotiations shall 

The importance of the Kennedy Round 
can, perhaps, be summarized by two proposi- 
tions : 

First, the outcome of the negotiations will 
have a major, and perhaps decisive, influ- 
ence on the conduct of world trade. A suc- 
cessful Kennedy Round will strengthen and 
extend the pattern of liberal, multilateral 
trade based on comparative advantage and 
nondiscrimination — that is, the principle of 
most-favored-nation treatment. It is not an 
exaggeration to say that this framework of 
liberal, multilateral trade has provided an 
indispensable foundation for the economic 
growth and prosperity which the major in- 
dustrialized countries have now enjoyed for 
almost two decades. On the other hand, if 
we are not successful in the Kennedy Round, 
it would be naive to expect our trading pat- 
terns — and the dynamism of our national 
economies — to be unaffected. If we should 
fall in the Kennedy Round, we would risk 
sliding back into restrictionism and bilater- 
alism. This, history should have taught us to 

The second proposition is a corollary of the 
first. While the outcome of the Kennedy 
Round — for better or worse — will have broad 
economic and political significance for all of 
us, it can also have a major direct impact 
on the future markets and profits of indi- 
vidual firms and industries. The more ex- 
tensive and comprehensive the reductions 
of trade barriers which emerge from the 
Kennedy Round, the greater the new mar- 
kets for us all to share. Conversely, to the 
extent we fall short of this goal, potential 
markets will not develop; and restrictive 
solutions to pressing immediate problems 
may threaten existing markets. 

Businessmen in all countries — and partic- 
ularly those interested in export markets — 
would do well, therefore, to pay close atten- 
tion to the conduct of the negotiations over 
the coming months. We in the United States 
have established procedures through which 
businessmen and the Government can con- 
duct a useful exchange of views and infor- 
mation on Kennedy Round matters. I assume 
that business leaders here in the Federal Re- 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


public as well as in other countries maintain 
similar contact with their negotiators. 

Principle of Universality 

Every multilateral negotiation must have 
ground rules to set the framework and pro- 
vide the guidelines for the conduct of the 
talks and for the nature of the commitments 
being discussed. The Kennedy Round is no 
exception. We are guided by certain princi- 
ples — some established GATT rules or nego- 
tiating traditions of long standing, others 
quite new and far-reaching. Their mean- 
ing for the success of the Kennedy Round and 
for the shape of the world trade relations 
may be considerable. I should like to recall 
four of these fundamental principles today — 
four principles which seem to me among the 
most important for they show the direction 
in which we must move in the solution of our 
remaining problems. 

The first basic principle of the Kennedy 
Round negotiation is its universality. All 
trade is included in the talks. Our effort to 
reduce trade barriers applies to all products, 
agricultural and nonagricultural, manufac- 
tured, semimanufactured, and raw mate- 
rials. Exceptions must remain at a bare 
minimum. No sectors or industries where 
export markets of participants are at stake 
should be left out. This is the letter and the 
spirit of one of the key decisions taken by 
GATT ministers in May 1963. 

The principle of universality, and the 
ministerial decisions to this effect, are clear 
and straightforward; but as negotiators we 
have not always found this an easy rule to 
implement in practice. Yet we in the United 
States are more than ever convinced, as we 
hope you are, that here lies one of the keys 
to the success or failure of the Kennedy 

This is so because practically every omis- 
sion of a product or industry or sector of 
trade from real trade liberalization vitally 
affects one negotiating partner or another 
having important export interests in these 
areas. This leads to their removing other 
products from the negotiations — products 
which they import — so as to square the 

balance or they may even drop out of the 
negotiations altogether. Once the principle 
of universality is violated, therefore, we 
can no longer be sure that a large number 
of countries can participate effectively in 
the talks or that a sufficient balance of advan- 
tages involving deep reciprocal reductions of 
trade barriers can be established by the vari- 
ous participants. For an undertaking as far- 
reaching and ambitious as the Kennedy 
Round, it is essential that the widest number 
of countries participate. Only in this way 
can the objectives of this negotiation be 

Lest it be felt that this emphasis on the 
universality of coverage of the negotiations 
is belaboring an obvious point, let me assure 
you that this is not so. We have already 
had evidence of recurrent temptations to 
overlook this principle. Each country, after 
all, has some difficult areas which it would 
just as soon not subject to a real reduction 
of trade barriers. For some countries, for 
example, effective liberalization of agricul- 
tural trade may be difficult. Yet it is clear 
that the omission of even a few major agri- 
cultural product groups would, in most cases, 
have a serious impact on countries export- 
ing these commodities. For many, the major 
benefits of the negotiations will flow pre- 
cisely from the degree of liberalization 
achieved in agriculture. Australia, New Zea- 
land, Argentina, and Denmark fall into this 
category. Others, like the United States 
with more than $6 billion in agricultural 
exports amounting to a quarter of our total 
exports, could hardly be content with a ne- 
gotiation which failed to make progress in 
the key agricultural commodities — for trade 
negotiations and the exchange of conces- 
sions cannot be confined into neat and dis- 
tinct compartments. 

The economy of the Federal Republic, as 
you are well aware, requires export markets. 
German exports, which are primarily in- 
dustrial goods, comprise about 15 percent of 
your gross national product. Yet here in the 
great industrial center of the Ruhr, you 
must also be interested in agricultural 
trade liberalization as one of the keys to 
success of the industrial negotiation. Un- 



less we work to resolve our agricultural as 
well as our industrial trade problems, the 
impact on industrial trade will be inevitable. 
I have but to mention one case, a situation 
which I sincerely hope will be the last of 
its kind — the fate which has befallen ex- 
ports of American broilers to the Com- 
munity and trucks to the United States. 

Restriction breeds counterrestrictionism 
in other fields. Hence, trade liberalization in 
agriculture and industry must go hand in 
hand. It is equally important, of course, 
that all parts of the industrial sector be in- 
cluded in the talks, apart from making cer- 
tain minimum exceptions of individual prod- 
ucts. Each country has certain industries or 
sectors in which trade liberalization presents 
particular problems. If we exclude from real 
liberalization, say, steel, to please one coun- 
try, or chemicals because they are a problem 
for another country, or textiles to accom- 
modate a third, the effects would be felt 
well beyond any one sector of trade. Ex- 
porters of these commodities would be 
obliged to scale down their own offers to 
bring them in line with the reduced op- 
portunities for their exports in other mar- 
kets. We must conclude, therefore, that the 
ministers were wise to establish the principle 
of the all-inclusiveness — of the universality 
— of the negotiations, even though imple- 
mentation of this principle requires great 
effort and courage. 

Let me emphasize also that the inclusion 
of all trade, of course, means inclusion for 
the purpose of genuine reductions of pres- 
ently existing trade barriers. Offering the- 
oretical rather than real rates of protection 
for cuts has little value to exporters who 
look for real reductions of presently exist- 
ing rates of protection or of trade barriers 
actually in effect. 

Global Reciprocity 

A second principle of importance is the 
concept of global reciprocity. What does it 
mean? In general terms, global reciprocity 
means that a country cannot be expected 
to extend to its trading partners as a 
group a package of trade-liberalizing con- 
cessions which it regards as more valuable 

than the package of concessions it receives. 

More specifically, it means the following: 
A country is expected to give only as much 
in concessions as it will receive. No major 
participant is expected to make a greater 
effort or deeper or more sweeping reduction 
than any other major participant. 

This would appear at first glance to be a 
rather simple concept, almost a self-evident 
one. Yet its implications are considerable, 
and almost no week goes by when we do not 
have to reflect on them in our discussions 
in Geneva. For example, if the EEC asks 
the United States for some particular con- 
cession — in the nontariff barrier field, for 
example — we are entitled to ask, "What will 
you give us in return?" I should add that 
nontariff barriers are a rather fruitful 
field in this regard. It has become clear 
from our discussions so far that all of us 
are quite experienced constructors of non- 
tariff barriers. 

Reciprocity must be global. It must apply 
to the final package as a whole. Balance 
does not have to be established for each 
sector or part of trade. In other words, a 
country may well provide greater benefits 
in one area as long as it receives offsetting 
benefits in another area and the total pack- 
age is an equal one. Failure to respect the 
global character of reciprocity would mean 
that concessions in each sector would have to 
be perfectly balanced, thus reducing the 
level of all concessions to the lowest common 
denominator — ^to the slowest ship in the con- 

Reciprocity must not only be global as 
between products but between countries as 
well. In other words, it must be measured 
among the sum total of all countries par- 
ticipating in the Kennedy Round. We do not 
need to work for a bilateral balance be- 
tween any two countries. This, too, is de- 
signed to maximize the sum total of con- 
cessions exchanged in the Kennedy Round. 

Such multilateral reciprocity, of course, is 
a logical concomitant of the multilateral 
nature of international trade itself. Here, 
however, a qualification is in order. While 
bilateral balancing is to be avoided, it is 

AUGUST 9, 196B 


clear that the major participants in the 
talks — I am referring principally to the 
Community, Britain, Japan, and the United 
States — ^must make roughly equivalent ef- 
forts. No doubt you would not find it 
easy to offer trade concessions of greater 
importance than those agreed to by the 
United States. We would find ourselves in 
a similar position. This, of course, has 
a direct relevance to the size of the excep- 
tions lists of the key countries: In the end, 
each one of the major negotiating partners 
will adjust his list to make sure that the 
importance of its concessions is substan- 
tially equivalent to those of the other major 
trading countries. That is why it is so im- 
portant that all of us seek to reduce our 
lists to a bare minimum. 

Provisions for Developing Countries 

The third general principle of the ne- 
gotiations is an entirely new one, intro- 
duced into GATT trade negotiations for the 
first time. I am referring to the decision 
that the requirement of full reciprocity is 
to apply to the developed countries only. 

This concept of less than full reciprocity 
for developing countries breaks new ground. 
It embodies the recognition that no de- 
veloping nation should have to make re- 
ductions in its trade barriers which are in- 
consistent with its development efforts, 
while welcoming and, in fact, encouraging 
the fullest possible participation of such 
countries in the negotiations. This principle 
permits developing nations to be full par- 
ticipants and to negotiate for maximum 
benefits for their export trade while making 
their own contributions in accordance with 
their particular needs and stage of de- 
velopment. It is by this means — and by 
making every effort to keep off our ex- 
ceptions lists the products of special interest 
to the developing nations — that we hope to 
implement our important objective of mak- 
ing the Kennedy Round a real factor in 
promoting the trade objectives of the many 
new and growing nations in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. 

Most-Favored-Nation Principle 

This leads to the fourth and in many 
ways the most important general principle 
underlying the negotiations. As I mentioned 
a few moments ago, one of our main stakes 
in the Kennedy Round is the strengthening 
and extension of the pattern of liberal, multi- 
lateral trade relations based on the most- 
favored-nation (MFN) principle. MFN — the 
concept that a concession to one nation is a 
concession to all and that, for a given prod- 
uct, all GATT countries have the right to 
be accorded the same treatment by im- 
porters — is the bedrock on which the present 
highly beneficial structure of world trade 
has been built. Stated inversely, MFN means 
nondiscrimination. We must not underesti- 
mate the importance and the value of this 

All the major industrialized countries are 
under pressures of various sorts, or have 
been tempted at one time or another, to 
depart from MFN in this or that area. We 
must resist this temptation. We must be 
particularly careful not to vitiate the MFN 
principle in our search for expedient solu- 
tions to immediate problems. 

There has been considerable discussion of 
departing in one way or another from MFN 
in an effort to improve the export oppor- 
tunities of developing countries. The issue 
of tariff preferences for developing coun- 
tries raises the question of whether the 
MFN principle should apply to this trade. 

While this is not the forum in which to 
discuss this matter in detail, I would like 
to make a brief comment. The more na- 
tions depart from the concept that trade 
should be conducted on the basis of com- 
parative advantage, the more we risk this 
trade being stifled and distorted by in- 
creasingly political rather than economic de- 
termination of trade patterns. Moreover, the 
actual trade benefits from preferences seem 
highly questionable. If a developing country 
is an efficient producer of a particular 
product, it may have much to gain from 
lower trade barriers but no need for pref- 
erential treatment. If a developing country 
is not an efficient producer, tariff pref- 



erences may not help it compete with the 
domestic industry in the import market, 
particularly where the latter is a large 
industrialized one. And this is by no means 
a complete case against preferences. My 
purpose, however, is merely to point out 
that in my view preferences appear to be 
neither a politically nor economically justi- 
fiable departure from MFN. 

If we fail in the Kennedy Round to 
strengthen the pattern of liberal multi- 
lateral trade through the significant re- 
duction of trade barriers on an MFN basis, 
we risk slippage of trade relations more 
and more into a restrictive mold. The MFN 
system is founded on an underlying common 
interest in the expansion of trade which we 
must have the wisdom, determination, and 
patience to protect and perfect. 

These, then, are what seem to me to be 
the four key principles on which the Ken- 
nedy Round is based. Universality: The ne- 
gotiations involve all products, all coun- 
tries are welcome to participate. And, of 
course, the inclusion of the broad range of 
world trade in these talks is for the purpose 
of a genuine and extensive reduction in the 
obstacles to trade. Global reciprocity : World 
trade is multilateral and is based on com- 
parative advantage. Narrow balancing of 
concessions between specific products or 
individual countries is, therefore, inconsist- 
ent with the essential structure of world 
trade. Special provisions for the developing 
countries: These nations can contribute to 
world trade while spurring their own de- 
velopment. Their actions in the field of com- 
mercial policy must be consistent with their 
development needs. And, finally, of course, 
MFN: The most-favored-nation principle 
must remain the foundation of our trade 

Progress in the Kennedy Round 

As I have already pointed out, these 
principles have not proven easy to imple- 
ment in Geneva. An outside observer may 
have gained the impression from occasional 
press reports that the Kennedy Round was 
witnessing much maneuvering but little 

progress. In fact, this has not been true. We 
have made very important progress. 

Let me be specific. 

— We have worked out a new formula for 
worldwide tariff reductions — the linear cut. 
The depth of the linear cut for all indus- 
trial goods was set at 50 percent. 

— The major trading nations tabled un- 
precedented offers for tariff cuts in in- 
dustrial products last November. While we 
must work to reduce exceptions to this 
linear offer, we have reason to be pleased 
with the importance of the offers which 
have been made. 

— Procedures for the participation of the 
developing countries based on the concept 
of less than full reciprocity have been agreed. 
These countries are now actively engaged in 
the negotiations in Geneva. 

— In agriculture, a method for negotia- 
tion by specific groups of commodities has 
been worked out. Concrete offers were made 
on grains, and negotiations on these offers 
now have begun. 

— For other agricultural products, pre- 
liminary negotiations have been completed; 
and offers are expected to be tabled in 
Geneva in the early fall. 

— Negotiations are underway on a number 
of nontariff barriers. 

How much longer will the Kennedy Round 
go on before it can be brought to a suc- 
cessful conclusion ? 

Much detailed and arduous work has al- 
ready been done, but much remains — es- 
pecially in the agricultural area. Neverthe- 
less, the outlines of a final package should 
begin to emerge by next winter. And during 
the year of 1966 we will have before us the 
complex, often delicate, but tremendously 
important task of shaping up a final Ken- 
nedy Round agreement. 

Courage, patience, and wisdom will be 
needed in the months ahead — the courage 
of our convictions, the patience to seek 
meaningful solutions, and the wisdom to 
move forward in the building of a world 
community — for a successful Kennedy Round 
is part of the stone and mortar of a better 
free world. 

AUGUST 9, 1965 


Regulations on International 
Traffic in Arms Revised 

Press release 180 dated July 20 

The Secretary of State has promulgated 
a complete revision of the Department's 
international traffic in arms regulations.^ 
These regulations, which were last revised 
in 1960, implement the control vested in the 
Secretary by delegation of the President 
over the export and import of arms, ammu- 
nition, and implements of war. The articles 
subject to control are enumerated in the 
regulations as the United States Munitions 
List, which has the concurrence of the Sec- 
retary of Defense. 

The new regulations continue the control 
long exercised by the Secretary of State and 
most recently authorized by section 414 of 
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as 

The more important changes in the regu- 
lations include (1) addition of articles to 
the United States Munitions List in reflec- 
tion of both technical military developments 
and policy requirements such as satellites, 
spacecraft, launch vehicles, filament wind- 
ing machines, experimental aircraft tech- 
nology and componentry, missile and space 
powerplants, guidance and control systems, 
and special insurgency-type weaponry; (2) 
clarification of certain areas of control such 
as strategic delivery systems, implementa- 
tion of the limited nuclear test ban treaty, 
naval nuclear propulsion plants and asso- 
ciated facilities, and classified military in- 
formation; (3) simplification of munitions 
control procedures such as elimination of 
certain categories of articles in normal com- 
mercial or sporting use, restricted defini- 
tion of technical data, elimination of issu- 
ance of registration certificates, ameliora- 
tion of unclassified technical data control, 
and inclusion of all .22-caliber weapons and 
all military cargo-type aircraft. 


' For the revised text of Subchapter M, Chapter 1, 
Title 22, of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 30 
Fed. Reg. 9034. 

Public Members Added to Teams 
of Foreign Service Inspectors 

Press release 181 dated July 24 

The Department of State for the first 
time is adding public members to the teams 
of Foreign Service inspectors examining 
its overseas activities and operations. 

Eight two-man Foreign Service inspec- 
tion teams traveling in Africa, Latin Amer- 
ica, Europe, and the Near Eastern areas dur- 
ing the third quarter of 1965 will each be 
joined by a public member. 

The private citizens will participate fully 
in the inspection of the posts to be visited 
by the teams. Six of the public members 
have been in Washington for briefings and 
orientation prior to moving on to their over- 
seas assignments. The public members were 
asked to serve in the program, which has 
the approval of Secretary Rusk, Under Secre- 
tary Ball, and Deputy Under Secretary for 
Administration William J. Crockett. 

The public members and their assign- 
ments follow : 

Jerome Keithley, who has served since 
1950 as city manager of Palo Alto, Calif., 
will join Inspectors R. Burr Smith and Ken- 
neth W. Calloway for the inspections of posts 
in Portugal and Switzerland. 

Charles D. Lewis, assistant to the chair- 
man and president of the American Suma- 
tra Corporation in New York, will serve 
with Inspectors Daniel M. Braddock and 
Howard P. Mace in the inspections of posts 
in India and Nepal. 

Robert Payton, vice chancellor of Wash- 
ington University in St. Louis, Mo., will join 
Inspectors Thomas K. Wright and William 
D. Calderhead for the inspections of posts in 

Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN retired, and 
formerly director of AID programs in Tuni- 



sia and the Malagasy Republic, will join In- 
spectors W. Wendell Blancke and Mason A. 
LaSelle for the inspections of posts in Israel 
and Jerusalem. 

William H. Figy, insurance company exec- 
utive, of Denver, Colo., will join Inspectors 
William Belton and Eldon B. Smith in the 
inspections of posts in Norway, Finland, 
and Sweden. 

Robert M. Adams, Jr., formerly an offi- 
cial of the United Aircraft Corp. in Hart- 
ford, Conn., and now a management consul- 
tant in Washington, will join Inspectors Al- 
fred leS. Jenkins and Earle A. Cleveland in 
their inspections of the posts in Jordan and 

Norbert Dengler, New York attorney, will 
accompany Inspectors William C. Burdett 
and Howard E. Chaille in the inspections of 
the posts in Nicaragua and Honduras. 

Dean Clowes, international affairs rep- 
resentative of the United Steel Workers of 
America in Washington, is scheduled to join 
Inspectors Edward A. Jamison and Fred- 
erick B. Cook for the inspections of the 
posts in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (Leopoldville). 

Federal District Judge Thaddeus M. Mach- 
rowicz, of the Eastern District of Michigan, 
had been invited to join the inspection 
teams, but illness will prevent his participa- 
tion as planned. 


The Senate on July 21 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

David M. Bane to be Ambassador to the Gabon 
Republic. (For biographic details, see White House 
press release dated July 7.) 

Edward Clark to be Ambassador to Australia. 
(For biographic details, see White House press re- 
lease (Austin, Tex.) dated June 13.) 

George J. Feldman to be Ambassador to Malta. 
(For biographic details, see White House press re- 
lease dated July 7.) 

Parker T. Hart to be Ambassador to Turkey. ( For 
biographic details, see White House press release 
dated July 7.) 

John D. Jemegan to be Ambassador to the Demo- 
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. (For bio- 

graphic details, see White House press release dated 
June 5.) 

Dr. Albert H. Moseman to be Assistant Adminis- 
trator for Technical Cooperation and Research, 
Agency for International Development. 

David D. Newsom to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of Libya. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated July 7.) 

Hugh M. Smythe to be Ambassador to the Syrian 
Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated July 7.) 


Current Actions 



Articles of agreement of the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Done at Wash- 
ington December 27, 1945. Entered into force De- 
cember 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance : Malawi, July 19, 1965. 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. 
Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 
Signature and acceptance: Malawi, July 19, 1965. 

Articles of agreement of the International Finance 
Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington 
May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. 
TIAS 3620, 4894. 
Signature and acceptance : Malawi, July 19, 1965. 

Articles of agreement of the International Develop- 
ment Association. Done at Washington January 26, 
1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. 
TIAS 4607. 
Signature and acceptance: Malawi, July 19, 1965. 



Agreement extending the loan of the vessel U.S.S. 
Benham under the agreement of February 12 and 
26, 1960 (TIAS 4602), relating to the loan of 
certain vessels to Peru. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Lima June 8 and 28, 1965. Entered into 
force June 28, 1965. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of May 26, 1965. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Saigon July 9, 1965. Entered into force 
July 9, 1965. 

AUGUST 9, 1966 



Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintend- 
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cations, which may b