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DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
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Superintendent of Documents
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Vol. LIU, No. 1358
July 5, 1965
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: A PARTNERSHIP OF MUTUAL HELP
Address by Secretary Rusk 2
SECRETARY RUSK REVIEWS EFFORTS TO REACH
PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT IN SOUTHEAST ASIA 5
SECRETARY McNAMARA DISCUSSES BUILDUP OF FORCES IN VIET-NAM
Transcript of News Conference 12
PEACE: THE CENTRAL TASK OF FOREIGN POLICY
by W. W. Rostov), Counselor 21
THE KENNEDY ROUND: A PROGRESS REPORT
hy Christian A. Herter 31
EXPANDING THE PARTICIPATION OF WOMEN IN NATIONAL LIFE
Article by Gladys A. Tillett 39
For index see inside back cover
The Alliance for Progress: A Partnership of Mutual Help
Address by Secretary Rusk
Good evening. I count it a special priv-
ilege to be here, as you wind up your first
day's work as delegates to the First Inter-
American Conference of the Partners of
the Alliance. This first conference is a mile-
stone in a truly great enterprise : the Alliance
for Progress.
Nearly 4 years have passed since repre-
sentatives of the 20 independent Republics
of this hemisphere met in Punta del Este to
fashion the Alliance for Progress. The Char-
ter of Punta del Este - gave hope to the as-
pirations of responsible and progressive
Latin Americans. The United States helped
in the formulation of the charter, but the
ideas and the inspiration were profoundly
Latin American.
^ Made before the First Inter-American Conference
of the Partners of the Alliance at Washington, D.C.,
on June 10 (press release 151).
' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
The signatory governments pledged to
their own peoples — and to one another —
that they would meet the challenges of the
20th century. The commitment was clear : to
change old ways so that each nation would
become politically more democratic, econom-
ically more developed, and socially more just.
The ties that bind the American Repub-
lics in the inter-American system command
us to respect one another and to help one
another. The Alliance for Progress was fash-
ioned in that spirit of mutual help and re-
spect.
The Charter of Punta del Este made it
plain that no one nation would, or could, as-
sume the major responsibility of carrying
out the purposes of the alliance. Indeed, that
historic document declared that this was to
be a common and united effort of the peoples
of the Americas.
The charter of the alliance recognized
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1358 PUBLICATION 7918 JULY 5, 1965
The Department of State BuUetin, a
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ment, as well as special articles on vari-
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mation is included concerning treaties
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ature.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
that the strengthening of liberty in Latin
America required rapid and profound change.
It declared :
The men and women of our Hemisphere are reach-
ing for the better life which today's skills have
placed within their grasp. They are determined for
themselves and their children to have decent and ever
more abundant lives, to gain access to knowledge
and equal opportunity for all, to end those conditions
which benefit the few at the expense of the needs
and dignity of the many. It is our inescapable task
to fulfill these just desires — to demonstrate to the
poor and forsaken of our countries, and of all lands,
that the creative powers of free men hold the key to
their progress and to the progress of future genera-
tions.
Those words were a call for peaceful revo-
lution. And, as President Johnson has said,
those who make peaceful revolution impos-
sible make violent revolution inevitable.
Obviously, then, the United States wel-
comes change in Latin America. From its
inception, the Alliance for Progress has been
the cornerstone of our policy in Latin Amer-
ica. The alliance objectives — of reform and
development in democracy — are our objec-
tives. They are our objectives because we
have always believed in them and because
their attainment in each and every country
of Latin America is in our national interest.
Achievements of the Alliance
The Alliance for Progress is approaching
its fifth year. It stands at a hopeful but crit-
ically important stage.
The situation is hopeful for several rea-
sons:
— Last year Latin America achieved an
overall increase in its gross national prod-
uct of 21/2 percent per capita — the rough
target set in 1961. The increase varied from
country to country but was rather well
spread. The Inter- American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress (CIAP) feels there
is a fair chance that an overall 21/2 percent
per capita rate of grovpth will be achieved
again in 1965.
Let me cite a few figures on the achieve-
ments of the alliance :
12 countries have land reform laws ;
10 have produced national development
plans or sector investment programs, and
other country programs are being com-
pleted ;
15 have self-help housing programs, and
more than 300,000 dwelling units have been
completed or are nearing completion ;
every alliance country has improved its
tax system or tax administration ; 9 have un-
dertaken major tax reform ;
42 intermediate credit institutions have
been created ;
6,150 miles of roads have been built;
more than 75,000 teachers have been
trained ;
nearly 10 million schoolbooks have been
circulated ;
more than 13 million schoolchildren are
participating in special school lunch pro-
grams, three times the number of 21/2 years
ago;
more than 200,000 agricultural credit loans
have been made.
— In most of the countries of Latin Amer-
ica there are governments, backed by a vital
new generation in public and private life,
which are facing courageously the tremen-
dous problems which must be solved to
achieve well-balanced economic and social de-
velopment. It is not easy to bring inflation
to a halt. It is not easy to increase tax col-
lections and to design and execute programs
of land reform. It is not easy to move away
from the protection of high tariff barriers
and to expand manufactured exports in a
competitive world. But these things are hap-
pening. The language of the Charter of
Punta del Este is being translated into
reality.
— The Western Hemisphere has fashioned
effective machinery for promoting sound de-
velopment and reform, institutions such as
the Inter-American Development Bank and
the Inter-American Committee on the Alli-
ance for Progress.
— Many of our friends in Latin America
wish to go beyond modernization of the in-
dividual nations of the hemisphere. They
seek to accelerate the process of economic in-
tegration. We see the beginnings of this proc-
JULY 5, 1965
ess in the Central American Common Mar-
ket and the Latin American Free Trade As-
sociation. Economic integration offers many
potential advantages. Investments for inte-
grated markets can be more efficient and
productive. Wider markets stimulate compet-
itive attitudes and practices. Integration ac-
celerates diversification of agriculture and
industry. And diversification is fundamental
to efficiency and regular self-sustained
grovid;h. The United States has supported,
and continues to support, economic integra-
tion in Europe. We think integration would
be correspondingly beneficial to Latin Amer-
ica. We look forward to having a strong eco-
nomic and political partner in Latin America.
That partnership would be strengthened by
the success of the integration movement.
Some Problems To Be Solved
Although we have solid grounds for satis-
faction in the progress that has been made
and for hope as we look to the future, we
must not underestimate the difficulties con-
fronting us.
One of the most serious difficulties is the
decline in the prices of certain traditional
Latin American exports — exports on which
many Latin American countries depend to
earn foreign exchange. The drop in the price
of sugar from 11 to 2Y2, cents was one of
the causes of the crisis in the Dominican
Republic. The long-range solution to over-
dependence on the export of a few agricul-
tural commodities lies in the diversification
of agriculture and the development of export
industries.
Another serious problem in several coun-
tries is inflation. Controlling it is a searching
test politically and socially as well as eco-
nomically. We are full of respect for those
governments which are dealing with the in-
flation courageously and tenaciously.
A third problem — and a far-reaching one
— is the modernization of rural life. Latin
America is at a stage of development where
industry and urban life are moving ahead
with high momentum. But most people in
Latin America still live in the country-
side, substantially untouched by modern life.
These people need schools and roads and elec-
tricity. They need to organize cooperatives
to sell their products in the cities at a fair
price. They need to learn how to improve
and diversify their production. Above all,
they need to hope that they will not be left
behind as the modernization of Latin Amer-
ica moves forward. They need to feel that not
only their governments but their fellow citi-
zens in the cities have an interest in im-
proving rural life. Building a modern nation
is more than a technical task. City folk and
country folk, the rich and the poor, the edu-
cated and the illiterate, must develop a sense
of common purpose and brotherhood.
The Dominican Republic
The Alliance for Progress was only be-
ginning to take hold in the Dominican Re-
public— a little country with a great poten-
tial to provide a good life for its people —
when the government was overthrovim in
April. Tragically, a hardhanded dictator had
for three decades thwarted the development
of the institutions required for effective de-
mocracy and social progress. Such economic
advance as took place was poorly balanced.
Potential leaders in the country did not have
an opportunity to develop mutual under-
standing and trust. Such a legacy is indeed
hard to overcome.
The countries of this hemisphere must de-
vise new mechanisms for cooperative action
in the Dominican situation and for any
crises which might arise in the future. And
all of us in the Alliance for Progress must
demonstrate our deep and lively interest in
the welfare of the people of the Dominican
Republic. For they want what the rest of us
want for ourselves: representative constitu-
tional government, economic and social prog-
ress, hope that their children's lives will be
happier and more fruitful than their ovsm.
One of our jobs in this hemisphere is to
help the Dominican people to attain these
objectives. The machinery of the Alliance for
Progress should set to work to build as rap-
idly as possible on that island the founda-
tions for a modem, democratic life.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Above all, however, the Alliance for Prog-
ress needs the enthusiastic and sustained
support of the people of all the member
countries. The people must knov? that this is
their program. And this is where you — the
Partners of the Alliance — are helping to
make an invaluable contribution. You have
established the means whereby the people
of all our countries can join together in a
partnership of mutual help — a partnership
based on respect for each other's culture and
for each other's dignity.
One of the greatest strengths of our form
of society is the readiness of private citizens,
as individuals and through voluntary or-
ganizations, to further public objectives.
Through your efforts more and more people
will come to see and understand that the
alliance is a living thing and that it goes
beyond power projects and trade conferences
and governmental decrees. Through your ef-
forts more and more people will come to
realize that there are many things they can
do for themselves, things that governments
cannot do for them, things they can do right
now to change their lives and to improve the
chances of their children having better lives.
Your work has already produced sugges-
tions for hundreds of ways in which the peo-
ple themselves can participate in the Alli-
ance for Progress.
So I think we are all entitled to regard
this First Inter-American Conference of the
Partners of the Alliance as a significant
milestone. I congratulate you. Let us move
forward, never forgetting, as President
Johnson said recently,^ that we in North
America and Latin America have always
had "very special ties of interest and affec-
tion" and that "together we share and shape
the destiny of the new world."
'Ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.
Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia
Following are remarks made by President
Johnson and Secretary Rusk after a meeting
of the Cabinet at the White House on June 18,
together with the transcript of a question-
and-answer period between Secretary Rusk
and the news correspondents.
White House press release dated June 18
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
The press office will have a statement from
the President to the Cabinet on the passage
of the excise tax reductions. We expect to
receive that bill later in the day. The state-
ment is self-explanatory, and I won't elab-
orate on it.
We received detailed reports this morning
on the international situation from Secretary
of State Rusk, and Secretary of Defense, Mr.
McNamara, in connection with the military
figures.
Mr. McNamara had an extended press con-
ference yesterday,! or the day before, and he
has met with groups, and I think I will just
ask Secretary Rusk today to review with you
.what he said to the Cabinet and to be avail-
able for any questions that you may care
to ask.
I will have to excuse myself, and certain
other Cabinet members have planes to catch
and luncheon appointments and so forth,
and so if they want to, they can retire through
the exit. Mr. Secretary, I submit you to their
mercies.
See p. 12.
JULY 5, 1965
REMARKS BY SECRETARY RUSK
Gentlemen, I reviewed for the Cabinet the
record of efforts to reach a peaceful settle-
ment of problems in Southeast Asia during
this past 4 or 41/2 years. Our commitment
there has been a simple one, a very serious
one. For more than a decade, obviously, it
demonstrated throughout this postwar period
since 1945 that the United States prefers to
find peaceful solutions rather than violent
solutions to outstanding questions.
I began by reviewing a series of bilateral
talks, using normal diplomatic procedure. It
started in a serious way at the meeting be-
tween President Kennedy and Chairman
Khrushchev in June of 1961.2 You will re-
call that at that meeting the two of them
agreed that we ought to be able to find a
solution for Laos, based upon everyone else
leaving Laos alone and letting the Laotians
run their own affairs.
There was no agreement at that time, or
subsequently in bilateral talks as far as Viet-
Nam is concerned, between ourselves and the
Soviet Union. The Laotian discussion, how-
ever, led to a conference in Geneva which
produced the Geneva accords of 1962.^ We
believe that those accords still represent a
proper basis for peace insofar as Laos is con-
cerned.
The difficulty with those agreements has
been that at no time since they were signed
has North Viet-Nam brought itself into com-
pliance with those agreements. At no time
did their military personnel in Laos reduce
below several thousand. At no time did
North Viet-Nam quit using Laos as an infil-
tration route into South Viet-Nam. At no
time did they give the International Control
Commission free access to all areas of Laos
under Viet-Nam and Pathet Lao control.
More recently, we have had similar bi-
lateral talks with Peiping, in which the sub-
' For background and text of a joint U.S.-U.S.S.R.
communique of June 4, 1961, see Bulletin of June
26, 1961, pp. 991 and 999.
' For text of a Declaration on the Neutrality of
Laos and an accompanying protocol, see ibid., Aug.
13, 1962, p. 259.
ject of Southeast Asia has arisen. But those
talks, as has been the case for the past 9
years or more, usually start with the other
side's insisting that there is nothing to talk
about unless we are prepared to surrender
Formosa and 11 million people on Formosa
to the mainland. When it becomes apparent
that that is not possible, then these talks
become rather harsh and forbidding and fol-
low the lines which you all know publicly.
There have been contacts from time to time
indirectly through those who are represented
in Hanoi, or through other means, with Hanoi
over the prospects and possibilities for peace
in Southeast Asia. No productive result from
such contacts as that.
There have been other governments who
are in contact with whom we have discussed
this matter over a considerable period of
time ; so the bilateral channels of diplomacy,
or normal channels of diplomacy, have been
fully utilized.
Possible Use of Geneva Machinery
Then we have, of course, considered how
the Geneva machinery might make a con-
tribution. I think we would want to record
with respect the serious concern and the dili-
gence with which the British Government, as
cochairman, has addressed itself to this ques-
tion throughout this period.
The British and Soviet cochairmen have
certain responsibilities with regard to that
Geneva machinery. For example, they are
supposed to report by midsummer under ar-
ticle 19 of the Geneva accords on Laos, on
the operations of the International Control
Commission. The British have been prepared
for some time to go into such discussions
with the other cochairman, the Laotian Gov-
ernment, and the three government members
of the International Control Commission
[Canada, India, and Poland], and there has
been no activity on the other side.
Efforts have been made to find out whether
it is possible that a reconvening of the Lao-
tian conference might be worth while. After
all, when the Hanoi delegation visited Mos-
cow some weeks ago, the joint communique
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
referred, or seemed to be approving terms to
the possibility of a conference on Cambodia
and on Laos.
Last year the policy proposed that the two
cochairmen and the three ICC countries and
the Laotians sit down for a discussion of
these problems, looking toward the possibility
of a Laotian conference.* We supported that
policy initiative. Hanoi was unwilling to go
forward with them.
The so-called three factions in Laos — the
Pathet Lao and the neutralists and the so-
called right wing — have, on occasion, had
talks among themselves, to see if some of
these questions in Laos could be resolved,
that would open the way for a further in-
ternational initiative. We have encouraged
constructive talks among the three factions.
But more recently it appears that the Pathet
Lao have, for all practical effect, broken
off those three-faction discussions.
As you know, there was an active proposal
to convene a Cambodia conference, stimu-
lated by a request by Prince Sihanouk, but
a conference would be held in order to give
international assurances with respect to the
security and the independence and neutrality
of Cambodia. We have agreed to such a
conference,^ but apparently, because of prob-
lems by Hanoi and Peiping, no motion has
taken place in that direction.
As far as the United Nations is concerned,
the Vietnamese problem was taken to the
Security Council last August in connection
with the Gulf of Tonkin affair.« The Soviet
representative moved that Hanoi be invited
to the Security Council, and we supported
that invitation, and the invitation was ex-
tended.
Hanoi refused to come. Both Hanoi and
Peiping have made it quite clear that a visit
by U Thant would not be acceptable on the
grounds that the Vietnamese question has
nothing to do with United Nations. Or
* For background, see ibid., July 20, 1964, p. 88,
and Aug. 17, 1964, p. 218.
° For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on
Apr. 25, see ibid., May 10, 1965, p. 711.
'Ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.
the United Nations intervention, as the Prime
Minister of North Viet-Nam put it, the
United Nations intervention in the Viet-
namese situation is inappropriate.
The British, as cochairman, suggested to
the Soviet Government that the two cochair-
men try to ascertain the views of the parties
to the Southeast Asian problem, to see
whether constructive suggestions might come
from the attitudes expressed by the various
parties.
That did not receive a response — a practi-
cal or constructive response. The British sent
Mr. Patrick Gordon Walker to Southeast Asia
to explore among the capitals the possibilities
for peace. He was not permitted to visit
Hanoi and Peiping.
President Johnson, on April 7,' said that
the United States remains ready for uncon-
ditional discussions with the Governments
concerned. This was described in Hanoi and
Peiping as a "hoax," as a "big swindle," and
a "lie covered with flowers."
The 17-Nation Appeal
Seventeen nonalined nations issued an ap-
peal to all parties most specifically concerned
to seek a peaceful solution through nego-
tiations without preconditions. * We respond-
ed affirmatively to that appeal. No result
from the other side. Some of the Communist
capitals have called some of the nonalined
backers of the 17-nation appeal "monsters"
and "freaks." President [of India Sarvepalli]
Radhakrishnan suggested that efforts be
made to arrange a cease-fire and that a group
of Afro-Asian troops be used to patrol such
a cease-fire, to keep the peace in that area..
We expressed our interest in his suggestions.
The other side rejected the Indian proposal,,
referring to the erroneous viewpoints of In-
dian ruling circles — as perhaps one of the
least colorful ways of expressing their ob-
jections.
You know that the Minister of External
Affairs of Canada, Mr. Paul Martin, referred
nbid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
"For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ibid., p. 610.
JULY 5, 1965
at the end of May or early this month to the
fact that his representative on the Inter-
national Control Commission in Viet-Nam
had gone to Hanoi to establish contact with
North Vietnamese leaders to see whether
there was any interest in a peaceful settle-
ment at this point. The result there was
negative.
Then there were those who felt that per-
haps a bombing pause might elicit some in-
terest in the other side in peaceful discussion
— in peaceful processes. There were those
who felt that a pause of 51/2 days or so was
not long enough.
The point is that, long before the 51/2 days
were over, the harsh attitude of the other
side was made very apparent and it was
quite clear that they called it a "worn-out
trick of deceit and threat," or "peace
swindle," a "despicable trick," "war black-
mail"— those are the words they used about
the idea of a pause.
Channels for Settlement Remain Open
I am not suggesting that all of these chan-
nels are closed. There are several of them
that remain open. For example, diplomatic
channels remain open. There remains the
possibility of utilizing the machinery of the
Geneva conferences. It may be that the 17
nations that addressed their original appeal
might find some basis on which they might
wish to renew that appeal or to take a fur-
ther step. Informal, indirect contacts, of
course, are available if there is a serious in-
terest among the various parties in finding a
peaceful settlement.
You are aware that the Commonwealth
prime ministers are now discussing the pos-
sibilities of a committee of Commonwealth
prime ministers to visit and to ascertain the
views of the capitals primarily concerned, to
see whether that kind of initiative would as-
sist in the situation.
The President yesterday [at a news con-
ference] indicated that he would welcome
any such initiative and that we would co-
operate with any such initiative which the
Commonwealth would take. It may be that
some initiative would come out of the Algiers
conference, which will be meeting toward the
end of this month.
So there are channels, there are proce-
dures ; but so far as we can tell at the present
time, the problem is not one of available
channels and procedures, but the problem is
one of readiness on the other side to look
at the problem here in terms of a peaceful
settlement.
We do not at the present time see much
evidence that any such ideas are in their
mind. They continue their actions in South
Viet-Nam, actions aimed primarily at the
civil structure of the countryside, aimed at
the civilians, aimed at local officials, hamlet
leaders or local government officials, or
teachers, public health workers — whoever
might be there in terms of the civic struc-
ture of the country.
Those acts of terrorism continue. If the
other side thinks that they have a military
success during these monsoon weeks and
months ahead of us, they may be holding
their hand and unwilling to engage in any
serious or responsible political discussion.
I would have to summarize by saying that
we do not see at the moment — we do not see
at the present time — active interest on the
part of Hanoi and Peiping, active effort by
Moscow, to bring this matter to a peaceful
conclusion.
Southeast Asia in Context of Postwar Period
In talking with the Cabinet, I put this
against the framework of other events in this
postwar period, because we tend to forget
that context. We have had problems in Iran,
Greece, Berlin, Korea, the Philippines, Ma-
laya, Cuba, and other places. When you look
back and see where the sources of violence
are to be found, who have upset the peace,
it was not South Korean divisions that
marched into the North; it was not Greek
guerrillas that moved into Bulgaria and
Yugoslavia; we did not blockade Berlin.
This is a part of that postwar struggle
between those who would try to build a
United Nations kind of world and those
who would try to change it fundamentally
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and drastically to what they call their world
revolution.
I think it is fair to recall also that the
free world — not speaking just of the United
States but of our other partners in the free
world — have tried to deal with these suc-
cessive questions that have arisen in ways
that are best adapted to finding a peaceful
settlement and maintaining the peace, rather
than to rush over the cliff in what the
United Nations Charter calls the "scourge
of war."
There were no military attacks aimed at
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia while the Greek
guerrillas were coming across the northern
frontiers. Weeks upon weeks upon weeks
an airlift moved supplies into Berlin, while
an effort was made to find a peaceful settle-
ment rather than move into an engagement
of armed forces over that issue.
Substantial casualties were accepted in
Korea without moving that into a larger con-
flict at a time when there were very impor-
tant military advantages in the free world
with respect to a general conflagration.
The Cuban missile crisis was resolved in
ways that kept open the doors of peaceful
settlement. There has been 41/^ years of con-
siderable patience here in Southeast Asia,
trying to find peace in that area rather than
inflict upon the peoples of that part of the
world all of the suffering and devastation that
a major conflict would involve.
The people speak of a pause — ^there was a
pause for 4 years. After the Gulf of Tonkin
incident, there was another pause for another
6 months. In other words, who wants peace
and who wants to absorb their neighbors?
These are the central questions.
There is no question at all about the posi-
tion of the United States and the principal
members of the free world who are inter-
ested in these problems. There is also no
question about our commitment and the ne-
cessity for maintaining the integrity of the
American commitment as one of the basic
pillars in the structure of world peace around
the globe.
That is a summary of the briefing that I
gave the Cabinet this morning.
QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD
Q. Mr. Secretary, the Ambassador to the
U.N. spoke in a speech yesterday about trying
to get more activity and to transfer some
responsibility in this Southeast Asia matter
to the U.N. Are there any specific new pro-
posals or initiatives in mind at this time?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think, again, the
United Nations is there, its machinery is
there, to do what can be done at any par-
ticular point. The principal obstacle has been
that Hanoi and Peiping have indicated that
the United Nations has no role to play and
that they will not take any part in the United
Nations effort to resolve it. Therefore this
greatly complicates what the United Nations
itself could do in this situation.
Q. Can you make any reading on the Soviet
attitude at this point beyond what it appears
to be on the surface?
A. No, we know nothing privately that adds
anything to what is known publicly. I think
at the present time on the political side they
are relatively inactive.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did you simply report
to the Cabinet this morning, or were there
some decisions made?
A. I reported to the Cabinet. We had some
discussion around the table, but we did not
take new decisions at the Cabinet meeting
this morning.
Q. Do you have any indication or any feel-
ing that if the monsoon-season offensive is
stopped, then the Communists might be
ready for peace talks?
A. We have no evidence of that. Of course,
if they have any such thing in mind, they
are not going to convey that under the present
circumstances.
Q. What is your feeling?
A. Let's wait until September-October and
find out. We just don't know. Somebody else
is helping to write the story here, and we
just can't say with assurance what the atti-
tude of the other side is going to be.
JULY 5, 1965
Question of Free Elections
Q. Did Senator [J. W.] Fulbright reflect
the administration's point of view in calling
for a return to the 19 5 A accords, including
elections ?
A. I think that he, himself, made it clear
that he was speaking for himself and not for
the administration, but we have said — we
have said more than once — that the 1954 and
1962 agreements are a basis for peace in
Southeast Asia.
The question of free elections is compli-
cated a bit by the problems of having free
elections in both Viet-Nams, and complicated
further by the question of possible reunifica-
tion. It is complicated further by the strong
impression one has that the North wishes to
be unified only in a Communist country and
the South wishes to be unified only in a non-
Communist country.
But we think those are questions — as they
are in other places — those are questions that
are to be arrived at by discussion and not by
armed action and an attempt to resolve them
by force.
Wlio Are the Viet Cong?
Q. Do you regard the problem of whether
or not the Viet Cong are to be able to par-
ticipate in any talks as, in itself, a major
operating problem in the business of possibly
coming to talks?
A. There is a certain artificiality about
this issue, because when you go dovni the
list of these dozen or more political possi-
bilities and find that one by one they have
been either rejected or not utilized, then
about the only thing that people have left
to think of is, well, maybe the answer is to
negotiate with the Viet Cong.
Who are the Viet Cong? In the first place,
as far as those tens of thousands of infiltra-
tors are concerned, they are Hanoi — they are
Hanoi — and it is the external infiltration that
ia responsible for the presence of American
forces today in South Viet-Nam.
As far as indigenous elements of the Viet
Cong are concerned, they are relatively few
in number compared to the rest of the South
Vietnamese. If South Viet-Nam can have
some peace and normal political processes
become possible, and the people who call
themselves the National Liberation Front
take their place alongside of all the other
elements in South Viet-Nam, looking for a
political solution in that country, that is a
South Vietnamese problem.
But the mere fact that there are tens of
thousands of military personnel sent in there
from Hanoi does not seem to us to give the
Viet Cong any special status to be treated
as a government or to be taken into account
by special negotiation on the question of
how you deal with the future of South Viet-
Nam. I don't know of any other government
in the world that would permit negotiations
with a group of that sort under these cir-
cumstances.
Q. Mr. Secretary, while Senator Fulbright
said he approved the present course in Viet-
Nam, he did say that that effort should be
directed toward what I think he called a
negotiated settlement involving major con-
cessions by both sides. Does that in any way
echo the administration's thinking?
A. I don't know what he had in mind
about major concessions. He didn't spell
them out. The principal thing we want is
for the people to stop shooting. That was
described in a column not too long ago as a
demand for unconditional surrender. That
is a very strange way to describe a simple
demand that somebody who is shooting at you
stop shooting.
We are not asking that an acre of ground
or a single individual be surrendered, or
anybody, but that those who are shooting go
home and leave these people in peace.
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you comment on
what effect there might be abroad in re-
action to the use of B-52's from Guam to bomb
suspected Viet Cong concentrations?
A. I don't think that would make that
much difference. As you know, we used
SAC aircraft, not the same aircraft, on many
missions — similar targets — in Korea, for ex-
ample.
10
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Q. Would the United States propose ad-
mitting North Vietnamese to have a repre-
sentative or a member of the Viet Cong on
the negotiating team?
A. I think the question of credentials at a
conference is something that is usually dealt
with in terms of the governments who are
there and who they name in their delegations.
It isn't normal for a conference to check on
who is sitting behind me in my chair when I
am at a conference, and I should think that
if Hanoi wants any of these people there in
their delegation, that is up to them.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with the
possibility you raised about a new initiative
coming from the Algiers conference, do you
feel that that conference is rigged against
you already? Are you apprehensive about
the extent of the Chinese control?
A. I think there will be a lot of discussion
of Viet-Nam at the Algiers conference. I
think it depends a good deal on how the con-
ference convenes, what its rules of procedure
are, who will be there, who will remain there,
whether some of these controversial ques-
tions are resolved. I just can't predict yet
because the shape of that conference is not
at all clear.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did the Cabinet get a
report on the SAC bombing mission?
A. A very, very brief one. We didn't get
into the particular military aspects of it in
detail. It was a very brief one.
Q. Was it successful?
A. The ground elements are there now,
and we will get more reports during the day.
I would think it was worth while, myself.
The British Mission
Q. Mr. Secretary, what does this Govern-
ment believe Prime Minister Wilson's ob-
jectives are? Is it simply to arrange for a
peace conference?
A. I think that the Prime Minister and
the President are interested in the possibili-
ties of a peaceful settlement in Southeast
Asia, to make it possible for these people to
live their own lives without interference by
force from the outside.
There are some very difficult and danger-
ous issues here, and I think the Prime Min-
ister, as chairman of the Commonwealth
prime ministers, as the head of the Govern-
ment that provides one of the cochairmen for
the Geneva conferences, and in terms of his
general responsibility, wants to be sure that
every possibility of peace is explored.
Q. Have they done any advance soundings
to indicate whether Peiping and Hanoi will
proceed?
A. I don't know. I think you better put
that question to them.
Vietnamese Encouraged by U.S. Support
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that the
South Vietnamese have been heartened by
our no2v involvement in a ground war there ?
A. I think they have been encouraged by
the clear evidences of the United States sup-
port and the clear evidence that we take our
commitments seriously and that they are
getting major assistance from us and grow-
ing assistance from others.
I think this has had a good deal to do with
strengthening their hand and sustaining
their morale in what has been a very diffi-
cult and mean situation over a period of
time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, would we use B-52's to
bomb North Viet-Nam if the tactical situ-
ation demanded it?
A. I am not going to get into a question
like that.
Q. Mr. Secretary, did I understand cor-
rectly that you said we would not oppose
trading ivith the North Vietnamese delega-
tion that had Viet Cong delegates in it?
A. What I am saying is that governments
come to a conference and we don't look be-
hind the head of the delegation to see who is
sitting in the chairs in the second row. That
is up to them.
JULY 5, 1965
11
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you hopeful and, if
so, in what terms, as far as time is concerned,
as to the outcome?
A. It is not just that diplomacy is pro-
fessionally committed to optimism, because
that is the end objective of diplomacy. But
if you want a personal reaction, we have
been here before, since 1945. Don't under-
estimate the importance of the commitment
of free peoples to their freedom, the impor-
tance of the United States' commitment, and
the recognition by people all over the
world that, whatever some of the propagan-
dists say from time to time, the power of the
United States is committed to the rather sim-
ple and decent purposes of the American
people, which is generally respected around
the earth.
We are not after anything or anybody. We
don't want any territory or anything else.
We don't want to take anything away from
anybody that is theirs. But we do believe in
sustaining the peace and in trying to build
a decent world order.
I think that is the source of common
strength, both at home and abroad.
The Press: Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
Secretary McNamara Discusses Buildup of Forces in Viet-Nam
Following is the transcript of a news
conference held by Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara at Washington on June
16.
Secretary McNamara: Good afternoon,
ladies and gentlemen.
I have two announcements I would like to
make today, and then I will be very happy
to take your questions.
Air Mobile Division
First, I have today authorized the Army to
organize a new division, the Air Mobile Di-
vision. This new division will be organized
and made combat ready as expeditiously as
possible at Fort Benning, Georgia. Its intro-
duction will greatly increase our capability
to meet all kinds of threats. It places the
Army on the threshold of an entirely new
approach to the conduct of land warfare.
I have also asked the Chief of Staff of the
Army to report to the Joint Chiefs and to
me before the first of next year on possible
conversion of other units of the Army to the
new type of structure.
The development of this new division was
begun over 3 years ago. It is a result of 36
months of study, experiment, test, and eval-
uation by both the Army and the Air Force.
The concept was initially established by the
Howze Board which, as you know, was
chaired by General [Hamilton H.] Howze of
the Army. It has been subsequently evaluated
by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They have
tested it, using the experimental 11th Air
Assault Division. This division will have a
strength of about 16,000 men. That is ap-
proximately equal to the strength of an in-
fantry division, but it will have four times
the number of aircraft assigned to an in-
fantry division.
As a result, about one-third of its combat
elements can be moved into combat by its
ovim aircraft ; the other two-thirds will move
simultaneously either in air transport air-
craft or by shuttling of the division's own
aircraft.
One of the division's brigades will be ca-
pable of airborne operation. This new type of
division will make its greatest contributions
to improving combat readiness in operations
where terrain obstacles could give enemy
guerrilla or light infantry forces an ad-
vantage over our standard combat forma-
tions.
12
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The tactics, the techniques, the proce-
dures that will be employed by this new di-
vision will result in a markedly different ap-
proach to the solution of tactical problems.
The use of aircraft to bring combat person-
nel directly to the battlefield, to remove
them from the battlefield, provides a capa-
bility which neither we nor any other army
in the world possess today.
strength of Forces in Viet-Nam
Now I should like to bring you up to date
upon our latest estimates of the strength of
the Viet Cong forces in South Viet-Nam,
and upon the strength of the U. S. combat
forces deployed to that country to assist the
Vietnamese Government in combating the
insurgency.
According to the latest intelligence infor-
mation available to us, the number of hard-
core, that is the number of full-time Viet
Cong Communists, regular combat and com-
bat-support forces in South Viet-Nam to-
tals approximately 65,000 men. In addition to
that, there are between 80,000 and 100,000
part-time or irregular guerrillas. The regu-
lar and irregular guerrilla forces therefore
total about 165,000. In addition, there are
approximately 30,000 Viet Cong serving in
political and propaganda activities in South
Viet-Nam. As I have reported previously,
between 1960 and the end of 1964, infiltra-
tion of combat personnel into South Viet-
Nam totaled approximately 39,000 men, all of
these from North Viet-Nam. It is probable
that the actual figure exceeded that number,
but 39,000 represents the number of con-
firmed infiltrees. In 1964 alone, for example,
we believe that about 10,000 men were
brought from North Viet-Nam to fight in
South Viet-Nam.
In addition, as you know, there is at least
one regular North Vietnamese army battal-
ion in South Viet-Nam, the 2d Battalion of
the 325th North Vietnamese Division. That
battalion has been located in the central
highland region, in the plateau area around
Pleiku and Kontum for some time. We have
recent indications that as many as eight ad-
ditional North Vietnamese regular army
battalions are also in that highland area.
Moreover, the Viet Cong forces have re-
cently been reequipped through the infiltra-
tion of new weapons, modern weapons from
North Viet-Nam. The net situation at pres-
ent is that the ratio of guerrilla to anti-
guerrilla forces is unfavorable to the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam — unfavorable
taking into account the hit-and-run char-
acteristics of guerrilla war, unfavorable tak-
ing into account the fact that the mission of
the Viet Cong forces, the guerrilla forces, is
to kill and terrorize the people, whereas
the mission of the Government forces is to
protect the populace.
It is worth noting, I think, that in addi-
tion to large-scale activities which have been
reported in the news recently, the attacks by
the Viet Cong forces on the South Viet-
namese forces — as always, in addition to
that, there has been a deliberate program of
terror and harassment, actions to kill,
maim, capture hundreds of South Vietnam-
ese citizens every week. Today's terrorist
bombing, for example, of the commercial
airport at Saigon is illustrative of these
tactics.
The South Vietnamese regular and para-
military forces facing the Viet Cong total
something in excess of 500,000 men. They
are facing, as I mentioned, about 165,000
guerrillas, a ratio of something on the order
of 4 to 1. That is considerably less than is
recognized as required to effectively deal
with guerrillas.
We have made efforts to improve these
ratios. About 100,000 men are currently be-
ing added to the South Vietnamese forces. As
you know, through the assistance of U. S.
forces we increased the mobility and fire-
power and the close air support of the South
Vietnamese, making each of their soldiers
more effective as a result. But this has not
been enough.
Therefore we are seeking to correct the
unfavorable manpower balance by the addi-
tion of combat forces from other nations —
Australia, United States, and Korea.
The United States has deployed nine
battalions of combat troops to South Viet-
JULY 5, 1965
13
Nam. These battalions consist of approxi-
mately 13,000 men out of the total of about
53,000 U. S. military personnel now as-
signed to that country. In addition, six new
combat battalions, plus additional logistic
and combat support, are now moving to
South Viet-Nam from this country. They
will be in place in a few weeks. Their de-
ployments will bring the total number of
combat battalions to approximately 15 from
the United States.
The total U. S. military strength in South
Viet-Nam will then approximate 70,000 to
75,000, of which number about 20,000 will
be ground combat personnel.
I will be very happy to take your
questions.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will these be Army
troops? Will they be coming from the United
States? What will their mission be?
A. The question is will the combat battal-
ions moving into South Viet-Nam be Army
troops. They will be Army and Marine
troops, and I am not at liberty to tell you
the units from which they will come.
Q. Do you foresee a buildup beyond the
70,000 to 75,000 man level?
A. The Secretary of State and I and the
President have repeatedly said that we will
do whatever is necessary to achieve our ob-
jective in South Viet-Nam and we won't do
more than is necessary. I can only give that
answer to your question.
Q. Can you spell out the mission of all of
the people in Viet-Nam you now classify as
ground combat personnel?
A. The mission of our troops is to protect
the bases on which we have very heavy con-
centrations of aircraft, helicopters, and U. S.
personnel and supplies. In addition, if the
Vietnamese military commanders request
the assistance of U. S. troops — U. S. combat
troops — ^because the Vietnamese lack the
necessary reserves to effectively counter
Viet Cong attacks. General [William C]
Westmoreland has authority to send our
combat troops to the assistance and support
of the Vietnamese.
I think you can realize that, if he didn't
have that authority, a situation could arise
in which very heavy loss of life could occur
and in which great advantage could be won
by the Viet Cong forces.
Effectiveness of Bombing Raids
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you have anything
further for us on the effectiveness of the
U. S. bombing raids ?
A. A question frequently arises as to how
effective are the U. S. bombing raids. Let
me repeat again to you the objective of
these raids.
Our objective is to affect and reduce the
capability of the North Vietnamese to infil-
trate men and equipment from North Viet-
Nam into South Viet-Nam, particularly to
reduce their ability to infiltrate into Laos
and through the roads of Laos into South
Viet-Nam. I think you are familiar with the
routes they have been using. They come
from North Viet-Nam across into the Plaines
des Jarres area south through Laos, back
into South Viet-Nam, or they come from the
southern tail of North Viet-Nam into Laos
and then into South Viet-Nam.
Into this area in the southern portion of
South Viet-Nam there are about 23 bridges
on the main rail and highway lines.^ We
have destroyed or made impassable 22 of
those bridges. You have seen some of the
pictures, I think, previously. I will just re-
view some of them for you briefly. I
think you will see some change since you
last noticed them.
Here is a bridge at Phuong Can, in this
area. You can see the span was dropped as a
result of our bombing attack. The bridge
was destroyed, in effect. Since that was ac-
complished, the North Vietnamese, because
this is a primary road supporting their in-
filtration routes, have constructed a tem-
porary bridge across that dropped span. It
will be necessary to take that out again. We
have done so in several of the other areas
' Throughout the news conference, Secretary Mc-
Namara used maps and photographs to illustrate his
remarks.
14
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
where they have acted to replace the bomb-
ing damage.
Here is another bridge at Dong Hoi in the
southern portion of North Viet-Nam, again
on one of the main infiltration routes. You
see it destroyed in this photograph after our
bombing raid. You see here the action that
the North Vietnamese are taking to estab-
lish ferry slips in order that they may
again use that road for infiltration. They
have moved tens of thousands of people into
this area to repair the bomb damage that
has been done to the routes of infiltration.
Here is another railroad bridge. Again you
can see the span destroyed.
So the first point I want to make is that
the rail route and the road routes of infil-
tration from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam have been substantially damaged
as a result of the bombing. In addition, we
have attacked their ammunition depots and
their barracks. Here are a few pictures of
the bomb damage that has resulted.
This is a barracks area, a very substantial
one. You can see in these pictures the near
complete destruction of certain areas of it.
In total, about 41 percent of this large Viet-
namese barracks — North Vietnamese bar-
racks— was destroyed.
This is an ammunition depot containing
about 8 percent of the total ammunition
stored in the country. You can see here the
dispersed storage area covering a very wide
geographic area. Here are the postattack
photographs showing the destruction of the
ammunition bunkers. About 21 percent of
this ammunition storage area was destroyed.
We are also attacking petroleum targets.
One of the major targets is at Vinh, which is
approximately in this area. This was at-
tacked in August of last year following the
attack on our destroyers in the Gulf of
Tonkin. At that time we substantially dam-
aged the center of this area. Since then the
Vietnamese have greatly expanded the area,
adding in this section and this section — you
can see the new tanks. These are the post-
attack photographs taken on the 26th of May,
2 or 3 weeks ago, showing the destruction
resulting from our bombing attacks.
Here is another petroleum area at Phu
Qui. They are expanding their petroleum
storage in the country. This was a new pe-
troleum storage depot that was being built.
We waited until it was nearly completed,
and shortly before it was in operation de-
stroyed these tanks, as you can see here.
As I said, we have attacked the bridges
to reduce the flow of men and materiel
over the roads and the railroads. We have
attacked the ammunition storage depots to
reduce the amount of equipment they had to
infiltrate. We have attacked the barracks to
reduce the number of men they could infil-
trate. We have also attacked their supply
depots, of which this is one of the largest at
Phu Van. Here it is before the attack, and
here it is afterward, with a tremendous
amount of destruction as a result. I would
guess about 60 percent of the area and ca-
pacity has been destroyed.
Here is another army supply depot in the
southern portion of North Viet-Nam. You
can see it before and after.
So I think the answer is that the attacks
have been effective. They haven't stopped
the flow of men and materiel. They have
reduced the flow, and they have greatly in-
creased the cost to the North Vietnamese of
continuing their efforts to support the in-
surgency in South Viet-Nam.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will these new deploy-
ments require an additional supplemental
request beyond the $700 million?
A. No.
Q. And will we need additional draft
calls?
A. No, I don't believe that the new de-
ployments will require any time in the near
future an additional budget supplement.
When we presented the budget supplement
a few weeks ago asking for $700 million to
be added to the fiscal '65 budget,^ we stated
it was not possible 14 months in advance to
predict accurately the total expenditures in
1966 and we did not wish to foreclose, there-
" For background, see Bulletin of May 24, 1965,
p. 816, and June 7, 1965, p. 896.
JULY 5, 1965
15
fore, the possibility of a budget supplement
sometime during fiscal 1966.
But in any event, we are not prepared and
see no requirement for submitting such a
supplement now. Furthermore, the deploy-
ment of the troops that I mentioned earlier
will not affect the draft calls in any way.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if our American forces
do join the South Vietnamese under the
conditions that you have outlined in ground
combat, who will be in charge of the battle-
field, the deployment plan, the South Viet-
namese officers or ours ?
A. The battlefield will be split into seg-
ments and the South Vietnamese forces will
operate under their own commanders in one
segment and U. S. troops under their com-
mand in support of the Vietnamese forces
in another segment under the command of
U. S. officers.
Morale of South Vietnamese Troops
Q. Mr. Secretary, the monsoon offensive
of the Viet Cong has made certain initial
successes. Could you give us some assess-
ment of the effect on the morale of the South
Vietnamese Army and Government, and how
do you combat it? Can we hold on before our
reinforcements get there ?
A. We have said previously that the Viet
Cong were building up their strength
throughout 1964. They had built it to a total,
we believe, by the end of the year, greater
than they had then deployed in combat, and
we therefore expected that during 1965 — and
we so stated publicly — that they would de-
ploy these additional troops after they had
been fully trained and fully equipped.
We assumed that deployment of addi-
tional Viet Cong troops would take place
during the monsoon season, which began
roughly the first of May and which ex-
tends very roughly through the end of Octo-
ber, depending upon the latitude and eleva-
tion of the terrain. Our forecasts proved re-
markably accurate.
They did increase the number of troops
assigned to combat. They did increase the
number of overt actions. They did increase
the intensity and level of both their harass-
ment and their overt actions. In the month
of May we saw, therefore, a substantial in-
crease in terror incidents, a substantial in-
crease in the number of attacks, and a very
large increase in the number of casualties,
both to Government forces and to Viet Cong
forces.
The level of casualties absorbed by both
the Viet Cong and the Government forces
far exceeds in proportion to the population
the level of casualties U. S. forces have ever
absorbed in any war in our history.
Under these circumstances it is remark-
able that the morale of the Government
troops is as good as it is. They're fighting
well, they are fighting hard, they are fight-
ing effectively.
We continue to see increases in their re-
cruitment. We are continuing to see some in-
crease in their strength, not as rapidly as we
would like to see, because the casualty rates
exceed those estimated at the time the plans
for expanding the forces were developed.
But the fact that they can recruit, the fact
that the men will fight under these very
heavy strains, I think is indicative of the
morale in those troops.
Q. What are the latest figures on deser-
tions?
A. The desertions are running somewhat
less than last year, but higher than desir-
able.
Q. Do you not plan at all to have a co-
ordinated command for the joint use of Viet-
namese and U.S. troops ?
A. There would have to be a coordinated
command both at the field level and at the
staff level when the troops are operating in
combat areas adjacent to each other.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you state that the new
1st Cavalry Division, the new Air Mobile
Division, will be made combat ready as ex-
peditiously as possible. Do you foresee little
use in Viet-Nam?
A. I don't want to predict future deploy-
16
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ments of any units beyond those that I
have announced today on which decisions
have already been made. We have made no
decisions affecting other units than those I
have announced. I do want to say, however,
that because of the great amount of work
undertaken by the Army in developing the
11th Air Assault Division over the past 3
years, they can quickly convert that into
the Air Mobile Division, and I believe it
will be combat ready for deployment, should
that become necessary, within about 8
weeks.
Q. Mr. Secretary, if you say that the ratio
between antiguerrilla forces and guerrilla
forces is unfavorable now, what would you
say would be a favorable ratio?
A. It is difficult to develop a statistical
objective here that relates in any way to the
assumed requirement of a 10-to-l advan-
tage in favor of the antiguerrilla forces. It
is difficult because never before has there
been as much mobility, fire power, and close
air support brought to bear upon the guer-
rilla units.
Therefore I don't want to give you a statis-
tical answer. I do want to emphasize, how-
ever, that the Viet Cong strength has in-
creased to such a degree that it is necessary
to expand the South Vietnamese forces, that
even taking account of that expansion, which
is a very substantial one, that they presently
have underway, it will be necessary to still
further add to the mobility, the fire power,
and the air support which we have been add-
ing to recently, and beyond that it will be
necessary to provide combat troops in re-
serve to take care of the emergency situa-
tions where Viet Cong in force are about to
overrun the South Vietnamese forces.
Under those circumstances our troops will
be available to come to the assistance of
the South Vietnamese.
Q. Where does the Viet Cong get their
petroleum supplies?
A. The petroleum supplies for the Viet
Cong come from several sources, some from
China over land, some by sea.
The U.S. Objective in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been a lot
of speculation that the United States is em-
barking on a Korean-type war. Would you
elucidate what is the overall American
strategy ?
A. Well, first let me repeat again our ob-
jective. The Secretary of State has stated
this, I have stated it, the President has
stated it on several occasions, but I think it
bears repeating because it bears directly on
the type of deployments we are making and
the strategy we are following.
The United States has no designs whatso-
ever on the territory or the resources of
Southeast Asia or any country in it. Our na-
tional interests do not require that we intro-
duce military bases for our forces in South-
east Asia. They don't require that the states
of Southeast Asia become members of West-
ern military alliances. The ultimate goal of
our country, therefore, in Southeast Asia is
to help maintain free and independent na-
tions there in which the people can develop
politically, economically, and socially, ac-
cording to patterns of their own choosing
and with the objective of becoming respon-
sible members of the world family of
nations.
That is our objective, that is our only ob-
jective. We are not seeking to destroy the
government of the North. We are not seek-
ing to acquire military bases. We are seek-
ing to preserve the independence of those
people to whom we are committed by treaty
to provide protection.
Now, with that as our objective, our strat-
egy is to convince the North Vietnamese
that their Communist-inspired, directed, and
supported guerrilla action to overthrow the
established Government in the South cannot
be achieved, and then to negotiate for the'
future peace and security of that country.
Q. Mr. Secretary, because of the precise
nature of this war and the way it has es-
calated, do you and the President personally
involve yourselves with picking out targets
beforehand to keep it on a precise way?
A. I noticed considerable speculation in
JULY 5, 1965
17
the press in the last few days about the role
played by myself as Secretary of Defense
and the President and others in civilian de-
partments of the Government in connection
with the military operations. I thought yes-
terday there was a very, very interesting
article in the New York Times over the
byline of one of your colleagues, Jack Ray-
mond. He was reporting an interview he had
had the day before, I think, with Admiral
Felt—
Q. Sharpe.
A. — Admiral Sharpe, who is Commander
in Chief of all of our forces in the Pacific.
Admiral Sharpe, in response to this same
question, I think, said to Jack Raymond that
the President and the Secretary of Defense
had never usurped the role of the military
commanders, and he went on to say that
certainly restrictions had been placed upon
the military commanders and that those
were perfectly logical, and, to use his words,
he said the President must consider all
political and diplomatic ramifications of his
acts and he is, after all, Commander in Chief
under our form of government. He then
ended by this statement, and I quote Ad-
miral Sharpe's words: "If I were the Presi-
dent, with his responsibilities, I would do no
less."
And that is exactly the policy we are fol-
lowing with respect to military operations.
The decisions relating to military operations
are made at the lowest possible echelon,
taking account of the political ramifications.
Introduction of North Vietnamese Army Units
Q. Mr. McNamara, you mentioned eight
North Vietnamese battalions have moved in.
Does this amount to a full division, and is
this an overt invasion of South Viet-Nam?
A. I said that we had clear evidence of one
regular North Vietnamese battalion in South
Viet-Nam and there was a possibility that
eight additional battalions were there. This
is not a division in any normal sense of the
word. The battalions are small in size. But it
is, I think, an important development. It
does indicate not that the strength of the
guerrillas is greater than it would be if a
comparable number of men other than from
regular battalions was present — because I
don't think that is the case — but, rather,
that the North Vietnamese are having diffi-
culty recruiting individuals to send down
into the South as guerrillas and that, there-
fore, to build up the strength to the level
they believe required to achieve their end in
South Viet-Nam they have had to call
upon their regular army units.
Q. And the second part: Is this an overt
invasion from the North?
A. No, it is further evidence of their infil-
tration. They haven't been infiltrated as bat-
talions. They are not uniformed. They are
continuing to function in many cases as
individuals.
Q. Sir, you didn't say ivhere the petro-
leum for the Viet Cong ivas coming from
when it comes by sea, and could you say
whether any of the supplies for the Viet
Cong or North Vietnamese are coming from
our allies or from ships owned by our allies ?
A. I think it is correct to say that some of
the seaborne commerce coming to North
Viet-Nam is coming in bottoms chartered
from nations of the free world.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how much would the
war have to intensify before some sort of
mobilization of American industry would be
required?
A. Mobilization of American industry?
Q. Yes, sir.
A. I think that it is difficult for me to
even estimate the circumstances under
which that would be required. We have so
built up our supplies of equipment and ammu-
nition in recent years that I can't conceive
of any mobilization of American industry
being required in connection with the opera-
tions of South Viet-Nam.
Q. Mr. Secretary, regarding South Korea,
what kind of a military contribution do
you expect from that country ?
18
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A. The South Koreans presently have
about 2,000 troops in South Viet-Nam,
primarily logistical support and engineering
troops but including some combat units to
protect those troops. Whether the Vietnam-
ese Government will request additional
troops of South Korea and how South Korea
would respond to that request, I can't
predict.
Q. Mr. Secretary, has the resignation of
the Quat government affected plans being
made by the Defense Department to any
measurable extent?
A. No, it hasn't, but, needless to say, we
are all interested in seeing the development
of stable political institutions in South Viet-
Nam.
Q. Mr. Secretary, will the increase of
American forces necessitate a change in the
command structure, and will the role of
Ambassador [Maxivell D.I Taylor be in-
volved in this ?
A. No, I don't see any need to change
either the command structure or the role of
Ambassador Taylor. I do think it may be nec-
essary to introduce intervening command
elements, perhaps, between the U. S. field
forces in South Viet-Nam and the com-
mander of all forces in South Viet-Nam, all
U. S. forces, General Westmoreland. We may
find it necessary to introduce a field force
headquarters, therefore, at some time in
the future.
Q. In that connection, sir, is it possible
that General Krulak [Lt. Gen. Victor H.
Krulak"] will move his headquarters from
Hawaii to Viet-Nam?
A. No possibility that I am aware of.
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you give us an esti-
mate of how many of the 39,000 infiltrees
have since become battle casualties?
A. I can't, other than to say that the
losses by the Viet Cong have been stagger-
ingly large for several years. This has been
one of the reasons why they have had to
move toward the use of regular North Viet-
namese army battalions as a source of in-
filtrees.
Now, I can take only one more question.
I think we are running out of time.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in his speech yesterday.
Senator [J. W."] Fulbright advocated a
holding action that would avoid any escala-
tion of the action in South Viet-Nam. Is this
a policy to which you are committed ?
A. I don't think you correctly quoted
Senator Fulbright. I think yesterday in his
speech what he said was that he supported
the objective of preserving the independence
of South Viet-Nam and he supported the
military action required to meet that objec-
tive. That is our objective. That is our
military program.
Thank you very much, ladies and gentle-
men.
The Press: Thank you.
An Assessment of the Situation
in tiie Dominican Republic
Following is the text of a statement read
by President Johnson at the opening of a
news conference at the White House on
June 17, together with the President's reply
to a question regarding his assessment of the
situation in the Dominican Republic.
STATEMENT ON CEASE-FIRE
White House press release dated June 17
In the Dominican Republic in the last 2
days there has been renewed, repeated, and
heavy firing on the Inter-American Force, in
ilagrant violation of the cease-fire.i This
sustained firing has been accepted without
reply by the inter-American forces for peri-
ods up to one-half hour, before the neces-
sary replies were given under the orders of
General [Hugo Panasco] Alvim and Gen-
^ For background, see Bulletin of June 21, 1965,
pp. 989, 992, 1017.
JULY 5, 1965
19
eral Palmer [Lt. Gen. Bruce Palmer, Jr.] . In
these actions 3 Americans have lost their
lives, and 37 more Americans and 5 Brazil-
ians have been wounded. These unprovoked
attacks on the Inter-American Force appear
to have been premeditated by elements which
seek to prevent the establishment of peace in
Santo Domingo. Our forces there have no
other mission, and they will continue to ob-
serve the same soldierly restraint they have
shown for 7 weeks in the face of more than
900 cease-fire violations, and they have al-
ready suffered almost 200 casualties.
STATEMENT ON U.S. POLICY
In the Dominican Republic forces moved
in and overthrew the government, and while
I am not passing on the merits of the actions
that take place many times in many places,
where they change governments — and we be-
lieve in change of conditions, and we are try-
ing to obtain them through the Alliance for
Progress — but in this particular instance, a
fact that has been emphasized all too little,
I think, some 1,500 innocent people were
murdered and shot, and their heads cut off,
and six Latin American embassies were vio-
lated and fired upon over a period of 4 days
before we went in.
As we talked to our Ambassador to con-
firm the horror and tragedy and the unbe-
lievable fact that they were firing on
Americans and the American Embassy, he
was talking to us from under a desk while
bullets were going through his windows, and
he had a thousand American men, women,
and children assembled in the hotel who
were pleading with their President for help
to preserve their lives.
We didn't start that. We didn't intervene.
We didn't kill anyone. We didn't violate any
embassies. We were not the perpetrators. But
after we saw what had happened we took
the necessary precautions. As I have said so
often and as I repeat again, we do not want
to bury anyone and we don't intend to, but we
are not going to be buried ourselves. And as
we had to go into the Congo to preserve the
lives of American citizens and haul them out
when they were being shot at, we went into
the Dominican Republic to preserve the lives
of American citizens and citizens of a good
many other nations — 46 to be exact, 46 na-
tions. While some of the nations were de-
nouncing us for going in there, their people
were begging us to protect them. And the
American Marines protected them. Twenty
died. We removed 5,600 people from 46 na-
tions, and we didn't sprain an ankle doing it.
But we had 20 of our boys killed by the reb-
els, who fired first and who tried to keep us
from evacuating these people. We estab-
lished a peace zone.
We had only two purposes there. One, to
get an inter-American force in there to
bring about a cease-fire and preserve peace,
that is all. We are not after their money or
after their philosophy or trying to dominate
them. We said that. And we tried our best
to get them there as quick as we could, and
we finally got them, and General Alvim is
doing an excellent job under great difficul-
ties.
Yesterday I saw one of his cables, and it
was 23 minutes after they started shooting
before he replied. I don't know how many
of you are anxious to stand up and be shot at
by tommyguns, and you ask a lot of these
boys to do that. That is the first thing.
The second was to have a government
broadly based to be acceptable to the people
of the Dominican Republic. We are not
pointing, we are not matching a computer
and saying here is what the government
will be. We asked Mr. [McGeorge] Bundy,
Mr. [Cyrus R.] Vance, Mr. [John Bart-
low] Martin, Mr. [Jack H.] Vaughn, and
everyone we knew to talk to the extreme
elements — some to talk to the other side,
some to the loyalists, the rebels — hoping
we could have a cease-fire until we could
have a broadly based government, and un-
til the OAS [Organization of American
States] could give help, counsel, and media-
tion.
They have appointed a very fine com-
mittee. They appointed the best men they
could find, and they are there talking to every
group, going all over the land. They are
20
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
making progress, and we hope that the OAS
will have a recommendation on the political
matter like they did on the military matter.
We don't want it to be unilateral. We much
prefer that the forces of all nations go in to
save people of 46 nations. But it is taking
us 7 weeks to get the two things we have
done up to now and haven't got the final
answer yet.
We first had a committee appointed, then
a man, then another committee appointed
from the OAS, and we are proud of what
the OAS is doing, but it is not a matter that
can save lives. As a matter of fact, we land-
ed our people in less than one hour from
the time the decision was made. It was a
decision we considered from Saturday until
Wednesday evening. But once we made it, in
the neighborhood of 6:00 or 6:30 that even-
ing, they landed within one hour. But they
didn't save 1,500 lives.
Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy
by W. W. Rostow
Counselor of the Department and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^
On an occasion of this kind it may be ap-
propriate for a State Department planner
to consider with you certain of the funda-
mentals of our foreign policy and what in
our national experience has shaped them.
I had the great privilege recently of
spending 9 days and nights in Japan dis-
cussing our foreign policy with the leaders
of almost every important group in Jap-
anese society. One always learns from dis-
cussions of this kind, either at home or
abroad.
As I talked with our Japanese friends, it
became increasingly clear how deeply our
postwar foreign policy has been shaped by
the memory of our failures between the
First and Second World Wars. (I concluded,
incidentally, that Japanese attitudes toward
foreign policy are also strongly shaped by
their interwar experiences, notably their
experience under military dictatorship in the
1930's.)
After the First World War we failed to
'■ Address made at commencement exercises at the
University of Miami, Coral Gables, Fla., on June 8
(press release 142).
join the League of Nations. We failed to
give France security guarantees on the con-
tinent of Europe. We failed to maintain our
armed forces. We withdrew into a transient
isolationism.
A good many Americans looked back on
the First World War as a no doubt well-
meant but inappropriate intervention be-
yond our shores. We sought peace, but we
sought it mainly by proclaiming its desir-
ability— an attitude symbolized by the Kel-
logg-Briand Pact.
When the peace was challenged by the
Japanese attack in Manchuria in 1931, we
did nothing. When in 1936 Hitler moved in
the Rhineland, testing the strength and
will of the West, we did nothing. President
Franklin Roosevelt's efforts to arouse the
country to the danger of Hitler — notably
in his famous "quarantine" speech of 1937
— failed to gather adequate public support.
The Congress fought off every effort to
strengthen our military and diplomatic pos-
ture in the face of growing danger in Eu-
rope and Asia. Only with the fall of France
did public opinion shift.
JULY 5, 1965
21
In the spring of 1940 opinion polls indi-
cated, as they had for some time, that two-
thirds of the American public believed it
was more important to keep out of war than
to aid Britain; by September less than half
of the American public held this view; and
by January 1941, 70 percent were prepared
to aid Britain at the risk of war. Thus we
came to recognize our vital interests late, in
the midst of a dangerous war, and only
after our friends were hard pressed or over-
whelmed.
The capacity of the West to deal with the
threatening events of the 1930's was com-
plicated, of course, by the world depression
which we did not prevent and which we and
our friends managed badly.
As a result of our whole performance in
the generation after 1918, we had to fight
a war that was almost certainly prevent-
able. It yielded the terrible harvest we all
know. As a nation we tend to agree with
Winston Churchill's judgment that the Sec-
ond World War was unnecessary; and we
are intent on preventing a third world war,
if it lies within our power to do so.
Three Conditions for Peace
Out of the interwar experience what we
learned can be summarized, I believe, in
terms of three conditions for peace.
First, peace requires that aggression not
pay. At every critical moment in the post-
war years, from the Truman Doctrine for-
ward, those responsible for the Nation's
foreign policy have recalled our failure to
act soon enough in the face of aggression
during the 1930's. Deep within us is the
judgment that a failure to deal with limited
aggression produces not peace but a larger
war in a not very distant future.
Second, we learned that peace requires
institutions and peacekeeping machinery
capable of insuring that international agree-
ments are kept once they are made and that
the peace is not violated.
In a way that baffled Churchill and
Stalin, President Roosevelt, in his wartime
negotiations, appeared obsessed with the
future role of the United Nations. He had
been, after all, the defeated candidate for
the Vice Presidency in 1920, when the last
hope for United States entry into the League
was lost. He gave the greatest attention to
building a political base at home which
would guarantee that, this time, we would
not fail to join the international peacekeep-
ing organization.
The third lesson we learned was that
peace requires us to work with others to re-
move the underlying causes of economic,
political, and social instability which at-
tract and hearten ambitious aggressors,
while distracting and rendering vulnerable
their potential victims.
These are the three lessons, I believe, of
our costly failures of the interwar years.
These are the touchstones we still bring
to the central task of contemporary foreign
policy.
Task of Contemporary Foreign Policy
How shall that task be defined ?
That task is no less than building — day
by day, brick by brick — a peaceful world
community which would live by the rules
laid down in the United Nations Charter.
Since 1914 we have not had an orderly
international community. We have lived for
a half century in an environment of war
and the danger of war, latterly with a nu-
clear sword of Damocles over our heads.
How have we pursued this objective of a
peaceful world community?
We began, of course, with high hopes
that the United Nations could immediately
achieve the objective. We dismantled our
armed forces unilaterally. We laid before the
United Nations an imaginative proposal for
placing atomic energy under effective in-
ternational control.
It was Stalin who destroyed this simple,
hopeful vision. He rejected the Baruch pro-
posal for international control of atomic en-
ergy and proclaimed to the world, in his
famous speech of February 1946, that he
judged the postwar years an interval of op-
portunity for the expansion of communism.
22
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Although the cold war had earlier anteced-
ents, that speech was an important bench-
mark.
But it was only a year later, with the
British inability to continue its support of
Greece and Turkey against Moscow's pres-
sure, that we were drawn fully back into
the world — this time to meet aggression at
an early rather than a late stage.
In the period of almost 20 years that has
followed the Truman Doctrine we have
been engaged, almost without respite, in
dealing with one form or another of Com-
munist aggression — in Greece and Turkey,
in Western Europe, twice in Berlin, in
Korea, at Quemoy and Matsu, in Southeast
Asia, in the Caribbean, and at many other
points.
Nevertheless, what I would like to make
clear today is that we have never regarded
the containment of aggression as a sufficient
objective. The larger vision — of moving to-
ward a world community at peace — has not
changed. We have done more and we are now
doing more than merely fending off various
kinds of Communist efforts at expansion.
We have been trying to meet all three of
the conditions for peace where we can, while
drawing those countries which now are
ruled by Communist regimes into peaceful
relations with us and others as fast as op-
portunity may offer.
The Atlantic Community
In Europe and the Atlantic, for example,
we first had to make sure that aggression
did not succeed in a Western and Southern
Europe weakened by war ; but that was only
the beginning of our task.
In NATO we have built an elaborate po-
litical and military institution capable of in-
suring an environment of stability through-
out the area; and within that framework,
in the Marshall Plan and afterward, we have
maintained remarkable economic, political,
and social stability in a critical part of the
world community. More than that, through
the OECD [Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development] we have been
moving with the Atlantic community and
Japan toward concert in monetary, trade,
and aid policies. These quiet efforts have
made a major contribution toward creating
an environment of progress and hope in
many parts of the world.
The Atlantic agenda of unsolved problems
is long, as President Johnson made clear in
his speech of May 7 on the 20th anniversary
of V-E Day. ^ But, if you compare what we
have done with Western Europe and Japan
in the 20 years after the Second World War
with the course of events in the generation
after 1918, the scale of our common achieve-
ment can be perceived. We still face, for
example, major unsolved problems with re-
spect to the handling of international fi-
nance and monetary reserves ; but if we had
had in 1929 the kind of intimate day-to-day
collaboration among the central bankers and
monetary authorities that we now have,
there is little doubt that much of the cata-
strophic world depression after 1929 could
have been avoided.
Latin America, Asia, and Africa
In this hemisphere, also, we have moved
in terms of the three conditions for peace.
We have worked — as we are working
every day — to insure that aggression in
this hemisphere does not pay, whether it
takes the form of the installation of Soviet
missiles in Cuba or indirect aggression.
We are gradually building institutions for
peacekeeping within the inter- American sys-
tem capable of insuring that international
agreements are kept and the peace is not
violated.
Above all, in the Alliance for Progress we
are in the midst of a great adventure, work-
ing shoulder to shoulder with our Latin
American friends to remove the underlying
causes of political, social, and economic in-
stability in that region.
In Asia we face a region which lacks, at
this stage in its history, the underlying sense
of community and communal destiny that
exists in Western Europe and Latin America.
• Bulletin of May 24, 1965, p. 790.
JULY 5, 1965
23
Our security commitments in Asia were not
undertaken on a regional basis but in re-
sponse to a series of particular circum-
stances where U.S. power and our guaran-
tee alone could fill dangerous vacuums into
which the Communists evidently intended
to move. The Japanese security treaty fol-
lowed upon our occupation responsibilities;
our present ties with South Korea resulted
from the North Korean aggression of 1950
and the United Nations decision to resist
that aggression ; our commitments in South-
east Asia arose from the withdrawal of
the French presence and commitment and
were formalized in the Manila Pact as well
as the Geneva agreements of 1954 and 1962.
Nevertheless, our basic policy in Asia is
also designed to fulfill the three conditions
for peace.
We are now engaged in Viet-Nam in an
effort to demonstrate that the particular
form of aggression being practiced there by
Hanoi will not pay. The peacekeeping ma-
chinery created by the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962 has obviously proved inade-
quate; and we are looking toward the day
when more effective peacekeeping machin-
ery might insure in that region that interna-
tional agreements are kept in the future.
Finally, moving beyond our bilateral as-
sistance programs, President Johnson, in his
Johns Hopkins speech of April 7, 1965,*
gave new impetus to economic and social
development in Asia, this time encouraging
the strengthening and creation of regional
development institutions.
In Africa we acquired in the postwar
years less direct responsibilities than in
Eui-ope, Latin America, and Asia. That
continent does not border the Communist
world. It is, nevertheless, like most regions
in the revolutionary transition to moderniza-
tion, vulnerable to intrusion, subversion,
and guerrilla warfare. These vulnerabilities
are the object of systematic exploitation by
Communists, and we have been called on to
play our part to avoid the danger of indi-
rect aggression in that area.
We observe with interest and respect the
efforts of the Organization of African Unity
to develop the capacity to handle regional
disputes, as was done in the conflicts be-
tween Somali and Ethiopia, Morocco and
Algeria. And, as Secretary Rusk indicated
in his testimony of March 9 * on this year's
foreign aid bill before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, we believe that re-
gional institutions, such as the United Na-
tions Economic Conunission for Africa and
the African Development Bank, may well be
helpful in the long, slow process of creating
in Africa the underlying conditions for
economic and social progress and political
stability.
In short, despite the understandable focus-
ing of public attention on the crises which
stem from the Communist compulsion to ex-
tend their power where weaknesses in the
non-Communist world appear to permit, we
have remained true to our vision of what the
building of peace requires. Quiet, creative
work goes forward in all those regions of the
world where we have the opportunity to act
constructively with others.
Soviet Union and Communist China
What about peace with the Soviet Union
and, indeed, with Communist China?
With respect to the Soviet Union, the
making of a stable peace centers, of course,
on the related issues of German unity and
arms control arrangements backed by effec-
tive international inspection. A divided
Germany and a divided Europe cannot be
the foundations for a peaceful world com-
munity; but the ending of that division re-
quires security arrangements judged reliable
by East and West alike.
We do not despair of achieving this re-
sult by peaceful means. It is, in fact, a major
object of our policy. But it may well take
some time before those responsible for pol-
icy in Moscow perceive that it is in their in-
terest to protect the legitimate security in-
terests of the Soviet Union, not by a tense
confrontation in the middle of Europe, not
•Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
' Ibid., Apr. 5, 1965, p. 482.
24
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
by a fragile empire of uncertain satellites,
but by a solid European security agreement
and by granting to the German people the
right of political self-determination.
In the meanwhile we shall work to find
more limited areas of agreement, helping in
particular to bring the nations of Eastern
Europe into a more normal and natural
relationship to Western Europe and the
rest of the world.
With respect to Communist China, our
ultimate objectives are no less pacific;
but the issues obstructing peaceful relations
are also no less difficult and precise.
The Chinese Communists have not for-
sworn the use of force in the Formosa
Straits. They aim to take over an island
which, through a mutual security agree-
ment, we are committed to protect and
which we intend to protect.
Moreover, the men in Peiping are openly
encouraging aggression through subversion
and guerrilla warfare conducted across in-
ternational frontiers in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere.
These positions they proclaim in public;
and they assert them, with equal force, to
us when we talk bilaterally in Warsaw.
As Secretary Rusk has often said, the
problem of peace with Communist China
hinges on Peiping's decision to leave its
neighbors alone.
One cannot, therefore, promise a quick
and definitive resolution of the issues which
define the cold war and obstruct the build-
ing of a peaceful world community. On the
other hand, there is no reason to abandon
hope or cease to pursue this large objective.
A generation's labor by free men has pro-
duced remarkable results in advancing each
of the three conditions for peace.
In working with others in many parts of
the world, we have successfully met a wide
range of aggressions: from nuclear black-
mail to guerrilla warfare; from the march-
ing of conventional forces across interna-
tional frontiers, as in Korea, to the blockade
of Berlin. Working with those who wish to
maintain their independence and who un-
derstand the mortal danger of permitting
aggression to pay, in any form, at any place,
we command the capacity in the interna-
tional community to continue to frustrate
aggressive probes against us.
And, leaving aggression aside, it is clear
from the historical test of this generation
that we have nothing to fear from commu-
nism in peaceful competition. Whether meas-
ured in terms of economic growth, social
justice, human freedom and creativeness,
free men and free societies can evidently
do more for the human race than Communist
dictatorship.
Second, while the international peacekeep-
ing machinery we have created thus far is
clearly inadequate and must be built further
in many directions and places, the world
community has shown a remarkable capac-
ity to face the hard facts of interdependence
and to create institutions which build on
those facts — in the Atlantic world, in this
hemisphere, and now increasingly in Africa
and in Asia.
Although the United Nations was, of
course, diminished by Stalin's decision in
1946 to initiate the cold war, and although
it is now going through a difficult passage,
it has performed and is performing many
vital services. In the Middle East, in Cyprus,
in the Congo, in Kashmir, it has helped to
damp regional conflicts which might other-
wise have expanded dangerously. In Korea it
made clear the will of the international
community to resist overt aggression with
conventional forces. The four regional eco-
nomic commissions of the United Nations
go about their work steadily and may in the
future play an even more vital role in Africa
and in Asia as regional development pro-
grams take hold. The Alliance for Progress
has enlarged the opportunities for creative
action by the Economic Commission for
Latin America; and the President's Balti-
more initiative has already brought about
an acceleration of the initiatives of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Asia and the Far
East, in the Mekong Valley, and with respect
to the Asian Development Bank. With the
widening of relations between Eastern and
Western Europe, the useful role of the Eco-
nomic Commission for Europe in Geneva
may also expand. And beyond these regional
JULY 5, 1965
25
functions, the United Nations must evi-
dently remain a central part of the archi-
tecture which, in the end, a peaceful world
community will require.
Lessons of Dominican and Viet-Nam Crises
In discussing with you the approach to
peace which underlies our foreign policy, I
would not wish to ignore the reality of the
crises in the Dominican Republic and in
Viet-Nam. It may be useful to look at these
difficult problems, however, not merely as
isolated and dangerous clashes, involving the
use of United States military force overseas,
but in terms of the long, laborious job of
peacemaking.
As I say, deep in our experience is the
judgment that there will be no peace to make
if aggression in any form is permitted to
pay.
In Southeast Asia we face an explicit
and thoroughly professional form of aggres-
sion concerning which the Communist par-
ties of the world have debated for many
years. What they debate, however, is not the
legitimacy of what they call "wars of na-
tional liberation." They assume their right to
conduct such aggression. They debate only
the appropriate degree of risk Communists
should take in pressing against us by sub-
version and guerrilla warfare. To them these
techniques of subversion and guerrilla war-
fare and the effort by a disciplined Com-
munist minority to seize from within an
inherently revolutionary situation are just
as real mechanisms for the expansion of
Communist power as the marching of troops
across frontiers or the launching of missiles.
Behind what may appear to be civil con-
flict in South Viet-Nam and the chaos in
Santo Domingo a few weeks ago are cool,
disciplined, and purposeful men and a strat-
egy and tactics matured from long experi-
ence and debate.
In meeting such indirect aggression, how-
ever, we have not lost sight of the second
and third conditions for peace. As President
Johnson pointed out in his speech at Baylor
on May 28,^ the community of nations and
• Ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 989.
people in this hemisphere are moving to re-
spond to the crisis in the Dominican Repub-
lic by refining and enlarging our common
institutions; and, as I noted earlier, peace
in Southeast Asia will also require on the
part of the world community improved
peacekeeping institutions.
Moreover, in both areas these crises have
heightened our determination to press for-
ward with those constructive ventures in
economic and social development which alone
can help move transitional nations from
their present state of vulnerability to in-
direct aggression toward that modern and
confident nationhood on which their long-
run independence must rest.
Architecture of Peacemaking
Looked at in this way — in terms of the
three conditions for peace — peacemaking is,
indeed, the central task of our foreign
policy. We have worked at it for a generation.
We have made progress. There is, however,
another generation's work ahead.
But the scale of the task and its slow,
laborious pace should be no cause for dis-
couragement. We are engaged in an enor-
mous piece of international architecture,
which the United States is in no position,
by itself, to impose on the world. Increas-
ingly, responsibility must be taken by oth-
ers, as they generate the resources, the
political and social stability to share the
burdens, and as their proper and under-
standable pride moves them from depend-
ence upon the United States to relations of
dignified interdependence.
Nevertheless, success in the generation
ahead will continue to depend upon the
strength and will and dedication of the
United States and of Americans. There is no
substitute for American military power in
the protection of freedom now in existence
or in sight. We still command the critical
margin of economic resources for the devel-
opment of other nations. We remain ines-
capably the greatest single power on earth;
and that power is evident and real and felt
by others whether we act or fail to act.
But more is required of us than the en-
26
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gagement of our military and economic re-
sources. Peacemaking requires that we con-
tinue to evoke out of our history and ex-
perience the best qualities that are in us —
the commitments made at our birth as a na-
tion to the equality of men before God and
the law; the sense of human fellowship
which suffuses equally our military advisers
in the countryside of Viet-Nam and our
Peace Corpsmen working in the Andes; our
genius for building and making work insti-
tutions for common action based on the ac-
ceptance of diversity; and, above all, the
commitment to persevere in building, no
matter how long it may take, a world com-
munity in which men and nations can live at
peace.
No less is required of us for the safety of
the Nation and the continuity of civilized
life on this small planet.
Building a Decent World Order
Address by Secretary Rusk ^
It is a very happy occasion indeed for me
to be with you this morning. My remarks
will not be too long because I am looking for-
ward to meeting and chatting with you at
our reception this evening. The simultaneous
interpretation equipment you are using
reminds me of an incident at the United
Nations. In the early days at Lake Success,
our equipment had seven channels. One was
for the speaker, five were for the five working
languages, and the seventh was for soft
music. Finally, someone lost his sense of
humor and eliminated the seventh channel.
It is my very great privilege to bring to
you the following message from President
Johnson :
To the International Congress of Publishers, I
offer my greetings.
In our exploding world of knowledge, the publisher
has a critical mission: to choose skillfully and to
present effectively what man must communciate to
his fellow man. Understanding is no longer simply
an essential for progress; it is a necessity for
survival. Your responsibilities — and your oppor-
tunities— are greater today than ever before.
All of us want a world in which men are free to
'- Made before the International Congfress of Pub-
lishers at Washington, D.C., on June 5.
read and free to exchange ideas — across a class-
room, across a continent, or across an ocean. All
of us want a world in which literate men are a
majority and not a minority, a world in which men
are slaves neither to tyrants nor to ignorance.
I salute you for your efforts to achieve such a
world. And I wish you a future of ever-increasing
success.
The Threads Binding People Together
In the world of today international rela-
tions are no longer exclusively, nor even
primarily, relations among governments. In
open societies international relations have
become increasingly relations among people
as individuals and in voluntary associations.
These relations comprise the great interna-
tional communities of science and the arts,
scholarship, the exchanges of students and
teachers, of international communications
and broadcasting, the distribution of periodi-
cals, newspapers, and books, international
contacts in music and sports, international
trade and commerce, nongovernmental con-
ferences such as this, and of the coming and
going of tourists. These day-by-day activ-
ities. Dr. Raymond Fosdick used to say, help
to spin the threads that bind people together.
JULY 5, 1965
27
On the governmental level — on every
working day of the year — the U.S. Govern-
ment is attending 15 to 20 intergovern-
mental meetings throughout the world on
such subjects as international seed testing,
United Nations Trusteeship Council, disar-
mament committees, FAO meetings on coco-
nuts and coconut products, hog cholera, Afri-
can swine fever, the standardization of
prunes, and the carriage of dangerous goods
by sea. This vast work of the day-to-day
business of mankind seems to me to be one of
the most encouraging, stimulating, and hope-
ful events of our times. Wilfred Jenks cited
this common law of mankind — where in spite
of national frontiers and despite storms
which stir the surface of the world and the
ideological differences which divide us, men
and women are busy at their own tasks and
getting on with the great business of the
race. It is our hope that in time, and not too
slowly, this great hidden substructure of in-
ternational cooperation can build such
strength that it can begin to lay its hands
upon the feverish issues of violent contro-
versy and make a massive contribution to the
establishment of peace.
In our generation, where we have seen al-
most miraculous technological development
in communications, the book remains the
world's chief repository of its intellectual
heritage and there is a vastly expanded need
for the printed word. In the context of the
vast ideological and geographical distances
which divide us, the theme of this Congress,
"The World and the Book — Publishing in an
Age of Change," has special significance. I
would just emphasize one point — the respon-
sibility of economically advanced people to
provide books for those who do not have them
or do not have as many as they need. The
educational explosion around the world de-
mands books. Economic development de-
mands books. Social progress demands books.
We should join together in a greater effort,
during this International Cooperation Year,
to bring textbooks to the student, readers to
the newly literate, the latest works of science
and medicine to members of those professions
in the developing countries. No one country
can fill this need. There is much to be done,
even though resources are limited.
The Florence Agreement
Government and the private sector each
has a role. The field of copyright is ob-
viously in the field of government, as is
the lowering of tariff barriers. In this con-
nection I would like to mention the Florence
Agreement, the agreement on the importa-
tion of educational, scientific, and cultural
materials.- The United States firmly be-
lieves in the basic purpose of this conven-
tion, which is to improve international un-
derstanding by reducing trade barriers to
knowledge. We participated in drafting it.
In 1960 the United States Senate gave its
advice and consent to ratification. But actual
ratification had to await implementing
legislation. Unfortunately, we ran into some
complications which delayed the drafting of
the actual bill. I understand that the most
difficult problems have since been worked
out, and a bill [H.R. 8664] was intro-
duced into Congress on Tuesday [June 1] of
this week. The President has given it his
support.
In the letter which he sent to both Houses
of Congress,^ he pointed out the benefits
this legislation would bring to schools and
universities, science laboratories and re-
search foundations, libraries, art galleries
and museums. He said that the fullest free-
dom of access to the culture of other na-
tions is the hallmark of an open society. Ac-
tion now rests with the Congress. We are
encouraged to believe that Congress will
agree with the President and act at this
session on this important matter.
Main Themes of American Foreign Policy
I want to conclude my brief remarks with
a few comments on the foreign policy of the
American people.
' For background and text of agreement, see
BULLETIN of Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422, and Feb. 16, 1960,
p. 261.
" For a statement by the President on June 1 and
text of his letter, see ihid., June 21, 1965, p. 1015.
28
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
The main themes of our foreign policy
are relatively simple. Some may even call
them naive. We are living in a world of as-
tonishing change. We have relations with 115
countries. During the last calendar year
there were more than 50 elections and
changes of government, and at least 12 or
15 of those changes were unscheduled. So
we must accept, in this complex world com-
munity, that for as long as we can see into
the future we are going to be confronted
with the phenomenon of change.
In reflecting upon that circumstance. Gen-
eral Omar Bradley, a great general as well
as a wise civilian, remarks that we must
chart our course by the light of the distant
stars rather than by the lights of every pass-
ing ship. I would like to mention one or two
of those distant stars which will help you
to organize your thinking of what the
United States is all about.
A pillar of foreign policy for us is the no-
tion articulated by Thomas Jefferson that
governments derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed. Some of the
erudite have found philosophical weakness in
that proposition, but it just happens that
the American people believe it and are
deeply dedicated to the notion. And that ex-
plains why we have welcomed the emergence
of the new nations of Asia and Africa to
national independence; why we have wel-
comed and encouraged the doubling of the
membership in the United Nations; why
we have the strongest attachment to the oth-
er democracies; and why we are so deeply
concerned about the withholding of freedom
outside our borders, and why we are act-
ing, even belatedly, to remove the barriers
to freedom within our own society.
Beyond that, I would call your attention
to the preamble and articles 1 and 2 of the
United Nations Charter. In all sincerity, I
would propose those as a succinct summary
of the foreign policy attitudes of the Amer-
ican people. It is no accident that this should
be so. We took an important part in draft-
ing that charter when men and women were
dying in the second great world war of this
century. We and others sat down to draft
that charter when we were thinking
long and hard and deeply and soberly about
the kind of a world it was in which we
wished to live. And so, in a few paragraphs,
we sketched out such a world — a world of in-
dependent nations, each with their own in-
stitutions, settling their disputes by peace-
ful means, banding together to resist aggres-
sion, striving to establish a rule of law.
Now these, in summary, were the lessons
we drew from World War II. How urgent it
is for us to remember that we shall not have
that chance again ! We shall not have a chance
to draw lessons from world war III in order
to devise a decent world order. For those
lessons must be learned before that war oc-
curs, and therefore our attachment to these
elementary principles of the charter is very
deep indeed.
Exploring the Possibilities of Peace
In this postwar period the American
people have been called upon to shoulder very
heavy burdens — over $100 billion in direct
assistance for reconstruction and economic
and social development of those beyond our
frontiers; massive defense budgets, calling
on our people for resources they would much
prefer to use for other purposes, if some-
how we could establish peace in the world.
Few people realize that since World War II
the American people have been called upon
to sustain 160,000 casualties in the defense
of the safety and independence of other
countries, particularly smaller countries in
distant parts of the world. This has not
come about through desire for a single acre
of land or any desire for the surrender of
anyone to anybody. It has come about
through the simple notion that, unless there
can come into being a decent world order in
which nations leave their neighbors alone, it
is hard to see how man can avoid catastrophe.
In that effort many of you in this room
have been involved. I think when you worry
about distant problems where violence is pres-
ent, when you are concerned about how far
these explosive situations may develop — •
whether you are yourselves directly involved
JULY 5, 1965
29
or not — when you ponder what is in the
minds of those who have to take direct part
in those situations, you should pause to re-
flect upon the sources of the violence in
this postwar period: for example, the ef-.
forts of the Soviet Union to retain its troops
in Iran, the guerrillas who crossed the
northern frontiers of Greece, the stoppage of
access to Berlin in the first Berlin block-
ade, the organized divisions that crossed
the demarcation line in Korea, the mas-
sive effort to establish offensive missiles
in Cuba, the tens of thousands of guerrillas
and the tons of arms that have moved
across the demarcation line from North to
South Viet-Nam. These have been difficult
experiences. They have been costly to the
countries directly concerned. They have been
costly to the American people. But we can see
no alternative but to continue with the at-
tempt to establish, support, and strengthen
a decent world order.
We believe that the integrity of the Amer-
ican commitment in that matter is fundamen-
tal to the maintenance of the peace of the
world right around the globe and not just in
some distant point. So the doors for discus-
sion, negotiation, peacemaking, and settle-
ment are always open — as far as Southeast
Asia is concerned through 4 years or more
of bilateral discussions with the principal
capitals concerned, through efforts in the
United Nations, through the use of the ma-
chinery of the 1954 and 1962 agreements on
Southeast Asia, through proposals made by
such distinguished statesmen as President
Radhakrishnan of India, and the attempts to
organize conferences of the interested
powers to review the total situation, through
offers of unconditional discussion, through
pauses in the military action itself, and in
attempts, in whatever way, to explore the
possibilities of peace.
But peace requires two to make it. And
if we are to have a decent world order, we
must make it quite clear that aggression can-
not succeed. For surely we have learned that
successful aggression breeds further aggres-
sion. And at the end of that trail lies a world
that no one, in his wildest dreams, believes
man can accept or even survive. And so we
shall persist in our efforts to build a peace
and in our belief that nations large and small
have a right to live without molestation from
their neighbors. We shall persist in our ef-
forts to build a structure of international law
for the peaceful settlement of disputes. And
we think that in doing so our purposes will be
steadily better understood and that there will
be men and women in all parts of the earth
who will join us in hoping for that day of
peace which man can dream about and which ""
is now an essential requirement for his sheer
survival.
U.S. Interest in Free Trade
and Peaceful Commerce
Remarks by President Johnson ^
It has been said that traveling makes men
wiser but less happy. I hope you return to
Iowa after your trade mission both wiser
and happier. Having bought a few Iowa hogs
myself, I have full respect for your trading
abilities.
As long as we have been a nation, peace,
commerce, and honest friendship with all
nations have been our aims — as Thomas
Jefferson once said. Those are still our
aims — and will be always.
In this world, in these times, America
seeks no domination over foes, no domina-
tion over friends. There is no war we want
to fight, except to join with other nations
to war on war itself. When you are in
Europe, visiting the cities and the peoples
there, I hope you will each speak from your
own hearts to convey to them how deeply
runs the commitment of Americans to
peace for all mankind.
America is a land of many interests
around the world, for our cause is the cause
of all mankind. But the peoples of the
lands you will visit are ever close to our
hearts, bound there by blood and beliefs
forever. So, also, the heart of America's
^ Made to the Iowa Trade Mission at the White
House on June 9 (White House press release).
30
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
purposes and policies is concerned with the
strength, the safety, the stability, and the
greater success of the Atlantic lands and
peoples.
In Europe — and in America, too — there
are now, as there are always, those who
would divide us and set us against one
another. Such efforts have never suc-
ceeded, and they will not succeed now.
This nation, this Government, this ad-
ministration, have no foes in the capitals
of the free world. We have no feuds to
follow, no vendettas to vindicate, no pro-
found differences to pursue or prolong. We
seek only — and always — to fashion with
our friends in Europe and other free lands
stronger supports for the security that
keeps the peace and the progress that
promises prosperity.
Central to our purposes with Europe — •
and all the world — is our desire to foster
increasingly free trade and peaceful com-
merce. You residents of Iowa know the value
of trade. You know what trade means to
Iowa farmers, what it means to Iowa manu-
facturers, what it means to more than 100,-
000 jobholders in your State.
Last year our exports reached the record
level of $25.2 billion — 30 percent above the
level in 1960. Agricultural exports of the
United States rose 14 percent in the last
calendar year — to $6.3 billion. Foreign mar-
kets took the output of 1 out of 4 acres of
American farmland.
Free trade is both sensible economics and
sane politics. And I believe we must move
together in that direction.
Old obstacles are obvious. Old myths are
many. But the time has come when all
nations must think far beyond the thinking
they have done before. If the people of the
world are to raise up their incomes, step up
their growth, and lift up the standards by
which men live, this is essential.
In our increasingly interdependent world
there is no room for the restrictiveness
that leads to counterrestriction and finally
to the rivalries and conflict that undermine
the foundations of free alliances and the
pillars of peace.
On your journey abroad, I wish you good
luck and Godspeed.
The Kennedy Round: A Progress Report
by Christian A. Herter
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations *
I thank you most sincerely for the honor
you have done me today. I take that honor
as applying not so much to me personally
as to the able and dedicated staff who have
worked with me in the Office of the Spe-
cial Representative for Trade Negotiations
— and to the late President Kennedy, who
^ Address made at a luncheon at Washington, D.C.,
on May 20, sponsored by the Metropolitan Washing-
ton Board of Trade, at which Mr. Herter received
the 1965 World Trade Award.
asked me to take on this task, and to Pres-
ident Johnson, who at all times has given
me the firmest possible support.
I take it, also, that you are expressing
hope and confidence today in what we can
accomplish in the future, rather more than
any recognition of what we have already
achieved. For the sixth round of trade ne-
gotiations under the auspices of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade — widely
known as the Kennedy Round — is today
just about in midcourse. We have at least
JULY 5, 1965
31
a year of complex and difficult negotiations
ahead before we can hope to achieve an
agreement.
There is a New Yorker cartoon on one of
the walls in our office. It shows a young
man and young lady bidding a fond fare-
well at the Geneva airport, and the caption
says : "Don't cry, Marie — there'll be another
round of talks."
Well, I don't know of any Maries — at
least, none that have been brought officially
to my attention — but there have certainly
been round after round after round of
talks. You may recall that King Charles II,
a gentleman at all times, apologized on his
deathbed for taking an unconscionable time
about dying. Many of you must have felt
that the Kennedy Round has been an un-
conscionable time coming to life. Things
have indeed moved slowly — not at the gla-
cial pace of disarmament negotiations, but
slowly enough.
I think we must bear in mind, however,
that these negotiations involve the vital,
bread-and-butter interests of many countries
— over 40, at the last count, including all
the principal trading nations of the free
world. Where so much is at stake, the re-
sponsible officials of all the participating
countries must be thorough in their prepara-
tions and painstaking in their negotiations.
Moreover, reductions in a greater range
of impediments to trade are being sought
in these negotiations than in any previous
ones — nontariff barriers as well as tariffs —
and we are seeking the liberalization of
agricultural as well as industrial trade.
I think we must also bear in mind the
special situation of one of our major ne-
gotiating partners, the European Common
Market. Each Kennedy Round decision re-
quires the unanimous vote of its six mem-
ber nations. Under these circumstances,
such decisions can be made only after
lengthy and difficult internal bargaining,
and these decisions, once made, are very
difficult to alter. Trade negotiations, by
their very nature, require give-and-take
flexibility of a kind it is difficult for the
Common Market, at this stage in its evolu-
tion, to exercise.
Despite these problems, I am glad to say
that we have made significant progress. I
shall not, however, seek today to cover the-
whole range of our negotiations in any
depth.
I shall not say much about agriculture,
which threatened for a long while to be a
bottleneck in our negotiations, except to
note that discussions on this difficult sub-
ject began on May 10 and will be proceed-
ing according to a definite and agreed
timetable. On Monday of this week [May
17] the major producers and consumers of
wheat and feed grains — 12 nations, includ-
ing our own — exchanged proposals in Ge-
neva for an international grains arrange-
ment.
With the opening of these talks on
agriculture, an essential part of the Kennedy
Round is now actively underway. President
Johnson has said, for reasons I am sure you
fully appreciate, that "the United States
will enter into no ultimate agreement un-
less progress is registered toward trade
liberalization on the products of our farms
as well as our factories." ^
Nor shall I say much about another im-
portant aspect of the negotiations, the
trade interests and aspirations of the de-
veloping countries. We believe that the
Kennedy Round offers them a real oppor-
tunity to play a more substantial role in
world trade; I am delighted to say that a
number of these countries have already
formally declared their intention to partic-
ipate. Trade expansion can help them to
achieve a 20th-century degree of economic
development and a better life in freedom for
their peoples. Moreover, as they succeed in
these objectives, they will offer substantial
and steadily expanding markets for Amer-
ican products.
I shall concentrate today, rather, on the
negotiations concerning industrial products,
because I think it is still insufficiently ap-
preciated how much they will mean as we
press this Kennedy Round through to suc-
cess.
= Bulletin of May 11, 1964, p. 749.
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Negotiations on Industrial Products
As you know, our major American objec-
tive in these negotiations is a 50-percent
linear tariff cut on as wide a range of in-
dustrial products as possible. There will in-
evitably be, for each nation, certain items
so sensitive to import competition that it
will wish to withhold them from so deep
a reduction and be willing to offer only a
lesser cut or none at all. In the jargon of
the Kennedy Round, such items are called
"exceptions" — because they are exceptions
to the 50-percent cut which has been ac-
cepted as a working hypothesis by the ma-
jor trading nations participating in the ne-
gotiations. Some 6 months ago — on Novem-
ber 16, to be exact — the nations prepared to
engage in the linear tariff cut exchanged
lists of exceptions.
These lists are confidential, and they must
be kept so. You may have seen in the press,
however, some criticism of the length of the
exceptions list the European Common Mar-
ket submitted. It is a fact that some of its
negotiating partners, including the United
States, consider this list to be overly large,
particularly in relation to those submitted
by the other principal countries. Of course
we fully recognize the great effort made by
the six nations of the Common Market in
working out the complex internal agree-
ments necessary to produce this list. At the
same time we hope that they will take into
account the unprecedented offers which
have been submitted by most of the other
countries, including our own, and which —
if realized — would bring them major trade
benefits. We hope these offers will prompt
the Common Market to reduce its ovvrn ex-
ceptions list in the course of the negotia-
tions, and we shall seek to persuade it to do
so.
As for ourselves, we have held our excep-
tions list to the bare minimum compatible
with our overriding national interest, as we
interpret it. And some of the smaller na-
tions— Sweden, Denmark, Norway, and Aus-
tria— have set a good example for all of us
by putting all their chips on the table and
claiming, at least in the beginning, no ex-
ceptions at all.
However — and here is a point I want to
emphasize very strongly — what is already
on the bargaining table, even before we be-
gin the effort to pare down some of the
longer exceptions lists, is much more impor-
tant, much more meaningful, than what is
not.
What is already on the bargaining table
offers all of us the opportunity for the most
significant reduction of industrial tariffs,
the most substantial liberalization of world
trade in industrial products that has ever
been achieved in the entire history of trade
negotiations. Thus, in the industrial area,
we are within sight of fulfilling the intent
of Congress in enacting the Trade Expan-
sion Act of 1962 — that it should initiate a
new era in our trade relations with the rest
of the world.
I should remind you at this point that the
Kennedy Round is concerned not only with
tariffs but with nontariff barriers as well.
Many nontariff barriers — particularly the
quantitative restrictions imposed by many
of our trading partners after the war for
balance-of -payments reasons — have been
done away with. The hard core of nontariff
barriers that remain have deep fiscal, social,
political, or economic roots. They will not
be easy to deal with — ^but we intend to make
a genuine effort to tackle them. This phase
of the negotiations has not yet really opened
in earnest, but we are preparing for it dili-
gently and thoroughly.
The "Sector" Approach
Now a word or so about what we shall be
doing in the industrial area at Geneva in the
coming weeks. In previous GATT rounds,
trade negotiations were conducted in terms
of specific offers by each participant — an
offer to reduce tariffs on umbrellas was bal-
anced by an offer on slippers, and so on.
This time we are dealing with virtually-
all goods which move in foreign commerce.
We are proposing for most products a linear
tariff cut of 50 percent. All of this is taking
place in an industrial world far more com-
petitive than that of the earlier postwar
years. Differences in technology, know-how.
JULY 5, 1965
33
size of market, and other major determi-
nants of competitive success are rapidly
narrowing.
In this light it is perhaps not surprising
that the problems relating to further trade
liberalization for some products and some
industries are often similar among partici-
pating nations. They have sometimes felt it
necessary to make exceptions of the same
commodities.
Eric Wyndham White, the Director-Gen-
eral of GATT, has suggested that v^e begin
our industrial discussions at Geneva by com-
ing to grips with this problem. For certain
key industries he has proposed a prelimi-
nary "sector" approach rather than the com-
modity-by-commodity technique of previous
negotiations. This is a procedural technique,
designed to elicit fuller information, rather
than a negotiating device.
We fully realize that certain disadvan-
tages and dangers may lurk along this new
path. It could give aid and comfort, for ex-
ample, to those who would balance any re-
sults within narrowly defined product areas
rather than on the basis of the overall ben-
efits given and received. It could provide a
basis from which nations aiming at tariff
harmonization could push their case — a case
which usually turns out to involve a pro-
posal that the United States should make
greater reductions than some other nations.
But there may be positive aspects to this
technique, as well. It provides an opportu-
nity to examine all the trade problems of an
industry, including barriers other than tar-
iffs. Further, it is certainly more meaning-
ful to look at the broader picture — the prob-
lems of firms and industries as a whole —
than at the situation, perhaps atypical, in
particular products or segments of an in-
dustry.
In some areas this approach may open up
the possibility of greater success in further-
ing our own export interests. We are not
alone in being adversely affected by some
of the major exceptions lists. By combining
forces around the negotiating table, in a
multilateral rather than bilateral setting,
those of us interested in genuine trade
liberalization might be able to bargain more
effectively.
Because of these positive aspects, we have
agreed to try out this new approach. We are
now busy preparing for the initial discus-
sions on a sector basis — and, in the process,
we are posing many questions to ourselves.
Precisely what is our export interest in
each of the major foreign markets in each
of these industries — not what it was in some
base year, not even in 1965, but what it will
be 5 years hence when the results of the
Kennedy Round begin to show up in the
marketplace ? I
How does this interest vary between firms I
and different divisions within each Indus- "
try? What is the comparable situation in
this same industry abroad?
What will be the nature of competition _
and world trade 5 or 10 years from now? I
What major changes or influences can be
expected to bear significantly upon this in-
dustry then?
Where do the individual products on the
various exceptions lists fit into the broader
industry picture, and how valid are the rea-
sons offered for not putting them on the
bargaining table?
In short, we seek a clearer picture than
we've had thus far — or in previous negotia-
tions— of the shape and character of future
markets and the competitive conditions
which are likely to prevail in them, as well
as the probable impact of evolving trade and
tariff policies at home and abroad.
This is a big order. To fulfill it, we need
the kind of judgments and forecasts that
can only come from men of seasoned experi-
ence within industry. The facts we require
go far beyond government statistics, com- J
prehensive as they are. ■
For these and many other essentials in
our preparations we have turned to our in-
dustrial advisers. I am delighted to say that
they have been extremely helpful and have
gone to great lengths to insure that your
American negotiators will be as well
equipped as possible. Beginning with the '
roster of almost 300 technical specialists
who were designated by industries and
84
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
trade associations as the point of contact
with our office, we have solicited advice and
assistance from steadily widening areas of
industry — and we have received it.
I should like to express the hope — and the
confidence — that this cooperation between
private industry and our office will con-
tinue. We shall need it in the areas of mul-
tilateral industrial negotiation which lie be-
yond the particular sectors we shall be deal-
ing with in Geneva during the coming
weeks. We have here, I believe, a working
example of that creative partnership be-
tween Government and business to which
President Johnson has dedicated himself
and his administration.
Trade and the Atlantic Partnership
I have spoken so far of your stake as
businessmen in the success of the Kennedy
Round negotiations. I should like, in conclu-
sion, to refer to your stake in it as cit-
izens.
Two weeks ago, on V-E Day, President
Johnson said that "the heartbeat of our pol-
icy and our expectations is with the nations
of the Atlantic" and declared that "we must
all — Americans and Europeans — vow never
to repeat the errors which have led to dis-
aster: for America to stand proud in isola-
tion, or Europe to fall apart in rancor." *
The success of the Kennedy Round can
lay the solid economic foundation for the
kind of meaningful Atlantic partnership to
which the President rededicated America
2 weeks ago. The negotiations may be com-
plex and perhaps at times difficult, but I am
prudently confident that, as reasonable men,
we shall work out the problems which con-
front us. Indeed, we must — for the sake of
ourselves and of the free world.
I welcome the honor you have done me
today as convincing evidence that you fully
appreciate the importance of our undertak-
ing, and I ask, in conclusion, your continued
support and understanding in the months
ahead.
THE CONGRESS
Department Opposes Bill To Amend
Export Control Act of 1949
Statement by Under Secretary Ball ^
I appear before you today in opposition to
S. 948, a proposed amendment to the Export
Control Act of 1949. This legislation, if en-
acted, would prohibit American firms from
taking any action, including the furnishing
of information, that would have the effect
of furthering or supporting restrictive trade
practices or boycotts imposed by foreign
countries against other countries friendly to
the United States.
The legislation is stated in general terms,
but as this committee knows, it has been
put forward primarily as a means of dis-
couraging the Arab boycott of Israel.
I need hardly tell this committee that the
administration is opposed to that boycott.
We have repeatedly made our position clear
to the Arab governments. We shall continue
to express our opposition and to assist
American firms affected by the boycott.
But while we oppose the boycott, we do
not support the legislation before this com-
mittee. What this committee is faced with
this morning is not so much a question of
principle but of the practical consequences
of the measures that are proposed. In our
judgment those measures would not be
helpful to American business and they
could interfere seriously with the effective
operation of programs of economic denial
that we are now conducting against several
Communist countries.
The program of economic denial designed
to inhibit trade with Cuba is, of course, the
best known, but we also impose what is in
effect an embargo on United States trade
" For text, see ibid., May 24, 1965, p. 790.
' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate Com-
mittee on Banking and Currency on May 24.
JULY 5, 1965
35
with Communist China, North Korea, and
North Viet-Nam. Trade in strategic goods
with other Communist countries is also
controlled.
Those restrictions are, in the main, im-
posed under the authority of four laws :
First, the Trading With the Enemy Act
prohibits United States firms from engaging
in virtually any transaction with Commu-
nist China, North Korea, North Viet-Nam,
and Cuba.
Second, the Battle Act requires the ter-
mination of military, economic, and finan-
cial assistance to any country that know-
ingly permits the shipment of certain
strategic items to Communist bloc countries.
Third, under the Export Control Act
special restrictions apply to the export of
United States goods and technology. This
act covers foreign participants in United
States export transactions and provides for
the imposition of sanctions against foreign
nationals who violate the act.
Fourth, several provisions of the Foreign
Assistance Act require the termination of
assistance to countries that engage in, or
permit their nationals to engage in, certain
kinds of transactions with Cuba.
Fifth, as a matter of policy, no United
States Government cargo may be shipped on
vessels that trade with Cuba, and every ef-
fort has been made to discourage friendly
countries from exporting critical materials
to Cuba.
These programs can be effectively car-
ried out only with the assistance and co-
operation of foreign firms and governments.
As an aid in policing the programs, we call
upon foreign firms and governments to fur-
nish a substantial amount of information
concerning their international trade. Much
of this information is of a kind that United
States concerns would be prohibited from
furnishing under the proposed legislation.
The Export Control Act regulations, for
example, require foreign companies to pro-
vide detailed information on the nature of
their business, the nature of their custom-
ers' business, the proposed disposition of
commodities obtained from the United
States, the use of the commodities, and spe-
cific certifications that the foreign firms will
not dispose of listed commodities to any
countries not approved for export.
Other United States regulations require
foreign firms and governments to provide
other items of information. And we request
— and receive — substantial amounts of ad-
ditional information that are not specifically
required by our regulations. All of this in-
formation is essential to make our economic
restrictions against trade with Communist
countries effective.
In defending the proposed bill its support-
ers have sometimes argued that our denial
programs apply only to American-produced
goods and services while the Arab boycott
affects goods and services emanating out-
side the Arab countries.
But under certain circumstances our en-
forcement regulations also apply to goods
produced outside the United States — if, for
example, they are produced with American
technology, if they are produced by foreign
firms controlled by American parent firms,
or if the foreign goods are strategic and
are being sold to controlled destinations
with the participation of United States firms
or individuals.
This extraterritorial application obviously
creates problems — particularly when other
countries do not fully share our own philo-
sophical concern with the relation of trade
to cold-war objectives. Nonetheless, it is a
fact that in many situations the enforce-
ment of our own programs does not stop at
the water's edge.
Because they interfere with the free flow
of commerce these programs of economic
denial are not popular in the international
trading world and there is considerable
complaint about them. S. 948, if adopted,
would provide the excuse for other govern-
ments to interfere with their effective exe-
cution. If foreign governments were to re-
fuse to provide information to the United
States to assist us in the enforcement of
these programs — and were to prohibit their
domestic concerns from providing such in-
formation— we would be sharply restricted
in our ability to make these programs ef-
fective.
36
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
This would have serious consequences,
particularly with regard to our efforts to
discourage trade with Cuba. And any weak-
ening of our economic denial program
against Cuba would, of course, affect not
merely the United States but the interests of
the entire Western Hemisphere.
I urge, therefore, that this committee
bear these practical considerations in mind
in its consideration of S. 948. However much
the committee may wish to express its oppo-
sition to the Arab boycott, this measure
would not, in our judgment, be effective for
that purpose, and it could seriously tie our
hands in the conduct of other Government
programs of major importance.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Calendar of International Conferences^
In Recess as of July 1, 1965
Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re-
cessed Sept. 17, 1964) Geneva .
U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session (recessed Feb. 18 until
September 1965) New York
Mar. 14, 1962-
Dec. 1, 1964-
Scheduled July Through September 1965
Inter-American Juridical Committee Rio de Janeiro .... July 1-Sept. 30
OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party III . . . Paris July 5-6
BIRPI Meeting of Experts on Revision of Bern Convention Geneva July 5-14
FAO Fertilizer Advisory Panel: 9th Meeting Rome July 6-7
8th WHO International Conference for Revision of Classifi-
cation of Diseases Geneva July 6-12
FAO Working Party for Rational Utilization of Atlantic Tuna Rome July 6-13
WMO Commission for Aerology: 4th Session Brussels July 6-20
South Pacific Commission: 6th Conference New Guinea .... July 6-20
OECD Economic Policy Committee Paris July 7-8
OECD Marine Transport Committee Paris July 12-13
UNESCO/IBE Council and 28th International Conference on
Public Education Geneva July 12-23
UNCTAD Committee on Commodities : 1st Session .... New York .... July 12-Aug. 6
International Wheat Council: 41st Session ....... London July 19-21
International Institute of Administrative Sciences: Triennial
General Assembly Paris July 20-24
' This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on June 14, 1965, lists
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period
July-September 1965. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings.
Persons interested in these are referred to the World Last of Future International Meetings, compiled by
the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of
Industrial and Intellectual Property; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commis-
sion for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECOSOC, Economic and So-
cial Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade; IAEA, International Atomic Energy Agency; IBE, International Bureau of Education; ICAO,
International Civil Aviation Organization; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Or-
ganization for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHO, Pan American Health Organization;
U.N., United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO,
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; WHO, World Health Organization;
WMO, World Meteorological Organization.
JULY 5, 1965
37
Calendar off International Conferences
-Continued
Scheduled July Through September 1965 — Continued
South Pacific Commission: 27th Session
OECD Development Assistance Committee: Ministerial Meeting
Inter- American Travel Congress:
New Guinea
Paris . . .
9th Session
Executive Committee
Technical Committee on Removal of Travel Barriers
Technical Committee on Research and Organization
Technical Committee on Tourist Travel Promotion .
Technical Committee on Travel Plant
IBE Council: 31st Session
ICAO Legal Committee
U.N, Committee of 24
U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Status of Women: Participation
of Women in Public Life
UNCTAD Conference on Transit Trade of Land-Locked Coun-
tries
3d U.N. Congress on Prevention of Crime and Treatment of
Offenders
UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures: 1st Session ....
2d FAG/WHO International Meeting on Veterinary Education
WMO Commission for Climatology: 4th Session
UNCTAD Trade and Development Board: 2d Session . . . .
U.N. World Population Conference: Preparatory Committee .
ECE Trade Committee: Subgroup on Reinsurance
2d U.N. World Population Conference
Inter- American Commission of Women: 14th Assembly . .
Special Inter-American Conference
ECAFE Committee of Experts on Asian Development Bank .
U.N. General Assembly: 19th Session (resumed)
BIRPI Regional Patent Meeting of Asian Countries ....
International Scientific Meeting on Polar Bears
U.N. ECOSOC Advisory Committee on Application of Science
and Technology to Development
U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Housing, Building and Planning
UNESCO Conference on World Literacy
International Statistical Institute: 35th Session
ITU Plenipotentiary Conference
IMCO Assembly: 4th Session
U.N. Sugar Conference
U.N. Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the Charter .
ECE Steel Committee and Working Groups
ILO Inter-American Advisory Committee
UNCTAD Expert Committee on Regional Development Fund
IAEA General Conference: 9th Session
U.N. General Assembly: 20th Session
OECD Interim Science Committee
ECAFE Working Party on Economic Development and Planning
ECE Coal Committee
BIRPI Interunion Coordination Committee
IMCO Council: 15th Session
BIRPI Conference of Representatives of the Paris Union for the
Protection of Industrial Property
BIRPI Committee of Experts on Problems of Industrial Prop-
erty Rights
WHO Regional Committee for the Western Pacific: 16th
Meeting
U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space ....
PAHO Directing Council and Regional Committee for WHO .
Caribbean Organization Council: 6th Meeting
Inter- American Tropical Tuna Commission: Special Meeting
GATT Committee III: Meeting on Trade and Development .
FAO Committee on Commodity Problems
GATT Committee on Cotton Textiles: Meeting of Experts .
EGA Conference on Economic Cooperation in East and Central
Africa
ECA Conference on Economic Cooperation in Central Africa
Bogota . .
Bogota . .
Panama . .
Mexico City
Caracas . .
San Jose .
Geneva . .
Melbourne .
New York .
Ulan Bator, Mongolia .
New York
Stockholm . . .
Geneva ....
Copenhagen . .
Stockholm . . .
Geneva ....
Belgrade . . .
Geneva ....
Belgrrade . . .
Uruguay ....
Rio de Janeiro .
Bangkok ....
New York . . .
Colombo . . .
Washington, D.C.
Alaska . . .
14
New York .
New York .
Tehran . .
Montreux
Belgrade
Paris , . .
Geneva . .
New York .
Geneva . .
Buenos Aires
Geneva . .
Tokyo . .
New York .
Paris . . .
Bangkok
Geneva . .
Geneva . .
Paris . . .
Geneva
Geneva
Manila . .
New York .
Buenos Aires
Martinique .
Quito . . .
Geneva . .
Rome . . .
Geneva . .
Lusaka, Zambia
Leopoldville
July 21-22
July 22-23
July 28-Aug. 3
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
July
Aug. 3-17
Aug. 3-30
Aug. 9-18
Aug. 12-20
Aug. 12-21
Aug. 12-26
Aug. 24-Sept.
Aug. 27-28
Aug. 30-Sept. 3
Aug. 30-Sept. 10
August
August
August
Sept. 1-14
Sept. 6-10
Sept. 7-10
Sept. 7-17
Sept. 7-20
Sept. 8-19
Sept. 14-Nov.
Sept. 14-22
Sept. 15-29
Sept. 15-Oct.
Sept. 16-18
Sept. 20-24
Sept. 20-25
Sept. 20-Oct.
Sept. 21-Oct.
Sept. 21-Dec.
Sept. 23-24
Sept. 27-Oct. 4
Sept. 27-Oct. 30
Sept. 28-Oct. 1
Sept. 29-Oct. 6
September
September
September
September
September
September
September
September
September
September or
October
September
September
I
12
19
1
1
15
4
38
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Expanding the Participation of Women in National Life
EIGHTEENTH SESSION OF THE U.N. COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
TEHRAN, IRAN, MARCH 1-20, 1965
by Gladys A. Tillett
By invitation of the Government of Iran
the U.N. Commission on the Status of
Women met for its 18th session, March 1-20,
1965, at Tehran. Meeting away from U.N.
headquarters was a departure from the usu-
al procedure; as a rule, Commission ses-
sions are held at U.N. headquarters in New
York or Geneva, and only twice before has
the Commission met in other countries. The
setting in a developing country highlighted
the importance of women in the economic,
social, and political progress of nations.
The timing of the session also added a
note of drama ; the delegates arrived at Teh-
ran on the second anniversary of the grant-
ing of the vote to the women of Iran. Some
5,000 or more Iranian women marched in
a parade celebrating the achievement of
political rights. Bands played inspiring
music. Young girls distributed handbills. The
Princess Ashraf Pahlavi, twin sister of the
Shah and honorary chairman of the High
Council of Iranian Women, stood and re-
viewed the parade. Later the women assem-
bled in the stadium, where Princess Ashraf
delivered a stirring address. The United
States delegation had seats on the reviewing
stand with the Princess.
The anniversary celebration was our in-
troduction to the women's movement of
Iran. This centers in the High Council of
Iranian Women, an organization composed of
32 member organizations affiliated with the
International Council of Women.
The women's movement has the support of
the royal family. It was the Reza Shah, fath-
er of the present Shah, who banished the veil
in 1936. The Empress of Iran addressed
the opening session of the U.N. Commission.
She received with the Princess at the recep-
tion given in the royal palace. High-ranking
officials of the Foreign Ministry were fre-
quently in attendance at sessions. The High
Council served as a committee for all ar-
rangements.
Officers and Agenda
Princess Ashraf was unanimously elect-
ed chairman of the Commission. Miss Helena
Benitez of the Philippines served as first
vice chairman and presided at many of the
sessions. Mrs. Helvi Sipila of Finland served
as second vice chairman and Judge Annie
Jiagge of Ghana as rapporteur.
Nineteen of the 21 countries serving on
• Mrs. Tillett is the United States
Representative on the United Nations
Commission on the Status of Women.
JULY 5, 1965
39
the Commission sent delegates to Tehran.
They came from all regions of the world.^
More than 20 nongovernmental organi-
zations sent representatives. Among them
were the World YWCA, the International
Federation of Business and Professional
Women, the International Council of
Women, the Commission of the Churches on
International Affairs, the International Fed-
eration of University Women, the Interna-
tional Alliance of Women, the World Union
of Catholic Women, St. Joan's International
Alliance, Zonta International Council, Inter-
national Federation of Women Lavs^ers, In-
ternational Council of Jewish Women, the
International Confederation of Free Trade
Unions, International Social Service, the
Pan-Pacific and South East Asia Women's
Association, and others.
The enthusiasm generated by Iran's prog-
ress, with participants from all parts of the
world, set the stage for an unusually produc-
tive meeting. Both the discussions and reso-
lutions adopted by the Commission served to
implement the women's program in Iran. The
interventions of nongovernmental organiza-
tions also reflected this emphasis.
The Commission gave primary attention to
broadening the base of women's participation
in national life. To accomplish this it voted to
initiate a new series of seminars on civic
education; adopted a resolution on family
planning; began work on a Declaration for
the Elimination of Discrimination Against
Women ; recommended standards on the dis-
solution of marriage, the emphasis not on
the merits of divorce but on equality of
rights for men and women ; encouraged con-
tinued work by the ILO in meeting problems
of women workers; recognized the vital im-
portance of sound general education and vo-
cational training to prepare girls for partic-
' Austria, China, Dominican Republic, Finland,
France, Ghana, Guinea, Hungary, Iran, Mexico,
Nepal, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Sierra Leone,
U.S.S.R., United Arab Republic, United Kingdom,
and United States. Canada and Japan sent observers.
Representatives were present from the International
Labor Organization (ILO), United Nations Educa-
tional, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), World Health Organization (WHO),
and United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF).
ipation in the social and economic progress
of their countries; and urged the need for
annual sessions to keep abreast of the chang-
ing situation for women as the result of in-
dustrial and social development.
Let us look at these achievements one at a
time.
Seminars on Civic Education
First, the new series of seminars. The
United States initiated a resolution calling
for regional seminars to help women use
their political and civic rights through lead-
ership training with the cooperation of non-
governmental organizations. Since women
now vote in almost all countries of the world,
the major problem is no longer the acquisi-
tion of political rights but the utilization
of rights already gained. Women need to
learn the skill and know-how to use their
political rights as a lever to lift their status
and to speed the economic and social prog-
ress of their countries.
The key is the skill of leadership. This is
a skill which can be taught and is in fact
continually being taught in nongovernmen-
tal organizations. The new U.N. pamphlet on
"Civic and Political Education of Women"
provides guidelines for this program.
The purpose of the new seminars pro-
posed by the United States is to work out
a pattern for training women in leadership
in community affairs. These regional semi-
nars would develop model workshops or
training courses to show women how to plan
and carry through community betterment
projects. Similar workshops and training
courses could then be established at the na-
tional and the local level in cooperation with
women's nongovernmental organizations. In
its final form the resolution was cosponsored
by the Dominican Republic, Iran, Mexico,
Nepal, and the Philippines along with the
United States. It will enable nations in all
regions to draw on the resources of woman-
power for the common good. Each country
will have its own needs and develop its proj-
ects accordingly.
In presenting the resolution I pointed out
that in the United States the Congress and
the President rely heavily on the active par-
40
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ticipation of women's nongovernmental or-
ganizations in U.S. programs to eliminate
poverty, advance education, and promote
social and economic progress.
Previous seminars organized by the U.N.
have demonstrated their value in extend-
ing the impact and supplementing the work
of the Commission on the Status of Women.
Nongovernmental organizations spoke en-
thusiastically in support, referring especially
to the long-range value of the recent series
of regional seminars on the Status of Women
in Family Law. I have attended three of these
family law seminars — in Latin America, the
Far East, and Africa.^ Each of these meet-
ings examined a problem in depth with spe-
cial attention to needs and situations in the
region. They stirred thought at the grass-
roots level and stimulated hope for practical
action for the progress of women. They dem-
onstrated the need for leadership training in
utilizing political rights for national prog-
ress.
Our resolution calling for seminars on
training in civic and political rights is
therefore of far-reaching importance. The
Philippines delegation immediately invited
the U.N. to hold the first of this series in
their country, for the benefit of the women
of Asia.
Family Planning
The second Commission action, also of
great importance to women, was a resolution
on family planning. The United States spon-
sored this resolution along with Austria, Fin-
land, and the United Arab Republic. It ex-
pressed appreciation of the steps already
taken by the United Nations to strengthen
research and information activities relating
to population. The United States expressed
the belief that information about family
planning should be available on the request
' For reports by Mrs. Tillett on seminars held at
Bogota, Colombia, Dec. 3-17, 1963, and at Lom6,
Togo, Aug. 18-31, 1964, see Bulletin of July 27,
1964, p. 128, and Feb. 15, 1965, p. 229. Mrs. Tillett
also attended the seminar at Tokyo, Japan, in 1962
as U.S. observer.
of governments, and that each government
should, of course, determine its own popula-
tion policy, taking into account its own eco-
nomic, cultural, and religious circumstances.
All of the sponsors emphasized that the
resolution was of common concern. It was
pointed out that lack of family planning may
be detrimental to the welfare of the family
as well as to that of the individual woman,
and that family planning would make pos-
sible better use of educational facilities and
employment opportunities by women in over-
populated countries. The delegates recog-
nized that religious views were important,
and it was noted that religious bodies were
becoming more and more concerned about
the rapid increase in population which, in
many instances, created serious difficulties.
The representative from Peru proposed in-
sertion of the word "educational" so that the
resolution stated that "married couples
should have access to all relevant educational
information concerning family planning."
This amendment was accepted. All of the
Latin American countries supported the res-
olution, which was adopted by a substantial
majority. No delegation voted against it, al-
though the U.S.S.R. and several others ab-
stained.
Advancement of Women
As the result of a General Assembly re-
quest in 1962 for a "unified, long-term
United Nations programme for the advance-
ment of women," the Commission had before
it a series of suggestions from member
states and analyses of the scope and effect
of U.N. technical assistance programs in
fields of special interest for women. Some
of this documentation proved so valuable
that the Commission recommended it be
published. It was pointed out that no signifi-
cant progress could be made unless govern-
ments themselves gave higher priority to
assistance projects which would prepare
and encourage women to participate more
fully in national life.
In reply to a Soviet objection that tech-
nical assistance merely "built factories,"
the United Staes pointed out that programs
JULY 5, 1965
41
already underway embraced a wide variety
of projects dealing with health, education,
protection of human rights, reform of fam-
ily law, training of doctors, nurses, and
medical technicians, professional training of
all types, training in leadership, family plan-
ning, community services, day nurseries,
public administration, and many other pro-
grams which, if put in operation on a
broader scale, would promote the status of
women. The United States sponsored a res-
olution also on this point, and it was adopted
by a large majority. The International Con-
federation of Free Trade Unions was among
the nongovernmental organizations speaking
urgently on this topic, as were also the In-
ternational Alliance of Women, the Interna-
tional Council, the BPW, and many others.
Declaration Against Discrimination
At the request of the General Assembly
the Commission began work on a Declara-
tion on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women. The Commission decided to
continue work on the declaration at the next
session. The former chairman of the Com-
mission, Miss Maria Lavalle Urbina of Mex-
ico, headed the drafting committee which
prepared a preliminary text. The United
States was among the 11 members of the
committee.
When completed, the declaration will rec-
ommend action to eliminate discrimination
in all areas — social, educational, civic, politi-
cal, economic, and cultural. The Human
Rights Declaration set the pattern in 1948.
Since then there have been two further dec-
larations on the Rights of a Child and the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination. A dec-
laration on the elimination of discrimination
against women will take its place with other
great human rights declarations.
Family Law
In line with its regular practice the Com-
mission considered questions in the field of
family law. The item this year dealt with
annulment of marriage, judicial separation,
and divorce. Earlier Commission studies.
and especially the seminars in each region
on family law, had made it clear that some
of the greatest injustices existing today are
in this field, threatening the security of the
family as well as of wives and mothers. The
merits of divorce were not discussed, but
the Commission endorsed the principle that
rights should be equal in event of dissolu-
tion of marriage by whatever legal or cus-
tomary process this might come about.
There was also consensus that facilities for
reconciliation should be made available; the
resolution recommends that appropriate
steps for reconciliation be taken before the
institution of proceedings for divorce.
As adopted, the resolution recommends
also that divorce or judicial separation be
granted only by a competent judicial au-
thority and be legally recorded and that both
spouses have the same rights and have
available the same legal grounds and legal
defenses. The discussion stressed the need
for the elimination of private one-party ac-
tion to obtain divorces, such as the "talak"
in Moslem countries and similar practices
elsewhere, in which the wife does not have
an opportunity to protect her rights.
There were none against the resolution.
Three countries, United Arab Republic, Iran,
and Guinea, abstained. All others voted in
favor.
Employment and Equal Pay
On the economic aspects of women's sta-
tus the ILO presented a series of reports,
beginning with an account of ILO activities
of special importance for the work of the ■
Commission. It was recognized that in the 1
present era of rapid industrial development
womanpower is of ever-increasing impor-
tance for social and economic progress. Rep-
resentatives expressed the view that the
right to employment constituted one of the
principal factors — if not the main factor —
in the emancipation of women.
All congratulated the ILO on its work
on behalf of women with family responsibili-
ties. The ILO conference in June 1964 agreed
on basic principles to be incorporated in a
recommendation, and governments had since
42
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
commented on the proposed text. The Com-
mission looked forward to final adoption of
this recommendation by the ILO conference
in June 1965.
One of the ILO documents was the com-
prehensive "International Survey of Part-
Time Employment," prepared in response to
the joint interest of the Commission and
the ILO on this subject. With the excep-
tion of the Soviet representative, who ex-
plained that women in the U.S.S.R. found no
need for part-time work, members stressed
the importance of part-time employment
opportunities for women. They agreed on the
need to observe the principle of equal treat-
ment to protect part-time workers from ex-
ploitation and full-time workers from unfair
competition.
The solution to many women's employ-
ment problems was felt to lie in better voca-
tional training and more realistic vocational
guidance for girls during their school
years. The ILO reports in this field noted
both changes and progress; the fact that
women were becoming better equipped to
work, with better opportunities and less
discrimination, reinforced the need for en-
lightened guidance which would expand oc-
cupational horizons for girls and women in
the context of new national goals and con-
ditions. The Commission adopted two reso-
lutions in this field, one anticipating further
ILO reports on this subject and the other
encouraging priority attention to improving
vocational training and guidance for girls
and women.
The ILO also presented a report on equal
pay. It noted increasing acceptance of the
principle but considered progress disap-
pointingly slow, with conditions in some
countries actually worsening. Among the
problems mentioned were the traditional
division of most industries into "women's
work" and "men's work," making it difficult
to obtain a realistic comparison of skill and
performance; the relatively low level of wo-
men's participation in trade unions, thus
weakening the representation of women's
interests in collective bargaining; and the
unwillingness of many girls to make the
necessary effort to develop their full voca-
tional potential. The United States reported
the success of our Federal Equal Pay Act
and the progress in many of our States hav-
ing equal-pay laws.
Education and Literacy
Access to education is also a regular Com-
mission agenda item and is considered on
the basis of information from UNESCO.
This year discussion focused on secondary
education. Compulsory free education was
recognized as essential; otherwise parents
often send boys to school and neglect the edu-
cation of girls. The Commission repeatedly
emphasized that education is basic to the
solution of most problems of women in de-
veloping countries.
A highlight was a report on literacy cam-
paigns conducted in Iran. It was brought out
that the Shah had initiated a literacy cam-
paign aimed at teaching communities to read
with the help of soldiers in the army. It was
so successful that a women's corps was
formed, and now a literacy campaign for
women is being conducted in Iran. The High
Council of Iranian Women is taking a leading
part and demonstrating the effective coopera-
tion of voluntary organizations.
National Legislation
Perhaps the acid test of the effectiveness
of the Commission's work is its impact on
national legislation. The Secretary-General
presented a report showing progress made in
family law in line with Commission recom-
mendations. The delegate from Nepal, Mrs.
Kamal Rana, testified during the meeting
to the impact of the U.N. Commission rec-
ommendations on the status of women in her
country. She said :
His Majesty's Government of Nepal, and we the
people of Nepal, have great faith in the United
Nations establishing peace in the world — and rais-
ing the status of women. . . . My Government has
been very sincerely following the principles of all
U.N. resolutions, recommendations, and conventions
in forming its national legislation. . . .
In accordance with the resolution 547J (XVIII)
of ECOSOC, my Government has assured the right
of a married woman to undertake independent work.
JULY 5, 1965
43
to carry it on and to administer and dispose of her
earnings without the necessity of securing her hus-
band's authorization.
The Convention on Consent to Marriage, Minimum
Age of Marriage, and Registration of Marriages has
had direct effect in forming our new legislation.
This has in fact proved the guiding light for us.
This Convention was opened for signature on 10th
December 1962 at the time when we were seriously
thinking about changing our marriage legislation.
We had new legislation in August 1965 on consent
to marriage and minimum age of marriage and we
are now working towards the registration of mar-
riages. This has, of course, abolished the caste
restriction which was the great obstacle to the free-
dom to choose a spouse.
The moving statement made by the rep-
resentative of Nepal can be documented by
action in many other countries. To name
a few, lavi^s establishing marriage standards
have been enacted in Singapore by a Wom-
en's Charter. Similar law^s have also been en-
acted in Pakistan, Brunei, Viet-Nam, Tunisia,
India, Morocco, Gabon, and Mali. Polygamy
has been abolished or restricted in a number
of countries, including Nepal, India, Israel,
Tunisia, Viet-Nam, and Iraq. Action has also
been taken in other fields; for example,
Brazil has introduced important reforms in
civil and family law, and more recently
France has adopted new legislation advanc-
ing the status of married women.
Annual Meetings
The Commission adopted unanimously a
resolution calling for a firm policy of annual
meetings. A number of delegates noted that
the omission of a Commission session in
1964 had delayed the Commission's work on
urgent problems for the developing countries.
The delegate from Mexico, in presenting
the resolution, pointed out that women con-
stitute half the people of the world and
stressed the rapid social changes in many
areas as they relate to women. She cited
the force of annual recommendations on na-
tional legislation and the urgent need to
equip women to make their full contribution
to social and industrial progress. All dele-
gates emphasized the need for a session every
year.
The 1965 session again made it evident
that in its almost 20 years of existence the
U.N. Commission on the Status of Women
has had a worldwide impact on the advance-
ment of women. Each year it has pressed
for the emancipation of women from ancient
laws and customs which all too often have
deprived women of essential human dignity
and threatened the stability of the home.
Recognition of the right of women to full
partnership in the family and all aspects of
community and public life is basic to the
progress of national development and im-
provement of living standards for people all
over the world.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such us those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Situation in the Dominican Republic:
Letters dated April 9 and 29 from the permanent
representative of the United States. S/6278,
April 9, 1965, 9 pp.; S/6310, April 29, 1965, 2 pp.
Cables, letters, and notes from various countries.
Albania, S/6354, May 13, 1965, 3 pp.; Cam-
bodia, S/6347, May 11, 1965, 2 pp.; Cuba, S/
6314, April 30, 1965, 3 pp.; Mongolian People's
Republic, S/6341, May 10, 1965, 1 p.; Poland,
S/6339, Mav 7, 1965, 2 pp.; Soviet Union, S/
6317, May 1, 1965, 3 pp., S/6363, May 18, 1965,
2 pp., S/6411, June 3, 1965, 3 pp.; Yugoslavia,
S/6330, May 5, 1965, 2 pp.
Letters and cables from the Assistant Secretary
General of the Organization of American States
transmitting documents of the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of the Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs of the American Republics. S/6364, May
18, 1965, 22 pp.; S/6370 and Adds. 1 and 2,
May 19 and 26, 1965, 20 pp.; S/6372/Rev. 1.
May 24, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6374, May 22, 1965, 1 p.;
S/6377/Rev. 1, May 24, 1965, 1 p.; S/6381, May
24, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6396, May 29, 1965, 7 pp.;
S/6400, June 3, 1965, 1 p.; S/6401, June 3, 1965,
2 pp.; S/6404 and Add. 1, June 3, 1965, 2 pp.
Cable dated June 3 from the OAS Secretary Gen-
eral informing the U.N. Secretary-General of
the visit of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights to Santo Domingo. S/6413, June
4, 1965, 1 p.
Reports by the U.N. Secretary-General. S/6353,
May 14, 1965, 11 pp.; S/6358, May 15, 1965, 1 p.;
S/6365, May 18, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6369, May 19,
1965, 3 pp. ; S/6371 and Adds. 1 and 2, May 20,
21, 22, 1965, 8 pp.; S/6380, May 24, 1965, 2 pp.;
S/6386, May 27, 1965, 1 p.; S/6408, June 3,
1965, 3 pp.
44
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
International air services transit agreement. Done
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat.
1693.
Acceptance deposited: Malta, June 4, 1965.
Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization shall be held not less than once in 3
years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June
14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956.
TIAS 3756.
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, January 11,
1965; Malta, May 25, 1965.
Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention
on international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to
increase membership of the council from 21 to 27.
Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force
July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
Ratifications deposited: Ecuador, January 11,
1965; Greece, May 26, 1965; Malta, May 25,
1965; Turkey, May 13, 1965.
Protocol relating to amendment to convention on
international civil aviation (to increase number of
parties which may request holding an e.xtraor-
dinary meeting of the Assembly) . Adopted at
Rome September 15, 1962.^
Ratifications deposited: Canada, January 22, 1965;
Ecuador, January 11, 1965; France, December
3, 1964; Greece, May 26, 1965; Malta, May 25,
1965.
Health
Additional regulations amending the international
sanitary regulations of May 25, 1951, as amended
(TIAS 3625, 4420, 4896, 5156), in particular with
respect to disinfecting of ships and aircraft, and
appendixes 3 and 4: forms of international cer-
tificates for vaccination or revaccination against
yellow fever and against smallpox. Adopted at
Geneva May 12, 1965. Enters into force January
1, 1966.
Statute for international agency for research on
cancer. Done at Geneva May 20, 1965. Enters
into force when five of the states which took the
initiative in proposing the agency have given
notification to observe and apply provisions of
statute.
Notification given to observe and apply provisions
of statute: United States, June 1, 1965.
Load Line
International load line convention. Done at London
July 5, 1930. Entered into force January 1, 1933.
47 Stat. 2228.
Notification of denunciation received: Niger,
March 29, 1965.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Oc-
tober 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Accession deposited: Kenya, June 11, 1965.
Safety at Sea
Convention on safety of life at sea. Done at London
June 10, 1948. Entered into force November 19,
1952. TIAS 2495.
Notification of denunciation received: Japan, May
26, 1965; effective May 26, 1966.
Satellite Communications System — Arbitration
Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COMSAT).
Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: Department of Posts and Telegraphs
of South Africa, June 15, 1965; Vatican City
State, June 16, 1965.
Trade
Protocol amending the General Agreement on TariflTs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac-
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.
Acceptances deposited: Austria (subject to ratifi-
cation). May 31, 1965; Japan, June 3, 1965.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into force
October 21, 1950; for the United States February
2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and 3365, respec-
tively.
Ratification deposited: Canada," May 14, 1965.
Wlieat
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing-
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.'
Ratification advised by the Senate: June 15, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Canada, June 18, 1965.
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Belgium, June 16, 1965.
BILATERAL
Brazil
Agreement for issuance of nonimmigrant visas free
of charge on a reciprocal basis to eligible na-
tionals. Effected by exchange of notes at Rio de
Janeiro May 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26,
1965.
Canada
Agreement relating to the loan of certain Loran-A
equipment for use in Canadian Loran-A stations.
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 7
and 8, 1965. Entered into force June 8, 1965.
' Not in force.
' With notice of withdrawal of reservation made
at time of signature.
JULY 5, 1965
45
PUBLICATIONS
Foreign Relations Volume for 1944
Released by Department
Press release 141 dated June 8, for release June 14
The Department of State on June 14 released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19U, Volume
V, The Near East, South Asia and Africa, The Far
East. This is the first volume to be published in the
series covering documentation of American policy
and diplomacy for the year 1944. It includes dip-
lomatic correspondence with all countries of the
Near East, Africa, South Asia, and the Far East
except China. Documentation on American policy
toward China will appear in a subsequent volume in
the series.
The documentation in the volume ranges widely
over the wartime economic and political problems of
the Middle East, Africa, and the Far East. It also
reveals that many problems which were to become
acute in the postwar period were already visible in
1944. From this perspective the coverage on Iran,
Greece, Turkey, and Korea is of particular interest.
Of equal interest is the documentation on the policies
of the United States toward India and on American
concern over the future status of Palestine.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
1944, Volume V, The Near East, South Asia and
Africa, The Far East (viii, 1,345 pp.; publication
7859) may be obtained from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D. C, 20402, for $4.25 each.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of
Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet
contains a map, a list of principal government of-
ficials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers,
and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those
listed below are available at 5^ each, unless othei-wise
indicated.
Algeria. Pub. 7821. 8 pp.
Argentina. Pub. 7836. 8 pp.
Dominican Republic. Pub. 7759.
4 pp.
Germany, Federal Republic of. Pub. 7834. 12. dd.
10(}.
India. Pub. 7847. 8 pp.
Indonesia. Pub. 7786. 8 pp.
Italy. Pub. 7861. 8 pp.
Kuwait. Pub. 7855. 4 pp.
Lebanon. Pub. 7816. 4 pp.
Libya. Pub. 7815. 8 pp.
Luxembourg. Pub. 7856. 4 pp.
Mexico. Pub. 7865. 8 pp.
Syria. Pub. 7761. 8 pp.
Turkey. Pub. 7850. 4 pp.
U.S.S.R. Pub. 7842. 12 pp. 10^.
Uruguay. Pub. 7857. 4 pp.
Zambia. Pub. 7841. 4 pp.
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands— 1964. 17th
annual report to the United Nations on the ad-
ministration of these islands from July 1, 1963 to
June 30, 1964. Pub. 7811. International Organization
and Conference Series 59. 304 pp. $1.25.
Major Publications of the Department of State — An
Annotated Bibliography. A list of publications selected
for their lasting value in developing U.S. foreign
policy and international relations. It includes a few
items published by Congress or other executive
departments and agencies because of their special
relevance to foreign affairs. Pub. 7843. General
Foreign Policy Series 200. Limited distribution.
Foreign Consular Offices in the United States— 1965.
Complete and official listing of foreign consular
offices in the United States together with their
jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub. 7846.
Department and Foreign Service Series 128. 87 pp.
35^
The Dangers of Nostalgia. This pamphlet is based
on an address by Under Secretary of State George
W. Ball before the National Foreign Policy Con-
ference for Nongovernmental Organizations at
Washington, D.C. Pub. 7858. General Foreign Policy
Series 201. 15 pp. 15^.
Pattern for Peace in Southeast Asia. This is the
text, as delivered, of an address by President Johnson
at Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, Md. Pub.
7872. Far Eastern Series 132. 12 pp. 10«;.
Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War. Text of an
address made by President Johnson to the Associa-
tion of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White
House. Pub. 7897. Far Eastern Series 134. 15
pp. 15^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Turkey,
amending the agreement of February 21, 1963, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ankara
January 22, 1965. Entered into force January 22,
1965. TIAS 5760. 2 pp. 5(f.
Experimental Communications Satellites — Inter-
continental Testing. Agreement with Spain. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Madrid September 18,
1964, and January 26, 1965. Entered into force
January 26, 1965. TIAS 5761. 3 pp. 5(f.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Sierra Leone — Signed at Freetown
January 29, 1965. Entered into force January 29,
1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5762. 8 pp.
10(#.
Tracking Stations. Agreement with Australia, amend-
ing the agreement of February 26, 1960, as amended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Canberra February
10, 1965. Entered into force February 10, 1965.
TIAS 5763. 3 pp. 5«(.
46
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 5, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1358
Africa. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign
Policy (Rostow) 21
American Principles. Building a Decent World
Order (Rusk) 27
American Republics
The Alliance for Progress: A Partnership of
Mutual Help (Rusk) 2
Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy
(Rostow) 21
Asia
Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy
(Rostow) 21
Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach Peace-
ful Settlement in Southeast Asia (Johnson,
Rusk) 5
China
Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy
(Rostow) 21
Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia (John-
son, Rusk) 5
Congress. Department Opposes Bill to Amend
Export Control Act of 1949 (Ball) .... 35
Diplomacy. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign
Policy (Rostow) 21
Dominican Republic. An Assessment of the
Situation in the Dominican Republic (Johnson) 19
Economic Affairs
Department Opposes Bill To Amend Export
Control Act of 1949 (Ball) 35
The Kennedy Round: A Progress Report
(Herter) 31
Peace: The Central Task of Foreign Policy
(Rostow) 21
U.S. Interest in Free Trade and Peaceful Com-
merce (Johnson) 30
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Building a
Decent World Order (Rusk) 27
Europe. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign
Policy (Rostow) 21
Foreign Aid. The Alliance for Progress: A
Partnership of Mutual Help (Rusk) .... 2
Human Rights. Expanding the Participation of
Women in National Life (Tillett) .... 39
International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences ... 37
Middle East. Department Opposes Bill To
Amend Export Control Act of 1949 (Ball) . 35
Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Discusses
Buildup of Forces in Viet-Nam 12
Presidential Documents
An Assessment of the Situation in the Domini-
can Republic 19
Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach
Peaceful Settlement in Southeast Asia ... 5
U.S.Interest in Free Trade and Peaceful Com-
merce 30
Publications
Foreign Relations Volume for 1944 Released by
Department 46
Recent Releases 46
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 45
U.S.S.R. Peace: The Central Task of Foreign
Policy (Rostow) 21
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 44
Expanding the Participation of Women in Na-
tional Life (Tillett) 39
Viet-Nam
Secretary McNamara Discusses Buildup of
Forces in Viet-Nam 12
Secretary Rusk Reviews Efforts To Reach Peace-
ful Settlement in Southeast Asia (Johnson,
Rusk) 5
Name Index
Ball, George W 35
Herter, Christian A 31
Johnson, President 5, 19, 30
McNamara, Robert S 12
Rostow, W. W 21
Rusk, Secretary 2, 5, 27
Tillett, Gladys A 39
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 14-20
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 14 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 141
and 142 of June 8 and 151 of June 10.
No. Date Subject
t 153 6/14 Vaughn: American Institute of
Architects and Pan American
Congress of Architects.
1 154 6/15 MacArthur: "America and Bel-
gium— A Community of Inter-
ests."
* 155 6/16 Leddy sworn in as Assistant Sec-
retary for European Affairs
(biographic details).
1 156 6/14 Williams: "Southern Rhodesia To-
day."
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
■{! GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE: 196S 20I-929/I
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTINO OFFICE
WASHINGTON, O.C. a040a
PENALTY FOR PRIVATB USE TO AVOID
PAYMENT OP POSTAGE, SSOO
(OPO)
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
NEW STATE DEPARTMENT FILM
u
The Unending Struggle''
This 29-minute, 16 mm., black-and-white documentary film, photographed entirely in Ecuador,
portrays various aspects of U.S. national interests abroad — political, economic, military, cultural
— and shows some of the ways in which the American "country team" works to protect and ad-
vance these interests.
The scenes range from a meeting in the Presidential Palace between the U.S. Ambassador
and the heads of Ecuador's Government to the jungle near Santo Domingo, where U.S. Army
guerrilla warfare experts are training Ecuadorean soldiers in counterinsurgency techniques, to
the steaming docks of Guayaquil, where American labor attaches are at work among workers
and officials of the banana loaders trade union.
The film is available for loan (the only charge is return postage) to schools and colleges,
television stations, public service organizations, and any other interested groups. Prints can
also be purchased for $39.54. A discussion guide to accompany the film has been prepared by
the Department of State Film Library.
ORDER FORM
TO:
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OFFICE OF MEDIA
SERVICES
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON, D.C., 20520
SALES: Please send a screening print of "The Unending Struggle."
I am considering buying print(s) of this film.
LOANS : I would like to borrow a print of "The Unending Struggle"
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
lioston Public Librar>
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JUL 2 9 1965
DEPOSITORY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LI II, No. 1359
July 12, 1965
VIET-NAM: FOUR STEPS TO PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 50
THE DOMINICAN SITUATION IN THE PERSPECTIVE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
by Leonard C. Meeker, Legal Adviser 60
HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA
by Assistant Secretary Vaughn 66
SOUTHERN RHODESIA TODAY
by Assistant Secretary Williams 71
ROADBLOCK TO ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT NEGOTIATIONS
by William C. Foster 77
THE INTERDEPENDENCE OF MANKIND
Address by Vice President Humphrey 56
For index see inside back cover
Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace
Address by Secretary Rusk
It is a very great pleasure for me to be
here. It is a privilege for me to salute my
colleagues, present and retired, of the For-
eign Service and to express to you the grati-
tude of President Johnson and of the Amer-
ican people for a service which is marked
by so much competence, dedication, and
personal commitment.
Two and a half months ago President
Johnson spoke to the world about Viet-Nam
at the Johns Hopkins University in Balti-
more.2 Today I wish to talk to you on the
same subject — ^to you who know that such
problems have deep roots, to you who have
lived through and worked upon such prob-
lems before, and to you who know that such
matters can gravely affect the future of our
nation and the prospects for general peace.
' Made before the American Foreign Service Asso-
ciation at the Department of State on June 23 (press
release 160; as-delivered text).
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
The struggle in Viet-Nam has continued
since April and indeed has grown the more
severe. The harsh resistance of the Com-
munists to any form of discussions or negotia-
tion continues. The effort to destroy the
freedom of Viet-Nam has been expanded.
The trial by fire of the people of Viet-Nam
goes on. Their own resistance has been
courageous, but the need for American resolu-
tion and for American action has increased.
Aggression From the North
The root of the trouble in Viet-Nam is
today just what it was in April and has been
at least since 1960 — a cruel and sustained
attack by North Viet-Nam upon the people
of South Viet-Nam. Now, as then, it is a
brutal war — marked by terror and sneak
attack, and by the killing of women and
children in the night. This campaign of ter-
ror has continued throughout the spring.
Those of us who have not served in Viet-
Nam may find it hard to understand just
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1359 PUBLICATION 7922 JULY 12, 1965
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
how ugly this war of aggression has been.
From 1961 to the present date the South
Vietnamese armed forces have lost some
25,000 dead and 51,000 wounded. In pro-
portion to population, these South Vietnam-
ese losses are 10 times as great as those
suffered by Americans in the Korean war,
and larger than our losses in World War II.
Even more terrible than these military
losses are the cruelties of assassination and
kidnaping among civilian oiRcials and ordi-
nary citizens. In the last 18 months, for
example, more than 2,000 local officials and
civilians have been murdered. When an of-
ficial is not found at home, often his wife
and children are slain in his place. It is as
if in our own country some 35,000 civic
leaders or their families were to be killed
at night by stealth and terror.
These are the methods of the Viet Cong.
This is the test to which the people of Viet-
Nam have gallantly responded.
Meanwhile, from the North, heavy infil-
tration has continued. Intelligence now shows
that some 40,000 had come down before the
end of 1964. Toward the end of that year —
well before the beginning of our own air
operations against North Viet-Nam — the in-
filtration of regular North Vietnamese army
units was begun, and important elements of
that army are now known to be in place
in South Viet-Nam and Laos, where they
have no right to be.
And so we face a deliberate and long-
matured decision by a persistent aggressor
to raise the stakes of war. Apparently this
was their answer to our own repeated af-
firmation that we ourselves did not wish
a larger war. Apparently a totalitarian re-
gime has once again misunderstood the de-
sire of democratic peoples for peace and has
made the mistake of thinking that they can
have a larger war without risks to them-
selves. And hence the airstrikes against
military targets in North Viet-Nam.
These actions have made infiltration
harder. They have increased the cost of ag-
gression. Without them South Viet-Nam to-
day would face still stronger forces from the
North.
These measured air operations have done
what we expected them to do — neither more
nor less. For air attack alone cannot bring
peace. I cannot agree with those who think
it wrong to hit the logistics of aggression.
It is the aggression itself that is the wrong.
Those who worry about bridges and bar-
racks and ammunition dumps would do well
to give their sympathy instead to the daily
victims of terror in South Viet-Nam.
Efforts To Negotiate
The other side is obviously not yet ready
for peace. In these last months, the friends
of peace of many lands have sought to move
this dangerous matter to the conference table.
But one proposal after another has been
contemptuously rejected.
We and others, for example, have sought
to clear a way for a conference on Laos,
and a conference on Cambodia — two neigh-
boring countries where progress toward
peace might be reflected in Viet-Nam itself.
But these efforts have been blocked by
North Viet-Nam and by Communist China.
Twice there has been an effort at dis-
cussions through the United Nations — first
in the Security Council after the August at-
tacks in the Tonkin Gulf,^ and later this
April, when Secretary-General U Thant con-
sidered visits to Hanoi and Peiping to ex-
plore the possibilities of peace. But in Au-
gust there was a refusal by Hanoi to come to
the Security Council. And in April both Ha-
noi and Peiping made it clear that they would
not receive U Thant, and both regimes made
plain their view that the United Nations is
not competent to deal with that matter.
Repeatedly our friends in Britain, as a co-
chairman of the Geneva conference, have
sought a path to settlement — first by work-
ing toward a new conference in Geneva and
then by a visit of a senior British states-
man. But the effort for a conference in
Geneva was blocked, and the distinguished
British traveler was told that he should stay
away from Peiping and Hanoi.
Twice in April we made additional ef-
For background, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 272.
JULY 12, 1965
51
forts of our own. In Baltimore the President
offered unconditional discussions with the
governments concerned. Hanoi and Peiping
call this offer a "hoax." At that time the
17 nonalined nations had appealed for a
peaceful solution, by negotiations without
preconditions. This proposal was accepted
on our side.* It was rejected by Hanoi and
by Peiping. And some of its authors were
labeled "monsters and freaks."
The President of India made constructive
proposals — for an end of hostilities and an
Afro-Asian patrol force. To us this proposal
was full of interest and hope. But by Hanoi
and Red China it was rejected as a betrayal.
Our own Government and the Government
of South Viet-Nam, in May, suspended air
attacks on North Viet-Nam. This action was
made known to the other side to see if there
would be a response in kind. This special
effort for peace was denounced in Hanoi as
a "wornout trick" and denounced in Peiping
as a "swindle." To those who complain that
that so-called "pause" was not long enough,
I would simply report that the harsh reac-
tion of the other side was fully known before
the attacks were resumed. And I would also
recall that we held our hand for more than
4 years while tens of thousands of armed
men invaded the South and every attempt
at peaceful settlement failed.
Hanoi's Response
Reports in the first half of June have con-
firmed that all these violent rejections are
in fact what they appear to be — clear proof
that what is wanted today in Hanoi is a mili-
tary victory, not peace, and that Hanoi is
not even prepared for discussions unless it
is accepted in advance that there will be a
Communist-dominated government in Saigon,
and unless too — so far as we can determine
— American forces are withdravsm in ad-
vance.
So this record is clear. And there is sub-
stance in Senator Fulbright's conclusion
* For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
that "It seems clear that the Communist
powers still hope to achieve a complete vic-
tory in South Viet-Nam and for this reason
are at present uninterested in negotiations
for a peaceful settlement." For the simple
truth is that there is no lack of diplomatic
procedures, machinery, or process by which
a desire for peace can be registered — that
there is no procedural miracle through
which peace can be obtained if one side is
determined to continue the war.
As I have said, Hanoi is presently ada-
mant against negotiation or any avenue to
peace. Peiping is even more so, and one can
plainly read the declared doctrine and pur-
pose of the Chinese Communists. They are
looking beyond the current conflict to the
hope of domination in all of Southeast Asia —
and indeed beyond.
But one finds it harder to understand
Hanoi's aversion to discussion. More immedi-
ately than the Chinese, the North Vietnam-
ese face the costs and dangers of conflict.
They, too, must fear the ambitions of Com-
munist China in Southeast Asia. Yet they
are still on the path of violence, insisting
upon the forceful communization of South
Viet-Nam and refusing to let their brothers
in the South work out their own destiny in
peace.
In recent weeks, after 2 months of re-
duced activity, the enemy has sharply quick-
ened the tempo of his military action in the
South. Since early May, major Viet Cong
units have returned to the battlefield, and
already a series of sharp engagements has
shown us that the fighting through the sum-
mer may be hard. Setbacks have occurred
and serious defeats have been avoided only
by the combination of continuing Vietnam-
ese bravery and effective air and other types
of support.
Losses on both sides have been heavy.
From April first to date, we have had con-
firmed reports of almost 5,000 Viet Cong
dead, almost 3,000 South Vietnamese, and
almost 100 Americans. We must expect these
losses to continue — and our own losses may
increase.
52
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Role of U.S. Forces
Since March we have deployed nine battal-
ions of fighting men to South Viet-Nam.
Six more are on their way. For as the Presi-
dent said in April, "We will not be defeated.
We will not grow tired. . . . We will do every-
thing necessary . . . and we will do only what
is . . . necessary."
Our own battalions in South Viet-Nam
have three related tasks. Their first assign-
ment was and is to guard such major instal-
lations as the airfield at Da Nang. A second
and closely related task is that of active
patrol in nearby areas. And the third is to
join in combat support of Vietnamese forces
— when such help is requested and when our
Commander, General [William C] West-
moreland, believes it should be given.
American forces so committed will carry
with them the determined support of our
people. These men know, as all our people
know, that what they do is done for freedom
and peace, in Viet-Nam, in other continents,
and here at home.
Support for U.S. Action
In authorizing combat missions for our
ground forces in Viet-Nam, the President
acted to meet his constitutional responsibil-
ities as Commander in Chief. He has recog-
nized the obligations of this nation under
the Southeast Asia Treaty, which the Senate
approved by a vote of 82-1. He has acted
under the joint resolution of August 1964,^
which passed the Senate by a vote of 88-2 —
and passed the House with no opposing vote.
This resolution expresses our national read-
iness— as the President determines — "to
take all necessary measures to repel any
armed attack against the forces of the
United States" and "all necessary steps, in-
cluding the use of armed force" to help
Viet-Nam and Southeast Asian members of
the SEATO who ask for help to preserve
their freedom.
The President has acted on the unani-
mous advice of the American leaders in
Saigon and his senior civil and military ad-
visers in Washington.
He has acted in full consultation with the
Government of South Viet-Nam.
And he has acted on his own considered
judgment of what is necessary at this time
to stop aggression.
This decision — like all of our decisions in
Viet-Nam — is open to review by Members of
the Congress and open to reversal if it does
not have their support. But the leaders of
the Congress have been kept in close touch
with the situation, and no such prospect
should stimulate the hopes of enemies or
the fears of friends. For America is not
divided in her determination nor weak in her
will.
In Viet-Nam today we face one more chal-
lenge in the long line of dangers we have,
unhappily, had to meet and master for a
generation. We have had to show both
strength and restraint — courage and cool-
ness— for Iran and for Greece, for Berlin
and for Korea, in the Formosa Strait, and
in the Cuban missile crisis. We mean to
show the same determination and coolness
now.
In 1954 President Eisenhower pledged our
support to the Government of Viet-Nam, to
assist that Government, as he put it, "in de-
veloping and maintaining a strong, viable
state, capable of resisting attempted subver-
sion or aggression through military means." "
And this determination was reaffirmed
again and again by President Kennedy. "We
are going to stay there," he said. "We are
not going to withdraw from that effort." "
And that is our position still.
Firmness and Restraint
Now, as in April, as the President put it,
"We will use our power with restraint and
with all the wisdom that we can command."
" For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
° For text of a message of Oct. 1, 1954, from Presi-
dent Eisenhower to Ngo Dinh Diem, President of
the Council of Ministers of Viet-Nam, see ibid., Nov.
15, 1954, p. 735.
'A reply made by President Kennedy at a news
conference on July 17, 1963.
JULY 12, 1965
53
For it is others, and not we, who have in-
creased the scale of fighting. It is others,
and not we, who have made threats of
gravely widened conflict. The firmness with
which we resist aggression is matched by
the firmness with which we will refrain
from ill-advised adventure.
A few — a very few — may believe that un-
limited war can take the place of the sus-
tained and steady effort in which we are en-
gaged, just as there may be a few — a very
few — who think we should pull out and leave
a friendly people to their fate. But the Amer-
ican people want neither rashness nor sur-
render. They want firmness and restraint.
They expect courage and care. They threaten
no one. And they are not moved by the
threats by others.
Role of South Viet- Nam
This contest centers in the defense of free-
dom for the people who live in South Viet-
Nam. The sustained and increasing infiltra-
tion from North Viet-Nam has required the
measured use of air attack on military targets
in the North. We alone cannot determine the
future — could we do so there would be a
prompt peace. The other side, too, must decide
about the future. And we must hope they
know — as we do — that increased aggression
would be costly far beyond the worth to the
aggressor.
The political turmoil in South Viet-Nam
has continued. It is easy to be impatient with
our friends in Saigon as they struggle to
establish and sustain a stable government
under the stress of war. We see there the
ferment of a society still learning to be free,
even while under attack from beyond their
borders.
We must remember that this ancient people
is young in its independence, restless in its
hopes, divided in its religions, and varied in
its regions. The turmoil of Viet-Nam needs
the steadfastness of America. Our friends in
Viet-Nam know, and we know, that our peo-
ple and our troops must work and fight
together. Neither of us can do the work of
the other. And the main responsibility must
always be with, and is fully accepted by, the .
South Vietnamese. Yet neither of us can "go
it alone." We would not be there without the
urgent request for assistance from those
whose land this happens to be. We have a
tested faith in the enduring bravery of the
people of Viet-Nam, and they, in turn, can
count on us with equal certainty.
Formula for Peace
The people of Viet-Nam long for peace.
And the way to peace is clear. Yesterday
the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam set
forth the fundamental principles that can
provide a "just and enduring peace." Those
principles, in summary, are :
— An end to aggression and subversion.
— Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose
and shape for itself its own destiny "in
conformity with democratic principles and
without any foreign interference from what-
ever sources."
— As soon as aggression has ceased, the
ending of the military measures now neces-*
sary by the Government of South Viet-
Nam and the nations that have come to its
aid to defend South Viet-Nam; and the re-
moval of foreign military forces from South
Viet-Nam.
— And effective guarantees for the inde-
pendence and freedom of the people of
South Viet-Nam.
Now these are the fundamental steps.
This is what the arguing and the fighting
is all about. When they are carried out, we
can look forward, as we have stated pre-
viously many times, to the day when rela-
tions between North Viet-Nam and South
Viet-Nam can be worked out by peaceful
means. And this would include the question
of a free decision by the peoples of North
and South Viet-Nam on the matter of re-
unification.
This forthright and simple program meets
the hopes of all and attacks the interests
of none. It would replace the threat of con-
quest by the hope of free and peaceful
choice.
54
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A Look to the Future
And even while these hopes of peace are
blocked for now by aggression, we on our side
and other nations have reaffirmed our deep
commitment to the peaceful progress of Viet-
Nam and Southeast Asia as a whole. In
April the President proposed to the nations
of Asia and to the United Nations that there
be constructed a new program of support for
Asian efforts and called upon Mr. Eugene
Black to assist them. Now in June this work
is underway. The Mekong River project has
been given new life. A new dam is ready to
rise in Laos. A billion-dollar bank is in the
making for the development of Southeast
Asia. And in Viet-Nam itself new impetus
has been given to programs of development
and education and health.
So let us call again on other nations — in-
cluding the Soviet Union — to join in turning
this great region of the world away from the
waste and violence of a brutal war. For the
hope of Asia is not in relentless pressure for
conquest. It is in unremitting hope for pro-
gress— a progress in which rice production
could be multiplied manyfold, where the
expectation of life could be doubled, the edu-
cation of the young could be tenfold what
it is today, and there could be an end of
cholera and tuberculosis and intestinal para-
sites and other human afflictions.
In April the President offered determi-
nation against aggression, discussion for
peace, and development for the human hopes
of all. And in June we reaffirm that three-
fold policy.
Aggression has increased, so that deter-
mination must be greater than ever.
Discussion is rejected, but our efforts to
find a path to peace will not be stopped.
We have welcomed the new initiative of
Prime Minister Wilson and the Common-
wealth Conference and regret that it has
received so little reception on the other side.
Beyond the terror of the aggressor and the
firmness of our defense, we must, neverthe-
less, look to the day in which many new dams
will be built, and many new schools opened,
and fresh opportunities opened to the peoples
of Southeast Asia. For we must look beyond
the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and
over the hard path of resistance to the broad
plain of progress which must lie ahead for
the peoples of Southeast Asia.
U.S. Shocked at Communist
Brutality in Viet-Nam
Department Statement ^
The regime in Hanoi and their puppet Lib-
eration Front in South Viet-Nam have
acknowledged their responsibility for the exe-
cution of Sergeant [Harold George] Bennett
and for the bombing of the My Canh Restau-
rant in Saigon, in which 44 persons — Viet-
namese, Americans, French, Swiss, and Fili-
pinos— were killed and many more persons
injured. They have compounded their brutal
conduct by publicly bragging about their ac-
tion and making threats to carry out even
more outrageous acts.
We in America and people around the
world cannot help but be appalled and re-
volted by this show of wanton inhumanity.
These Communist threats to intimidate, of
course, will not succeed. Our determination
to help the embattled people of South Viet-
Nam to avoid their falling under a regime
which is capable of such brutality will only
be strengthened,
Hanoi's recent statements have surely also
made it clear to anyone who may have had
any doubt that it is the power directing the
policies and actions of the Viet Cong, its
instrument in South Viet-Nam, and must bear
full responsibility for these acts.
" Read to news correspondents on June 26 by
Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News.
JULY 12, 1965
55
The Interdependence of Mankind
Address by Vice President Humphrey
Woodrow Wilson once said that "every
man sent out of a university should be a
man of his nation as well as a man of his
time."
A university graduate today who would
be both a man of his nation and a man of
his time must understand that the moral
unity and interdependence of mankind,
which has for centuries been the basis of
Western civilization, has now become a
physical fact of our lives.
We have long understood that the brother-
hood of all human beings implies responsi-
bility for our neighbor. But today, in an age
where science and technology have shrunk
our physical neighborhood, no crisis is wholly
foreign to us, no curse or blessing is received
in isolation. In this world, responsibility for
our fellow man is inescapable.
In this contemporary era — where technol-
ogy has led to a rapid multiplication of social
relationships — interdependence has replaced
solitary individualism as the central fact of
our lives.
As Barbara Ward has noted :
In a world society in which hate is institutional-
ized in war and self-interest in our web of economic
relations, we can hardly survive unless we also insti-
tutionalize the moral needs of man for community,
for compassion, for dedication, and, let us not fear
the word, for love.
Because the "greatness of our institu-
tions" has not matched "the grandeur of our
intentions," ^ we are witnessing both in our
nation and in our world a revolution of peo-
ples against what Emmanuel Mounier called
the "established disorder." Everywhere we
see populations caught between soaring
hopes and immovable traditions.
In our nation this has produced the Negro
revolution, a revolution against centuries of
indifference and neglect, of oppression and
exploitation. It is a revolution that is not
over — indeed it has only begun.
But it is a revolution that we know now
is destined to succeed.
Its success is assured because the people
of this nation have realized that the perpetu-
ation of a separate Negro nation in our midst,
a nation whose people have been "deprived
of freedom, crippled by hatred" — in Presi-
dent Johnson's phrase — is morally intoler-
able.
While peaceful protest and legal redress
of grievances have been important, in the
end moral indignation has been decisive in
bringing recognition of the validity of the
Negro revolution in the United States.
Pursuit of justice has triumphed over nar-
row self-interest. Justice has triumphed be-
cause modern prophets — from John LaFarge
to Martin Luther King — have aroused our
consciences and incited our action against
an "established disorder" based on racism,
the most pernicious form of injustice to arise
in our time.
^ Made at commencement exercises at Fordham
University, New York, N.Y., on June 9.
' For the as-delivered text of remarks made by
President Johnson at the Alfred E. Smith memorial
dinner at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 14, 1964, see
White House press release dated Oct. 14.
56
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Revolution Against Proverty
In pursuing justice — ^the supreme virtue
in the political order — an equally important
challenge for a man of our time is that posed
by the growing disparity between rich na-
tions and poor, the widening gap between
the affluent minority and the impoverished
masses of the human race.
A central fact of this decade — which will
loom larger and larger for graduates of the
class of 1965 — is that Western societies are
exceedingly rich and almost all others are
exceedingly poor.
A small fraction of the human race living
around the North Atlantic enjoys per capita
incomes of $1,000 to $2,800 per year. Two-
thirds of humanity subsists on a per capita
income of less than $200 per year.
It may be accidental — but it is surely not
irrelevant — that most of the first group are
white and most of the second are colored.
Since 1960 the gap between the two
groups has accelerated. To understand why
it has been growing, one need only recall
that in 1964 the United States added $30
billion to its gross national product — the
equivalent of 50 percent of the total national
income of Latin America and 100 percent
of the income of Africa.
The relevance of this problem to the uni-
versity graduate of today, and the obliga-
tion of nations that are rich and advanced
toward those that are poor and undeveloped,
was spelled out in bold language by Pope
John XXIII in his encyclical Mater et Mag-
istra. He stated :
The solidarity which binds all men and makes
them members of the same family requires political
communities enjoying an abundance of material
goods not to remain indifferent to those political
communities whose citizens suffer from poverty,
misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elemen-
tary rights of the human person.
This is particularly true since, given the growing
interdependence among the peoples of the earth, it is
not possible to preserve lasting peace if glaring
economic and social inequality among them persist.
He concluded :
We are all equally responsible for the undernour-
ished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to educate
one's conscience to the sense of responsibility which
weighs upon each and every one, especially upon
those who are more blessed with this world's goods.
Just as our generation has inherited the
responsibility for bringing to fulfillment the
Negro revolution at home, it lies with your
generation to insure the triumph of the revo-
lution against crushing poverty around the
world.
The Responsibility of the Western World
We who live in the Western World have a
special responsibility, for it was we who
launched the technological revolution that
has produced dazzling wealth in the midst
of squalor.
We not only initiated the technological
revolution but we have spread it to the
world at large. And today we tolerate — by
limited exertion if not by inaction — incon-
ceivable disparities of wealth and destitu-
tion.
As we in the United States are among
those "more blessed with this world's goods,"
to use the Pope's phrase, we have a special
obligation to take the lead in reducing these
inequities.
It is obvious that problems of poor na-
tions will not be solved by external efforts
alone. No transfer of resources from the
rich nations to the poor will alone be suf-
ficient.
It requires a massive effort by local
leaders in a country to end the shocking in-
equality between privileged and impover-
ished, between glittering capitals and fester-
ing slums, between privileged urban enclaves
and neglected rural areas.
It requires not only the availability of
technical resources but vision and will and
determination on the part of those who
would break the tyranny of poverty and bring
to their peoples the wonders of the modern
world.
But our recognition of this fact should
not blind us to the compelling truth that
nations that are poor and undeveloped stand
little chance of success without the help of
those which are rich.
It is not necessary here to engage in a
detailed analysis of the process of develop-
ment in undeveloped nations. Once we recog-
JULY 12, 1965
57
nize the existence of a universal common
good and of international social justice —
and show a willingness to commit ourselves
to it — the technical problems of assistance
can be solved. Not without difficulty — but
they can be solved.
Trade, aid, and private investment all
will be needed to meet the requirements of
developing nations — ^that is, if the poor
nations of the world are to have a chance
of breaking the ancient cycle.
Despite our efforts since World War II
to accelerate economic and social develop-
ment, we are just standing still. During the
past 3 years we have failed to progress at all ;
indeed, we are slowing down.
Yet each day we learn anew that the
disorder which persists cannot be ended by
political maneuver or military power alone.
We learn anew of outbreaks of violence and
turbulence, of peaceful revolutions turned
into violent ones. We learn anew of disorder
which invites communism — which so often
comes as the scavenger of ruined revolutions.
Peace Threatened by Economic Deprivation
We now know that peace can be threatened
by other forces than armies crossing borders
and bombs and missiles falling from the
sky. Peace can be threatened by social and
economic deprivation, by destitution and
hunger. If we are concerned about "peace-
keeping" in all its aspects, then we dare not
ignore this explosive threat which can erupt
at any time.
And it is time we learn that peacekeep-
ing pertains not only to military forces
and United Nations machinery. Peacekeep-
ing pertains to every force that disturbs or
threatens to disturb the peace of mankind.
We must strengthen every economic insti-
tution we have — and develop new ones if
need be. If our existing financial and de-
velopment institutions — all formed two de-
cades ago with the establishment of the
United Nations — need to be supplemented or
modified, we should not hesitate to do so.
In our interdependent world, disorder due
to economic deprivation and underdevelop- "
ment is the concern of all — the rich nations
and the poor. When a crisis erupts — whether
in the Congo or in Santo Domingo — the fate
of all is affected.
Only by a massive assault, carefully
planned and superbly orchestrated, can so-
cial and economic progress be made. Only
by a massive assault can the burden of
hunger and disease which brings disorder
later be lifted from the peoples of man-
kind.
Congress must be convinced of this. The
doubts about the foreign aid program in
recent years must be replaced by a new in-
sight into our obligation, a new resolution
to do the job that needs to be done.
Our European friends — though they have
expanded their programs during the past
decade — still do far less than their capacity
allows.
Similarly, unless we and the other wealthy
nations of the Northern Hemisphere are
willing to do our part to revise world trad-
ing patterns to take into account the prob-
lems of new, developing nations, they stand
no chance of achieving economic viability
through peaceful means. And as we know
better each day, if peaceful revolution is im-
possible, violent revolution is inevitable.
Once we recognize the dimensions of the
problems, we must then resolve to do the job
that needs to be done — to expend the re-
sources necessary. And we need to do this,
not just because it is in our own interest, not
just because of the Communist challenge,
but as President Kennedy said in his inau-
gural message — "because it is right." *
When one looks back on the landmarks
of the Negro revolution in our time — such
as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 — some of
the causes can now be clearly delineated.
There can be no doubt that justice triumphed
over injustice, the conscience of the present
over the memory of the past, because men
and women with consciences formed by a
Judeo-Christian tradition took their convic-
' Bulletin of Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.
58
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tions seriously and translated them into ac-
tion. This in the end was the difference be-
tween failure and success.
If a peaceful revolution against world
poverty and the chaos that follows from it
is to be won, it will require the same aroused
action from men and women of religious
inspiration — and all developed countries. It
will require men and women who are de-
termined to lead the rich peoples of the
world to fulfill their obligations to the poor.
It is the task of both the graduation class
of 1965 and of our generation to convince
the legislatures and the executives, not only
of the United States but of Europe as well,
that moral imperatives as well as physical
security require a substantial commitment
to long-range economic and technical as-
sistance to the developing nations of the
world.
We must do this out of compassion, for we
are our brother's keeper. And we also do it
out of self-interest as well, for our lot is their
lot, our future their future, our peace their
peace.
In pursuing the global war on poverty, we
must remember that it is not just a matter
of satisfying physical needs and raising ma-
terial standards of living. What is equally
important is to inspire hope among both
the leaders and the mass of the people, hope
of a better day to come.
In approaching the problem of poverty
and chaos in an interdependent world, we
should be guided by the vision of a great
man who died here in New York 10 years
ago, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin.
Through his vision we can come to under-
stand that the growing interdependence of
mankind caused by the technological revolu-
tion can lead to a world civilization in which
both persons and nations find their indi-
viduality enhanced, find their mutual de-
pendence and mutual fate a condition to be
welcomed rather than a threat to be feared.
The Pursuit of Peace
Our concern about economic chaos and
disorder, about world poverty and depriva-
tion, is a part of our larger concern about
world peace. All men profess to seek peace.
But peace is like a flower — it needs fertile
soil to grow. It cannot grow in the rocks
of bitterness and poverty, in the dry sands
of backwardness and despair. It needs the
fertile soil of education and food, of health
and hope.
Peace is too important to be the exclusive
concern of the great powers. It requires the
attention of all — small nations and large, old
nations and new.
The pursuit of peace resembles the build-
ing of a great cathedral. It is the work of
generations. In concept it requires a master
architect ; in execution, the labors of many.
The pursuit of peace requires time, but
we must use time as a tool and not as a
crutch.
We realize that the hopes and expecta-
tions which may be aroused cannot all be
satisfied in the immediate future. What can
be accomplished in a limited time will always
fall short of expectations.
This should not discourage us. What is
important is that we be prepared to give
some evidence that progress toward peace —
progress in the global war on poverty — is
being made, that some of the unsolved prob-
lems of peace can be met in the future.
It is the challenge to your generation to
convert the hopes for peace, the hopes for
progress, the hopes for social justice for all
into reality. With the benefit of 4 years in a
great university, I am confident you will suc-
ceed.
JULY 12, 1965
59
The Dominican Situation in tfie Perspective of International Law
by Leonard C. Meeker
Legal Adviser ^
I should like to talk this evening about a
subject of current interest — the recent situa-
tion in the Dominican Republic.
There is much to be said on the merits of
the actions taken by the United States Gov-
ernment and taken by the Organization of
American States. I should like to discuss
these actions in relation to the situation on
the ground in Santo Domingo and in rela-
tion to the fabric of legal rules and princi-
ples that govern the actions of individual
countries and of international organizations.
I should also like to consider the Domini-
can situation more generally in the perspec-
tive of international law. The situation in
Santo Domingo has, as often in great mo-
ments of history, evoked the expression of
fundamentalist views about the nature of
international law.
Some commentators have been free with
the use of categorical imperatives in talking
about the international legal duties of the
United States. Others have pronounced as a
dogma that action by the inter-American
system is incompatible with the responsibili-
ties and functions of the United Nations
and that by supporting the OAS involve-
ment we have speeded the world organiza-
tion on a path of decline and political dis-
integration.
' Address made before the Foreign Law Associa-
tion at New York, N.Y., on June 9 (press release
147).
What I should like to suggest is that re-
liance on absolutes for judging and evaluat-
ing the events of our time is artificial, that
black and white alone are inadequate to
portray the actuality of a particular situa-
tion in world politics, and that fundamen-
talist views on the nature of international
legal obligations are not very useful as a
means to achieving practical and just so-
lutions of difficult political, economic, and
social problems.
I should say at the outset that my view of
international law, as of other institutions
that have been devised by human society, is
a practical view. So that there should be no
confusion or misunderstanding — to the ef-
fect that I am expounding a cold or cynical
philosophy — I should go on to say that my
approach would properly be described as
practical idealism.
It does not seem to me that law and other
human institutions should be treated as ab-
stract imperatives which must be followed
for the sake of obeisance to some supernat-
ural power or for the sake of some supposed
symmetry that is enjoined upon the human
race by external forces. Rather, it seems to
me that law and other institutions of society
should be seen as deliberate and hopefully
rational efforts to order the lives of human
communities — from small to great — in such
a way as to permit realization by all mem-
bers of a community of the full range of
whatever creative powers they may possess.
60
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. Action in the Dominican Republic
There has been a good deal of criticism,
from various quarters, of United States ac-
tion in the Dominican Republic as a throw-
back to "gunboat diplomacy." We have been
accused of violating the Charter of the
Organization of American States — particu-
larly articles 15 and 17, w^hich deal with
intervention and use of force. Let us con-
sider for a moment what the situation was
in the Dominican Republic in late April of
this year and what the choices were that
presented themselves to the United States
during a crucial period of history.
The revolt that began on April 24 arose
out of an unstable political situation in the
Dominican Republic. The government headed
by Donald Reid Cabral did not have a popu-
lar mandate. It was trying to deal with an
unsatisfactory economic situation which it
had inherited. The government's efforts to
correct the economic situation were reason-
ably effective, but because of that fact they
did increase the political strain.
Some senior military officers who had
been removed from key positions in a re-
form program carried out by the Reid gov-
ernment were obviously unhappy with that
government. At the same time, junior mili-
tary officers were complaining that the mili-
tary reforms were not broad enough and
that the government was acting too slowly
in implementing them.
The Dominican Revolutionary Party was
seeking to restore to power former President
Juan Bosch, who had been deposed in Sep-
tember 1963.
From these elements there arose a loose
association which set off the April 24
revolution.
The next day Reid Cabral resigned and
went into hiding. Rebels seized the national
palace, and a leader of the Dominican Revo-
lutionary Party was installed as provisional
president. For a time the rebels appeared to
be making headway. Then, on April 26,
elements of the armed forces began to move
against rebel-held areas of Santo Domingo.
They conducted air attacks on the city.
Meanwhile, large quantities of arms were
distributed by the rebels to civilians, and
disorder grew rapidly. Repeated efforts by
the United States Embassy to bring about
a cease-fire between the opposing factions
were unsuccessful. In the course of April 26
a large number of American citizens had as-
sembled at a hotel west of Santo Domingo,
seeking safety and assistance in being
evacuated.
April 27 saw a complete breakdown of
law and order. The rebel provisional presi-
dent of only 2 days abandoned his office and
took asylum in a Latin American embassy.
During the course of April 28 the anti-
rebel forces lost their momentum after ear-
lier progress against the rebels. The situa-
tion in Santo Domingo became increasingly
confused. The breakdown in public order
resulted in indiscriminate shooting on a
rising scale. The police were no longer ef-
fective. Armed mobs were terrorizing the
city, firing on homes and other buildings,
including the United States and other em-
bassies.
During this period the activities of Com-
munist leaders in organizing mobs and in
directing their wanton forays increased
markedly. With the withdrawal of a num-
ber of moderate political leaders from the
rebel movement, it appeared that the Com-
munists were in a fair way to take it over.
Late in the afternoon of April 28 the
antirebel military and police authorities in-
formed the United States Embassy that
they could no longer provide any assurance
for the safety of American lives.
This, then, was the situation on the
Wednesday afternoon before President John-
son ordered the landing of Marines to the
west of the city of Santo Domingo.^ Let
us look at the choices confronting the United
States Government.
One possibility would have been to wait
and see. There is no telling how many
American and other foreign nationals would
have lost their lives in mob violence if this
course had been followed. There is no tell-
' For background, see Bulletin of May 17, 1965,
p. 738.
JULY 12, 1965
61
ing how many hundreds and thousands of
Dominican lives would have been sacrificed
needlessly in the armed civil strife that had
exploded in Santo Domingo. There was also
a grave risk that Communist takeover of
the revolt would fasten a new totalitarian-
ism on the Dominican Republic which could
not easily be dislodged.
Another possibility would have been to in-
tervene in the Dominican Republic on the
side of the antirebel forces and to put down
the revolt, as the United States was re-
quested to do on April 28 by the antirebel
military junta.
Still another possibility would have been
to intervene on the side of the rebels and
seek to eliminate the extremists and restore
moderate leadership to the revolt, ultimately
imposing this kind of political solution on
the whole country.
In fact, the United States Government did
none of these things. It chose instead a
more complicated and, I believe, a more
constructive course. We landed troops in the
Dominican Republic in order to preserve the
lives of foreign nationals — nationals of the
United States and many other countries. We
continued our military presence in the Do-
minican Republic for the additional purpose
of preserving the capacity of the OAS to
function in the manner intended by the
OAS Charter — to achieve peace and justice
through securing a cease-fire and through
reestablishing orderly political processes
vdthin which Dominicans could choose their
own government, free from outside inter-
ference.
The Inter-American System
The primary purposes for which the
American states established the OAS, set
forth in article 1 of its charter, are "to
achieve an order of peace and justice, to
promote their solidarity, to strengthen their
collaboration, and to defend their sover-
eignty, their territorial integrity and their
independence." The OAS thus exists to assist
the American states to maintain their rights,
to defend their integrity, and to provide for
their preservation and prosperity. The ac-
tion of the United States gave the organs
of the OAS the essential time in which to
consider the situation in the Dominican Re-
public and to determine means of preserv-
ing the rights of that country under the
inter-American system.
Participation in the inter-American sys-
tem, to be meaningful, must take into ac-
count the possibility that chaos and terror in
the streets can make a country ripe for a con-
spiratorial group inspired from the outside
to assault its independence and integrity.
In the context of Cuba, only a few miles
away, and of the announced drive of the
Communists to expand their control in this
hemisphere, external threat to the Domin-
ican Republic was by no means fancified.
The threat of a Communist takeover had to
be viewed as very real.
Here was the very kind of threat which
the Latin American foreign ministers had
in mind when they declared at Punta del
Este in January 1962 : ^
The principles of communism are incompatible
with the principles of the Inter-American system.
. . . (and) adherence by any member of the Organi-
zation of Amei'ican States to Marxism-Leninism is
incompatible with the inter-American system and the
alignment of such a government with the communist
bloc breaks the unity and solidarity of the hemi-
sphere.
This meeting of foreign ministers therefore
urged :
. . . the member states to take those steps that
they may consider appropriate for their individual
or collective self-defense, and to cooperate, as may be
necessary or desirable, to strengthen their capacity
to counteract threats or acts of aggression, subver-
sion, or other dangers to peace and security result-
ing from the continued intervention in this hemi-
sphere of Sino-Soviet powers, in accordance with the
obligations established in treaties and agreements
such as the Charter of the Organization of Amer-
ican States and the Inter-American Treaty of Recip-
rocal Assistance.
' For texts of resolutions adopted by the Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Af-
fairs of the American Republics, see ibid., Feb. 19,
1962, p. 278.
62
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Actions Taken by the OAS
Let us consider next the course of events
in the political organs of the inter-Amer-
ican system, which had first discussed the
Dominican situation on April 27 and 28 and
which have been meeting continuously since
the morning of April 29.*
On that day, and during the next three,
the OAS took the following actions : It called
for a cease-fire; it appealed for the estab-
lishment of an international neutral zone of
refuge in Santo Domingo; it dispatched a
five-member commission to the Dominican
Republic; and it called upon member gov-
ernments to supply food and medicine to
the people of the Dominican Republic. These
actions were taken in the light of the pres-
ence of United States military forces in
Santo Domingo. Without that presence,
none of the OAS actions would have been
meaningful. Without it, the OAS machinery
for seeking an orderly political settlement
in the strife-torn Dominican Republic could
not have become effective.
On May 6, the Tenth Meeting of Con-
sultation of OAS Foreign Ministers re-
solved :
To request governments of member states that
are willing and capable of doing so to make contin-
gents of their land, naval, air or police forces avail-
able to the Organization of American States, within
their capabilities and to the extent they can do so,
to form an inter-American force that will operate
under the authority of this Tenth Meeting of Con-
sultation.
The resolution also provided that the Force
would have as its sole purpose,
. . . that of cooperating in the restoration of
normal conditions in the Dominican Republic, in
maintaining the security of its inhabitants and the
inviolability of human rights, and in the establish-
ment of an atmosphere of peace and conciliation
that will permit the functioning of democratic in-
stitutions.
The countries contributing contingents to
the Force were to work out among them-
selves the measures necessary to establish
a unified command of the OAS for this
Inter-American Peace Force. Regulations
for setting up the command were agreed
among the six countries now contributing
national contingents to the Force, and a
general of the Brazilian Army assumed
command of the Force on May 31, 1965.
Substantial United States forces, includ-
ing all of our Marine Corps units, have been
withdrawn from the Dominican Republic
since the formation of the Inter-American
Force.^ United States military units that
remain are included in the Force under the
unified command. Under the relevant reso-
lutions, it will be for the OAS to determine
when the Inter-American Force shall be
withdrawn from the Dominican Republic.
Later, the OAS meeting of foreign min-
isters took further actions, which were de-
signed to lead toward a political settlement.
On May 20, the meeting entrusted to the
OAS Secretary General the functions of pro-
viding good offices to the factions and
groups in Santo Domingo. The following
day, the meeting urged that the truce in the
Dominican Republic be converted into a
permanent cease-fire. Then, on June 2, the
Meeting of Consultation appointed an ad
hoc committee of three to join in providing
good offices to all the parties in Santo Do-
mingo,
. . . for the purpose of achieving the establish-
ment of a climate of peace and reconciliation that
will permit the functioning of democratic institu-
tions in the Dominican Republic and its economic
and social recovery.
That committee, made up of Ambassador
[Ellsworth] Bunker and representatives of
Brazil and El Salvador, is now in Santo
Domingo at work on its OAS mandate.
Lesson of the Dominican Crisis
What then is the lesson of the Dominican
Republic crisis for international law? There
are at least two ways of looking at the
matter :
* For background and texts of resolutions, see ibid.,
May 17, 1965, p. 739; May 31, 1965, p. 854; June 7,
1965, p. 908; and June 21, 1965, p. 1017.
° For a statement made by President Johnson on
June 1, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 992.
JULY 12, 1965
63
On the one hand, we might take a funda-
mentalist approach. We might say that, de-
spite the exigencies of the situation on
April 28, the doctrine of nonintervention
precluded the United States from sending
troops into Santo Domingo. Or we might say
that a request from a Dominican govern-
ment, if we had chosen to recognize one,
could have served to justify the landing of
forces. We might simply have invoked the
Monroe Doctrine. Or we might have chosen
from among other reasons, perhaps even
more theoretical, for taking or not taking af-
firmative action.
On the other hand, if, as I have suggested,
international law is really the story of
man's attempt to create satisfactory and
useful human relationships, we should be-
gin by looking at the facts. The facts show
that Americans in Santo Domingo were in
imminent danger of life and limb from riot-
ing mobs. The facts show that, had the
United States withdrawn its forces from
Santo Domingo after the evacuation of
United States and other foreign civilians,
the situation would have reverted to an-
archy and bloodletting. Without our troops,
the OAS would now have no foothold for
constructive multilateral action and peace-
making efforts. Without our presence, it is
quite possible the Dominican Republic could
have been thrown into another 30 years of
darkness.
It will surprise no one here if I say that
international law which cannot deal with
facts such as these, and in a way that has
some hope of setting a troubled nation on
the path of peace and reconstruction, is not
the kind of law I believe in.
Over the last few years we have faced
hard sets of facts several times. In 1962 the
United States was subjected to a direct
threat to its security when the U.S.S.R.
placed strategic missiles in Cuba. The
United States and the other members of the
OAS took action to quarantine the island
and compel removal of the weapons.
At that time, some commentators dusted
off old treatises to analyze the classical in-
ternational law of blockade. They ques-
tioned whether the American Republics were
fulfilling the requirements of the venerable
doctrine of blockade. Others questioned why
the stationing of the missiles should not be
considered an armed attack on the United
States so as to bring into play the doctrine
of individual and collective self-defense.
In fact, the United States Government
did not resort to any absolutes in theoreti-
cal analysis or in the actions it took. We
did not bomb; we did not invade; we did
not do nothing. We recognized that, regard-
less of any fundamentalist view of interna-
tional law, the situation then existing re-
quired us to take action to remove the
threat and at the same time to avoid nu-
clear war. In the tradition of the common
law we did not pursue some particular legal
analysis or code, but instead sought a prac-
tical and satisfactory solution to a pressing
problem.
To take another and current example, we
are engaged today in a harsh and sangui-
nary conflict in Viet-Nam. The world has
learned at terrible cost that countries which
are not willing to cooperate in resisting ag-
gression away from home will soon find that
aggression coming closer. If we have learned
little else in world politics in this century,
we have learned that appeasement does not
satisfy and stop the appetite of aggression.
Yet, today, the policy of the United States
in Viet-Nam is subjected to criticism on
some fundamentalist grounds. One analy-
sis holds that the war in South Viet-Nam is
a "civil war" and therefore we have no
right to conduct airstrikes against the
North. Another asserts that United States
actions are in violation of the Geneva ac-
cords of 1954 and 1962. Still others hold
there is a Gordian knot to be cut by the sup-
posedly clear expedient of military attack on
mainland China — the source of Communist
infection in Asia.
These again are arguments based on ab-
solutes at the expense of the facts — facts
which are not simple but extraordinarily
complex. Such arguments, failing to recog-
nize the world which law is trying to
shape, cannot hope to shape that world.
We have heard also expressed recently
the view that the United States should have
64
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
turned some or all of these problems over
to the United Nations to solve — indeed that
our international obligations required us to
do so. Again, I suggest that we look at
the facts. Does it seem possible that the
United Nations, with its General Assembly
deadlocked over constitutional and financial
issues stemming from peacekeeping opera-
tions in the Middle East and Congo, could at
this time take over from the United States in
Viet-Nam and bring to that war-torn coun-
try a peace with freedom? Of course, to ask
this question is not to say that we should
relax our effort to strengthen the United
Nations' capacity to deal with the most dif-
ficult of world political and security prob-
lems.
In the case of the Dominican Republic
was there any practical alternative to our
seeking to engage the regional organization
of this hemisphere in the tasks of restoring
peace and building a democratic order?
There should be no doctrinaire assumption
that the United Nations and its Security
Council are the exclusive guardians of world
peace. In fact, the United Nations and the
OAS are mutually reinforcing. We see from
the actions of the two organizations that
they have worked together toward common
purposes. The United Nations has supported
the cease-fire appeals and peacemaking pro-
posals of the OAS. The latter, in its own
region, has been operating to give effect to
charter purposes and principles — to restore
peace and to afford to the Dominican people
the chance to decide freely their own future.
Process of Creating International Law
In closing, I should like to leave this
thought : International law is being made by
the actions of governments and international
organizations as they seek to devise solu-
tions for age-old problems and present crises.
The arrangements and relationships they de-
velop constitute much of the new and grow-
ing fabric of this law.
The history of national, regional, and
global efforts at cooperation is a record of
practical adjustments designed to carry the
world community toward ends upon which
there is general, if not universal, agreement.
The charters of the United Nations and the
OAS are important not least for identifying
and setting forth some political goals that
have special meaning and relevance for our
time.
One may hope that from an experience
such as the Dominican Republic crisis na-
tions will have gained knowledge useful
for the future. From such experience, and
from the experiment and innovation which
are indispensable, they may find it possible
to be better prepared to meet the next
contingency when it arises.
The process of creating international law
is continuous. It is not a job that can ever
be finished and complete. As we progress to-
ward the accomplishment of familiar pur-
poses, new goals are set and human effort
reaches toward farther horizons.
Thus it is that law grows out of life, and
international law out of the life of nations.
Pilot School Lunch Program
Begins at Bogota
White House press release dated June 19
President Johnson announced on June 19 a
pilot school lunch program for 2,400 children
in Bogota, Colombia, a program that has re-
sulted from cooperation between U. S. busi-
nessmen, the U. S. Government, the people
of the United States, and the Colombian Gov-
ernment. The new project will take place
at Ciudad Kennedy, a low-income suburb of
Bogota, Colombia.
Secretary of Agriculture Orville L. Free-
man will join a group of U. S. food industry
leaders in dedicating the new school cafe-
teria on July 4. They will leave July 1 to
confer with Colombian officials on possibili-
ties of getting similar lunch programs started
in other schools, using U. S. know-how and
increased participation by the people of Co-
lombia.
The original idea came from the U. S. food
industry, which pledged its support about 6
months ago — on the occasion of Freedom
JULY 12, 1965
65
From Hunger Week — at the Academy of Food
Marketing at St. Joseph's College at Phila-
delphia, when Secretary Freeman visited the
academy. James O'Connor, executive direc-
tor of the Academy of Food Marketing, is
also cochairman of the Citizens Committee
on Agriculture and Food for International
Cooperation Year.
Equipment for the new cafeteria — pat-
terned after school lunchrooms in the United
States — was donated and installed by some
30 U. S. manufacturers, who have also paid
for transportation and training of cafeteria
personnel. The total investment in equip-
ment and services is almost $90,000.
U. S. Food for Peace commodities, to be
furnished through CARE, will be supple-
mented with fresh meat and produce to be
bought by the Colombian Government, which
will also furnish space for the cafeteria in a
new school. The children will also pay a
small amount for their lunches.
Fourteen businessmen and their wives will
attend the dedication and meetings, at their
own expense. The project committee is com-
posed of Harvey Stephens, chairman, senior
vice president. Automatic Retailers of Amer-
ica; Daniel J. Hanlon, Jr., vice president,
Horn and Hardart Baking Co.; and Edward
J. Piszek, president, Mrs. Paul's Kitchens.
The cafeteria will serve 480 meals at one
time and will operate five times daily, provid-
ing meals for 2,400 children a day. Foods
from the United States will include powdered
milk, wheat llour, shortening, bulgur (a
wheat product) , and beans.
Housing and Urban Development in Latin America
by Jack H. Vaughn
Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^
The process of learning to cope with the
acceleration of rural-urban migration com-
pounded by centuries of cumulative neglect
of the most elementary shelter and sanitary
requirements presents a great challenge. This
is true even when considered only as an aca-
demic exercise by the collective disciplines of
a university campus. Thrust under the harsh
light of the economic realities of Latin
America, the problem assumes characteristics
that stagger the imagination. The quantita-
tive dimensions of the problem join forces
with its structural complexities to plague all
those unwary enough to do battle with it.
' Address made at the opening session of a joint
meeting of the Pan American Congress of Architects
and the American Institute of Architects at Wash-
ington, D.C., on June 14 (press release 153).
How did the United States, in the pursuit
of its foreign policy objectives, become in-
volved in the perilous process of urban
growth in the developing countries? What
is the nature and extent of this involvement?
What have we learned from our experiences?
These are the matters I propose to review
with you this morning.
The history of making loans for housing
and urban development purposes has been
brief. Prior to 1960 it was merely technical
assistance responding to a particular request
and generally involving public housing agen-
cies. The United States, for example, sup-
ported a training center of the Organization
of American States to develop technicians for
the production of low-cost housing.
Beginning about 1961, technical assist-
66
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ance was largely supplanted by financial as-
sistance, but there was considerable resist-
ance to making loans for housing purposes.
In general the argument ran that the con-
struction of housing was largely a matter to
be financed by local efforts and did not in-
volve significant dollar costs. While the in-
ternational financial community understood
the need for housing, it was urged that dol-
lar loans would make a greater contribu-
tion to the economic development of Latin
America if they were devoted to financing
import requirements for economic develop-
ment. On the other hand, the Latin Ameri-
can countries had not developed financial in-
stitutions which would provide the savings
necessary for housing, and thus we were
caught in a vicious circle in which the re-
quirements for housing increased and neither
local nor international financial institutions
provided the requisite funds for housing
construction.
However, we know that economic and so-
cial turmoil flourishes and multiplies in the
slums which abound in every Latin Ameri-
can city and that, without some measure of
political and social tranquillity, orderly, bal-
anced economic development can never be
achieved. More importantly, the average
Latin American himself discovered, through
radio and newspapers, that the degradation
in which his family was being reared was not
the only way to live. We applauded him as
he demanded an increasing measure of en-
vironmental dignity to assist him in his un-
balanced struggle with life.
Fortunately this aspect of our social sensi-
tivity coincided with and, in all probability,
was significantly responsible for the orienta-
tion of a series of inter-American declara-
tions of policy reaching their spiritual and
operational climax in President Kennedy's
Alliance for Progress. The Alianza estab-
lished, once and forever, the respectability of
using international lending resources to
improve the living conditions of families
throughout the hemisphere.
The consequences of this policy adjust-
ment have been enormous. The United States
in approximately 5 years, through loans and
guarantees, has made housing assistance
available in the staggering amount of more
than $600 million, and the probability is
that this figure will be increased by at least
an additional $250 million over the next 2
years. When loans made for sewer and water
systems are included, the total soars well
over $1 billion.
By itself this is an impressive figure, but
measured against the overwhelming dimen-
sions of the problem, with which most of
you here today are all too familiar, it has
virtually no quantitative meaning. $1 billion
over 5 years is an insignificant percentage
of a cumulative Latin American housing de-
ficiency estimated conservatively to exceed
$40 billion. The statistical impact becomes
even less impressive if we acknowledge that
over the same 5-year period the deficiency
increased, because of new family formations
and progressive obsolescence of existing
dwellings, In an amount far greater than $1
billion.
Since we all recognize that there will never
be enough external resources available to
meet the total requirements of even a single
country, we have learned that the impact of
our efforts can be meaningful only to the
extent that we are capable of reducing the
problem to manageable proportions. We con-
cluded that the only way that we could have
a significant impact on the housing situa-
tion in Latin America was to encourage the
development of savings institutions that
would provide financing for housing. It was
our view that we could help get these insti-
tutions started by providing the initial cap-
ital. But over the long run, funds for housing
construction in Latin America would have
to be provided by increasing the level of sav-
ings by the Latin Americans themselves.
From the long-range point of view, we are
interested in the building of institutions,
public and private, which will provide the
legal, economic, and planning know-how and
impetus to urban development. In fact, at
this stage of development in Latin America,
it may be that the institution is just as im-
portant— if not more so — than the construc-
tion of physical structures.
JULY 12, 1965
67
An Achievable Frame of Operations
A statement of policy which embraces the
spirit of the alliance within an achievable
frame of operations would consist of the fol-
lowing components :
1. The ownership of a decent home and
the land on which it is located is one of
mankind's most compelling aspirations. Its
fulfillment adds dignity and healthfulness
to a family's existence. To the extent that
homeownership becomes available to more
families, political and social stability increase
proportionately, as does the potential for
balanced economic development.
2. The principal missing ingredient from
the formula to make homeownership avail-
able to more families is the availability of
long-term housing loans. The creation of in-
stitutions which mobilize private savings and
issue housing mortgages most effectively
fills this void. A simultaneous development
must be the creation of a vigorous and com-
petitive private homebuilding industry.
3. A great many families in developing
countries do not have sufficient income to
purchase a home even when long-term credit
is available at reasonable rates of interest.
This problem must be recognized and dealt
with by the local governments, including the
use of subsidies of various types as circum-
stances may require. However, external
loans, which are very limited in amount,
should be used for institutions whose pro-
grams are addressed to those families which
can "pay the freight," since such loans must
be repaid in order to be used over and over
again for the full multiplier effect.
4. The public sector also has a role to play.
National institutions must be created or
strengthened
a. to assure sound programing of public
resources ;
b. to undertake essential regional and ur-
ban planning functions ;
c. to develop programs with local resources
for families requiring subsidies;
d. to initiate and supervise highly special-
ized programs such as self-help, urban re-
newal, squatter settlement upgrading, and
slum clearance ;
e. to encourage and assist the performance
and organization of such nonprofit interme-
diary institutions as housing cooperatives
and trade union housing groups ;
f, to assure national or municipal govern-
ment provision of all sanitary, health, edu-
cation, and other facilities in the public do-
main which housing projects require for an
ideal urban environment.
5. External loans must have a correspond-
ing contribution by local sources to the total
cost of a housing program. The local contri-
bution may be cash, housing sites, dowoi-
payments, value of self-help labor, resources
of trade union or housing cooperatives, sav-
ings attracted by thrift and homeownership
institutions, et cetera.
Tile U.S. Aid Program
Together with the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank, which makes housing loans
exclusively with resources which it admin-
isters on behalf of the Government of the
United States, the Latin American Bureau
of AID [Agency for International Develop-
ment] has amassed the aforementioned hous-
ing portfolio of more than $600 million. This
has been done substantially in conformance
with these broad criteria, and thereby a
much greater advantage from the available
resources has been achieved than would have
been the case if we permitted the program
to become one of subsidies subject to political
favoritism. Neither have we permitted it to
become a construction program, exclusively,
dedicated only to the superficial objective of
adding as quickly as possible an insignifi-
cant number of houses to the existing woe-
fully inadequate inventory.
Our $600 million has produced from local
sources almost an equal additional amount
in support of the programs. Without excep-
tion every home has been for sale rather than
rent and every home has been built by pri-
vate homebuilders selected almost always by
a sealed competitive bidding process. Inter-
mediary institutions have included housing
cooperatives, savings and loan associations,
trade union organizations, and national hous-
68
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ing agencies. Self-help, which actually has
the final borrower building part of his home
with his own hands, is a feature in more
than 25 percent of all the loans. Technical
assistance has been provided in support of
virtually every type of homebuilding and
housing finance activity and is now being
expanded into more esoteric exploi-ations of
such subjects as the urban community as a
functioning organism and the politics of ur-
ban devolopment.
Because it has become a most striking
phenomenon of the Alliance for Progress,
very brief special mention is necessary at
this time of the savings and loan programs
of the hemisphere. The concepts of thrift
and homeownership reach their natural
fusion in these specialized private institu-
tions. Their dramatic successes in Peru and
Chile have caught the imagination of the
other countries, and already savings and loan
systems are flourishing in nine countries
with more scheduled to start over the next
12 months. Seed capital loans exceeding $80
million have already been made with U. S.
resources, and the results have been phenom-
enal. The associations, none of which is older
than 4 years, have more than 250,000 depos-
itors and have generated more than $65 mil-
lion in savings, which have been increasing
at a monthly rate of more than $2 million.
Approximately 28,000 homes have already
been fmanced, and $126 million in home
mortgages have been recorded.
Notwithstanding these occasional dramatic
triumphs, the stewardship of a billion dol-
lars in urban development loans is at best
a nerve-racking undertaking. Because of its
very complex nature and the imminent pros-
pect of its early expansion, we have recently
completed an intensive self -analysis. We have
discovered, without it being too much of a
surprise, that responsibility for administer-
ing the diverse housing and urban develop-
ment activities has become dispersed among
too many offices. This has been a result of
the spectacular growth of the programs. We
are, in effect, suffering from a kind of in-
ternal urban sprawl.
To make our programs more effective, we
are establishing in the Latin American Bu-
reau a new housing and urban development
office. I take pleasure in announcing that
Stanley Baruch, who has been known to most
of you as the Housing and Urban Develop-
ment Director of the Inter-American Devel-
opment Bank for the past 4 years and who
has accompanied me here this morning, has
been appointed director of the new office
and will inaugurate its operations 1 week
from today.
Housing Needs of Low-Income Families
During my earlier comments there were
very few references to low-income families.
This was deliberate on my part. I consider
that obsessive concentration on attempts to
divide each country in Latin America into
artificial categories of low-, middle-, and
high-income families in order to decide
who is and who isn't eligible to participate
in the housing loans of the Alianza is com-
pletely nonproductive. It is clear to us that
the cost of a home and the terms of the loan
are the only significant elements when eval-
uating a family's ability to share in our pro-
grams. Obviously a family which cannot af-
ford to purchase the least expensive home
built in a country, even under the generous
terms and conditions of the loans of the Al-
liance for Progress, is not eligible, in accord-
ance with the criteria established by the
legislative mandate under which we operate
within the alliance, whether he be in the
bottom 10 percent, 20 percent, or 50 percent
of the family income groupings.
The fact is that huge masses of families
in newly developing countries are not able
to afford the least expensive homes now be-
ing produced. Some of these families never
will be able to afford a home through their
own efforts and will require subsidies in one
form or another from local sources. AID has
provided some $80 million for direct govern-
ment action, largely for the lower income
level. Most of the $190 million administered
by the Social Progress Trust Fund of the
Inter-American Development Bank is for
low-income housing loans. At the same time,
we are examining new means of reducing
JULY 12, 1965
69
squatter settlements that house so much of the
urban population of Latin America and
are exploring new ways of using Food for
Peace for housing.
There are many families, however, who
are denied eligibility because no one has de-
signed the house they can afford. We must
be realistic in relating design standards to
available resources rather than to the local
editions of House Beautiful. We are in favor
of beauty and understand that economic de-
sign need not be ugly design. However, in
the final analysis we must be ruthlessly prac-
tical. Has a problem been solved, or has it
not?
We feel that the accumulated genius, ex-
perience, and creativity here gathered must
focus to its full capacity on the reduction of
housing costs and that there must be ade-
quate communication between the architects
and those responsible for executing rational
housing programs.
We implore you to fulfill your natural role
of leadership in seeking methods of dealing
with these fundamental issues. We pledge
you our full support in any reasonable joint
venture to accomplish our common purpose
of making improved housing conditions avail-
able to an ever-increasing number of this
hemisphere's population.
President Asks for Funds
for Canal Commission
White House preas release dated June 22
President Johnson transmitted to Congress
on June 22 an amendment to the 1966 budget
amounting to $7.5 million for the Interoceanic
Canal Commission.
The funds are needed for a study to de-
termine the feasibility of, and the most suit-
able site for, construction of a sea-level
canal connecting the Atlantic and Pacific
Oceans.
Most of the funds will be used to initiate
the collection of basic information on the
topography, geology, and hydrology of po-
tential canal sites. Studies, based on the
data to be gathered by the on-site surveys,
will be undertaken to determine the feasi-
bility of both nuclear and conventional meth-
ods of construction. Funds are also provided
for administrative and operating expenses.
The Commission must initiate its work in
the fiscal year 1966 if it is to complete a
final report prior to the statutory deadline
of June 30, 1968.
A tentative estimate of $7.5 million for the
Interoceanic Canal Commission was specifi-
cally included in the 1966 budget, but the
formal request for an appropriation was
withheld pending a review by the Commis-
sion of its financial requirements. That re-
view has now been completed and an appro-
priation is needed to allow surveys, studies,
and investigations to get underway.
President Decides To Complete
P.L. 480 Commitment to U.A.R.
Department Statement ^
The President has determined that it is in
the United States interest to fulfill remaining
commitments under the Public Law 480
agreement entered into with the United Arab
Kepublic in October 1962, and which ends
June 30, 1965.
Accordingly, the Department of Agricul-
ture is proceeding with the issuances of pur-
chase authorizations totaling approximately
$37 million, consisting of wheat, $22.4 mil- «
lion; vegetable oil, $5.6 million; dried milk, |
$0.1 million; tobacco, $8.9 million.
In connection with the agreement, the
U.A.R. Government has undertaken to enter
into discussions with us on any outstanding
differences and to resolve these to our mutual
satisfaction.
^ Read to news correspondents on June 22 by
Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News.
70
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Southern Rhodesia Today
by G. Mennen Williams
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^
Cecil John Rhodes, who gave his name to
a segment of south-central Africa and pro-
claimed his belief in "equal rights for all
civilized men," probably would have diffi-
culty adjusting to Southern Rhodesia in
1965. Large numbers of that country's edu-
cated African citizens are imprisoned or un-
der detention for seeking elementary human
rights long accepted as man's birthright else-
where in the world. Southern Rhodesia, a
self-governing British colony since 1923 un-
der a white minority government, has en-
acted stringent legislation designed to per-
petuate control of nearly 4 million Africans
by 215,000 whites. Nearly all of its black
African leaders are either restricted to re-
mote, primitive camps or are in voluntary
exile. More than 2,000 black Africans have
been arrested (restricted) under 1964 secu-
rity legislation.
The Government of Southern Rhodesia
has stated publicly on numerous recent occa-
sions that it is considering a unilateral dec-
laration of independence from the United
Kingdom, if current negotiations for inde-
pendence are not successful. This indicates
the extent of white Southern Rhodesian op-
position to the British position that inde-
pendence for the colony will be granted only
with the consent of the majority of the in-
habitants. The United States has given, and
will continue to give, its support to a peace-
ful transition to independence for Southern
^ Address made before the Chicago chapter of
the Federal Bar Association at Chicago, 111., on
June 15 (press release 156 dated June 14).
Rhodesia under a government based upon
the consent of the governed.
Tonight I would like to discuss some as-
pects of the current difficulties in Southern
Rhodesia. First, however, a brief review of
some of the basic elements leading to the
present problem will help put current diffi-
culties in a more meaningful setting.
Southern Rhodesia's high, fertile plateaus,
rising from 3,000 to 5,000 feet above sea
level, have attracted many white immigrants.
The country's major agricultural commod-
ities are sugar, citrus fruit, corn, cotton,
beef and dairy cattle, and tobacco.
The mineral wealth Rhodes hoped to find
in the country does not approach the value
of that in South Africa or Zambia (formerly
Northern Rhodesia), but there are impor-
tant deposits of chrome, asbestos, gold, cop-
per, coal, and some precious stones. There
are well-developed processing and consumer
industries, based on local raw materials,
which have given Southern Rhodesia a so-
phisticated and diversified economy.
United States investment in Southern
Rhodesia is estimated at $56 million in in-
dustry, mining, and agriculture, a figure
considerably smaller than that of the Brit-
ish. British trade with the colony is about
six times greater than ours. Last year
Southern Rhodesia exports to the United
States were $11 million, while imports
from here were $21 million. In the same
period British exports to Southern Rhodesia
amounted to about $95 million, and imports
from Southern Rhodesia to Britain were
about $93 million.
JULY 12, 1965
71
There are 1,825 Americans resident in
Southern Rhodesia, of whom half are mis-
sionaries and their families.
Southern Rhodesia was inhabited origi-
nally by African Bantu peoples, now called
Mashonas, who are generally believed to have
established a flourishing and impressive
civilization at Zimbabwe, in the southeast-
ern part of the country, well before America
was discovered. Today African nationalists
call Southern Rhodesia by this old name of
Zimbabwe. About 150 years ago a Zulu in-
vasion by Matabele peoples moved north into
Southern Rhodesia from South Africa. Some
time later the first British explorers and
missionaries arrived, following the explora-
tory travels of David Livingstone.
Expanding from his base in South Africa,
Cecil Rhodes obtained a mineral concession
in Southern Rhodesia and organized the
British South Africa Company in 1889. The
company founded the present capital city of
Salisbury the next year. In 1895 the country
was formally named Rhodesia in honor of
Rhodes. It was administered under charter
by the British South Africa Company until
1923, when Southern Rhodesia became a full
British colony after its white citizens re-
jected union with South Africa and chose
internal self-government.
The Political Background
An unsuccessful 10-year attempt at pool-
ing the resources and manpower of the
protectorates of Nyasaland and Northern
Rhodesia and the colony of Southern Rho-
desia in the Federation of Rhodesia and
Nyasaland, or the Central African Federa-
tion, collapsed at the end of 1963. Actually
the outstanding black African political lead-
ers had opposed the Federation from the be-
ginning as a tool of white domination, and
the African opposition in Nyasaland and
Northern Rhodesia to policies determined in
Salisbury, the federal capital, became more
and more pronounced. African nationalists
had great confidence in the British but none
in Salisbury. In 1964 Nyasaland and North-
ern Rhodesia came to independence under
African governments as Malawi (Nyasa-
land) and Zambia (Northern Rhodesia).
Southern Rhodesia remained a self-govern-
ing British colony.
During the last years of the Federation,
and in preparation for its dissolution, new
constitutions were adopted in each of the
three countries. The December 1961 South-
ern Rhodesian constitution established a
technically nonracial franchise. However,
the franchise was so surrounded with eco-
nomic and educational qualifications for
each elector that the "A" roll of 50 seats
was primarily white and the "B" roll of 15
seats was primarily black. The way was left
open constitutionally for an eventual black
African majority in the 65-seat parliament,
as the economic and educational level of the
black Africans advanced. This, according to
the Southern Rhodesian Government at that
time, would have taken 15 years.
African nationalists, led by Joshua Nkomo
and U.S.-educated Reverend Ndabaningi
Sithole, however, refused to cooperate. They ,
launched a political boycott of the new con- I
stitution by declining to register to vote or
to run for parliament. African nationalists
demanded that Great Britain give them "one
man, one vote" immediately, without wait-
ing for a rise in the economic and educa-
tional level of the black Africans to meet the
franchise qualifications.
The United States was not satisfied that
the December 1961 constitution went far
enough in responsible progress toward self-
government and so told the Southern Rho-
desian Government. However, the United
States also regretted the decision by the
African nationalist leaders to withhold their
political cooperation under the new consti-
tution, and we urged them to reconsider
their position. We continue to believe in the
importance of black African participation in
government as a normal development toward
self-government.
In the December 1962 election the pre-
dominantly white voters, alarmed at what
they regarded as unreasonable black African
demands for equality and by events in the
Congo, ousted the relatively moderate White-
head government, which had negotiated the
72
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
new constitution and certain civil rights
measures in the hopes of developing racial
partnership. They replaced it with the right-
ist Rhodesian Front (RF) under Winston
Field. When Prime Minister Field failed to
move rapidly enough for the white extrem-
ists in independence negotiations with the
United Kingdom, he, in turn, was replaced
in an April 1964 party revolt by his deputy,
Ian Smith. Prime Minister Smith launched
a vigorous and highly publicized drive to
win independence from the United Kingdom
through negotiation.
The two African nationalist parties have
been banned by the Southern Rhodesian
Government. Both leaders, Nkomo of the
Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU)
and Sithole of the Zimbabwe African Na-
tional Union (ZANU), are under detention,
along with more than 2,000 of their support-
ers— most without trial. This action was
taken because of scattered African disorders
and violence in mid-1964, after the Smith
government came to power.
Independence Movement of White Minority
The increasingly strong threats of Prime
Minister Smith's government to make a uni-
lateral declaration of independence, if nego-
tiations with the United Kingdom failed,
and Prime Minister Smith's rejection of a
British invitation to London caused concern
in Britain. The Southern Rhodesian actions
prompted Prime Minister Harold Wilson, on
October 27, 1964, to issue a public warning
to Southern Rhodesia that a unilateral dec-
laration of independence would be "an open
act of defiance and rebellion and it would be
treasonable to take steps to give effect to it."
Prime Minister Wilson concluded his warn-
ing with these words :
In short, an illegal declaration of independence in
Southern Rhodesia would bring to an end relation-
ships between her and Britain; would cut her off
from the rest of the Commonwealth, from most for-
eign Governments and from international organiza-
tions; would inflict disastrous economic damage
upon her; and would leave her isolated and virtually
friendless in a largely hostile continent.
The next day, October 28, 1964, the U.S.
Government issued a statement supporting
Prime Minister Wilson's message. Our state-
ment said : ^
We have on frequent occasions expressed our hope
that a solution would be found to the Rhodesian
problem acceptable to the majority of the people.
We continue to hope that Rhodesia will gain in-
dependence as a united nation with a government
based upon the consent of the governed. We have
been encouraged by the forthright position taken
by the British Government in insisting that it would
not sanction independence for Rhodesia until satis-
fied that the people have been allowed the full exer-
cise of self-determination. Prime Minister Wilson's
message to the Rhodesian Prime Minister, published
yesterday, makes clear some of the serious conse-
quences which could befall all Rhodesians should
their Government continue to follow its present
course.
Following the British warning of the con-
sequences of a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence, the issue subsided for several
months. The Rhodesian Government began
to consolidate its position. It introduced
more stringent security legislation to cur-
tail the few political gains the black Afri-
cans made in the closing years of the White-
head administration. It also found ways of
watering down the effectiveness of the dec-
laration of rights in the 1961 constitution.
The British Government, for its part, con-
tinued to seek ways to work out a solution
to the problem.
In late February 1965 Commonwealth Re-
lations Secretary [Arthur] Bottomley and
the Lord Chancellor, Lord Gardiner, paid a
10-day factfinding visit to Southern Rho-
desia. In his March 8 statement on the trip
to the House of Commons, Mr. Bottomley
said he returned with the main impression
of a hardening of attitudes among both
Europeans and Africans. He declared that
the Southern Rhodesian problem must be
resolved by negotiation to achieve a settle-
ment acceptable to the majority of the popu-
lation, and he stressed his Government's
steadfast opposition to unconstitutional ac-
tion. The Bottomley report pointed out that
African nationalists also had responsibilities
in the matter and couldn't simply sit back
' Bulletin of Nov. 16, 1964, p. 721.
JULY 12, 1965
73
and await independence and control of the
government.
Southern Rhodesians thought the British
were taking a tough, but not altogether un-
reasonable, position. There was an indication
they were somewhat reassured that the Brit-
ish were acting in good faith.
During the subsequent campaign for the
Southern Rhodesian election held on May 7,
heavy emphasis was placed by the governing
Rhodesian Front on independence, not ex-
cluding the possibility of a unilateral dec-
laration of independence. In response to an
official Southern Rhodesian Government
white paper on the economic effects of such
a declaration and the probable decisions of
the British Government, Prime Minister Wil-
son made a statement concerning the white
paper on April 29 of this year. He said the
paper completely misrepresented the likely
economic effect on Southern Rhodesia of a
unilateral declaration of independence. The
British Prime Minister stressed the continu-
ing validity of his October 27, 1964, state-
ment concerning the disastrous economic
consequences of such a declaration and the
approval of that statement by the entire
Commonwealth. He declared that Southern
Rhodesia "cannot hope to defy Britain, the
whole of the Commonwealth, nearly the
whole of Africa and the United Nations."
On May 6, during the United Nations Se-
curity Council discussion of the Southern
Rhodesian problem, Ambassador Stevenson
pledged U.S. support for British efforts to
reach a solution.^ He stated firmly that "the
United States will not recognize a unilateral
declaration of independence" by Southern
Rhodesia. The next day, in the May 7 elec-
tion, the Rhodesian Front won an over-
whelming vote of confidence and captured
all 50 of the "A" roll seats from the almost
exclusively white electorate.
This gave Prime Minister Smith better
than the two-thirds majority he sought and
has put him in the position of being able to
•U.S./U.N. press release 4546/Corr.l; for other
U.S. statements, see Bulletin of June 28, 1965, p.
1061.
make fairly extensive amendments to the
constitution. There are, however, certain
"entrenched clauses" in the constitution
which cannot be tampered with except by a
series of referendums among all races of
Southern Rhodesia voting separately.
Following the election Prime Minister
Smith made a number of conciliatory state-
ments indicating his desire to obtain inde-
pendence through negotiation, while holding
a possible unilateral declaration of independ-
ence as a last-ditch move if negotiated in-
dependence proved to be impossible. African
nationalists for their part have declared
their intention, in the event of a declara-
tion, to establish a government-in-exile.
Deterioration of Conditions
The United States has watched with re-
gret the rapid deterioration of Southern
Rhodesia's opportunity to build a viable mul-
tiracial society. On my first visit to that
country in 1961 there was considerable hope
that problems of constitutional transition
and accommodation between races could be
worked out. Speaking to the Rhodesia Na-
tional Affairs Association, before an inter-
racial meeting in Salisbury, I expressed the
position the United States held at that time : *
... It is our genuine hope that political, social,
and economic progress will occur without reference
to the race of individual citizens and certainly with-
out the derogation of the full rights of any element
of the population. There are some who feel you
are going too fast, and there are some who feel you
are going too slow. But the important thing is that
you have not set your face against the course of
history. You are working toward the commendable
goals of self-government by all the people and an
interracial society. It is the speed with which you
approach these goals which is the substance of
your political dialog. We take it that it is your in-
tention to get on with the job.
Since that time conditions in Southern
Rhodesia have deteriorated. We continue to
follow the situation with keen interest, how-
ever, and we are maintaining our contacts
with the British and with all Southern Rho-
desian factions.
* Ibid., Oct. 9, 1961, p. 600.
74
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Although we recognize the legal and con-
stitutional limitations upon the British, we
have stated publicly in the United Nations
and told them privately that we believe they
must be the catalyst in this situation. We be-
lieve that their undoubted influence — polit-
ical, financial, psychological, and moral — is
the most effective means to bring all the
parties together to negotiate a settlement of
the problem by peaceful means. We also have
appealed to all parties concerned not to re-
sort to force and violence in seeking a solu-
tion.
We have gone on record at the United
Nations several times in favor of the appli-
cation of the right of self-determination to
Southern Rhodesia in a way that will (a)
lead to timely universal adult suffrage and
(b) preserve the rights of all the country's
inhabitants, regardless of their color. Fur-
thermore, and most importantly, we have
supported Britain's determination not to re-
linquish sovereignty over Southern Rhodesia
until the government of that country is rep-
resentative of the majority of its population.
Legal and Policy Views of United States
A unilateral declaration of independence
could not alter the basic legal or policy views
of the United States. Southern Rhodesia is
a British colony accorded internal autonomy
by the United Kingdom. The American con-
sulate general in Salisbury deals with the
Southern Rhodesian Government on this
basis. Our relations may be characterized as
"correct but cool." We continue to support
all reasonable proposals for a peaceful solu-
tion of Southern Rhodesia's problems that
will be satisfactory to all parties.
Neither a unilateral declaration of inde-
pendence by the Southern Rhodesian Gov-
ernment nor the establishment by African
nationalists of a government-in-exile would
warrant a different position regarding the
legal status of Southern Rhodesia. Nor would
they change the policy we follow of support-
ing peaceful and agreed achievement of inde-
pendence under a government established by
the consent of the governed and ready to
honor its international obligations.
Let me make our position crystal clear, so
there will be no misunderstanding. The
United States will support the British Gov-
ernment to the fullest extent, if asked to do
so, in its efforts to reach a solution of the
Southern Rhodesian problem. We would also
support the British Government to the full-
est extent in case of a unilateral declara-
tion of independence in Southern Rhodesia.
A unilateral break in the constitutional rela-
tions of Southern Rhodesia with the United
Kingdom by the Southern Rhodesian Gov-
ernment would cause inevitable political, eco-
nomic, and social chaos in the country. I am
firmly convinced that an illegal minority
government in Southern Rhodesia would not
find international support or recognition. I
therefore urge in the most serious manner,
and with the utmost of good will, that the
Southern Rhodesian Government recognize
the full consequences of an act of rebellion.
On another matter, the United States has
been charged recently with supplying arms
to the Southern Rhodesian Government. I
would like to set the record straight on this
point once and for all. The United States is
not, I repeat not, supplying military arms or
equipment to Southern Rhodesia. Nor have
we supplied these items since the dissolution
of the Federation in December 1963.
The operations of the Agency for Interna-
tional Development in Southern Rhodesia,
which were never very large, were termi-
nated completely on June 30, 1964.
We do, however, maintain an active and
successful information program in Southern
Rhodesia. Recently a pioneer effort in a 4-
day science fair for young students — both
black and white — attracted 400 entries, more
than 15,000 visitors, and widespread inter-
est. There is a well-used U.S. Information
Service library in Salisbury. We have stu-
dent scholarship programs that bring about
50 qualified young people of both major
races to the United States to study annually.
The first group of students is now finishing
its studies and will be returning to Southern
Rhodesia in the near future. There is also a
small program to bring leaders and special-
ists to visit the United States to keep pace
JULY 12, 1965
75
with the latest developments in their fields
of specialization.
U.S. Hopes That Reason Will Prevail
Obviously many of the actions that would
be forced upon the United States, the United
Kingdom, and other governments in the
event of a Southern Rhodesian unilateral
declaration of independence would not be
happy ones for any of the parties concerned.
I would like to conclude these remarks,
therefore, with yet another expression of our
Government's hope that reason can prevail
in Southern Rhodesia.
We firmly believe that the British Gov-
ernment, with its broad experience in mat-
ters of decolonization and with its determi-
nation to see justice done for all the inhabit-
ants of Southern Rhodesia, will do all it can
to ameliorate the situation, and we hope that
Southern Rhodesia and its people of all races
will recognize the seriousness of the world's
concern with events in that country.
The United States has no special formula
to advance for the solution of this complex
problem beyond the only rightful and nat-
ural one of timely majority rule. The ways,
the means, and the pace at which this goal
is achieved is for Southern Rhodesians —
black and white — to work out for themselves
with the help of the British Government. The
country is big enough and rich enough for
all its inhabitants to enjoy a full life with
high living standards. It is a place where it
is still possible to develop a successful ex-
ample of how black Africans and white
Africans can live and work in harmony for
their mutual advantage. It is heartbreaking
to see this goal in danger of being lost.
For one thing, failure to find a solution to
the problem of Southern Rhodesia's future
could result in the formation of a tragic
line drawn across Africa between the newly
independent states and a white-minority-con-
trolled region in southern Africa. We would
find ourselves with a bitter confrontation
drawn on racial lines which might require
years to end. Such a situation would not be
in the long-term interests of either black
Africans or white Africans.
The United States Government has been
concerned for years with the question of
Southern Rhodesia, not only because of our
interest in the welfare of the people of that
country but because the solution found
there — whether bad or good — will have an
extensive impact for a generation to come
on the destiny of southern Africa and, in-
deed, all of Africa. We have never been able
to see the problem as one existing in a
vacuum. Its impact also will have an im-
portant effect upon the structure of the
British Commonwealth and upon the United
Nations.
We have followed sympathetically the ef-
forts of the British to prepare for independ-
ence with majority rule. We have been
confident that, despite the obstacles en-
countered, the British— with the support of
white and black Southern Rhodesians of
good will — would develop a formula for a
mutually agreeable, peaceful transition to
government by the consent of the governed.
We believe wholeheartedly in the correct-
ness and validity of the present British
position and are prepared to support it to the
extent requested.
United States Welcomes Japanese-
Korean Agreements
Following is the text of a statement by
Secretary Rusk regarding the signing at
Tokyo on June 22 of agreements between
Japan and the Republic of Korea for nor- ■
malization of relations between the two coun-
tries. Mr. Ruck's statement ivas read to news
correspondents on June 22 by Robert J. Mc-
Closkey, Director of the Office of News.
The United States is pleased that Japan
and the Republic of Korea have decided to
take this highly constructive and important
step. We believe that in addition to its mu-
tual benefit to the two countries, the agree-
ment will contribute to the strengthening of
the free nations of Asia.
76
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament Negotiations
by William C. Foster
Director, U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency ^
My appearance before you today is the
culmination of negotiations which, I believe,
began about a year and a half ago. During
that time exigencies in Washington, my at-
tendance at the United Nations General
Assembly in New York, and reconvenings of
the 18-Nation Disarmament Conference in
Geneva, have forced me reluctantly more
than once to postpone planned appearances
before your distinguished group.
And at this moment the United Nations
Disarmament Commission is in session in
New York. Although the Commission is now
in perhaps the most important phase of its
deliberations, I felt that I could not again
deprive myself of the pleasure of being
with you.
I am not unaware of the possibility that
when I have concluded my remarks you might
ask, "Why not?"
The patience shown by the Common-
wealth Club in booking me for this occasion
is a most necessary ingredient in my busi-
ness, too. Patience has never been more im-
portant than at this moment of time in our
efforts to negotiate arms control and dis-
armament agreements with the Soviet
Union.
It was just 2 years ago to the week, and 5
years after the opening of negotiations,
that the then-Chairman Khrushchev ac-
ceded to the late President Kennedy's urgent
requests that the Soviet Union, the United
Kingdom, and the United States sit down
together once again to attempt to reach
agreement on a nuclear test ban treaty. You
may recall that the President announced
Soviet acceptance for discussions on this
possibility in his memorable speech at
American University in Washington on June
10, 1963.2
During the following month, the limited
nuclear test ban treaty was negotiated in
Moscow.^ It was signed in that city by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and
the Soviet Union on August 5, 1963.
I have delved briefly into history because,
significant as the limited nuclear test ban
treaty is to arms control and disarmament,
what was even more significant was the
basic decision by the Soviet leadership which
led to the successful conclusion of those
negotiations.
It seems to me that the outcome of the
Cuban missile crisis led the Soviet Union to
an important shift in its international poli-
cies, bringing about a decided letup in the
cold war and a major thrust forward of the
policy of peaceful coexistence. That shift, of
course, made possible the agreement on the
limited nuclear test ban treaty.
There have been other steps, too, which I
would define as progress in arms control as
a result of this shift in policy. I refer to the
so-called "hot line" between Moscow and
* Address made before the Commonwealth Club
of California at San Francisco, Calif., on June 4.
' Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.
' For background and text of the treaty, see ibid.,
Aug. 12, 1963, p. 234, and Aug. 26, 1963, p. 314.
JULY 12, 1965
77
Washington; the United Nations resolution
expressing the intention of all members to
refrain from placing weapons of mass de-
struction in space; and the simultaneous
announcements of planned cutbacks in the
production of fissionable materials for weap-
ons use.
The Soviet Union's shift in its interna-
tional policies, I would suggest, was long-
range in scope, designed for at least limited
accommodation with the West without com-
promising its goal of eventual world domi-
nation. The new approach appeared also
to represent a strategic move, in the face of
Communist China's challenge to Soviet lead-
ership of the Communist world, to prove that
useful results can be attained from what the
Soviet Union calls the policy of "peaceful
coexistence" with the West.
Finally, it probably represented recogni-
tion of the need to pay greater attention to
pressures for faster, increased internal de-
velopment.
The Problem of the Kremlin Leaders
The Soviet Union is not on a smooth
course, obviously. The contradictions in ide-
ology between East and West, the struggle
to maintain Communist world leadership
against Communist China's open challenge,
and other international situations — such as
the one in Viet-Nam — all tend to make more
difficult the efforts gradually to establish a
relationship that would promote further
progress in arms control and disarmament.
The Soviet policy shift of 1963 may not
have changed in 1965, but I would suggest
that the course of history in the meantime
has created problems of considerable magni-
tude for the Soviet Union, and also for the
United States and the rest of the world, in
the area of arms control and disarmament.
You probably are aware that the United
States and the Soviet Union act as cochair-
men of the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee in Geneva. This is a good arrange-
ment because, in addition to the plenary ses-
sions of the conference, the cochairmen have
the opportunity to discuss privately, free
from public limelight, arms control and dis-
armament proposals of either side. We
have considered this a valuable opportunity
for both sides.
But it is precisely this function, shared
in by the United States and the Soviet Un-
ion, that presently creates a worrisome prob-
lem for the Kremlin leaders at a time when
they are being attacked by the Chinese
Communists for collaborating with the
United States. Therefore, the Soviet Union
has found need to be as strident in tone as
Communist China in attacking the United
States' actions in Viet-Nam, the Congo, and
lately the Dominican Republic.
I suspect this is one of the reasons why
the Soviet Union, on March 31, called for the
reconvening of the United Nations Disarma-
ment Commission, rather than the ENDC, as
we call the 18-Nation Disarmament Conmiit-
tee. The Commission is made up of 114 na-
tions, the full membership of the General
Assembly.
Neither the Soviet Union nor the United
States is a cochairman of the Commission,
and therefore the Soviets cannot be charged
with collaboration with the United States.
Also, the meetings of the Commission are
public, with full opportunity for sounding
the propaganda drums, particularly on its
alleged distress at so-called "U.S. imperial-
ist aggression" around the globe.
Finally, perhaps the Soviet Union sought
to preempt a world stage from Communist
China through a meeting of the Disarma-
ment Commission. You see, Communist
China has no voice in the Commission. But on
June 29 the mainland Chinese will attend
the Bandung II Conference in Algiers, and
the Soviet Union, so far as is presently
known, has not been invited. Arms control _
and disarmament discussions almost cer- f
tainly will occur at Algiers, but they are apt
to be anticlimactic — or so the Soviets may -
hope — in light of the various presentations f
of those subjects in New York.
The United States frankly was skeptical
that a meeting of a large body, such as the
UNDC, would produce any concrete re-
sults. We wanted to go back to the ENDC at
Geneva last February. We much prefer the
smaller ENDC forum because, among other
78
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
things, the delegates there, over the years,
have become the foremost experts in the
world in this highly complex field.
However, since many nations accepted the
invitation to convene the Disarmament Com-
mission, the United States determined to
participate in as constructive a manner as
possible.*
Soviet Proposals Unrealistic
The Soviet Union and its allies have per-
formed in the forum as we expected. They
have all, in orchestrated fashion, seized the
opportunity to attack the United States'
presence in Viet-Nam, the Dominican Re-
public, and elsewhere, distorting facts and
maligning our motives with complete aban-
don.
The Soviet Union came up with its shop-
worn, unrealistic, and nonnegotiable pro-
posals. It was obvious from the start that
the Soviet Union was flatly refusing even
to discuss meaningful arrangements to halt
the arms race at this time. On the other
hand, the United States was — and is — pre-
pared and willing to participate in the search
for a mutually acceptable basis for progress
in this most important field.
In the light of present Soviet attitudes,
it was not unexpected when, a week ago
today, the Soviet Union submitted two
draft resolutions ^ of a purely propagandistic
nature. One of them called upon "all States
maintaining military bases in other coun-
tries to liquidate them forthwith and re-
frain henceforth from establishing such
bases"; and further called upon "the States
concerned to conclude an agreement provid-
ing for the withdrawal of all foreign troops
within their national frontiers." The other
called upon "all States to take steps to
bring about the conclusion of a convention
on the prohibition of the use of nuclear and
* For a statement made in the Disarmament Com-
mission on Apr. 26 by U.S. Representative Adlai E.
Stevenson, see ibid., May 17, 1965, p. 762.
"U.N. docs. DC/218 and DC/219; the Soviet rep-
resentative announced on June 15 that he would
not insist on a vote on the Soviet draft resolutions
at the current session of the Commission.
thermonuclear weapons as soon as possible,
convening for this purpose a special confer-
ence of all States in the world not later
than the first half of 1966," and it went on
to invite "States possessing nuclear weap-
ons to declare, pending the conclusion of
such a convention, that they will not use
them first."
These are not realistic resolutions, and I
so declared in my statement at the Dis-
armament Commission last Tuesday [June
1].* The political environment in which we
have lived since World War II, in which na-
tions have been threatened with Commu-
nist aggression — in fact, sometimes have ex-
perienced Communist aggression — has forced
nations to establish alliances for defensive
purposes. Our alliances are in keeping with
the United Nations Charter. When and if the
Soviet Union, Communist China, and their
satellites decide to refrain from aggressive
bent, then perhaps it will no longer be neces-
sary to maintain our bases or troops on for-
eign soil. The United States has a whole-
hearted desire to see that time come.
The ban-the-bomb proposal is just as un-
realistic. The United States has already
pledged itself in the Charter of the United
Nations not to use any kind of force to com-
mit aggression against the territorial integ-
rity or political independence of any state.
We have, on many occasions, offered full
assurance never to use any weapon, large or
small, with aggressive intent. What we have
attempted to do is to reach meaningful, veri-
fied agreements whereby these weapons,
nuclear and conventional, could be reduced
and ultimately eliminated.
Declaratory statements of good intention
are dangerous because they create false
illusions. I believe we all remember that,
although the Soviet Union and the United
States at one time had an understanding on
what some referred to as a "moratorium"
on nuclear testing in the atmosphere, the
Russians breached that understanding in
September 1961. In that series of tests, de-
plored by the United Nations General As-
sembly, the Soviet Union tested the biggest
• For text, see U.S. /U.N. press release 4571.
JULY 12, 1965
79
bomb ever exploded in the history of man-
kind.
The Soviet Union has refused to consider
a nonproliferation agreement without a prior
commitment from the West to abandon
plans for a NATO multilateral force or for
the British-proposed Allied nuclear force.
Negotiations on a comprehensive test ban
treaty, according to the Soviet representa-
tive, can take place only on Russian terms —
which are no on-site inspections. Other pro-
posals were shrugged off as demands for
control and espionage — without disarma-
ment.
U.S. Proposals
The United States, on the other hand, has
again offered to negotiate a comprehensive
test ban treaty, taking account of modifica-
tions in its on-site inspection requirements.
This has been made possible by a research
program in which the United States has now
invested about $300 million since 1959. Nev-
ertheless, we believe some on-site inspec-
tions still are necessary. Although the So-
viet Union insists that unilateral means are
adequate to detect possible violations, it has
refused, despite our many invitations, to
give any scientific proof of such a capabil-
ity or agree to scientific exchanges in this
regard.
The United States considers it a matter of
great urgency that a nondissemination/
nonacquisition agreement be attained to pre-
vent the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The Soviet objection to the MLF and ANF
proposals is largely aimed at weakening and
dividing NATO, a policy they have never
ceased to follow. The Russians insist that
the MLF/ANF proposals would constitute
proliferation and would give control of nu-
clear weapons to nations — particularly the
Federal Republic of Germany — which do not
now have them.
The suggested Western ideas for nuclear
arrangements within the alliance actually
support nonproliferation, since no single
participant would gain control of the weap-
ons or, under the safeguards we propose.
increase the ability to develop its own nu-
clear weapons.
We have, therefore, urged the Soviet Un-
ion not to delay longer in reaching agree-
ment with us, since we believe such an
agreement should remove any genuine con-
cern they may have regarding the MLF.
The Soviet Union would then have further
assurance that we mean what we say in pro-
claiming that we are opposed to the dissem-
ination of nuclear weapons.
We also have urged that the Soviet Union
join with us in stopping further production
of fissionable materials for weapons use.
Coupled with this proposal of ours is an-
other, suggesting that the two nuclear pow-
ers transfer a combined total of 100,000 kilo-
grams of fissionable materials for peaceful
purposes. The U.S. share would be 60,000
kilograms, reflecting our superiority in this
field.
This is a more significant proposal than
many people realize. Not only would it put
the lid on all further production of fission-
able materials for weapons use, but it would,
of course, automatically limit general in-
creases in nuclear arsenals. I might add that
the transfer of 100,000 kilograms of fission-
able material would represent, in terms of
electric energy potential, about two-thirds as
much as the entire electrical production of
the United States in 1963.
The Soviets show no interest. They say
this is not disarmament but that it is con-
trol for the purpose of espionage.
Another important measure, introduced
both in Geneva and again in New York, is
President Johnson's proposal to explore a
verified freeze on the number and characteris-
tics of strategic nuclear offensive and defen- i
sive delivery vehicles.'' An agreement on this !
measure would enable us to halt the
most potentially destructive segment of the
arms race and would prove to the world
that the two major nuclear powers were in-
deed serious in their intentions to halt and
reduce the arms race.
' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 10, 1964, p. 223.
80
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Agreement on the proposal would signifi-
cantly reduce military expenditures. I leave
to your imagination the constructive pur-
poses to which these released funds might
be put for the benefit of our people and of
mankind generally.
The United States is concerned that, as
more power reactors are developed around
the world, the byproducts of peaceful nu-
clear activities could be diverted to weapons
development. We consider it vital that such
activities be under international safeguards.
Accordingly, the United States has proposed
and given its strongest support to the de-
velopment of an international system of
safeguards on peaceful nuclear activities by
the International Atomic Energy Agency. We
have offered some of our reactors for in-
spection by the IAEA in the hope that the
Soviet Union will do the same. We also are
gradually transferring to the IAEA the ad-
ministration of safeguards under our exist-
ing bilateral agreements throughout the
world.
You will note that the United States pro-
posals I have set forth in the foregoing
represent a carefully developed program of
related measures, designed to halt the fur-
ther spread of nuclear weapons. Any one,
or all, would contribute to this vital goal.
Usefulness of Commission Sessions
Skeptical as we were regarding the Soviet
Union's motives for requesting the recon-
vening of the Commission, and despite our
doubt concerning a constructive outcome, I do
not believe that the sessions have been a com-
plete waste. Not only did Vv?e have the op-
portunity to present our views and sug-
gestions before every member nation of the
United Nations General Assembly, but all
other member nations, as well, had the op-
portunity to be heard.
Aside from the Communist orchestration,
many of the other participants, both large
and small, presented intelligent, constructive
views. It provided us the opportunity to as-
sess at firsthand those issues to which they
gave greatest priority. And we found con-
sensus on a number of issues.
I have studied carefully the remarks made
by the many delegations which spoke, and
I believe that the following matters were
given the widest area of support:
Nearly every nation said that the 18-Na-
tion Disarmament Committee should resume
deliberations in Geneva as soon as possible.
None, not even the Communist countries,
openly opposed resumption of the ENDC.
Many wanted a comprehensive test ban
treaty.
Many wanted a nondissemination/nonac-
quisition agreement.
Many wanted an agreement to halt the
further production of fissionable materials
for weapons use and the conversion of such
materials to peaceful purposes.
Many of the nations supported the veri-
fied freeze proposal.
We were heartened by the serious interest
shown in our proposals and by the aware-
ness of the need to curb proliferation of
nuclear weapons now.
One proposal which has been pressed by
the Soviet bloc and Yugoslavia is that of
convening a world disarmament conference.
The idea of convening a world conference
appears to stem from the feeling on the part
of many that Communist China, as a mili-
tarily significant state, would have to be a
party to arms control and disarmament
agreements.
However, it is also our view that further
consideration should be given to the advis-
ability and timeliness of a world conference.
Consideration should also be given to the
motives of Communist China if it were to
attend such a meeting. Would that nation
participate in an obstructive or constructive
manner? Would Communist China seriously
consider forgoing its present militarily ag-
gressive posture to conduct itself within the
framework of the United Nations Charter?
These are indeed important considerations.
There is no doubt but that at some stage in
disarmament Communist China must enter
as a party to agreements, or there can be no
further disarmament. But until the Chi-
nese exhibit a more constructive interest in
JULY 12, 1965
81
world peace and stability, I would suggest
that such important first steps as can be
taken now should not be deferred pending
a change in the Chinese attitude.
Present arms control requirements, with-
out question, center around the imperative
need to stop the further spread of nuclear
weapons. Communist China's second nuclear
weapons test, conducted at the very time the
Disarmament Commission was in session in
New York, highlighted the immediacy of this
problem.
As I mentioned earlier in my remarks, the
Soviet Union, following the Cuban missile
crisis, apparently decided that its long-term
interests might best be served by a relaxa-
tion of the cold war and a more positive in-
terest in its policy of peaceful coexistence.
But during the past year, and reaching a
climactic pitch during the present session
of the Disarmament Commission, another
change of attitude among nations has be-
come markedly apparent. That change is the
drastically increased feeling of the urgency
in dealing with this problem of prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons capabilities.
The United States has long been aware of
this and, in fact, first attempted to put the
atom under peaceful control through the
Baruch Plan of June 1946. Today, however,
with a fifth country having tested nuclear de-
vices and a number of others weighing de-
cisions to develop a nuclear weapons capa-
bility, the urgency of the problem has be-
come crystal clear to almost all nations.
And where time might be a factor in favor
of improved Soviet-American relations, time
definitely is not on humanity's side in our ef-
forts to prevent the spread of nuclear weap-
ons capabilities.
Concern About Communist China's Tests
While two tests have not made Communist
China a nuclear power — and she will not
be one of any significance for years to come
— those tests had an unsettling effect
throughout Asia, and particularly in India.
There was obvious concern regarding the
military threat implicit in the tests, but per-
haps even greater concern that the prestige
and influence of such countries as India and
Japan would suffer. Indian prestige had al-
ready suffered as a consequence of the mili-
tary attack by China in 1962. There is the
other factor that India is well advanced in
the development of the peaceful uses of the
atom — indeed further advanced than Com-
munist China — and Japan is not far behind.
But the psychological impact of China's test
magnified her nuclear achievements beyond
proper proportion. Furthermore, the success
of the Chinese program was largely due to
the considerable assistance supplied by the
Soviet Union in the late 1950's.
Fortunately, the Governments of India
and of Japan have made the decision not to
go nuclear in the weapons field. They are
to be commended for making the decision.
We believe it is wise on both political and
military grounds. A reversal of this decision
could start an unfortunate chain reaction,
leading to similar decisions by other gov-
ernments.
It would be a fearful world, indeed, that
housed not 5 but 10, 15, or 20 nuclear
powers in the next decade or so. And among
them, there might well be the unstable as
well as the stable, the irresponsible as well as
the responsible.
The rapidly expanding peaceful uses of
the atom program contributes to the dangers
of proliferation. Significant quantities of
Plutonium are being produced in peaceful
nuclear power reactors around the world.
Those quantities, of course, will be increased
as more power reactors are built. It is es-
sential that international safeguards be ap-
plied to the operation of such reactors.
I hope that you will agree that the prob-
lem of proliferation is urgent. The steps that
can be taken in this area must be taken now
if the spread of nuclear weapons is to be
stopped. The dreadful consequences of delay
are all too obvious.
The United States has proposed such steps.
Our proposals are simple, easily verified,
widely supported.
Our proposals are embraced in a resolu-
82
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tion, tabled with the UNDC last Monday
[May 31] .« That resolution urges the ENDC
to reconvene as soon as possible, and to :
A. Resume negotiations as a matter of priority
on a comprehensive treaty banning all nuclear
weapon tests;
B. Undertake without further delay drafting of
an international non-proliferation agreement as
called for in General Assembly resolution 1665
(XVI) . . .;
C. Conclude as soon as possible an agreement to
halt all production of fissionable material for
weapons use and to transfer to non-weapons use
sizable, agreed quantities of such material; and
D. Explore with a sense of urgency a freeze on
the number and characteristics of strategic nuclear
offensive and defensive vehicles which would open
the path to early reductions in such vehicles.
This draft resolution was tabled because —
and I would like to reemphasize :
1. The ENDC represents the most skilled
body of disarmament experts in the world
today ;
2. The problem of proliferation is the most
urgent one we face ;
3. Nearly all the nations represented at
the UNDC have given recognition both to
the competency of the ENDC and to the
urgency of negotiating the proposals set forth
in our resolution ; and
4. These are proposals possible of agree-
ment. Not only do they serve the mutual in-
terests of the Soviet Union and ourselves,
but they are in the interest of all other na-
tions as well.
We would like to get back to Geneva and
renew negotiations.
Responsibility of Great Nuclear Powers
It is to be regretted that the struggle for
leadership of the Communist world going on
now between Communist China and the
Soviet Union is injected into important
world affairs, such as the deliberations of
the UNDC.
It would be most regrettable if the strug-
gle between these two nations should have
a serious inhibiting effect when time is run-
ning out on the possible solution of the prob-
lem of proliferation of nuclear weapons.
The overwhelming desire of nearly all the
nations of the world to reach agreements on
arms control and disarmament measures
must not be subordinated by them to that
struggle.
Last night the President told the world
that,»
The common interests of the peoples of Russia and
the peoples of the United States are many, and this
I would say to the people of the Soviet Union to-
night: There is no American interest in conflict
with the Soviet people anywhere. . . . We of the
United States of America stand ready tonight as
always to go with you onto the fields of peace, to
plow new furrows, to plant new seed, to tend new
growth, so that we and so that all mankind may
some day share together a new and a bountiful
harvest of happiness and hope on this earth.
The Soviet Union is a powerful nation. It
is one of the two great nuclear powers. It
must then share with us the same respon-
sibility to meet the just desires of our own
people and those of other nations to reach
balanced, verified arms control and disarma-
ment agreement, by which all can benefit and
none will suffer.
Instead of a world conference as a plat-
form for further Soviet Union vilification of
the United States and its allies, we need to
get back to the smaller, expert forum of
the 18-Nation Disarmament Committee for
concentrated work on the many problems of
arms control and disarmament.
For our part, we are prepared to study
seriously any proposals which will curb the
spread of nuclear weapons. Our ovm propos-
als are worthy of closest attention.
Time is against us in this struggle. These
matters demand urgent attention now. We
think that the Soviet Union knows this. What
'U.N. doc. DC/220/Rev. 1.; the U.S. representa-
tive announced on June 15 that he would not insist
on a vote on the U.S. draft resolution at the current
session of the Commission.
" For the substantive portion of an address by
President Johnson before the Cook County Demo-
cratic Party at Chicago, 111., on June 3, see Bulletin
of June 21, 1965, p. 986.
JULY 12, 1965
83
is needed now is a decision on their
part to act on that knowledge so that we
may yet utilize the little time remaining to
stop the spread of nuclear weapons. The na-
tions of the world have a right to demand
this of the great nuclear powers.^"
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 1st Session
Continuation of the Use of Mobile Trade Fairs in
Promoting the Foreign Commerce of the United
States. Report to accompany H.R. 4525, H. Kept.
343. May 12, 1965. 8 pp.
Overseas Programs of Private Nonprofit American
Organizations. Report No. 3 on "Winning the Cold
War: The U.S. Ideological Offensive" by the Sub-
committee on International Organizations and
Movements of the House Foreign Affairs Com-
mittee. H. Rept. 368. May 25, 1965. 565 pp.
Implementing the Convention for the Safety of Life
at Sea, London (1960). Report to accompany H.R.
7954. H. Rept. 380. May 26, 1965. 18 pp.
Balance of Payments Voluntary Agreements. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 5280. H. Rept. 385. May
27, 1965. 9 pp.
Departments of State, Justice, and Commerce, the
Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation
Bill, Fiscal Year 1966. Report to accompany H.R.
8639. H. Rept. 427. May 27, 1965. 41 pp.
Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Report to ac-
company S. 2054. S. Rept. 267. May 27, 1965. 21 pp.
Extension of the Export Control Act. Report to ac-
company H.R. 7105. H. Rept. 434. May 29, 1965.
22 pp.
Proposed Supplemental Appropriation To Increase
United States Quota to the International Mone-
tary Fund. Communication from the President.
S. Doc. 31. June 1, 1965. 2 pp.
Southeast Asia Aid Program. Message from the
President. H. Doc. 196. June 1, 1965. 3 pp.
Mutual Defense and Development Programs, 1966.
Communication from the President. H. Doc. 197.
June 3, 1965. 2 pp.
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
AND CONFERENCES
'° The U.N. Disarmament Commission concluded
its session on June 16 after adopting two resolutions.
One (U.N. doc. DC/224), adopted on June 11 by a
vote of 89-0-16 (U.S.), recommended that the Gen-
eral Assembly at its 20th session give "urgent
consideration" to the "proposal adopted at the
Second Conference of Non-Aligned Countries in
October 1964 for the convening of a world disarma-
ment conference"; the other (U.N. doc. DC/225),
adopted on June 15 by a vote of 83 (U.S.)-1-18,
recommended that the 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee should "reconvene as early as possible."
U.S. Denies Plaque Violates
U.N. Headquarters Agreement
Following are the texts of two exchanges
of notes (U.S./U.N. press release Jf57Jt dated
June 3) between the U.S. and U.S.S R. Mis-
sions to the United Nations concerning a
bronze plaque on a building opposite the So-
viet Mission.
FIRST EXCHANGE
U.S. Note of February 24
February 24, 1965
The Permanent Mission of the United
States to the United Nations presents its
compliments to the Permanent Mission of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to
the United Nations and refers to the latter's
note No. 19 of January 15, 1965, protesting
the unveiling by Congregation Zichron Eph-
raim, a synagogue in the vicinity of the
Soviet Mission to the United Nations, of
a bronze plaque affixed to the wall of that
synagogue reading : "Hear the cry of the op-
pressed— the Jewish community in the So-
viet Union".
The United States Government recognizes
and discharges the international obligation
to accord foreign embassies and missions
within its territories absolute protection
against any form of violence or physical
interference with performance of the em-
bassy's or mission's legitimate function. In
furtherance of its firm respect for this ob-
ligation, the United States Government
took all appropriate measures to ensure that
the meeting to which the Soviet Mission
refers was completely orderly, that no vio-
lence occurred, and that there was no physi-
cal interference with entry or exit into the
84
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Soviet Mission or with its performance of it^
normal functions.
The Soviet Mission must also be aware
that this scrupulous regard for international
law and comity on the part of the United
States Government, and the orderly and
peaceful nature of the meeting held by the
American citizens involved, were in strong
contrast with occurrences of organized mob
violence recently directed against official
United States Government buildings in the
Soviet Union, where inadequate protective
measures by the local authorities resulted
in damage to the embassy property, danger
to embassy officials, and interference with
the work of the embassy.^
The Soviet Mission should be aware of
the fact that the erection of the plaque
in question was a private action, with which
the United States Government has had no
association of any kind. The plaque is on
private property belonging to the group of
persons involved. Its erection has not re-
sulted in violence against the mission or in
impediment in any way to the fulfillment by
the Soviet Mission of its functions. The
plaque on the wall of the synagogue does not
in any way violate, as claimed in the Soviet
note of January 15, the Charter of the
United Nations, the Headquarters Agreement
of June 26, 1947, or principles of interna-
tional law, since the privileges and immu-
nities assured to the Soviet Mission thereun-
der are not impaired by the plaque's erec-
tion.
Soviet Note of January 15
Official translation
No. 19 January 15, 1965
The Permanent Mission of the USSR to the UN
presents its compliments to the US Mission to the
UN and has the honor to communicate the following:
As has been reported in the press, certain circles
in the United States, which are kindling feelings of
hostility among the American people toward the
Soviet people and the USSR Government, are plotting
' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965,
p. 289.
a new provocation against the Soviet Union. Accord-
ing to a press report, these circles are planning to
organize an anti-Soviet demonstration and to dis-
play, across the street from the building of the USSR
Mission to the UN in New York, a provocative and
insulting plaque regarding the Soviet people and
Government.
This step cannot be assessed otherwise than as
an integral part of that campaign of calumny which
is being conducted in the US with the open con-
nivance and sympathy of US officials.
The USSR Mission to the UN considers it neces-
sary to draw the attention of the US Mission to the
illegality of such activities, which are in flagrant
contradiction with diplomatic practice and with the
generally recognized norms of international law.
These provocative activities are also a gross viola-
tion of the obligations undertaken by the US Gov-
ernment under the UN Charter and also under the
Headquarters Agreement of June 26, 1947.
SECOND EXCHANGE
U.S. Note of May 28
May 28, 1965
The Permanent Mission of the United
States to the United Nations acknowledges
receipt of note number 225, dated April 24,
1965, concerning a bronze plaque on a build-
ing opposite the premises of the Permanent
Mission of the Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics to the United Nations.
In this connection, the Government of the
United States in its note of February 24,
1965, made it clear that the erection of the
plaque on Congregation Zichron Ephraim
Synagogue in no way violates the privileges
and immunities of the Soviet Mission to the
United Nations. The Government of the
United States has nothing to add to that note.
Soviet Note of April 24
Official translation
No. 225 April 24, 1965
The Mission of The Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics to the United Nations deems it necessary to
inform the United States Mission to the UN of the
following.
On January 17, 1965, in New York, in spite of the
appeal of the USSR Mission to the UN to the US
Mission with the request to adopt measures to pre-
vent the provocations being plotted, an anti-Soviet
JULY 12, 1965
85
demonstration was organized in front of the USSR
Mission's building, in which the Mayor of New York,
Wagner, and other official persons took part. At the
same time a bronze plaque was installed opposite
the Mission with an inscription which is slanderous
and hostile to the Soviet Union.
Such acts violate the normal conditions required
by the USSR Mission to the UN for the perform-
ance of its functions, and represent an impermis-
sible violation of the privileges and immunities of
the Mission, which are its due in accordance with
the Agreement dated June 26, 1946 [sic] between the
UN and the government of the USA regarding the
location of the central offices of the United Nations,
as well as of universally recognized principles of in-
ternational law on diplomatic relations, which were
laid down in the Vienna Convention of 1961.
The US Mission's references to the fact that the
above-mentioned plaque is installed on a building
which is private property, do not in any way alter
the substance of this matter, inasmuch as interna-
tional law, as is well known, imposes on each state
the obligation not to permit and to prevent the com-
mission of unlawful acts on its territory against rep-
resentatives of foreign countries on the part of pri-
vate persons. The inaction of the American authori-
ties in this case is still less understandable since the
national laws of the USA directly provide that "it
is unlawful to display any kind of flags, banners,
posters or devices intended to intimidate, exert
pressure or publicly present any foreign government
in an unfavorable light . . ., closer than 600 feet
from any building in the District of Columbia
which is used or occupied by any foreign govern-
ment or its representatives, such as: an embassy, a
mission, a consulate . . ." (Law of Feb. 15, 1938,
Chapter 29, par. 1).
The conduct of the anti-Soviet assemblage in
front of the USSR Mission, as well as the fact that
the plaque bearing an anti-Soviet inscription is
still in place a few steps from the building of the
USSR Mission, run counter to the assurances given
by US Ambassador Foy Kohler to the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of the USSR on February 9, 1965,
to the effect that "effective measures are being
taken in the USA to guard buildings relating to
the Soviet Embassy or to the USSR Mission to
the UN, specifically: a rule exists prohibiting dem-
onstrations at a distance of less than 500 feet from
embassy or mission buildings."
In this connection the Mission of the USSR enters
a protest against the negligence of the American
authorities in permitting the above-mentioned pro-
vocative acts and insists on the immediate removal
of the slanderous inscription as well as on the
prevention of similar provocations against the
USSR Mission to the UN in the future.
54 Nations To Attend October
Meeting on Water Desalting
White House press release dated June 20
White House Announcement
President Johnson announced on June 20
that an international meeting on water de-
salting, with delegates from more than 50
countries, will be held at Washington next
October. Planned for October 3-9, it will
be one of the major events during the observ'
ance of International Cooperation Year.
Statement by President Johnson
A shortage of fresh water is one of the
most critical problems facing the nations of
the world. Developing nations which face
rapid population growth must establish ade-
quate fresh water supplies if they are to
achieve their potential. The world's seas and
oceans offer an inexhaustible supply of fresh
water — if economically feasible methods of
desalting can be developed.
The United States has been deeply in-
volved in recent years in desalination re-
search, sharing the results of this research
with other nations :
— A study is underway, supported jointly
by the U. S. and Israel, to determine the
feasibility of a large dual-purpose, power-
water plant for construction on the Medi-
terranean coast south of Tel Aviv.^
— American experts have visited the United
Arab Republic and Tunisia to review water
needs there and to study possible ways of
solving water supply problems through de-
salting.
— The United States has offered the serv-
ices of the Office of Saline Water, an agency
of the Department of the Interior, to the
Government of Saudi Arabia as it works to
bring water to the arid Jidda area.
— Teams of visitors from Greece, Italy,
^ For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965,
p. 635.
86
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Spain, Mexico, and other nations have visited
U. S. desalting facilities and shared infor-
mation with this nation's experts in the field.
And the United States recently agreed with
the Soviet Union to exchange information
and visits by specialists in the water desalt-
ing field.2
Much of the information about desalting
provided to other nations has been based on
government and industrial work in desalting
to solve domestic water supply problems:
The largest water desalting plant operat-
ing in the United States produces over a
million gallons of fresh water a day, and
even more efficient forms of desalting are
under study. The Interior Department's Of-
fice of Saline Water has award 15 contracts
for design studies aimed at achieving a de-
salting plant which would produce up to 50
million gallons of water per day.
The State of California, the city of San
Diego, and the Interior Department cooper-
ated in the construction of the Point Loma
Desalting Plant, which was moved to Guan-
tanamo Bay, Cuba, in 1964 to meet U. S.
Navy water needs there.
Discussions have begun between the In-
terior Department and the State of California
for a joint Federal-State research station in
California to test components of multimillion-
gallon-per-day desalting plants. Studies by
the Atomic Energy Commission and the In-
terior Depai-tment are inquiring into the
possibility of building a nuclear desalting in-
stallation in southern California.
The knowledge developed through these
programs will be available at the October
symposium to all nations which need it and
can benefit from work in the area of salt-
water conversion.
Countries Scheduled To Attend Symposium
Argentina
Canada
Australia
Ceylon
Belgium
Chile
Brazil
China
Bulgaria
Colombia
Burma
Dahomey
Denmark
Poland
Ecuador
Portugal
El Salvador
Rumania
Finland
Saudi Arabia
Prance
Senegal
Germany
South Africa
Greece
Spain
India
Sudan
Israel
Sweden
Italy
Syrian Arab Republic
Japan
Thailand
Jordan
Togo
Kuwait
Trinidad and Tobago
Lebanon
Tunisia
Libya
Turkey
Malagasy Republic
U. S. S. R.
Mauritania
United Arab Republic
Mexico
United Kingdom
Netherlands
Uruguay
Peru
Venezuela
Philippines
Viet-Nam
President Assigns Functions
for Participation in Coffee Group
AN EXECUTIVE ORDER'
Participation in the International Coffee
Organization
By virtue of the authority vested in me by the
Constitution of the United States of America, the
International Coffee Agreement Act of 1965 (Public
Law 89-23, approved May 22, 1965, hereinafter re-
ferred to as the Act), the International Coffee Agree-
ment, 1962, ratified December 20, 1963, and pro-
claimed January 17, 1964 (TIAS 5505, hereinafter
referred to as the Agreement) , and Section 301 of
Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President
of the United States, it is ordered as follows:
Section l. Secretary of State. Subject to the pro-
visions of this Order, the powers of the President
involved in the participation of the United States of
America in the Agreement, including so much of the
functions conferred upon the President by the Act
as is neither reserved nor delegated to other officers
herein, are hereby delegated to the Secretary of
State.
Sec. 2. Secnetary of the Treasury. The functions
conferred upon the President by subsections (1) and
(2) of Section 2 of the Act, together with the au-
thority to issue and enforce such rules and regula-
tions as may be necessary to perform such functions,
are hereby delegated to the Secretary of the Treas-
ury.
Sec. 3. Secretaries of State, the Treasury, Agri-
culture, Commerce, and Labor. The functions con-
■ Ibid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828.
^ No. 11229; 30 Fed. Reg. 7741.
JULY 12, 1965
87
f erred upon the President by subsection (3) of
Section 2 of the Act, together with the authority to
issue and enforce such rules and regulations as may
be necessary to perform these functions, are hereby
delegated to the Secretaries of State, the Treasury,
Agriculture, Commerce, and Labor, severally.
Sec. 4. Functions reserved. There are hereby re-
served to the President the functions conferred upon
him by Sections 5 and 8, and by the first sentence
of Section 4, of the Act.
Sec. 5. Coordination. The functions assigned by
the provisions of this Order shall be performed under
effective coordination. The measures of coordination
hereunder shall include the following:
(1) In effecting and carrying out the participa-
tion of the United States of America in the Agree-
ment, the Secretary of State shall consult with the
appropriate heads of Federal agencies, including the
Secretary of the Treasury, the Secretary of Agri-
culture, the Secretary of Conamerce, and the Secre-
tary of Labor.
(2) The delegates under Section 3 of this Order
shall use the functions delegated thereunder as they
and the Secretary of State shall mutually agree.
Sec. 6. Redelegation. Each Secretary mentioned
in this Order is hereby authorized to redelegate
within his Department the functions hereinabove
assigned to him.
The White House,
June H, 1965
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed beloiv) may be consulted at depository librae
ries in the United States. U.N. printed publications
may be purchased from the Sales Section of the
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated May 27 from the deputy permanent
representative of Turkey concerning Cyprus. S/
6384. May 27, 1965. 4 pp.
Letter dated May 26 from the permanent represent-
ative of Cyprus concerning "acts of provocation
and aggression committed by the Turkish Cjrpriot
rebels." S/6383. May 26, 1965. 3 pp.
Letter dated May 25 from the permanent represent-
ative of Syria concerning "repeated aggressive at-
tacks by Israel on the Syrian borders." S/6382.
May 25, 1965. 2 pp.
Letter dated June 1 from the Charge d'Affairee a.i.
of Australia enclosing a statement of the Govern-
ment of Australia in reply to the Soviet Govern-
ment concerning the dispatch of Australian forces
to South Viet-Nam. S/6399. June 1, 1965. 4 pp.
Letter dated May 25 from the representatives of
Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Nica-
ragua, Panama, Paraguay, and Peru concerning
the OAS as a peacekeeping instrument. S/6409.
June 3, 1965. 2 pp.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Letter dated February 24 from the deputy perma-
nent representative of the United States re-
garding Ranger VII moon photographs. A/ AC.
105/25/Rev. 1. March 11, 1965. 2 pp.
Letters dated March 24, April 7, and May 6 from
the United States enclosing registration data
concerning objects launched into orbit or beyond
by the United States. As of December 31, 1964,
A/AC.105/INF.93, March 30, 1965, 2 pp.; as
of January 15, 1965, A/AC.105/INF.94, April
13, 1965, 2 pp.; comprehensive report of all
U.S. space vehicles as of December 31, 1964,
A/AC.105/INF.95, May 11, 1965, 12 pp.
Letters dated April 13 and May 15 from the per-
manent representative of the Soviet Union
transmitting registration data of its artificial
earth satellites. For the period March 1-25, 1965,
A/AC.105/INF.96, May 18, 1965, 2 pp.; for
the period April 17-May 7, 1965, A/AC.105/
INF.97, May 18, 1965, 2 pp.
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations:
Letter dated March 25 from the permanent rep-
resentative of the Soviet Union transmitting a
memorandum "regarding certain measures to
strengthen the effectiveness of the United Na-
tions in the safeguard of international peace
and security." A/AC.121/2. March 26, 1965.
6 pp.
Report of the Secretary-General and the President ■
of the General Assembly. A/AC.121/4. May 31, ■
1965. 25 pp. '
Letter dated April 14 from the permanent represent-
ative of Brazil transmitting a copy of the Final
Act of the first session of the Preparatory Com-
mission for the Denuclearization of Latin Amer-
ica. A/5912. April 15, 1965. 9 pp.
Note verbale dated May 13 from the permanent rep-
resentative of Italy concerning Indonesia's with-
drawal from the United Nations. A/5914. May 17,
1965. 4 pp.
1964 United Nations Pledging Conference on the
Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance and
the Special Fund. Statement of contributions
pledged for 1965, as of April 15. A/CONF.29/2.
May 20, 1965. 4 pp.
Disarmament Commission
Letter dated April 28 (U.N. doc. DC/213) from the
permanent representative of the Soviet Union re-
questing circulation of two Soviet documents on
arms control and disarmament. Treaty on gen-
eral and complete disarmament under strict in-
ternational control, DC/213/Add. 1, April 28, 1965,
31 pp.; memorandum on measures for the further
reduction on international tension and limitation
of the arms race, DC/213/Add. 2, April 28, 1965,
9 pp.
88
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
TREATY INFORMATION
U.S. and Colombia Conclude
Cotton Textile Agreement
Press release 144 dated June 9
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT
The Governments of the United States
and Colombia announced on June 9 the con-
clusion of a bilateral agreement covering
trade in cotton textiles between the two
countries for a 4-year period extending
from July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1969.
The agreement is designed to promote the
orderly development of Colombian cotton
textile exports to the United States. It was
negotiated under article 4 of the Long-Term
Arrangement Regarding International Trade
in Cotton Textiles, done at Geneva on Feb-
ruary 9, 1962,1 and was concluded by an
exchange of notes between U.S. Ambassador
Covey T. Oliver and the Colombian Min-
ister of Foreign Affairs, Fernando Gomez
Martinez.
The agreement results from bilateral
talks held at Bogota between representa-
tives of Colombia and the U.S. Departments
of Commerce, Labor, and State. The talks
led to a complete understanding between the
two Governments on the future pattern of
cotton textile trade between Colombia and
the United States.
The principal features of the agreement
are as follows :
1. The agreement covers all 64 categories
of cotton textiles and continues in force for
the period July 1, 1965, to June 30, 1969.
2. During the first year of the agreement,
Colombia will limit its exports of cotton tex-
tiles to an aggregate of 24 million square
yards equivalent and, within this limit, to
^ For text of the long-term arrangement, see
Bulletin of Mar. 12, 1962, p. 431.
the following levels: a. yarn (Categories
1-4), 12 million square yards equivalent; b.
fabrics (Categories 5-27), 11,500,000 square
yards; and c. made-up goods, apparel, and
miscellaneous items (Categories 28-64),
500,000 square yards.
3. Within the aggregate and group limits,
the agreement also provides export ceilings
for seven specific categories of cotton fab-
rics.
4. Colombia may exceed any of the group
ceilings by 5 percent so long as the ag-
gregate volume of exports does not exceed
the aggregate limit of 24 million square
yards. Similarly, Colombia may exceed any
of the specific category ceilings by 5 per-
cent so long as the aggregate of the exports
does not exceed the applicable limits for the
fabric group.
5. During the first year of the agree-
ment only, Colombia will be entitled to ex-
port the following additional quantities to
the United States: Categories 5 and 6, 1
million square yards (not more than 25
percent shall be in Category 6) ; Category 22,
4 million square yards ; and Category 26, ex-
cluding duck, 2 million square yards.
6. A set of conversion factors is specified
in the annex to the agreement to express
various textile units in terms of a square
yard equivalent.
7. The two Governments agreed on con-
sultation procedures to be followed in the
event of an undue concentration of Colom-
bia's exports to the United States in cate-
gories for which the agreement provides no
specific ceilings at this time.
8. The aggregate, group, and category
limits and ceilings will be increased by 5
percent for the second 12-month period be-
ginning July 1, 1966. For each subsequent
year, each of the limits and ceilings will
be increased by a further 5 percent over
those of the immediately preceding 12-month
period.
9. The Government of Colombia will en-
deavor to space exports evenly over each
agreement year.
10. The two Governments will exchange
statistical information on cotton textiles as is
JULY 12, 1965
89
required for the effective implementation of
the agreement.
11. The export levels established by the
bilateral agreement supersede the restraint
actions taken by the U.S. Government over
the past 12 months with respect to cotton
textile exports from Colombia pursuant to
article 3 of the Long-Term Cotton Textile
Arrangement.
AGREEMENT AND RELATED LETTERS
Bogota, June 9, 1965
U.S. Note
No. 699
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to recent
discussions in Bogota between representatives of the
Government of the United States of America and of
the Government of Colombia concerning exports of
cotton textiles from Colombia to the United States
and to the Long Term Arrangements Regarding
International Trade in Cotton Textiles done in
Geneva on February 9, 1962.
As a result of these discussions, I have the honor
to propose the following Agreement relating to trade
in cotton textiles between Colombia and the United
States :
1. For the first agreement year, constituting the
twelve-month period beginning July 1, 1965, the
Government of Colombia shall limit exports of cot-
ton textiles from Colombia to the United States as
follows :
A. The aggregate limit shall be 24 million square
yards equivalent.
B. The following group ceilings shall apply:
Thousand Square Tards
Group Equivalent
I. Yarn (Categories 1-4) 12,000
II. Fabrics (Categories 5-27) 11,500
III. Made-up Goods, Apparel, and
Miscellaneous (Categories 28-64) 500
Provided: That any of these group ceilings may
be increased by five percent so long as the aggre-
gate of all group ceilings does not exceed the
aggregate limit.
C. The following specific ceilings shall apply:
Category
or Categories
Thousand Square Yards
5 and 6
1,000, of which not more than 25
percent shall be in category 6
9
2,500
16
750
19
2,250
22
3,000
26
2,000, of which not more than 350
thousand square yards shall be in
duck
Providied: That any of these specific ceilings may
be increased by five percent so long as the aggre-
gate of all specific ceilings does not exceed the
group ceiling for fabrics.
2. In the event of undue concentration in exports
from Colombia to the United States of cotton textiles
for which no specific ceilings are stated in paragraph
IC, the Government of the United States of America
may request consultation with the Government of
Colombia in order to reach a mutually satisfactory
solution to the problem. The Government of Colom-
bia shall enter into such consultations when re-
quested, and until a mutually satisfactory solution
is reached, the Government of Colombia shall limit
the exports from Colombia to the United States of
the item in question to an annual level not exceeding
one hundred five percent of such exports during the
most recent twelve-month period for which statistics
are available to both Governments.
3. Each of the limitations on exports established
for the first agreement year in paragraphs 1 and 2
of this Agreement shall be increased by five percent
for the second agreement year, beginning July 1,
1966. For each subsequent agreement year each of
these limitations shall be increased by a further five
percent over those of the immediately preceding
agreement year.
4. The Government of Colombia shall use its best
efforts to space exports from Colombia to the United
States within each category evenly throughout the
agreement year, taking into consideration normal
seasonal factors.
5. The Government of the United States of Amer-
ica shall promptly supply the Government of Colom-
bia with data on monthly imports of cotton textiles
from Colombia, and the Government of Colombia
shall promptly supply the Government of the United
States of America with data on monthly exports on
cotton textiles to the United States of America.
Each Government agrees to supply promptly any
other available statistical data requested by the other J
Government. 1
6. In the implementation of this Agreement the
system of categories and the rates of conversion
into square yard equivalents listed in the annex
hereto shall apply.
7. The Government of the United States of Amer-
ica and the Government of Colombia agree to con-
sult on any question arising in the implementation
of this Agreement or with regard to trade in cotton
textiles.
8. All relevant provisions of the Long Term Ar-
rangements Regarding International Trade in Cotton
Textiles shall remain in effect between the two Gov-
ernments except that the Government of the United
States of America shall not exercise its rights under
Article 3 of the Long Term Arrangements while ■
this bilateral Agreement remains in force. ■
9. This Agreement shall become effective on July
90
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
1, 1965, and continue in force through June 30, 1969,
provided that either Government may terminate this
Agreement effective at the end of an agreement year
by written notice to the other Government to be
given at least ninety days prior to the end of such
agreement year. Either Government may also pro-
pose revisions in the terms of the Agreement no
later than ninety days prior to the beginning of an
agreement year.
If these proposals are acceptable to the Govern-
ment of Colombia, this note and Your Excellency's
note of acceptance on behalf of the Government of
Colombia shall constitute an agreement between our
Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
Category
Nitmber
Description
Conversion
Vnit Factor
CovEY T. Oliver
ANNEX
List of Cotton Textile Categories and
Conversion Factors foe Fabrics and
Made Up Goods
Category
Number
Yam
1
2
3
4
Description
Yarn, carded, singles
Yarn, carded, plied
Yarn, combed, singles
Yarn, combed, plied
Fabrics
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
Ginghams, carded yarn
Ginghams, combed yarn
Velveteens
Corduroy
Sheeting, carded yarn
Sheeting, combed yarn
Lawns, carded yarn
Lawns, combed yarn
Voiles, carded yarn
14 Voiles, combed yarn
15 Poplin and broadcloth,
carded yarn
16 Poplin and broadcloth,
combed yarn
17 Typewriter ribbon cloth
18 Print cloth, shirting type,
80 X 80 type, carded yarn
Print cloth, shirting type,
other than 80 x 80 type,
carded yarn
Shirting, carded yarn
Shirting, combed yarn
Twill and sateen, carded yarn
Twill and sateen, combed yarn
Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s.,
carded yarn
Yarn-dyed fabrics, n.e.s.,
combed yarn
Fabrics, n.e.s., carded yarn
Fabrics, n.e.s., combed yam
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
sq yds 1.0
Made Up Goods
28 Pillowcases, plain,
carded yarn
29 Pillowcases, plain,
combed yarn
30 Dish towels
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
numbers
1.084
numbers
1.084
numbers
.348
31 Towels, other than dish
towels
32 Handkerchiefs
33 Table damasks and
manufactures
34 Sheets, carded yarn
35 Sheets, combed yarn
36 Bedspreads, including quilts
37 Braided and woven elastics
38 Fishing nets
Apparel '
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
(
Conversion
49
UnU
Factor
50
lb.
4.6
lb.
4.6
51
lb.
4.6
lb.
4.6
52
53
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
54
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
55
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
56
sq yds
1.0
57
sq yds
1.0
58
sq yds
1.0
sq yds
1.0
59
60
61
62
63
64
Gloves and mittens
Hose and half hose
T-shirts, all white, knit,
men's and boys'
T-shirts, other, knit
Shirts, knit, other than
T-shirts and sweatshirts
Sweaters and cardigans
Shirts, dress, not knit,
men's and boys'
Shirts, sport, not knit,
men's and boys'
Shirts, work, not knit,
men's and boys'
Raincoats, % length or
longer, not knit
Other coats, not knit
Trousers, slacks and shorts
(outer), not knit, men's
and boys'
Trousers, slacks and shorts
(outer) , not knit, women's,
girls' and infants'
Blouses, not knit
Dresses (including uni-
forms) , not knit
Playsuits, washsuits, sun-
suits, creepers, rompers,
etc., not knit, n.e.s.
Dressing gowns, including
bathrobes, beach robes.
housecoats
not knit
Undershirts,
and boys'
Briefs and
and dusters,
knit, men's
undershorts.
men's and boys'
Drawers, shorts and briefs,
knit, n.e.s.
All other underwear, not
knit
Pajamas and other night-
wear
Brassieres and other body-
supporting garments
Wearing apparel, knit, n.e.s.
Wearing apparel, not knit,
n.e.s.
All other cotton textiles
numbers
dozen
pounds
numbers
numbers
numbers
pounds
pounds
doz. prs.
doz. prs.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
doz.
lb.
lb.
lb.
.348
1.66
3.17
6.2
6.2
6.9
4.6
4.6
3.527
4.6
7.234
7.234
7.234
36.8
22.186
24.457
22.186
50.0
32.5
17.797
17.797
14.53
45.3
25.0
51.0
9.2
11.25
5.0
16.0
51.96
4.75
4.6
4.6
4.6
Colombian Note
Unofficial translation
Bogota, June 9, 1965
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge
receipt of your note No. 699, of today's date, pro-
posing a bilateral agreement relating to trade in
^ Each component of apparel items imported in sets
shall be recorded separately under its appropriate
category.
JULY 12, 1965
91
cotton textiles between Colombia and the United
States, which reads as follows:
[text of U.S. note]
I have the honor to inform you that this proposal
is acceptable to the Government of Colombia. It is
therefore agreed that your note and this note of
acceptance shall form a bilateral agreement between
our two Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
Fernando Gomez Martinez
U.S. Letter
Bogota, June 9, 1965
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to the
Agreement between our two Governments concern-
ing trade in cotton textiles signed today and to
confirm my Government's understanding with respect
to the exports of cotton textiles which are to be
counted against the limitations in that Agreement.
In view of the special circumstances described by
the representatives of the Government of Colombia
during the discussions from which this Agreement
resulted, the Government of the United States
agrees that during the first year of the Agreement
only, exports of cotton textiles in the following
categories and amounts shall not be counted against
the limitations specified in paragraph 1 of the Agree-
ment:
Current Actions
Category or Categories
Categories 5 and 6
Category 22
Category 26,
excluding duck
Thousand Square Yards
1,000 of which not more than
25 percent shall be in cate-
gory 6
4,000
2,000
I shall appreciate receiving your Excellency's con-
firmation of the above understanding. Accept, Ex-
cellency, the renewed assurances of my highest
consideration.
Covey T. Oliver
Colombian Letter
Unofficial translation
Bogota, June 9, 1965
Excellency: I have the honor to acknowledge
receipt of your note of today's date which refers to
the Agreement between our two Governments con-
cerning trade in cotton textiles signed today and
which reads as follows:
[text of U.S. letter]
I have the honor to confirm that this is also the
understanding of the Government of Colombia.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.
Fernando Gomez Martinez
MULTILATERAL
Satellite Communications System — Arbitration
Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COMSAT).
Done at Washington June 4, 1965.^
Signature : Ministry of Communications of Jordan,
June 22, 1965.
Telecommunications
Telegraph regulations (Geneva revision, 1958) an-
nexed to the international telecommunication con-
vention, 1952, with appendixes and final protocol.
Done at Geneva November 29, 1958. Entered into
force January 1, 1960. TIAS 4390.
Notification of approval: Turkey, April 28, 1965.
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notifications of approval: Byelorussian Soviet So-
cialist Republic, May 10, 1965; Mexico, April
28, 1965.
Trade
Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.^
Notification of de facto implementation: Cyprus,
June 4, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature
at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.'
Acceptances deposited: Australia, June 22, 1965;
United States, June 21, 1965.
Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Cuba, June 14, 1965; Greece, June 21, 1965.
BILATERAL
Canada
Agrreement extending the agreement of June 14, 1960
(TIAS 4524), relating to conditions governing the
maintenance and operation of upper-atmosphere
and cold-weather testing facilities at Fort Church-
ill, Manitoba, with annex. Effected by exchange
of notes at Ottawa June 11, 1965. Entered into
force June 14, 1965.
Agreement relating to the further joint use, opera-
tion, maintenance, and support of the research
range at Fort (IHiurchill, Manitoba, with annex.
Effected by exchange of notes at Ottawa June 11,
1965. Enters into force January 1, 1966.
China
Agreement amending agreement concerning trade
in cotton textiles of October 19, 1963, as amended
(TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754). Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington June 22, 1965. Entered into
force June 22, 1965.
* Not in force.
92
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Israel
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 6, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5220, 5490, 5557, 5596, 5610, 5808). Effected by
exchange of notes at Washington June 22, 1965.
Entered in force June 22, 1965.
Uganda
Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Kampala May 29,
1965. Entered into force May 29, 1965.
PUBLICATIONS
Foreign Relations Voiume on Britisii
Common weaitli, Europe for 1944
Press release 157 dated June 21, for release June 28
The Department of State on June 28 released
Foreign Relations of the United States, 19ii, Volume
III, The British Commonwealth and Europe, the
second in the series of annual volumes for the year
1944.
This volume includes documentation on the rela-
tions of the United States with the United Kingdom
and nations of the Commonwealth in the year that
saw the Normandy landings, the successful invasion
of Hitler's Europe, and American recognition of the
provisional government of France under General
de Gaulle. Volume III also covers American diplo-
macy with respect to the nations of Europe, begin-
ning with Albania and proceeding in alphabetical
order through Poland. Documentation on the re-
maining European nations will be included in a sub-
sequent volume of the series.
Students of American diplomacy will find of par-
ticular interest the negotiations leading to the sign-
ing of armistices with Bulgaria and Hungary and
the postarmistice problems of occupation and control
occasioned by Soviet policy regarding Eastern Eu-
rope. There is full documentation, likewise, on
American concern over Soviet policies and actions
in the liberated areas of Poland. The volume also
includes papers on the difficulties caused by the fail-
ure of American efforts to persuade Finland to with-
draw from the war and the consequent rupture of
Finnish-American relations.
Copies of Foreign Relations of the United States,
19U, Volume HI, The British Commonwealth and
Europe (viii, 1,478 pp.; publication 7889) may be
obtained from the Superintendent of Documents,
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402, for $4.75 each.
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20A02.
Address requests direct to the Superintendent of Doc-
uments, except in the case of free publications, which
may be obtained from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.
Sovereignty of the Sea. Background and reference
data on oceanography and its increasing implications
for national security in U.S. foreign affairs. This
publication, which includes discussions, technical ex-
planations, tables and diagrams, is primarily con-
cerned with rights the United States and other coun-
tries have on, over and under the surfaces of the
oceans. Geographic Bulletin No. 3. Pub. 7849. 31
pp. 25(f.
Status of the World's Nations. A revision of the con-
cise reference guide prepared by The Geographer
which gives the official nomenclature, area popula-
tion, and capital city of all independent states.
Quasi-independent states and "irregular categories"
of political areas and regimes are also discussed.
Geographic Bulletin No. 2 (Revised May 1965). Pub.
7862. 21 pp. 25<f.
Protocol for Prolongation of International Sugar
Agreement of 1958. Agreement with other Govern-
ments—Done at London August 1, 1963 — Signed
subject to ratification, for United States September
27, 1963. Entered into force with respect to the
United States February 27, 1964. TIAS 5744. 35
pp. 15«(.
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with the Cen-
tral African Republic. Exchange of notes— Dated at
Bangui December 31, 1964. Entered into force Janu-
ary 1, 1965. TIAS 5747. 5 pp. 6(t.
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Pakistan.
on .^M^ of notes— Signed at Washington February
TT A l^^h^ E"*ered into force February 26, 1965.
liAb5764. 9 pp. 10^.
Atomic Energy— Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agiee-
ment with Thailand, amending the agreement of
March 13 1956, as amended— Signed at Washington
^T a'^c I'nJ-^^'^k Entered into force March 5, 1965.
ilAt> 5765. 2pp. 50.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Dominican Republic. Exchange of notes— Signed at
banto Dommgo January 28 and February 2, 1965
li-ntered into force February 2, 1965. TIAS 5766
4 pp. 5^.
Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia
—Signed at Tunis February 17, 1965. Entered into
^°/f o ^nnr^^V ^'^' 1^65- With exchange of notes.
llAb 5767. 11 pp. 100.
North Atlantic Treaty: Co-operation Regarding
Atomic Information. Agreement with parties to the
North Atlantic Treaty— Done at Paris June 18, 1964.
Entered into force March 12, 1965. TIAS 5768. 13
pp. 10«(.
Agricultural Commodities— Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of
December 7, 1964. Exchange of notes— Signed at
Nairobi February 15, 1965. Entered into force Feb-
ruary 15, 1965. TIAS 5769. 2 pp. 5^.
Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels to Argen-
tina. Agreement with Argentina. Exchange of notes
— Signed at Buenos Aires February 1 and 17, 1965.
Entered into force February 17, 1965. TIAS 5770.
2 pp. 5«!.
JULY 12, 1965
93
Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels to China.
Agreement with China. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Taipei February 23, 1965. Entered into force
February 23, 1965. TIAS 5771. 8 pp. 10(*.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade
March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965.
With exchange of notes. TIAS 5772. 6 pp. 5«f.
Mutual Waiver of Certain Claims. Agreement with
Viet-Nam. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon
February 9, 1965. Entered into force February 9,
1065. TIAS 5773. 3 pp. 54.
Tracking and Communications Station — Continua-
tion of Expanded Use of Station at Empalme-Guay-
mas, Sonora. Agreement with Mexico. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Mexico February 27, 1965. En-
tered into force February 27, 1965. TIAS 5774. 11
pp. 10«(.
Education — Financing of Exchange Programs.
Agreement with Denmark, amending agreement of
May 28, 1962. Exchange of notes — Signed at Copen-
hagen February 18 and 25, 1965. Entered into force
February 25, 1965. TIAS 5775. 4 pp. 5<t.
Defense — U.S. Communications Facility on Military
Reservation at Mount Cabuyao. Agreement with the
Philippines. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila
March 16, 1965. Entered into force March 16, 1965.
TIAS 5776. 7 pp. 10«(.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Bolivia. Exchange of notes — Signed at La Paz
March 16, 1965. Entered into force April 15, 1965.
TIAS 5777. 3 pp. 5<t.
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with
Ecuador. Exchange of notes — Signed at Quito March
26, 1965. Entered into force March 26, 1965. TIAS
5779. 4 pp. 5(f.
Safety of Life at Sea. Convention, with regulations,
vdth Other Governments — Signed at London June 17,
1960. Entered into force May 26, 1965. With proces-
verbal of rectification — Done at London July 5, 1962.
TIAS 5780. 396 pp. $1.25.
Relief Supplies and Packages. Agreement with India
amending agreement of July 9, 1951, as extended.
Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi January
21, 1965. Entered into force January 21, 1965. TIAS
5781. 3 pp. 6(?.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Edward R. Fried as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Resources, Bureau of Economic
Affairs, effective June 22.
Joseph A. Greenwald, as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for International Trade Policy and Economic
Defense, Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective June
22.
Ciieck List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 21-27
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to June 21 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
144 and 147 of June 9 and 153 and 156 of
June 14.
No. Date Subject
157 6/21 Foreign Relations volume re-
leased.
*158 6/21 Jova sworn in as Ambassador to
Honduras (biographic details).
*159 6/21 Osborn designated Deputy Assist-
ant Secretary for Educational
and Cultural Affairs (bio-
graphic details).
160 6/23 Rusk: American Foreign Service
Association (as-delivered text).
*161 6/25 Harriman: African-American
Chamber of Commerce, Inc.,
New York, N.Y. (excerpts).
* Not printed.
94
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 12, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1S59
Agriculture
Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota 65
President Decides To Complete P.L. 480 Commit-
ment to U.A.R. (Department statement) . . 70
American Republics. Housing and Urban De-
velopment in Latin America (Vaughn) . . 66
Asia. Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace (Rusk) . 50
Atomic Energy. Roadblock to Arms Control and
Disarmament Negotiations (Foster) ... 77
China. Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Negotiations (Foster) 77
Colombia
Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota . 65
U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile
Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89
Congress
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 84
President Asks for Funds for Canal Commission 70
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Pried, Greenwald) 94
Disarmament. Roadblock to Arms Control and
Disarmament Negotiations (Foster) .... 77
Dominican Republic. The Dominican Situation
in the Perspective of International Law
(Meeker) 60
Economic Affairs
Fried and Greenwald designated Deputy Assist-
ant Secretaries 94
Housing and Urban Development in Latin Amer-
ica (Vaughn) 66
The Interdependence of Mankind (Humphrey) . 56
President Asks for Funds for Canal Commission 70
President Assigns Functions for Participation in
Coffee Group (Executive order) 87
U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile
Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89
Europe. Foreign Relations Volume on British
Commonwealth, Europe for 1944 93
Foreign Aid
Housing and Urban Development in Latin Amer-
ica (Vaughn) 66
The Interdependence of Mankind (Humphrey) . 56
Pilot School Lunch Program Begins at Bogota . 65
Human Rights. The Interdependence of Mankind
(Humphrey) 56
International Law. The Dominican Situation in
the Perspective of International Law (Meeker) 60
International Organizations and Conferences
The Dominican Situation in the Perspective of
International Law (Meeker) 60
54 Nations To Attend October Meeting on Water
Desalting (Johnson) 86
President Assigns Functions for Participation in
Coffee Group (Executive order) 87
Japan. United States Welcomes Japanese-
Korean Agreements (Rusk) 76
Korea. United States Welcomes Japanese-
Korean Agreements (Rusk) 76
Non-Self-Governing Territories. Southern Rho-
desia Today (Williams) 71
Presidential Documents
54 Nations To Attend October Meeting on Water
Desalting 86
President Assigns Functions for Participation in
Coffee Group 87
Publications
Foreign Relations Volume on British Common-
wealth, Europe for 1944 93
Recent Releases 93
Science. 54 Nations To Attend October Meeting
on Water Desalting 86
Southern Rhodesia. Southern Rhodesia Today
(Williams) 71
Treaty Information
Current Actions 92
U.S. and Colombia Conclude Cotton Textile
Agreement (agreement and related letters) . 89
U.S.S.R.
Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament
Negotiations (Poster) 77
U.S. Denies Plaque Violates U.N. Headquarters
Agreement (exchange of U.S. and Soviet
notes) 84
United Arab Republic. President Decides To
Complete P.L. 480 Commitment to U.A.R. (De-
partment statement) 70
United Kingdom
Foreign Relations Volume on British Common-
wealth, Europe for 1944 93
Southern Rhodesia Today (Williams) .... 71
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 88
Roadblock to Arms Control and Disarmament
Negotiations (Foster) 77
U.S. Denies Plaque Violates U.N. Headquarters
Agreement (exchange of U.S. and Soviet
notes) 84
Viet-Nam
U.S. Shocked at Communist Brutality in Viet-
Nam (Department statement) 55
Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace (Rusk) ... 50
Name Index
Foster, William C 77
Fried, Edward R 94
Greenwald, Joseph A 94
Humphrey, Vice President 56
Johnson, President 86, 87
Meeker, Leonard C 60
Rusk, Secretary 60, 76
Vaughn, Jack H 66
Williams, G. Mennen 71
it GOVERNMENT PRINTINO OFFICE: 1963 770.22S/9
SUPERINTENDENT OF DOCUMENTS
U.S. QOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, O.C. t040a
PCNALTV FOR PRIVATE USB TO AVOID
PAYMENT OP POSTAGE, (SOO
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace
This 18-page pamphlet is the text of a major address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk be-
fore the American Foreign Service Association on June 23. The Secretary describes the recent in-
crease in aggression from North Viet-Nam, reviews the many efforts that have been made, unsuc-
cessfully, to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table for negotiations, and repeats
President Johnson's call for a new program of support for Asian development efforts. In closing
Mr. Rusk says, "We must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard
path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast
Asia."
PUBLICATION 7919 15 CENTS
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Boston Public Library
S>uperintendent of Doc.nr.ents
Vol. LIII, No. 1360
July 19, 1965
TWENTIETH ANNIVERSARY OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Addresses by President Johnson and Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 98
PARTNERSHIP IN WORLD AFFAIRS
by Ambassador Stevenson 123
SECRETARY DISCUSSES VIET-NAM ON USIA TELEVISION
Transcript of Interview 105
AMERICA AND BELGIUM— A COMMUNITY OF INTERESTS
by Assistant Secretary Mac Arthur 118
COMMODITY AGREEMENTS— A PARTIAL ANSWER TO THE
TRADE PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Special Article by Henry Brodie 111
For index see inside back cover
Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations
Following is the text of an address made
by President Johnson at the opening of the
U.N. 20th anniversary commemorative ses-
sion at San Francisco June 25, together with
the text of an address made at the close of
the session on June 26 by Adlai E. Steven-
son, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations.
ADDRESS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON, JUNE 25
"White House press release (San Francisco, Calif.) dated June
25; as-delivered text
On my journey across the continent I
stopped in the State of Missouri, and there I
met with the man who made the first such
pilgrimage here 20 years ago as the 33d
President of the United States — Harry S.
Truman.
Mr. Truman sent to this assembly his
greetings and good wishes on this anniver-
sary commemoration. He asked that I ex-
press to you for him — as for myself and for
my countrymen — the faith which we of the
United States hold firmly in the United Na-
tions and in the ultimate success of its mis-
sion among men.
On this historic and happy occasion we
have met to celebrate 20 years of achieve-
ment and to look together at the work that
we face in future meetings. I come to this
anniversary not to speak of futility or fail-
ure nor of doubt and despair. I come to raise
a voice of confidence in both the future of
these United Nations and the fate of the
human race.
The movement of history is glacial. On
two decades of experience, none can presume
to speak with certainty of the direction or
the destiny of man's affairs. But this we do
know, and this we do believe: Futility and
failure are not the truth of this organization
brought into being here 20 years ago.
Where, historically, man has moved fit-
fully from war toward war, in these last two
decades man has moved steadily away from
war as either an instrument of national
policy or a means of international decision.
Many factors have contributed to this
change. But no one single factor has con-
tributed more than the existence and the
enterprise of the United Nations itself. For
there can be no doubt that the United Na-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1360 PUBLICATION 7925 JULY 19, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation ia included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States la or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.
Publications of tte Department. TJnlted
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currentiy.
The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Psiob: 52 issues, domestio 910,
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
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Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
notb: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin Is Indexed
in the Keadeis' Guide to Periodical Uter-
ature.
98
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tions has taken root in human need and has
estabhshed a shape, and a purpose, and a
meaning of its own.
By providing a forum for the opinions
of the world, the United Nations has given
them a force and an influence that they have
never had before. By shining the light of
inquiry and discussion upon very dark and
isolated conflicts, it has pressed the nations
of the world to conform their courses to the
requirements of the United Nations Charter.
And let all remember — and none forget —
that now more than 50 times in these 20
years the United Nations has acted to keep
the peace.
By persuading nations to justify their own
conduct before all countries, it has helped,
at many times and in many places, to soften
the harshness of man to his fellow man.
By confronting the rich with the misery
of the poor and the privileged with the de-
spair of the oppressed, it has removed the
excuse of ignorance, unmasked the evil of in-
difference, and has placed an insistent, even
though still unfulfilled, responsibility upon
the more fortunate of the earth.
By insisting upon the political dignity of
man, it has welcomed 63 nations to take their
places alongside the 51 original members — a
historical development of dramatic import,
achieved mainly through peaceful means.
And by binding countries together in the
great declarations of the charter, it has
given those principles a strengthened vitality
in the conduct of the affairs of man.
Today, then, at this time of anniversary,
let us not occupy ourselves with parochial
doubts or with passing despair. The United
Nations — after 20 years — does not draw its
life from the assembly halls or the committee
rooms. It lives in the conscience and the rea-
son of mankind.
Dangers to Peace in Southeast Asia
The most urgent problem we face is the
keeping of the peace.
Today, as I speak, clear and present dan-
gers in Southeast Asia cast their shadow
across the path of all mankind. The United
Nations must be concerned.
The most elementary principle of the
United Nations is that neighbors must not
attack their neighbors — and that principle
today is under challenge.
The processes of peaceful settlement today
are blocked by willful aggressors contemptu-
ous of the opinion and the will of mankind.
Bilateral diplomacy has yielded no result.
The machinery of the Geneva conference
has been paralyzed.
Resort to the Security Council has been
rejected.
The efforts of the distinguished Secretary-
General have been rebuffed.
An appeal for unconditional discussion
was met with contempt.
A pause in bombing operations was called
an insult.
The concern for peace of the Common-
wealth prime ministers has received little
and very disappointing results.
Therefore, today I put to this world as-
sembly the facts of aggression, the right of
a people to be free from attack, the interest
of every member in safety against molesta-
tion, the duty of this organization to reduce
the dangers to peace, and the unhesitating
readiness of the United States of America
to find a peaceful solution.
I now call upon this gathering of the na-
tions of the world to use all their influence,
individually and collectively, to bring to the
tables those who seem determined to make
war. We will support your efforts, as we will
support effective action by any agent or
agency of these United Nations.
Agenda of Peace Not a Single Item
But the agenda of peace is not a single
item.
Around the world, there are many disputes
that are filled with dangers, many tensions
that are taut with peril, many arms races
that are fraught with folly, among small na-
tions as well as large.
And the first purpose of the United Na-
tions is peacekeeping. The first work of all
members now, then, just must be peacemak-
ing. For this organization exists to resolve
quarrels outside the confines of its headquar-
JULY 19, 1965
99
ters — and not to prolong quarrels within.
Where there are disputes, let us try to find
the means to resolve them — through what-
ever machinery is available or is possible.
Where the United Nations requires readily
available peace forces in hours and days —
and not in weeks or months — let all pledge
to provide those forces. And my country is
ready.
On another front of our common endeav-
ors, I think nothing is more urgent than the
effort to diminish danger by bringing the
armaments of the world under increasing
control. Nations rich and poor are burdened
down by excessive and competitive and
frightening arms. So let us all urgently
commit ourselves to the rational reduction
of those arms burdens. We of the United
States would hope that others will join with
us in coming to our next negotiations with
proposals for effective attack upon these
deadly dangers to mankind.
International War on Poverty
And after peace, high on the agenda of
man is devotion to the dignity and to the
worth of the human person — and the promo-
tion of better standards of life in larger free-
dom for all of the human race.
We in this country are committing our-
selves to great tasks in our own great so-
ciety. We are committed to narrow the gap
between promise and performance, between
equality in law and equality in fact, between
opportunity for the numerous well-to-do and
the still too numerous poor, between educa-
tion for the successful and education for all
of the people.
It is no longer a community or a nation
or a continent but a whole generation of
mankind for whom our promises must be
kept — and kept within the next two decades.
If those promises are not kept, it will be
less and less possible to keep them for any.
And that is why — on this anniversary — I
would call upon all member nations to re-
dedicate themselves to wage together an in-
ternational war on poverty.
So let us then together : raise the goal for
technical aid and investment through the
United Nations; increase our food, and
health, and education programs to make a
serious and a successful attack upon hunger,
and disease, and ignorance — the ancient
enemies of all mankind.
Let us in all our lands — including this
land — face forthrightly the multiplying
problems of our multiplying populations and
seek the answers to this most profound chal-
lenge to the future of all the world. Let us
act on the fact that less than $5 invested in
population control is worth a hundred dollars
invested in economic growth.
For our wars together on the poverty and
privation, the hunger and sickness, the de-
spair and the futility of mankind, let us
mark this International Cooperation Year by
joining together in an Alliance for Man.
Realizing the Promise of the Future
The promise of the future lies in what
science, the ever more productive industrial
machine, the ever more productive fertile
and usable land, the computer, the miracle
drug, and the man in space all spread before
us. The promise of the future lies in what
the religions and the philosophies, the cul-
tures and the wisdoms of 5,000 years of
civilization have finally distilled and confided
to us — the promise of the abundant life and
the brotherhood of man.
The heritage that we share together is a
fragile heritage.
A world war would certainly destroy it.
Pride and arrogance could destroy it. Neg-
lect and indifference could destroy it. It
could be destroyed by narrow nationalism
or ideological intolerance — or rabid extrem-
ism of either the left or the right.
So we must find the way as a community
of nations, as a United Nations, to keep the
peace among and between all of us. We must
restrain by joint and effective action any
who place their ambitions or their dogmas
or their prestige above the peace of all the
world. And we just must find a way to do
that. It is the most profound and the most
urgent imperative of the time in which we
live.
So I say to you as my personal belief, and
100
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the belief, I think, of the great American
majority, that the world must finish once and
for all the myth of inequality of races and
peoples, with the scandal of discrimination,
with the shocking violation of human rights
and the cynical violation of political rights.
We must stop preaching hatred, we must
stop bringing up entire new generations to
preserve and to carry out the lethal fantasies
of the old generation, stop believing that the
gun or the bomb can solve all problems or
that a revolution is of any value if it closes
doors and limits choices instead of opening
both as wide as possible.
As far back as we can look — until the light
of history fades into the dusk of legend —
such aspirations of man have been sub-
merged and swallowed by the violence and
the weakness of man at his worst.
Generations have come and gone, and gen-
erations have tried and failed.
Will we succeed?
I do not know. But I dare to be hopeful
and confident.
And I do know this : Whether we look for
the judgment to God, or to history, or to
mankind, this is the age, and we are the men,
and this is the place to give reality to our
commitments under the United Nations
Charter. For what was for other genera-
tions just a hope is for this generation a sim-
ple necessity.
Thank you very much.
ADDRESS BY AMBASSADOR STEVENSON,
JUNE 26
U.S./U.N. press release 4697
This is the end of a commemorative occa-
sion. Some of us here today who were mid-
wives at the birth of the United Nations can
never forget those days here in San Fran-
cisco in the twilight of the war, when an old
world was dying and a new world was com-
ing to birth.
We shared an audacious dream — and
launched a brave enterprise.
It seemed so easy then — when all was hope
and expectation. I remember my own sense
of pride, of history, of exultation — and the
special responsibility that fell upon the host
country to that historic conference.
Inescapably I remember, too, both the tri-
umphs and the failures. For over these
churning, fearful, and expectant years, we
have been up and we have been down.
But up or down, my Government and my
people have never lost faith in the United
Nations.
The hope, the expectation, was mirrored
by the vote — 89 to 2 — by which the United
States Senate approved the ratification of the
Charter of the United Nations in 1945, a few
weeks after the charter was signed here in
San Francisco in this very hall.
And our Congress only this week — in a
rare mood of unanimity — reaffirmed that
support and dedicated this country, once
again, to the principles of this organization.
This concurrent resolution^ referred spe-
cifically to this 20th anniversary event, to
International Cooperation Year, to the "im-
portant, and at times crucial, role" which the
United Nations has played in defense of the
peace and to its other "valuable service" to
human rights and the fight against hunger,
poverty, disease, and ignorance.
The resolution then stated:
Now, therefore, be it
Resolved . . . That it is the sense of the Con-
gress that the United States of America rededicates
itself to the principles of the United Nations and
to the furtherance of international cooperation
within the framework of law and order. . . .
Thus in this week of memory and antici-
pation did the representatives of our demo-
cratic diversity declare again our unity and
our commitment in matters that touch the
peace of the world.
We welcome the counsel of all our breth-
ren, large and small, on this long, rough
voyage to world community.
We make no claim to omniscience or om-
nipotence; we, too, believe that to the humble
many things are revealed that are obscure to
the mighty.
Out of 20 years of humbling experience,
we all know that we need the United Na-
tions more today than we needed it 20 years
1 See p. 103.
JULY 19, 1965
101
ago — that we shall need it more 20 years
from now than we do today — that the United
Nations is a simple necessity of our times.
We know that the issue therefore is not
one of survival but of how rapidly or how
slowly, how surely or how hesitantly, how
skillfully or how clumsily, we shall get on
with the work we took up here so short a
time ago.
What the United Nations Has Done
And the record of the United Nations is
full of evidence of skillful action by men and
women of many nations.
There is time, even in a short address, to
salute the Secretary-General and the inter-
national civil servants of the U.N. family of
agencies who pioneer day in and day out in
our emerging world community.
We have time to extend our congratula-
tions to those delegates from the younger
nations who have joined our ranks since the
charter first was signed, who have added
diversity to our company, who have given us
all an intimate sense of wider community,
who have contributed their minds and tal-
ents, their vision and wisdom, to the conduct
of our affairs.
We have time, too, to pay our respects to
those hundreds of men of the United Nations
who have given their lives in the cause of
peace, to those tens of thousands from 54
countries who have helped the United Na-
tions keep the peace, and to those other thou-
sands of Blue Berets who at this moment
stand guard for peace in Gaza, Cyprus, and
Kashmir, even as we meet here, peacefully,
in San Francisco.
We have time here to offer thanks to those
unsung heroes of the United Nations who
are responsible for curing 37 million children
of the yaws, and 11 million more of tra-
choma, and another million of leprosy — and
to those who have protected 162 million peo-
ple against tuberculosis, and lowered the in-
cidence of malaria by over a hundred million
people a year — and to those nameless men
and women of the United Nations who have
helped find new homes and new lives for
more than a million refugees.
These are a few — and only a few — of the
things that we the people of the United
Nations have done together in the time speck
of two tearing decades.
Symptoms of an Unstable World
In the bright glow of 1945 too many
looked to the United Nations for the full and
final answer to world peace. And in retro-
spect that day may seem to have opened with
the hint of a false dawn.
Certainly we have learned the hard way
how elusive is peace, how durable is man's
destructive drive, how various are the forms
of his aggressions.
We have learned, too, how distant is the
dream of those better standards of life in
larger freedom, how qualified our capacity
to practice tolerance, how conditional our
claims to the dignity and worth of the hu-
man person, how reserved our respect for
the obligations of law.
Our world is still as brave, though not so
new, as it seemed in this place two decades
past. But the world's leaders, and their
peoples, are deeply troubled — and with
cause:
There is war in Viet-Nam — and in other
places, too.
There has been revolution and bloody vio-
lence in the Dominican Republic — and in
other places, too.
There are still border troubles in Kashmir,
communal bitterness in Cyprus, violence in
the Congo.
There is shattering ideological conflict;
there is subversion and aggression, overt and
clandestine; there is tension and mistrust
and fear.
The nuclear threat is spreading, and the
means of self-destruction are still uncon-
trolled.
Meanwhile, the economic gap between the
developed and developing nations grows
wider. Human rights and political rights
and self-determination are cynically denied.
Hunger, disease, and ignorance still afflict
the majority of God's children.
I agree with Ambassador [Benoit] Bindzi
of the Cameroon that these are symptoms of
I
102
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th Anniversary
of United Nations
CONCURRENT RESOLUTION ^
Whereas the year 1965 marks the twentieth an-
niversary of the United Nations, which will
be celebrated in San Francisco on June 26,
1965; and
Whereas the United Nations General Assembly
has designated the year 1965 as "International
Cooperation Year"; and
Whereas the President of the United States has
proclaimed 1965 as "International Cooperation
Year", and has set up a broad program within
the executive branch to review our present
international policies in cooperation with a
bipartisan group of distinguished private
citizens; ^ and
Whereas the President has charged those par-
ticipating in the International Cooperation
Year program to "search and explore and
canvass and thoroughly discuss every con-
ceivable approach and avenue of cooperation
that could lead to peace"; and
Whereas the International Cooperation Year pro-
gram will culminate in a White House Con-
ference on International Cooperation which the
President has announced he will convene in
November 1965 ; and
Whereas during the twenty years of its existence
the United Nations has played an important,
and at times crucial, role in pursuit of one of
its stated purposes "to save succeeding genera-
tions from the scourge of war, which twice in
our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to man-
kind"; and
Whereas during that time the United Nations has
also performed a valuable service through the
specialized agencies and otherwise in helping
^ S. Con. Res. 36; passed by the Senate on June
16 and by the House on June 22.
2 For remarks made by President Johnson at
White House ceremonies on Oct. 2, 1964, and text
of the proclamation, see Bulletin of Oct. 19,
1964, p. 555.
to establish human rights and to eliminate
those ancient enemies of mankind — hunger,
poverty, disease, and ignorance: Now, there-
fore, be it
Resolved by the Senate (the House of Repre-
sentatives concurring), That it is the sense of
the Congress that the United States of America
rededicates itself to the principles of the United
Nations and to the furtherance of international
cooperation within the framework of law and
order; and that all other members of the
United Nations are urged to do likewise.
Sec. 2. It is further the sense of the Con-
gress that in connection with the examination
for International Cooperation Year of United
States participation in international coopera-
tive activities, the executive branch should —
(1) review with a high sense of urgency the
current state of international peacekeeping
machinery with a view to making specific sug-
gestions for strengthening this machinery, (2)
review other major elements of international
community and cooperation with a view to
making specific suggestions to promote the
growth of institutions of international coopera-
tion and law and order, and (3) review ur-
gently the status of disarmament negotiations
with a view to further progress in reducing
the dangers and burden of competitive national
armaments.
Sec. 3. In order to provide for participa-
tion by the Congress in the White House
Conference on International Cooperation, sub-
ject to an invitation by the President, there
is hereby created a congressional delegation
of twelve members to be composed of six mem-
bers of the Senate appointed by the President
pro tempore of the Senate and six members of
the House of Representatives appointed by the
Speaker of the House of Representatives. Any
vacancy in the membership of the delegation
shall be filled in the same manner as in the
case of the original appointments.
an unstable, dangerous world — ^too danger-
ous and too unstable for the General Assem-
bly to remain in its present deadlock. We
all know that the deadlock must be broken
before we sit down again in the General As-
sembly 9 weeks hence.
Common Enterprise in World Community
If there be disputes which keep us apart,
there is much, much more to be done which
draws us together.
Change, guaranteed by the inventions of
science and the innovations of technology,
JULY 19, 1965
103
accelerates, threatens, and promises.
Already science has destroyed any rational
excuse for war between states.
Already science induces statesmen to reach
for national prestige, not in the conquest of
someone's territory but in the conquest of
everyone's environment.
Already science and technology are inte-
grating our world into an open workshop
where each new invention defines a new task,
and reveals a shared interest, and invites
yet another common venture.
In our sprawling workshop of the world
community, nations are joined in cooperative
endeavor: improving soils, purifying water,
harnessing rivers, eradicating disease, feed-
ing children, diffusing knowledge, spreading
technology, surveying resources, lending
capital, probing the seas, forecasting the
weather, setting standards, developing law,
and working away at a near infinitude of
down-to-earth tasks — tasks for which science
has given us the knowledge, and technology
has given us the tools, and conmion sense has
given us the wit to perceive that common
interest impels us to common enterprise.
Common enterprise is the pulse of world
community, the heartbeat of a working
peace, the way to the great society.
"A Truce to Terror"
Yet we are all impatient. We are all con-
cerned that the scope of our work is still too
narrow, that the pace of our work is still
too slow, that our best efforts to date risk
being overwhelmed by the enormity of the
tasks and challenges that press upon us from
all sides.
We need time to perfect our peacekeeping
machinery to the point where no nation need
use its own armed forces save in the service
of the international community.
We need time to adjust to the thundering
impact of science and technology upon hu-
man society and human tradition.
We need time to get on with international
cooperation toward disarmament, toward a
decent world diet, toward peaceful explora-
tion of outer space, toward international de-
velopment.
And we the members of the United Na-
tions need time at home to struggle with all
those great domestic tasks of welfare and
justice and human rights which cry out for
the priority attention of all national leaders,
regardless of the size or the wealth or the
social system of any particular country.
Is there no way to quicken the pulsebeat
of our common enterprise? Is there no short-
cut to a better world society? Is there no
way to make time our ally — and use it better
to serve us all ?
Of course there is. For the enemy is not
change but violence. To induce needed
change without needless murder, what we
require above all is a truce to terror. We
need a moratorium — a breathing spell free
from acts of international violence.
We need — all of us — a respite from the
malignant claims which violence levies upon
our energy and our attention and our re-
sources.
There is not a single dispute in this world,
however sharply the issues may be drawn,
which would not look different two decades
from now, after time and change have done
their erosive work on the sharpest corners
of conflict.
If we could somehow bring about a truce
to terror we would soon discover that world
order will come, not through the purity of
the human heart nor the purge of the human
soul, but will be wrought from a thousand
common ventures that are at once possible
and imperative.
Our Shield Against International Folly
Mr. President, on behalf of myself, on be-
half of my Government, on behalf of the vast
bulk of my countrymen, let me say this :
We believe in the United Nations; we sup-
port the United Nations; and we shall work
in the future, as we have worked in the past,
to add strength and influence and perma-
nence to all that the organization stands for
in this, our tempestuous, tormented, talented
world of diversity in which all men are
brothers and all brothers are somehow, won-
drously, different — save in their need for
peace.
104
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
For all our desperate dangers, I do not be-
lieve, as Winston Churchill did not believe,
that "God has despaired of His children."
For man in his civil society has learned
how to live under the law with the institu-
tions of justice and with a controlled
strength that can protect rich and poor alike.
This has been done, I say, within domestic
society. And in this century, for the first
time in human history, we are attempting
similar safeguards, a similar framework of
justice, a similar sense of law and impartial
protection, in the whole wide society of man.
This is the profound, the fundamental, the
audacious meaning of the United Nations. It
is our shield against international folly in an
age of ultimate weapons. Either we shall
make it grow and flourish, arbitrator of our
disputes, mediator of our conflicts, impartial
protector against arbitrary violence, or I do
not know what power or institution can en-
able us to save ourselves.
We have the United Nations. We have set
it bravely up. And we will carry it bravely
forward.
Secretary Discusses Viet-Nam
on USIA Television
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Riisk by members of the in-
ternational press, videotaped at Washington
on June 2U for broadcast on July U on the
U.S. Information Agency television service.
Press release 167 dated July 3, for release July 4
Commentator: This is a conversation with
the Honorable Dean Rusk, United States
Secretary of State, as he speaks to members
of the international press, about the Amer-
ican position in Viet-Nam. His distinguished
interviewers are Mr. Werner Imhoof, Wash-
ington correspondent for Switzerland's Neue
Zuercher Zeitung, and Mr. H. R. Vohra,
Washington correspondent for the Times of
India.
Mr. Vohra has the first question for Secre-
tary Rusk.
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, one proposal
made by the Commonwealth ministers in
London, that they ought to go and meet the
leaders of the concerned countries, has also
been rejected apparently by Moscow, Hanoi,
and Peiping. I was wondering, sir, what is
your feeling about this? Does it amount to
a rejection, or is there still some life left in
this proposal?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we would hope that
there is some life left in the proposal. Now,
this has been one in a series of constructive
steps taken by many governments in many
ways over the last several months to try to
find a way to bring the dangers of the Viet-
Nam problem to the conference table. I can
assure you that bilateral diplomacy has been
used to the utmost during the past 41/^ years.
The Geneva machinery has been attempted.
Britain, as cochairman, is trying to stimu-
late that machinery. And that has been re-
jected. U Thant has tried to play a construc-
tive role. He tried to visit Hanoi and
Peiping; they wouldn't let him come. The
Security Council — Hanoi refused.
You remember, when Mr. Patrick Gordon
Walker visited in Southeast Asia, he could
not go to Hanoi and Peiping. Your own
President, Mr. [Sarvepalli] Radhakrishnan,
made a very constructive proposal in which
we found considerable interest and prospect.
That was brushed aside by the other side
rather rudely.
Now, the Commonwealth prime ministers
felt that they ought to make another try. We
expressed our pleasure that they were mak-
ing such an effort. We would hope that the
other side would find some way to come to
the table, because the situation is very dan-
gerous and it takes two to make a peace.
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, would you care
to tell us, that is, if there is any proposal
now in the hopper or is it now empty?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that I would
have to say that there is not much going on
at the present time that points the way to
discussions and a peaceful settlement. The
machinery is all there. There are a dozen
ways of moving toward peace if there is a
willingness to do so. The problem is not a
lack of channels, or a lack of diplomatic
procedure, or a lack of contact. The prob-
JULY 19, 1965
105
lem is that we see no evidence on the other
side that they are interested in bringing this
matter to a peaceful conclusion.
Mr. Imhoof: This being so, Mr. Secretary,
what then is the outlook on the military
side? Are we moving toward a perhaps
Korea-type war?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that exact
analogies are difficult to apply in matters of
this sort. There are many differences be-
tween Korea and Southeast Asia. But I
think that it is true that the situation is
dangerous. I think the summer will see some
sharp engagements there in Southeast Asia.
Much will depend upon what Hanoi and
Peiping themselves elect to do. We ourselves
have a very direct and simple commitment
to South Viet-Nam. We are going to meet
that commitment. The North will not be
permitted to achieve a military victory. And
so I think we have some difficult weeks
ahead of us.
Mr. Imhoof: In a recent speech, Mr. Secre-
tary, you were talking about Hanoi's atti-
tude and you were expressing some surprise
at the aversion of Hanoi to negotiations.
Were you thinking there in terms of poten-
tial Titoism in North Viet-Nam?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I was thinking of
what might be considered the objective in-
terests of North Viet-Nam, not so much how
they might look at it from an ideological
point of view. But surely the North Viet-
namese need peace. Surely they want a
chance to build up their own country. Surely
the North Vietnamese as Vietnamese do not
want to be overrun by the Chinese. Surely
they'd like to look forward to a time when
they have peaceful relations with their
brothers in the South — and perhaps at some
future time get into a discussion at the table
on the question of the reunification of the
country. That is what all Vietnamese want.
But these objective factors seem to be
brushed aside by the present leadership in
Hanoi, and they feel committed to that
militant doctrine of world revolution that
has been proclaimed by Peiping with a
harshness that has caused serious problems
even within the Communist world. On
ideological grounds they are undertaking an
effort which is very costly to them and which
cannot have success at the end of the trail.
The "Second Pause" Proposal
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, one proposal
which has remained untried and is still cur-
rent is — has come from Mr. Pearson [Lester
B. Pearson, Prime Minister of Canada] and
Mr. Shastri [Lai Bahadur Shastri, Prime
Minister of India], that there ought to be a
second pause longer than the first in which
they could operate and possibly exercise an
influence in Hanoi and Peiping, among other
places. Are you giving thought to this?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we are giving
thought always to any possibility of bring-
ing peace into that part of the world, but
let me remind you that we held our hand for
41/2 years after the infiltration started from
the North. That was a 41/2-year pause, dur-
ing which we were probing continually
through diplomacy and Geneva conferences
and other means for a peaceful settlement
of Southeast Asia. Now it is true that the
pause of a few weeks ago was short, about
51/^ days, but the other side was made aware
that that pause was coming and I can assure
you that we already had their replies before
the bombing was resumed and their replies
were very harsh, very harsh.
Now, the other side has not indicated that
a pause would make any difference. As a
matter of fact there have been public state-
ments from Peiping that if we stopped
bombing North Viet-Nam they still would
not enter into negotiations for a peaceful
settlement. So this is a possibility, but we
need to look at it in terms of whether in
fact it will contribute to a peaceful settle-
ment. We've asked the other side on more
than one occasion what else would stop if
we stopped the bombing. What else will
stop? Are you going to stop sending those
tens of thousands of men from North Viet-
Nam into South Viet-Nam? Are you going
to stop attacking these villages and killing
off thousands of innocent civilians? What
else will stop? And we've never had any
reply. So the direct answer to your question
106
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
is yes, these matters are being considered,
but we need to find a path to peace and not
some — merely a gesture which will make no
contribution to the peace.
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, wouldn't it be
an advantage, at least a political advantage
if not a military advantage, to have a sec-
ond pause as suggested by not only these two
heads of government but by a number of
others — the political advantage — possible po-
litical advantage — being that your own argu-
ment might be strengthened, that here you
are, you tried your best, and yet the other
side has been against it?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I should think that
the record of refusal and rejection of peace-
ful means by the other side is long and, I
would think, rather convincing at this point.
As far as this postwar period is concerned,
I think it is worth recalling where the
sources of violence have come from since
1945, in Iran, and Greece, and Berlin, and
Korea, Cuba, Southeast Asia, the Philip-
pines, Malaya. Violence has appeared first
from those who want to change the United
Nations kind of world and impose upon it
a world revolution based upon another pre-
scription. Now, in dealing with these at-
tempts in the postwar period to impose a
solution by force, we and others have had
to meet those threats with very considerable
costs; in our case, 160,000 casualties since
the end of World War II.
We have also tried to meet them with very
considerable restraint in order to maintain
the peace. For example, when the guerrillas
moved into Greece, we didn't attack Bulgaria
and Yugoslavia. When Berlin was blockaded,
for weeks upon end we flew supplies to Ber-
lin rather than engage in large-scale fight-
ing on the ground. At the time of Korea we
had a nuclear monopoly. We took 100,000
casualties without using a nuclear weapon.
In handling the Cuban missile crisis, great
care was exercised to leave open the door to
peaceful settlement. And we waited 4^/^
years before we attacked North Viet-Nam
because of what they're doing in South Viet-
Nam.
So restraint has been a mark of our policy
in this postwar period, and in dealing with
the violence which has come from the other
side against smaller countries, in an attempt
to impose their system by force.
Mr. Imhoof: Are you saying then there
would have to be a degree of reciprocity, so
to speak, about any new pause?
Secretary Rusk: I wouldn't want to be
specific on that or talk about the particular
circumstances. All I was saying is that we
don't exclude the possibility on doctrinal
grounds — as I say, we paused for years, and
we did pause not long ago, but what we want
is a peaceful settlement. Now it takes two
to make the peace. We'd like to see somebody
come to the table, but the empty chairs have
never been filled.
Question of Viet Cong Representation
Mr. Imhoof: If, finally, Hanoi is ready to
come to the table, would — what would the
position of the Viet Cong be? This is a ques-
tion that's often discussed.
Secretary Rusk: Well, we don't know what
kind of delegation Hanoi would bring to the
table. But it is quite clear that Hanoi is
the spokesman for tens of thousands of
people that they have sent into South Viet-
Nam. Some of these are elements of the
regular North Vietnamese army, so that
negotiating with Hanoi is negotiating with
those who are responsible for the primary
problem in South Viet-Nam. Now, of course,
there are some Viet Cong who are southern-
ers, who have lived in the South, but they
are part of a population of 14 million — there
may be, what, 100,000 of them.
Now, there are many other groups among
the South Vietnamese population. There are
the sects — there are the Catholics, and the
Buddhists, and there are about a million
Cambodians who have lived for a long time
in South Viet-Nam. There are the monta-
gnards; there are other groups.
Now, the southerners, the genuine south-
ern members of the Viet Cong, should estab-
lish their contacts and take their place in
the general structure of South Viet-Nam.
They're not entitled to be counted on a ratio
of 1,000 to 1, merely because they have rifles
JULY 19, 1965
107
in their hands. No country in the world
would permit this to happen, but they can
take their place peacefully in South Viet-
namese society. But these people, these in-
digenous Viet Cong, cannot insure the re-
moval of those tens of thousands who have
come down from the North. That is for
Hanoi to do, and Hanoi can be at the table.
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, did you imply
by your answer now that the North Viet-
Nam people would be permitted or would be
free to have any kind of delegation they
like, that is to say, they would be free to
include the Viet Cong as members of the
delegation — is that the implication?
Secretary Rusk: That's correct. When we
come to the table, the head of the delegation
will have his credentials, and I wouldn't ex-
pect to look behind the chief Hanoi delegate
to determine who is sitting behind him, any
more than I would expect him to look behind
our representative to see who was sitting for
us. That's up to Hanoi.
Mr. Vohra: I'm sorry, sir. Is it the same
thing as Mr. Martin's [Paul Martin, Cana-
dian Secretary of State for External
Affairs] proposal, who has said something
similar but possibly not the same thing? Is
there a measure of difference between your
reply —
Secretary Rusk: I doubt it. I think —
Mr. Vohra: — and Mr. Martin's proposal?
Secretary Rusk: You see, we've said that
we're prepared to discuss this problem with
the governments concerned, because it is the
governments who have been responsible for
the problem and governments can make
themselves responsible for the solution. Now,
who represents governments, who sits for
governments, will be for those governments
to determine. If they want to bring some
Viet Cong or National Liberation Front
people with them, that's fine, we have no ob-
jection.
Mr. Vohra: I see.
Mr. Imhoof: As far as the solution is con-
cerned, Mr. Secretary, Senator [J. W.] Ful-
bright recently in a speech suggested that
perhaps the solution would be to go back to
the — what you call it, the essentials of the
1954 Geneva agreements. Would you care
to comment on that?
Secretary Rusk: Yes. We have believed
all along that the Geneva agreements of 1954
and 1962 are an adequate base for peace in
Southeast Asia. The agreement of 1962 was
negotiated with great care and as late as
1962 — just 3 years ago. It has never been
complied with. Hanoi has refused to live up
to it. Now, in 1954 they worked out a settle-
ment which appeared to be a permanent
settlement for Southeast Asia, but the Viet
Minh moved from North Viet-Nam into
Laos; they attempted to settle these issues
between North and South Viet-Nam by
force. Now, that's not the way to have peace.
If there are differences, they should be talked
about at a conference table. They should be
explored by peaceful means. That is what is
required in all parts of the world, and
there's no need to think that that is not
the way to proceed in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Vohra: The Viet Cong problem will
continue, it seems now, to make their repre-
sentation effective; if they cannot come in
directly, how are they going to come in at
all? Is there any way of overcoming this
obstacle at all?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, they can walk into
the capital tomorrow and say, "We are pre-
pared to be like other South Vietnamese and
discuss problems of South Viet-Nam on a
political basis, rather than by arms." They
can do that tomorrow, and their voices un-
doubtedly would be heard as the voices of
other groups in South Viet-Nam are heard.
I don't know why they are entitled to a
special status merely because they've taken
up arms and merely because they've been
reinforced by tens of thousands of armed
militaiy men from the outside.
Now, they can make their views known.
They do it in many ways, in public state-
ments and things of that sort. But I wouldn't
see that they are entitled to be a primary
party in international negotiations merely
because they've acted as they've acted. You
wouldn't let that happen in your country, or
your country. You wouldn't let it happen for
108
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
a moment if the same thing happened in
your country.
Wider Context of Viet-Nam Conflict
Mr. Imhoof: Mr. Secretary, I would like
to ask you two questions about the wider
context of the Viet-Nam conflict. One, it is
often said here that you would like to see as
many flags in Viet-Nam as possible. Are you
satisfled with the number of flags you have
presently there?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the more the bet-
ter, Mr. Imhoof. At the present time there
are about 30 countries that are providing
direct assistance to South Viet-Nam. Per-
haps 12 to 15 of those are providing people,
either in uniform or civilians to work as
engineers and doctors and teachers in the
countryside.
There will be — there are others that are
providing economic assistance and financial
assistance of various types. We think there
are another 10 countries or so that will soon
be joining that group in providing direct
assistance.
Yes, we think that this is important not
just because of its practical assistance to
South Viet-Nam but also because it sends a
signal to Hanoi that there are a large num-
ber of countries who believe that South Viet-
Nam should be left alone in peace and that
Hanoi should not count upon any develop-
ment of a large international public opinion
in support of what they're trying to do
against their neighbors in the South.
Mr. Imhoof: I think many countries feel
that they are irl the same boat with you in
this conflict, however — and this leads to the
second question — many also appear to be
concerned about how this might affect your
East-West relationship, that is, the U.S.-
Soviet relationship. I wonder whether you
would care to say something about that?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I have no doubt
that it has a direct effect on Easf>-West
relationships. So did the guerrilla problem
in Greece, and the blockade in Berlin, and
the invasion of Korea, and the Cuban missile
crisis. Here was a very brutal attempt on
the part of a Communist country, with its
capital in Hanoi, to take over a neighbor by
force, against existing international agree-
ments and against general principles of in-
ternational law.
Well, of course, if we stand in the way,
the other side is not going to like it. And
in this sort of an affair, general relation-
ships cool and become difficult and even
dangerous. Oh, no, this has a direct bearing
upon the East-West relations, but it also has
a direct bearing on the safety of every small
country in the world that is within the reach
of any great power, because unless we can
establish and maintain the principle that
small countries have a right to be left alone
— then there are a hundred small countries
that are safe no longer and are — and their
futures are at the whims of great powers.
We can't have that situation. That would
be utterly dangerous and disastrous for the
smaller countries.
Mr. Vohra: Mr. Secretary, is there any
difference of opinion between Hanoi and
Peiping on their approach to peace negotia-
tions which could be made use of?
Secretary Ru^k: I think if you would look
at the situation objectively as seen by a man
from Mars you could suppose that there are
differences of interest between Peiping and
Hanoi in this situation, but for all practical
purposes we have not seen such differences
reflected in the policies of Hanoi and Peiping
at the present time. Once in a while they
will say things which appear to have in them
some shades of difference, but over time
these tend to balance out and we find that
these two capitals seem to be very close to-
gether on this matter.
Mr. Vohra: Another point which bothers
some people is that there is in fact not a
community of views as expressed by you and
as expressed by Hanoi in its four-point pro-
posal.
Secretary Rusk: Yes?
Mr. Vohra: Both have emphasized going
back to the Geneva agreement. Now is that
broad enough —
Secretary Rusk: Well, the four-point pro-
gram—
JULY 19, 1966
109
Mr. Vohra: — broad enough agreement be-
tween the two sides?
Secretary Rusk: The four points an-
nounced by Hanoi include the point that
South Viet-Nam should be organized and
resolved in accordance with the program of
the Liberation Front. And, of course, that
is not acceptable to the South Vietnamese
or to the friends of South Viet-Nam. But we
would be glad to go to the conference table
to take up these agreements of 1954 and
1962 to see where things went wrong, to try-
to bring the situation back to those basic
agreements, but these people on the other
side won't even come to the conference table.
You remember when Hanoi sent a delegation
to Moscow some weeks ago, in their joint
communique they expressed their interest in
conferences on Cambodia and Laos. All
right, why not have such conferences? Let's
get started. Let's get to the table. There's
plenty to talk about. There's a great job to
accomplish of restoring peace in Southeast
Asia, to remove the dangers that are there
at the present time. But you can't do it un-
less you get started, and that is why it's
so puzzling to know why the other side won't
come to a table, won't receive visits, won't
let anyone discuss these problems with them,
won't take any part in the process of discus-
sion.
Mr. Vohra: Would it include, Mr. Secre-
tary, the freedom to form any kind of gov-
ernment in South Viet-Nam, coming back to
the Geneva agreements?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, but people usually
somehow shy away from making the same
statement about North Viet-Nam. North
Viet-Nam has had no chance for free elec-
tions. We'd be in favor of free elections in
both places. Let elected governments be in
touch with each other by peaceful discussion
to see how they can work out their common
interests.
Mr. Imhoof: Mr. Secretary, I wonder if
you would give us now a brief summary of
your assessment of the present situation in
Viet-Nam.
Secretary Rusk: It seems to me that we
have, once again, Mr. Imhoof, the problem
of a country that is under attack from a
neighbor, by force, a country to whom others
have important commitments. We ourselves
have important commitments to South Viet-
Nam. Our choice is, broadly speaking, to
fail to meet those commitments with all the
consequences which that would entail right
around the world. I happen to believe that
the integrity of the American commitment
is a primary support for the peace in many
continents.
We do not see at the present time an in-
clination on the part of Hanoi and Peiping
to move toward a peaceful settlement of this
problem. The doors are open. The channels
are there. We would be glad to go to the
table and begin the process of building the
peace in Southeast Asia. But I think we and
those who think like us would find ourselves
alone there at the table. There would be no
one to talk to. And, therefore, an early
peace is rather difficult to anticipate. I think
we shall have some serious weeks and
months in the immediate future.
Mr. Imhoof: Thank you very much.
Mr. Vohra: Thank you very much, Mr.
Secretary.
Secretary Rusk: Thank you, gentlemen.
Commentator : This has been a conversa-
tion with United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk about the American position in
Viet-Nam. Interviewing Secretary Rusk
were Mr. Werner Imhoof, Washington cor-
respondent for Switzerland's Neiie Zuercher
Zeitung, and Mr. H. R. Vohra, Washington
correspondent for the Times of India.
110
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
"The United States Government is prepared to consider
sympathetically any reasonable proposal for the improve-
ment of commodity markets," says the Special Assistant to
the Assistant Secretary of State for Economic Affairs. In
this article, prepared especially for the Bulletin, Mr. Brodie
examines some of the trade problems of the developing na-
tions and explains the U.S. position in response to their in-
creasing pressure for international action to help correct the
problems of world commodity markets.
Commodity Agreements— A Partial Answer to tiie Trade Problems
of Developing Countries
by Henry Brodie
The economic growth of the developing
countries is intimately linked to the exploita-
tion of their natural resources for export.
A substantial share of the national income
of the developing countries is derived from
the production of primary products, both
mineral and agricultural, for sale abroad.
Such exports also provide the principal means
of financing imports of industrial equipment
and supplies essential for their economic de-
velopment.
It is not surprising, therefore, that the de-
veloping countries have become increasingly
concerned about the sluggish growth of their
exports relative to their import needs and
the wide short-term fluctuations in the prices
of their principal exports. The instability and
slow growi;h of their export earnings, result-
ing from forces they feel powerless to control,
have seriously hampered their efforts to
achieve and maintain satisfactory rates of
economic growth.
As they look ahead, the developing coun-
tries see little prospect of a change for the
better. Consequently they have been pressing
in various international forums for new pol-
icies to strengthen the markets for their tra-
ditional exports. They have placed particular
emphasis on the need for international action
to organize world commodity markets, both
to reduce short-term price fluctuations and
to achieve more favorable prices.
This article examines the trade problems of
the developing countries and the role that
international commodity arrangements might
play in relieving them.
In varying degrees the less developed coun-
tries are all afflicted with the economic mal-
aise of low productivity, low incomes, low
savings, and low investment. They all are
caught up in the same vicious cycle of self-
perpetuating poverty.
To help them help themselves break out of
this cycle, the United States and other ad-
vanced countries are providing the developing
countries with technical assistance to improve
the skills of their rapidly growing popula-
tions. We are supplementing domestic capital
for investment in basic industries: agricul-
ture, industry, power, and transportation.
Vital as it is to their grovrth, this foreign
aid accounts for only a relatively small pro-
portion of the foreign exchange available to
low-income countries to finance essential im-
JULY 19, 1965
111
ports. The overwhelming proportion of the
foreign exchange needed for development
comes from their merchandise exports.
In the decade of the fifties the low-income
countries derived about 12 percent of their
foreign exchange receipts from long-term
capital flows from abroad and about 88 per-
cent from their own export trade. Whether
or not the flow of aid and private foreign
investment increases in the years ahead, ex-
port earnings undoubtedly will continue to
be the main support of their import require-
ments.
Almost 90 percent of the trade receipts of
the lower income countries as a group is de-
rived from exports of food, agricultural raw
materials, metals, and fuel. Unlike the in-
dustrialized countries, whose trade involves
primarily the exchange of manufactured
goods with each other, the trade of the low-
income countries is predominantly the ex-
change of primary products for manufac-
tured goods.
One or two commodities usually account
for the bulk of the exports of each of the
developing countries. Some 30 depend upon
a single product for at least half of their ex-
port earnings. Colombia, for example, de-
pends on coffee for 70 percent of its export
earnings. Ghana depends on cocoa for 60
percent of its earnings; Chile depends on
copper for 68 percent; Malaysia depends on
rubber for 53 percent; the Sudan depends
on cotton and cottonseed for 60 percent ; and
so on. This heavy dependence on trade in
one or a few commodities, particularly agri-
cultural commodities, makes the low-income
countries peculiarly vulnerable to world
market developments over which they have
little control. Prices for their exports fluc-
tuate widely over short periods of time.
Effects of Price Fluctuations
Let us look at the recent fluctuations in
the prices of some of the more important of
these commodities. The wholesale price for
green (i.e., before roasting) Santos coffee
from Brazil has been as high as 90 cents a
pound and as low as 32 cents in the past
decade. Cocoa was as high as 58 cents a
pound in 1954; it was 27 cents in 1956; 44
cents in 1958. It is today 13 cents, the lowest
price in two decades. Within the last year
alone it dropped 10 cents a pound. Natural
rubber was 22 cents a pound in 1954, 37 cents
in 1955, 26 cents in 1958, 35 cents in 1960,
and 27 cents today. Sugar was about 3 cents
a pound in 1960 ; it exceeded 13 cents in 1963 ;
it is currently 2 cents. Tin was 95 cents a
pound in 1956; 90 cents in 1958; $1.12 in
1963 ; and $1.94 currently.
These fluctuations in price cause varia-
tions in the foreign exchange receipts of the
developing countries amounting to hundreds
of millions of dollars. A 1-cent-a-pound
change in the price of coffee, for example,
means $65 million per annum to the export-
ing countries as a whole ; a 1-cent change in
the price of tea means $15 million ; in cocoa,
$25 million; in natural rubber, $45 million;
in rice, $100 million.
In the period 1950-61 the price of rubber,
for example, fluctuated from year to year by
21 percent on the average. Cocoa prices fluc-
tuated from year to year by 20 percent on the
average.
Year-to-year price and earnings fluctua-
tions of other commodities of the less devel-
oped countries for the period 1950-61 are
shown below.
Commodity
Percentage
Percentage
fluctuation in
fluctuation in
price
foreign exchange
earnings
Sisal
16
16
Abaca
14
20
Jute
15
15
Copra
15
12
Palm oil
11
12
Tea
7
11
Coffee
9
8
Impact of Changes in Supply and Demand
There are a variety of reasons why the
prices and volume of the exports of the de-
veloping countries fluctuate more sharply
and more frequently than those of manu-
factured goods. On the supply side, varia-
tions in weather and disease cause fluctua-
tions in the output of agricultural commod-
ities which cannot be turned off when it is
excessive or readily increased when it falls
short. On the demand side, small changes in
final demand induce large changes in inven-
tories.
112
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Moreover, the world market for some pri-
mary commodities is a residual market, rep-
resenting only a small proportion of total
production and consumption. As a result,
this market bears the full impact of changes
in supply and demand. A small decrease in
production in an exporting country may re-
sult in a significant percentage decrease in
supply on the world market. Conversely, a
small increase in domestic production in an
importing country may result in a significant
percentage decline in imports.
Instability in commodity markets feeds on
itself. Excessively high prices in periods of
shortage lead to overproduction ; overproduc-
tion to glut and excessively low prices; low
prices to underproduction, and so on in a
continuous cycle of exaggerated ups and
downs.
Because exports typically account for such
a large proportion of total production as well
as foreign exchange earnings in the low-
income countries, instability in commodity
markets has widespread repercussions
throughout their economies. When prices are
good, the economy is buoyant to the point
where serious internal inflationary pressures
often develop, with the usual accompanying
economic distortions. When prices drop, so
too do government revenues, private invest-
ment, imports, and the level of economic ac-
tivity generally. Development programs are
interrupted, and development projects grind
to a halt.
Characteristics of Primary Commodity Trade
More serious perhaps than the instability
of their trade receipts is the longer range
problem that the traditional commodity ex-
ports of the low-income countries are not
dynamic. They have not been increasing and
are unlikely to keep pace with the increase
in world trade and world income generally.
Demand for many primary products is
sluggish for a variety of reasons, including
saturation of per capita demand in the main
consuming centers (e.g., grains), the com-
petition of synthetics (e.g., cotton and
rubber), technological improvements that
have led to economies in the use of raw mate-
rials (e.g., tin), and increasing agricultural
self-sufficiency in the industrial countries
(e.g., sugar).
Despite unpromising market prospects,
producers have great difficulty in bringing
their production into line with demand. They
continue to produce what they have been
accustomed to producing, largely because
their economies lack flexibility and their eco-
nomic alternatives are few. Increasing sup-
plies in the face of sluggish demand have led
to weak and falling prices, often reinforced
in the case of agricultural products by the
efi'orts of farmers to compensate for lower
unit returns through increased volume.
In the 1952-61 period the value of exports
(excluding petroleum, which affects only a
few countries) increased by only 19 percent,
not even keeping pace with population
growth, let alone providing resources for
development at satisfactory rates. In the
same period the export receipts of the indus-
trial countries increased by about 70 percent.
In the decade of the fifties the export re-
ceipts of Latin America — excluding Vene-
zuela and Cuba — increased only 10 percent,
while the unit value of imports rose 12.5 per-
cent. In other words, in terms of real pur-
chasing power Latin America's export earn-
ings were less at the end of the decade than
at the beginning.
In 1963 and 1964 higher prices for sugar,
coffee, and nonferrous metals improved the
earnings of the developing countries sig-
nificantly, but this temporary improvement
has not been sustained. The sharp drop in
sugar prices, weakness in coffee prices, and
plummeting cocoa prices have combined to
depress export earnings once again.
These characteristics of primary commod-
ity trade — inherent price instability, slow
growth in demand, a persistent tendency to
oversupply — have greatly hampered the ef-
forts of the developing countries to carry out
their development programs and have led
them to press for international corrective ac-
tion. It is easy to brush off these pressures
by reaffirming the basic answer to the trade
problems of the low-income countries: di-
versify output and exports and thus reduce
excessive dependence on a few traditional
commodities. But this easy response ignores
JULY 19, 1965
113
the fact that the process of diversification is
the process of growth itself. It is necessarily
a long and difllicult process. In the mean-
time the developing countries have no alter-
native but to seek whatever practicable meas-
ures are available to moderate their trade
diflficulties.
Functions of Cominodity Agreements
Commodity agreements offer one such
measure though by no means the only one.
Commodity agreements, if effectively imple-
mented, can perform two useful functions:
They can reduce short-term price fluctu-
ations, and they can help arrest the decline
in raw material prices. They can do this,
however, only if countries participating in
commodity agreements cooperate to regulate
their exports and to adjust their production
policies in accordance with anticipated mar-
ket demand.
Today's commodity agreements — in tin,
wheat, sugar, and coffee — are of recent
origin, but the first efforts to influence world
market prices for primary commodities date
back to the early part of the century. These
initial attempts were largely unsuccessful in
accomplishing their objectives and indeed
account for some of the lingering doubt as-
sociated with commodity agreements as in-
struments of international economic policy.
Serious interest in international agree-
ments developed again in the late 1940's and
early 1950's, first, with the drafting of the
1948 Havana charter and, secondly, with the
persistent downtrend in the prices of pri-
mary commodities after the Korean war.
The Havana charter laid down certain
basic principles
... to prevent or moderate pronounced fluctua-
tions in the price of a primary commodity with a
view to achieving a reasonable degree of stability
on a basis of such prices as are fair to consumers
and provide a reasonable return to producers.
While the charter was never formally
adopted, these principles gained general ac-
ceptance as guidelines in subsequent com-
modity negotiations.
Stabilization arrangements can take a va-
riety of forms. They can be export quota
agreements to hold stocks oflt the market when
production is excessive and release stocks
when supply is short. The agreement can be
a simple export-quota arrangement, like the
coffee agreement, where each producing coun-
try is responsible for holding its own stock-
pile supplies in excess of its quota. It can
be combined with an international buffer
stock arrangement, like that of the tin agree-
ment, where the buffer buys when the market
is weak and sells when the market is strong.
It can be an international contract arrange-
ment, like the wheat agreement, in which im-
porting countries undertake to buy agreed
quantities at a specified minimum price when
the market slips below that price, and ex-
porting countries undertake to sell agreed
quantities at a fixed maximum price when
the market moves above that maximum.
There are a variety of other possible arrange-
ments. The object, however, is the same;
that is, to keep price fluctuations within
agreed limits.
For a number of primary commodities,
however, the problem is not simply to reduce
year-to-year swings in price. It is a struc-
tural one of persistent overproduction and
depressed prices. For such commodities, an
international agreement must attack the root
cause of depressed prices by measures to
bring production back into line with demand.
If this is done, commodity agreements can
be effective within certain limits in achieving
more remunerative prices and earnings for
producers.
One authority, John A. Pincus, in an
article published in the January 1964 issue of
Foreign Affairs, estimated that if fully ef-
fective commodity agreements had existed in
1961 for coffee, tea, cocoa, sugar, and ba-
nanas, the earnings of producing countries,
as a result of better prices, could have been
$700 million higher than they were. He goes
on to point out, however, the great diffi-
culties producers would have had in meeting
the necessary conditions for an effective
agreement. Because of these difficulties,
some of which are outlined below, he con-
cludes that the process of achieving effective
commodity agreements may be slow.
Not all commodities, of course, lend them-
114
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
selves to formal agreements. It would be
difficult to develop an effective agreement
for perishable commodities like bananas; or
for certain oils and oilseeds vi^ithout embrac-
ing the whole range of fish and animal fats
and vegetable oils that are close substitutes ;
or for natural rubber without embracing
synthetics; or for those metals where scrap
is a major element of supply. For these
reasons, agreements could work for only a
limited number of commodities.
Problems of Negotiation and Implementation
Economics textbook discussions generally
focus on the economic argument against com-
modity agreements, stressing that such ar-
rangements may create more difficulties than
they solve because of the problems of produc-
tion controls, competition from substitutes,
the handling of stocks, etc. Much less atten-
tion has been paid to the no less difficult
problem of negotiation and implementation.
Agreement among the participants on a
realistic price range within which it can be
expected to confine price fluctuations must
be obtained before negotiations have a chance
for successful conclusion. The exercise can
also penalize the most dynamic and progres-
sive producers because quotas generally are
set on the basis of past export performance
and not with an eye to relative efficiency.
As a result, low-cost producers become res-
tive in time and are tempted to violate agree-
ments so as to capture a larger share of the
market for themselves.
But the principal problem is living by
agreements once they are established. Sup-
plying countries find it hard to limit exports
to their quotas so long as some additional
sales offer the immediate prospect of extra
earnings. Coffee-producing countries tried
to regulate supplies to the coffee market in
the late 1950's but failed because members
were unable or unwilling to abide by the
quotas limiting their exports. Each sought to
evade the burden of export control at his
neighbor's expense. But the result of such
widespread evasion was to place more coffee
on the market than it could absorb at prevail-
ing prices and to force down prices for all.
Clearly, an agreement that depends on
supply control cannot protect producers un-
less they are prepared to hold back supplies
when the market is weak. Nor can it protect
consumers if exporting countries are not pre-
pared to release supplies when prices are
pushing through the ceiling.
The task of setting production goals for
each supplying country so as to bring world
production into line with estimated world
consumption is an especially delicate and
difficult problem. Countries not only have to
agree on which among them should expand
production and which should curtail but,
having agreed, are then obliged to act. Cur-
tailing production and finding alternative
employment for displaced labor is acutely
difficult. We know this only too well from
experience with our own farm programs.
The problems we in the United States face
in this regard are compounded many times
in the developing countries. However, unless
such action is taken in the case of commod-
ities in persistent oversupply, a commodity
agreement is bound to fail as stocks build up
and the cost of holding them becomes in-
tolerable.
U.S. Position on Commodity Agreements
The United States was for many years re-
luctant to support commodity agreements,
although we participated in agreements in
sugar and wheat — commodities we produce
at home.
A combination of factors recently has led
us to adopt a more positive and constructive
position: (1) our recognition that the insta-
bility in commodity trade makes orderly
growth and development for the low-income
countries virtually impossible ; (2) our desire
to help the developing countries become more
self-supporting through trade; (3) the emer-
gence of new independent countries heavily
dependent on commodity trade, and their in-
sistent pressure for the cooperation of the in-
dustrialized countries to help them with their
commodity problems; (4) the increasing
realization that the economic ups and downs
caused by commodity price fluctuation in-
spire and nurture political unrest.
JULY 19, 1965
115
Mr. Brodie's article is one of a series being
written especially for the Bulletin by officers
of the Department and the Foreign Service.
Officers who may be interested in submitting
original bylined articles are invited to call the
editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton,
extension 5806, room 5536.
The participation of consumer countries in
agreements is essential. Without them there
is no satisfactory way to police an agreement
or to apply penalties against producers un-
willing to join. This lack of enforcible sanc-
tions was one of the main reasons why the
producers' coffee agreements of 1958-62 did
not work well. With consumers as members,
the possibilities for insuring compliance with
producers' obligations under an agreement
are greatly increased.
The United States Government is prepared
to consider sympathetically any reasonable
proposal for the improvement of commodity
markets. We are prepared to help develop
and support agreements which have the po-
tential for dealing effectively with the short-
run and the long-run difficulties of particu-
lar commodities important to the trade of the
developing countries.
We are today members of the International
Wheat Agreement ; we helped to develop and
negotiate the International Coffee Agree-
ment ; we hope to participate in developing a
new sugar agreement ; we participated in the
spring of 1964 in the negotiation of a new
tin agreement ; we would be prepared to sup-
port a cocoa agreement if a realistic one
were negotiable. In short, although we are
fully aware of the technical and political as
well as economic difficulties of devising and
operating effective agreements, we are never-
theless willing to examine all proposals on
their merit in a positive spirit.
Such commodity agreements as we have
had in the postwar period have helped some-
what to moderate sharp swings in prices.
They have not been effective, however, in
solving the basic problem of oversupply.
Thus the wheat agreement has kept prices
within the target range but only because the
United States and Canada have been pre-
pared to hold large stocks. The sugar agree-
ment kept prices reasonably stable, but it was
necessary to lower the price range at each
renewal of the agreement because of persist-
ent oversupply. The tin agreement may
have moderated short-term price movements
somewhat, but the buffer stock never had the
resources needed to enable it to function with
full effectiveness as a price stabilizer. The
coffee agreement did help to moderate the
recent price rise, caused by a crop failure in
Brazil, but it is too early to tell whether it
will be able to meet the test ahead, that is,
to keep prices from plummeting again be-
cause of oversupply.
Agreements cannot for long sustain prices
out of line with the underlying forces of
supply and demand, unless, as in the case of
the wheat agreement, the producing coun-
tries are rich enough to continue to hold
burdensome stocks. If the producing coun-
tries are weak and poor, they cannot afford to
hold ever-growing stocks and the price range
must be continuously adjusted to accommo-
date supply or the agreement will fall apart.
The basic solution of tailoring production,
and not just exports, to world demand has not
yet been undertaken in any agreement, al-
though the coffee agreement contemplates
this as a longrun objective.
other Techniques To Ease Commodity Problems
Because of their limitations we do not rely
on commodity agreements alone to cope with
the commodity problems of developing coun-
tries. We use a variety of techniques in com-
bination. We are trying to expand the mar-
kets for the commodity exports of the low-
income countries by removing artificial im-
pediments to trade and consumption. Thus
we have urged the other industrial coun- «
tries to join with us in eliminating tariffs, |
quotas, and excise and consumption taxes
on tropical products. Undoubtedly high taxes
do inhibit the consumption of some of these
commodities. Our Trade Expansion Act of
1962 authorizes us to eliminate duties and
other restrictions on tropical agricultural
and forestry products not produced in sig-
nificant quantities in the United States, pro-
vided the European Economic Community
116
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
takes comparable action.
We are supporting the program developed
by the International Monetary Fund to pro-
vide compensatory credits to offset short-
term declines in the export earnings of the
low-income countries. If prices and sales of
basic commodities are depressed for 1 or 2
years, compensatory credits can alleviate
distress and help sustain a continuing flow
of imports. When prices and sales recover,
the credits can be repaid. The new IMF com-
pensatory financing program is an important
facility to help the low-income countries cope
with the problem of short-term market in-
stability.
We are participants in international study
groups for individual commodities. These
study groups perform a variety of valuable
services. They improve statistics, make short-
term forecasts and long-term projections of
supply and demand, and provide a useful
forum for intergovernmental consultations
on the specific problems facing specific com-
modity markets. They can be a valuable aid
to governments in this forward planning.
To sum up, commodity agreements can
play a useful though limited role in helping
the developing countries with their trade
problems. However, they are essentially an
interim measure which provides the develop-
ing countries time to come to grips with their
underlying structural problems. Only a
limited number of commodities can be con-
trolled because of problems of substitutes,
both natural and synthetic, perishability, etc.
For such commodities, agreements can re-
duce short-run price fluctuations and achieve
moderately more remunerative prices over
the long run. To improve prices, however,
the developing countries will have to demon-
strate much more discipline than they have
in the past with regard to regulating their
exports and bringing their production into
line with demand. This is likely to be a slow
and difficult process. But the rewards would
be worth the effort.
• Reprints of the above article will soon be
available upon request from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
President Inaugurates Commercial
Telephone Service by Satellite
Remarks by President Johnson ^
This moment marks a milestone in the
history of communications between peoples
and nations.
For the first time a manmade satellite of
earth is being put into commercial service as
a means of communications between conti-
nents. The occasion is as happy as it is his-
toric, and that is for many reasons.
This is, first of all, a very tangible and
valuable realization of the promise and
potential of man's exploration of space. On
ahead, we shall take many more and, I think,
many longer strides forward. But we can
know, from this step today, that mankind's
growing knowledge of space will bring grow-
ing improvement for life on this earth.
So it is especially fitting that this historic
step comes not as the achievement of any
single nation but as the work of many
nations. This represents a joint venture of
44 countries, with still more participants in
prospect. For us in the United States, that is
especially gratifying. Since the earliest days
of the Age of Space, we have urged — as we
still do — that all nations join together to ex-
plore space together and to develop together
its peaceful uses.
Finally, for us — and, I am sure, for our
friends in Europe as well — it is a particu-
larly happy circumstance that this service is
another bond in the many ties that join us
together across the North Atlantic.
Other satellites, in days to come, will open
new communications pathways for all the
world. But we are especially pleased that
this first service brings closer together lands
and people who share not only a common
heritage but a common destiny — and a com-
mon determination to preserve peace, to
uphold freedom, to achieve together a just
1 Made on June 28 at the beginning of a six-nation
telephone ceremony marking the opening for com-
mercial use of the circuits of the Communications
Satellite Corp. (White House press release). For
background, see Bulletin of Mar. 8, 1965, p. 340.
JULY 19, 1965
117
and a decent society for all mankind.
In these times the choice of mankind is a
very clear choice between cooperation or
catastrophe. Cooperation begins in the better
understanding that better communications
bring.
On this occasion, then, I am pleased to
extend my congratulations to all the inter-
national participants in this system and to
the Communications Satellite Corporation.
And I would express the hope that all na-
tions may become willing to join in such
great enterprises for the good of mankind,
and that all of our labors may be blessed by
a rich and a bountiful harvest of peace on
this earth.
America and Belgium— A Community of Interests
by Douglas MacArthur II
Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations ^
First, let me say that it is an honor and
a pleasure for me to be able to meet with
you today. And I say this, not just for the
usual reasons of courtesy, but from a very
full heart. I have, to begin with, just re-
turned to the United States from a 4-year
assignment in your country, where, as Amer-
ican Ambassador, I had the privilege of
working closely and intimately, not only with
the outstanding members of your Govern-
ment but with other distinguished Belgians
— members of the hard-working and highly
creative industrial and business community
of your homeland.
But the friendship and affection I shall
always feel for Belgium and the Belgian
people has even deeper roots than the mem-
ories of my two tours of duty in your beau-
tiful country. Indeed, my daughter — my
only daughter, I shall add — found the
Belgian people in general quite as attractive
as I did, and one young Belgian in particular
she found attractive enough to marry. In
fact, let me frankly state that the most de-
lightful and totally irresistible woman in my
' Address made before the Belgian Chamber of
Commerce in the United States at New York, N.Y.,
on June 16 (press release 154 dated June 15).
own life is a Belgian — my 7 months' old
granddaughter. And, with the slightest prov-
ocation, I could spend the rest of your time
talking about her. But I am sure you have
all heard new grandfathers before.
The Bonds Between the U.S. and Belgium
Let me, with some effort, then, turn to
another subject. I want to talk, instead, of
the relations between our two countries and
the community of interests that have bound
us together and will, I believe, continue to
do so in an ever more constructive relation-
ship in the future.
We have shared much over the years. We
share, of course, the common heritage of
Western civilization. We share an unbroken
history of friendly relations from the very
birth of our two countries. We have a bond
in the shared experience of two world wars,
in which Americans fought side by side with
their valiant Belgian allies and mingled their
blood in defense of liberty. And most re-
cently our United States Air Force joined
with Belgium's legendary and gallant berets
rouges in saving the lives of hundreds of for-
eign hostages in the Congo. I think it is fair
to say that the seal of history has been
118
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
placed on the bonds that unite our countries.
But our sharing has not been restricted
to the military sphere and to the blood
spilled in the fields of Flanders and the
forest of the Ardennes. We share, too, in
the works of peace. Both our nations sup-
port and encourage continued progress
toward European integration. And when
Americans speak of this, we think irresist-
ibly of the creation of Benelux, of the im-
measurable contribution which Belgium has
made to the New Europe and the role that
your distinguished Foreign Minister, Paul-
Henri Spaak — a great European — ^has played
in the development of the Treaty of Rome
and the European Communities.
Nor has our sharing been confined to Eu-
rope. Both our countries have recognized that
one of the major unfinished tasks on the
agenda of the century is the reduction in the
immense disparity in income and living con-
ditions between the industrialized nations
and the newly emerging, developing coun-
tries. Through the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development],
through the U.N., and through the individual
efforts of both countries, we have sought
ways to bring our national wealth and our
technical skills to bear on this problem.
Both our countries are contributing sub-
stantial resources to this end. And I cannot
touch on this subject without paying a spe-
cial tribute to the Belgian contribution to
the development of the Congo. Belgium left
to the people of the Congo an economic in-
frastructure unsurpassed elsewhere among
the newly independent African states, and
we believe that the Congo stands to benefit
greatly from continued close ties with Bel-
gium. In particular, I want to mention not
only the economic and technical assistance
which is supplied to the Congo by the Bel-
gian Government but also the tremendous
and invaluable contribution that Belgian in-
dustries which operate there have made and
are making to the development of schools,
hospitals, and the other essential economic
underpinnings which are necessary for eco-
nomic and social progress.
But I need not further belabor the point
that Belgium and the United States have
much in common — a common heritage, com-
mon goals, common values. Above all, the
American people, like the Belgian people,
are dedicated to the cause of freedom and
to the quest for peace.
The Aggression in Viet-Nam
I want to spend the remaining few min-
utes I have with you in discussing the most
crucial present challenge to our common
principles — the aggression that the free
world faces in Viet-Nam.
In no other part of the world today is
there such immediate peril to the security
of free peoples and to the cause of peace
with freedom and justice for which we
stand.
The history of Viet-Nam and the struggle
there is a complicated one. But the issue is
simple. Bluntly stated, the question is, can
aggression be made profitable?
Let there be no mistake on this point.
What is happening in Viet-Nam is not a civil
war. It is not an insurrection. It is not a
popular uprising, nor is it, in the terms
Hanoi and Peiping prefer to use, a "war of
national liberation." It is aggression, pure
and simple.
I was in France in 1940 when hundreds
of thousands of German troops smashed into
Belgium and Holland and Luxembourg and
then into France. I remember debates as to
what America's reaction should be — but I
cannot remember any debates as to whether
or not Nazi Germany was committing ag-
gression against its neighbors.
In 1950 North Korean soldiers in great
numbers rolled across the 38th parallel,
where for 3 bloody years men from Korea,
the United States, and other free nations —
including the heroic Belgian unit — resisted
their aggression so that a small nation that
was minding its own business could remain
free. I can recall that there were differ-
ences over how to cope with that aggression.
But I do not remember any respected seg-
ment of opinion which denied that aggres-
sion had indeed taken place.
Aggression does not lose its character be-
cause efforts are made to conceal its naked
face — or because the time schedule is drawn
JULY 19, 1965
119
out — or because trained men and weapons
of war are introduced by stealth across
frontiers and then unleashed in a savage as-
sault on free peoples — or because the ag-
gressor's troops speak the same language as
their victims.
Viet-Nam is not the first arena of this
kind of aggression. In 1948 the motherland
of Western civilization — Greece — was torn
by what superficial observers called a "civil
war." Greeks, fighting for the ideals of free
government which had motivated their an-
cestors over twenty centuries before, found
themselves fighting Communist Greeks for
the freedom and independence of their coun-
try. It was not a large-scale military action.
Bands of Communist guerrillas armed and
equipped from abroad would cross the fron-
tier into Greece to strike and disrupt the
life of the country. When, as often hap-
pened, they needed supplies or when they
were cornered by troops of the Greek Army,
they melted into the landscape or recrossed
borders into a Communist country next door.
The fate of Greece, and the security, per-
haps, of the entire Mediterranean world,
hung in the same delicate balance as at
Marathon and Thermopylae.
But this great Communist effort to take
over Greece and then the rest of the Med-
iterranean was frustrated by the courageous
Greek people, aided by the United States,
which supplied military advisers and equip-
ment under the Truman Doctrine to help a
small, gallant country remain free.
What we are facing in Viet-Nam today is
the same type of operation the Communists
tried against Greece, although on a greatly
expanded scale.
We are, in short, confronted with ag-
gression by the Communist regime in Hanoi,
spurred on by Peiping, against the Govern-
ment and people of South Viet-Nam. The
United States is helping the South Viet-
namese at their request, in their interest, in
our own clear, unmistakable national inter-
est, and in the interest of the free peoples of
Southeast Asia and all the world.
The North Vietnamese have repeatedly re-
ferred to their attack upon South Viet-Nam
as a "war of national liberation." Some have
implied that Hanoi and Peiping are react-
ing only to our presence in South Viet-Nam —
that the Viet Cong represent an armed
popular rebellion in South Viet-Nam against
an unpopular government and army.
But the facts demonstrate that the Viet
Cong has spent most of its energy in at-
tacks, not upon the Vietnamese army, but
upon unarmed, inoffensive civilian men,
women, and children in the provinces. What
Hanoi calls a "war of national liberation" is
actually simple thuggery, directed from
North Viet-Nam against the people of South
Viet-Nam in an effort to terrorize them into
submission.
The State Department white paper of
February - shows conclusively what the
SEATO Council meeting in London stated — I
that the struggle in Viet-Nam is "an aggres-
sion organized, directed, supplied and sup-
ported by the Communist regime in North
Viet-Nam in contravention of the basic ob-
ligations of international law and in fla-
grant violation of the Geneva Agreements
of 1954 and 1962." ^
And 3 years ago — in 1962 — the Interna-
tional Control Commission, consisting of
India, Poland, and Canada, reached a similar
conclusion in a majority report.
The Question of Negotiations
I have heard some people say, "Even if
this is aggression, we should end it by ne-
gotiation, not by war. Why isn't the United
States willing to negotiate?"
The answer to that is very simple. We are
willing to negotiate, and we have been will-
ing to negotiate for over 10 years.
In 1954 the United States and eight
other nations, including the Soviet Union,
Communist China, and the North Vietnam-
ese, were together at the conference table
in Geneva where agreements were ham-
' Aggression From the North: The Record of
North Viet-Nam' s Campaign To Conquer South Viet-
Nam, Department of State publication 7839 ; for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402 (40
cents).
=> Bulletin of June 7, 1965, p. 923.
120
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
mered out to protect the freedom and in-
dependence of the South Vietnamese, Lao-
tian, and Cambodian peoples.
We agreed to respect that agreement.
The Hanoi regime was also committed to
respect it. However, the ink was hardly dry
before Hanoi began to violate it by ordering
its agents to go underground, caching arms
in South Viet-Nam, and organizing secret
bases for future aggression. The aggression
itself began almost at once and had reached
massive proportions by 1962.
Again, in 1962, the United States sat
down at the conference table with 13 other
countries in our effort to preserve the in-
dependence of Laos. Again, the Soviet Union,
the Chinese Communists, the North Viet-
namese were present with representatives
of Laos, South Viet-Nam, and other countries
immediately involved. Again agreements
were hammered out that, if observed, would
have brought peace to Laos and preserved
its freedom. Once again, the ink on the agree-
ment was not dry when Hanoi proceeded
to violate the prohibitions on the presence
of foreign forces and then directed the Com-
munist Pathet Lao to resume their savage as-
sault on the forces of the peaceful little
Kingdom of Laos.
And more recently, with what I believe
must be considered commendable patience,
we have invited Hanoi to enter into uncon-
ditional discussions, only to have that offer,
up until this time, rebuffed.
But even if the other side proves willing
to negotiate — and we hope it will — I would
emphasize that negotiations and peace are
not the same thing, as our experience in
1954 and 1962 makes quite clear. Negotia-
tions are not an end unto themselves. For
us they are a means to reach an honorable
settlement that will respect the freedom and
independence of a small country — the Re-
public of Viet-Nam — that asks only to be
left alone.
For the other side negotiations in the
past have meant something different. They
have served as a smokescreen behind which
stealthy and concealed aggression has con-
tinued.
Let me emphasize that the United States
insists upon an honorable settlement for the
Republic of Viet-Nam that will preserve its
independence. We will not resort to negotia-
tions as a cloak for capitulation.
I have heard it said the so-called "loss of
face" we might suffer in simply withdraw-
ing from Viet-Nam "is not worth the death
of one American." I agree. "Face" is not
worth the death of one American or one
Vietnamese or one old mule. But we are not
talking about "saving face." We are talking
about the fate of the people of South Viet-
Nam — and, what is even more important,
about the people of every nation in the free
world.
Indeed, it is the Hanoi regime itself that
makes this clear. General [Vo Nguyen]
Giap, Commander of the North Vietnamese
Communist Army, has stated publicly,
"South Viet-Nam is the model of the na-
tional liberation movement of our time. . . .
If the special warfare that the U.S. im-
perialists are testing in South Viet-Nam is
overcome, then it can be defeated every-
where in the world." Let me repeat — "every-
where in the world."
The Lessons of the 1930's
In the 1930's young men marched through
German streets singing, "Today Germany
is ours. Tomorrow the whole world." Many
did not take them seriously. Some of Nazi
Germany's neighbors, including Belgium and
Holland, sought refuge in neutrality. The
United States, thinking itself secure behind
the shields of two oceans, also sought the
will-of-the-wisp of neutrality. Many looked
the other way when the Rhineland was
reoccupied, when first Austria and then
Czechoslovakia and then Poland were de-
voured. Even then many thought that the
storm would pass by without touching them.
We all learned otherwise. We learned the
deep wisdom of the comments of a great
Englishman who told his countrymen, after
Munich :
Do not suppose that this is the end. This is only
the beginning of the reckoning. This is only the first
sip, the first foretaste of a bitter cup which will be
proffered to us year by year unless, by a supreme
recovery of moral health and martial vigor, we arise
JULY 19, 1965
121
again and take our stand for freedom as in the
olden time.
We learned eventually — but at what tragic
cost — that Winston Churchill was right.
Today we have been given full warning of
Hanoi's and Peiping's intentions as clear as
Hitler gave in Mein Kampf. If the free world
withdraws its support of South Viet-Nam,
whose only desire is to remain free and who
asks help to do so, we will encourage the be-
lief that aggression pays off.
And if we show that we are not prepared
to stand by our commitments to South Viet-
Nam, no one else is likely to believe that
our commitments anywhere else can be de-
pended on.
In 1939 Germany finally went to war —
her appetite having grown by what it fed
upon since 1936. Every historian of the cru-
cial days just prior to the invasion of Poland
agrees that the German Government went
to war secure in the assumption — solidly
based on the history of the preceding 3
years — that Britain and France would not
abide by their commitments.
From the lessons of the thirties we have
learned, I believe, that freedom is indivis-
ible— that as the area of freedom shrinks
under aggression's blows, our own security
and our own freedom are threatened. We
have learned that when aggressors succeed
they are encouraged to commit further ag-
gressions. We have learned that if aggres-
sion is not halted it will spread until once
again we will see a world in flames.
The South Vietnamese people are not alone.
The United States is not alone in coming to
their aid. More than 30 other nations have
offered aid of varying kinds to South Viet-
Nam. The struggle will be a long and a dif-
ficult one, and the end is far from view. But
the cause of freedom will eventually triumph.
So let us all renew our commitment to the
defense of freedom in the world today. Let
us show that this commitment is credible.
But at the same time, let us continue to
make clear that we are prepared to discuss
without conditions an honorable settlement
that asks nothing for the United States and
seeks only the continued freedom and in-
dependence for the people of the Republic
of Viet-Nam.
United States and Israel Sign
Income Tax Convention
Press release 164 dated June 29
On June 29 Secretary Rusk and Israeli
Ambassador Avraham Harman signed a con-
vention between the United States and Israel
for the avoidance of double taxation and for
the encouragement of international trade
and investment.
The purpose of the convention is similar
to that of income tax conventions presently
in force between the United States and nu-
merous other countries, namely, to eliminate
as far as possible double taxation resulting
from the taxation of the same item or items
of income by both countries.
The provisions of the convention deal with
exemptions or credits with respect to taxes
on various types of income, including com-
mercial and industrial profits, earnings from
the operation of ships and aircraft, divi-
dends, interest, royalties, income from real
property, personal service income, remunera-
tion of teachers, remittances and certain
payments to students and trainees, and gov-
ernment salaries or wages. The convention
also contains provisions for cooperation be-
tween officials of the two countries in the
exchange of information and for the pre- |
vention of fiscal evasion.
Certain provisions of the convention will
reduce U.S. taxes and thereby the overall
cost of financing with respect to certain |
business activities in Israel. Certain U.S.
investors are offered a credit against U.S.
taxes amounting to 7 percent of investments
made during the tax year, subject to pre-
scribed conditions. The convention also al-
lows deferral of tax payment on shares re-
ceived in return for the transfer of technical
know-how and the performance of related
services. Recipients of such shares may
122
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
postpone payment of both the Israel and
U.S. taxes until the shares are disposed of.
As usual in the income tax conventions,
the convention with Israel contains a precise
definition of the term "permanent establish-
ment" as that term is used in the articles
relating to the taxation of business and in-
vestment income.
The taxes covered by the convention are,
in the case of the United States, the Federal
income tax, including surtax, imposed by the
Internal Revenue Code, and, in the case of
Israel, the income tax, the company profits
tax, and the tax on gains from the sale of
land under the Land Appreciation Tax Law.
However, one of the articles of the conven-
tion provides for nondiscriminatory treat-
ment for nationals and corporations of
either country resident in the other country
in regard to taxes of every kind, national,
state, or local.
According to its terms, the convention will
be brought into force by the exchange of in-
struments of ratification. It will be sub-
mitted to the United States Senate for ad-
vice and consent to ratification.
Partnership in World Affairs
by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
Goethe said there are many echoes in the
world but only a few voices. These days
everyone is voicing or echoing their views
about Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic,
and student demonstrations and picketing. I
claim without shame that I am really a
battle-scarred, if not scared, veteran of the
demonstrators and picketers. I've been pick-
eted, applauded, and abused from right and
left and center everywhere from Texas to
Toronto for more years than I like to remem-
ber. Indeed my honorary degree should have
a P.D.— a "Doctor of Pickets."
I don't share the concern of some of my
contemporaries about student demonstra-
tions. I like their involvement in great is-
sues. But if I could offer them one word
of advice, I would say that to state goals is
easy; to tell us how to get there is not so
' Address made before the Harvard Alumni Asso-
ciation at Cambridge, Mass., on June 17 (U.S./U.N.
press release 4588 dated June 16).
easy. A moral commitment is hardly mean-
ingful without a practical hope of improving
the human condition.
But now I must speak a bit, and you must
listen. I hope we both finish our work at
about the same time. I will suggest how we
might — I say "might" advisedly — get to
some of our goals in the world.
Twenty years have passed since we made
the last peace — exactly the same span of
time as from Versailles to Hitler's war. This
is the sobering fact which today overshad-
ows our troubled world. Last time, not all
our good intentions, not all our last-minute
efforts and improvisations, could stave off
catastrophe. Can we be sure that on this
grim anniversary we may not be failing once
again? This question dwarfs all others, for
in the nuclear age we have peace — or we
have nothing.
We know all about our errors in 1919.
They were, simply, to repeat the policies of
the last century: high moral tone and non-
JULY 19, 1965
123
involvement. President Wilson attempted
through the League of Nations to bring our
idealism down to earth in the first sketch of
a functioning world society based on law, on
self-determination, on the organized institu-
tions of peace. But this dive into reality
was too much for us. We retreated to an old
isolation and continued to mistake exhorta-
tion for power.
Could we have repeated this error
in 1945? Perhaps. But in fact we were pre-
sented with the opposite temptation. What a
heyday of conquest we could have had —
alone with the atom bomb, alone with i
healthy economy in a shattered world, alone
with our energy unleashed and unbroken by
the ordeal of war.
But we are not conquerors. We are per-
haps the most unwilling great power in his-
tory. And certainly no great power has been
plunged so suddenly from the temptations
of lofty noninvolvement to the opposite
temptations of almost total power.
Yet we did not lose our idealism. We set
up the United Nations on the basis of equal-
ity and self-determination, and have helped
mightily to make it work ever since. We
have pressed for decolonization. We offered
to internationalize atomic energy. We gave
Europe the Marshall Plan — first proposed
from this platform. We preached the ideal
of unity and federation to Europe. All this
was very far from a selfish exercise of our
power.
But of course it tvas power. The United
States was dominant. The Western alliance
was guided by us. The United Nations ma-
jorities voted with us. The economic assist-
ance was all from us. The Communists were
largely contained by us.
It is a great record of magnanimous and
responsible leadership. But I suspect we be-
came used to the idea that, although all na-
tions are equal, we were somehow a little
more equal than anyone else. And, of course,
for any nation this sense of leadership is
very heady stuff! I have myself said of
flattery that "it is fine provided you don't
inhale." The same is true of leadership. It's
fine — and we did inhale.
Today's New Conditions
Today, however, we face entirely new con-
ditions. Preponderant power is a thing of the
past. Western Europe has recovered its eco-
nomic strength and military potential.
Russia commands a vast war machine with
a full nuclear arsenal. China adds incipi-
ent nuclear power to massive armies. And
both exploit the new techniques of covert
aggression, the so-called "wars of national
liberation" — which have nothing to do with
nation or liberation and can be stretched to
cover any use of outside interference to re-
move any government, whatever its policies,
that is anti-Communist or even non-Commu-
nist.
Our idealism is frustrated, too. The "third
world" of postcolonial states seems to have
much less stability and staying power than
we expected. Just as Western colonialism
ends, some of them seem ready to fight it
all over again under the guise of "neoco-
lonialism." Meanwhile, the new tactics of
subversion, infiltration, deception, and con-
fusion seem to be little understood, to say
the least. Even in Europe the partnership
we looked for from a unified continent has
been challenged and circumscribed by reas-
sertions of national power.
So we face a new situation, less manage-
able and less appealing. What do we do about
it? There are those who would bid us accept
the inevitable. If Europe is strong enough to
defend itself, let it do so. If China is recov-
ering its ancient influence in Asia, so what !
We can't stop it. If weak, developing nations
want to try communism, let them learn the
hard way. We've done the best we could with
aid and advice.
In these arguments we can detect some of
the old isolationist overtones and assump-
tions. But in a world much less closely knit
than this, isolation has not saved us from
two global wars. It launched us on a world-
wide depression. It saw the Far East all but
devoured by a single military clique.
Would we now keep the peace by leaving .
the levers of power largely in the hands of |
vast imperial systems whose ideological aim
is still to dominate the world? And at what
124
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
point should we cry "halt" — and probably
confront a nuclear holocaust?
The old isolationism was always too naive
about power and about the pretensions of
power. We must not make that mistake
again.
But equally we must not make the op-
posite mistake and put too much faith in
power. We have among us advocates of
much stronger action. For them, it is the
idealism of America that is at fault. Get
the Allies back into line. Confront Russia
over Berlin and East Germany. Bomb
China's nuclear capacity before it increases.
Back any anti-Communist government any-
where. Teach everyone they can't push us
around.
But this won't work either. What power
have we to coerce our friends in Europe?
What assurance have we that direct action
against either Communist giant will not un-
leash the nuclear war from which we would
suffer as much as they? How can we be sure
that unlimited support of any authoritar-
ian anti-Communist government may not
merely hasten the day when their citizens
become Communists as the only means to
change?
If total isolationism is no answer, total
interventionism is no answer either. In fact
the clear, quick, definable, measurable an-
swers are all ruled out. In this new twilight
of power there is no quick path to a con-
venient light switch.
What Are the Options?
What then can we do? What are the op-
tions? I want to suggest that the extremes
are not exhaustive. In between — less exciting
perhaps, less nationally satisfying, but safer
and more humane — are other routes and
methods which recognize the limits of our
power, allow for our traditional idealism,
take account of the world's ideological strug-
gle, and include no fantasies of either total
withdrawal or total control. But they are all
paths which demand a high degree of gen-
uine partnership, of genuine cooperation.
As such they will often seem more arduous
and more tedious than the old pursuits — for
it is easier to command than to persuade.
How do we apply a new sense of partner-
ship and cooperation to the dilemmas of our
time? In Europe we have to help defend
against renewed Soviet pressure westward.
Equally, we have to remove the grievance
of a divided Germany which obstructs gen-
uine peace in Central Europe. And, to com-
pound the problem, to defend the West we
must take a hard line with Russia. But our
only hope of reunifying Germany peacefully
is with Russian good will. I do not believe
a divided, splintered, nationalist Europe cut
off from America can accomplish this com-
plicated balance. Either its divisions will
enfeeble it militarily, or a resurgence of
German nationalism will postpone possible
reconciliation with the East.
Our best policy is, I think, on the one
hand to keep our defense commitment to
Europe unequivocal and to explore all rea-
sonable ways of transferring greater re-
sponsibility to them — by joint planning, by
joint purchasing, by joint burden sharing,
by our readiness to consider any pattern of
cooperation the Europeans care to suggest.
And if, at some future time, they move
toward political union, then, clearly, the ques-
tion of nuclear responsibility will have to be
reconsidered.
But at the same time let us seek all pos-
sible ways, together with our European al-
lies, to increase peaceful and profitable
contacts with Eastern Europe and the So-
viet Union. There were small signs not long
ago of a modest thaw in the dead winter
of the old cold war. We should be ready
for all such signs — in trade, in scientific
research, in cultural exchanges, in tourism,
in anything, in short, that opens the two
systems to each other and substitutes knowl-
edge and reality for myths and fears. Just
the other day President Johnson said di-
rectly to the Soviet people: "There is no
American interest in conflict with the So-
viet people anywhere." ^
' For the substantive portion of an address made
by President Johnson before the Cook County Demo-
cratic Party at Chicago, 111., on June 3, see Bulletin
of June 21, 1965, p. 986.
JULY 19, 1965
125
Had I been talking with you even a year
ago, I would have been more optimistic about
these possibilities. Today the drama in
Southeast Asia and the dilemmas faced by
Russia in its relations with its stubborn,
dogmatic Chinese associate have shrouded
our hopes of yesterday. But the aim is not
at fault — to prove that we at least want to
end this tragic breach in human society,
want to overcome the barriers that unnat-
urally divide an ancient continent and cul-
ture, want to explore with our fellow citizens
of a threatened world the dilemmas and the
possibilities of a stable peace.
The Principle of Self-Determination
In Asia, too, I do not believe our aims are
false. The right we seek to defend is the
right of people, be it in Korea or South
Viet-Nam, not to have their future decided
by violence. I do not believe this right can
be secured by retreat. Retreat leads to re-
treat just as aggression leads to aggression
in this still primitive international com-
munity. Already an active apparatus of sub-
version has begun its work in Thailand.
And it is only a few years since Malaya
beat down a long and murderous attempt to
impose communism by force. The Tibetans
were not so fortunate. And the Indians have
found the neighborhood of 800 million
Chinese hardly a guarantee of peace and
security.
So the aim of reinforcing the right of
peoples, large and small, to determine their
own destiny does not seem one that we dare
allow to go by default. The old, old principle
that powerful neighbors, for reasons of power
alone, must prevail never gave the world
peace in the past. I question whether it will
do so even in the nuclear age.
But if you ask me whether the task of
defending and upholding this right should
be the responsibility of any one power,
particularly of a large white Western power
whose past behavior in its own hemisphere
has not, shall we say, been wholly without
"imperialist" overtones, then I say emphat-
ically "No."
Let us be quite clear about this. The
United States has no desire to dominate.
We have no delusion of omnipotence or
omniscience. We do not cheat ourselves with
the purple rhetoric of "manifest destiny."
We do not see ourselves as self-appointed
gendarmes of this very troubled world. And
we do not rely on muscle instead of diplo-
macy.
But although we are not even a direct
party to most of the world's disputes, we
have had to take a disproportionate share of
the burden because the international com-
munity is not prepared or ready to do so, or
to do so fast and far enough in a given
crisis.
In South Viet-Nam the task of upholding
the principle of self-determination and popu-
lar sovereignty is ours in part by the
chances of history, but in part by default.
We should use every persuasion, every in-
strument available, to put responsibility
where it belongs — in the international com-
munity, with international guarantees and
policing, and in a long-term settlement rest-
ing not only on our arms but on the will
and authority of the United Nations.
This is what we seek. That the Commu-
nists have rejected every overture from
every quarter — more than 13 — for negotia-
tions without preconditions does not alter
our aim: to stop the fighting, to create the
international machinery to safeguard the
people's right to peaceful choice and to un-
derpin the whole postcolonial settlement.
Only the right of self-determination brought
it into being. Only that right, properly rein-
forced, can defend it now.
The Way of Consultation and Joint Action
So I am suggesting that our role is not
absolute responsibility. Rather, it is to seek
patiently, yes, and modestly, to persuade our
fellow nations to take on the indispensable
tasks of peace and law. And if we want the
new nations to recognize the reality of the
threat to self-determination in Southeast
Asia, for example, we must be ready to rec-
ognize the reality to them, for example, of
the threat of continued colonialism in south-
ern Africa. We can hardly proclaim the duty
126
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to safeguard the right of free choice in the
Caribbean and deny its validity on the other
side of the Atlantic. The credibility of our
posture rests on its consistency.
Safeguards for the right of choice, like
safeguards for peace itself, must depend
ultimately on multilateral foundations and
the concept of collective security enshrined
in the United Nations Charter.
At a time when peace is so precarious, it
is shameful that the great peacekeeping in-
stitution must beg for the means of keeping
the peace. But I believe its financial troubles
may soon be over. It has been on a sickbed
long enough. But it is not a deathbed. It
is suffering not from death pangs but from
growing pains.
The simple truth is that as long as the
world is in crisis, the United Nations will be
in crisis. That's what it is there for. As long
as there is global tension, there will be ten-
sion at the global headquarters. When it
ceases to reflect the troubles of the world,
then you can start worrying about its de-
mise.
But external pressure is not the only
threat to self-determination. Of the U.N.'s
114 members, perhaps two-thirds are vul-
nerable and unstable. Not because of great-
power ambitions and rivalries — the instabil-
ity springs from the growing gap between
their aspirations and the hard economic real-
ity of making their way in the postcolonial
world. The fact that sugar prices fell by half
last winter is not unconnected with the crisis
in the Dominican Republic. Nor has the sta-
bility in Latin America been reinforced by
a 10-year decline in primary prices that
wiped out the effect of all incoming capital,
public or private.
These are roots of disorders exploited by
external subversion. To suppose that our
world can continue half affluent and half
desperate is to assume a patience on the part
of the needy for which — to put it mildly —
history gives us no warrant at all.
But, like peacekeeping, this vast global
task is not a task for one nation or for na-
tions acting singly. The developed states to-
gether must redress the imbalance. While
America can give and has given a generous
lead, we have to accept once again the pa-
tient, modest, unsensational tasks of con-
sulting and persuading.
The developing nations have started to act
together in the framework of the United
Nations Trade and Development Conference.
The developed nations' policies should also
be internationalized more and more by
working in and through the United Nations
group.
If only one government is giving a country
aid, it easily comes to play too pervasive a
part on the local scene. Suspicions of
neocolonialism arise. Issues of prestige, of
paternalism, of dependence begin to obtrude.
The answer to these dilemmas is once
again the way of consultation and joint ac-
tion to bring a sizable part of the needed
flow of capital under international bodies
in which donors and recipients can work out
their problems together.
No doubt much of this seems more diffi-
cult than the role of direct benefaction. But
our readiness to act not as benefactor but
as partner could lead to increasing respect,
closer understanding, the sense of commu-
nity, and perhaps, at last, enough confi-
dence to dissipate the myths of "neocolonial-
ism" and erase the memories of earlier ser-
vitudes and humiliations.
In short, what I believe we should seek in
this new age of more limited power but still
unlimited challenge is not so much new pol-
icies but a new emphasis, a new tone. We
should be readier to listen than to instruct
— with that curiosity which is the beginning
of wisdom. It will take a greater effort of
imagination for us to see the world through
others' eyes, to judge our policies as they
impinge on others' interests.
For what we attempt today is to extend
to the whole society of man the techniques,
the methods, the habits — if you will, the
courtesies — upon which our own sense of
citizenship is based. In our free society we
ask that citizens participate as equals. We
accept their views and interests as signifi-
cant. We struggle for unforced consensus. We
JULY 19, 1965
127
tolerate conflict and accept dissent. But we
believe that because each citizen knows he is
valued and has his chance for comment and
influence, his final loyalty to the social order
will be more deeply rooted and secure.
As heirs to the tradition of free govern-
ment, what else can we do? Our founders
had the audacity to proclaim their ideals
"self-evident" for all mankind. We can
hardly be less bold when "all mankind" is
no longer an abstraction but a political fact
in the United Nations, a physical fact for
the circling astronaut.
Nor should we despair. The art of open
government has grown from its seeds in the
tiny city-states of Greece to become the
political mode of half the world. So let us
dream of a world in which all states, great
and small, work together for the peaceful
flowering of the republic of man.
United States and Mexico Agree
To Extend Civil Air Talks
Joint Statement
Press release 165 dated July 1
Delegations representing the Government
of the United States of America and the
Government of the United Mexican States
have been conducting air transport discus-
sions in Mexico City to consider the manner
in which United States and Mexican sched-
uled airlines would provide international air
services between the two countries in the fu-
ture.
Having reached an understanding on a
majority of the elements of a new agree-
ment which, if concluded, will further ex-
pand the network of air routes and air
services between the two countries, the dele-
gations have agreed on an extension of the
present agreement ^ without change, through
July 15, 1965, to permit conclusion of the
negotiations.
^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series
4675, 5513, and 5648.
Importance of Scientific Exchanges
With U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe
Following is the text of a report made to
the Cabinet on June 18 by Glenn T. Seaborg,
Chairman, U, S. Atomic Energy Commission.
White House press release dated June 19 for release June 20
Report to the Cabinet
From: Chairman, U. S. Atomic Energy
Commission
Subject : Scientific-Technological Exchanges
in the Peaceful Uses of Atomic
Energy with the Soviet Union and
Countries of Eastern Europe
I believe that the visit last week to the
United States of a group of Soviet scientists
offers us a concrete example of that common
bond of science about which the President
has spoken. Though this visit received little
public attention, it was a noteworthy ex-
ample of the way in which scientific exchange
can add significantly to better international
relations.
This was the fourth group of Soviet sci-
entists to visit the United States in the last
year or so, balanced by the visits of four
similar American groups to the Soviet Union.
These visits which I will review later con-
firm our hopes that science can serve as a
possible bridge to span the gap which con-
tinues to exist between many countries. The
language of science has increasingly become
identified as a common tongue that tran-
scends regular language barriers and politi-
cal differences. I strongly believe that to be
understood is essential to peace, and no un-
derstanding is possible where there is a want
of communication. The field of science is an
area in which incipient understanding can
take root and grow.
I should like to take this opportunity to tell
you of our experience in the scientific-tech-
nological exchanges in the peaceful uses of
atomic energy.
In May 1963, I visited the U.S.S.R. as the
head of a U. S. delegation at the invitation
of Mr. A. M. Petrosyants, Chairman of the
State Committee for the Utilization of Atomic
128
department op state bulletin
Energy. Our delegation was warmly re-
ceived at a number of civilian research lab-
oratories and reactor plants, including several
which had never before been open to foreign
scientists from either the East or West.
During the visit, Mr. Petrosyants and I
reached agreement on a new Memorandum of
Cooperation ^ which provided for an expan-
sion of the exchanges previously conducted,
as well as a program of new exchanges in-
volving the assignment of researchers in each
other's unclassified facilities. This Memo-
randum of Cooperation represents part of
more inclusive agreement negotiated between
our Department of State and the U.S.S.R.
Later that year a team of ten Soviet tech-
nical personnel under the leadership of Mr,
Petrosyants visited U. S. installations com-
parable to those we had visited. In a coast-
to-coast tour the Soviet visitors were shown
many of our most recent advances in those
areas in which we believe it is to our mutual
advantage to exchange information.
Important mutual benefits were derived
from this initial exchange. In our visit to
the Soviet Union and in their visit to the U.S.
each was able to obtain a more detailed pic-
ture of the comparative status of our two
countries in reactor development, controlled
fusion, nuclear chemistry, high energy
physics and other disciplines.
In addition to opening many aspects of
the Soviet nuclear energy program to U. S.
scientists, a large amount of good will was
engendered between responsible American
and Soviet scientists. After the initial ex-
change of senior program administrators was
completed, the way was clear for more de-
tailed exchanges under the Memorandum of
Cooperation.
I am pleased to report that in the past year
or so we have achieved considerable success
in implementing the Memorandum. This has
led to a substantial improvement of our
knowledge of Soviet scientific research in the
fields of controlled fusion, solid state physics,
civilian power reactors, and the disposal of
radioactive wastes. Delegations of up to ten
'■ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5582,
scientists in each of these fields have spent
two weeks visiting the leading facilities in
each other's countries. The opportunity for
U. S. scientists to examine in detail Soviet
research, development, and operating facili-
ties has permitted the AEC, and U, S. science
in general, to make more accurate appraisals
of the relative standing of American and
Soviet science in these fields.
I have had the pleasure of meeting with
each of the Soviet delegations upon comple-
tion of their tours of U. S. facilities, and in
every instance they have expressed their
appreciation for the hospitality received
throughout their travels, their admiration of
the achievements of U. S. science and tech-
nology, and their earnest desire to continue
this program.
A ' recently implemented feature of the
Memorandum of Cooperation is the exchange
of a number of research specialists to work
and study in each other's installations for
periods of up to one year. In the past few
weeks, two Soviet scientists from the Yerevan
Physics Institute completed a three-month as-
signment at the Cambridge Electron Acceler-
ator while Dr. and Mrs. [Gerhardt E.]
Fischer, from our Cambridge program, com-
pleted three months of work in Yerevan.
(Incidentally, Mrs. Fischer is the daughter of
former Presidential Scientific Advisor, Dr.
George Kistiakowsky, and a competent sci-
entist in her own right.)
A scientist from Moscow spent six months
with the high energy physics group at the
AEC's Brookhaven National Laboratory on
Long Island, and, in return, a Brookhaven
scientist is currently participating in the re-
search of the Moscow Institute of Theoretical
and Experimental Physics, The participants
of these exchanges have been provided broad
opportunities for professional and personal
travel, in addition to having the rather unique
distinction of being the first actually to con-
duct research in each other's nuclear energy
programs.
Last month, Foy D, Kohler, our Ambassa-
dor in Moscow, confirmed our belief in the
international importance of these exchange
JULY 19, 1965
129
programs when he informed me that he is
looking forward to the arrival of more AEC
delegations this summer. In his opinion,
these scientific exchanges are especially use-
ful in improving our bilateral political re-
lationships during these troubled times. High
Soviet officials have expressed similar senti-
ments.
We are maintaining a continuous flow, in
both directions, of reports and doctoral dis-
sertations on recent research in the peaceful
uses of atomic energy. The number of docu-
ments exchanged to date has exceeded 500.
As a result of this and other informal ex-
changes of information, the U.S.S.R. is one
of the leading foreign contributors to our
compilation of reports in the nuclear sciences.
The Memorandum provides for further ex-
changes of delegations in the use of tracer
compounds in medicine, radioneurological re-
search, nuclear physics, high and low energy
physics, and accelerator design, as well as
the long-term exchanges of research special-
ists in controlled fusion and reactor tech-
niques. In addition, we plan to hold joint
conferences on specific scientific problems
of mutual interest.
One specific area of exchange which I wish
to bring to your attention is in the field of
desalination, including the use of nuclear
energy. This program is carried out by the
Department of the Interior, and the AEC.
As a result of President Johnson's invitation
for cooperative efforts in this very important
field, a Soviet group toured U. S. desalination
facilities and reactor plants last summer.-
In November an agreement to cooperate in
the field of desalting was signed in Moscow ^
and a U. S. group made a return visit to
Soviet installations engaged in this work.
We have made a good start in exchanging
information in this area and look forward to
further exchanges as the programs develop.
Of course not all exchanges in the peaceful
uses of nuclear energy are carried out under
' For background, see Bulletin of July 13, 1964,
p. 60, and Aug. 3, 1964, p. 144.
' For background and text of agreement, see ibid.,
Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828.
the Memorandum or the Desalination Agree-
ment, for there are other programs which
involve AEC facilities and permit AEC and
other scientists to visit Soviet scientific cen-
ters. Both sides have also facilitated par-
ticipation at professional meetings and, for
example, AEC scientists have recently par-
ticipated in scientific symposia and seminars
in Minsk, Novosibirsk, and Yerevan. A large
group of U. S. scientists also will attend a
meeting in Moscow later this month of the
International Union of Pure and Applied
Chemistry. It might also be of interest to
note that there are currently several dozen
Soviet scientists in the United States at work
in many areas of study and at many facilities
across the country.
In addition to our exchanges with the
Soviet Union we engaged in similar ac-
tivities with a number of the countries in
Eastern Europe. For example, Polish sci-
entists are working in a number of atomic
energy installations and universities in areas
which do not involve national security.
Among a number of such projects, a young
Polish scientist, sponsored by the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, is now spend-
ing a year at the Brookhaven National
Laboratory studying theoretical physics and
another is participating for four months in
the Laboratory's medical research program.
Other young Polish scientists are participat-
ing in unclassified AEC-sponsored research
at various universities such as Stanford,
Notre Dame, Marquette, and the California
Institute of Technology. U. S. scientists visit
Polish institutes and the AEC supported a
post-graduate researcher who spent a full
year at the leading Polish nuclear energy
research center. A very important aspect of
our exchange program with Poland is the
AEC depository library which is maintained
in Warsaw. In return, we receive a substan-
tial number of Polish reports, mostly in Eng-
lish, in sufficient copies to supply all of the
domestic depository libraries.
AEC Commissioner, Dr. Mary I. Bunting,
recently completed a trip to Poland at the
invitation of the Polish AEC. As both a
130
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
scientist and appointee of President Johnson
to a high-level position in his administration,
her visit is worthy of special note.
I would hope that the wider exchange of
information and ideas in the peaceful uses
of atomic energy will continue and expand
the desire for constructive cooperation.
While the Soviet scientists live in a society
different from ours in many ways — a society
whose political principles clash with our na-
tional ideals — in the laboratory, the Soviet
scientist behaves in much the same way as
the American scientist. It is our hope that
the message of free inquiry which the sci-
entists around the world must apply in their
work will increasingly contribute to better
understanding.
Science certainly will not remove all of
the differences and resolve all the conflicts
between East and West, but it is an approach
that offers some promise of results. And in
this nuclear age, I do not think that we can
afford to neglect any path that offers hope of
increasing international understanding.
Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy
89th Congress, 1st Session
Export Controls on Black Walnut Logs. Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Commerce. March
16 and 31, 1965. 213 pp.
Antireligious Activities in the Soviet Union and in
Eastern Europe. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on Europe of the House Committee on
Foreign Affairs. May 10-12, 1965. 190 pp.
Planning for Peace. Hearings before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on S. Con. Ees.
32. May 11 and 12, 1965. 190 pp.
Safety of Life at Sea. Hearing before the Subcom-
mittee on Communications and Power of the
House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Com-
merce on H.R. 7954, a bill to amend the Com-
munications Act of 1934 to conform to the Con-
vention for the Safety of Life at Sea, London
(1960). May 19, 1965. 16 pp.
Hague Protocol to Warsaw Convention. Hearings
before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
on Executive H, 86th Congress, 1st session. May
26 and 27, 1965. 126 pp.
Report of the National Advisory Council on Inter-
national Monetary and Financial Problems on pro-
posed increase in International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development assistance to private
enterprise through the International Finance
Corporation and associated matters. H. Doc. 198.
June 3, 1965. 22 pp.
The Foreign Service Annuity Adjustment Act of
1965. Report to accompany H.R. 4170. H. Rept.
500. June 10, 1965. 20 pp.
Accelerated Program To Advance Desalting Tech-
nology. Report to accompany S. 24. S. Rept. 319.
June 14, 1965. 11 pp.
Tenth NATO Parliamentarians' Conference. Report
of the House delegation to the conference held at
Paris, November 16-20, 1964. H. Rept. 510. June
14, 1965. 33 pp.
International Council of Scientific Unions and Cer-
tain Associated Unions. Report to accompany
H.R. 8862. H. Rept. 518. June 15, 1965. 7 pp.
Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia
and Vietnam (revised edition). Senate Committee
on Foreign Relations. June 16, 1965. 233 pp.
[Committee print.]
The Baltic States. Report to accompany H. Con.
Res. 416. H. Rept. 526. June 17, 1965. 5 pp.
South Pacific Commission. Report to accompany
H.J. Res. 503. H. Rept. 531. June 21, 1965. 10 pp.
International Cooperation Year. Report to accom-
pany S. Con. Res. 36. H. Rept. 533. June 21,
1965. 4 pp.
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965. Report of
the House Committee on Ways and Means to ac-
company H.R. 9042, a bill to provide for the imple-
mentation of the agreement concerning automotive
products between the Government of the United
States and the Government of Canada. H. Rept.
537. June 21, 1965. 58 pp.
United Nations Participation Act Amendments. Re-
port to accompany S. 1903. S. Rept. 360. June 23,
1965. 17 pp.
U. S. Contributions to the South Pacific Commission.
Report to accompany S.J. Res. 71. S. Rept. 361.
June 23, 1965. 18 pp.
Greek Loan of 1929 Settlement Act. Report to ac-
company S. 1760. S. Rept. 362. June 23, 1965.
23 pp.
Export Control Act of 1949. Report to accompany
H.R. 7105. S. Rept. 363. June 23, 1965. 12 pp.
International Committee of the Red Cross. Report
to accompany H.R. 8715. H. Rept. 548. June 23,
1965. 10 pp.
Refugees and Escapees. Report of the Senate Com-
mittee on the Judiciary made by its Subcommittee
To Investigate Problems Connected With Refugees
and Escapees. S. Rept. 371. June 25, 1965. 8 pp.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Samuel D. Berger as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs, effective July 6. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press
release dated June 30.)
David L. Osborn as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective July
4. (For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 159 dated June 21.)
JULY 19, 1965
131
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Submits to U.N. Security Council OAS Documents
on Dominican Republic
statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
U.S. Representative in the Security Council ^
Mr. President, I have asked to speak at
this point in order to bring promptly to the
Council's attention the proposals which the
Organization of American States Ad Hoe
Committee in the Dominican Republic^ has
made public today in behalf of a peaceful
and democratic solution of the Dominican
crisis. These documents have, as you have
announced, been transmitted to the United
Nations by the Organization of American
States and, as you have also informed the
Council, will be circulated before the day is
over.
However, in view of their importance and
their significance to our consideration of the
item before us, I will read them to the Coun-
cil because they contain positive and for-
ward-looking contributions to the restoration
of normal conditions of life in the Dominican
Republic. They look, indeed, beyond the
very limited sights and the sterile invective
which I am told has been reflected by some
speakers here during our immediately pre-
ceding meetings. They are the product of
an effort not to assess blame or to engage in
1 Made in the Security Council on June 18 (U.S./
U.N. press release 4594) ; for previous statements on
the Dominican situation made in the Council by
Ambassador Stevenson, see Bulletin of May 31,
1965, p. 869; June 7, 1965, p. 913; and June 14, 1965,
p. 975.
2 For background, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 1017.
recriminations about what has happened in
the Dominican Republic but rather to find a
lasting solution which will truly benefit the
Dominican people.
I hope that the members of the Council
will give these proposals their thoughtful at-
tention after they have been distributed in
the official languages.
Proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee
The first is a document entitled "Proposal
of the Ad Hoc Committee for the Solution
of the Dominican Crisis." And I quote it
as follows :
In carrying out the mandate entrusted to it, the
Ad Hoc Committee, composed of representatives of
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of
Foreign Affairs of the American Eepublics, has,
since its arrival in the Dominican Republic on June
3, undertaken extensive exploratory conversations
with both contending sides, and with a large number
of groups and individuals from various sectors of
the population and various sections of the country.
Despite existing divergencies, the Committee has
been able to observe a general revulsion against
possible resumption of fighting and a widespread
yearning for the restoration of a climate of peace
and conciliation and for a return of the country to
normal democratic institutional life so that the
Dominican people may freely express their will and
shape their own destiny. The Organization of Amer-
ican States is sincerely devoted to helping the
Dominican people achieve this vital objective.
132
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
As a result of its conversations and study of the
present situation, the Committee is convinced that
the best way of achieving this objective is through
free, democratic elections. For this purpose, the
Committee herewith presents for the consideration
of the parties and of the Dominican people as a
whole the following plan of action:
1. Elections
General elections for the President and Vice Presi-
dent of the Republic, members of the National Con-
gress and for municipal authorities shall be held
throughout the country. In order to allow sufficient
time for the restoration of a climate of peace and
tranquility necessary for carrying out the electoral
process, the date set for these elections will be no
earlier than six months but no later than nine
months from the present date, so the period referred
to will be as short as possible with an assured
termination date.
In these elections all political parties and their
candidates who register with the electoral board will
be able to participate and all will enjoy full free-
dom of speech and assembly.
2. Preparation for the Electoral Process and OAS
Assistance
In order that such elections might be free and
reflect the will of the Dominican people, the Orga-
nization of American States, through its competent
organs, will cooperate fully in the preparation and
holding of the elections and will provide the assist-
ance which may be indicated.
An OAS Technical Advisory Election Commission
will be established immediately, composed of jurists
and experts from the member states of the Orga-
nization. In its work, the Committee may draw upon
the experience of the OAS Electoral Commission
which assisted in the preparation and holding of the
elections of December, 1962. The Committee will
cooperate in all aspects of the technical preparations
that may be necessary. The Committee will observe
the entire electoral process, including the elections
themselves, as well as the verification of the results
of the voting.
The Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights, provided with an adequate staff, will main-
tain a headquarters in Santo Domingo throughout
the pre-electoral period and will be available to all
Dominicans to receive and investigate any com-
plaints of violations of the basic civil and political
rights of the people. The appropriate provisions of
the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties
of Man, which both parties have already pledged
themselves to observe, will be accepted by all civilian
and military authorities and all political parties and
candidates who participate in the election.
During the electoral process, the Inter-American
Peace Force, reduced to the number strictly neces-
sary to carry out its mission, will supplement the
efforts of the Dominican authorities in the mainte-
nance of peace.
3. General Amnesty and Restoration of Peace
In a spirit of reconciliation, full amnesty will be
granted to all who have participated in the civil
strife, provided that they will lay down their arms
and acknowledge a willingness to live at peace and
in harmony with their fellow citizens. The Orga-
nization of American States will give assistance to
any who wish to leave the country and wiU take
the necessary action to obtain safe conducts for
them.
The Dominican armed forces will return to their
quarters and will remain subject to the authority of
the provisional government which will be estab-
lished. They will refrain from any political activity.
The Organization of American States and all
responsible authorities will call upon the irregular
forces on both sides to lay down their arms and
return to their homes and peaceful pursuits. The
Organization of American States will receive cus-
tody of all arms surrendered and will establish arms
collection stations.
4. Provisional Government
In order to carry the country to the elections
there must necessarily be a provisional government
which will exercise authority throughout the entire
Dominican territory until the elected government
assumes office, and which will :
A. Assume immediate responsibility for the main-
tenance of law and order, and insure respect for
human rights;
B. Restore the normal functioning of public
administration ;
C. Institute urgent and necessary programs for
the rehabilitation and development of the economic
and social Life of the country ; and
D. Represent the Dominican nation in the inter-
national community.
In order for the provisional government to carry
out its caretaker functions and insure an impartial
atmosphere during the electoral process, it should
represent all sectors of the country. The Commis-
sion will hold conversations with political groups
and community leaders in order to contribute to
the formation of the provisional government.
5. OAS Assistance for the Provisional Government
Once the provisional government is established,
the Ad Hoc Committee will recommend to the 10th
Meeting of Foreign Ministers that the governments
of the member states of the Organization of Ameri-
can States grant it immediate diplomatic recogni-
tion.
The provisional government will then be in a
JULY 19, 1965
133
position to receive through the Organization, major
technical and economic assistance, in order to insti-
tute immediately programs of national rehabilita-
tion.
6. Institutional Act
Without prejudice to the constitutional instru-
ment under which the Dominican people will wish to
be governed following elections, the provisional gov-
ernment can best be provided with the basis for
exercising its political and administrative authority
through putting into effect temporarily of an Insti-
tutional Act, drawn from the relevant provisions
of the 1963 constitution, which are essentially those
of the 1962 constitution in these respects.
A group of distinguished Dominican jurists could
be entrusted with the immediate preparation of the
draft of the Institutional Act.
7. Constitutional Assembly
It is the conviction of the Committee that it is
up to the Dominican people to decide the constitu-
tional issue. In accordance with this principle a
constitutional assembly will be convoked within six
months following assumption of office by the elected
government. The Congress, once elected, shall deter-
mine the method by which the constitutional assem-
bly shall be composed.
8. The Committee hopes that, in a spirit of
democracy and patriotism, this plan will receive the
support of the leaders of the contending forces and
of all the Dominican people.
Signed at Santo Domingo, June 18, 1965,
by Ilmar Penna Marinho, Ambassador Rep-
resentative of Brazil, Ambassador Ramon de
Clairmont Duefias, Representative of El Sal-
vador, and Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker,
Representative of the United States of Amer-
ica.
Declaration to the Dominican People
Together with this document and this ap-
peal there is a Declaration to the Dominican
People agreed to by the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Organization of American States,
which I should also like to take the liberty
of reading to the members of the Security
Council. It is as follows:
The Representatives of the Organization of Amer-
ican States in the Dominican Republic, speaking on
behalf of the regional community, address the fol-
lowing declaration and appeal to the Dominican
people :
The American Republics comprise a family of
nations. They are bound together by close spiritual
and material ties. What affects one member of the
family necessarily affects all the other members.
The American conmiunity has been deeply dis-
turbed by the fratricidal strife in the Dominican
Republic. We are here because of this concern. We
have not come to take sides in the struggle. The
reestablishment of peace is what we seek. Our
mission is not intervention, but rather conciliation.
The Organization of American States is no
stranger to the Dominican people: It has shared in
the struggle for freedom which you have sustained
for so many years. In cities and hamlets through-
out the land the Organization of American States
stands for impartiality, respect for human rights,
assistance to the needy and defense of the demo-
cratic process. We come in the same spirit to help
the Dominican people in this moment of crisis.
In an effort to understand the current situation
we have spoken to Dominicans from all walks of
life and of all persuasions. We recognize the patri-
otism and valor that have gone into the struggle.
We understand the causes and objectives which have
brought Dominicans to take up arms. We know the
price that has been paid in human lives. We ap-
preciate the fact that those who live do not want
to break faith with those who have died. We realize
that convictions are passionately held and that
divisions run deep.
But we also sense the longings of countless num-
bers of Dominicans not actively engaged in the
struggle. They do not want a solution imposed by
force of arms. Their desire is for a peaceful solu-
tion emanating from the will of the people. At this
moment they ask for peace to resume their normal
lives, assurances of respect for individual rights,
and guarantees for democratic institutions to func-
tion again. We interpret these to be the aspirations
of the great majority of the Dominican people. We
are confident that these aspirations have the support
of the peoples of the hemisphere.
We have examined many different possibilities in
an effort to find a basis for understanding between
the contending sides. We have also held extensive
conversations with the leaders of the two groups in
an effort to determine the possibility of reaching a
formula satisfactory to both. We regret to say that
we have not found agreement on the fundamental
issues.
We are confident, however, that there is a solution
that all democratic men and women of good will can
support. This is to let the Dominican people decide
the crucial issues for themselves through early
general elections. The Organization of American
States stands ready and willing to play a major role
in this undertaking, as it did in 1962.
We, therefore, propose to the Dominican people
the following:
1. The holding of general elections with Organi-
zation of American States supervision in a period
of six to nine months, the minimum time required to
make the necessary arrangements.
134
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
2. The opportunity for all leaders of democratic
political parties abroad to return to the Dominican
Republic under safeguards of the Organization of
American States in order that they may participate
in the political life of the nation, including the elec-
tions.
3. The immediate termination of the armed strug-
gle, with the return of all members of the regular
armed forces to their barracks and irregular forces
to their homes under the supervision of the Organi-
zation of American States.
4. The surrender to the Organization of American
States of all arms in the hands of the civil popula-
tion. For this purpose there will be established arms
collection stations of the Organization of American
States.
5. The reopening of all commercial and industrial
establishments throughout the country and the
return of all employees to their customary places
of work.
6. The formation of a provisional government
which will carry the country to elections and the
preparation of an Institutional Act which will serve
as a provisional charter until the people decide the
constitutional issue through a constitutional assem-
bly which will meet following elections.
The Organization of American States for its part
assures the Dominican people that it stands ready
to carry out the program described below in estab-
lishing a climate propitious for the holding of free
elections and thereby helping the country to return
to political normalcy and to initiate economic re-
covery:
1. The creation of a new OAS Electoral Commis-
sion to work closely with the central electoral board
in organizing and supervising the electoral process.
2. The continuation of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights in the Dominican Repub-
lic to assure respect for political rights throughout
the electoral period.
3. The immediate establishment of an expanded
program of economic and technical assistance to
promote the recovery of the nation and to help it
solve its most urgent economic and social problems.
In making the foregoing proposals we do not ask
the Dominican people to cease in their struggle to
win political freedom. What we ask is that the
solution not be imposed by force of arms — by hatred,
by imprisonment, by persecution or by death. We
want no one to surrender his ideals under the threat
of force. We desire, instead, that the political strug-
gle continue but that it be decided by ballots, not
bullets. Let the will of the people freely expressed
deteiTiiine the destiny of the nation. In this way
the decision of the majority will prevail and the
rights of the minority will be respected. Violence
will give way to reason !
In making this proposal we appeal to all Domini-
cans to help save their country from further suffer-
ing and bloodshed.
We ask those who fight to lay down their arms
and return to their barracks or to their homes.
We ask public employees to return to their posts
to reestablish all public services.
We ask labor and management to restore the
economic life of the nation.
We ask political leaders to rally their followers
to the cause of peace through free elections.
We ask teachers to instiU in their students Domin-
ican brotherhood.
We ask the clerg:y to heal the spiritual wounds
caused by civil strife.
In conclusion, we address a sincere, urgent appeal
to all patriotic Dominicans of democratic conviction
and good will to take this path to national reconcili-
ation.
The Dominican people long for peace and freedom.
This is the hour of decision !
Santo Domingo, June 18, 1965, and signed
by the same members of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee, including Jose A. Mora, Secretary-
General of the Organization of American
States.
ANZUS Ministers Excliange Views
on World Problems
Following is the text of a communique of
the lUth ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand,
and United States Security Treaty) Council
meeting, which tvas held at Washington on
June 28.
Press release 162 dated June 28
The ANZUS Council held its annual meet-
ing in Washington on June 28, 1965. The
Right Honorable Keith J. Holyoake, Prime
Minister and Minister for External Affairs,
represented New Zealand; the Honorable
Paul Hasluck, Minister for External Affairs,
represented Australia; and the Honorable
Dean Rusk, Secretary of State, represented
the United States.
This annual meeting, like its predecessors,
was the occasion for a full and candid ex-
change of views on world problems of direct
concern to the ANZUS partners. This ex-
change further broadened and deepened the
community of interests felt by the ANZUS
JULY 19, 1965
135
countries, which have fought side by side in
two World Wars and in Korea, and once
again in South Viet-Nam are comrades in
arms in the defense of freedom.
The Council discussed the serious situa-
tion in Southeast Asia caused by the aggres-
sive actions of North Viet-Nam, with the
support of Communist China, in flagrant
violation of basic obligations of international
law and of the Geneva Accords of 1954 and
1962. It noted that the infiltration of arms
and combat personnel from North Viet-Nam
into South Viet-Nam has been substantially
increased and that this infiltration includes
units of the regular armed forces of North
Viet-Nam.
The Council noted that North Viet-Nam
continues to flout the 1962 Geneva agree-
ment by maintaining military forces and
supplies in Laos and by moving armed men
and weapons through Laos into South Viet-
Nam. It noted also the increasing Com-
munist threat to Thailand, which has been
clearly identified by the Communist Chinese
as the next target.
The Council noted that the Communists
themselves regard the war in South Viet-
Nam as a critical test of the technique of
infiltrating arms and trained men across na-
tional frontiers. It afl!irmed its conclusion
of a year ago "that the defeat of this ag-
gression is necessary not only to the security
of Southeast Asia and the Southwest Pacific
but as a demonstration that Communist ex-
pansion by such tactics will not be allowed
to succeed." ^
The Council agreed, at the same tune, that
every effort should be made to achieve a
peaceful settlement which would enable the
people of South Viet-Nam to choose and
shape for themselves their own destiny "in
conformity with democratic principles and
without any foreign interference from what-
ever sources." ^
It was noted with regret that the Com-
1 For text of a communique of the 13th ANZUS
Council meeting dated July 18, 1964, see Bulletin
of Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.
2 From an address by Tran Van Do, Foreign Min-
ister of the Republic of Viet-Nam, June 22, 1965.
munist side had rejected many moves in the
direction of such a settlement by negotia-
tion. Such moves included those made by
the United Kingdom as Co-Chairman of the
Geneva Conferences, by the Secretary-Gen-
eral of the United Nations, by the President
of India, by a group of seventeen non-aligned
nations,^ and by President Johnson in his
speech at Baltimore on 7 April.* The Council
nevertheless agreed that such efforts should
continue, including the recent initiative of
the Commonwealth Prime Ministers.
With the same objective in view, the
Council also agreed that more intensive
efforts should be made to promote the eco-
nomic and social development of Southeast
Asia as a means of helping to remove some
of the basic causes of instability in the area.
In this respect the Australian and New
Zealand Ministers welcomed the readiness of
the United States, as announced by Presi-
dent Johnson on 7 April, to contribute a bil-
lion dollars to an expanded program of
economic assistance under the leadership of
Asian nations and the United Nations. It
was hoped that North Viet-Nam would co-
operate in such a program as soon as peace
is restored.
The Council expressed serious concern at
the situation resulting from Indonesia's con-
tinuing confrontation of Malaysia, which
has created a major threat to peace in
Southeast Asia. It reaffirmed its support
for the territorial integrity and independ-
ence of Malaysia. The Council hoped that
peaceful relationships would soon be re-
stored so that the Asian nations concerned
would be allowed to pursue the advancement
of their peoples.
The Council noted with concern that Com-
munist China, in the past year, has twice
tested nuclear devices in the atmosphere, in
defiance of world public opinion as expressed
in the nuclear test ban treaty. The Council
urges all nations to consider the dangers in-
herent in further proliferation of nuclear
weapons and the threat to the health and
8 For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965,
p. 610.
* For text, see ibid., p. 606.
136
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
well-being of mankind which results from
atmospheric testing of nuclear weapons.
The Ministers expressed a keen awareness
of the value to Council Members of regular
exchanges of views within the context of the
ANZUS Council and stated their intention
to meet again in about one year, at a place
to be determined.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be p^irchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y,
Disarmament Commission
Memorandum of the United States on measures to
stop the spread of nuclear weapons, halt and turn
down the arms race, and reduce international ten-
sion. DC/214/ Add. 1. April 29, 1965. 51 pp.
Letter dated May 3 from the permanent represent-
ative of Yugoslavia transmitting a memorandum
on "necessary immediate measures in the field of
disarmament." DC/216. May 3, 1965. 6 pp.
Letter dated May 20 from the deputy permanent
representative of the Soviet Union concerning a
letter from Portugal (DC/215). DC/217. May 21,
1965. 2 pp.
Economic and Social Council
United Nations Children's Fund:
Review of UNICEF/WHO-assisted leprosy control
projects. Report by the Director-General of the
World Health Organization. E/ICEF/513. April
20, 1965. 52 pp.
Recommendations of the 14th session of the
UNICEF-WHO Joint Committee on Health Pol-
icy. E/ICEF/515. May 17, 1965. 3 pp.
General progress report of the Acting Executive
Director, program trends and prospects. E/
ICEF/511/Add. 1. May 20, 1965. 42 pp.
Growth and development of the young child from
one to six years. Prepared for submission to
the UNICEF Executive Board by the Interna-
tional Children's Centre. E/ICEF/521. May 21,
1965. 65 pp.
Reaching the young child. Note and recommenda-
tions by the Acting Executive Director. E/
ICEF/520. May 24, 1965. 20 pp.
Summary of project recommendations by the Act-
ing Executive Director to the June 1965 session
of the Executive Board. E/ICEF/P/L.550. May
25, 1965. 39 pp.
Technical assistance activities of the United Na-
tions. E/4016. May 10, 1965. 200 pp.
Advisory services in the field of human rights. E/
4023. May 12, 1965. 3 pp.
Coordination of international assistance in cases of
natural disaster. E/4036. May 12, 1965. 8 pp.
Economic and social consequences of disarmament.
Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources re-
leased by disarmament. E/4042. May 12, 1965. 49
pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Atomic Energy
Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi-
lateral agreement between the United States and
Israel of July 12, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3311,
4407, 4507, 5079, 5723), for cooperation concern-
ing civil uses of atomic energy. Done at Vienna
June 18, 1965. Enters into force on the date on
which the Agency accepts the initial inventory.
Signatures: Israel, International Atomic Energy
Agency, United States.
Satellite Communications System
Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite sys-
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964.
Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accessions deposited: Pakistan, June 30, 1965;
Yemen Arab Republic, June 29, 1965.
Special agreement. Done at Washington AugTist 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.
Signatures: Pakistan, June 30, 1965; Ministry of
Communications of Yemen AJrab Republic, June
29, 1965.
Supplementary agrreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.»
Signature : Ministry of Communications of Yemen
Arab Republic, June 29, 1965.
Trade
Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to
the General Ag:reement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into
force April 19, 1964; for the United States No-
vember 20, 1964. TIAS 5687.
Acceptances deposited: Argentina, May 11, 1965;
Canada, April 15, 1965.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950; for the United States
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and
3365, respectively.
Accession deposited: Mali, May 24, 1965.
^ Not in force.
JULY 19, 1966
137
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at
Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.i
Acceptances deposited: New Zealand, June 30,
1965; South Africa, July 1, 1965.
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Portugal, July 1. 1965.
BILATERAL
Belgium
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur opera-
tors of either country to operate their stations in
the other country. Effected by exchange of notes
at Brussels June 15 and 18, 1965. Entered into
force June 18, 1965.
Dahomey
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Cotonou December 31, 1964. Entered into force
December 31, 1964. TIAS 5759.
Terminated: May 21, 1965 (notice given by
Dahomey pursuant to art. I, par. 3, of agree-
ment) .
Ecuador
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Quito June 25, 1965. Entered into force
June 25, 1965.
Fiji
Agreement providing for parcel post insurance.
Signed at Suva April 12, 1965, and at Washington
April 22, 1965. Entered into force July 1, 1965.
Israel
Convention for avoidance of double taxation and for
encouragement of international trade and invest-
ment. Signed at Washington June 29, 1965.
Enters into force after exchange of instruments
of ratification.
Japan
Agreement relating to certain additions to the agree-
ment of December 4, 1964 (TIAS 5724), for a
joint cost-sharing program for the base air de-
fense ground environment (BADGE) system.
Effected by exchange of notes at Tokyo June 18,
1965. Entered into force June 18, 1965.
Saudi Arabia
Agreement relating to the construction of certain
military facilities in Saudi Arabia. Effected by
exchange of notes at Jidda May 24 and June 5,
1965. Entered into force May 24, 1965.
Upper Volta
Agreement relating to investment g:uaranties.
Effected by exchange of notes at Ouagadougou
June 18, 1965. Entered into force June 18, 1965.
Uruguay
Agreement for financing certain educational ex-
change programs. Effected by exchange of notes
at Montevideo March 22 and May 17, 1965.
Entered into force May 17, 1965.
1 Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press
Releases: June 2S-July 4
Press
releases
may be obtained from the
Office of News,
Department of State, Wash-
ington.
D.C., 205
20.
Release issued
prior to June 28 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. |
154 of June 15.
No.
Date
Subject
162
6/28
ANZUS communique.
*163
6/28
Heroism award to vsddow of
Indian exchange student.
164
6/29
Income tax convention with
Israel.
165
V/1
U.S.-Mexico civil aviation
talks.
tl66
7/2
Cleveland: "The View From
Up There."
167
7/3
Rusk: USIA television inter-
view.
*Not
printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
i
138
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 19, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1360
American Republics. U.S. Submits to U.N. Se-
curity Council OAS Documents on Domini-
can Republic (Stevenson) 132
Asia
ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views on World
Problems (communique) 135
Berger desigTiated Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Far Eastern Affairs 131
Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations
(Johnson, Stevenson) 98
Atomic Energy. Importance of Scientific Ex-
changes With U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe
(Seaborg) 128
Australia. ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views
on World Problems (communique) .... 135
Aviation. United States and Mexico Agree To
Extend Civil Air Talks 128
Belgium. America and Belgium — A Community
of Interests (Mac Arthur) 118
Congress
Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th
Anniversary of United Nations (text) . . 103
Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 131
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Berger, Osbom) 131
Dominican Republic. U.S. Submits to U.N. Se-
curity Council OAS Documents on Dominican
Republic (Stevenson) 132
Economic Affairs
Commodity Agreements — A Partial Answer to
the Trade Problems of Developing Countries
(Brodie) Ill
Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123
United States and Israel Sign Income Tax
Convention 122
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Osbom desig-
nated Deputy Assistant Secretary .... 131
Euroipe
Importance of Scientific Exchanges With
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128
Partnership In World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123
International Information. Secretary Discusses
Viet-Nam on USIA Television 105
International Organizations and Conferences.
ANZUS Ministers Exchange Views on World
Problems (communique) 135
Israel. United States and Israel Sign Income
Tax Convention 122
Mexico. United States and Mexico Agree To
Extend Civil Air Talks 128
New Zealand. ANZUS Ministers Exchange
Views on World Problems (communique) . 135
Presidential Documents
President Inaugurates Commercial Telephone
Service by Satellite 117
Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations . 98
Science
Importance of Scientific Exchanges With
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128
President Inaugurates Commercial Telephone
Service by Satellite (text of remarks) . . 117
Treaty Information
Current Actions 137
United States and Israel Sign Income Tax
Convention 122
United States and Mexico Agree To Extend
Civil Air Talks 128
U.S.S.R.
Importance of Scientific Exchanges With
U.S.S.R. and Eastern Europe (Seaborg) . . 128
Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123
United Nations
Congress Passes Concurrent Resolution on 20th
Anniversary of United Nations (text) . . . 103
Current U.N. Documents 137
Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123
Twentieth Anniversary of the United Nations
(Johnson, Stevenson) 98
U.S. Submits to U.N. Security Council OAS
Documents on Dominican Republic (Steven-
son) 132
Viet-Nam
America and Belgium — A Community of In-
terests (MacArthur) 118
Partnership in World Affairs (Stevenson) . . 123
Secretary Discusses Viet-Nam on USIA Tele-
vision 105
Name Index
Berger, Samuel D 131
Brodie, Henry Ill
Imhoof, Werner 105
Johnson, President 98, 117
MacArthur, Douglas, II 118
Osbom, David L 131
Rusk, Secretary 105
Seaborg, Glenn T 128
Stevenson, Adlai E 98, 123, 132
Vohra, H. R 105
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Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace
This 18-page pamphlet is the text of a major address made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk be-'
fore the American Foreign Service Association on June 23. The Secretary describes the recent in-
crease in aggression from North Viet-Nam, reviews the many efforts that have been made, unsuc-
cessfully, to bring the North Vietnamese to the conference table for negotiations, and repeats
President Johnson's call for a new program of support for Asian development efforts. In closing
Mr. Rusk says, "We must look beyond the battle to peace, past fear to hope, and over the hard
path of resistance to the broad plain of progress which must lie ahead for the peoples of Southeast
Asia."
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIII, No. 1361
July 26, 1965
STRENGTHENING THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTIONS
Statement by Ambassador Adlai E. Stevenson 1U2
THE CHALLENGE OF THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
hy David E. Bell 173
THE VIEW FROM UP THERE
hy Assistant Secretary Cleveland 151
A TIME FOR DECISION
by Ambassador George C. McGhee 157
IHE IMPACT OF CHANGE IN EASTERN EUROPE ON THE ATLANTIC PARTNERSHIP
by J. Robert Schaetzel 161
For index see inside back cover
strengthening the International Development Institutions
statement by Adlai E. Stevenson
V.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
We meet here in Geneva at the midpoint
of the Year of International Cooperation
and the midpoint of the Decade of Develop-
ment. Let us be neither cynical nor de-
spondent about the gap between these brave
titles and the fact that at the moment our
M^orld community is in fact chiefly notable
for minimal cooperation and very lopsided
development. Our aspirations are there to
spur us on, to incite us to better efforts.
They are emphatically not there as a blind
or a cover or as rhetoric to suggest that we
are really doing very well.
I take as the understood premise of
^ Made before the 39th session of the U.N. Eco-
nomic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland,
on July 9 (press release 170).
everything I say that as a world community
we are not developing as we should and that
our record of cooperation is inadequate, to
say the least. But I believe — I hope — we can
do better and that the nations meeting in
1970 will say : "Ah, yes, 1965 was a kind of
turning point. That was the moment at
which we began to realize how much better
our performance has to be."
How much better can best be registered
by a glance at where we are now.
We launched the Decade of Development
because we realized, as a world community,
that while our wealth was growing, its dis-
tribution had become increasingly unbal-
anced. I need hardly repeat the figures — the
developed market economies and the devel-
oped centrally planned economies make up
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1361 PUBLICATION 7927 JULY 26, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor*
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service, The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well aa special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
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Publications of the Department, United
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NOTE : Contents of this publication are
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142
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
about a quarter of the world's population
and account for three-quarters of the world's
trade, production, and investment.
By the chances of history and geography,
these developed nations are largely to be
found to the north of the Tropic of Cancer.
Ideology makes no difference here. Soviet
Russia belongs by income and growth to the
developed "north," Ghana to the developing
"south" in our new economic geography.
These facts we knew in 1960. In the last
5 years the contrasts have grown more
vivid. The developed nations with per capita
incomes of above $700 a year have grown —
the index I use is gross national product
per head of population — by not less than 3
percent a year.
Below them a smaller group of nations,
which are in the range of $200 to $700 per
capita, have grown even more rapidly — by
4 to 8 percent a year.
But at the bottom of the scale at a figure
of $200 per head and less, comprising over
a hundred nations making up over two-thirds
of humanity, the rate of per capita growth
has in many instances been less than the
average of 2.3 percent of the developing
countries as a whole. Population growth has
swallowed up their margins, and per capita
grovsrth hovers around zero.
The Hidden Miseries
This is the statistical picture which
emerges from the present data about world
development. But how bare and uninforma-
tive such numbers really are. They tell us
nothing about the rates of child mortality —
10 times higher among poor than rich. They
give us no picture of the homeless migrant
living without water or shelter on the fringe
of Asian or Latin American cities. We get no
feel from them of the dull ache of hunger or
the debility that comes from diets without
enough protein and vitamins.
These are the hidden miseries about which
we talk with our figures of per capita gross
national product, our statistical compari-
sons, our impersonal percentages. We are
Ambassador Stevenson died at London on
July 14.
talking about pain and grief and hunger and
despair, and we are talking about the lot of
half the human race.
Expansion in tlie Developed Societies
But we are also talking about another
phenomenon — the extraordinary increase in
resources available to human society taken
as a whole. These 3- or 4-percent increases
in the national growth of developed societies
mean an unparalleled expansion of new re-
sources.
Under steady and responsible economic
management, we cannot see, and we certainly
do not want, any end to this process of ex-
pansion. Out of the research that is con-
nected with weaponry, with space, and with
the whole wide range of needs of our civil-
ian economy, we are constantly making new
breakthroughs — new methods, new products,
new sources of food or energy or medical
relief that increase our capacity to reproduce
wealth still further. We have harnessed en-
ergy to take us into outer space and to con-
vert saline waters into drink for the thirsty.
The isotopes which grow from nuclear exper-
iments can revolutionize medical and agri-
cultural research. And we know not what
new, still undiscovered sources of abundance
lie ahead.
We have to begin to grasp and digest this
new, astonishing liberation of our industrial
resources, for only after such an under-
standing can we hope to act on the scale
and with the audacity that our profound
problems of poverty and hopelessness and
obstruction demand. We shall conquer, no
doubt, the dark face of the moon. But I
would hope we can with equal confidence
conquer the dark face of poverty and give
men and women new life, new hope, new
space on this planet.
Let's face it: We are nowhere near con-
quering world poverty. None of us — neither
JULY 26, 1965
143
the weak nor the strong, the poor nor the
rich, the new nations nor the old — have yet
taken seriously enough the contrast between
the abundance of our opportunities and the
scarcity of our actions to grasp them. It is
good that the rich are getting richer — that
is what economic development is for. But it
is bad that, despite our considerable efforts
in the first half of this decade, the poor are
still poor — and progressing more slowly than
present-day society can tolerate.
What shall we do to improve the trend
during the next 5 years? There is something
for everybody to do. There are tasks for all
of us, and it won't help the poor countries
for us to sit around this table blaming the
state of the world on each other. There are
clear and present tasks for the developing
countries in doing what they know is neces-
sary to their own economic growth and social
progress. There are tasks, equally clear and
equally present, for the industrialized coun-
tries. And there are tasks — a growing num-
ber of much larger tasks — for U.N. organi-
zations themselves.
I think each of us should come to this
table vowing to bring proposals that his na-
tion can — and intends to — do something
about. In that spirit I will not rehearse here
my views on how the developing nations can
better help themselves but will suggest what
the wealthier countries can do to help and
how the U.N. itself can do more about de-
velopment and do it better.
A Convergent Strategy
Let me suggest first the sense of a con-
vergent strategy for the industrialized na-
tions. Its aim should be to see to it that more
of the wealth and purchasing power of our
expanding world economy will be used to
stimulate economic growth in the developing
nations.
We can accomplish this aim only by the
coordinate use of a variety of means : by the
direct transfer of resources from developed
nations to developing nations through effec-
tive aid programs ; next, by assuring the de-
veloping countries greater access to the ex-
panding markets of the world; next, by
working to reduce fluctuations in the export
earnings of the developing countries; next,
by working harder, doing more specific re-
search, on what the more developed coun-
tries can do to help the less developed create
more wealth faster ; next, by helping to slow
down the vertiginous growth in the numbers
of people which the still fragile developing
economies have to support. A steady, over-
all, 4-percent rate of growth in national in-
come is in itself a difficult achievement. Its
effects are tragically nullified if the rate of
population growth is 3 percent or even more.
These five strands of a convergent strat-
egy contain no mysteries. We have discussed
them over and over again. What has been
lacking has been an adequate urgency of
purpose and decision and a real determina-
tion to face the full costs.
There is no doubt that we can afford
whatever direct transfer of resources can
really be put to effective use. There are so
many manmade obstacles in the developing
process that there is a kind of natural limit
to the transfer of resources from the richer
countries to the poorer countries.
In my judgment, we are in no danger at
all of harming our own healthy economies by
maximizing our efforts to promote interna-
tional development. Our problem, rather, is
to step up the training of people, the sur-
veying of resources, and the investigation of
opportunities — in a word, the preinvestment
work — which still sets the ceiling on direct
investment, public and private, in the eco-
nomic growth of most developing countries.
With my next point — improved trading
opportunities for the developing countries
— I come to all the issues at stake in the
continuing work of the new U.N. Trade and
Development Board and its committees,
and of the GATT [General Agreement on |
Tariffs and Trade]. These are some of the
problems we must face together. Primary
prices are unstable, and many have tended
downward in the last decade. The tariff :
structures in the industrial countries hit I
harder at the processed and manufactured
goods than at raw materials. Internal taxes
discourage the consumption of tropical prod-
144
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
ucts. And finally, there is need for greater
effort to improve production and efficiency
in the export industries of the developing
countries.
Many of the developing countries suffer
enormous uncertainties and interruptions of
trade, with their unstable, fluctuating ex-
port earnings. The world has already put
into effect some means of providing com-
pensatory finance and balance-of-payments
support to help the developing countries
deal with such difficulties. Perhaps we will
never find an ideal solution, but I think we
have by no means reached the end of the
road in dealing with these problems. We
must continue to do everything practicable
to provide to developing countries resources
that are effectively related to the fluctua-
tions in their export trade.
When I say we need a concerted attack
on these obstacles, I do not mean a great
debate in which the attack is concerted
against the governments of the wealthier
countries. Complaints about other countries'
policies have their place in international
politics — they seldom change what the other
nations actually do, but they help make the
complainant a hero to his own countrymen —
and that has its place in politics too.
But when it comes to trade between the
world's "north" and the world's "south," we
need not a general debate about general
principles but concrete proposals, direct nego-
tiations, specific nose-to-nose confronta-
tions about particular ways the developing
countries can increase their exports and how
the rest of us can really help, commodity
by commodity.
Research on Cause and Cures of Poverty
Another vital contribution the industrial-
ized nations can make to development is to
expand their own research into the cause
and cures of poverty. Partly this is a matter
of putting extra emphasis on those fields of
science that are especially relevant to the
needs and possibilities of the developing
countries. We stand here in the presence of
exciting breakthroughs in nutrition, in farm-
ing, in water use, in meteorology, in energy.
All these are vital, and it is particularly
gratifying that the United Nations Advisory
Group of Scientists have put the develop-
ment of water resources and the evolution
of new high-protein diets at the top of
their list of points needing special attack.
Mr. President, while I am on this subject,
I should like to say a special word about the
work of the Advisory Committee on the
Application of Science and Technology to
Development. My Government will make
known in due course its detailed views with
respect to the specific proposals made by
this group in the report which is before us."
As to the report itself, I would only say at
this time that it is clear, precise, and pro-
fessional— high testimony to the quality of
work that can be done in our international
community. On behalf of my delegation, I
should like to congratulate all members of
the Advisory Committee, the many experts
of the specialized agencies who contributed
to it, and the members of the United
Nations Secretariat under whose supervision
the work went forward.
But I have more in mind than the merits
of the recommendations put forward and the
quality of the report as a whole. I have in
mind the background of this report and the
process by which these proposals have taken
shape for our consideration.
The background of the report, as we all
know, is the Conference on the Application
of Science and Technology to Problems of
the Developing Areas, held here in Geneva
in early 1963.^ That conference was criti-
cized by superficial observers. They said
that the whole thing was much too big — too
many people, too many subjects, too many
papers, too much talk to do any good. They
said that the whole thing was much too
vague — too general, too unfocused, too dis-
parate— and perhaps there was something in
some of this criticism.
But it was a start. And the big thing is
that we did not let it die. We maintained
the momentum generated at that confer-
ence. We went on to the next step. Within
' U.N. doc. E/4026.
' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 4, 1963, p.
188, and Feb. 25, 1963, p. 302.
JULY 26, 1965
145
a few months after the close of that con-
ference, this Council recommended the
establishment of an expert committee of
advisers to carry on — to pick up where the
conference left off — to sort the important
from what is merely useful.
I have no doubt, Mr. President, that what
followed was a difficult and tedious exercise
for the committee of advisers. But they
went about it systematically. They consulted
and took evidence. They worked steadily
and quietly. And out of thousands of things
that might be good to do, they have derived
a few dozen of things which it is urgent and
necessary to do — which, in fact, it would be
outrageous not to do. They have resisted
dreams of tomorrow's science and thought
hard about today's technology. They have
refrained from proposing yet another agency
and come to grips instead with existing
agencies — what more they might do, what
we know they can do better, with foreseeable
resources.
So what began as a seemingly unmanage-
able project has been tamed, mastered, and
transmitted into a sensible list of specific
proposals of priority value and manageable
proportion. This is no small accomplish-
ment in so short a time. And we can all
take heart from this exercise. It bodes well
for the work of the Council and of the U.N.
system at large.
Research on Urbanization
The Advisory Committee focused of
course on science and technology — ^that is
what it was asked to do. But we need re-
search and inquiry fully as much in great
areas of social confusion and uncertainty.
I must be content with one vital example.
All through the developing world we face an
increasing crisis of accelerated and un-
controlled urbanization. Men and women and
children are streaming into the great cities,
generally the capital cities, from the monot-
ony and all too often the misery of rural
life, and they are moving, bag and baggage,
long before farming can afford to lose their
labor or the city is ready to put them to
work and accommodate them properly.
This rootless, hopeless, workless urban
poverty is the greatest single cause of
misery in the world. Can we lessen or re-
direct this flow? Can we prepare the urban
world better to receive it? Or improve the
rural world enough to diminish the flood?
We don't know, because we have not sought
seriously to find out.
We lack adequate policies, because we
have so few facts and so few people trained
to develop and implement programs. For
too long we have proceeded on the false
assumption that people would really rather
live in villages than anywhere and that it
is better for society if they did. The trouble
is they don't — even when the village is
modernized and sanitized and electrified,
people move into larger towns and cities.
Some countries have in fact recognized
that the problem is not less urbanization
but more urban areas — not just one or two
in each country. Some are experimenting
with regional development programs — and
here I mean regions within countries — in an
effort to create new urban centers which
will not only deflect migration headed for
already overcrowded capital cities but will
have an impact on the surrounding country-
side and improve rural living in a wide area
around the new cities. But the process of
decentralization is difficult and complex,
and failures — temporary or permanent — are
as common as successes.
This is the background against which we
helped launch the unanimous decision of the
Social Commission to recommend a research
training program in regional development,
using as a laboratory the current efforts be-
ing made in a variety of different lands,
political systems, and cultures to deal with
the problems of urban in-migration.
With some systematic research perhaps
some usable conclusions can be drawn about
how best to encourage an appropriate pat-
tern of urban development which will avoid
the blight and misery so visible in so many
cities throughout the world. This is precisely
the kind of research we need if the full
weight of modem discovery and modern
146
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
resources is to be brought to bear on the
social as well as the technical problems of
the developing world.
Population Control
In this same context — of science applied
to an explosive human and social problem —
we have to make a wholly new attack upon
what President Johnson has called "the
multiplying problems of our multiplying
populations." * It is perhaps only in the last
5 years that we have come fully to realize
on what scale they are proliferating. Since
1960, under United Nations auspices, cen-
suses have been held in scores of countries,
in nine of them for the first time. They have
all underlined the same fact — that popula-
tion is increasing more rapidly than had
previously been imagined and that this ac-
celerating growth, in all developing lands, is
eating into the pitiful margins needed to
give bread and hope to those already born.
We have to find the ways of social, moral,
and physical control adequate to stem the
rising, drowning flood of people. We need
more knowledge, we need more cooperative
effort. In fact, much that we do elsewhere
will be undone unless we can act in this
vital field.
Aid, trade, research, population control —
in all these fields we can mount a convergent
attack upon the great gap between rich and
poor. But we must also mount it together.
And that brings me to some quite concrete
suggestions about international organiza-
tions in the development field — in what di-
rection they should be going and how fast
they should be growing.
Merits of Functional Organizations
The organizations of the U.N. family
perform a rich variety of useful labors. At
a moment when one of the central political
organs in the U.N. is temporarily hung up
on a constitutional hook, it is worth re-
flecting on the success and growth of the
specialized agencies and of the central
'/6fd., July 19, 1965, p. 98.
funds which provide a growing fraction —
more than half in some cases — of the re-
sources they apply to the business of de-
velopment. These agencies are an illustra-
tion, and a good one, of the proposition that
international politics is not a game in which
an inch gained by our player must mean
an inch lost by another.
The reality is that international agree-
ments can be reached, and international or-
ganizations can be formed, and international
common law can be elaborated, on subjects
which draw nations together even as they
continue to quarrel about the frontiers and
friends and ideological frenzies which keep
them apart.
So let's look for a moment at the political
merits of functional organizations — the kind
that work at peace through health, or food,
or education, or labor, or communications, or
meteorology, or culture, or postal service, or
children, or money, or economic growth, or
the exploration of outer space — organiza-
tions, that is, for the pursuit of some spe-
cific and definable task beyond the frontiers
of one nation, a task for which the tech-
nology is already conceived or conceivable,
for which a common interest is mutually
recognized, for which institutions can — and
therefore must — ^be designed.
Organizations like these begin by taking
the world as it is. No fundamental political
reforms are needed; no value systems have
to be altered; no ideologies have to be seri-
ously compromised. These organizations
start from where we are and then take the
next step. And that, as the ancient Chinese
guessed long ago, is the only way to get
from here to there.
These organizations tackle jobs that can
be managed through imperfect institutions
by fallible men and women. Omniscience is
not a prerequisite; the peace of the world
does not stand or fall on the success of any
one organization ; mistakes need not be fatal.
These limited-purpose organizations by-
pass the obstacle of sovereignty. National
independence is not infringed when a na-
tion voluntarily accepts in its ovra interest
the restraints imposed by cooperation with
JULY 26, 1965
147
others. Nobody has to play who doesn't want
to play, but for those who do play, there are
door prizes for all.
All these special characteristics of the
functional agencies are important to their
survival value and growth potential. The best
example is also momentarily the most dra-
matic. In the midst of the military, political,
and diplomatic turmoil of Southeast Asia,
the governments which are working together
to promote the regional development of the
Lower Mekong Basin have continued to work
there in surprising and encouraging har-
mony.
Political Disputes in Technical Agencies
But a certain shadow hangs over the af-
fairs of the technical agencies — a shadow
which threatens to compromise the very vir-
tues we have just been discussing. That
shadow is political controversy, and it
has no place on the agenda of the technical
agencies.
I shall not attempt to draw sharp lines
along the sometimes murky borders between
the politicoideological and the functional
fields — between just what is doctrinal and
just what is technical. The important dis-
tinctions are clear enough. The difference
between appropriate content for the general
debate in the General Assembly and appro-
priate content for debates on international
labor or world literacy or world health does
not need much elaboration. We can all recog-
nize that the remaining problems of colonial-
ism have practically nothing to do with the
problem of adult literacy — and vice versa.
We have organizational arrangements for
dealing with both. We have times and places
set aside, we have agenda prepared and rep-
resentatives assigned, for dealing in sepa-
rate and orderly ways with these and other
subjects.
Yet we cannot overlook a disturbing ten-
dency to dilute the proceedings of the tech-
nical agencies with ideological dispute — and
to steal time, energy, and resources needed
to help the developing countries, and divert
it instead to extraneous issues calculated to
stir everybody's emotions without raising
anybody's per capita income.
This limits the value, inhibits the growth,
hurts the prestige, and crimps the resources
of the technical agencies. It is a wasteful
and moreover a futile exercise. It is only to
be hoped that these diversionary tactics will
fade from our forums so we may get along
more promptly with the practical, useful,
technical tasks which lie before us in such
profusion.
The great spurt in useful activity by the
U.N. specialized and affiliated agencies has
come about through the good sense of the
members, expressed in a series of actions by
the Economic and Social Council and in the
General Assembly, and designed to provide
new resources to break down the main ob-
stacles to development.
Through the Expanded Program of Tech-
nical Assistance and the U.N. Special Fund
the members have already provided close to
$1 billion to help the developing countries
organize the use of knowledge and to get
ready to make effective use of large capital
investments. Now these two programs, on
the recommendation of the Council, are to
be merged in the 20th General Assembly to
become the U.N. Development Program.
We are reaching this year, for the first
time, the target of $150 million a year for
that program. My Government believes that
this has been a useful and efficient way to
provide technical assistance and preinvest-
ment capital. The target should now be
raised. For our part, we would be glad to see
the target set substantially higher.
We also think that the use for development
of noncommercial exports of food from some
of the surplus producing countries has been
promising. At a meeting in Rome last week
we have already indicated that we would be
glad to see the World Food Program con-
tinued, with a target for the next 3-year
period almost triple that of the 3-year exper-
imental period which is just now coming to
an end. We hope that other nations which
foresee noncommercial surpluses in their
agricultural horoscope will join in expanding
the World Food Program as another way to
transfer needed resources for the benefit of
148
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the developing countries.
We are also pleased with the progress of
industrial development. The establishment of
the Center for Industrial Development in the
U.N. Secretariat has clearly proved itself a
sound and progressive move. We think the
time has come to move further along this
line and find much promise in the sugges-
tions made by the distinguished representa-
tive of the United Kingdom on this subject.
We strongly agree that it will be necessary
to secure additional resources for the pro-
motion of industrialization. We believe, how-
ever, that rather than to establish yet an-
other special voluntary fund, such resources
could best be made available by special ar-
rangements within the framework of the
new U.N. Development Program.
International Development Programs
Beyond raising the target for the Devel-
opment Program, and expanding the World
Food Program, and giving a special push
to the work of industrialization, I would fore-
see another kind of development activity to
which I believe every government should ac-
cord a very high priority indeed. This is the
field which might be called truly interna-
tional development programs.
So far we have needed to define the word
"development" to encompass only the ele-
ments of an individual country's economic
grov^rth and social progress. Some regional
projects have gained favor as well, but
clearly visible now on the horizon are pro-
grams and projects in which the operating
agency will not be a national government or
a private company or even a small group of
governments in a region — but rather one of
the U.N.'s own family of worldwide organi-
zations.
The best example — one that is already re-
quiring our attention — is the World Weather
Watch now being planned by the WMO
[World Meteorological Organization] . In the
preliminary design work already underway,
it is proposed, for example, to :
— probe into atmosphere from satellites in
orbit ;
— establish ground stations to read out
what the satellites have to say and to proc-
ess and communicate weather information
throughout continental regions ;
— establish floating weather stations to
give more coverage to vast oceanic areas,
particularly in the Southern Hemisphere;
— possibly even launch balloons from in-
ternational sites which will travel around
the world at a constant level making weather
observations as they go.
The major components of the World
Weather Watch must continue to be the na-
tional facilities, operated primarily for na-
tional purposes and also contributing to the
needs of the world. But we are speaking here
of additional facilities, some of which may
need to be internationally operated and per-
haps internationally owned and which may
be very costly even at the start. Money
would have to be raised on a voluntary basis
and placed in the hands of an international
agency — the WMO, perhaps, or some new op-
erating facility.
Here, then, is a new kind of problem for
us to think about before it overtakes us.
Here is a great big development project, in-
volving activity inherently international
which will have to be financed interna-
tionally. We would propose that the U.N.
Development Program start experimenting
with this kind of development activity, mod-
ifying as necessary the rules and procedures
that were drafted with national development
projects in mind.
Maybe such large projects will have to be
financed in some special way. But for a
start we would like to see the new U.N. De-
velopment Program, with its rich experience
in financing various kinds of development,
work on this subject and present to its own
board, and to this Council, an analysis of
the problem of meeting the costs of global
international operations.
If all these suggestions for raising our
sights — yes, and our contributions — give the
impression that the United States believes
in the strengthening of international devel-
opment institutions, you may be sure that
JULY 26, 1965
149
that impression is correct. Most of these in-
stitutions need to be strengthened to meet,
within their respective areas, the challenge
of the requirements and aspirations of the
developing countries. Equally, and perhaps
even more important, their policies and ac-
tions need to be harmonized, for there is no
room left in this world for narrow parochial-
ism. The various aspects and problems of
economic and social development — moderni-
zation of agriculture and industrial growth,
health and production, education and social
welfare, trade and transportation, human
rights and individual freedom — have become
so closely interrelated as to call for inter-
locking measures and programs.
These basic conditions in the contemporary
world give meaning and urgency to the re-
view and reappraisal of the Economic and
Social Council's role and functions which U
Thant proposed in this chamber a year ago.
The position of my Government is set forth
in our submission to the Secretary-General
reproduced in document E/4052/Add.2 and
needs no further explanation.
But there are just a few points I want
to stress :
With the U.N. system as envisaged in and
established by the charter, the General As-
sembly and ECOSOC are the two principal
intergovernmental organs with overall re-
sponsibilities for U.N. policies and activities
in the economic and social field, their or-
derly development and effective implemen-
tation.
Whatever the record of the Council in the
past — and we believe that it is a good record
— it has become evident that the Council
faces ever-increasing difficulties in the dis-
charge of its functions due to the ever-wid-
ening scope of the United Nations and the
multiplication of machinery.
To make the Council fully representative
of the total enlarged membership of the U.N.,
its size will soon be increased by the nec-
essary ratifications of the charter amend-
ment.
We believe that the role of the Council as
a preparatory body for the General Assem-
bly, and acting under its authority, needs to
be clarified and strengthened. It should make '
a significant contribution to the work of the
General Assembly by drawing its attention
to major issues confronting the world econ-
omy; by formulating proposals for relevant
action ; by providing supporting documenta-
tion; and in preparing and reviewing pro-
grams with a sense of financial responsibil-
ities— and thus assisting in the preparation
of budget estimates by the Secretary-Gen-
eral for appropriate action by the commit-
tees of the General Assembly.
In stressing the coordination function of
ECOSOC every care needs to be taken to
encourage rather than to hinder the work of
functional and regional economic and social
bodies and the activities of the specialized
agencies and other related organizations. The
role of these functional organizations in
achieving coordination within their areas of
competence needs to be more fully recog-
nized.
The review and reappraisal proposed by
the Secretary-General is a difficult task and
adequate time must be allowed for it. Many
of the constructive suggestions he made yes-
terday regarding research, documentation,
and sound budgeting are directly related to
the work of the Council and deserve most
careful thought. It is our hope that the Coun-
cil at the present session will make the nec-
essary arrangements to facilitate and as-
sure such study in depth and full considera-
tion.
We assume the review will go through sev-
eral stages, including consideration by both
the Council and the General Assembly. The
Council will have to undertake thorough
preparatory work in order to enable the
General Assembly and its Committees II
[Economic and Financial], III [Social, Hu-
manitarian and Cultural], and V [Adminis-
trative and Budgetary] to reach informed
conclusions and to take the necessary ac-
tions.
Last but not least, and this I cannot stress
strongly enough, the review will require the
closest possible cooperation between all mem-
bers of the Council representing developed
and developing countries. The Council will
150
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
wither away, whatever conclusions are
reached by the review, unless there is a will
among all of us to make it succeed. And
succeed it must as an indispensable organ of
the United Nations for the achievement, be-
yond anything we have experienced to date,
of constructive international cooperation in
the economic and social fields and as a
powerful aid to the promotion of economic
development.
Finally, let me say that the need for
joint action in the wide field of develop-
ment is obvious. Whether we are talking
about aid, or trade, or research, or urban
development, or industrialization — whether
we are talking about scientific discovery or
about institution building — we hold that
there are no monopolies of trained minds
and disciplined imaginations in any of our
countries.
Joint action is, after all, the final sig-
nificance of all we do in our international
policies today. But we are still held back by
our old parochial nationalisms. We are still
beset with dark prejudices. We are still
divided by angry, conflicting ideologies. Yet
all around us our science, our instruments,
our technologies, our interests, and indeed
our deepest aspirations draw us more and
more closely into a single neighborhood.
This must be the context of our think-
ing— the context of human interdependence
in the face of the vast new dimensions of
our science and our discovery. Just as
Europe could never again be the old closed-
in community after the voyages of Colum-
bus, we can never again be a squabbling band
of nations before the awful majesty of
outer space.
We travel together, passengers on a lit-
tle space ship, dependent on its vulnerable
reserves of air and soil; all committed for
our safety to its security and peace; pre-
served from annihilation only by the care,
the work, and, I will say, the love we give
our fragile craft. We cannot maintain it
half fortunate, half miserable, half confident,
half despairing, half slave — to the ancient
enemies of man — half free in a liberation
of resources undreamed of until this day.
No craft, no crew can travel safely with
such vast contradictions. On their resolu-
tion depends the survival of us all.
The View From Up There
hy Harlan Cleveland
Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs ^
This must be the biggest teach-in of the
season.
But the format tonight is different — and
easier for both of us. All I have to do is
answer my own questions. And you are in
the position of a passenger on a transconti-
nental jet: You can listen to the Muzak or
think your own thoughts, and nobody can
tell which option you choose.
For my part, I have every intention of
taking full advantage of my protected posi-
tion.
I once heard a distinguished American
educator admonish a talkative luncheon com-
panion this way: "Don't tell me there are
nine men on a baseball team. I know that.
Tell me something I don't know."
So I am not going to tell you that nuclear
weapons have provided us and others with
history's most efficient and cheapest way of
^ Address made before the National Education As-
sociation at New York, N.Y., on July 2 (press re-
lease 166).
JULY 26, 1965
151
killing large numbers of people — and that
they threaten to spread from nation to na-
tion. You know that.
I am not going to tell you that there is
war in Viet-Nam, and trouble in the Domini-
can Republic, and tension along a dozen fron-
tiers, and apostles of militant violence are
on the prowl in near and far corners of
Planet Earth. You know that.
I am going to talk, instead, about some
of the other sights and sounds in this churn-
ing, tortured, and expectant world which are
harder to see because conflict has thrown
sand in our eyes and because the noise of
violence afflicts our ears.
Perspective on the World We Live In
I shall start by observing that, given
enough perspective, this world we live in is
a lovely place. And I take as my authority
the only men who have been far enough
away from earth to see it whole.
Listen to the first countryman of ours to
look down from outer space — to the very
first words of Astronaut [Alan B.] Shepard :
"What a beautiful view," he said.
Listen to Cosmonaut [Gherman] Titov:
"Our earth is wonderful, the blue halo
around it is very beautiful. . . ."
And to Cosmonaut [Andrian G.] Niko-
layev: "Our planet is uncommonly beautiful
and looks wonderful from cosmic heights."
And to the immediate reaction of Astro-
naut [James A.] McDivitt from Gemini 4
just a few weeks ago, when he first looked
out and exclaimed : "Beautiful . . . beautiful !
It looks great from up here !"
Note that this new fraternity of spacemen
spoke not of nations, of continents, of islands,
but of our earth, our planet, our world.
They didn't even mention its divisions but
found it whole and blue and beautiful — and
open.
I don't have to remind you that down on
earth most nations are not open — or even,
in their urban areas, beautiful. That's some-
thing else you know.
Yet have we really noticed that in a bare
two decades about 1 billion people have been
freed from foreign rule and given their
chance to build decent modern societies,
while only a bit over 1 percent remain in
dependencies?
And do we listen closely enough to the
sounds coming from within the societies still
closed — to the poets and painters, the philos-
ophers and composers — to the low drum-
beat of doubts and the muffled crossfire of
questions — to the crackling creativity of the
open mind which no force on earth can long
enslave?
There is no dogma that can be trans-
mitted through the genes. No child is born
an orthodox believer; he has to be carefully
taught. So every woman who gives birth in
a closed society produces a potential new
threat to tyranny.
As teachers in an open society, you can
well imagine the plight of teachers in a re-
gime which pretends to know all the answers
— and be grateful for your kinds of problems.
"A World Community Abuilding"
So some of the sounds coming from inside
the closed corners of earth are at least
mildly encouraging.
And from outside comes another kind of
clamor: the construction noises of a world
community abuilding under our noses.
It is anything but a tidy sight. This world
community of ours has no master plan and
no foreseeable ultimate shape.
Few of its structures are yet complete,
and many have not been started.
Its law is in a primitive stage of evolu-
tion, and lawbreakers abound.
The police and fire departments of the
world community are primitive and unreli-
able, too. And the world's school system still
has more dropouts than "stay ins."
But there is work in progress. Around most
of the world, most of the peoples — even as
they hold to their weapons and cling to their
disputes — have picked up tools in cooperative
labors.
While they argue about some things, they
are doing other things together because they
share a host of common interests.
Things like improving soils, purifying
water, harnessing rivers, eradicating disease,
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DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
feeding children, improving diets, resettling
refugees, training teachers, surveying re-
sources, probing the seas, and forecasting
the weather.
There is a long and grovi^ing list of things
to do cooperatively — because science has
shown us how, and technology has made the
tools, and common sense impels us to the
conclusion that they can best be done coop-
eratively— and often cannot be done in any
other way.
In the course of it all, knowledge is dif-
fused and technology spreads by contagion,
indifferent to cultural differences. Standards
are set, and regulations are published, and
international law — which is the practice of
international organizations — is growing in
the way law grows best : organically.
The center of this emerging community,
this sprawling international workshop of the
world, is that busy band of organizations
that cluster about the United Nations.
And this is only the beginning. The pace
of discovery and invention accelerates. Each
major innovation reveals a shared interest,
defines a new task that can only be tackled
in common, and invites still another cooper-
ative international enterprise.
We know that instant global communica-
tions and long-range global weather fore-
casting are around the corner. We know
economic power from atomic energy is at
last at hand and that economic conversion
of salt water to fresh water is only a prob-
lem of engineering.
No New Knowledge Needed
We don't even need new knowledge to
make this beautiful blue planet of ours a
decent place to live. We know enough right
now.
We don't need any new ideas to create a
great society in the world community. We
have plenty of tested ideas right now.
We know how — right now — to grow and
preserve enough food to conquer hunger.
We know how — now — to multiply the yield
of food from the seas.
We know how to provide the average in-
fant with a diet that gives him a fighting
chance to develop his physical and intellec-
tual potential — and an even crack at three
score years and ten.
We know how to survey and conserve
water resources, how to develop river basins
and valleys, how to irrigate land and build
powerplants and develop enough industry to
make enough goods to meet the needs of
even the swollen population of this earth.
Yet despite the cheerful hum of men and
women at work in the world, the present
outlook mocks our present knowledge — our
poor triumphs fail to match our rich tech-
nology.
It is appalling — it is an intolerable statis-
tic— that the diet of two out of three people
on earth is more likely to deteriorate than
to improve in the years just ahead.
It is good that the rich are getting richer
— and fast; but it is very bad that, despite
our considerable efforts, the poor are still
getting poorer — absolutely in some cases,
relatively in most,
U.S. Commitment in World Affairs
In these circumstances it is curious that
some of our sounder citizens are nagged by
the notion that the United States is overex-
tended and overcommitted in world affairs.
This notion is no novelty, of course. It has
popped up with tedious frequency in recent
decades.
In the early days of World War II there
were many who feared that the United
States was overextended — that our commit-
ments would outrun our resources.
And no wonder. When Pearl Harbor was
attacked on that memorable Sunday, we were
so unready for major war that we might as
well have been starting from scratch. And
within months we were committed to raising
and training and equipping and sending over-
seas a great land army, to designing and
building the world's greatest air force and
training the crews to fly it, to constructing
the greatest navy ever to sail the seas —
capable of operating for extended periods
thousands of miles from its bases, to build-
ing, from keel on up, the world's largest
merchant marine, to feeding the Nation even
JULY 26, 1965
153
as young men were drained from the farms
for fields of battle, to helping supply and
feed our British and Soviet allies. In a word,
we committed ourselves to fighting two
great wars against two powerful enemies on
opposite sides of the world at the same time,
while providing the critical margin of sur-
vival to our wartime partners. By any nor-
mal standards a rational man could well
conclude that we were dangerously, even
desperately, overcommitted.
The "impossible took a little longer," as
the Seabees said, but the fact is that we did
all of these things — and did them all at the
same time — and found that as a byproduct
we literally had doubled the productive ca-
pacity of the domestic economy of the United
States.
Then, not long after the war, the fear re-
turned. Some people felt that the United
States again "overcommitted" its resources
when it mounted the Marshall Plan for the
recovery of Europe. The Marshall Plan is
now considered the most enlightened act, the
most brilliant overseas operation, and, for
that matter, one of the wisest investments
ever made by any nation. Those who were
then afraid to commit American energy and
imagination to an enormous task whose out-
come was at first in doubt — those worriers
now celebrate the success of the Marshall
Plan.
In the decade and a half since then the
people who worry that America tries too
hard and does too much had plenty of cause
for gloomy headshaking. We fought a war
in Korea, defended the Straits of Taiwan,
helped set up international peacekeeping for
the Middle East, sent the Marines to help in
Lebanon, airlifted U.N. peacekeepers to the
Congo, quarantined Cuba, faced down the
Soviet Union over those Soviet missiles,
helped set up a peacekeeping operation in
Cyprus, and increased our commitment in
Viet-Nam to match the increasing effort of
the Communists to destroy the Government
and take over the people of South Viet-Nam.
So for a quarter of a century past the
United States of America has been com-
mitted and extended — and deeply engaged in
strenuous enterprise around the world.
At the cost of vast efforts and huge ex-
penditures and more lives than we like to
count, the Nazi-Fascist-militarist compact to
conquer the world was smashed, the aggres-
sive outward thrust of the Soviet Union was
contained. Western Europe not only was re-
stored but launched upon a vigorous and
self-sustaining new life, aggression in the
Far East was thrown back upon itself, sev-
eral developing nations have graduated from
dependence on outside aid and many more
can begin to see the light of self-support at
the end of the tunnel, the United Nations has
survived and grown and will doubtless re-
vive to grow some more.
In the course of these exertions — since
those tense days in the Caribbean in the fall
of 1962, when the world seemed on the verge
of the abyss — I believe we have arrived at
something like a tacit understanding that in
the presence of nuclear weapons, as Presi-
dent Eisenhower used to say, "There is no
alternative to peace."
In the course of those exertions I believe
the point also has been made that there is
no nourishment either in conventional mili-
tary aggression. Since 1950 in Korea, it has
become more and more unfashionable for
aggressors to raise their flags, blow the
bugles, and march their armies across the
frontiers of their neighbors.
Our current exertions are designed to
prove that there is no more mileage in clan-
destine attack than in overt attack, that in
this day and age aggression by any name
cannot pay off. Our enemy is not change but
violence; but we are committed to the prop-
osition that those who wish to change the
shape of society must pursue their ambitions
by nonviolent means. When that lesson is
learned at last by the Far Eastern Commu-
nists as well as others, this will be a much
safer and a much happier planet. For ad-
venturism in world affairs is on the wane —
if we make it so.
These exertions have required great com-
mitments in the past, and they still do. But
are they greater — or even as great — today
as they were a few years ago ?
In our own armament we have reached
the point where our power is so great that
154
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
we could safely agree to a treaty banning
all but underground nuclear tests. We could
afford to cut back on the production of
fissionable materials. We could afford to
close or reduce 135 major overseas military
bases in the past 4 years. And we could
afford to lower our overall defense budget —
not much, but a little bit absolutely, and a
little bit more relatively, because our econ-
omy keeps growing at a steady, high rate.
In Europe our presence is still needed ; but
our commitment is less great in relation to
our resources and in relation to that of our
allies than it had to be a decade or so ago.
In Viet-Nam our commitment in man-
power and resources is but a fraction of our
commitment a decade and a half ago in
Korea.
For military aid to allies and friends
around the world, our commitments have
dropped to about one-third of what they
were a decade ago.
For economic development under the For-
eign Assistance Act, our expenditures have
dropped from liy2 percent of the Federal
budget in 1949 to about 2 percent of our
budget today.
So in relation to resources, to our physical
capacity to fulfill our commitments, we are
significantly less extended today than at al-
most any time since World War II.
Sharing the Peacekeeping Responsibility
If we are not, then, overextended in a
physical sense, have we taken on too big a
responsibility for keeping the peace of the
world? Are we trying to play the world's
gendarme? Are we tending to go it alone, as
some anxious voices have asked ?
The answer is that we have taken as little
direct responsibility for the peace of the
world as the safety of that peace would al-
low us. We have done what we could to in-
duce the world community to assume the
responsibility for policing the world. We
have tried our best to go it — not alone but
in the largest company we could find to go
with us.
This is the whole meaning of our persist-
ent and successful efforts to have the Or-
ganization of American States assume the
peacekeeping role in the Western Hemi-
sphere and to relieve us as promptly as possi-
ble when we were forced to move alone on
an interim basis in the Dominican Republic.
This is the whole meaning of our persist-
ent efforts to build up the capacity of the
United Nations to perform the policeman's
function on a world basis — and to support it
when it has. We have backed every one of a
dozen peacekeeping missions by the United
Nations and many other efforts to tamp
down conflicts so no policeman would be
needed at all.
In Korea, though we provided an over-
whelming proportion of the resources, we
did so as executive agent of the Security
Council.
In the Congo, when we were asked to in-
tervene directly, we turned instead to the
United Nations.
And we have said over and again — and the
President indicated once more last week in
San Francisco ^ — we would like nothing bet-
ter than to share with other members of the
United Nations, or with any other relevant
association of peacekeepers, the violent role
of restoring order in Southeast Asia.
And if we are extended in Viet-Nam, how
much more extended would we find ourselves
were the doctrine of militant violence to
succeed there — and spread throughout Asia
and Africa?
If we are extended in the Dominican Re-
public, how much more extended would we
be if armed anarchy, promoted from the out-
side, were to succeed and flare through
Latin America ?
We might well prefer to be less bothered
by responsibility, less distracted by the
brickbats that are the price of power. But
if the world is to have peace, we of all peo-
ple cannot afford to be less committed to
world order than we are.
Seven Lessons To Be Learned
So I have tried to think what I would be
trying to teach children about world af-
fairs today, what thoughts I would be trying
' Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 98.
JULY 26, 1965
155
to leave with them if I were back at teaching
now. There are seven things that I think I
would ask them to learn and to keep in their
minds as they grow up, citizens of the
world's greatest power — which has to mean
responsible citizens of the world's most re-
sponsible power.
First, learn to love diversity. All men are
brothers, but all brothers are different. No
nation, no doctrine, no culture will conquer
this planet. Our world, thank God, is and will
remain pluralistic — and for this reason color-
ful and interesting and exciting to live in.
Second, learn to beware of labels and cate-
gories. No society in this world bears any
real resemblance to Communist society as
seen by Marx. No society in this world
bears much resemblance to capitalist society
as understood by Adam Smith. And the
struggles we see are never clear if they are
viewed as simple, and never simple once they
are clear.
Third, learn to choose between sharply dif-
ferent shades of gray. There is a real
difference between the aggressors and the de-
fender in armed conflict, even if the de-
fender is not quite a saint. For if there were
nothing to choose between the major pro-
tagonists in the so-called cold war, then the
whole of postwar history would make no
sense at all.
Fourth, learn that power is a many-sided
thing — to be used with great care. Power
is wealth and armed strength ; but it is also
good deeds and good intentions and warm
feelings, and it rests at least partly upon
good example. Great power is inseparable
from great responsibility, and in many ways
the mightiest nation in the world community
is the most involved with all other nations.
Fifth, learn to tvatch the deeper trends of
world events. The surface is subject to quick
storms and sudden calms, neither of which
tells us much of tomorrow. So keep a close
eye on the mainstreams and on the quiet,
lesser currents — how strong and how fast
they flow and where and when they promise
to converge or to veer apart.
Sixth, learn not to worry too much about
what other people say. To prove their inde-
pendence— which we want them to have —
they sometimes have to thumb their noses
at those who have the power to act for peace.
But fortunately, the basis for our self-esteem
and the measure of success in our foreign
policy are not gratitude or popularity but
respect and results.
Finally, learn to enlighten your judgment
with a healthy touch of optimism. Time and
change alter the contours of every dispute.
The problem is never as big as the biggest
expert thinks it is. And man always has in
him something more, and something better,
than appears at the moment.
But these and other nuggets of distilled
experience only confirm what instinct and
freedom and faith and preference tell us in
our bones: The wave of the future is still
the open society, and the engine of that
society is the open mind of the free individ-
ual.
Just open the minds of the young Ameri-
cans in your charge, and stand back. They
will prove, in their time, even if we do not
in ours, that our Declaration of Independ-
ence was indeed written for "all men."
Letters of Credence
Republic of China
The newly appointed Chinese Ambassa-
dor, Chow Shu-kai, presented his credentials
to President Johnson on July 8. For texts of
the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated July 8.
156
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
A Time for Decision
by George C. McGhee
Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany i
The time has come, I say, for the world to
make up its mind about the Germans. I say
this because there is evidence that many
have not yet made up their minds. I say this
because I believe that ample grounds for a
decision exist.
The free world has welcomed the Federal
Republic as a partner in its enterprises, has
learned to respect its counsel, has applauded
the proven solidity of its democratic institu-
tions, has admired its economic progress,
and has leaned on its military strength.
There is no question as to the high place
Germany has attained in the Western com-
munity of nations — with great benefits to the
community as well as to Germany. Why,
then, should there be any remaining doubt
about Germany?
Yet there are indications — some subtle,
some quite open — that a doubt persists. A
letter to an editor, an editorial, a threat of
boycott, a minor demonstration against Ger-
man NATO forces, a private conversation in
which distrust of Germans is expressed —
these are some of its manifestations. Taken
individually, these phenomena are not alarm-
ing. Collectively, they are disturbing rem-
nants of a negative attitude that is badly
out of date.
For two decades the German goal has been
to earn the world's acceptance. The Ger-
1 Address made at commencement exercises of the
European Division of the University of Maryland at
the University of Heidelberg, Heidelberg, Germany,
on May 30.
mans have worked hard for it. They expected
that if they made good they could win from
the world a final verdict in their favor. They
have made progress, but what are their gains
worth if the world takes all the Federal
Republic off'ers — and still denies them the
one thing they want most? If the world
should ever force on the Germans the con-
viction that nothing they can do can ever
gain them full acceptance — that there is no
further use in their trying — then it will not
be the Germans only who are the losers.
Time does not change the facts of the
Nazi past nor lighten its oppressive weight
upon the history of humanity. Today's Ger-
mans are fully aware of this. As a people
they stand squarely against everything this
past represented.
But it is one thing for the world to decry
the past, another to insist on continuing to
live in it — always to see its shadow in the
present. There is a distinction to be made
between drawing lessons from experience
and refusing to accept the evidence of new
experience. If there have been profound
changes in Germany in the last 20 years,
it is irrational to retain habits of thought
which ignore this fact. We asked the Ger-
mans to put aside their past and build anew.
If they have in fact done so, our interests,
as well as those of the Germans, suffer if we
fail to give recognition.
What is needed is not forgetfulness but a
memory which does not stop in 1945. What
is required is not forgiveness of an account
which must always stand in the record
JULY 26, 1965
157
against the men who compiled it, but the
setting down in Germany's ledger of the new
entries which bring the account up to date.
It is high time that this be done — that the
account be audited.
The U.S. Decision of 1946
The United States began early to accumu-
late evidence on the German question. In
1946 we took a crucial decision based on
evidence which was then only fragmentary.
Partly, this decision stemmed from the con-
viction, derived from our own history, that
the same people placed in new circumstances
can learn new ways. We Europeans, includ-
ing Germans, who emigrated to America,
learned new ways. Partly, our decision was
taken out of a determination to bring an end
to a situation of increasing paralysis and
despair that existed in Germany. Largely, it
was an act of faith in the German people.
Looking back nearly two decades later, I
consider it to have been a faith well founded.
In September 1946, American Secretary of
State [James F.] Byrnes came to Stuttgart.
He came from wearisome sessions with the
Russians in Paris, where it had become evi-
dent that four-power cooperation on Ger-
many was available only on Russian terms.
At the Opera House in Stuttgart Secretary
Byrnes made an historic declaration. = He
promised the German people that, if they
undertook the reconstruction of their society
as a democracy, they could look forward to
the friendship and material assistance of the
United States. For the first time since the
war, a high American official spoke to the
German people in terms of amity and good
will.
In the prosperous landscape of the Ger-
many of today, it is hard to recall to the
mind's eye that barren heap of rubble which
was the image of Germany when Secretary
Byrnes spoke — the physical rubble of cities,
the figurative rubble of social upheaval, the
human debris of dispossession. If faith
moves mountains, here indeed was a need
for strong faith. It is true that our coun-
- For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 15, 194C, p. 496.
try offered much to its recent enemy. The
world should also take note, however, that it
was not a one-sided gift.
There was, I believe, at that time a con-
scious decision on the part of the German
people. They decided to put aside those ele-
ments in their society which had poisoned
their past — and to make for and of them-
selves a new nation. When they made that
decision they had no way of knowing pre-
cisely where their efforts would lead them.
They had hope, but it was not an easy hope
to hold in the confusion of those times. The
sour smell of defeat was still in the air,
families were disrupted, refugees in need of
care poured into constricted living space,
food and shelter were scarce. The future
was uncertain.
In the years from 1946 to 1948, the tenta-
tive growth of a new spirit of resolution
could be felt — but it had not yet found its
confirmation and its release in a flood of
achievement. That moment of release came,
I believe, when in the year 1948 there was
put into effect the currency reform with
which the statesman who is with us on this
platform today was closely associated. The
words "currency reform" have a technical
sound; our vocabularies have not kept pace
with our knowledge that an action which
bears an economic label may have a deep
political meaning — even a moral one. The
currency reform did have such a meaning.
Germans suddenly became aware that talk
of reconstruction was not chimerical, but
practical — that German striving had an at-
tainable goal.
The next year brought the enactment of
the Basic Law as the constitution of the
Federal Republic. Thus there came into
being the political as well as the economic
design for a new Germany, visible to all.
With greater energy and surer purpose the
Germans bent again to the backbreaking
trial of rebuilding their battered cities —
many of which had taken a thousand years
to build. The sheer volume of stone, mortar,
bricks required — not to mention hard, sweaty
labor — staggers the imagination.
Many other difficult tasks had to be under-
158
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
taken simultaneously. A modern economy
cannot function efficiently if any of a number
of essential elements are missing — goods,
markets, communications, services, the rela-
tionship between town and country. Progress
was, of course, uneven. Even when the most
urgent needs had been met, Germany still
displayed a pattern of scattered ruins —
standing among hopeful new growth. Yet so
dynamically did the German people go about
refashioning their economy that, in scarcely
half a decade, the recovery of Germany was
assured.
Germany Today
Today the scars of war are gone. The
cities are flourishing. People are prospering
as no Germans before them have ever pros-
pered. The democratic society that they have
worked to create has fulfilled its promise.
The institutions of the Federal Republic
have proved solid by the test of experience.
We all know well enough the signs of sick-
ness in a democracy: a fragmentation of
parties, an absence of consensus for action,
internecine strife, an alienation of major
parts of the electorate — who are persuaded
that they have no stake in the regime. Search
German democracy as deeply as you will.
You will find in it none of these symptoms.
On the contrary, the Bundestag has a
place of respect among the world's parlia-
ments— free in debate and competent in
decision. The vigorous contests among the
German political parties are of the kind
that strengthen, rather than tear, the fabric
of democracy. The trend has been toward
the formation of a national consensus on
vital issues, which finds expression by the
individual voter in support for the party
which he thinks best represents that con-
sensus. The true test of a country's political
maturity is the capacity of its citizens for
responsible choice. The men and women who
will vote this fall in national elections in the
Federal Republic will meet that test.
The only authentic spokesman for the Ger-
man nation is the Federal Government in
Bonn. In the years since the war, what role
has it played in the world? What course has
it pursued toward its friends and neighbors,
and toward its self-appointed foes?
A prolog preceded the formal entry of the
Federal Republic as an independent actor on
the stage of world affairs. Chancellor [Kon-
rad] Adenauer and his colleagues had hoped
that the inescapable need for a German con-
tribution to defense against Communist ag-
gression could be met by the creation of a
European Defense Community — with forces
in which Germans could serve along with
men of other member nations. Many other
statesmen, European and American, shared
this hope. However, it failed. Hence, at the
same moment that the Federal Republic
entered the Atlantic community as a sover-
eign power, it acquired the obligation to
raise national forces for the conmion de-
fense. National forces were not Germany's
first choice.
That was 10 years ago. Since then, a re-
armed Germany has given the world no
cause to fear its strength. All its forces are
committed to NATO; the Federal Republic
has renounced their use for national ends.
It has faithfully kept its obligations. The
United States, for one, is glad that these
forces are in existence and are available for
the common defense of freedom.
German hopes for the creation of a united
Europe have never flagged. The Chancellor
of Germany [Ludwig Erhard] has been one
of the leading spokesmen for European uni-
fication. There have been disappointments,
but they have been far outweighed by the
successes. The Coal and Steel Community,
EURATOM, and the Common Market are
not only milestones in the history of Ger-
many— they are also milestones on the road
toward a united Europe. Such a united
Europe is seen in Germany as an integral
part of a wider Atlantic community — the
ideal which President Kennedy set for all
of us.
Still, Europe or even the Atlantic area is
not the whole world. What role has Ger-
many— free Germany — played elsewhere?
Although the Federal Republic is denied
membership in the United Nations, it takes
an active part in the global struggle against
JULY 26, 1965
159
the ancient evils of poverty, disease, and
ignorance. Besides participating in the work
of international organizations, the Federal
Republic extends direct assistance on a large
scale. Like that of the United States, its
program of bilateral aid is truly worldwide
in scope.
The Question of Reunification
Since the war the Germans plainly have
solved many problems. How have they faced
up to problems which have resisted solution?
The reunification of Germany is one, and it
is of deep concern not only to Germans but
to the whole world. Peace cannot be secure
while this division at the heart of Europe
persists. The United States, as President
Johnson pledged again in his address to
Europe on the eve of VE-Day,^ will not
weary in playing its full part in the un-
finished task of bringing it to an end.
Communist propaganda calls the German
desire for unity "revanchism." It tries to
present the Federal Republic's striving for
it as evidence that those Germans not under
Soviet control still harbor dangerous designs.
The truth is that only the Federal Republic
is qualified to express what Germans want.
Germans do not seek the restoration of the
old Germany — but the completion of a new
Germany, where all can live in freedom.
Here is a classic example of the notorious
Communist technique of turning truth up-
side down. There is, indeed, a dangerously
anachronistic regime in Germany. It is the
neocolonial regime the Soviets maintain in
their zone. There is a threat to peace in
Central Europe. It is the division that the
Soviets have not allowed to heal. Their prop-
aganda against the Federal Republic is but a
thinly disguised cover to their determination
to perpetuate this division for their own
ends.
To repudiate a past is not to be quit of it.
3 For text, see ibid., May 24, 1965, p. 790.
as Germans well know. What have they done
in retribution for their legacy from Hitler?
First, they have sought the guilty. German
authorities have investigated more than
13,000 cases and have sentenced some 5,500
individuals for Nazi war crimes. Second,
they have assumed a national responsibility
to rectify, insofar as possible, the evil com-
mitted in Germany's name. What is possible
is limited. The dead cannot be made to live.
What can be done, however, the Germans
are doing.
Germany has undertaken compensation
payments to the victims of Nazi persecution,
including the restitution of property, which
will amount to an estimated DM 42 billion —
and the payment of DM 31/2 billion to the
State of Israel. The Parliament also acted
this year to extend the statute of limitations
on the prosecution of war crimes. To any
who feel that today's Germans do not suffi-
ciently feel the burden of Germany's past, I
recommend a reading of the debate on that
measure. On March 10 of this year, in the
Bundeshaus in Bonn, the soul of this country
was laid bare.
This is the Germany of a new generation.
In the Federal Republic 60 percent of the
people are under 40 years of age; few of
them can have had any significant part in
the Nazi period. The age group now over
55 which furnished the most active partici-
pants in the Nazi misdeeds constitutes only
a small fraction of the population. Demo-
graphically as well as in other respects, this
nation has indeed transformed itself.
It is understandable that an interval
should have elapsed between Germany's
transformation and the world's acknowledg-
ment of it. It takes time for new facts to
impress themselves on the consciousness of
mankind.
However, the facts have been available for
some time now. Germany has made its case.
It is time for the world to weigh that case —
and to make up its mind about the Germans.
160
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on the Atlantic Partnership
by J. Robert Schaetzel
Deputy Assistant Secretary for European Affairs '
This conference addresses a subject — the
interaction of East and West developments —
which is more than ordinarily appropriate
and timely. It is also a subject about which
more questions can be raised than answers
easily supplied. There can be no happier
situation for conferees.
The first step should be to examine what
has been happening and try to project what
is likely to happen in the European Com-
munist world. As with all political analysis,
there is bound to be disagreement. Any
political assessment is difficult, doubly so
with societies which have internal reasons
for cloaking their actions and hiding their
motives.
Perhaps the most important fact to note
is that the Communist world is beginning
to have to face up to objective reality — or,
in other words, facts.
The first objective fact that the Soviet
bloc has had to face has been the unity of
purpose, the economic progress, and the
political stability achieved by the Atlantic
nations. As we review the last 20 years of
world history, we cannot help but speculate
about the surprise and the ideological dis-
may with which this situation must be seen
by observers in the Communist countries.
As contrasted with Marxist predictions,
' Address made at a conference on "Esst-West
Relations: Their Impact on the Atlantic Alliance,"
sponsored by the University of California at Los
Angeles Institute of International and Foreign
Studies at Lake Arrowhead, Calif., on Apr. 3.
what has happened to the great industrial
societies of Europe and North America?
1. The exploitation of labor by capital has
not increased but steadily decreased while
living standards have risen.
2. "Capitalist" governments have dedi-
cated themselves to eliminate unemployment
— and have had a substantial measure of
success in this endeavor.
3. Countercyclical policies give new as-
surance against boom-and-bust crises. In-
deed, the Eastern world seems more har-
ried by wide cyclical swings than do the
North Atlantic nations.
4. High growth rates and dynamic econ-
omies are by no means a special preserve
of Communist societies. In fact, free
Europe, Japan, and Formosa stand as ex-
amples of the amazing vigor of the enter-
prise economic system.
5. Contrary to Marxist-Leninist dogma, the
capitalist states have not experienced the
series of frightful crises leading to an-
nihilating wars that were predicted.
6. The process of colonial exploitation by
capitalist nations is now a thing of the
past; energies are now directed at helping
the newly independent nations.
With the November 1962 Cuban missile
crisis as a probable watershed, a second fact
became evident to the Soviet Union and
presumably the Eastern European states as
well: that the West would face up to the
most serious risk of nuclear war rather than
be blackmailed into submission when a
challenge to its vital interests was posed.
JULY 26, 1965
161
Hence, general war becomes an unaccept-
able means of achieving political ends. This
conclusion has obviously become a major
source of deep division and disagreement
between the Communist Chinese and the
Russians.
Third, rising internal conflicts and indeed
basic dilemmas are floating to the surface
of the Communist world. They include the
irrelevance of rigidly imposed Marxist-Len-
inist ideology to the intellectual and scien-
tific challenges of our times, the incompat-
ibility of totalitarian controls on personal
freedom and choice with the development
of a modern productive society, the absurd-
ity of the attempt to contain the thirst for
national independence and dignity within an
imperial system ruled from Moscow or
Peiping.
Fourth, there are the objective facts not
only of economic theory but of acute and in
certain cases of almost insoluble practical
economic dilemmas. It is quite evident that
the Soviet system, which has performed im-
pressively at the level of heavy industry, is
now caught up in a series of extremely dif-
ficult theoretical and practical economic
problems.
The economic goals and priorities set by
the ambitions of its leaders — enormously
costly arms and space programs, a rate of
growth in economic capacity sufficient to
overtake the United States in the foresee-
able future, the modernization of a back-
ward agriculture, improvement in the still
deplorable living conditions of the Soviet
people, ventures into foreign aid — all these
have imposed immense strains in recent
years. Growth has in fact declined sharply.
The result has been crisis within the leader-
ship and bitter debate over ways to overcome
the inherent inefficiencies of the traditional
command economy centralized in Moscow.
There is also the practical problem of ef-
fective economic cooperation among the Com-
munist states. Even when the Eastern Eu-
ropean states were in the role of docile satel-
lites economically subservient to the Soviet
Union, the system worked imperfectly. To-
day, in the face of increasing independence
of the Eastern European nations and their
expanding economic requirements, the COM-
ECON [Communist Economic Council] ar-
rangements seem to be confronted by more
problems than solutions.
Perhaps the most portentous change, the
change that affects all aspects of the Com-
munist world, is the fact that there is no
longer a monolithic bloc. There is an ex-
panding area for maneuver, with Eastern
European states backing Moscow against
Peiping — but not unequivocally.
Soviet Moves To Increase Tensions
Despite these deep changes in the world
which the Communist nations inhabit — and
changes which they increasingly recognize —
there is no reason for us to assume that
either the Soviet Union or the other Com-
munist states entertain any real doubts about
the intrinsic merit of their ideology or that
they have forsaken their goal to see the
Communist system imposed upon a reluc-
tant world. Nor is there any valid reason to
assume that the tension and cross-purposes
which exist between the East and the West
and the complex of issues that divide us are
due to Soviet or Communist uncertainties
about American or Western intentions.
Our Western democracies — political sys-
tems composed of both reasonable people
and interest groups in fluid conflict — look
upon compromise as the indispensable lu-
bricant. It is thus natural for democracies
to work from the premise that, if the world
is difficult and dangerous, then each of the
contending sides should compromise toward
some middle position.
By definition, democratic societies are less
well prepared by instinct and political orga-
nization for aggression than authoritarian
regimes. The diffusion of the power of de-
cision— an important ingredient of democ-
racy— reduces the chances for precipitous
action.
Further, political and economic forces are
always at work within democracies eager
to exploit any opportunity to reduce de-
fense expenditures or to convert resources
from military to peaceful domestic ends.
Thus, any favorable change in the inter-
162
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
national temperature leads almost inevitably
to pressures to decrease military outlays
and to weaken the tenuous lines of col-
lective action for common security.
What this analysis suggests is that, vi^hile
the ambitions and goals of the Soviet state
remain the same, they recognize at the
same time the unacceptable dangers of
major conflict as a road toward those goals.
But we must, at the same time, assume they
will use with all imagination and skill de-
vices short of war to improve their deterio-
rating position.
For instance, we see in the Cyprus crisis
a problem involving two NATO allies and
one in which no essential Soviet interest is
involved. Yet they have inserted themselves
in this troubled situation to sow dissen-
sion and hopefully to cause a deterioration
in the Western position. This is clearly evi-
dent in such superficially inconsistent ac-
tions as the supplying of heavy military
equipment to the island simultaneous with
diplomatic gestures and maneuvers encour-
aging to the Turks. The objective is to
exacerbate tensions and disagreements.
In the troubled Middle East the efforts of
the Soviet Union and the Eastern European
states are not to stabilize the area or to re-
duce the possibility of local conflict. On the
contrary, through the provision of arms and
mischievous diplomatic action, the objective
is to move in ways calculated to increase
rather than to reduce tension.
Another example of this technique can be
seen in the labored and strident attacks of
the Communist states on proposals being-
considered among the Western nations for a
multilateral nuclear force. This psychological
offensive ignores, of course, the fact that an
increase in Western nuclear missile strength
is a belated response to the close to 800 to
1,000 Soviet missiles now in place and tar-
geted on Western Europe.
The Soviets also charge that any collective
Western nuclear force will be nothing more
than a facade behind which the Germans
will gain access to nuclear weapons. In fact,
a major purpose — and indeed the essence
of the arrangements now being considered
— is precisely the contrary, namely to develop
a collective Atlantic arrangement which will
preclude the proliferation of national nuclear
systems on the Continent.
Nor has the Soviet Union shown any dis-
position to strengthen the U.N. system. In-
deed, it is hard not to be discouraged by the
Soviet wrecking crews at work in the U.N.,
by their unwillingness to cooperate at any
level in peacekeeping activities.
Limits on Pace and Cliaracter of Change
The Western World has watched with fas-
cination and anticipation the changes going
on within the Eastern European states and
the Soviet Union. After the frozen Stalin
years, this movement is of critical impor-
tance and a source of hope for the future.
But we must continually remind ourselves
that, while the potential of this change is
enormous, the full fruition will at best only
take place over a very long period. Nor can
we ignore the possibility that in the end the
transformation we work and hope for may
not take place.
If the Western nations are to contribute
to and benefit from this process of Commu-
nist change, the process must be understood
and unemotionally evaluated. We need to
realize that there are real limits on the pace
and character of change. For instance, we
have seen very little movement recently as
far as Poland is concerned. Even in Yugo-
slavia, one of the first Communist states to
assert its independence, there is the unhappy
episode of the young instructor and writer
who reported in a Yugoslav literary jour-
nal on his summer experience in the Soviet
Union. In telling of the literary ferment of
Russian reaction to the years of Stalin re-
pression he offended Moscow. The result of
the Soviet protest has been the arrest and
sentencing of the writer, repressive action
threatened against the journal itself — and
another defeat for freedom of expression.
Obviously, one of the real quandaries
faced by the Communist nations is how to
reconcile nationalism with ideology. The
renaissance of nationalism east of the Iron
Curtain is not only tonic for the Eastern
European states themselves, but it can well
JULY 26, 1965
163
be a stabilizing factor in East-West rela-
tions. But one may ask, why is rising na-
tionalism to the East a constructive develop-
ment, while signs of similar phenomena in
Western Europe are considered regressive?
One explanation might be that the Eastern
European states have been until very re-
cently tightly locked into the Soviet empire.
Just as the less developed countries of Africa
and Asia, recently freed from their colonial
ties with the West European nations, are in
a phase of acute nationalism, in part as a
reaction to their most immediate experience,
so it is with the Eastern European states.
On the other hand, the Western European
nations, with no experience under colonial
suppression, have no impulse for nationalism
as a reflex reaction to colonialism. Indeed,
the Western European nations seem to be
in a new and more sophisticated historical
phase in which they see, still somewhat
dimly, that their security and economic well-
being cannot be assured by nation states
but only through the devising of policies and
institutions that emphasize collective action.
We do ourselves an injustice when we fail
to recognize how far the Western nations
have come in abandoning some aspects of
national sovereignty and in building a sys-
tem of consensus by democratic consent.
This development is in sharp contrast to the
technique, clearly impoverished, of compul-
sive cohesion among the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries.
Another significant change in the Com-
munist bloc has been the necessity, in the
face of economic problems, to improvise
against Marxist dogma. Despite, for in-
stance, the article of Communist insistence
that the European Economic Community
does not exist, there is accumulating evi-
dence that the Eastern European states see
the handwriting on the wall and realize that
some accommodation must be made with this
dynamic reality. Recent modest arrange-
ments between Poland and the Community
with respect to certain agricultural products
are the tangible evidence that facts must be
recognized.
Another adjustment to reality is the inter-
est of the Poles in becoming members of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
in Geneva. There is also the recent decision
of the Soviet Union to become a signatory
of the patent convention,- presumably as a
consumer to get the advantages of this in-
ternational arrangement, but probably due
primarily to the fact that the Soviet Union
has now reached a level of industrial and
scientific development where it is to their
economic interest to gain the protection the
convention provides.
In considering the matter of economic re-
lations between the Soviet Union and East-
ern Europe with the West it must be borne
in mind what an inherently difficult problem
it is. The difficulty arises not so much from
the political conflict between Communist and
democratic societies, or from territorial dis-
putes, or over the unsettled question of Ger-
many, but it is rooted in certain incompati-
bilities of the free-enterprise and the state-
trading economic systems. There is, for in-
stance, the difficulty of establishing rules
which will assure equitability in the move-
ment of goods and services between the two
economic systems. A tariff lowered by a pri-
vate-enterprise nation has economic mean-
ing and has contractual characteristics ; sim-
ilar action by a state-trading society has no
real content.
I can recall, back in 1946, at the first pre-
paratory conference for an International
Trade Organization, in London, the efforts
we made — and which responsible econo-
mists have been making since then — to de-
velop rules and obligations which would deal
fairly with this dilemma. It should be noted
that these mid-1940 London discussions, and
those in Geneva the following year, took
place within an atmosphere of hope for un-
derstanding just prior to the time that the
Soviet Union rang down the curtain on East-
ern Europe.
I should think it reasonable to predict
that, at least over the next several years, we
may see fewer dramatic developments of a
' For an article entitled "Soviet Adherence to In-
ternational Patent Convention" by Harold A. Levin,
see Bulletin of May 17, 1965, p. 758.
164
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
political or economic nature in the Eastern
European world, or in the relationships of
this world to the West, than we have seen
in the recent past. Partly this is because the
recent changes have been dramatic in con-
trast to the frozen years, partly because
these changes have been played up, under-
standably enough. What will probably occur
in the future will be a gradual broadening
and extending of the changes we have been
seeing in Rumania, Czechoslovakia, and Hun-
gary. Furthermore, should the increase of
intellectual, political, and economic freedom
threaten the authority of national Commu-
nist regimes, we must assume that there will
be reactions by the entrenched power struc-
tures to curtail freedom and to protect
vested leadership.
Finally, just as some Western observers
may have overdramatized the degree and
pace of change in Eastern Europe that has
taken place, we may have to deal with the
reverse error in the future. If future evolu-
tion is less dramatic, and as we become ac-
customed to a changed Eastern Europe, the
slow process of adjustment may be dis-
counted and a new mood of Western dis-
enchantment may set in. I believe this disil-
lusionment may occur first with respect to
economic affairs, where a rapid increase of
trade between the East and the West is
still anticipated. I will come to this matter
later.
If we may assume that our actions have
at best a marginal effect on the policies and
actions of the Communist world, let us none-
theless take the foregoing analysis and see
what it implies for the Atlantic nations. I
intend to examine this question within the
three rather classical subdivisions: defense,
politics, and economics.
Strategic and Defense Problems of NATO
With respect to defense, one's attention
is directed immediately at NATO. To what
extent did the birth and viability of this
organization depend on an unambiguous
threat of Soviet aggression? We can cer-
tainly agree that the change in the nature
of the military confrontation between the
East and the West has made the strategic
and defense problems of the alliance more
complicated.
NATO must face complex strategic issues
that would be difficult to solve even among
allies undivided on other issues. On one ex-
treme, there is the view advanced by the
French that nuclear retaliation should fol-
low any unambiguous act of aggression
aimed at the conquest of substantial NATO
territory. On the other hand, the United
States has been patiently advancing the need
for flexibility. We have argued that the
West must not only have a strong strategic
and tactical nuclear force for use if neces-
sary but that NATO must have a backup
of conventional military means able to deal
with accidental or unpremeditated crisis.
Such contingencies could occur over Berlin
or on the flanks of NATO.
Apart from this continuing examination
of NATO strategy, there is, of course, the
natural instinct within the alliance, in as-
suming that the threat has diminished, to
reduce defense expenditures at an even
more rapid pace. There can be no economic
justification for this state of affairs. Our
affluent Western nations can in fact afford
without strain modest increases of expend-
itures for defense. Certainly, the ability to
sustain such expenditures is greater today
than when we initiated our collective action
in 1950. The problem is the lack of political
will, rationalized by the proposition that
any greater effort is unnecessary.
It is hard to see how this proposition can
be defended when one considers the of-
fensive Soviet missiles aimed at Western
Europe, the 26 Soviet divisions and 400,000
men in East Germany, Hungary, and Poland,
supplementing almost 1,200,000 Eastern Eu-
ropean men under arms, backed up by 32
combat-ready Soviet divisions in the western
U.S.S.R. Twenty-six NATO divisions face
this force.
Reasonable men may disagree on the ac-
tual risk in the postwar period of outright
Soviet military aggression against Western
Europe. There can, however, be little ques-
JULY 26, 1965
165
tion about the fact that the Soviets have
in the past used military power in being as
a means of pressure or for purposes of
blackmail — and presumably they will use it
in the future. Nor can we afford to ignore
the fact that there is a real threat.
Nor can there be any reasonable doubt
that the change in the nature of the Soviet
threat and the sense of greater military sta-
bility, due principally to American and
German strength, have contributed to the
erosion of the novel institutional and inte-
grating factors typified by NATO, factors
which are indeed unique in the history of
military coalitions. Fifteen years of effort
has gone into developing the command struc-
ture of SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters
Allied Powers Europe] in Paris, the various
subordinate commands, the infrastructure
program involving millions of dollars of
NATO pipelines, and the common-use air-
fields and depots.
Finally, we have evolved a political body
in the North Atlantic Council, a means of
consultation, which has proved itself to be of
unique effectiveness. We have seen this proc-
ess work well, for instance, in connection
with the several Berlin crises. As another
example of this process, a continuing pro-
fessional examination has been carried on
within NATO in an attempt to develop a
consensus among the Allied nations on de-
velopments in the Soviet Union and the other
Eastern European states. This meticulous
effort of political consultation begins among
working-level officials but involves foreign
ministers as well at least twice a year. The
net effect of this consultation has been to
enlarge the consensus among the member
states.
The Area of Political Activity
Turning to the area of political activity,
there can be little doubt but that the pre-
vailing East-West situation offers tempta-
tion to national maneuver in contrast to col-
lective action. For instance, from time to
time we hear Americans, impatient with the
slowness of the process and the compromises
necessary to develop common Western posi-
tions, urge that the United States should get
into bilateral negotiations with the U.S.S.R.
in order to settle the differences between
the East and the West. The argument runs
that, as the danger to the world arises out
of polarity of the Soviet Union and the
United States military power, why should
we allow ourselves to be needlessly encum-
bered by our commitment to negotiate only
on the basis of consensus among our allies?
Indeed, the argument is sometimes given the
further gloss that such a U.S.-Russian set-
tlement would so benefit the free world as
a whole that we actually owe it to the alli-
ance to move quickly to bilateral negotia-
tion. This seductive line of rationalization
has been rejected out of hand by this and
previous American administrations.
Diminution of a direct threat and changes
in the East, instead of stimulating a re-
newed effort in the Western World to orga-
nize ourselves to gain the advantages of com-
mon action vis-a-vis the East, have encour-
aged some national governments to see the
new situation in the East as an opportunity
for national virtuosity. For instance, over a
year ago, when an effort was made to main-
tain the 5-year Berne Union rule for credits
to the Communist bloc, Britain indicated its
unwillingness to accept the principle of
common action. This has led other countries
to follow suit.
According to newspaper reports, at the end
of the early March meeting of the Common
Market Council of Ministers, France took an
adamant position in excluding the Com-
mon Market Commission from any responsi-
bility in relations with the East. The argu-
ment advanced was that these relations are
political, hence the prerogative of national
governments and not of the Economic Com-
munity.
In this situation of flux and apparent op-
portunity, is there much chance that na-
tional governments can control their normal
instincts to exploit the East-West issue for
domestic political advantage? In the West-
ern World the great bulk of public opinion
166
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
will understandably support almost any
proposition the purpose of which is to cre-
ate a more secure world and opportunities
for expanding economic relations. Thus any
government will be drawn to an "active
Eastern policy" no matter how real or illu-
sory the prospects for major breakthroughs.
This natural political impulse mitigates
against collective policies and actions.
Nor can we ignore the effect of changes
in the East on the existing European and
Atlantic institutions. In addition to NATO,
we have, first, the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development and,
second, the European Economic Community.
We hope and expect the European Commu-
nity will continue to develop toward full
economic integration and that, in time, the
process will lead to political unity. But this
is a long-term goal with many obstacles to
be overcome. In the meantime the Commu-
nity will not be able to escape the fact that
it must address itself to the Community's
economic relations with the East. Until the
common external tariff is fully in effect, it
presumably remains possible for the Six to
avoid facing this issue.
The notion can still be advanced that all
relations — economic, political, and otherwise
— between the East and the West are politi-
cal and the province of the national govern-
ments. I find it just as hard to see how the
pretense can be maintained that these are
not matters of the common commercial pol-
icy of the Community as to see how the
Communists much longer can pretend that
the Community does not, in fact, exist.
Another vague proposition is occasionally
advanced which also grows out of the
changes in train in the East. It is argued
that a united — but undefined — Europe is one
that must be open to all European states,
presumably those in the Eastern world as
well. Confronted by a notion of this sort,
I cannot help but wonder at the superficial
appreciation it demonstrates of what the six
nations of the Common Market are about,
the problems they have surmounted and
those that they are now tackling.
Uncharted Political Waters
One of the reasons the six Western Euro-
pean nations have been able to move so far
so quickly in their federal experiment is
that they started from the base of six gen-
erally similar economic, social, and political
structures. Levels of national and individual
income were not too disparate. Members of
a political party of one country sit in the
European Parliament with members of sim-
ilar parties from the other member states.
Businessmen and agriculturists find it easy
and natural to meet together in European
conclaves. In short, the most important ele-
ment in the mysterious chemistry of political
integration may be the underlying fact of
similarity of outlook, of interests, and of
achievement.
We are conscious today of matters upon
which the Six disagree, and the extent to
which this disagreement seems for the mo-
ment to hold up progress. Nonetheless the
things that hold the Six together are domi-
nant. Contrast these common ideas with the
disagreement on basic security and political
policy between the neutrals — Sweden and
Switzerland — and the NATO allies.
I raise these points primarily so that we
can understand what is happening. The
North Atlantic nations are moving into un-
charted political waters. Our purpose is to
expand the areas of common interest and
common actions as a means of promoting
freedom and open societies around the world.
Despite our similar origins, experience, and
common political beliefs, our progress re-
mains painfully slow. It is not a process that
will succeed if it is broadened to include
every political system or idea. The European
and Atlantic experiments, which are comple-
mentary, should have a beneficent impact on
the East by creating Western institutions so
strong and progressive that the Eastern
Europeans in turn will shape and encourage
constructive changes within and among
themselves.
This is not to say that we should ignore
the possibility of ad hoc arrangements be-
tween the Eastern nations and Western in-
JULY 26, 1965
167
stitutions. Indeed, the OECD has already
had a considerable amount of experience
with Yugoslavia, which is a full member for
confrontation of economic policies, scientific
and technical matters, agricultural and fish-
eries questions, technical assistance, and pro-
ductivity.
A separate issue and one deserving of
careful attention in the future will be the
effect of the changes in Eastern Europe on
the Comiftunist parties in Western Europe.
In several countries, particularly Italy and
France, these parties retain a substantial
hold amounting to better than 25 percent
of the vote. The Western European Commu-
nist parties have found it difficult to recog-
nize the party line; they were embarrassed
and incensed by the manner of Khrush-
chev's ouster ; more recently they can hardly
be sure with what dominant group within
the Communist world they should aline
themselves.
Nonetheless, the crises, strains, and dif-
ferences within the Communist movement
have not adversely affected either the
French Communist or the Italian Commu-
nist parties to the extent we might have
hoped. Indeed, as communism appears less
evidently aggressive, one effect in Western
Europe is to strengthen the Communist
parties by giving them increased respecta-
bility. The parties are thus able to stress
even more that they are merely liberal pro-
test groups, striking out at the obvious eco-
nomic and social problems in the Western
European countries. Further, the parties,
particularly in Italy but also in France, re-
main well organized, well financed, and
with dedicated and experienced leadership.
It would seem to behoove all of us, Euro-
peans and Americans alike, to recognize
these Communist parties for what they are.
The apparent lessening of tension between
Eastern and Western Europe should not ob-
scure the fundamental disagreement and the
almost unbridgeable chasm between the pur-
poses and techniques of Communist parties
and those of democratic societies. The divi-
sion is over the basic issue of means and
processes, indeed, of the meaning of freedom
itself.
Perspective on East-West Economic Contacts
Of the three functional areas it is perhaps
easiest to speculate about the development
of economic relationships between the East
and West. Partly this is because we have had
more experience in this area, partly because
we deal with more objective data. The gen-
eral conclusion I would draw about the near-
term future of economic relations is to sug-
gest that a rapid expansion of trade is not
in the offing. Second, the expanding and
mutually beneficial economic contacts will
not be of overriding significance in altering
the basic political relationships between the
East and the West or in inducing changes
in the political structure of the Communist
states themselves. To make these points is
not to degrade the importance of movement
in this area — only to put it in proper per-
spective.
This cautious, if not pessimistic, judgment
derives from recent experience, namely the
growing imbalance in the trade between
East and West. For instance, under the bi-
lateral trade agreements that have been in
place for a number of years between the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European
states and several of the Western countries,
the modest performance and disproportion-
ately slow rate of growth have not been due
to a lack of interest in either Eastern Eu-
rope or in Western Europe. The problem has
been the lack of the means on the part of
the Eastern European countries to pay for
desired goods. On the one hand, the tradi-
tional raw material exports from Eastern
Europe either are not available — this is par-
ticularly true of agricultural goods — or they
produce raw materials for which the market
is no longer of the sort that existed in the
prewar period.
Oil may be an exception to this picture,
although higher-than-market prices discour-
age potential buyers. Also, the Western im-
porting nations have been anxious to avoid
168
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
excessive dependence on Russian petroleum.
With regard to fabricated Communist
goods, the problem is their noncompetitive-
ness — in the broad connotation of the word.
Their products are frequently overpriced,
quality control is uneven, the terms of deliv-
ery may be poor, and they have little experi-
ence with the highly developed merchandis-
ing techniques for finding and exploiting
the Western market. In the course of trade
agreement negotiations the Communist rep-
resentatives frequently fail to understand
that Western governments cannot agree to
take Eastern manufactured goods; these are
decisions made by private traders in our
Western societies.
To deal with this situation of ti'ade stag-
nation, pressures, have quite naturally de-
veloped in several of the Western Euro-
pean countries and Japan, to some extent
abetted by the Communist states, to en-
courage Western exports by infusion of
Western credit. The United States has
argued, as have several other Allied nations,
that this technique amounts to nothing more
than subsidizing the Communist world so
that they can postpone the time when hard
choices of resource allocation must be made.
Long-term credits are a form of aid which
the West should reserve for developing
countries. To the degree we extend aid in
this form to the Soviet Union, we make it
easier for them to conduct politically moti-
vated aid programs of their own. Further-
more, as one Western nation moves to meet
another's offer, we are perilously close to
a Western credit race, the beneficiaries of
which will be the Communist nations.
There is a murky area in economic rela-
tions in which it is very hard to see what
the immediate future holds for us. One
peripheral conclusion from the UNCTAD
[United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development] conference held in Geneva
last summer ^ is that in certain areas the
Soviet Union, in particular, but also several
of the other industrialized Eastern European
" Ibid., Aug. 3, 1964, p. 150.
states, may find themselves less uncomfort-
able in the company of Western developed
countries than with the less developed
countries of the Southern Hemisphere. As
the less developed countries persist in their
demands to the advanced countries, without
too fine discrimination between state-trading
and free-enterprise countries, the advanced
Communist nations may find themselves, to
their surprise, making common defensive
cause with the North Atlantic nations.
I find it hard to speculate with any as-
surance on what all this means. Certainly
it will mean no more than an uneasy and
very limited alliance between ourselves and
the Communist states. But it may have the
negative effect of limiting somewhat the
ability of the Eastern European nations to
exploit the hopes and ambitions of the less
developed countries without finding them-
selves the target of new demands.
We do know, as a footnote on this, that
the Soviet Union in its extensive aid pro-
gram to the less developed countries has
had experiences which resemble very closely
indeed the problems and frustrations which
have surrounded our own Western foreign
aid efforts.
One aspect of East-West economic rela-
tions is clear. The advanced nations of the
North Atlantic have the opportunity to ad-
vance their self-interest through modest
coordination of their efforts in order to
enhance their great potential bargaining
position with the East. This is not a pro-
posal for economic warfare. But if we are to
encourage the changes in the Eastern world
which will make our relationships more
fruitful and tranquil, then these changes will
be brought about by the strength and co-
herence of the Atlantic nations, not by
disunity and division.
There are real limits on what we can do.
Private enterprise means limited govern-
mental direction of the economic life of our
democratic societies. Western governments
have limited ability to direct and aim in-
dustries at specific markets. The nature of
our Western system makes the organiza-
JULY 26, 1965
169
tion of economic resources for the broad
political, strategic ends I suggested ex-
tremely difficult.
The German Problem a Central Issue
Beyond the positive opportunities, we must
avoid allowing Western economic relations
with the East to become a source of division
and contention among the Allies. As I sug-
gested a moment ago, a credit race could
have this effect.
The central issue between East and West
is the German problem. Security for Eu-
rope and the world will always be uncertain
as long as the German people are divided.
While the solution to this problem will not
come quickly, it is possible to see how
Western and Eastern developments may con-
tribute to its ultimate resolution.
First, a strong Germany must live and
grow within the framework of vital Western
institutions. As European unity flourishes,
German dynamism will have a constructive
outlet. NATO is essential to the Germans'
sense of security. In fact, there is not a
German army in the classical sense of the
term; there are German units committed to
and commanded by SACEUR [Supreme
Allied Commander Europe] ; there is no
German general staff.
Second, developments in the East can
hasten the day when the Soviet Union may
be prepared to negotiate an equitable set-
tlement. As the other Eastern European
states test their new independence, increase
their trade and contacts with Western Eu-
rope, the isolation and rigid Stalinism of the
Ulbricht regime is bound to be cast in even
bolder relief. The pressures that will be re-
leased by this evolution in the East may open
the presently closed road to German unifi-
cation.
Impact of European Unity on the East
In conclusion it seems to me that there
are two basic issues that might be abstracted
from the foregoing analysis.
First, there is a question of the extent to
which fear and a clear and present danger
are necessary motivations for constructive i
collaborative action among the Western
nations. Is the adhesive that has bound the
six nations of the Common Market together
based on the chemical — fear? NATO was
clearly born in an atmosphere of weakness
in Europe and the threat that an aggressive
Soviet Union would move unhindered across
the Elbe. Can NATO survive the warm
breezes that occasionally blow from the
East? Can we find ways of dealing with the
more ambiguous threats to Europe and the
dangers to security that arise outside the
NATO area?
In a word, have the nations of our At-
lantic community matured to the point
where common interest and the instinct
for common action derive from a recognition
of the innate value of working together?
Have we reached this point, as contrasted
with an almost animal instinct for preserva-
tion, in which we are driven to cooperate
only by real dangers but fall into disarray
and confusion when the evident threat re-
cedes? This is the first basic issue.
The second issue is whether we can agree
among ourselves and operate on the prem-
ise that Western strength, unity, and pur-
pose create a situation in the world which
induces the type of constructive change
in the East which is our common objective.
I am not suggesting that our Western ac-
complishments and strength are the single
factor which has brought about these
changes, only that it is an important factor
and furthermore one which we have it with-
in our capacity to control. If this is so, it
becomes doubly important in this period of
transition for the Western nations to
strengthen those elements in our society
which have encouraged these positive changes
in the East.
This means to push ahead with the
process of European unity, which is such
a dynamic force in Europe and has caught
as well the imagination of so many people
in the United States. Nor should we ignore
the impact of this process on those in the
East who find it a challenge to their theories
and a source of attraction. Sustained eco-
170
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
nomic growth and prosperity of the capital-
ist countries have given the lie to Marxist
prediction. Even more effective has been the
ability of democratic nation states to sub-
merge themselves in a process of peaceful
unification which amounts to a continuing
and perhaps decisive reply to the theologists
of the East that the capitalist nations have
no alternative but to fall into internecine
quarrels and ultimate collapse.
To review this situation and attempt to
look into the future is to have a tinge of
pity when one sees the extremely rough
road that lies ahead for the Communist
nations and leaders. Accepted economic and
political tenets are being challenged from
within the Communist camp. They are fall-
ing behind in the economic race. Young
people show little taste for the ideology of
their fathers and much interest in the
bourgeois ways of the West. And as these
young people become educated, this very
process inevitably whets the appetite for
freedom, for unrestricted inquiry, and for
contact through and across the Iron Curtain.
On the other hand, we in the West have
no ideological barriers to break through.
Practically all of the great political problems
among the Western nations which existed
20 years ago have been settled. There is no
longer the Franco-German problem which
contributed so heavily to the European
civil war of the last hundred years. Nor is
there an unsolved colonial problem. The
colonial empires of the 19th century have
disappeared. The new nations which have
replaced them are in many cases politically
and economically unprepared for the rigors
of national existence, but their problems are
far different from the colonial problems of
the past.
Most importantly, the Atlantic nations
have begun to experiment with new institu-
tions. The most imaginative and the most
important is the process of creating a new
Europe out of the old nation states on the
Continent. At a more modest level we also
are learning a great deal in the slow and
steady process of consultation and of com-
mon action within the framework of NATO
and the OECD.
Therefore it is not unreasonable to en-
visage a steady degree of progress by and
among the Western nations. This process
should lead to their own enhanced well-
being and greater sense of security. It should
expand the great market of the North At-
lantic for less developed countries of the
world and encourage a growing flow of cap-
ital.
Finally, there is the example this com-
munity of Western nations offers. It is an
example that should encourage, induce, and,
hopefully, bring about the process of change
and evolution in the attitudes and policies
of the Eastern world.
It is to this process of peaceful adjust-
ment that we should dedicate ourselves.
Captive Nations Week, 1965
A PROCLAMATION'
Whereas the joint resolution approved July 17,
1959 (73 Stat. 212), authorizes and requests the
President of the United States of America to issue
a proclamation each year designating the third week
in July as "Captive Nations Week" until such time
as freedom and independence shall have been
achieved for all the captive nations of the world;
and
Whereas all peoples yearn for freedom and
justice; and
Whereas these basic rights unfortunately are
circumscribed or unrealized in many areas in the
world; and
Whereas the United States of America has an
abiding commitment to the principles of independ-
ence, personal liberty, and human dignity; and
Whereas it remains a fundamental purpose and
intention of the Government and people of the
United States of America to recognize and encourage
constructive actions which foster the growth and
development of national independence and human
freedom :
Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, President
of the United States of America, do hereby designate
the week beginning July 18, 1965, as Captive Na-
tions Week.
I invite the people of the United States of America
to observe this week with appropriate ceremonies
'No. 3661; 30 Fed. Reg. 8663.
JULY 26, 1965
171
and activities, and I urge them to give renewed de-
votion to the just aspirations of all people for na-
tional independence and human liberty.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this second day
of July in the year of our Lord
[seal] nineteen hundred and sixty-five,
and of the Independence of the
United States of America the one hundred and
eighty-ninth.
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment
of Science Institute in Korea
President Johnson announced on July 4
(White House press release (Austin, Tex.))
that Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Special Assistant
to the President and Director of the Office
of Science and Technology, would leave for
Korea on July 7 to explore possibilities for
U.S. cooperation in establishing an Institute
for Industrial Technology and Applied
Science in Korea. President Johnson had of-
fered to send his science adviser to Korea
for this purpose during President [Chung
Hee] Park's visit to Washington in May.^
Dr. Hornig was accompanied by his wife.
Dr. Lilli Hornig, of Trinity College, Wash-
ington, and three advisers: Dr. Albert I.
Moseman, Director, Agricultural Sciences,
The Rockefeller Foundation of New York
City; Dr. James B. Fisk, President, Bell
Laboratories, Murray Hill, N. J.; and Dr.
B. D. Thomas, President, The Battelle Me-
morial Institute, Columbus, Ohio.
The Presidential mission spent 1 week in
Korea, meeting with leaders of the business
community, scientists, industrialists, and uni-
versity professors, as well as key Govern-
ment officials.
' Bulletin of June 14, 1965, p. 950.
President Johnson expressed the hope to
Dr. Hornig that the visit of the mission
would produce early results, adding :
The talents of trained Korean scientists and en-
gineers are a rich resource for the country's de-
velopment and progress. I believe it is important
that efforts on their part to advance the level of
technological achievement in Korea should receive
encouragement and support. If the Institute con-
tributes toward channeling Korea's talents effec-
tively into accelerating the pace of Korean economic
growth, it will serve as an inspiring example of
what can be accomplished through international co-
operation in science.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section of
the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated June 5 from the U.S.S.R. representa-
tive concerning the situation in Southern Rho-
desia. S/6416. June 7, 1965. 2 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the United Na-
tions Operation in Cyprus for the period March
11 to June 10. S/6426. June 10, 1965. 53 pp. and
map.
Letter dated June 14 from the U.S.S.R. representa-
tive transmitting the text of a statement made by
the U.S.S.R. Envoy in Wellington to the New
Zealand Government regarding the sending of a
New Zealand military detachment to South Viet-
Nam. S/6435. June 14, 1965. 2 pp.
Letter dated June 16 from the representative of New
Zealand transmitting the text of the New Zealand
Government's reply to the Soviet statement. S/
6449. June 16, 1965. 3 pp.
Report of the Special Committee on the Policies of
Apartheid of the Government of the Republic of
South Africa. S/6453. June 17, 1965. 69 pp.
Reports by the Secretary-General regarding the situ-
ation in the Dominican Republic. S/6420, June 7,
1965, 1 p.; S/6432, June 11, 1965, 1 p.; S/6447,
June 16, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6447/Add. 1, June 16,
1965, 1 p.; S/6459, June 19, 1965, 3 pp.
Cables from the Assistant Secretary General of the
Organization of American States transmitting
texts of cables received by the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation from the Secretary General of the
OAS regarding the situation in the Dominican
Republic. S/6417, June 7, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6418,
June 7, 1965, 3 pp.; S/6419, June 7, 1965, 2 pp.;
S/6427/Rev. 1, June 10, 1965, 1 p.; S/6431, June
11, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6433, June 11, 1965, 4 pp.; S/
6465, June 22, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6467, June 22, 1965,
1 p.; S/6468, June 23, 1965, 1 p.; S/6477, June 25,
1965, 3 pp.; S/6479, June 28, 1965, 3 pp.; S/6480,
June 28, 1965, 1 p.
172
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The Challenge of the Developing Countries
by David E. Bell
Administrator, Agency for International Development ^
I am highly honored to be invited to speak
at this commencement and to join the dis-
tinguished company of those who hold de-
grees from this university.
You who are graduating here today are
fortunate to inherit a great tradition. Ver-
mont and New England stand in American
history for special qualities. Well known
among these are thrift, frugality, and the
prudent and sparing use of resources.
As a former Budget Director, I would be
the last to minimize such virtues. But it is
often overlooked that New Englanders are
also renowned for bold initiatives and readi-
ness to run great risks. Those were New
Englanders, after all, who sailed the whaling
ships to the Antarctic, and the clipper ships
to the Far East — acts of the highest daring
and fortitude. They were New Englanders
who initiated our War of Independence at
Concord and at Ticonderoga, and it was their
revolutionary political imagination that
helped to invent in the federal United States
a constitutional form flexible enough to unite
a continent — a constitutional form which is
still fresh today and offers hope in many
parts of the world of gaining the benefits of
larger unities without losing the values of
smaller diversities.
I cite, also, one of the gi-eatest of New
Englanders, wounded three times in the Civil
War, who in a speech 20 years afterward
expressed his mature judgment by saying:
1 Address made at commencement exercises at the
University of Vermont, Burlington, Vt., on May 23.
"Life is action and passion" and "it is re-
quired of a man that he should share the
passion and action of his time at peril of
being judged not to have lived."
These are all elements of New England
tradition, and they make a great legacy.
In their spirit may I say to this graduat-
ing class, welcome to the turmoil and the
challenges of today's world. You will need
all the daring and fortitude — as well as all
the prudence — you can muster. You will
need all the passionate commitment to free-
dom and to progress of your forefathers.
You are living in turbulent and perilous
times, times which call at least as much for
revolutionary political imagination as did the
times of 1775.
Like it or not, the United States has been
flung, willy-nilly, into the center of the
world's stage, to deal with the breakup of
empires, the implacable thrust of Communist
aggression, the unimaginable power of the
atom. Since the end of World War II, our
country has been striving to play a useful
and constructive role all around the world —
with very little experience and few trained
practitioners. We can take pride in the per-
formance of many Americans — among them
notable Vermonters, like the late Warren
Austin, first U.S. Representative to the
United Nations; George Aiken, who has
given many years of strong and sensible
leadership in the Senate; and Ellsworth
Bunker, who speaks for the United States
today in the Organization of American
States.
JULY 26, 1965
173
These men have shown us how to face the
challenges of our times calmly and intelli-
gently. But they would also be the first to
say that we have far to go and much to do if
we are to bring our country — and help bring
others — safely through these years.
I would like to speak briefly this afternoon
about one facet of these times — one aspect of
the challenge facing the United States — the
challenge of the less developed countries of
Asia, Africa, and Latin America.
Why the U.S. Helps Developing Countries
All of us know the vast changes that have
occurred in these areas since the end of
World War II. The European colonial em-
pires in Asia and Africa, which had been
built up over three or four centuries, have
been all but liquidated in two decades. Scores
of new nations have come into being, each
seeking to establish its independence and to
achieve progress for its people. Of the 37
independent countries in Africa today, 27
have gained nationhood since the beginning
of 1960; only 4 were independent in 1950.
These new nations, and older ones as well
in Asia and Africa and Latin America, are
aware of the potential benefits of modern
science and technology and are fiercely deter-
mined to accomplish overnight the economic
and social progress that has been achieved in
Europe and the United States in the 200
years of the Industrial Revolution. In this
worldwide scene of turmoil and upheaval, the
international Communist movement has been
continuously at work, seeking by persuasion
and by subversion, by threat and by promise,
to turn to Communist ends the powerful
motivations of nationalism and progress
which are at work in all these countries.
What is all this to us in the United States?
What do we care?
We care because our own national inter-
ests are deeply involved. We could not live
safely in a world where the area of freedom
was steadily shrinking. Just as our own
security was greatly strengthened because
the Marshall Plan saved Europe from com-
munism, so the security of our country today
is bound up with the survival and strength-
ening of free countries in Latin America,
Africa, and Asia.
We care also for economic reasons.
Stronger economies abroad help our own
economy. American exports to the European
countries have more than doubled since the
Marshall Plan, and American investments in
Europe have gi'OAvn even more rapidly. It is
clear today that the Marshall Plan would
have been worth its cost to the United States
had it been regarded as nothing more than
an economic investment.
Over and above security and economic in-
terests is still another reason why we care.
As Americans, we are proud of our religious
background and our ethical and moral tradi-
tions. It would surely not be fitting for the
wealthiest nation on earth to refuse help to
our friends in other lands who are poor and
hungry and ill.
Thus the security interests, the economic
incentives, and the humanitarian motives
that impel us to want to help the developing
countries are very powerful.
This, I believe, is why the policy of the
United States toward the less developed
countries has been clear and consistent since
the end of World War II and has been fol-
lowed on a bipartisan basis under four Presi-
dents— Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, and
Johnson. We seek to assist the less developed
countries to establish themselves as inde-
pendent, self-supporting nations, able to
achieve continuing economic and social prog-
ress for their people. We have provided bil-
lions of dollars in economic and military as-
sistance to these countries in pursuance of
this policy.
The costs of our foreign assistance efforts
are often exaggerated. We are spending
fewer dollars today than we were in 1950 —
and because of the rapid growth in our econ-
omy, foreign aid as a percentage of our gross
national product is much less than half as
large as it was in the days of the Marshall
Plan. Moreover, under today's policies, over
80 percent of the funds appropriated by Con-
gress for foreign assistance are spent in the
United States, for American goods and serv-
ices— and it is those American goods and
174
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
services, not American dollars, that are sent
abroad under the aid program. As a result,
our aid program has a smaller impact today
on the United States balance of payments
than it has ever had before.
Nevertheless, even though our foreign aid
costs are held to a minimum, they are still
sizable — several billion dollars per year. Are
we getting results for our money? I believe
we are.
We can cite some outstanding successes —
for example, the Republic of free China on
Taiwan. Fifteen years ago Taiwan looked
as though it would be an indefinite pensioner
of the United States. But the strong and
sensible efforts of the Chinese, plus major
foreign aid from the United States, have
brought remarkable progress. As a result,
our economic aid to Taiwan is coming to an
end this present year.
What has happened in Taiwan is highly
instructive. With our help, the Chinese have
built roads, ports, power stations. They have
carried out a highly successful land reform
program and raised agricultural yields per
acre almost to the level of those in Japan.
The United States has provided technical
advisers, capital assistance, surplus agricul-
tural commodities. The Chinese have taxed
themselves, increased their own savings,
worked hard, avoided luxury consumption.
Today the economy of free China is ad-
vancing very rapidly. Production, incomes,
and exports are rising. But the crucial
change is that now in Taiwan there is
enough competence, enough trained leader-
ship, enough of a capital base, so that the
Chinese can go ahead on their own. They
have learned how to apply modern science
and technology to overcome their problems.
The need for aid from the United States is
coming to an end — because the ability to
achieve continuing economic and social prog-
ress has been established in Taiwan.
By U.S. standards the Taiwanese are still
very poor. Their per capita income is only
about $150 per year, compared to more than
$2,500 per year in the United States. But
they can take it from here. Instead of a vi-
cious downward spiral of poverty breeding
more poverty, the Chinese on Taiwan have
established the beginnings of the benign up-
ward spiral of steadily larger production,
yielding steadily larger incomes, leading to
steadily rising living standards.
What has happened on Taiwan is what we
want to see happen throughout Africa and
Asia and Latin America. Taiwan is an espe-
cially impressive case. But major progress
has been achieved in other countries as
well — in India, in Pakistan, in Turkey, to
name just a few.
The Lessons of Experience
We have learned a great deal over these
last 15 years about how to provide aid effec-
tively.
We have learned that the most important
ingredient of success is not the aid we pro-
vide to a country but what the people and
the leaders of a country do for themselves.
If the people of a poor country are willing
to undertake strong measures to mobilize
their own resources and to apply sensible
priorities in their use — if they are willing to
save and to learn and to work hard — then
our assistance can be enormously beneficial.
It is this concept which underlies the Alli-
ance for Progress, a partnership in which
the Latin American nations have agreed to
undertake strong policies of reform and de-
velopment— ^to stop inflation, raise taxes,
broaden educational opportunities, and do
whatever else is in their power — and we in
the United States have agreed to provide
the crucial margin of external resources —
technical advice, capital goods, supplies and
equipment — which will be needed to achieve
self-sustaining progress in Latin America.
The alliance is working now in most of the
countries of Latin America, and you can
begin to sense the spirit and lift of people
on the move.
A second lesson from our experience is the
importance of establishing in developing
countries conditions which permit local and
private initiative to work. We are not so
naive as to try to superimpose the pattern
we have worked out here in the United
States on countries with wholly different his-
JULY 26, 1965
175
torical and cultural traditions. But we do
believe firmly in the efficiency, in all coun-
tries, of giving people a maximum of free-
dom to make their own decisions and to get
things done. Consequently we work very
hard, in the developing countries, to help
establish local and private institutions, and
we have learned to draw more and more on
the skills and experience of local and private
resources in the United States — of busi-
nesses, trade unions, cooperatives, farm or-
ganizations, savings and loan associations,
and many more — to help accomplish this.
A third lesson from these years of foreign
assistance work is the crucial importance of
trained leadership in the developing coun-
tries. By far the most valuable foreign as-
sistance received by the United States during
our own developing years was the immigra-
tion of several millions of people who had
received their education, and often years of
valuable practical experience, in Europe or
elsewhere before they arrived in this coun-
try. The United States did not have to pay
for their education and training but bene-
fited greatly from them.
This particular method of obtaining skilled
leadership is not open, except to a relatively
small extent, to today's less developed coun-
tries. We have been learning, however, in
the United States and in other advanced
countries, how to send our own trained ex-
perts to the developing countries to help
build competence there, and we are bringing
thousands of young men and wom^n from
the developing countries to the United States
for advanced education and training — in-
cluding, I am glad to note, several who are
now enrolled here at UVM.
We are seeking to apply these lessons, and
others, in improving the effectiveness of our
assistance to the developing countries. And,
as I indicated earlier, we can point to con-
siderable evidence of progress. But we also
try to face honestly the problems we have
not yet overcome. Food supplies around the
world are barely keeping pace with growing
demands. Rates of population growth in
many countries are very high, making more
difficult the provision of schools and health
services, the achievement of constructive
family life. Above all, the tactics of Com-
munist subversion, under the leadership of
trained and dedicated cadres, using skillfully
the tactics of assassination and terror, have
proven to be extremely difficult for the im-
perfect institutions of newly independent
countries to deal with, even with massive
help from the United States. We have much
still to learn and much still to do.
The Wider Perspective
Let us step back a pace and look at a
wider perspective. Suppose we are success-
ful, as I hope we can be, in helping to es-
tablish, in country after country, economi-
cally strong and politically independent
nations. What then? Will this solve all the
problems of international life? Certainly not.
Foreign assistance, even where successful,
is no recipe for instant paradise.
Witness France, the largest recipient on
record of U.S. economic and military aid —
over $9 billion in the 10 years following
World War II. Our aid to France was highly
successful. It was intended to help France
restore a vigorous, self-sustaining economy
and to rebuild modern military forces. Those
objectives were achieved, and our aid to
France came to an end.
As every day's newspapers bear witness,
the success of our aid program in France
did not end differences of view between the
French Government and ours. Does this fact
change the success of our aid into failure?
Certainly not. We wanted a free, strong,
and independent France, and that is what
we have. A world of strong and independent
nations obviously does not and should not
insure conformity. What it does provide is
an opportunity, if we are wise enough, to
solve common problems in peace and free-
dom.
And this, I suggest, is the deepest mean-
ing of what we have been doing through our
foreign assistance programs. We have been
trying to establish conditions in which men
can work together cooperatively for the ad-
vancement and enrichment of human life
and the free society. This has been the under-
176
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
lying theme of the American experience —
from the pioneers of Plymouth through the
War of Independence, the Westward Move-
ment, and all the other landmarks of Ameri-
can history right down to last summer's civil
rights legislation.
Our purpose abroad is and must be what
it is at home — to liberate the spirit of man,
to open opportunities for seeking and finding
new knowledge and applying it to human ills,
to build cities that support life and do not
stifle it, to create international political ar-
rangements that will permit diversity in
unity, to create a world society based upon
true equality for all. These are our objec-
tives in the world, and our foreign assistance
programs are among the more effective
means we have for achieving those objec-
tives.
These are not objectives the United States
can achieve alone, no matter how strong we
are. Even though it is painful, we must
continually remind ourselves that world
leadership is not equivalent to world domi-
nation, that while we can influence events we
cannot control them, and that for many
world problems there may not only be no
solution that is satisfactory to the United
States — there may be no solution at all for
the foreseeable future.
We should not delude ourselves, either, as
to the pace at which change can be achieved.
If India succeeds, with help from us and
other advanced countries, in doubling her
per capita income in 25 years — which would
be an excellent achievement and a faster
rate of growth than the United States has
maintained since 1900 — India's people by
then would have a per capita income of $150
per year (ours in the United States by then
would be around $4,000 per capita per year) .
Nevertheless, small though the figure sounds,
it could mean that all of India's children
could be in primary school, instead of half
only, which is the case today. It could mean
that major diseases like malaria and cholera
could have been wiped out. Above all it
could mean that the conditions for steady
and continuing progress could have been
established.
We should not minimize the obstacles of
malice and folly that confront us. But also
we should not minimize the progress that
can be made if we stick to the job. For we
are working vdth, not against, the deepest
aspirations of man and leading the way
toward the coming international civilization.
To that civilization, with its multiple,
potential benefits for science, for commerce,
for the enrichment of the human spirit, I
believe our foreign assistance programs are
contributing a great deal. And I hope some
of you who are graduating today from this
university will have the opportunity in years
to come to engage in this work, which is as
constructive and satisfying as any that
exists in the world today.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Labor
Convention (No. 74) concerning the certification of
able seamen. Adopted at Seattle June 29, 1946.
Entered into force July 14, 1951; for the United
States April 9, 1954. TIAS 2949.
Ratification deposited: Ghana, March 18, 1965.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere, in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Octo-
ber 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Turkey, July 8, 1965.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Kuwait (with an under-
standing). May 14, 1965.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
JULY 26. 1965
177
Notification of approval: Ukrainian Soviet Social-
ist Republic, May 12, 1965.
Trade
Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro-
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963.
Entered into force November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809.
Signatures: Belgium (subject to ratification),
June 8, 1965; Canada, April 15, 1965.
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on
provisional accession of Switzerland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
November 22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461,
4957). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. En-
tered into force for the United States December
18, 1964. TIAS 5734.
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 17, 1965.
Second proces-verbal extending period of validity
of declaration on provisional accession of Ar-
gentina to the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade of November 18, 1960, as extended
(TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva October 30,
1964. Entered into force for the United States
December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.
Ratification deposited: Austria, May 17, 1965.
Protocol amending the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on
trade and development and to amend annex I.
Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise,
at Geneva from February 8 until December 31,
1965.1
Acceptances deposited: Cyprus, June 9, 1965;
Pakistan, June 15, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature
at Washington March 2 through April 23, 1965.'
Notifications of undertaking to seek accept-
ance: Finland, July 2, 1965; Spain, July 3,
1965.
Acceptances deposited: Korea, July 8, 1965;
Western Samoa, July 7, 1965.
BILATERAL
Australia
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their
stations in the other country. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Canberra June 25, 1965.
Entered into force June 25, 1965.
Brazil
Agreement for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Washington July 8,
1 Not in force.
1965. Enters into force on the date on which
each Government shall have received from the
other written notification that it has complied
with all statutory and constitutional require-
ments for entry into force,
Canada
Agreement amending the technical annex to the
agreement of October 24, 1962 (TIAS 5205),
concerning the coordination and use of radio
frequencies above 30 megacycles per second,
with annex. Effected by exchange of notes at
Ottawa June 16 and 24, 1965. Entered into
force June 24, 1965.
Agreement relating to a seismic research program
known as Project Vela Uniform. Effected by
exchange of notes at Ottawa May 18, June 28
and 29, 1965. Entered into force June 28, 1965.
Israel
Agreement relating to radio communications be-
tween amateur stations on behalf of third
parties. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 7, 1965. Enters into force August 6,
1965.
Mexico
Agreement extending through July 15, 1965, the
air transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as
extended and complemented (TIAS 4675, 5513,
5647, 5648). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico June 30, 1965. Entered into force July 1,
1965.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 5-11
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D. C, 20520.
Release issued prior to July 5 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 166 dated
July 2.
No. Date Subject
*168 7/6 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Development.
*169 7/9 Mrs. Harris sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Luxembourg (biographic
details).
170 7/9 Stevenson: 39th session of ECO-
SOC.
*171 7/9 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Development.
*172 7/9 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Development.
• Not printed.
178
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX July 26, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1361
American Principles. The View From Up There
(Cleveland) 151
China. Letters of Credence (Chow Shu-kai) . 156
Economic Affairs
The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on
the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . . 161
Strengthening the International Development
Institutions (Stevenson) 142
Europe
Captive Nations Week, 1965 (proclamation) 171
The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on
the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . 161
Foreign Aid. The Challenge of the Developing
Countries (Bell) 173
Germany
The Impact of Change in Eastern Europe on
the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) . . . 161
A Time for Decision (McGhee) 157
Korea. Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment of
Science Institute in Korea 172
Military Affairs. The Impact of Change in
Eastern Europe on the Atlantic Partnership
(Schaetzel) 161
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The Im-
pact of Change in Eastern Europe on the
Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) .... 161
Presidential Documents. Captive Nations Week,
1965 171
Science. Dr. Hornig Studies Establishment of
Science Institute in Korea 172
Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 177
U.S.S.R. The Impact of Change in Eastern Eu-
rope on the Atlantic Partnership (Schaetzel) 161
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 172
Strengthening the International Development
Institutions (Stevenson) 142
The View From Up There (Cleveland) ... 151
Name Index
Bell, David E 173
Chow Shu-kai 156
Cleveland, Harlan 151
Johnson, President 171
McGhee, George C 157
Schaetzel, J. Robert 161
Stevenson, Adlai E 142
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Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy
In this pamphlet, based on an address he made at George Washington University on June 6,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk develops a number of ideas that can serve as guidelines — "helpful
household hints," he calls them — for the ordinary citizen who wants to understand the funda-
mentals of U.S. foreign policy.
The pamphlet is devoted primarily to an examination by the Secretary of a series of familiar
concepts, some negative, some positive: "omnipotence," "diversity," "gray alternatives," "ap-
peasement," "national liberation," "building world order," "regionalism," and so on. By keeping
some of these principles in mind, he says, the American citizen can develop a broad perspective
in which to consider specific foreign policy issues as they arise.
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIU, No. 1362
August 2, 1965
PRESIDENT JOHNSON DISCUSSES VIET-NAM,
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC, DISARMAMENT
Opening Statements From News Conference of July 13 182
SECRETARY TALKS ABOUT VIET-NAM ON "ISSUES AND ANSWERS" 183
NEW STEPS TO IMPROVE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY ARRANGEMENTS
by Secretary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler 209
CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES— PRINCIPLES FOR PARTNERSHIP
A Report by Livingston T. Merchant and A.D.P. Heeney 193
For index see inside back cover
President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam,
Dominican Republic, Disarmament
Following are statements read by Presi-
dent Johnson at the opening of his news
conference at the White House on July 13.
Viet-Nam
Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] McNa-
mara and Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge
will be leaving tomorrow evening for Sai-
gon. When they return next week, we will
give careful consideration to their recom-
mendations, as well as those of Ambassador
[Maxwell D.] Taylor and General [William
C] Westmoreland. We will do what is neces-
sary.
The present center of the struggle is in
South Viet-Nam, but its root cause is a de-
termined effort of conquest that is directed
from Hanoi. Heavy infiltration of North
Vietnamese forces has created new dangers
and difficulties in South Viet-Nam. In-
creased aggression from the North may re-
quire an increased American response on the
ground in South Viet-Nam. Increased ag-
gression from the North continues to require
very careful replies against selected mili-
tary targets in North Viet-Nam.
Meanwhile, General Westmoreland has the
authority to use the American forces that
are now in Viet-Nam in the ways which he
considers most effective to resist the Com-
munist aggression and the terror that is
taking place there. These forces will defend
their own bases. They will assist in provid-
ing security in neighboring areas, and they
will be available for more active combat
missions when the Vietnamese Government
and General Westmoreland agree that such
active missions are needed.
So it is quite possible that new and serious
decisions will be necessary in the near fu-
ture. Any substantial increase in the present
level of our efforts to turn back the ag-
gressors in South Viet-Nam will require
steps to insure that our reserves of men and
equipment of the United States remain en-
tirely adequate for any and all emergencies.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LMI, NO. 1362 PUBLICATION 7930 AUGUST 2, 196S
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, aa well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents. U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Peicb: 52 issues, domestic »10,
foreign $16 ; single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
ITOTE ; Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.
182
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary McNamara and Ambassador
Lodge will concern themselves also with the
political and economic situation. We have
had Mr. Eugene Black visiting Southeast
Asia, and he has given me an oral report
on his encouraging visit to that area.i We
mean to make it plain that our military ef-
fort is only a necessary preliminary to the
larger purpose of peace and progress.
Dominican Republic
In the Dominican Republic, Ambassador
[Ellsworth] Bunker and his colleagues are
continuing their skillful and determined ef-
fort to find a peaceful solution.^ We believe
as they do that it is urgent that a solution
be found and found promptly. We are en-
couraged by indications that leaders on
both sides are prepared to stand aside in
favor of a new government which will enjoy
the confidence of the Dominican people as a
whole. Those on both sides who show good
will and who join a new government in the
work of restoring peace will deserve the
thanks of all of their countrymen. Right
now, here, we are both cautious and hope-
ful.
Disarmament Tall<s
Yesterday the Soviet Government notified
the U.S. Government that it is agreeable to
the resumption of negotiations of the 18-
Nation Disarmament Committee at Geneva.
The United States has suggested a date no
later than July 27 for this resumption. Mr.
William C. Foster now is in the process of
inquiring whether this date is agreeable to
the other 16 members of the Disarmament
Committee.
At the conclusion of the Geneva confer-
ence last September ^ it was agreed that the
^ See p. 215.
' For background, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965,
p. 132.
° For a statement made at Geneva on Sept. 17,
1964, by Mr. Foster, during which he read a mes-
sage from President Johnson to the Conference of the
Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee, see ibid.,
Oct. 12, 1964, p. 524.
two cochairmen, the Soviet Union and the
United States, would consult and would agree
on a date for resumption, after which the
other members of the Committee would be
consulted in order to obtain their agreement
as well.
Mr. Foster met with the Soviet spokes-
man in New York on June 15 and 16, on
instructions to urge reconvening of the
Disarmament Committee as soon as possible.
Yesterday's Soviet response is an encourag-
ing development. As we have stated before,
peace is the "leading item on the agenda of
mankind" and every effort should be made
to lead us toward that goal.
As I stated in San Francisco,* we will
come to these negotiations with proposals for
effective attack on these deadly dangers to
mankind and we hope that others will do the
same.
Secretary Talks About Viet-Nam
on "Issues and Answers''
Following is the transcript of an inter-
vieiv with Secretary Rusk on the American
Broadcasting Company's radio and televi-
sion program, "Issues and Answers" on
July 11. Intervieiving Mr. Rusk were ABC
correspondents William H. Lawrence and
John Scali.
Press release 173 dated July 12
Announcer: This week the United States
poured more men into Viet-Nam and suf-
fered new casualties as the fighting in-
creased in tempo. President Johnson said
that more than 75,000 United States troops
will be needed there and that the war in
Viet-Nam is going to get worse before it
gets better. How much worse is it going to
get? How can we win in Viet-Nam? What
does the appointment of Ambassador Lodge
mean?
For the answers to the issues, the Secre-
tary of State, the Honorable Dean Rusk.
Here to interview Secretary Rusk, ABC
* Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98.
AUGUST 2, 1965
183
White House correspondent Bill Lawrence
and ABC State Department correspondent
John Scali.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, welcome to "Is-
sues and Answers." Let's start off with a
question that some critics are asking and,
indeed, some others : Why don't we bomb the
Soviet antiaircraft missiles that are being
built in the Hanoi area?
Secretary Rusk: Well, those missiles are in
the immediate vicinity of Hanoi, presum-
ably for the immediate defense of Hanoi.
From a military point of view, that is a
problem of Hanoi itself.
I don't want to predict the future, but
what we should like to see is to see Hanoi
and Peiping and Moscow and the others
come to a conference table and find a peace-
ful solution to this problem, but if these
matters become relevant to our commitment
in South Viet-Nam, then we will have to
take this into account.
Mr. Latvrence: Do we not bomb the Soviet
missile sites, though, because we fear we
might kill Russians? I remember this was
one of the reasons we didn't hit first in
Cuba but rather took the route that we did
take.
Secretary Rusk: Those missile sites at the
present time are not interfering with the
things that we feel are required to be done,
at the present time.
Mr. Scali: Congressman [Gerald R.] Ford
says the missile sites, as they are being de-
veloped now, Mr. Secretary, are a threat to
the Americans already in Viet-Nam. Would
you agree?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I wouldn't agree
on that at the present time. After all, no
American has been lost from these missile
sites. They are not, indeed, operational at the
present time, and this depends upon the
course of the struggle, the attitude of the
other side, the possibilities of a peaceful
settlement, and the military requirements of
of the situation.
Mr. Scali: But is what you are saying we
have not ruled out bombing these, if neces-
sary?
Secretary Rusk: We can't write the future
until we know what the other side is going
to do about the future. What we would like
the other side to do is to come to a confer-
ence table and make some peace and leave
their neighbors alone, but that does not
mean that they have a free hand to do any-
thing they wish to without pain to them-
selves.
Mr. Lawrence: From a military point of
view, do we know now that these complexes
that have been constructed are simply for
antiaircraft missiles, or are they adaptable
to antipersonnel missiles —
Secretary Rusk: Thus far, they are anti-
aircraft missiles in character. They have a
range of perhaps 30 miles within their own
particular sphere. We have not encountered
any military problem from the presence or
the construction of these sites. As I say,
they are not operational, and we have lost no
Americans to these sites up to this point.
Bombing of Military Targets
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, I know in our
bombings so far we have very rigorously
sought to aim the bombs strictly at military
installations. There are some very key mili-
tary installations around Hanoi and Hai-
phong, including a big oil refinery which is
supposed to produce 40 percent of the oil
available to the North Vietnamese. Why
don't we hit those ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, this has to do with
the general shape of the struggle, the general
problem of escalation. We, ourselves, have no
desire to inflict major damage upon the
civilian population of North Viet-Nam nor
indeed upon the daily livelihood of these
people. We have been hitting military tar-
gets throughout the southern part of the
country and, indeed, in the northwestern
part of the country — such things as ammu-
nition dumps, POL installations in the
southern part of the country that can supply
the infiltration forces, barracks, radar sites,
and military targets of that sort.
We are not waging war upon the civilian
population of North Viet-Nam nor upon, in-
deed, the regime as such. We have never un-
dertaken to destroy that regime. What we
184
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
want them to do is to stop bothering their
neighbors. We hope very much that they will
realize before this matter gets into much
larger conflict that this is the essential
purpose.
I noticed 2 or 3 days ago that Peiping said
that the object here is our capitulation.
Well, we are not going to capitulate, but, on
the other hand, we don't expect and want or
ask for capitulation from anybody else.
We are not asking for a surrender by
Hanoi, or surrender by Peiping; all we are
asking them to do is to stop shooting at
people at whom they have no right to shoot.
Take their people home that they have in-
filtrated into South Viet-Nam, including
some of their own regular armed forces,
and live at peace with their neighbors. This
is the object of the exercise.
Mr. Lawrence: Well, Mr. Secretary, in
terms of our strategy, what are the reports
of the success of our bombing? Are we slow-
ing down infiltration? Are we cutting off
supplies? Are we indeed bringing them any
closer to the peace table?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think there have
been very important results of the bombings
in the North thus far. Ammunition dumps
and bridges, transportation facilities, POL
supplies in the South —
Mr. Lawrence: What is POL?
Secretary Rusk: Gas and oil — gasoline and
oil — and these have had an important prac-
tical effect upon the ability of the North to
support or to increase the support of their
effort in South Viet-Nam.
We had never suspected this in itself
would be a decisive element, but it is im-
portant, Mr. Lawrence, that they have dis-
covered that they are not going to be per-
mitted to send tens of thousands of people
into the South to attack South Viet-Nam
and live in safety and comfort there in the
North.
The idea of the sanctuary is dead as far
as this situation is concerned, and that is
something that all of the others who may be
supporting Hanoi must take fully into ac-
count.
Mr. Scali: Including the Red Chinese?
Secretary Ru^k: Including everybody —
including everybody who elects to get into
this war.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, some people who
have criticized the limited nature of our
bombing have compared it to trying to in-
flict a mortal wound on a man by biting
his big toe.
Secretary Rusk: Well, let me point out
that we have been through many episodes
since 1945 in which the Communist world
has resorted to force. They left behind
troops in Iran that they wanted to keep there
in order to take over that country. Guerril-
las came down from Bulgaria and Yugo-
slavia against Greece. There was a blockade
of Berlin. There were divisions coming
across the North Korean frontier. There
have been other efforts in this postwar pe-
riod to take over neighbors by force.
Well now, the free world — we and others
— have had to meet this. We have met it
with stubbornness, with determination, but
we have also met it with a certain restraint,
in the interests of trying to find a peaceful
settlement that is tolerable for the liberty of
men.
I mean, in the case of the Berlin blockade,
for example, we used an airlift for some
considerable weeks there to keep open the
doors of peaceful settlement. In the case of
Korea, we had a monopoly for all practical
purposes in nuclear weapons at that time,
but we took 100,000 casualties without us-
ing nuclear weapons. In the case of the Cuban
missile crisis. President Kennedy went to
great pains to keep open the doors for the
possibility of peaceful settlement. We waited
41/^ years in Southeast Asia to try to find a
peaceful settlement before attacking North
Viet-Nam military installations.
Now, this is because the American people
and most of our friends abroad are dedi-
cated to the idea of building a peaceful and
decent world order. Of course, you can go
down the chute-the-chute to a general war in
5 minutes. That is the easiest thing to think
of and the easiest thing to do, but the prob-
lem is how to bring these acts of aggression
under control, to turn them back and in the
AUGUST 2, 1965
185
process organize a more stable peace in the
world, and that has been the object of our
policy.
Integrity of American Commitment
Mr. Lawrence: Well, are we really achiev-
ing success anywhere, or are we really being
more or less defeated at the moment?
Secretary Rusk: Do you mean throughout
the world ?
Mr. Lawrence: No, I mean in Viet-Nam.
Secretary Rtisk: I think in Viet-Nam we
are in a very crucial situation there. As
you know, there has been a substantial
buildup of Viet Cong forces in certain areas,
particularly in the highland areas of the 2d
Corps. The situation in the 4th Corps down
in the delta area has improved. The situa-
tion around Saigon is more relaxed than it
was a few months ago. But up in the high-
land area, where there are substantial con-
centrations of Viet Cong, there are going to
be some very sharp engagements and very
severe fighting.
But the point is that we have a simple
commitment there. The essential facts are
that Hanoi has been sending tens of thou-
sands of men and arms into the South. They
are unwilling to come to the conference
table or talk about a peaceful settlement,
and therefore we must meet our commitment,
and that is going to mean during these com-
ing weeks and months, as the President inti-
mated the other day, that there is going to
be trouble ahead in this next period.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, President
Johnson said this week ^ that things would
get worse in Viet-Nam before they get bet-
ter and that there was a need for more
American forces there. Some reports have
said that we may send up to a quarter of a
million troops in order to defeat the Com-
munists. Do you know of any ceiling?
Secretary Rusk: I don't know of any par-
ticular numbers at the present time, John.
The President made it very clear that we
have a simple commitment there, that we will
do what is required. We won't do more than
' At a news conference on July 9.
is required, but we will see this thing
through, and I have no doubt whatever that
what is required will be done.
Now, the Viet Cong have been suffering
very substantial casualties in the past few
weeks. They have taken casualties not only
in their infantry fighting but from bomb-
ing. The monsoon has not had as much ef-
fect as perhaps they had anticipated, because
although it may rain very hard once or
twice a day, in between those rains is a lot
of flyable weather. So we expect some se-
vere fighting. My guess is that the refusal
of Hanoi and Peiping to come to the con-
ference table is based upon their hope that
they will achieve something substantial dur-
ing these next weeks and months. Well, this
isn't going to happen, and therefore we have
to do what is required under the circum-
stances.
Mr. Lawrence: Do you see a danger
though, Mr. Secretary, that we are being
drawn deeper and deeper into the kind of a
land war that so many of our generals
think we can't win — and, after Korea, said
we should never fight again?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't know any
generals who think what we did in Korea
was not wise, but that is not the problem
in South Viet-Nam. There is a very large
South Vietnamese force that is operating
there. We do not believe that the Viet Cong
are operating on a basis such as that in
Korea, when massive divisions came across
the frontier — they still are attacking the
undefended district towns, the civilian pop-
ulation.
They have not sustained a battalion in
combat for more than a day or two at a
time. They are basically still in what might
be called the guerrilla stage, although a
somewhat increased guerrilla-type of opera-
tion. They are not in the formation, nor do
I believe they have the capabilities, for a
sustained conventional war of the sort that
occurred in Korea.
Mr. Lawrence: Yet our needs for combat
troops keep going up and up and up.
Now, Secretary [of Defense Robert S.]
McNamara on at least two occasions upon
186
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
returning from Viet-Nam said that we didn't
need any more combat troops there; yet to-
morrow's list is bigger than yesterday's.
Secretary Rusk: Those judgments, of
course, vary from time to time depending on
what the other side is doing and what they
have done. As you know, they have moved
some of their regular forces from North
Viet-Nam into Laos and into South Viet-
Nam. That is an increase in the scale of the
operation. That requires increased action on
the part of the South Vietnamese and on the
part of ourselves. But I think we need to
keep our eyes on the central point, and that
is that we have a commitment there.
The integrity of that commitment has a
major bearing upon similar commitments
we have in other parts of the world, and the
integrity of the American commitment is
the principal pillar of peace in the present
world situation. That is the essence of it.
Hanoi's Attitude Toward Peace Talks
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, are you at all
optimistic that the unofficial British peace
mission that Mr. [Harold] Davies is conduct-
ing now in Hanoi, that this will succeed in
encouraging Hanoi to come to the conference
table?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have no real
knowledge of what might come out of that.
We were informed that he was about to go
there. He is not carrying any mandate from
us, and he has no authority to negotiate for
us or for the South Vietnamese. If he learns
anything of interest, of course, we will be
glad to know what that might be, but from
what has been said publicly by Hanoi in con-
nection with his visit, I think the prospect
now is that that will not make much differ-
ence to Hanoi's attitude toward discussions
and negotiations or conferences or any meth-
ods of peaceful settlement.
Mr. Scali: You said earlier, Mr. Secre-
tary, that the results of the Communist
monsoon offensive perhaps are not as big or
as important as Hanoi might have wished.
Do you mean to say that thus far we are
winning this battle —
Secretary Rusk: What I said was that the
actual effect of the monsoon weather has
not been as important as perhaps the Viet
Cong supposed.
We had some indication, for example,
they were concentrating in the highlands
area, the 2d Corps area, the north-central
part of South Viet-Nam, in order to escape
the effect of air power. Well now, air power
has been used effectively during the mon-
soon period, and it may be the other side
has overestimated the monsoon effect on the
actual operations.
Mr. Lawrence: Well, what is it we do next
to try to bring these people to the peace
table? Might we try another lull in the
bombing as we tried —
Secretary Rusk: I think the principal
thing, Mr. Lawrence, is that they must dis-
cover— which they will surely discover at
some point — that they are not going to take
over South Viet-Nam by armed force. That
is the point, and when they discover that,
either they will in fact — not at a conference
table — in fact, cut back and withdraw in
what they are trying to do, or they may
come to a conference table to see what
might be achieved in a peaceful settlement.
Peace Proposals Rejected
Mr. Lawrence: Well, are these positive
steps that we take?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have taken 12 or
15 steps in connection with possibilities of
a peaceful settlement. We have used bilateral
diplomacy, the machinery of the Geneva
conferences, machinery of the United Na-
tions, the appeal of the 17 neutral nations,*
President Johnson's offer of unconditional
discussion in his Baltimore speech,^ the
Commonwealth initiative, all sorts of pri-
vate initiatives — some of them public, such
as President Radhakrishnan's [President
Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan of India] proposal
for a cease-fire and an Afro-Asian force in
the area. There have been a dozen or so of
» For background, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965,
p. 610.
'Ibid., p. 606.
AUGUST 2, 1965
187
these suggestions leading to a peaceful
settlement. Hanoi and Peiping have turned
them down.
Mr. Lawrence: What about Prime Minis-
ter Shastri's [Prime Minister Lai Bahadur
Shastri of India] proposal for a lull in the
bombing? The last one was not successful,
but perhaps we blunted it on our side by not
being too clear about it.
Secretary Rusk: We have been clear about
it, and the answer on the other side was
entirely clear before the bombing was re-
sumed. I want to emphasize that because
there are those who think that that pause
was too short. Well, we had the answer be-
fore we resumed bombing from the other
side.
Mr. Lawrence: Did we communicate with
them in writing as the British "congres-
sional record" suggested just recently?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have communi-
cated in a variety of ways with Hanoi.
That was one of them.
Mr. Lawrence: What did you say in
that message, in effect?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the idea was that
the other side said there cannot be any
political action of any sort so long as the
bombing occurred. In effect, here was a
period in which there would not be any
bombing. What have you got to say? What
else will stop if we stop the bombing? How
do we move this toward a peaceful settle-
ment?
Now, we had the answer to that very
quickly, and it was quite clear the other side
wasn't interested. Indeed, on the first day of
that pause Peiping, perhaps through a co-
incidence, made a public statement saying
that even if we stopped bombing North
Viet-Nam, they are not going to be inter-
ested in any negotiations.
Mr. Scali: Well, Mr. Secretary, didn't we
diminish somewhat the psychological impact
of that lull by some confusion, at least in
public announcements or in discussions with
reporters, as to whether the lull was opera-
tional or deliberate or indeed whether the
lull existed at all?
Secretary Rv£k: Well, we are not negotiat-
ing with reporters.
Mr. Lawrence: Sometimes we help.
Secretary Rusk: The important thing is
what the other side knows and thinks and
what their reaction is.
Mr. Scali: But the other side knew right
at the first it was a deliberate lull, and it
was put forward as a gesture to encour-
age—
Secretary Rusk: — to find out whether
there was any substance in what they had
been saying on this subject, and there proved
to be no substance.
Mr. Lawrence: In the terms of peacemak-
ing, is there any significance in the shift
from General [Maxwell D.] Taylor, a soldier,
to Henry Cabot Lodge, a civilian?
Secretary Rusk: No, there is no policy im-
plication on that at all. General Taylor, a
great soldier, is also a great civilian, and
Ambassador Lodge, a great civilian, also has
a very strong appreciation for military fac-
tors.
No, that was a very simple matter that
doesn't need to be complicated at all. General
Taylor, for personal reasons, indicated that
he could serve for about a year out there.
Ambassador Lodge was the best qualified
man in the President's judgment and my
judgment to succeed him, and so we made
the change.
U.S. Obligation to Allies
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, you have men-
tioned repeatedly, in explaining why we are
fighting, that the credibility of American
pledges is at stake here and that if the
Communists succeed in overrunning South
Viet-Nam we will have trouble elsewhere in
the world. What, specifically, could you
foresee in the unlikely event we did lose
this?
Secretary Rusk: Wall, suppose that our
41 other allies — or 42 allies — should find
themselves questioning the validity of the
assurance of the United States with respect
to their security? What would be the effect
I
188
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of that? If our commitment to South Viet-
Nam did not mean anything, what would
you think if you were a Thai and considered
what our commitments meant to Thailand?
What would you think if you were West
Berliners and you found that our assurance
on these matters did not amount to very
much?
Now, this is utterly fundamental in main-
taining the peace of the world, utterly fun-
damental. South Viet-Nam is important in
itself, but Hanoi moved tens of thousands
of people in there in the face of an Ameri-
can commitment of 10 years' standing. Now,
this is something that we cannot ignore be-
cause this begins to roll things up all over the
world if we are not careful here.
Mr. Scali: Is the converse not also true —
if we stop the Communists in South Viet-
Nam that it will make it considerably easier
to achieve an enduring peace elsewhere?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that one can
say with reasonable confidence that both
sides recognize that a nuclear exchange is
not a rational instrument of policy and that
mass divisions moving across national fron-
tiers is far too dangerous to use as an easy
instrument of policy, but now we have this
problem of "wars of liberation" and we must
find a complete answer to that, and the
other side must realize that the use of mili-
tancy, of men and arms across frontiers in
pursuit of what they call "wars of libera-
tion," also is too dangerous.
Now, there has been a big argument be-
tween Moscow and Peiping on this subject
over the years, but Peiping must also begin
to work its way back toward the idea of
mutual coexistence. Otherwise there is going
to be very great trouble ahead.
Mr. Lawrence: Mr. Secretary, you spoke
of our obligation to 42 allies around the
world. What is the prospect they may do
something more about helping us keep our
promise in Viet-Nam?
Secretary Rusk: Well, there are some 36
countries giving help of one sort or another
in South Viet-Nam. Much of that is very
small. Much of it is important in terms of
people, not only military, such as Austra-
lians, the New Zealanders, the Koreans, but
also technicians and medical workers and ad-
ministrators and others are out in the coun-
tryside taking their chances and accepting
all of the dangers involved.
We would like to see more of that help
because it would have very important prac-
tical effects for the South Vietnamese and
would have important international political
effects and might also help to persuade
Hanoi and Peiping that they have no chance
of getting away with what they have under-
taken.
Mr. Lawrence: Can you confirm the re-
ports from Korea that we have offered to
equip three more divisions for them if they
will send one more battle division ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, this is not a mat-
ter of a direct arrangement. We have been
giving military assistance in substantial
quantities to Korea right through. They are
now considering whether they are able to
send additional elements to South Viet-Nam
to assist in the effort there.
Mr. Lawrence: Mr. Secretary, when Con-
gress adjourns, do you envisage that Presi-
dent Johnson will be doing the traveling
abroad that he spoke of in his state of the
Union message ? *
Secretary Rusk: Well, those plans are not
in any way developed. He has no present
plans to go abroad. He has been very much
preoccupied with South Viet-Nam and with
the Dominican matter and other questions. I
just don't know what the answer to that is at
the present time. It depends so much on the
general situation,
Mr. Lawrence: Are you one of those who
is urging him to travel this year?
Secretary Rv^k: Well, I don't think I
should get into discussions between the
President and myself on a matter of that
sort.
Mr. Lawrence: What do you think, Mr.
Secretary, of the prospects now, in the light
of the Viet-Nam problem, of the President's
' For text, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.
AUGUST 2, 1965
189
earlier wish that the leaders of the Soviet
Union might visit Washington this year and
that he in turn might go to the Soviet
Union?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have — quite
apart from the visit, which I have nothing
to report on — we are interested in a steady
improvement of our relations with the Com-
munist world, but we can't do it at the ex-
pense of their overrunning smaller countries
to which we have commitments. So there
definitely is a chill, a reduction in the possi-
bilities of real progress between ourselves
and the Soviet Union at the present time.
We would like to see this South Vietnam-
ese problem settled on a peaceful basis so
that we can get on with the great tasks that
the rest of the world is expecting us to pick
up and move with.
Mr. Lawrence: Thank you very much,
Mr. Secretary, for being with us today on
"Issues and Answers."
Secretary McNamara Discusses
U.S. Operations in Viet-Nam
Following are questions and answers re-
lating to Viet-Nam from, the transcript of a
news conference held by Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara at Washington
on July 14.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how would you describe
in military terms the present state of rela-
tionships between North Viet-Nam and the
United States in Viet-Nam? Is this war,
undeclared war, hostility, undeclared hostil-
ity?
Secretary McNamara: I don't wish to en-
gage in a legal discussion. I am not a law-
yer, but I think it is very clear what is hap-
pening. The North Vietnamese have publicly
and otherwise indicated their plan to subvert
the political institutions of South Viet-Nam,
to achieve domination over those political
institutions, to supply whatever material and
personnel assistance is required.
Last night I was looking over some of the
public statements, and I think you might be
interested in them. In 1960, at the third
congress of the North Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party, Ho Chi Minh had this to say : "It
is absolutely essential for North Viet-Nam to
step up the national democratic people's
revolution in the South."
In March 1963 the Communist Party jour-
nal of North Viet-Nam Hoc Tap frankly
stated that the Government in South Viet-
Nam is "well aware that North Viet-Nam is
the firm base for the southern revolution,"
and there are page after page after page of
quotations of this kind, frankly asserting
the responsibility of North Viet-Nam for the
insurgency action in the South; frankly
stating it is their objective to supply what-
ever men, whatever equipment, is required
to successfully carry out that revolution to
subvert the institutions of the South and
achieve domination over the people of the
South.
Q. Mr. Secretary, what has been your
method of increasing the size of our forces in
South Viet-Nam? Have you set out with an
approximate sense of the need earlier this
year and then moved them in as long as
that seemed to be justified? Or have you ac-
tually— in the way that ive have been getting
the news, 10,000 here, 15,000 there, dis-
covered the need in those terms?
A. Well, a little of both, I think. The sit-
uation is changing, and as it changes we
must change our plans. At any given time
we assign forces to South Viet-Nam in rela-
tion to a military plan that has been estab-
lished and approved by the appropriate con-
stitutional authorities.
That plan remains in effect, and we sup-
ply forces in accordance with it until the sit-
uation changes. Changes in the situation
are beyond our control. What action the
North Vietnamese will take in accordance
with these statements I have just read to
you I can't predict. All I can say is that at
any particular time we will have a plan to
respond to our best estimate of their actions
190
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and we will modify that plan when we see
indications that they are changing their
own plans.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is our operation in
Viet-Nam still primarily a counterinsur-
gency operation, or is it gradually being
converted into a conventional war?
A. These are questions of semantics. I
think what is happening out there is very
clear to you. There are 65,000 what we call
regular guerrillas and about 80,000 to 100,-
000 irregulars, for a total guerrilla force of
about 165,000, which, because of its size, is
attacking in larger and larger concentra-
tions. Whether you call those guerrillas or
semiconventional, I don't know. As I say, I
think it is a question of semantics. But the
number of battalion-size operations is in-
creasing, the duration of them is increasing,
the intensity of the attack is increasing, and
this requires that we change the tactic by
which we respond to those operations.
Q. Mr. Secretary, you spoke about the
changing plans, the changing strength, of
the Vietnamese and our plans being changed
to meet them. Do we have any plans at all
to take the initiative and get this thing in
more manageable form?
A. The question is do we have any plans to
take the initiative and get the operations
into what was termed to be more manage-
able form.
We have stated time and time again that
our objective in Southeast Asia is a limited
one. We are not seeking to destroy the people
or the government of North Viet-Nam. We
are not seeking to obtain military bases on
the soil of South Viet-Nam ; we are not seek-
ing to develop an alliance with South Viet-
Nam, to introduce it into a relationship, a
military relationship, vdth nations of the
West.
We are seeking to insure that the people
of that country will have control of their own
destiny and can develop politically, econom-
ically, and socially as they choose. Our ac-
tion is taken to achieve that end. The pri-
mary responsibility for achieving it must, of
course, be the South Vietnamese. We are
there to assist them. We are there at their
request.
As President Johnson emphasized yester-
day, three American Presidents have com-
mitted us to that policy and we propose to
continue it.
U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets
for Nazi War Crime iVIaterial
Press release 178 dated July 15
Following is the text of a note delivered
by the American Embassy at Moscow to the
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on July
15, 1965. Similar notes tvere delivered to
the Soviet Ministry by the British and
French Governments.
The Embassy of the United States of
America refers to the note of March 15,
1965 * of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the subject of making available material on
Nazi crimes by the East German authorities
to the Central Office for the investigation
of Nazi crimes at Ludwigsburg in the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany.
The Embassy of the United States of
America notes with regret that the Soviet
Government has not responded to the re-
quest made to Ambassador [Petre A.]
Abrasimov by the American Ambassador in
Bonn [George C. McGhee] that he use his
influence so that any material available in
East Germany concerning crimes of murder
from the Nazi period will be transmitted di-
rectly to the Central Office in Ludwigsburg.
Instead, the Ministry's note under reference
consists largely of unjustified accusations
against the Federal Republic which in no
way contribute to the objective of the prose-
^ Not printed.
AUGUST 2, 1965
191
cution of persons guilty of Nazi crimes of
violence.
The Embassy of the United States of
America suggests that the Government of the
Soviet Union can best show its interest in
the prosecution of these crimes by giving its
assistance to the renewed efforts of the
Federal German authorities to bring their
perpetrators to justice. The Soviet authori-
ties will have noted that the Federal Govern-
ment has taken steps to enable their prosecu-
tion to continue in the future. The law
recently passed by the Federal German
Bundestag allows the statutory period for
the prosecution of crimes punishable with
life imprisonment to run until the end of
1969. Moreover, such prosecutions will be
possible even after the end of 1969, in cases
where at that date the period of limitation
has been interrupted by any judicial action
whatsoever against the alleged perpetrator
of the crimes.
The assistance of the Soviet authorities
has been requested in this matter as a re-
sult of the lack of cooperation by the East
German offices in question, who have not so
far placed the evidence in their possession
at the disposal of the Ludwigsburg Central
Office. The Embassy continues to hope that
the Soviet Government will use its influence
in order that the Ludwigsburg Office may
have access to pertinent material held in
East Germany.
Letters of Credence
Malawi
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ma-
lawi, Vincent H. B. Gondwe, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on July 14.
Mission From IVIali Concludes
Visit to United States
Following is the text of a joint statement
issued at Washington on July 14 at the con-
clusion of a visit to the United States of a
mission from the Republic of Mali.
Press release 177 dated July 16
A mission from the Republic of Mali vis-
ited the United States in June-July 1965. Its
members were Their Excellencies Hamacire
N'Doure, Minister Delegate for Economic
Cooperation and Technical Assistance;
Moussa Keita, High Commissioner for Youth
and Sports; and Moussa Leo Keita, Ambas-
sador of Mali to the United States.
The mission carried letters from Presi-
dent Modibo Keita to President Johnson and
Assistant Secretary of State G. Mennen
Williams. In addition to a series of meetings
with the Assistant Secretary, the mission
had talks with the Secretary of State,
Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman,
and other officials of the Departments of
State and Agriculture and the Agency for In-
ternational Development. A full and frank
exchange of views was developed on sub-
jects of interest to the two countries.
Food for Peace agreements under Public
Law 480 were signed on July 10 and July 14,
under which the United States will provide
5,000 tons of sorghum under the emergency
provisions of title II and offer for sale 8,000
tons of wheat flour under title I of the law.
Representatives of the two Governments
expressed gratification at the positive re-
sults achieved by the mission in strength-
ening the ties of friendship, comprehension,
and cooperation between the peoples of the
United States of America and the Republic
of Mali.
192
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In this report, prepared at the request of President Johnson
and Canadian Prime Minister Pearson, two former ambas-
sadors, one Canadian and one American, formulate some
guiding principles for U.S.-Canadian relations. "There are
large opportunities," they conclude, "for mutual advantage
in the extension of the partnership of our two countries. . . .
For our part, we are satisfied that the process can be as
mutually rewarding as it is inevitable."
Canada and the United States— Principles for Partnersiiip
A Report by Livingston T. Merchant and A. D. P. Heeney
June 28, 1965
THE TASK AND THE METHOD
1. The task assigned to us by the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister was to study
"the practicability and desirability of work-
ing out acceptable principles which would
make it easier to avoid divergencies in eco-
nomic and other policies of interest to each
other." In our study we were asked to take
"account of the interests of other countries
and of existing international arrangements."
We attach in Annex A the relevant extract
from the communique of January 22, 1964,
and the announcements of our subsequent
appointments for this purpose as "a work-
ing group."
2. We were also asked to submit a prog-
ress report to the Joint United States-
Canadian Committee on Trade and Economic
Affairs. This we did in April of last year.
A copy of this report is attached as Annex
B.
3. A word is in order about the procedure
we have followed. As we indicated in our
progress report to the Cabinet Committee,
we decided to adopt a "case method" and
analyze a selected number of "cases" in
United States-Canada affairs to explore
the possibility of extracting useful lessons
for the future. For this purpose we selected
arbitrarily a dozen subjects from recent ex-
perience. A list of these subjects is attached
to our interim report in Annex B.
4. Each of the topics chosen became the
theme of an informal study within our re-
spective governments. We pursued some-
what different methods in the preparation
of these studies but each of us sought from
the authors informal suggestions as to how
— in each case — a particular problem might
in retrospect have been dealt with better.
All these papers came to each of us on the
understanding that they were for our eyes
only. The results of this unusual exercise
were both stimulating and helpful and we
take this occasion to express our warm
thanks to our colleagues for their willing
response to our requests.
5. We have considered the product of this
exercise and each of us has supplemented
his knowledge and tested his own impres-
sions in personal conversations with senior
officials in Ottawa and Washington. In this
process, we have sought to discover whether
AUGUST 2, 1965
193
any discernible pattern emerged and
whether any conclusions in principle were to
be derived.
6. We have not added to our working
group nor have we retained any special
staff. We have deliberately avoided setting
up any interdepartmental or expert groups
in Washington and Ottawa. We have not
engaged in a work of "research." Our method
has been essentially that of a dialogue be-
tween two friends who have served together
in both capitals and have had the good for-
tune to have represented their respective
governments, each for two terms in the
country of the other.
7. Our personal friendship, our associa-
tion in the past in the joint affairs of Can-
ada and the United States and our common
concern for the maintenance and strengthen-
ing of the partnership between our two
countries have greatly facilitated our pres-
ent undertaking. They have also contributed
to our work, and to this report, an informal
and personal quality which we believe is not
inappropriate.
II
THE CHARACTER OF THE RELATIONSHIP
8. The feasibility of working out accept-
able principles to govern or guide the be-
havior of our two countries in their dealings
with one another must depend upon the
possibility of agreeing on the principal facts.
In other words, there must be, on both sides
of the border, a common appreciation of at
least the main features of the relationship.
9. It is trite to refer to relations be-
tween Canada and the United States as
"unique." Nevertheless, this is the principal
fact. There are elements in our situation
which are not to be found in that of any
other pair of independent countries in the
world. Furthermore, the impact of the re-
lationship, though unequal in its incidence on
the two sides of the boundary, extends into
virtually every aspect of the national life of
each. This, we believe, will be increasingly
so as the years go by.
Mutual Involvement
10. The volume and variety of mutual in-
volvement of the two countries and their
peoples are without parallel. Perhaps first in
importance is the vast network of personal
and family connections, the effect of which is
incalculable but certainly great. There can
be few Canadians who do not acknowledge
some close American relative by blood or
marriage, while the number of Americans
resident in the Canadian society is substan-
tial. The density of travel between our
countries testifies to their interest in each
other. Last year a total of more than 16
million Americans and Canadians headed
north or south for work or play, with little
formality or inconvenience. They have both
taken good advantage of the open border.
11. There is a myriad of other close links
between Canada and the United States. In
religion, in all the professions, in business,
in labor, in education and in the arts, the
pattern of organization and exchange strad-
dles the boundary. As one perceptive official
recently put it: "From businessmen to Boy
Scouts, women's clubs to engineers, and
scientists to little league hockey teams,
Canadian and American counterparts find
fraternal interests and often organizational
affiliation in a magnitude defying descrip-
tion. Meetings, conventions, cross-border
visits, and mail, telegraphic and telephone
contacts have combined in a pattern of
North American neighborhood so common-
place that we rarely give it special thought."
Within such groups the habit as well as the
means of communication between our two
peoples is strong and growing stronger daily.
12. We have cooperated naturally and
easily in measures for the conservation of
wildlife. Wild animals, fish and birds rec-
ognize no boundary drawn by men. Sim-
ilarly we have worked together in the pres-
ervation of adjacent wilderness areas and
contiguous public parks.
13. Competent American and Canadian
authorities have cooperated in a number of
mutually advantageous local interchanges of
electric power and for the movement of oil
and natural gas across the border.
194
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
14. A significant proportion of trade be-
tween our two countries moves free from
tariffs or other restrictions and efforts are
on foot for further improvement. Subject to
the required legislative approval, trade by
manufacturers of automobiles and new auto
parts is to be free of duty in both countries
under a special agreement concluded earlier
this year between the two governments. ^
15. Much has been said and written about
aspects of the cultural involvement of the
two countries. In this area the preponder-
ance of the United States is most notable.
The stream of television and radio programs
and of publications from hundreds of pri-
vate sources in the United States encounters
no natural barriers in its northward surge,
except in French Canada. In larger meas-
ure than any other people, Canadians share
with Americans the mixed and massive out-
put of the United States.
16. In commerce and finance the situation
is well known. Canadians and Americans re-
mind themselves constantly that they are
each other's best customers, that the trade
crossing the border is the largest between
any two countries in the world. Of recent
years they have become especially conscious
of the importance of their financial rela-
tions. Americans are deeply involved in the
strength and prosperity of the Canadian
economy by reason of the magnitude and
variety of their investments as well as the
absorptive capacity of the Canadian market.
The stability of the Canadian dollar is of
importance to the United States. As recently
as 1962 when the Canadian dollar was under
serious pressure, the financial authorities of
the United States promptly rallied — with
others — to its support. On the other hand,
the cooperation of Canadian financial insti-
tutions and the continuing Canadian deficit
in bilateral transactions has contributed
materially to lessening the balance of pay-
ments problem of the United States. More-
over, the importance of the United States
dollar as a world currency is accepted in
Canada. Access to the United States capital
Release of Report on United
States-Canadian Relations
White House Statement
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated July 12
The President and the Prime Minister of
Canada are making public today a Report pre-
pared at their request by Ambassador Living-
ston Merchant of the United States and Am-
bassador A. D. P. Heeney of Canada.
In their first working meeting in Washing-
ton in January 1964, the President and the
Prime Minister agreed on the need for a study
of the basic principles of relations between the
United States and Canada. Later, they com-
missioned Ambassador Merchant and Ambassa-
dor Heeney to make this study together. The
two Ambassadors made their Report on Friday,
July 9, and the President and the Prime Mini-
ster have agreed that it deserves prompt pub-
lication .
The President emphasizes again the extraor-
dinary importance of close and friendly rela-
tions between the United States and Canada,
which have lived together as the best of neigh-
bors in two centuries. The President believes
that this Report is a serious and constructive
contribution to still better relations between
Canada and the United States. He has asked
Secretary of State Rusk to take the lead for
the United States in a prompt review of the
Report and its recommendations. The Secre-
tary's review will be the basis for further
United States' action on this Report.
' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191.
market has been of major importance to the
Canadian economy and private United States
investment continues to play a significant
role in the rate of Canadian growth. The
existence of conditions which attract for-
eign capital is of course an element in its
availability. It should also be noted that
private Canadian funds flow southward for
investment in substantial volume. On a per
capita basis — though not of course overall
— Canadian investment in the United States
exceeds the American investment in Cana-
dian business. The financial and commercial
stakes of each country in the other are high.
17. In recent years the revolution of mod-
ern technology, the consequent acceleration
in the tendency toward specialization and
the "internationalization" of business, with
AUGUST 2, 1965
195
technical "know how" accompanying capital
investment, have been striking features of
the world economic scene. They have been
especially apparent in United States-Can-
ada relations where their effects continue
to multiply and extend the interdependence
of the two economies.
18. The changing technology of war may
diminish the significance of geography but,
for the years immediately ahead, Canada will
remain of great importance to United States'
defense while the United States is essential
to the defense of Canada. The considera-
tions which, since World War II, led in-
creasingly to the integration of continental
air defense still obtain. The logic of our
military partnership has been extended ef-
fectively into the fields of production and
supply. The network of joint arrangements
between the two governments and their
military services is striking evidence of the
degree to which the two countries are in-
volved with one another in the ultimate and
fundamental business of national security.
Wherein Our Countries Differ
19. Canada and the United States are — in
Churchill's phrase — "mixed up together"
more than any other two countries on earth
so that the similarities in our "ways of
life" often lead observers to erroneous con-
clusions. For there are important differ-
ences. Both understanding and acceptance
of this fact are essential to the successful
working of the partnership. Many of these
differences have their roots in history.
20. First and foremost in this context,
the United States is a unicultural society,
while Canada, founded upon the partner-
ship of two races, is discovering anew in its
bicultural composition a distinguishing na-
tional quality of growing vigor and signif-
icance. We believe that this distinction is
likely to have increasing importance in the
development of relations between the two
countries. An example of its relevance in the
cultural area is one response of Canadians
to the northward stream of the products of
contemporary American mass media, a re-
cent comment on which was that "the danger
from the United States to English-speaking
Canada is that of cultural absorption, while
for French Canada it is cultural destruc-
tion."
21. The political traditions and institu-
tions of the United States are a strong ele-
ment in the national character which pro-
foundly affect American attitudes. The same
is true of Canada and Canadians. We have
already alluded to the importance of French
Canada in this connection. We have also
been impressed, in our own experience, by
the misunderstandings which can develop
from institutional differences, for example,
the congressional system on the one hand
and the parliamentary on the other. The
division of powers is a concept natural to
every American but it is often difficult for
Canadians, raised in the tradition of par-
liamentary government, to appreciate its
practical consequences.
22. Until recent years Canadians and
Americans have had a somewhat different
view of the outside world. Since World War
II, the United States has taken over the im-
mense and necessary burden of leadership
and protection of the free nations. The
Canadian connection with Europe has always
been a main influence in the development of
Canada's national attitudes. But it is only
in recent years that Canada has become
deeply involved in the wider international
context and then, with different capabilities
and responsibilities, not as a military power
of the first rank but as one of the leaders
in world trade, highly developed economi-
cally, and respected in world councils, with
a demonstrated willingness to assume varied
obligations around the globe.
23. In world affairs — as in the bilateral
relationship — the most conspicuous differ-
ence between the United States and Canada
is the disparity between the two countries
in power and the responsibility that goes
with it. Since World War II, while Canada
has emerged as a country of importance
and influence, in the same period the United
States has become the most powerful nation
on earth.
24. The disparity is striking, whatever
the area or terms of comparison — manpower.
196
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
military or economic capabilities, what you
will. By every material test other than geo-
graphic extent, and possibly undeveloped re-
sources, the United States is immensely
stronger than her northern neighbor. There
is no satisfactory factor or combination of
factors — ten to one in population, fourteen
to one in Gross National Product — by which
this inequality can be measured realisti-
cally. Degree in most areas of comparison
becomes kind; the contrast more significant
than the figures.
25. The consequences of this disparity are
among the most difficult features in the re-
lations between our two governments and
peoples.
Ill
PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE RELATIONSHIP
26. The direct and inevitable result of the
great and growing volume and variety of
mutual involvement is the multiplication of
actual and potential points of friction. It is
our impression, however, that, considering
the extent and frequency of contact between
our governments and peoples, the actual con-
flicts are remarkably few. For the most part,
our two governments seem able to settle
their differences much as conflicts of inter-
est are resolved within our own two countries.
Nevertheless, because ours are independent
countries and separate peoples whose at-
titudes and interests do not always coincide,
there are, and will continue to be, problems
between them. Mutually acceptable solutions
or accommodations to these problems re-
quire, on both sides, wider and deeper under-
standing of their origins.
27. Over the course of the history of the
two countries, there have been times of
emotional outburst which have clouded re-
lations between the two governments and
peoples. We do not accept the theory that
such phenomena are endemic or inevitable.
Nevertheless, it is true that Canada owes
its national existence largely to the deter-
mined, negative response of Canadians to the
challenge inherent in the size and power of
the United States. The once real Canadian
fear of military aggression from the south
has long since passed. Current Canadian
anxieties do not arise from warlike pressures,
and release from them is not to be found in
simple heroic measures.
28. The current concern in Canada — de-
termined as ever upon its independent
North American future — has its roots in
history, in its struggle to achieve its own
destiny, and in the disparity of size and
power. The present preoccupations of Cana-
dians, however, relate primarily to social and
economic developments of more recent date —
the massive influence of American cultural
expression upon Canadian life, the extent of
American ownership of Canadian industry
and resources, and the prevailing attrac-
tions south of the border for Canadian
scientists, engineers and professional men
and women. Such present phenomena must
be seen by Americans as well as Canadians
within the context of history and national
aspirations. If in their dealings, public and
private, there is to be the mutual confidence
that both desire and need, there must be con-
scious effort on both sides to appreciate the
historical as well as the current factors
which tend to divide them.
29. The mutual involvement of the two
countries and peoples has also complicated,
on both sides, the problems arising from the
disparity in power. In most — though not all
— of their bilateral affairs the capacity of
the United States to benefit or harm Cana-
dian interests is greater than that of Canada
to affect the prosperity and security of the
United States. Canadians are more conscious
than Americans of this element in their
dealings with the United States. On the
other hand, the United States, preoccupied
with the responsibilities of world power, may
sometimes be inhibited in its bilateral deal-
ings by considerations which do not operate
directly on Canadian attitudes. Here restraint
is required of both sides.
30. Canadians sometimes feel that, be-
cause they are so close, so "American,"
there is a disposition on the part of the
United States to expect more of Canada
than of other allies — as in setting other
countries a good example — reflecting a tend-
AUGUST 2, 1965
197
ency to apply to Canada a kind of "double
standard" of international conduct. The re-
sult is sometimes to tempt Canadians into
demonstrating their independence by adopt-
ing positions divergent from those of the
United States. In a quite different sense,
Americans are inclined sometimes to suspect
the application of a "double standard" on
the part of Canada when, for example, in
an international negotiation, the United
States is urged to be "reasonable," to make
unilateral concessions to break a logjam
which has been created by the intransigence
of others. For Canadians cannot but be
disturbingly aware that, despite their under-
lying confidence in the basic motives of the
United States, Canada could be involved in-
evitably in the consequences of United
States' decisions in circumstances over which
Canadians had little influence or control.
Such tendencies, on each side, arising from
mutual involvement, inequality and the facts
of international life, should be recognized
but not exaggerated.
IV
THE CONCLUSIONS TO BE DRAWN
31. We take as basic fact the will on both
sides of the border to live together in peace
and prosperity and to that end to work to-
gether. Given that fact, we believe that
certain general conclusions can be drawn
from the present situation and experience
in the past.
32. In the first place, we are convinced
that the nature and extent of the relation-
ship between our two countries is such as to
require, in the interests of both, something
more than the normal arrangement for the
conduct of their affairs with one another.
The reasons which lead us inexorably to this
conclusion have been touched on in the two
preceding sections. We will have more to say
later as to the kind of arrangements these
should be. Meantime, we wish to emphasize
our conviction that the strength of the
friendship and the value of the partnership
— of great and increasing significance to
both countries — depend not only upon mutual
198
understanding and respect, but upon the abil-
ity and determination on both sides to find
solutions or accommodations to the problems
which inevitably arise from an intimate and
involved relationship.
33. The majority of the issues which reach
the government level are, in fact, resolved
in a fashion at least reasonably satisfactory
to both sides. The evidence we have studied
in the course of the present exercise con-
firms this conclusion. Indeed, the marvel is
that, with such varied questions arising liter-
ally every day, so many are resolved with-
out the need for consideration at a high
level of government. Considering the volume,
the number of problems which have to re-
ceive top treatment is not large. But those
which do emerge are often very difficult and
delicate, not only intrinsically but in terms
of national attitudes. The intimacy, breadth
and depth of the relationship make it certain
that there will always be problems between
our two countries, large as well as small.
And, as they are resolved, new ones will re-
place them. This is a condition of conti-
nental cohabitation.
34. Many of the problems which have been
satisfactorily solved in the past are by their
nature likely to recur. Those associated with
wheat marketing, labor relations and de-
fense production are examples. In this con-
nection, it should be noted that prosperity
acts as a lubricant. By the same token, hard
times can exacerbate difficulties.
35. In every case that we have examined
where difficulties have developed, and ulti-
mately been satisfactorily resolved or ac-
commodated, full and timely consultation
has been an essential element in its dispo-
sition. Similarly, the absence of prior con-
sultation or the fact that such consultation
as did take place was regarded as insuf- g
ficient, has been a feature of many cases "
where an impasse has occurred and no ac-
ceptable compromise has been reached.
36. It should be frankly recognized that,
in the future as in the past, there are bound
to arise cases of genuine conflict of national
interest which by their nature are, at the
time at least, incapable of mutually accept-
able solutions. In such matters there may
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
i
indeed be no immediate alternative to an
agreement to disagree. On the other hand,
it may be that, within a larger framework
of national interests, some solution can be
worked out. For it is important that in-
dividual issues should not be insulated from
one another within the wide range of our re-
lationship.
37. We have noted a surprising number of
areas in which our governments have adopted
a common approach to our common advan-
tage. Their recital is both impressive and
reassuring. We are of the opinion that there
are further promising possibilities which
could and should be jointly explored with a
view to the extension of this mutually ad-
vantageous partnership.
THE IMPORTANCE OF CONSULTATION
38. Given the long experience of our two
countries in dealing with one another and
the virtual certainty that their interdepend-
ence will grow rather than be washed away
by inward-looking and protectionist policies,
we believe it is feasible to identify certain
principles of conduct which would reduce
the possibilities of divergencies in economic
and other policies of interest to each other.
39. We are convinced that the cornerstone
of a healthy relationship between our two
countries is timely and sufficient consulta-
tion in candor and good faith at whatever
level or levels of government is appropriate
to the nature and importance of the subject.
To consult in this fashion, however, cannot
be taken to imply that agreement must al-
ways result. The purpose rather is that each
be enabled to hear and weigh the other's
views. The outcome will depend upon the
circumstances of the case and, ultimately,
upon the judgment by each of its national
interest.
40. Effective consultation depends far
less on machinery and procedure than on the
will to consult. This applies at all levels. In
fact the kind of consultation which the
breadth and intimacy of the relationship de-
mands should develop into ineradicable habit
in the two capitals.
41. While manner must give place to sub-
stance, it may be well to glance at existing
machinery for consultation before express-
ing further views on this topic.
Machinery for Consultation
42. Especially since the days of Prime
Minister Mackenzie King and President
Franklin Roosevelt, certain major problems
have been the subject of informal inter-
changes between the two heads of govern-
ment. It is assumed that this useful per-
sonal relationship will be maintained in the
future. In some circumstances, there is liter-
ally no substitute for it.
43. Our respective Embassies, dealing in
each case principally with the department
charged with responsibility for foreign af-
fairs, but also with other departments, are
the normal and official means of communi-
cation between the two governments. It is
their function to conduct a continuing ex-
change of views and information over the
whole range of the relationship.
44. There is a responsibility on each side
to ensure, within its government apparatus,
a high degree of interdepartmental coordi-
nation and discipline. Otherwise the conduct
of business will be inefficient and produc-
tive of unnecessary difficulty. It should go
without saying that our respective Em-
bassies and the concerned divisions of the
Department of State and the Department of
External Affairs should be sufficiently
staffed with officers of high quality. Among
them should always be some who are es-
pecially knowledgeable in Canada-United
States affairs through actual service in the
other country. It is evident that the situa-
tions within the two governments are not
identical, for various reasons. Nevertheless,
we attach importance to these observations
which we believe to have validity on both
sides.
45. Over the years, and especially since
the early days of World War II, certain
joint bodies for the conduct of certain of our
affairs have been created by treaty and by
AUGUST 2, 1965
199
executive action. Of the former the Interna-
tional Joint Commission is one which has
been of continuing importance to both coun-
tries since its establishment by the Bound-
ary Waters Treaty of 1909. Originally de-
signed to prevent disputes arising between
Canada and the United States regarding
the use of boundary waters and to settle any
questions involving the rights, obligations,
or intei'ests of either party along the com-
mon frontier, this unique institution acts as
a single body composed equally of United
States' and Canadian members. In our judg-
ment, its solid foundation of law and prece-
dent and its long and successful record in
the disposition of problems along the bound-
ary justify consideration of some extension
of the Commission's functions. Accordingly,
we recommend that the two governments ex-
amine jointly the wisdom and feasibility of
such a development.
46. Among the bodies established by ex-
ecutive agreement, the Joint Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs is among the
most important. Composed of the Cabinet
members, on both sides, responsible for for-
eign affairs, trade and commerce, finance,
agriculture and natural resources, it meets
periodically to review the economic situation
of the two countries and to consult on cur-
rent problems.^ Under the general aegis of
this Committee special working groups or
other consultative arrangements have been
established.
47. In this connection, we recommend
that the Joint Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs establish a Joint Commit-
tee of Deputies which could meet frequently
on behalf of their principals and be avail-
able at short notice to consider any emer-
gent problem. We make this recommenda-
tion because it is unreasonable to expect
Cabinet members with all their other re-
sponsibilities to come together as often, as
systematically and as quickly as is needed.
48. In other areas of common concern
similar joint facilities have been set up,
among them the Committee on Joint De-
fense ' on which sit the Cabinet members
responsible for defense, foreign affairs and
finance.
49. Below the Cabinet level there is the
Permanent Joint Board on Defense estab-
lished in 1940. Consisting as it does of both
civilian and military members, it seems to
us that this body could be more fully utilized
to the mutual advantage.
50. There is also continuing and valuable
interchange between the military services
of the two countries.
51. Special mention should be made of the
direct consultative arrangement between
Parliament and the Congress. Founded in
1959 this Canada-United States Interparlia-
mentary Group is composed of representa-
tives from both Houses in both countries.
Any misgivings which may at first have ex-
isted as to possible legislative intrusion into
the conduct of foreign affairs have been dis-
pelled by the important and positive role
which this body has played in broadening
understanding between our two countries.
The members meet regularly, alternating
between the United States and Canada. Their
agenda cover a wide range of current topics
and their discussions have been character-
ized by ease, candor and enthusiasm.
52. One could extend this enumeration,
for there are many other joint bodies which
have been set up to facilitate the process of
consultation and the conduct of our joint
affairs in different areas. Their importance
and utility vary with circumstance. Their
activities supplement the scores of daily con-
tacts maintained by the official departments
and agencies of the two governments listed
in Annex C. Added together, all these means
of communication must surely constitute the
most elaborate and valuable apparatus of
consultation existing between any two na-
tions. Not only should these arrangements
' For a joint communique released at the conclu-
sion of the ninth meeting of the Committee at Ottawa
Apr. 29-30, 1964, see ibid., May 18, 1964, p. 774.
' For a joint communique released at the conclu-
sion of the fourth meeting of the Committee at
Washington June 25, 1964, see ibid., July 13, 1964,
p. 45.
200
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
be utilized but they should be strengthened,
revised and expanded as need and conven-
ience may suggest.
53. In view of the complexity and variety
of official relationships between the two
governments at all levels, it is particularly
important that there be maintained be-
tween the capitals of Washington and Ot-
tawa passenger air facilities with modern
standards of equipment, rapidity and regu-
larity. It is also important that mail deliv-
eries between the two capitals be prompt
and frequent.
Guidelines for Consultation
54. We now turn to the essence of con-
sultation and to certain guidelines which,
in our judgment, should be observed by our
two governments in their dealings with each
other :
(a) In the first place, every effort should
be made to begin the consultative process
sufficiently early to provide reasonable time
for each party to consider and give full
weight to the views and interests of the
other. This will help to satisfy each side
that its position on any issue is being seri-
ously examined. It will also improve the
chances of resolving difficulties and, where
no detours around roadblocks are to be
found, it can ease the shock of impending
collision.
(b) In certain fields where combined ef-
forts are called for, such as continental air
defense arrangements and joint development
of resources, there is obvious advantage in
having the consultative process begin at the
planning stage so as to facilitate concurrent
formulation of policy.
(c) There will be in the future — as in the
past — cases where, by reason of what is
deemed an overriding need for speed or
secrecy, the process of consultation must be
telescoped. This is a fact of life which must
be recognized, but the judgment in such cir-
cumstances should be that of the highest au-
thority.
(d) While all crises are not predictable,
many — probably most — can be foreseen as
possible. For this reason the process of con-
sultation should provide for continuous ex-
changes of views between the appropriate
authorities of the two governments over the
whole range of looming problems, including
mutual exposure to any relevant contingency
planning.
(e) Consultation should be initiated when-
ever one of the two governments is in the
process of formulating important policies or
planning actions which would have an appre-
ciable impact on the other. The responsibil-
ity for initiating consultation in such cases
rests on the party approaching decision or
contemplating action.
(f ) Existing mechanisms for consultation
should be utilized in order to ensure prompt
and continuous access by one government to
the other.
(g) Many problems between our two gov-
ernments are susceptible of solution only
through the quiet, private and patient exam-
ination of facts in the search for accommo-
dation. It should be regarded as incumbent
on both parties during this time-consuming
process to avoid, so far as possible, the
adoption of public positions which can con-
tribute unnecessarily to public division and
difference.
(h) Each government has a responsibility
to ensure that its own procedure for intra-
governmental consideration of subjects
which affect the other country operates
promptly, effectively and consistently so as
to facilitate the consultative process.
55. We recognize that the kind of consul-
tation which we have described has differ-
ent implications for our respective govern-
ments. These derive primarily from the
wide disparity in power and international
responsibility which we have already under-
lined. In consultations with the United States,
Canadian authorities must have confidence
that the practice of quiet diplomacy is not
only neighborly and convenient to the United
States but that it is in fact more effective
than the alternative of raising a row and
being unpleasant in public. By the same
token, the United States authorities must be
satisfied that, in such consultations, Can-
AUGUST 2, 1965
201
ada will have sympathetic regard for the
world-wide preoccupations and responsibil-
ities of the United States.
56. Such a regime of consultation is diffi-
cult— for both sides — but we are convinced
that it is fundamental to the maintenance
of healthy relations between our two gov-
ernments and peoples. We believe it can be
most effective in the best interests of both
if it is conducted along the above lines.
VI
TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE PARTNERSHIP
57. President Kennedy in his address be-
fore members of the two Houses of Parlia-
ment in Ottawa on May 17, IQGl,* said:
Geography has made us neighbors. History has
made us friends. Economics has made us partners.
And necessity has made us allies.
A little later, in the same speech, he added :
Thus ours is the unity of equal and independent
nations, cotenants of the same continent, heirs of
the same legacy, and fully sovereign associates in
the same historic endeavor. . . .
Prime Minister St. Laurent, some years
earlier, in a Commencement address in the
United States, referred to one of the con-
ditions of the partnership in these terms :
You in the United States obviously have the
power and the strength to dominate our country.
But you also have the wisdom and the respect for
freedom to refrain from exercising that power and
that strength. The fact that you respect our free-
dom, the fact that you treat us as an equal partner,
make our country a far more potent ally than any
satellite could ever be.
58. Wrapped in such eloquence is the core
of the problem. How can two free political
communities of such unequal strength, living
side by side and with so much in common —
though with a strong element of contrast in
their cultural heritage — reconcile the facts
and expanding opportunities of partnership
with the preservation and development of
the national identity of each?
59. In the first place, the process of rec-
For text, see ibid., June 5, 1961, p. 839.
onciliation is a continuing one; it is never ,
"done." It calls for conscious and sustained
effort on both sides and at many levels. It
requires a large extension of mutual knowl-
edge of one another's affairs. For one thing,
a better and wider understanding is needed i
in both countries of their respective national '
characteristics, their political institutions
and processes, the trends of public opinion
and the development of government policies.
Americans and Canadians often assume that
they know and understand one another in-
stinctively. This is both untrue and dan-
gerous.
60. It will have been abundantly evident
from earlier passages in our report that we
are persuaded of the mutual advantage
which is to be derived from the development
of a more effective working partnership be-
tween our two countries. If such benefits are
to be fully realized, it will require on the
part of both not only a willingness to exploit
acceptable opportunities for joint under-
takings but also the willingness of each
government to examine existing hindrances
to cooperation with a view to their removal.
Mutual Respect for National Jurisdiction
61. It is important that each country
should avoid efforts, or apparent efforts, to
extend its domestic law into the territory of
the other. A case in point — the administra-
tion of foreign assets control under the
United States Trading with the Enemy ||
Act, as it relates to United States-owned
branches and subsidiaries domiciled in Can-
ada, occasionally comes into conflict with
the laws, regulations and policies of the
Canadian Government. We strongly recom-
mend that the two governments examine
promptly the means, through issuance by
the United States of a general license or
adoption of other appropriate measures, by
which this irritant to our relationship may
be removed, without encouraging the evasion
of United States law by citizens of the
United States.
62. Each country should respect scrupu-
lously the other's exercise of its sovereign
authority in legislation and the functioning i
202
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
of its judicial system. There are clearly iden-
tifiable areas where good fences contribute
to good neighborly relations.
Projects for Partnership
63. If such fundamentals be accepted on
both sides, then the border need prove no
barrier or hindrance to a common ap-
proach, as partners, in broad areas of the
national lives of the tvi'o countries. Indeed,
this has already been demonstrated in many
ways over many years, for example, in the
great joint enterprise of the St. Lawrence
Seaway and Power Project and in the agree-
ment for the cooperative development of the
water resources of the Columbia River Basin.
Four areas where the current possibilities
of a similar approach seem to us promising
and important are described in the follow-
ing paragraphs.
A. Energy
64. We have been impressed by the pros-
pects of mutual benefit which might be
realized in closer cooperation and coordina-
tion between our two countries in the produc-
tion and distribution of energy, especially
electrical energy. Under appropriate condi-
tions, joint planning and development of re-
sources to that end in various regions would
appear to afford promising opportunities.
For this reason we recommend early and
serious study of such possibilities.
65. We have been led to this conclusion
by a number of circumstances in the current
and prospective situation :
(a) the high and rapidly rising use of
energy in the two countries and its increas-
ing importance to our peoples and in the
economic development of the regions in
which they live ;
(b) recent technological advances, espe-
cially in extra-high voltage transmission,
which create the potential for substantial
future reductions in costs ;
(c) the economic advantages to both
countries of disregarding the boundary for
energy purposes, that is, in the develop-
ment and distribution of energy on a re-
gional north-south basis where this is to
the mutual advantage. Such an approach
permits the "economies of scale" to operate
to reduce costs ; planning can be coordinated
and efficient; and mutually profitable inter-
changes and interconnections can be effected,
taking advantage of the different time zones
and the diversity of climatic conditions
which can produce important savings.
66. In any such study, and in any subse-
quent cooperative arrangements worked out
between the competent authorities in the
two countries, a number of important points
would have to be kept in mind :
(a) the differing situation as between the
various sources of energy and their changing
importance relative to one another ;
(b) the importance of having regard to
whole north-south regions at an early stage
in the design and development of networks;
(c) the need to establish jointly in ad-
vance that significant net benefits would re-
sult from joint projects, and that such bene-
fits could be equitably divided ;
(d) the wisdom of avoiding situations in
which the entities involved in one country
become in effect "public utilities" in the
other ; and,
(e) the protection of the national inter-
ests of each country.
67. Primary responsibility for moving
ahead, and much of the expertise, partic-
ularly in electricity, rests with the system
owners — public and private — in the two
countries, and much of the authority re-
sides elsewhere, notably within State and
Provincial jurisdiction. Nevertheless, we are
persuaded that in this area there is op-
portunity for advantageous cooperative lead-
ership and initiative in the two national
governments.
68. We appreciate the variety of differing
circumstances which affect the various en-
ergy sources in the two countries. There
are, for example, special conditions bearing
on coal, oil and gas which are not all or
equally applicable to electrical energy. Never-
theless, we believe there would be virtue in
having a joint look at the energy picture
as a whole.
AUGUST 2, 1965
203
69. We express no opinion as to how such
studies can best be undertaken and advanced,
whether under the aegis of a joint body or
by the coordinated efforts of the appropriate
elements and agencies of government in the
two countries.
B. Trade
70. The economies of scale in production
and the potential of larger markets justify
continuing efforts on both sides to minimize
barriers to trade between the two countries.
It is to be hoped that the current Kennedy
Round negotiations will make significant
progress in this direction.
71. Each government should continue to
study, for the longer range future, the eco-
nomic, financial, and political practicability
of further progressive reductions in tariffs
and other barriers to trade between the two
countries with a view to increasing the
market for the products of each. This study
should go forward on a basis consistent with
their obligations under the GATT and their
common effort to expand and liberalize
multilateral trade. There should be frequent
consultations on the subject between the two
governments. In this connection the pos-
sibilities of working out special arrange-
ments of mutual advantage, as was done by
the two governments with respect to auto-
mobiles and automotive parts, might be
worthy of exploration.
C. Civil Aviation
72. For a variety of historical reasons, the
United States-Canada network of air routes
and services has failed to keep pace with
either the technical development of jet
transport or the travel needs of the peoples
of the two countries proceeding to and from
the other's territory.
73. We recommend that the appropriate
authorities of the two countries approach
the aviation problem with a view to the de-
velopment of a continental pattern of air
travel which :
(a) would be responsive to the travel re-
quirements of the public of both countries;
(b) would provide for the optimum utiliza-
tion of modern equipment ; and,
(c) would result in opportunity for equi-
table sharing of air business between Canada
and the United States.
D. Cooperation in Finance
74. The commercial and financial relation-
ships between Canada and the United States I
are so extensive and so intimate that each
country is bound to be affected if the other
finds it necessary to take steps to correct
a deficit in its balance of international pay-
ments. In a world of convertible currencies,
what matters to each country is, of course,
the maintenance of an appropriate balance
of payments with the world as a whole. But
the impact on the other country of the spe-
cific measures taken by either to correct
a disequilibrium is bound to be affected by
the structure of their bilateral trade and
financial relationships. Thus, the fact that
two-thirds or more of Canada's trade is
with the United States and that Canada has
a very large current account deficit with the
United States makes it inevitable that any
measures Canada finds necessary to reduce
its overall current account deficit if it gets
into exchange difficulties will bear particu-
larly heavily on the United States. On the
other hand, if the United States finds it
necessary on occasion to limit its exports
of capital, or if it should ever find it neces-
sary to curtail imports, the impact of such
measures would, in the absence of some
special alleviation, fall with particular sever-
ity on Canada which is a large importer of
capital from the United States and with
which it does most of its trade.
75. The very close though asymmetrical
relationships referred to in the previous
paragraph appear to involve two conse-
quences. The first is that each country, in
determining from time to time what policies
to follow with regard to its balance of pay-
ments with the outside world, should have
clearly in mind its bilateral balance of pay-
ments with the other, so that the impact
on the other of any corrective action which
may be needed is recognized. The second is
that each side should keep the other fully
informed of developments in its balance of
204
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
payments and the underlying reasons for
them, so as to provide opportunity for work-
ing out constructive and imaginative solu-
tions to difficulties that may from time to
time arise in their bilateral trade and pay-
ments flows. In this connection we com-
mend the recent agreement to establish a
joint committee to maintain continuous
watch over the situation.
76. Thus we see compelling reasons — based
upon past experience and discernible op-
portunities for the future — actively to seek
the strengthening of the partnership, both
by removing impediments to its better func-
tioning and by exploring other areas in
which the two countries can work together
to their mutual advantage.
VII
SOME GUIDING PRINCIPLES
77. From the foregoing analysis we con-
clude that it is feasible to formulate certain
guiding principles. These we set out in the
following paragraphs.
78. The need is clear for our two govern-
ments to confirm the practice of intimate,
timely and continuing consultation on all
matters of common concern, at the ap-
propriate level, employing such machinery
and procedures as are most effective for this
purpose.
79. As partners in NATO, and sharing
responsibility for the air defense of this
continent, Canada and the United States
have similar policies and share important
common obligations. In the conduct and de-
velopment of their unique bilateral relation-
ship, however, the two countries must have
regard for the wider responsibilities and in-
terests of each in the world and their obli-
gations under various treaties and other ar-
rangements to which each is party.
80. This principle has a particular bearing
upon our affairs in relation to the heavy
responsibilities borne by the United States,
generally as the leader of the free world
and specifically under its network of mutual
defense treaties around the globe. It is im-
portant and reasonable that Canadian au-
thorities should have careful regard for the
United States Government's position in this
world context and, in the absence of special
Canadian interests or obligations, avoid, so
far as possible, public disagreement espe-
cially upon critical issues. This is not to say
that the Canadian Government should auto-
matically and uniformly concur in foreign
policy decisions taken by the United States
Government. Different estimates of efficacy
and appropriateness or degree of risk gen-
erate honest differences of opinion among
the closest allies. The Canadian Govern-
ment cannot renounce its right to inde-
pendent judgment and decision in the "vast
external realm." On its part, Canada has
special relations and obligations, some of
which the United States does not share but
of which it should take account, in particular
with Great Britain and the other states of
the Commonwealth, with France, and with
certain other nations.
81. It is in the abiding interest of both
countries that, wherever possible, divergent
views between the two governments should
be expressed and if possible resolved in
private, through diplomatic channels. Only
a firm mutual resolve and the necessary
practical arrangements to keep the totality
of the relationship in good and friendly
working order can enable our countries to
avoid needless frictions and minimize the
consequences of disagreement.
82. It is hardly necessary to add that, in
these remarks concerning public state-
ments by government spokesmen, we intend
of course no reference to all those whose
freedom to criticize official policies at home
and abroad is clear and equally cherished
in both countries.
83. There should be a conscious effort by
the authorities on both sides to accept and
extend a common approach to additional
areas of the two economies where it can be
demonstrated that joint undertakings are to
the national advantage of each as well as to
the common advantage of both.
84. There is another important principle.
This is that the United States should be
continuously alert, throughout the entire
AUGUST 2, 1965
205
process of policy-formulation and decision-
making, to the potential impact on Canada
of United States' actions, especially in the
economic area. By this we intend particularly
commercial policy — tariffs and quantitative
restrictions — and fiscal and monetary af-
fairs. While the necessity for such constant
alertness derives primarily from the eco-
nomic inequality of the two countries,
coupled with their close interconnection, it
derives also from the different characteris-
tics of the two economies. Decisions taken
in this area by the United States can have
a disproportionately heavy incidence upon
Canada. This vulnerability to United States
economic policies is increased by the per-
sistent Canadian deficit on trading account
with the United States and the fact that
Canada is far more dependent on exports —
16 percent of GNP as compared with 4 per-
cent for the United States. Obviously the
United States cannot renounce concern for
the protection of its own economic inter-
ests, but it should maintain a conscious
awareness of Canadian interests to ensure
that they are not violated or prejudiced
through inadvertence or ignorance.
85. Since Canadian actions and decisions
can also seriously harm the United States,
there should be a sense of reciprocal obliga-
tion on Canadian authorities to give consid-
eration in advance to the potential impact on
United States' interests of decisions and ac-
tions contemplated in the economic and fi-
nancial fields.
86. In conclusion, we find the evidence
overwhelmingly in favor of a specific re-
gime of consultation between the two gov-
ernments. We are also convinced that there
are large opportunities for mutual advan-
tage in the extension of the partnership of
our two countries. Not only is the relation-
ship unique but Canadian-American mutual
involvement and interdependence grow daily
more evident. For our part, we are satisfied
that the process can be as mutually reward-
ing as it is inevitable.
Livingston T. Merchant A. D. P. Heeney matter
ANNEX A
Terms of Reference
1. Excerpt from Text of joint communique of
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime Minister
Lester B. Pearson following discussions held in
Washington, D.C., January 21-22, 1964.
"The Prime Minister and the President discussed
at some length the practicability and desirability of
working out acceptable principles which would make
it easier to avoid divergencies in economic and other
policies of interest to each other. They appreciated
that any such principles would have to take full ac-
count of the interests of other countries and of
existing international arrangements. The President
and the Prime Minister considered that it would be
worthwhile to have the possibilities examined. Ac-
cordingly, they are arranging to establish a Working
Group, at a senior level, to study the matter and to
submit a progress report to the April meeting of
the Joint Committee."
2. White House Announcement of February 28,
1964.
"The White House announced today that Ambas-
sador Livingston T. Merchant has been appointed
to represent the U.S. on a U.S.-Canadian Working
Group charged with the task of examining the de-
sirability and practicability of developing accept-
able principles which would make it easier to avoid
divergencies in economic and other policies of in-
terest to each other. The Working Group was es-
tablished by the President and Prime Minister
Pearson of Canada during their meeting in Wash-
ington January 21-22, 1964. Ambassador Merchant
served as United States Ambassador to Canada from
1956 to 1958 and 1961 to 1962. The Canadian Gov-
ernment has informed the United States Government
that the Canadian representative on the Working
Group will be Ambassador A. D. P. Heeney who J
served as Canadian Ambassador to the United States "
from 1953 to 1957 and 1959 to 1962. He is presently
Chairman of the Canadian Section of the Interna-
tional Joint Commission, United States-Canada."
3. Office of the Prime Minister, Press Release of
February 28, 1964.
"The Prime Minister announced today the appoint-
ment of Mr. A. D. P. Heeney to an intergovern-
mental working group which will study economic
and other relationships between Canada and the
United States.
"The Prime Minister and President Johnson, at
their meeting on January 21-22 in Washington con-
sidered that it would be worthwhile to study the
practicability and desirability of working out ac-
ceptable principles which would make it easier to
avoid divergencies in economic and other policies
of interest to each country. They agreed to set up
an intergovernmental working group to study this I
206
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
"Mr. Heeney, born in Montreal, 1902, was Cana-
dian Ambassador in Washington from 1953 to 1957
and from 1959 to 1962. He is at present Chairman
of the Canadian Section of the International Joint
Commission.
"Mr. Livingston T. Merchant, who was United
States Ambassador in Ottawa from 1956 to 1958
and from 1961 to 1962, has been appointed to the
working group by President Johnson."
ANNEX B
Report to the April Meeting of the Joint United
States-Canadian Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs
April 30, 1964
1. At the conclusion of their meeting earlier this
year in Washington, the Prime Minister and the
President issued a communique (on January 22,
1964) in which they stated that they had "dis-
cussed at some length the practicability and de-
sirability of working out acceptable principles which
would make it easier to avoid divergencies in eco-
nomic and other policies of interest to each other."
They also announced at that time that they were
arranging to establish "a Working Group, at a
senior level, to study the matter and to submit
a progress report to the April meeting of the Joint
Committee."
2. On February 28 it was announced that the
undersigned, Livingston T. Merchant and A. D. P.
Heeney, had been appointed by the President and
the Prime Minister respectively to constitute the
working group as announced in the said com-
munique.
3. We have now to report to the Joint Committee
that we have considered together the task com-
mitted to us and, in several personal meetings and
in correspondence, have discussed the means by
which practical progress could best be made. We
have also considered the areas of study likely to
prove most fruitful, having in mind the objectives
stated by the Prime Minister and the President.
4. We are in consultation with officials concerned
in our respective Governments and, as our work pro-
gresses, we will be calling upon them for further
advice and assistance.
5. The difficulties involved in the serious and
positive effort which the President and the Prime
Minister had in mind are substantial. At this stage,
we are unable to say whether or not a mutually
helpful product in the form of "acceptable princi-
ples" is or is not feasible.
6. It is already evident to us, however, that, if
anything useful is to emerge, a great deal of work
and thought will be required. For this reason, it is
not possible for us to produce, at this time for the
Joint Committee, anything more than this pre-
liminary progress report.
7. After some consideration of alternative meth-
ods, we have come to the conclusion that analysis
of a selected number of "cases" in recent United
States-Canada experience could be helpful and
should be undertaken on each side of the border,
preferably by senior officials who have been per-
sonally involved.
8. We are attaching a list of such cases, reexami-
nation of which we believe might provide useful
lessons for the future. Each of us has made ap-
propriate arrangements for such studies at his
own capital. As papers are produced, we propose
to examine them together to see what conclusions in
principle, if any, can be derived.
9. It will be evident that, at the outset, we were
in complete agreement that it would be unprofitable
to produce, in response to the direction of the Presi-
dent and the Prime Minister, any mere statement of
familiar generalities which would have little practi-
cal significance. Our efforts are being directed
rather to what were referred to in the communique
of January 22 as "principles which would make it
easier to avoid divergencies."
10. It is of course self-evident that "consultation"
between the two Governments lies at the root of our
relations. Here the problem is complicated not only
by marked differences in our systems of govern-
ment but also by the striking disproportion of
power and influence between the two countries and
the position and responsibilities of the United States
as a world power. We will be giving serious atten-
tion to these factors as we consider the case studies
and as we seek to derive mutually advantageous
lessons therefrom.
11. We are satisfied that consideration of any
new "machinery" for consultation should be de-
ferred until we are in a position to estimate with
some confidence whether or not a statement of ac-
ceptable principles is likely to prove feasible.
The above, then, constitutes our "Progress Re-
port." We are arranging to meet again personally
as the case studies proceed.
Livingston T. Merchant
A. D. P. Heeney
Working Group on "Principles"
in United States-Canada Relations
List of "Cases" to be Examined
(a) U.S. interest equalization tax in conjunction
with Canadian withholding tax;
(b) Trade with Cuba;
(c) Nuclear weapons (in bilateral context, i.e.,
for Canadian forces and storage for U.S.) ;
(d) Great Lakes shipping (the labor dispute) ;
(e) Civil aviation;
(f) Wheat marketing;
(g) Defense production sharing;
(h) Extraterritorial implications of domestic legis-
lation (including specifically U.S. Treasury Trading
with the Enemy Act, anti-trust legislation, Securi-
ties Exchange legislation ) ;
AUGUST 2, 1965
207
(i) U.S. magazines in Canada;
(j) Oil and gas exports;
(k) Fishing rights and territorial seas;
(1) Canada-U.S. relations in the multilateral con-
text (including examination of our working rela-
tionships in such organizations as UN, NATO, the
GATT, etc., and in situations such as the Geneva
Conference on Indo-China, disarmament, etc.).
ANNEX C
Joint Canada-United States Entities and United States' and Canadian
Agencies Which Deal Directly With One Another
Joint United States-Canada Entities
1. Cabinet Committee on Joint Defense
2. Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Af-
fairs
3. Canada-United States Interparliamentary Group
4. Great Lakes Fishery Commission
5. International Boundary Commission
6. International Joint Commission
7. North American Air Defense Command
8. Pacific Halibut Commission
9. Pacific Salmon Commission
10. Permanent Joint Board on Defense
\
United States' Agency
11. Department of State (via Canadian Embassy)
12. Atomic Energy Commission
13. Bureau of Customs (Treasury)
14. Civil Aeronautics Board
15. Coast Guard (Treasury)
16. Commerce Department
(a) Great Lakes Pilotage
(b) St. Lawrence Seaway Corporation
(c) Office of Export Control
17. Commissioner of Narcotics (Treasury)
18. Department of Agriculture
19. Department of Defense
Department of the Army
Department of the Navy
Department of the Air Force
20. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare
21. Department of Interior
(a) Mineral Resources
(b) Bonneville Power Administration
(c) Park Service
(d) Fish and Wildlife Service
22. Department of Justice (Anti-Trust Division)
23. Department of Labor
24. Federal Aviation Agency
25. Federal Bureau of Investigation
26. Federal Communications Commission
27. Federal Power Commission
28. Immigration and Naturalization Service
29. National Aeronautics and Space Administration
30. Office of Emergency Planning
31. Securities and Exchange Commission
32. Treasury Department
33. Weather Bureau
Canadian Agency
Department of External Affairs (via U.S. Embassy)
Atomic Energy of Canada, Ltd.
Department of National Revenue
Air Transport Board
Department of Transport
Department of Transport
St. Lawrence Seaway Authority
Department of Trade and Commerce
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Department of Agriculture and
Canadian Wheat Board
Department of National Defence and
Department of Defence Production
Department of National Health and Welfare
National Energy Board
(British Columbia Hydro and Power Authority)
Department of Northern Affairs and National
Resources
Department of Northern Affairs and National
Resources
Department of Justice
Department of Labour
Department of Transport
Royal Canadian Mounted Police
Department of Transport
National Energy Board
Department of Citizenship and Immigration
National Research Council
Emergency Measures Organization
Various Provincial Officials
Department of Finance and Bank of Canada
Department of Transport
34. Municipalities (on or near border)
35. State of Alaska
36. Other States
Neighbouring Municipalities
Department of Public Works
Neighbouring Provinces
Note: The above list is not to be taken as complete as regards U.S. and Canadian agencies, for it is cer-
tain that, from time to time, other departments and representatives of the two federal governments, and local
authorities on both sides of the border communicate with one another on matters of joint interest and con-
cern.
• A limited number of reprints of the above report will soon be available upon request
from the Office of Media Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 20520.
208
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
New Steps To Improve International Monetary Arrangements
by Henry H. Fowler
Secretary of the Treasury ^
We have all heard or read a great deal in
recent months about the problem this na-
tion faces in its balance of payments and
about the need for the nations of the free
world to move toward agreement on ways of
assuring the financial resources needed to
support increasing international trade and
development.
Indeed, world financial questions have
never occupied a more prominent place in
public discussion than they do today. But to
most Americans, I suspect, these problems
still seem rather remote from their daily
lives and labors — rather unrelated, even, to
the other national and international events
that engage so much of our interest and our
concern. Nor is it unnatural that they should
pale beside events such as those in Saigon or
in Santo Domingo.
But we must never forget that America's
ability to succeed in its difficult and de-
manding role as leader of the free world —
that all the political, diplomatic, and military
resources at our command — depend upon a
strong and stable American economy and a
sound dollar.
We must never forget that our lives can
be vitally affected, not only by the events
in Saigon or Santo Domingo, but by such
apparently far removed occurrences as the
outflow of American gold and dollars abroad.
For the role of the dollar as the most
widely used international currency is part
^ Address made before the Virginia State Bar As-
sociation at Hot Springs, Va., on July 10.
and parcel of America's leading role in the
free world — politically, economically, mili-
tarily. More than any other single factor, it
is the strength and the soundness and the
stability of the American dollar that serves
as the essential underpinning of the entire
free-world monetary system through which
the interdependent nations of the free world
have fashioned their awesome economic ac-
complishments of the past several decades.
The solution of our balance-of-payments
difficulties and the strengthening of the in-
ternational monetary system are thus far
more than merely arid economic exercises.
They are crucial matters which must deeply
concern — for, in a broad but very real sense,
they deeply affect — not just bankers and
businessmen and economists but every
American in every walk of life.
What, then, is our balance-of-payments
problem? Why is it so important that we
solve it ?
The Balance-of-Payments Problem
Since 1949 the United States has had bal-
ance-of-payments deficits every year except
for 1957 — when our exports soared as a re-
sult of the Suez crisis. During that first
postwar decade — up until 1958 — those defi-
cits were little cause for concern, for they
were simply the counterpart of our effort
to help rebuild a Europe laid waste by war.
Our vast outpouring of dollars was the es-
sential source-spring for replenishing the
reservoir of international reserves and li-
quidity required by a Western Europe and a
AUGUST 2, 1965
209
Japan whose financial, as well as physical,
resources war had drastically depleted.
Under the Marshall Plan and other pro-
grams, we furnished some $30 billions in
grants and loans to help put the economies
of Europe back on their feet again. With
the recovery of Europe, we turned more
and more of our dollars toward aiding the
underdeveloped countries of the world. We
also sent dollars abroad to support large mil-
itary forces and furnish military aid essen-
tial for the defense of the free world.
These measures were eminently success-
ful. By the midfifties the economies of
Europe and Japan were strong and growing,
controls and restrictions on trade and pay-
ments were being progressively dismantled,
and in 1958 external convertibility of the
leading European currencies was restored.
But this progress was accompanied by
other developments that led to U. S. bal-
ance-of-payments deficits far larger than
Europe required and than we could live with
indefinitely. Rising prices in this country
had weakened our competitive position at a
time when Europe and Japan had once again
become a formidable competitive force in
world markets. At the same time the
strength of Europe's economic resurgence
and its new-won financial stability began to
attract growing amounts of American cap-
ital abroad.
Thus, beginning in 1958, things changed —
and more swiftly perhaps than most people
realized. The "dollar shortage" which Eu-
rope had suffered in the early postwar years
was fast disappearing.
During the 7 years 1950-57, our deficits
averaged only $1.5 billion a year — and at the
end of that period our gold stock amounted
to about $22 billion, or more than a third
larger than the total volume of dollars held
by all foreigners.
Yet over the next 3 years — 1958-59-
60 — our balance-of-payments deficits aver-
aged almost $4 billion a year. Other coun-
tries found their dollar holdings growing
more rapidly than they wished, and our
gold began flowing abroad in much greater
volume — roughly $5 billion in 3 years.
That was the situation that confronted us
in early 1961, when we launched a strong
and sustained effort to move our interna-
tional payments into balance once more.
Over a period of 4 years — 1961-64 — we
achieved substantial improvements in many
separate accounts entering into our balance
of payments, including :
— a $900 million gain in our commercial
trade surplus — those not financed by gov-
ernment— making it a record $3.7 billion in
1964;
— a $400 million cut in the dollar outflow
as a result of foreign aid ;
— a cut of nearly $700 million in net mil-
itary dollar outlays despite rising costs
abroad ;
— a $1.6 billion rise in our earnings from
past private foreign investments.
Simply as a matter of arithmetic, those
gains were enough — all else being equal — to
have given us virtual balance in our pay-
ments last year. But all other things were
not equal. Instead of approaching the van-
ishing point, with the $3.9 billion deficit of
1960 being absorbed by these gains in par-
ticular sectors of our payments totaling
$3.6 billion, our deficit in 1964 was in fact
reduced by a net total of only $800 million
to $3.1 billion.
Outflow of Private Capital
We incurred that deficit — despite 4 years
of real and lasting progress — primarily be-
cause of a drastic deterioration in the one
major area of our balance of payments
which our programs had not yet effectively
reached in a comprehensive way — the area
of private foreign investment outflows.
In 1964 the outflow of private capital
abroad reached the $61/2 billion mark — more
than twice the size of the deficit and up
over $2 billion from 1963 and over $21/2 bil-
lion from 1960. That outflow reflected a
variety of causes — including the drive by
American business to stake out a claim in
the rapidly growing and seemingly highly
profitable European markets. But, to a very
large degree, the accelerating outflow had
its source in the marked disparity that had
210
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
long existed between European capital mar-
kets and our own — a disparity in size and
scope and facilities that led borrowers in
other countries to tap our market for a
large share of their capital requirements.
The United States had often enough called
attention to this disparity and urged its
European friends to expand and improve
their markets. But their progress in that
endeavor had simply not been large and
rapid enough, and we had passed the point
where we could sustain the huge drain of
capital which that disparity entailed.
We had to act. We had not only to in-
tensify the efforts already underway in
other sectors of our balance of payments but
to extend those efforts to include compre-
hensive curbs upon private capital outflows.
It had become abundantly clear that to re-
store balance to our payments once more we
had to attack our deficit on all major fronts
simultaneously. President Johnson launched
such an attack with his February 10 mes-
sage to Congress on the balance of pay-
ments.2 The heart of that message was the
call to arms of America's businesses and
banks — the call to join voluntarily in a na-
tional effort to curb the outflow of dollars
abroad, while preexisting programs were in-
tensified.
That call has been heard — and heeded.
After a bad start in January, our balance
of payments improved in February following
the President's message and showed a sur-
plus in March, in April, and in May.
Thus we are off to a good beginning, but —
let there be no mistake — it is no more than
a beginning. Let no one think that a few
months of apparent surplus — a surplus pur-
chased only through extraordinary and tem-
porarj'^ measures — can suffice.
Sustaining an Equilibrium
The likelihood of a surplus in the second
quarter of this year does tell us that we
are moving in the right direction — that our
current measures can turn our deficit into
a surplus. But the big job — the job that
" For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.
remains — is for us to demonstrate that we
can sustain equilibrium through these meas-
ures as well as the longer term measures
inaugurated since 1961. We must maintain
those extraordinary measures in full force
until rising returns from past private in-
vestment abroad, our improved climate for
domestic employment of capital, enlarged
availability of capital in markets abroad and
growth in our trade balance — which requires
that we maintain our excellent record of
price stability — place our accounts securely
in equilibrium.
It is imperative not simply to reach bal-
ance in our payments for a quarter or two,
or even for a year, but to sustain equilib-
rium over time. The reasons are clear. Our
14 years of deficits have resulted in a large
outflow of dollars to the rest of the world.
Because there is worldwide confidence in
the stability of those dollars and because
they are convertible into gold at the fixed
price of $35 an ounce, those dollars are
widely used to finance international trans-
actions and other countries hold them along-
side gold in their official reserves.
Today those dollars — some $27 billion — ac-
count for a major share of the international
liquidity that sustains the growing free-
world economy. Some $12 billion of those
dollars are in official reserves, while the re-
mainder serve to support growing world
trade and investment. Thus it is essential to
the viability of the international monetary
system as it exists today that the usefulness
and value of those dollars remain unques-
tioned throughout the world. And, whatever
changes might be introduced into that sys-
tem, the dollar will have to continue to carry
a heavy burden as a reserve currency.
If we allowed our deficits to continue, or
if we lapsed back into prolonged deficit after
a brief period of surplus, we would under-
mine world confidence in the dollar and im-
pair its usefulness as a world reserve and
leading currency. Dollars would return to
our shores as claims on our gold, thus de-
pleting instead of supplementing world fi-
nancial resources. To prevent such a con-
traction in world liquidity and the widening
AUGUST 2, 1965
211
circles of deflation and restriction that
would surely follow, we must reach and
maintain equilibrium in our payments as a
matter of the highest national priority, along
with sustaining the economic advance that
has marked the last 53 months.
The paradox is, therefore, that the very
increase in official foreign dollar holdings
that has fueled so much of the growth in
world liquidity in the past — and has thus
helped support the growth in world trade —
can no longer be allowed to continue if cur-
rent international liquidity is to be pro-
tected. Yet, without additions to the reserve
dollars that our deficits have so long sup-
plied, the world will need a new and assured
source of growing liquidity to support in-
creasing world trade and investment.
This, in a nutshell, is what the issue of
world monetary reform is all about. It is to
assure ample world liquidity for the years
ahead that the United States, in cooperation
with other leading financial powers, is seek-
ing workable ways of strengthening and
improving international financial arrange-
ments.
For several years now the essential laying
of the technical groundwork has been un-
derway as the United States has joined
with other major countries in comprehensive
studies of the international monetary system
— its recent evolution, its present effective-
ness, and its future. An early conclusion was
that there are two elements in international
liquidity : on the one hand the more conven-
tional reserves of gold and reserve curren-
cies and on the other hand the ready avail-
ability of credit facilities for countries in
need of temporary assistance.
As long ago as 1961 the 10 major indus-
trial nations, now known as the Group of
Ten, negotiated with the International Mon-
etary Fund so-called General Arrangements
To Borrow whereby the 10 nations agreed
to lend to the IMF up to $6 billion should
this be necessary "to forestall or cope with
an impairment of the international monetary
system." ^ That arrangement was activated
last December and again this May in order
to provide a part of a $2.4 billion drawing
from the IMF on the part of the United
Kingdom.
On the credit side, also, the members of
the International Monetary Fund have now
agreed to support a 25-percent general in-
crease in IMF quotas. This 25-percent in-
crease, plus special increases for some 16
countries, will raise total aggregate quotas
from $15 billion to around $21 billion. The
Congress last month approved a $1,035 mil-
lion increase in the U. S. quota.
Meanwhile, the Group of Ten and the In-
ternational Monetary Fund have been con-
tinuing their studies of the future course of
world liquidity. Deputies of the Group sub-
mitted a comprehensive report on the prob-
lems involved last August. In their minis-
terial statement last August,* the Group of
Ten stated that, while supplies of gold and
reserve currencies are fully adequate for
the present and are likely to be for the im-
mediate future, the continuing growth of
world trade and payments is likely to re-
quire larger international liquidity. While
they said that this need might be met by an
expansion of credit facilities, they added that
it may possibly call for some new form of
reserve asset.
A study group was set up "to examine
various proposals regarding the creation of
reserve assets either through the I.M.F. or
otherwise." The efforts of that group have
culminated in the so-called Ossola report,
submitted to the deputies of the Group of
Ten on June 1 of this year, which exhaus-
tively examines, with all their promises and
pitfalls, the possible paths to the creation
of reserve assets.
New Steps Proposed
Now for the first time in 4 years we are
confronted by the happy concurrence of
three crucial facts :
1. The U. S. balance of payments is ap-
proaching an equilibrium and the executive
branch, the Congress, and the private sec-
'Ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 187.
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 31, 1964, p. 323.
212
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tor, including industry, banking, and labor,
have mounted a program that makes unmis-
takably manifest our determination to keep
it that way.
2. Evidence is accumulating of a rising
tide of opinion in many knowledgeable and
influential quarters in the free world, pri-
vate and public, that our international mon-
etary arrangements can and should be sub-
stantially improved, building on the basis of
the International Monetary Fund and the
network of more informal international mon-
etary cooperation that has marked recent
years.
3. The completion of technical studies
necessary to give a thorough understanding
of the problem and various alternative ap-
proaches to solution on the part of those at
the highest levels of government who must
ultimately make these decisions.
We have now reached the moment which
President Johnson had in mind when, in
speaking of new international monetary
steps, he said : ^
We must press forward with our studies and be-
yond, to action — evolving arrangements which will
continue to meet the needs of a fast growing world
economy. Unless we make timely progress, interna-
tional monetary difficulties will exercise a stubborn
and increasingly frustrating drag on our policies for
prosperity and progress at home and throughout
the world.
In taking office, I described this as "the
major task facing our Treasury and the
financial authorities of the rest of the Free
World in the next few years."
In recent weeks we have moved beyond
the plane of hope and technical studies
toward the prospect of more conclusive ne-
gotiations from which alone solution can
emerge. I met last week with the British
Chancellor of the Exchequer James Calla-
ghan, and we exchanged preliminary and
tentative views on the subject of interna-
tional liquidity. Next week I hope to have
the pleasure of informal discussions with
the Japanese Minister of Finance, Takeo
Fukuda, in connection with the joint Cabinet
sessions of the U.S.-Japan Committee on
' Ibid., Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.
Trade and Economic Affairs.
Both before and after the scheduled meet-
ing of the International Monetary Fund and
World Bank in late September, I expect to
visit ranking financial officials of other
Group of Ten countries, to ascertain first-
hand their views on the most practical and
promising ways of furthering progress
toward improved international monetary ar-
rangements. We must not only be prepared
to advance our own proposals but to carefully
consider and fairly weigh the merits of other
proposals. As Congressman Robert Ellsworth
of Kansas in discussing this subject re-
cently remarked :
We must appreciate that if we wish a strong
Europe it must be a Europe strong enough to look
upon an American proposal as merely one among
many possible solutions — all of which will be re-
viewed together. If we wish their partnership, we
must treat them as partners.
Advisory Committee
Already your Government is engaged in
an intensive internal preparation for these
bilateral meetings and multilateral negotia-
tions that should follow. In addition, so that
the Government may have the benefit of
some of the expertise and experience out-
side the Government in this highly technical
area, President Johnson has accepted my
recommendation and announced creation of
an Advisory Committee on International
Monetary Arrangements, which includes as
its chairman the former Secretary of the
Treasury, Douglas Dillon, and a distin-
guished group of experts including Robert
Roosa, former Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Monetary Affairs; Kermit Gordon,
former Director of the Bureau of the Budget ;
Edward Bernstein, economic consultant spe-
cializing in international monetary policy;
Andre Meyer, of the investment banking
firm of Lazard Freres; David Rockefeller,
president of the Chase Manhattan Bank;
and Charles Kindleberger, professor of eco-
nomics at Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology.
With their help and that of many others
who will be consulted, including, particu-
larly, many well-informed members of the
AUGUST 2. 1965
213
appropriate committees of Congress, we
shall constantly seek a comprehensive U. S.
position and negotiating strategy designed to
achieve substantial improvement in interna-
tional monetary arrangements thoroughly
compatible with our national interests. In
the various proposals which have and will
be made we must determine those which
will be acceptable to the United States, those
which are entirely unacceptable, and those
which may well be appropriate for negotia-
tion.
There will be an initial meeting of the
Advisory Committee on International Mone-
tary Arrangements on July 16. Hearings are
planned before the International Finance
Subcommittee of the House Banking and
Currency Committee under the chairman-
ship of Congressman Henry Reuss of Wis-
consin to obtain various private and orga-
nizational points of view. These hearings and
the reports of the committee will be of
great value, together with those of the
Joint Economic Committee of Congress and
the International Finance Subcommittee of
the Senate Banking and Currency Com-
mittee under the chairmanship of Senator
Edmund Muskie of Maine.
U.S. Prepared To Participate
I am privileged to tell you this evening
that the President has authorized me to an-
nounce that the United States now stands
prepared to attend and participate in an in-
ternational monetary conference that would
consider what steps we might jointly take
to secure substantial improvements in in-
ternational monetary arrangements. Need-
less to say, if such a conference is to lead
to a fruitful and creative resolution of some
of the free world's monetary problems, it
must be preceded by careful preparation
and international consultation.
To meet and not succeed would be worse
than not meeting at all. Before any confer-
ence takes place, there should be a reason-
able certainty of measurable progress
through prior agreement on basic points.
Our suggestion is that the work of prepa-
ration be undertaken by a preparatory com-
mittee which could be given its terms of
reference at the time of the annual meeting
of the International Monetary Fund this
September.
The United States is not wedded to this
procedure nor to any rigid timetable. I shall
exchange views with my colleagues in Eu-
rope and elsewhere, as well as with the sen-
ior officials of the International Monetary
Fund, on how best to proceed. The point I
wish to emphasize here is that the United
States is determined to move ahead — care-
fully, deliberately — but without delay. Not
to act when the time is ripe can be as un-
wise as to act too soon or too hastily.
We are, therefore, moving ahead — and we
are making progress. But we must be aware
that the issues involved are complex and they
raise basic questions of national interest.
It is not, therefore, easy to arrive at the
degree of international consensus we must
have for any workable reform of the inter-
national monetary system. We can expect no
overnight solution — but only patient explo-
ration of the alternatives with our trading
partners in a spirit of mutual cooperation.
This is the course we are now pursuing.
As we move ahead, we will do well to re-
member that the existing international
financial system has successfully financed
an unparalleled expansion in world trade
and payments. We have also done much in
recent years to strengthen that system. The
need now is not to start all over again, to
move in a completely new direction. Rather,
we must move once more to strengthen and
improve the existing arrangements.
And while we proceed solidly and surely
toward international agreement on the prob-
lems of world liquidity, we in this country
must keep ever before us the present and
pressing need to protect the existing inter-
national payments system by maintaining a
strong, sound, and stable dollar. First things
must come first. We are bringing our own
payments into equilibrium, and we must
keep them in equilibrium. By resolutely
shouldering that responsibility we will pre-
serve the foundation upon which must rest
all efforts to assure free-world growth in
the years ahead — the monetary system that
has served the free world so well in the past.
214
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Black Reports on Southeast
Asia Economic Development
White House Announcement
White House press release (Austin. Tex.) dated July 10
Mr. Eugene Black, consultant to President
Johnson on economic development of South-
east Asia, telephoned the President this
morning at the LBJ Ranch and gave him a
full and encouraging report on his trip to
Southeast Asia and the Far East. During
his trip Mr. Black participated in the
consultative committee meetings of the U.N.
Economic Commission for Asia and the
Far East on the Asian Development Bank. He
discussed with the leaders of Thailand, Laos,
South Viet-Nam, and Japan the via.ys, and
means of accelerating economic and social
development in Southeast Asia.
Mr. Black told the President that the
consultative committee meetings went very-
well and that the Bank could be in business
by early next year.
At the meeting Mr. Black indicated on be-
half of the President, that — subject to con-
gressional approval — the United States is
prepared to provide 20 percent of the Bank's
capital, up to $200 million, and also to con-
tribute— if other countries will join — up to
$100 million to the multilateral Southeast
Asia Development Fund. The Fund would
be administered by the Asian Bank and would
finance regional projects in Southeast Asia.
The President was happy to learn from
Mr. Black that the Japanese Government
also intends to take a 20-percent share in
the Bank's capital.
The President expressed to Mr. Black his
hope that other nations, too, would make
generous pledges soon, in order to give the
Bank a flying start in the difficult, long-
range task of building a more prosperous
Southeast Asia.
The President also expressed a hope that
other developed countries would join the
United States in contributing to the multi-
lateral Southeast Asia Development Fund.
In each of the countries he visited Mr.
Black talked with prime ministers and
other high-ranking officials and was
gratified to learn that there is a strong de-
sire to quicken the pace of economic and
social development and to expand and
strengthen regional cooperation. Mr. Black
also had fruitful discussions with ECAFE
officials and the staff of the Mekong com-
mittee on current programs and future
plans for regional development.
Mr. Black's schedule was limited; he did
not have the opportunity to visit all of the
countries in the region. He hopes to be able
to visit these countries in the future.
The President asked Mr. Black to go to
Europe next week to meet with the members
of the Development Assistance Committee
of the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] to review the
results of his trip, and to enlist their sup-
port in this cooperative effort to accelerate
economic and social progress in Southeast
Asia.
President Sends Congress Report
on New England Resource Program
President Johnson announced on July 10
(White House press release (Austin, Tex.)
dated July 10, for release July 11) that he
had approved and would send to the Con-
gress on July 12 a report on the Passama-
quoddy-Saint John River Basin develop-
ment. ^ This report, based on studies under-
way for the past 4 years, outlines a broad
program for resource development in the
New England area.
Recommended for immediate authoriza-
tion is a multiple-purpose project at the
Dickey-Lincoln School site on the Saint
John River. This project, costing a total of
$227 million, will generate 794,000 kilowatts
of power, more than five times larger than
^ H. Doc. 236, 89th Cong., 1st sess. A limited num-
ber of copies of the report, Conservation of the
Natural Resources of New England: The Passama-
quoddy Tidal Power Project and Upper Saint John
River Hydroelectric Development, are available upon
request from the Department of the Interior, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20240.
AUGUST 2, 1965
215
any hydroelectric project in the area. It will
also provide flood control and recreation
benefits.
The construction of the project would be
contingent upon the completion of arrange-
ments with the Government of Canada,
which is affected because the reservoir
would flood an area in Quebec. In addition,
downstream power developments in the
Province of New Brunswick will obtain ben-
efits as a result of water storage at the
Dickey-Lincoln School site.
The President also approved a recommen-
dation that early discussions be undertaken
with Canada for an exchange of power at
Canadian hydroelectric sites to provide addi-
tional peaking power capability in the New
England area. These actions would have a
highly important effect on New England's
current power costs, which are 28 percent
above the national average.
The President noted particularly the con-
clusion in the report that "comprehensive
development of the water and power re-
sources of New England will take the com-
bined efforts of public and private sectors of
the electric utility industry working cooper-
atively with the Federal Government."
The report outlines a number of specific
steps designed to provide additional and
more economic power for the entire area,
with major potential advantages to east-
ern Canada as well.
The Secretary of the Interior will con-
tinue studies on the economic feasibility of
the International Passamaquoddy Tidal Pow-
er Project, taking into account the econo-
mies resulting from advances in extra-
high-voltage transmission technology.
In addition to power development the
President, in his letter transmitting the
report to the Congress, requested that fur-
ther actions be taken to develop the natural
resources of the area. In this letter he
stated, "I am requesting that the Federal
agencies, working in full cooperation with
State and regional groups, continue and
accelerate the preparation of an overall plan
for the development of the region's re-
sources."
The report stressed the possibility of
further development at Campobello Island,
President Roosevelt's former summer home,
and preservation of the Allagash River for
recreational use, consistent with the wild-
rivers concept.
World Law Day
Following are remarks made by President
Johnson on July 8 at a ceremony during
which he proclaimed World Law Day, to-
gether with the text of the proclamation.
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated July 8
I welcome you this morning to the Rose
Garden. By tradition and custom, and by di-
rection of the Congress and on petition of
the public, the President has signed many
proclamations each year on many subjects.
Some are of great significance, and some
have great impact. Others are, as I am sure
the press will agree, of somewhat lesser sig-
nificance and import. But today we are meet-
ing in this manner to observe the signing
of a proclamation which, in its way, ex-
presses something of the greatest impor- i
tance about the purposes of the American i
people and the purposes of the American na-
tion. And that is our commitment to, and
our quest toward, a world where all men
may live in peace with the hope of justice
under the rule of law.
That goal cannot be made real by any
proclamation that I issue or sign. It cannot
be attained by the observance of any single
day of the year. But I do believe that by ob-
serving together one day designated as World
Law Day we may remind ourselves, and we
hope call to the attention of others, that a
decent world ruled by just law is not a vain
dream.
It can be real. It will be true — if the
peace-loving peoples uphold the beginnings
216
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of world law with the same resolve as they
defend the end of individual liberty.
In this 20th century millions of men and
women have fought and have died and have
struggled and sacrificed to win or to redeem
their liberty or freedom. The fighting and
the dying and the struggle and sacrifice
goes on as even we meet here today.
But this century has really seen the be-
ginning of a will and an effort to establish
respect for the rule of law over the con-
duct of the nations of the world. Those na-
tions must not perish under the heel or by the
hand of those who refuse to honor their
own agreements, or refuse to keep their
own treaties, or refuse to respect the bor-
ders or the rights of their own neighbors.
And this is central to the purposes of the
American people and the policies of the gov-
ernments around the world.
And by faithfully honoring our agree-
ments, by faithfully keeping our treaties to
which we are party, we seek to assure sub-
stance for the dream of a world that is ruled
by law.
This year, in September, the leaders of the
law for many nations will assemble here in
Washington. In observance of this Interna-
tional Cooperation Year they will confer on
this most vital and on this most basic subject
of strengthening the hope for world peace by
strengthening the rule of law among world
nations.
And so to honor this significant occasion
I am today proclaiming September the 13th,
1965, as World Law Day. In so doing, I would
call upon citizens throughout the land to join
in appropriate observances on that day to
reaffirm our abiding American goal of a
world where all men live in obedience to the
rule of laws that they have chosen, rather
than in subjugation to the rule of men that
they have not chosen.
It is a great pleasure to have the lead-
ership that we have present with us here
this morning.
I will now sign the proclamation.
TEXT OF PROCLAMATION i
Whereas the year 1965 has been designated by
the United Nations General Assembly as Interna-
tional Cooperation Year, and I have so proclaimed
it for the United States; and
Whebeas international cooperation is essential to
the achievement of a peaceful world order; and
Whereias the foundation for the peace of mankind
within nations and among nations is a system of
law and legal institutions; and
Whereas a system of law enables men and nations
to avoid conflict, and legal institutions provide
forums for the peaceful resolution of conflicts when
they arise; and
Whereas the expansion of the Rule of Law in
the World Community requires broad agreement on
principles and terminology for multilateral treaties
and conventions; and
Whereas those treaties require public support
for the promise and potential of a world ruled by
law; and
Whereas it is essential that the minds and hearts
of men of good will of all nations be focused upon
the necessity of world peace through law:
Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, believing that
cooperation to build a world legal system is among
the most beneficial projects that can be advanced
by International Cooperation Year and in order to
further the great objectives thus noted for achieving
world peace, do hereby proclaim September 13, 1965,
as World Law Day and call upon all public and
private officials, members of the legal profession,
citizens, and all men of good will to arrange appro-
priate observances and ceremonies in courts, schools,
and universities, and other public places.
In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.
Done at the City of Washington this eighth
day of July in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and sixty-five, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the one hundred and ninetieth.
By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.
*No. 3662; 30 Fed. Reg. 8773.
AUGUST 2, 1965
217
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Preserving the Peacekeeping
Powers of the General Assembly
statement by Francis T. P. Plimpton ^
One of the most interesting points dis-
cussed by the committee has been the dis-
tinction between, on the one hand, the types
of peacekeeping operations which have
been carried out by the U.N. to date and,
on the other hand, the enforcement actions
contemplated by article 42 of the charter.
This important distinction was lucidly ex-
plained by our distinguished Secretary-
General in his address on June 13, 1963, to
the Harvard Alumni Association. ^ U Thant
pointed out that "there has been a tacit
transition from the concept of collective
security, as set out in Chapter VII of the
United Nations Charter, to a more realistic
idea of peacekeeping. The idea that conven-
tional military methods — or, to put it blunt-
ly, war — can be used by or on behalf of the
United Nations to counter aggression and
secure the peace, seems now to be rather
impractical."
He went on to say: "The nature of these
developments is sometimes confused, wit-
tingly, by an attempt to relate them to the
use of force to counter aggression by the
Security Council provided for in Chapter
VII of the Charter. In fact, the peacekeep-
ing forces I am about to describe are of a
very different kind and have little in com-
mon with the forces foreseen in Chapter
VII, but their existence is not in conflict with
' Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations on June 15 (U.S./U.N. press
release 4586). Mr. Plimpton is Alternate U.S. Rep-
resentative in the committee. For a statement made
by Mr. Plimpton in the committee on Mar. 26, see
Bulletin of Apr. 19, 1965, p. 598.
'U.N. doc. A/3594/ Add. 1.
Chapter VII. They are essentially peace and
not fighting forces and they operate only
with the consent of the parties directly con-
cerned."
The Secretary-General observed in that
address that there has been a long history
of peacekeeping actions which have involved
the use of military forces but were not en-
forcement actions: in Greece in 1947; in
Kashmir starting in 1948; the U.N. Truce
Supervision Organization starting in 1949;
UNEF [United Nations Emergency Force]
starting in 1956 ; in Lebanon in 1958 ; in the
Congo starting in 1960; in West Irian in
1962-68 ; and in Yemen in 1963-64.
Most of these are outlined in paragraphs
8-17 of the report of the Secretary-General
and the President of the General Assembly
in their report dated May 31, 1965. *
As the Secretary-General and the Presi-
dent of the General Assembly noted in their
report, all the U.N.'s peacekeeping opera-
tions except UNEF and UNTEA [United Na-
tions Temporary Executive Authority] have
been authorized by the Security Council. In
the case of UNEF the Security Council, by a
resolution voted for by the Soviet Union,
referred the Suez situation to the General
Assembly for its recommendations — a clear
case of the General Assembly's acting pur-
suant to Security Council action. In the case
of UNTEA, the Soviet Union voted for the
General Assembly resolution authorizing the
operation — a clear case of the Soviet Union
itself favoring the initiation by the General
Assembly (not the Security Council, the
General Assembly) of a peacekeeping oper-
ation.
We believe that the way it has been is the
way it should be, that is, the Security Coun-
cil should normally authorize peacekeeping
operations, but the General Assembly should
' U.N. doc. A/AC.121/4.
218
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
undertake such recommendatory respon-
sibility in appropriate cases where enforce-
ment action is not involved.
The late Dag Hammarskjold on August 22,
1957, expressed this distinction very well in
his introduction to the Secretary-General's
annual report. He said :
In this connexion, it is worth recalling that the
"Uniting for Peace" resolution, in establishing a
procedure intended to safeguard the application of
the relevant provisions of the Charter — Articles 10,
11, 12 and 51 — in support of the maintenance of
peace, did not constitutionally transfer to the Gen-
eral Assembly any of the enforcement powers re-
served to the Security Council by the Charter. En-
forcement action by the United Nations under
Chapter VII continues to be reserved to the Security
Council. The relative role and significance of the
Assembly and the Council, in practice, reflect general
political conditions playing within the constitutional
framework which, thus, was maintained in line with
the basic concepts of the Charter.
Nor is all of chapter VII concerned ex-
clusively with enforcement action. On the
contrary, a careful reading of that chapter
makes it clear that other types of peace-
keeping are envisaged. Article 50, for ex-
ample, refers to "preventive or enforcement
measures," and article 40 mentions pro-
visional measures which may be taken in or-
der to prevent aggravation of a situation
which may become a threat to the peace.
There are many preventive or provisional
measures of this type which do not constitute
enforcement action as comprehended in ar-
ticle 42 of the charter.
Such nonenforcement measures taken in
compliance with chapter VII of the charter
lie within the area where the Security
Council has primary responsibility but where
the General Assembly has exercised residual
responsibility in the past. We believe that in
the best interests of encouraging the develop-
ment of a world of peace and order, the Gen-
eral Assembly should continue to exercise
its recommendatory authority in this area.
To contend that it has no such authority,
and that the Security Council has a monop-
oly, means that any single permanent mem-
ber of the Security Council could block any
action or measure to help in maintaining
the peace or to prevent the development of a
situation which could threaten the peace.
Certainly my country does not desire any
such power.
The arguments against such a restricted
position were eloquently stated by the dis-
tinguished representative of Venezuela
[Carlos Sosa Rodriguez] to this committee
on April 29. He said :
However, we have felt that as between the two
interpretations of the Charter, namely one which
would make impossible any action by the United
Nations to comply with its primary responsibility — ■
which is the maintenance of international peace and
security — merely because of an expression of will
of one single state, as compared with the other
interpretation which permits of complementary ac-
tion by the General Assembly in such cases, it is
preferable and more in accord with the spirit and
indeed the very raison d'etre of the United Nations
to select that thesis which facilitates the discharge
by this world organization of the primary task which
has been assigned to it from the very first article
of the United Nations Charter.
The distinguished representative of Vene-
zuela and several others have also pointed
out that the International Court of Justice in
its advisory opinion upheld the action of
the General Assembly in recommending
peacekeeping operations which do not con-
stitute enforcement action. May I note also
that 76 delegations, including the overwhelm-
ing majority of the African, Asian, and Latin
American delegations, accepted (not noted,
but accepted) the opinion of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice.
From the foregoing it is clear that the
present Secretary-General and his predeces-
sor, as well as the overwhelming majority of
delegations, have clearly supported the fol-
lowing views: (1) that the peacekeeping
operations carried out by the U.N. to date
have not been enforcement actions; (2) that
the Security Council has primary respon-
sibility in this peacekeeping field; and (3)
that the General Assembly has residual au-
thority to recommend such operations. This
view has also been held consistently by al-
most all members of the U.N.
It is, of course, open to a small minority
to express the view that one or the other of
these operations was not permitted by the
charter. But they cannot impose their views
AUGUST 2, 1965
219
on the rest of us — surely we cannot be bound
to accept a lower common denominator sim-
ply because someone urges it — and here the
someone represents only a small minority
among us.
The U.S. delegation is gratified to observe
that the general trend in the committee op-
poses any cutback in the power of the Gen-
eral Assembly to recommend peacekeeping
operations, and this despite stubborn op-
position by that small minority.
The United Nations has encountered such
opposition before and has moved ahead any-
way— and not just in the field of peacekeep-
ing.
When we in the United Nations started the
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance
in 1950, one great power denounced it as "a
cloak for imperialism." But the program
went forward successfully, and 3 years
later that power joined.
When we launched the idea of the U.N.
Special Fund in 1957, one great power op-
posed it. But the rest of us went ahead, and
the program succeeded. Now all members
have joined in, and the developing countries
are the better off because of it.
Then there is the matter of amending the
charter to expand the Security Council and
the Economic and Social Council. Almost all
of us have been ready to take that step since
the early fifties, but one great power ada-
mantly objected. Finally, in 1963, the African
and Asian members proposed, and the Gen-
eral Assembly approved, amendments to en-
large these bodies. Again the great power
opposed, but now it has finally ratified
the amendments and by the time this year
is out those amendments will have become ef-
fective.
We believe that the same process will take
place if those of us who believe in the pow-
ers of the General Assembly to recommend
peacekeeping operations stand fast in de-
fense of those powers. Eventually the mi-
nority opposition will realize that its opposi-
tion is mistaken and that the best interests
of the United Nations and of all its mem-
bers lie in preserving, unimpaired, the rec-
ommendatory peacekeeping powers of the
General Assembly which have served the
preservation of peace so effectively. *
U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Program
for Training of South Africans
Following is the text of a note from
U.S. Representative Adlai E. Stevenson to
the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
U.S./U.N. press release 4598
June 25, 1965
The Representative of the United States
of America to the United Nations presents
his compliments to the Secretary General of
the United Nations and has the honor to re-
fer to Security Council Resolution S/5773 of
June 18, 1964.1 Operative paragraph 11 of
that resolution invited the Secretary General
"in consultation with appropriate United
Nations specialized agencies to establish an
educational and training program for the
purpose of arranging for education and
training abroad for South Africans." Pur-
suant to that resolution, the Secretary Gen-
eral on April 2, 1965 informally submitted
proposals for the program of fellowships
and grants for South Africans and re-
quested contributions to it. These grants
and fellowships would be in such fields as
teacher-training, medicine, engineering, ge-
ology, agronomy, business and industrial
management, and constitutional law and
would utilize in part universities and volun-
tary agencies which have already provided a
substantial number of scholarships to non-
whites from South Africa.
The Representative of the United States
' On June 15 the committee adopted a report (U.N.
doc. A/5915) in which it said: "The Special Commit-
tee came to the conclusion that more time is required
to complete the consideration of the matters covered
by its mandate from the General Assembly and has
decided to continue its work."
^ For a statement made by Ambassador Stevenson
on June 16, 1964, and text of the resolution, see
Bulletin of July 6, 1964, p. 29.
220
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
recalls that at the time Security Council
Resolution S/5773 was adopted he stated in
the Council that the United States was pre-
pared to examine opportunities to contribute
to such a program both financially and in
terms of scholarships and other facilities at
American educational institutions. The
United States Government firmly believes
that no people can grow and develop with-
out advantages of higher education now de-
nied so many South Africans. The United
States, through both private and public
resources, has already contributed to the
education of young South Africans. Accord-
ingly, the United States Government is
now prepared to pledge to the Secretary
General's program $75,000 for assistance
to qualified South Africans with the proviso
that the United States contribution not ex-
ceed 40 per cent of total contributions.
In connection with the use of funds, the
United States Government suggests con-
sideration be given to placement of candi-
dates at the University of Bechuanaland,
Basutoland, and Swaziland. The United
States Government is also certain that edu-
cational institutions in the United States
which have had experience with administra-
tion of African education programs stand
ready to consider placement of qualified
South African students. The United States
will, for its part, be pleased to cooperate
with the United Nations Secretariat regard-
ing placement of students in the United
States and is prepared to discuss individual
needs and requirements.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Cables from the Secretary General and Assistant
Secretary General of the OAS regarding the ar-
rival of a mission of criminologists to investigate
events pointing to violations of human rights in
the Dominican Republic. S/6430, June 11, 1965,
1 p.; S/6443, June 15, 1965, 1 p.
Cable dated June 16 from the Assistant Secretary
General of the OAS transmitting a message sent
by the chairman of the Inter-American Commis-
sion on Human Rights to the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation. S/6448. June 16, 1965. 3 pp.
Cables from the Secretary General and Assistant
Secretary General of the OAS transmitting texts
of messages received from the Ad Hoc Committee
of the Tenth Meeting of Consultation which in-
clude reports made by the Inter-American Peace
Force in the Dominican Republic and reports of
the Committee's interviews with representatives
of various Dominican factions. S/6445, June 16,
1965, 2 pp.; S/6450, June 16, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6451
and Corr. 1, June 17, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6452, June
17, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6455, June 17, 1965, 1 p.;
S/6456, June 18, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6462, June 21, 1965,
2 pp.; S/6471 and Corr. 1, June 24, 1965, 8 pp.;
S/6472, June 24, 1965, 4 pp.; S/6475, June 25,
1965, 5 pp.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Letters from the U.S. representative enclosing
data concerning objects launched into orbit or
beyond by the United States. A/AC.105/INF.98,
June 1, 1965, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.99, June 1,
1965, 2 pp.; A/AC.105/INF.100, June 1, 1965, 2
pp.; A/AC.105/INF.101, June 1, 1965, 3 pp.;
A/AC.105/INF.102, June 21, 1965, 3 pp.
Draft International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Note by
the Secretary-General. A/5921. June 16, 1965. 9
pp.
Draft Declaration on Freedom of Information. Note
by the Secretary-General. A/5928. June 16, 1965.
5 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Progress in Land Reform. Fourth Report. E/4020,
April 9, 1965, 226 pp.; E/4020/Add. 1, May 14,
1965, 100 pp.; E/4020/ Add. 2, May 14, 1965, 108
pp.
United Nations Development Decade. Progress re-
port submitted in accordance with Council resolu-
tion 984 I (XXXVI). Note by the Secretary-
General. E/4033, May 14, 1965. 266 pp.
Technical Assistance Committee. 15 years and 150,-
000 skills: an anniversary review of the United
Nations Expanded Programme of Technical As-
sistance. E/TAC/153/Add. 1. May 19, 1965. 24 pp.
Relationships among planning institutes. E/4035.
May 20, 1965. 15 pp.
Commission on Human Rights. Working paper sub-
mitted by the Secretary-General at the request of
the working party on the International Year for
Human Rights. E/CN.4/AC.19/3. May 25, 1965.
10 pp.
Slavery. Report of the special rapporteur on slavery
appointed under Council resolution 960 (XXXVI).
E/4056. May 27, 1965. 259 pp.
Inflation and Economic Development. Progress re-
port by the Secretary-General. E/4053. June 4,
1965. 108 pp.
Question of Procedures for the Revision of the Con-
vention on Road Traffic and of the Protocol on
Road Signs and Signals, done at Geneva, Sep-
tember 19, 1949. Report of the Secretary-General.
E/4066. June 7, 1965. 6 pp.
AUGUST 2, 1965
221
TREATY INFORMATION
Notifications of undertaking to seek approval:
Philippines, July 14, 1965; United Arab Repub-
lic, July 14, 1965.
Entered into force: July 16, 1965, for part I and
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.
Current Actions
MULTi LATERAL
Atomic Energy
Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency
with annex, as amended. Done at New York
October 26, 1956. Entered into force July 29, 1957.
TIAS 3873, 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Kenya, July 12, 1965.
Safety at Sea
International regulations for preventing collisions at
sea. Approved by the International Conference on
Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17,
1960. Enters into force September 1, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Morocco, June 28, 1965.
Trade
Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Congo (Brazzaville), June
21, 1965.
United Nations
Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963.^
Ratifications deposited: Belgium, April 29, 1965;
Zambia, April 28, 1965.
Wheat
International Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for sig-
nature at Washington April 19 through May 15,
1962. Entered into force July 16, 1962, for part
I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 1962, for
part II. TIAS 5115.
Accession deposited: Italy, July 15, 1965.
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing-
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965.
Acceptances deposited: Austria, July 8, 1965; Ice-
land, July 12, 1965; Israel, July 13, 1965;
Netherlands (including Surinam and Nether-
lands Antilles), July 12, 1965; Norway, July 9,
1965; Southern Rhodesia, July 12, 1965; Switzer-
land, July 14, 1965; Tunisia, July 15, 1965;
United Kingdom, July 13, 1965.
Accession deposited: Peru, July 12, 1965.
Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Ecuador, July 9, 1965; Italy, July 15, 1965;
Sweden, July 14, 1965; Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics, July 14, 1965.
Notification of undertaking to seek accession:
Sierra Leone, July 12, 1965.
BILATERAL
Japan
Agreement extending the agreement of May 14, 1954,
as amended (TIAS 2985, 3162, 4171, 4355), relat-
ing to the loan of certain vessels to Japan. Effected
by exchange of notes at Tokyo July 6, 1965. En-
tered into force July 6, 1965.
Malaysia
Agreement between the United States and the United
Kingdom relating to air services. Signed at Ber-
muda February 11, 1946. Entered into force
February 11, 1946. TIAS 1507.
'Twelve months' notice of termination of obligations
received from Malaysia: June 1, 1965.
Mali
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Washington July 14, 1965. Entered into force
July 14, 1965.
Turkey
Amendment and extension of the agreement of June
10, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3320, 4748), for co-
operation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Washington June 3, 1965.
Entered into force: July 8, 1965.
United Kingdom
Extension of the agreement of June 15, 1955, as
amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078, 5397, 5693),
for cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Washington July 15, 1965.
Enters into force on the d;.te on which each
Government shall have received from the other
written notification that it has complied with all
statutory and constitutional requirements for
entry into force.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
^ Not in force.
Confirmations
The Senate on July 15 confirmed the nomination
of Verne B. Lewis to be the deputy representative
of the United States to the International Atomic
Energy Agency. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated June 10.)
222
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX August 2, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1362
Asia. Mr. Black Reports on Southeast Asia
Economic Development (White House an-
nouncement) 215
Atomic Energy. Lewis confirmed as Deputy
U.S. Representative to IAEA 222
Canada
Canada and the United States — Principles for
Partnership (Pleeney, Merchant) .... 193
President Sends Congress Report on New Eng-
land Resource Program 215
Release of Report on United States-Canadian
Relations (White House statement) . . . 195
Congress
Confirmations (Lewis) 222
President Sends Congress Report on New Eng-
land Resource Program 215
Department and Foreign Service. Confirma-
tions (Lewis) 222
Disarmament. President Johnson Discusses
Viet-Nam, Dominican Republic, Disarmament 182
Dominican Republic. President Johnson Dis-
cusses Viet-Nam, Dominican Republic, Dis-
armament 182
Economic Affairs
Mr. Black Reports on Southeast Asia Economic
Development (White House announcement) 215
New Steps To Improve International Monetary
Arrangements (Fowler) 209
President Sends Congress Report on New Eng-
land Resource Program 215
Educational and Cultural Affairs. U.S. Pledges
Funds to U.N. Program for Training of
South Africans (U.S. note) 220
Germany. U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets for
Nazi War Crime Material (text of note) . 191
International Law. World Law Day (Johnson
proclamation) 216
International Organizations and Conferences
Lewis confirmed as Deputy U.S. Representa-
tive to IAEA 222
New Steps To Improve International Monetary
Arrangements (Fowler) 209
President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin-
ican Republic, Disarmament 182
Malawi. Letters of Credence (Gondwe) ... 192
Mali. Mission From Mali Concludes Visit to
United States (joint statement) .... 192
Military Affairs. Secretary McNamara Dis-
cusses U.S. Operations in Viet-Nam (ex-
cerpts from news conference transcript) . 190
Presidential Documents
President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin-
ican Republic, Disarmament 182
World Law Day 216
South Africa. U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Pro-
gram for Training of South Africans (U.S.
note) 220
Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 222
U.S.S.R. U.S. Repeats Request to Soviets for
Nazi War Crime Material (text of note) . . 191
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 221
Preserving the Peacekeeping Powers of the
General Assembly (Plimpton) 218
U.S. Pledges Funds to U.N. Program for Train-
ing of South Africans (U.S. note) .... 220
Viet-Nam
President Johnson Discusses Viet-Nam, Domin-
ican Republic, Disarmament 182
Secretary McNamara Discusses U.S. Opera-
tions in Viet-Nam (excerpts from news con-
ference transcript) 190
Secretary Talks About Viet-Nam on "Issues
and Answers" (transcript of interview) . 183
Name Index
Black, Eugene R 215
Fowler, Henry H 209
Gondwe, Vincent H. B 192
Heeney, A. D. P 193
Johnson, President 182, 216
Lawrence, William H 183
Lewis, Verne B 222
McNamara, Robert S 190
Merchant, Livingston T 193
Plimpton, Francis T. P 218
Ruslc, Secretary 183
Scali, John 183
Stevenson, Adlai E 220
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 12-18
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
173 7/12 Rusk: interview on "Issues and
Answers."
tl74 7/12 Rusk, Shiina: U.S.-Japan Com-
mittee on Trade and Develop-
ment.
tl75 7/14 U.S.-Japan Committee on Trade
and Development: joint com-
munique.
tl76 7/14 Rusk: death of Ambassador
Stevenson.
177 7/15 Mission from Mali: joint state-
ment.
178 7/15 Note to U.S.S.R. on availability of
material from East Germany on
Nazi war crimes.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy
In this pamphlet, based on an address he made at George Washington University on June 6,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk develops a number of ideas that can serve as guidelines — "helpful
household hints," he calls them — for the ordinary citizen who wants to understand the funda-
mentals of U.S. Foreign policy.
The pamphlet is devoted primarily to an examination by the Secretary of a series of familiar
concepts, some negative, some positive: "omnipotence," "diversity," "gray alternatives," "ap-
peasement," "national liberation," "building world order," "regionalism," and so on. By keeping
some of these principles in mind, he says, the American citizen can develop a broad perspective
in which to consider specific foreign policy issues as they arise.
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CITY. STATE
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIII, No. 1363
August 9, 1965
UNITED NATIONS HOLDS MEMORIAL CEREMONY FOR AMBASSADOR STEVENSON 226
U.S.-JAPAN CABINET COMMITTEE ON TRADE AND ECONOMIC AFFAIRS
HOLDS FOURTH MEETING AT WASHINGTON
Exchanges of Remarks and Joint Communique 2^2
WORLD TRADE AND THE KENNEDY ROUND
by W. Michael Blumenthal 2^9
For index see inside back cover
United Nations Holds Memorial Ceremony
for Ambassador Stevenson
Representatives of member states of the
United Nations held a memorial ceremony in
the General Assembly Hall at U.N. Head-
quarters on July 19 for U.S. Representative
Adlai E. Stevenson, who died at London on
July IJt. Following are texts of remarks
made by the four speakers at the ceremony:
U Thant, U.N. Secretary-General; Carlos
Sosa Rodriguez, President of the 18th session
of the General Assembly; Archibald Mac-
Leish, American poet and playwright; and
Secretary Rusk.
SECRETARY-GENERAL U THANT
When I first was told last Wednesday, a
little before 1 :00 p.m., that Ambassador
Stevenson had died in London, I could not
believe my ears. I had seen him only re-
cently, in Geneva, less than a week before,
and he was so alive and looked so well.
When the news was confirmed, it took me
some time to accept the fact that Adlai
Stevenson had really passed away.
My first thought was to send a message of
condolences to President Johnson. In my mes-
sage I referred to the respect, admiration,
and affection of all of his colleagues at the
United Nations, which Ambassador Steven-
son had earned over the last 41^ years by
reason of his extraordinary human qualities.
The same afternoon I referred, in a public
statement, to my sense of grief and shock
because, suddenly and without warning,
death had struck and we had lost a good
friend and a highly esteemed colleague. As
I stated in that tribute, in his years at the
United Nations Ambassador Stevenson had
demonstrated with rare distinction how it
was possible to combine the highest form of
patriotism with loyalty to the idea of in-
ternational peace and cooperation.
When on 8 December 1960 it was an-
nounced that Mr. Stevenson was to be Per-
manent Representative of the United States
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, N0.1363 PUBLICATION 7936 AUGUST 9, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Sdedia Services. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
aeencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreiern relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreism
Service. Tiie Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerninif treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of ffeneral international in-
terest.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Docuiaents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printins Office. Washinffton, D.C.,
20402. Price: ^2 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyriRhted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed
In the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.
!
226
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of America to the United Nations, it seemed
to everybody to be such a natural and right
appointment. He was, in truth, one of the
founding fathers of the United Nations, hav-
ing been present at the signing of the char-
ter in San Francisco in June 1945, and also
having been closely associated vs^ith the ne-
gotiations leading up to that historic event.
Thereafter, he was the head of the United
States delegation to the Preparatory Com-
mission and Executive Committee of the
United Nations in London, and I believe his
offices were located in Grosvenor Square,
close to the very spot where he collapsed last
Wednesday.
Subsequently, of course, he had entered
domestic politics and his direct association
with the United Nations was only intermit-
tent. But I have no doubt in my ovsti mind
that his presence at the birth of the United
Nations was an important factor in the evo-
lution of his own political thinking and in his
own dedication to the noble principles and
purposes of the charter.
I remember how many tributes were paid
to him when he took over his duties at the
United Nations. There were so many en-
comiums, both within and outside these
walls, that they could have turned the head
of a lesser man. Not so with Ambassador
Stevenson. On one occasion he observed:
"Flattery is like smoking — it is not danger-
ous so long as you do not inhale."
During the 4i^ years that he served at the
United Nations, he stood as the embodiment
of dedication to the principles of the United
Nations. His many speeches, which ex-
pressed so well his whole mental and intel-
lectual approach, in the championship of
fundamental rights, in defense of the dignity
and worth of the human person, in support
of the equal rights of nations large and
small, were cheered and applauded by all
sides of the house. He not only spoke with a
rare gift of phrase but with such an ob-
vious sincerity that his words carried con-
viction.
My first contact with Ambassador Ste-
venson came about in 1952, when I was one
of the members of the Burmese delegation
to the seventh General Assembly. This was
at the time when he was the Democratic
candidate for the presidential election. His
speeches were naturally fully reported in the
newspapers, and I followed his campaign
closely. His speeches were not only master-
pieces of oratory; they were also the inci-
sive reflections of a great man and of a great
mind, in line with the best traditions of
American liberal thought.
There were some during his lifetime, of
course, who rated him as too liberal and too
far ahead of the times. Others sought to
discount his effectiveness on the score that
he was too much the idealist and therefore
not practical enough. This does him in-
justice.
The line of distinction between idealism
and vision is obscure at best. Vision, cer-
tainly, is an essential attribute of states-
manship, and he was a fine statesman. In
any case, what a dismal world it would be,
and how unpromising its future, without
spiritual lift given to mankind by the ideal-
ists who, in the courage of their conviction,
chart the course and mark the goals of man's
progress !
At that time I did not have any personal
acquaintance with Mr. Stevenson. For me the
chance came a year later when he visited
Burma in 1953. On that occasion I had the
opportunity to talk to him and to discuss
with him many issues of current interest.
Again I was greatly impressed, not only by
the depth of his intellect but equally by his
breadth of vision.
From the time that Mr. Stevenson became
the Permanent Representative of his coun-
try at the United Nations and while I was
still the Permanent Representative of Burma,
we developed very close ties of friendship.
These ties became even closer toward the
end of the year when I assumed my present
responsibilities and continued to be so during
the last 3V^ years. I found it easy to discuss
with him any current issue of importance
with complete freedom and in full frankness
and friendliness.
No one can serve his country in the United
Nations for long without having his moments
AUGUST 9, 1965
227
of frustration. Ambassador Stevenson had
his share of such moments, and on such oc-
casions he confided to me his innermost
thoughts and I was struck by his completely-
human approach to our common problems.
He seemed not only to think about them but
also to feel about them as a human being.
In all such discussions I was repeatedly im-
pressed by his dedication to the basic con-
cepts of peace, justice, and freedom.
So many tributes have been paid to Mr.
Stevenson since his sudden and tragic pass-
ing away. So many of his friends and admir-
ers have eulogized his fine intellect, his
modesty and humility. Many have praised
his felicitous style and his ready wit. Trib-
utes have been paid to his great learning,
which he carried so lightly because he was
truly an educated man, a cultured man, a
civilized man.
Speaking in San Francisco on 26 June
1965 on the 20th anniversary of the United
Nations, Ambassador Stevenson said : ^
Some of us here today who were midwlves at the
birth of the United Nations can never forget those
days here in San Francisco in the twilight of the
war, when an old world was dying and a new world
was coming to birth.
We shared an audacious dream — and launched a
brave enterprise.
It seemed so easy then — when all was hope and
expectation. I remember my own sense of pride,
of history, of exultation. . . .
He went on to reflect :
In the bright glow of 1945 too many looked to the
United Nations for the full and final answer to
world peace. And in retrospect that day may seem
to have opened with the hint of a false dawn.
Certainly we have learned the hard way how elu-
sive is peace, how durable is man's destructive
drive. . . .
We have learned, too, how distant is the dream
of those better standards of life in larger freedom,
how qualified our capacity to practice tolerance, how
conditional our claims to the dignity and worth of
the human person, how reserved our respect for the
obligations of law.
He then proceeded to restate, on behalf of
himself, his Government, and the vast bulk
of his countrymen, his faith in the United
Nations in the following words :
' For text, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 101.
We believe in the United Nations; we support the
United Nations; and we shall work in the future, as
we have worked in the past, to add strength and in-
fluence and permanence to all that the organization
stands for in this, our tempestuous, tormented, tal-
ented world of diversity in which all men are
brothers and all brothers are somehow, wondrously,
different — save in their need for peace.
And he concluded by saying :
We have the United Nations. We have set it
bravely up. And we will carry it bravely forward.
Unfortunately Adlai Stevenson is no longer
with us to keep step with us in the march
forward to the goals he had stated so well.
On this occasion, when we are paying hom-
age to the memory of one who has left us so
large a legacy, it is fitting, I believe, to give
some thought to the momentous questions of
war and peace which were so close to his
heart.
In my view, many governments, while un-
willing to wage war and at the same time
unable to make peace, seem to have resigned
themselves to the prospect of an interminable
cold war. While admittedly the cold war can-
not bring down the physical holocaust on our
heads, it has nevertheless already inflicted on
us a tremendous moral and psychological in-
jury which is intangible but equally destruc-
tive. The long, uneasy cold war has de-
stroyed and mutilated not our bodies but our
minds. Its weapons are the myths and the
legends of propaganda.
It has often been said that in war the first
casualty is truth. The cold war is also capable
of inflicting the same casualty. The weapons
designed and utilized to crush and muti-
late the human mind are as potent as any
of the weapons designed for physical destruc-
tion. The weapons of the cold war contami-
nate our moral fiber, warp our thinking
processes, and afflict us with pathological
obsessions. These are the invisible but, never-
theless, the most devastating effects of the
cold war on humanity. I believe Adlai Steven-
son, in his innermost thoughts, realized these
truths.
There is no doubt that Adlai Stevenson has
earned a place in history — not only a place
in the history of his own country but a
place in the history of this world organiza-
228
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Pay Tribute
to Ambassador Stevenson
statement by President Johnson, July 14
White House press release dated July 14
The flame which illuminated the dreams and
expectations of an entire world is now extin-
guished. Adlai Stevenson of Illinois is dead.
I am sending a delegation of distinguished
Americans headed by Vice President Humphrey to
London to bring back his body to America, on the
airplane of the President of the United States.
His great hero, Abraham Lincoln, said at the
beginning of his political career, "I have no other
ambition so great as that of being truly esteemed
of my fellow man, by rendering myself worthy of
their esteem."
And although his disappointments were many,
in this, like Lincoln, he was vindicated.
Like Lincoln he was rooted in America's heart-
land, yet his voice reached across every boundary
of nation and race and class.
Like Lincoln he was a great emancipator. It
was his gift to help emancipate men from narrow-
ness of mind and the shackles which selfishness
and ignorance place upon the human adventure.
Like Lincoln he will be remembered more for
what he stood for than for the offices he held, more
for the ideals he embodied than the positions in
which he served. For history honors men more
for what they were than who they were. And by
this standard Adlai Stevenson holds a permanent
place on that tiny roster of those who will be
remembered as long as mankind is strong enough
to honor greatness.
It seems such a short time ago that out of
Illinois came that thoughtful eloquence summon-
ing an entire nation back from its dangerous drift
toward contentment and complacency. For an
entire generation of Americans he imparted a
nobility to public life and the grandeur to Ameri-
can purpose which has already reshaped the life
of the Nation and which will endure for many
generations.
One by one he sounded the great themes of our
time — peace and justice and the well-being of
humanity. And many men will labor for many
years toward the vision and the high purpose
which was the generously crafted outpouring of
this great man's heart and skills.
He was an American. And he served America
well. But what he saw, and what he spoke, and
what he worked for is the shared desire of all
humanity. He believed in us, perhaps more than
we deserved. And so we came to believe in our-
selves much more than we had. And if we per-
severe, then, on the foundation of that faith, we
can build the wondrous works of peace and of
justice among all of the nations.
He will not see that day. But it will be his
day still.
So let us therefore, adversary and friend alike,
pause for a moment and weep for one who was a
friend and who was a guide to all mankind.
Statement by Secretary Rusk
Press release 176 dated July 14
America has lost one of her greatest sons. He
not only served his country, but he stood for the
best of it. He not only spoke for his country, but
he represented the essence of it.
Our history, our traditions, our ideals, our
aspirations were in his mind, his heart, and his
very bones. He never forgot that our Founding
Fathers created for all mankind. And so the
whole world has lost a great citizen; for being
truly American, Adlai Stevenson was a universal
man. We shall mourn him and miss him and be
poorer for his passing.
What he said in tribute to Sir Winston Church-
ill in the U.N. General Assembly last January
is most fitting for Adlai Stevenson: "It is plain
that the world will be diminished by his death, as
it has already been immeasurably enlarged by his
life. We shall not soon see his like again."
tion. He brought to international diplomacy,
in his dignity, his gentility, and his style, a
special dimension. Even more, he has earned
the admiration and affection of millions of
people to whom he was but a name and a
legend.
This was so, I think, because so often his
voice rang true as the voice of the people,
his eloquence expressed the hopes and aspira-
tions of the common man the world over. He
was, in our times, in a quite unique way the
people's friend. Equally, he has earned a per-
manent place in the hearts of all those who
knew him, and today I mourn his passing
AUGUST 9, 1965
229
not just as a great historical figure, a famous
man, but as a true and trusted friend. As
the poet says : "Friendship is a nobler thing ;
Of friendship it is good to sing."
MR. SOSA RODRIGUEZ
Mr. Secretary-General, Mr. Secretary of
State, fellow delegates, ladies and gentlemen :
It is sometimes difficult to put into words
the true magnitude of a feeling, the sorrow
that takes hold of the spirit in the face of
the irreparable, the sadness that invades the
soul in the face of hard reality. And yet, we
must find words to reflect the pain that grips
us at the loss of a friend who knew how to
win our hearts, of a colleague who knew how
to conquer our admiration, for such was for
us Adlai Stevenson, the Governor, as we, his
friends, used affectionately to call him.
The impact of the unexpected news, while
I was on holiday in Madrid, was a hard blow
for me: "Adlai Stevenson died suddenly in
London." Only 3 weeks earlier we had
been together in San Francisco at the com-
memoration of the 20th anniversary of the
United Nations, and he appeared so jovial,
as ever so full of life.
Why is it that it is the good men, the men
necessary to mankind, that we lose so sud-
denly? We must bow, however, before the in-
scrutable dictates of Providence and resign
ourselves to the will of God. Yet the vacuum
left by the death of a friend we cannot but
feel profoundly. We, his colleagues in the
United Nations, have lost a dear and admired
friend. But America has lost one of its most
enlightened sons and the United Nations one
of its most faithful champions.
In this time of mourning, in which, gath-
ered here in the General Assembly, witness
to so many of his brilliant interventions, we
pay tribute to his memory, it seems to us
that we still hear the echo of his eloquent and
tempered words, the expression of a noble
spirit and a high culture placed at the serv-
ice of his country but placed also at the serv-
ice of the ideals of peace and justice advo-
cated in the United Nations Charter.
Of the many qualities that adorned the
shining personality of Adlai Stevenson, per-
haps the most outstanding were his modera-
tion and his profound human feeling. Per-
haps this is the reason why he never inspired
hatred but only affection, and always re-
spect. Adlai Stevenson, like all public men,
has been known to have devoted admirers and
formidable adversaries, but he has never
been known to have enemies. And it is be-
cause the goodness and sincerity that flowed
from his personality could not allow for feel-
ings of enmity to be forged against him.
In his distinguished public life, and espe-
cially in the United Nations where we better
knew him, Stevenson always highlighted the
great sense of equanimity and his constant
preoccupation with the search for truth and
justice. Perhaps these qualities, combined
with so vast a culture which perforce opened
for him horizons of doubt, at times deprived
him of the necessary impetus for political
triumph but gave him instead the universal
and broad understanding of the problems of
our time and an acute and penetrating vision
of the future, clouded neither by prejudice
nor by preconceived notions.
Adlai Stevenson was a great patriot. He
placed at the service of his country, unstint-
ingly and unsparingly, the full fountain of
his extraordinary intelligence, of his pro-
found culture, and of his personal charm.
And while in the service of his country he
was struck down by death.
Adlai Stevenson lived and died for his
country. Perhaps better than any other pub-
lic figure, Adali Stevenson gave the world an
image of a modern and liberal North Amer-
ica, conscious of the outstanding role it is
called upon to play in history and conscious
of the enormous responsibility derived for
her from her great military and economic
power. It would be difficult to classify
Adlai Stevenson, from the political stand-
point, as a man of the right or a man
of the left. Stevenson was a liberal in
the true sense of the word. He was a man
free of extremism, ever respectful of the
opinions and viewpoints of others, but al-
ways convinced of the force of reason, not of
230
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
the reason of force. His liberal spirit was re-
flected in all his acts as a public figure and
especially in his performance as a diplomat.
For him, negotiation and conciliation were
the methods par excellence for the attainment
of his aspirations, and he never lacked mod-
eration, patience, and understanding in the
fulfillment of the delicate functions entrusted
to him. As an orator he was brilliant, elo-
quent, witty. When it was necessary to enter
into polemics he could be sharp and even
ironical but at all times courteous and con-
siderate. Socially, he was a man of the world,
of great personal charm, with the simplicity
and the natural manner of great men.
Adlai Stevenson leaves of his passage
through life a profound imprint. He leaves
in his country that owes him so much a pro-
found mark. He leaves a mark in the United
Nations, which he so vigorously defended. He
leaves a mark in the world, which he under-
stood so well. He leaves his imprint in the
hearts of his friends, who will never forget
him. The death of Adlai Stevenson opens a
great vacuum in the intellectual world, in the
world of letters, in the world of politics, in
the world of diplomacy. It leaves a vacuum
in his country, and it leaves a vacuum in the
world.
His understanding of the true causes of
present-day problems, his great concern with
social affairs, his untiring defense of peace
and concord among nations, his knowledge of
man and his stanch defense of the ideals in
which he believed — all of this manifested in
his public acts, in his words, his writing, and
his actions — had made of him the prototype
of the intellectual who uses his culture for
the benefit of mankind.
Stevenson was not happy with the egotis-
tical pleasure of having a vast culture for
himself. His constant preoccupation with the
well-being of the less favored in the world
and with the true grandeur of his country
made him at all times place that culture at
the service of others. That is why he will al-
ways be remembered with admiration and re-
spect, both by his partisans and his adver-
saries.
The death of Adlai Stevenson will be felt
most especially in the United Nations, where
we had become used to having him as head of
his country's delegation. There were those
who agreed with the views he upheld and
those who did not, but no one can deny that
Stevenson, because of his great love for peace,
his profound human feeling, and his faith in
negotiation, was at all times a guarantee in
the most difficult situations. It will not be
easy to fill the void that he leaves with his
death.
To the great American people, to President
Johnson, to Mr. Stevenson's family, I con-
vey my words of condolence. May the good
and generous man, the true and sincere
statesman, the refined diplomat, the perfect
gentleman, who was Adlai Stevenson rest in
peace.
May these words of mine be accepted as
the modest tribute of a sincere friend to the
great man whose memory will continue to
guide future generations in the search for
peace and justice in our world.
MR. MACLEISH
U.S./U.N. press release 4602
I am deeply conscious of the privilege of
speaking of Adlai Stevenson in this company
and in this place, this room which has heard
his remembered voice so often.
I am conscious too of the responsibility
and burdened by it, for it is here, and per-
haps only here, that something might be
said of him which would touch, or almost
touch, the indefinable, rare thing he was.
When Adlai Stevenson spoke at the memo-
rial service for Eleanor Roosevelt, who had
come home, he said, to the rose garden at
Hyde Park for the last time, he told her
friends that it was not her life they had
lost — she had lived that out to the full: It
was the thing she was — "and who can name
it?"
Who can name what he was? Not I cer-
tainly. But if there is a room anywhere in
which it can be spoken of, it is this one.
Not because — not only because — the United
Nations was, for so many years, the center
AUGUST 9, 1965
231
of his life and of his concern, but for a dif-
ferent reason: because the organization it-
self, the nature of the organization, creates
a perspective in which a life like Adlai
Stevenson's might perhaps be seen — in
which it might assume the nobility, the sig-
nificance, which are its inward form.
In the ordinary context, the context to
which our age is increasingly accustomed, a
life like his becomes a puzzle, a contradic-
tion which even those who love him — and
this room is full of those who love him —
cannot readily resolve. Our generation — and
not in the United States alone — not only in
the United States— is obsessed by a view of
human life which leaves no room for any
human greatness or magnificence but one.
Power fascinates us, and the exercise of
power, and we judge our public figures by
the power they dispose of, by the offices
they hold which give them access to the
thrust of power.
Adlai Stevenson cannot be measured by
these measures, cannot be known or recog-
nized by them, or even named. He had no
taste for power, no desire for it. The unfor-
gettable speech in which he accepted the in-
evitability of his nomination for the Presi-
dency was a portrait of himself as ill-advised
politically as it was personally honorable.
And the two disastrous and superb cam-
paigns which he conducted were proof that
his reluctance at the start was not the re-
luctance of political calculation but of pas-
sionate belief.
When he said, years afterward, that he
would like to be remembered for those un-
successful ventures, for those two defeats, he
meant that there are some things in the life
of a democracy more important than to come
to power — more important, ultimately, than
the possession of the power.
And yet, as the last few days have dem-
onstrated, it is in terms of power or of the
failure to come to power, that his life is
still most commonly conceived. In the shock
and sorrow of his sudden death, the minds
of those who wrote and spoke of him went
back again and again, over and over, with
admiration and regret and more sometimes
than admiration or regret, to what were
called the contradictions and the paradoxes
of his history. He was, we were reminded,
a great political figure who had never held
a great political office; a master of the art
of government who had governed only in his
ovm State; a public man unsuccessful
somehow in public life — too fine for it per-
haps; a Hamlet who thought too long too
deeply, who doubted too scrupulously, who
could never permit himself to be as sure as
an American politician in the fifties was
supposed to be sure, that that voice beneath
the battlements urging to violence and re-
venge was the king his father's voice.
Well, it was true in part of course — true
that he thought long and deeply — ^true that
he had the courage of his doubts — ^true, too,
that he was skeptical of hatred and its
prophets in a day when the great majority
of his fellow citizens were listening to those
prophets and believing them. But the con-
clusions most often drav?n from these ob-
servations are not true. Hamlet dies to those
heartbreaking words in which the pity
overwhelms the grief: "Good-night, sweet
prince." In Adlai Stevenson's death there is
no room for pity. Those of us who mourn
him and will always mourn him think of him
not as a man defeated in his purpose but as
a man victorious in it; not as a man whose
life was a contradiction and a paradox, but as
a man whose life had a particular singleness,
an unusual wholeness, its own law.
And it is here in this room, I think, that
that wholeness best appears. For the United
Nations, though it knows and suffers from
our contemporary trust in power, is dedi-
cated to another end: the subordination of
power to the hope for peace — which is to
say the hope for humanity. Those qualities
in Adlai Stevenson which seemed, in other
surroundings, to be traits of character,
attributes of personality — his warmth, his
charm, his considerateness, his intelligence,
his humor, his devotion, his incisiveness,
his eloquence — were fused here, in their
employment in the noblest of all causes, to
232
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
compose a complete man, a man so bal-
anced, so harmonious as a human being, that
his greatness passed almost unnoticed
while he lived.
His effectiveness here, his services to
this organization and to the country to
which his life was given, others have
spoken of and will speak. They were great
services, greatly rendered. But the most im-
portant thing about them, or so it seems to
me, was their humanity. It is not, in the long
history of civilization, the accomplishment
which counts but the manner of the accom-
plishment. Works of will are notoriously
short-lived, and even works of intellect can
fail when the intelligence is cynical or dry.
It is only when the end is reached through
the human heart as well as through the hu-
man mind that the accomplishment is certain
to endure. And it is for that reason that
Adlai Stevenson seems certain of remem-
brance.
His great achievement was not political
triumph or, indeed, triumph of any kind.
His great achievement was the enrichment
of his time by the nature of his relation-
ships with his time. If his intelligence was
remarkable, it was remarkable, even more
than for its clarity, by its modesty, its hu-
mor, its total lack of vanity or arrogance.
If he was one of the great articulators of
his time, one of the few, true voices, it was
because the words he spoke were the words
of his own thought, of his deepest and
most personal conviction. It was himself he
gave in word and thought and action, not to
his friends alone but to his country, to his
world. And the gift had consequences. It
changed the tone and temper of political
life in the United States for a generation.
It humanized the quality of international
exchanges throughout a great part of the
world. It enlightened a dark time.
Which means, I suppose, that Adlai Ste-
venson's great achievement was himself.
What we have lost, as he said of his friend
Mrs. Roosevelt, is not his life. He lived that,
if not to the full, at least more fully than
almost any other man. What we have lost is
himself. And who can name the warmth
and richness of it?
SECRETARY RUSK
Press release 179 dated July 19
Colleagues and friends: His family and
his fellow countrymen are grateful that so
many from so many lands are gathered in
this great hall to pay respect to Adlai Steven-
son. Today he returns to the soil which gave
him birth, as we gather here at the United
Nations which had become the very fiber of
his life.
We have been deeply moved by what has
been said here today and by the messages
which have come from all over the earth. For
these are messages which leap over the fron-
tiers of nation, cultural tradition, or ideology,
messages which brush aside the passing dif-
ferences of present controversy and recall
that Adlai Stevenson's hopes, dedication, and
passionate concern encompassed all mankind.
You and we who have worked alongside
him day by day have lost a talented colleague
in our most stimulating profession — a profes-
sion corporately bound together in the un-
relenting search for peace. And what an in-
spiring colleague he was !
His restless conviction that things were
never good enough sustained his zest and
joy in public service. But his exultation in
a further step toward peace was short-lived,
for there was always the unfinished busi-
ness still to be done — the next step which
consumed his energy and imagination.
Adlai Stevenson deeply respected the col-
leagues with whom he labored in this United
Nations and treasured the friendships nour-
ished in this place. It is true that he had
the capacity for forceful advocacy — when ad-
vocacy was needed. But he also had the per-
ception to see that all issues worthy of de-
bate are complex and are seen differently —
and honestly — from other points of view.
Thus, if his talents blazed bright from the
public platform, his skills were no less lumi-
nous in the professional arts of quiet diplo-
macy. For he had the wisdom to seek always
AUGUST 9, 1965
233
to see problems as they are seen by others,
even though he might himself not be able to
share their view.
He had the discrimination to separate the
important from the unimportant. And he
had the endless patience — and the tolerance
and restraining moderation — to sustain him
through the sometimes exhausting work of
mediation and accommodation.
He knew, as do all who are schooled in the
great traditions of diplomacy, that it is
never too early to anticipate difficulty in or-
der to prevent it and never too late to lay the
hand of reason upon a crisis in order to solve
it.
His colleagues were never bored; perhaps
it was with Adlai Stevenson in mind that one
editor defined a liberal as "independent and
surprising." In private this public man was
a warm and entertaining friend, perceptive
of the ironies of politics and statecraft, given
to illuminating shafts of sardonic wit, ob-
viously worried about the behavior of nations
but deeply confident about the nature of man.
Because he believed so thoroughly in what he
was doing and enjoyed so immensely the
doing of it, he poured out his energies to the
full — and to the very end.
In these past few days it has been said,
over and over again, that Adlai Stevenson
was a universal man. And so he was. But
not merely because he was informed, well
traveled, urbane, sophisticated, eloquent, and
gifted. He was all of these; but his univer-
sality did not rest upon his being a prince
among plain men, but rather upon his being
a plain man even among princes. His was
the simplicity of fundamental human values
— what is common in the midst of diversity
— what is permanent in the midst of change :
the love of peace, the instinct of tolerance,
the feeling of compassion, the devotion to
human rights, the urge to act for human
welfare.
This philosophy which animated Adlai
Stevenson lay deep in him — permanent and
indestructible. Perhaps this is what at-
tracted him so powerfully, almost irresist-
ibly, to the United Nations and its noble
tasks. For he was committed to the principles
of the charter before it was written. The pre-
amble and the first two articles of the
charter put into words what had already
guided his life. And so it seems most natural
that he should have spent so much of his
energies in the cause of the United Nations.
He began in 1945 as an assistant to the
Secretary of State and adviser to the United
States delegation at the charter conference in
San Francisco. He was the chief of our dele-
gation at the Preparatory Commission in
London, then a delegate to the first and sec-
ond sessions of the General Assembly. It was
altogether fitting that his life work was
crowned in these halls and that his last mis-
sion was to the United Nations Economic and
Social Council.^
The words of the charter — and his own
ringing phrases which will live in literature
— ^were more than sjrmbols to him. They were
calls to action. He used language as few men
have — but used it to summon himself and
others to work.
The work to which he summoned our rea-
son and our feelings remains still to be done.
The charter he kept on his desk contains
only 5 pages of philosophy, followed by 50
pages of procedures.
He knew that the philosophy could lift
men's vision and sustain their energies. But
he also sensed that its meaning was con-
tained not in eloquent words but in agreed
procedures, in workable machinery, in ar-
rangements that enabled the nations to work
together on particular tasks — while continu-
ing to argue about why they are working to-
gether and why they sometimes disagree.
He had early learned the dictum of Jus-
tice Oliver Wendell Holmes that general prop-
ositions do not decide concrete cases, and he
worked hard and long to build that execu-
tive machinery for peace which is the real
alternative to the system of war by which
men and nations have always lived — by
which they no longer dare to live.
And so we pay tribute to a working col-
league— to a professional diplomat, to a prac-
titioner, a craftsman, an indefatigable work-
er for peaceful change. And in honoring him
' For the text of a statement made by Ambassador
Stevenson before the U.N. Economic and Social
Council on July 9, see ibid., July 26, 1965, p. 142.
234
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
we are affirming our determination that the
peace of the world will be secured.
You and I, who worked with him, will re-
member Adlai Stevenson not only as an in-
spired voice of the conscience of man; we
shall remember him and miss him and honor
him, as well, as a valued professional col-
league— as a brilliant public servant in the
broadest and noblest sense of that term.
There is no institution which deserves such
talents more than the United Nations ; it calls
out for the best that can be produced by the
societies of man. Three Presidents of the
United States sent Adlai Stevenson to the
United Nations. They sent you our best.
Now that he is gone I think of the line
from Pilgrim's Progress: "So he passed over,
and all the trumpets sounded for him on the
other side." Yet something of him remains
with us in this great Assembly Hall.
President Johnson Receives Book
on tlie IVIagna Carta
Following is an exchange of remarks be-
tween President Johnson and the British
Ambassador, Sir Patrick Dean, at the White
House on July 22 during a ceremony in
which the Ambassador presented to the
President a specially bound copy of a hook
on the Magna Carta.
White House press release dated July 22
Ambassador Dean
Mr. President, it is a great honor and
privilege for me to present to you this spe-
cially bound copy of the book Magna Carta
by Professor [John] Holt. A similar copy
has been presented to Her Majesty the
Queen.
The Magna Carta is one of the many his-
toric links that bind together so closely the
peoples and institutions of the United States
and the United Kingdom.
The Chief Justice of the United States,
the Honorable Earl Warren, has written:
"The founding fathers in America regarded
its principles as their birthright. It is the
very essence of the rule of law as distin-
guished from the rule of men, even as law
is the essence of freedom itself."
The message of the charter is as relevant
today as the day on which it was sealed
750 years ago.
On behalf of the Cambridge University
Press, which is the press of my own univer-
sity, I invite you, Mr. President, to accept
this book.
President Johnson
Sir Patrick, I am most grateful to you.
On behalf of the American people, I thank
your Government and your countrymen for
this most gracious and this very deeply ap-
preciated act of yours this morning.
The Magna Carta has always meant much
to all Americans. The success of the lords
who, shall we say, reasoned together with
King John 750 years ago inspired the
Americans who tried the same on King
George HI, 189 years ago, from Philadel-
phia. The outcome was good or bad — de-
pending on the point of view. I think more
than that, the principles set forth in this
Great Charter have inspired and guided all
of us throughout our existence — and they
do that today. All we do at home, all we do
throughout the world, is meant to assure
men the right to "freedom under law" and
the right to expect impartial justice.
We never forget those great words of this
charter: "To no one will we sell, to no one
deny or delay right or justice."
Britain's sons, like America's sons,
stand their guard today in many distant
lands so that these promises may be fulfilled
for all mankind and that we may ulti-
mately obtain our objective of a world that
can live in peace together.
American families, like your families.
Sir Patrick, devotedly want peace. We are
extremely grateful in this country to your
leaders, to your very able Prime Minister,
for the courageous and their very willing
initiatives and efforts that they have made
seeking the peace. But we also know that
you want, as we want, peace with honor,
and peace with freedom, and peace with dig-
nity.
AUGUST 9, 1965
236
So we are proud to stand with you this
morning, and to work with you, and to
strive with you as friends and allies for a
better world and for a peaceful world.
And while you are here, Sir Patrick, may
I say this. I ask you to convey to your coun-
trymen the appreciation of all the Ameri-
cans for the very many thoughtful courtesies
extended last week when death came in Lon-
don to our beloved statesman Adlai Steven-
son. By birth and loyalty Ambassador
Stevenson was an American, but in spirit
he was at home really in both of our lands.
When death came to him in the midst of
your people, your gracious understanding
touched all Americans, and I should like for
you to say to them, on behalf of the people
of the United States, we are so grateful that
in this hour of trouble for us you were so
understanding.
Conquering the Ancient Enemies
of IVIanlcind
Remarks by President Johnson ^
Mr. Fisher, members of the World Press
Institute staff, outstanding young journal-
ists:
It is a great privilege and pleasure to wel-
come all of you, especially Mr. Johnson from
Stockholm. You come from continents and
countries that I have enjoyed greatly in the
past — from the Middle East, from South
America, from Asia and Africa, from India
and Italy, Switzerland and Sweden, England
and France.
One of you has come in from Greece. Once
I attended your Trade Fair, and I asked my
daughter to say a few words to your
friendly citizens. She talked long and learn-
edly about the birthplace of Alexander the
Great and all the rich history of northern
Greece and Macedonia. And when she had
finished no one in attendance was even will-
ing to listen to me.
'Made before the World Press Institute at the
White House on July 22 (White House press release).
I won't make that same mistake today.
But I do wish that we could have a press
conference, with me asking the questions
and you giving the answers.
Americans have always been the respect-
ers of the views of our visitors. Nowhere
are views from other lands and other peo-
ples more respected than in this White
House.
Our country, our whole nation, is, after
all, the creation of peoples of all countries,
and cultures, and colors, and creeds. In our
veins flows the blood of all men. And that
is why, in our hearts, we have for 189 years
regarded America's cause as really the cause
of all mankind.
The great meaning of America is that men
of all nations can live together in under-
standing and in peace. That is the great
challenge and the great opportunity and the
great responsibility that is facing you and
facing your profession — that is, to foster
understanding among men so that there may
be peace among nations.
Seventy percent of the world's people to-
day lack the means of being informed about
developments in their own countries, much
less in other countries. Of Africa's 236 mil-
lion people, less than 3 million actually re-
ceive newspapers. Nearly half the countries
of the Middle East have no daily press at
all. And so it goes on all around the world.
But we are so happy to observe that a new
day is dawning, and you and I and all of us
are living now the moment of one of history's
great breakthroughs.
In the 18th century the world was altered
by the political revolution. In the 19th cen-
tury it was changed by the industrial revolu-
tion. Now, in this 20th century, the world is
being changed as never before by the sci-
entific revolution — the revolution of human
knowledge.
It is no dim and distant dream to envi-
sion the day when men everywhere will be
able to receive in their homes telecasts from
satellite stations of sessions of the United
Nations.
I was delayed for a moment in greeting
you not by telecasts from the United Nations
236
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
i
but by a telephone call from what I hope will
be the new United States representative to
the United Nations, who is going before the
Foreign Relations Committee in the morning
to be confirmed and, we hope, to be sworn
here at the White House as soon as he has
been confirmed.
Yes, no technology is changing more radi-
cally and more rapidly than the technology of
communications, which will permit commu-
nication between nations and people. Surely
from these better communications will
come better understanding between all of
us.
But the meaning of this revolution, and
the meaning of this breakthrough, runs far
beyond the impact upon any one technol-
ogy. Advances of science are rendering ob-
solete the old thinking, the old theories, the
old doctrine and dogma about relations be-
tween nations.
Young and less developed nations have an
opportunity today to bypass the hundred
years of the industrial revolution and begin
to enter the mainstream of the 20th cen-
tury. New nations with a minimum of
trained scientists can share, and can benefit,
from the vast store of already existing
scientific knowledge.
They can benefit from modern medicine
to free their people of diseases and of
early death, and to extend the life expec-
tancy. They can benefit from advances made
in agriculture and produce more food to
feed their growing population. And we are
trying so hard to encourage them and to
help them and to get them to develop their
agriculture better.
They have the hope nations never had
before of building better lives for their
people, regardless of their size or their
power or their wealth or their past history.
So it is a great and grand and thrilling
vision that opens before mankind as we meet
here this afternoon. And we of America
are moved by that vision. We are moved by
it in all that we do at home and all that we
do in the world.
For if the dream is to become the reality,
peace must be preserved for mankind, and
peace is the purpose of all that we do.
There are those who would force human
hopes and aspirations back into the darkness
of the past by aggression, by terror, by
oppression, by war. But we believe that
mankind has outrun the darkness of those
dogmas which subjugate man's body and
which imprison man's soul.
We believe that mankind should have a
choice, and we believe that mankind does
have a choice today. We think he can choose
the way of life, the way of peace, the way
of freedom, the way of justice through the
liberation of his mind and of his soul.
And we believe that is the choice that
men of all continents and of all cultures
and colors and creeds will really ultimately
make if they are permitted to choose their
way in peace.
The strength that we have and the suc-
cess that we enjoy and the spirit that swells
within the soul of America is mobilized and
committed to one end — that end is to pre-
serve the peace so that men everywhere
can choose for themselves the way they
want to go in this davsming age of oppor-
tunity in which we are privileged to live.
I am glad that I am privileged to welcome
you here and to make these observations.
These are trying moments in our relations
with other nations.
Yesterday I talked to a thousand brilliant
leaders of the field of education in this
country, not just about the programs that
will involve advancement and adventure for
our own citizens here at home but about the
great progress that we can make in the field
of international education.
While we will be true to our commit-
ments, we will keep our treaties, we will
join in protecting freedom in the world. And
we think that strength will be required to
preserve that freedom.
At the same time we will do everything
within our power to see that, while strength
is maintained on the military front to pre-
serve freedom from aggression, there will be
equal strength on the political, and on the
diplomatic, and on the economic front that
will try to find ways of avoiding contests.
AUGUST 9, 1965
237
At the same time, we are prepared to deal
with them if we must.
I want to take a moment, if you will, be-
fore I return to my other appointments, to
meet each of you individually. I want to ask
you to convey to your leaders, and to your
fellow men, our hopes and aspirations and
best wishes for their success and their ad-
vancement.
We are not concerned just with 190 mil-
lion people in this country. We are devotedly
interested in all the 3 billion people of the
world.
We are organizing, and planning, and mo-
bilizing to win the wars that we have de-
clared— and we will win them. And those
wars are wars on poverty — it was being
fought in the House of Representatives to-
day, and we won a while ago by five votes;
the wars on ignorance — we are making
great advances there — the educational pro-
gram this year has never been equaled in
this country before ; wars on diseases — while
our life expectancy has improved a great deal
with the years, we are not at all satisfied
with it, and we have a half-dozen far-
reaching comprehensive health measures
that will not just confine our efforts to our
own people but will help us to help others
in the world and provide leadership in im-
proving the health and in some of the prob-
lems of population and other matters.
So we are committed to win the wars that
we have declared on the ancient enemies of
mankind: ignorance, illiteracy, poverty, and
disease.
And it will be a great day in the world
when we can say that victory is ours against
those ancient enemies in all lands.
Thank you very much.
Senate Confirms Mr. Merchant
as U.S. Executive Director of IBRD
The Senate on July 22 confirmed the nom-
ination of Livingston T. Merchant to be
U.S. Executive Director of the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development
for a term of 2 years.
Advisory Committee on Monetary
Arrangements Has First Meeting
White House press release dated July 16
Announcement of Meeting
The President met on July 16 with Treas-
ury Secretary Henry H. Fowler and the new
Advisory Committee on International Mone-
tary Arrangements. Former Secretary of the
Treasury Douglas Dillon is chairman of the
committee, which was set up to assist
Secretary Fowler in exploring methods to
increase international financial resources.^
The committee held its first meeting with
Secretary Fowler on July 16 at the Treasury
and later moved to the White House to meet
with the President.
Other members of the committee in-
clude :
Edward Bernstein, economic consultant specializing
In international policy
Kermit Gordon, until last month Director of the
Bureau of the Budget, now at the Brookings In-
stitution
Charles Kindleberger, professor of economics, Massa-
chusetts Institute of Technology
Andre Meyer, of the investment banking firm of
Lazard Preres
David Rockefeller, president of the Chase Manhat-
tan Bank, New York, N.Y.
Robert V. Roosa, former Under Secretary of the
Treasury for Monetary Affairs, now a partner
in the investment banking firm of Brown Bros.
Harriman and Co.
Government officials attending the meeting
included :
Gardner Ackley, Chairman of the President's Council
of Economic Advisers
George W. Ball, Under Secretary of State
Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the Treasury
Francis Bator, White House staff
Frederick L. Deming, Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Monetary Affairs
William McChesney Martin, Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve Board
Merlyn Trued, Assistant Secretary of the Treasury
for International Affairs
Paul Volcker, Deputy Under Secretary of the Treas-
ury for Monetary Affairs
' For an announcement of the naming of the com-
mittee by Secretary Fowler on July 3, see White
House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated July 3.
238
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
statement by the President
I met today with Secretary Fowler and
his Advisory Committee on International
Monetary Arrangements. We had a brief
discussion of the United States balance-of-
payments situation and the international
monetary system.
There was complete agreement on the
necessity for the United States to eliminate
its balance-of-payments deficit quickly and
to maintain payments equilibrium for a pro-
longed period.
While we were all pleased with the indi-
cations that my balance-of-payments pro-
gram announced February 10 ^ seems to be
taking hold, and that the business and fi-
nancial community is doing a splendid job
of voluntary cooperation, we are well aware
that it is still much too early to get an
accurate picture of just where we stand.
Secretary Fowler is moving ahead effec-
tively to prepare for international agreement
on solving any future problem of world
liquidity which might arise after we have
successfully maintained equilibrium for an
extended period. He has put together an ex-
cellent committee, and I am confident that,
under the leadership of Douglas Dillon, they
will provide him with the best talent and ad-
vice available in this area to supplement the
resources in the Government on this vital
subject.
statement by Secretary Fowler
I met today for the first time with my
Advisory Committee on International Mone-
tary Arrangements. While the meeting was
principally an organizational one, there was
opportunity for me to bring Chairman Dil-
lon and the members of his committee up to
date on the latest developments both in our
own balance of payments and in our ef-
forts to promote international agreement on
strengthening the world monetary system.
Among the things we discussed were my
recent talks with British Chancellor of the
Exchequer [James] Callaghan and Japanese
Finance Minister [Takeo] Fukuda.
The committee was in unanimous agree-
ment that the United States' proposal for an
international conference on the potential
problem of world financial resources was an
important step in the right direction.*
I took the opportunity to set before the
committee the general framework of our
present policy, which includes the following
points :
1. The importance of the United States'
eliminating its own deficit as promptly as
possible as a necessary precondition to
modification of the international monetary
system.
2. The importance of a flexible approach,
not only by the United States but by other
countries, in discussing international mone-
tary arrangements.
3. The need for thorough and careful
preparation to promote fruitful negotiations
on the international level.
4. The need to build upon the existing sys-
tem by making maximum use of present
instruments of international financial co-
operation which have served so effectively
in the past.
5. The necessity to maintain the dollar as
the principal reserve currency in order to
foster continuing stability in the interna-
tional trade and payments system.
Statement by Mr. Dillon
The first meeting of the Advisory Com-
mittee on International Monetary Arrange-
ments went very well.
Secretary Fowler brought us up to date
on a number of matters, and we were able
to settle our organizational problems with-
out difficulty, and we expect to begin sub-
stantive discussions in the near future.
Secretary Fowler's advocacy of a flexible
approach by all countries, including our ovm,
offers great promise that the United States
will be able to play a significant and con-
structive role in future international discus-
sions on possible modification of the mone-
tary system.
' Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282.
° For text of an address made by Secretary Fowler
on July 10 before the Virginia State Bar Association,
see ibid., Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209.
AUGUST 9, 1965
239
President Names Justice Goldberg
as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.
Following is an exchange of remarks be-
tween President Johnson and Supreme Court
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg at the White
House on July 20.
White House press release dated July 20
Remarks by President Johnson
One week ago we, and the world, lost
Adlai Stevenson. For all who knew him, and
for all whose lives were touched by his rare
gifts of inspiration, the world will seem for-
ever poorer for his death. Yet we know that
the world will be forever richer for his life.
None can fill the void that his passing
leaves in our hearts. But the vacancy left at
the council tables of the United Nations must
be filled.
Our yearning for peace and for justice on
this earth, and our quest for the dignity of
all mankind, are not the yearning and quest
of one heart but of 190 million. Where men
and where nations come together to seek
these goals, the voice of all America must be
heard.
It is therefore my responsibility to select
a successor to Ambassador Adlai Stevenson
as the special representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations.
Since the birth of the United Nations 20
years ago, each President has faced the
same responsibility. Each President has re-
flected the faith and the firmness of our
commitment to the United Nations by al-
ways calling upon distinguished citizens of
very high achievement to serve in this hon-
ored office.
As an example, President Truman called
upon Senator Warren Austin of Vermont.
President Eisenhower called upon an
outstanding American, who serves his coun-
try faithfully and selflessly still, Henry
Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts.
President Kennedy called the great Gov-
ernor Adlai Stevenson of Illinois.
To assume these responsibilities now, I
call upon a member of the Supreme Court
of the United States and a former member of
the Cabinet — Justice Arthur Goldberg.
At the insistence of the President of his
country, he has accepted this call to duty.
Justice Goldberg, like Governor Steven-
son, is a son of Illinois. Where Governor
Stevenson was descended from some of
America's oldest settlers, Justice Goldberg
was bom of our newest. He rose from the
city streets to Cabinet office, and then to the
highest court in this land. His life embodies
the story of our open and free society as a
fulfillment of the opportunity that we want
all mankind to share with us.
A counselor of the American trade union
movement. Justice Goldberg won the es-
teem of both labor and business. His ap-
pointment to the Cabinet of the late Presi-
dent Kennedy drew bipartisan approval and
drew praise from leaders of widely diver-
gent philosophies. His nomination to the
Supreme Court was warmly welcomed by all
who knew him as a lawyer of exceptional
ability, a student and thinker of original
and profound capacity, and, above all, a man
of courage and independence and conviction
and generous humanitarian compassion.
But Justice Goldberg is a man of inter-
national reputation, too. Before entering pub-
lic service he was an articulate and very
forceful champion of the international labor
movement to preserve and extend the demo-
cratic institutions in the free world. In the
Cabinet he represented his President on mis-
sions to Europe and Africa and Asia, and
was continuously concerned with the affairs
of the United Nations International Labor
Organization. Since becoming a member of
the Supreme Court, he has traveled exten-
sively in the world, speaking in many lands
about the problems and the issues which all
men share.
At different periods, over the past 20
years, we have had varying concerns in
our constant and continuing efforts for world
peace. But always — and never more than
now — we strive for a world where all men
may live in peace with the hope of justice
under the rule of law over the conduct of
nations.
Committed as we are to this principle
240
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and this purpose, it is fitting- that we should
ask a member of our highest court to re-
linquish that office to speak for America
before the nations of the world.
Finally, let me say that Justice Goldberg
is an old and trusted friend of mine, a
counselor of many years. He will sit in our
Cabinet. He will always have direct and
ready access to, and the full and respectful
confidence of, the President of the United
States and the Secretary of State. In his new
office he will speak not only for an admin-
istration, but he will speak for an entire
nation, firmly, earnestly, and responsibly
committed to the strength and to the success
of the United Nations in its works for
peace around the world.
Now, if Justice Goldberg would say a few
words, we would all be pleased.
Thank you very much.
Justice Goldberg
Mr. President, with the death of Adlai
Stevenson, a great voice of America in the
world has been stilled, but the message of
Adlai Stevenson to the world must go on.
That message is man's ancient supplication :
Grant us peace. Thy most precious gift.
What has been prayer throughout the
ages is a necessity today.
Adlai Stevenson was the voice of a great
and powerful nation, at once dedicated to
peace and implacable in its commitment to
freedom. The eloquence of his words no more
than reflected the richness of his spirit
and the righteousness of his cause.
We, and the world, are different because
he lived.
Of Adlai Stevenson's departure and my
appointment, I can only borrow words ut-
tered on a similar occasion by Thomas Jef-
ferson: I succeed him. No one could replace
him.
I shall not, Mr. President, conceal the
pain with which I leave the Court after 3
years of service. It has been the richest and
most satisfying period of my career. And I
shall have more to say about this in a letter
I am sending to the Chief Justice and my
brethren on the Court.
Throughout my life I have been deeply
committed to the rule of law. The law gives
form and substance to the spirit of liberty
and to mankind's sacred stir for justice.
It now comes that the President has asked
me to join in the greatest adventure of
man's history — the effort to bring the rule
of law to govern the relations between
sovereign states. It is that or doom — and we
all know it.
I have accepted, as one simply must.
In my efforts at the United Nations I shall
do my best to carry on, in my own way, the
work of my distinguished predecessors. I
hope to help make real and manifest the
assertion of the charter that social justice
and better standards of life in larger free-
dom are indispensable to the achievement of
world peace.
I am grateful to the President for judging
me capable of the effort I now commence.
I am grateful to the Secretary of State, my
friend and my former colleague in the Cabi-
net, for welcoming me so warmly to this
post.
It is with great humility that I undertake
the role of our nation's advocate of peace in
the council of nations.
My wife, my son, my daughter — who is in
Chicago and cannot be with us today — my
mother-in-law, all join with me in asking
only the prayers of the American people that
we shall succeed.
AUGUST 9, 1965
241
U.S.-Japan Cabinet Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs
Holds Fourth iVIeeting at Wasiiington
The fourth meeting of the Joint United
States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs was held at Washington July
12-1 Jf. Following are remarks made at the
opening session on July 12 by Secretary Rusk
and Foreign Minister Etsusaburo Shiina, re-
marks made at a White House luncheon on
July IJfhy President Johnson and Mr. Shiina,
and text of a joint communique issued on
July 14 at the conclusion of the meeting.
OPENING SESSION, JULY 12
Press release 174 dated July 12
Remarks by Secretary Rusk
We are opening today the fourth meeting
of the Joint United States-Japan Commit-
tee on Trade and Economic Affairs. Presi-
dent Johnson and Prime Minister Sato
agreed during the Prime Minister's visit
last January * that this Committee should
meet again at the earliest practicable date.
The Committee can look back to a solid
record of accomplishment during the past
4 years.2 On this firm base we can look
forward confidently to further success in
promoting and strengthening the economic
relationships which form so important a
part of our overall relations.
* For text of a joint communique, see BuUiETiN
of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 134.
' For texts of joint communiques issued at the con-
clusion of the three previous meetings, see ibid.,
Nov. 27, 1961, p. 891; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959; and Feb.
17, 1964, p. 235.
Japan's exports to the United States this
year double those of 1961, the year of our
first meeting. United States exports to
Japan have also increased substantially al-
though at a slower rate. The trade balance
in our favor has diminished steadily, until
this year we expect our trade to be in close
balance at levels in the neighborhood of $2
billion each way. These are truly impressive
figures.
During the years this Committee has been
meeting, both countries have enjoyed vigor-
ous economic growth. We are both much
wealthier and stronger than we were only 4
years ago, and we can confidently look for-
ward to the continuance of this healthy eco-
nomic expansion. The United States is now
in the 53d month of steady upturn. This is
the longest peacetime advance in our his-
tory, and we expect it to continue. Japan has
experienced an economic expansion during
the past 15 years unparalleled in history for
a major industrial nation. Even though the
rate of growth has slowed somewhat, Japan
maintains rates of growth in gross national
product considerably above those which
other industrialized countries have been able
to achieve during periods of peak perform-
ance.
Considering its magnitude and diversity,
our economic relationship is remarkable for
its cordiality and evenness. While we are
major trading partners, we are also major
competitors over a broad front. A wide
variety of difficult problems is to be ex-
pected in the economic relationships of
242
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
virile, progressive, industrial nations. Com-
petition brings change within as vi^ell as be-
tvi^een national economies. As old problems
are solved, nevi^ ones emerge. Happily most
of the economic problems between Japan
and the United States have proved man-
ageable over time without too great a strain
on the fabric of our total relationship.
We have a full agenda for this meeting —
one which gives us the opportunity to dis-
cuss frankly and fully the current problems
in our economic relationship. However, we
must not let these bilateral problems ob-
scure our great mutual interest in expand-
ing trade and our common concern with
worldwide political and economic problems.
The United States and Japan share a con-
cern in the welfare of the countries of the
world which do not share our prosperity.
We have a mutual interest in the success of
the developing countries in modernizing their
economies. This broader interest is rooted in
our interest in increasing our trade but, more
importantly, in our vital concern for the
well-being of our fellow inhabitants of this
planet.
We share a particular responsibility to
the countries of Asia, especially to the coun-
tries of Southeast Asia which are affected
not only by chronic problems of poverty and
underdevelopment but by aggressive neigh-
bors. President Johnson has indicated the
depth of the American concern and commit-
ment, not only to the concept of the freedom
of these countries to choose their institutions
and guide their own destinies but to a bet-
terment of the way of life for all the peo-
ples of Asia.
The Joint Committee has proved to be an
effective instrument for expanding our
knowledge and understanding of each other.
This has in turn enhanced the Japanese-
American partnership in good will, friend-
ship, and prosperity. We look forward over
the next 3 days to further frank, wide-
ranging, and fruitful exchanges of views. I
am certain that this meeting will add luster
to the already solid accomplishments of this
Committee.
Remarks by Foreign Minister Shiina
Mr. Secretary, distinguished members of
the American Cabinet, gentlemen: On be-
half of the Japanese delegation, I wish to
express my sincere appreciation for your
warm words of welcome.
Our Joint Committee has met on three oc-
casions in the past, in Hakone, in Washing-
ton, and in Tokyo, and we have now returned
to Washington for our fourth meeting. Dur-
ing this time many important changes have
taken place in the political and economic sit-
uation in the world. With regard to eco-
nomic development in Japan, the first major
important steps toward the transition to an
open economy have been completed, as sym-
bolized by our promotion to an article 8
status under the IMF [International Mone-
tary Fund] and our accession to the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development]. At the same time we have
been taking increased responsibility in the
sphere of international economy, and par-
ticularly in relation to our Asian neighbors.
One of the notable facts of these years has
been that the trade and economic inter-
change between the United States and
Japan has steadily continued to develop into
a closely knit relationship of mutual cooper-
ation.
In our view, such a strengthened relation-
ship is characterized by two special fea-
tures.
First : Our interchange of materials, serv-
ices, and capital have constantly been on the
increase, and to take trade figures alone, our
bilateral trade amounting to $4 billion is
next only in size to the trade between the
United States and Canada. On the Ameri-
can side, U.S. exports to Japan last year
were twice U.S. exports to the United King-
dom and amounted to half the exports to
the six member countries of the EEC [Euro-
pean Economic Community] taken together
— ample evidence that our two countries have
come to be linked by the strong tie of inter-
dependence.
The second feature is that Japan and the
United States have strengthened the ties of
AUGUST 9, 1965
243
cooperation not only through finding solu-
tions to specific issues between our two
countries but also through jointly seeking
solutions to the broader economic questions
of international significance. In fact, as was
recognized in the joint communique issued
at the meeting of President Johnson and
Prime Minister Sato this January, there are
many diverse areas with respect to which
our two countries could and should cooper-
ate and coordinate policies, in addition to the
areas presenting problems of direct mutual
concern. I believe there is much room for
closer and better cooperation between our
two nations in such areas. Yet the progress
already made in Japan-U.S. cooperative
ties will lose its firm basis unless it is ac-
companied by constant and strenuous efforts
to bring about appropriate solutions to each
and every one of such problems as may arise
between our two countries.
At our first meeting at Hakone, the "equal
partnership" between our two countries was
emphasized. Today, 4 years later, this part-
nership has become so obvious a relation-
ship and is so taken for granted on both
sides that it is scarcely necessary to reiter-
ate or reemphasize. This change brought
about in the course of 4 years is direct
proof that the ties of close cooperation be-
tween our two countries have undergone a
very sound strengthening.
Half of the United States Cabinet mem-
bers seated across the table have partici-
pated in the Joint Committee since the first
meeting, while on this side, with the excep-
tion of Mr. Fujiyama [Aiichiro Fujiyama,
Director General of the Economic Planning
Agency], none of us has had experience of
previous attendance. As a matter of fact,
this conference is our first opportunity since
the formation of the new Japanese Cabinet
to tackle in earnest the various problems of
international import facing our country. This
being the case, we have all the more interest
and expectation with regard to the delibera-
tions of the current session.
It is our sincere hope that this meeting,
through frank exchange of views, will pro-
duce fruitful results and contribute to the
further consolidation of Japan-U.S. rela-
tions.
WHITE HOUSE LUNCHEON, JULY 14
White House press releases dated July 14
Remarks by President Johnson, Prepared Text^
This is a great pleasure — and a welcome
privilege — to welcome to this house in peace,
friendship, and a common purpose all of
you who have come from across the great
Pacific.
This is the fourth meeting of our two
Cabinets, and the second such meeting here
in Washington. For me it is a meeting to
which I have looked forward since the con-
structive and productive meeting earlier this
year with your Prime Minister. I was most
impressed with him at that time, and it con-
firms my estimate to know that he is able to
conduct the affairs of your Government
with so many members of his Cabinet so far
from his side today.
Your presence here in Washington is a
tribute to the importance which both you
and we attach to the close friendship be-
tween Japan and the United States. These
sessions between the Cabinet officers of our
two countries are without precedent or paral-
lel, and we can be very proud of them.
Such meetings reflect to the world the im-
portance our Governments and our peoples
attach to our continuing ties as great nations
of the free world.
Destiny has placed before us both great
opportunities, responsibilities, and chal-
lenges. Together we shall meet them with
enthusiasm, with courage, and, I am confi-
dent, with success.
On this day, when the genius of man has
been able to probe the far distant planet of
Mars, I am privileged to pledge my country
anew to explore with vigor and imagination
the pressing problems which confront us
here on earth.
' Not delivered because of the death of Ambassador
Adlai E. Stevenson.
244
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
As Pacific countries, we have different
assets and — in terms of narrow economics —
some different interests. But we share the
common purpose of contributing to the
peace and prosperity of that part of the
world.
Mankind as a whole faces a great chal-
lenge in finding ways to restore and main-
tain peace in Southeast Asia. We know that
merely yearning for peace will not bring it
about. An international effort enlisting com-
mitments from peoples in the area — and all
the nations interested in peace in the area —
is needed to assure progress within that
great region. I am confident that if Japan
and the United States can share their wis-
dom— and share their endeavors side by
side — we can contribute greatly to the reali-
zation of this noble purpose.
We in the United States welcome your
thoughts, your initiatives, and your coopera-
tion in seeking objectives which are not only
in our mutual interest but in the interests
of peoples everywhere.
In particular, I believe that our two great
countries should together strive, first, to en-
gage a broad range of developed countries
in the task of promoting the economic de-
velopment of Southeast Asia, to strengthen
the foundation for stability there and for
world peace everywhere.
Secondly, I believe our two countries
should together strive to help foster regional
cooperation and a sense of common interest
in the economic field.
Finally, I believe we should strive to per-
suade all countries in the area, especially
those which are now committed to encourag-
ing or supporting aggressive wars of na-
tional liberation, that their own patriotic
self-interests would be better served by par-
ticipating with others in peaceful economic
development.
The basic conflict of our times is not over
economic ideas or between economic sys-
tems. We do not believe any one people — or
any one nation — stand as the sole possessors
of all the truth. We do believe, however, that
men and nations must have the right to de-
velop their own systems and their own so-
cieties without fear of neighbors and with-
out a return to the dangers and perils of the
past.
To end aggression as an instrument of
national policy would bring great opportu-
nities for progress and better welfare to un-
happy millions throughout all of Asia. That
is our goal in the United States — and our
only goal.
Between us, in your country and in ours,
we have mutual problems and mutual con-
cerns. But much more important are our
great mutual opportunities. Let us hope that
this meeting serves well the common pur-
poses which we share together as we look to
a broader, better, more peaceful horizon for
ourselves and for all mankind.
Now may I ask you to join with me in a
toast to the sovereign whose distinguished
Cabinet Ministers we proudly and warmly
welcome today. Ladies and gentlemen. His
Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Japan.
Remarks by President Johnson, As-Delivered Text
Distinguished guests, gentlemen: We are
deeply grateful for the time that the minis-
ters of the Cabinet of Japan have given to
this visit to our country. We have found our
discussions to be both pleasant and pro-
ductive.
It seems that it is very difficult to avoid
some tragedy in meetings of this kind, be-
cause I remember almost 20 months ago
when members of the American Cabinet were
en route to Tokyo for discussions that we first
learned of the death of our beloved President
John Fitzgerald Kennedy.
A few moments before this luncheon be-
gan today, I received word that the great and
good man, Adlai Stevenson, had died in
London.
Of course, my immediate reaction was to
cancel this luncheon meeting, but after talk-
ing to some of the members of my own Cabi-
net and some of his friends, they all real-
ized that Adlai Stevenson would not have had
us do any such thing. He would want us to
continue because he was first, and he was
AUGUST 9, 1965
245
foremost, concerned that the works of peace
and the works of progress and, most im-
portant, the works of understanding, which
have prevailed and predominated throughout
this meeting, must go on.
So this, then, is our legacy from Adlai
Stevenson — a charge to continue the quest
for a decent world, for a better world order,
for a life for man that is free of war and
destruction and the oppression of his spirit.
So this is our pledge to the memory of
this great man who is really, as all of you
here know, a true citizen of the world — a
pledge to devote our energies and our tal-
ents and our resources and our wills to the
cause for which he died.
We realize that America lost its foremost
advocate and its most eloquent spirit and one
of its finest voices for peace in the world.
The world of freedom has lost, I think, per-
haps its most dedicated champion.
So I would like to ask each of you to stand
with me in a moment of silent tribute to this
great lover of peace, this great statesman,
Adlai E. Stevenson.
Remarks by Foreign Minister Shiina
Mr. President, Your Excellencies: I am
deeply grieved to hear of the passing of a
truly great American, Ambassador Steven-
son. It was last December that I had the
privilege of meeting him for the first time
at the United Nations when I attended the
General Assembly meeting. His life, I be-
lieve, symbolizes the conscience of humanity
upon which the United Nations is built. He
will be deeply missed by all those who
seek peace. Let me express my heartfelt
sympathy and condolence to the remaining
members of his family and to the people of
the United States.
We are greatly pleased to be honored in
this way, to be accorded the privilege of
meeting and talking with you at this lunch-
eon, and I should like to thank you very
much for the words that you have spoken. I
am reminded that at the beginning of this
year, I and Mr. [Takeo] Miki, who is here
with us today as our Minister of Interna-
tional Trade and Industry, had the honor to
be present on the occasion of Prime Minis-
ter Sato's visit to you.
One of my favorite expressions in classical
Chinese, if I may attempt to translate it, is :
"To the same pole, but by a different route."
It suggests the fact that it is entirely nat-
ural for two countries with such different
historical and geographical background to
pursue their respective national interests in
a different manner, but it suggests also that
we ultimately seek the common goal of
world peace and prosperity.
This is the most natural mode of coopera-
tion between our two countries and is the
basis of a permanent and positive relation-
ship. The results of the conversations be-
tween you, Mr. President, and Prime Minis-
ter Sato have been welcomed in Japan with
nationwide support and have been regarded
as a demonstration that the relations be-
tween our countries have entered an era of
cooperation on a higher plane in the way I
have just tried to suggest, and, to borrow
Secretary Rusk's expression at the time of
those talks, that we have entered into a "new
chapter" of our relationship.
Since the beginning of this year we have
witnessed various developments in the inter-
national scene, mainly in Asia. In certain
areas the efforts we have directed toward
achieving freedom, peace, and prosperity in
Asia are producing fortunate results, and
they appear to be opening the way for new
developments conducive to future advance.
However, the general situation in Asia
seems to be one of persistent tension and
strain and is growing more serious with
each day. In such a continually changing in-
ternational scene the close cooperation be-
tween our two countries serves a very signif-
icant role in sustaining a measure of inter-
national stability and prosperity.
This joint United States- Japan Committee
on Trade and Economic Affairs, attended by
Cabinet members of both Governments and
allowing a frank exchange of views to take
place, is a unique arrangement which sym-
bolizes our close and cordial ties. Our present
session has nearly been completed, and we
believe that this fourth meeting has been as
246
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
productive as the past three meetings. I am
confident that this session has not only
served to create a better and deeper under-
standing of the problems we face in our re-
spective countries but has contributed also
to the promotion of peace and progress
throughout the world.
Thank you.
JOINT COMMUNIQUE
Press release 175 dated July 14
I
The Fourth Meeting of the Joint United States-
Japan Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs
was held in Washington on July 12, 13, and 14,
1965 under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of
State, Dean Rusk. The meeting was the forum for
a major review of trade and economic relations be-
tween the two countries, not only from a bilateral
point of view, but also from a global perspective.
The Committee recognized that the continuing
strength of the Japanese and United States econo-
mies made possible closer and more effective collabo-
ration between the two countries in meeting their
wider responsibilities in the world economy. The
Committee affirmed the importance of fostering the
growth and welfare of developing countries and gave
special attention to countries in Asia. The Com-
mittee first reviewed the general world situation
in recognition of its importance for the trade and
economic relations between Japan and the United
States.
II
The discussions covered a wide range of trade
and economic affairs and understanding was reached
on many points including the following:
1. The Committee noted with satisfaction the long
sustained expansion in the U.S. economy and pros-
pects for its continuance. It again recognized the
remarkable growth record of Japan and, while not-
ing that Japan is going through a readjustment
period, expressed confidence in the steady growth of
its economy. As in previous meetings, the Commit-
tee emphasized the need for further exchange of in-
formation between the two Governments on their
major economic problems and policies.
2. The Committee welcomed favorable develop-
ments in the balance of payments situation of both
Japan and the United States but noted both coun-
tries still face problems in their external accounts.
The United States delegation, noting the limited
Interest Equalization Tax exemption,' assured the
Japanese delegation that the U.S. will continue to
give full consideration to Japan's financial prob-
lems. The Japanese delegation stated its willingness
to support, whenever possible, the efforts of the
United States to restore balance of payments equilib-
rium.
3. The Committee noted with satisfaction the
gratifying increase in the trade between the two
countries which may exceed $4 billion in 1965. The
Committee recognized that with a growing volume
and diversity of trade, problems are bound to arise
for both countries. Both delegations had a frank
exchange of views on some of the pending problems
in this field, such as the problems of United States-
Japan textile trade. The Committee observed that
generally expanding trade, growing economic activ-
ity and rising living standards, and greater recipro-
cal understanding by governments, industry and
labor can contribute to the solution of trade problems.
4. The U.S. delegation noted that United States
policy encourages a free flow of Japanese private
investment which contributes to an expansion of
trade, economic growth, and higher living standards
through more efficient use of capital and technology,
and then referred to the difficulties facing Ameri-
can enterprises desiring to set up or expand their
industries and businesses in Japan. The Japanese
delegation, while stating its basic attitude of welcom-
ing sound foreign investment, cited adverse effects
on the Japanese economy which could be produced
by large and sudden inflow of foreign investment.
The Committee agreed on the desirability of facili-
tating sound direct investment between the two
countries in an orderly and mutually beneficial man-
ner.
5. The delegations took note of the progress made
in recent informal talks concerning the Civil Avia-
tion Agreement and look towards a formal negotia-
tion commencing in Tokyo on August 10.
6. The Committee also discussed matters relating
to the North Pacific Fisheries Convention. It re-
called with satisfaction that the two Governments
reached an interim agreement on the East Bering
Sea king crab question in November 1964,° making
another step forward in solving problems between
the two countries. It was agreed that, for the pur-
poses of an early resumption of the recessed nego-
tiations, each side should make the preparations
needed to create an atmosphere which would ensure
reaching an agreement based on recognition of the
legitimate interests of the United States, Japan and
Canada.
Ill
The importance of close cooperation between Japan
and the United States in international economic af-
fairs was emphasized.
' For text of an Executive order, see Bxilletin
of May 3, 1965, p. 667.
" For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964,
p. 892.
AUGUST 9, 1965
247
1. The Committee recognized the vital importance
to both countries of the success of the Kennedy
Round of Tariff Negotiations at Geneva for the re-
duction of tariffs and non-tariff barriers which re-
strict trade. Both delegations welcomed the progress
made so far in the negotiations and expressed the
hope that these could proceed according to schedule
and lead to an early successful conclusion in support
of expanded world trade.
2. The two delegations explained the basic policies
of their respective Governments on trade with the
Communist countries. Japan's policy is based on the
principle of separating the political and economic
aspects of Japan's relations with the countries of
the Communist Bloc. The United States delegation
explained the reasons for having no economic rela-
tions with Communist China, North Korea or North
Viet-Nam, its economic embargo of Cuba and its
opposition to long term credits to the Communist
Bloc. It pointed out that United States trade in non-
strategic items with the countries of Eastern Europe
and the U.S.S.R. has been under intense review as a
means of enabling the United States to develop addi-
tional avenues of communication and contact with
these countries.
3. The Committee recognized the significance of the
United Nations Conference on Trade and Develop-
ment Es a forum for systematic consideration of
the trade problems of the developing countries. The
two delegations confirmed their Governments' inten-
tions to cooperate in seeking constructive solutions to
the problems of these countries.
4. The Committee noted with satisfaction that
during the first year of Japan's participation in the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment, it played an increasingly active and re-
sponsible role in that organization.
5. The Committee agreed on the importance of as-
suring that supplies of international liquidity over
the long-term are adequate to support increasing
world trade and investment. It noted that as the
United States approaches balance in its external ac-
counts, the world will need to consider and prepare
for improvements in world monetary arrangements
to assure that sources of liquidity will be made avail-
able as may be necessary.
IV
The Committee noted with satisfaction the in-
creasingly close cooperation between the two coun-
tries in economic assistance to the developing coun-
tries. The delegations also discussed the problem
of creating and utilizing resources to meet the de-
velopment requirements of the developing countries.
The Committee agreed that the implementation of
the Southeast Asia assistance offer which President
Johnson made in April this year " and to which Prime
Minister Sato promptly gave support would be a
major contribution to social and economic progress
in the countries of Southeast Asia. Both delegations
welcomed progress being made in creating an Asia
Development Bank, and saw great promise in its
operations. The delegations agreed that Japan and
the United States must in their assistance pro-
grams, work closely with other countries to develop
needed arrangements able to maximize the effective-
ness of the resources made available for the growth
and development of the area. The delegations hoped
for further Asian initiatives which would make
possible improvement of human welfare, give im-
petus to economic growth, and lead to an environ-
ment where the many countries of the area with their
diverse economies and varying levels of development
could live in peace together.
1. Both delegations expressed satisfaction with the
United States-Japan exchange programs for trade-
union and vocational training experts, in view of
their significant contributions to friendship and un-
derstanding of the two peoples.
2. The Committee received the report of the United
States-Japan Conference on Development and Utili-
zation of Natural Resources. The Committee en-
dorsed the conclusion of the Conference that the
exchange activities have helped significantly in pro-
moting understanding between Japanese and Ameri-
can specialists and their agencies concerned with na-
tural resources problems and that it is worthwhile
to continue the program as a whole at about the pres-
ent level of effort.
VI
The Committee agreed that the Fourth Meeting
of the Joint Committee had made a meaningful
contribution to the strengthening of relations be-
tween the two countries. Both delegations looked
forward to an exchange of views at the next meet-
ing in Tokyo.
VII
The United States was represented by Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State; Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of
the Treasury; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary of the
Interior; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary of Agri-
culture; John T. Connor, Secretary of Commerce;
W. Willard Wirtz, Secretary of Labor; and Gardner
Ackley, Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visors. Edwin 0. Reischauer, United States Am-
bassador to Japan, William M. Roth, Acting Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations, David E.
Bell, Administrator, Agency for International De-
velopment, and senior advisers from the various
departments concerned also were present.
Japan was represented by Etsusaburo Shiina,
Minister of Foreign Affairs ; Takeo Fukuda, Minister
" For an address made by President Johnson at
Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see ibid., Apr.
26, 1965, p. 606.
248
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of Finance; Eiichi Sakata, Minister of Agriculture
and Forestry; Takeo Miki, Minister of International
Trade and Industry; Hisao Kodaira, Minister of
Labor; Torata Nakamura, Minister of Transporta-
tion; and Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director General of
the Economic Planning Agency. Ryuji Takeuchi,
Japanese Ambassador to the United States, as well
as Nobuhiko Ushiba, Deputy Vice Minister for For-
eign Affairs, and other advisers from the various
ministries concerned, also were present.
World Trade and the Kennedy Round
by W. Michael Blumenthal
Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^
The Kennedy Round is the most ambitious
effort to liberalize world trade ever under-
taken. All the world's trading nations stand
to gain from the success of this effort. And
yet these negotiations involve much more
than trade and economics. They are a unique
and singular opportunity to give added
strength, vitality, and meaning to the politi-
cal as well as economic ties that unite Eu-
rope, North America, and the other trading
nations of the world.
President Johnson expressed this idea re-
cently when he said : ^
We in the United States look upon these nego-
tiations as an important opening to a better world.
If we act together with dedication and purpose, all
can gain and none need lose. Not only the major
commercial nations, but all the countries of this
shrinking world — poor and rich alike — have the right
to expect success from our endeavors.
The importance of the Kennedy Round is
widely recognized in many parts of the
world and among a large number of coun-
tries negotiating in Geneva. This is partic-
ularly true here in the Federal Republic. No
one is a greater champion of liberal trade
policies than Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard,
' Address made at the Dusseldorf Chamber of
Commerce and Industry, Dusseldorf, Germany, on
July 15.
"Bulletin of June 1, 1964, p. 878.
who as Minister of Economics participated
in the first ministerial meeting in May of
1963.3 He can justly be called one of the
fathers of the negotiations.
President [Walter] Hallstein of the Eu-
ropean Economic Community also has given
the Kennedy Round high priority. He has
characterized the negotiations as ". . . prob-
ably the most important thing that has ever
occurred in the foreign relations of our Com-
munity." Only recently the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) ministers meet-
ing in Vienna again emphasized their view
that the success of the negotiations is of
vital importance to all the member countries
of EFTA. One could go on in a similar vein
quoting leading statesmen in important
world trading countries, whether from the
European Economic Community (EEC),
Canada, Japan, or from many of the develop-
ing nations of the world.
There is, therefore, a remarkable degree of
unanimity that the Kennedy Round is im-
portant and that it is in the common inter-
est of all nations to have the talks succeed.
And there is a firm shared commitment
among all the principal nations involved to
translate the objectives of the Kennedy
Round into concrete reality.
When Heinrich Heine was asked why, in
' For background, see ibid., June 24, 1963, p. 990.
AUGUST 9, 1965
249
his time, they no longer built cathedrals like
the one at Amiens, he replied, ". . . men in
those days had convictions, the moderns
have opinions and it requires something
more than an opinion to build a Gothic
cathedral."
There is both opinion and conviction that
the Kennedy Round should succeed.
Why is this so? Why the common com-
mitment to leave no stone unturned to make
the negotiations succeed? Why the great ef-
fort and expense expended in Geneva for so
long?
Is the Kennedy Round merely another —
the sixth in fact — in a continuing series of
tariff talks conducted under the GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
since the end of the war? Or does this par-
ticular negotiation differ from others?
What is our joint stake in the success or
failure of this effort?
What are the basic principles underlying
the Kennedy Round? What are the condi-
tions, traditions, and framework of interna-
tional trade which we are trying to preserve,
perfect, and adapt?
What has been accomplished in the trade
negotiations thus far? Why has it taken us
so long to get to the present stage of our
negotiations? Has our progress been satis-
factory?
The Kennedy Round has now been under-
way for 2 years. The negotiations will be
entering their vital phase this fall, when the
preparations and preliminaries will have
been completed and the offers tabled, clari-
fied, and discussed. Countries will have to
be ready to make important decisions. In
other words, we will soon be moving toward
the stage in the negotiations which will de-
termine their success or their failure.
With the August recess in sight, this is
an opportune moment to answer these ques-
tions, to take stock, to review where we
stand, and to look frankly at where we are
going and what problems lie ahead.
For some of you, as leaders of German in-
dustry, certain aspects of this review may be
familiar. But perhaps some of the thoughts
which I shall express today may be new and,
hopefully, provide useful material for fruit-
ful discussion and for illumination of the
task still ahead of us.
Importance of Negotiations
What is the Kennedy Round ?
Simply stated, it is the most ambitious
undertaking of the postwar period to reduce
all kinds of barriers that hamper interna-
tional trade. The goal is to halve tariffs
wherever possible and, at the same time, to
attack nontariff barriers. Virtually all prod-
ucts entering world trade — agricultural and
industrial, raw materials, and manufac-
tured goods — are included in this effort.
What does this mean to the European busi-
nessman in Germany, in France, in Italy,
and elsewhere ?
In the first instance, the negotiations are
concerned with access to world markets. We
are negotiating on the conditions of ac-
cess to a rapidly growing American market.
The gross national product of the United
States last year exceeded the $600 billion
mark and is expected to reach $1,000 billion
by about 1975. In 1963 our trading partners
found markets for $17 billion of their ex-
ports in the United States. This figure has
been rising steadily. If we cut American
trade barriers in half, how will this affect
opportunities for exporting to the United
States ? Similarly at stake are the markets of
Japan with present imports of over $5 bil-
lion and of Britain and the rest of EFTA
with a sum total of imports of about $24
billion — $8 billion from the EEC alone. And,
of course, there is the market of the Euro-
pean Economic Community, with imports
from third countries running at $24 billion.
But much more is involved in the Kennedy
Round than even these imposing trade sta-
tistics imply — more is involved economically
and politically — for these negotiations occur
at a particularly important moment in world
history, when a number of far-reaching de-
velopments are underway.
In particular :
250
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The European Economic Community is es-
tablishing the pattern of its world trading
relationships. This is a most significant as-
pect of the Community's participation in the
Kennedy Round both as an exporter and as
an importer, for the extent to which the
Kennedy Round succeeds in lowering world
trade barriers must necessarily be heavily in-
fluenced by the actions of the world's larg-
est trading unit — the European Economic
Community. The Community has a great in-
terest in the development of world trade,
and it has a responsibility to contribute to
this development — a responsibility explicitly
recognized in article 110 of the Treaty of
Rome.
The negotiations also occur at a moment
when the nations of the European Free
Trade Association are moving toward full
implementation of their trading arrange-
ments. A successful Kennedy Round can
greatly facilitate the harmonious expansion
of trade between the EFTA countries and
other nations, not least the Community.
The developing nations are now justly
pressing for action to improve the expansion
of their exports and export earnings as a
part of their economic development efforts.
As with so many of the world's problems
and pressures, the trade aspirations of the
developing nations can — with foresight and
effort — be dealt with constructively. Other-
wise less constructive solutions will inevita-
bly be forced upon us.
Finally, there are other countries, includ-
ing some in Eastern Europe, now seeking
to expand their commerce and to fit into a
wider pattern of international trade. Some
of these see in the Kennedy Round one
means of achieving this objective.
The outcome of the Kennedy Round may
well set the tone for the conduct of world
trade for many years to come. For a number
of reasons, some accidental, these negotia-
tions may greatly influence our longrun
commercial, economic, and, in part, also
political relations. That is why the stakes
are high; that is why so many nations are
determined that these negotiations shall
succeed.
The importance of the Kennedy Round
can, perhaps, be summarized by two proposi-
tions :
First, the outcome of the negotiations will
have a major, and perhaps decisive, influ-
ence on the conduct of world trade. A suc-
cessful Kennedy Round will strengthen and
extend the pattern of liberal, multilateral
trade based on comparative advantage and
nondiscrimination — that is, the principle of
most-favored-nation treatment. It is not an
exaggeration to say that this framework of
liberal, multilateral trade has provided an
indispensable foundation for the economic
growth and prosperity which the major in-
dustrialized countries have now enjoyed for
almost two decades. On the other hand, if
we are not successful in the Kennedy Round,
it would be naive to expect our trading pat-
terns— and the dynamism of our national
economies — to be unaffected. If we should
fall in the Kennedy Round, we would risk
sliding back into restrictionism and bilater-
alism. This, history should have taught us to
avoid.
The second proposition is a corollary of the
first. While the outcome of the Kennedy
Round — for better or worse — will have broad
economic and political significance for all of
us, it can also have a major direct impact
on the future markets and profits of indi-
vidual firms and industries. The more ex-
tensive and comprehensive the reductions
of trade barriers which emerge from the
Kennedy Round, the greater the new mar-
kets for us all to share. Conversely, to the
extent we fall short of this goal, potential
markets will not develop; and restrictive
solutions to pressing immediate problems
may threaten existing markets.
Businessmen in all countries — and partic-
ularly those interested in export markets —
would do well, therefore, to pay close atten-
tion to the conduct of the negotiations over
the coming months. We in the United States
have established procedures through which
businessmen and the Government can con-
duct a useful exchange of views and infor-
mation on Kennedy Round matters. I assume
that business leaders here in the Federal Re-
AUGUST 9, 1965
251
public as well as in other countries maintain
similar contact with their negotiators.
Principle of Universality
Every multilateral negotiation must have
ground rules to set the framework and pro-
vide the guidelines for the conduct of the
talks and for the nature of the commitments
being discussed. The Kennedy Round is no
exception. We are guided by certain princi-
ples— some established GATT rules or nego-
tiating traditions of long standing, others
quite new and far-reaching. Their mean-
ing for the success of the Kennedy Round and
for the shape of the world trade relations
may be considerable. I should like to recall
four of these fundamental principles today —
four principles which seem to me among the
most important for they show the direction
in which we must move in the solution of our
remaining problems.
The first basic principle of the Kennedy
Round negotiation is its universality. All
trade is included in the talks. Our effort to
reduce trade barriers applies to all products,
agricultural and nonagricultural, manufac-
tured, semimanufactured, and raw mate-
rials. Exceptions must remain at a bare
minimum. No sectors or industries where
export markets of participants are at stake
should be left out. This is the letter and the
spirit of one of the key decisions taken by
GATT ministers in May 1963.
The principle of universality, and the
ministerial decisions to this effect, are clear
and straightforward; but as negotiators we
have not always found this an easy rule to
implement in practice. Yet we in the United
States are more than ever convinced, as we
hope you are, that here lies one of the keys
to the success or failure of the Kennedy
Round.
This is so because practically every omis-
sion of a product or industry or sector of
trade from real trade liberalization vitally
affects one negotiating partner or another
having important export interests in these
areas. This leads to their removing other
products from the negotiations — products
which they import — so as to square the
balance or they may even drop out of the
negotiations altogether. Once the principle
of universality is violated, therefore, we
can no longer be sure that a large number
of countries can participate effectively in
the talks or that a sufficient balance of advan-
tages involving deep reciprocal reductions of
trade barriers can be established by the vari-
ous participants. For an undertaking as far-
reaching and ambitious as the Kennedy
Round, it is essential that the widest number
of countries participate. Only in this way
can the objectives of this negotiation be
achieved.
Lest it be felt that this emphasis on the
universality of coverage of the negotiations
is belaboring an obvious point, let me assure
you that this is not so. We have already
had evidence of recurrent temptations to
overlook this principle. Each country, after
all, has some difficult areas which it would
just as soon not subject to a real reduction
of trade barriers. For some countries, for
example, effective liberalization of agricul-
tural trade may be difficult. Yet it is clear
that the omission of even a few major agri-
cultural product groups would, in most cases,
have a serious impact on countries export-
ing these commodities. For many, the major
benefits of the negotiations will flow pre-
cisely from the degree of liberalization
achieved in agriculture. Australia, New Zea-
land, Argentina, and Denmark fall into this
category. Others, like the United States
with more than $6 billion in agricultural
exports amounting to a quarter of our total
exports, could hardly be content with a ne-
gotiation which failed to make progress in
the key agricultural commodities — for trade
negotiations and the exchange of conces-
sions cannot be confined into neat and dis-
tinct compartments.
The economy of the Federal Republic, as
you are well aware, requires export markets.
German exports, which are primarily in-
dustrial goods, comprise about 15 percent of
your gross national product. Yet here in the
great industrial center of the Ruhr, you
must also be interested in agricultural
trade liberalization as one of the keys to
success of the industrial negotiation. Un-
252
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
less we work to resolve our agricultural as
well as our industrial trade problems, the
impact on industrial trade will be inevitable.
I have but to mention one case, a situation
which I sincerely hope will be the last of
its kind — the fate which has befallen ex-
ports of American broilers to the Com-
munity and trucks to the United States.
Restriction breeds counterrestrictionism
in other fields. Hence, trade liberalization in
agriculture and industry must go hand in
hand. It is equally important, of course,
that all parts of the industrial sector be in-
cluded in the talks, apart from making cer-
tain minimum exceptions of individual prod-
ucts. Each country has certain industries or
sectors in which trade liberalization presents
particular problems. If we exclude from real
liberalization, say, steel, to please one coun-
try, or chemicals because they are a problem
for another country, or textiles to accom-
modate a third, the effects would be felt
well beyond any one sector of trade. Ex-
porters of these commodities would be
obliged to scale down their own offers to
bring them in line with the reduced op-
portunities for their exports in other mar-
kets. We must conclude, therefore, that the
ministers were wise to establish the principle
of the all-inclusiveness — of the universality
— of the negotiations, even though imple-
mentation of this principle requires great
effort and courage.
Let me emphasize also that the inclusion
of all trade, of course, means inclusion for
the purpose of genuine reductions of pres-
ently existing trade barriers. Offering the-
oretical rather than real rates of protection
for cuts has little value to exporters who
look for real reductions of presently exist-
ing rates of protection or of trade barriers
actually in effect.
Global Reciprocity
A second principle of importance is the
concept of global reciprocity. What does it
mean? In general terms, global reciprocity
means that a country cannot be expected
to extend to its trading partners as a
group a package of trade-liberalizing con-
cessions which it regards as more valuable
than the package of concessions it receives.
More specifically, it means the following:
A country is expected to give only as much
in concessions as it will receive. No major
participant is expected to make a greater
effort or deeper or more sweeping reduction
than any other major participant.
This would appear at first glance to be a
rather simple concept, almost a self-evident
one. Yet its implications are considerable,
and almost no week goes by when we do not
have to reflect on them in our discussions
in Geneva. For example, if the EEC asks
the United States for some particular con-
cession— in the nontariff barrier field, for
example — we are entitled to ask, "What will
you give us in return?" I should add that
nontariff barriers are a rather fruitful
field in this regard. It has become clear
from our discussions so far that all of us
are quite experienced constructors of non-
tariff barriers.
Reciprocity must be global. It must apply
to the final package as a whole. Balance
does not have to be established for each
sector or part of trade. In other words, a
country may well provide greater benefits
in one area as long as it receives offsetting
benefits in another area and the total pack-
age is an equal one. Failure to respect the
global character of reciprocity would mean
that concessions in each sector would have to
be perfectly balanced, thus reducing the
level of all concessions to the lowest common
denominator — ^to the slowest ship in the con-
voy.
Reciprocity must not only be global as
between products but between countries as
well. In other words, it must be measured
among the sum total of all countries par-
ticipating in the Kennedy Round. We do not
need to work for a bilateral balance be-
tween any two countries. This, too, is de-
signed to maximize the sum total of con-
cessions exchanged in the Kennedy Round.
Such multilateral reciprocity, of course, is
a logical concomitant of the multilateral
nature of international trade itself. Here,
however, a qualification is in order. While
bilateral balancing is to be avoided, it is
AUGUST 9, 196B
253
clear that the major participants in the
talks — I am referring principally to the
Community, Britain, Japan, and the United
States — ^must make roughly equivalent ef-
forts. No doubt you would not find it
easy to offer trade concessions of greater
importance than those agreed to by the
United States. We would find ourselves in
a similar position. This, of course, has
a direct relevance to the size of the excep-
tions lists of the key countries: In the end,
each one of the major negotiating partners
will adjust his list to make sure that the
importance of its concessions is substan-
tially equivalent to those of the other major
trading countries. That is why it is so im-
portant that all of us seek to reduce our
lists to a bare minimum.
Provisions for Developing Countries
The third general principle of the ne-
gotiations is an entirely new one, intro-
duced into GATT trade negotiations for the
first time. I am referring to the decision
that the requirement of full reciprocity is
to apply to the developed countries only.
This concept of less than full reciprocity
for developing countries breaks new ground.
It embodies the recognition that no de-
veloping nation should have to make re-
ductions in its trade barriers which are in-
consistent with its development efforts,
while welcoming and, in fact, encouraging
the fullest possible participation of such
countries in the negotiations. This principle
permits developing nations to be full par-
ticipants and to negotiate for maximum
benefits for their export trade while making
their own contributions in accordance with
their particular needs and stage of de-
velopment. It is by this means — and by
making every effort to keep off our ex-
ceptions lists the products of special interest
to the developing nations — that we hope to
implement our important objective of mak-
ing the Kennedy Round a real factor in
promoting the trade objectives of the many
new and growing nations in Africa, Asia,
and Latin America.
Most-Favored-Nation Principle
This leads to the fourth and in many
ways the most important general principle
underlying the negotiations. As I mentioned
a few moments ago, one of our main stakes
in the Kennedy Round is the strengthening
and extension of the pattern of liberal, multi-
lateral trade relations based on the most-
favored-nation (MFN) principle. MFN — the
concept that a concession to one nation is a
concession to all and that, for a given prod-
uct, all GATT countries have the right to
be accorded the same treatment by im-
porters— is the bedrock on which the present
highly beneficial structure of world trade
has been built. Stated inversely, MFN means
nondiscrimination. We must not underesti-
mate the importance and the value of this
principle.
All the major industrialized countries are
under pressures of various sorts, or have
been tempted at one time or another, to
depart from MFN in this or that area. We
must resist this temptation. We must be
particularly careful not to vitiate the MFN
principle in our search for expedient solu-
tions to immediate problems.
There has been considerable discussion of
departing in one way or another from MFN
in an effort to improve the export oppor-
tunities of developing countries. The issue
of tariff preferences for developing coun-
tries raises the question of whether the
MFN principle should apply to this trade.
While this is not the forum in which to
discuss this matter in detail, I would like
to make a brief comment. The more na-
tions depart from the concept that trade
should be conducted on the basis of com-
parative advantage, the more we risk this
trade being stifled and distorted by in-
creasingly political rather than economic de-
termination of trade patterns. Moreover, the
actual trade benefits from preferences seem
highly questionable. If a developing country
is an efficient producer of a particular
product, it may have much to gain from
lower trade barriers but no need for pref-
erential treatment. If a developing country
is not an efficient producer, tariff pref-
254
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
erences may not help it compete with the
domestic industry in the import market,
particularly where the latter is a large
industrialized one. And this is by no means
a complete case against preferences. My
purpose, however, is merely to point out
that in my view preferences appear to be
neither a politically nor economically justi-
fiable departure from MFN.
If we fail in the Kennedy Round to
strengthen the pattern of liberal multi-
lateral trade through the significant re-
duction of trade barriers on an MFN basis,
we risk slippage of trade relations more
and more into a restrictive mold. The MFN
system is founded on an underlying common
interest in the expansion of trade which we
must have the wisdom, determination, and
patience to protect and perfect.
These, then, are what seem to me to be
the four key principles on which the Ken-
nedy Round is based. Universality: The ne-
gotiations involve all products, all coun-
tries are welcome to participate. And, of
course, the inclusion of the broad range of
world trade in these talks is for the purpose
of a genuine and extensive reduction in the
obstacles to trade. Global reciprocity : World
trade is multilateral and is based on com-
parative advantage. Narrow balancing of
concessions between specific products or
individual countries is, therefore, inconsist-
ent with the essential structure of world
trade. Special provisions for the developing
countries: These nations can contribute to
world trade while spurring their own de-
velopment. Their actions in the field of com-
mercial policy must be consistent with their
development needs. And, finally, of course,
MFN: The most-favored-nation principle
must remain the foundation of our trade
relations.
Progress in the Kennedy Round
As I have already pointed out, these
principles have not proven easy to imple-
ment in Geneva. An outside observer may
have gained the impression from occasional
press reports that the Kennedy Round was
witnessing much maneuvering but little
progress. In fact, this has not been true. We
have made very important progress.
Let me be specific.
— We have worked out a new formula for
worldwide tariff reductions — the linear cut.
The depth of the linear cut for all indus-
trial goods was set at 50 percent.
— The major trading nations tabled un-
precedented offers for tariff cuts in in-
dustrial products last November. While we
must work to reduce exceptions to this
linear offer, we have reason to be pleased
with the importance of the offers which
have been made.
— Procedures for the participation of the
developing countries based on the concept
of less than full reciprocity have been agreed.
These countries are now actively engaged in
the negotiations in Geneva.
— In agriculture, a method for negotia-
tion by specific groups of commodities has
been worked out. Concrete offers were made
on grains, and negotiations on these offers
now have begun.
— For other agricultural products, pre-
liminary negotiations have been completed;
and offers are expected to be tabled in
Geneva in the early fall.
— Negotiations are underway on a number
of nontariff barriers.
How much longer will the Kennedy Round
go on before it can be brought to a suc-
cessful conclusion ?
Much detailed and arduous work has al-
ready been done, but much remains — es-
pecially in the agricultural area. Neverthe-
less, the outlines of a final package should
begin to emerge by next winter. And during
the year of 1966 we will have before us the
complex, often delicate, but tremendously
important task of shaping up a final Ken-
nedy Round agreement.
Courage, patience, and wisdom will be
needed in the months ahead — the courage
of our convictions, the patience to seek
meaningful solutions, and the wisdom to
move forward in the building of a world
community — for a successful Kennedy Round
is part of the stone and mortar of a better
free world.
AUGUST 9, 1965
255
Regulations on International
Traffic in Arms Revised
Press release 180 dated July 20
The Secretary of State has promulgated
a complete revision of the Department's
international traffic in arms regulations.^
These regulations, which were last revised
in 1960, implement the control vested in the
Secretary by delegation of the President
over the export and import of arms, ammu-
nition, and implements of war. The articles
subject to control are enumerated in the
regulations as the United States Munitions
List, which has the concurrence of the Sec-
retary of Defense.
The new regulations continue the control
long exercised by the Secretary of State and
most recently authorized by section 414 of
the Mutual Security Act of 1954, as
amended.
The more important changes in the regu-
lations include (1) addition of articles to
the United States Munitions List in reflec-
tion of both technical military developments
and policy requirements such as satellites,
spacecraft, launch vehicles, filament wind-
ing machines, experimental aircraft tech-
nology and componentry, missile and space
powerplants, guidance and control systems,
and special insurgency-type weaponry; (2)
clarification of certain areas of control such
as strategic delivery systems, implementa-
tion of the limited nuclear test ban treaty,
naval nuclear propulsion plants and asso-
ciated facilities, and classified military in-
formation; (3) simplification of munitions
control procedures such as elimination of
certain categories of articles in normal com-
mercial or sporting use, restricted defini-
tion of technical data, elimination of issu-
ance of registration certificates, ameliora-
tion of unclassified technical data control,
and inclusion of all .22-caliber weapons and
all military cargo-type aircraft.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
' For the revised text of Subchapter M, Chapter 1,
Title 22, of the Code of Federal Regulations, see 30
Fed. Reg. 9034.
Public Members Added to Teams
of Foreign Service Inspectors
Press release 181 dated July 24
The Department of State for the first
time is adding public members to the teams
of Foreign Service inspectors examining
its overseas activities and operations.
Eight two-man Foreign Service inspec-
tion teams traveling in Africa, Latin Amer-
ica, Europe, and the Near Eastern areas dur-
ing the third quarter of 1965 will each be
joined by a public member.
The private citizens will participate fully
in the inspection of the posts to be visited
by the teams. Six of the public members
have been in Washington for briefings and
orientation prior to moving on to their over-
seas assignments. The public members were
asked to serve in the program, which has
the approval of Secretary Rusk, Under Secre-
tary Ball, and Deputy Under Secretary for
Administration William J. Crockett.
The public members and their assign-
ments follow :
Jerome Keithley, who has served since
1950 as city manager of Palo Alto, Calif.,
will join Inspectors R. Burr Smith and Ken-
neth W. Calloway for the inspections of posts
in Portugal and Switzerland.
Charles D. Lewis, assistant to the chair-
man and president of the American Suma-
tra Corporation in New York, will serve
with Inspectors Daniel M. Braddock and
Howard P. Mace in the inspections of posts
in India and Nepal.
Robert Payton, vice chancellor of Wash-
ington University in St. Louis, Mo., will join
Inspectors Thomas K. Wright and William
D. Calderhead for the inspections of posts in
Ecuador.
Adm. Elliott B. Strauss, USN retired, and
formerly director of AID programs in Tuni-
256
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
sia and the Malagasy Republic, will join In-
spectors W. Wendell Blancke and Mason A.
LaSelle for the inspections of posts in Israel
and Jerusalem.
William H. Figy, insurance company exec-
utive, of Denver, Colo., will join Inspectors
William Belton and Eldon B. Smith in the
inspections of posts in Norway, Finland,
and Sweden.
Robert M. Adams, Jr., formerly an offi-
cial of the United Aircraft Corp. in Hart-
ford, Conn., and now a management consul-
tant in Washington, will join Inspectors Al-
fred leS. Jenkins and Earle A. Cleveland in
their inspections of the posts in Jordan and
Syria.
Norbert Dengler, New York attorney, will
accompany Inspectors William C. Burdett
and Howard E. Chaille in the inspections of
the posts in Nicaragua and Honduras.
Dean Clowes, international affairs rep-
resentative of the United Steel Workers of
America in Washington, is scheduled to join
Inspectors Edward A. Jamison and Fred-
erick B. Cook for the inspections of the
posts in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (Leopoldville).
Federal District Judge Thaddeus M. Mach-
rowicz, of the Eastern District of Michigan,
had been invited to join the inspection
teams, but illness will prevent his participa-
tion as planned.
Confirmations
The Senate on July 21 confirmed the following
nominations :
David M. Bane to be Ambassador to the Gabon
Republic. (For biographic details, see White House
press release dated July 7.)
Edward Clark to be Ambassador to Australia.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease (Austin, Tex.) dated June 13.)
George J. Feldman to be Ambassador to Malta.
(For biographic details, see White House press re-
lease dated July 7.)
Parker T. Hart to be Ambassador to Turkey. ( For
biographic details, see White House press release
dated July 7.)
John D. Jemegan to be Ambassador to the Demo-
cratic and Popular Republic of Algeria. (For bio-
graphic details, see White House press release dated
June 5.)
Dr. Albert H. Moseman to be Assistant Adminis-
trator for Technical Cooperation and Research,
Agency for International Development.
David D. Newsom to be Ambassador to the King-
dom of Libya. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated July 7.)
Hugh M. Smythe to be Ambassador to the Syrian
Arab Republic. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated July 7.)
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. Done at Wash-
ington December 27, 1945. Entered into force De-
cember 27, 1945. TIAS 1502.
Signature and acceptance : Malawi, July 19, 1965.
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945.
Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501.
Signature and acceptance: Malawi, July 19, 1965.
Articles of agreement of the International Finance
Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington
May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956.
TIAS 3620, 4894.
Signature and acceptance : Malawi, July 19, 1965.
Articles of agreement of the International Develop-
ment Association. Done at Washington January 26,
1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960.
TIAS 4607.
Signature and acceptance: Malawi, July 19, 1965.
BILATERAL
Peru
Agreement extending the loan of the vessel U.S.S.
Benham under the agreement of February 12 and
26, 1960 (TIAS 4602), relating to the loan of
certain vessels to Peru. Effected by exchange of
notes at Lima June 8 and 28, 1965. Entered into
force June 28, 1965.
Viet-Nam
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1965. Effected by exchange
of notes at Saigon July 9, 1965. Entered into force
July 9, 1965.
AUGUST 9, 1966
257
PUBLICATIONS
Recent Releases
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, except in the case of free publi-
cations, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.
Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet
contains a map, a list of principal government offi-
cials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and,
in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed
below are available at 5^ each, unless otherwise in-
dicated.
Algeria. Pub. 7821. 8 pp.
Argentina. Pub. 7836. 8 pp.
China, Republic of. Pub. 7791. 8 pp.
Dominican Republic. Pub. 7759. 4 pp.
Germany, Federal Republic of. Pub. 7834. 12 pp.
India. Pub. 7847. 8 pp.
Italy. Pub. 7861. 8 pp.
Kuwait. Pub. 7855. 4 pp.
Lebanon. Pub. 7816. 4 pp.
Libya. Pub. 7815. 8 pp.
Luxembourg. Pub. 7856. 4 pp.
Mexico. Pub. 7865. 8 pp.
Somali Republic. Pub. 7881. 8 pp.
Syria. Pub. 7761. 8 pp.
Turkey. Pub. 7850. 4 pp.
Uruguay. Pub. 7857. 4 pp.
U.S.S.R. Pub. 7842. 12 pp. 10<S.
Zambia. Pub. 7841. 4 pp.
United States and Outlying Areas. An inventory of
useful, hard-to-find information about all outlying
areas under U.S. protection. It outlines their exact
status within the framework of the U.S. Government
and includes a glossary and statistical data in the
appendixes. Two maps are also included. Geographic
Bulletin No. 5. Pub. 7852. 15 pp. 20«f.
Survey of the French Republic. Current data on the
geographic and political structure of Metropolitan
France and its overseas departments and territories.
Background historical data and specialized informa-
tion in the tables, appendices, and maps are also in-
cluded in this publication. Geographic Bulletin No.
U. Pub. 7868. 21 pp. 25^.
When Americans Live Abroad. A pamphlet pre-
pared for personnel going overseas for the first time.
Suggestions are offered to facilitate understanding
of cultural differences and to develop meaningful re-
lationships in living and working with people in
other countries. Pub. 7869. Department and For-
eign Service Series 129. 41 pp. 20^.
Communist China: A Problem in U.S. Policymaking.
Foreign Affairs Outline No. 11. Article based on an
address by Marshall Green, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Far Eastern Affairs, before the Princeton
University Conference on the United States and
Communist China, at Princeton, N.J. Pub. 7870. Far
Eastern Series 131. 5 pp. 5^.
Profiles of Newly Independent States. Revision of
the concise reference guide prepared by The Geog-
rapher, describing the status of 54 newly independent
states (since 1943). It includes statistical high-
lights, reference table and map. Geographic Bulle-
tin No. 1 (Revised May 1965). Pub. 7874. 30 pp.
25«.
Congo Realities and United States Policy. Foreign
Affairs Outline No. H. Article based on an address
by G. Mennen Williams, Assistant Secretary of State
for African Affairs, before Ford Hall Forum, Bos-
ton, Mass. Pub. 7892. African Series 42. 12 pp. 10#.
Viet-Nam: The Third Face of the War. Text of an
address made by President Johnson to the Associa-
tion of American Editorial Cartoonists at the White
House. Pub. 7897. Far Eastern Series 134. 15 pp.
15«f.
African Programs of U.S. Organizations. A selec-
tive directory describing the current African opera-
tional projects both overseas and in the United States
of 724 American nongovernmental organizations and
institutions. Pub. 7902. African Series 43. 132 pp.
$1.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 19-25
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to July 19 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 174 of
July 12 and 175 and 176 of July 14.
No.
Date
Subject
179
7/19
Rusk : U.N. memorial ceremony for
Ambassador Stevenson.
180
7/20
International traffic in arms regu-
lations.
181
7/24
Public members of Foreign Service
inspection teams.
258
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
INDEX August 9, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1363
Algeria. Jernegan confirmed as Ambassador . 257
American Principles. Conquering the Ancient
Enemies of Mankind (Johnson) 236
Australia. Clark confirmed as Ambassador . . 257
Congress
Confirmations (Bane, Clark, Feldman, Hart,
Jernegan, Moseman, Newsom, Smythe) . . 257
Senate Confirms Mr. Merchant as U.S. Execu-
tive Director of IBRD 238
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Bane, Clark, Feldman, Hart,
Jernegan, Moseman, Newsom, Smythe) . . 257
Public Members Added to Teams of Foreign
Service Inspectors 256
Economic Affairs
Advisory Committee on Monetary Arrange-
ments Has First Meeting (Dillon, Fowler,
Johnson) 238
Senate Confirms Mr. Merchant as U.S. Execu-
tive Director of IBRD 238
U.S.-Japan Cabinet Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs Holds Fourth Meeting at
Washington (Johnson, Rusk, Shiina, joint
communique) 242
World Trade and the Kennedy Round (Blumen-
thal) 249
Europe. World Trade and the Kennedy Round
(Blumenthal) 249
Foreign Aid. Moseman confirmed as Assistant
Administrator, AID 257
Gabon. Bane confirmed as Ambassador . . . 257
International Organizations and Conferences.
Senate Confirms Mr. Merchant as U.S. Execu-
tive Director of IBRD 238
Japan. U.S.-Japan Cabinet Committee on
Trade and Economic Affairs Holds Fourth
Meeting at Washington (Johnson, Rusk,
Shiina, joint communique) 242
Libya. Newsom confirmed as Ambassador . . 257
Malta. Feldman confirmed as Ambassador . . 257
Military Affairs. Regulations on International
Traffic in Arms Revised 256
Presidential Documents
Advisory Committee on Monetary Arrange-
ments Has First Meeting 238
Conquering the Ancient Enemies of Mankind . 236
President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Pay
Tribute to Ambassador Stevenson .... 229
President Johnson Receives Book on the Magna
Carta 235
President Names Justice Goldberg as U.S. Am-
bassador to the U.N 240
U.S.-Japan Cabinet Committee on Trade and
Economic Affairs Holds Fourth Meeting at
Washington 242
Publications. Recent Releases 258
Syria. Smythe confirmed as Ambassador . . . 257
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 257
Turkey. Hart confirmed as Ambassador . . . 257
United Kingdom. President Johnson Receives
Book on the Magna Carta (Dean, Johnson) 235
United Nations
President Johnson and Secretary Rusk Pay
Tribute to Ambassador Stevenson .... 229
President Names Justice Goldberg as U.S. Am-
bassador to the U.N. (Goldberg, Johnson) . 240
United Nations Holds Memorial Ceremony for
Ambassador Stevenson (MacLeish, Rusk,
Sosa Rodriguez, U Thant) 226
Name Index
Bane, David M 257
Blumenthal, W. Michael 249
Clark, Edward 257
Dean, Sir Patrick 235
Dillon, Douglas 238
Feldman, George J 257
Fowler, Henry H 238
Goldberg, Arthur J 240
Hart, Parker T 257
Jernegan, John D 257
Johnson, President . . . 229, 235, 236, 238, 240, 242
MacLeish, Archibald 226
Merchant, Livingston T 238, 259
Moseman, Albert H 257
Newsom, David D 257
Rusk, Secretary 226,229,242
Shiina, Etsusaburo 242
Smythe, Hugh M 257
Sosa Rodriguez, Carlos 226
U Thant 226
Superintend
u.s. governn
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIII, No. 136Jt
August 16, 1965
WE WILL STAND IN VIET-NAM
Statement by President Johnson 262
AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG HOLDS NEWS CONFERENCE AT NEW YORK 272
THE TRUST TERRITORY OF THE PACIFIC ISLANDS
Statements by Dwight Dickinson, M. Wilfred Goding, and Bailey Olter 280
MILITARY MEMBERS OF THE COUNTRY TEAM
Special Article by Solis Horwitz 268
For index see inside back cover
We Will Stand in Viet-Nam
Statement by President Johnson
My fellow Americans: Not long ago I
received a letter from a woman in the Mid-
west. She wrote,
Dear Mr. President: In my humble way I am
writing to you about the crisis in Viet-Nam. I have
a son who is now in Viet-Nam. My husband served
in World War II. Our country was at war, but now,
this time, it is just something that I don't under-
stand. Why?
Well, I have tried to answer that ques-
tion dozens of times and more in practically
every State in this Union. I have discussed
it fully In Baltimore in April,^ in Washing-
ton in May,^ in San Francisco in June.*
Let me again, now, discuss it here in the
East Room of the White House.
Why must young Americans, born into a
land exultant with hope and with golden
' Read at the opening of a news conference at the
White House on July 28.
' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
' For text, see ibid., May 31, 1965, p. 838.
' For text, see ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98.
promise, toil and suffer and sometimes die
in such a remote and distant place ?
The answer, like the war itself, is not an
easy one, but it echoes clearly from the
painful lessons of half a century. Three
times in my lifetime, in two world wars and
in Korea, Americans have gone to far lands
to fight for freedom. We have learned at
a terrible and brutal cost that retreat does
not bring safety and weakness does not
bring peace.
It is this lesson that has brought us to
Viet-Nam. This is a different kind of war.
There are no marching armies or solemn
declarations. Some citizens of South Viet-
Nam, at times with understandable griev-
ances, have joined in the attack on their
own government.
But we must not let this mask the central
fact that this is really war. It is guided by
North Viet-Nam, and it is spurred by Com-
munist China. Its goal is to conquer the
South, to defeat American power, and to ex-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1364 PUBLICATION 7938 AUGUST 16, 1965
The Department of State Bolletin, •
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government ^th Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreisn relations and on the vroric of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreizn policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officer* of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international asreements to which the
United States Is or may become a party
and treaties of ffeneral international in-
terest.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and lecislativa mat^
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb: 62 issues, domestio $10,
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961).
note: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.
262
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tend the Asiatic dominion of communism.
There are great stakes in the balance.
Most of the non-Communist nations of
Asia cannot, by themselves and alone, re-
sist growing might and the grasping am-
bition of Asian communism.
Our power, therefore, is a very vital
shield. If we are driven from the field in
Viet-Nam, then no nation can ever again
have the same confidence in American
promise or in American protection.
In each land the forces of independence
would be considerably weakened and an
Asia so threatened by Communist domina-
tion would certainly imperil the security of
the United States itself.
We did not choose to be the guardians at
the gate, but there is no one else.
Nor would surrender in Viet-Nam bring
peace, because we learned from Hitler at
Munich that success only feeds the appetite
of aggression. The battle would be renewed
in one country and then another country,
bringing with it perhaps even larger and
cruder conflict, as we have learned from
the lessons of history.
Moreover, we are in Viet-Nam to fulfill
one of the most solemn pledges of the
American nation. Three Presidents — Presi-
dent Eisenhower, President Kennedy, and
your present President — over 11 years have
committed themselves and have promised to
help defend this small and valiant nation.
Strengthened by that promise, the people
of South Viet-Nam have fought for many
long years. Thousands of them have died.
Thousands more have been crippled and
scarred by war. We just cannot now dis-
honor our word, or abandon our commit-
ment, or leave those who believed us and
who trusted us to the terror and repression
and murder that would follow.
This, then, my fellow Americans, is why
we are in Viet-Nam.
Increase in U.S. Fighting Strength
What are our goals in that war-stained
land?
First: We intend to convince the Com-
munists that we cannot be defeated by
force of arms or by superior power. They
are not easily convinced. In recent months
they have greatly increased their fighting
forces and their attacks and the number
of incidents. I have asked the Commanding
General, General [William C] Westmore-
land, what more he needs to meet this
mounting aggression. He has told me. We
will meet his needs.
I have today ordered to Viet-Nam the Air
Mobile Division and certain other forces
which will raise our fighting strength from
75,000 to 125,000 men almost immediately.
Additional forces will be needed later, and
they will be sent as requested. This will
make it necessary to increase our active
fighting forces by raising the monthly draft ,
call from 17,000 over a period of time to
35,000 per month, and for us to step up our
campaign for voluntary enlistments.
After this past week of deliberations, I
have concluded that it is not essential to
order Reserve units into service now. If that
necessity should later be indicated, I will
give the matter most careful consideration
and I will give the country due and adequate
notice before taking such action, but only
after full preparations.
We have also discussed with the Govern-
ment of South Viet-Nam lately- the steps
that we will take to substantially increase
their own effort, both on the battlefield and
toward reform and progress in the villages.
Ambassador Lodge is now formulating a
new program to be tested upon his return
to that area.
I have directed Secretary Rusk and Secre-
tary McNamara to be available immediately
to the Congress to review with these com-
mittees, the appropriate congressional com-
mittees, what we plan to do in these areas.
I have asked them to be able to answer the
questions of any Member of Congress.
Secretary McNamara, in addition, will ask
the Senate Appropriations Committee to add
a limited amount to present legislation to
help meet part of this new cost until a sup-
plemental measure is ready, and hearings
can be held when the Congress assembles in
January.
AUGUST 16, 1965
263
In the meantime, we will use the author-
ity contained in the present defense ap-
propriations bill under consideration, to
transfer funds in addition to the additional
money that we will ask.
These steps, like our actions in the past,
are carefully measured to do what must be
done to bring an end to aggression and a
peaceful settlement.
We do not want an expanding struggle
with consequences that no one can per-
ceive, nor will we bluster or bully or flaunt
our power, but we will not surrender and
we will not retreat, for behind our Ameri-
can pledge lies the determination and re-
sources, I believe, of all of the American
nation.
U.S. Willing To Begin Unconditional Discussions
Second, once the Communists know, as we
know, that a violent solution is impossible,
then a peaceful solution is inevitable.
We are ready now, as we have always
been, to move from the battlefield to the
conference table. I have stated publicly and
many times, again and again, America's
willingness to begin unconditional discus-
sions with any government at any place at
any time. Fifteen efforts have been made
to start these discussions with the help of
40 nations throughout the world, but there
has been no answer.
But we are going to continue to persist,
if persist we must, until death and desola-
tion have led to the same conference table
where others could now join us at a much
smaller cost.
I have spoken many times of our objec-
tives in Viet-Nam. So has the Government of
South Viet-Nam. Hanoi has set forth its
own proposals. We are ready to discuss
their proposals and our proposals and any
proposals of any government whose people
may be affected, for we fear the meeting
room no more than we fear the battlefield.
In this pursuit we welcome and we ask
for the concern and the assistance of any
nation and all nations. If the United Nations
and its officials or any one of its 114 mem-
bers can by deed or word, private initiative
or public action, bring us nearer an honor-
able peace, then they will have the support
and the gratitude of the United States of
America.
I have directed Ambassador Goldberg to
go to New York today and to present im-
mediately to Secretary-General U Thant a
letter ^ from me requesting that all of the
resources, energy, and immense prestige of
the United Nations be employed to find ways
to halt aggression and to bring peace in
Viet-Nam.
I made a similar request at San Francisco
a few weeks ago, because we do not seek
the destruction of any government, nor do
we covet a foot of any territory, but we in-
sist and we will always insist that the
people of South Viet-Nam shall have the
right of choice, the right to shape their own
destiny in free elections in the South, or
throughout all Viet-Nam under international
supervision, and they shall not have any
government imposed upon them by force
and terror so long as we can prevent it.
This was the purpose of the 1954 agree-
ments which the Communists have now
cruelly shattered. If the machinery of those
agreements was tragically weak, its pur-
poses still guide our action. As battle
rages, we will continue as best we can to
help the good people of South Viet-Nam en-
rich the condition of their life, to feed the
hungry, and to tend the sick, and teach the
young, and shelter the homeless, and help
the farmer to increase crops and the worker
to find a job.
It is an ancient but still terrible irony
that while many leaders of men create divi-
sion in pursuit of grand ambitions, the chil-
dren of man are really united in the simple,
elusive desire for a life of fruitful and re-
warding toil.
As I said at Johns Hopkins in Baltimore,
I hope that one day we can help all the
people of Asia toward that desire. Eugene
Black has made great progress since my
' For text, see p. 275.
264
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
appearance in Baltimore in that direction — *
not as the price of peace, for we are ready
always to bear a more painful cost, but
rather as a part of our obligations of justice
toward our fellow man.
A Personal Note
Let me also add now a personal note. I
do not find it easy to send the flower of our
youth, our finest young men, into battle. I
have spoken to you today of the divisions
and the forces and the battalions and the
units. But I know them all, every one. I
have seen them in a thousand streets, of a
hundred towns, in every State in this Union
— working and laughing and building, and
filled with hope and life. I think that I
know, too, how their mothers weep and how
their families sorrow. This is the most
agonizing and the most painful duty of your
President.
There is something else, too. When I was
young, poverty was so common that we
didn't know it had a name. And education
was something that you had to fight for.
Water was really life itself. I have now been
in public life 35 years, more than three
decades, and in each of those 35 years I
have seen good men and wise leaders
struggle to bring the blessings of this land
to all of our people.
Now I am the President. It is now my
opportunity to help every child get an educa-
tion, to help every Negro and every other
American citizen have an equal opportunity,
to help every family get a decent home, and
to help bring healing to the sick and dignity
to the old.
As I have said before, that is what I have
lived for. That is what I have wanted all
my life, since I was a little boy, and I do not
want to see all those hopes and all those
dreams of so many people for so many
years now drowned in the wasteful ravages
of cruel wars. I am going to do all I can
to see that that never happens.
' For background, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p.
215.
But I also know, as a realistic public
servant, that as long as there are men who
hate and destroy, we must have the courage
to resist or we will see it all — all that we
have built, all that we hope to build, all of
our dreams for freedom — all — all — will be
swept away on the flood of conquest.
So, too, this shall not happen. We will
stand in Viet-Nam.
Justice Goldberg Sworn In
as Representative to U.N.
Following is an exchange of remarks be-
tiveen President Johnson and Supreme Court
Justice Arthur J. Goldberg at the White
House on July 26.
White House press release dated July 26
President Johnson
Only a few days ago the great voice of a
great and good American was stilled by the
passing of Adlai Stevenson. Today another
distinguished American comes forward to
follow in his place. It is a symbolic and
appropriate reminder to us, and to the
world, of the continuity in the continuing
purposes of this great nation.
The voice of America is never one voice.
The vision of America is never one vision
alone. The will of America for a just and
for a decent and for a peaceful world is
never the will of just one citizen but the
continuing and constant will of 190 million
citizens, the will that will be expressed by
the distinguished Ambassador as the voice
of America at the United Nations.
It is this constant, this unchanging, this
unending will and resolve of our people that
we ask our representatives to convey to all
the peoples of the world through the forums
of the United Nations.
Ours is a dynamic land and a dynamic
society. Arthur Goldberg's own story testi-
fies to this most eloquently. A son of im-
migrants, born to the most humble begin-
nings, he has risen from newsboy on the
AUGUST 16, 1965
265
streets of Chicago to success in his profes-
sion, to serve in the Cabinet, to honor on
the Nation's highest court, and now to a
position where he will be the advocate of
this nation's policies before the world.
This personal story is a testament to the
vigor, and the vitality, and the forward
movement of our open and our restless and
our questioning society.
But there is another side of America— a
side which I hope the world will never
forget or never underestimate.
We are a nation dedicated to ideals and
values about the worth of man and about
the preciousness of his liberty. In support
of our dedication and commitment, we are
resolute and we have built great strength to
manifest that resolve. But we are above all
a patient nation and a patient people, and
we have the strength and we have the sta-
bility and the success to permit us to be
patient.
For 20 years or more we have manifested
our patience around the world. Our sons,
today, keep a vigil of peace and freedom on
lines where they have stood now for a gen-
eration. We do not expect the world to
change or to be changed either in a month,
or a year, or a decade. But we have the
patience and the resolve to pursue our pur-
poses for however long it may be necessary
to assure for mankind the blessings of a
world without terror, or without injustice,
or without want.
So let none abroad — and let none here at
home — ever doubt or ever question that
America has the patience or the persever-
ance to do what the cause of mankind re-
quires and what our many commitments
around the world necessitate.
I know of no more gifted citizen, no more
able individual, to express and to interpret
and to explain the policies of the United
States Government, as determined by the
people and the President and the Congress,
than this most able and distinguished gentle-
man who will shortly take the oath of office
— Arthur Goldberg.
This is a very proud moment personally,
but it is also a very proud moment for all
Americans.
Mr. Goldberg
[At this point Justice Hugo Black administered
the oath of office to Mr. Goldberg, who then read
his letter of resignation as an Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court and a letter to the Chief
Justice and Associate Justices. Then he said:]
I go to New York to curse no one but in
my own way to help keep the candle of
peace burning.
This, Mr. President, is your charge to me.
This is the true memorial to Adlai Steven-
son, who, as a disciple of Aaron, the priest,
loved peace and pursued peace.
I have no illusions that peace can be
achieved rapidly. But I have every confi-
dence that it is going to be possible to inch
forward to it, inch by agonizing inch. This
we must do, for there is simply no alterna-
tive in a nuclear age to world peace through
the rule of law.
The immediate task at hand is to resolve
the constitutional crisis at the United Na-
tions so that the U.N.'s basic mission to
achieve freedom from fear and freedom
from want for all people everywhere can go
forward.
The United Nations' quest for peace has
been based upon the theory that "since wars
begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds
of men that the defences of peace must be
constructed." I, together with millions of
Americans and hundreds of millions of men
and women throughout the world, would
restate our conviction, Mr. President, that
you have voiced repeatedly, that the United
Nations is not only a useful but a necessary
tool for building those defenses of peace, and
that the United Nations is the world's best
hope for a lasting peace.
The crises, both diplomatic and financial,
currently faced by the United Nations hover
like a specter over the arena of international
politics. Before giving way to pessimism,
however, we should remember the numerous
achievements of the United Nations — in
Iran, in Korea, in Suez, in the Congo, and
in Cyprus. And we have witnessed the un-
precedented transfer of political power from
European nations to newly independent
states — a transfer that could hardly have
taken place so peacefully had the United
266
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Nations not been in existence. Moreover, we
all know the important work of the United
Nations in providing economic aid and tech-
nical assistance to the emerging nations, its
role in facilitating international cooperation
in such areas as the peaceful uses of atomic
energy, and its undertakings to assure
greater respect for human rights.
The failures which have resulted in the
crises through which the organization is now
passing are not those of the United Nations.
Rather, member states of the United Na-
tions, not the organization itself, are at
fault.
A leading statesman has pointed out that
a Stradivarius violin is nothing more than
an assemblage of wood and catgut — it takes
a musician to get harmony out of it. But if
the player is at fault, there is no sense in
blaming the instrument — still less in smash-
ing it to pieces.
I believe that the problems facing the
United Nations can be overcome provided
that each member nation, and its citizens,
base its actions upon patriotism in the best
sense of the word. This, as Lord Cecil once
remarked, is "the patriotism by which a man
instinctively sets the highest standard for
his nation's conduct."
I dedicate myself both to the support of
the United Nations and to this ideal of
patriotism. I am grateful to the President
for judging me capable of the effort I now
commence, and to Congress and to the
American people, who have so wholeheart-
edly responded to my appointment.
Business Executives Briefed
on Soutli Africa
The Department of State announced on
July 27 that executives of 21 representative
American firms with business interests in
the Republic of South Africa had met that
day with G. Mennen Williams, Assistant
Secretary of State for African Affairs, for
a background briefing about South Africa.^
Robert L. McNeill, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary of Commerce for Trade Policy, and
Leonard C. Meeker, State Department Legal
Adviser, also attended.
The businessmen were informed about
the current situation, problems, and poli-
cies affecting United States relations with
South Africa. During the meeting there
was an exchange of views with the execu-
tives, but there was no announcement of
any new policy toward South Africa. The
meeting was similar to others previously
held by officers in the Bureau of African
Affairs with various business groups as
well as representatives from professional,
educational, and church organizations to in-
form them about developments in Africa.
U.S. and Cliina Reach Substantive
Agreement on Status of Forces
Press release 182 dated July 29, for release July 30
Chinese and U.S. Government representa-
tives have reached substantive agreement on
the text of a status-of -forces agreement be-
tween the two countries.
The agreement will be signed following
approval of the final text by both Govern-
ments. The agreement will enter into force
when the two Governments have notified
each other that they have approved the
agreement in accordance with their respec-
tive legal procedures.
The agreement includes a preamble and
20 articles covering all aspects of the status
of U.S. military forces deployed pursuant to
article VII of the 1954 Mutual Defense
Treaty between the two countries.
' For a list of the 21 executives who attended the
briefing, see Department of State press release dated
July 27.
AUGUST 16, 1965
267
Mr. Horwitz is the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Ad-
ministration. In this article, prepared especially for the
Bulletin, he describes the "country team" concept and how
the military members of an overseas post contribute to the
coordination of U.S. Government activities under the chief
of mission.
Military IViembers of tlie Country Team
by Solis Horwitz
The mushrooming of United States gov-
ernmental commitments and activities
throughout the world after World War II
led to a situation in which various and
sundry activities were being carried on by a
number of uncoordinated agencies which
sometimes worked at cross purposes and often
overshadowed and ignored our ambassador
to the host country. To correct this de-
ficiency, all activities in a given country,
with the exception of operational military
forces, were placed under the direction of
the President's senior representative, the
chief of the diplomatic mission. This concept
known as the "country team," places re-
sponsibility for the coordination of all
U. S. governmental activities under the chief
of mission and designates him as the senior
U.S. representative in his area.
The Department of Defense feels that
the country-team concept provides for a very
flexible organization. It can be utilized ac-
cording to the individual mission needs as
determined by the chief of mission and can
function to bring various U. S. elements
together for coordinating sessions at over-
seas missions. These sessions can be used
to develop unified courses of action, to re-
solve policy conflicts, and to bring all ac-
tivities under the supervision of the chief
of mission. Normally, military membership
on country teams is limited to military
attaches and the chiefs of Military As-
sistance Advisory Groups (MAAG's) or
missions. However, voluntary participation
by operational military force commanders
has been a common procedure at many
missions.
One of the most important annual projects
of the country team is the development of the
"country plan." The military members of
the country team assist in its development,
and approved country plans are distributed
widely throughout the military establish-
ment. Department of Defense elements use
these country plans to coordinate their ef-
forts in public information and psycholog-
ical operations, both at Washington and at
commands overseas.
The military members of the country
team — attaches and chiefs of MAAG's and
missions — have widely varying missions and
functions in the overseas areas.
What the Military Attache Does
In essence, military attaches are primarily
military representatives and secondarily
diplomatic functionaries. Their functions as
published in departmental regulations and
universally stated by administrators in
Washington are basically as follows :
a. To act as an overt information col-
268
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
lecting agency for the Department of De-
fense.
b. To foster good relations between the
armed forces of the two countries.
c. To further the objectives of the U. S.
Armed Forces in the country in which they
are assigned — act as representatives of the
U. S. Armed Forces in the host country.
d. To provide military advice to the
chief of the diplomatic mission.
Only outstanding officers are selected for
attache duty. They attend a 16-week attache
course in addition to the time required for
language preparation. All attaches must at-
tain an S-3 proficiency in the language of
the country of assignment.
Currently military attaches are stationed
at 101 U.S. embassies and legations and are
fully accredited diplomatic representatives in
the host countries. The attaches are as-
signed to the diplomatic mission and are
supervised by the chief of mission but are
authorized direct communication with the
Department of Defense. Most attaches have
frequent contact with the ambassador, and
some have close daily contact. Their relation-
ship with other executive embassy personnel
is very close.
As a representative of the U.S. Armed
Forces, the attache has many social obliga-
tions, attends ceremonies and military dem-
onstrations, and sponsors or assists other
members of the embassy staff in social, re-
lief, cultural, and informational activities.
His wife actively assists with embassy char-
ity projects and other goodwill projects
within the host country and assists as
hostess at many official functions. With
very few exceptions, attaches feel that they
are completely assimilated into the ambas-
sador's family.
To preclude duplication of effort, the at-
tache insures that his primary plans and
activities are coordinated with those of other
members of the local United States com-
munity, and to the maximum extent possible
he assists other elements of this community
in the attainment of the national goals.
Unless otherwise specified, the attaches
channel of communication is direct to Wash-
ington and need not be routed through the
chief of mission, but informal copies of his
communications are prepared for the am-
bassador's information. This does not mean
that the attache secretly operates behind
the back of the chief of the diplomatic
mission, nor does it mean that he fails to
coordinate his action with other elements
of the mission. The interests of the De-
partment of Defense and the ambassador
may not always be identical, and a large
amount of military communication is of no
concern to the mission chief. However, when
data of interest to both parties is produced,
the attache is expected to relay it to the
proper diplomatic office at the mission. To
those who might entertain misgivings re-
garding these separate channels. Ambassador
David K. E. Bruce testified before a con-
gressional committee in September 1963
that separate channels of communication
are not opposed by the chiefs of diplomatic
missions and that they do not constitute
a problem of any kind.i
MAAG's and Military IVIIssions
The stationing of the Military Assistance
Advisory Groups, missions, military com-
mands, technicians, and logistical elements
in the host countries has had a very sig-
nificant effect upon the role of the at-
taches. Previous to World War II, the mili-
tary attache was generally the sole military
person available for advice and assistance
and played a primary role in the opera-
tions of the diplomatic mission. Since then,
however, in many countries there has been
an influx of large numbers of United States
military personnel, assigned to MAAG's,
military missions. Unified Commands, and
major operational commands. Many of these
expanding staffs are commanded by general
and flag officers of higher rank than attaches.
The chiefs of the MAAG's are representa-
tives of the Secretary of Defense in the
T/ie Ambassador and the Problem of Coordination,
Part 3, Subcommittee on National Security, Staffing
and Operations, 88th Cong., 1st sess., Sept. 18, 1963,
pp. 234-258. [Committee print.]
AUGUST 16, 1965
269
country to which they are accredited for
matters pertaining to military assistance.
However, as representatives of the United
States they are also subject to the author-
ity of the chief of the U.S. diplomatic mis-
sion. The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
specifically provides, in section 622, that the
chief of mission "shall make sure that rec-
ommendations of such [all United States]
representatives pertaining to military as-
sistance are coordinated with political and
economic considerations, and his comments
shall accompany such recommendations if
he so desires." In nearly all cases these
MAAG's and military missions have de-
veloped from an initial request from the
host government to the U.S. ambassador.
Acting under the supervision of the Uni-
fied Commands, the chiefs of MAAG per-
form the following functions :
a. Make recommendations to the Unified
Commands concerning military assistance in
their respective countries.
b. Develop military assistance plans and
programs, in cooperation with the ambassa-
dor, and submit them to the Unified
Commands.
c. Observe and report on the utilization
of materiel furnished and personnel trained
by the military assistance program.
d. Administer military assistance sales
transactions in accordance with current
instructions.
e. Provide advisory services and techni-
cal assistance to recipient countries.
f. Arrange for the receipt and transfer
of military assistance materiel.
g. Provide liaison with the country con-
cerned in connection with such special pro-
grams as the weapons production program.
h. Perform other duties as specified in
their individual terms of reference.
The military assistance organizations in
certain countries (e.g., Greece, the Philip-
pines, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, and Turkey)
have designations other than Military As-
sistance Advisory Group but perform the
same functions as the MAAG's, have simi-
lar organizational arrangements, and are
both funded and supported in the same
manner as MAAG's.
In countries where no MAAG establish-
ment exists, service training missions may
be assigned MAAG functions with respect
to military assistance programs. In these
instances, the commanders of the Unified
Commands call upon the appropriate desig-
nated mission chief to provide the necessary
information and assistance to conduct an ef-
ficient military assistance program within
that country. In several countries which
receive military assistance in a limited
scale, the military attache is charged with
the responsibility of the MAP administra-
tion.
The precise status of MAAG personnel in
host countries varies according to the pro-
visions of the applicable military assistance
agreement with each country, the host
country's interpretation of privileges and
immunities accorded under international
law and comity, and the applicability of
other agreements, such as the status-of-
forces agreements. Diplomatic status is
generally granted to the MAAG chief and
to the senior Army, Navy, and Air Force of-
ficers. A second category of personnel,
usually the remaining commissioned mem-
bers of the MAAG, enjoys the same privi-
leges and immunities. A third category of
personnel, normally the noncommissioned
MAAG personnel, is accorded the same
status as the clerical personnel of a diplo-
matic mission.
Special Training for IVIAAG Personnel
The Department of Defense recognizes
that personnel of all U.S. agencies stationed
in a foreign country must speak with one
voice, present a united front, and work as
a team if we are to achieve our national ob-
jectives in that country. Consequently, great
care is taken in the selection of officers for
MAAG duty. They receive special school-
ing, and all are thoroughly briefed on the
necessity for close cooperation with all other
U.S. elements in the country where they will
be stationed.
The military departments detail the key
270
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
personnel who have been selected for
MAAG assignments to attend the Military
Assistance Institute. The objective of the
course at the Institute is to acquaint the
student with the processes and procedures
which apply to the military assistance pro-
gram. The course presents a program of in-
struction tailored to meet the needs of the
students according to their assignment in a
Military Assistance Advisory Group or mili-
tary mission overseas. All students receive
instruction in U.S. foreign policy and mili-
tary strategy; the organizational relation-
ships and functions of agencies having re-
sponsibilities for MAP both in Washington
and overseas; the geographic, demographic,
political, social, and economic conditions in
their countries of assignment; and the pro-
cedures for programing and implementing
the military assistance program. Additional,
specialized instruction is given to those stu-
dents classified as advisers, planners, and
chiefs of MAAG's or chiefs of military
service sections of the Advisory Groups and
missions.
Improving Operational Effectiveness
The equating of cost economies and op-
erational effectiveness of our military rep-
resentation overseas is a matter of continu-
ing concern to the Department of Defense.
In this regard, the Department is partici-
pating with the Department of State and
the Bureau of the Budget in a series of re-
gional studies to improve the organizational
arrangements and reduce the staffing of
Defense units abroad which are not part of
the unified and specified commands. Such
matters, among others, as consolidation of
military attaches, consolidation of certain
MAAG-mission functions, and economies in
the provision of administrative support for
the Defense overseas activities are being
explored in these studies. As the study
group completes a study, it submits a re-
port of its findings and recommendations to
the heads of each of the respective agencies
and action as considered appropriate is
taken by that head.
It is significant to comment here that one
regional report recommendation, dealing
with the consolidation of military attaches,
has already been approved by the Secretary
of Defense for worldwide implementation.
In effecting this consolidation, a single or-
ganizational element known as the Defense
Attache System (DAS) was established on
July 1, 1965, to replace the tri-service
military attache system.
Although the previously discussed overall
functions of the military attaches remain
unchanged, the DAS is expected to provide
benefits both in terms of economies result-
ing from personnel reductions and in the
form of improved coordination and focus of
effort within the attache staffs. A single
Defense attache, appointed from the mili-
tary services, will be designated in each for-
eign country to supervise and coordinate
the work of all of the military attaches as-
signed to that country. These Defense at-
taches will provide their ambassadors with
clearly identified sources of military at-
tache support and services and, in addition,
will serve as a single point of contact on
military attache matters within their re-
spective host countries for the Secretary of
Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In summary, while perhaps the mission
of the military members of the country
team may not be of identical concern to other
elements of the U. S- community in the over-
seas country, the U. S. national goals are
common to all and the need for all the ele-
ments to work closely and harmoniously
with each other in the attainment of these
goals is obvious. Fully appreciating this, the
Department of Defense agencies overseas
will always stand prepared to fully cooper-
ate with other U. S. elements in the country
and to assist them to the maximum extent
possible.
AUGUST 16, 1965
271
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Ambassador Goldberg Holds News Conference at New York
Following is the transcript of a news
conference held by Ambassador Arthur J.
Goldberg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, at New York, N.Y., on July 28.
U.S./U.N. press release 4608
Ambassador Goldberg: Before saying any-
thing else, I think I would like to repeat
what I have said in Washington, and I hope
you will forgive me if I say it again, and
that is that coming here I am deeply conscious
that Adlai Stevenson cannot be replaced ; and
if there has been an element of sadness in
my taking this important assignment for
my Government, it is largely because of the
fact that I cannot come here without being
conscious of this great loss. But I am here
to represent the United States in the best
way I can, and I do so with gratitude to
the President for appointing me and with
enthusiasm for the job at hand.
This is my baptism of diplomacy — pro-
fessional diplomacy. I have had to do with
other types of diplomacy in my lifetime.
I have just been upstairs to present my
credentials to the Secretary-General, and now
I am in another sense presenting my cre-
dentials to you, the press, which plays an
important and indispensable part in the
work of the United Nations, because what
we do here is of no moment if it is not
communicated and understood by all the
people of the world everywhere.
Adlai Stevenson was a friend of mine of
long standing. I hope it will not be regarded
to be a partisan statement, since I told the
Senate — and I propose to follow the con-
cept that this post is a nonpartisan post —
that I supported Adlai Stevenson enthu-
siastically in two of his presidential cam-
paigns. I think you know that I did not
support him in the third of his campaigns,
but he would have told you that was not a
campaign. Some of us thought differently
in Los Angeles. But Adlai Stevenson was an
inspiration both to his party and his coun-
try. And I know you who have covered the
United Nations for so long will miss him as
much as I do.
Now we go on with the work in which he
was so deeply involved. I hardly need em-
phasize the critical state of international
tension. It is a fact of life with which you
are familiar and everybody in the world is
conscious of. But one thing emerges from
this hard fact of life: It is clear that the
world needs the United Nations as never
before.
I have said in accepting this appointment
that the first order of business is to resolve
the United Nations' financial and constitu-
tional crisis, for if we do not put our own
house in order, I doubt if we will succeed
in putting other houses in order. We must
resolve this constitutional crisis so that the
United Nations' basic mission to achieve
freedom from fear and freedom from want
for all people can go forward.
I cannot give you any formulae as to how
this crisis can be resolved. I can only tell
you that I regard this to be my first re-
sponsibility as United States Representative
here and that, following my visit here today
and tomorrow, I shall return to Washington
272
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to go to work on that particular aspect of
our problems.
I should like to tell you briefly about my
visit with the Attorney General — with the
Secretary-General — it will take me a little
while to make this transition — and tell you
that it was most interesting and enjoyable.
I have met the Secretary-General before
socially. This was the first time that I had
met him officially, but I have been long
familiar with his tireless efforts on behalf
of international peace and the United Na-
tions. I am looking forward to a most useful
and pleasant collaboration with him and with
the very fine staff of international civil
servants that plays such an important role
in the work of the United Nations.
As you know by now — I assume you have
copies or will get copies — I brought with me
a letter to the Secretary-General from the
President of the United States. ^
My talk with the Secretary-General cov-
ered a variety of topics of mutual interest,
including Viet-Nam, the Dominican Republic,
and article 19.
With regard to Viet-Nam, I reiterated
President Johnson's continuing desire to seek
a peaceful solution of the problem and his
continuing interest in finding ways in which
the United Nations and the Secretary-Gen-
eral might help to remove that dispute from
the battlefield and get it to the bargaining
table, where it must ultimately be resolved.
As to the Dominican Republic, I informed
the Secretary-General about the degree of
progress and efforts of the Organization of
American States to bring about a solution
of the current difficulties and noted the
participation of the United Nations in this
problem.
As to article 19, I have indicated to U
Thant that the United States has not arrived
at any final position as to what it will do
when the Committee of 33 convenes in
August. This is a task which I propose to
work on and will have something to say
about at some subsequent time.
Finally, I would like to add a personal
word. I did not leave the Supreme Court
• See p. 275.
of the United States lightly. I revere that
Court and what it does. But I profoundly
believe that the cause of peace is paramount,
and my heart is in this new assignment as
is my conscience. I want to do all a man can
do to make good on this new mission. I hope
I will have your help and cooperation.
I shall be very glad to respond to ques-
tions.
U.N. Role in Viet-Nam Situation
Q. Do you see, sir, the United Nations
playing an active role in an attempted set-
tlement of the Viet-Nam situation within
the next few weeks?
A. The letter of the President makes
clear that we hope that the members of the
United Nations, individually and collectively,
will use their influence to bring to the ne-
gotiating table people who will ultimately
have to settle this dispute. And we have also
indicated in the letter of the President, and
what I said to the Secretary-General, that
we appreciate what his efforts have been.
I cannot put any timetable on that, nor
do I think it is advisable to put any time-
table on that. I said in Washington that
the road to peace in general — this applies to
any aspect of the areas where peace is not
here — is not readily easy to achieve and that
we have to go inch by agonizing inch. And,
therefore, I assume that that statement ap-
plies here as well.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, will the United
States bring the Viet-Nam problem to the
Security Council ?
A. We have brought the matter to the
United Nations, to the Secretary-General, in
the form in which we did today in the letter
to the Secretary-General. This is the manner
in which we have brought it to the attention
of the United Nations.
Q. Ambassador Goldberg, when Secretary-
General U Thant returned from abroad
recently, he pointed out that it was impera-
tive that two steps must be taken in con-
nection with Viet-Nam: one, a cease-fire
and, two, a return to Geneva. I was wonder-
AUGUST 16, 1965
273
ing what your view is on the Secretary-
General's proposals?
A. I think that the United States view,
which I express, has been stated again and
again, and that view, as expressed by the
President just today,- is that we are anxious,
we are willing, we are ready to go to the
conference table. And at the conference table
all items, if you have an unconditional dis-
cussion, are on the agenda.
Q. Sir, according to reliable sources, the
most important question in the background
of the White House conferences on Viet-Nam
was whether the U.S.A. will or should get
into war with China. It seems one group
definitely favors this. Is it possible for you,
Mr. Ambassador, to shed some light on
this?
A. The goal of the United States policy
is not war with anybody, but peace.
The Article 19 Issue
Q. Mr. Ambassador, the President of the
General Assembly told us last month that
the article 19 issue was dead. My question
to you, sir, is this: Is the United States
going to press — going to abandon its de jure
attempts to deprive the Soviet Union and
France of its voting rights on this issue, as
it did de facto on the last day of the 19 th
session ? *
A. I said earlier, and I will try to make
it more explicit: I was just appointed to this
post. I am aware that the first problem at
hand is the article 19 problem.* I propose
to explore that problem with my colleagues,
with the President, with Congress, which is
vitally involved in matters of this type, and
I cannot say what the solution is. We have
not arrived at a position. But I do so with
the hope that the problem can be resolved
so that the work of the United Nations can
go forward.
' See p. 262.
' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 8, 1965,
p. 354.
' For a U.S. statement on the U.N. constitutional
crisis, see ibid., Feb. 15, 1965, p. 198.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, many efforts have
been made to reach Hanoi and Peiping in
recent months. In the light of your being
neiv at this post, is there any likelihood of
your making a personal attempt to contact
Hanoi and Peiping, despite past refusals of
these countries — these capitals — to see
others ?
A. I think I have a pretty big task at
hand right here for the time being. I will
do, of course, what my Government wants
me to do in any area of the work which has
been entrusted to me. But I am rather in-
clined to believe that I will be here.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, you are going to-
morrow, we understand, to have lunch at
the Soviet Embassy. This house, this build-
ing, has been the scene of some of the bit-
terest cold-war confrontations that have
occurred anywhere. I loonder whether you
can tell us whether you believe that that
era is now over and that tomorrow you
begin a friendlier, warmer era?
A. I can only answer that by what I said
at the White House on Monday, and I would
like to repeat that. I come to New York to
curse no one but to help keep the candle of
peace burning.^
U.S. Position on Viet-Nam Negotiations
Q. Mr. Ambassador, pursuing further the
proposal of the Secretary-General in regard
to Viet-Nam, has the United States made —
is the United States prepared to give an
affirmative response on the Geneva format,
that it ivould be acceptable to pursue these
negotiations? And, further, since all the
parties need to be concerned, do you think
the President has in mind — or would the
United States be willing to accept both of
the factions in South Viet-Nam at the table,
that is, the Saigon Government and the Na-
tional Liberation Front?
A. I do not want to use this occasion to
repeat every statement that has been made
= See p. 265.
274
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
U.S. Calls Upon U.N. To Strengthen Common Search
for Peace in Viet-Nam
Following is an exchange of letters between
President Johnson and U.N. Secretary-General
U Thant. The President's letter was delivered
to the Secretary-General by Ambassador Arthur
J. Goldberg on July 28 when he presented his
credentials as U.S. Representative to the United
Nations.
President Johnson to the Secretary-General
White House press release dated July 28
Jxn.Y 28, 1965
Dear Mr. Secretary-General: I want you to
know from me directly of the very grreat personal
confidence which I place in Ambassador Goldberg.
His appointment as Permanent Representative of
the United States to the United Nations — and his
acceptance of this responsibility in the circum-
stances— is, I hope, strong evidence that this Gov-
ernment places the very highest importance on
the work of the United Nations and will continue
to give it our utmost support.
I have instructed Ambassador Goldberg espe-
cially to maintain close contact with you on the sit-
uation in Viet-Nam. Your efforts in the past to
find some way to remove that dispute from the
battlefield to the negotiating table are much ap-
preciated and highly valued by my Government.
I trust they will be continued.
Meanwhile, as I stated publicly last April,^ the
Government of the United States is prepared to
enter into negotiations for peaceful settlement
without conditions. That remains our policy.
And as I stated in San Francisco last month,°
we hope that the Members of the United Nations,
individually and collectively, will use their influ-
ence to bring to the negotiating table all govern-
ments involved in an attempt to halt all aggres-
sion and evolve a peaceful solution. I continue to
hope that the United Nations can, in fact, be ef-
fective in this regard.
I hope that you will communicate to us, through
Ambassador Goldberg, any helpful suggestions
that may occur to you that can strengthen our
common search for the road to peace in Southeast
Asia.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
The Secretary-General to President Johnson
White House press release dated July 29
July 29, 1965
Dear Mr. President: It was my great pleasure
yesterday afternoon to receive Ambassador Gold-
berg and welcome him to the United Nations, and
at the same time to have from his hand the letter
which you addressed to me, for which I thank you
most warmly.
Your letter gives me much satisfaction and
encouragement, not only as evidence of the very
great personal confidence which you have in Am-
bassador Goldberg, but also as reassurance that
your Government attaches highest importance to
the work of the United Nations and will continue
to give the United Nations its utmost support.
It is particularly gratifying to know that you
have instructed Ambassador Goldberg especially
to maintain close contact with me on the situation
in Vietnam. For my part, of course, I will keep
closely in touch with him on all important issues
relating to international peace. Knowing the very
great importance which I attach in the present
circumstances to the question of Vietnam, you
may rest assured that I look forward to continu-
ous mutual consultation on this issue.
In this connection, Mr. President, please allow
me to thank you for your kind words about my
efforts in the past to find some way to remove
the dispute over Vietnam from the battlefield to
the negotiating table. I am heartened by your
wish that my efforts should be continued, and I
gladly assure you of my determination to pursue
them by all the means at my disposal, since I
believe most strongly that concerted efforts should
be made to put an early end to all further hostile
military activities.
I shall, of course, be pleased to communicate to
you through Ambassador Goldberg, in accordance
with your wish, any further suggestions which I
would consider helpful in bringing peace to South-
east Asia.
Yours sincerely,
U Thant
* For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
= Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98.
AUGUST 16, 1965
275
on American policy, which I am here to
represent. That policy has been stated. I
can restate it. And that is that the United
States is willing to go to the conference
table. The United States is willing to have
the Geneva accords used as a framework for
the conference. The United States believes
that it has to deal with governments. The
Secretary of State stated not so long ago
that in the North Vietnamese representation
at any conference, they would decide who
their delegate should be and that that could
provide an avenue, if they so desired, to
have the Viet Cong represented.* That is
the United States policy as I understand it.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, in the Korean ivar,
a United Nations call for a cease-fire paved
the way to stopping the fighting there,
and neither the Red Chinese nor the North
Koreans were members of this organization.
Do you think it is time to test the effective-
ness of a United Nations call for IH. nations
to try to substitute words for bombs in
Viet-Nam ?
A. Our President has indicated again and
again that the only way to settle the dispute
is to go to the conference table without con-
ditions, without conditions. And I must say
at a personal level that that has been my
experience. Going back to my experience
representing the labor movement over many
years, I found that the best way to settle
disputes is to go to the conference table and
then all subsidiary questions can be re-
solved. And it seems to me that that is the
real nub of the problem. Once you go to the
conference table without conditions, every
item is on the agenda.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, did you and the Sec-
retary-General happen to discuss any spe-
cific ways in which the influence of the
United Nations can be brought to bear on
the Viet-Nam situation, following the sug-
gestion in the President's letter?
A. I think that when I have a discussion
' For an interview with Secretary Rusk broadcast
by USIA on July 4, see Bulletin of July 19, 1965,
p. 105.
with the Secretary-General that that discus-
sion is a privileged discussion, if we are to
make progress in the cause to which we are
all devoted. I have said that we discussed
all aspects of the Vietnamese problem re-
lated to the United Nations. And I should
think that that means that we canvassed all
possible matters that could occur to either
of us. But I do not think that it would be
appropriate for me to breach the confidence
of the Secretary-General.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, do you plan to at-
tend all Cabinet meetings? And do you
have any understanding that you will be
consulted before foreign policy is made
that might affect your work here?
A. "All" is a pretty big word. There will
be duties here, of course, which may take
priority. I will be invited to all Cabinet
meetings, where I will sit with the Cabinet,
as was the practice with Governor Steven-
son, and I will attend all that I can attend.
And the President was kind enough to say
when he appointed me that I will have di-
rect access to the President and to the Secre-
tary of State, and I expect to.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, you have stated that
one of the aspects for which you have a
special interest as a jurist is the promotion
of world order. Do you think that this aim
can particularly be fostered by enhancing
the role of the International Court of Justice
in establishing the rule of law?
A. Yes, most emphatically.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, in President John-
son's letter to Secretary-General U Thant he
says the United States is prepared to enter
into negotiations for a peaceful settlement
without conditions. Now, heretofore, he has
been talking about unconditional discussions
rather than using the word "negotiations."
Are those two words interchangeable to
you as a lawyer, or does "negotiations" in-
dicate a more substantive approach to the
problem and a more advanced approach?
A. I think they are interchangeable. If
you use "discussions," I would assume you
mean "meaningful discussions," and then I
276
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
would assume that "meaningful discussions"
or "negotiations" mean the same thing.
Q. / am sure you know, Mr. Ambassador,
that Ambassador \_Henry Caboti Lodge
says they are not interchangeable.
A. I will have to only talk for myself in
this respect. I think that to me, with my
experience, "discussions" mean you are talk-
ing about the problems in a meaningful way ;
when you say "negotiations," you are talk-
ing about problems in a meaningful way.
I do not know exactly in what context the
Ambassador used it, but I think it has been
meant throughout the United States that to
enter into — is willing to enter into meaning-
ful discussions is, to wit, negotiations, to
wit, meaningful discussions.
Q. Sir, can you tell us exactly ivhat is
the position of your Government to holding
the Geneva conference on Viet-Nam ?
A. Would you please repeat that?
Q. What is the position of your Govern-
ment, as of now, on holding the Geneva
conference on Viet-Nam? You are speaking
about negotiations, but my question is
specifically on the Geneva conference.
A. Our Government has indicated in a
number of ways that we would be willing to
enter into a Geneva-type conference, and
the President repeated that several times,
using that as a framework for discussions
on this issue.
Q. Then do I understand that you are
against the Geneva conference as it is?
A. I have not said that. I thought I said
exactly the contrary.
Q. You said "a Geneva-type conference."
My question is the Geneva conference.
A. I do not know precisely what you
mean by that. We will say this: We are
willing, as the President said, to enter into
a conference of any type that would be a
meaningful conference without conditions to
discuss this.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, what personal role
will you be playing in shaping United
States policy before the United Nations?
A. I will do anything my Government
wants me to do in this area.
Dedication to Rule of Law
Q. Mr. Ambassador, on a more personal
note, I am rather curious to know which
of your experiences you think might be
most useful, as a conciliator or as a justice ?
A. I would hope the first experience that
would be most meaningful would be my ex-
perience as a Justice of the Supreme Court
dedicated to the rule of law. That is what
we are talking about. The great adventure
of the United Nations is to bring the rule
of law to bear in relations between sovereign
states. And I would think that that is the
most meaningful.
My experience in labor matters in a
sense is not unrelated to that because it
also involved bringing to bear the rule of
law in industrial relations with the United
States when that was very badly needed.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, S'peaking of your
relations with the Cabinet and the Presi-
dent— having access to the President and
the Secretary of State — / was reminded
that Robert Murphy in his "Diplomat Among
Warriors" quotes an incident in which Am-
bassador Lodge told Mr. Murphy, when he
was Assistant Secretary of State, that he
was not answerable to instructions from the
State Department but that he was a mem-
ber of the Cabinet. Do you consider that
you are acting under instructions from the
State Department or as coequal to the Sec-
retary of State?
A. I haven't the slightest bit of interest
in jurisdictional matters. I concluded my
interest in jurisdictional matters when I re-
signed my post as counselor for the labor
movement, and I had my fill of them at that
time. I was appointed by the President. I
have the most cordial relations with my old
Cabinet colleague. Dean Rusk. I do not an-
ticipate that there will be the slightest bit
of difficulty in this area. And I am not
AUGUST 16, 1965
277
going to draw an organizational chart to
plot the path that here I have to follow.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, ivhat do you intend
saying to the Russians tomorrow at the
lunch, and how did it come about?
A. I intend, first of all, to have a good
lunch, because I am sure you can have a
good lunch at the Russian Embassy. Mostly
I think I will listen tomorrow. I have a lot
to learn.
Q. Mr. Ambassador, would it be correct
to assume from your remarks just now on
Viet-Nam, all these remarks, that the
United States is not willing to Imve a cease-
fire before negotiations?
A. I have said that the main task at
hand is to get an agreement to have nego-
tiations. It is an academic question to talk
about cease-fire where there has been no
agreement to negotiate. That is an academic
question, and academic questions need not
be answered — where if you have parties
who say they are willing to negotiate, then
you talk about all problems. It is quite
academic to talk about cease-fire when
there has been no understanding to nego-
tiate. I remember that the United States
ceased firing for a while, and nothing hap-
pened. The important thing is, is there a
willingness to negotiate?
May I just make one final comment. I
will ask a question of myself that you
haven't asked, which I have been thinking
about; so if you will allow me to ask it:
How am I to be addressed? Ambassador?
Justice? Secretary? I have had this question
put to me in Washington, and I declined
to answer until I thought about it. It seems
like a protocol question which I ought to
ignore, but it is a question of some meaning
to me because of my feeling for the Court
in which I sat. And I would like to answer
it, since you will have to talk to me and I
propose to talk to you.
In the last 5 years I have had three very
great titles of honor given to me by my Gov-
ernment: Mr. Secretary, Mr. Justice, and
now Mr. Ambassador. You can address me
by any of those titles, and I will be glad
to respond to them with a feeling of great
honor. In Texas — which has some relevancy
to my present post — when you are named a
judge, you are always a judge. And I would
be flattered if some of my friends continue
to call me Mr. Justice.
Our housekeeper, who has been with us for
many years, said she is tired of learning
my new titles, and she is going to call me
Mr. Justice. But I will be equally flattered
and honored if you call me Mr. Ambassador,
representing the President of the United
States at this great assembly. It is as high
an honor as a man could aspire to, and I
will answer to Mr. Secretary to old friends
who remember me in that capacity, and I
will answer to any name that in any re-
sponse to which would contribute to the
cause of peace.
Security Council Urged To Respond
to Cliallenge in Southeast Asia
U.S./U.N. press release 4610 dated July 30
Following is the text of a letter from
Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Rep-
resentative to the United Nations, to Am-
bassador Platon D. Morozov, President of
the U.N. Security Council.
July 30, 1965
Dear Mr. PREsroENX: The President of
the United States announced on July 28,
1965,1 certain steps being taken by my gov-
ernment to lend further assistance to the
Republic of Viet-Nam in resisting armed
aggression.
At the same time the President reaffirmed
to the Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions the willingness of the United States
to enter into negotiations for peaceful settle-
ment without conditions, and again invited
all Members of the United Nations, indi-
vidually and collectively, to use their influ-
ence to bring about discussions in a nego-
' See p. 262.
278
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tiating forum.^ On July 29 the Secretary-
General immediately sent a most welcome
and appreciated reply, stating his determi-
nation to pursue his efforts to remove the
dispute over Viet-Nam from the battlefield
to the negotiating table.
The Security Council, which has a legiti-
mate interest in the peace of Southeast Asia,
has been kept informed of the policy of my
government with respect to the dangerous
course of events in that part of the world.
For example, my late predecessor. Ambassa-
dor Adlai E. Stevenson, told the Council
more than a year ago, on May 21, 1964:*
. . . the United States has no, repeat no, national
military objectives anywhere in Southeast Asia.
United States policy for Southeast Asia is very
simple. It is the restoration of peace so that the
peoples of that area can go about their own inde-
pendent business in whatever associations they may
freely choose for themselves without interference
from the outside.
Members of the Council also are aware
of the prolonged and repeated efforts of the
United States Government to open a path
to peaceful solution of the disputes of South-
east Asia, beginning with our acceptance of
the terms of the Geneva Accords of 1954.
These efforts have included :
— Various approaches to Hanoi, Peking
and Moscow.
— Support of peaceful overtures by the
United Kingdom, Canada, and the British
Commonwealth of Nations.
— Favorable reactions to proposals made
by seventeen non-aligned nations,^ and later
by the Government of India.
— Approval of efforts by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations to initiate
peace talks.
— Endorsement of a larger role for the
United Nations in Southeast Asia, including
a U.N. mission of observers along the fron-
tier between Viet-Nam and Cambodia, a
^ For text of President Johnson's letter to the U.N.
Secretary-General and the Secretary-General's reply,
see p. 275.
' Bulletin of June 8, 1964, p. 907.
* For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
U.N. mission to investigate alleged suppres-
sion of minority rights in Viet-Nam, and a
U.N. invitation to Hanoi to participate in
Security Council discussions of the incident
in the Gulf of Tonkin.
— Major participation, directly and through
the United Nations, in economic and social
development projects in Southeast Asia.
— A direct appeal by the President of the
United States to the members of the United
Nations to use their influence in bringing
all parties to the peace table.
— Repeated assertions on the highest au-
thority that the United States is prepared
to engage in negotiations or discussions of
any character with no prior conditions
whatever.
On at least fifteen occasions in the past
four-and-a-half years, the United States has
initiated or supported efforts to resolve the
issues in Southeast Asia by peaceful nego-
tiations.
I am sure that the other Members of the
Security Council share the deep regrets of
my government in the fact that none of these
initiatives has met with any favorable re-
sponse whatever. It is especially unfortunate
that the regime in Hanoi, which, along with
the Republic of Viet-Nam, is most directly
involved in the conflict, has denied the com-
petence of the United Nations to concern
itself with this dispute in any manner and
has even refused to participate in the dis-
cussions in the Council.
Nonetheless, our commitments under the
Charter of the United Nations require us to
persist in the search for a negotiated end to
the cruel and futile violence that ravages the
Republic of Viet-Nam. This responsibility — ■
to persist in the search for peace — weighs
especially upon the Members of the Security
Council, the primary organ of the United
Nations for peace and security affairs.
The purpose of this communication there-
fore is to reemphasize to the Members of
the Council the following points :
First, that the United States will continue
to provide, in whatever measure and for
whatever period is necessary, assistance to
AUGUST 16, 1965
279
the people of the Republic of Viet-Nam in
defending their independence, their sover-
eignty, and their right to choose their own
government and make their own decisions.
Second, the United States will continue
to assist in the economic and social advance-
ment of Southeast Asia, under the leadership
of Asian countries and the United Nations,
and will continue to explore all additional
possibilities, especially in connection with
the great projects taking shape in the Lower
Mekong Basin.
Third, the United States will continue to
explore, independently and in conjunction
with others, all possible routes to an honor-
able and durable peace in Southeast Asia.
Fourth, the United States stands ready,
as it has in the past, to collaborate uncondi-
tionally with Members of the Security Coun-
cil in the search for an acceptable formula
to restore peace and security to that area of
the world.
It is the hope of my government that the
Members of the Security Council will some-
how find the means to respond effectively
to the challenge raised by the present state
of affairs in Southeast Asia.
I respectfully request that this communi-
cation be circulated to the Members of the
United Nations as a Security Council docu-
ment.
Accept, Excellency, the assurance of my
highest consideration.
Arthur J. Goldberg
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
Following are statements made in the
United Nations Trusteeship Council by
D wight Dickinson, Alternate U.S. Repre-
sentative in the Trusteeship Council; M.
Wilfred Coding, High Commissioner of the
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands and
U.S. Special Representative in the Trustee-
ship Council; and Bailey Olter, adviser to
the U.S. delegation.
STATEMENT BY MR. DICKINSON, MAY 28
U.S. /U.N. press release 4668
My delegation is pleased to participate
once again in the Trusteeship Council's dis-
cussion of the United States administration
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
My remarks will be brief, since the High
Commissioner of the Trust Territory, Mr.
M. Wilfred Coding, who is again serving
as the Special Representative, will shortly
be giving the Council a detailed report.
Present also on the delegation as an ad-
viser is Mr. Bailey Olter, assistant district
administrator for public affairs in the Po-
nape District and an elected representative
of the Ponape District in the new Congress
of Micronesia. With the Council's approval,
Mr. Olter will make a brief statement later.
In addition, three other representatives
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
are here observing the Council's proceedings
as part of a United States leader grant pro-
gram. They are Mayor Petrus Mailo of Truk,
Mr. Raymond Setik, assistant district ad-
ministrator for administration, also of Truk,
and Mr. Juan Blanco, manager of the Saipan
branch of the Bank of America. We are con-
fident that this group of Micronesians, like
previous groups, will benefit substantially
not only from their leader grant experience
but also from the sure knowledge that this
Council discusses with interest and consid-
erable detail matters concerning the ad-
vancement of Micronesia and of the trust
territories of Nauru and New Guinea.
280
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I need not reiterate here, Mr. President,
the seriousness with which my Government
seeks to fulfill the political, economic, edu-
cational, and social developmental obligations
we accepted under the Charter of the United
Nations and under the trusteeship agree-
ment. That seriousness of purpose is further
demonstrated by our attention to this Coun-
cil's recommendations and our execution of
them.
The Council is familiar with the extensive
new program undertaken in the trust terri-
tory 4 years ago. At the Council's last
session the United States Representative
stated that the initial efforts in the accel-
erated program in the fields of education
and medical facilities were well advanced
and that increased appropriations would en-
able the United States to develop plans for
the expansion of programs for economic and
social development. At the same time it was
indicated that these new programs would
be undertaken without prejudice to the ac-
celerated programs in health and education.
As the Council will hear in the statement of
the Special Representative, the education
and medical programs have indeed been
continued and enlarged and far-reaching
programs are underway in the economic and
social development fields.
No doubt the most important event of all
is in the area of political development. A
major step toward the fulfillment of the
charter obligation to develop "self-govern-
ment or independence" was taken on Sep-
tember 28, 1964, with the issuance of a Sec-
retarial order authorizing the establishment
of the first territory-wide legislature. Elec-
tions were held on January 19, 1965, and
the Congress will convene in its first session
on July 12, 1965. The Congress is a two-
house body: a House of Delegates with 2
members from each of the six administra-
tive districts and a 21-member General As-
sembly, the membership of which is appor-
tioned on a population basis. The Council
undoubtedly will be interested in Mr. Cod-
ing's presentation of information about the
Congress of Micronesia and about the atmos-
phere in which the election campaigns were
conducted.
In the year since the Council last met, the
United States has also taken steps to add
compassionate compensation to the extensive
provisions already made for the people of
Rongelap. The compensation bill described at
the Council's 31st session was signed into
law by President Lyndon B. Johnson on Oc-
tober 22, 1964. Under this law $950,000 will
be paid as compassionate compensation to
the Rongelapese. Since the bill was signed
after the Congress had already passed the
budget for fiscal year 1965, it was necessary
to submit a supplemental appropriation bill
to secure funds for payment of the compen-
sation. This special supplemental appropria-
tion was approved by the President on April
30, 1965, and payment can now begin.
I am sorry my delegation cannot report
similar success in the efforts of the United
States to reach an agreement with the Jap-
anese Government on a solution to the prob-
lem of Micronesian claims remaining from
World War II. The United States will con-
tinue to pursue these talks and keep the
Council informed.
Finally, Mr. President, despite the prog-
ress to which we can point, we are only too
aware that the task still before us is enor-
mous ; much remains to be done. We believe,
however, that anyone visiting the trust terri-
tory today will gain the same impression
that the visiting mission did last year — that
"the Territory is now moving and the hum
of activity can be heard throughout Micro-
nesia."
STATEMENT BY MR. CODING, MAY 28
U.S./U.N. press release 4B69
It is a privilege to appear again before
this body as the Special Representative for
the Administering Authority of the Trust
Territory of the Pacific Islands. ^ In this
fifth appearance as Special Representative
of the United States, I am happy to be able
to report continuing and accelerated prog-
^ For a statement made by Mr. Coding in the
Trusteeship Council on May 28, 1964, see Bulletin
of June 29, 1964, p. 1007.
AUGUST 16, 1965
281
ress in carrying forward our obligations and
responsibilities to the people of Micronesia.
In the 4 years that have elapsed since my
first appearance in June of 1961, many
eventful changes have come about. A reas-
sessment of needs in the fields of education,
in economic development, in public health, in
short, reassessment of needs and priorities
in all fields of endeavor have led to basic
policy changes and to the reshaping and re-
vamping of all programs in the territory
pointed toward accelerated development.
Administration
Our major task the first year of the new
approach was to justify to the U.S. Congress
the need for vastly increased appropriations
to facilitate a more rapid pace of develop-
ment. Strong support was forthcoming from
all levels of government — from the office of
the President, the Department of the In-
terior, the Department of State, the Bureau
of the Budget, the appropriate congressional
committees. A sympathetic and generous re-
sponse from the U.S. Congress was soon
forthcoming. Legislation was enacted in 1962
increasing statutory limitation on appro-
priations from $714 million to a new authori-
zation level of $171/2 million. Our requests
for increased appropriations fell upon recep-
tive ears, and for the fiscal years 1963, 1964,
and 1965 a total of $47,500,000 was appro-
priated by the United States Congress for
administration of the territory. Our budget
proposal for the coming fiscal year, 1966,
that of $17,344,000, already has been ap-
proved by the House of Representatives and,
with the approval of the Senate Appropria-
tions Committee, now awaits final action by
the Congress.
The increased appropriations have pro-
vided for accelerated programs in elemen-
tary and secondary education, a tripling of
funds for public-health services, a vastly in-
creased construction program, as well as ex-
pansion in all major activities of the terri-
tory. I propose to outline in these introduc-
tory remarks the most significant aspects of
progress in these expanded programs this
past year.
Plans for an integrated social security
system continue to be studied, and we ex-
pect to have a top expert in this field visit
the territory later this year to advise us in
preparing a workable system. Supplemental
beneficial measures for Micronesian work-
ers, however, continued to be instituted on
an interim basis. The most significant of
these this past year was a change in the
annual-leave program for Micronesian em-
ployees, which provides more liberal benefits.
Whereas formerly all Micronesian employees
regardless of length of service accrued 13
workdays of leave per year, they will now ac-
crue annual leave on the basis of length of
service, the minimum being 13 workdays per
year and the maximum 26 workdays, a leave
system similar to that provided for the U.S.
Civil Service employee. Micronesian employ-
ees now are in the same category as are the
U.S. Civil Service employees with respect to
sick leave and annual leave. The next step,
and one in which I hope the new Congress
of Micronesia will take a special interest, is
to provide a suitable and workable retire-
ment system for Government workers.
A new procedure was implemented during 1
the year which provides that a promotion "
action for a Micronesian shall represent, at
the minimum, a two-step within-grade salary
increase in contrast to a former one-step in-
crease. An additional pay-grade level, A-9,
was added to the wage scale for Micro-
nesian trade employees to provide suitable
compensation for high-level supervisory per-
sonnel in the trades. Arrangements also
were made to extend workmen's compensa-
tion to all Micronesian employees of private
contractors who perform work for the trust
territory government.
The turnover of senior administrative po-
sitions to qualified Micronesians continued
during the year. Mr. Bailey Olter was ap-
pointed assistant district administrator for
public affairs in Ponape District, his ap-
pointment being the sixth of this nature.
The position of political affairs officer on
my staff was filled by a Palauan, Mr. Ray-
mond Ulochong. A Palauan graduate of the
George Washington Law School, Mr. Kaleb
Udui, was appointed to the position of as-
sistant attorney general and, on several oc-
282
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
casions during extended absences of the at-
torney general, has served capably and well
as acting attorney general. Within the past
month a qualified candidate from the Mari-
anas, Mr, Manuel T. Sablan, was appointed
to the newly created position of assistant
director of public safety.
An item also worthy of special note was
the award of a Parvin graduate fellowship
in public administration to Mr. Leo Falcam,
present assistant district administrator for
administration, Ponape District. Mr. Falcam
will attend the Woodrow Wilson Graduate
School of Public and International Affairs,
Princeton University, this coming year,
specializing in the area of public adminis-
tration. Upon completion of this advance
academic graduate and internship training,
Mr. Falcam will have an educational back-
ground which will qualify him for almost
any senior administrative position now occu-
pied by U.S. staff.
Our scholarship and special training pro-
grams now are reaching a level where an
ever-increasing number of qualified Microne-
sians are returning to the territory equipped
to take over senior administrative and pro-
fessional posts. We expect the pace to
quicken in replacement from now on.
I am pleased to be able to announce also
that the reorganization I described at the 31st
session, that of setting up four major areas
of responsibilities, each headed by an assist-
ant commissioner, has been completed. The
appointment of the remaining assistant com-
missioner, that for resources and develop-
ment, has just been announced, and he will
be reporting for duty early next month.
A new director of budget and finance also
was appointed a month ago, and I feel we
are well on our way to achieving a more
effective coordination of efforts in all major
activities.
Education
The accelerated program in education
continued into its third year. As with all
programs involving major changes, planned
schedules have not always been maintained.
Supply and logistic problems prevented the
carrying out of construction of new ele-
mentary schools as rapidly as we had hoped
in certain of the outlying areas of Truk
District and the Marshalls, where logistic
problems are of considerable magnitude. A
readjustment of timetables of construction
was necessitated. Nonetheless, during the
year 250 new elementary classrooms were
placed in use and 88 additional qualified
American classroom teachers joined local
elementary school staffs to supplement the
U.S. teaching force of 35 elementary teach-
ers employed the previous school year.
There was continued expansion of sec-
ondary schools during the year. The 11th
grade was added to the high school in Yap,
and the other five districts added the 12th
and final grade of high school. New public
high schools came into being in Kusaie and
in Ulithi with the institution of the 10th
grade to the former junior high schools
there.
Three years ago, in 1962, the territory
had one public high school with a total en-
rollment of 150 students. This past school
year, six district public high schools, grades
9 through 12, and two subdistrict high
schools, up to grade 10, were in operation
with an enrollment of 1,980 students. Esti-
mated public high school enrollment for this
coming school year is set at 2,500 students.
I have not computed the percentage in-
crease, but as the members can easily see,
it is one of formidable magnitude.
Twenty-four additional qualified Amer-
ican teachers were added to the staffs of
these high schools this past year. This com-
ing school year we expect to have 72 U.S.
teachers in the high schools in addition to
a substantial number of qualified Micro-
nesian staff. Construction of additional sec-
ondary classrooms, dormitories, and other
essential auxiliary buildings is underway or
is planned in all districts.
The Micronesian teacher education center
moved into its third year of operation and
provided training in elementary school meth-
ods and general education for 60 Micro-
nesian teachers.
During fiscal year 1964, 196 students
were attending institutions of higher learn-
AUGUST 16, 1965
283
ing outside the territory, some 86 students
of this group being official government
scholars, and for the coming school year I
have just announced general scholarship
avifards for 60 students, of which 44 will
be for initial studies and 16 for advanced
degrees. Additionally, 21 new premedical
and paramedical scholarships have been
awarded for the coming year. It is expected
that possibly 10 additional government
scholarships will be available before the
opening of the school year next fall. There
will also be 5 new East-West Center degree
scholars, some 15 district congress scholars,
as well as a limited number of scholars on
grants from outside institutions. Our scholar-
ship program, as can be seen, is a major
part of our educational system.
It is anticipated that another 100 students
of university level will be attending colleges
through their own resources or through a
combination of administration and private
assistance.
Specialized short-term or refresher train-
ing greatly expanded this past year. Through
the Institute for Technical Interchange, over
150 men and women attended refresher
courses or specialized training courses at the
East-West Center in Hawaii or in the ter-
ritory. These included medical officers,
nurses, hospital administrators, sanitarians,
radio broadcast personnel, extension agri-
culturists, business methods teachers, train-
ees in commercial cooking, waitress train-
ing, and trainees of a variety of other skills.
We expect a similar amount of refresher
training this forthcoming year.
Four leading citizens of the territory
were abroad during the year on United
Nations fellowships : Mrs. Rose Makwelung,
adult education supervisor from Ponape, was
observing community development projects
in the Philippines, Ceylon, and India; Mr.
Yoster Carl, public defender representative
in Ponape, was studying and observing the
court system in New Zealand; Mr. Manuel
Sablan, assistant director of public safety
of the attorney general's staff, studied at
the International Police Academy in Wash-
ington and other law enforcement groups in
the U.S.A. ; and Mr. Prudencio Manglona of
Rota was studying public administration in
the Philippines.
The members of the 1964 visiting mis-
sion will be pleased to learn that plans
are well underway to transform the liter-
ature production center into a trust ter-
ritory printing and publications establish-
ment. An experienced literature production
officer was recruited early in 1964 and this
past year completed an analysis of the
territory's printing needs. Plans were drawn
up and approved for establishment of a well-
equipped trust territory printing and pub-
lication office. Accommodations for the
plant already have been provided, some of
the basic printing equipment has arrived, and
budget provision has been made to enable
this publication unit to become operational
by the end of this calendar year.
Two trainees currently are at the East-
West Center for printing and graphic art
training, some in-service training is being
given at headquarters, and a full scholar-
ship in graphic arts has just been awarded.
As soon as the central headquarters facility
is operational, further training programs
will be offered to meet district needs.
The Council might be interested to know
that one of the items that our publications
office now is working on is a pictorial, and
geographically accurate, map of Micronesia,
showing its relations to its Pacific neighbors.
By early next year we hope to be doing the
bulk of our own printing, and much of the
production will stress the history of Micro-
nesia and its culture. Since I know so many
members of past visiting missions have ex-
pressed special interest in this aspect, I feel
it worthy of special mention at this time.
Political Advancement
Without question the highlight of the
year was in the field of political develop-
ment: the culmination of planning pointing
to the formation of the Congress of Micro-
nesia.
The Council is well aware of the step-by-
step development of this territorial legis-
lature, and I will not go into details of
284
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
background here. Its predecessor, the Coun-
cil of Micronesia, devoted almost 2 years to
studying this matter and by resolution in
two separate sessions recommended the
formation of a two-house body.
I might state that the desires of the
people of Micronesia with respect to the new
Congress, as expressed through the elected
Council of Micronesia, were given every
consideration. The Secretarial order fol-
lowed closely the recommendations of the
Council of Micronesia, not only in estab-
lishing a two-house body but in embodying
most of the major recommendations of that
group. A Secretarial order was used to es-
tablish the Congress because it was felt
this would provide the necessary flexibility
by which changes could be effected easily
and quickly. Special provision was made for
the submission to the Secretary of amend-
ments recommended by two-thirds of each
House of Congress.
The order grants wide legislative author-
ity to the Congress. Among its other pro-
visions, the order gives the Congress power
to levy taxes, requires that legislation twice
vetoed by the High Commissioner be referred
to the Secretary of the Interior for further
action, and provides for participation in the
review of the annual budget of the trust
territory prior to its submission to the
United States Congress.
Provision was made in the order for the
appointment of a full-time legislative coun-
sel to assist the Congress. I am most
pleased to report that I have appointed Dr.
Robert R. Robbins, chairman of the Depart-
ment of Government and professor of gov-
ernment. Tufts University, to serve as leg-
islative counsel for the initial session of the
Congress. Dr. Robbins formerly served as
alternate U.S. Representative to the Trustee-
ship Council in 1954, was a member of the
U.S. delegations to the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly in 1949 and from 1953 to
1955. He served also as a member of the
U.N. Trusteeship Council visiting mission to
Togoland in 1955. Dr. Robbins' field of
speciality is the development of dependent
territories toward self-government, and I
feel we are very fortunate in being able
to secure his services at this time. After
the first session of the Congress in July, he
will remain with us in the territory for 6
months, serving as consultant to the Con-
gress and adviser on political development.
I will be pleased to provide additional de-
tails on the new Congress as may be de-
sired by members of the Council. It might
be noted here, however, that by special pro-
vision, during the first formative years of
the Congress, membership is fully open to
persons holding positions in the executive
branch or the judiciary of the trust ter-
ritory government. This provision will en-
able the Congress during its initial stages
to draw upon the extensive experience in
public affairs of many Micronesians who
hold important posts in the administration.
However, after a 4-year period of time, or,
to be precise, at the third general election
to the Congress, government officers and em-
ployees holding positions as a department
head or assistant department head, or as a
judge or a member of a district legislature,
may no longer hold office in the territorial
Congress.
I look forward to the first meeting of the
new Congress and the early consideration
of a sound legislative program.
In all districts the general elections for
the Congress of Micronesia were regarded as
the most significant political event of the
year. The planning and execution of a gen-
eral election in an area as diffuse as ours
was not an easy task, and the local election
boards are to be commended for the out-
standing work they performed. District elec-
tions were lively affairs with vigorous cam-
paigning. In Palau District, for example, six
candidates vied for the two seats in the
General Assembly. Palau has two political
parties, and party affiliation proved to be
strong, enabling the parties to capture four
of the five seats, with one seat in the House
of Assembly being captured by an inde-
pendent candidate.
Ponape District also carried on a very
lively and aggressive campaign with 23
candidates vying for Ponape's six seats.
AUGUST 16, 1965
285
There five of the six elected Congressmen
are young men of high educational qualifica-
tions who have gained recognition and rep-
utation in their respective professional
fields.
Mr. Bailey Olter, who is here as adviser
on our delegation, carried out a successful
campaign for a seat in the House of Dele-
gates from Hawaii, where he was completing
academic work at the East-West Center. It
is a tribute to his local reputation that he not
only won his seat but led all the candidates
in Ponape by polling the largest vote of any
candidate.
And so it went in all our districts. In-
tense, meaningful campaigns were conducted,
with candidates presenting their programs
by radio, in rallies, and by home visits.
Without exception, each of the district ad-
ministrators was so impressed with the po-
litical maturity of candidates and the dem-
ocratic procedures carried out by local cit-
izens in choosing their representatives for
the new Congress as to earmark the elec-
tions as the most important single event oc-
curring in the districts during the year.
Economic Development
A major economic development event of
the year was the signing last month of a
contract with a leading economic develop-
ment consulting firm to undertake a 2-year
economic development program for Micro-
nesia. This firm will prepare an inventory
of assets, liabilities, and opportunities of
Micronesia which will be used in preparing
a long-range integrated economic develop-
ment program for the territory. Formula-
tion of the development program will be car-
ried out concurrently with actual imple-
mentation. The president and senior associ-
ate of this firm have completed preliminary
studies in the territory, and the first mem-
bers of the permanent staff are expected to
arrive in Saipan in June. Services of the
firm will include assistance in developing
immediate action projects, assistance in de-
veloping territory-wide projects, preparation
of feasibility studies, land-use analysis, as-
sistance in estimating and securing local
and outside capital requirements, technical
and managerial assistance to businessmen,
technical representation and development
training of Micronesians, and advisory
services to the High Commissioner.
The Van Camp Sea Food Company began
commercial operations in the Palau District
in August 1964. Total export of fish by Van
Camp for this present year is estimated at
4,194 tons, valued at $291,761. This includes
250 short tons of yellowfin valued at $21,552
and 2,158 short tons of skipjack valued at
$146,519. The Caroline Fisheries Company,
a Micronesian-owned firm, also was estab-
lished in Palau in April 1965. This firm,
which utilizes fishing vessels built in Oki-
nawa for offshore tuna fishing, will sell its
catch to the Van Camp Sea Food Company.
An appreciable increase in the tonnage of
tuna now being exported from Palau is ex-
pected as a result of the new firm's opera-
tions. The Palauan firm will also sell fish
to the Palau Fishermen's Cooperative for
local sale. With the arrival of the 7 vessels
of Caroline Fisheries, there are now 13 tuna
fishing vessels operating in Palau waters.
Another six vessels are expected to be oper-
ated by Van Camp and will arrive within
the next month.
Plans are underway to expand commercial
fisheries operations in other districts of the
territory. The Van Camp Sea Food Company
has completed engineering and feasibility
studies preliminary to construction of a
freezing plant and cold storage plant and J
other necessary shore facilities in Truk. The "
company has requested a lease and has in-
dicated its intention of opening fisheries
operations in this district. A number of
trainees from Truk are presently working on
tuna vessels in Palau. Other companies also
have expressed interest in opening fisheries
operations and have conducted preliminary
investigations. The Bureau of Commercial
Fisheries, Fish and Wildlife Service, in the
Department of the Interior, U.S. Govern-
ment, also is planning to set up a fishery
sampling station in Palau, with the initial
work being directed toward collection of
statistics and biological samples in the tuna
fisheries. This research will be of great
286
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
value in planning commercial fisheries ex-
pansion for the territory.
The Palau boatyard, which was dedicated
on September 3, 1964, is equipped to build
wooden vessels up to 100 feet. Our boat-
building specialist is training Micronesians
to build vessels to meet the growing terri-
tory demand for boats and ships of all types
and sizes, and approximately 64 small boats
have been completed since July of last year.
Under construction is a 75-foot Hawaiian-
type tuna fishing vessel for experimental
and training operations in the Palau fish-
eries.
During the year the Marshall Islands Im-
port-Export Company took over the opera-
tion of the Trust Territory Hotel in Majuro.
At the present time construction is proceed-
ing to convert the second floor of their main
building in the district center into a modern
20-room hotel facility.
In Saipan a 16-room, 2-story concrete
government hotel will be completed this
month and will be leased to private opera-
tors by the government. Another new 10-
room hotel is nearing completion in Yap.
This brings to a total of three the govern-
ment-owned hotels now being operated by
Micronesian entrepreneurs or local firms,
the others being in the Marshalls and Palau.
Four new motels were completed this past
year in the Marianas, and three others cur-
rently are under construction. Rota has a
new 20-bed privately owned hotel in opera-
tion.
In other business areas private enterprise
expanded operations. Atkins-Kroll Company
of Guam opened a branch office on Saipan
to engage in business as indent merchants,
insurance and steampship agents. Microne-
sian Underwriters Insurance Company, an
affiliate of American Underwriters Insur-
ance of America, was given a charter to con-
duct business in the trust territory. Plans
are underway to turn the Micronesian prod-
ucts center over to a private Micronesian
company in order to increase sales of hand-
icraft.
With the passage of legislation by the
U.S. Congress, $368,000 in a former revolv-
ing fund for loans to trading companies was
transferred to the economic development
loan fund. This brought the balance of the
fund established in 1963 to $668,000 during
the year under review.
In all districts economic development loan
review icommittees have been established
to review loan applications and submit rec-
ommendations to the development loan fund
board.
The current year witnessed an increased
development in the field of low-cost housing.
In addition to the Marianas and Ebeye
housing authorities, which were established
in 1964, the Truk housing authority was
created in February of this year. As a re-
sult of typhoon Louise, which struck An-
gaur and Peleliu Islands, Palau District,
severely damaging over 90 percent of pri-
vate dwellings, an Angaur housing author-
ity was established in February to develop
and administer low-cost housing and urban
renewal projects in Angaur.
Like other housing authorities previously
established, the Angaur housing authority
is a public body corporate with power
vested in a 5-man board of directors. The
authority may discharge its responsibilities
by engaging in such activities as purchase
and resale of construction materials and
loans or guarantee of loans to individuals,
groups, or associations.
This year the trust territory government
transferred 50 acres of government land in
Garapan area, Saipan, to the Mariana
Islands housing authority on condition that
the authority develop the area in connection
with low-cost housing and urban renewal
projects. It is planned to build on the Gar-
apan site complete two- and three-bedroom
concrete-block houses for approximately
$5,000 and $6,000 respectively. Each unit
will include modern bathroom facilities and
hot water heaters.
Tourism development in the trust terri-
tory has increased during the year. Both the
Marianas and the Palau Districts are mak-
ing efforts to encourage tourism. Plans are
underway to provide a complete information
and guide service to tourists entering Sai-
pan. Additionally, proposals have been re-
ceived for building several sizable tourist-
AUGUST 16, 1965
287
type hotels in Saipan, and negotiations as
to leasing land, et cetera, currently are un-
derway.
In Palau the opening of the 6,000-foot
Airai Airfield has greatly increased possi-
bilities for tourism. During the year under
review, a special chartered flight was ar-
ranged to bring tourists from Guam to Palau
for the annual fair.
This past year also marked the highest
production of copra since 1938, when 14,938
short tons of copra were exported. It is esti-
mated that for fiscal year 1965, 14,000 short
tons of copra valued at $2,523,867 will be
exported.
Due to better marketing procedures and
rising world prices, the copra stabilization
board was able to grant two price increases
during the year in October 1964 and April
1965, bringing the price paid in the districts
for grade-1 copra to $130 per short ton. In
addition to increasing prices to producers,
between July 1964 and April 1965 the cap-
ital of the copra stabilization fund was in-
creased by $53,000 to $760,561.
The growth and expansion of credit un-
ions and cooperatives were greatly encour-
aged during the year through the services of
the new headquarters cooperative officer and
two field officers. At the end of 1964 there
were 27 credit unions operating in the terri-
tory, with assets of $193,000. These popular
mutually owned savings and loan associa-
tions had 2,450 members, with membership
savings of $167,814 or an average per mem-
ber of $68. The entire amount belongs to
Micronesians, and there are no government
funds in these credit unions. During the
year, 1,149 borrowers obtained loans from
their credit unions for some $166,500, or an
average of about $145. These loans are made
exclusively to members for such useful pur-
poses as home improvement, purchasing fur-
nishings for the home, purchasing boats and
outboard motors, and a variety of other pur-
poses.
Total income (principally from loans to
members) aggregated $16,008, and net earn-
ings, after paying all operating expenses,
were $13,210. After allocating a portion of
net earnings to reserves (which totaled
$5,150 at the end of the year), most credit
unions were able to pay dividends on shares
to their members of from 3 percent to 6 per-
cent. One credit union paid an exceptional
dividend of 16 percent.
At the end of the year there were 14 op-
erating cooperative associations in the trust
territory : 6 copra producers' ; 2 fishermen's ;
3 handicraft producers'; 1 housing; 1 boat-
building; 1 federation. These associations
had total membership of approximately 2,600
persons, mostly Micronesians. In 1964 these
mutually owned and operated cooperative
associations did total business with their
members of about $ll^ million. While fig-
ures are incomplete, these associations had
estimated net savings (earnings) of about
$75,000, which were available to members
as dividends on contributed capital and pa-
tronage refunds in proportion to the amount
of business each member did with his asso-
ciation during the year.
Further expansion in the field of cooper-
atives for fishermen, copra producers, and
retail stores, and among farming groups is
anticipated.
Coconut planting and rehabilitation con-
tinued throughout the territory, with the
greatest emphasis being in the Marshall
Islands and Ponape Districts. Cacao promo-
tion continued in Ponape, Truk, Palau, and
Yap, and 15 tons of cocoa beans will be ex-
ported this fiscal year. In the pilot rice proj-
ect, 5,000 pounds of rice were harvested; 9
acres of paddy land were in cultivation; 14
varieties of rice were tested, of which 2
were found to be quite suitable to local con-
ditions. Twenty-five (100-vine) pepper gar-
dens were established by local farmers at
Ponape; 2,175 pounds of black and white
pepper were processed from the Ponape
demonstrational planting. Approximately 10
acres of ramie is now under cultivation in
Palau, and 21/4 tons of ramie fiber were ex-
ported.
A beef cattle project was initiated in July
1964 in the Marianas District, and 55 Santa
Gertrudis heifers were imported from the
United States as the foundation breeding
stock for this project.
New poultry breeding units were built at
I
288
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Palau, Marianas, Truk, and Marshalls, and
new piggery units at Truk, Yap, Marshalls,
and Rota were constructed.
New agricultural warehouse and equipment
buildings were completed at the trust terri-
tory farm institute, in the Marianas and in
the Marshalls. A new building to house coir
fiber machinery at Truk and a rice process-
ing building at Ponape were completed.
Two Micronesians graduated with B.S.
degrees in agriculture; one specializing in
poultry husbandry, the other in agriculture
economics. Both have been employed in their
respective fields.
Twenty-four trust territory farm institute
students graduated after 9 months' basic
training in tropical agriculture. Another
class for 21 students opened in March 1965.
A headquarters forestry conservation offi-
cer has been hired and will be stationed in
the new plant industry branch in Koror,
Palau. As one of his first assignments, the
new forestry conservation officer will be
charged with setting up a proper forestry
conservation development program for the
Palau District. A trust territory forestry
demonstration and training station will be
established at the Nekken demonstration
center in Babelthuap. Subsequently the for-
estry conservation officer will set up suit-
able programs of forestry conservation de-
velopment for the districts of Yap, Ponape,
Marianas, and Truk in that order.
Training in various aspects of agriculture
was greatly intensified during the year. In
cooperation with the East-West Center a
coconut interchange seminar was conducted
at Ponape, with 48 participants in attend-
ance for 3 weeks. Six participants studied
practical island horticulture and plant quar-
antine in Hawaii, and two Micronesians and
the plant pathologist are attending a plant
pathology training project in Apia, Western
Samoa.
During the year, two Ponapeans were sent
to Sarawak, Malaysia, for a year's training
in pepper culture.
A plant pathologist from the University of
California made a survey for us during the
year on a cacao canker disease occurring
at Ponape.
An animal parasitologist of the Univer-
sity of Hawaii also conducted a 5-week
study and survey of animal parasites in the
Marianas District.
The oriental fruit fly eradication program
on Tinian and Saipan previously described
to the Council and detailed in our annual
report ^ shows every sign of a successful con-
clusion by July 1, 1965. This program has
been under the direction of the U.S. Depart-
ment of Agriculture in cooperation with the
Trust Territory Agriculture Division.
Transportation
In presenting the transportation aspects
of this report I am particularly pleased to
announce that the formal opening of the
Palau airfield on Babelthuap Island was
held on April 16th. Our DC-4 aircraft landed
on the 6,000-foot airfield about 11:40 on
that morning, and hundreds of residents of
Palau were on hand to witness the event.
The building of the airfield was truly a mas-
sive project from the start, and I am
pleased to report that the field now rep-
resents the fifth link in the airfield chain
of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands.
Transfer of heavy earthmoving equip-
ment is now underway from Palau to
Ponape, where preliminary work has begun
on the sixth and final airfield serving the
district centers of the territory. Planning
is being directed toward completion to the
point where it can be made operational a
year from this summer.
Three years ago our air fleet carried ap-
proximately 4,000 passengers throughout the
territory, and this included both official
and revenue passengers. In 3 short years
the passenger lift figure has more than
doubled to 8,192 persons. I expect that fig-
ure to climb even higher now that the
Palau airfield is completed.
Consideration is being given to the es-
tablishment of a commercial airline opera-
tion to serve trust territory air service re-
" Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, 196i (De-
partment of State publication 7811) ; for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D. C, 20402 ($1.25).
AUGUST 16, 1965
289
quirements. One proposal for the establish-
ment of such a venture has been submitted
and is being given study and consideration.
Two passenger and cargo carrying charter
aircraft companies are now operating be-
tween the Guam-Saipan link, and a few ex-
ploratory flights to Yap and Palau have
been made by these companies.
A corollary development of airfield con-
struction in the trust territory has been the
extension of new roads and the improve-
ment of miles of existing roads, particu-
larly on Babelthuap Island. There an ad-
ditional 6 miles of road has been added pro-
viding rapid access from the general vicin-
ity of the airfield project to Koror, the ad-
ministrative center of the district.
As a separate development on Babelthuap
Island, a new pioneer road is underway,
being projected to extend some 27 miles,
the length of the island, which will ultimate-
ly connect all villages of Babelthuap. A little
over a month ago I drove a small vehicle
from the airfield area a distance of 71/2 miles
north on the projected route averaging 20
miles an hour. This development, when ac-
complished, should do much to improve and
speed the transportation throughout the is-
land. No longer will people of the island of
Babelthuap rely entirely upon water trans-
portation from their villages to the outlet
for their agricultural products. Administra-
tion officials too will be able to bring the
services now enjoyed daily by district center
residents to the people of the interior of
Babelthuap with increasing speed and reg-
ularity.
A new 18-mile-long road on Jaluit in the
Marshalls was formally opened a little over
2 months ago, and roads on practically every
large island in the territory are being ex-
tended.
The airfield development on Ponape Is-
land requires that a new 15-mile road be
built out from the district center to the air-
field, which in itself opens greater areas of
the island to homesteading and agricultural
development. Ninety-six additional miles of
road have been rehabilitated or built in the
various parts of the territory in the past
3 years.
Coral or crushed rock surfacing material
has been laid where heavier vehicular traf-
fic requires it. Plans are being discussed now
regarding the possible use of a mobile road-
surfacing crew, complete with modern equip-
ment, which would be loaded aboard ship
and transported from district to district to
seal and surface primary roads where im-
proved surfacing is justified. Steps have
been taken to establish a designated road
system throughout the territory, with pri-
mary roads as the basic responsibility of the
central administration. Secondary roads will
be designated as those involving district
support, with municipal or local roads being
essentially the responsibility of the local
communities. It is planned, however, to con-
tinue to work cooperatively with local com-
munities in developing all three types of
roads.
Though the administration is highly
pleased with the development of the new
airfield network, realistically we do appreci- |
ate that the bulk of material tonnage and
passengers must continue to be lifted by sea
transportation within the territory, and, in
keeping with that knowledge, development of
the maritime service has not been over-
looked.
Last year before this Council I reported
that bid estimates were being secured for a
new 65-foot vessel to be used in the large
lagoon area of the Truk District, while other
construction estimates were also being
gathered. It is my pleasure to report that
the 65-foot Truk Lagoon boat, the MV Feioch,
has been delivered and placed in service.
The Feioch is now serving the Truk Lagoon
area providing regular passenger and cargo
service. Contracts have been awarded and
the keels laid for two new 200-gross-ton
vessels, the MV Yap Islander and the MV
Truk Islander. It is expected that these two
ships will be placed in service this summer.
Increased cargo capacity also will be pro-
vided with the recent conversion of the
MV Errol, which saw the addition of a 36-
foot section inserted in this vessel. Renamed
the MV Palau Islander, this ship, formerly
having a 250-ton cargo capacity, now has a
lift capacity of nearly 700 tons. The Palau
290
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Islander will provide a scheduled fortnightly
service between Guam/Saipan/Yap and
Palau, the fastest and most frequent cargo
and passenger service ever enjoyed by the
latter two districts. It is worthy of note to
compare this new fortnightly schedule with
the service frequency of from 70 to 90 days,
which was the best that prevailed a few
years ago.
As an index to the growing prosperity of
the territory, we need but compare the total
revenue tons of material lifted by the ad-
ministration ships over the past 3 years. In
1962, 58,584 revenue tons were lifted, and in
1964 that total reached 111,584 revenue
tons, an increase of more than 50,000 tons.
An appreciable increase is also foreseen for
the present year.
The training of Micronesians to assume
responsible positions in the territory's mari-
time service was advanced this year as four
men were selected for advanced sea training
at the Honiara Marine School in coordination
with the British Solomon Islands Protect-
orate. Seventeen other Micronesians have
been issued certificates of competency to
serve in an officer capacity aboard trust
territory vessels. In the new scholarship
awards, four nominees were in the field of
navigation for the coming year.
Information and Radio
In the report of the United Nations visit-
ing mission to the trust territory in 1964 ^
heavy emphasis was laid on the need for
imaginative use of the broadcasting facilities
in Micronesia. A recommendation of that
report called for the selection and training
of Micronesians in the field of broadcasting
— men and women of wide education, imag-
ination, and political sensitivity. In this year
under review the administration feels this
goal is being achieved.
Ten young Micronesians attended a 31/2-
month radio broadcasting training session
at the East-West Center last year, and an
additional 12 are scheduled for similar train-
ing this coming September. Three men re-
»U.N. doc. T/1620.
ceived advanced managerial and operations
training at Voice of America facilities in
Washington, D.C., last year and have since
assumed positions as station managers in
three districts. It is planned that within 3
years a total of 43 trained Micronesians will
be directly employed as radio personnel at
all levels within the broadcast system.
The sixth and final district broadcast sta-
tion, WSZA Yap, is to go on the air next
month, completing the administration's goal
for physical plant construction. Stations
such as WSZO Palau will soon undergo a
modernization program which will see in-
creased power outputs so as to reach all
areas of the district. Standby generators
and transmitters are being installed in this
modernization program to provide for such
emergencies as typhoons and other disasters.
At this stage of development in the ter-
ritory's broadcast system, a uniform plan of
operation and goals must be developed. To
this end a conference is being called for late
this summer which will see all Micronesian
station managers and senior announcers
gathered to establish a unified and practical
set of operating goals. Senior officials of all
major program areas of the territory will
also be in attendance to obtain maximum
utilization of broadcast facilities.
A few of the stations, such as those in the
Marshalls, Truk, and Palau, that have been
on the air for several years are making truly
impressive progress in programing imagina-
tive and worthy materials for their respec-
tive districts. Their ideas and programs are
to be freely exchanged through the coming
conference.
It should also be pointed out that dis-
trict stations are striving to use all avail-
able talent on a volunteer basis in addition
to those people employed full time.
The Micronesian employees of the central
repository and duplicating center for broad-
cast material in Saipan will soon be operat-
ing modern high-speed duplicating equip-
ment which will do much to resolve the
present bottleneck in copying taped material.
Programing material in the central reposi-
tory is also made available to all schools in
AUGUST 16, 1965
291
the territory and is quickly becoming an ad-
ditional educational tool, particularly in the
elementary schools.
Radio English classes are already an es-
tablished fact in the Palau District, and the
adaptation of this successful program is be-
ing made by adult education departments of
other districts.
Sessions of the Congress of Micronesia are
to be taped and broadcast on all district
broadcast stations. Equipment to accom-
plish this is on order and will be installed
before the July 12 opening session of the
Congress.
The reception and distribution of world
news on a daily basis to all broadcast sta-
tions has been assured in the territory with
the signing of a service contract with an
international news service. Daily transmis-
sions are being copied in all district centers
and broadcast each day on the five stations
presently on the air. Yap is also receiving
this service and will be broadcasting daily
world news with the formal opening of the
station.
Other communications advances recorded
this year include the establishment of 16 ad-
ditional small radio stations on remote is-
lands. This brings to a total of 28 such facili-
ties for receiving and transmitting on outer
islands. Additional units will be added in the
coming years until all major populated is-
lands are radio equipped.
Major communications stations are main-
tained in each district center and form a
closely integrated network through common
radiotelegraph and radiotelephone networks.
A continuing training program in prepar-
ing Micronesian communications employees
for key positions is conducted through on-
the-job training coupled with correspond-
ence courses administered by contract em-
ployees. Those men who do well in this pro-
gram are selected for 2-year scholarships in
a Honolulu technical school. Graduates from
this school have replaced contract employees
in the Truk and Palau Districts, and even-
tual replacement of all such contract employ-
ees will be made throughout the territory.
Public Health
In the field of public health our immuni-
zation program continued to be pushed vig-
orously during the year. As I indicated at
the 31st session, this territory-wide program
was launched in 1964 with special repro-
graming of some $110,000. This past year
another $100,000 was funded to carry the
immunization program forward. Immuniza-
tion for smallpox, diphtheria, pertussis
(whooping cough), tetanus, typhoid, para-
typhoid, poliomyelitis, and BCG for tubercu-
losis will now be given routinely as part of
this program. To date, immunization is com-
plete for the Marianas District. Palau Dis-
trict is 95 percent completed and should be
100 percent complete by the end of June.
The Yap Island area is complete, and the
outisland area immunization program is
slated for completion this July, when a spe-
cial field-trip ship will be equipped as an
immunization vessel to complete the pro-
gram for the Yap outer islands. In Truk
75 percent of the immunization program is
completed. Immunization for the district
center and Truk Atoll is finished and the
program for outislands well underway. Pon-
ape is 80 percent completed; here again a
current project is underway in the outer
islands. In the Marshalls District center and
in Ebeye the immunization program is com-
pleted. Outisland immunization has been
delayed in the Marshalls primarily because
of the many logistic factors involved in the
tremendous spread of the islands.
Future immunizations as described above
will be given for all infants, to newcomers
to the islands, as booster shots for previous
immunizations, and to any inhabitants who
may have somehow missed the initial series.
Expanded training for Micronesian medical
and paramedical staff was provided during
the year through a combination of resources :
Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, East-
West Center, and other sources. Refresher
training for sanitarians, hospital adminis-
trators, medical officers, graduate nurses,
nurse-dieticians, laboratory technicians was
provided as part of a continuing program
292
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
with the East-West Center. Some 34 medi-
cal staff members participated in this pro-
gram in Hawaii during the year. A jointly
sponsored East-West Center-TTPI followup
seminar on sanitation problems was held in
Truk, where in 1964 a field training center
for trust territory sanitarians and commu-
nity development leaders had been carried
out. The Micronesian director of sanitation
serves as the TTPI delegate at the South
Pacific Commission seminar on village sani-
tation held in Villa, New Hebrides.
Various members of the medical staff at-
tended international conferences, such as a
World Health Organization Conference on
Leprosy in the Philippines, a WHO Nutri-
tion Conference in Thailand, a WHO Con-
fei-ence on Communicable Diseases in the
Philippines, a WHO-South Pacific Commis-
sion Refresher Course in Tuberculosis in
Noumea.
The territory continued to be plagued by
outbreaks of influenza and rubella (German
measles) this spring in several districts, be-
ing particularly severe in Truk and Ponape.
Slighter waves of German measles occurred
in Yap, Palau, and the Marianas.
Ordinary measles were also of widespread
occurrence, and programs for better control
measures are underway. Emergency assist-
ance, however, had to be extended to Truk
in the form of extra nurses, doctors, and
medical supplies to combat the measles epi-
demic there. The senior students of the terri-
tory nursing school, nurse instructors, and
two medical officers were flown to Truk to
relieve the local staff.
A significant event of the year was the
formation of a Micronesian medical associ-
ation which was founded as a private pro-
fessional society. Four students graduated
from the Central School of Medicine in
Suva and began internship training pro-
grams. One student graduated from Fiji in
sanitation and began a 1-year field training
program.
Two medical conferences were held in
Saipan with 10 district Micronesian medical
officers-in-charge and district M.D. clinical
supervisors in attendance for discussions on
district and territory medical problems.
In an attempt to upgrade nursing school
applicants, the Department of Public Health
and Department of Education have initiated
a new prenursing program under the aus-
pices of the Education Department in which
special training in English will be given this
summer to all prospective candidates for
entrance to the fall term of nursing school.
The medical scholarship program was
again increased. Last year 10 special schol-
arships in premedical education were
awarded; this coming school year this has
been increased over 100 percent to 21 new
premedical and paramedical scholarships.
Additionally, preliminary arrangements were
made for acceptance into U.S. medical schools
for selected Micronesian medical officers who
have Suva Medical School training or equiva-
lent training. Just 2 weeks ago Dean John C.
Rose and Dr. Bruce Shnider of Georgetown
Medical School made a trip to the territory to
interview Micronesian medical officers who
might be qualified for selection to enter medi-
cal school. We hope that from this present in-
vestigation it will be possible for some of the
present medical officers to enter medical
school to receive full M.D. training. This
special medical scholarship training will be
in addition to the program of scholarships
described above for premedical and full
medical training.
Community Development
Increased emphasis has been placed on the
community development approach as a
means to improve local communities. Seven
pilot projects were underway during the
year in selected parts of the territory.
On the coral atolls of Ulul, Namonuito,
Truk, Jabor, and Jaluit, the people have been
engaged in road and causeway building in
order to provide vehicular transportation of
their copra to central warehouses. An 18-
mile road has been completed in Jaluit link-
ing the various islands of that atoll. At
Ulithi (Yap District) emphasis has been on
a program of village cleanup. On the five is-
AUGUST 16, 1965
293
lands inhabited in the Namonuito area,
where a pilot project has been underway, a
village cleanliness project also is underway.
Palau has an active youth corps with three
chapters located at Peleliu, Angaur, and
Koror. The membership, between 16 and 22
years of age, consists of young men who
have dropped out of school and who are
jobless. The main program emphasis in the
youth corps is employment training, and all
trainees to date have been placed in one or
another agency in Koror where they can re-
ceive effective on-the-job training.
At Pingelap Atoll in Ponape District, vil-
lage planning and encouraging people to
move out of a very congested community
on the main island will be one of the main
initial elements in the community develop-
ment project there. On Pagan and Agrihan
islands in the Marianas, land management,
sanitation, and transportation are being
emphasized.
A training program is in progress for the
district community development staff mem-
bers, and special attention is being paid to
the needs of problems emerging in and
around district centers.
A women's interest coordinator has been
appointed, the incumbent being a very ca-
pable young Micronesian woman. Her office
acts as a clearinghouse for all women's in-
terest activities. A major activity of this unit
was a training program in scouting which
was conducted for potential women leaders
throughout the territory earlier this month
in collaboration with the field office of the
Girl Scouts of America.
Training opportunities of very specialized
natures also were afforded a number of
community development staff members. The
staff supervisor for the Nan Madol site de-
velopment in Ponape completed training in
the management of an archeological park
site at the City of Refuge National Park in
Hawaii. Two men from Jaluit are learning
diesel boat maintenance and diversified fish-
ing operations with the fishermen of Nger-
emlengui village, Palau; two persons from
Namonuito learned diesel truck maintenance
and operation with the public works at
Moen, Truk; two persons from Jabor Island,
Jaluit, are learning how to maintain and ad-
minister a small diesel electric powerplant
for that island; a skilled Marshallese boat-
builder is undergoing a period of observa-
tion-instruction with the Palau Boatbuilders
and Drydocking Association.
Legal and Land Claim Events
During the year the territory embarked
upon a project designed for thorough review
of the Trust Territory Code, and two com-
mittees— an advisory committee comprised
of outstanding legal personalities in Guam
and the United States and a working com-
mittee composed of the chief justice, asso-
ciate justice, attorney general, and other
members of the trust territory legal staff —
recommended several amendments to the
Trust Territory Code covering such sections
as the Bill of Rights, which adopted the
language of the U.S. Constitution concern-
ing freedom of religion, speech, press, right
of assembly and petition; declaratory judg-
ments; tampering with mail; and several
sections concerning usury. These were im-
plemented by Executive order, since it was
felt that they were urgently required. Other
recommendations on code changes or new
additions will, of course, be submitted to the
Congress of Micronesia.
I have already noted the addition of a
qualified Micronesian as an assistant attor-
ney general and the appointment of an as-
sistant director of public safety to the legal
staff as examples of increasing participa-
tion of local inhabitants in this important as-
pect of the administration. Another event
worthy of special note was the award of the
annual attorney general's award for out-
standing contribution to the field of admin-
istration of the law of Micronesians to the
public defender of Truk District, Mr. Andon
Amaraich, who appeared before this body in
1963.
Status of Rongelapese
The annual medical survey of the people
of Rongelap was conducted again in March
1965 by a joint AEC-trust territory medical
294
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
team. Reports by Atomic Energy Commis-
sion officials again found the general health
of the Rongelapese to be satisfactory. The
analysis and results of a 10-year summary
of medical survey results are available in
official AEC reports and in scientific journ-
als. Mr. Dickinson has informed the Council
of the enactment of a $950,000 compassion-
ate compensation bill for the people of Ron-
gelap. I expect to make payment shortly
after I return to the trust territory.
Rehabilitation of Ebeye
At the 31st session I described prelimi-
nary steps being taken with interested U.S.
Government departments to develop a major
program for the thorough upgrading of all
housing, water, power, and sewage facilities
on Ebeye Island. Agreement was reached
with the cooperating departments, and re-
habilitation of Ebeye has been planned in a
number of increments.
This past year the first increment of re-
habilitation included the construction of
seven apartment buildings containing four
apartments each. These new buildings were
accepted for occupancy on October 21, 1964.
A complete salt water sanitary sewage
system has been installed and is now in use
all over the island. Nine central temporary
toilet structures were built as interim mea-
sures until such time as all future housing
units are completed. An electrically powered
pumping station and lift stations have been
constructed, and a new power generator is
in operation for pumping sewage far out into
the lagoon. The sewage system consists of
a main underground line running the length
of the island, with laterals running off to
the sites of future new housing units, as well
as to the temporary toilet structures.
The new housing units all have interior
electric wiring but are not yet connected
since a complete new power plant is in the
subsequent phase of the overall construction
plan. All of the new housing will have elec-
tricity, water, and bathroom facilities. Two
new fresh water storage tanks have been
constructed. They each have a capacity of
250,000 gallons.
Phase one of the rehabilitation of Ebeye
has been completed. The next phase of con-
struction is expected to commence in Octo-
ber 1965 and will continue until all substand-
ard housing on the island is replaced.
In this report I have touched briefly on
what I feel to be the outstanding progress
events of the year. Our annual report for
fiscal year 1964, which is before the Council
for review, describes in detail progress and
programs of the review period. I am pre-
pared to amplify or clarify any points which
members may wish to raise during the
examination period.
STATEMENT BY MR. OLTER, JUNE 2
U.S./U.N. press release 4672
I should like to express my gratitude to
our Administering Authority and to this
Council for this opportunity to make a brief
but uniquely Micronesian statement.
It is an honor to be here because we, the
Micronesians, do recognize the importance
of the United Nations and this Council. We
recognize its importance by making its
birthday a legal holiday.
Three weeks ago I toured my district with
my fellow Congressmen from Ponape Dis-
trict. In every place we visited we con-
cluded our meetings by asking the people
their future political preference. Given sev-
eral alternatives, the people invariably in-
sisted that they wished to remain under the
present system until they are ready in terms
of educational standard, economic stability,
political sophistication, and social maturity
and responsibility. The Micronesians are
cautious and are reluctant to gamble for the
price of uncertainty. When we are ready to
accept the responsibilities and are aware of
the implications and consequences of com-
mitting ourselves to whatever political sta-
tus we prefer, we will ask for it.
In the words of the Micronesian who ap-
peared before this Council last year, he
stated : "It is like the papaya fruit — when it
is ripe, it will show on the surface." *
* For a statement made on May 28, 1964, by
Thomas Remengesau, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964,
p. 1018.
AUGUST 16, 1965
295
In the 1964 report of the U.N. visiting
mission to the trust territory the Micro-
nesian students at the University of Hawaii
stated: "Full understanding of the implica-
tions and consequences of choosing the fu-
ture status of the territory required further
preparation." In the same report the Micro-
nesian students at Guam College stated:
"We propose to remain under the present
administration and to learn more about self-
government."
These quotations restate the trust these
people have in this Council and our Admin-
istering Authority. They express a cautious
but positive attitude of a young generation
preparing and progressing toward the goal
of self-determination. They are also impor-
tant in that they represent the future de-
termining factors of the territory now un-
der review.
The challenge at present is whether the
Micronesians, the Administering Authority,
and this Council will be willing to make
constructive evaluations, recommendations,
and implementations of such recommenda-
tions. The territory at present looks to the
U.N. and to the Administering Authority as
a child looks to his parents. Each parent may
have his or her own personal preferences
as to the development of the child. But the
crucial psychological issue is, what is best
for the development of the child ?
This Council is aware of the fact that
the trust territory's natural resources are
meager. The subsidies to support or initiate
development programs are considered gener-
ous and are greatly appreciated, but ex-
panded programs and needs may necessi-
tate even greater support.
Our needs for development are becoming
greater than present resources. By re-
sources, I refer to those we can raise locally
as well as current assistance from our
Administering Authority.
To make the best use of what we have
available, we must have long-range plans
which may remain basically the same in or-
der to insure continuity with such changes
as may be necessary. Such long-range plans
may help our development in the long run. It
may incorporate the different aspects of our
development into a unity. It may eliminate
the "trial and error" or the "wayside"
fashion projects. Such a long-range plan will
give our people a clear-cut picture to what is
to be or not to be. This will eliminate con-
fusion of priorities of projects and in the
long run may help the territorial develop-
mental aspects. I realize that long-range
plans of this nature were hard to make in
the past when public opinion and desires of
our people were difficult to determine. But i
with the advent of the present Congress of '
Micronesia such plans should be made an es-
sential part of its concern. I am very
pleased, as are my fellow Micronesians, with
the economic contract which will be develop-
ing a master plan for economic develop-
ment. I
The newly created Congress of Micronesia |
is an example of evolutionary and planned
development. Several years ago it was only
an advisory body whose members were ap-
pointed by the district administrator, later
the district legislatures elected members to
the Council of Micronesia, and now mem-
bers are elected by universal suffrage. Its
power has changed from one of a purely ad- •
visory capacity to a council electing its own '
chairman and with power to make resolu-
tions. Now it has become a true territorial
legislative body with power to levy taxes
and to review the overall annual budget. |
Its growth and transformation are signif i- "
cant in that the Administering Authority
provided the advice and the Micronesians
provided the basic desires, wishes, and co-
operation.
This new Congress is highly regarded by
the Micronesians for they feel that their
elected representatives helped to create it
and through it their voices now will be
heard and listened to.
The intensity of the people in the creation
of this Congress is evidenced by the per-
centage of voting. It is also evidenced by
their celebrations and staying up late beside
their radios to hear election results. The
people's attachment to this Congress is
shown by their enthusiasm in the meetings
296
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
after the voting and the high courtesy and
honor they have extended to the elected
Congressmen.
The challenge is now on the shoulders of
the elected Congressmen and the adminis-
tration to help fulfill some of the simple but
real needs of the people of Micronesia.
I endorse the statements made by fellow
Micronesians who have appeared before this
Council and therefore will not need to com-
ment on details of what has already been
accomplished in or said about our territory.
I will reiterate, however, with emphasis
the appreciation we have for the accelerated
elementary school program launched several
years ago. Where once loomed dilapidated
elementary school buildings, we now have
modern classrooms. In support of these
buildings more and better qualified teach-
ers have been recruited and are on the job.
Our Micronesian teachers are also under-
going a program of further training to im-
prove competency and performance.
The Micronesians recognize the immedi-
ate as well as the long-range benefits
from the expanded program of development.
On the short-range side, the program offers
employment to those in the outer islands,
and the outlying areas where copra is the
only source of cash income. Income and
community spirit arising from this program
offer inducement to organized labor forces
to venture into building housing and other
cooperatives which will elevate the living
standards of those concerned. It has also
stimulated other groups to seek construction
contracts for new schools and other projects
and to accept the responsibilities under the
terms of such contracts. These are but a few
of the many beneficial aspects of the
program.
I am certain that similar and urgent pro-
grams in public health, in economic develop-
ment, and in other areas will benefit the
people of Micronesia greatly.
In conclusion I wish to thank the honor-
able members of the Council and trust that
the Council will endeavor to make con-
structive evaluations and recommendations
which our Administering Authority and the
Congress of Micronesia may use as guidelines
in all fields of growth — whether it be politi-
cal, health, social, or economic. I must say,
again, that I am very grateful to our Ad-
ministering Authority and to this Council
for this opportunity to present this brief
statement.
Thank you, Mr. President.
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Cable dated June 18 from the Secretary General of
the Organization of American States transmitting
texts of the "Proposal of the Ad Hoc Committee
for the solution of the Dominican crisis," and the
Ad Hoc Committee's "Proposal to the Dominican
people." S/6457. June 18, 1965. 7 pp.
Letter dated June 17 from the Assistant Secretary
General of the Organization of American States
transmitting the text of a statement made by the
Secretary General of the OAS on June 16 before
the Tenth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers
of Foreign Affairs. S/6469. June 23, 1965. 6 pp.
Letter dated July 8 from the Assistant Secretary
General of the Organization of American States
transmitting texts of the grant agreement and the
memorandum of agreement entered into on June
30 by and between the OAS and the United States.
S/6515. July 9, 1965. 7 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the situation in
the Dominican Republic during the period from
June 19 to July 15. S/6530. July 16, 1965. 11 pp.
General Assembly
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
Letter dated July 8 from the acting representative
of the U.S.S.R. reporting launchings of artificial
earth satellites and space objects, May 25-June
25. A/AC.105/INF.103. July 13, 1965. 2 pp.
Economic and Social Council
Review and Reappraisal of the Council's Role and
Functions. Note by the Secretary-General. E/
4040. June 10, 1965. 76 pp.
Questions Relating to Science and Technology. Re-
port submitted to the Council on research into
environmental pollution and measures for its con-
trol. E/4073. June 10, 1965. 36 pp.
The United Nations Development Decade at Mid-
Point. An appraisal by the Secretary-General.
E/4071. June 11, 1965. 38 pp.
Decentralization of the Economic and Social Activi-
ties and Strengthening of the Reg:ional Economic
Commissions and the United Nations Office in
Beirut. Report by the Secretary-General. E/4075.
June 14, 1965. 25 pp.
AUGUST 16. 1965
297
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at sea.
Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered into force
May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Burma, July 12, 1965.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notification of approval: Ethiopia, May 27, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at Washing-
ton March 22 through April 23, 1965. Entered into
force July 16, 1965, for part I and parts III to
VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.
Acceptance deposited: El Salvador, July 23, 1965.
Agreement relating to general procurement arrange-
ments for goods and services. Effected by exchange
of notes at Washington July 15 and 20, 1965. En-
tered into force July 20, 1965.
Korea
Amendment and extension of the agreement of Feb-
ruary 3, 1956, as amended (TIAS 3490, 4030), for
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy.
Signed at Washington July 30, 1965. Enters into
force on the date each Government shall have re-
ceived from the other written notification that it
has complied with all statutory and constitutional
requirements for entry into force.
Sierra Leone
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of January 29, 1965 (TIAS 5762), with
related notes of May 20, 1965. Effected by ex-
change of notes at Freetown May 5, 1965. Entered
into force May 6, 1965.
United Kingdom
Convention and supplementary protocol relating to
avoidance of double taxation and prevention of
fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income.
Signed at Washington April 16, 1945 (conven-
tion), and June 6, 1946 (protocol). Entered into
force July 25, 1946. TIAS 1546.
Notification of termination of article VI given by
the United States: June 30, 1965, effective Janu-
ary 1, 1966, for the United States and April 6,
1966, for the United Kingdom.
BILATERAL
Colombia
Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles, with
exchange of notes at Bogota June 9, 1965. Entered
into force June 9, 1965.
Congo
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes of July
17 and 19, 1965. Signed at Leopoldville July 19,
1965. Entered into force July 19, 1965.
Israel
Agreement relating to the purchase of various goods
from Israel for sale in U. S. Navy ships stores
overseas. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington July 20 and 26, 1965. Entered into force
July 26, 1965.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Confirmations
The Senate on July 23 confirmed the nomination
of Arthur J. Goldberg to be the representative of
the United States to the United Nations, and the
representative of the United States in the Security
Council of the United Nations, and on July 27 con-
firmed his nomination to be a representative of the
United States to the 19th session of the General
Assembly of the United Nations.
The Senate on July 28 confirmed the nomination
of Henry Cabot Lodge to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Viet-Nam.
298
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX
August 16, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1364.
Asia, Security Council Urged To Respond to
Challenge in Southeast Asia (Goldberg) . 278
China. U.S. and China Reach Substantive
Agreement on Status of Forces 267
Congress. Confirmations (Goldberg, Lodge) . 298
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Goldberg, Lodge) 298
Military Members of the Country Team (Hor-
witz) 268
Economic Affairs. Business Executives Briefed
on South Africa 267
Military Affairs
Military Members of the Country Team (Hor-
witz) 268
U.S. and China Reach Substantive Agreement
on Status of Forces 267
Ndn-Self-Governing Territories. The Trust Ter-
ritory of the Pacific Islands (Dickinson,
Coding, Olter) 280
Presidential Documents
Justice Goldberg Sworn In as Representative
to U.N 265
U.S. Calls Upon U.N. To Strengthen Common
Search for Peace in Viet-Nam 275
We Will Stand in Viet-Nam 262
South Africa. Business Executives Briefed on
South Africa 267
Treaty Information
Current Actions 298
U.S. and China Reach Substantive Agreement
on Status of Forces 267
United Nations
Ambassador Goldberg Holds News Conference
at New York (transcript) 272
Current U.N. Documents 297
Goldberg confirmed as U.S. representative . . 298
Justice Goldberg Sworn In as Representative
to U.N. (Goldberg, Johnson) 265
Security Council Urged To Respond to Chal-
lenge in Southeast Asia (Goldberg) . . . 278
The Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands
(Dickinson, Coding, Olter) 280
U.S. Calls Upon U.N. To Strengthen Common
Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (Johnson,
U Thant) 275
Viet-Nam
Ambassador Goldberg Holds News Conference
at New York (transcript) 272
Lodge confirmed as Ambassador 298
Security Council Urged To Respond to Chal-
lenge in Southeast Asia (Goldberg) . . . 278
U.S. Calls Upon U.N. To Strengthen Common
Search for Peace in Viet-Nam (Johnson,
U Thant) 275
We Will Stand in Viet-Nam (Johnson) ... 262
Name Index
Dickinson, Dwight 280
Coding, M. Wilfred 280
Goldberg, Arthur J 265,272,278,298
Horwitz, Solis 268
Johnson, President 262,265,275
Lodge, Henry Cabot 298
Olter, Bailey 280
U Thant 275
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: July 26-August 1
Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.
No. Date Subject
182 7/29 Status-of -forces agreement with
China.
*183 7/30 Rusk : consular convention with
U.S.S.R. (excerpts).
* Not printed.
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1944, Volume III, The British Commonwealth and Europe
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betical order from Albania through Poland. Documentation on the remaining European nations
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South Asia, and the Far East except China. Material on American policy toward China will
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DEPOSITORY
THE
DEPARTMENT
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STATE
BULLETIN
Yol. LIU, No. 1365
August 23, 1965
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 2 302
THE TASKS OF THE FREE-WORLD COMMUNITY
by Ambassador George C. McGhee 324.
CONFERENCE OF 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE
RECONVENES AT GENEVA
Statement by William C. Foster 333
NORTH AFRICA: ACTIVE CROSSROADS
Special Article by David D. Newsom 315
For index see inside back cover
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 2
Press release 184 dated August 2
Secretary Rusk: I gather you have a
good many things on your mind so I won't
start with opening statements today.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Arthur Schlesinger in
a magazine article last week asserted that
the late President Kennedy, shortly before
his death, had reluctantly made up his mind
to permit you to resign after the 196^ elec-
tions because of your reluctance to make
decisions, and Mr. Schlesinger had some
uncomplimentary remarks to say about the
Department in general. Were you aware of
these views of the late President, if indeed
he did hold them?
A. Well, let me say I'm not going to com-
ment on these particular remarks or simi-
lar remarks that might be made while I am
in public office. I am quite sure that the
future historian is going to look back on this
period with a compound eye, that is, through
many facets.
When the time comes some day for me
to leave office, my papers will be in the files
of the Department of State or in the Ken-
nedy or Johnson libraries. I shall take none
with me. I do expect to record for the Ken-
nedy and Johnson libraries my ovm impres-
sions of the principal events during the pe-
riod in which I might serve. Those will be
available when the relevant Presidential
papers will become available.
But my associates in Government and my
colleagues abroad can rest on the assurance
that when they deal with me on the basis
of confidence, that confidence will be re-
spected.
And that is all I am going to say on that
subject from now on.
Geneva Disarmament Talks
Q. Mr. Secretary, there has been much
talk about priorities in the Geneva Dis-
armament Conference — priority for a non-
proliferation treaty, priority for a NATO
structure for nuclear defense, and so forth.
Is there any American priority?
A. We have no priority on this matter be-
cause we attach very great importance to a
nonproliferation agreement which will pre-
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. llll, NO. 13«S PUBLICATION 7942 AUGUST 23, 1965
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DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
vent the spread of nuclear weapons in the
hands of — into the hands of additional na-
tional nuclear forces.
We also give high priority to the arrange-
ments w^ithin NATO for an effective control
of the nuclear power of the NATO alliance,
and we have already taken a great many
steps in that direction. The question of pri-
ority comes because there have been those,
particularly the Soviet Union, who have
claimed that what we were talking about in
NATO had something to do with prolifera-
tion.
Well, we know this is not the case. They
have objected to the MLF [multilateral
nuclear force], to the ANF [Allied nuclear
force] ; they have objected to the special
committee which Secretary [of Defense
Robert S.] McNamara has suggested. I
have no doubt they object to NATO.
So we do not see this as a problem of
priorities, because we are convinced that the
arrangements within NATO, as they will be
evolved, have nothing whatever to do with
the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and
we do not see any basis on which others
can claim that this very important matter
of nonproliferation ought to be suspended in
order to achieve some other object, which
is not relevant to the question of pro-
liferation.
U.N. Role in Viet-Nam Settlement
Q. Mr. Secretary, Hanoi, according to
the latest reports, has apparently rejected
any U.N. role in a Viet-Nam settlement.
Now, in view of this, is there still any hope
that the U.N. can use its influence to bring
about negotiations ?
A. Well, I think we might point to two
possibilities: One is that the officers and
agencies of the U.N. might attempt by pri-
vate exploration to discover still once more
whether there is any indication on the part
of the other side that a peaceful settlement
is possible.
Another is the possibility of formal action
by one or another of the U.N. agencies.
At the present time, the General Assem-
bly is not in session and has some problems
of its own. In the Security Council, the ques-
tion naturally turns around what the Se-
curity Council would be able to do with the
concurrence of all five permanent members.
These are matters which ought to be ex-
plored. If there were some way in which
the United Nations can move toward
a peaceful settlement of this problem, we
would, of course, give it our full support, but
we cannot be very specific today because
these are matters that are being explored
and we do not yet know the results.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is there anything that
the Russians might not veto that you en-
visage in the Security Council?
A. Well, I think that it would get in the
way, quite frankly, Mr. Lisagor [Peter
Lisagor, Chicago Daily News], if I were to
comment on that today. Let's just wait and
see what might be possible after exploration
in New York.
Peace in Viet-Nam Rests With Hanoi
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you rule out talking
to the Viet Cong except as part of a
North Vietnamese delegation, or are there
other formulas which you are ready to con-
sider in order to give them a voice in any
discussions ?
A. Well, let me point out very simply
that, so far as we are concerned, the prob-
lem of peace in Viet-Nam rests with Hanoi,
that is, our forces are there because of the
infiltration of men and arms by Hanoi into
South Viet-Nam. Had that not occurred, our
forces would not be in South Viet-Nam. So
it is Hanoi that has to decide to bring its
troops back and stop its infiltration of men
and arms. They are the ones that hold the
key to peace as far as we are concerned.
Now, if there are conditions in which
North and South Viet-Nam are separated
militarily, and the problem then is some-
thing indigenous within South Viet-Nam,
that is a matter for the South Vietnamese
to work out.
But I see no possibility of peace there un-
less Hanoi is prepared to make peace, and
that is why we keep the emphasis on Hanoi
AUGUST 23, 1965
303
in this situation. They are the cause of the
events which brought the United States
with combat forces into South Viet-Nam,
and they are the ones that can remove that
cause and open the way to peace.
Elections in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, are you in any position,
sir, to amplify on the United States' view
about elections for the unification of Viet-
Nam?
A. Well, in the first place, as far as elec-
tions in South Viet-Nam are concerned, we
have no problems whatever about that, and
I have no doubt that the South Vietnamese
would wish elections. I point out that it is
not very easy to have free elections in a situ-
ation where tens of thousands of armed men
have come in from across the borders to kill
off local officials and to disrupt the civilian
life of the country.
A few weeks ago, they did have elections
in the provinces. Some 73 percent of the
eligible voters registered for those elections,
and about two-thirds of those who registered
actually voted throughout the provinces in
local elections. And these figures included
the areas that are subject to the Viet Cong
terror.
I have no doubt that free elections in
South Viet-Nam can be accomplished with
respect to what happens to South Viet-Nam.
Now, when you get to the question of
plebiscite or free elections with regard to
unification, that, obviously, is something
that applies to both parts of Viet-Nam. That
suggests that North Viet-Nam would have
to be interested in free elections, as ordinary
people understand that term.
We have no indication — have not had for
a decade — that North Viet-Nam has any in-
terest in free elections, as we would under-
stand it.
The question of unification there is one
for the Vietnamese themselves in the North
and in the South to decide themselves by the
exercise of what we would broadly call self-
determination. We do not believe that that
is an issue which should be settled by force.
There have been other problems about uni-
fication in other countries in this postwar
period, and force has been rejected or re-
nounced in these other situations as a solu-
tion to the problem of reunification.
Now, if the Vietnamese people themselves
in due course wish to find a way to unify
themselves, then that is up to them, but
there are serious problems in a situation
where those in the North say that they want
to be unified only on the basis of a Com-
munist regime and those in the South say
that they are unwilling to be unified on the
basis of a Communist regime.
But in any event, this is a problem which
can only be tackled under conditions of peace
and by peaceful processes. It is not a problem
to be settled by force.
Q. Sir, Congressman {Gerald R.'] Ford
and Senator [Jack'] Miller have proposed
bringing in Chinese Nationalist forces to
South Viet-Nam. What woidd be the political
implications to such a move ?
A. Well, the Government of the Republic
of China has provided some important as-
sistance to South Viet-Nam. The question of
combat troops is a more complicated ques-
tion. It has to do with not only the availa-
bility of forces but also whether the South
Vietnamese problem should be heavily in-
volved with the main issue between For-
mosa and the mainland with respect to the
Chinese problem. That has not, I think, had
very serious consideration among any of the
governments concerned.
Yes, sir?
Q. The Government of Peru appears to be
in a new dispute with the U.S.-oivned oil
company there — International Petroleum —
about the control or ownership of certain
properties. First, have we cut off aid to Peru
pending a settlement of that problem, and
what is your view about this?
A. No, this is a bilateral discussion be-
tween the Government and the company con-
cerned. We, of course, are interested in the
outcome of that, but this is in their hands,
and we have not taken an active part in
those discussions thus far.
304
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Economic Development in Southeast Asia
Q. Mr. Secretary, the President indicated
last tveek that Ambassador [Henry Cabof]
Lodge would be going to Saigon loith a new
program tvhich is being formulated on the
nonmilitary side.^ Is there any detail on
that that you can give us ?
A. Well, I think that he should have a
chance to get into position and talk out
these matters with the Government in Sai-
gon before details are announced, but the
impetus of this comes from our feeling that
this is not just a military problem. We are
going to deny to the other side an attempt
to solve it as if it w^ere a military problem.
But the real issue in the long run here is
the peaceful construction of viable societies
in Southeast Asia.
I think v^e have made it clear that we
would much prefer to spend our available
resources in building up economic and social
structures of the countries of Southeast Asia
rather than have those resources absorbed
into an unnecessary war caused by aggres-
sion from the North.
Now, there are a good many things that
could be done in the field of housing and
land reform and economic development, and
the development of the basic — I think the
word these days is — "infrastructure" of the
country, which would greatly stimulate the
main purposes of the United States in that
part of the world.
Ambassador Lodge will be going out there,
having had talks with Mr. Eugene Black
and others, with real feeling as to the possi-
bilities, the prospects, and the extent of the
interests of the United States in moving in
this direction.
I would have to say, however, that eco-
nomic and social reconstruction is difficult
while guerrilla depredations continue to af-
flict the countryside. When local officials
are assassinated and kidnaped, when com-
munications are destroyed and bridges
knocked out, it is not easy to build up the
economy of a country.
^ For a statement made by President Johnson on
July 28, see Bulletin of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 262.
A little peace would open the way for
some dramatic moves in that direction, but
he will be approaching this on a very broad
front and with the seriousness of our own
purpose and major resources behind it if
the opportunity opens up.
Purpose of the Department of State
Q. Mr. Secretary, could you say some-
thing about the attacks on the State De-
partment's efficiency as distinguished from
those on your own person? Both were
involved in Mr. Hensley's [M. Stewart
Hensley, United Press International] ques-
tion, but I think you only dealt with the first
half.
A. Well, I am always glad to talk about
the State Department if you do not relate it
to what I think you are relating it to.
The Department of State is filled with
competent and dedicated officers who have
to grapple every day with the most complex
and difficult problems that this nation has
to face. The Department of State is the de-
partment of all the departments in govern-
ment. It has to deal with that part of the
world that we can influence but cannot con-
trol. We are 1 nation among 120 others. We
have relations with 115 others.
This world looks different to each one of
those nations. They have their own policies
and their own special problems, and we are
in constant process of trying to relate our
own interests and our own hopes and aspira-
tions to those of others, and it requires a
tremendous effort on the part of every of-
ficer in this Department, from the desk of-
ficer all the way to the Secretary.
Now, there are times when some wish us
to act with more drama, but there are prob-
lems about dramatizing issues, if drama
gets in the way of settlement.
If I could quote one of your city editors
who said, "No blood, no news."
It is the purpose of the Department of
State to try to bring about what some people
will call a boring situation, that is, a period
of peace. I should not object if we got in-
ternational relations off of the front page
AUGUST 23, 1965
305
for a while. I see no prospect of it.
But settlement is our object, and settle-
ment frequently is not very newsworthy.
There are times to move, and there are
times to delay. The art of the business is
deciding when to move and when to delay.
I hope that we can increasingly be in a posi-
tion where if we do delay, it is on purpose,
and that we don't have accidental delays.
So we are constantly working on this
matter, but I have great confidence in the
capacity of my colleagues and their dedica-
tion to the job which they are doing for the
American people.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the same subject,
one of your predecessors, who has a good
bit of experience in the field of criticism in
Washington — Mr. [Dean] Acheson — once
said that in Washington the environment
here has methods which would have aroused
the envy of the Borgias. I wonder if you
are feeling so these days ?
A. Not at all. Not at all. I feel very com-
fortable around this town because the part
of the town that I see is in connection with
my official duties and not in some of the
suburbs.
Nuclear Weapon Proliferation Problem
Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you look upon.
Mr. Secretary, some suggestions ivhich have
been advanced recently that those nations
who have an atomic capability — do not
produce atomic weapons — may make sort of
a unilateral declaration not to do so?
A. Nations which do have or do not
have?
Q. Which have a capability but are not
going to produce atomic weapons.
A. Well, I think it would be a very con-
structive development if all those nations
who do not now have nuclear weapons would
themselves undertake to renounce the de-
velopment of nuclear weapons. I noticed an
important suggestion to that effect made at
Geneva the other day by Mr. Fanfani
[Italian Foreign Minister Amintore Fan-
fani]. I think this is an important con-
tribution.
We do believe that the proliferation prob-
lem has two elements: One is that those
who have them agree not to spread them;
and those who do not have them agree not
to receive them. And if both sides will work
on it from that point of view, I should think
we might get somewhere, but time is run-
ning short, and we need to move fairly
promptly on both aspects of this problem.
The Path to Peace in Viet-Nam
Q. Mr. Secretary, our nation's goal has
been stated very flatly as that of uncondi-
tional negotiations for Viet-Nam, but this
might seem to be a sort of intermediate
goal. Isn't there a more immediate goal
than this — that of the eviction of the Viet
Cong from Viet-Nam, very clearly?
A. Well, there is no doubt that, to come
back to what I said earlier, the infiltration
of men and arms from North Viet-Nam into
South Viet-Nam is the heart of the problem,
and that must stop, and we are acting along
with the South Vietnamese to prevent it, de-
feat it, stop it, and, as far as the infiltrees
are concerned, to eject them. So that is the
military problem.
Now, it should be obvious that in any dis-
cussion or negotiation that is going to be the
central issue, and that is — we would be glad
to accomplish that by words instead of
bombs, to use an expression used the other
day — but that is the path to peace. It is to
stop those activities which brought about the
fighting, brought about the war. We would
be glad to have it done by peaceful means,
but if it is necessary to do it by military
means, we are prepared to help do that, too.
Q. Mr. Secretary, President Tito [o/
Yugoslavial and Prime Minister Shastri
[of India"] in their communique called for
a conference of everyone interested in the
Geneva thing, including the Viet Cong, and
also suggested again that the United States
cease its bombing or air attacks on North
Viet-Nam. Have you any comment on that
communique ?
A. I would not want to comment on the
particular communique as it was put out by
306
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
those two distinguished gentlemen. This
question of bombing in the North has come
up from time to time. As you know, we sus-
pended the bombing for a brief period and
had a very harsh reaction from the other
side when we did so. We are interested in
what else would happen if we stopped the
bombing, and no one has been able to tell
us. We have asked Communist capitals; we
have asked third countries. We would be glad
to know what would happen. For example
what would happen to that 325th North
Viet-Nam Division that is in Laos and
South Viet-Nam if we should stop the
bombing? Would it go home? No one has
told us — no one has told us. No one has even
hinted to us what else would happen if we
stopped the bombing.
Now, Mr. Ball indicated yesterday ^ that
the bombing could be suspended or stopped
if it was quite clear that this had something
to do with bringing this matter to a peace-
ful conclusion. But if it simply meant that
everything else would remain the same, then
this is not a very attractive path to take,
because it doesn't seem to be a path leading
to peace.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have there been any
meaningful communications which would
indicate a change of mind on the other side?
A. The question was whether there have
been any meaningful communications indi-
cating a change of mind on the other side.
We do not yet see any indication that the
other side — I mean specifically Hanoi and
Peiping — are ready for a peaceful settlement
of this situation.
Policy With Respect to U.S. Operations
Q. Mr. Secretary, some leading Republi-
cans, including Vice President Nixon, have
contended that the administration is not
using American sea and air power effec-
tively enough in South Viet-Nam and, in-
deed, against North Viet-Nam. Could you
comment on that ?
A. Well, as far as South Viet-Nam is con-
cerned, we are using whatever is available.
' See p. 310.
The problem still remains, in South Viet-
Nam, finding these fellows. Once they are
found, there is plenty of force to be brought
to bear against them.
As far as North Viet-Nam is concerned,
you know what we have been doing there.
We report on that on a daily basis.
There is always some difference of judg-
ment between those who would do far more
and those who would do far less. What we
are trying to do is to make it quite clear
to the other side that they would not be per-
mitted to take over South Viet-Nam by force,
and whatever is required to prevent that
will be undertaken. But, on the other hand,
we do not wish ourselves to make this into
a larger war or a general war or to inflict
unnecessary suffering and pain on civilians
who have no way to control the course of
events.
This combination of firmness and re-
straint has marked the handling by the free
world, including ourselves, of most of these
postwar crises, running from Iran and the
Greek guerrillas and the Berlin blockade and
Korea through the situation in Southeast
Asia.
I believe, myself, that the present policy
with respect to operations is correct, that it
does make very clear that the other side is
not going to take over South Viet-Nam by
force, and it does keep open the possibilities
of a peaceful settlement.
Now, that is no guarantee as to what the
scenario of the future will be, because the
other side helps to determine that and will
determine that just as much as we do, but
that is the basis of our present policy.
Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to the
problem of nonproliferation, do you think
any progress could be made on a country -
by-country basis outside the context of an
American-Soviet agreement?
A. Well, this was one of the suggestions
that was discussed in Geneva the other day,
that all those governments who do not have
nuclear weapons might themselves declare
their own policies and attitudes toward that,
and that could be a very constructive and
important development. How far that would
AUGUST 23, 1965
307
go, we have no way of telling at the present
time, but I should think if it is generally
accepted, for example, in the United Nations
General Assembly, as it was by unanimous
vote, that nuclear weapons should not pro-
liferate, that most countries in the world
would be willing to join in such a common,
parallel declaration on this subject. No, I
think all of these avenues ought to be fully
explored to see what might be accomplished.
It may be that some of the special prob-
lems obtaining between the United States
and the Soviet Union, or, shall we say, be-
tween NATO and the Soviet Union, might
be an obstacle that can be overcome by an
approach from a different direction. If so, it
is worth a try.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on a lighter problem,
did you get a long letter from Madam Papan-
dreou, please ?
A. I understand that one is on its way, but
I haven't seen it yet.
No Signs of Communist Political Inroads
Q. Mr. Secretary, everything I think of
today seems to he linked to a personality.
I am sorry. But Senator [Richard B.l Rus-
sell yesterday, in the course of various re-
marks about Viet-Nam, expressed the opinion
that if an election were held today in South
Viet-Nam, the Viet Cong would probably
win it. Do you agree with that?
A. No, I wouldn't agree with that. I think
that it is true that 20 years ago, when Ho
Chi Minh was leading his people against
Japanese occupation, and, later, when he
seemed to be the principal figure in the
movement toward freedom from colonial-
ism, that he personally had a very great
hold upon the feelings of the people of the
country. But the situation has changed very
substantially.
Hanoi is a Communist regime. The con-
trast between that regime and South Viet-
Nam during the late fifties may have had a
good deal to do with the decision in the
North to go after the South by force, be-
cause they recognized that they were not
able to achieve their purposes by other
means.
We have Americans working all over the
countryside in South Viet-Nam — in ones
and twos and sixes and eights. I think we
would know if the National Liberation
Front, or Hanoi, were making any signifi-
cant political inroads on the opinions of the
people of South Viet-Nam. We don't see the
signs that the South Vietnamese would be
the first country in history freely to elect
a Communist regime. This is not our under-
standing of the attitude of the Buddhists
and their leadership, or the Catholics and
their leadership, or the sects, or the mon-
tagnards, or the million or so Cambodians
who have lived for years in South Viet-
Nam. I think we would know that if it
should be the case.
I would be, myself, confident in relying
upon free elections in South Viet-Nam inso-
far as the character of the government of
that country was concerned. I would have
no fear about that at all.
Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Russell —
Relations With United Arab Republic
Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the allega-
tions recently voiced against the United
States by the United Arab Republic could
you bring us up to date on American-Egyp-
tian relations?
A. Well, we have been having some talks
between our two Governments on these re-
lations. I don't want to comment on the word
"allegations" in total, because I think one
must discriminate among those allegations.
But we would be ready to see a steady im-
provement in our relationships. There has
been some improvement in recent weeks, but
there are still some problems that need fur-
ther discussion and resolution.
Looked at objectively, there is no reason
why the United States and the United Arab
Republic could not have good and mutually
beneficial relations with each other. But
there have been some misunderstandings
and some differences of attitude which have
gotten in the way, and we hope further dis-
308
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
cussions will resolve some of those.
There was a question over here. [Indicat-
ing.]
Need for Stable Government in Saigon
Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator Russell called
attention to the weakness in the rise and
fall of various South Vietnamese govern-
ments. He demanded that we do more to re-
store their stability and expressed the opin-
ion that the war could not be won there un-
til they have a stable government and de-
mand the people's loyalty. Do you agree with
that?
A. Well, this is a principal preoccupa-
tion; the stability and the attitude of the
Government in Saigon is a very important
part of this total problem. And we have
worked very closely with our South Viet-
Nam friends repeatedly on this particular
issue.
I would point out that it is not easy to
have an effective government under the con-
ditions that now obtain in South Viet-Nam:
the guerrilla operations, the 20 years of war,
the attacks on communications, the assaults
on local officials — all those things make it
very difficult to have an effective govern-
ment.
We find, almost without exception, that
the local people in the countryside are
ready to cooperate with the Government if
they find that they can do so without being
assaulted by the Viet Cong the following
night.
We do not find that the National Libera-
tion Front is achieving political loyalties
among any significant portion of the South
Vietnamese people.
Now, the problem in organizing an effec-
tive government is a serious one and has
been all along and is a major preoccupation.
It certainly will be with Ambassador Lodge,
just as it was with Ambassador [Maxwell
D.] Taylor.
I cannot assure you that the problem has
been overcome and is finished. But, never-
theless, we get on with the problem as best
we can and try to help the South Vietnamese
do what all of them agree that they want
to do, and that is to repel this attack from
the outside and get some peace in their
country so that they can then worry about
how to build a decent society, as the rest of
us would understand it.
U.S. IVIilitary Commitment
Q. Mr. Secretary, tve have one Army divi-
sion permanently in Hawaii, two frozen in
Korea, and the equivalent of six in Germany
which can't be moved. Do you envision a
situation like this in Southeast Asia, where
we will have two or three or four divisions
which will be stuck there for an indefinite
time ?
A. No, I wouldn't want to predict the fu-
ture on that.
A peace settlement, I think, is bound to
come when the other side recognizes that
they are not going to be permitted to have
a settlement by military means. In that
peace settlement, what we would like to do
is see all military forces now in South
Viet-Nam depart: North Vietnamese and
American.
We have said many, many times that if
this aggression stops, our forces need not
be there, because it was the aggression it-
self that brought them there.
I cannot, however, predict the future, be-
cause I do not know under what circum-
stances this matter is going to be resolved
and when it will become evident to the other
side that they cannot succeed from a mili-
tary point of view.
Q. Mr. Secretary, on the basis of Mr.
Harriman's reports to you, do you regard
his vacation in Moscotv as a success, a fail-
ure, or something in between?
A. Oh, I think that he felt that his visit
there was enjoyable and interesting, and he
will be back tomorrow and I will be able to
get somewhat more detail from him. But I
personally thought it was worth while for
him to go. I know he enjoyed the visit.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to get back to Mr.
Rogers' [Warren Rogers, Hearst Netvs-
AUGUST 23, 1965
309
papers] question, is there a point at which
our military commitment will become so
great that we will have to take a hand in
maintaining civilian stability in Saigon?
A. Oh, I don't think that we anticipate
that we are going to take over the
country. I think the people of South Viet-
Nam strongly prefer that their own Govern-
ment operate there. This is not the problem.
The main burden of the struggle continues
to be South Vietnamese; the principal prob-
lem of pacification remains South Vietnam-
ese in character. No one has asked us to
take over that country, and we are not ask-
ing to take it over.
Q. Mr. Secretary —
Difference in Position of the Two Sides
Q. Mr. Secretary, considered purely from
the point of view of the Geneva agreement,
could you characterize the difference be-
tween the presence of one North Vietnam-
ese division in South Viet-Nam and three
North American divisions in South Viet-
Nam?
A. Yes. Infiltration from North Viet-Nam
started up again in 1959, was extended in
1960, and has continued throughout that
period.
We reviewed this matter in 1961 at the
time that we achieved an agreement on
Laos — an agreement that failed because
Hanoi never brought itself into compliance
with the Geneva accords on Laos. We were
not able to get an agreement on Viet-Nam
at that time.
The initial effort there was by North
Viet-Nam to take over South Viet-Nam by
force; they announced it, declared it to the
world.
Our combat troops did not arrive until late
1961, and during 1962, and subsequently.
We have been asked by the South Vietnam-
ese to assist them in repelling this aggres-
sion; and it is an aggression. If this infil-
tration from the North should stop, we can
come home. To me, this is a fundamental
difference in the position of the two sides.
Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.
Mr. Ball Discusses Viet-Nam
on "Issues and Answers"
Following is the transcript of an inter-
view with Under Secretary Ball on the
American Broadcasting Company's radio
and television program "Issues and An-
swers" on August 1. Interviewing Mr. Ball
were ABC correspondents William R. Downs,
Jr., and John Scali.
Mr Scali: Mr. Ball, welcome to "Issues
and Answers."
Yugoslavia's President Tito and India's
Prime Minister Shastri have issued a joint
communique in which they call for an end to
the American bombing of North Vietnamese
installations as a necessary prelude to cre-
ating the conditions that might lead to
peace talks. What do you say to this ?
Mr. Ball: I think if we are going to have
peace talks, one of the first items on any
agenda for a serious discussion of a political
solution in Viet-Nam would be how we bring
about an end to aggression. That means
how do we bring about an end to the infil-
tration from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam, how do we bring about an end
to the aggressive actions of the North Viet-
namese and the Viet Cong who have been
infiltrated into South Viet-Nam ?
The question of a cessation of American
bombing could be considered as a part of
this item, of course, but the proper context
for this question is the total consideration
of how we end violence in the whole of that
unfortunate country.
Mr. Downs : We had one of these voluntary
cessations before and nothing worked. Do
you think another pause would help?
Mr. Ball: We not only had it before, but
at the time when the pause was undertaken
we made clear to the North Vietnamese gov-
ernment that we were undertaking this
pause to see what kind of a response it
might invoke — whether on their part they
would be prepared either by word or by deed
to respond in some manner. They responded
by contempt. And the same was true of the
Soviet Union when we discussed this pause
with them. So I don't think that a pause in
310
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and by itself is necessarily useful, although
we don't preclude the possibility that another
pause might be undertaken at some time but
under different conditions when we would
be assured that it could have a better re-
sponse.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, are you saying that
if the North Vietnamese publicly pledge to
stop the infiltration of men and supplies
across the border, we might be willing, then,
to call off our bombing?
Mr. Ball: I think this is a possibility, but
there are two elements in what the North
Vietnamese are doing. Not only are they in-
filtrating men and supplies into South Viet-
Nam, but also, through the agency of the
Viet Cong — which is really their own crea-
tion— they are conducting a guerrilla war
against the people of South Viet-Nam.
I think we have to consider the questions
of cease-fire and cessation of violence as a
totality. We have to look at all aspects of it
and not merely single out one aspect.
Mr. Downs : One of the reasons that they
say that we are in a bad posture is that the
Viet Cong think they can win.
Mr. Ball: Well, I think they will learn
otherwise.
Efforts Toward a Peaceful Solution
Mr. Scali : Secretary Ball, President John-
son said the other day ^ that we have under-
taken either 15 or 16 — I have forgotten the
number — separate efforts to convince the
other side to go to the peace table. Now,
what we are doing now at the United Na-
tions, the newest letter the President has
sent through Arthur Goldberg to the Secu-
rity Council — is this effort number 17?
Mr. Ball: It is part of a process. I think
the President said there have been in the
last 4J/2 years about 15 different efforts to
bring about a political solution to this prob-
lem. And the letter that Arthur Goldberg
has given the Secretary-General is only a
part of a process trying to achieve this.
This isn't an isolated appeal to the United
Nations. You will recall that when the Presi-
dent was at San Francisco a month ago, he
made a very extraordinary speech to the
people who were assembled there in com-
memoration of the anniversary of the United
Nations.^ He called on each member of the
United Nations, individually or collectively,
to give its best efforts to trying to bring
about peace.
Then at the time that he appointed Am-
bassador Goldberg, he sent a letter to the
Secretary-General, in which he requested
the Secretary-General to take on the re-
sponsibility of trying to find a peaceful solu-
tion, saying that we would cooperate in
every possible way, and the Secretary-Gen-
eral has responded in a very cooperative way
to this suggestion.^
The third step has been the letter which
Ambassador Goldberg has given the Presi-
dent of the Security Council,* in which we
have indicated that we feel that the 11 mem-
bers of the Security Council — which has the
prime responsibility under the U.N. Charter
for trying to bring about peaceful solutions
— should do what they can to bring about a
political solution to this very serious busi-
ness.
Mr. Dotvns: But in view of our own
stepped-up military effort in Viet-Nam, isn't
this more difficult and practically impossi-
ble?
Mr. Ball: Not at all. I think our own
stepped-up military effort is demonstrating
the seriousness of the American commit-
ment, the seriousness of the American deter-
mination not to let an independent people be
overrun and let their freedom be destroyed.
We are now providing the additional force
necessary to persuade the aggressors that
aggression is not paying off in this situation.
Our increased military effort should cre-
ate the conditions in which serious attempts
can be made to try to bring about an hon-
orable and peaceful solution.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Under Secretary, we have
stopped a step short of calling for a formal
meeting of the Security Council to consider
' For a statement made by President Johnson on
July 28, see Bulletin of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 262.
" Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98.
' For text of President Johnson's letter and the
Secretary-General's reply, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965,
p. 275.
* For text, see ibid., p. 278.
AUGUST 23, 1965
311
the Viet-Nam problem. Do we intend to do
so?
Mr. Ball: We have no objection, of course,
to a meeting of the Security Council. The
Security Council is the body that has the
prime responsibility under the charter. But
think what a meeting of the Security Coun-
cil might mean, divorced from everything
else — outside the context of other effort. It
could mean simply an acrimonious debate in
which the positions of the various parties
would only be hardened. It could mean pos-
sibly the exercise of a veto by one party or
the other.
Now this wouldn't advance the cause of a
peaceful solution very much. What we want
to do is to use the United Nations and the
Security Council in the most sophisticated
way, not to achieve a propaganda victory for
ourselves — this isn't what President John-
son is interested in — but to develop an hon-
orable, peaceful solution, and therefore we
have to use the instrumentalities of the
United Nations in a way which can contrib-
ute most effectively to bringing this about.
This is what we are trying to do.
Mr. Downs : Why haven't we used them in
the past ?
Mr. Ball: We have. And, you may recall,
without very much success. At the time of
the Gulf of Tonkin, when the Security Coun-
cil asked the government in Hanoi to send
representatives, that invitation was greeted
only with scorn. And I would point out to
you that, since the President's statement at
his press conference last Wednesday, already
the Peiping radio and the Hanoi radio have
come out denouncing the United Nations
and saying it has no useful role to play here
and attacking the bona fides of any effort
which the United Nations might make in
this situation. So it isn't as easy as a great
many people have represented it to be.
We want to use the United Nations. We
want the United Nations to play a useful
role. The problem is how to do it and how
to bring it about. It has been a subject of
a great deal of study and consideration on
our part, and I think the steps that have
been taken within the past week are the
most useful steps that could be taken under
the circumstances.
Soviet Missile Sites
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, in the 30 seconds
which we have left in this segment, could
you tell us whether the discovery of two
additional Soviet missile sites in North Viet-
Nam adds up to a stepped-up Soviet aid to
North Viet-Nam?
Mr. Ball: Well, we have been very well
aware of the fact that the Soviet Govern-
ment has been providing assistance to North
Viet-Nam. The missiles are presumably a
part of the assistance they apparently have
been providing. But I wouldn't draw too
many conclusions from this.
Mr. Downs : Well, Secretary Ball, we have
hit two of those Russian-made missile sites.
Why don't we hit the other five ringing
Hanoi?
Mr. Ball : Let me make two or three points
with regard to that. First of all, the Hanoi-
Haiphong area is not a sanctuary which we
recognize. What we are trying to do at the
moment is to destroy the military targets in
North Viet-Nam that are associated with the
infiltration.
Now this means that we are trying to do
our best to avoid the kind of air attack
that would bring about large civilian casual-
ties. This has been a very clear, definite
line that we have followed. We at the mo-
ment have military targets which we are
finding in North Viet-Nam which do not re-
quire attacking these particular surface-to-
air missile sites. When, under other circum-
stances and upon other occasions, this may
become necessary, it may be done, but not
at the moment.
Real Issue Is in South Viet-Nam
Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, why wait until
these missile sites become operational and
shoot down an American plane ?
Mr. Ball: I don't think this is going to
occur, and I think that you can count on the
American Air Force to take the measures
that are necessary to insure that the kind of
attacks which we are mounting on North
312
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam, within the framework of what
our objectives are there, will be carried on
with a minimum loss of American pilots.
Let me make one other point, because I
think this is sometimes misunderstood: The
real issue here is going to be settled in the
South and not in the North. What we are
doing in the North is in addition to the ef-
fort that is being made by the South Viet-
namese, with the help of the United States
forces, in the South.
Our objective is to achieve a political
solution that will assure our objective of an
independent Viet-Nam, by helping the South
Vietnamese forces win a victory in the South
and by persuading the North Vietnamese
regime that their kind of aggression does
not pay.
Now, toward that end, the attacks in the
North are designed to make more difficult
the infiltration into the South, the equip-
ment of the aggressor forces, and to make
clear to the North Vietnamese government
that the costs are very great. But the real
issue has to be joined in the South, and this
is where it is being joined.
Mr. Downs: Aren't these tactics turning
this from a South Vietnamese-North Viet-
namese war, with American help, into an
American war?
Mr. Ball: No, I don't think so. Not at all.
The President made it clear in his press con-
ference that the major burden will still be
carried by the South Vietnamese forces, but
that we are going to help them in a larger
manner than we have helped them up to this
point.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, would you say that
during these monsoon months, helped by
the weather, the Viet Cong has scored
substantial gains in their monsoon offensive?
Mr. Ball: I wouldn't say "substantial"
gains. They have had some local successes,
but they have also had a certain number of
defeats. The reason that we are sending
American forces in greater number to South
Viet-Nam now is to assure that they don't
have many local successes in the future.
Mr. Downs: Well, this greater military
commitment would seem to call for a mili-
tary response. Has there been any sign,
other than the Russian-made missiles, of,
say, Russian aircraft, additional Russian
aircraft, or Chinese movement, military
movement ?
Mr. Ball: No, not so far as we have been
able to perceive, but we will do what we
have to do.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, many of the leading
Republicans, including some prominent in
Congress, have insisted that we are not
using our air and sea power well enough or
effectively enough to gain whatever advan-
tage we have in this department. Why don't
we, or are we?
Mr. Ball : I think we are. I think seapower
is being very effectively used, not only to
provide carrier platforms for launching air
attacks but also to guard the sealanes from
the efforts of the North Vietnamese to in-
filtrate men and materials into the South.
And airpower is being used very effectively,
not merely in attacks on the military targets
in North Viet-Nam but all through South
Viet-Nam, in company with the South Viet-
namese Air Force, to increase the costs of
the Viet Cong activity and to make their
efforts of guerrilla warfare far more ex-
pensive to them.
Mr. Scali: Vice President Nixon said last
night that we should institute a full-fledged
naval blockade of North Viet-Nam to stop
not only Communist ships but Allied ships
which might be carrying war cargoes. What
do you think of this idea?
Mr. Ball: There is access to North Viet-
Nam both by land and by sea, and the prob-
lem right now is to try to prevent the North
Vietnamese from increasing their infiltration
into the South. This is what we have been
concentrating on and, I think, with a certain
measure of success. I hope that that meas-
ure of success will increase as time goes on.
Size of U.S. Commitment
Mr. Downs: It was pretty obvious, I
think, from the various briefings and the
President's statement that what had hap-
pened with the increase of the draft and the
raising of the force level in Viet-Nam of
American troops, that this is only the first
AUGUST 23, 1965
313
installment. How big do you anticipate our
effort out there will grow ?
Mr. Ball: The President was asked that
question the other day, and he gave the only
answer one can give who wants to be re-
sponsible in this situation: It is going to be
big enough to meet the kind of aggression
which may be launched against the South
Vietnamese people. I think it is impossible
to say how big it will be, but the President
made perfectly clear in his statement that
we are not going to make it any bigger than
it has to be in order to accomplish the lim-
ited but very vital objective which the
United States has in this part of the world —
preventing the destruction of freedom and
independence.
Mr. Scali: Mr. Ball, you hear many
voices raised, warning against getting Amer-
ican troops involved in a major land war in
Asia. Do you think the steps that have been
taken so far are a step in that direction?
Mr. Ball: I don't think we can make our
decisions on the basis of slogans or over-
simplified formulations.
What we have to do in South Viet-Nam is
the same thing that we have had to do else-
where in the world — in Greece, in Turkey,
in Iran — stop aggression that can mean an
extension of Communist power, that can
mean the discrediting of American commit-
ments around the world. This is what we
are doing there. And this is what we will
continue to do.
Mr. Downs : Can we be the world's police-
man, really, without help ?
Mr. Ball: We have some help, and I hope
we will get more. There are 30 nations so
far that are helping us in South Viet-Nam
in one way or another, and we are in con-
sultation with all the nations around the
world who are actual or potential allies of
ours. More and more they are beginning to
realize that the struggle that we have been
assisting the South Vietnamese to carry on
is their struggle as well.
Mr. Scali: In about the 30 seconds that
we have left, I would just like to read here
that Communist China's Chief of General
Staff has made a speech in Peiping in which
he claims that the bombing of North Viet-
namese targets, including areas near Red
China, shows that a big-scale regional war
is imminent. Does this warning, or this
bluster, particularly alarm you?
Mr. Ball: He made that on Army Day,
as I recall. It is not something we would
regard as a particularly significant state-
ment.
Mr. Scali : Thank you very much, Mr. Ball.
Letters of Credence
Somali Republic
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
Somali Republic, Ahmed Mohamed Adan,
presented his credentials to President John-
son on July 27. For texts of the Ambassa-
dor's remarks and the President's reply, see
Department of State press release dated
July 27.
314
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The four North African states — Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia,
and Libya — play an increasingly influential role in world
affairs. A recent change of government in Algeria, result-
ing in postponement of an Afro-Asian conference scheduled
for Algiers last June, has brought North Africa into current
headlines. In this article, written especially for the Bulletin,
the new American Ambassador to Libya, formerly Director
of the Office of North African Affairs, explains the pri-
mary interests of the North African nations and their reUi-
tions with the United States.
North Africa: Active Crossroads
by David D. Newsom
Recent events, including political change
in Algeria, new initiatives from Tunisia, and
the postponement of the Afro-Asian confer-
ence, have focused attention on the states
of the Maghreb, or Arab v^^est, in North
Africa: Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and
Libya. What are these nations? What are
their interests and their objectives? What
influences are present in the area ? What are
the interests and policies of the United
States?
In spirit these four nations stand, first
and foremost, with the world's newly inde-
pendent countries. Their primary objective
is the consolidation of their national in-
dependence. They are concentrating on com-
pleting this consolidation, developing institu-
tions compatible with their traditions and
needs, furthering their economic progress,
and establishing their relationships with the
other nations of their region and of the
world.
Three of the lands, Morocco, Tunisia, and
Algeria, were under French rule during the
colonial period. In all three, arrangements
held over from the colonial period remain
issues today.
In Tunisia and Morocco the question of
the future of lands settled by the French
still remains unresolved. Franco-Tunisian
relations have been strained since Tunisia
in 1964 nationalized all foreign-held lands.
Morocco has negotiated with France on a
portion of the lands, and the Moroccan Par-
liament has set a 3-year limit for action on
the remainder.
In Algeria the current question is essen-
tially that of finding a basis for continuing
Franco-Algerian cooperation. Arrangements
made under the Evian Accords, which ended
the 7 years of revolutionary war and brought
independence in 1962, expire this year. Ne-
gotiations are in progress regarding future
petroleum arrangements. Settlement remains
to be reached on French lands and property.
The future of French assistance and of
French technical help is also not yet clear.
French aid is currently running at approx-
imately $130 million per year.
Libya, which after the end of Italian
colonial rule and prior to independence in
1951 was a United Nations trusteeship, has
had fewer problems of transition. Last year,
however, questions were raised both about
the future of treaties and agreements made
with foreign powers just after independence
AUGUST 23, 1965
315
and about the future of foreign military
facilities which existed prior to independ-
ence.
Political Evolution
Political evolution is a second area of key
interest in these countries. The three coun-
tries of former French rule emerged under
different forms of government. In Tunisia
the traditional rule of the Bey was sup-
planted by a republic. In Algeria the pro-
visional government-in-exile moved in to rule
the country, but a contest for power within
that government essentially changed the
leadership. In Morocco the monarchy re-
mained, but after his succession to the
throne, King Hassan II sought to establish
democratic institutions within a constitu-
tional monarchy.
In each of these countries the political
parties which led the struggle for independ-
ence against the French were and still are
a major factor in the political evolution.
Tunisia's Destourian Socialist Party re-
mains the effective and democratic political
base for the rule of President Habib Bour-
guiba. In Algeria the FLN, or National
Liberation Front, which was at the heart of
the struggle for independence, remains the
only authorized political party in the country
and has an influence of major importance at
all levels of the Government.
In Morocco the fight for independence was
never fully consolidated in one political
party although the Istiqlal Party played the
major role. Divisions within the Istiqlal
Party and the development of other political
parties have given Morocco today the only
multiparty system in North Africa. This
year has seen the first major test of this
system in the workings of Parliament under
the constitution of 1962 and the assumption
of power by the King under article 35 of
the constitution on June 7.
Libya became a federal constitutional
monarchy upon independence in 1951 and
remains today under the leadership of King
Idris, who for many years led the struggle
for independence for Libya. While the basic
institutions of the constitution remain the
same, there has been an evolution in the
direction of a unified state. The issue of con-
stitutional evolution remains important in
Libya as it does in the other states, ac-
centuated by the needs of its development
and the management of its major resources.
Economic Development
As in every newly independent land, the
leaders of these countries are under great
pressure to improve the lot of their people.
Reforms are being pressed by the relatively
small educated classes, often impatient with
the institutions of the colonial regime as
well as with the traditional methods and
practices of their country. At the same time
the transition to independence has meant the
loss of some sources of income and an in-
crease in the basic requirements of the new
states. The states of North Africa have, in
general, been fortunately endowed, but their
needs are, nevertheless, substantial.
The three former French countries have
inherited an excellent infrastructure of
roads, harbors, communications, and public
services. Morocco has phosphates, much in
demand in the world. Algeria has oil and
gas in substantial quantities. Tunisia has re-
cently found oil and has the benefit of a
good tradition of technical and administra-
tive competence. Tunisia is about to enter
upon its second development plan to cover
the 4-year period 1966-70. Morocco's 3-
year development plan has just been
approved by the Pai-liament. Algeria is still
in the process of adapting to its independ-
ent needs the economic plans of the French
era. It is still grappling with major prob-
lems of reconstruction and rehabilitation as
a result of the ravages of 7 years of war
and the abrupt withdrawal, under extremist
pressure, of much of the European popula-
tion.
In Libya the problem is less and less that
of resources. Libya now has an oil production
of over 1 million barrels a day and income
of nearly $250 million annually. Libya, how-
ever, has a substantial need for advisory as-
sistance in its internal development and for
technicians to assist in planning and imple-
316
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
NORTH AFRICA
Nouakchott
I
:Si8a6 8-65
SUDAN
mentation and in the training of Libyans
ultimately to take over the major responsi-
bility for developing the country.
Regional Influences
In the field of foreign relations, these na-
tions are in the process of adjusting to their
neighbors, to their region, and to the world.
In the case of Morocco and Algeria, an un-
resolved frontier dispute flared into fight-
ing in October 1963. The intervention of the
Organization of African Unity and the desire
of both nations to adjust their differences
resulted in a cease-fire. A long-awaited meet-
ing between President Ben Bella of Algeria
and King Hassan of Morocco took place in
May of this year and further advanced the
steady improvement in relations between the
two. Frontier problems remain between
Tunisia and Algeria, as well, but they are
being peacefully adjusted.
On the wider scene, each country seeks to
play its role in regional and continental or-
ganizations. Each espouses some ultimate
closer links between the North African or
Maghreb states, even though political unity
does not seem immediately possible. The four
countries are, in a sense, a bridge between
the Arab East and Africa and consequently
are active members of both the Arab League
and the Organization of African Unity. Each
has debts to and an interest in the United
Nations. Morocco was a member of the Se-
curity Council in 1964. Algeria benefited in
its fight for independence from substantial
support among members of the United Na-
tions. Tunisian statesmen have played a sig-
nificant role in the U.N., and Tunisia and
Morocco provided troops for the U.N. effort
in the Congo. Libya was the first of the
trusteeships converted by United Nations
action into independence.
North Africa, geographically, and to a cer-
tain extent politically, lies at the hub of a
wheel with spokes reaching to Europe, Amer-
ica, Eastern Europe, the Far East, and
Africa. It is an area which reaches in sev-
eral directions and which, because of its lo-
cation, its traditional ties, and its resources,
has attracted the interest of nations from
these same several directions.
The first influence is Arab. Although
AUGUST 23, 1965
317
there are still strong influences of the in-
digenous Berber, the principal language of
the area is Arabic and most of the inhabit-
ants consider themselves a part of the Arab
world. This has been particularly true in
Algeria, which for over a hundred years was
cut off from Arab influence by French rule.
Closely associated with this is the influence
of Islam, intertwined almost inseparably
with Arab cultural influence. Islam remains
a strong force in all four countries, particu-
larly in the rural areas.
Political issues of the Arab East are also
important in North Africa, although these
states may be more inclined to independent
action. On the Palestine question, Libya
and Algeria share the strong feelings of the
eastern Arab nations. Tunisia, as recent
events have demonstrated, is more prepared
to take new initiatives, at variance with the
general Arab policy. On the question of re-
lations with Germany, Libya, Tunisia, and
Morocco have taken independent stands.
Nevertheless, while there may be differ-
ences on individual issues, all of these na-
tions attach importance to continued good
relations among the Arab States and to
the perpetuation of the flow of Arab cultural
influence.
The second major external influence is
African. Despite the Sahara, these states
have had long ties with Africa to the south
and attach importance to their role on the
African scene. Tunisia has played an impor-
tant role on various commissions of African
states and as one of the leaders of the Afri-
can group at New York. King Hassan of
Morocco was one of the original leaders of
efforts to get closer groupings of the African
states. Former President Ben Bella of Al-
geria based his external policy to a large ex-
tent on his strong feelings about the contin-
uing struggle against colonialism in Africa.
He saw, particularly in the Portuguese col-
onies of Angola and Mozambique, parallels
to Algeria under the French, and he made
it a matter of high priority to further their
"liberation." It was to Africa and to the Or-
ganization of African Unity that Morocco
and Algeria turned for a resolution of their
border dispute in 1963.
All of these states are influenced by the
wider pressures of the Afro-Asian world as
manifested at the United Nations or in var-
ious international nonalined meetings. Al-
geria has hosted several Afro-Asian confer-
ences and is still scheduled to be the site
of the postponed Afro-Asian conference.
Europe and North Africa
The most significant European influence
in North Africa is France. France came to
Algeria in 1832 and established protec-
torates in Tunisia in 1883 and in Morocco
in 1912. Despite bitter revolutionary strug-
gles, particularly in Algeria, French cul-
tural, economic, and commercial influence re-
mains paramount. French remains the pri-
mary language in Algeria, and is the sec-
ondary language in Morocco and Tunisia. In
Morocco and Algeria and, until recently, in
Tunisia, France has been the principal
source of foreign aid and the principal mar-
ket. Algeria's interest in France is further
influenced by the large number of Algerians
who continue to go to France to work. Both
the Moroccan and the Algerian Governments
still depend on cadres of French technicians
and teachers.
France's interest in these countries is also
great. There is a deep interest in maintain-
ing French culture. Algeria is France's prin-
cipal source of oil, and French companies
own the greater share of the production.
Under the Evian Accords of 1962 France
obtained a 15-year lease on the important
naval base at Mers el Kabir on the Mediter-
ranean Sea and a 5-year lease on sites in
the Sahara used for missile and other
testing.
Another important influence from Europe
is that of Britain. This is primarily true in
Libya, with which Britain has a treaty of
alliance. Britain maintains an important
airbase in eastern Libya and until 1966 will
maintain garrisons near two of Libya's prin-
cipal cities, Tripoli and Benghazi. British
petroleum interests have concessions in both
Libya and Algeria, and a British firm is
now building a pipeline for the Algerian
Government.
Spain retains colonies in North Africa
318
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and close relations with Morocco. Germany
has wide commercial interests, blunted
somewhat by recent difficulties with the
Arab world. Italy retains an interest and
commercial relations, particularly with Tu-
nisia and Libya.
The other major European interest is that
of the European Common Market. This is an
interest which springs primarily from the
countries of the area which see the absolute
necessity for continuing trade relations with
Europe, the traditional market for North
Africa. Algeria, by virtue of its accord with
France, has already a special relationship
recognized by the EEC. Closer association
with the EEC is under study. The EEC has
agreed to draw up terms of reference for
negotiations with Tunisia and Morocco. The
outcome of the negotiations of all three with
the EEC will be significant in determining
the degree to which these countries will re-
main politically, as well as economically, in-
fluenced by Europe.
The Soviet Union has, in recent years,
shown an increasing interest in North Af-
rica. During the Algerian struggle against
the French, the Soviet Union equivocated be-
cause of its ties with the French Communist
Party, but since Algerian independence it
has adopted a policy of more clear-cut in-
terest in North Africa. It has shown an in-
terest in furthering relations with both Tu-
nisia and Morocco, but the primary effort
has been in Algeria. President Ben Bella was
accorded unprecedented treatment for a non-
alined leader during his visit to Moscow in
1964, and the Soviet Union has entertained
Algerian military and party leaders as well.
Soviet aid, while not matching that of France
in quantity, has been substantial in the mili-
tary and economic areas. The Soviet Union
has endorsed Algeria as the site for con-
ferences sympathetic to the Soviet view-
point.
Communist China has also demonstrated
an increasing interest, but its path to North
Africa has not been smooth. It has estab-
lished diplomatic relations with Morocco,
Algeria, and Tunisia but recently took
strong exception to Tunisian statements on
Far Eastern policy. There is some trade
with Morocco, but political relations are
not close. During its war of independence,
Algeria found more political support from
Communist China than it did from the So-
viet Union, but today Algeria seeks to re-
main "nonalined" in the ideological strug-
gle between the two major Communist
countries. Nationalist China retains diplo-
matic relations and an important technical
assistance program in Libya.
From the Western Hemisphere, Cuba has
made a special effort to establish influence
in North Africa, playing upon some sym-
pathy for its revolution among the militants
of Algeria and offering its sugar at favor-
able prices. Morocco, where sugar is a par-
ticularly important import and a drain on
foreign exchange, turned to Cuba as its prin-
cipal source at projected prices below the
world market.
U.S. Interests in North Africa
The United States is but one of many
countries interested in North Africa. The
four countries of the area were among the
first with which we had commerce and diplo-
matic relations. In the last several years,
since these nations have become independ-
ent, these relations have grown. The United
States is separated from North Africa not
only by distance but also, to some extent,
by language. Nevertheless, it has a position
of major influence and power in the Mediter-
ranean area, a position that is growing
through an increasing presence and invest-
ment in North Africa itself.
The United States is keenly interested in
establishing a relationship of mutual under-
standing and confidence with the nations of
North Africa. The role of this country may
be secondary, but the United States cannot
depend on others — and, in the present con-
text, on France — to advance and promote its
interests. Quite apart from the presence of
a large number of U.S. citizens and U.S.
facilities and interests. North Africa, as the
hub of the Afro-European world, is impor-
tant to the United States because of its lo-
cation, the relationship of its resources to
the well-being of the area, and the influence
of its new leaders on the world scene.
AUGUST 23, 1965
319
The United States has five principal ob-
jectives in its relations with the countries of
North Africa: (1) It wishes to maintain free
and friendly relations on a basis of mutual
interest consistent with the dignity and in-
dependence of the countries of the area.
(2) Closely related to this is the desire to
prevent the growth of influence inimical to
the United States which would close the
doors of mutually beneficial cooperation.
(3) The United States wants to be in a posi-
tion to present and gain support for its posi-
tions on major international issues. (4) It
is willing to join with the other nations of
the West active in the area in contributing
to the economic development and well-being
of North Africa. (5) Where U.S. military
facilities exist, the United States wishes to
find an acceptable basis for continuing co-
operation with the host country.
The United States has faced certain very
real handicaps in developing its relations
with North Africa, particularly with the
three former French states. United States
influence was virtually excluded from direct
contact with the peoples of Morocco, Al-
geria, and Tunisia during the period of
French rule. Because of our relations with
France in Europe, the United States faced
difficulties in establishing any relationship
with the nationalist leaders, although indi-
vidual Americans came to know Bourguiba,
Bouabid, Ben Seddik, and leaders of the Al-
gerian revolt prior to independence. In Mo-
rocco and Tunisia because of the problem of
access and in Algeria, both because of this
problem and because of the emergence of
new leadership, the United States had vir-
tually to start "from scratch" in building
relationships with leaders, many of whom
believed that the United States was on the
wrong side in their struggle for in-
dependence.
In the case of Algeria not only was the
United States distant from the nationalist
leaders, but Algeria received support from
nations and regimes which today are active
opponents of U.S. policy. Thus North Viet-
Nam assisted Algerians captured from the
French in the fighting in Indochina and sent
help to the Algerian nationalists. Today the
Algerians feel a close revolutionary bond
with the Viet Cong which inevitably affects
their outlook on the Vietnamese situation
and on U.S. policy in the Far East.
In relations with Algeria, also, the United
States faces the problem of reaching an un-
derstanding on African problems with those
in the postrevolutionary period who see the
solution to remaining colonial problems in
revolutionary rather than evolutionary
terms.
While the political differences which the
United States faced with European coun-
tries over North Africa largely evaporated
with the independence of Algeria, potential
conflicts still remain in the economic sphere.
While, for example, Maghreb association
with the European Economic Community is
of major future importance to the economies
of these nations, the United States cannot
favor any form of association which would
exclude American commerce and trade from
that area.
United States activities in the area are
impressive. Economic assistance has been
extensive, and important diplomatic and
consular missions have been established.
American economic aid obligations and loan
authorizations totaled more than $680 mil-
lion to the four countries through fiscal year
1965. Morocco and Tunisia have been re-
cipients of about $290 million and $235 mil-
lion, respectively. In addition, well over $500
million worth of agricultural commodities
have been furnished to this area under
various provisions of Public Law 480. The
United States has 10 diplomatic and con-
sular missions in the four countries and 10
U.S. Information Service posts.
Against this background of the objectives
of the nations themselves, the spectrum of
influences in the area, and the interests and
problems of the United States, the relation-
ships with the individual nations have pro-
gressed. Today, although major problems
remain with Algeria, the United States has
moved toward a better understanding and
mutually beneficial relationship with each of
the nations of this important area.
320
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Morocco
For several years after Morocco gained
its independence, the question of the future
of U.S. bases in that country remained an
issue between Morocco and the United
States. The newly independent Moroccan
Government did not recognize the base ar-
rangements made with France, and efforts
to negotiate a new agreement did not suc-
ceed. Finally, in 1959, President Eisenhower
and King Mohammed V reached an agree-
ment on the evacuation of the bases,' which
was implemented 4 years later. The three
airbases and the naval base at Kenitra were
turned over to the Moroccans, although
some U.S. personnel remain at Kenitra to
assist in training the Moroccan forces in
certain specialties.
Close relations were established between
Morocco and the United States during the
visit of King Hassan II to Washington early
in 1963 - and have continued since. The
United States is assisting Morocco economi-
cally and with some military equipment.
Morocco, while remaining nonalined, has
assumed an independent and constructive
role on international issues, particularly
during its recent membership on the Se-
curity Council.
Algeria
In Algeria the United States started with
the handicap of isolation from the national-
ist movement and from Ahmed Ben Bella,
who emerged as the leader of the new na-
tion. Although the United States opposed
France on many aspects of its Algerian pol-
icy and was frequently attacked by French
partisans, the Algerians also believed the
United States supported France by virtue
of U.S. membership in the NATO alliance
and because France used some U.S. equip-
ment in its war against the Algerians. The
speech delivered by Senator John F. Ken-
' For text of a joint communique released at
Casablanca on Dec. 28, 1959, see Bulletin of Jan.
11, 1960, p. 57.
' For text of a joint communique released at
Washin^on on Mar. 29, 1963, see ibid., Apr. 22,
1963, p. 601.
nedy in 1957 sympathetic to the Algerian
nationalists was one of the few such expres-
sions on the American scene and is still re-
membered in Algeria.
In 1961 the United States began to pro-
vide surplus food for the feeding of Al-
gerian refugees in Morocco and Tunisia
through private U.S. voluntary agencies.
After independence this program was car-
ried into Algeria itself, and in the first win-
ter of Algerian independence U.S. food fed
more than one-third of the population — 4
million people. The United States has con-
tinued that program at a reduced level and
has also moved into new activities such as
providing food for wages on some rural re-
habilitation projects, medical training as-
sistance, and some dollar aid for technicians
and tools.
Algeria, although still bound strongly to
France, seeks a place of leadership among
the militant nations of the nonalined world.
Its position on such issues as Viet-Nam and
Cuba brings its differences with the United
States into sharp focus. The basic trends
of the relationship between the United States
and this important and energetic, but revo-
lutionary-minded, nation have yet to be
clearly determined.
Tunisia
In 1962, impressed by Tunisia's capacity
and determination to develop, the United
States made a commitment of $180 million
to Tunisia's development plan. The United
States today remains Tunisia's primary
source of foreign assistance and is examin-
ing with the Tunisians the basis for further
help to the new 4-year plan. Despite diffi-
culties in the implementation of the original
plan, Tunisia has demonstrated genuine
progress in development. Political relations
between Tunisia and the United States are
excellent. President Bourguiba has, on nu-
merous recent occasions, expressed his sup-
port for U.S. policies and actions in a man-
ner not often heard in the nonalined world.
Libya
Libya obtained its independence in 1951
as a result of a United Nations resolution
AUGUST 23, 1965
321
Ambassador Newsom's article is one of a
series being written especially for the Bulletin
by officers of the Department and the Foreign
Service. Officers who may be interested in
submitting original bylined articles are invited
to call the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline
Patton, extension 5806, room 5536.
of which the United States was one of the
sponsors. From the beginning, the United
States provided a major part of the foreign
assistance which started Libya on its inde-
pendent path. In 1954 the United States and
Libya concluded an agreement covering the
use of Wheelus Air Base and certain other
agreed areas. In 1960 a subsequent agree-
ment was concluded which increased the
level of U.S. aid. At about the same time,
U.S. companies led the way in prospecting
for oil in Libya; the first substantial pay-
ment of oil revenues to Libya was made in
1963.
The discovery of oil and the rapid accel-
eration in Libyan revenues have brought
promise and hope that did not previously ex-
ist. At the same time, Libyan officials are
seeking throughout the Western World those
who can assist them in utilizing the new
revenues for Libyan development. Although
the United States aid program has phased
out, about 20 Americans remain on contract
to the Libyan Government in various phases
of national development.
In February 1964 the Libyan Government
raised the question of the future of the U.S.
and British military installations in Libya.
After some weeks of discussions, the United
States agreed to the principle of with-
drawal, but without at that time discussing
any dates. Contacts with the Libyan Gov-
ernment on the future of the base are con-
tinuing. The present U.S.-Libyan agree-
ment runs until 1971.
The four countries of North Africa, in the
variety of their regimes, their concerns and
liaisons, their problems and their priorities,
are, in a sense, typical of the Afro-Asian
world as a whole. While there are individual
differences, the desires to consolidate their
independence, to create viable political in-
stitutions, to progress economically, and to
find a relationship of stature and accept-
ability among other nations of the area are
common to all.
To the United States this area is im-
portant. Through the patient building of
relationships with the peoples and leaders of
North Africa, the United States has moved
into a position of recognition and influence
there. Many problems and differences re-
main, but the successes along the present
path suggest that these, too, can be over-
come in the quest for a relationship of full
understanding.
• A limited number of reprints of the
above article will soon be available upon
request from the Office of Media Services,
Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.
Advisory Group Reports on Study
of Science Institute in Korea
Whito House press release dated August 5
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
The President met on August 5 with his
Special Assistant for Science and Technol-
ogy, Donald F. Hornig, and the advisory
group that had accompanied him to Korea
in July to explore the possibility for U.S.
cooperation in establishing in Korea an In-
stitute for Industrial Technology and Ap-
plied Science.! The President had initiated
the proposal for the institute during the visit
of President Park of Korea in May.^
The group included :
Dr. James B. Fisk, president, Bell Telephone
Laboratories, Murray Hill, N.J.
Dr. Albert H. Moseman, director, agricultural
sciences. The Rockefeller Foundation, New York
(Dr. Moseman was recently appointed Assistant
Administrator for Technical Cooperation and Re-
search of the Agency for International Develop-
ment)
^ For background, see Bulletin of July 26, 1965,
p. 172.
^ Ihid., June 14, 1965, p. 950.
322
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Dr. Bertram D. Thomas, president, The Battelle
Memorial Institute, Columbus, Ohio
Dr. Lilli Hornig, assistant professor of chemistry.
Trinity College, Washington, D. C.
Daniel F. Margolies, a Foreign Service officer, pres-
ently on the staff of the Office of Science and
Technology
Dr. Hornig and the members of his party
reported to the President that his proposal
had aroused widespread interest in Korea
and had been warmly supported by top Ko-
rean leaders in government, education, and
industry. They stated that the Koreans were
convinced that greater emphasis ought to be
placed on the development of Korean science
and technology and that the initiative by the
President was opportune and should con-
tribute to the healthy expansion of the
Korean economy.
Dr. Hornig transmitted a report to the
President in which steps to be taken for es-
tablishing the institute were outlined.
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
I am very pleased and grateful for the en-
thusiastic and generous welcome given Dr.
Hornig and his delegation by the people of
Korea and by President Park. The interest
there in the Institute for Industrial Technol-
ogy and Applied Science project is most en-
couraging.
When President Park was here, we dis-
cussed the need and opportunity to bring
the wealth of modern science and technology
to bear more effectively on the problems of
Korea's growing industry. I believe the insti-
tute idea which grew out of our conversa-
tions can set an example of excellence in
Korea and in the world. It will provide op-
portunities at home for an able young gener-
ation of Korean engineers and scientists.
Also, it will be a model for constructive
cooperation with other developing countries.
We will work together with the Korean
Government and Korean industry to build
up the new institute as rapidly as talented
people can be assembled for the task. I have
asked the Director of the Agency for Inter-
national Development, in consultation with
Dr. Hornig, to proceed as rapidly as possible
with concrete steps to accomplish this goal.
I am grateful to Dr. Hornig, his wife, and
the other members of the mission for the
credit they have done their country by this
outstandingly successful visit to Korea. I be-
lieve the language of science offers us new
and still largely unstaffed opportunities for
international understanding and coopera-
tion. I am hopeful that we may develop an
increasing number of joint programs in
which the talents of our science and those
of other countries can be united in construc-
tive endeavors.
Secretary To Set Up Procedures
for Foreign Affairs Research
Following is the text of a letter from
President Johnson to Secretary Rusk.
White House press release dated August 4
August 2, 1965
Dear Mr. Secretary : Many agencies of the
Government are sponsoring social science re-
search which focuses on foreign areas and
people and thus relates to the foreign policy
of the United States. Some of it involves
residence and travel in foreign countries and
communication with foreign nationals. As
we have recently learned, it can raise prob-
lems affecting the conduct of our foreign
policy.
For that reason I am determined that no
Government sponsorship of foreign area re-
search should be undertaken which in the
judgment of the Secretary of State would
adversely affect United States foreign rela-
tions. Therefore I am asking you to estab-
lish effective procedures which will enable
you to assure the propriety of Government-
sponsored social science research in the
area of foreign policy. I suggest that you
consult with the Director of the Bureau of
the Budget to determine the proper proce-
dures for the clearance of foreign affairs re-
search projects on a Government- wide basis.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
AUGUST 23, 1965
323
The Tasks of the Free-World Community
by George C. McGhee
Ambassador to Germany ^
The University of Goettingen confers a
high privilege upon a visiting lecturer such
as myself. For the duration of his visit, he
becomes a participant in the intellectual
pursuits of one of the world's most dis-
tinguished centers of learning. He may
emerge chastened from the rigorous testing
of ideas which is the hallmark of the uni-
versity's excellence. He may find the ideas
he presents confirmed by new insights. In
either case, he cannot fail to profit from the
experience. I expect to do so.
Diplomacy customarily is considered an
art. It is a great pity that it cannot be re-
fashioned into a science. The world would
be a much tidier place if it were possible
to predict events and control them with
mathematical precision. There is no evidence
that it will ever be possible to do so. Un-
fortunately the world does not array itself
for us in such a convenient fashion. We
can, however, at least attempt to reduce
uncertainty in international affairs to that
minimum level which is inherent in their
nature. We can take care not to widen the
margin for error by imprecision of thought
or expression.
Political science can be likened to natural
science at least in this one respect : As a first
step in solving a political problem, one can
construct a conceptual model which will
hopefully approximate the real world in at
least some of the characteristics which enter
' Address made at the University of Goettingen,
Goettingen, Germany, on July 14.
into the problem. It is the wisdom with
which parameters are chosen for inclusion in
the model which will determine the accuracy
of the deductions about reality which can be
made from it.
One need not look far in search for an il-
lustration. A nation is itself a model, a
synthesis of certain attributes common to
large aggregates of people — people who are
at the same time individuals, with problems
and lives of their own. The idea of nation-
hood has been found to be capable of in-
spiring a devotion which can lead individ-
uals to join together to achieve great com-
mon goals not otherwise attainable. In so
doing they acquire, within limits, certain
collective characteristics. A model of nation-
hood based on those characteristics can serve
a useful function.
Such a model does not, of course, serve
to solve all the varied problems that nations
encounter in the kind of world we now in-
habit. It is not the concept of nationhood,
however, but its extrapolation into extreme
nationalism which has had evil consequences.
Extreme nationalism, which divides the
world into inward-looking separate entities,
is incompatible with a world community
of nations. There can be no mutual-
ity of interest among national entities dom-
inated by nationalism ; each becomes defined
not by what all have in common but by
what differentiates each from every other.
International affairs in a world of such
nationalism must, as a result, inevitably be
an arena of competition and conflict.
324
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
If this were the inevitable state of affairs,
we should indeed have cause to despair of
the future of the human race. In fact, how-
ever, it is a highly artificial view, based on
a rather crude model of the political uni-
verse which excludes many elements of real-
ity. To name but two: There is the reality
that it is today not possible for any nation
to defend itself against its enemies except
in alliance with others. There is also the
reality that economic progress demands large
internal markets and expanding world
trade. Any adequate model of today's world
must take into account not only the existence
of many separate nations but the fact that
people of different nationalities have in-
terests which can best be advanced only by
concerted action on an international scale.
Since the war, a great effort has been
made in the free world, and especially in
the Atlantic area, to achieve this new con-
cept— or model — of a "community of na-
tions." Among the fruits of our labor are
such institutions as NATO, the OECD [Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment], and the European Communi-
ties. I am convinced that the great majority
of the Western peoples will wish to continue
the task of shaping their relationships to
the exigencies of their close community of
interest.
My purpose today, however, is to ask you
to consider what kind of model can best
guide our judgment, not just in Western
affairs but in the world as a whole. In
such a model not merely nations but whole
groups of nations are often considered as
possessing certain general distinguishing
characteristics. Indeed, we must generalize
— if we are to say anything about so vast
a subject except that it is complex. We must
take care, however, that the distinctions we
make between categories of nations are not
only valid but properly qualified.
Dividing the World Into Categories
The model which communism has at-
tempted to establish is the most deficient
of all. At one end of the scale it loses
sight of the uniqueness of each individual;
at the other, it acknowledges no value in
national diversity. From the Communist
point of view, humanity is divided quite
simply into its present servants and its
prospective prey. Hence this model is con-
trary to fact and thereby presents a great
danger to mankind.
We should not, however, in the view we
take of communism fall into the Communist
error of oversimplification. It would be fool-
ish, for example, to treat a small Eastern
European nation, the powerful Soviet Union,
and the aggression-minded Communist Chi-
nese as identical, simply because they are all
Communist.
It has been demonstrated that minds
trained in the tenets of communism are not
incapable of assimilating realities undreamed
of in their own dogma. It is a slow process,
however, and there is no sign anywhere
that it has more than begun. In Communist
China, for example, the ruling clique is still
blindly following Stalin's prescription for
world revolution by force of arms. As a con-
sequence, we who do not accept the Com-
munist view of the nature of world affairs
have no choice but to continue, at whatever
cost, to demonstrate that aggression and sub-
version bring no profit to their perpetrators.
Another kind of division of humanity into
dual categories survives in memory, although,
save in the fiefs of Communist neocolonial-
ism, it has largely disappeared in fact. This
was the distinction between self-governing
peoples and those who fell under the govern-
ance of others. Dozens of former colonies
have taken their places as independent mem-
bers of the world community, responsible only
to themselves except insofar as they freely
choose to participate in wider responsibilities
through world and regional organizations.
For the most part, the former major
colonial powers have not only yielded sov-
ereignty but have devoted major efforts to
enabling their former dependencies to exer-
cise their new sovereignty effectively. In
many instances they tried to leave behind,
when they departed, the political institu-
tions, administrative skills, and economic
viability which make a nation truly free.
AUGUST 23, 1965
325
In most cases they have been responsive to
the needs of the new countries for more
aid — sometimes to make up for previous
failures but more often to complete a re-
sponsibility assumed on their own initiative.
There is a certain vogue these days for
a view which divides all the world, like
Caesar's Gaul, into three parts: two great
power blocs — regarded with impartial dis-
taste— with some vague repository of all
political virtue lying in between. Under
this concept, bigness itself becomes evil.
Here is indeed a simple model, that of
"the two hegemonies." It is as if an observer
should declare that because one box contains
lead, the contents of another box of similar
size cannot be gold but also must be lead —
it is not necessary to look inside. Such an
approach to international relationships can
have few points of correspondence with
reality. We refuse to be equated to the
Soviet Union in anyone's model. We believe
that an objective review of the conduct of
the United States and the Soviet Union
makes the differences clear.
Essence of Free World Is Variety
The world is characterized by diversity,
and if we are to discuss its affairs ra-
tionally we must employ concepts which
acknowledge the fact. That is why I believe
the term "free-world community" is a use-
ful one. The essence of the free world is
variety. It is a grouping to which the
United States belongs equally with the
smallest nation. My country is no leader of
an hegemony. It seeks to exercise no dom-
ination. It is, on the contrary, the greatest
source of strength for that liberty which all
members of the free world claim for them-
selves.
The concept is broad enough to include
peoples who have built highly industrialized
societies, as well as those who are only be-
ginning to build. It also includes the na-
tions which claim to be "unalined," as well
as those who are allied together in the de-
fense of freedom. Declared nonparticipants
though some may be in the struggle that
the Allied nations have accepted, they none-
theless have a vital stake in it. Without the
protective cover provided by the United
States and other committed nations, the
"unalined" could not long expect to retain
the opportunity to occupy themselves with
their own affairs in peace — even to remain
"unalined."
Against the category of the free-world
community the category of its opponents
must be set. In the latter category, too,
there is variety. Considered in juxtaposi-
tion, however, the two groupings differ in
an essential respect. The members of one
are united by the conviction that men have
a right to determine their own destinies. The
others relegate all such decisions to the all-
powerful party and state.
Note that this is not an opposition be-
tween two systems competing to give men
what they desire. It is on the one hand the
assertion, and on the other a denial, that
men may choose their own goals. Aggres-
sion, subversion, and the exploitation of
legitimate grievances for perverted ends
cannot be instruments of a positive pur-
pose. Their employment is a negation of
the value of human life itself. That nega-
tion is what free men, however they may
differ in viewpoint on other issues, can
never accept.
The validity of the concept of the free-
world community is borne out by the fact
that, broadly speaking, its members do ac-
knowledge a common interest in many fields.
One is the development of modern econ-
omies in countries which do not yet possess
them. The international part of that task
calls for trade concessions and aid pro-
grams. To achieve them many countries,
both donors and recipients of aid, have had
to put aside memories of a recent past in
which the relationship of a developed to an
undeveloped land often was that of metro-
pole to colony. Though it is often expressed
in economic terms, the fundamental change
in the relationship between the developed
326
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and undeveloped parts of the free world is
a remarkable political achievement. It must
be preserved and extended.
Keeping the Peace
There is, how^ever, an even more vital
free-vvforld interest vi'hich is less well under-
stood. This is the necessity of keeping the
peace. In today's world the preservation of
peace and order is generally beyond the
capabilities of any one state or any small
group of states. Yet, if there is to be prog-
ress, the peace must be kept. If there is in-
ternational anarchy, only the Communist
scavengers will profit. The social and eco-
nomic progress that has been made, as
well as the hard-won political gains, can
have no permanence unless peace in free-
dom is made secure.
Here, in my opinion, is the crucial prob-
lem, one to which our conceptual model of
world affairs must give us an answer if it
is to be adequate to the needs of our time.
To distinguish a peacekeeper from an inter-
ventionist should not be harder than to dis-
tinguish development aid from economic
imperialism. The free-world community
must learn to make the distinction, if it is
to be spared endless disorder and the danger
of eventual piecemeal defeat.
It would be pleasant if the task of peace-
keeping could be set aside until a free-world
consensus on the means of discharging it
had fully matured. A list of well-knovra
place names will suffice to show why that
is not possible: Iran, Greece, Berlin, the
Philippines, Korea, Laos, Viet-Nam, and
Malaya. These are places in which overt
Communist action ranging from blockade to
full-scale war has placed freedom in peril —
all since 1945. Each of these assaults ex-
ceeded the defensive capability of the coun-
try attacked. They could be beaten off
only by an immediate and forceful free-
world response.
The sources of violence in the world are
not hard to identify. Their pattern of ag-
gression and subversion has become clear.
It must be made equally clear that these in-
trusions will always be resolutely met.
In some cases there has been a broad
enough consensus among the free-world na-
tions to enable the United Nations itself to
take action against disorder. In the Congo,
for example, the U.N. sought to establish
conditions under which a representative
government could unite the country and
begin the long struggle toward political
and economic well-being. In large measure
due to U.N. efforts, the Democratic Repub-
lic of the Congo has at last been enabled to
make a start. The U.N. also has played a
useful role in keeping the peace in the
Middle East.
Korea, too, was a United Nations police
action, though it is doubtful that the inter-
national organization would have been able
to undertake it had not Stalin committed
the gross tactical error of absenting the So-
viet Union from the Security Council. In
Korea the free world faced an example of
naked aggression by the Communist North,
later joined by a Communist China which is
still the most unrepentantly aggressive of
the Communist powers. The United Na-
tions responded firmly and, in the end, suc-
cessfully. South Korea remains independent,
with its territorial integrity intact — and
Communist China still stands condemned by
the United Nations as an aggressor.
Sometimes a regional organization under-
takes to be the peacekeeper. Defensive ar-
rangements which deter aggression are a
form of peacekeeping to be preferred,
when possible, to post hoc actions to restore
a broken peace. The most successful of all
such arrangements is NATO, which has
shielded the Atlantic area and provided
Europe with the tranquillity which made
possible its present prosperity. NATO is
indeed an instrument of peace — precisely
because Its members have armed and or-
ganized themselves in a fashion which
makes plain that no aggression against
them can be profitable.
Another example of regional peacekeep-
ing is the current situation in the Domini-
AUGUST 23, 1965
327
can Republic. In this case the Organization
of American States could not immediately
provide or authorize peacekeeping forces to
deal with the crisis at its inception. The
United States supplied the lack. As quickly
as feasible, we turned our forces over to
OAS command. We are gradually with-
drawing our forces as they are replaced by
troops of other American states, who are
thus bearing their share of the peacekeep-
ing task.
In every peacekeeping operation in which
Americans have participated — not exclud-
ing our refusal to bow to Communist pres-
sure against Berlin — we have found our-
selves subjected, in one or another degree,
to incomprehension and criticism. In the
case of Berlin, there were people in other
parts of the world who wondered aloud why
some compromise could not be made to ease
tension — even at the cost of some vital por-
tion of Berlin's freedom.
When we went to the aid of Greece
against the Communist guerrillas, we were
accused of supporting a rightist government
against the true desires of the Greek
people. No one says that now. We heard
when we were fighting in Korea much the
same objections — and from much the same
quarters — that we are hearing today about
our involvement in Viet-Nam.
The questions that some friends have
raised about our action in the Dominican
Republic seem to me, however, the clearest
illustration of the need for the free world
to think deeply about this difficult problem
of keeping the peace. The United States
and the OAS have no desire to dictate to
the Dominican people either the form of
their government or the persons of their
leaders. We have sought only the oppor-
tunity for the Dominican people to make a
free choice. That the denouement still
lies in the future should not alter the abil-
ity of students of American actions in the
world to read it now. The net result of our
peacekeeping action in the Dominican Re-
public will be the preservation of its people's
freedom — as it has been in all those actions
in which we have been involved in the past
and as it will be in Viet-Nam.
U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam
Southeast Asia is, at this moment, the
part of the world in which freedom is
under the heaviest attack. Peiping has pro-
claimed the militant doctrine of world rev-
olution with a harshness that has caused
serious problems even within the Com-
munist world. South Viet-Nam has been
made the testing ground for that doctrine.
It is being tested there whether, under a
new guise, the armed aggression which has
failed the Communists so badly in other cir-
cumstances may not yet succeed.
What is taking place in South Viet-Nam is
certainly not a "war of liberation" save in
Communist doublespeak — nor is it an insur-
gency or a popular uprising or a civil war.
It is aggression by stealth, in which trained
men and weapons are being brought into
the country from outside to kill and destroy
at the orders of outside masters. Even the
curtain of pretense is growing thinner as
Hanoi states ever more arrogantly the
terms of surrender — on which South Viet-
Nam may have the privilege of ceasing to
exist as an independent state.
It is a hard war, one in which the cost
in human suffering is especially high in re-
lation to the prospect of rapid victory. To
make it high is the deliberate aim of the
enemy, who sees in the multiplication of
atrocities a means of sickening free men
into an acceptance of defeat. It is a war
from which, some have suggested, gentle-
men should stand aside. To do so, however,
would be not only to abandon a courageous
people but to confirm that terror supplies
the margin of success for which com-
munism has been vainly seeking.
Today some 30 countries are providing di-
rect assistance to South Viet-Nam. Yours is
one of them. Another 10 countries or so
soon will be joining in the task. This is no
mean proportion of the free world. As for
the reasons for American involvement, they
are simple. South Viet-Nam asked for our
help; we promised it; we are giving it; and
whatever our commitment demands of us,
we shall not fail to provide it.
Our commitment is that force shall not
prevail over the people of South Viet-Nam.
328
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Our objective is an honorable settlement
that will respect the freedom and inde-
pendence of this small country — no more,
no less. We place no conditions on our will-
ingness to negotiate. We would gladly
place this confrontation, even in its present
unresolved state, before an international
conference. At least 12 attempts to ini-
tiate discussions have been made — by our-
selves, by allies, and by nations committed
to no alliance. All have been rebuffed.
Earlier this month. Secretary of State Rusk
summarized the situation in these words : -
The machinery is all there. There are a dozen
ways of moving toward peace if there is a willingness
to do so. The problem is not a lack of channels, or a
lack of diplomatic procedure, or a lack of contact.
The problem is that we see no evidence on the other
side that they are interested in bringing this matter
to a peaceful conclusion.
It is a pity, since we know the conclusion
already. We are fully committed, and we and
the South Vietnamese have the strength to
prevail. In Viet-Nam we are using our
strength with restraint, as we always have.
We did not attack Bulgaria or Yugoslavia
when guerrillas moved from those countries
into Greece. We mounted a Berlin airlift
rather than respond to the blockade by en-
gaging in large-scale fighting on the ground.
We did not use atomic weapons in Korea,
though at the time our principal adversaries
had none. We did not make it impossible
for the Soviet Union to retreat peacefully
from the Cuban missile crisis. Four and a
half years passed between North Viet-Nam's
covert attack on the South and our initiation
of a limited attack on the North. After an
interval, we paused again — and made the
other side aware in advance that our pause
was a question. We received a harsh answer.
We are trying now, as we have consist-
ently tried, to measure what we do by what it
is necessary to do to keep the peace. To ignite
a world holocaust would not serve that ob-
jective. Neither would a failure to spend
treasure and lives when they are required.
- For the transcript of an interview with Secre-
tary Rusk on USIA television on July 4, see Bul-
letin of July 19, 1965, p. 105.
In Viet-Nam we shall do what is required
of us.
Our experience teaches that one should
not expect thanks for keeping the peace ; oblo-
quy is a commoner reward, until the value of
the achievement becomes obvious in retro-
spect. Peacekeeping gains for the peacekeeper
no foot of ground, no iota of domination.
It is a costly business. The cost to the
United States since 1945 has been 160,000
casualties in a world ostensibly untroubled
by major conflict. Why, then, engage in
peacekeeping? Would it not be better to let
each nation fend for itself as best it can?
The answer is that no nation can fend for
itself — and that each has a duty to the free-
world community proportionate to its
strength to assist other members of the com-
munity.
We happen to be the strongest member.
There are many tasks that only we can do.
That is why many peoples turn to us in
their hour of need. To deny them would be
in effect to say: Yes, freedom is precious —
but only my share of it, not yours. Thus
the total of freedom in the world would be
diminished. The English poet John Donne
stated the truth long ago :
No man Is an Hand, entire of it selfe; every man
is a peece of the Continent, a part of the maine: If
a Clod bee washed away by the Sea, Europe is the
lesse, as well as if a promontorie were, as well as if
a Mannor of thy friends or of thine owne were; any
man's death diminishes me, because I am involved
in Mankinde.
Peacekeeping and European Unity
We Americans cannot, however, even if we
had the military strength, perform the task
of peacekeeping alone. We need the moral, as
well as the physical presence, of other mem-
bers of the free-world community at our
side. Only in this way can the American peo-
ple be given encouragement to continue to
accept our heavy burden of responsibility in
the affairs of the world. Only in this way
can an impetus be given to the development
of a consensus as to our individual and col-
lective responsibilities toward peacekeeping
to which the whole free-world community
must ultimately come if we are to rid the
AUGUST 23, 1965
329
world of lawlessness.
I believe that peacekeeping is a duty to
which the nations of Europe could well ad-
dress themselves more wholeheartedly. It is
true that many European countries labor
under handicaps of one kind or another
which make them hesitate lest their motives
be misunderstood. These handicaps can, how-
ever, be exaggerated. The overriding fact
is that, in the field of peacekeeping, as in
the field of economic aid and other fields,
the free-world community has sore need of
Europe's full strength. I believe that Europe
has a responsibility to make it available.
This is another good reason which can be
added to the many that Europeans already
have for wanting to unite among them-
selves. For peacekeeping, as for other pur-
poses, Europeans may wish to consider the
advantages of acting in concert. Tasks are
easier when they are shared. Furthermore,
though many peoples have memories of some
European nation or other — none has any
acquaintance with Europe as such — a Europe
united from the North Cape to the Mediter-
ranean. Perhaps it is that entity, still to
come into being, which can tip the balance in
the parts of the world in which the victory
still wavers between freedom and coercion.
As an argument for unifying Europe, the
one I have just offered is austere. It is also,
however, an urgent one. Peacekeeping is not
a task which can be postponed to suit the
convenience of those who have the resources
to keep the peace. If it is logical for Europe
to help maintain peace and order in a par-
ticular part of the world — let us say Africa
— then both Europe and Africa will suffer
if either allows outworn concepts to inter-
pose between the need and the response.
In the concept of the free-world com-
munity I am convinced that mankind at
last possesses a model which can give a
hopeful answer to the problem of establish-
ing a peaceful order in a troubled world.
We shall succeed in this endeavor only in-
sofar as we rightly read the meaning of
that concept — and act upon what we learn.
To do so is a vital interest that all free
men share.
U.S. Loan To Support Economic
Integration of Central America
Following are reinarks made by President
Johnson and Enrique Delgado, President of
the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration, at a White House ceremony on
July 29 during which President Johnson
signed a $35 million loan from the Agency
for International Development to the Bank.
White House press release dated July 29
REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
Distinguished guests, members of the
diplomatic corps, members of Congress:
I regret that these days and nights I am
usually an hour late and a dollar short, but
it is good to finally be here with you, and
this house is honored today by the presence
of such distinguished company. I am deeply
privileged to extend to each of you a very
warm welcome.
For all Americans of all the Americas,
today is a very proud occasion. I believe we |
realize the real meaning of this moment as
much more than just signing the papers that
are before us. In a real sense by what we
have come to do we really honor the spirit —
the new and the soaring spirit — that is
stirring throughout the length of this young
and this proud and this newly hopeful West-
ern Hemisphere of ours, and no cynicism
can corrode the promise that is beginning to
gleam so brightly in the sun of this New
World's new day, for we are thinking as we
have never had cause to really think before
as Americans, as peoples, as nations, sharing
not just a common history or even a com-
mon geography but sharing a common vi-
sion and possessing common aspirations.
That spirit was brought to life here in this
room 4 years ago when a good many of you
heard President Kennedy speak his hopes
and speak the hopes of his countrymen, that
the Americas could ally themselves together
in peace to better the life of man in all of
the Americas.!
' For text of an address by President Kennedy J
on Mar. 13, 1961, see Bulletin of Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471. \
330
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
We see that spirit gaining substance and
reality now, and in a good many lands. But
nowhere do we see it more than in the lands
of Central America — Guatemala, Honduras,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Costa Rica. They
have, in a series of acts of the highest
statesmanship, embarked upon a process of
integrating their economies, which is one of
the really most exciting undertakings of our
world today. Together these nations have
created a common market. They have
leveled their trade barriers. They have co-
ordinated their efforts in higher education.
They have done the same for their tax sys-
tems and their development planning. And
they are all making an effort to cope with
the problems created by the ancient enemies
of all mankind — disease, poverty, and il-
literacy.
And the results are already apparent and
already gratifying. Trade among these na-
tions amounted to $20 million in 1958 but
reached $105 million last year, and the gross
national product is rising to close to 7 per-
cent a year. In support of these historic ad-
vances a key role is today being filled by
the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration. It is represented here today
by its able and dynamic president. Dr.
Delgado.
This bank is capitalized by equal contribu-
tions from the five Central American coun-
tries. But as the governments have pledged
mutual support to each other, so the mem-
bers of the alliance have pledged support to
them.
In March 1963, in Costa Rica, our late be-
loved President John Kennedy, pledged this
country's support.- And so today we have
come here to fulfill that pledge by signing
this loan agreement for $35 million.
Yes, great progress has been made in
Central America, but the future offers
greater promise both there and throughout
the hemisphere. The Central American Re-
publics are providing all their neighbors and
all the world what I would think is a very
' Ibid., Apr. 8, 1963, p. 511.
stirring example of what can be accom-
plished by free men with vision, and with
wisdom, and with courage. And we of the
United States are very proud to be fortu-
nate enough to work with them in this very
hopeful enterprise. We are so grateful for
your friendship, for your loyalty, for your
cooperation in trying to solve the problems
of this hemisphere and trying to be equal
to the challenges of the 20th century. And
we want you to know that, and we want your
governments to know it.
And so this morning, to the distinguished
representatives of Central America that
may be present on this historic occasion, I
would affirm again my country's deep re-
spect and admiration and support for your
efforts. And likewise, to the distinguished
representatives of the Organization of
American States, the CIAP [Inter- Ameri-
can Committee on the Alliance for Prog-
ress], the Inter-American Development
Bank, I would reaffirm the interest and the
support of the United States of America for
economic integration throughout this hemi-
sphere.
In all the world there are no dreams so
stirring or so exciting or so inspiring as
those that we can dream realistically and
reasonably now in our ovm hemisphere. The
day is no longer so dim and distant as once
it seemed to be when those dreams begin
to reach the lives of all our people, for we
can truly believe that that day has already
dawned and we are now working in its early
morning. Long before the twilight of this
century has come, we may believe that men
and women of the Americas will come to
know a much better life, a life of peace, a
life of social justice, a life of liberty, a life
of independence, a life where reason rules
and where tyranny is vanquished.
And it is toward this happy hour that we
work together now with a steady purpose
and with a rising confidence and with a deep
appreciation of what friendship and under-
standing really means.
I'm sorry I was late. Thank you so much
for coming.
AUGUST 23, 1965
331
REMARKS BY MR. DELGADO
Mr. President, Your Excellencies, distin-
guished guests :
I wish to express our deep appreciation
for the honor you have conferred upon us
by personally signing the loan of $35 million
to our bank from the Agency for Interna-
tional Development. This is a moment of
great satisfaction for me, a satisfaction that
I know^ is shared by the distinguished am-
bassadors from the five Central American
countries.
This occasion stands as the culmination of
long and sustained efforts to establish the
Central American Integi'ation Fund, efforts
that were initiated between the meeting of
the Presidents of the Central American Re-
publics and the late John F. Kennedy, whose
memory is so close to the hearts of Latin
Americans. These resources, matched with
the contribution of $7 million already made
by the Central American governments, will
serve to initiate a vast program of neces-
sary regional public works. Central Ameri-
can integration is thus advanced and eco-
nomic and social progress enhanced.
We Central Americans are indeed achiev-
ing a sustained rate of regional growth,
showing that the 15 years we have devoted
to the creation of an operating regional com-
mon market are bearing fruit.
The awakened spirit of entrepreneurship,
which is creating an entirely new generation
of business and institutional leaders, un-
doubtedly constitutes one of the most
striking phenomena in our region today.
Equally striking, however, is the awareness
that social progress is as important as in-
dustrial progress. We Central Americans
take pride in these developments.
After more than a century of darkness
and disunion we are pleased with this op-
portunity to bring directly to all of you the
voice of a Central America reunited by
common ideals and purposes.
The support of the United States to Cen-
tral American economic integration has been
strong and continuing. The Inter-American
Development Bank has also provided im-
portant financial support.
We must also thank the International
Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and our
agencies of the Western Hemisphere — the
Organization of American States, CIAP, and
ECLA [U.N. Economic Commission for
Latin America] — for the special interest they
have taken in the economic and social de-
velopment of the Central American
countries.
The Alliance for Progress to be successful
requires confidence in its principles and a
firm determination to overcome whatever
obstacles may conspire to prevent us from
achieving our ultimate goals. Much work re-
mains to be done and we are determined to
do it — through the multilateral mechanism
of the alliance and within the framework of
our regional integration.
U.S. Senators Visit Brazil
Department Announcement ^
A group of United States Senators, includ-
ing Senator [J. W.] Fulbright, Senator
[Bourke B.] Hickenlooper, and Senator
[Stuart] Symington, will visit Brazil on a
5-day trip beginning Thursday, August 5.
They will be accompanied by Under Secre-
tary of State for Economic Affairs Thomas
C. Mann, Assistant Secretary for Inter-
American Affairs Jack H. Vaughn, Special
Assistant to the President Jack Valenti, and
the President of the Export-Import Bank,
Harold Linder.^
The purpose of the trip is to discuss with
Brazilian and United States officials the
present stage of development of the Alliance
for Progress and other aspects of economic
cooperation, to visit various alliance proj-
ects, and to discuss ways and means of
strengthening the Organization of American
States, one of the major items on the agenda
of the upcoming conference of the Organiza-
tion of American States.
^ Read to news correspondents on Aug. 3 by Mar-
shall Wright, Deputy Director, Office of News.
' On Aug. 4, Mr. Wright announced that Senator
J. Caleb Boggs and Senator Milward L. Simpson
would also be in the party.
332
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
Conference of 18-Nation Disarmament Committee
Reconvenes at Geneva
Statement by William C. Foster ^
The business of this conference is peace.
Frankly, I deplore the fact, Mr. Chairman
[Semyon K. Tsarapkin], that you, as repre-
sentative of the Soviet Union, today took
advantage of your privilege as chairman to
make an attack upon the foreign policy of
my country in your statement in the pub-
lic session.
This Committee is dedicated to the propo-
sition that a lasting peace cannot be based
on military strength and that the security
of nations in the nuclear age requires co-
operative international efforts to control
and limit the production and spread of nu-
clear weapons. But as long as the world is
plagued by aggression, as long as force is
used or threatened against the territorial in-
tegrity and political independence of states
in Southeast Asia and elsewhere, countries
must look to their own defenses.
The many forms which this force has
taken were described in President Johnson's
letter of January 18, 1964, to Mr. Khrush-
chev.2 Force can be direct or indirect. It
can be in the form of aggression, subver-
sion, or the clandestine supply of arms.
In his message of January 21, 1964, to
^ Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on July 27.
Mr. Foster is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delega-
tion to the conference.
" For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 3, 1964, p. 157.
this Committee,^ the President pointed out
the importance of making progress on
means of prohibiting the threat or use of
force for the purposes of aggression. This
task, as events during the past year have
emphasized, remains a fundamental en-
deavor for nations which wish to secure and
preserve international peace and advance
the pace of progress in disarmament. If we
are to live in peace with each other, we
must do more than proclaim peace as our
goal. We must develop the customs and
rules for living together in peace.
Time of Increased Tension
We meet at a time of increased tension.
As we sit here, troops, military supplies,
and subversive agents directed and provided
by outside powers are engaged in an effort
to seize control of a country whose only of-
fence is its determination to live in peace
and freedom. My country and others have
made repeated efforts to secure the peace-
ful settlement of all disputes as regards the
Viet-Nam conflict. President Johnson pro-
posed to negotiate toward a peaceful settle-
ment without any preconditions,* and we
have attempted repeatedly to bring the
other side to the negotiating table, but
each overture has been rejected. Meanwhile,
men and arms continue to infiltrate across
• For text, see ibid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224.
• Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
AUGUST 23, 1965
333
the frontier, and the other side continues its
slaughter of thousands of civilians and its
blowing up of schools, hotels, hospitals, and
buses. For all those reasons, we are deter-
mined to meet our commitments to collec-
tive defense in Viet-Nam. To do so, we
will do what is necessary and only what is
necessary.
Let there be no mistake about the firm-
ness of our purpose to resist this aggres-
sion until the aggressors agree to seek a
solution around the conference table. But
we are equally firm in our determination to
make every reasonable effort to reach
agreement on arms control and reduction
measures.
The dangers posed by the arms race, and
particularly the threatened proliferation of
nuclear weapons, will not wait until the guns
are stilled. We dare not lose contact with
the work of peace while we strive to end
the destruction of war.
The steadily mounting nuclear stockpiles
in the United States and the Soviet Union
do not insure the security of any nation,
and the spread of nuclear weapons to addi-
tional countries threatens the security of all.
Limiting tlie Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The United States therefore attaches su-
preme importance to the opportunity af-
forded here to undertake serious negotia-
tions leading to the earliest possible accords
on measures to curb the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons and to begin to turn back the
arms race. We have come here with this sole
purpose in mind, and the world will be satis-
fied with nothing less than a supreme ef-
fort by every government represented here
to reach such accords.
It is in this spirit that President John-
son has addressed the following message to
the conference.
[Here Mr. Foster read the President's message.]
The first point of President Johnson's
message is to seek agreements to "limit the
perilous spread of nuclear weapons."
My Government supported the United
Nations Disarmament Commission's call *
upon this Committee to :
. . . accord special priority to the consideration
of the question of a treaty or convention to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. . . ,
The United States recommends that this
session engage in a renewed and intensive
effort to achieve a mutually acceptable
treaty to prevent the spread of nuclear
weapons. Such an agreement could follow
and be consistent with the Irish resolution
adopted unanimously by the 1961 General
Assembly.
A nonproliferation agreement could be
the beginning of increased security for all
states. Indeed, while turning our attention
to the problem of proliferation, we must
also consider the security of nations that
forgo nuclear weapons. The President of
the United States indicated his awareness
of this problem when in October 1964 he
stated : *
The nations that do not seek national nuclear
weapons can be sure that, if they need our strong
support against some threat of nuclear blackmail,
then they will have it.
The question of the security of non-
nuclear states is an important one. It should
be considered fully as part of the response
of the international community to the dan-
ger of nuclear proliferation.
Use of IAEA Safeguards
As a further part of the international
community's response to the dangers of pro-
liferation, we should make greater use of the
International Atomic Energy Agency — the
agency we have set up to facilitate the use
of atomic energy for peaceful purposes — and
at the same time provide safeguards against
diversion of such programs to military pur-
poses. For that reason, we urge that as a
part of the nonproliferation effort all
governments undertake to accept IAEA or
similar international safeguards in all their
peaceful nuclear activities. This is an under-
taking which should be assumed both by
those countries which have developed nu-
clear weapons and by those which have kept
» For text of a resolution, see U.N. doc. DC/225
dated June 15, 1965.
• Bulletin of Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.
334
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
their nuclear activities confined to the
peaceful field.
Under its statute the International
Atomic Energy Agency has two aims : to as-
sist in promoting the peaceful uses of
atomic energy and to insure that this as-
sistance does not further any military pur-
pose. The work of the IAEA has long been
an area of close cooperation between the So-
viet Union and the United States. Their ef-
forts, together with those of other member
countries, have produced a comprehensive
system of international safeguards designed
to prevent the diversion of nuclear ma-
terials produced in peaceful reactors to mili-
tary purposes.
This system was extended last year to
large reactors. The first such reactor to
which the expanded safeguards were ap-
plied was in the United States — at Rowe,
Massachusetts — and the United Kingdom
has recently invited the IAEA to apply
these safeguards to one of its large power
reactors. These actions were consistent with
President Johnson's proposal to this Com-
mittee last year that the nuclear powers ac-
cept in an increasing number of their own
peaceful nuclear activities the same inspec-
tion as recommended for other states.
The United States believes that the
IAEA's continuing efforts to insure that
peaceful atomic activities are not diverted to
military purposes are of paramount impor-
tance in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons. We suggest that all those inter-
ested in pursuing that objective give full
support to the IAEA's effective work. As I
said earlier, we urge that all governments
undertake to accept IAEA or similar in-
ternational safeguards in all their peaceful
nuclear activities.
Halting the Nuclear Production Race
President Johnson's second point is that
we should "work toward the effective lim-
itation of nuclear weapons and nuclear de-
livery systems."
To this end we should seek agreement to
halt and reduce mounting nuclear stockpiles.
One way this could be done is by a cutoff
of production of fissionable material for
President Outlines Objectives
for Disarmament Talics
Message from President Johnson '
I send my greetings to the members of the
Disarmament Committee as they renew the
most important task on earth.
The Bible describes "Death" as the fourth
horseman of the Apocalypse, saying: "And
Hell followed after him." Our genius has
changed this from a parable to a possibility.
For the wasting power of our weapons is be-
yond the reach of imagination and language
alike. Hell alone can describe the consequences
that await their full use.
Therefore, if we love man, nothing is more
important than the effort to diminish danger
— halt the spread of nuclear power — and bring
the weapons of war under increasing control.
Many proposals to this end now sit on your
conference table. My delegation, and others,
will make new proposals as the Conference
continues.
I have instructed the American delegation
to pursue the following objectives with all the
determination and wisdom they can command:
First, to seek agreements that will limit the
perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and make
it possible for all countries to refrain without
fear from entering the nuclear arms race.
Second, to work toward the effective limita-
tion of nuclear weapons and nuclear delivery
systems, so that we can diminish present
danger as well as prevent expanding peril.
Third, to work for a truly comprehensive
test-ban treaty.
Many nations will, and should, share in these
discussions.
No difference among any of us, on any other
issue, can be allowed to bar agreement in this
critical area. This is not in any single nation's
interest, nor is it in the interest of the multi-
tude of nations and peoples whose future is
so tied to the good sense of those at this con-
ference table.
My nation is ready. If others are equally
prepared, then we can move, with growing
confidence, toward the light.
' Read at the opening session of the Confer-
ence of the 18-Nation Disarmament Conmiittee
at Geneva on July 27 by William C. Foster, Di-
rector of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarma-
ment Agency and head of the U.S. delegation to
the conference (White House press release
dated July 27).
AUGUST 23, 1965
335
weapons use and a transfer to nonweapons
use of agreed sizable quantities of such ma-
terial.
In making this proposal we have always
taken into consideration the fact that we
have been stockpiling nuclear materials
longer than the Soviet Union. Therefore we
are willing to transfer more from our weap-
ons stocks to peaceful uses than we would
ask of the Soviet Union. For example, we
have proposed that the United States trans-
fer 60,000 kilograms of weapons grade U-235
to nonweapons use if the Soviet Union would
transfer 40,000 kilograms. These amounts,
if completely fissioned in explosions, would
be roughly equivalent to a 1-ton TNT bomb
for every three people on earth.
Another proposal within President John-
son's second point is the freeze on strategic
nuclear bombers and missiles. Last year he
suggested to the Committee the exploration
of a verified freeze on the number and
characteristics of strategic nuclear offensive
and defensive vehicles. He stated :
. . . while we continue our efforts to achieve
general and complete disarmament under effective
international control, we must first endeavor to
halt further increases in strategic armaments now.
After describing the freeze, he pointed out
that agreement to it ". . . will open the path
to reductions in all types of forces from
present levels."
The United States continues to believe
that a way must be found to halt the pro-
duction race in the most dangerous of all
weapons systems. We urge the Soviet Union
to join with us in exploring whatever possi-
bilities may exist for agreement. Our posi-
tion is flexible; we are willing to consider
constructive suggestions from any source.
Need for Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
President Johnson's third point in his
message today to the Committee is that we
should work for "a truly comprehensive test-
ban treaty."
The United States strongly supported the
language of the resolution adopted by the
United Nations Disarmament Commission
on June 15, 1965, reaffirming the call to all
states to become parties to the limited test
ban treaty and recommending that the
ENDC consider as a matter of priority the
question of extending the scope of that
treaty to cover underground tests.
I believe that the pai'tial test ban treaty
has been a major first step in controlling
the nuclear arms race, and I only regret that
all countries have not yet joined in and that
it was necessary for the Disarmament Com-
mission to reaffirm that call to some
states. However, in the light of the in-
creased urgency of the need to move for-
ward in further steps to control the nuclear
arms race and also to deal forcefully with
the problem of nuclear proliferation, I be-
lieve it is a matter of priority for this Com-
mittee to address itself to the extension of
that treaty to underground tests.
For many years the United States has
been conducting a vigorous research pro-
gram, working cooperatively wherever pos-
sible with other nations of the world, to as-
sist in solving the problems of adequately
verifying compliance with the treaty which
would cover underground tests. That pro-
gram has achieved major progress. Sci-
entific developments permit the detection of
seismic events of much smaller size through-
out the world and greatly improve the abil-
ity to discriminate between natural earth-
quakes and underground explosions. We 1
have now reached the stage in the develop- "
ment of very large seismic arrays and
other new types of instrumentation of being
confident that they can provide still further
improvements.
However, in spite of these improvements
all present scientific evidence indicates that
there will still be a significant number of
natural events occurring each year which
have signals which cannot be distinguished
from those to be expected from an explo-
sion. These events, therefore, cannot be
identified by distant seismic devices. Thus,
all evidence at present indicates that a num-
ber of inspections continues to be necessary
to provide verification of a comprehensive
test ban. Unless reassurance could be pro-
vided by those inspections, such events
would give rise to undesirable suspicions
that they might have resulted from clandes-
336
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tine explosions in violation of a compre-
hensive test ban treaty.
The United States, hovs^ever, continues to
be willing to explore what would constitute
an adequate verification system in the light
of recent and prospective developments in
our capabilities. If such exploration indi-
cates that verification requirements can be
satisfied by a different number and type of
inspections than were previously proposed,
we will take those facts into account. We
invite other countries to submit any data or
research results which may be helpful to
this end. We are determined to make prog-
ress toward the prohibition of all nuclear
weapon tests at the earliest possible date.
This conference in its previous delibera-
tions produced a consensus on the ends to
be achieved by each of the measures I have
described today. I believe all of us agree
that all nuclear weapon tests should be
stopped. All agree that nuclear weapons
should not be acquired by any nonnuclear
nation by transfer or manufacture. All
agree that stocks of nuclear weapon ma-
terials and carriers should not rise higher
and, indeed, should be reduced.
Let us build upon this consensus concern-
ing the objectives to be sought. Let us
agree upon concrete measures to accom-
plish these objectives. Let us proceed in a
businesslike fashion to discuss these and
similar measures which are realistically
capable of agreement in the near future.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTIUVTERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations. Done at
Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: Mexico (with reservation),
June 16, 1965.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.''
Ratification deposited: Mexico, June 16, 1965.
Accession deposited: Kenya, July 1, 1965.
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplo-
matic relations concerning the compulsory settle-
ment of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961.
Entered into force April 24, 1964.-
Accession deposited: Kenya, July 1, 1965.
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplo-
matic relations concerning acquisition of national-
ity. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into
force April 24, 1964.'
Accession deposited: Kenya, July 1, 1965.
North Atlantic Treaty
Protocol on the status of International Military
Headquarters. Done at Paris August 28, 1952.
Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978.
Ratification deposited: United Kingdom, August
3, 1965.
Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-
phere., in outer space and under water. Done at
Moscow August 5, 1963. Entered into force Octo-
ber 10, 1963. TIAS 5433.
Ratification deposited: Bolivia, August 4, 1965.
South Pacific Commission
Agreement amending the agreement of February
6, 1947, as amended (TIAS 2317, 2458, 2952),
establishing the South Pacific Commission. Done
at London October 6, 1964.
Acceptance deposited: France, July 15, 1965.
Accession deposited: Western Samoa, July 17,
1965.
Entered into force: July 15, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at
Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.
Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.
Proclaimed by the President: August 2, 1965.
Acceptance deposited: Ecuador, August 4, 1965.
White Slave Traffic
Agreement for the repression of the trade in white
women, as amended by the protocol of May 4,
1949 (TIAS 2332). Signed at Paris May 18, 1904.
Entered into force July 18, 1905; for the United
States June 6, 1908. 35 Stat. 1979.
Accession deposited: Malawi, June 10, 1965.
BILATERAL
Chile
Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Santiago July 27, 1965. Enters into
' Not in force.
' Not in force for the United States.
AUGUST 23, 1965
337
force upon notification from the Government of
Chile that the agreement has been approved in
accordance vnth its constitutional law.
Guinea
Agreement relating to military assistance. Effected
by exchange of notes at Conakry June 29, 1965.
Entered into force June 29, 1965.
India
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793). Effected by exchange of
notes at New Delhi July 26, 1965. Entered into
force July 26, 1965.
Mexico
Agreement extending through August 4, 1965, the
air transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as
extended and complemented (TIAS 4675, 5513,
5647, 5648). Effected by exchange of notes at
Mexico July 15, 1965. Entered into force July
15, 1965.
Agreement extending through June 30, 1970, with
the substitution of a new route schedule, the air
transport agreement of August 15, 1960, as ex-
tended and supplemented (TIAS 4675, 5513, 5647,
5648). Effected by exchange of notes at Mexicn
August 4, 1965. Entered into force August 4,
1965.
United Kingdom
Agreement to establish on Ascension Island a
facility for the United States National Aero-
nautics and Space Administration to provide for
lunar and planetary spacecraft tracking. Effected
by exchange of notes at London July 7, 1965.
Entered into force July 7, 1965.
Yugoslavia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Belgrade July 16, 1965. Entered into
force July 16, 1965.
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20J,02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
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Viet-Nam: Four Steps to Peace. Text of an address
made by Secretary of State Dean Rusk before the
American Foreign Service Association at Washing-
ton, D.C. Pub. 7919. Far Eastern Series 136. 18 pp.
15<f.
Peace Corps. Agreement with Costa Rica. Exchange
of notes — Signed at San Jose November 21 and 23,
1962. Entered into force August 11, 1964. TIAS
5719. 6 pp. hi.
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
Agreement with Dominican Republic — Signed at
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March 18, 1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS
5778. 13 pp. 10<».
Space Research Programs — Participation by Mexican
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Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.
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With exchange of notes. TIAS 5784. 8 pp. 10(*.
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tered into force April 23, 1965. With exchange of
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Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement
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ment of March 8, 1954. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Tokyo April 23, 1965. Entered into force April
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Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement
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Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels Under Cer-
tain Agreements. Agreement with Italy. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Rome March 31 and April 17,
1965. Entered into force April 17, 1965. TIAS 5789.
3 pp. 5t>.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 2-8
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C, 20520.
No.
184
tl85
*186
n87
1-188
*189
Date
8/2
8/2
8/3
8/3
8/4
8/4
of
Subject
Rusk: news conference
August 2.
Cleveland: "The Grist of Our
Mills."
Jernegan sworn in as Am-
bassador to Algeria (bio-
graphic details).
Bane sworn in as Ambassador
to Gabon (biographic de-
tails).
Civil air agreement with Mex-
ico extended to 1970 (re-
write).
Feldman sworn in as Ambas-
sador to Malta (biographic
details).
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
338
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX August 23, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1365
Africa. North Africa: Active Crossroads (New-
som) 315
Algeria. North Africa: Active Crossroads
(Newsom) 315
American Republics. U.S. Loan To Support
Economic Integration of Central America
(Delgado, Johnson) 330
Brazil. U.S. Senators Visit Brazil 332
Communism. The Tasks of the Free-World
Community (McGhee) 324
Congress. U.S. Senators Visit Brazil . . . 332
Department and Foreign Service
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 2 302
Secretary To Set Up Procedures for Foreign
Affairs Research (Johnson) 323
Disarmament
Conference of 18-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee Reconvenes at Geneva (Foster) . . . 333
President Outlines Objectives for Disarmament
Talks 335
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 2 302
Economic Affairs
U.S. Loan To Support Economic Integration of
Central America (Delgado, Johnson) . . . 330
U.S. Senators Visit Brazil 332
Europe. The Tasks of the Free-World Commu-
nity (McGhee) 324
Foreign Aid. U.S. Loan To Support Economic
Integration of Central America (Delgado,
Johnson) 330
Germany. The Tasks of the Free-World Com-
munity (McGhee) 324
International Organizations and Conferences
Conference of 18-Nation Disarmament Com-
mittee Reconvenes at Geneva (Foster) . . 333
President Outlines Objectives for Disarmament
Talks 335
Korea. Advisory Group Reports on Study of
Science Institute in Korea (Johnson) . . 322
Libya. North Africa: Active Crossroads (New-
som) 316
Morocco. North Africa: Active Crossroads
(Newsom) 315
Presidential Documents
Advisory Group Reports on Study of Science In-
stitute in Korea 322
President Outlines Objectives for Disarmament
Talks 335
Secretary To Set Up Procedures for Foreign
Affairs Research 323
U.S. Loan To Support Economic Integration of
Central America 330
Publications. Recent Releases 338
Science. Advisory Group Reports on Study of
Science Institute in Korea (Johnson) . . . 322
Somalia. Letters of Credence (Adan) . . . 314
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 337
Tunisia. North Africa: Active Crossroads
(Newsom) 316
United Arab Republic. Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of August 2 302
United Nations
Mr. Ball Discusses Viet-Nam on "Issues and
Answers" (transcript) 310
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 2 302
Viet-Nam
Conference of 18-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee Reconvenes at Geneva (Foster) . . . 338
Mr. Ball Discusses Viet-Nam on "Issues and
Answers" (transcript) 310
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 2 302
Name Index
Adan, Ahmed Mohamed 313
Ball, George W 310
Delgado, Enrique 330
Downs, William R., Jr 310
Foster, William C 333
Johnson, President 322,323,330,335
McGhee, George C 324
Newsom, David D 315
Rusk, Secretary 302
Scali, John 310
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We Will Stand in Viet-Nam
In his opening statement at his July 28 news conference President Johnson set forth the pur-
pose of United States action in Viet-Nam and the importance to all peoples of a firm stand
against aggression in that war-torn land. This pamphlet is the text of that statement. The title,
taken from the President's closing words, sums up this country's determination not to permit
"all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom" to "be swept
away on the flood of conquest." The President at the same time reaffirms the readiness of the
United States "to move from the battlefield to the conference table ... to begin unconditional
discussions with any government at any place at any time."
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIU, No. 1366
August 30, 1965
POLITICAL AND MILITARY ASPECTS OF U.S. POLICY IN VIET-NAM
CBS Interview With Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNamara 3k2
BUILDUP OF U.S. FORCES IN VIET-NAM
Statement by Secretary McNamara 369
RESEARCH IN ACTION: THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE'S BUREAU
OF INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
Special Article by Allan Evans 359
For index see inside back cover
Political and Military Aspects of U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk and Secretary McNa-
mara on a Columbia Broadcasting System
television program by Peter Kalischer, Alex-
ander Kendrick, and Harry Reasoner on
August 9.
Press release 192 dated August 9
Mr. Reasoner: Good evening. Across the
table from me are the two decisionmakers
who sit on the right and left of the Presi-
dent of the United States. This is Secretary
of State Dean Rusk, who with the Presi-
dent formulates the foreign policy decisions.
This is Secretary of Defense Robert McNa-
mara, who with the President formulates the
military decisions.
Two of my colleagues and I have joined
them in the John Quincy Adams Room of
the Department of State: Alexander Ken-
drick, now stationed in Washington, who
covered Europe and the Soviet Union for
many years; and Peter Kalischer, who has
covered the war in Viet-Nam a long time —
maybe longer than any other correspondent.
In the past year CBS News has broadcast
a half-dozen special reports on Viet-Nam
with foreign dignitaries, professors, hawks,
and doves, and now we are presenting the
decisionmakers.
I would like to begin by asking both Secre-
taries two basic questions : First, how is our
honor involved in Viet-Nam? And second,
how is our security involved in those rice
paddies and remote villages? And since
sometimes in international relations security
comes before honor, I will ask Mr. Mc-
Namara to answer first.
Why U.S. National Security Is Involved
Secretary McNaviara: First, let me make
clear, Mr. Reasoner, that this is not primarily
a military problem. Above all else, I
want to emphasize that. It is a battle for
the hearts and the minds of the people of
South Viet-Nam, and it will only be won if
we make clear to those people that their
longrun security depends on the develop-
ment of a stable political institution and an
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. llll, NO. 1366 PUBLICATION 7944 AUGUST 30, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
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foreign relations and on the work of the
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Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
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and statementa and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
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the functions of the Department. Infor-
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and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
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342
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
expanding economy. That is our objective.
As a prerequisite to that, we must be able
to guarantee their physical security. How
does our physical security, our national in-
terest, become involved in this? That is your
question. Secretary Rusk will elaborate on
it, but let me say to start with that it is
apparent that underlying the terror, the
harassment, of the South Vietnamese by the
Viet Cong is the purpose and the objective
of North Viet-Nam, backed by Communist
China, to expand Communist control over
the peoples of the independent nations of
Southeast Asia and to use this as a test of
their method of expanding control over in-
dependent peoples throughout the world in
the undeveloped areas of Asia, Africa, and
Latin America. The leaders of those two na-
tions have on numerous instances stated
this as their purpose. For example. General
[Vo Nguyen] Giap, who is the head of the
North Vietnamese military forces, said not
long ago that South Viet-Nam is the model
of the national liberation movement of our
time. If the special warfare that the United
States is testing in South Viet-Nam is over-
come, then it can be defeated anywhere in
the world.
And perhaps more pertinently in relation
to Latin America is the comment of Pham
Van Dong, who is the Prime Minister of
North Viet-Nam, who said recently: "The
experience of our compatriots in South
Viet-Nam attracts the attention of the world,
especially the peoples of Latin America,"
and the interests of the Chinese Communists
in advancing Asian communism by force
are well known.
But I want to call your attention to two
important statements emphasizing that. The
Peiping People's Daily said about 12 months
ago from Peiping, China : "It is advantageous
from the point of view of tactics to refer to
the desire for peaceful transition from capi-
talism to communism, but it would be in-
appropriate to emphasize that possibility.
The Communist Party must never entertain
the illusion that the transition to commu-
nism can be achieved through the parlia-
mentary road. . . . Violent revolution is a
universal law of proletarian revolution. To
realize the transition to communism the
proletariat must wage armed struggle. . . ."
And, put even more succinctly, Mao Tse-
tung said recently, "Political power grows
out of the barrel of a gun."
That is why our national security is in-
volved in South Viet-Nam.
Integrity of American Commitment
Mr. Reasoner: And the honor, Secretary
Rusk?
Secretary Rusk : Mr. Reasoner, the answer
to this question is extremely simple and need
not be complicated.
When President Johnson talks about our
national honor, he is not using some empty
phrase of 18th-century diplomacy. He is talk-
ing about the life and death of the Nation.
Now, the essential fact from which we
start is that North Viet-Nam has sent tens
of thousands of men and large quantities of
arms into South Viet-Nam to take over that
country by force. We have a very simple
commitment to South Viet-Nam. It derives
out of the Southeast Asia Treaty, out of the
bilateral arrangements that President Eisen-
hower made with the Government of South
Viet-Nam, out of regular authorizations
and appropriations of the Congress in giv-
ing aid to South Viet-Nam, out of the res-
olution of the Congress of last August,^
out of the most formal declarations of three
Presidents of both political parties.
Now, there is no need to parse these com-
mitments in great detail. The fact is that
we know we have a commitment. The South
Vietnamese know we have a commitment.
The Communist world knows we have a
commitment. The rest of the world knows
it.
Now, this means that the integrity of the
American commitment is at the heart of
this problem. I believe that the integrity of
the American commitment is the principal
structure of peace throughout the world. We
have 42 allies. Those alliances were approved
by overwhelming votes of our Senate. We
didn't go into those alliances through some
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
AUGUST 30, 1965
343
sense of amiability or through some phil-
anthropic attitude toward other nations. We
went into them because we consider these
alliances utterly essential for the security of
our own nation.
Now, if our allies or, more particularly, if
our adversaries should discover that the
American commitment is not worth any-
thing, then the world would face dangers of
which we have not yet dreamed. And so it
is important for us to make good on that
American commitment to South Viet-Nam.
Mr. Kendrick : But, sir, don't you have to
reckon honor at its cost? I mean, it is not
an abstract thing. It has to be evalued and
weighed according to what it costs you. And
what about dishonor? What about the world
image that we now present? We are burn-
ing villages, we are killing civilians. Now,
don't you weigh one against the other?
Secretary Rusk : Well, let me say that you
also weigh the costs of dishonor, that is, the
failure of an American commitment. And I
would hope that our own American news
media would go to some effort to present a
balanced picture of what is going on in
South Viet-Nam: the thousands of local
officials who have been assassinated or kid-
naped, the tens of thousands of South Viet-
namese civilians who have been killed or
wounded by North Vietnamese mortars and
by the constant depredations of these acts
of violence against the civilian population.
No, there are costs involved in meeting
your commitments of honor. There always
have been, there always will be. But I would
suggest, if we look at the history of the last
30 or 40 years, that the costs of not meeting
your obligations are far greater than those
of meeting your obligations.
Political and Military Situation in Viet-Nam
Mr. Reasoner: Gentlemen, having set the
stage, more or less, with your opening
statements, I would like to start off first in
the area of what we hope to achieve there
this year and how we are doing militarily
and politically. Peter?
Mr. Kalischer : Well, I would like to bring
up the subject of who we are committed to.
You mentioned the fact, Mr. Secretary, that
we have had a commitment to the Viet-
namese Government. That government has
changed some seven or eight times in the
last 18 to 20 months, and when we say we
have this commitment to this government,
are we reasonably assured that this govern-
ment represents the people of South Viet-
Nam or even a large number of the people
in South Viet-Nam?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we recognize, of
course, that there are difficulties in the top
leadership in South Viet-Nam and have been
over the months, but that does not mean
that our commitment to the nation and to
the people of South Viet-Nam is changed
any more than the fact that we have had
three changes of government in our own
Government during the period of this com-
mitment.
Mr. Kalischer : In a slightly different form.
Secretary Ru^k: The impression we have
is that among the 14 million people in South
Viet-Nam we do not find any significant
group outside of the Viet Cong itself, rel-
atively limited in numbers, that seems to be
looking to Hanoi for the answer. The Bud-
dhists are not, the Catholics are not, the other
sects are not, the montagnards are not, the
million Cambodians living in South Viet-
Nam are not. In other words, we, I think,
would know very quickly, because we have
lots of Americans living throughout the
countryside — we would know very quickly
if these people of South Viet-Nam wanted
the program of the Liberation Front or
wanted domination from Hanoi. That we do
not find.
Now, there have been some problems in
the Government in Saigon, as you know, and
we and the leaders of South Viet-Nam have
tried to work very closely together to try
to resolve those problems; but that is quite
separate from the problem of whether Hanoi
should be permitted to come in by force and
impose a solution on the people of South
Viet-Nam by force. If these people in South
Viet-Nam were left alone in peace, these
problems that you are concerned about, and
we are concerned about, could be worked
out by normal peaceful means.
344
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Mr. Kcdischer : By Department of Defense
statistics, sir, I think we now estimate there
are 190,000 to 200,000 Viet Cong with a
commensurate influx of North Vietnamese,
and only three battalions have been directly
identified as being North Vietnamese army
battalions. Against this, in Viet-Nam we
have now, with the American commitment
of about 100,000 and 545,000 Vietnamese,
more troops fighting the Viet Cong than the
French had, and their Vietnamese auxil-
iaries, fighting the Viet Minh, and we con-
trol only a little less than half of the terri-
tory and about one-third of the rural popu-
lation. Would you say then that this policy
that we have been following was notable for
its success?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I will ask Secre-
tary McNamara to comment on the military
aspects of what you were saying. We do not
find that the people in the countryside in
South Viet-Nam look to the Liberation
Front or to Hanoi for leadership. These are
villagers who are trying to get on with the
day's work. We find that there is no diffi-
culty about their cooperation with the Gov-
ernment or with us, in those areas where
they can cooperate without having their
throats cut by terrorists the following night.
Now, the villagers there are like villagers
everywhere else. They are not perhaps highly
motivated politically in any particular direc-
tion, but we are quite convinced that they
are not reaching out to the Liberation Front
or Hanoi for their answers.
Now, Secretary McNamara can comment
on the military aspect of it.
Secretary McNamara: Well, first, has our
policy been successful? I think you have to
look at this over a period of years, and I
would say the answer is yes. For 10 years,
since the nation was born, or reborn, after
the Geneva accords of 1954, it has main-
tained its independence. It is not dominated
by the Communists. And for much of that
period prior to the recent expansion of the
terror reign directed against it by the
guerrillas it did increase its strength eco-
nomically and politically. As you undoubt-
edly know, between 1954 and 1961, when
the terror raids began to increase in number
and frequency, the number of teachers in
that country increased threefold. The number
of students in schools increased 300 per-
cent. The rice production nearly doubled,
and, by the way, that happened at a time
when the rice production per capita in North
Viet-Nam was declining. The income per
capita is 50 percent more than it is in
North Viet-Nam. So I'd say much progress
has been made — continues to be made.
Last year the Communist guerrillas killed
or kidnaped about 1,500 civic officials. Now,
when you recognize that the population un-
der the control of the Government is less
than a twentieth of that in this country, you
should multiply those figures by 20 to get
an impression of what that would mean in
this country. It would mean that we would
have lost last year 30,000 mayors, members
of boards of education, city managers. And
yet, despite that tremendous loss and de-
spite a loss of about 10,000 civilians kid-
naped, murdered, assassinated, the people
are continuing to fight, continuing to resist.
They are absorbing fatalities today at a rate
greater than we have ever absorbed in our
history, twice that of World War I, twice
that of World War II, 10 or 15 times that of
the Korean war, showing that they are
fighting, they do have a will to resist, they
are opposed to Communist domination. I
think this is the best measure I can give you
of the success of the policy.
Mr. Kalischer: Would you say, sir, that, if
they were resisting, their defection rate or
their desertion rate should drop appre-
ciably? I understand now there are 4,000 to
5,000 a month and that recruitment barely
keeps up with it.
Secretary McNamara: Recruitment is in
excess of desertions, but I don't want to fail
to recognize desertions are at a rate higher
than we would like to see, higher than the
South Vietnamese Government believes sat-
isfactory, and they have acted recently to
increase the pay, take care of the families
and dependents of men wounded and killed
in battle, and I understand the desertion
rate is falling.
It has been higher than we would have
liked to have seen, however. But the fact
AUGUST 30, 1965
345
that they can continue to recruit, the fact
that they continue to fight and die for their
country in the numbers that they do, I think
indicates their will to resist. And also I
should mention that the desertions are not
to the Viet Cong. The desertions are back
to their homes to take care of their rice
fields. And also, on that same point, I should
emphasize that the defections from the Viet
Cong are rising and, further, that there has
been no desertion of any important person-
ality and no movement to defect of any
group — no religious group, no economic
group, no labor group has deserted the
Government for the Viet Cong, although the
opportunities for that have been numerous.
A Political and Economic Problem
Mr. Kendrick: Sir, let me take this a
little bit forward. You started by saying
that this was not entirely a military prob-
lem, and I gather that you have felt that
it was not even primarily a military prob-
lem.
Secretary McNamara: It is not primarily
a military problem.
Mr. Kendrick: All right, and from what
you have said since about the situation in
the villages, the kidnapings, the terroristic
activities, obviously it is more than a mili-
tary problem. But we are now in the proc-
ess of a gigantic military buildup in Viet-
Nam. Don't military considerations now as-
sume a larger role than ever before? Is it
possible that they have taken over from
political considerations? Don't they have a
logic all their own which is not always re-
lated to policy? Aren't military actions taken
usually to support or reinforce previous mil-
itary actions? In other words, are we now
in the maws of a military machine?
Secretary McNamara: No, I think not.
This problem is primarily a political and
economic problem. We will succeed, the
Government of South Viet-Nam will suc-
ceed, only if it obtains and retains the con-
fidence of its people. It can't retain the con-
fidence of its people unless it appears to be
advancing their interests economically and
politically. That is the objective of the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam. That is our ob-
jective. The military operations are neces-
sary but not of sufficient action to assure
achievement of that objective. We must pro-
vide physical security in the countryside.
Otherwise, the peasants can't till their fields ;
the Government representatives can't move
to carry on elections, as they did 60 days
ago; the members of the United States eco-
nomic aid mission, who are stationed out in
the districts and provinces, can't work with
the peasants to increase the yield per acre
of rice, to add to the pig population, to
double the corn production, as it is our ob-
jective to do between 1964 and 1966. So that
physical security is an absolute requirement
for achievement of our economic and politi-
cal goals. But it is not a substitute for
those goals in any sense of the word. We
realize that. Every one of our men there
realizes that.
Mr. Reasoner : Mr. Secretary —
Secretary Rusk : I think it might be worth
pointing out, Mr. Reasoner, to Mr. Kendrick,
that when we say that this is not a military
problem, this is profoundly true from the
point of view of the Vietnamese Govern-
ment, and what we are trying to accom-
plish. Our economic and social development
aid to South Viet-Nam has been as large as
our military aid. But we want to be very
careful that we not say that the other side
can have a military solution. Now, you can't
get on with this job in the countryside if
the other side puts a man with a rifle in
his hand there to stop you. So that the se-
curity element is a very important part of
the main theme, which is to develop that
country economically and socially and pull
these people together.
It Remains a South Vietnamese War
Mr. Reasoner: There is an area here that
I think affects the confidence in this coun-
try in what we are doing, and I think may-
be we can dispose of it without trying to
pin either of you down on things you have
said before ; but for instance, as you remem-
ber about 18 months ago when we had a
conversation, you said to the effect that this
346
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
is a Vietnamese war, it must be won by the
Vietnamese, we cannot win it for them. The
kinds of things that administration leaders
say have changed radically in the last 2
years. Is this because you have changed
your minds that much, or is there a possi-
bility that you have even now a more ad-
vanced attitude and you are letting the coun-
try in on it little by little?
Secretary McNamara: Let me say, first,
that the outlook has changed over the past
2 years because the action of the North
Vietnamese has changed during that period
of time. They have vastly increased the num-
ber of men that they have infiltrated into
South Viet-Nam. They have vastly increased
the amount of equipment and materiel which
they have infiltrated into that country. And
this has temporarily given them an advan-
tage which they particularly have applied in
the form of terror and harassment. Today
they have, for all practical purposes, a nu-
merical advantage — not absolutely, but rel-
atively— in guerrilla war terms. They have
about 70,000 regular guerrillas, perhaps
100,000 irregulars, and another 20,000 or
30,000 in political cadres to collect taxes or
distribute propaganda and so on. So, as Mr.
Kalischer mentioned a moment ago, there are
some 200,000 Communists acting in guerrilla
forces.
Opposing them are about 550,000 South
Vietnamese regular and paramilitary forces,
a ratio something on the order of 3 or 31/2
to 1 and a somewhat lesser ratio in the form
of combat battalions — quite an unsatisfac-
tory ratio in terms of guerrilla wars of the
past, where in Malaya, in the Philippines,
in Greece, a 10-to-l advantage was required
to defeat the guerrillas.
This increase in the strength of the North
Vietnamese occurred in the last 12 months.
It requires that we supplement — not substi-
tute for, but supplement — the South Viet-
Nam forces; and since our forces will sup-
plement and not substitute for their forces,
it remains a South Vietnamese war. They
are bearing the brunt of the fighting; they
vnll continue to bear the brunt of the
fighting. We will furnish a mobile reserve
to come in to assist them when their forces
are inadequate numerically to effectively
counteract the Viet Cong concentrations di-
rected against them.
Mr. Kalischer: Mr. Secretary, how many
of the 200,000 guerrillas are South Viet-
namese?
Secretary McNamara: I think the bulk of
them are, but that isn't the important point.
The important point is that the leaders, po-
litical and military, the cadre men, if you
will — some 50,000 of them — have been sent
down from the North, trained in the North,
sent down from the North, directed, oper-
ated, controlled from the North, and the
bulk of the weapons — I would say probably
80 percent of the weapons — today have been
supplied by the North. The main-force units
of the guerrillas were completely reequipped
in the last year or year and a half with
7.62-mm. rifles by the North. All the am-
munition for that comes from the North. The
interrogation of prisoners in recent months
shows that North Viet-Nam out of Hanoi
is directing the war day by day, hour by
hour — and I mean that literally — by com-
mands, political and military, out of the
North. So while the bulk of the guerrillas
are from the South, the control, the direc-
tion, the foundation, the effort is from the
North. And, as a matter of fact. North
Viet-Nam doesn't deny that. And I think it
is important to recognize this.
It is not a civil war. It is a war of ag-
gression by an outside power seeking to sub-
vert the established political institutions,
and they say that. In 1960 Ho Chi Minh
issued orders, and this is a matter of record,
to step up the revolution in the South. And
a year or two ago Hoc Tap, which is the
periodical of the North Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party, said :
The authorities in South Viet-Nam are well aware
that North Viet-Nam is the firm base for the revolu-
tion in that country and the point on which it leans.
So North Viet-Nam hasn't made any ef-
fort to hide the fact that it is directing
the activities in the South. I don't mean to
say there aren't dissident minorities in the
South. There are in all countries evolving
as rapidly as that one is politically and eco-
AUGUST 30, 1965
347
nomically, and there are dissident minor-
ities there, but they are minorities which
could be properly controlled and properly
assimilated into the structure of that nation
were it not facing this aggression from the
North.
Why U.S. Combat Troops Are in Viet-Nam
Mr. Kalischer: Mr. Secretary, pragmati-
cally, granted that the revolutionary effort
is being directed from North Viet-Nam, the
defense of South Viet-Nam is being directed
by us and supported by us. We are Ameri-
cans. The North Vietnamese are Vietnamese.
In a matter of contesting for the minds
and the hearts of the people, wouldn't we,
whether we liked it or not, be stuck with
the onus of invaders rather than the North
Vietnamese, since we are showing ourselves
in the countryside as what we are ?
Secretary McNamara: First, Mr. Ka-
lischer, let me make perfectly clear the de-
fense of South Viet-Nam is not being di-
rected by the United States. The defense of
South Viet-Nam is being directed by the
Government of South Viet-Nam. The forces
of South Viet-Nam operate under the mili-
tary command of their own leaders. Our sol-
diers will operate under the command of
United States officers, but it will be in a
supplementary role and we are not assum-
ing direction of the military program there.
Secretary Rusk: We ought to clarify this
point about who are the Vietnamese. We re-
sisted the effort of the North Koreans to
move in and take over South Korea, al-
though both were Koreans, and I can assure
you that the other side would not call it
simply an indigenous matter if the Federal
Republic were to put tens of thousands of
Germans into East Germany to take over
East Germany. In other words, there was
a basic settlement in 1954 on Southeast
Asia and, following that, an agreement in
1962 on Laos. Now a very important effort
is being made by Hanoi to change those set-
tlements by force. This is a thing that is not
acceptable. The infiltration by the North is
what causes the presence of American com-
bat troops in South Viet-Nam. Had this not
started, our combat forces would not be
there. If this were removed, our forces could
come home. We are not there to take on
what might be called a purely indigenous
problem within South Viet-Nam. It is ag-
gression from the outside that causes us to
be there.
Mr. Kalischer: Yes, but can this be ex-
plained to the Vietnamese peasant?
Secretary McNamara : Let me answer that,
if I may, by telling you that 10 days ago —
2 weeks ago — when General [Earle G.]
Wheeler and I were in South Viet-Nam, we
were, of course, very much interested in
that point. This was before the President
had decided to increase the strength of U.S.
military forces assigned to South Viet-Nam.
We asked a number of South Viet-Nam lead-
ers this exact question. Without a single ex-
ception, they asked for additional U.S.
forces and they stated that, unless additional
forces came, the people of South Viet-Nam —
and by this they meant not only the sophis-
ticated citizen of the city but the peasants
as well — would doubt our determination to
stay and our ability to provide the physical
security which they require to advance their
economic and political welfare.
I was particularly interested in the com-
ment of one of these individuals. Dr. [Phan
Huy] Quat, whom you know as the former
Prime Minister, asked to see us, and we went
to talk to him, and he had just two points
to make: One, you must increase the num-
ber of U.S. military personnel in South
Viet-Nam. Unless you do, our soldiers can-
not continue to fight effectively against the
expanded Viet Cong guerrilla force. And,
two, if you do increase your forces, of course
there will be isolated instances of friction
between your soldiers and our people. But
our people will welcome it because they
know that you have no designs on our na-
tion that conflict with our own interests.
They know that when the Viet Cong are de-
feated, you will leave. And therefore they
welcome you.
Secretary Rusk: We have thousands of
Americans throughout the countryside, both
civilian and military, living with the South
Vietnamese and in a sense completely at
their mercy. And I think it is important to
348
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
realize that we have not had reported a sin-
gle instance of treachery on the part of the
South Vietnamese with respect to an Amer-
ican who is living right inside their villages
or right with them in the countryside. This
is an important thermometer of political
attitude, it seems to me.
The Military Situation This Year
Mr. Reasoner: I'd like before we turn to
another aspect of this — Secretary McNa-
mara, you have been there. We have made
these decisions. We have had a few months
of experience with increased United States
forces. How is it going this year?
Secretary McNamara: The Viet Cong did
expand their force in the last 12 months,
and, as we stated during the winter of last
year and the spring of this, a major part of
this expanded force had not been committed
to combat at that time. We could only as-
sume they were holding it for some special
purpose or some special period. And we as-
sumed that they might be holding it to start
operations on an expanded basis following
the beginning of the monsoon season. This
is the season of heavy rains in the high-
lands. It is a season when our airpower is
somewhat less effective than during the dry
period, and we assumed that the Viet Cong
would believe it was an advantage for them,
therefore, to expand operations under those
weather conditions. They did so. They ex-
panded operations in number and intensity,
beginning in May, and they increased their
control of the area. They began to isolate
certain particular portions of the villages,
isolate them in terms of road transporta-
tion, road communications with other parts
of the country. This made it difficult to
move rice from the storage centers out into
certain of the rural areas. It made it diffi-
cult to move produce from the rural areas
into the city.
The number of South Vietnamese killed in
action increased. But, while that is true, the
number of Viet Cong killed in action in-
creased dramatically. It is about 70 percent
higher today than it was a year ago. So in
recent weeks, recent months, they have had
some success. They are paying a terrible price
for it. And in the last 30 days, as a matter
of fact, there seems to have been some with-
drawal on their part. Whether this is for
regrouping, recuperation, because some of
their battalions were severely mauled, I don't
know. It may be a reflection of the fact that
larger United States forces are beginning to
enter the country.
U.S. Objectives
Mr. Kendrick : Sir, I would like to pursue
that. Now, would you give us a view into the
future? There are estimates that it might
take another $10 billion a year to carry this
on. The military advisers are supposed to
have proposed a level of 750,000 men in
Viet-Nam. If there is a failure of bombing
of North Viet-Nam, as there may be, isn't
the next logical step ground action into
North Viet-Nam? I wonder if you would de-
velop these points in the perspective of the
months ahead.
Secretary McNamara: First let me say I
can't predict the future with accuracy. I
do want to mention one thing about the fu-
ture, however, that I think is very interest-
ing. Within the last 3 or 4 weeks. Ho Chi
Minh looked into the future and he said it
might take 20 years for them to win. So
while they have had some temporary success,
it is obvious even to their own leaders that
this is not going to lead to an immediate
victory on their side.
Let me comment on one or two of the
points you made.
First, I don't know of any military ad-
viser to our Government who has proposed
a level of 750,000 U.S. military personnel in
South Viet-Nam.
Secondly, as to the bombing program in
the North, I think it is important that we
understand what we hope to achieve by that
program. In the first place, you recall, it
started in part as a reprisal action for the
terror bombings that have been carried out
by the Viet Cong last year at Bien Hoa
Airfield, at Brinks barracks, and more re-
cently in February — early February this
year — at Pleiku. It was necessary to show
AUGUST 30, 1965
349
the North Vietnamese who were directing
those activities that this would not go un-
challenged, that they would pay a price for
the continuation of them. And our bombings
started in part to make that clear.
It was also important to begin to raise the
price to the North Vietnamese of carrying
on this war. It was important to try to re-
strict— although certainly it was never con-
sidered it would be possible to stop — the
movement of men and equipment to the
South. And I think these objectives have in
part been accomplished. We never believed,
and we don't believe today, that bombing in
the North will drive the North Vietnamese
to the bargaining table or force them to
cease their terror tactics and harassment
and subversion of the political institutions of
the South. There is only one thing that will
stop that in my view, and that is to prove
to them they can't win in the South. And
therefore our strategy is directed to that
end. How long it will take, I can't tell.
Mr. Kendrick: We don't envision then
going into the North on the ground?
Secretary McNaTuara: We have made
clear time and time again we have limited
objectives in the South. I think it is impor-
tant for our own people to realize that, and
it is certainly important for the people of
the world to realize that. We do not seek to
overthrow the government of North Viet-
Nam. We do not seek permanent military
bases in South Viet-Nam. We do not seek
to force the South Vietnamese into an alli-
ance with Western nations. We seek only to
insure that they have the right and the op-
portunity to control their ovim destiny, to
shape their political and economic institu-
tions according to patterns of their own
choosing.
Secretary Rusk: Mr. Kendrick, I wonder
if I might not add that it is always easy to
turn a lesser war into a big war. This can
be done in any 5 minutes. In this postwar
period, had we and others not been con-
cerned about the effort of the Communist
world to take over a country by force, we
well might have seen Iran and Greece, Tur-
key, Berlin, Korea, the Philippines, South-
east Asia, including Malaya, other areas.
taken over by force by the Communist world.
Now, we and others have had to meet that
with firmness and determination. We have
taken considerable losses. We alone have
taken 160,000 casualties since 1945. Others
have taken more. But in that process, we
have tried to keep open the doors to a peace-
ful settlement. We have tried to avoid the
slippery slope down into a general war.
In the case of Berlin, we used an airlift
rather than divisions on the ground in order
to try to resolve that by peaceful means.
In the case of Korea, with the monopoly
of nuclear weapons, we took substantial
casualties rather than opening up a nuclear
war.
We waited over 4 years before we bombed
North Viet-Nam in the Southeast Asian sit-
uation.
In other words, it is not a part of our de-
sire to turn these difficult and mean and
frustrating issues into general war. That is
the easiest thing to think of and the easiest
thing to do.
The commitment of the American people
and the American Government is to a de-
cent world order in which these problems
can be resolved by peaceful means.
Question of Suspension of Bombing
Mr. Kendrick: But might not the suspen-
sion of bombings of North Viet-Nam be
more conducive to negotiations than the con-
tinuation of them?
Secretary Rusk : Well, we did, as you know,
suspend the bombing for a period, and long
before we resumed the bombing we had the
answer from the other side, which was very
harsh indeed. And there have been public
statements recently from the other side in-
dicating that suspension of the bombing is
not necessarily the door to a peaceful settle-
ment.
Mr. Kendrick: Mr. Harriman was in Eu-
rope and he talked to Tito, and Tito, re-
flecting the Russians, apparently thought
that if we did suspend the bombing, it might
help.
Secretary Rusk : Well, it might help them.
Mr. Kendrick: No, they meant it might
help bring about talks.
350
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETINl
Secretary Rusk: We have asked them, we
have asked everybody that we can find to
talk to, "What else do you think would hap-
pen if we stopped the bombing in North
Viet-Nam?"
Mr. Kendrick: Why don't we stop it and
find out?
Secretary Rusk: Would the operations in
the South stop? Would the infiltration of
men stop? Would they even come to a con-
ference table? In other words, we can't find
from the other side the slightest hint as to
what would happen if we stopped the bomb-
ing.
Secretary McNamara : Mr. Kendrick asked
why we don't stop and find out. The an-
swer is, we did stop. It wasn't long ago, 8
or 9 weeks ago.
Mr. Kendrick: You stopped 4 or 5 days.
Even on the Hill, people thought it wasn't
long enough.
Secretary McNamara : It was long enough
for North Viet-Nam to make perfectly clear
that they didn't plan to do anything as a
result of our stopping, other than what they
had previously been doing. They wouldn't
talk, they wouldn't stop the aggression in the
South, they wouldn't agree to talk in the
future. So all I can say is, we stopped. Now,
maybe sometime in the future —
Secretary Rusk: We made it clear in re-
cent days that this question of bombing
North Viet-Nam has to do with making of
a peace, and we are prepared to consider
this if in fact it can be a step toward peace,
but we want to see some indication that this
will have that effect and not just the op-
posite effect.
Mr. Kendrick: Sir, over the weekend
Hanoi announced that the Viet Cong had
appealed to it for aid and that they were
thinking about asking volunteers from the
North to go back to the South. This, of
course, may be a matter of throwing dust
into our eyes, but could it also be a matter
of having our assumptions wrong to start
with? This is the thing that a great many
people are still confused about — the Viet
Cong, Hanoi, that is North Viet-Nam, and
the Chinese Communists in the background.
Now, Mr. McNamara indicated much
more broadly than you did, sir, that our
objective in East Asia — Southeast Asia —
was more than simply the restoration of a
status in South Viet-Nam. He was talking
about overall Communist aggression there,
as if we were sort of thinking of trying to
roll it back. I wonder, now, if we are still
fighting the same war with Communist
China that we were fighting in Korea; is
that really the enemy?
Secretary Rusk: Well, the present enemy
on the ground is North Viet-Nam and infil-
tration from North Viet-Nam, as far as we
are concerned. This appeal by the Liberation
Front to Hanoi and Hanoi's response to it
simply repeats the factual situation. Hanoi
has been sending tens of thousands of men
and large quantities of arms into South
Viet-Nam. This is not new.
Now, in terms of the more general prob-
lem, as you know, there have been very im-
portant disputes within the Communist
world, and specifically between Moscow and
Peiping, on the question of strategy and
tactics in promoting the world revolution.
Moscow has been more prudent, more cau-
tious in this respect. Peiping has announced
a doctrine of militancy which has caused
great problems even within the Communist
world. Now, if Peiping should discover
that a doctrine of militancy is a successful
policy through what happens to Southeast
Asia, then the dangers throughout the rest
of the world mount very quickly and very sub-
stantially.
Danger of Great-Power Race for Influence
Mr. Kendrick : We are putting our priority
on South Viet-Nam, and I was thinking in
terms of our relations with the Russians,
let's say. You speak of a split in the Com-
munist world, but are we making it impos-
sible really for the Russians to cooperate
with us even if they might want to? They,
at Geneva, for instance, have intruded Viet-
Nam before all other questions, and the
whole business of disarmament, of nuclear
control, of proliferation, is just left hang-
ing in air until, they say, we resolve the
Viet-Nam problem by getting out of Viet-
Nam.
AUGUST 30, 1965
351
Secretary Rusk: Well, Mr. Kendrick, we
do want improved relations with the Soviet
Union. We should like to find whatever
points of agreement we can find in order
to build the possibilities of a more normal
relationship. The test ban treaty raised
some hopes that we might be able to find
those other points. But we can't have good
relations with the Soviet Union at the ex-
pense of letting a country like Viet-Nam be
taken over by force. We could have had
good relations with the Soviet Union had
we pulled out of Berlin in 1948, or had we
ignored Korea in 1950. This is not the basis
on which safe, good relations can be based.
We have got to get to a point where those
who have power will leave the smaller coun-
tries alone.
I know that there are some who think
that China is entitled to a sphere of influ-
ence out in its part of the world. Those peo-
ple don't usually specify which are the great
powers that are entitled to a sphere of in-
fluence and who are the rest of them that
have to accept a sphere of influence. I
can't think of a more dangerous develop-
ment in world affairs than for three or four,
or perhaps five, great powers to embark upon
a great race for influence through spheres
of influence, because there you would find
a race for power that would be almost un-
manageable in its violence and in its danger.
We have got to establish the point that
a small country that is within reach of a
great power is nevertheless entitled to live
at peace and to be unmolested by that great
power. Otherwise the entire structure of
world order comes to pieces and we are back
in the law of the jungle.
Mr. Kalischer: Mr. Secretary, the Rus-
sians aside, what is the picture of our effort
among — not among our potential enemies
but among our allies?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have been in
touch, of course, with a lot of our friends
on this matter. I would make a rough esti-
mate that between 60 and 70 governments
support what we are doing in South Viet-
Nam and wish us well. There are more than
30 governments that are providing some sort
of assistance, some of it too small in our
judgment, for the effort in South Viet-Nam.
There are about 25 governments that are
genuinely indifferent or neutral and another
25 — most of them, many of them, in the
Communist world — that are opposed to what
we are trying to do. But the underlying fact
is that most of the hundred small countries
of the world have a stake in the right of a
small country to live at peace even though
it is within reach of a great power. And
I have no doubt that if we could bring this
to a successful conclusion on the basis of
throwing back this effort to take over South
Viet-Nam by force, more than a hundred J
small countries would clap their hands and "
say this is a new day in the life of the
world.
Role of the United Nations
Mr. Kendrick : In our efforts to get a nego-
tiation, now, we have asked the United Na-
tions to do what it can. Now, why didn't we
go the whole way and put the case formally
to the United Nations?
Secretary Rusk: Well, we have been in
touch vdth the Secretary-General and the
members of the United Nations many times
on many occasions on that matter. The prob-
lem is relatively simple. As you know, the
General Assembly has not been functioning
in the last year or so because of a very dif-
ficult constitutional issue involved in the fi-
nancial problems of the U.N. The Security
Council is the principal agency in which
this matter might arise. In the Security
Council nothing could be done except by
agreement among the Big Five. There is a
veto in the Security Council. Now, the
question is really whether it is desirable to
have a highly acrimonious, eye-gouging kind
of debate there if at the end of the trail
there is going to be no action by the Security
Council. It would be far better to sound this
out quietly behind the scenes, as is going on
and has been going on for a long time, to
see whether there is some action which the
United Nations can take that would help
the situation.
352
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Now, we could easily, I suppose, meet the
views of those who say, "Oh, take it to the
U.N.," by putting on one or two demonstra-
tions. Let it go there. Let a resolution be
vetoed. Have the U.N. break up with no ca-
pacity to do anything about it, no agreement,
and then come away and say, "Well, they
have had their fling at it." Well, this is a
little irresponsible to deal with it that way.
What we would like to do is to find some
way in which the United Nations can contrib-
ute positively and constructively to the solu-
tion of the problem in South Viet-Nam and
not necessarily just to a further inflamma-
tion of the issues involved.
U.S. Responding to Communist Aggression
Mr. Reasoner : Mr. Secretary, getting back
to the military situation for a moment, you
have said from time to time that the condi-
tions for peace are an end to the aggression,
but Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge once
suggested that perhaps it might happen in a
different way — just on a given day, less
fighting. Have you got such a major opera-
tion mounted now that you would know if
this were happening? Can you stop what you
have started there?
Secretary McNamara: Oh yes, and I
don't think there is any conflict between
what I have said as a condition of peace and
end to the aggression and Ambassador
Lodge's statement that on a given day there
simply may be fewer incidents than the day
before and a gradual reduction therefore.
That is the way the guerrilla war ended in
Greece, and it may well end that way in
South Viet-Nam. We are very sensitive to
the level of activity. We measure very care-
fully the effort expended by North Viet-
Nam in supporting the Viet Cong and the
manner in which the Viet Cong apply that
support and effort, and we would be quick
to sense any change in policy or objective or
capability, and our effort would drop ac-
cordingly.
We have stated many, many times we do
not seek to assign U.S. military forces per-
manently in South Viet-Nam. We have no
desire to develop military bases there for our
use. We will bring our forces back as
promptly as the external aggression ceases.
Mr. Reasoner: Do you risk or do you get
into the situation where you make one deci-
sion because of the previous one where you
have lost control? In other words, you put in
100,000 men because you put in 50,000?
Secretary McNamara: No, certainly not.
The number of men we have there is a direct
function of the level of aggression carried on
by North Viet-Nam. It was necessary for us
to put in combat troops only because the
North Vietnamese introduced sufficient
forces to overpower the antiguerrilla forces,
those of the Government.
Mr. Kendrick : Sir, on this question of de-
cisions, aren't they now making themselves,
or aren't the Communists making them for
us? Really they are the ones who are decid-
ing what shall be the nature and the stature
of the war, so to speak, and we are respond-
ing to that. We are putting in more men be-
cause of what they do. Therefore, basically
the decision as to what we do in the future
is in their hands, isn't it?
Secretary McNamara: Certainly what we
do in the future will be influenced by what
they do. The price they are paying is in-
creasing. At some point it will reach a level
they are unwilling to pay. At that point
they will stop, and they will withdraw. How
soon that will come, I can't tell you. How
much force we must apply before they make
that decision, I can't tell you.
Motivation of Viet Cong
Mr. Kalischer: Mr. Secretary, you men-
tioned before that Dr. Quat told you it was
absolutely necessary now to get your Amer-
ican troops in. Otherwise the Government
forces could not continue to fight effec-
tively against the increased infiltration from
North Viet-Nam. But you also said earlier
in this program that the majority of the
Viet Cong were South Vietnamese. Now,
what keeps the Viet Cong fighting and
fighting so effectively with what is a great
degree smaller amount of goods and arms
AUGUST 30, 1965
353
and cadres coming in through the Ho Chi
Minh Trail and by sea against Government
forces, which are reinforced by 125,000
Americans and a blank check on arms?
Secretary McNamara: Well, part is an
ideological motivation, a religion, if you will.
They believe in communism. There is no
question about that. A part of it is the ter-
ror that is imposed upon them by their offi-
cers, by their noncommissioned officers, by
the acts that have been directed against
their villages and their wives and their
families.
Mr. Kalischer: But don't we in a sense
exercise terror also ?
Secretary McNamara: Not to my knowl-
edge, and certainly not in that fashion. I
don't think we should close our eyes to the
fact. The fact is that in 1964 — the 12 months
that ended December 31st of last year —
the Viet Cong killed or kidnaped 1,500 civic
officials in that country and they killed or
kidnaped 9,700 other civilians. That is ap-
proximately 11,500 civilians killed or kid-
naped. Now, that is the level of terror that
is being directed against that population.
And despite that level of terror, only 25
percent of the people remain in areas con-
trolled by the Viet Cong; 300,000 refugees
have left those areas in recent months.
An army that, on our terms, is equivalent
to about 12 million Americans continues to
fight the Viet Cong, and they are absorbing
fatalities, as I say, at rates higher than we
have ever experienced in our history. So I
don't think we should fail to recognize the
degree of allegiance, if you will, of the peo-
ple to not only their Government but to their
owTi independence —
Mr. Kalischer: But, sir, suppose —
Secretary McNamara: — and the degree
of pressure placed on those who are support-
ing the Viet Cong. There is one group, a
minority group, that is ideologically motivat-
ed. There is another group that represents
the government of Hanoi, politically and
militarily. There is a third group — and I
believe the largest group — which is fighting
because they have no physical alternative
open to them.
Hanoi's Attitude Unrealistic
Mr. Kendrick : Is it possible that a Saigon
government — ^not this one — might in the fu-
ture negotiate terms with North Viet-Nam
and ask us to leave, and if it is possible,
what would we do ?
Secretary Rusk : Well, I think the question
there, Mr. Kendrick, turns on Hanoi's atti-
tude toward their own program. In that
sense the aggressor always has a certain ini-
tiative. It is my impression Hanoi at the
present time is living on three prospects.
One, that they can succeed militarily in
South Viet-Nam. Now, that is going to be
denied to them; so that can be put aside.
Secondly, that international opinions some-
how will build up in such a way as to cause
the United States to change our commitment
to South Viet-Nam. That will not occur.
And third, that internal differences among
the American people might cause the United
States to change its course. I do not believe
that will occur.
We do have in this country a vigorous
and thriving and sometimes tumultuous de-
mocracy, and it is quite right for us to de-
bate actively and vigorously all great issues
of public moment. But it is quite true that
Hanoi lives on expressions of dissent or
disagreement here within our own society.
I think the repeated demonstration of unity
in this country is very important in per- |
suading Hanoi that they cannot rely upon
differences here at home to cause us to pull
away from our commitment to South Viet-
Nam.
So I think on those three elements that
seem to sustain the hope of Hanoi, they must
come to the awareness that these are un-
realistic and that they must in fact come
sometime to the idea of a peaceful settle-
ment. 4
But this is the key thing. "
We have had dozens upon dozens of con-
tacts in every conceivable form, fashion,
and forum in order to find out whether
there is any interest on the part of the
other side in a peaceful settlement. Those
contacts continue. We would know very
354
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quickly if they had concluded that they are
prepared to bring about peace in Southeast
Asia, and it is important that those contacts
continue open, as I can assure you they are
open.
Mr. Kalischer: Have they continued re-
cently?
Secretary Rusk: The contacts continue.
Quite apart from what we ourselves do, which
is considerable — and I can assure you that
our diplomacy is not inactive on this matter
— ^the world is filled with volunteers who
would be glad to come in and make contacts
with both sides to see if they could find some
peace here. So there is no lack of contact.
Mr. Reasoner : Has there been any sign at
all of interest on the other side?
Secretary Rusk: Well, Secretary Mc-
Namara mentioned Ho Chi Minh's statement
that they are in this if it takes 20 years.
My own understanding of that statement is
that they know very well they are not going
to win this year or next year. I think that
there are some serious problems on the
other side. We, in all of these crises in the
postwar period, quite rightly concentrate
upon the problems that we have on our side.
We sometimes forget about the fact that
there are some very serious problems on the
other side. We in all of these crises in the
in the past there came a moment where a
casual word or a passing comment or a little
sign or a little signal opened the door to
peace. This happened in Korea. It happened
with the Berlin blockade. It has happened in
other circumstances.
All I can say at the moment is we do not
yet feel that we have had that crucial sign
that peace is open, but we are looking for it
and we will continue to look for it while we
make it clear that we are not going to be
driven out of South Viet- Nam.
U.S. Commitment Fundamental to Peace
Mr. Reasoner: Secretary Rusk, I think
Americans sometimes have — while they sup-
port this policy — have trouble understand-
ing just what we mean when we speak
in the pattern of having to defend it here
or we will have to fight in some less suitable
place. To be hypothetical, what would hap-
pen if Secretary McNamara announced that
we had done all we could and we were now
withdrawing because we needed the boys
at home and we left? What do you think
would ensue?
Secretary Rixsk : I think that it would not
be for me to answer that one directly. But
imagine yourself to be a Thai, and ask what
the American commitment to Thailand
would mean to you under those circum-
stances. Think of yourself as a West Ber-
liner, and ask yourself what the American
commitment to you would mean under those
circumstances.
At the very heart, gentlemen, of the
maintenance of peace in the world is the
integrity of the American commitment un-
der our alliances.
Mr. Kendrick: Is it possible that it is an
overcommitment ?
Secretary Rusk : Well, that can be argued.
But it should have been argued at the time,
at the various stages. I personally do not
think so, because we have made 42 allies, as
you know, in this postwar period, and at
the time it seemed to be in the vital interest
of the United States that these alliances be
formed.
Now, I can tell you that we are not out
drumming the bushes for more allies, and
we are not necessarily cutting ourselves in
on every dispute or problem that arises in
every part of the world.
We have gone some distance in getting
others to take part in problems involving
violence, to settle them in other forums and
without our direct presence. For example,
the Organization of African Unity has
taken hold of some of the problems in
Africa and has moved to settle them within
an African context. That is first class from
our point of view.
So we do not have a worldwide commit-
ment as the gendarme of the universe, but
we do have 42 allies, and South Viet-Nam
is a protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Treaty and it does have a commitment from
AUGUST 30, 1965
355
us. Therefore, the nature of that commit-
ment is fundamental here if we are to
maintain peace in the years ahead.
Mr. Reasoner: Are we overcommitted
from your standpoint, Mr. Secretary? Can
you handle everything you foresee?
Secretary McNamara: I believe so. The
military forces of this country have been
built up in strength, as you know. We do
have 45 percent more combat-ready divi-
sions today than we did 3 or 4 years ago.
We do have nearly 50 percent more tactical
fighter squadrons today than we did then.
We have been building up our inventories in
men and equipment.
I think the question is really more funda-
mental than are we overcommitted. The
question is, what kind of a world would we
and our children live in if we failed to carry
out the commitments we have or sought to
reduce them?
The Road Ahead
Mr. Reasoner: I have what I guess would
be a good final question. You spoke about
Ho Chi Minh's 20-year war, and you re-
ferred to it. Can the Americans stand a 5-
year war or a 10-year war or a 20-year war?
Can we stick it out?
Mr. Kendrick: More in terms of stamina
and stomach, let's say, than in terms of
materiel.
Secretary McNamara: Well, I think I
should ask you, perhaps. I can answer yes,
without any qualification. I speak for 2%
million of them who are in the Armed Forces
today who I can guarantee can stand it,
and I think the 180 million who stand be-
hind them can stand it. But I don't think
we should fail to recognize what it is that
lies ahead. The road ahead will be long.
It will be tortuous. It will be frustrating. And
if we are to travel that safely, and I under-
line the word "safely," and if we are to travel
it successfully, we will require courage and
we will require imagination and we will re-
quire patience, and perhaps that is what you
meant by stamina. Without it, we shouldn't
start the road and we certainly won't be able
to continue.
Secretary Rusk: I can't escape the recol-
lection, Mr. Kendrick, that I was a student in
college when Manchuria was invaded in
1931. And I lived through those periods be-
fore World War II when the forces of democ-
racy were not able to organize the defenses
of democracy. And that led the men of my
generation, your generation, into World War
II. We could not find the answer to the
problem of tempting thieves.
Now, in this postwar period, we have en-
countered a number of threats. The free
world, with the United States' leadership,
has moved to meet those threats. We have
had a remarkable success in fending them
off without a general war. I am deeply con-
vinced myself that the American people
have thought long and hard about the kind of
world in which we want to live and that,
when they know that something has to be
done and that all of the alternatives are
being and have been fully explored to find
out if peace is possible, we need not worry
about the stamina and the determination of
the American people. It has been proved too
often, too often, and the very life of the
Nation depends upon it.
Mr. Reasoner: Gentlemen, I would like to j
thank you very much for coming here. I as- \
sume there will remain in the United States
some difference of opinion on your policies,
but I am sure that this part of your job —
to come and talk to the American people —
you have done very well, and we thank you.
Tonight we have examined the military
and political decisions involved in United
States policies in Viet-Nam. Next week at
this time, in the second of our four-part
series on Viet-Nam perspective, we will ex-
amine the problems in securing a military
victory in South Viet-Nam. Our guests will
be General Maxwell Taylor, the former Am-
bassador to South Viet-Nam, and General
Earle G. Wheeler, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
356
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
President Johnson Congratulates
Maldive Islands on Independence
Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson to Prime Minister Ibra-
him Nasir of the Maldive Islands read to
news correspondents on August 10 by Rob-
ert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of
News.
August 10, 1965
On the auspicious occasion of the acces-
sion of the Maldive Islands to independence/
I extend to you and through you to the peo-
ple of the Maldive Islands the sincere con-
gratulations of the American people. We
warmly vi^elcome the Maldive Islands to the
family of nations and look forward to the
growth of close and friendly relations be-
tween our two Governments and peoples.
U.S. Recognizes Singapore
as Sovereign, Independent State
Following are a Department statement
read to news correspondents on August 11 by
Robert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office
of News, and the text of a message from Sec-
retary Rusk to Sinnathamby Raja Ratnam,
Foreign Minister of Singapore, tvhich was
delivered at Singapore that day.
DEPARTMENT STATEMENT
Today, August 11, the United States
Government recognized Singapore as a
sovereign and independent state. We wel-
come the new state of Singapore to the
community of nations and wish it success in
carrying forward its program of economic
and social development and its announced
policy of cooperation with Malaysia.
We reaffirm our friendship for the people
and Governments of Singapore and Malay-
sia and look forward to the continuation of
the good relations we have had thus far.
^ The Maldive Islands and the United Kingdom
signed an independence agreement on July 26.
message from secretary rusk
August 11, 1965
Excellency: I have the honor to convey
to the Government of Singapore the best
wishes of the Government of the United
States of America.
The Government of the United States rec-
ognizes that the Independence of Singapore
Agreement, 1965, The Proclamation of Sing-
apore of August 9, and The Constitution and
Malaysia (Singapore Amendment) Act,
1965 represent the authoritative decision of
the people of Singapore and of the people of
Malaysia that their common interest in the
welfare and security of their territories is
best advanced on the basis of friendship
and cooperation between independent and
sovereign states. It is noted that these Acts
make provision for the continuity of inter-
national obligations.
The United States Government therefore
recognizes Singapore as an independent and
sovereign state. Further, the Government
and the people of the United States wish to
reaffirm their close friendship for the Gov-
ernment and people of Singapore and to ex-
press their sincere desire for the successful
development of the new state of Singapore.
I look forward to early communication with
you concerning the accreditation of repre-
sentatives between our two Governments.
Accept, Excellency, the assurances of my
highest consideration.
Dean Rusk
Mexico and U.S. Extend Civil
Air Agreement to 1970
The Department of State announced on
August 4 (press release 188) that Antonio
Carrillo Flores, Secretary of Foreign Rela-
tions of Mexico, and Fulton Freeman, U.S.
Ambassador to Mexico, had that day signed
diplomatic notes i at Mexico City extending
the air transport agreement between Mexico
^ For text, see Department of State press release
188 dated Aug. 4.
AUGUST 30, 1965
357
and the United States through June 30,
1970, with the substitution of a new route
schedule for the route schedule previously in
effect. The agreement originally was signed
on August 15, 1960, ^ and was thereafter ex-
tended and amended by various supplemen-
tary agreements between the two Govern-
ments, the last of which was signed July
15, 1965, extending the agreement through
August 4, 1965.
Extension of the agreement represents the
successful conclusion of negotiations which
took place recently at Mexico City. In the
course of these negotiations representatives
of both Governments agreed that air serv-
ices between the two countries should be ex-
panded to meet the need for improved com-
munications. The agreement is based upon
the friendly relations between the Govern-
ment of the United States of America and
the Government of the United Mexican
States, the contiguity of their respective
territories, and the mutual desire to
strengthen even more the ties which bind
their peoples and the understanding and
good will which exist between them.
The agreement recognizes the increasing
importance of air travel between the two
countries and the mutual desire to insure
the continued development of such travel.
In order to facilitate the desire of both
countries for the accelerated growth of the
air travel market and for adequate service
to stimulate this growth, the new route
schedule provides for a significant expan-
sion in the routes to be served by United
States and Mexican airlines. Under the ex-
panded route exchange Mexican airlines will
be enabled to offer service between Acapulco
and New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles,
either nonstop or via Mexico City; to serve
San Antonio and Dallas/Fort Worth via the
new intermediate point of Guadalajara; to
serve Houston from Guadalajara ; to operate
over a new route from Monterrey to Laredo
and Corpus Christi; to serve Phoenix and
Tucson from Hermosillo; to serve Los
Angeles from Acapulco and La Paz via Ti-
juana; and to offer service from Detroit to
■ For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 12, 1960, p. 423.
cities in Canada without traffic rights
between Detroit and the Canadian cities.
U.S. airlines, in turn, will be permitted
to operate on routes from New York, Los
Angeles, Dallas, Fort Worth, and San An-
tonio to Acapulco, either nonstop or via
Mexico City; to serve Acapulco from Chi-
cago via Mexico City; and to operate over
new routes from the Texas cities of Mission,
McAllen, and Edinburg to Monterrey and
the Texas cities of Harlingen and San Benito
to Veracruz via Tampico.
The new services will be progressively
introduced in the coming months as each
airline receives from its own Government
the necessary authority to serve the cities
concerned and as it receives from the other
Government the required operating permit
as provided for under terms of the agree-
ment.
U.S. and Philippines Amend
IVIilitary Bases Agreement
Press release 191 dated August 9. for release August 10
The Department of State announced on
August 10 that the United States and the
Philippines have agreed on a revision of the
criminal jurisdiction arrangement now a
part of the military bases agreement of 1947
which governs the presence of U.S. forces
and bases in the Philippines.
The new arrangement, patterned after the
NATO status-of-forces formula, provides for
U.S. primary jurisdiction over American
servicemen present in the Philippines in
connection with U.S. bases there in cases
involving offenses arising from acts or omis-
sion done in performance of official duty,
offenses solely against the property or se-
curity of the United States, and offenses
solely against the person or property of
U.S. personnel.
The Philippines has primary jurisdiction
in all other cases, including those on U.S.
bases. Each country has exclusive jurisdic-
tion regarding offenses punishable under its
own laws but not by laws of the other
country.
358
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Information flows into the Department of State in the pro-
portions of a daily flood. How are these millions of words
sorted and sifted so that their essential messages are avail-
able to policymakers when they need them? In this article,
tvritten especially for the Bulletin, the Deputy Director for
Research of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research ex-
plains how the work of the Bureau helps meet those needs.
Research in Action: The Department of State's Bureau
of Intelligence and Research
hy Allan Evans
Thousands of official telegrams flow into
the Department of State daily, together with
innumerable press service items, countless
official reports brought from abroad by
courier, newspapers as numerous as they
are diverse in language, and myriad docu-
ments from other agencies of the United
States Government. Even so, the Depart-
ment does not by any means have available
all the facts it needs on all the questions
that bother it — at the moment, perhaps,
when it most urgently wants the informa-
tion. Absence of data is, however, rivaled as
a problem by the complexities of managing
and mastering the material that is actually
received every day.
The need for information and the effort
to satisfy it confront the Department with
thorny questions. Who will make sure that
the elaborate information-gathering appara-
tus of the Government is stirred to try to
obtain missing data? Who will select among
the items that do come to hand so that the
most useful ones may reach the Secretary
of State, other top Department officers,
and officials elsewhere who depend on the
Department for knowledge of foreign af-
fairs? How can perspective be applied so
as to discriminate what is trivial from what
is crucial? What battery of minds can re-
late and correlate these myriads of new
data with the accumulated wisdom of yes-
terday and last year that overflows the
formidable rows of file drawers? How is the
totality of global patterns to be kept in
sight amidst the overpowering assault of
isolated bits of fact?
Officers work on various aspects of these
problems in all areas of the Department.
The Executive Secretariat, for example,
condenses and summarizes current informa-
tion for the Secretary, Under Secretaries,
and Deputy Under Secretaries; staff assist-
ants of other key officers do the same for
their bosses. Members of the geographic
"policy bureaus," from the desk officer for
one country to the Assistant Secretary who
views a whole fifth of the globe, send for-
ward to higher levels with their proposals
for action a selection and evaluation of
relevant information. In addition, however,
the authorities have ever since World War
II felt the need for a specialized center
which should devote itself exclusively to the
internal and external implications of the
Department's enormous appetite for sound,
AUGUST 30, 1965
359
pertinent, and absorbable information. This
center is the Bureau of Intelligence and Re-
search (INR).
The contribution which INR makes is
threefold. For one thing, this single unit
handles the whole mass of incoming infor-
mation from all parts of the world, and fol-
lows through uniformly and systematically
in selecting and analyzing the material
which can be of use. A proportion of its of-
ficers have both permanent tenure and spe-
cialized knowledge, which enable INR to
apply in greater depth than would otherwise
be possible the processes of analysis and in-
terpretation. Being closely knit and of handy
size, the Bureau can focus quickly whatever
range of information, geographical and func-
tional, is relevant to topical questions of
foreign policy that are confronting the
makers of policy. INR is thus specially de-
signed to get to other Department officers
a concentrate of the information they want
when they want it.
Because of its characteristic scope and
facilities, the Bureau adds a distinctive in-
gredient to the overall viewpoints that de-
velop within the Department concerning
foreign situations. It may be thought from
what has already been said that there must
be overlap between INR and the other bu-
reaus which also, within their fields of ac-
tion, digest information. Some area of over-
lap there certainly is — and precisely in this
fact resides the second major INR contri-
bution.
Following the best tradition of checks and
balances, high authorities in the Depart-
ment have felt the need for a supplier of
information parallel to the historic source in
the policy bureaus — a supplier whose view,
conditioned by the particular qualities of
research work, would complement and on
occasion differ from the viewpoints of bu-
reaus whose central focus is formulation of
policy. Secretary Marshall, when he set the
framework which still shapes INR's orga-
nization, said that this complementary view
was what he wanted, and so did Secretary
Acheson upon assuming office. Succeeding
Secretaries have echoed the idea, tacitly or
explicitly, and have found the same advan-
tages in it. Countless other officers at all
levels have shown by their appetite for
INR products that they, too, find it useful
to check their ideas against a viewpoint
separately arrived at in an organization re-
mote enough to have individuality but close
enough to appreciate their problems.
Finally, INR concentrates in a coherent
group of expert hands the staff work neces-
sary to assist the Secretary of State in his
relations with the Government's intelligence
network and all its complex technological
and operational processes. It is a two-way
street. The Bureau, through ramified con-
nections with the agencies that make up the
"intelligence community," insures that the
Department receives all relevant informa-
tion collected or produced by them. Equally
important — INR acts to fulfill the Depart-
ment's obligations toward those same agen-
cies.
The Director of the Bureau sits on the
United States Intelligence Board (USIB) and
makes the Department's contribution to the
top-level substantive and executive deci-
sions of the intelligence community. Mem-
bers of the staff participate in the com-
munity's wide network of committees and
working groups, bringing to them informa-
tion and judgments relevant to the full
range of intelligence problems from collec-
tion to estimating. In these ways, on behalf
of the Department and as required by deci-
sions of the National Security Council, the
Bureau both supplies the community with in-
telligence in the political, economic, and
sociocultural fields and brings considera-
tions of foreign policy to bear on the com-
munity's problems.
Thus INR is the organization specially as-
signed within the Department to supply in-
formation of particular kinds tailored for
specific needs, to provide a professional re-
searcher's view of events abroad, and to
insure that the Department both benefits
fully by and does its duty toward the in-
telligence community. The outer limits of
the Bureau's activity are marked in one di-
rection by the tradition that it does not it-
self form foreign policy in the way that
policy bureaus invent and plan courses of
360
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
action for the United States. On the other
hand, it differs from other components of
the intelligence community in having no
field force, in relying for collection on For-
eign Service reporting and on the work of
its fellow^ intelligence agencies.
Hovi?, then, does the Bureau of Intelligence
and Research go about its work?
Organization of the Bureau
Constitutionally the Bureau revolves
about a Director and a Deputy Director. The
Director has the rank, salary, and privileges
of an Assistant Secretary but, for remote
and irrelevant historical reasons, has a dif-
ferent title. Under him, the Bureau's staff
of 370, after allowing for 50 people assigned
to a miscellany of functions, breaks down
roughly among four major blocks of activ-
ity. These activities may be designated as
"executive," with 30 people, "coordinating,"
with 45, "external," 25, and "producing,"
220.
The producing area, in turn, divides into
seven Offices of Research. Six of them cover
the geographic areas of the world — West
Europe, Africa, Latin America, U.S.S.R. and
East Europe, Near East and South Asia, Far
East. The seventh Office works on func-
tional fields — economic subjects of broad
scope like transportation, commodities, or
population; scientific topics and political-
military questions; and problems of terri-
torial and cartographic character. These
Offices have, on the average, some 6 cleri-
cal staff and 23 professionals each, subdi-
vided into two or three regional or func-
tional divisions.
The Executive Staff not only takes care
of familiar functions like personnel, budget
and finance, and general management but
also administers the mechanism for receiv-
ing and circulating throughout the Bureau
most incoming documents and for dispatch-
ing the outgoing ones. Thus, through its
management activities, it upholds the well-
being — indeed the very existence — of the
Bureau's staff at the same time that its
Communications Center contributes a vital
ingredient in the working processes of the
organization.
This Communications Center is, in an im-
portant sense, the heart of the Bureau, for
without the steady, quick, and well-directed
flow of new information, work would at
once come to a standstill — while without in-
stant duplicating of the Bureau's own writ-
ten reports, and timely delivery of them to
the readers who can use them, its work
would be in vain. For normal and extensive
jobs of duplication, it may be said, the
Bureau relies upon the first-class service of
the Department's central facilities, but for
urgent papers the Bureau itself usually
takes care of a small first edition of ad-
vance copies directed to an ad hoc pin-
pointed clientele.
Deputy Director for Coordination
The Deputy Director for Coordination runs
a three-ring show. One part of his organiza-
tion, the Operations Staff, works with De-
partment policy officers and certain other
intelligence agencies to insure that these
agencies' activities abroad accord with
U.S. policy objectives. A second unit, the
Intelligence Staff, newest addition to the
Bureau, primarily concentrates on handling
certain highly confidential materials, seeing
that each item reaches the small number of
State Department officers directly con-
cerned, and from time to time summarizing
series of items that shape up into coherent
pictures.
The third unit in this area, the Coordina-
tion Staff, concerns itself largely with the
collection and the flow of new information.
Among its many specialized activities may
be mentioned the Department's program for
collection of biographic information, which
this staff directs. It is also the central
point for dealing with other agencies on the
activities of attaches. Ambassadors and
senior officers of missions are for INK both
key directors of collection activity in the
field, and themselves original sources of im-
portant knowledge; the Coordination Staff
arranges for briefings of outgoing officers on
INR's needs and debriefings of their infor-
mation when they return. The staff also re-
ceives and screens requests from other
agencies for information that can be ob-
AUGUST 30, 1965
361
tained by the Foreign Service in the field,
and sends out to other agencies questions
that they can answer for someone in the
Bureau or elsewhere in the Department.
This unit works in innumerable ways with
other agencies on procedures to prevent
duplication of requests and to hasten infor-
mation of critical importance, and on pro-
graming for certain complex scientific and
technical means of collection.
Deputy Director for Research
Parallel with the Deputy Director for Co-
ordination there is also a Deputy Director
for Research, who works directly with a
couple of staff units and has generalized
responsibility for the integrated planning
and smooth running of the Offices that
produce political, economic, and sociological
analyses of foreign developments.
The External Research Staff (XR) is
one of the staff units in this group. It was
designed many years ago to be a bridge
over which there might flow an exchange be-
tween scholars outside the Government who
were producing information and ideas on
foreign affairs and officers inside the De-
partment who could point out areas in which
scholarly researchers might, if they wished,
help to meet the Government's needs. This
exchange soon expanded. The outside experts
themselves cooperated with the staff and en-
abled it to gather and keep up to date a
catalog of over 30,000 private research proj-
ects recently completed or under way in the
social and behavioral sciences on topics re-
lating to foreign affairs. In return, XR has
channeled to scholarly consumers what un-
classified material the Bureau produced —
to say nothing of selective listings from the
master catalog of private projects — thus
forwarding the Department's work of giving
out to the public whenever possible its in-
formation about foreign affairs.
The External Research Staff has many
ways of seeking out substantive contribu-
tions from the private research community.
For example, members of the staff attend
professional meetings and report for the
Department and the intelligence community
on those presentations and discussions which
bear most usefully on problems of foreign
policy. The staff collects, and then circu-
lates or lends to the Department and the
intelligence community, research materials
not otherwise available — for example, copies
of the many manuscripts in subjects related
to foreign affairs which private scholars
prepare for one-time use, perhaps at a pro-
fessional meeting or a discussion group, but
may publish only after a long lapse of time
or not at all. Most recently the staff has
made visits abroad which are bringing in
dividends of information on European re-
search programs. It is active in arranging
for scholars and experts to work as consul-
tants, especially with INR, but also with
other bureaus and agencies. In general, this
staff acts to bring together, through writ-
ings or face-to-face conversations, the offi-
cial and private worlds of study and prac-
tice in foreign affairs.
Having so wide a knowledge of resources
for private research throughout the country,
XR administers the Department's own small
fund for research contracting. It also helps
to make widely useful other Government
agencies' research contracts that relate to
foreign affairs by collecting and circulating
the reports produced under those contracts.
Several agencies have for some time tangibly
recognized the value of the staff's work by
contributing to its finances. Recently more
than a score of agencies have voluntarily
joined under XR leadership in forming the
Foreign Area Research Coordination Group
(FAR) to compare and coordinate their
plans for research contracts and to concert
with private research groups the planning of J
research programs. "
The scope of the activities involved may
be judged from the estimate that these
agencies among them spend some $30 mil-
lion every year on research contracts relat-
ing to foreign affairs. The projects involved
have impact on foreign policy not only
through the end product of information but
also through the associated activities, espe-
cially the contacts made during field work
in foreign countries. Additional arrange-
362
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
ments are therefore in contemplation which
will strengthen the Department's leadership
and influence in Government-sponsored re-
search activities that bear closely upon the
conduct of foreign relations.^ These arrange-
ments will impose upon XR considerable new
responsibilities.
A second and small staff unit under the
Deputy Director for Research helps him
with aspects of his job which range from
program planning to developing the format
of the Bureau's reports, but primarily it
focuses upon keeping at a high level the
quality of the Bureau's writing. This staff
reviews every official report written in the
Offices, to check on both style and content.
The members of this unit — numbering two
— must be stylists who can persuade the
Bureau's authors to follow the direct, sim-
ple, clear mode of writing which alone will
convey a message to busy official readers.
They must be logicians to point out any
non sequiturs and special pleading, and to
spot implicit conclusions which the paper
could put across only if it stated them
straightforwardly. Obviously, this staff re-
quires tact and firmness in careful balance.
The Offices of Research carry on all the
operations familiar to any observer of an
organization that produces finished intelli-
gence. These operations can be regarded as
traditional research in that the Offices ac-
cumulate information and evaluate, store, re-
trieve, and reshape it. Their activity is at the
same time called "intelligence" in the sense
that it always deals with foreign situations,
focuses on problems that are of immediate
or prospective concern to the makers of pol-
icy, and points to the impact of develop-
ments abroad on U.S. interests. It is intelli-
gence also in the sense of being usually
estimative; its judgments are perforce based
often on incomplete evidence, and it charac-
teristically includes projections into the
future. The nature of these activities ap-
pears more clearly if we look at the differ-
ent kinds of vehicles which convey the in-
telligence and research product to its readers.
^ For a letter of Aug'. 2 from the President to Sec-
retary Rusk, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 323.
Briefings and Briefing Papers
Every morning, either at a meeting of the
Secretary with the Assistant Secretaries, or
more often individually to the Secretary and
Under Secretaries, the Director and Deputy
of the Bureau brief some score of the most
recent intelligence items that bear on policy
problems of concern to the leaders of the
Department. Behind this presentation of 15
minutes or more lies a continuing Bureau-
wide effort to keep on top of events, to
scan all fresh information, to select the
items that will help this high-level audience,
and to make the information meaningful by
bringing to bear on it the accumulated
knowledge and judgment of the Bureau's
experts. The physical result is a set of
"briefing papers" that detail both news and
comment and serve the Director and Deputy
as basis for their presentations. This series
is but the most conspicuous of the many
briefings carried on by members of the
Bureau for individual officers or groups of
officers in the Department.
The essential characteristic of all the
briefings is that they lend perspective to
up-to-the-minute information through the
application of deep background knowledge.
Thus the nub of a seemingly conventional
hostile propaganda outburst may turn out
to be just one inconspicuous statement that
only an experienced observer would single
out amid the repetition of threats long since
worn threadbare; what looks at first sight
like a profound ideological conflict may but
give modernized form to age-old ethnic and
tribal rivalries; on the other hand, shop-
worn and apparently normal rumors of mil-
itary takeover can be shown to have menac-
ing significance if set against a backdrop
of long though hitherto undramatic decline
in economic and political stability.
This briefing operation to an important ex-
tent develops into an exchange. From their
briefings of groups or individual officers in
the Department, members of the Bureau
gain in return indispensable knowledge of
the problems that are current in policy bu-
reaus and that should guide INR's program.
Upper level officers of INR also participate
AUGUST 30, 1965
363
in staff meetings of other bureaus, where
they can readily supply INR information
and thinking relevant to matters at issue
and learn what difficulties have appeared
that could be helped by research contribu-
tions.
It is this interchange that guides a large
part of the overall INR production program
of major papers described below. These proj-
ects tend to respond to questions asked of
the Bureau in briefings or meetings, to say
nothing of phone calls and individual con-
versations, with policy officers at all levels
and in all areas of the Department. The part
of the program not so guided is, of course,
devoted to the "self-initiated" projects
through which an organization like INR
must, at its own discretion, attack problems
and stimulate attention to questions which
might otherwise be overlooked and neg-
lected.
Intelligence Notes
In the next stage of production after the
briefing papers, the Bureau prepares a series
called Intelligence Notes. Each Note com-
prises a report of an event, a marshaling of
facts and interpretation to make clear within
a fuller context what really happened, and
a view of prospective consequences, espe-
cially of the effects upon U.S. interests.
The occasions are much like those which
prompt briefing items — may, indeed, be
identical if the Secretary asks for additional
analysis of an item briefed to him. A new
personality in a Communist Party presi-
dium, returns from a representative by-
election, latest production figures in a one-
commodity country, rumors of a Communist
offer of military aid, regional reactions to
a U.S. move, progress of a military coup and
its prospects, last-straw crisis signals in an
unstable country — the context makes the
event seem more or less momentous, or sim-
ply emphasizes its meaning; the estimate
gages the resulting impediment to U.S. pur-
poses or opportunity for U.S. action. These
analyses may appear at any time of day.
The Director signs them, and they receive
special priority in reproduction. Then they
move posthaste to the Secretary and Under
Secretaries and to other senior officers —
but, being still essentially quick impressions
and therefore ephemeral, they seldom circu-
late outside the family circle of the Depart-
ment.
Research Memoranda
The balance between current intelligence
and research evens up in the series of Re-
search Memoranda. Into these papers the
Bureau pours the results of its longer term
efforts; they may take from 2 days to 2
months; they may run from 2 pages to 200.
In this medium INR may analyze compre-
hensively the social and political factors that
are shaping the outcome of an election, the
economic consequences to an African coun-
try of gaining preferential treatment in the
European Economic Community, the reac-
tions around the world to be expected when
the Chinese Communists explode a nuclear
device and then again those that occur
after they have actually done so, the his-
torical and current claims of an ethnic group
that is divided among several states, the
consequences present and to be anticipated
of Communist aid, trade, and less orthodox
relations with a given country — anything
from factual statistics of interregional trade
to speculation on the thoughts and plans of
national leaders, and, whenever possible, an
estimate of likely prospects. But no matter
how weighty the array of evidence, how
meticulously complete the argumentation,
how far into the future the speculative pro-
jection, each Memorandum opens with an
abstract which distills and condenses into
a page or two the essential conclusions of the
paper. This device promises that eloquence
will not serve to conceal an absence of orig-
inality, and that the paper's contribution of
novel interpretation and ideas will not be lost
among the trees.
The Link Between Research and Policy
It is the Research Memoranda that most
clearly illustrate one vital characteristic of
the Bureau's research as it has developed
over the last 4 years. This research is fre-
364
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
quently described as "policy oriented," a
term which means more than that the work
is timely and focused on a current interest.
Breaking away from the classic view that
intelligence research should above all things
keep itself pure from policy-thinking for
fear of falling into bias in support of a par-
ticular course of action, the new tradition
urges that the intelligence product has an
obligation to sensitize itself to issues of
policy and need not necessarily sacrifice ob-
jectivity if it meshes more closely with these
issues.
Research may link to policy in two ways. It
may estimate future development in terms
of contingent or hypothetical U.S. actions,
often discussing the prospective conse-
quences of alternatives set by a policy of-
ficer himself. It may put forward sugges-
tions for action — not recommendations, to
be sure, for to recommend means to select
the one best choice among many that are
possible and requires taking into account
considerations such as domestic U.S. politi-
cal or financial factors which lie largely
outside the purview of an intelligence re-
search organization — but suggestions in the
form of checklists of possible actions, to
make sure that harassed readers may not
miss some of the opportunities implicit in
the situations analyzed. Experience has
shown that these devices, as bridges to the
immediate concerns of the policy officers,
have done much to diminish the psychologi-
cal block between the mind of the action
officer and the thinking of an intelligence
research organization.
This blend of approaches also reflects
another factor which has materially helped
to bring INR's work to bear at points of
decision. As a result of the integration pro-
gram of the last few years, the professional
staff of the Bureau has come to include
both Foreign Service and Civil Service offi-
cers. The Bureau aims at preserving a
roughly fifty-fifty balance between the two
services, though the ideal balance is for nu-
merous reasons seldom attainable. The pro-
portions are now about four FS to six CS
officers.
Even so rough a balance still gives INR
the advantage that it mixes the civil serv-
ant's continuity of tradition and depth of
specialized knowledge with the Foreign
Service officer's experience in the conduct of
international affairs and his memory of
what a policy officer needs in wrestling
with plans of action. This combination of
the two services has for participants from
both of them notably broadened and at the
same time sharpened their points of view.
It has also, as a result of the interchange
among Foreign Service officers and of their
actual rotation to other bureaus, powerfully
served to increase in those bureaus an ap-
preciation of the contribution which INR
can make to the work of the Department.
The contemplated new personnel programs
in the field of foreign affairs are expected
to retain this advantage of complementary
traditions.
Political Dynamics Studies
A fourth category of product falls in the
area of research in depth, and culminates
in the recently begun series of Political Dy-
namics Studies. Designed to support the
complex interdepartmental program for re-
viewing and integrating policy toward indi-
vidual countries, each study tries to explain
what it is that makes a particular country
tick. It concentrates on formative elements,
social, political, and economic — those forces
that are waning, those that prevail now,
those that show potential for the future.
Interest groups, political attitudes, foreign
influences, and the framework of institu-
tions are all allowed their part. Whatever
the factor may be, the analysis aims less
to describe it than to gage its value as a
force at work — the paper focuses on the
pressures, the drives, the energies that are
moving the society along and that must be
understood if U.S. action is to help and not
hinder the more beneficial trends.
Cooperative Research
Within these categories of publication,
the Bureau has developed procedures to
meet certain problems inherent in work of
this kind. Any intelligence organization
AUGUST 30, 1965
365
Mr. Evans' article is one of a series being
written especially for the Bulletin by oflBcers
of the Department and the Foreign Service.
Officers who may be interested in submitting
original bylined articles are invited to call the
editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton,
extension 5806, room 5536.
must, for example, take account of the fact
that the world was not shaped for the con-
venience of bureaucracy. Region and coun-
try provide the inescapable foundation for
an organization chart, but foreign policy
problems are hardly respectful of these
boundaries. The Bureau has always realized
that one of the advantages it has to offer
in dealing with a complex problem is the
quick marshaling of views that may diverge
by reason of geographic or functional focus.
Its voluntary and informal procedures show
a kaleidoscopic pattern of shifting groups
which pool ideas through ad hoc conferences
or exchange of drafts, and there is always
the sanction of formal internal clearance.
In addition to the informal procedures,
and the functional Office of Research in Eco-
nomics and Science, two semiformal institu-
tions have gi'own up within INR for cross-
cutting projects. The global phenomenon of
communism has required special attention,
and the Bureau's Committee on World Com-
munism manages work in this broad field.
Under a full-time chairman, representatives
from each Office meet together to sharpen
each other's alertness to current develop-
ments, to plan a program of reporting, and
to review drafts of inter-Office papers. Re-
search and writing, be it noted, still get
done basically in the Offices under Office
discipline, but in a cooperative process the
chairman works out programs with the di-
rectors and the Committee members give
their colleagues in each Office the benefit
of their more specialized understanding of
communism itself. Most recently the Com-
mittee has issued reports on the prevailing
themes of the Sino-Soviet rift, polycentrism,
and Communist penetration, giving compara-
tive and global interpretations of these de-
velopments in the Communist movement.
On more general matters, the Office direc-
tors themselves meet as an Estimates Group
to pool their thoughts about broad topics of
interregional scope. INR feels that any
separate and specialized group is neces-
sarily remote from the mainstream of ac-
tivity, information, and thinking; only the
top executives who command the resources
of the Offices can bring to discussion the
fullness of the organization's knowledge and
wisdom.
Community Programs
Finally, separate mention must be made
of INR's participation in production pro-
grams of the intelligence community.
The Bureau works on community pro-
grams in each major category of produc-
tion. Current intelligence at the level of
briefings or Intelligence Notes appears daily
in a community publication coordinated for
high-level recipients; a Bureau officer sits
with the approving panel, and the responsi-
ble analysts work over with editors the in-
dividual items in their fields, proposing
drafts to the Director of INR if they en-
counter irreducible differences of opinion
which seem to require a footnote to record
INR's dissenting view. Similarly, Bureau
officers take part in preparation of the
weekly report of the USIB Watch Committee,
that weighs in a worldwide frame any ap-
parent indications of imminent hostile ag-
gressive action.
To in-depth research, represented by the
comprehensive interagency country hand-
books of the National Intelligence Survey
(NIS), the Bureau no longer contributes
written texts, but it does review many of
the sections in the political, economic, and
social fields. It also both arranges for re-
view of these sections in the field and by
other bureaus, with valuable results in up-
dating and correction, and participates in
the planning and guiding actions of the NIS
interagency committee.
Most engrossing of all its community
commitments, the National Intelligence Esti-
mates program absorbs intensive effort by
INR. These Estimates, coordinated among
366
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
the intelligence agencies and sanctioned by
USIB, present the ultimate official judg-
ment of the community upon top-level prob-
lems. At every stage the Bureau is closely
involved, from helping an officer of the De-
partment who wishes to frame the initial
request for an NIE, to the closing cere-
monies when the Director of INR at USIB
shares with the intelligence community in
discussing and authorizing the final text,
which is usually Intended for the National
Security Council. Country analysts partici-
pate in interagency working groups to de-
velop terms of reference, they prepare
often voluminous written contributions on
political, economic, and social aspects of the
problems, and they spend sometimes many
days at interagency discussions of the com-
bined drafts into which the Central Intelli-
gence Agency weaves these contributions.
This intelligence community process is an
integral part of the Bureau's production
program.
We may note in conclusion that the Bu-
reau of Intelligence and Research works at
three levels of involvement in the different
aspects of the Government's total intelli-
gence effort. There are programs of the
intelligence community in which the De-
partment of State does not actively partici-
pate— chiefly forms of collection and a
number of diversified support programs;
in these programs the Bureau represents
the Department in giving guidance, assist-
ance, and, in the end, policy judgment, to
the responsible agencies. The Department as
a whole makes a direct contribution to the
community through its administration of
reporting from the diplomatic missions
overseas, an activity in which the collecting
of information vital to the intelligence com-
munity is a major element. In the operation
of this program INR has a twofold role,
representing the needs of the intelligence
community to the Department and, as a
member of the Department, sharing in de-
terminations of deployment and guidance.
Finally, INR carries on a major original
program of its own for producing intelli-
gence analyses of national economies in the
free world and of worldwide political and
sociological developments; in these fields
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research,
under the directives of the National Se-
curity Council, bears principal production
responsibility.
U.S. Diplomats Withdrawn
From Brazzaville
The Department of State on August 13 re-
leased the text of the following note from the
Secretary of State to the Ambassador of the
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), which was
delivered on that day to the Charge d'
Affaires of the Congolese Embassy by Act-
ing Assistant Secretary for African Affairs
William C. Trimble.
The Secretary of State presents his com-
pliments to His Excellency the Ambassador
of the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville)
[Jonas Mouanza] and has the honor to notify
him that the Government of the United
States has decided to withdraw its diplomatic
and consular representatives from the Re-
public of Congo (Brazzaville).
Within the past nine months there have
been three instances of serious mistreatment
by the Congolese authorities of American
diplomats and officials. In each instance
the American Embassy in Brazzaville dis-
cussed with the Congolese authorities the
arrival of the American diplomat and offi-
cials involved. Technical matters raised re-
garding visas were of such nature that be-
tween nations maintaining normal diplo-
matic relations they would have been incon-
sequential and would have been settled with-
out difficulty. However, the American dip-
lomat and officials, on or after arrival in
Brazzaville, were variously subjected to ar-
rest, detention, incommunicado interroga-
tion and forced departure. The treatment
accorded to the American diplomat and of-
ficials was in contravention of the rules of
international law and traditional practice
governing diplomatic intercourse among
nations — rules which have been codified in
the comprehensive Vienna Convention on
AUGUST 30, 1965
367
Diplomatic Intercourse and Immunities at
a world conference meeting in 1961.
The United States Government in each
instance sought to resolve the case amicably
vpith the Government of the Republic of
Congo (Brazzaville). In each instance the
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) has of-
fered no satisfactory explanation. The Amer-
ican Ambassador [Henry L. T. Koren] dis-
cussed the latest of these instances, involv-
ing Mr. William K. Mackey, vi^ith the Presi-
dent and the Foreign Minister of the Repub-
lic of Congo (Brazzaville). The requests of
the Ambassador and of the Secretary of
State for an explanation vs^ere rejected. The
United States Government's request for as-
surances that effective steps would be taken
to prevent a recurrence of these incidents
went unanswered.
This course of conduct on the part of the
Government of Congo (Brazzaville) has
made it impossible for the Government of
the United States to maintain its diplo-
matic and consular representation in the
Republic of Congo (Brazzaville).
The Government of the United States has
requested the British Government to as-
sume protection of the interests of the
United States in the Republic of Congo
(Brazzaville), and the British Government
has agreed to do so. The American Embassy
in Brazzaville has already taken steps to ar-
range the departure of its staff. The Charge
d'Affaires ad interim and the remaining
staff who are charged with turning over to
the British Embassy the affairs of the
American Embassy will depart Brazzaville
as soon as they have fulfilled their func-
tions, but at the latest within one week
from today.
At such time as assurances are received
from the Government of Congo (Brazza-
ville) that effective steps will be taken to
assure the right of legation to American
diplomatic representation in Brazzaville, the
Government of the United States will be
prepared to consider the resumption of dip-
lomatic and consular representation.
Department op State,
Washington, August 13, 1965.
Use of Mexican Border-Crossing
Cards Extended
White House Statement
White House press release dated August 10
The President has instructed the Depart-
ment of State and the Immigration and
Naturalization Service to take steps to re-
duce the amount of red tape encountered by
visitors from Mexico, and thereby encourage
travel to this country. He asked that regula-
tions be simplified relating to documentary
requirements for Mexican visitors and the
use of Mexican nonresident alien border-
crossing cards be extended. He specifically
instructed the two agencies to waive exist- J
ing passport and visa requirements for I
Mexican nationals with border-crossing cards
who seek to enter the United States as
visitors for business or pleasure. The new
system will become effective on September
15, 1965.1
At present a Mexican national may enter ,
the United States for visits in the border |
areas for a period of time not to exceed 72
hours upon presentation of a Mexican non-
resident alien border-crossing card. A Mex-
ican national who desires to enter the
United States as a visitor for longer than
72 hours or to proceed beyond the border
area must present a valid passport contain- J
ing a nonimmigrant visa issued at an Amer- ■
ican consulate in Mexico. They must apply
at an American consulate in Mexico for the
nonimmigrant visa.
Under the new procedures the border-
crossing card will be the only document re-
quired of Mexican nationals who seek to
enter the United States as visitors, whether
they are seeking admission to shop for a few
hours in the border area or intend to visit
in the interior of the United States for pe-
riods up to 6 months.
Mexican nationals residing in the area ad-
jacent to the United States border will ap-
ply for cards at Immigration and Naturaliza-
tion Service offices on the border, while Mex-
^ For Department regulations on nonimmigrant
documentary waivers and nonresident alien Mexican
border-crossing cards, see 30 Fed. Reg. 10188.
368
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
ican nationals residing in the interior of
Mexico can apply for the cards at the
American consulate nearest their home. It
is expected that the simplification of the
documentary requirements for Mexican na-
tionals who wish to visit the United States
will encourage a greater number of bona
fide visitors to come to the United States,
with no lessening of ordinary immigration
safeguards.
This action will represent a significant
reciprocal step in relations between the
United States and Mexico. The Mexican
Government has already announced that the
validity of their equivalent tourist card will
be extended from 30 days to 6 months.
THE CONGRESS
Buildup of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam
Statement by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense ^
Last Wednesday President Johnson in-
formed the Nation of the mounting Com-
munist aggression in South Viet-Nam and the
additional measures which we plan to take
to assist the people of that country in de-
fending their freedom and independence.^
We are here today to report on that situa-
tion, to review with you the additional mil-
itary actions involved, and to request the
funds required to finance these actions pend-
ing the submission of a detailed fiscal year
1966 supplemental request to the Congress
when it convenes in January.
Although Viet-Nam is now the focus of
attention, we are not overlooking the possi-
bility that trouble may arise in other areas
'■ Made before the Subconunittee on Department
of Defense Appropriations of the Senate Committee
on Appropriations on Aug. 4.
" Bulletin of Aug. 16, 1965, p. 262.
of the world, perhaps as a reaction to our
increased effort in that country or for other
reasons. Accordingly, in planning for the in-
creased deployment of U.S. forces to South-
east Asia, we have also taken into account
the forces which may be needed to meet
contingencies elsewhere. Although we have
no basis to assume at this time that the
Soviet Union or Communist China would de-
liberately provoke new crises in other areas,
prudence dictates that we be prepared for
such emergencies.
The issue in Viet-Nam is essentially the
same as it was in 1954 when President
Eisenhower said : ^
I think it is no longer necessary to enter into a
long argument or exposition to show the importance
to the United States of Indochina and of the
struggle going on there. No matter how the struggle
' Ibid., May 10, 1954, p. 702.
AUGUST 30, 1965
369
may have started, it has long since become one of
the testing places between a free form of govern-
ment and dictatorship. Its outcome is going to have
the greatest significance for us, and possibly for a
long time into the future.
We have here a sort of cork in the bottle, the
bottle being the great area that includes Indonesia,
Burma, Thailand, all of the surrounding areas of
Asia with its hundreds of millions of people. . . .
What is at stake there is the ability of the
free world to block Communist armed ag-
gression and prevent the loss of all of South-
east Asia, a loss which in its ultimate con-
sequences could drastically alter the strate-
gic situation in Asia and the Pacific to the
grave detriment of our own security and
that of our allies. While 15 years ago, in
Korea, Communist aggression took the form
of an overt armed attack, today, in South
Viet-Nam, it has taken the form of a large-
scale intensive guerrilla operation. The co-
vert nature of this aggression, which char-
acterized the earlier years of the struggle in
South Viet-Nam, has now all but been
stripped away. The control of the Viet Cong
effort by the regime in Hanoi, supported and
incited by Communist China, has become
increasingly apparent.
The struggle there has enormous implica-
tions for the security of the United States
and the free world and, for that matter, the
Soviet Union as well. The North Vietnamese
and the Chinese Communists have chosen to
make South Viet-Nam the test case for their
particular version of the so-called "wars of
national liberation." The extent to which vio-
lence should be used in overthrowing non-
Communist governments has been one of the
most bitterly contested issues between the
Chinese and the Soviet Communists. Al-
though the former Chairman, Mr. Khrush-
chev, fully endorsed "wars of national liber-
ation" as the preferred means of extending
the sway of communism, he cautioned that
"this does not necessarily mean that the
transition to Socialism will everywhere and
in all cases be linked with armed uprising
and civil war. . . . Revolution by peaceful
means accords with the interests of the
working class and the masses."
The Chinese Communists, however, insist
that:
Peaceful co-existence cannot replace the revolu-
tionary struggles of the people. The transition from
capitalism to socialism in any country can only be
brought about through proletarian revolution and
the dictatorship of the proletariat in that country.
. . . The vanguard of the proletariat will remain
unconquerable in all circumstances only if it masters
all forms of struggle — peaceful and armed, open
and secret, legal and illegal, parliamentary struggle
and mass struggle, and so forth. (Letter to the
Central Committee of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union, June 14, 1963.)
Their preference for violence was even
more emphatically expressed in an article in
the Peiping People's Daily of March 31,
1964:
It is advantageous from the point of view of
tactics to refer to the desire for peaceful transition,
but it would be inappropriate to emphasize the
possibility of peaceful transition. . . . the prole-
tarian party must never substitute parliamentary
struggle for proletarian revolution or entertain the
illusion that the transition to socialism can be
achieved through the parliamentary road. . . . Violent
revolution is a universal law of proletarian revolu-
tion. To realize the transition to socialism, the pro-
letariat must wage armed struggle, smash the old
state machine and establish the dictatorship of the
proletariat.
"Political power," the article quotes Mao
Tse-tung as saying, "grows out of the barrel
of a gun."
Throughout the world we see the fruits of
these policies and in Viet-Nam, particularly,
we see the effects of the Chinese Commu-
nists' more militant stance and their hatred
of the free world. They make no secret of
the fact that Viet-Nam is the test case, and
neither does the regime in Hanoi. General
Giap, head of the North Vietnamese army, j
recently said that "South Viet-Nam is the 1
model of the national liberation movement
of our time. ... If the special warfare that
the U.S. imperialists are testing in South
Viet-Nam is overcome, then it can be de-
feated everywhere in the world." And Pham
Van Dong, Premier of North Viet-Nam,
pointed out that "The experience of our com-
patriots in South Viet-Nam attracts the at-
tention of the world, especially the peoples
of South America."
It is clear, therefore, that a Communist
success in South Viet-Nam would be taken
370
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
as positive proof that the Chinese Commu-
nists' position is correct and they will have
made a giant step forward in their efforts
to seize control of the world Communist
movement. Furthermore, such a success
would greatly increase the prestige of Com-
munist China among the nonalined nations
and strengthen the position of their follow-
ers everywhere. In that event we would then
have to be prepared to cope with the same
kind of aggression in other parts of the world
wherever the existing governments are weak
and the social structures fragmented. If
Communist armed aggression is not stopped
in Viet-Nam as it was in Korea, the confi-
dence of small nations in America's pledge of
support will be weakened, and many of them,
in widely separated areas of the world, will
feel unsafe.
Thus the stakes in South Viet-Nam are far
greater than the loss of one small country
to communism. Its loss would be a most seri-
ous setback to the cause of freedom and
would greatly complicate the task of pre-
venting the further spread of militant Asian
communism. And, if that spread is not
halted, our strategic position in the world
will be weakened and our national security
directly endangered.
It was in recognition of this fundamental
issue that the United States, under three
Presidents, firmly committed itself to help
the people of South Viet-Nam defend their
freedom. That is why President Eisenhower
warned at the time of the Geneva conference
in July 1954 that "any renewal of Commu-
nist aggression would be viewed by us as a
matter of grave concern."* That is why Pres-
ident Johnson in his statement last Wednes-
day made it clear to all the world that we
are determined to stand by our commitment
and provide whatever help is required to ful-
fill it.
Conditions Leading to the Present Situation
Essential to a proper understanding of the
present situation in South Viet-Nam is a rec-
ognition of the fact that the so-called insur-
gency there is planned, directed, controlled.
and supported from Hanoi. True, there is a
small dissident minority in South Viet-
Nam, but the Government could cope with
it if it were not directed and supplied from
the outside. As early as 1960, at the Third
Congress of the North Vietnamese Commu-
nist Party, both Ho Chi Minh and Vo
Nguyen Giap, the commander in chief of
the North Vietnamese armed forces, spoke
of the need to "step up" the "revolution in
the South." In March 1963 the party organ
Hoc Tap stated that the authorities in
South Viet-Nam "are well aware that North
Viet-Nam is the firm base for the southern
revolution and the point on which it leans,
and that our party is the steady and experi-
enced vanguard unit of the working class
and people and is the brain and factor that
decides all victories of the revolution."
Yet through most of these years the North
Vietnamese government denied and went to
great efforts to conceal the scale of its per-
sonnel and material support, in addition to
direction and encouragement, to the Viet
Cong. It had strong reasons to do so.
First of all, in 1954 the authorities in
Hanoi had pledged to "respect . . . the ter-
ritory under the military control of the
other party" — South Viet-Nam — and engage
in no hostile act against the other party.^ In
1962 those same authorities pledged that
they would "not use the territory of the
Kingdom of Laos for interference in the in-
ternal affairs of other countries."^
The North Vietnamese regime had no
wish to force upon the attention of the world
its massive and persistent violations of those
pledges. Nor was it anxious for its own cit-
izens to dwell upon the ultimate risks of
committing, unequivocally, aggression across
international boundaries. Nor could the Viet
Cong cause be anything but harmed if it
were to be recognized openly in the South
♦ Ibid., Aug. 2, 1954, p. 163.
° For texts of the declaration on the neutrality of
cessation of hostilities in Viet-Nam, see American
Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, vol. I
(Department of State publication 6446), p. 750.
* For texts of the declaration on the neutrality of
Laos and protocol, see Bulletin of Aug. 13, 1962,
p. 259.
AUGUST 30, 1965
371
as an instrument of the North Vietnamese
regime.
However, in building up the Viet Cong
forces for a decisive challenge, the author-
ities in North Viet-Nam have increasingly
dropped the disguises that gave their earlier
support a clandestine character.
Through 1963 the bulk of the arms infil-
trated from the North were old French and
American models acquired prior to 1954 in
Indochina and Korea. Now the flow of weap-
ons from North Viet-Nam consists almost
entirely of the latest arms acquired from
Communist China; and the flow is large
enough to have entirely reequipped the
main-force units, despite the capture this
year by Government forces of thousands of
these weapons and millions of rounds of the
new ammunition.
Likewise, through 1963, nearly all the per-
sonnel infiltrating through Laos, trained
and equipped in the North and ordered
South, were former Southerners. But in the
last 18 months the great majority of the in-
filtrators— more than 10,000 of them — have
been ethnic Northerners, mostly draftees or-
dered into the People's Army of Viet-Nam
for duty in the South. And it now appears
that, starting their journey through Laos
last December, from one to three regiments
of a North Vietnamese regular division, the
325th Division of the North Vietnamese
army, have deployed into the central high-
lands of South Viet-Nam for combat along-
side the Viet Cong.
Thus, despite all its reasons for secrecy,
Hanoi's desire for decisive results this sum-
mer has forced it to reveal its hand even
more openly.
The United States during the last 4 years
has steadily increased its help to the people
of South Viet-Nam in an effort to counter
this ever-increasing scale of Communist ag-
gression. These efforts achieved some meas-
ure of success during 1962. The South Viet-
namese forces in that year made good prog-
ress in suppressing the Viet Cong insurrec-
tion. Although combat deaths suffered by
these forces in 1962 rose by 11 percent over
the 1961 level (from about 4,000 to 4,450),
Viet Cong combat deaths increased by 72
percent (from about 12,000 to 21,000).
Weapons lost by the South Vietnamese fell
from 5,900 in 1961 to 5,200, while the num-
ber lost by the Viet Cong rose from 2,750
to 4,050. The Government's new strategic
hamlet program was just getting underway
and was showing promise. The economy was
growing and the Government seemed firmly
in control. Therefore, when I appeared be-
fore this committee in early 1963, I was able
to say :
. . . victory over the Viet Cong will most likely
take many years. But now, as a result of the opera-
tions of the last year, there is a new feeling of
confidence, not only on the part of the Government
of South Viet-Nam but also among the populace, that
victory is possible.
But at the same time I also cautioned :
We are not unmindful of the fact that the pres-
sures on South Viet-Nam may well continue through
infiltration via the Laos corridor. Nor are we un-
mindful of the possibility that the Communists,
sensing defeat in their covert efforts, might resort
to overt aggression from North Viet-Nam. Ob-
viously, this latter contingency could require a
greater direct participation by the United States.
The survival of an independent government in South
Viet-Nam is so important to the security of all of
Southeast Asia and to the free world that we must
be prepared to take all necessary measures within
our capability to prevent a Communist victory.
Unfortunately, the caution voiced in early
1963 proved to be well founded. Late in 1963
the Communists stepped up their efforts,
and the military situation began to deterio-
rate. The Diem government came under in-
creasing internal pressure, and in November
it was overthrowm. A year ago last February,
I had to tell this committee that :
The Viet Cong was quick to take advantage of
the growing opposition to the Diem government and
the period of uncertainty following its overthrow.
Viet Cong activities were already increasing in
September and continued to increase at an ac-
celerated rate in October and November, particu-
larly in the delta area. And I must report that they
have made considerable progress since the coup.
Following the coup the lack of stability
in the Central Government and the rapid
372
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
turnover of key personnel, particularly sen-
ior military commanders, began to be re-
flected in combat operations and throughout
the entire fabric of the political and eco-
nomic structure. And, in 1964, the Commu-
nists greatly increased the scope and tempo
of their subversive efforts. Larger scale at-
tacks became more frequent, and the flow of
men and supplies from the North expanded.
The incidence of terrorism and sabotage
rose rapidly, and the pressure on the civil-
ian population Mvas intensified. The deterio-
rating military situation was clearly
reflected in the statistics. South Vietnamese
combat deaths rose from 5,650 in 1963 to
7,450 in 1964 and the number of weapons
lost from 8,250 to 14,100. In contrast, Viet
Cong combat deaths dropped from 20,600 to
16,800, and, considering the stepped-up tempo
of activity, they experienced only a very
modest rise in the rate of weapons lost
(from 5,400 to 5,900).
Continued Buildup of Communist Forces
At various times in recent months, I have
called attention to the continued buildup of
Communist forces in South Viet-Nam. I
pointed out that, although these forces had
not been committed to combat in any signifi-
cant degree, they probably would be after
the start of the monsoon season. It is now
clear that these forces are being committed
in increasing numbers and that the Com-
munists have decided to make an all-out at-
tempt to bring down the Government of
South Viet-Nam. The entire economic and
social structure is under attack. Bridges,
railroads, and highways are being destroyed
and interdicted. Agricultural products are be-
ing barred from the cities. Electric power-
plants and communication lines are being
sabotaged. Whole villages are being burned
and their population driven away, increasing
the refugee burden on the South Vietnamese
Government.
As I mentioned, in addition to the con-
tinued infiltration of increasing numbers of
individuals and the acceleration of the flow
of modern equipment and supplies, orga-
nized units of the North Vietnamese army
have been identified in South Viet-Nam.
We now estimate the hard-core Viet Cong
strength at some 70,000 men, including a
recently reported increase in the number of
combat battalions. In addition, they have
some 90,000 to 100,000 irregulars and some
30,000 in their political cadres, i.e., tax col-
lectors, propagandists, et cetera. We have
also identified at least three battalions of
the regular North Vietnamese army, and
there are probably considerably more. At
the same time the Government of South
Viet-Nam has found it increasingly difficult
to make a commensurate increase in the size
of its own forces, which now stand at about
545,000 men, including the regional and
local defense forces but excluding the na-
tional police.
Combat deaths on both sides have been
mounting — for the South Vietnamese from
an average of 143 men a week in 1964 to
about 270 a week for the 4-week period end-
ing July 24 this year. Viet Cong losses have
gone from 322 a week last year to about 680
a week for the 4-week period ending July 24.
Most important, the ratio of South Vietnam-
ese to Viet Cong strength has seriously de-
clined in the last 6 or 7 months from about
5 to 1 to about 3 or 3V2 to 1; the ratio of
combat battalions is substantially less. This
is far too low a ratio for a guerrilla war,
even though the greater mobility and fire-
power provided to the South Vietnamese
foi'ces by the United States help to offset
that disadvantage. The South Vietnamese
forces have to defend hundreds of cities,
towns, and hamlets, while the Viet Cong are
free to choose the time and place of their
attack. As a result, the South Vietnamese
forces are stretched thin in defensive posi-
tions, leaving only a small central reserve
for offensive action against the Viet Cong,
while the latter are left free to concentrate
their forces and throw them against selected
targets. It is not surprising, therefore, that
the Viet Cong retains most of the initiative.
Even so, we may not as yet have seen the
full weight of the Communist attack. Pres-
ently, the situation is particularly acute in
AUGUST 30, 1965
373
the northern part of the country, where the
Communists have mobilized large military-
forces which pose a threat to the entire re-
gion and its major cities and towns. Our air
attacks may have helped to keep these forces
off balance, but the threat remains and it is
very real.
Clearly, the time has come when the peo-
ple of South Viet-Nam need more help from
us and other nations if they are to retain
their freedom and independence. We have
already responded to that need with some
75,000 U.S. military personnel, including
some combat units. This number will be
raised to 125,000 almost immediately with
the deployment of the Air Mobile Division
and certain other forces. But more help will
be needed in the months ahead, and addi-
tional U.S. combat forces will be required to
back up the hard-pressed Army of South
Viet-Nam. Two other nations have provided
combat forces — Australia and New Zealand.
We hope that by the end of this year others
will join them.
Role of U.S. Combat Forces in South Viet-Nam
As I noted earlier, the central reserve of
the South Vietnamese Army has been seri-
ously depleted in recent months. The prin-
cipal role of U.S. ground combat forces will
be to supplement this reserve in support of
the frontline forces of the South Vietnam-
ese Army. The indigenous paramilitary
forces will deal with the pacification of areas
cleared of organized Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese units, a role more appropriate
for them than for our forces.
The Government of South Viet-Nam's
strategy, with which we concur, is to achieve
the initiative, to expand gradually its area
of control by breaking up major concentra-
tions of enemy forces, using to the maximum
our preponderance of airpower, both land-
and sea-based. The number of "fixed wing"
attack sorties by U.S. aircraft in South
Viet-Nam will increase manyfold by the end
of the year. Armed helicopter sorties will also
increase dramatically over the same period,
and extensive use will be made of heavy
artillery, both land-based and sea-based. At
the same time our air and naval forces will
continue to interdict the Viet Cong supply
lines from North Viet-Nam, both land and
sea.
Although our tactics have changed, our ob-
jective remains the same. We have no desire
to widen the war. We have no desire to over-
throw the North Vietnamese regime, seize its
territory, or achieve the unification of North
and South Viet-Nam by force of arms. We
have no need for permanent military bases
in South Viet-Nam or for special privileges
of any kind. What we are seeking through
the planned military buildup is to block the
Viet Cong offensive, to give the people of
South Viet-Nam and their armed forces some
relief from the unrelenting Communist pres-
sures— to give them time to strengthen their
Government, to reestablish law and order,
and to revive their economic life which has
been seriously disrupted by Viet Cong har-
assment and attack in recent months. We
have no illusions that success will be
achieved quickly, but we are confident that
it will be achieved much more surely by the
plan I have outlined.
[Here Secretary McNamara outlined specific pro-
posals relating to further increases in the U.S.
military force structure and personnel.]
Summary
Last Wednesday in his statement on Viet-
Nam, President Johnson said :
I have asked the Commanding General, General
[William C] Westmoreland, what more he needs to
meet this mounting aggression. He has told me. We
will meet his needs.
The program I have outlined here today
and the $1.7 billion amendment to the fiscal
year 1966 Defense appropriation bill now be-
fore the committee will, in the collective
judgment of my principal military and ci-
vilian advisers and myself, provide the men,
materiel, and facilities required to fulfill
this pledge, while at the same time main-
taining the forces required to meet commit-
ments elsewhere in the world. I earnestly
solicit the full support of this committee and
the Congress for this program and budget
request.
374
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Consular Convention With the Soviet Union
Statement by Secretary Rusk
I shall speak relatively briefly, Mr. Chair-
man, on this matter that is before us. If
the Senate approves this treaty ^ for ratifica-
tion, it will be the first treaty which we
would have of a bilateral character between
the United States and the Soviet Union.
Its subject matter is not dramatic, but
nevertheless it is very important. I suppose
that the earliest responsibility of the De-
partment of State from the very beginning
has been the protection of American citi-
zens abroad. We have had some special
problems in that regard in our relations
over the years with the Soviet Union. We
have had two different systems of law, an
open society in relation with what is basi-
cally a closed society, with special problems
and sensitivities and animosities particu-
larly during the Stalinist period. And so we
have had a number of continuing problems
about giving adequate protection to our citi-
zens who might be traveling in the Soviet
Union.
At the present time there is an increase
in the number of our citizens who ai'e going
there. We hope that the general situation
will permit some increase in trade between
ourselves and the Soviet Union, giving fur-
ther emphasis to the importance of the nor-
mal type of consular relations that exist be-
tween us and many other governments.
This consular convention will help to
normalize further our relations with the
'■ Made before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee on July 30.
' Ex. D, 88th Cong., 2d sess. ; for text, see Bul-
letin of June 22, 1964, p. 979.
Soviet Union. It will help to reduce sources
of friction between us.
Some of these incidents which have oc-
curred with respect to the treatment of
American citizens have been extremely
sensitive. They have taken on very large
political implications. They have at times re-
quired the intervention of the President of
the United States with the Chief of Govern-
ment of the Soviet Union.
If we can find ways to deal with such
problems properly, through normal consular
channels, then we feel that there would be a
gain in the relations between our two great
countries.
We feel also that this convention would
encourage the Soviet Union to accept the
conduct which other responsible nations ac-
cept in their treatment of foreigners and of
foreign interests within their territory.
It will place obligations upon the Soviet
authorities to respect some of the elemen-
tary civil rights which are cherished by
democratic nations.
Let me turn briefly to the important spe-
cific provisions of the convention and to the
benefits which it will provide for American
citizens. Apart from distinctive provisions
on notification, consular access, and con-
sular immunity, which differ from the pat-
tern of our previous consular conventions,
the convention follows the standard pattern
of such conventions.
Like others it is a bilateral treaty de-
signed to regulate the activities and func-
tions of consular establishments and their
officers and employees.
The provisions governing these activities
AUGUST 30, 1965
375
and functions are comparable to those in our
conventions with other countries. In my
view this convention, which was carefully
negotiated over an 8-month period follow-
ing informal discussions between our two
Governments beginning with my predeces-
sor, Secretary Christian Herter, is advan-
tageous to our national interests.
The convention, if ratified, will, of course,
be a document of high value to both coun-
tries. It will provide much-needed regulariza-
tion of traditional contacts between the two
countries affecting the flow of people and of
ships and, perhaps of growing importance,
commerce.
Conversely, it will supply a reference point
to reduce unnecessary misunderstanding. It
is well known that the Soviet and American
ways of doing things are often quite unlike.
A common set of ground rules is desirable
if they can be achieved. Since many more
Americans visit the U.S.S.R. than Soviet
citizens visit the United States, the conven-
tion has special importance for the United
States.
Consular Provisions To Protect U.S. Visitors
About 12,000 American tourists visited
the U.S.S.R. last year, while only 204
Soviet tourists came to the United States.
Those figures on Soviet visitors to the
United States do not include about 650 who
came over on exchange programs of various
sorts under official sponsorship.
Because we value so highly the protection
of individual rights, the convention's provi-
sions on notification and access have par-
ticular significance. These clauses should
improve markedly the ability of the Depart-
ment of State to protect and assist the
thousands of Americans who now visit the
U.S.S.R. as tourists or on business or under
the exchange program.
The current practice in the Soviet Union
is to refuse access to arrested persons until
after the completion of investigation, which
under Soviet law can extend for 9 months.
You probably recall the disappearance of
Prof. Frederick Barghoorn in the U.S.S.R.
in 1963. Only after 12 days did our Em-
bassy in Moscow learn of his arrest. The
Soviet authorities never allowed our officials
to visit him in prison. If this convention had
been in effect in 1963, the Soviet authori-
ties would have been obliged to notify us of
his arrest within 3 days and to grant us
consular access within 4 days.
The U.S.S.R. has never before given so
specific a guarantee on access. Other govern-
ments have recognized the importance of the
notification and access provisions in the
United States-U.S.S.R. convention, and
have indicated an interest in obtaining
these benefits for themselves. We under-
stand, for example, that the Japanese are
currently preparing to negotiate a consular
convention with the Soviets and hope to
achieve the same access and notification
provisions.
The British, we understand, are in the
final stages of negotiating a consular con-
vention with the U.S.S.R. which incorpo-
rates these safeguards.
Immunities for Consular Personnel
As an additional measure of protection
which we regard as important, the conven-
tion contains a special provision on immu-
nity for consular personnel. Under this pro-
vision they will be immune from criminal
prosecution. Related provisions of the con-
vention will protect against abuse of such
immunity by Soviet consular officers.
These provisions specify first of all the
right of the receiving state to declare con-
sular personnel persona non grata. Thus by
means of a persona non grata action we
would be able to remove from this country
any individual who abused his official privi-
lege. The convention also states that all per-
sons enjoying immunity from criminal juris-
diction are obliged to respect the laws and
regulations of the receiving state, including
traffic regulations. Finally, the convention
provides for screening all nominees for con-
sular assignments in advance, so that we
would not have to accept as a consul any
Soviet citizen to whom we objected.
The United States-U.S.S.R. consular con-
vention, I wish to stress, does not itself au-
376
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
thorize the opening of any consulates in
either country. It merely provides a legal
framework for their operation when open.
If the present convention is ratified, the De-
partment of State plans to discuss with
Soviet representatives the possibility of
opening at least one American consulate in
the Soviet Union.
Leningrad, the second largest city in the
Soviet Union, and a favorite place for visit-
ing Americans, is the most attractive of
several possible sites for such a consulate.
The U.S.S.R. has not indicated where it
might like to open a consulate in this
country. In any discussion of the establish-
ment of consulates we would be sure we re-
ceive at least as advantageous a location as
we give.
I should like to add, Mr. Chairman, that
we would expect to be in consultation with
this committee with respect to any discus-
sions which we have about opening one of
our consulates there or one of their consul-
ates here.
Effect of Convention on Espionage, Subversion
My remarks would not be complete if I
did not invite the committee's attention to
the question of whether this convention and
any consulates established subsequently
would result in opening the door to Commu-
nist espionage and subversion.
This possibility was, of course, carefully
considered in consultation with other re-
sponsible agencies of our Government before
we signed the consular convention. We are
satisfied that the convention would not ma-
terially affect this problem. If after ratifica-
tion of the convention we agree to an open-
ing of a Soviet consulate in an American
city, its employees will be subject to the
same visa screening and entry controls as
officers and employees of the Soviet Em-
bassy in Washington, of whom some are now
carrying on consular functions. They will
also be subject to the same travel restrictions
as now apply to Soviet officials assigned to
Soviet missions in the United States. They
would be subject to the expulsion provision
of the consular convention.
Finally, a relatively small number of con-
sular officials would make little difference
in the total of Soviet citizens in the United
States possessing immunity from criminal
jurisdiction. As of July 1, 1965, there were
847 Soviet citizens residing in the United
States, of whom 249 officials and 150 de-
pendents had diplomatic immunity.
These, I believe, are the most significant
aspects of the convention itself.
I would close, Mr. Chairman, with a re-
mark on the place which this convention oc-
cupies in the total atmosphere which exists
at the present time between ourselves and
the Soviet Union. There is no question that
our relations at the present time are under
strain. There is no question that the dan-
gerous situation in Southeast Asia has inter-
fered significantly with the search for fur-
ther points of agreement which many of us
had hoped we could find following this sig-
nature of a nuclear test ban treaty.
I have had the privilege of appearing with
this committee in executive session on more
than one occasion to discuss this aspect of
the matter and our relations with the Soviet
Union. So I do not suggest that the atmos-
phere today is good. But I would suggest
that in the face of that atmosphere, and per-
haps even a little bit because of it, we ought
to pay attention to those points, whether
they are minor and administrative in char-
acter or broader, such as in the disarmament
field — we ought to pay attention ■ to those
points at which we think some progress can
be made in getting our relations on a more
normal basis.
A consular convention is a rather long-
term affair. It attempts to put on an admin-
istrative and routine base, if possible,
problems which otherwise stimulate ten-
sion and make more difficult the relations
between our two countries.
So we would hope that the committee
would give full consideration to the sugges-
tion that even though we would like to see
more substantial improvement in the rela-
tions between our two countries on broad
political issues, and very especially on the
dangerous issue of Southeast Asia, never-
theless it is not too early to try to resolve
AUGUST 30, 1965
377
some of these problems we have between us
where we can, when we can. The consular
convention makes it possible, therefore, for
us to move forward quietly, rather modestly,
in an attempt to eliminate some of the
causes of friction which may exist between
us and which may develop in the future as
we attempt to give full protection to our
citizens traveling in the Soviet Union.
I think that is all I need say at this time,
Mr. Chairman, in order to move on to the
committee's questions and comments.
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Automotive Traffic
Convention on road traflfic, with annexes. Done at
Geneva September 19, 1949. Entered into force
March 26, 1952. TIAS 2487.
Application to: Grenada and Swaziland (with
reservations), August 13, 1965.
Aviation
Agreement on joint financing of certain air naviga-
tion services in Iceland;
Agreement on joint financing of certain air naviga-
tion services in Greenland and the Faroe Islands.
Done at Geneva September 25, 1956. Entered into
force June 6, 1958. TIAS 4048 and 4049, respec-
tively.
Accession deposited: Czechoslovakia, June 3, 1965.
Diplomatic Relations
Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April
24, 1964.'
Ratification deposited: Congo ( Leopoldville) , July
19, 1965.
Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic
relations concerning the compulsory settlement
of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. En-
tered into force April 24, 1964.' ^
Accession deposited: Congo (Leopoldville), July
19. 1965.
Marriage
Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age
for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done
at United Nations Headquarters, New York, De-
cember 10, 1962. Entered into force December 9,
1964.'
Ratification deposited: Netherlands (including
Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles), July 2,
1965.
Property
Convention of Union of Paris for the protection of
industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised at
Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington June
2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, at London
June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Done
at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered into force
January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notifications of accession: Belgium, Japan, July
21, 1965.
Trade
Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.'
Signature: Ghana, July 9, 1965.
Notification of de facto implementation: Haiti,
July 22, 1965.
United Nations
Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963.'
Ratifications deposited: Australia, June 9, 1965;
Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic, June 22,
1965; Congo (Brazzaville), July 7, 1965; Malta,
June 23, 1965; Saudi Arabia, June 17, 1965;
Turkey July 1, 1965; Yemen, July 7, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International Wheat
Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for signature
at Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.
Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.
TIAS 5844
Approval deposited: Philippines, August 12, 1965.
BILATERAL
Luxembourg
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio op-
erators of either country to operate their stations
in the other country. Effected by exchange of notes
at Luxembourg July 7 and 29, 1965. Entered into
force July 29, 1965.
'Not in force for the United States.
' Not in force.
378
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX Augtist 30, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1866
Aviation. Mexico and U.S. Extend Civil Air
Agrreement to 1970 357
Congo (Brazzaville). U.S. Diplomats With-
drawn From Brazzaville (text of U.S. note) 367
Congress
Buildup of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam (Mc-
Namara) 369
Consular Convention With the Soviet Union
(Rusk) 375
Department and Foreign Service
Research in Action: The Department of State's
Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Evans) 359
U.S. Diplomats Withdrawn From Brazzaville
(text of U.S. note) 367
Immigration and Naturalization. Use of Mexi-
can Border-Crossing Cards Extended (White
House statement) 368
Intelligence. Research in Action: The Depart-
ment of State's Bureau of Intelligence and
Research (Evans) 359
Malaysia. U.S. Recognizes Singapore as Sover-
eign, Independent State (Rusk) 357
Maldive Islands. President Johnson Congrat-
ulates Maldive Islands on Independence (text
of message) 357
Mexico
Mexico and U.S. Extend Civil Air Agreement
to 1970 357
Use of Mexican Border-Crossing Cards Ex-
tended (White House statement) .... 368
Military Affairs
Buildup of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam (Mc-
Namara) 369
Political and Military Aspects of U.S. Policy
in Viet-Nam (transcript of CBS interview
with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara) . . 342
U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases
Agreement 358
Philippines. U.S. and Philippines Amend Mili-
tary Bases Agreement 358
Presidential Documents. President Johnson
Congratulates Maldive Islands on Independ-
ence 357
Recognition. U.S. Recognizes Singapore as
Soverign, Independent State (Rusk) . . 357
Singapore. U.S. Recognizes Singapore as Sov-
ereign, Independent State (Rusk) .... 357
Treaty Information
Consular Convention With the Soviet Union
(Rusk) 375
Current Actions 378
Mexico and U.S. Extend Civil Air Agreement
to 1970 357
U.S. and Philippines Amend Military Bases
Agreement 358
U.S.S.R. Consular Convention With the Soviet
Union (Rusk) 375
United Kingdom. President Johnson Congratu-
lates Maldive Islands on Independence (text
of message) 357
Viet-Nam
Buildup of U.S. Forces in Viet-Nam (Mc-
Namara) 369
Political and Military Aspects of U.S. Policy
in Viet-Nam (transcript of CBS interview
with Secretaries Rusk and McNamara) . . 342
Name Index
Evans, Allan 359
Johnson, President 357
Kalischer, Peter 342
Kendrick, Alexander 342
McNamara, Robert S 342, 369
Reasoner, Harry 342
Rusk, Secretary 342, 357, 375
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 9—15
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to August 9 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
185 of August 2 and 188 of August 4.
Sabject
Clark sworn in as Ambassa-
dor to Australia (bio-
graphic details) .
Amendment to military bases
agreement with Philip-
pines.
Rusk, McNamara: CBS tele-
vision interview.
No.
Date
♦190
8/9
191
8/9
192
8/9
* Not printed
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
We Will Stand in Viet-Nam
In his opening statement at his July 28 news conference President Johnson set forth the pur-
pose of United States action in Viet-Nam and the importance to all peoples of a firm stand
against aggression in that war-torn land. This pamphlet is the text of that statement. The title;
taken from the President's closing words, sums up this country's determination not to permit
"all that we have built, all that we hope to build, all of our dreams for freedom" to "be swept
away on the flood of conquest." The President at the same time reaffirms the readiness of the
United States "to move from the battlefield to the conference table ... to begin unconditional
discussions with any government at any place at any time."
PUBLICATION 7944 15 CENTS
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Please send me copies of We Will Stand in Viet-Nam.
NAME
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I> /
THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol LIII, No. 1367
September 6, 1965
A special issue on
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION YEAR
featuring articles by chairmen of ICY Cabinet committees
Boston Public Library
Superintendent of Documents
SEP 2 4 1965
DEPOSITORY
H^L COOP,,
^^ 1965 *^*
SPACE AND THE INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION YEAR: A NATIONAL CHALLENGE .. SU
by Arnold W. Frutkiuj Assistant Administrator for International Affairs, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration
ATOMS FOR PEACE AND THE EFFORT TO HALT THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS S93
by John G. Palfrey, Commissioner, U,S, Atomic Energy Commission
STRENGTHENING PEACE THROUGH ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
by Jacob D, Beam, Assistant Director, U,S, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency
S98
TRADE WINDOWS TO THE WORLD ^01
by William M, Roth, Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, Executive Office of
the President
BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY IN INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION YEAR J^OG
by Alexander B. Trowbridge, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International
Business
INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION FOR HEALTH: A MODERN IMPERATIVE 412
by James Watt, Director, Office of International Health, Public Health Service, U.S, Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare
COOPERATION FOR DISASTER EMERGENCY RELIEF j^19
by Stephen R, Tripp, Disaster Relief Coordinator, Office of Material Resources, Agency for Inter-
national Development
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1367 PUBLICATION 7947 SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
acenciea of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations end on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of greneral international in-
terest.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.
The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbicb : 62 isBues. domestic $10,
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1901).
NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers* Guide to Periodical Liters
atura.
382
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
A special issue of tlie Bulletin . . .
International Cooperation Year in the United States is something special. At the
direction of the President the resources of private individuals and groups, as well as those
of the U.S. Government, are being mobilized. The result is not to be just another blurb
for international togetherness but specific proposals for specific international actions which
will, in sum, help make the world a better, safer, and more prosperous place.
Many of the best ideas of what government should do actually get started outside the
Government. It was with this thought in mind that President Johnson invited a distinguished
group of citizens from all over the country — 350 of them — to come to the White House last
October 2 to witness the signing of the proclamation on International Cooperation Year and
to hear the President talk about appropriate ways to observe International Cooperation Year
in a nation where every day is international cooperation day on hundreds of topics.^
This conviction also led the President to ask that representatives of Government agencies
and private groups put their heads together and study new possibilities for action calling for
mutual efforts in line with mutual interests, with mutually beneficial results.
It led the Secretary of State to ask the United Nations Association of the U.S.A. to take
the lead in organizing a National Citizens Commission for ICY. The Commission and the
Cabinet committees make up the National Council for International Cooperation.
And it led, finally, to the President's call for a White House Conference on International
Cooperation to take place November 29 through December 1, 1965. At this time the citizen
groups and Government agencies will report to the President on their best ideas for "next
steps."
Now ICY committees, both private and governmental, are at work, most of them hard at
work, in 31 different subject-matter areas, preparing their findings and recommendations for
presentation to the President in November.
This issue of the Department of State Bulletin is the first of two special issues on Inter-
national Cooperation Year. The articles which follow have been written for the Bulletin by
chairmen of the ICY committees.
Harlan Cleveland
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee
^ For text of the proclamation and remarks by President Johnson and Secretary Rusk, see Bulletin of
Oct. 19, 1964. For an address made by the President's Special Assistant, McGeorge Bundy, before the
National Council for International Cooperation on Mar. 23, 1965, see ihid., Apr. 19, 1965, p. 562. For an
address made by Vice President Humphrey before the Council on June 2, 1965, see ihid., June 28, 1965,
p. 1048.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965 333
Space and the International Cooperation Year: A National Challenge
by Arnold W. Frutkin
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Space
The age of discovery that began late in
the 15th century was the result of scientific
and technological change. The leading math-
ematicians of the Middle Ages — Albertus
Magnus, Nicholas of Cusa, Regiomontanus,
and Copernicus — believed the earth a sphere.
The better navigators and pilots thought
the same, but their belief would have served
little practical purpose without the introduc-
tion of the compass, an all-weather guide to
direction, without the astrolabe to determine
location north and south, and without the
chronometer and longitude tables used to
calculate position east and west. With these
navigational aids, men of the stamp of Diaz
and Da Gama, Columbus and Cabot, Magel-
lan and Drake opened the way for the ex-
pansion of Western Europe throughout the
world.
The empire builders followed the explor-
ers, and by the middle of the 17th century
the Spanish and Portuguese, the English,
the French, and the Dutch, Danes, and
Swedes had established possessions beyond
the sea. The process touched the vital ener-
gies of the people of Europe. The stimulus
to economic and intellectual life shaped the
world we know today. But the process also
enmeshed mankind in centuries of bloody
conflict, with the end not yet in sight. The
headlines from Saigon and Stanleyville are
the bitter fruit of the voyages of discovery.
Five centuries later, scientific and techno-
logical change — advances in chemistry,
metallurgy, and electronics — have enabled
man to escape his earthly environment and
to operate in the boundless sea of space. The
adventure already is affecting life in all parts
of the world. Changes in scientific and en-
gineering communities, educational systems,
and industries are but the first manifesta-
tions of forces that will affect human so-
ciety for generations to come. Mankind has
thrilled at the prospect, but with the thrill
has come dread that the advance of nations
into space will precipitate a new cycle of
conflict. Voices throughout the world have
cried alarm; the presence of great stock-
piles of nuclear weapons gives the warnings
a special urgency. Can man learn to cooper-
ate in this new environment? If he can,
might this not help him live in peace on
earth?
The prospect of cooperating in space and
thereby establishing patterns that would re-
duce terrestrial tensions is appealing. Space
is essentially international, for an orbiting
spacecraft knows no national boundaries and
operations are so expensive that even the
most affluent nations might welcome assist-
ance. Though space has important implica-
tions for national security, it still is rela- I
tively uncomplicated and free from the vested
interests that make joint action difficult.
The idea is so intrinsically attractive that
calls for international cooperation are con-
stantly raised, at home and abroad, by in-
dividual citizens, by newspaper editors, and
particularly by those who fear the polariza-
tion of space by the United States and
Russia. This is altogether wholesome and
proper, yet the public seems largely unaware
of how much already has been done. Inter-
national Cooperation Year is a welcome op-
384
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
portunity to tell this story, not in any sense
to quiet pleas for action but to provide a
factual basis for considering how best to
move ahead. With that purpose in mind, let
us survey the principal areas of cooperation
that have thus far developed and then con-
sider vi'here we stand today.
International Scientific Community
The scientific community has a long tradi-
tion of more or less informal cooperation.
We need not accept the misleading oversim-
plification that "science knows no interna-
tional boundaries" to recognize that scien-
tists throughout the world cooperate by
corresponding, by exchanging papers, and by
meeting to discuss common interests. Space
science has benefited from this wholesome
tradition to an extent only suggested by the
fact that 1965 will see at least 30 interna-
tional conferences devoted to various aspects
of space science and engineering.
But informal cooperation alone cannot suf-
fice, and virtually all subjects of interna-
tional exchange achieve an organizational
framework. The space age, indeed, began in
the context of the International Geophysical
Year (IGY) , a program of the International
Council of Scientific Unions (ICSU). IGY
oifered such great promise that ICSU took
steps to extend the benefits by organizing the
International Committee for Space Research
(COSPAR). Today, COSPAR membership
numbers 30 national bodies and 10 scientific
unions. At its 1964 meeting in Florence, 430
registered participants and observers at-
tended— including 130 from the United
States, 58 from France, 50 from the United
Kingdom, and 33 from the Soviet Union.
Strictly nongovernmental, COSPAR pro-
vides opportunity for scientists to meet in
an environment that minimizes political con-
siderations. Through its meetings, symposia,
and publications, it facilitates communica-
tion among scientists. It establishes stand-
ards for reporting research results, and it
sponsors world data centers for depositing
and exchanging experimental data.
These activities are important, but the
more creative side of COSPAR lies in its six
working groups, whose central function is to
define suitable objectives and programs for
space research. The imaginative role that a
working group can play is illustrated by the
synoptic sounding-rocket programs spon-
sored by Working Group II, which is
responsible for the space aspects of the In-
ternational Years of the Quiet Sun. This
working group is promoting synoptic launch-
ings of some 10 types of rocket experiments
which have well-developed techniques and
can be conducted on a widespread basis. The
effort already has produced a coordinated
series of rocket flights to study the iono-
sphere and several series of sodium vapor
experiments to measure winds in the upper
atmosphere.
Although COSPAR recommendations bind
no government, they reflect the opinion of
space scientists throughout the world. The
policy implications of this are illustrated by
COSPAR endorsement in 1964 of a report
by its Consultative Group on the Poten-
tially Harmful Effects of Space Experi-
ments. This report put to rest, more effec-
tively than could be done by any other
means, fears that the exhaust from large
boosters would contaminate the upper atmos-
phere and that Project West Ford's orbiting
dipoles would interfere with optical or radio
astronomy.
Another nongovernmental forum, princi-
pally for annual symposia on the engineering
aspects of space research, exists in the In-
ternational Astronautical Federation, which
brings together a considerable number of
national rocket societies with longstanding
interests in promoting space exploration.
Aeronautics and Space Administration
The most extensive cooperation in space —
cooperation that has involved 69 nations and
touched every continent — has been based on
the broad and varied program of the U.S.
National Aeronautics and Space Administra-
tion. The National Aeronautics and Space
Act of 1958 expressed a national purpose to
devote our space activities to peaceful pur-
poses and to execute them in cooperation
with other nations and groups of nations.
Congress was influenced by the successful
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
385
precedent of the International Geophysical
Year, but more than that, it hoped that co-
operative activities would bear witness to our
peaceful aims, establish patterns of coopera-
tion that would further our goal of a stable
world order, and contribute to the NASA
mission. Cooperative activities, it was fore-
seen, could help by (1) affording oppor-
tunities to the best brains abroad to con-
tribute to and participate in space research,
(2) stimulating technical development
abroad which might help reduce some of the
gaps causing political and economic strains,
(3) providing a framework for other coun-
tries to join in cost-sharing and complemen-
tary programs, (4) giving access to geo-
graphic areas of special significance over-
seas, and (5) helping support our opera-
tions abroad.
Following its mandate, NASA in March
1959 offered to enter into projects of mu-
tual interest with scientists of other coun-
tries. From the first, the governing philos-
ophy has been that, for cooperation to be
effective, it must be literal and substantive.
From this basic premise are derived the spe-
cific guidelines for cooperation : that all par-
ticipants commit their own resources in
funds, personnel, and equipment; that there
be no dollar export from the United States ;
that the content of a given project be of mu-
tual interest and possess valid scientific ob-
jectives; that the organizational context be
civilian in character; and that the scientific
results be open to all interested parties.
The cooperative space program which has
developed has effectively achieved all of
these objectives of mutual interest and value.
Four international satellites are now in
orbit :
Ariel I, engineered and launched by NASA
in April 1962, carries satellite instrumenta-
tion designed, prepared, and funded under
the direction of the British National Com-
mittee for Space Research. It has provided
valuable data on spatial conditions not pre-
viously measured in combination.
Ariel II, a similar satellite, was orbited in
March 1964, and the British are now en-
gaged with NASA in a cooperative project
involving a third satellite, this one engi-
neered as well as instrumented by the Brit-
ish.
Alouette, the Canadian satellite launched
by NASA in September 1962, was designed,
funded, and engineered by the Canadian
Telecommunications Establishment (DRTE).
This satellite, the first to sound the iono-
sphere from above, proved so successful that
the Canadian Government then offered to
assume full responsibility for a more con-
siderable portion of the established NASA
program for ionospheric studies. Accord-
ingly, NASA and DRTE have agreed to the
ISIS program (International Satellites for
Ionospheric Studies), which provides for
NASA to launch four additional Canadian
satellites to monitor the ionosphere through
the next maximum of the solar cycle.
In December 1964, Italy became the third
nation to launch a satellite when an Italian
crew used the facilities at Wallops Island,
Va., and a Scout vehicle to place an Italian-
built and instrumented San Marco spacecraft
in orbit. This was in preparation for the
eventual Italian launching of an identi-
cal satellite from a towable platform in the
Indian Ocean to determine local atmospheric
densities in the equatorial upper atmosphere.
In 1965, NASA plans to launch (1) a
French satellite to measure very low
frequency radio emission and (2) the first
Canadian satellite in the ISIS series. The
third British satellite will be ready in late
1966 and two satellites prepared by the new
European Space Research Organization in
1967. The Italian platform launching is pro-
jected for late 1966 or early 1967. NASA and
the German Federal Ministry for Scientific
Research recently agreed on a cooperative
study of the earth's radiation belts which
looks to the launching of a German scien-
tific satellite in 1968.
Offering similar advantages is a relative-
ly new program under which foreign scien-
tists are invited to propose individual experi-
ments for inclusion on NASA satellites,
their proposals to be reviewed in competi-
tion with those submitted by American
scientists and, if selected, funded and pre-
pared by sponsoring agencies abroad. One
such experiment has already flown success-
386
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
fully. Fifteen additional ones have been sched-
uled for later flights, and several more are
under consideration. NASA has recently
opened virtually all categories of its space-
craft, including manned spacecraft, to for-
eign participation on this cooperative basis.
Cooperative sounding-rocket projects have
special international appeal. To nations wish-
ing to initiate space programs, they offer
relatively low-cost opportunities on a smaller
but significant scale. To NASA, they offer
the use of sites overseas of unique scientific
interest and a means of organizing simul-
taneous launchings in different locations (a
practice required for certain scientific ob-
jectives). The basic elements in sounding-
rocket projects are the scientific in-
strumentation, the rockets themselves, the
launching sites and the ground instrumenta-
tion to retrieve data from the rockets, and
the analysis of the data. Cooperating coun-
tries divide responsibility for these elements
in ways that suit the requirements of the
individual projects. More than 130 rockets
have been launched in joint NASA projects
with 17 countries.
One of the attractive features of NASA's
bilateral sounding-rocket projects is that
they tend to serve as nuclei for broadening
international activity. Ionospheric studies
with Norway have led to collaborative ef-
forts among all three Scandinavian coun-
tries. A small sounding-rocket project with
Argentina has helped to engender regional
interest: eight technicians and scientists
from other Latin American countries spent
a month observing the preparation and
launching of a recent ionospheric series
from the range at Chamical. Thus, Chamical
is beginning to serve in a sense as a Latin
American training center for the use of
sounding rockets in geophysical and meteor-
ological research. In August 1964 Argentina
and Brazil actually signed a memorandum of
understanding which provides a framework
for future cooperation in space research to
which these countries can bring competence
developed in cooperative programs with
NASA. Both Argentina and Brazil are now
undertaking with NASA joint programs of
high-altitude meteorological sounding-rocket
studies which will serve as elements in an
experimental inter-American meteorological
sounding-rocket network.
Ground-based cooperative projects pro-
vide for observations of, or measurements
based on, NASA spacecraft by experimenters
abroad using their own resources. Such proj-
ects permit NASA to gain data overseas on
a scale that would be difficult, if not im-
possible, if the United States had to finance
the equipment and make arrangements for
its installation. For other countries, these
ground-based projects are appealing because
they permit participation in space programs
of great scope without requiring expensive
vehicle or spacecraft hardware.
When the fixed-frequency topside sounder
was launched in August 1964, 23 ground
stations in 15 countries were in position to
make coordinated ground observations. When
the polar beacon satellite was launched in
October, more than 61 ground stations in
27 countries were ready to use its signal for
electron density measurements. This array
of stations in a total of 32 countries pro-
vides opportunity for participation around
the world and is indispensable to NASA for
the collection of data on which to base a
global survey of the ionosphere. Similar
widespread cooperation is being organized
in connection with the United States geodetic
satellite program.
Ground-based cooperation is paramount in
applications of great practical interest —
satellite communications and meteorology.
The dramatic transoceanic television demon-
strations of the Telstar, Relay, and Syncom
satellites required special ground terminals
costing many millions of dollars both in the
United States and abroad. The stations
abroad, which now number nine, were con-
structed by the cooperating countries entirely
at their own expense under agreement with
NASA. One of their principal values has
been the creation of informed interest over-
seas in a commercial communications satellite
system and in frequency allocation questions.
In meteorology, NASA and the U. S.
Weather Bureau invited foreign weather
services to make conventional observations
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
387
synchronized with cloud photography by
NASA's TIROS satellites. Thus, the TIROS
series has afforded 42 foreign weather
services the opportunity to conduct, at their
own cost, special observations of local
weather conditions. Through this program,
the United States has been able to correlate
(a) the analysis of weather from cloud
pictures taken hundreds of miles above the
earth with (b) detailed data on the local
weather below.
An International Meteorological Satellite
Workshop in Washington in November 1961,
which foreign meteorologists attended at
their own expense, instructed them in the
use of satellite photographs in operational
forecasting. A new form of cooperation, per-
mitting the direct use of this information,
recently became possible with the inclusion
of an Automatic Picture Transmission sys-
tem on TIROS VIII and on the advanced
meteorological satellite Nimbus. The camera
can provide continuous read-out of cloud-
cover photographs. A simple and inexpen-
sive ground station permits the direct and
immediate acquisition and printing of cloud-
cover photographs taken by the satellite
overhead. Thirteen countries have acquired
APT sets at their own expense and used
them successfully, many reporting direct im-
provements in forecasting. Thus, this pro-
gram is paving the way for the broad-scale
international cooperation which will feature
the meteorology of the future.
To track its satellites and to receive the
data they radio back to earth, NASA needs
stations around the globe. The establish-
ment of such stations on the territory of
other countries requires not only the consent
of these countries but also their coopera-
tion in the acquisition of land, the importa-
tion of equipment, the movement of person-
nel, and the use of radio frequencies. Be-
yond this, the interest of other countries in
participating in the technology and adventure
of space exploration has prompted them to
make available their own technicians to
work side by side with ours in many of
the stations. At some locations in England
and Canada, the host country of its own vo-
lition has assumed responsibility for operat-
ing costs. Australia makes a contribution
to the cost of operating stations on its
territory. Such stations represent common
efforts and centers for the continued grov?th
of understanding and cooperation.
Personnel exchanges and training ar-
rangements have important places in most
international efforts. Opportunities have been
made for senior scientists from abroad to
spend a year or more in NASA centers in
research or experimental work. Fellowships
at the graduate level are available in Amer-
ican universities for foreign trainees whose
travel and subsistence are paid by their own
sponsoring agencies. Training directly and
specifically required for the execution of
cooperative projects is made available at
appropriate NASA centers. The requirement
for investment on the part of the cooperat-
ing country assures careful consideration of
the training arrangements, the personnel
selected to be sent here, and their future
utilization at home.
U.S./U.S.S.R. Relationships
Space cooperation with the Soviet Union
stems from an exchange of correspondence
between Chairman Khrushchev and Presi-
dent Kennedy after the successful flight of
John Glenn in February 1962. In his mes-
sage of congratulations, Mr. Khrushchev
observed that it would be a fine thing if the
two nations could pool their efforts in space.
President Kennedy promptly made specific
proposals for such cooperation and sug-
gested that negotiators be designated.
The resulting talks between Dr. Hugh L.
Dryden and Academician Anatoly A. Bla-
gonravov produced the bilateral space agree-
ment of June 8, 1962. The first part pro-
vides for coordinated launchings by the
two countries of experimental meteorologi-
cal satellites, for the exchange of data thus
obtained, and for the exchange of conven-
tional meteorological data prior to, and on a
secondary basis during, the exchange of
satellite data. The second part provides for
the launching by each country of an earth
satellite equipped with absolute magnetom-
eters and the subsequent exchange of data.
The third part provides for cooperative com-
388
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
munications experiments by means of the
U.S. passive satellite Echo II.
The communications project is the first
to be completed. In February and March
1964, the facilities of the Jodrell Bank
Observatory of the University of Man-
chester in the United Kingdom were used
to transmit radio signals via Echo II to the
Zimenki Observatory of the State Univer-
sity of Gorki in the U.S.S.R. These trans-
missions included radio teletype messages,
photograph transmissions using facsimile
equipment, and voice messages. While the
technical benefits from this project should
not be overemphasized, it v?as a useful ex-
ercise in organizing a joint undertaking with
the Soviet Union.
Exchange of magnetic field data obtained
by ground-based instruments has begun and
will provide a basis for analysis of satellite
data. In the meteorological project, a 24-
hour communications link has been estab-
lished on a shared-cost basis between Wash-
ington and Moscow to prepare for the ex-
change of satellite data. Daily two-way
transmissions of data are now taking place
over this link under temporary arrange-
ments until the prime objective, the ex-
change of satellite cloud-cover data, can be
achieved.
The United States has no desire to estab-
lish a bipolarity in space matters with the
Soviet Union. Rather, it wishes to insure
that these initial cooperative projects are,
from the outset, open to other countries
and will serve the general interest. Thus,
British capabilities were essential to the
Echo II communications tests. The coordi-
nated mapping by satellite is designed essen-
tially to contribute to the World Magnetic
Survey. And other countries will be able to
tap into the satellite data exchanges which
may materialize between Washington and
Moscow.
The United States is ready to explore any
and all possibilities for meaningful co-
operation with the Soviet Union in the ex-
ploration and use of outer space. In some
areas, cooperation might be fruitfully carried
out by means of the coordinated approach
that characterizes those joint efforts already
agreed. We might share the many tasks of
exploration of our spatial environment by
instrumented satellites and other means of
observation necessary to assemble knowl-
edge vital to the planning and execution of
manned flights beyond earth orbit. In other
projects, questions of national security
would be encountered, since engineering
techniques and spacecraft and vehicle de-
sign might be involved, but the United
States has set no arbitrary limits to cooper-
ation with the Soviet Union.
European Regional Organizations
NASA's cooperative programs could not
have developed without strong interest
abroad. Leadership even in developing
countries has seen that involvement in
space projects can contribute to the creation
or expansion of a scientific and technical
community, spread an awareness of the
character and techniques of the outside
world, and stimulate young people to follow
technical careers. Advanced countries have
recognized that participation in the space
age is mandatory. No other peacetime ac-
tivity has demonstrated an equivalent capac-
ity to stimulate national scientific and engi-
neering communities, educational systems,
industries, and governments to new capabil-
ities, standards, and the combined effort
which strengthens societies.
Recognition in Europe of the inherent
values of space activity, combined with a
realization that the high costs of space ac-
tivity require the smaller nations to pool
their resources, has resulted in the estab-
lishment of two European regional organi-
zations— the European Space Research Orga-
nization (ESRO) and the European Launcher
Development Organization (ELDO). ESRO,
devoted to scientific endeavor only, plans
the expenditure of some $300 million over
an 8-year period. ELDO, committed to boost-
er development, budgets about $200 mil-
lion over 5 years.
ESRO has undertaken a balanced space
program featuring sounding-rocket experi-
mentation, small first-generation geophysi-
cal satellites, stabilized astrophysical satel-
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
389
lites, a large astronomical satellite, a track-
ing and data acquisition network, and tech-
nical and data analysis centers. The United
States welcomes this development, and
NASA has agreed to launch an ESRO
ionospheric satellite and an ESRO solar and
cosmic radiation satellite. Both are ex-
pected to be ready for flight in 1967. Since
ESRO is making its tracking and data ac-
quisition stations compatible with NASA's,
the possibility of cooperation in this area is
open.
Meanwhile ELDO has tested the first
stage of Europa I, a three-stage launch ve-
hicle designed to develop 365,000 pounds of
thrust and to put a ton-and-a-half space-
craft into low earth orbit. The test flights
will eventually incorporate French and West
German second and third stages and culmi-
nate in a 1966 launching of an Italian test
satellite. ELDO is already studying a sec-
ond-generation booster with high-energy
upper stages. It is in this area of advanced
technology that projects of mutual interest
are conceivable as the basis for coopera-
tive efforts between the United States and
ELDO.
The movement to establish space pro-
grams on a regional basis in Europe illus-
trates the unifying forces which are brought
into play by the requirements and the prom-
ise of the massive technologies of the future.
The United Nations
The United Nations quite naturally mirrors
the concern among all countries that space
activity be directed to peaceful purposes.
For 2 years, efforts to explore a proper role
for the U.N. were snarled in political maneu-
ver. Then, in December 1961, the way was
cleared for constructive action by the Com-
mittee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.
The General Assembly asked the Committee
to provide for the exchange of information on
space activities, to study measures for the
promotion of international cooperation, and
to report on the legal problems that might
arise from the exploration and use of outer
space. At the same time, the General As-
sembly called on all states to provide the
Secretary-General with information on ob-
jects launched into orbit or beyond. This
call resulted in the early establishment of a
U.N. public registry.
At its first regular working session in
March 1962, the Committee on the Peaceful
Uses of Outer Space concluded that its
proper role was to support and encourage
existing agencies competent in space activity
and to assist in coordinating the work of such
bodies. It further decided to establish two
subcommittees, one to concern itself with
scientific and technical matters, the other
with legal matters.
The efforts of the Scientific and Technical
Subcommittee have resulted in the publica-
tion of a biennial collection of reports on
national and international space activities
and training opportunities, and in a formal
recommendation that the U.N. sponsor the
Thumba Equatorial Rocket Launching Site in
India. Thumba had its origin in a NASA/
Indian Committee on Space Research co-
operative project and has since benefited
by equipment loans from France and the
Soviet Union as well as the United States.
With such support, General Assembly con-
firmation of U.N. sponsorship is assured.
One of the subcommittee's current concerns
is to have the U.N. serve as a clearinghouse
for information on space-related education
and training opportunities. The record of the
past 3 years leaves no doubt that the Scienti-
fic and Technical Subcommittee has succeed-
ed in placing greater emphasis on coopera-
tion among nations.
The work of the Legal Subcommittee led
to a draft declaration of legal principles to
guide the exploration and use of outer space,
which was adopted by the General Assembly
on December 13, 1963. Among the most
significant of these principles are those de-
claring that outer space and celestial bodies
are not subject to national appropriation,
that international law and the United Na-
tions Charter apply in outer space, that
states bear responsibility for all activities
of their nationals in space, that they are
liable for damage done by the objects they
390
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
launch, and that they shall render astronauts
all possible assistance in the event of acci-
dent, distress, or emergency landing. The
Legal Subcommittee is now drafting inter-
national conventions to specify in detail the
responsibilities of states in the areas of liabil-
ity and of assistance to and return of astro-
nauts and spacecraft.
Other U.N. agencies have been asked by
the General Assembly to play a role in
space. The World Meteorological Organiza-
tion has made a start in evaluating and plan-
ning requirements for a world weather sys-
tem, including satellite systems. Significant
economic and human benefits are inherent in
the prospect that international weather cen-
ters near Washington and Moscow and some-
where in the Southern Hemisphere will ac-
quire data from satellites which will pro-
vide 24-hour weather service on a global
basis. In the fall of 1963 an Extraordinary
Administrative Radio Conference of the In-
ternational Telecommunication Union allo-
cated frequencies and established interna-
tional regulations for the use of radio in space
communications and research, including me-
teorological, communications, and navigation
satellites. The convention embodying these
arrangements, already ratified by the United
States, represents an orderly approach to
one of the central problems of the space age.
Communications Satellite System
The United Nations has reflected the
strong interest of countries throughout the
world in the potential of communications
satellites. In 1961 the General Assembly re-
solved that "communication by means of
satellites should be available to the nations of
the world as soon as practicable on a global
and non-discriminatory basis." It returned
to the subject again in 1962, when it stressed
"the importance of international co-opera-
tion to achieve effective satellite communi-
cations which will be available on a world-
wide basis."
Eleven countries. Including the United
States, took a giant stride toward the goal
reflected by these resolutions on August
20, 1964, when they signed two agreements
for the establishment of interim arrange-
ments for a global commercial communi-
cations satellite system. These agreements —
one an intergovernmental agreement setting
forth principles and basic organizational ar-
rangements and the other between designat-
ed communications entities of the signatory
countries and covering commercial, financial,
and operational details — remain open to ac-
cession by all member states of the Interna-
tional Telecommunication Union. Thirty-five
additional countries have already adhered to
the agreements, making 46 in all, but it is
not necessary to do so or to invest in these
arrangements for a nation to have access to
the system being established. Access will be
open to all as it becomes technically feasible.
The Global Commercial Communications
Satellite System became an operational
reality in April 1965, when the Early Bird
synchronous satellite took its station 22,300
miles above the Atlantic. In the fall of 1965
the international policy committee established
by the agreement will decide on the basic
operational system, and actual deployment of
that system will start in late 1966. The
system will utilize the most advanced com-
munications satellite equipment currently
available. Voice, telegraphy, high-speed data,
facsimile, and television communications
service will be developed as rapidly as tech-
nically and economically practicable on a
global and nondiscriminatory basis.
Communications traffic is expanding in
all areas of the world. Over the North At-
lantic, for example, the rate of growth is
about 20 percent a year. While the North
Atlantic is the heaviest traffic area at pres-
ent, traffic will undoubtedly increase rapid-
ly elsewhere. All areas will profit through
the use of satellite communications facilities.
It is clear that improved communications
contribute significantly to increased inter-
national trade and investment, travel, edu-
cational and cultural opportunities, and the
exchange of ideas among people, thus fur-
thering world peace and international under-
standing.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
391
A Look at the Future
A year before his death President Kennedy-
asserted his faith that "space can be explored
and mastered without feeding the fires of
war, without repeating the mistakes that
man has made in extending his writ around
this globe of ours." The international cooper-
ation already achieved in space confirms
that faith.
But the time is not yet to indulge in con-
gratulations. 1964 witnessed a surge of space
activity abroad — the energetic programs of
France, the demonstrated competence of
Canada and Italy, the entry of the British
aircraft Industry into spacecraft engineer-
ing, the formal establishment of ESRO and
ELDO, the successful flight test of the
ELDO booster. These events were harbingers
of a broader and deeper technical capability
and interest that will be present in Europe,
Canada, and Japan 5 years from now. This
increased activity will make possible either
new opportunities for cooperation or a repeti-
tion of older patterns of competition.
The challenge that the United States faces
during International Cooperation Year is to
keep the hope and promise of cooperation
alive. We cannot do it alone, but we must
do our part. If we are to realize the technical
and political advantages of cooperation, for
ourselves and for others, we must continue
alert to more considerable and advanced co-
operative efforts with our present partners.
Otherwise we will offer foreign engineers
and scientists no more than is available in
their domestic and regional programs. Be-
yond that, we must continue to search with
infinite patience for meaningful and truly
reciprocal ventures with the Soviet Union. If
imagination and enlightened self-interest
prevail, we will cooperate significantly. Our
efforts will continue to stimulate construc-
tive activities abroad, supplement our ovsti
resources of brain and purse, further the
common destiny in space, and reduce — in
some measure — the political and economic
strains that divide us here on earth.
392
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Atoms for Peace and the Effort To Halt
the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
by John G. Palfrey
ChairTuan ICY Cabinet Committee on Atomic Energy
Not all forms of international cooperation
are by definition desirable even during Inter-
national Cooperation Year. One example
would be a cooperative program for the mili-
tary development of atomic weapons by the
nations of the world. In fact, some have sug-
gested that since halting the spread of
nuclear weapons is of first importance, any
form of international cooperation involving
atomic energy development, such as the
Atoms for Peace program, is a bad thing.
The argument against the program goes
this way: The more we assist other nations
in the development of the civil uses of
atomic energy, help them explore for ura-
nium, enable them to construct research re-
actors, develop the capability to produce
fuel elements, electronic equipment, and
other components with their own technology,
and the more we push the sale of United
States power reactors abroad, and help them
with Plutonium separation and plutonium
metallurgy, the more we are providing other
countries with the capability and the temp-
tation to undertake a weapons program and
to divert the plutonium they produce for
military purposes. I disagree.
I believe the case for the program is a
strong one, and that the program, both in its
conception and continuing execution, has
been an important element in our overall
effort to minimize the problem of nuclear
proliferation. In order to explain the basis
for this belief, we must start with a brief
historical review.
During the early post- World War II period,
the United States was both awestruck with
its new-found weapon and confident that it
would have a monopoly of the technology
and know-how in this field for some time.
Therefore our first effort was to use this in-
terval of United States monopoly to seek a
global renunciation in advance of the devel-
opment of nuclear weapons under a system
that would place atomic activities, including
our own, under international ownership, de-
velopment, and control.
Following the proposals put forth in the
Acheson-Lilienthal report and the Baruch
proposals, the United States tried to estab-
lish through the United Nations a regime of
international control of the atom. Concur-
rently national legislation was enacted in
1946 establishing a stringent system of se-
crecy and control which essentially barred
any form of international nuclear coopera-
tion, even in civil uses, until international
control of nuclear weapons vdth adequate
safeguards could be achieved.
During the ensuing years, roughly from
1946 to 1953, several developments took
place which resulted in a basic change in our
approach. First, despite our repeated efforts
during this period, we could not achieve
agreement with the Soviet Union on the
subject of the control of atomic weapons.
A militant Soviet Government was unwill-
ing to forgo its nuclear ambitions and to
subscribe to our proposals regarding atomic
control and disarmament. Second, a number
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
393
of other countries, including the Soviet
Union, established vigorous independent na-
tional atomic energy programs, thereby
making it plain that the United States was
not going to be able to dictate or control the
global development of this technology sim-
ply by withholding help. Moreover, a number
of less atomically advanced nations were al-
ready beginning to recognize the great
potential of the peaceful atom. In the ab-
sence of a favorable response from us, they
were beginning to look elsewhere for
assistance.
Finally, there was a growing awareness
that the United States, as leader in the
field, was under a moral obligation to share
its knowledge of the constructive uses of
atomic energy.
These factors suggested that it would no
longer be sensible for the United States to
continue to adhere to a policy which prohib-
ited nuclear cooperation even in areas of
relatively little sensitivity, but that we stood
to gain more by cooperating in the field of
civil uses than by preserving our nuclear
embargo. By means of such cooperation we
might be in a better position to orient these
foreign programs to beneficent rather than
destructive purposes. Lastly, it was felt that
by encouraging the channeling of atomic
materials to civil uses only, we might be
able to establish a common ground with the
Soviet Union in this regard and encourage
the adoption of new measures of arms
control.
These were the considerations that
prompted President Eisenhower to make his
"Atoms for Peace" address before the
United Nations General Assembly on De-
cember 8, 1953. They also were largely re-
sponsible for the major amendments in
1954 to the Atomic Energy Act, which per-
mitted the United States to cooperate with
other countries in the field of civil uses.
I believe the considerations that led to the
formulation and adoption of the interna-
tional program in 1954 continue to be valid
today and the returns substantial. I further
believe that it would be unsound for the
United States to attempt to avoid prolifera-
tion by reverting to secrecy and limited co-
operation. Any such attempt would be des-
tined to fail since, in the last 20 years,
many nations have become sophisticated in
the nuclear field. They are not dependent
on us for their achievements.
Economic Nuclear Power
The age of economic nuclear power is
close at hand, and many nations either have,
or are planning to construct, nuclear power
stations as important supplements to their
conventional sources of electrical energy.
India, for example, is currently constructing
two large-scale nuclear power stations with
United States and Canadian assistance.
It appears certain that nuclear power will
figure even more importantly in meeting
long-term energy requirements. In this
country alone, for example, it is now authori-
tatively estimated that we shall have
70,000,000 KW of nuclear power installed by
1980. The projections of a number of other
advanced countries are comparably im-
pressive. For example, within the six coun-
tries of the European Atomic Energy Com-
munity (EURATOM), with which the
United States has enjoyed close and mu-
tually beneficial cooperation, there is about
4,200,000 KW of nuclear power capacity ac-
tually in service, under construction, or
firmly planned. This means that in 1970
the nuclear capacity vdll constitute about 3
percent of all forms of electrical generating
capacity in the Community, rising to an es-
timated 30 percent in 1980.
Nuclear energy may serve in the eco-
nomic desalting of sea water, or as pro-
pulsion for merchant ships ; we may also be
able, through our Plowshare program, to use
nuclear explosives in major engineering
projects, such as the building of canals or
the excavation of harbors that might not be
feasible through conventional methods.
With such achievements and prospects, our
withdrawal from international cooperation
would be difficult. It would be resented. It
would leave the international field to the
other developed countries to occupy.
At the same time we have recognized
from the outset that the technology of pro-
ducing nuclear power for peaceful pur-
394
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
poses is related to the technology of produc-
ing fissionable material for weapons pur-
poses. The operation of most types of power
reactors results in the production, as a by-
product, of plutonium which is capable of use
either in atomic weapons or as fuel in cer-
tain types of reactors.
Thus one major problem of proliferation
derives inevitably from the increasing de-
velopment of nuclear power throughout the
world. Accordingly, in making our tech-
nology and material available, we have from
the beginning taken special measures to as-
sure that the assistance we rendered to
other countries would not be diverted to
military programs.
Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954,
the supplying of U.S. nuclear fuel for
United States reactors abroad is permitted
only under an intergovernmental agreement
which must include a solemn, sovereign
guarantee by the recipient government that
the material or equipment it receives, and
any resulting fissionable material which it
produces, will be used exclusively for peace-
ful purposes. At the start of the program,
the executive branch decided that more than
this was needed. It adopted a policy, which
has been strictly adhered to by successive
administrations, of requiring that the
agreements include specific commitments
to give the United States an opportunity to
verify for itself that this limitation is being
honored. Essentially all of the agreements
we have concluded since 1955 have included
provisions calling for the application of such
controls.
These safeguards give the United States
far-reaching rights to enter the territory of
the recipient government and to carry out
the inspections necessary to make sure that
no material or equipment has been diverted
to military purposes or transferred to a
third country without the permission of the
United States. In the course of these in-
spections, the inspectors have access to facil-
ities and records and are permitted to take
appropriate measures to account for the
nuclear material that is subject to safe-
guards. The United States may require the
return of the nuclear material and equipment
if the safeguards article and associated
guarantees are violated.
I believe it is quite remarkable that we
have been able to negotiate some 40 agree-
ments containing such provisions. This de-
velopment, in my view, has represented a
significant advance in the field of interna-
tional relations; it has helped establish a
valuable precedent.
Developing International Safeguards
Important as bilateral safeguards have
been, however, we have regarded them as
only an interim way of meeting the problem.
We have believed from the start that the
long-term solution would be to develop a
safeguards system administered by an inter-
national organization of broad membership.
We have had several reasons for consist-
ently sticking to this position. To begin
with, safeguards administered by an inter-
national organization should offer more
credible assurances to the world at large
that the projects being assisted by the
United States are in pursuit of peaceful ob-
jectives only. In some countries an assur-
ance based on American inspection alone
may not be convincing.
Of even greater importance is the recog-
nition that many nations besides the
United States now provide nuclear assist-
ance to other countries. Accordingly, if we
relied simply on a system of bilaterally
applied safeguards in this developing situa-
tion, we would find that some nations might
apply effective controls while others would
apply wholly inadequate controls or no con-
trols at all. Because of the competitive
commercial pressures that exist in the in-
ternational nuclear power market, the ulti-
mate result would probably be a reduction
to the lowest common denominator — no safe-
guards at all.
A system administered by an international
agency encourages the uniform application
of a technically adequate series of controls
to all significant transactions. It also offers
the promise of removing the matter of safe-
guards from the marketplace.
To meet this need, the International
Atomic Energy Agency, with strong U.S.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
395
support, has been developing over the last
several years its own capability to apply
safeguards to nuclear activities. A simplified
system which promises to be effective for
verifying the peaceful use of both large and
small nuclear reactor facilities recently
has been reviewed by the Agency's Board
of Governors. The Agency's system applies
automatically to nuclear projects which have
been assisted by or through the Agency, and
it applies to any other project where the
member states concerned request the Agency
to apply its safeguards.^ Therefore one of
our major tasks has been to convince all
important suppliers of nuclear assistance
that they should insist on the application of
safeguards, preferably IAEA safeguards, as
a condition of making their help available
to other countries.
Fortunately we have found common agree-
ment with this objective. Other countries,
notably the United Kingdom and Canada,
have followed the policy of requiring safe-
guards on their nuclear energy assistance.
Like ourselves, they prefer international
safeguards, but they have relied on bilateral
safeguards until IAEA could fully develop
its own system and capability.
For its part, the United States is now
pursuing a determined policy of replacing its
bilateral safeguards with the safeguards of
the IAEA. Whenever our agreements for co-
operation are extended or amended, we have
undertaken to secure agreement that the
parties shall promptly request the IAEA to
apply its safeguards to the agreement. We
have been remarkably successful in this ef-
fort, and some 20 countries receiving our ma-
terials or equipment (either directly or
through the IAEA) have agreed to submit
these arrangements to IAEA safeguards.
Perhaps most important of all, during the
later phases of the formulation of the IAEA
safeguards system, there has developed unan-
imous support by the Agency's 25-member
' The United States has placed four of its own
reactors under IAEA safeguards; one, Yankee
Electric, is a large commercial power reactor. The
United Kingdom announced on June 16 that the
Bradwell Nuclear Power Station would be placed
under IAEA safegruards.
Board of Governors for the system — support
from East and West, nuclear powers and
nonnuclear powers alike. In particular, the
Soviet Union has come to support the system
and has participated constructively in the
debates which led to its development. I be-
lieve that this broad support is due to a
widespread realization of the dangers of
nuclear proliferation and of the necessity to
develop practical measures to prevent it.
Independent National Nuclear Programs
I have stressed the application of safe-
guards to projects undertaken by one country
with assistance from another. However, some
few countries are able to proceed entirely on
their own in building nuclear facilities for
the production of nuclear weapons. The fact
that this independent capability exists, and
will inevitably become more widespread, is
obviously one of our major areas of concern
for the future.
In the long run, the greatest risk of
nuclear proliferation may lie in what coun-
tries can do on their own, rather than what
they will be able to do with external assist-
ance, since most suppliers are applying safe-
guards or guarantees to the exports of their
reactors or fuel materials. Therefore, fur-
ther progress in this area will depend on the
steps we can take to bring more of the inde-
pendent national nuclear programs under in-
ternational (IAEA) control.
Apart from fostering the application of
safeguards, the Atoms for Peace program
has more generally oriented the atomic am-
bitions of nations to constructive ends. It
also has created a general atmosphere of
openness in this field — conferences, visits,
exchanges of experts — which has made it
less likely that nations avowedly committed
to peaceful programs might clandestinely
subvert some of these activities to military
programs.
I am not claiming that the Atoms for
Peace program accompanied by international
safeguards is the whole answer to the prolif-
eration problem. I do claim, however, that
we are in a better position to exert an in-
fluence on the decisions of other countries
through our atomic cooperation than we
396
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
would be in the absence of such cooperation.
No single course of action or group of
actions is going to be decisive in limiting
the spread of nuclear weapons. A nation
with raw materials and an industrial capa-
bility, determined to develop a national
weapons capability, will in due course succeed
in doing so, as China has demonstrated.
It is heartening to note, however, that
going into the third decade of the atomic
age, only two additional nations have em-
barked on nuclear weapons programs. Politi-
cal, economic, and moral restraints against
nuclear proliferation continue to be very
strong.
A dramatic case in point is, of course,
India. Its facilities for atomic research com-
pare favorably with any in the United States
or in Europe. While India has developed the
full range of capabilities and facilities re-
quired for producing and separating pluto-
nium, it is not involved in a military nuclear
program. There is little question, however,
that India could develop weapons in the next
few years if it chose to allocate the neces-
sary resources. But it has looked at the con-
siderable costs and the consequences and has
chosen not to, despite the provocation from
its northern neighbor.
While the decision on weapon development
is India's, it is not irrelevant that she has
obtained help in the civil uses from other
countries. For example, the 380 MWe en-
riched uranium reactor at Tarapur was de-
signed by International General Electric and
financed by means of a long-term loan
from the U.S. Agency for International De-
velopment. A second power reactor at
Rajasthan is to be built by India with Cana-
dian cooperation, using Canadian designs
and specifications. Both these power reactors
will be subject to safeguards.
In addition to safeguards, there need to be
assurances that those advanced countries
that do not develop nuclear weapons are not
going to suffer because of their decision.
Last fall, following the first Chinese explo-
sion. President Johnson said: "The nations
that do not seek national nuclear weapons
can be sure that, if they need our strong
support against some threat of nuclear black-
mail, then they will have it."
In both its influence on individual coun-
tries and in its establishment of institutional
machinery, the Atoms for Peace program has
a valuable contribution to make to nonprolif-
eration. It has uncovered a genuine area of
agreement between Eastern and Western
countries in international safeguards to pro-
tect against the diversion of materials and
facilities to military purposes. This con-
sensus provides a rare opportunity to exploit
and, in my opinion, is in itself a significant
reason for continuing the program of in-
ternational cooperation in the civil uses of
atomic energy.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
397
strengthening Peace Through Arms Control and Disarmament
by Jacob D. Beam
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament
Many forms of international cooperation
involve activities in which the common in-
terests of nations lie in clear view, unob-
structed by controversy and conflict. The
subject of arms control and disarmament is
different. The common interest, easily iden-
tifiable, is in a goal of vital significance —
for it is nothing less than survival. But the
obstacles are also great, because the achieve-
ment of arms control and disarmament af-
fects a nation's most important political re-
lations and its military security. So the
reach, despite exertions, often exceeds the
grasp far more than it does in other, less
controversial areas of international cooper-
ation.
The formulation of disarmament policies
is a cooperative international effort. Before
a United States proposal is tabled, we con-
sult closely with our alliance partners, with
the many nations who participate with us in
disarmament conferences, and with all other
nations who are interested in disarmament.
Immediately after World War II the
United States took a bold initiative in seek-
ing to control the awesome threat of weap-
ons of mass destruction. The United States
plan for international control of atomic en-
ergy would have placed all natural resources
and processing plants for nuclear energy
under an international authority. This his-
toric proposal would have removed from the
world military equation the weapon which
assured this nation unquestioned supremacy.
The Soviet Union, however, rejected it.
There followed years of disarmament dis-
cussions under the auspices of the United
Nations, sometimes concentrating on con-
ventional armaments, sometimes on nuclear.
Each time the talks foundered on mutual
suspicion between the Western allies and the
Soviet Union and on an unwillingness on the
part of the Soviets to agree to accept the
verification machinery essential to over-
come suspicion. The need for cooperation
was clear ; the path was obscure.
Toward the end of the 1950's some signs
of increased cooperation appeared. Two in-
ternational conferences on the technical as-
pects of the arms control problems were
held in Geneva. Although no lasting agree-
ment resulted, both sides did realize that
continued efforts to establish the basis for
further negotiations were necessary. An
abortive conference in 1960, when the Soviet
Union and its allies walked out of the Ten-
Nation Disarmament Committee, only recon-
firmed this fact.
In 1961 the new Kennedy administration
instituted a broad program which gave fresh
impetus to U.S. disarmament efforts. A sepa- ■
rate establishment, the U.S. Arms Control |
and Disarmament Agency — the first of its
kind to be set up by any government — was
assigned the function of disarmament nego-
tiation and of undertaking extensive re-
search in the field of arms control. In the ■
summer of 1961, John J. McCloy, President i
Kennedy's adviser on disarmament, formu-
lated with Valerian Zorin, a Soviet Deputy ■
Foreign Minister, a "Joint Statement of f
Agreed Principles" which set the guidelines
for resumed disarmament talks. For the first
time both sides expressed their intention to
398
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
seek progressive agreements leading ulti-
mately to general disarmament, and they
agreed that strict and effective international
control should accompany arms reduction
measures which were to be implemented in
such a way that at no stage would any state
or group of states gain military advantage.
They also agreed to search for more imme-
diate arms control agreement, seeking the
widest possible agreements at the earliest
possible dates.
That year at the General Assembly of the
United Nations the United States and the
Soviet Union agreed to invite, for the first
time, states belonging neither to NATO nor
to the Warsaw Pact to participate in the
new disarmament forum. Thus, the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament (EN
DC) ' was born and began its work on March
14, 1962.
Three years of working together has pro-
duced a certain improvement in atmosphere
in these disarmament talks. The United
States and the Soviet Union serve as co-
chairmen, and the conference has become a
convenient forum for disarmament nego-
tiations and a continuing body accumu-
lating the experience necessary to deal with
the complex political and technical questions
of arms control. There has been an increas-
ing recognition of the value of quiet con-
versation (which has already resulted in sev-
eral agreements), as against public postur-
ing (which has a 20-year record of sterility) .
In 1963 three concrete disarmament
achievements grew out of ENDC discussions.
The first was the establishment of a direct
communications link between the Govern-
ments of the Soviet Union and the United
States. Based on a United States proposal
of December 1962, it resulted in the opening
of the "hot line," a teletype circuit, for emer-
gency use, between Washington and Mos-
cow in August 1963.
' The ENDC participants are Brazil, Bulgaria,
Burma, Canada, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, India,
Italy, Mexico, Nigeria, Poland, Rumania, Sweden,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Arab
Republic, United Kingdom, and United States. France
has refused to take its seat at the conference.
The Nuclear Test Ban Treaty
The outstanding accomplishment of coop-
eration in the arms control area is the
treaty prohibiting nuclear explosions in the
atmosphere, under water, and in outer space.
The question of a nuclear test ban as well
as the possibility of a partial ban had been
considered by the nuclear powers since 1958.
The concept had been discussed by the
ENDC, where the issues had been clearly
defined. As a result of President Kennedy's
personal intervention, a rapid negotiation
took place in Moscow in July 1963. The
treaty was signed there on August 5, by the
United States, the United Kingdom, and the
Soviet Union. As of this date, August 20,
90 nations have become parties to the treaty.
The 18th session of the U.N. General As-
sembly in November 1963 adopted unani-
mously a resolution calling on all states to
refrain from orbiting weapons of mass de-
struction in outer space. Cooperation through
quiet diplomacy thus averted the costly and
technical extension of the arms race into a
vast new dimension.
In January 1964 President Johnson sent
five proposals to the ENDC. He placed spe-
cial emphasis on the need to prevent the
further spread of nuclear weapons capabil-
ity. The Johnson proposals included a far-
reaching offer to explore a freeze of strate-
gic offensive and defensive nuclear delivery
vehicles. Such an agreement would halt the
development and accumulation of bigger and
more powerful strategic missiles and bomb-
ers capable of carrying nuclear weapons. It
could serve as the first important brake
upon the nuclear arms race.
A different form of arms control was
carried out through the United States in-
spection of Antarctic stations in January
1964, pursuant to the Antarctic Treaty of
1959. This treaty embodies, among other
things, an agreement to keep the Antarctic
free from the arms race. As such it is
partly an arms limitation agreement, grant-
ing each signatory the right of inspection to
insure the peaceful uses of the stations
there. In exercising the right, the U.S. ob-
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
399
server teams reported that they found no
evidence of military activities.
Efforts To Prevent Proliferation
The danger of additional countries' acquir-
ing nuclear weapons capabilities — a specter
which has haunted statesmen since 1946 —
was highlighted by the Chinese Communist
explosion of October 1964 and by the possi-
bility that other states — at least a dozen have
significant resources and know-how — may de-
cide nuclear weapons are essential to their
defense arsenals. Today some 40 countries
have nuclear reactors in peaceful atomic en-
ergy programs. The technology of nuclear
energy for peaceful purposes is not unrelated
to the technology for weapons ; and thus the
number of countries on the threshold of a
nuclear weapons potential increases.
The limited test ban treaty has placed
some hurdles in the way of nonnuclear
powers which seek to produce nuclear weap-
ons. President Johnson's January 1964 mes-
sage to the ENDC stressed three further
measures which would effectively help pre-
vent nuclear dissemination. One calls for
agreement among nuclear powers not to
transfer nuclear weapons to states not now
controlling them. Another calls for extension
of the limited test ban to underground tests.
The third calls on the nuclear powers to ac-
cept inspection of an increasing number of
their peaceful activities and to transfer
nuclear materials only under the safeguards
of the International Atomic Energy Agency
(IAEA) — another instrument of interna-
tional cooperation. The United States has
taken the lead by announcing at the ENDC
that the large power reactor of the Yankee
Atomic Electric Co. in Rowe, Mass., would be
open to international inspection, and by urg-
ing the Soviet Union and other nations to
take similar steps. Our Government is also
transferring to the IAEA the responsibility
for maintaining safeguards against diversion
in all of the installations which the United
States has built in other countries under
bilateral assistance grants.
Despite U.S. efforts to reconvoke a dis-
armament negotiating forum, valuable time
was lost by the inability of the 19th session
of the U.N. General Assembly to deal with
substantive questions, including disarma-
ment, and by the delay in reconvening the
ENDC. The 114-nation Disarmament Com-
mission did, however, meet from April 21
through June 16 of this year and adopted
two resolutions, the first recommending that
the General Assembly consider convening a
world disarmament conference "to which all
countries would be invited" and the second
recommending the early resumption of the
ENDC to consider key disarmament meas-
ures with special emphasis on nonprolifera-
tion and a comprehensive test ban.
At the ENDC on August 17 the United
States tabled its "draft treaty to prevent
the spread of nuclear weapons." In brief,
the nuclear states would undertake not to
transfer nuclear weapons into the national
control of any nonnuclear state and each
nonnuclear state for its part would under-
take neither to manufacture nuclear weap-
ons or receive them into its national control.
In addition, all parties would engage in a
general undertaking not to adopt any other
action which would cause an increase in the
total number of states and alliances having
independent power to use nuclear weapons.
In an accompanying message President John-
son declared that the U.S. was prepared to
move forward "with promptness and deter-
mination to make this proposal a reality"
and reaffirmed the conviction that world
peace requires firm limits be set upon the
spread of nuclear weapons.
Thus, for 16 years, disarmament negotia-
tions, while persistent, were barren of re-
sults. Since 1963 there has been progress.
It has been slow, but it is perceptible. The
members of the United Nations are squarely
facing the realities of the nuclear confron-
tation. They are gaining an understanding
of the technological and political realities
which underlie disarmament issues. The non-
alined nations are playing a constructive
role. Disarmament negotiation, which has
been a source of frustration for statesmen
throughout the forties and fifties, has be-
come a promising area for international co-
operation in the sixties and seventies.
400
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Trade Windows to the World
by William M. Roth
Cochairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Trade
Trade is the oldest form of cooperation
among nations. Indeed, it long antedates
their emergence, having begun among tribes
in prehistoric times, probably in much the
same fashion as it is carried on in primitive
regions of the world to this very day.
Trade has been a major creative and in-
novating force throughout history. Cities,
nations, and empires have been built upon
it. The grovirth of trade undermined and
destroyed the feudal system in Europe, and
opened the door to the modern world. Trade
made it possible to establish and maintain
the first scattered settlements along the
American seaboard ; and the early identifica-
tion of the United States with world trade
was symbolized in the clipper ship, which
the historian James Truslow Adams has
called "the most beautiful thing ever pro-
duced in America."
When the first infant industries were
established in the United States, pressures
began to build up for their protection from
foreign competition, and tariffs became and
remained for generations the major economic
issue in American politics, with the farmers
pressing for low tariffs and the industrialists
for higher ones. After the Civil War the
proponents of high tariffs generally held the
upper hand, and protectionism reached a
peak with the enactment of the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930.
A new policy of reciprocal tariff reduc-
tions and trade expansion was initiated with
the Trade Agreements Act of 1934. That
act has been renewed or extended 11 times
under both Democratic and Republican ad-
ministrations, most recently in the form of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, a major
legislative achievement of President Ken-
nedy's administration.
Trade liberalization has proven to be in
our national interest. Our tariffs on dutiable
imports, which averaged 47 percent in 1934,
have come down to 12 percent in 1964. Our
total trade in 1934 was only $3.7 billion ; in
1964 it was $44.3 billion. The reciprocal
tariff concessions which we secured from
other nations have played a major part in
expanding our exports from $2.1 billion to
$25.6 billion in the same period. Both the
American producer and the American con-
sumer have benefited from the simultaneous
growth of imports from $1.6 billion to $18.7
billion — the producer from access to raw
materials and the invigorating effect of
wider competition and the consumer from
the availability of a wider variety of
products at reasonable prices.
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
Up until 1947, trade negotiations were
conducted on a bilateral basis — that is, the
United States negotiated trade agreements
with individual nations. In that year, how-
ever, a major step forward was taken with
the negotiation by 23 nations, including the
United States and most of the other major
trading countries of the free world, of the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
(GATT). It has constituted one leg of a
sturdy tripod — the World Bank and the
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
401
International Monetary Fund being the oth-
ers— on which the thriving international
economy of the postwar world has been
founded.
The job of the GATT, headquartered in
Geneva, is to clear the channels of world
trade of needless obstructions and to keep
them clear. A measure of its effectiveness is
the almost complete absence from the head-
lines of the past 18 years of the "beggar
my neighbor" trade and tariff wars which
many nations conducted against one an-
other in prior years.
As its name implies, the General Agree-
ment is basically a set of rules for the or-
derly conduct and expansion of world trade.
Whereas there were 23 founding nations, 66
now subscribe to the GATT. An additional
13 participate under various other arrange-
ments. The total of 79 includes all the major
trading nations of the free world and the
majority of the developing nations. Neither
the Soviet Union nor Communist China par-
ticipates in GATT, but a few other Commu-
nist nations do and still others have shown
interest in it.
One basic principle of the GATT is that of
nondiscrimination. Each member country
agrees that any tariff concessions or trade
advantage granted to any one nation shall
be extended to all GATT countries. The
GATT thereby serves to safeguard Ameri-
can exporters against actions by other
countries which would result in discrimina-
tion against U.S. exports. It gives the ex-
porters of other GATT countries the same
assurance. Thus, nations are rarely driven
to resort to retaliatory measures, often the
first step toward a full-scale trade war.
A second basic principle of the GATT is
that, with certain limited exceptions, pro-
tection for each member nation's industries
shall be confined to tariffs. The advantages
to exporters of this principle as compared
with quantitative restrictions are that tar-
iffs are known and definite, that they are
the same with regard to all GATT mem-
bers, that there is no scope for arbitrary
discrimination among the exporting coun-
tries, and that there is free competition over
the tariff wall as opposed to the rigid con-
trols that quantitative restrictions impose.
These are important factors making for or-
derly trade.
There is a strong emphasis upon consulta-
tion in the operation of the GATT. It serves
as a forum in which member nations may
meet to discuss disputes arising from poten-
tial or actual breaches of the GATT trading
rules. If one member nation takes an action
that infringes on the trading rights of a
particular country or generally damages the
trading interests of all or a number of mem-
ber countries, any nation claiming injury
can initiate a consultation. If no satisfactory
adjustment is reached after consultation, a
formal complaint may be lodged. Often a
panel of conciliation, made up of experts
from countries which have no direct interest
in the issue, may be set up to examine the
complaint and recommend a solution.
In recent years, the GATT has devoted
increasing attention to the trade needs and
problems of the developing countries. A
special committee was established in 1958
to focus on this question, and the GATT has
been actively at work in this field ever
since. In 1964 an International Trade Center
was established within the GATT to assist
the developing countries in expanding their
exports. On February 8, 1965, the GATT
Chapter on Trade and Development was
opened for acceptance. It consists of three
articles added to the GATT to take account
of the trade interests of the developing
countries.
The GATT is also a forum for interna-
tional trade conferences at which, on a multi-
lateral basis, the reduction or elimination of
tariffs and nontariflf bari-iers to trade can
be negotiated and bound. Exporters thereby
gain the benefit of assurances by the major
trading countries that their tariffs will not
be suddenly changed, but will only be
changed under fixed procedures for which
the GATT lays down strict rules.
Five major rounds of negotiations have
been held under the auspices of the GATT
since its establishment, and the sixth major
round — generally known as the Kennedy
Round — is now in progress. It is estimated
that, through the GATT, tariffs have al-
402
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ready been reduced or stabilized on prod-
ucts accounting for approximately half of
world trade. The resulting trade expansion
has been to the benefit of all nations, for
— as the late President Kennedy said — a
rising tide lifts all the boats.
The GATT is the only international forum
in which trade agreements are negotiated
and administered. The organizations listed
below are largely consultative in character
— forums for study, discussion, and recom-
mendations to governments.
Organization for Economic Cooperation
and Development
The Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development (OECD) is the prin-
cipal instrument of cooperation on the
broad range of policy questions in the eco-
nomic field among the Western European
countries, the United States, Canada, and
Japan.
The 21 members of the OECD account
for nearly three-quarters of world trade
and two-thirds of its industrial production,
although their population is only about one-
fifth of the world's total. The organization
was established in 1961 as the successor to
the Organization for European Economic
Cooperation (OEEC).
The OECD's aims, as specified in its con-
vention, are to promote policies designed
(a) to achieve rapid economic grovrth in
member countries while maintaining finan-
cial stability, (b) to contribute to the eco-
nomic expansion of less developed countries,
and (c) "to contribute to the expansion of
world trade on a multilateral, non-discrimi-
natory basis." In connection with the third
of these objectives, the members have
agreed to "pursue their efforts to reduce or
abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods
and services" and to recognize, in contribut-
ing to the economic development of less
developed countries, the importance to the
latter's economies of securing expanding ex-
port markets.
The purposes of the organization in trade
and other matters are accomplished primar-
ily through confrontation, the process of
examining in detail through questions and
answers the relevant policies of each mem-
ber country, and through consultation, which
takes place on a practically continuous
basis among permanent representatives of
the member governments at the organiza-
tion's headquarters in Paris. Participants in
the meetings of the Council and the various
committees and other subsidiary bodies of
the OECD frequently include high officials
from capitals who are responsible for formu-
lation and execution of policies and who are
in a position to exert direct influence on the
development of domestic policies. The Coun-
cil and some of the committees also hold
periodic meetings at the ministerial level.
The OECD Trade Committee is concentrat-
ing on two particular aspects of trade policy
in its current program : nontarif f barriers to
trade, and trade questions arising from the
United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
It is recognized that nontariff impedi-
ments to trade will assume a greater rela-
tive importance as tariffs are further re-
duced. The OECD program in this field,
which supplements that of the GATT, in-
cludes consultations on such problems as the
effects on trade of government purchasing
policies and antidumping measures. These
OECD activities involve close study of each
member's policies in the fields under exam-
ination and, in some cases, consideration of
the possibility of achieving closer harmoni-
zation of such policies.
The OECD's consultation on UNCTAD
matters has led to an improved understand-
ing of each member's views and to some ex-
tent to agreement on positions to be taken.
From a review of the results of the first
UNCTAD, the organization has now pro-
ceeded to an examination of new initiatives
which UNCTAD bodies might undertake in
the future.
In addition to the Trade Committee, a
number of other parts of the OECD are also
engaged in policy consultations on subjects
involving trade. They include the Export
Credits Group, the Board of Management of
the European Monetary Agreement, the
Fiscal Committee, and committees on invis-
ible transactions, payments, insurance, mar-
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
403
itime transport, and restrictive business
practices.
U.N. Conference on Trade and Development
The United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development met in Geneva in the
spring of 1964 in accordance with a resolu-
tion of the U.N. Economic and Social
Council, endorsed by the U.N. General As-
sembly. It emerged as a forum in which the
developing nations expressed with urgency
and a high degree of unity their desire for
freer access to developed countries' mar-
kets, including tariff preferences, expanded
use of international agreements to stabilize
the prices of primary commodities at re-
munerative prices, compensatory payments
for export losses, reduction of export serv-
ice costs, and establishment of new institu-
tional machinery to further these objectives.
Fifty-nine recommendations were adopted, a
number over objection of the developed
countries, touching on virtually all interna-
tional trade and development problems.
UNCTAD, which has been subsequently
established by the U.N. General Assembly
as one of its organs, is to be an integral
part of the U.N., rather than a specialized
agency. It is to provide a forum for discus-
sion between the developed and developing
countries on matters of joint concern. The
Conference itself is scheduled to convene at
intervals of not more than 3 years; mean-
while its work is proceeding under the su-
pervision of the U.N. Trade and Develop-
ment Board, consisting of 55 governments,
which met for the first time in the spring of
1965. The Board has established commit-
tees on commodities, manufactures, ship-
ping, and invisibles and financing related
to trade.
U.N. Economic and Social Council
The U.N. Economic and Social Council re-
views the world economic situation each
year. It receives reports from specialized
agencies of the U.N., such as the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund.
Much of its work in the trade field has been
carried on through its Commission on Inter-
national Commodity Trade and four regional
economic commissions. These latter are con-
cerned, respectively, with Europe, Latin
America, Asia, and Africa. The United States
is a member of the first three and parti-
cipates in the last as an observer. The
trade matters with which the Economic
Commission for Europe is concerned include
questions of East-West trade. The other
three commissions are largely concerned
with regional problems involving the role
of trade, particularly as this relates to the
developing countries, which predominate in
all the regional commissions.
I began by citing the role of trade as
one of the prime moving forces of past
history. Even in today's complex world, it
continues to play a major part and its im-
plications extend far beyond the economic
field.
For instance, a major objective of the
current Kennedy Round of GATT negotia-
tions is to lay by trade expansion a solid
economic foundation for a partnership in
prosperity and progress among the industrial
nations of Western Europe, North America,
and Japan.
Another major objective of the Kennedy
Round (and of the GATT, OECD, UNCTAD,
and ECOSOC and its regional commissions)
is to expand the trade of the developing coun-
tries with the industrial nations and among
themselves. Given all the bilateral and mul-
tilateral aid that can presently be antici-
pated, these nations must still rely mainly
on expanded trade to obtain the needed
foreign exchange to work themselves out of
their present poverty and the frustrations
and occasional bitterness that it breeds. It is
worth remembering, also, that as they
achieve economic development, they may
reasonably be expected to provide substantial
and growing commercial markets for the
United States and other industrial countries.
Trade is also opening new windows to the
outside world in the closed societies and
hitherto autarkic economies of the Com-
munist nations. A powerful force motivat-
ing the Eastern European countries in as-
404
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
serting their increased independence of the
Soviet Union is their need to expand their
trade with the industrial nations of the free
world. Even the Soviet Union is feeling the
need to expand its trade with the outside
world, and to accomplish this, sweeping
changes in the organization of the Soviet
economy will be needed — indeed some seem
already to be underway.
A special committee appointed by the
President to "explore all aspects of the ques-
tions of expanding peaceful trade" with the
countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union submitted its report in April 1965.
The committee informed the President it be-
lieved that peaceful trade in nonstrategic
items can be an important instrument of na-
tional policy in our country's relations with
individual Communist nations of Europe. It
added that political, not commercial or eco-
nomic considerations, should determine the
formulation and execution of our trade poli-
cies toward those countries. The committee
submitted certain specific recommendations
for the President's consideration, including
the recommendation that the President should
be given discretionary authority to grant or
withdraw most-favored-nation tariff treat-
ment to and from individual Communist
countries when he determines it to be in the
national interest.
Trade is a strong force for international
cooperation, and therefore a force for peace.
As Alexander Hamilton wrote in 1787:
The spirit of commerce has a tendency to soften
the manners of men and to extinguish those in-
flammable humors which so often have kindled
into wars. Commercial republics like ours will never
be disposed to waste themselves in ruinous conten-
tions with each other. They will be governed by mu-
tual interest, and will cultivate a spirit of mutual
amity and concord.
This is as true today as it was in 1787.
Trade weaves a seamless web across all
frontiers. When nations are busily and prof-
itably trading with one another, they have
a strong incentive to live at peace with one
another. In the case of the developing na-
tions, increased trade opportunities and the
consequent economic growth can do much
to damp down the economic discontents from
which more serious dissensions might arise.
The far-reaching importance of trade ex-
pansion was stressed by President Johnson
in his message on May 4, 1964, to the meet-
ing of the GATT Ministers at which the
Kennedy Round was formally launched. He
wrote, inter alia:
"Your meetings, universally knovm as the
Kennedy Round, exemplify the hope and com-
mitment of our late President to bring to-
gether the nations of the world in peaceful
pursuits. ... We in the United States look
upon these negotiations as an important
opening to a better world. If we act together
with dedication and purpose, all can gain
and none need lose. Not only the major com-
mercial nations, but all the countries of this
shrinking world — poor and rich alike —
have the right to expect success from our
endeavors."
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
405
Business and Industry in International Cooperation Year
by Alexander B. Trowbridge
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Business and Industry
Public and private organizations in the
United States and other nations are putting
their skills and resources to work for the
greater well-being of all peoples, everywhere
in the world.
U.S. business and industry contribute im-
portantly to the cooperative effort. They
share in the global progress to which they
contribute — economic growth, expanding
commerce, and scientific and technological
advances.
Solid accomplishment marks the pursuit of
greater world progress through peaceful co-
operation among nations and peoples.
The opening of the International Center
for Advanced Technical and Vocational
Training in Turin, Italy, last spring illus-
trates the extent and effectiveness of the
cooperative drive.
Some 300 trainees were enrolled in the in-
augural workshop sessions of the Turin
school, which is the world's first advanced
training center for young people from the
developing countries. As many as 2,000
trainees from about 90 countries in Africa,
Asia, and Latin America will be accommo-
dated when the school is in full operation.
The International Labor Organization, a
specialized agency of the United Nations, es-
tablished the Turin center. The Government
of Italy donated the site and 22 buildings,
initial operating funds, and fellowships.
In the United States, the U.S. Department
of Commerce consulted with the Machine
Tool Builders Association about the possibil-
ities for providing the advanced machines
needed to equip the teaching workshops. The
association's membership voted to support
the program.
Tools for Freedom, a nonprofit organiza-
tion formed by the U.S. business community
to advance technical training in less devel-
oped countries, took on the job of canvassing
the U.S. machine tool industry and collecting
the necessary equipment.
The longshoremen's union agreed to han-
dle the machines free of charge. The Com-
merce Department, which operates the NS
Savannah, shipped them cost-free aboard the
nuclear-powered ship to Italy.
More than a hundred American machine
tool manufacturers donated $600,000 worth
of their newest products, ranging from hand-
tools and arc welders to electronic instru-
ments, diesel engines, and large boring and
grinding machine tools. Other industrial-
ized countries supplied additional equipment,
complementing that contributed by Ameri-
can industry.
One of the greatest obstacles to industrial
progress in the nations served by the new
school is their shortage of skilled technicians.
At the Turin center, their capable young
people will obtain specialized training in the
most advanced production and managerial
techniques of modern industry. When they
return home, they will teach others.
With the opening of the center, the devel-
oping nations have gained an opportunity to
I
406
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
move ahead more rapidly, but those who co-
operated in their behalf also have a chance
to benefit.
Turin trainees will be the future techni-
cians and executives of the developing na-
tions. They will contribute to industrial
growth, rising prosperity — and increased de-
mand for industrial tools and equipment — in
their countries. They could become excellent
customers of the producers who supplied
their training tools.
Forward Steps in Business Cooperation
International cooperation has opened the
door to mutually beneficial business progress
in many directions. Forward steps include
international standardization, international
protection of patents and trademarks, in-
creased protection of private investments,
and the reciprocal reduction of restrictive
business practices — to name but a few.
The committees, councils, and forums
which are the machinery of international
cooperation work quietly — so quietly that few
people realize how much constructive activity
is carried on. Too many people are too little
aware of the importance of international co-
operation to the well-being of the world,
their nations, and themselves.
The smallest international conflict often
gets bigger headlines than a major coopera-
tive achievement. Disruptive controversy at-
tracts more attention than constructive prog-
ress.
This year — the 20th anniversary of the
United Nations — has been designated as In-
ternational Cooperation Year by the U.N.
General Assembly to focus attention on the
cooperative activities that join nations rather
than on the conflicts that divide them. Pres-
ident Johnson has responded by proclaim-
ing 1965 as International Cooperation Year
in the United States.
Calling upon Government and private citi-
zens throughout the country to take part in
ICY activities, the President announced that
a White House Conference on International
Cooperation would be held November 29-
December 1. This important event will be
the culmination of the ICY program now un-
derway.
The President, in making the announce-
ment, set two goals for ICY : "I believe it is
time now to take stock of what we have ac-
complished and what we have learned — and
look ahead to identify the purposes and aims
of our continuing efforts in this century."
A Cabinet Committee appointed by the
President, and a National Citizens Commis-
sion (NCC) composed of some 200 distin-
guished American leaders in international
affairs, which met in Washington, D.C., on
March 23, are spearheading this nationwide
program. The two groups are working as a
foreign policy task force to make a searching
review of our current international programs
and to develop specific policy recommenda-
tions for future U.S. action in such areas
as disarmament, trade, and business and in-
dustry. They will prepare a report to the
President, focused on what we are doing now,
where we should go in the years to come,
and how best to get there.
These Government and private leaders
have been asked to serve on 31 committees
in fields relating to their special knowledge
and interests. These committees cover all
areas of international cooperation, such as
agriculture and food, business and industry,
communications, education and training,
health, science and technology. The NCC
Committee on Business and Industry is
chaired by I. M. Stewart, vice president of
the Union Carbide Corporation of New York.
The first task is to "take stock" — ^to take
a closeup look at what we are doing now.
Here is an "inventory" of major interna-
tional activities which contribute to the
progress of business and industry.
Industrial Standardization
International standardization is an out-
standing example of constructive coopera-
tion. Nations around the world, working to-
gether to harmonize divergent national views
and practices, have developed uniform stand-
ards of measurement, quality, composition,
and performance for products ranging from
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
407
motion pictures to freight containers. They
work voluntarily as members of nongovern-
mental international standardization orga-
nizations.
No nation is required to adopt the stand-
ards these international organizations rec-
ommend. Adoption is completely voluntary,
but more and more nations are accepting
and using the standards because of the prac-
tical advantages international standardiza-
tion offers in our modern world.
In the world today, former national mar-
kets have become competitive international
markets. International standardization pro-
vides a universal "language" for buyers and
sellers everywhere at home and abroad. It
enables them to compete on an equitable
basis.
The same international language helps
scientists and technologists exchange ideas,
processes, and techniques across international
boundaries. And the knowledge they share
accelerates scientific and technological prog-
ress throughout the world.
Standardization has contributed to the
progress of mass production, mass distribu-
tion, and mass consumption in the older in-
dustrialized nations. Today it provides a
sound basis for future industrial and eco-
nomic expansion in the newly developing na-
tions— and for the continuing growth of the
developed nations.
The United States, represented by the
American Standards Association (ASA), is
one of 55 nations participating in the prep-
aration of standards issued by the Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization
(ISO). ASA is wholly supported by U.S. in-
dustry and is controlled by a council and
board of directors from industry. ISO, also
nongovernmental, has consultative status
with the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC).
The effort to develop an international
standard begins with a proposal by an ISO
member. If at least five members agree that
a standards project should be initiated, a
technical committee is formed to do the pre-
paratory work needed to draw up an ISO
recommendation.
The draft recommendation is circulated to
all ISO members. If it is accepted by 60
percent of the members voting, it is sent
to the ISO's Administrative Council. If ap-
proved by the Council, it becomes an of-
ficial ISO recommendation. It becomes an
"international standard" when nations vol-
untarily put it to use. There are well over
500 such international standards, developed
and recommended by ISO, in use today.
ASA's role is to keep U.S. interests in-
formed on ISO activities and to obtain and
present unified, representative U.S. views
in ISO meetings and committees. American
Industries and professional groups nominate,
and ASA accredits, delegates to ISO tech-
nical committee meetings.
U.S. industry participation in the develop-
ment of international standards, though not
widespread, has been strong in a number of
fields. International standardization of mo-
tion pictures and photography was brought
underway through American enterprise about
30 years ago. Leadership by the U.S. plastics
industry has resulted in 40 ISO recommenda-
tions. Americans also played an important
role in the development of a global standard
for freight containers.
Agencies of the United States Govern-
ment have been working informally with
ASA on an international electrical code,
worldwide standards for pipe and fittings,
a uniform boiler code, and other projects.
The standards in the electrical subject areas
are issued by the International Electro-
technical Commission, which, though an older
organization, functions as a department of
ISO.
A major standardization organization in
which the United States has an official
interest is the International Bureau of
Weights and Measures (IBWM) located at
Sevres, France. This group is affiliated with
the U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (UNESCO). Its functions in-
clude comparisons, verifications, and cali-
brations of international, national, and other
standards; the preservation of physical
standards; and investigation of new stand-
ards of weights and measures.
408
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Industrial Property Rights
The United States and 63 other nations
are members of the Convention of Union of
Paris for the Protection of Industrial Prop-
erty. Under this convention, all member coun-
tries grant to nationals of each of the other
member countries the same advantages with
respect to patents, trademarks, and other
types of industrial property that their respec-
tive laws grant to their own nationals.
Also, when a national of a member
country files a patent or trademark applica-
tion in any member country, he may take
advantage of the priority of a previous fil-
ing in any other member country, if the
later filing occurs within a specified time
after the earlier filing.
The convention is administered by the
United International Bureaus for the Pro-
tection of Industrial and Intellectual
Property (BIRPI), located in Geneva,
Switzerland.
The United States has been a member of
the convention since 1887, shortly after it
went into effect. As a result of U.S. mem-
bership, American business and industry can
receive industrial property protection in
markets abroad. When they file patent ap-
plications in the United States, they have 1
year to determine whether they should also
file applications abroad.
The United States is also a member of
the separate but similar Buenos Aires Con-
vention of 1910, which adopted the principles
of the Paris Convention on national treat-
ment and rights of priority. This convention
extends the benefits of the Paris Conven-
tion to U.S. interests in the Latin American
countries. Another tie with Latin America is
U.S. membership in the 1929 General Inter-
American Convention for Trademark and
Commercial Protection.
International cooperation in information
retrieval is a promising new development.
The aim is to speed the examination of
patent applications and, thus, to provide
patent protection more promptly to patent
applicants in the cooperating countries.
This effort is being made through the
Committee for International Cooperation in
Information Retrieval Among Examining
Patent Officers (ICIREPAT). The United
States Government is providing strong sup-
port through the U.S. Patent Office.
Fifteen member countries at the ICIRE-
PAT conference last fall agreed to share in
the use of five operating information re-
trieval systems, including: (1) the Steroid
system of the United States, (2) the Alloy
system of the United Kingdom, (3) the
Lubricants system of the Netherlands-I.I.B.
Offices, (4) the Analog-Digital Convertor
system of the Netherlands, and (5) the
Nuclear Reactor system of Japan.
By informal agreement, the U.S. Patent
Office is exchanging copies of newly is-
suing patents with some 25 other countries.
Foreign patents received are placed in the
Patent Office's search file, where they are
used in the examination of applications for
patents in this country. These patents are
also made available for inspection by U.S.
businessmen and potential patent applicants
as an aid in their research programs or as
a help to determine whether or not to file
a patent application.
On July 1 of this year an informal ex-
change of search results was inaugurated
on a trial basis between the United States
and West Germany covering 1,000 applica-
tions on file in each country. It is hoped
that such exchange will facilitate the work
of patent examiners in the United States.
This would mean speedier protection on in-
ventions for patent applicants and the busi-
ness community in both countries.
Agriculture
Global business and industrial progress is
promoted, with U.S. Government participa-
tion, through the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO) of the United Na-
tions. FAO's goal is to increase the output
of farmlands, forests, and fisheries in all
nations.
FAO working groups have been estab-
lished to study international problems in
various commodity fields, such as citrus
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
409
fruit; copra; coconut oil and coconut; and
jute, kenaf, and allied products. The U.S.
Government supplies technical papers and
statistics to assist research on production
and supply problems and the economic as-
pects of these industries, and on the special
problems of each industry.
The United States, as a member of FAO
and other U.N. groups, strongly supports
international cooperative activities involving
forest products.
Regional Cooperation
The formation of the Common Market and
the European Free Trade Association has
given rise to new mutual efforts by the
United States and the European nations to
prevent unwarranted restrictions on busi-
ness and to widen the areas of industrial
cooperation.
The United States participates with the
European nations in the work of the Orga-
nization for Economic Cooperation and De-
velopment (OECD), which succeeded the
Organization for European Economic Co-
operation in 1961. OECD member nations
concentrate on economic policy coordination,
aid to developing countries, and the promo-
tion of world trade. The United States is
active in various OECD committees involv-
ing business and industry. These include:
1. The Industry Committee, which works
on the practical problems of industrial prog-
ress and expansion.
2. The Committee of Experts on Restric-
tive Business Practices, which studies prob-
lems connected with monopolies, cartels, and
other restrictive business practices. It re-
views developments in member countries
and certain regional organizations, partic-
ularly with regard to legislation and its
application.
3. The Energy Committee, a forum for
discussion of member countries' energy
policies. It also studies the different as-
pects of fair competition between different
kinds of energy.
4. Special committees in various fields of
industry and energy — iron and steel, non-
ferrous metals, timber, pulp and paper,
textiles, chemicals; coal, electricity, oil, and
gas. These committees, set up in July 1962
for a 3-year period, consist of national civil
servants, representatives of industry and
other nongovernmental groups — appointed
by their respective governments — or experts
who meet to discuss specific problems and
work to solve them.
The United States plays an active role in
the U.N. Economic and Social Council
(ECOSOC) and its four regional economic
commissions — for Europe, Asia and the Far
East, Latin America, and Africa. Special
committees have been set up within the
regional commissions to study various in-
dustries, such as the Steel, Chemical, and
Timber Committees.
U.S. Government representatives and in-
dustry experts work together with repre-
sentatives from other nations in meetings
centered on both economic and industrial
problems and projects.
One of ECOSOC's principal aims is to im-
prove world productivity through the estab-
lishment of national productivity centers,
surveys of mineral and energy resources,
and examination of measures to maintain
full employment and economic stability. Its
annual reviews of the world economic situa-
tion are a valuable aid to the businessmen
of all nations.
Less Developed Countries
American traders and investors contribute
with the U.S. Government to economic
growth in the developing countries under
the assistance programs administered by the
Agency for International Development
(AID). This is international cooperation in
its broadest sense.
But U.S. cooperation reaches beyond
trade and investment. For example, the In-
ternational Executive Service Corps (lESC),
a private, nonprofit organization assisted
initially by AID, provides local enterprises
in the developing nations with needed man-
agerial and executive skills and talents.
American private enterprise also con-
tributes to AID'S participant training pro-
grams. About 6,000 people were brought to
410
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the United States from other countries for
training in U.S. schools, universities, and
private business establishments in fiscal 1964.
other Activities
The U.S. Government plays an important
role in many specialized international orga-
nizations. It participates in the work of the
International Labor Organization (ILO),
as illustrated by its support of the Turin
training center. It also cooperates with other
nations in such groups as the International
Cotton Advisory Committee, the Interna-
tional Rubber Study Group, the International
Wood Study Group, the International Tele-
communication Union (ITU), and the Inter-
national Publishers Association.
This inventory is a starting point for the
full-scale review of current activities and
accomplishments which has been under-
taken by the ICY Committee on Business
and Industry.
When we have finished our "stocktaking,"
we face the more challenging task of looking
ahead "to identify the purposes and aims of
our continuing efforts in this century." This
is the second goal set by President Johnson
for the United States in this International
Cooperation Year.
Much has been accomplished through in-
ternational cooperation. How much more
should we seek to accomplish in cooperation
with other nations?
Should we, for example, set our sights on
such goals as :
A world patent bureau and an "interna-
tional patent" which would be registered
automatically and simultaneously in all mem-
ber countries?
Greater international uniformity in com-
mercial laws?
U.S. Government representation at inter-
national standardization conferences ?
An international "better business bureau" ?
The President has asked American busi-
ness and industry to join forces with the
Government in developing specific policy
recommendations for the future. The task
raises two important challenges. First, ivhat
are the goals we should seek to attain?
Second, how should we advance toward
them?
President Johnson has expressed the hope
that the White House Conference on Inter-
national Cooperation may be a "landmark
session."
It can be — if we succeed in meeting the
challenges of the preparatory tasks in hand.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
411
International Cooperation for Health: A Modern Imperative
by James Watt
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Health
On a small Spanish ship in the stormy
Atlantic, a young sailor tossed in his bunk,
groaning with pain. In another compart-
ment, a radio operator was twisting dials,
broadcasting a call for medical aid — for the
young sailor was suspected of having an ap-
pendicitis attack.
At a Coast Guard Station in New York
City, the AMVER Service, a computerized
system that keeps track of the position of
all merchant vessels in the North Atlantic,
was alerted to the possible emergency.
AMVER — Atlantic Merchant Vessel Report
— soon knew the names and positions of the
ships nearest to the Spanish vessel, and aid
was sped on its way.
The AMVER Center receives voluntary
reports on the positions of merchant vessels
in the North Atlantic. As each ship enters
the area it broadcasts its location, and the
computer, knowing its speed and direction,
accurately predicts the ship's position at any
future time. The AMVER Service is free of
charge, and it is understood by all concerned
that predicted positions will be disclosed to
anyone in need of the information, irre-
spective of nationality.
The "picture" of ship positions produced
by the computer has been used many times
to answer distress calls and relieve emer-
gency situations — many of them of a medi-
cal nature.
The voluntary report of position of ships
of all nationalities is a simple, but outstand-
ing, example of international cooperation
for the relief of human suffering and saving
of lives. Such cooperation is essential, for
disease and death respect no nations or per-
sons.
World of Scientific Knowledge
As human suffering, death, and disease
know no boundaries, so the world of science
and scientific knowledge knows no bound-
aries.
The story of Rauwolfia serpentina is an
outstanding example of the global nature of
scientific research. Long in use in India as
a part of the age-old "science" of herbal
medicine, Ramvolfia serpentina was the sub-
ject of scientific studies first published in
India almost 40 years ago, and of a definitive
article by an Indian scientist in the British
medical press some 15 years ago. Following
this, the modern medical uses of Rauwolfia
finally became known and applied outside
India, as a muscle relaxant in operations, to
bring relief to violent patients in mental in-
stitutions, and, finally, as a prototype of the
tranquilizers now in wide use.
Such useful discoveries in one part of the
world can have great effect in other nations
— the problem now is to find some way to
speed this exchange of information and to
master the incredible amounts of scientific
knowledge being produced. We cannot afford
to wait 40, or even 15, years for the solutions
to some of our pressing medical problems.
One of the most recent mechanisms for
speeding knowledge to investigators around
the world has been developed by the United
States Government. The National Library of
Medicine of the Public Health Service, De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare,
412
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
is the world's largest depository of published
biomedical knowledge — and its sources are
worldwide.
Dr. Jones, struggling with a difficult re-
search problem in a Houston laboratory, for
instance, can make a simple request to the
library for information. His request sets in
motion the Medical Literature and Analysis
Retrieval System (MEDLARS), a computer
system which can quickly search the world's
medical literature for clues to help Dr. Jones
find the answer he needs.
In 1964, the library added 71,000 pieces
of foreign medical literature to its collection.
For many years, it has participated in a co-
operative publication exchange program
with other nations, and currently receives
more than 2,200 regularly issued periodicals
and monographs from more than 500 for-
eign exchange partners. The library also
conducts a program of grants and contracts
for the translation of foreign biomedical
literature.
Throughout the world, by international
symposiums and meetings, through ex-
changes of scientific personnel, and through
other means, the world of science and medi-
cine communicates needed knowledge on an
international basis. And this knowledge is
being more and more widely applied.
The impulses of humanitarianism and good
will that are the basis for international co-
operation must be organized in a rational,
permanent fashion if there is to be any last-
ing benefit. For that reason a number of
mechanisms have been created to insure con-
tinued international cooperation in health
and medicine.
Some of these mechanisms are worldwide
in impact and organization, others are re-
gional. Still others are bilateral arrange-
ments whereby one country directly cooper-
ates with another in a health program.
World Health Organization
The World Health Organization is the one
international organization for health open to
all nations. Over 100 nations now belong to
WHO, each nation contributing to its budget
and entitled to receive its service and aid.
WHO assistance can take many forms:
strengthening national health services, help-
ing train health workers, controlling or erad-
icating major diseases, improving sanitation
and water supplies, or protecting maternal
and child health.
WHO provides services of use to all coun-
tries. These include an epidemic informa-
tion service; international quarantine meas-
ures; world health statistics; international
standardization of drugs, vaccines, and other
medical substances; and the promotion of
medical research and technical publications.
U.S. cooperation with WHO has existed
from the time of the establishment of WHO.
Our Government joined with others in con-
vening the International Health Conference
of 1946, at which Surgeon General Thomas
Parran of the PHS was elected President.
He guided the conference in drafting and
adoption of the constitution of the WHO by
62 signatory powers.
The official liaison agency of the U.S.
Government with WHO is the Public Health
Service. Beginning with the first World
Health Assembly, the Surgeon General of
the Service has served as chief U.S. delegate
to each of the 17 Assemblies except one, and
PHS medical officers have served as U.S.-
designated members of the WHO Executive
Board. PHS experts are members of many
different expert advisory panels within
WHO, along with hundreds of other U.S.
health experts not in the Service.
WHO operates from headquarters in Ge-
neva and through six regional offices for
Africa, Southeast Asia, Europe, the Eastern
Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the
Americas.
Regional Organizations for Health
The Pan American Health Organization
(PAHO) is the intergovernmental health
agency for the Americas. The Pan American
Sanitary Bureau (PASB) serves as the sec-
retariat of PAHO. The PASB also serves as
the regional office of the WHO for the Amer-
icas.
The Pan American Sanitary Bureau was
the first permanent international health
agency. The United States, through the PHS,
has contributed financial, technical, and per-
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
413
sonnel support to the PASB since its begin-
ning. From 1902 to 1936, the Surgeon Gen-
eral of the Public Health Service was also
the Director of the PASB. PASB and PHS
now cooperate through an arrangement
which permits the Service to assign officers
to the Pan American Health Organization
and to WHO, on request. U.S. financial sup-
port for the programs of WHO is channeled
through PAHO for projects in the Americas.
There are other regional organizations
with which this country cooperates that are
involved in health projects, although the
Pan American Health Organization is the
only one of these with health as its primary
mission. The others are involved in more
general programs for the economic, social,
scientific, and cultural advancement of un-
derdeveloped and emerging nations — al-
though health activities are a part of many
of these programs.
The Organization of American States, for
instance, trains medical and health person-
nel through its programs of technical assist-
ance. The Inter-American Children's Insti-
tute studies problems related to child life and
welfare, and takes an interest in health mat-
ters within that context.
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) conducts science activities which
in some cases relate to health and medicine.
The programs of socioeconomic development
of the Central Treaty Organization
(CENTO) have at times emphasized health
matters, and CENTO has sponsored seminars
in such fields as nursing and preventive med-
icine. The Colombo Plan for Cooperative
Economic Development in South and South-
east Asia and the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development both adminis-
ter cooperative programs of technical as-
sistance aimed at solving health-related prob-
lems.
Through the Southeast Asia Treaty Or-
ganization (SEATO), the United States
supports three medical research programs.
The SEATO Cholera Research Program op-
erates a research laboratory in East Paki-
stan, which is supported mainly through the
National Institutes of Health of the Public
Health Service, and AID, with additional
contributions by other governments. In
Bangkok, the Walter Reed Army Institute
of Research has developed the SEATO Med-
ical Research Laboratory in cooperation vdth
the U.S. and Thai armed forces and the
SEATO Council, and the SEATO Clinical
Research Center in cooperation with the
University of Medical Sciences, Bangkok.
The South Pacific Commission promotes
the economic and social welfare of people in
territories administered by the United States,
the United Kingdom, France, New Zealand,
and Australia. Health programs for the U.S.
trust territory are administered and financed
by the Department of the Interior.
The Organisation de Coordination et de
Cooperation pour la Lutte contre les Grandes
Endemies (OCCGE) assists in the control of
endemic diseases in Africa. In cooperation
with the OCCGE and supported by teams
from the National Institutes of Health of
the Public Health Service, the Agency for
International Development has financed
measles vaccination campaigns in West
African countries.
In 1962 a three-man team from NIH trav-
eled more than 15,000 miles by jeep over
dusty bush roads and cattle trails in Upper
Volta, supervising vaccination teams in the
administration of measles vaccine to 731,000
African children.
The vaccinations saved an estimated
150,000 lives, for measles is the single big-
gest killer of children in West Africa.
The mass immunization campaign against
measles was the outgrowth of earlier studies
by the NIH team, in the first of which 400
children in the western part of Upper Volta
were successfully immunized. A second study
was designed to determine if combinations
of live measles, smallpox, and yellow fever
vaccine could be successfully administered
by jet injection. The second preliminary
study proved that such a technique was safe
and effective.
The NIH teams provided the technical as-
sistance and AID financed the programs,
both in cooperation with OCCGE. Following
the success of the earlier studies and pro-
414
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
gram in Upper Volta one-fourth of the sus-
ceptible population of seven countries of
West Africa was immunized against measles.
Specialized U.N. Agencies
Within the United Nations Organization,
other specialized agencies are also involved
to some extent in international health activ-
ities. The United Nations Children's Fund
(UNICEF), for example, was developed to
improve the conditions of children and
youth, and the major part of its work
is concerned with health affairs, often co-
operatively with WHO. The Children's Bu-
reau of the Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare has also cooperated with
UNICEF in health projects related to the
welfare of children and youth.
Another related U.N. agency with some
health interests is the Food and Agriculture
Organization (FAO), which supports pro-
grams in the field of nutrition. FAO also
works closely with UNICEF, and with the
Department of Agriculture, AID, and other
Federal agencies.
The International Labor Organization,
UNESCO, the U.N. Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near
East, and the International Telecommunica-
tion Union — which disseminates information
on epidemics, disease outbreaks, and disas-
ters— are among other U.N. agencies in-
volved in the long struggle against disease
and death.
Government and Nongovernment Agencies
Agencies involved in the financing of for-
eign assistance and foreign trade must also
be included in the overall picture of inter-
national cooperation in health. There are
three major U.S. agencies and five interna-
tional agencies engaged in such work, which
affects the health status of other countries
through water and sanitation projects, ref-
ugee and disaster relief, and by generally
working to raise living standards.
The Export-Import Bank, AID, and the
Commodity Credit Corporation of the De-
partment of Agriculture are the U. S. par-
ticipants in such programs, the others being
the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (World Bank), the Inter-
national Development Association, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, the International
Finance Corporation, and the Inter-Ameri-
can Development Bank.
There are also many nongovernmental or-
ganizations active in international health af-
fairs, some of which have been the pioneers
in this field. Among the better known orga-
nizations are private foundations such as the
Rockefeller, Kellogg, and Ford Foundations,
the Commonwealth Fund, and the Popula-
tion Council.
Professional organizations and societies,
such as the World Medical Association and
the international divisions of domestic or-
ganizations like the American Medical Asso-
ciation and the American College of Phy-
sicians, have also sponsored and pioneered
international health programs with fine rec-
ords of accomplishment.
Scientific associations and unions; volun-
tary organizations such as the International
Red Cross, CARE/MEDICO, or the Thomas
Dooley Foundation; universities; hospitals;
and private enterprise in such areas as
pharmaceuticals, pesticides, and medical
equipment and supplies — all have added their
resources to the battle for better world
health.
Public Health Service Responsibilities
Some 13 major Federal agencies have in-
ternational health responsibilities.
The Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare is perhaps the most deeply in-
volved in such activity. Within the De-
partment, the Public Health Service, the
Federal agency whose sole mission is the
advancement of health, has the greatest re-
sponsibilities in this area.
Some of the PHS activities have been
noted earlier— its close ties to WHO and
PAHO, and its cooperation with AID and
other agencies of our own Government.
But the PHS has direct relationships with
other nations in the areas of health and med-
icine as well.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
415
The Office of International Health of the
PHS is the focal point for the international
activities of the Service. This Office coordi-
nates the medical exchange delegations with
the U.S.S.R., assigns PHS medical officers
to AID, Peace Corps, PAHO, and WHO,
and also coordinates all technical support
furnished by the Service to these organiza-
tions.
One of the most rewarding forms of in-
ternational cooperation in the health field
has been the exchange of medical missions
with the U.S.S.R. Twenty American delega-
tions have visited the Soviet Union since
1958, when the first exchange agreement
was made. These scientists have visited the
Soviet Union to study Russian activities in
such fields as biochemistry, radiobiology,
maternal and child health care, diseases
common to animals and man, medical educa-
tion, and urban health planning.
An equal number of exchange teams from
the U.S.S.R. have visited this country. Re-
cent Soviet visitors in the United States
have studied diseases of the blood, anesthesi-
ology, and many other health and medical
problems.
In addition to the exchange of formal dele-
gations, individual scientists from the
United States have gone to the Soviet Un-
ion, and Soviet scientists have come to this
country, to work on research projects for a
number of months. Joint meetings have also
been convened between U.S. and U.S.S.R.
scientists, who have studied together such
topics as cardiovascular and rheumatic dis-
eases.
The Public Health Service also conducts
programs of international research in health
and medicine, which are coordinated through
the Office of International Research of the
NIH. These international research activities
have been established in response to the In-
ternational Health Act of 1960, which seeks
"to advance the status of the health sciences
in the U.S. and thereby the health of the
American people through cooperative endeav-
ors with other countries in health research
and research training."
Among the research programs admin-
istered by the Office of International Re-
search are the international centers for med-
ical research and training, international
postdoctoral fellowships, the international re-
search career development program, and the
special foreign currency program. In addi-
tion, the OIR administers NIH offices in
Paris, London, Rio de Janeiro, Tokyo, and
New Delhi, where NIH personnel work with
science personnel of the Department of State
and other agencies to represent U.S. scien-
tific interests around the world.
The Service also supports international
laboratories such as the SEATO Cholera Re-
search Laboratory, in conjunction with
SEATO, AID, and the country of Pakistan.
The Middle American Research Institute in
the Canal Zone, which studies viral and
fungal tropical diseases, is supported by PHS,
in cooperation with the Gorgas Memorial
Laboratory, the U.S. Army, and PAHO. The
Institute of Medical Research in Kuala Lum-
pur is also supported by the PHS, where
work in malaria in monkeys, and its vectors,
is studied to provide clues to human malaria.
Problems of Quarantine
The Public Health Service also includes
the Division of Foreign Quarantine — one of
the oldest of all international health activities.
The United States has enjoyed 17 years
of freedom from the outbreak of a quaran-
tinable disease known to have been intro-
duced from abroad. Yet the expansion in in-
ternational travel since World War II and, in
particular, the increase in the volume and
speed of travel have intensified quarantine
problems. In maintaining our vigilance
against these diseases, the PHS has had the
full cooperation of WHO, whose responsibil-
ity is to pinpoint sources of quarantinable
diseases and to marshal worldwide support
for their isolation, control, and eradication.
The experience the PHS has gained in 87
years of quarantine activities, as well as
our modem procedures for the immuniza-
tion and inspection of travelers, insect and
rodent control, and sanitation of conveyances,
is shared with other nations through the
Expert Committee on International Quaran-
tine convened by WHO. The cooperative en-
416
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
forcement of the International Sanitary
Regulations issued by WHO, which are ad-
hered to by most foreign countries, is one
of the best examples of international co-
operation in health — and one that clearly
shows the benefits that are to be derived
through such cooperation.
Perhaps a concrete example will be to the
point here.
The last smallpox epidemic in the United
States occurred in 1947.
In August of 1962, a 15-year old Canadian
boy, traveling with his parents, arrived in
New York City by plane from Brazil. From
New York the boy would continue his trip
to Toronto by train.
The family, like all the other passengers
and crew of the plane, were cleared through
quarantine without trouble. All vaccination
certificates were valid and up-to-date.
While waiting at Grand Central Station
for the train, the boy became ill. In Toronto,
5 days later, he was hospitalized with sus-
pected smallpox.
Canadian officials informed the Division
of Foreign Quarantine of the PHS, which
swung into immediate action.
Together with the Communicable Disease
Center, another PHS Division, the Division
of Foreign Quarantine began an immediate
search for all of the boy's possible contacts
on the plane. They were scattered far and
wide — some had gone on to other foreign
countries. All but two were found, revac-
cinated, and placed under surveillance. All
other possible contacts — along the taxi route
from the airport to Grand Central Station,
at Grand Central, on the train, along the
train route, in Toronto — were alerted to the
danger and urged to be vaccinated, as were
all airport personnel.
For more than 2 weeks the knovsm con-
tacts were watched closely. No known sec-
ondary cases were found ; a situation of ex-
treme danger had been averted.
The Canadian teenager recovered. His
valid vaccination certificate had been issued
by a local Brazilian doctor, who, seeing an
old vaccination scar on the boy's arm, had
signed the certificate without revaccina-
tion.
Other components of the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare are also di-
rectly involved in international cooperation
in health. The work of the Children's Bu-
reau, closely allied with UNICEF, has al-
ready been mentioned. The Food and Drug
Administration is increasing its role in the
international exchange of drug information
and other activities in the field of drugs.
The thalidomide tragedies of just a few
years ago point up the necessity of such in-
ternational drug information programs.
other U.S. Government Activities
The Vocational Rehabilitation Adminis-
tration conducts an exciting program of re-
search in the surgical restoration of the ef-
fects of leprosy. The program, conducted in
India, also attempts to integrate patients
into community life and helps them find em-
ployment. In Israel and Brazil, the VRA
supports rehabilitation programs for the
blind, the severely burned, those with cere-
bral palsy, and the victims of other forms
of disability. VRA also conducts research
under the provisions of the International
Health Research Act of 1960 and has
sponsored exchanges of experts in rehabil-
itation between this country and other na-
tions.
The Department of State is responsible
for the regular assessed contributions of this
country to the specialized agencies affiliated
with the United Nations, many of which,
as has been noted, have health responsibil-
ities. The Agency for International Develop-
ment within the Department of State is one
of the most important and the most per-
vasive supporters of health and medical ac-
tivity throughout the world. Through co-
operation with many other Federal agencies,
through its own direct programs of as-
sistance, and in collaboration with interna-
tional agencies of many kinds, AID pro-
vides for immediate and long-range relief
of suffering among the peoples of the
world. In Pakistan, for instance, AID pro-
vided funds to support a malaria eradica-
tion program. In Tunisia and Nigeria loans
were made for the construction of water
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
417
supply systems in major cities. In Colombia,
AID has assisted projects in medical and
nursing education, water and sewage prob-
lems, through technical cooperation, grants,
and loans.
The Department of Defense supports
programs in medicine and public health for
the care of American military forces.
The Department also supports research here
and abroad in such fields as tropical and
preventive medicine, epidemiology, sanita-
tion, and nutrition.
The Peace Corps provides direct technical
assistance in the developing countries, and
has a limited number of medical and public
health activities. In 13 nations, some 250
volunteers conduct health projects that fit
into overall programs of socioeconomic ben-
efit to the host countries.
The Department of Agriculture supports
programs that affect the health of peoples
in developing countries. Probably the most
important of these is the Food for Peace
program, which makes use of Public Law
480 funds. The Food for Peace program pro-
vides for the sale of agricultural commod-
ities to friendly countries with payments
made to the United States in local currency.
These funds can then be loaned or granted
to the country for development projects, or
used, as noted earlier, in research projects
administered by such agencies as the Public
Health Service.
The Food for Peace program also makes
grants of farm products for famine relief;
provides farm products stocks for use by
domestic welfare agencies such as CARE,
Catholic Relief Service, or Church World
Service ; and uses such stocks of farm prod-
ucts for the barter of strategic materials.
The Department of Agriculture supports
a large research program which concentrates
on the problems of improving nutrition for
Americans but has worldwide relevance.
The Foreign Agricultural Service provides
technical personnel to AID for food pro-
duction projects, with significant effect on
health matters.
The Department of the Interior supports
medical and public health services in the
trust territory and U.S. possessions, and
supports research on water, occupational
health, and the nutritive value of fishery
products.
The Department of Commerce and the
Department of Labor make indirect con-
tributions to health programs overseas,
through the assignment of personnel for
census projects, studies in the costs of
medical care, health services for workers,
and manpower planning.
The Veterans Administration supports
veterans hospitals in the Philippines, pro-
vides for training of eligible graduate foreign
medical students in U.S. veterans hospitals,
and administers research in parasitology and
tropical medicine at the Veterans Medical
Center in San Juan, Puerto Rico.
The Atomic Energy Commission and the
National Science Foundation both support
research that is of worldwide relevance, al-
though not directly international in scope.
The Atomic Energy Commission works with
the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Advisory Committee on the Peaceful Uses of
Atomic Energy, and the U.N. Scientific Com-
mittee on the Effects of Atomic Radiation.
The Smithsonian Institution operates a
science information exchange program on
behalf of a number of Federal agencies and
serves as a clearinghouse for information on
current research in medicine, biology, and
other life sciences.
Health and Peace
This necessarily sketchy description of
the international health activities of this
Government demonstrates the exceptional
complexity and wide range of such ac-
tivities today. Although international co-
operation in health is not usually widely
known, it is a fact of life in the 20th century.
Programs for the relief of suffering any-
where, for the raising of standards of living,
for the expansion of trade and commerce,
are, in an extended fashion, programs for
the advancement of the health of the world.
The WHO constitution states that "the
health of all peoples is fundamental to the
attainment of peace and security." It is to -
this end that the health activities of this |
nation and other nations are directed.
418
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Cooperation for Disaster Emergency Relief
by Stephen R. Tripp
Chairman, ICY Cabinet Committee on Disaster Relief
Disasters, natural or manmade, have been
known to change the character of nations
and the course of history. Disaster still
strikes somewhere on the earth daily, al-
though we are conscious of only a fragment
of it. An occasional headline, such as "12,000
Killed and 3 Million Homeless in East Paki-
stan," reminds us of this awesome fact.
Some of our personal donations to voluntary
agencies and churches, as well as some of
our tax dollars, are used to help disaster
victims — even though the disaster may oc-
cur on the other side of the world.
The people of the United States have al-
ways given aid when it would reduce human
suffering. There is no record of when this
began. It came naturally to us. We are a
people of many backgrounds, cultures, creeds,
and races. We come from all parts of the
world, and there remains within us a basic
kinship with our ancestors.
On May 8, 1812, Congress made its first
appropriation for aid to foreign persons.
The occasion was a destructive earthquake
on Holy Thursday, March 26, 1812, which
left the cities of Caracas and La Guaira in
Venezuela in shambles and cost the lives of
some 20,000 people. The losses were heaviest
among the devout who had gathered into
their churches to worship, only to be buried
alive in the ruins. The U.S. Congress au-
thorized a sum of $50,000 for food, clothing,
and transportation.
The United States has also received aid
from others when disasters have struck our
country. The first record of this was in 1889
after the Johnstown flood in Pennsylvania.
The Sultan of Turkey expressed great sym-
pathy for those suffering from it and do-
nated 200 Turkish pounds to the U.S. Secre-
tary of State, suggesting that the fund be
turned over to the appropriate relief com-
mittee.
Predicting Natural Disasters
No one can foresee or prevent disasters,
but a brief review of events may indicate a
trend of natural disasters and it may be prov-
ident to expect that they will recur. The
major volcanoes and earthquake areas, the
flood plains, the routes of the hurricanes,
cyclones, and typhoons, and the areas of tor-
rential rains or monsoons are all well known.
Specific incidents differ in their speed of
onset and their destructive effects on people
and things. They also differ in the human
responses they arouse and the capability of
the society and its resources to cope with
the disaster. But there are patterns that il-
lustrate how important it is for us to know
the causes of natural disasters.
The National Geographic Society has
plotted "The Earth's Lines of Fire— Seis-
mology and Ocean Floor Topography" on a
map in its "Atlas of the World— 1963." The
map shows the earthquake lines encircling
the Pacific Rim, going through the center
of the Atlantic and along the coasts of the
Mediterranean. The National Geographic
Society reports that as many as a million
earthquakes occur in a year. When they
occur under the sea, they may set off tsu-
namis, great tidal waves that race across
oceans and cause destruction on shores. One
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
419
tremendous fault line is reported to wriggle
its way for 45,000 miles around the world.
About 500 volcanoes follow the earthquake
lines and "their formidable force dramatizes
the fact that the earth is not a stable mass,
but a vibrant body, full of energy, ever
changing."
Meteorological information, too, is impor-
tant. The World Weather Watch reports :
One thing that all men share is the earth's atmos-
phere. Every human being in every nation depends
on this blanket of air for the breath that sustains
his life and the rain that grows his food. Our
atmosphere knows no national boundaries, and as
it flows around the planet, the weather patterns
it creates sometimes benefit and often endanger
each one of us. . . .
Plans for a global weather satellite system,
world and regional data-processing centers,
and a worldwide communications network
are underway. In June of 1964 at the College
of the Holy Cross, President Johnson said :
. . . we will move ahead with plans to devise a
worldwide weather system, using the satellites and
facilities of all industrialized countries. The space
age has given us unparalleled capacity to predict
the course of the weather. By working together, on
a global basis, we can take new strides toward cop-
ing with the historic enemies of storm and drought
and flood.
As much as is known about disaster pat-
terns, and as widely spread as the commu-
nications network is, there are still millions
of people who have no warning of impending
disasters and no knowledge of how to pro-
tect themselves.
Disaster Research
A program of disaster research was con-
ducted by the National Academy of Sciences
— National Research Council from 1952 to
1963, and the Disaster Research Group pub-
lished a series of books and pamphlets on
important disaster subjects. In 1963 a Disas-
ter Research Center was established at Ohio
State University. It took over some of the
work and records of the National Academy
of Sciences. The Center is now studying the
operations of organizations under stress, par-
ticularly their problems and responses in
emergencies. It has sent researchers to many
areas of recent disasters, including the Vaiont
Dam flood in northern Italy, the Niigata
earthquake and fire in Japan, the earth-
quakes in Chile and El Salvador. It has pre-
pared reports on the effects of hurricane
Cindy in the United States, the floods in the
Cincinnati area, and the Alaskan earthquake.
U.S. Government Activities
Foreign disaster relief activities in the
U.S. Government are set up in a coordinated
program in the Department of State, the
Agency for International Development, the
Department of Defense, and the Department
of Health, Education, and Welfare. Through
close coordination with other Government
agencies, U.S. registered voluntary agencies,
and private organizations, it is possible to
expedite decisionmaking and delivery of food,
shelter, and medicine to stricken vic-
tims around the world. The policies, proce-
dures, and guidelines are contained in man-
ual orders and directives issued by State/AID
and the Department of Defense as follows:
In the event of a foreign disaster, the United
States may provide emergency relief assistance as a
humanitarian service consistent with United States
foreign policy goals. In order to achieve the maxi-
mum impact abroad, the initial decision as to
whether United States assistance is required should
be made promptly. In arriving at this decision, it
should be clear that disaster relief assistance by the
United States would be acceptable in the country
concerned.
A foreign disaster is an act of nature (such as
flood, drought, fire, hurricane, earthquake, volcanic
eruption or epidemic), or an act of man (such as
a riot, violence, civil strife, explosion, fire, or
epidemic) which is or threatens to be of sufficient
severity and magnitude to warrant United States
emergency relief assistance. The severity and magni-
tude of a foreign disaster is determined by taking
into account the local resources available for alle-
viating the hardship and suffering caused and the
extent of social or economic disruption.
Disaster operations include: (a) the analysis and
study of disasters for the purpose of planning in
advance the type of United States assistance that
may be needed when disaster strikes overseas; (b)
disaster preparedness; (c) coordination of avail-
able United States resources, including the voluntary
agencies, and (d) developing and implementing the
operational plan for the disaster.
Emergency disaster relief is aid which can be
used to alleviate immediately the suffering of dis- J
aster victims, and which does not constitute a sub- "
420
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
stantial, permanent contribution to the economy of
the country. Normally, it includes services and com-
modities that are used in the course of relief; the
rescue and transportation of victims; the provision
of food, clothing, medicines, beds and bedding, tem-
porary shelter and housing; and the furnishings
of hospital equipment, medical and technical per-
sonnel, and making repairs to essential services.
Emergency disaster relief may be made available
during the emergency disaster period, i.e., the in-
terval of time, usually not exceeding 60 days, during
which the kinds of relief cited above are needed.
Public Law 480 foods may be made available to
disaster victims over extended periods of time.
Assistance required for full recovery, such as re-
construction and rehabilitation, is subject to AID
program approvals, even though it may be financed
from contingency funds under the Foreign Assist-
ance Act or from P. L. 480 resources.
Disaster assistance is roughly divided into
three phases : ( 1 ) immediate rescue and life-
saving and prompt delivery (often within a
few^ hours or days) of food, disaster supplies,
medicine, and vaccines; (2) intermediate
cleanup and reestablishment of public and
private services and utilities, medical treat-
ment, feeding, and temporary housing; and
(3) recovery, rehabilitation, and long-range
reconstruction. Within this general frame-
work, governments and voluntary organiza-
tions provide assistance.
In a country afflicted by a disaster, the
U.S. ambassador or principal officer may ex-
pend up to $25,000 for immediate emergency
relief. This may be a cash presentation to a
local relief organization, voluntary agency,
or the government, or it may be used to pur-
chase and transport disaster-relief supplies.
The ambassador and the U.S. AID mission
director may also divert P.L. 480 food and
medical and other supplies available through
registered U.S. voluntary agencies. They may
make use of AID projects, such as health
programs, village improvement, community
development, or other activities that are
helping the needy in the area and which may
provide direct aid to victims. They may also
assist in the coordination of the resources of
the local Red Cross organization with those of
the American National Red Cross and the
League of Red Cross Societies. U.S. military
activities overseas may, to the extent feasi-
ble and insofar as conditions and timing
permit, provide personnel, excess property,
transportation, etc., to aid disaster victims.
When the extent of the disaster calls for
outside assistance, the AID Disaster Relief
Coordinator in the Office of Material Re-
sources coordinates the capabilities and re-
sources of AID, the Department of Defense,
the U.S. registered voluntary agencies,
American National Red Cross, and private
sources by circulating data on the disaster
supplies required. As soon as donated items
are assembled, air transport is arranged
either on a free-space-available basis,
through the Military Air Transport Service,
or on AID commercial airway bills. Working
relationships are coordinated to expedite ex-
change of facts on disasters ; determine needs
and how best to meet them ; speed up supply
and transportation ; avoid overlap and waste ;
maintain the humanitarian spirit and moti-
vation ; give accurate public information ; and
demonstrate United States concern and ef-
fectiveness in assisting disaster victims.
The U.S. voluntary agencies take a vital
and meaningful role in foreign disaster re-
lief. Their historical, detailed knowledge of
areas and people, their experience in dis-
tribution of emergency food and supplies,
and their dedication are indispensable. Some
of the American voluntary agencies that
have made major contributions to foreign
disaster relief programs over the years are :
the American Jewish Joint Distribution
Committee, American National Red Cross,
Cooperative for American Relief Everjrwhere
(CARE), Catholic Relief Services, Church
World Service, Lutheran World Relief, Men-
nonite Central Committee, and the Seventh-
Day Adventist Welfare Service.
U.S. Disaster Relief Assistance in 1964
During 1964 the United States, including
Government and voluntary agencies, pro-
vided $221/^ million in assistance to people
in 41 nations who suffered from 62 natural
and manmade disasters. A total of 7,922,345
people were victims of these disasters, of
which 11,428 were killed.
Throughout 1964 — in the form of goods
and services purchased in the United States
— AID contributed $4,123,162 for disaster
relief from its contingency fund; $209,089
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
421
was made available by U.S. ambassadors
using AID contingency funds on the scene.
Direct grants of U. S. surplus agricultural
products valued at $11,894,480 were made
by AID under the Food for Peace program.
In addition, Food for Peace supplies valued
at $2,354,428 were distributed by the volun-
tary agencies mentioned above.
U.S. registered voluntary agencies made
direct contributions from their private re-
sources valued at $2,508,030.
United Nations Programs
United Nations specialized agencies with
ongoing programs have likewise provided
assistance. The United Nations reports :
The most substantial resources now available with-
in the United Nations system that are specifically
reserved for emergency use are those of the United
Nations/ FAO World Food Programme. The . . .
World Pood Programme indicates that it is usually
unnecessary for it to make substantial quantities
of food available on the spot at the first emergency
stage of a disaster since assistance is almost always
immediately available from Governments and vol-
untary agencies. The most constructive role of the
World Food Programme lies in the intermediate
phase, which can last for several months following
a disaster.
The constitution of WHO authorizes, in addition
to technical assistance, the furnishing of necessary
aid in emergencies upon the request or acceptance
of Governments and requires the establishment of
a special fund, to be used at the discretion of the
Executive Board, to meet emergencies and unfore-
seen contingencies. . . . The Executive Board's Spe-
cial Fund to meet emergencies amounts to $100,000.
... In most cases WHO's aid in emergencies is
provided by adapting or expanding its assistance
to Governments under existing programmes. . . .
Under the regular programme the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO) has available $15,000 for sending emer-
gency missions of experts to areas affected by severe
earthquake or volcanic eruption immediately after
their occurrence. . . .
UNICEF has a special fund of $25,000 reserved
for use in emergencies. The Executive Director
may draw on the fund at his discretion. It is intended
for aid in the $5,000 to $15,000 range. . . . The
policy of the Executive Board, however, is to leave
the emergency phase as far as possible to relief
agencies and rather to provide assistance at the
reconstruction or rehabilitation stage.
The United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees has at his disposal an emergency fund
for refugee relief with a ceiling of $500,000. While
this is designed for dealing with refugee emer-
gencies rather than natural disasters, it has hap-
pened occasionally — as at Agadir and Skoplje —
that refugees were among the victims of a natural
disaster. On these occasions the High Commissioner
has been able to make an allocation from his emer-
gency fund for assistance to the refugee victims.
A Hard Look at Coordination
The U. N. Economic and Social Council
Report by the Secretary-General dated May
12, 1965, stated :
By their very nature, disasters disrupt organiza-
tion; both human and physical resources are under
great stress. Some confusion is to be expected. While
this is certainly a reason for ensuring co-ordina-
tion as far as is possible, it also explains why
hopes placed in its efficacy should not be pitched
too high. Furthermore, although disasters have com-
mon features and may be grouped under headings
(floods, earthquakes and so on) that to some ex-
tent facilitate advance planning, each in practice
presents a set of specific problems.
The donors of aid at the time of a disaster, while
aware of the need to coordinate their efforts, are
also conscious of the need for flexibility in opera-
tions. There are two main reasons for this. The
first applies to the very early stages, when speed
of response is of the utmost importance. It is
held that any routine that might impede this should
be avoided; some measure of duplication, or even
of confusion is regarded as a small price to pay for
very quick action to save life and suffering. The
second reason seems to stem from the desire of most
donors to maintain the individual identity of their
contribution. This is true of governments, of inter-
national and national non-governmental organiza-
tions, of intergovernmental organizations, and of pri-
vate firms and individuals. However unfortunate
this attitude may seem from the viewpoint of over-
all co-ordination, it is deeply rooted and the motives
behind it must be respected as in most cases such
identification of individual effort serves as a power-
ful stimulus for action which is most essential in
an emergency. It would be still more unfortunate
if excessive emphasis on a joint and integrated
approach should lead to any drying up of sources
of voluntary assistance.
Nevertheless, it remains true that at least some
of the confusion, overlaps, delays, cases of dona-
tions unsuited to local conditions, which are familiar
to anyone who has worked in disaster relief and
reconstruction, could be avoided, or at least reduced,
by co-ordination.
In recent years more and more nations
have provided assistance directly to coun-
tries stricken by major disasters. Although
the AID Disaster Relief Coordinator's office
422
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
I
is trying to obtain as much information as
possible on the extent, timeliness, value,
and the nations concerned, records are in-
adequate and the facts are incomplete.
Case Study in Coordination
A few things can be learned from the
experience in foreign disaster emergency
relief coordination by the United States
during the past 18 months :
1. There are many interpretations of
"coordination." Some people have the idea
that coordination is the collation of data
and, even worse, that it is telling somebody
else what to do. Coordination is the act of
working together, of mutual adjustment — it
implies functioning in harmony. It is the
basic root of joint action, of doing or per-
forming. To be effective, the coordinator
must have the authority and the capability
to bring together, to act, and to operate.
2. The major concern of international
disaster assistance must be for the people
and country hit by disaster.
3. It can be reaffirmed that natural
disasters such as earthquakes, volcanoes,
hurricanes, floods, drought, etc., tend to
occur over and over again in the same gen-
eral areas.
4. It is evident that some of the less de-
veloped countries of the world are not pre-
pared to cope with major natural disasters
because of their environment, internal gov-
ernment problems, lack of preemergency
planning or any clear scheme of priorities,
or recognition that some of these problems
can be solved.
5. When other nations and private orga-
nizations send assistance, it can only be used
as effectively as the local ability to admin-
ister it at the scene and for the disaster
victims.
6. Although there are some indications of
oversupply, duplication of effort, and inef-
ficient distribution, ultimately most of the
supplies reach the victims or are used in the
area of the disaster.
7. There is practically no evidence of
widespread panic; people tend to face dis-
aster according to their natural instincts
of survival.
8. Evidence points to the need, partic-
ularly in the disaster-prone areas, for bet-
ter warning and public response systems,
improved rescue equipment, more trained
personnel, supplies of high-protein precooked
foods, lightweight shelters, blankets and
appropriate clothing, improved utilization of
medicine and medical personnel, and more
expeditious transportation and delivery of
goods and personnel to the disaster scene.
9. Countries with economic and leader-
ship capabilities are usually prepared to
protect themselves from natural disasters
or to lessen the damaging effects. (For ex-
ample, Japan, occupying as it does a disaster-
prone area, has an extensive, well-organized
emergency relief system.)
Efforts to provide outside help for dis-
aster victims have sometimes been hampered
because :
1. A country would not report that an
earthquake had caused severe damage and
human suffering for fear it would hurt the
tourist business.
2. A country failed to make a prompt re-
port of an outbreak of cholera for fear of
its effect on business and exports.
3. In one instance a cyclone warning — 36
hours ahead of time — was ignored.
4. Refusal of customs clearances and
free entry of donated items has deprived
disaster victims of needed medicines and
other disaster supplies.
The Challenge
The challenge in realistic disaster as-
sistance lies before the United Nations.
Each country needs its own disaster policy,
preemergency plans, trained and equipped
rescue and relief teams, and recovery and
rehabilitation programs. Through the United
Nations there could be developed such pat-
terns and capabilities for each country, in-
cluding plans and priorities when assistance
is needed from the other nations of the
world.
A systematic approach to the solution of
these problems, starting with the nations
where disasters are most likely to occur,
would provide not only valuable interna-
tional cooperation but also global humani-
tarian concern.
SEPTEMBER 6, 1965
423
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POUCY
Joston Public Library
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ai 18 1965
DEPOSITORY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIII, No. 1368
September 13, 1965
THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS: FOUR YEARS OF FORWARD MOVEMENT
Address by President Johnson A26
U.S. FINDS U.N. MAJORITY UNWILLING TO ENFORCE ARTICLE 19
Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg U5U
PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF TWENTIETH SESSION OF U.N. GENERAL ASSEMBLY 457
VIET-NAM: WINNING THE PEACE
CBS Interview With Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Goldberg, and McGeorge Bundy 4,31
For index see inside back cover
The Alliance for Progress: Four Years of Forward Movement
Address by President Johnson ^
Mr. Vice President, Secretary Rusk, dis-
tinguished ambassadors, members of the
Cabinet, distinguished friends in the Con-
gress, my fellow citizens of the Americas:
Four years ago this hemisphere embarked
upon a great adventure — the greatest per-
haps since an unknown Italian mariner
touched these shores almost five centuries
ago.
It was nothing less than to transform the
life of an entire continent.
It was to reach into the home and the
villages of more than 200 million people,
touching each with great hope and expecta-
tion.
It was to replace privilege with social jus-
tice, and unchanging poverty with economic
progress. Where there was disease we would
* Made at a ceremony at the White House on Aug.
17 commemorating the fourth anniversary of the Al-
liance for Progress (White House press release).
bring health. Where there was ignorance we
would bring learning. We would feed the
hungry and we would shelter the homeless
and we would do all of this as free men
making liberty the companion of progress.
The adventure began in a dozen scattered
spots. In Colombia, the Act of Bogota,
was signed. 2 In Caracas, Romulo Betancourt
moved a nation from dictatorship to a living
and hopeful democracy. In Costa Rica, and
Mexico, and in many other places, new
standards were being shaped; old dreams
were taking on fresh meaning. Across the
hemisphere revolution was in the air, promis-
ing these three things : freedom, and justice,
and progress.
And then all of these growing, resistless
forces converged on this room. A brilliant
new President of the United States ad-
' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 3, 1960, p. 537.
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Llll, NO. 1368 PUBLICATION 7950 SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
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of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
faire, provides the public and interested
affenciei of the Government with infor-
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Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White Bouse and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
Stata and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included eoncemlnff treaties
and international affreementa to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.
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rial in the field of international relations
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426
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
dressed himself to his fellow citizens of this
hemisphere, and with unmatched vision John
Fitzgerald Kennedy called for "a vast coop-
erative effort, unparalleled in magnitude and
nobility of purpose, to satisfy the basic
needs of the American people. ..." *
And 5 months later — 4 years ago today —
on the coast of Uruguay, 20 American Re-
publics solemnly resolved to establish and to
carry forward an Alliance for Progress.*
That act was a turning point, not only in
the history of the New World but in the long
history of freedom itself.
The goals were towering, almost beyond
achievement. The hopes were soaring, almost
beyond fulfillment. The tasks were immense,
almost beyond capacity. But entire nations
are not stirred to action by timid words or
narrow visions. The faith and will of mil-
lions do not take firebrands that are muffled
in reluctance and fear. And if the reality of
progress was to be slow, the radiance of
ultimate achievement must be bright enough
to compel the efforts and the sacrifice of
generations.
If our Alliance was suffused with com-
passion and idealism, it also responded to
the most real and the most urgent necessities
of our time. Our continent is in ferment.
People long oppressed demanded their share
of the blessings and the dignity which the
modern world can offer to man. The peace-
ful democratic social revolution of the Al-
liance is not the alternative to tranquillity
and changelessness. It is the alternative,
and the only alternative, to bloodshed and
destruction and tyranny. For the past is
gone. And those who struggle to preserve it
enlist unawares in the ranks of their own
destroyers.
We will shape the future through the
principles of our Alliance, or we will find
it swallowed up in violence that is bred of
desperation.
How fortunate we are to live in such a
time, when justice so mingles with necessity
and faith with opportunity.
'Ibid., Apr. 3, 1961, p. 471.
* For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see
ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.
Increasing the Pace of Development
Almost from the moment of birth, the
Alliance for Progress was beset by doubt.
But men of rooted faith in every country
held firm to the purpose. And if they have
not really reached the farthest limit of ex-
pectation, we have done much ; more, indeed,
than many believed we could do.
This 4 years has been the greatest period
of forward movement, progress, and fruit-
ful change that we have ever made in the
history of this hemisphere. And that pace is
now increasing.
Last year Latin America as a whole ex-
ceeded the Alliance for Progress target of
21/2 percent per capita growth rate. Our ex-
perts tell me that we will do the same this
year. And in the Central American Common
Market the growth is almost 7 percent.
A large and swelling flood of resources
contributes to this progress. In 4 years the
United States alone has contributed almost
$41/2 billion in grants, in loans, in goods,
and in expert assistance. The nations of
Latin America have channeled $22-24 bil-
lion into development. And more than an
extra billion dollars has come from other
countries and international agencies.
At the heart of the Alliance are the twin
urgencies of planning and reform. Ten na-
tions have already submitted development
programs, and others are on the way. Four-
teen nations now have major tax reforms un-
derway, and their rate of tax collection is
steadily increasing. Fourteen nations have
now instituted land reform programs. Others
are confronting the growing importance of
population control. One government after
another is determined to reconcile reform
and economic growth with the struggle
against destructive inflation. And this morn-
ing I salute those — the people of Brazil —
who have helped to lead the way.
In my own country we have constantly
worked to improve the speed and the useful-
ness of our own participation in the Alliance,
and we have made remarkable progress.
In the last year and a half we have loaned
over $847 million — and that is almost $150
million more than was loaned in the entire
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
427
2 full preceding years combined. The number
of loans is increasing. The amount of invest-
ment guarantee is on the rise. Housing guar-
antees have gone up 20 times in the last 2
years.
So you see in both the United States and
Latin America we are moving more and
more swiftly to meet the obligations and to
reach the goals that we set in the Alliance
for Progress.
And behind the statistics lie the countless
stories of human needs that have been met,
human suffering that has been relieved, and
human hopes that have been fulfilled.
Twenty-five million people — 13 million of
them little children — are receiving food from
the Alliance programs.
More than 11/4 million people already have
new homes. A million children now have new
classrooms, and 10 million textbooks have
already been produced.
Hundreds and hundreds of thousands now
can find relief from suffering in more than
850 hospitals and health centers and health
units that have been already placed into
operation.
More than 100 million people today are
protected from malaria. And all across the
face of the hemisphere new roads are being
constructed. Electric power lines are going
up. And institutions for savings and credit
and development are already opening new
doors.
These are important gains. But, perhaps
more importantly, the banners of reform, of
social justice, of economic progress have
been seized by governments and by leaders
and by parties throughout this hemisphere.
Elections are fought and elections are won
on the principles of the Alliance. And where
once the light of hope flickered in very few
places, today it burns in many nations. In
the oppressed countryside and in the desper-
ate slums, growing numbers of people know
that far away in distant capitals — under
different slogans and with varying success
— their leaders are working to brighten
their days and to insure their dignity.
For the fact is, even though the forces of
injustice and privilege and tyranny still
hold many fortresses, they are on the de-
fensive today. And we can say, far more
surely than we once could, that their final
day is coming.
Future Emphasis
But whatever we have accomplished, we
all know that the road ahead is longer and
it is more steep than the way behind. If
many have been helped, then there are many
more that are still untouched. If some are
newly free, there are millions that are still
shackled by poverty and disease and igno-
rance and malnutrition. If we have made
more progress than before, as we have, we
have made far less than we should and we
must.
So, to this end, we must all increase the
efforts that we are now making: first, to
build modern industry and the structures on
which it rests; to attract a growing flow of
private investment and technology to Latin
America; to speed up the process of social
reform.
But it is not just enough to continue doing
what we are doing. From the experience and
the achievement and the failures of the first
4 years, we can now shape new directions.
Recently I received — as did the other
American Presidents — a letter from CIAP
[Inter-American Committee on the Alliance
for Progress] suggesting changes and new
departures. The leadership of this organiza-
tion is itself one of our very healthiest de-
velopments. And I pledge that my Govern-
ment will review this letter with great care
and sympathy.
But from this letter — and from our own
experience — we can already see the shape of
future emphasis.
First, we must step up our efforts to pre-
vent disastrous changes in the prices of those
basic commodities which are the lifeblood of
so many of our economies. We will continue
— as we did this week in London — to
strengthen the operation of the coffee agree-
ment and to search for ways to stabilize the
price of cocoa.
We will try to maintain a regularly ex-
428
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
panding market for the sugar that is pro-
duced by Latin America. And consistent
with the CIAP recommendations, I will pro-
pose this afternoon that Congress eliminate
the special import fee on sugar so that the
full price will go to the Latin American
producers.
Second, we must try to draw the econ-
omies of Latin America much closer to-
gether. The experience of Central America
reaffirms that of Europe. Widened markets
— the breakdown of tariff barriers — leads
to increased trade and leads to more efficient
production and to greater prosperity.
The United States will, as CIAP suggests,
contribute from its Alliance resources to the
creation of a new fund for preparing mul-
tinational projects. By building areawide
road systems, by developing river basins
which cross boundaries, by improving com-
munications, we can help dissolve the bar-
riers which have divided the nations.
In addition, I hope the American nations
will consider the establishment of a pro-
gram— patterned after the European Coal
and Steel Community — for the production
and trade, on a continental basis, of ferti-
lizer, pesticides, and other products that are
needed to increase agricultural production.
My country stands willing to help in such
a venture.
And thus, in ways that he never imagined,
we can move much closer to the dream of
Bolivar.
Third, we must emphasize the needs of
rural Latin America. Here is the scene of
the most abject poverty and despair. Here
half the people of Latin America live. And
it is here, in the countryside, that the foun-
dation of a modem economy will finally be
built. Through the diversification of crops,
we can decrease dependence on a few export
products. Through increasing production, the
countries of Latin America can feed their
own people. Through increasing farm in-
come, we can provide growing markets for
new industry.
And we must, as CIAP also suggests, di-
rect more of our effort toward those things
which directly touch the lives of individual
human beings — housing, education, health,
and food. And it is not enough simply to say
that a growing economy will ultimately meet
those needs. Misery and pain and despair
exist in the present, and we must fight them
in the present with all we have and the best
way we can. This is not only the command
of compassion. It is, as we all recognize, the
counsel of wisdom. For factories and banks
and dollars do not alone build a nation.
People build a nation. And on those people,
on their health and their knowledge and
their faith, their participation and their
sacrifice, rests the future of all of us and
the future of all nations.
This is the common thread which runs
through the Great Society in my country
and the Alliance for Progress in all countries.
These are a few — and only a few — of the
many tasks which lie before us as we meet
here this morning to labor to complete the
second revolution of the Americas.
Enlarging the Dignity of IMan
The task of development is a practical
process. Development demands skilled lead-
ership. It demands careful judgment. It de-
mands initiative, ingenuity, and imagination
that is firmly tempered by possibility. But it
also demands something more. For our prog-
ress is not its own end. It is an instrument
to enlarge the dignity of man. And so we
must build on faith and on belief and on
those values which are the resistant and en-
during mark of our civilization.
This means that each man should have the
chance to share in the affairs of his nation.
Each should participate in that liberating
process of self-rule that we know as democ-
racy. It is fundamental to our Alliance that
all of our nations should be free and that all
of our people should be a part of that free-
dom. We have not yet achieved that for all
of our countries, indeed for all the people of
my own country. But that is our goal for
this entire continent. And, however we build,
the Alliance will not be a success until that
is accomplished.
It is to protect that right of self-determi-
SEPTEMBER 13, 1966
429
nation that the OAS today works in the
Dominican Republic. I know that all of you
share the wish that the future government,
chosen by the Dominican Republic and by
the Dominican people themselves, will be de-
voted to the principles of liberal democracy
and social justice; and that you share as
well the intention of my country to help
them rebuild that memory- and strife-
scarred land.
This also means that each man's nation —
whether it is great or small — must walk as
an equal with all others — free to shape its
society, free to select its institutions and
free to find its own way to the future so
long as it respects the rights of its fellows.
And from this enriching diversity of custom
and tradition — practice and the conduct of
affairs — I think we will all draw strength
and, perhaps, even wisdom.
This also means that each man must have
a chance to share in present benefits and to
share in future progress. God did not create
any man to live in unseen chains, laboring
through a life of pain to heap the table of
a favored few. No farmer should be enslaved
to land that he can never own. No worker
should be stripped of reward for toil. No
family should be compelled to sacrifice while
others escape the obligations of their society.
"Indeed," said Thomas Jefferson, "I tremble
for my country when I reflect that God is
just." We must surely tremble for our con-
tinent as long as any live and flourish pro-
tected by the walls of injustice.
If we follow these commands in all our
lands, then progress will fulfill our dreams.
But if we sacrifice them to weakness, or in-
terest, or to false promise, then the hand
that builds will become the hand of desola-
tion.
I am, as best I can, and best I know how,
trying to follow them in my own country.
This year new laws will help the old in my
country to find health, will help families to
supplement the cost of their homes, will help
the Negroes to share in democracy, will
help the poor to find an exit from poverty,
and will help little children to seek learning.
For in my nation, like yours, we are still
struggling to find justice for all of our peo-
ple. And because we are fortunate in abun-
dance, we feel that morality requires that we
must also try to help others who seek it for
their own people, too.
And there is also something more. The
process of development is still an unknown
process. Although we mask our uncertainty
with charts and tables, calculations and in-
tricate theories, we are still very uncertain.
But one thing we do know. Development is
not just a matter of resources, or trade, or
production, or even crops. Rather, in some
mysterious way, a people — because they have
great leaders and because they have great
hopes and because they themselves are great
— an entire people begin to stir and to sac-
rifice and to work. And when they move a
nation begins to move.
And today in this country and, I believe,
throughout this continent, this is really be-
ginning to happen.
It is this — not the numbers or reports —
which tell us these have been fruitful years.
And with luck and with skill and with in-
transigent resolve we will clear away the
thousand barriers that lie ahead — if enough
hands grasp them, and all are allowed to
make the journey.
To all that was pledged that momentous
August day 4 years ago — and everything
promised since then — I here, on this anni-
versary today, again pledge my administra-
tion and my personal life in office.
As for the future, leave that to the New
World. It will be ours, as it was promised
so many years ago.
Thank you.
430
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Viet-Nam: Winning the Peace
Following is the transcript of an inter-
view with Secretary Rusk, Arthur J. Gold-
berg, U.S. Representative to the United
Nations, and McGeorge Bundy, Special As-
sistant to the President, on a Columbia
Broadcasting System television program on
August 23.
Press release 194 dated August 23
Harry Reasoner: Good evening. We are in
the John Quincy Adams Room of the State
Department in Washington for the third in
our series of programs with the United
States policymakers on Viet-Nam.^
Across from me are three distinguished
officials whose task it is to pursue perhaps
the most difficult and elusive of our objec-
tives in Viet-Nam, the pursuit of peace.
We are happy to have back with us the
Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, who, with
the President, formulates our foreign policy,
and who heads our diplomatic offensive in
Southeast Asia. This is our newly desig-
nated Ambassador to the United Nations,
Arthur Goldberg, who is exploring the ave-
nues of a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam
through United Nations channels. And this
is McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the
President, who has played a key role in the
formulation of our policies in Viet-Nam and
who, a few weeks ago, on this network de-
fended the administration's position with
some professors who disagree with it.
Seated with me are two CBS News col-
leagues: diplomatic correspondent Marvin
Kalb, who regularly covers the State De-
1 For the transcript of the first program, on which
Secretary Rusk and Secretary of Defense Robert S.
McNamara were interviewed, see Bulletin of Aug.
30, 1965, p. 342.
partment and who is just back from one of
many trips to Russia, and United Nations
correspondent Richard C. Hottelet.
Gentlemen, I would like to begin with a
fairly basic question. It has been quite a
weekend in Viet-Nam. We have bombed
close to China again. We have bombed, for
the first time, some targets that could be
described as less directly military than be-
fore. And there is a kind of new optimism
about how the ground fighting is going. Is
this the moment, is this the time, for nego-
tiations ? I would like each of you to reply to
that briefly.
Secretary Rusk?
Secretary Rusk: Well, that depends on the
other side in their assessment of the situa-
tion. We have been ready for a long time to
make peace in Southeast Asia. Our problem
is to get the other side to the conference
table. We just don't know. The other side
must make that decision.
Mr. Reasoner: Ambassador Goldberg?
Ambassador Goldberg: I think any time is
a good time for negotiations. The only way
to resolve conflict is to "go to the bargaining
table," to use a term that I am very well
familiar with. And it seems to me that this,
is not determined by the calendar or even by
the course of military events. This is deter-
mined by the genuine desire of the parties;
to the conflict to remove the problem from
the battlefield to the bargaining table. So,
for me, any time is a good time to negotiate.
Mr. Reasoner: Mr. Bundy?
Mr. Bundy: Well, it is certainly true that
it is our position that now is a good time
to negotiate. We have had that view for
many months, have tried to make it clear in
every way — public and private — at every
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
431
level of discourse, from the President on
down. It is also true that the response from
Hanoi — still more from Peiping — ^has been
consistently and powerfully negative. No
later than a week ago, in an interview with
the correspondent of the French newspaper
Le Monde, Ho, of Hanoi, made it very plain
that they were not prepared to negotiate ex-
cept on terms of all power to the Commu-
nists.
I believe it to be true that military success
of the kind which we have seen in recent
days does help us bring nearer the day
when there will be an effective negotiation.
Mr. Hottelet: It also reinforces the ques-
tion that some people have asked of whether
you ought to negotiate at all, or whether, if
you find the tables turning your way, if you
are gaining any kind of military ascendancy,
whether you shouldn't use that advantage,
press it to checkmate Communist aggression,
which is the United States' professed aim —
not only in Viet-Nam, but all through South-
east Asia, and Laos, and in northeast Thai-
land and Malaysia as well. In other words,
"Why should we negotiate?" is the question.
Mr. Bundy: I think all of us would agree —
and I know this to be the position of Presi-
dent Johnson — that we are ready to nego-
tiate and that we are not disposed to take
the view that because the battle is going well
we are unwilling to talk about it.
In our view, the effort to end the aggres-
sion must continue while the aggression con-
tinues. But we are prepared for discussion
and for negotiation at any time.
Meeting the U.S. Commitment
Mr. Kalb: There is in the air right now,
in Washington, something which has not
been here before, at least in the past couple
of months, and that is a wispy kind of feel-
ing that maybe there is some optimism here
and some grounds for optimism. I would like
to ask you, Mr. Secretary, what are the
grounds for optimism? What is the evidence
that gives rise to this sense?
Secretary Rusk: I think the fact that
President Johnson has made it very clear
that we are not going to be pushed out of
South Viet-Nam and that we shall meet our
commitments to South Viet-Nam has made
a big difference to this situation.
I think, also, the fact that international
opinion is not supporting the effort of Hanoi
to take over South Viet-Nam makes a dif-
ference, because I think they were hoping
at one time that there would be a buildup of
international opinion that might cause the
United States to change its attitude toward
our commitment.
Ambassador Goldberg: May I make an ob-
servation on the Secretary's statement? New
to diplomacy, I have been reading in diplo-
macy. Talleyrand made a statement about
the Vienna Congress, in which he said that
"The great powers there assembled were too
frightened to fight and too stupid to agree."
And I think, in a very simple measure, we
can say of American foreign policy in this
situation that it is clear — from what the
President has said, from what the Secretary
of State has said, what Mr. Bundy has said
in his teach-ins — that the United States
very definitely is not too frightened to fight.
That has been demonstrated.
Elements of a Peaceful Settlement
Secretary Rusk: Let me come back, Mr.
Kalb, if I may, to Mr. Bundy's reference to
the interview by Ho Chi Minh in Le Monde
on August 14. He seemed to be saying there
that a precondition for peace is the with-
drawal of American forces. Well, under the
circumstances, this is quite an unrealistic
point of view, because those forces are there
solely because of the intervention of outside
forces from Hanoi in South Viet-Nam.
Now, one would suppose that peace re-
quires that there be a withdrawal of those
North Vietnamese forces that have pene-
trated into South Viet-Nam. If you don't like
the word "withdrawal," you can use the
word "redeployment." But it is that infil-
tration which is solely responsible for the
presence of American combat forces in South
Viet-Nam.
Now, obviously, we and others have been
giving a good deal of thought to the basis
on which peace can be achieved. I think the
432
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
entire record of the United States since 1945
shows that we want peace and not war, and
that all of our effort in this postwar period
has been directed to that end.
Well, now, in South Viet-Nam the cessa-
tion of outside aggression, the cessation of
this infiltration from the North, is certainly
fundamental, because that would make it
possible for American forces to come home.
We should like to see full performance on
all sides of the military clauses of the 1954
agreements. We have said repeatedly, time
after time, that as far as the United States
is concerned, we have no interest in military
bases or a permanent military presence in
Southeast Asia.
Well, now, that is in accord with the 1954
agreements, and that should be one of the
essential elements of a peaceful settlement.
Now, as far as South Viet-Nam internally
is concerned, we have a deep commitment to
the simple notion of self-determination. In
the 1954 agreements it was anticipated that
there would be elections through secret
elections — through secret ballot — and that
the peoples of Viet-Nam, North and South,
would have a chance to express their opin-
ions. And we are prepared for elections in
South Viet-Nam to determine what the
people of that country want in terms of their
oviTi institutions.
And then the question of reunification,
which has been troublesome over the years —
again, it is instinctive with the United
States to say, "What do the people want?
What do the people want?" And there, again,
to find out in North Viet-Nam and in
South Viet-Nam what the people themselves
really want on this matter is important.
Now, this isn't very simple. And it doesn't
mean that both are going to want reunifi-
cation. The people in the North would want
reunification only if there were a Commu-
nist regime throughout the country. The
people in the South don't want reunification
on that basis. But it is for the people of
Viet-Nam to decide that at such time as they
have a chance to express their views freely
on that point.
So what we are talking about here are the
simple elements of a settlement which were
reached basically in 1954 and again in 1962
in the Laotian agreements.
Mr. Hottelet: Mr. Goldberg, you sit at
probably the most sensitive listening post in
the world. Do you get any indication from
your colleagues at the United Nations that
the other side has gotten this message — that
we are not too frightened to fight and not
too stupid to talk?
Ambassador Goldberg: Not yet, in all can-
dor. But we have to persevere with patience
and experience and hope. Our message is
loud and clear. The signal that the Secretary
has referred to on occasion, saying that
"negotiations will take place when you hear
a signal" has been made by the United
States.
Our President has stated publicly to the
world that we are prepared to sit down in
unconditional negotiations, discussing the
points that Hanoi has made, discussing the
points that we have made, and to arrive at
a durable settlement, a durable settlement.
I am hopeful — I am hopeful, and I con-
tinue in this hope — that we will get a similar
signal from the other side. It is very simple
to make that signal. The President did it at
Baltimore.^ He did it on other occasions. He
has done it since. He armed me with a letter
to the Secretary-General,^ when we said
very plainly that we are ready to negotiate
unconditionally all problems — to negotiate
on the basis of their position and our posi-
tion. And I think we are looking for a signal
from the other side.
The 1954 Agreements
Mr. Reasoner: Mr. Secretary, I think that
there is some confusion in this country
about the 1954 agreements,* which are men-
tioned so often. For instance, I don't know
how many Americans realize it is an agree-
ment that we didn't sign. Could you outline
' For text of an address by President Johnson at
Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see Ibid., Apr.
26, 1965, p. 606.
= For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 275.
* For texts of the Geneva agreements, see Ameri-
can Foreign Policy, 1950-1955, Basic Documents, vol.
I (Department of State publication 6446), pp. 750-
788.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
433
why we did not sign that and if we would
sign a similar agreement now?
Secretary Busk: Well, we did not formally
sign those agreements, but General Bedell
Smith, who was then Under Secretary of
State, made a statement ^ at the time which,
in effect, embraced those agreements on be-
half of the United States and said that any
attempt to violate those agreements by force
would be looked upon by the United States
as a threat to the peace. So that we do be-
lieve that the 1954 agreements, in their
essential principles, do provide a basis for
peace in Southeast Asia. What we do not
believe is that the settlement of 1954 can be
upset by force by any party.
Mr. Reasoner: Mr. Bundy, for reasons
which you have explained and Secretary
Rusk has explained and the President has
explained, the war in Viet-Nam has gotten
bigger. Our participation in it has increased.
How do we know that it won't continue to
escalate until eventually we have world war
III? Is there some kind of a tacit under-
standing on how far both sides go ?
Mr. Bundy: I know of no tacit under-
standing, Mr. Reasoner, but I think it is fair
to say that all parties, and all those con-
cerned, are aware of the danger of enlarge-
ment of the conflict. We certainly are, on
our side. We have lived with crises, large
and small, over a 20-year period now — in
Berlin, in Greece, in Korea, in Cuba, and
elsewhere — and I think Americans can be
proud of the care and the prudence and the
restraint which their Government has shown
in this generation of effort.
Under the leadership of President John-
son— a man of peace if there ever was one —
we are conducting our affairs in that tradi-
tion and with that purpose of restraint. We
believe that there is a similar recognition —
although not always a similar recognition
of the rights of others — there is a similar
recognition of the hazards of any great en-
largement of the conflict on the part of the
parties interested on the other side. We can-
not be sure of what they will do. We can be
• For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.
sure — and we must be accountable for what
we do, and that is why our entire effort has
been directed at things related specifically
to what is being done to and in South Viet-
Nam.
That is what we are concerned with — not
the fate of any other regime elsewhere, not
the safety or security of any larger power
nearby which we do not threaten. We are
concerned with the fulfillment of our obliga-
tions in South Viet-Nam, a limited objective.
And the nature of those limitations we have
made just as clear as we know how.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Bundy, could you convince
us and thereby provide us with the evidence
that leads you to feel that the American
bombing of North Viet-Nam is specifically
related to acts of terrorism in South Viet-
Nam and that this will convince the Viet
Cong operation in South Viet-Nam that they
must stop what they are doing.
Mr. Bundy: No, the bombing in North
Viet-Nam is not — I would not relate it spe-
cifically and directly to any one action in
South Viet-Nam, but to the campaign in
South Viet-Nam and to the program pursued
by Hanoi against South Viet-Nam it is re-
lated and related most directly. The targets
are military targets: military lines of com-
munication, military barracks, military de-
pots. There has been no miscellaneous bomb-
ing of any old target in North Viet-Nam, or
anywhere, so far as we can avoid it. The
targets have been directly related to a cam-
paign of infiltration, a campaign of mili-
tary control, and a campaign of organized
terror, where the heartbeat of that campaign
is in Hanoi.
Question of Chinese Intervention
Mr. Hottelet: Getting back to China, I
have heard the assumption expressed that
China will not intervene directly in Viet-
Nam as long as the regime — the Communist
regime of North Viet-Nam — is not in danger
of being overthrown and as long as there is
no massive incursion of American power on
the ground. Is this in fact an assumption
that guides your policy?
434
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Rush: Well, I think we are at
some hazard in trying to think like the mem-
bers of the Politburo in Peiping. It is my
impression that the Communist world does
not want a general war over Southeast Asia.
Unfortunately, some of them want Southeast
Asia. Therefore, we cannot be completely
sure at the end of the trail which desire on
their part will predominate.
But the authorities in Peiping must know
that they have undertaken to support an
effort in South Viet-Nam right up against
an American commitment of which they
were fully informed. Therefore, they must
recognize that there are very large hazards
if they themselves elect to pursue this by
direct intervention.
Now, we therefore have been acting with
the combination of firmness and prudence
in an effort to keep wide open the doors of
peaceful settlement. This has characterized
American policy in all of these postwar
crises to which Mr. McGeorge Bundy re-
ferred. And we would hope very much that
the time will come when it will be recog-
nized on the other side that pushing this
matter militarily is not worth the risk at
the end of the trail, and therefore that they
will bring this to the conference table for
settlement.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, there are a num-
ber of people in Washington who study the
China problem who believe that, on the con-
trary, it is precisely a war in Southeast Asia
that the Chinese want. It is precisely the
bogging down of an enormous number of
American troops in Southeast Asia that the
Chinese want, both for internal political
reasons as well as the justification of their
position in terms of their quarrel with the
Russians. What evidence can you provide
that, indeed, the Chinese — I'm not talking
about the Russians now — do not really want
this kind of a larger and deeper American
involvement, even running the risk of war
with America?
Secretary Rtisk: Well, one can only judge
by their actions thus far and by impressions
one gets from those who have been in touch
with Peiping. There is a comment going
around in the Communist world these days
that Peiping is prepared to fight to the last
Vietnamese. There is a certain caution and
prudence in their action, more so than in
their words. But when you analyze these
matters from the point of view of basic na-
tional interest, objectively, in terms of what
can be at the root of their thinking, I myself
cannot believe that it is a rational idea that
the principal powers involved in this busi-
ness could look with favor upon the outbreak
of a general war. It doesn't make sense
from anyone's point of view.
Now, that means that it is important to
do what we can not to let events take con-
trol, to try to keep some sort of control over
the situation so that contacts among the
capitals might have a chance to find a way
to a peaceful settlement. And that is one of
the reasons why — one of the principal rea-
sons why — President Johnson has tried to
act with the combination of the firmness
and prudence that he believes the situation
requires.
Mr. Bundy: If I could pick up from what
the Secretary said for one moment and say,
in the first place, nothing is more impor-
tant than the maintenance of prudence and
of effective control of our own operations by
our own Government. That is the meaning
of the insistent direct surveillance which the
President maintains over major military de-
cisions and specifically over decisions which
affect military action against North Viet-
Nam. This is a matter which he keeps under
his own control by the consent and with the
support of the senior military commanders
concerned.
And just one more point. Obviously the
Chinese would be delighted to have us mis-
manage our affairs in South Viet-Nam and
in Southeast Asia so that we got more and
more engaged in something less and less suc-
cessful. It is our object and our purpose and
our responsibility to do a better job than
that, and to do that job within the limits
of prudence, restraint, and decency which
we are trying to follow.
Ambassador Goldberg: Could I summarize
American policy in this area by quoting an
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
435
ancient Greek wise man, Polybius, who said
that "The purpose of war" — and I would de-
scribe it in terms of our attitude toward
Hanoi — "is not to annihilate the enemy but
to get him to mend his ways." And this, in
fact, is what we have been attempting to do
— prevent aggression — and this has been
made clear time and time again.
The President said, my distinguished pred-
ecessor at the United Nations said, we don't
covet any territory. We don't seek to estab-
lish any military bases. We are acting the
way we do to stop aggression. And when you
move only to stop aggression, not to promote
aggression, I think the dangers of a general
war are minimized.
China's National Interest
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Ambassador, everything
that you said is certainly true, and this is
precisely what the administration is saying.
At the same time, people sit in the Chinese
capital who have to view it from the point of
view of their national interest. You can say
that we are not building bases around China,
but when the Chinese leaders look out at the
map, they can see the presence of American
military forces from one end of the Chinese
border to the other.
When you bomb, as we did today, within
31 miles of the Chinese border, people re-
sponsible for Chinese national security prob-
ably would look with some great concern
about that. I'm trying to understand what
makes you feel that they are not that deeply
concerned or that they don't feel that bomb-
ing 31 miles on this side of the border might
not lead to 31 miles on the other side of the
border.
Ambassador Goldberg: Mr. Kalb, for a
very simple reason : because we have stated,
as a matter of direct public policy to the
world, a commitment which America has
made to everybody, that if aggression
ceases from the North, our activities in
South Viet-Nam will likewise cease. This is
a pretty broad statement, quite different
from statements that were made by other
powers at other points in the history of
South and North Viet-Nam.
Mr. Hottelet: There was a time in the
Korean war, after the cessation of fire and
before the armistice was signed, when, as
President Eisenhower revealed not long ago,
he got tired of waiting for the Chinese to
sign the armistice and threatened or prom-
ised to use all American power, including
nuclear power, against the Chinese. He said
they got the message, and they came to the
conference table. Can you envisage any sim-
ilar circumstances in Viet-Nam?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think we will have
to let that question ride for the future. There
already was a negotiation going on at that
time, and the problem was to bring it to a
final conclusion. In a major sense the fight-
ing had already been brought to a conclusion
by the earlier discussions of the cease-fire.
We may get to a point where a cease-fire
gets to be the crucial element there in Viet-
Nam.
Well, Mr. Kalb, if I could return to your
point just for a second. I don't believe that
ideological differences are as profound as to
cause Peiping to be concerned about what
they see around their borders, when they
know that we would come home if Hanoi
would leave South Viet-Nam alone and that
we would not have bases or troops in South-
east Asia if these countries could live in
peace.
Now, they can pretend, given their ideo-
logical commitments, that they somehow are
afraid that we have in mind a major attack
on China. There is nothing in the record to
show that, nothing in the conduct of the last
15 or 20 years to give any support to that
idea.
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, are you suggest-
ing then that the American confrontation —
if I can use that large word — in Southeast
Asia is really the United States and North
Viet-Nam and not the broader confrontation
of the United States and Communist China?
Secretary Rusk: Well, I think, in the first
instance, it is clear that what Hanoi is doing
is our principal problem and explains why
we are in South Viet-Nam with military
forces, so that we are not involved in a con-
frontation the purpose of which on our side
436
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
is to destroy the regime in Peiping. We have
two divisions in Korea because, among other
things, several hundred thousand Chinese
came into the Korean vi^ar in 1950-51, and
this posed a problem of the security of South
Korea. But throughout this postwar period,
force has been initiated by the other side.
The free world has had to meet that force
with determination, but the free world has
also met it with the kind of prudence and
restraint that keeps open the doors of peace-
ful settlement. And all I would say on that
is, to our colleagues in Peiping, if they want
to test whether or not the United States is
aggressive, then let them live at peace with
their neighbors and they would find out that
the United States is not aggressive with re-
spect to mainland China.
No Lack of Communication With Peiping
Mr. Kalb: You're talking in a kind of
shorthand though, sir. Isn't it more direct in
some way at this stage, given the dimension
of the danger, to have a more direct link of
communication with the Chinese Commu-
nists? I'm aware of the Warsaw conversa-
tions, but we have had enormous political
differences with the Russians. We have been
able to establish a "hot line" to Moscow.
What about some kind of line directly to
Peiping?
Secretary) Rusk: Well, I think we have
had more discussions with Peiping over the
last 10 years on more important subjects
than has any government that recognizes
Peiping, with the possible exception of Mos-
cow. Our problem with Peiping is not com-
munications. Our problem is that when we
have talks with them, they begin by saying
that there can be no improvement in the
situation until we are prepared to surrender
Formosa to the mainland, and that means
turning over 11 million people against their
will to Peiping. And we will make it clear
that this is not possible, and I must confess
the conversation gets to be implacable and
harsh and takes well-known lines, as repre-
sented in the public statements of the two
sides.
Mr. Bundy: Going by their own conversa-
tions, Mr. Kalb, what they say to journal-
ists— the few and rare ones whom they re-
ceive— the Peiping government itself has
said over and over again, framing the mat-
ter in its own terms, that what is at issue
in Viet-Nam is fundamentally a matter for
the Vietnamese people to decide. This is ex-
actly what we think. We believe that the
center of this question is in what is being
done to and in South Viet-Nam. It is not in
Peiping, except as they may be engaged in
support and assistance to those who are at-
tempting to destroy a given society and re-
place it with one fashioned in their own
image.
And I believe the people in Peiping know
that, and I believe they understand clearly
that it is only by their action and by their
decision that there can be the kind of en-
largement which would involve direct danger
to them.
Mr. Reasoner: This question has come up
several times, about letting the people of
Viet-Nam decide what they want to do. Is
this, indeed, the case? Or is it a case, as in
other United States policy, where there are
limitations, where there are certain options
denied them? Suppose South Viet-Nam de-
cided it wished to make a separate peace,
would we accept it?
Mr. Bundy: Well, I think when you asked
that question earlier to Ambassador [Max-
well D.] Taylor, he said that he just didn't
think that was a realistic possibility. My
own judgment is — on the basis of one short
visit and innumerable reports and a great
many discussions with others who had been
there much longer — that there is no problem
from our side of confidence in the ability of
the people of South Viet-Nam, given a free
choice and conditions of reasonable peace, to
frame their ovim future in ways with which
we would be happy to live, that it is an un-
real question to suppose that they would
freely choose to cast their lot with the Com-
munists.
Mr. Reasoner: In other words, it is not an
unreal question to this extent, that some in-
telligence estimates this spring indicated this
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
437
would be a possibility ; even if it is unlikely,
it must be something we consider.
Mr. Bundy: I'm not aware of that — of
those estimates.
Mr. Reasoner: Well, put it on a purely
hypothetical basis. To think through the un-
thinkable, what would be our attitude?
Would we accept it?
Mr. Bundrj: Let me put it the other way
around and say the United States is ob-
viously not in a position to make the kind of
effort and to make the kind of sacrifices
which we are making if there were not ef-
fort and sacrifice by the people and govern-
ment of the country to which we are giving
assistance.
There is that kind of effort. There is that
kind of sacrifice. Our attention focuses most
naturally upon the battles in which Ameri-
cans are heavily engaged, and we feel most
naturally American casualties. But the rate
of casualties and the rate of effort is run-
ning many times to one on the Vietnamese
side as between us.
Mr. Hottelet: Are there any points on
which the peace aims of the United States
and the Government of South Viet-Nam do
not coincide?
Mr. Bundy: Well, there is a constant
problem of discussion over the exact ways in
which we would state our peace aims. But
the current situation is that — and the Secre-
tary can speak to this better than I can —
that the Foreign Minister of the Government
of South Viet-Nam and the Secretary him-
self have made closely parallel statements
about our peace aims.
U.S. Commitment to Free Elections
Mr. Reasoner: I don't mean to be of-
fensive, and I certainly recognize your right
to decline to answer this question, but in
Santo Domingo we retained the possibility of
a veto over a government. This was clear.
This denied certain options to people in the
way of self-determination. Do we retain sim-
ilar veto over possible decisions in South
Viet-Nam?
Mr. Bundy: Mr. Reasoner, you're talking
about an island I love. I was down there.
And the point that I think needs to be made
is rather that these two situations are
closely parallel.
Our action there — first, to save lives, then
to prevent a particular kind of Communist
hazard — has developed into an action de-
signed precisely to give a reasonable oppor-
tunity for the people of the Dominican Re-
public to make their own choice about the
kind of government and the kind of society
they want to have.
Now, a small island in the Caribbean and
a newly independent country operating with-
in international agreements which somewhat
affect its international position on the other
side of the world — these are two very dif-
ferent situations. But my own belief is that
the fundamental purposes of the United
States in both areas can be defined in the
same broad terms.
Mr. Rusk: Mr. Reasoner, there is a very
deep commitment of the American people
to the simple notion that governments de-
rive their just powers from the consent
of the governed. And we have not seen
a government — a Communist government —
brought to power by the free election of its
own people.
Now, we have overwhelming evidence
from all sections, sectors, areas, groups in
South Viet-Nam that they do not want what
Hanoi is offering to them in South Viet-
Nam. Therefore, I do not believe that we
need fear — from the point of view of free-
dom— that we need to fear what the effect
would be of genuinely free elections among
the people of South Viet-Nam. I have heard
some people — who were not, I think, in a
very good position to know the details —
speculate that 80 percent of the people in
South Viet-Nam would elect Ho Chi Minh
or accept Hanoi if they had a free election.
That just doesn't fit any of the evidence
that we have about the attitude of these
people.
Mr. Reasoner: I'm not speaking so much
of elections as of a coup which would put
into power without reference to the people —
as essentially the present government is
438
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
without reference to the majority of the
people. It's not established that way yet.
They don't know how, Ambassador [Henry
Cabot] Lodge says. But if they had a gov-
ernment which wanted to make peace, do we
retain veto power over this peace ?
Mr. Bundy: Mr. Reasoner, the coup-
making power, to put it in those terms, does
rest, as Ambassador Taylor was suggesting
last week, primarily with the military. There
is no hint of this in the military, but people
underestimate the degree of the commit-
ment of all factions — not the Communists —
to a non-Communist solution in South Viet-
Nam.
One of the principal Buddhist leaders said
to one of our people the other day, on a
point that comes up occasionally with re-
spect to negotiation, that he hoped very
much that we would not give any interna-
tional diplomatic recognition to the Viet
Cong; the Viet Cong did not represent the
South Vietnamese people but only an agency
of the Communists in the North. There are
divisions and difficulties, many, varied, and
fascinating, among the non-Communist
forces in South Viet-Nam, but not on this
issue.
Position of National Liberation Front
Mr. Hottelet: In earlier discussions the
Viet Cong has been treated as a monolithic
force which is really not human because
human beings are different and even if they
are bound by a discipline or bemused by an
ideology, they do have their own anteced-
ents and they do have their own tastes.
How much is being done now, and what will
be done more in the future, to insert a
wedge into the differences that must exist
inside this theoretically monolithic Viet
Cong — the nationalists, the patriots, the peo-
ple who are just peasants wanting to live a
life of their own?
Secretary Ricsk: Well, there are various
elements in the National Liberation Front.
I think it is true that not all of them are
Communists, although the Communists have
even in recent weeks declared that they are
the dominant factor and that they must
themselves be the ones to give the orders.
I think there may also be some tensions be-
tween some of the Southerners and some
of the Northerners within the Liberation
Front. But, basically, they are united on the
notion that the program of the Liberation
Front must be accepted as a solution for
South Viet-Nam and that the Liberation
Front itself must have a dominant role in
the government there, regardless of the fact
that this is not the wishes of the over-
whelming majority of the 14 million South
Vietnamese.
Ambassador Goldberg: May I add a word
in this connection. I was looking at the
Geneva agreement last night. The Geneva
agreement, despite w^hat is said in Hanoi,
did not contemplate nor does it say any-
thing about a coalition government in which
the Liberation Front would occupy the dom-
inant role that Hanoi would like to accord
it. The Geneva agreement says that the
Vietnamese people. North and South, should
"enjoy the fundamental freedoms, guaran-
teed by democratic institutions" — I'm read-
ing— "established as a result of free general
elections by secret ballot."
Now, it's very interesting to see the con-
trast in positions. When we talk about re-
turning to the essentials of the Geneva
agreement, which Hanoi says it wants and
which we say we subscribe to, we rely upon
the fact that there shall be self-determina-
tion. Hanoi relies upon the fact that they
should take over the government in their
image before there are free elections. Well,
we all have had a bit of history in this since
the war. I don't recall, after that has been
done elsewhere, that there have been any
free elections.
Now, surely the acid test is whether you
are willing to subscribe to the principle of
free elections. That, we have said, we are
ready to subscribe to. If we are ready to
subscribe to it, it must reflect a considerable
degree of confidence, which is lacking on
the other side.
Mr. Bundy: To put it another way, the
Geneva conference included as a participant
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
439
the state of Viet-Nam. The current position
from Hanoi is that there is no question of
Saigon authorities — this is the very language
of Ho Chi Minh — so what they wish to do is
to foreclose the question of choice by the
establishment, as the only authentic repre-
sentative— again his own language — their
agent, controlled from within by a clearly
Communist Party, the Viet Cong.
Secretary Rusk : And without elections.
Political Instability Related to War
Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, you mentioned
before, or Mr. Bundy did, actually, that you
and the Foreign Minister of South Viet-Nam
have come out with statements that are
rather similar as to what both countries
want in South Viet-Nam. We have yet to
hear what the Prime Minister of South Viet-
Nam actually wants, and there have been
stories that there are possible differences
already, even in this early period of Ambas-
sador Lodge's return — of differences between
the two. The Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao
Ky] was not there when the Ambassador
arrived. Do you feel, sir, that negotiations,
as we have been discussing them, are in any
way realistic or possible, given the possibili-
ty of continued political instability in South
Viet-Nam, or the continued absence of state-
ments from the new South Vietnamese gov-
ernment that aline themselves with us ?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think that political
instability in South Viet-Nam is itself di-
rectly related to violence in the countryside
and the conditions of the war. During the
Greek guerrilla operations, for example,
there were some eight Greek governments
in the period of some 15 months of guerrilla
operations.
It isn't easy to sustain an orderly govern-
ment based upon elections throughout the
countryside when thousands of local officials
are being assassinated or kidnaped and when
the normal processes of the economy are
interrupted by sabotage of routes of com-
munication.
So that there is a connection between the
political possibilities of what we would
call a democratic and constitutional govern-
ment and peace throughout the country. I
have no doubt that the South Vietnamese
themselves would move toward a government
rooted in popular support and that this
could be easily demonstrated if the condi-
tions of peace made it possible for them to
proceed on that basis.
A few weeks ago, as you will recall, they
did have provincial elections, where a large
number of those who were eligible to vote
did in fact register — over two-thirds — and
that some 73 percent of those who were
registered did in fact vote, even though the
Viet Cong were opposing those provincial
elections. There were multiple candidates.
From our point of view they were free elec-
tions. And we can, I think, take some con-
fidence from the fact that, if given a chance,
if given some possibility of peace, these peo-
ple in South Viet-Nam would know how to
establish a government and base it upon
popular support and get on with the main
job — it would be their first choice.
Mr. Kalb: And yet, sir, the Prime Minis-
ter of the country, the Air Commander, has
expressed his impatience publicly with the
politicians in South Viet-Nam. He has ex-
pressed a certain admiration for dictators of
the past. Do we really have a sense that this
is the kind of government that we can go
to the conference table with?
Secretary Rusk: Oh, I think that we go to
the conference table with the Government of
South Viet-Nam. I think that their war aims
and our war aims are basically the same and
that if that country can get some peace,
then there could be a rapid development of
their political, economic, and social institu-
tions in the direction which would cause all
of us to applaud them and give them full
support.
Mr. Hottelet: You don't say, sir, that the
war aims are identical. What are the points
of difference ?
Secretary Rusk: Well, perhaps I could say
identical. As far as my present knowledge
is concerned, I'm not aware of any signifi-
cant difference in the war aims of our two
countries.
The central thing, though — the central
thing is that the aggression from the
440
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
North, the infiltration of men and arms
from the North, must be stopped and the
South Vietnamese be allowed to work out
their own problems themselves without the
use of force from the outside. Now, this is
the major, central, overriding point. The de-
tails are incidental to that central point, and
on that there is no difference between us
and Saigon.
Ambassador Goldberg: May I rephrase
the Secretary's remark in a simple way. I
was writing it down as he said it. If we
look at the public record — the public record
is not unimportant in this area — the goal of
Hanoi policy, as recently expressed, is to
wage a 20-year war, to impose a Communist
regime on South Viet-Nam. The goal of
American and South Vietnamese policy is
to determine their own destiny by demo-
cratic means under conditions of peace.
Secretary Rusk: I think an examination
of Hanoi's broadcasts and of Peiping's
broadcasts in the last several months would
indicate that they are leaning rather heavily
on three points :
One, that they could score a military
success in South Viet-Nam. We know that
that will be denied to them.
Second, that international opinion some-
how will build up in such a way as to put
sufficient pressure on the United States to
cause us to change our commitment to South
Viet-Nam. We know that that will not oc-
cur.
And, third, that divisions inside the
United States will cause us to change our
view of this matter. We don't believe that
will occur.
Therefore, Hanoi, I think, must face the
fact that three essential pillars in their pol-
icy are weak pillars, and, therefore, we
would hope very much that they would
realize that this matter must be brought to
some conclusion.
Now, I don't want to exaggerate the role
of public discussion and public debate. Am-
bassador Goldberg has made a very useful
comment on the limitations of debate in
settling these matters.
Looking back over the postwar period,
you will recall, for example, that the Greek
guerrilla problem was not settled in debate.
At a certain stage the guerrillas simply
began to wither away. You will recall that
the Berlin blockade was not lifted through
a debate in the Security Council. It was
done through private contacts ahead of time
between the Soviet Union and the United
States. Similarly, the Korean war was not
settled in a debate in the United Nations.
It was settled by contacts among the parties.
And, therefore, we believe that we are in
a period where the real views of the various
parties need to be explored by channels
that are available in order to see whether
the basis for a peace exists. I have indi-
cated myself early in this program what
seemed to us to be the main lines of a
peaceful settlement as far as we are con-
cerned. There are many details which can't
be elaborated because we are not at a ne-
gotiating table.
But I do believe that it is important for
us to pursue the quiet diplomacy, whether
in the United Nations or in other respects,
because it is in that way that we shall, I
think, get the key signals at some stage
that might bring this to the conference
table.
U.S. Unconditionally Ready for Discussions
Mr. Hottelet: Can one not hasten this
process somewhat? Can one not ripen the
quiet diplomacy by creating circumstances
in which the other side will find it neces-
sary to come to the conference table by, for
instance, dramatizing a desire to return to
Geneva, or perhaps some dramatic — sub-
stantive but dramatic — approach by Presi-
dent Johnson — a summit conference on this
problem, which I think everyone recognizes
is a most serious problem ?
Ambassador Goldberg: Mr. Hottelet, how
more dramatic can the President of the
United States be? He made a public declara-
tion about this in Baltimore — unconditional
discussions — and then some critic said that
the President did not mean negotiations. So
then, in the letter that he sent down with
me to the Secretary-General of the United
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
441
Nations he used the word "negotiations" to
put at rest this thing that people were
talking about. Following which we sent a
letter to the Security Council,® in which we
said we call upon anyone, any member, not
only of the Security Council but of the
United Nations, to participate with us in
this effort.
The 17 nonalined nations made a pro-
posal.'' We said that they would form the
basis for a negotiation.
And then I can't go through all of the
15 efforts that were made. Mr. [Harold]
Davies went to Hanoi. We said that we
welcomed that initiative. The Common-
wealth Ministers made a declaration. We
said we welcomed that initiative. Mr. Nkru-
mah has indicated some interest. We did
not discourage him. I personally feel that
you never denigrate any party, nor a great
nation, by indicating a desire for a peaceful
resolution of a conflict. The President has
done this. He has gone all out for this pur-
pose.
Mr. Hottelet: The purpose of my ques-
tion, Mr. Goldberg, was to ask whether one
could not do more than just indicate a will-
ingness to accept, indicate an acquiescence
in.
Mr. Bundy: We have done that in the
specific case that you have mentioned, Mr.
Hottelet. It seems to me that the fact is —
and it is very clear, really, and increasingly
recognized around the world — we are uncon-
ditionally ready for negotiations. We are
unconditionally ready to return to Geneva
if others are. We are unconditionally ready
for the good offices of the United Nations
in any way that they can be made effective.
We are unconditionally ready to meet with
all interested governments and go to work
on this problem, and we have said so in
every sharp and flat and, as the President
is fond of saying, in every State of the
Union. And I believe the message has been
heard.
° For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278.
' For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
Question of Pause in Bombing
Mr. Kalb: At one time, Mr. Bundy, there
was an unadvertised pause in the bombing
of North Viet-Nam. I wonder, sir, if the
administration might not — in following up i
Dick's line of questioning — might not con-
sider that an advertised or unadvertised
effort along these same lines might not be
contemplated. Because the leaders in Hanoi
— and you keep making reference to the
other side — have certain things that they
must go on, too : In addition to public state-
ments they have the fact that they are be-
ing bombed.
Mr. Bundy: Well, you talked about this
matter in this series of a couple of weeks
ago, and I think the Secretary then made
the point that at the time of that unan-
nounced pause there was information about
its existence, which was in fact conveyed to
the governments most concerned and, in the
first instance, to the government in Hanoi.
They were in no doubt that this was happen-
ing. They were in no doubt that we would
be watching to see whether there was any
response or any secondary action. Any time
that we thought that there was promise of
action in response, in terms of the reduc-
tion of the activities which have made this
trouble, there would be no hesitation in the
United States about making appropriate
adjustments in our own military activities.
Secretary Rusk: Yes, I'd like to assure
you that we have not been negligent in our
business and that hardly a week goes by
that the other side doesn't have a chance
to indicate what else would happen if the
bombings ceased.
Now, I said in our earlier program on
this series that we would be willing to con-
sider cessation of the bombing if it were a
step toward peace. Now, that remains open,
that possibility. But what else would hap-
pen? Would the 325th North Vietnamese
Division go home? Would there be a cessa-
tion of the bombing in South Viet-Nam,
where it's occurring all the time among the
South Vietnamese and against our own
forces?
442
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
In other words, the target here is peace,
and all of these incidental aspects of it
ought to be fitted into a movement toward
a genuine, permanent, peaceful settlement
of this situation.
Mr. Reasoner: There is a question here
I'd like to address to Mr. Bundy. If, as we
seem to feel, we have some years ahead of
us — or some weeks or months or possibly
years — making South Viet-Nam strong, wait-
ing for a signal, what happens to the war
in the meantime? It seems to get a little
bigger all the time. Our participation seems
to get stronger. Is there a limit to that?
Mr. Bundy: Well, our actions there — and
this is a point which I think Secretary
McNamara spelled out with some care a
couple of weeks ago on this program — our
actions there have been essentially actions in
response and in reply. And what has en-
larged the war has been the increasing com-
mitment directed from, supplied by, and
coming from, very often and increasingly
coming from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam.
Our ovvTi forces are there because of ac-
tions which have been necessary in re-
sponse. That is why we feel so strongly
that the question here, as to whether it's
going to get worse or better, and the ques-
tion as to when it will come to the peace
table, is one in which one has to think about
more than just the United States position.
Our determination is to assist and support
a people who are defending themselves
against an effort to make them a Com-
munist power, part of a Communist power.
That effort has been the effort which
seemed necessary and appropriate at each
stage, and only that much.
We are not in a position to say to our
countrymen in this country when that will
end. We think that the American people
understand why they are there and why
these sacrifices are necessary. We hope that
it will not grow larger.
Now, the conflict in South Viet-Nam — we
will do what we can to limit it, but we can-
not be unwilling and unready to do our part.
Role of the United Nations
Mr. Hottelet: Mr. Secretary, looking ahead
to the permanent peace settlement, you
have stressed your adherence to the es-
sentials of the Geneva agreement and you
have stressed the need for self-determina-
tion. When the United States refrained from
signing the Geneva agreement. Bedell Smith
also suggested that free elections should be
supervised by the United Nations. Do you
see a role for the United Nations in making
certain that any future Geneva agreement
on Viet-Nam is actually honored by those
who sign it?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, I would hope that
the United Nations could play an im-
portant part in connection with any settle-
ment, but that would depend upon the at-
titude of all the parties, including Hanoi
and Peiping, and thus far both of those
capitals have rather pushed aside and re-
jected participation by the United Nations.
But if there could be organized an inter-
national inspection force or police force to
supervise a peaceful settlement, if there
could be a strong effort to build upon the
capability of the United Nations to bring
about economic and social development in
the area, then I think there is a very im-
portant role for the United Nations in con-
nection with the making and keeping of the
peace. And I would hope very much that
the other parties would make it possible for
the United Nations to play that kind of a
role.
Ambassador Goldberg: Before we leave
this subject, may I make an observation
on what Mr. Bundy just said. We are not
the ones that are talking about a war that
lasts 10 or 20 years. Ho Chi Minh has been
talking about that. We are talking about a
peace that should be negotiated here and
now, here and now.
Mr. Bundy: That is a very important
point. I'd like to just make one comment in
finishing up on that. We don't know when,
but the sooner the better, and we are ab-
solutely sure that it is the order to all of
us from our President — from our nation's
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
443
President — that we shall never be second,
never be slow, never be without energy
and imagination, in trying to find ways of
bringing a peaceful and a decent settlement
to this contest.
Secretary Rusk: Mr. Reasoner, it seems to
me that each citizen in the United States
has a special obligation in thinking about
such a problem as South Viet-Nam. I think
it really isn't enough just to worry about
it, to be concerned about it, to be anxious
about the future. Of course, all of us are
concerned about it and anxious about the
future. But each citizen might consider what
he would do if he were the President of
the United States facing the choices faced by
the President of the United States, to enter
into the full agony of the question, "What
does the United States do in this situation?"
And I have no doubt that if each one of
us should look very hard at the nature of
the aggression, at the nature of the Amer-
ican commitment — the importance of the
integrity of the American commitment — at
the many efforts made to find a peaceful
settlement, that the citizen — thinking of
himself as President for the moment —
would conclude that we have to make good
on our commitment. But at the same time
we have to explore every possibility for
a peaceful settlement, and that is what
President Johnson is doing.
Mr. Reasoner: Gentlemen, I'd like to
thank you very much for coming. As we
leave some millions of citizens considering
what they would do if they were President
of the United States, you may have spoiled
a lot of people's sleep, Mr. Secretary.
Thus far in our four-part series on Viet-
Nam, we have examined the critical deci-
sions that our country faces, the question
of how we can win the war there, and, to-
night, how we can win the peace. Two weeks
from tonight, on September 6th, in the con-
clusion of "Viet-Nam Perspective," we shall
take a close look at what kind of a war it is
we are fighting there. Teams of CBS News
correspondents and camera crews will film
a single day of combat at different loca-
tions to bring to you in color "Viet-Nam
Perspective — a Day of War."
This is Harry Reasoner. Good night.
Basic U.S. Position on Viet-Nam
Reaffirmed in Note to U.K.
Following is the text of a U.S. note re-
garding Viet-Nam which was transmitted to
the British Governinent on August 8 and
published in a British white paper issued on
August 26.
Press release 199 dated August 26
On April 2, the Government of the United
Kingdom, acting in its capacity as Co-Chair-
man of the 1954 Geneva Conference, ad-
dressed to the United States and other gov-
ernments a request for a statement of the
respective governments' positions concern-
ing the Viet-Nam situation.
Shortly afterward, President Johnson
made clear the basic views of the United
States Government in his speech of April
7 at Johns Hopkins University.^ On April 8,
supplementing President Johnson's state-
ment, the United States Government formal-
ly replied to an appeal of 17 non-aligned na-
tions of March 15. ^ These documents were
fully discussed with the Government of the
United Kingdom, and their status as explan-
ations of the basic United States posi-
tions made clear. Subsequently, Under Secre-
tary Ball discussed the matter fully with
the United Kingdom Secretary of State for
Foreign Affairs, Mr. Michael Stewart, in
London on May 10.
The basic position of the United States
Government, as set forth in President John-
son's speech, and the reply to the 17 non-
aligned nations, was and remains as follows :
a. The goal of the United States Govern-
ment not only in South Viet-Nam but every-
where in Southeast Asia is a state of peace
in which independent nations may develop
' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p.
'Ihid., p. 610.
606.
444
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
as they themselves wish. The United States
Government has no territorial ambition and
threatens no regime.
b. Together with numerous other nations
that maintain diplomatic relations with the
Republic of Viet-Nam, the United States
considers the Republic of Viet-Nam an in-
dependent national entity, exercising juris-
diction in the territory south of the 17th
parallel demarcation line established under
the Geneva Accords of 1954. Both under
these Accords and under the basic principles
of international law, the Republic of Viet-
Nam has the right to be free from external
interference. The United States has a long-
standing commitment to assist the Republic
of Viet-Nam in achieving this end, and has
provided economic and military assistance
for its security and in order to further the
welfare of the South Vietnamese people. In
response to the subversive movement and
aggressive actions for which the essential
leadership and direction, and the key person-
nel and equipment, have been provided by
North Viet-Nam in violation of the Geneva
Accords and the basic principles of interna-
tional law, successive governments of the
Republic of Viet-Nam, acting freely, have
requested increasing military assistance
from the United States and other friendly
governments. The United States regards ac-
tions being taken by itself and other friendly
countries as acts of individual and col-
lective self-defense under the United Nations
Charter. It considers that limited air actions
undertaken by the Republic of Viet-Nam and
the United States since February 1965
against military targets in North Viet-Nam
fall within the same principle of self-de-
fense. The United States believes that the
principle of preventing the take-over of
other national entities by force and external
interference, such as North Viet-Nam is
now engaged in, is of vital importance not
only to the countries of Southeast Asia but
throughout the world.
c. The essential element in a peaceful
settlement is the ending of aggression, which
in turn would permit the termination of
American supporting military action. The
ultimate objective must be conditions under
which the people of South Viet-Nam can
determine their own future free from ex-
ternal interference, and, when this condi-
tion has been created, the United States
will be ready and eager to withdraw its
forces from South Viet-Nam. Future rela-
tionships between North and South Viet-
Nam should then be worked out by peaceful
means.
d. To this end, the United States Govern-
ment is prepared at any time for uncondi-
tional discussions vdth any government.
e. The United States Government, in addi-
tion, believes that it is vitally important to
proceed as rapidly as possible with programs
for the development of Southeast Asia, un-
der the leadership of Asian nations and the
United Nations. As the President stated on
April 7, the United States Government is
prepared to contribute one billion dollars to
appropriate projects in this area. It also
envisages that such programs would include
North Viet-Nam under conditions of peace.
Subsequent to basic statements by the
United States Government on April 7 and
April 8, the United States Government has
taken other occasions to make clear its posi-
tion. On June 23, Secretary of State Dean
Rusk further spelled out the United States
position in a public address,^ and, on July
28, President Johnson made a further state-
ment.* Portions of the President's state-
ment dealing with conditions for peace are
attached. In addition, during the period from
February onward, a number of suggestions
and initiatives looking toward a peaceful
solution were made by the Government of
the United Kingdom and other govern-
ments and interested parties. The United
States Government has responded affirm-
atively to each of these initiatives, and in
addition itself undertook a temporary cessa-
tion or pause in the bombing of North Viet-
Nam.
» Ibid., July 12, 1965, p. 50.
• Ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 262.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
445
In Secretary Rusk's June 23 address, he
stated that an ultimate peaceful solution
could be based on the following points sug-
gested by Foreign Minister Tran Van Do of
the Republic of Viet-Nam :
a. An end to aggression and subversion,
including the withdrawal of political and
military personnel introduced by North Viet-
Nam into South Viet-Nam.
b. Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose
and shape for itself its own destiny in con-
formity with established democratic proc-
esses without any intervention of whatever
form and whatever source.
c. As soon as aggression has ceased, the
ending of the military measures now neces-
sary by the Republic of South Viet-Nam
and the nations that have come to its aid
to defend South Viet-Nam, and the removal
of foreign military forces from South Viet-
Nam.
d. Effective guarantees for the independ-
ence and freedom of the people of South
Viet-Nam.
These points would represent in principle
a return to the basic concept of the Geneva
Accords of 1954. Whether their realization
would involve a reaffirmation of these Ac-
cords or new agreements which would
embody these essential points, perhaps pro-
viding for more effective international ma-
chinery and guarantees, could be worked out
in discussions and negotiations. Once the basic
points set forth by Mr. Tran Van Do were
achieved, future relations between North
Viet-Nam and South Viet-Nam could be
worked out by peaceful means, including the
question of free decision by the peoples of
North and South Viet-Nam on the matter of
reunification. The United States Government
notes that it has, since 1954, consistently
supported the principle of such free deter-
mination under international supervision.
The Government of the United Kingdom will
have noted the statement of the President
on July 28 that the United States visualizes
free elections in the South (as stated in the
second point of Foreign Minister Tran Van
Do), or throughout Viet-Nam under inter-
national supervision.
The United States Government has made
clear its willingness at any time to engage in
unconditional discussions in an effort to find
a peaceful solution. North Viet-Nam appears
to maintain that it will engage in discus-
sions only if the principle of dominant Com-
munist participation in a Saigon Govern-
ment is accepted in advance, a step the
United States Government believes could
only lead to a Communist take-over and is
in any event contrary to the principle of
the freedom of South Viet-Nam to shape its
own destiny without interference, in this
case from a movement based on force and
supported by North Viet-Nam. Other Hanoi
statements have appeared to require that
the United States withdraw its forces before
there can be any discussions. We have re-
peatedly tried to establish whether Hanoi
in fact insists on such preconditions to dis-
cussions, and such reports as that of the
Canadian representative in late May strong-
ly suggested that North Viet-Nam did thus
insist. Similarly, the recent reception given
Mr. [Harold] Davies by North Viet-Nam
appeared to show little inclination on its part
to engage in discussions at this time.
Alternatively, discussions might follow af-
ter reciprocal actions leading to the reduc-
tion or cessation of hostilities. The United
States Government's initiation of a pause
in the bombing of North Viet-Nam in mid-
May, and the communication of its inten-
tions to Hanoi, was undertaken in order to
explore this path. At that time North Viet-
Nam made it completely clear that it would
not respond. The United States Government
does not rule out the possibility of another
and perhaps more prolonged suspension in
the bombing of North Viet-Nam, if Hanoi
gives some clear indication that there would
take place appropriate and commensurate
actions in relation to infiltration and mili-
tary action in South Viet-Nam and the pres-
ence of North Vietnamese military person-
nel.
Apart from the search for a solution in
Viet-Nam itself, the United States Govern-
ment has hoped that discussions could be
held on problems concerning Cambodia and
Laos. The United States Government sup-
446
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ported Prince Sihanouk's proposals for a
conference on Cambodia, to be attended by
governments that participated in the 1954
conference.^ Although the Soviet Union and
the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam joint-
ly stated in April that both favored the con-
vening of conferences on Cambodia and Laos,
North Viet-Nam subsequently appeared to
draw back and to impose conditions at vari-
ance with the Cambodian proposal.
As to the so-called National Liberation
Front, the United States Government is con-
vinced that the Front was created by author-
ities in North Viet-Nam and remains under
their effective control. Hence the United
States Government does not regard the
Front as an independent party, although it
would have no objection if, for example.
Front representatives participated in dis-
cussions as part of the delegation of the
Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. As Presi-
dent Johnson has stated, there would be no
difficulty in representation for the so-
called Liberation Front if Hanoi were to de-
cide to cease its aggression and to seek a
peaceful solution.
In the absence of any indication that North
Viet-Nam is prepared for a peaceful solution
by some path, the United States Govern-
ment remains fully committed to use what-
ever resources and military force are neces-
sary to protect the people of South Viet-
Nam against outside-directed Communist ag-
gression.
U.S. Continues To Abide by Geneva
Conventions of 1949 in Viet-Nam
Folloiving is the text of a letter from Sec-
retary Rusk to Samuel Gonard, President of
the International Committee of the Red
Cross.
August 10, 1965
Dear Mr. Gonard : I appreciate Mr. Frey-
mond's [Jacques Frejmiond, Vice President
of the International Committee of the Red
Cross] letter * concerning the application of
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 ^ to the hos-
tilities in Viet Nam. The United States Gov-
ernment has always abided by the humani-
tarian principles enunciated in the Geneva
conventions and will continue to do so. In
regard to the hostilities in Viet Nam, the
United States Government is applying the
provisions of the Geneva Conventions and we
expect the other parties to the conflict to
do likewise.
Among the particular measures being tak-
en to implement the Conventions at the
present time, the United States Government
is developing plans to assist the Govern-
ment of the Republic of Viet Nam to expand
and improve facilities and procedures to pro-
cess and care for an increased number of
captives taken in combat. The two Govern-
ments are also increasing programs of in-
struction for personnel in the details of the
provisions of the Conventions.
As you are aware, those involved in ag-
gression against the Republic of Viet Nam
rely heavily on disguise and disregard gen-
erally accepted principles of warfare. From
the outset it has therefore been difficult to
develop programs and procedures to resolve
fully all the problems arising in the appli-
cation of the provisions of the Conventions.
Continued refinement of these programs
and procedures in the light of experience
will thus undoubtedly be necessary.
The United States Government will co-
operate fully and communicate further with
the International Committee of the Red
Cross concerning the performance in Viet
Nam of its traditional and valuable human-
itarian mission.
Sincerely yours.
Dean Rusk
The Honorable
Samuel Gonard, President,
International Committee of the Red Cross,
7 Avenue de la Paix,
Geneva.
" For a statement made by Secretary Rusk on Apr.
25, 1965, see ihid.. May 10, 1965, p. 711.
' Not printed.
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
3362, 3363, 3364, and 3365.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
447
President Pleased by Korean
Ratification of Treaty With Japan
Following is the text of a message dated
Aiigust 15 from President Johnson to Pres-
ident Chung Hee Park of the Republic of
Korea. The President's message ivas read
to news correspondents at Austin, Tex., on
August 15 by Joseph Laitin, Assistant
Press Secretary to the President.
The United States Government has for
many years believed that the establishment
of normal relations between the Republic of
Korea and Japan would be a historic step
that would bring important and durable
benefits to both nations and to the Free
World.
I was pleased to learn that the Korean
government has just ratified the Basic
Relations Treaty with Japan and its as-
sociated agreements.^ The establishment of
normal relations between these two coun-
tries will be welcomed by all friends of the
Republic of Korea and Japan.
U.S. Welcomes Dispatch of Korean
Division to South Viet-Nam
Following is a statement made to news
correspondents at Austin, Tex., on August
13 by Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to the
President, together with the text of a letter
sent on that day by President Johnson to
President Chung Hee Park of the Republic
of Korea, which Mr. Moyers read to the
correspondents.
statement by Mr. Moyers
The Government of Korea announced
today it is sending a division of 15,000
troops to assist the people of South Viet-
Nam. That division will be in addition to
the 2,200 Korean troops already in South
' For a statement by Secretary Rusk dated June
22, see Bulletin of July 12, 1965, p. 76.
Viet-Nam. That will bring to 17,200 the
total contribution of Korea.
Letter of President Johnson
I was deeply gratified to learn that the
National Assembly of Korea, at your re-
quest, has approved the dispatch of a Korean
division to join the Korean troops already
assisting the Vietnamese people in their
fight to preserve the freedom of the Re-
public of South Viet-Nam.
The American people welcome this fur-
ther demonstration of the devotion of Korea
to the spirit of liberty and independence.
I know how much this contribution owes
to your leadership and I want to express to
you my personal gratitude.
Artificial Kidney Center To Be
Established in Israel
The White House announced at Austin,
Tex., on August 16 that the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare has awarded
a grant to Hadassah University Hospital in
Israel to establish an artificial kidney
center. It will be the first such center estab-
lished by the U.S. Government outside the
continental United States.
The grant will enable Hadassah Hospital,
located in Jerusalem, to undertake a 2-year
program of treatment and research in the
field of artificial kidneys. An artificial kid-
ney unit will be established at the hospital,
and supervisory nursing and technical per-
sonnel will receive training in a similar unit
in the United States.
The establishment of the kidney center in
Israel is part of the administration's pro-
gram to use American medical knowledge
for the benefit of all mankind.
Four federally supported artificial kidney
centers are now operating in the United
States — at Seattle, Wash., Brooklyn, N.Y.,
Birmingham, Ala., and Chicago, 111.
The total award for the 2-year program is
$176,400. The first-year grant of $95,526
will be used to purchase the kidney unit as
well as train the necessary technicians.
448
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Canada and U.S. Mark Anniversary
of Joint Board on Defense
WHITE HOUSE STATEMENT
White House press release dated August 18
President Lyndon B. Johnson and Prime
Minister Lester B. Pearson today observed
the 25th anniversary of the Canada-United
States Permanent Joint Board on Defense
with messages of congratulations. The Per-
manent Joint Board on Defense was es-
tablished by President Franklin Roosevelt
and Prime Minister Mackenzie King at
their historic meeting in Ogdensburg, N.Y.,
on August 17 and 18, 1940.i The establish-
ment of the Board marked the beginning of
the close cooperation of Canada and the
United States in their common defense. The
congratulatory messages are as follows:
From the Prime Minister :
Throughout its quarter century of dedicated
service, the Canada— United States Permanent Joint
Board on Defense has symbolized the spirit of
friendly cooperation which characterizes relations
between our two countries. Created to meet the
requirements of wartime, it has continued to ful-
fill a valuable role in North American defense. On
this, its twenty-fifth anniversary, I congratulate
the Board and wish it continued success.
Lester B. Pearson
From the President :
The Canada-United States Permanent Joint
Board on Defense has played an invaluable role in
developing the close and effective cooperation of
Canada and the United States in our common de-
fense. I am confident that it will render equally
signal service to the defense of our two countries
in the years ahead. On this twenty-fifth anniver-
sary of the Board, I am happy to extend my con-
gratulations and best wishes.
Lyndon B. Johnson
The Board was directed by President
Roosevelt and Prime Minister King to
"consider in the broad sense the defense of
the north half of the Western Hemisphere."
After dealing with many and often urgent
problems during World War II, the Board
has continued in the postwar era to concern
itself with the complex problems related to
the modern-day defense of North America.
From its beginning the Board has provided a
useful combination of civilian and military
representation. Cochairmen from each coun-
try are assisted by representatives of the
military services of each country, and of the
Department of External Affairs and State
Department. Canada's first chairman was
Col. Oliver Mowat Biggar, a prominent law-
yer, who was succeeded by Gen. A. G. L.
McNaughton and by Mr. L. Dana Wilgress,
a former Under Secretary of State for Ex-
ternal Affairs, who is the present Canadian
chairman. The first United States chairman
was Mayor Fiorello La Guardia of New York,
who was followed by the Honorable Dean
Acheson, Maj. Gen. Guy V. Henry, United
States Army, and Dr. John A. Hannah,
president of Michigan State University. The
present United States chairman is the Hon-
orable H. Freeman Matthews, a former Dep-
uty Under Secretary of State.
Although it is no longer the only agency
concerned with joint defense relationships
between the two countries, the Board's
combination of civilian and military member-
ship and the flexibility of its procedures
continue to give it a useful and important
role in the military relations between Canada
and the United States.
ADDRESS BY W. AVERELL HARRIMAN,
AMBASSADOR AT LARGE ^
It is a great pleasure for me to represent
the United States on the 25th anniversary
of the signing of the Ogdensburg Declara-
tion. The agreement reached on August 18,
1940, between Prime Minister William Mac-
kenzie King and President Roosevelt estab-
lished a unique defense relationship between
Canada and the United States which has
vital and continuing significance for our
two countries.
' For text of the Ogdensburg Declaration, see
Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1940, p. 154.
" Made at Ogdensburg, N.Y., on Aug. 18 (press
release 196 dated Aug. 17).
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
449
I would like to read to you a message
from President Johnson :
The Canada-United States Permanent Joint Board
on Defense has played an invaluable role in devel-
oping the close and effective cooperation of Canada
and the United States in our common defense. I
am confident that it vk^ill render equally signal
service to the defense of our two countries in the
years ahead. On this twenty-fifth anniversary of the
Board, I am happy to extend my congratulations
and best wishes. Lyndon B. Johnson.
Ogdensburg has in addition many personal
associations for me. My mother, Mary Aver-
ell, was born here and my grandfather,
William J. Averell, was Mayor of Ogdens-
burg. I have had many occasions to visit this
city and the north country as Governor of
New York and as a native New Yorker.
One of the unique aspects of the Ogdens-
burg agreement was the amazing informal-
ity in the way it was concluded. In these
days of multilateral diplomacy, multiple
bureaucratic clearances, with all the attend-
ant memoranda, position papers, task forces,
and conferences, it may seem unusual that
two commonsense men got together at the
dinner table and came to a far-reaching de-
cision which has continued and broadened
for a quarter of a century.
A noteworthy detail was that, while the
two men were talking at the dinner table
and sketching out their agreement, paper
was evidently not available; so their notes
were jotted down on the tablecloth. My good
friend Frank Little of the Ogdensburg
Journal tells me that Mackenzie King gave
him a detailed account of the meeting. The
President and the Prime Minister agreed
that an attack on either country would be
considered an attack on both. They agreed
to interchange bases; in other words, Can-
ada could use American bases and the Unit-
ed States could use Canadian bases — Air,
Navy, and Army. They agreed that there
should be a standardization of weapons.
Notes on these points were among those
that were jotted down on the tablecloth. The
next morning, when it came to drafting the
communique, no one could find the table-
cloth. Fortunately it was retrieved from the
laundry just before the notes were to be
obliterated in soap and water. Unhappily
the name of the hero who saved the table-
cloth is lost to history.
Another unusual aspect of the understand-
ing was that the communique became the
agreement — now known as the Ogdensburg
agreement. No formal document was signed.
And yet this document has brought together
our two nations in the closest cooperation
on matters of the deepest importance to the
security of our peoples.
Twenty-five years ago the threat that
faced our countries and the rest of the civ-
ilized world was the aggression from Nazi
Germany and her allies. That summer the
situation was dark. Hitler's army had
marched through the low countries. France
had fallen, and the Battle of Britain was on.
The British were standing alone against the
full strength of the Nazi forces. The small
but gallant British Air Force, under the
inspired leadership of Winston Churchill,
was all that was protecting the British Isles,
and in fact the whole free world. I recall
Churchill's words in speaking of the German
bombers : "They must be clawed down." And
that's what the RAF did.
An interesting detail of the meeting be-
tween Franklin Roosevelt and Mackenzie
King was that the following morning, Sun-
day, before they attended church services
at Lisbon, they reviewed the air power of
the United States First Army. The entire
force was accommodated on the airport near
Ogdensburg.
It is interesting, also, to note that two of
the most important wartime meetings were
held only a short time later on Canadian soil.
I refer to the Quebec meetings in August
1943 and September 1944.
By establishing the Permanent Joint
Board on Defense, the Ogdensburg agree-
ment provided a continuing channel for
high-level consultations between the two
countries on military matters. This Board
is still functioning, now under the able co-
chairmanship of two of my wartime col-
leagues— Dana Wilgress, whom I first met
when he was Canada's wartime Ambassa-
dor to Moscow, and Freeman Matthews,
with whom I served in London.
450
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
The need for mutual defense consultation
did not end with World War II. Unhappily,
within only too short a time after the capit-
ulation of Germany and Japan, it became
evident aggressive policies of the Soviet Un-
ion and the subversive threat of communism
in Europe required new and vigorous de-
fenses in Canada and the United States.
More detailed agreements have been reached
between our two countries in the postwar
period, all of which evolved from the original
Ogdensburg Declaration. These show how
valuable our collaboration has been and con-
tinues to be.
In 1946 the Military Cooperation Com-
mittee was established.
Our close working arrangements made it
possible for Canada and the United States
to work together in postwar reconstruction
of Europe and in NATO. We must not forget
that Canada played an important role in con-
tributing to European recovery.
In 1958 both the Senior Policy Com-
mittee on the Canada-U.S. Defense Produc-
tion and Development Sharing Program and
the Canada-U.S. Ministerial Committee on
Joint Defense were established. The Perma-
nent Joint Board itself was directly involved
in mutual defense planning for the three
radar lines constructed across the continent,
the Pine Tree Line, the Mid-Canada Line,
and the Distant Early Warning Line. The
Board also had a role, positive though in-
direct, in the construction of the Ballistic
Missile Early Warning System and the
establishment of NORAD in 1957. By this
time Canada and the United States were, of
course, formally allied as members of NATO.
Nevertheless, the Permanent Joint Board
and other bilateral agencies have provided
an indispensable supplement to our coopera-
tion in NATO.
I have just returned from a visit to the
Soviet Union in which I met Chairman Kosy-
gin and other Soviet leaders for informal
discussions. These discussions left me con-
vinced that whatever changes may be
occurring in Soviet society, Soviet objectives
remain the same. The Soviet leaders remain
convinced that communism is the way of the
future — the inevitable trend of history. The
status quo for them is the world in revolu-
tion. When the nations of the free world op-
pose armed subversion and terror, the So-
viets charge us with aggression. It is clear
that the Soviets want to avoid nuclear dis-
aster, but they have publicly stated they
will continue to support what they call "wars
of liberation." Today such a war is being
fought in South Viet-Nam. The battle of the
people of South Viet-Nam for their inde-
pendence is of concern to the entire free
world. If South Viet-Nam falls to the Com-
munist subversion and guerrilla terrorism,
as Austria and Czechoslovakia fell to the
Nazis, no country, particularly no small
country, will be safe.
As President Johnson has stated : ^
This is the clearest lesson of our time. From
Munich until today we have learned that to yield
to aggression brings only greater threats — and more
destructive war. To stand firm is the only guarantee
of lasting peace.
There are some who find reassurance in
the rift between Moscow and Peiping. While
in the long run the breakup of the monolithic
structure of communism will have, I believe,
vital significance, in the short run the com-
petition between Moscow and Peiping for
leadership of the Communist international
movement is causing each to increase its ef-
forts to exploit any weakness among free
nations. We have recently seen these sub-
versive activities in Latin America and
Africa.
As we look ahead, the people of Canada
and the United States can be reassured by
the close collaboration in our mutual defense
which has existed during the past 25 years.
Our free way of life is still under threat.
The mutual trust and confidence between
our two countries continues as strong and
intimate as was the confidence and intimacy
of Franklin Roosevelt and Mackenzie King.
It finds expression in their historic Ogdens-
burg Declaration. Prime Minister Pearson
and President Johnson are dedicated to the
same ideals. Under their leadership, and
surely under successive leaders, we can be
certain that future cooperation between our
' Bulletin of May 17, 1965, p. 748.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1966
451
two countries will be as durable and con-
structive as the foundations established by
their farsighted predecessors.
Search for Steps To Improve
International Monetary System
Statement by President Johnson ^
Last month I authorized Secretary-
Fowler to announce that the United States
stands ready to participate in an interna-
tional monetary conference that would con-
sider what steps might be taken to secure
substantial improvements in international
monetary arrangements.
Secretary Fowler very properly specified
in his July 10th speech " that such a con-
ference must be preceded by careful prep-
aration and international consultation. He
has been meeting with the financial and
monetary officials of other nations as op-
portunities to do so became available in
Washington, including, to date, representa-
tives of Japan and Canada. The trip he
and Under Secretary of State Ball are about
to take will extend and broaden these con-
sultations.
The international monetary system, as it
has existed since World War II, has func-
tioned with commendable flexibility and
resourcefulness in the rebuilding of mone-
tary reserves and in their enlargement and
distribution in keeping with the tre-
mendous and widespread economic rehabili-
tation and growth that has characterized
the free world.
We want to determine, through our own
studies and in consultation with others,
what may be needed to assure the satisfac-
tory future performance of that system.
The United States is not wedded in this
' Made on Aug. 25 following a meeting with Sec-
retary of the Treasury Henry H. Fowler and Under
Secretary of State George W. Ball, who were leaving
on a European trip to discuss the need for improv-
ing the international monetary system (White House
press release).
= For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209.
enterprise to any particular procedure, nor
to any rigid timetable. The point to be kept
in the forefront is that we are determined
to move ahead — carefully and deliberately,
but without delay — because we are con-
vinced that not to act when the time is ripe
can be as unwise as to act too soon, or too
hastily.
I believe that government and monetary
officials everywhere are prepared to join
with us in the earnest search upon which
we have embarked for ways to assure con-
tinued sound and stable grovd;h of the free
world's international monetary system
which is fundamental to the continued
economic progress of the nations of the
free world, whatever their stage of eco-
nomic development.
We must press forward with our studies
and beyond, to action — evolving arrange-
ments which will continue to meet the
needs of a fast-growing world economy.
Unless we make timely progress, interna-
tional monetary difficulties will exercise a
stubborn and increasingly frustrating drag
on our policies for prosperity and progress
at home and throughout the world.
Tabling of Agricultural Offers
in Kennedy Round Announced
statement by Christian A. Herter ^
The United States will table its agri-
cultural offers on September 16, 1965, the
date agreed upon by the countries participat-
ing in the Kennedy Round. It expects that
other major negotiating partners will also
table specific and concrete offers on the
agreed-upon date. As regards the EEC
[European Economic Community], we un-
derstand the difficulties confronting it at
this time and hope they may be resolved.
We anticipate that the EEC, which occupies
a key role in the negotiations, will be able
' Released to the press at Washington, D.C., on
Aug. 19. Mr. Herter is the President's Special
Representative for Trade Negotiations.
452
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
to table agricultural offers, if not on Sep-
tember 16 then at an early date.
The U. S. offer will essentially comprise
products of interest to countries tabling
agricultural offers. The United States has
repeatedly made clear that offers it puts for-
ward are made in the expectation that the
other major participants will make and be
willing to implement offers of a like degree.
If this proves not to be the case, the United
States will withdraw or modify its offers on
both agricultural and industrial products to
the extent it deems necessary to achieve
reciprocity in the negotiations.
The United States wishes to again em-
phasize the importance it attaches to the
Kennedy Round. We are confident that a
fair and equitable agreement will be reached
in Geneva leading to a substantial liberali-
zation of world trade.
Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Flint, Michigan
The Department of State announced on
August 25 (press release 197) that Am-
bassador at Large W. Averell Harriman will
be the principal speaker in a three-State
foreign policy conference at Flint, Mich.,
on September 22. The conference, jointly
sponsored by the Department of State and
the Mott Adult Education Program of the
Flint Board of Education, has the coopera-
tion of nearly 50 other State and community
organizations in the area and is expected
to attract several hundred representatives
of local. State, and national organizations in
Michigan, Wisconsin, and Indiana.
Other officials scheduled to participate
are: Leland Barrows, Ambassador to the
Federal Republic of Cameroon; Richard H.
Davis, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for European Affairs; William J. Jorden,
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs and chairman of the De-
partment of State Public Affairs Working
Group on Viet-Nam; and William B. Buffum,
Director of the Office of United Nations Po-
litical Affairs. Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hub-
bard, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
for Public Affairs, will be the conference
moderator.
The Flint conference is one of a series
conducted by the Department of State to
bring Government officials responsible for
formulating and carrying out foreign policy
together with citizen leaders and representa-
tives of the radio, television, and press.
In addition to the main conference, there
will be a similar program for selected col-
lege and high school students and faculty
from both public and private institutions.
The purpose of the youth conference is to
give a basic review of U.S. foreign policy
in the postwar period and answer questions
on foreign policy raised by the students.
Letters of Credence
Ethiopia
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ethi-
opia, Tashoma Haile-Mariam, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on August
25. For texts of the Ambassador's remarks
and the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated August 25.
Iceland
The newly appointed Ambassador of Ice-
land, Petur Thorsteinsson, presented his cre-
dentials to President Johnson on August 17.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated August 17.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
453
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
U.S. Finds U.N. Majority
Unwilling To Enforce Article 19
Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg
V.S. Representative to the United Nations ^
Mr. Chairman, I am deeply touched by
your more than cordial welcome and re-
marks, and I hope that I can in small meas-
ure add to your efforts and the efforts of
the distinguished colleagues who sit here
and in the other organs of the United Na-
tions in pursuing the goals we all share.
I have had the pleasure of meeting infor-
mally with some of the heads of delegations
to the United Nations during the past few
weeks. I hope that in the weeks to come I
shall have the pleasure of meeting with all
of them. This, however, is my first formal
appearance before an official organ of the
General Assembly. I therefore asked to be
inscribed to speak first so that I might
begin, with your indulgence, by assuring
all members represented on this important
committee of the great sense of responsi-
bility I feel in assuming my new duties as
Permanent Representative of the United
States of America to the United Nations.
President Johnson, in announcing my ap-
pointment, said of my assignment : ^
In his new office he will speak not only for an
administration, but he will speak for an entire
nation, firmly, earnestly, and responsibly committed
to the strength and to the success of the United
Nations in its works for peace around the world.
My own thoughts, in accepting this as-
signment, are dominated by a strong con-
viction that the world is so full of danger
and tribulation that every part of the
United Nations peacekeeping machinery
must be in working order so that the United
Nations as a whole can perform its ap-
pointed role, under the charter, of peace-
maker and peacekeeper.
And I cannot enter upon my official
duties without paying my respects to my
great and gifted and eloquent predecessor,
the late Adlai E. Stevenson. He will be
sorely missed, not only by his own nation
but also in this great world assembly and
by peoples throughout the whole universe.
Governor Stevenson and I were personal
friends of long standing; we came from the
same part of the United States, the State of
Illinois, and I knew him well enough to be
sure that if he could be here today his mes-
sage to us would be simple and forthright:
Get on with your work of making peace.
U.S. Adheres to Principles of Charter
I therefore turn to the business at hand.
I do not intend to review here in detail
the position which the United States has
taken with respect to articles 17 and 19 of
the charter.* As the members of this com-
mittee are well aware, we believe in the
soundness of the following straightforward
principles: first, that the concept of collec-
tive financial responsibility adopted by the
United Nations in 1945 is a sound principle
and a landmark in the practice of interna-
tional organizations; second, that article 17
of the Charter of the United Nations is im-
peccably clear on the right of the General
Assembly to assess and apportion among its
members the "expenses of the Organiza-
tion"; third, that the costs of peacekeeping
operations, once they are assessed and
^ Made in the U.N. Special Committee on Peace-
keeping Operations on Aug. 16 (U.S. /U.N. press
release 4615).
* Bulletin of Aug. 9, 1965, p. 240.
'For background, see ibid., Oct. 5, 1964, p. 486;
Nov. 9, 1964, p. 681; Dec. 7, 1964, p. 826; and Feb.
15, 1965, p. 198.
454
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
apportioned by the General Assembly, are
expenses of the organization within the
meaning of article 17 — a proposition con-
firmed by the International Court of Jus-
tice and accepted by the General Assembly
by an overwhelming vote; fourth, that
article 19 is clear beyond question about the
sanction to be applied in the case of 2-year
delinquents.
Our views on these matters have not rep-
resented a bargaining position, nor have
they changed. They have not been based on
narrow national interest but on the clear
language of the charter and what seemed to
us to be the clear interests of the organiza-
tion.
This is not and never has been an issue
in the so-called cold war. Under the law of
the charter the questions would be identi-
cal regardless of which member or mem-
bers happened to be in arrears, or for what
assessed United Nations activity they failed
to pay, or why they refused to pay for it.
Nonetheless, the issue has been inter-
preted widely as a "confrontation," not be-
tween the delinquent members and the law
of the United Nations but between major
powers. And I will say for my Government
and for myself that we do not so regard it.
We, for our part, cannot abandon our ad-
herence to positions which we firmly believe
to be constitutionally, legally, procedurally,
and administratively correct.
Much less can we abandon positions
taken and precedents established by the As-
sembly itself by overwhelming majorities,
acting within the framework of the charter
and according to its established procedures.
I refer specifically to the formal actions of
the General Assembly since 1956 levying
assessments to finance the United Nations
Emergency Force; to the similar assess-
ment resolutions since 1960 for the United
Nations Operation in the Congo; to the de-
cision in 1961 to submit to the International
Court of Justice the question of whether
these assessments are, in the words of the
charter, "expenses of the Organization"
within the meaning of article 17 ; to the As-
sembly's authorization in 1961 of the United
Nations bond issue; to the Assembly's ac-
ceptance in 1962 of the advisory opinion of
the Court on the question submitted to it;
to the reaffirmation by the Assembly's
fourth special session in 1963 of the collec-
tive financial responsibility of all United
Nations members; to the appeal by the
same body to all delinquent members to pay
their arrears.
All this has been done by the Assembly
and cannot be undone by a few of its mem-
bers. The law and the history of this matter
cannot be revised.
U.S. Position on Article 19
The United States regretfully concludes,
on ample evidence, that at this stage in the
history of the United Nations the General
Assembly is not prepared to carry out the
relevant provisions of the charter in the
context of the present situation. From
private consultations, from statements by
the principal officers of the organization,
from the statements and exhaustive nego-
tiations within and outside this committee,
from an informal polling of the delegations
— indeed from the entire history of this
affair — the inevitable conclusion is that
the Assembly is not disposed to apply the
loss-of-vote sanction of article 19 to the
present situation.
We regret exceedingly that the intransi-
gence of a few of the member states, and
their unwillingness to abide by the rule of
law, has led the organization into this state
of affairs.
The United States adheres to the position
that article 19 is applicable in the present
circumstances. It is clear, however, that we
are faced with a simple and inescapable
fact of life, which I have just cited. More-
over, every parliamentary body must de-
cide, in one way or another, the issues that
come before it; otherwise it will have no
useful existence and soon no life.
Therefore, without prejudice to the posi-
tion that article 19 is applicable, the United
States recognizes, as it simply must, that
the General Assembly is not prepared to
apply article 19 in the present situation
and that the consensus of the membership
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
455
is that the Assembly should proceed nor-
mally. We will not seek to frustrate that
consensus, since it is not in the world in-
terest to have the work of the General As-
sembly immobilized in these troubled days.
At the same time, we must make it crystal
clear that if any member can insist on
making an exception to the principle of col-
lective financial responsibility with respect
to certain activities of the organization, the
United States reserves the same option to
make exceptions if, in our view, strong and
compelling reasons exist for doing so. There
can be no double standard among the mem-
bers of the organization.
Some members may believe that in not
applying article 19 no important decision is
being made. The United States believes —
and I believe — that no one can or should
overlook the fact that the exercise of im-
portant prerogatives of the Assembly
granted to it under the charter is being im-
paired. The United States wishes to
strengthen, not weaken, the United Nations
by adhering to rather than departing from
basic, sound principles. Therefore, we must
disclaim responsibility for the Assembly's
attitude, which has developed contrary to
the views which we still hold to be valid,
and place the responsibility where it prop-
erly belongs — on those member states which
have flouted the Assembly's will and the
Court's opinion.
We look forward nonetheless to the not
too distant day when the entire membership
will resume its full range of collective re-
sponsibility for maintaining world peace.
In the meantime, it is all the more impor-
tant for the membership, though unready
to apply article 19, to solve the United
Nations financial problems and to continue
to support in practice the sound principle
of collective financial responsibility, and to
adopt practical and equitable means by
which those willing to share the responsi-
bility for peace can act in concert to main-
tain and strengthen the indispensable peace-
keeping capacity of the United Nations.
Meanwhile, the Security Council retains
its primary — and I emphasize "primary" —
responsibility, although this does not mean
sole responsibility, for the maintenance of
international peace and security; and the
General Assembly retains its residual au-
thority for this purpose, especially when
the Security Council is unable to meet its
responsibilities.
My Government has never been prepared,
and is not prepared, to accept a situation
in which the capacity of the United Nations
to act for peace could be stopped by the
negative vote of a single member. Nor
should the effectiveness of this organization
be determined by the level of support forth-
coming from its least cooperative members.
The world needs — the world desperately
needs — a strengthened, not a weakened.
United Nations peacekeeping capacity;
and if we need additional proof, we have it
in the events which have occurred this very
weekend. Those who are prepared to help
to strengthen it — the overwhelming major-
ity— must be in a position to do so with or
without the support of the reluctant few
until they learn, as they surely will, that a
workable and reliable international peace
system is in the national interest of all
members of the United Nations.
Time To Get on With Unfinished Business
My Government states these views here
today in the conviction that the time is now
for the General Assembly to get on with its
heavy agenda, which is indeed the unfin-
ished business of mankind.
We must find new strength and new
capacities for building, brick by brick, the
community of man.
When my appointment was first an-
nounced by the President of the United
States, I said: The effort to bring the rule
of law to govern the relations between sov-
ereign states is "the greatest adventure in
man's history." Coming from a high tri-
bunal of law, which I left with great regret,
these were not merely ceremonial words.
They described, rather, a deep conviction
on my part and a precise evaluation of what
I think this work at the United Nations is
all about. If President Johnson did not
agree, he would not have sent me here.
456
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
I would be less than candid if I did not
state to my colleagues here assembled my
conviction that the rule of law is not being
furthered by the action of those member
states which are responsible for not imple-
menting it. But establishing a rule of law
is not easy, as we know from our national
experience and as we know from the entire
history of civilization, and, despite tempo-
rary setbacks, we must persevere in what is
not only a noble but an indispensable task
if universal peace is to be achieved.
I therefore pledge to you, the representa-
tives here assembled, and to the United Na-
tions as a whole, on behalf of myself, on
behalf of my delegation, and on behalf of
the Government that I am privileged to
represent, that the United States is pre-
pared to join in a fresh drive to help the
United Nations to gather new strength
until the rule of law is universally ac-
cepted, until the present and future genera-
tions are indeed safe from the scourge of
war, until better standards of life in larger
freedom are indeed the order of the day,
and until the dignity and worth of the
human person, entitled to be treated on a
plane of equality, which the charter so
nobly speaks about, is realized everywhere.
The United States agrees, in light of pres-
ent world tensions, that the General Assem-
bly must proceed with its work. In doing so,
it is well to remember the ancient counsel
that, while the world is full of tribulations,
"tribulation worketh patience; and pa-
tience, experience; and experience, hope."
Provisional Agenda of Twentietii
Session of U.N. General Assembly ^
U.N. doc. A/69B0 and Corr.
1. Opening of the session by the Chairman of the
delegation of Ghana.
2. Minute of silent prayer or meditation.
3. Credentials of representatives to the twentieth
session of the General Assembly:
(a) Appointment of the Credentials Committee;
' To convene at Headquarters, New York, on Sept.
21, 1965.
(b) Report of the Credentials Committee.
4. Election of the President.
5. Constitution of the Main Committees and elec-
tion of officers.
6. Election of Vice-Presidents.
7. Notification by the Secretary-General under Ar-
ticle 12, paragraph 2, of the Charter of the
United Nations.
8. Adoption of the agenda.
9. Admission of new Members.
10. General debate.
11. Report of the Secretary-General on the work of
the organization.
12. Report of the Security Council.
13. Report of the Economic and Social Council.
14. Report of the Trusteeship Council.
15. Report of the International Atomic Energy
Agency.
16. Election of non-permanent members of the Se-
curity Council.
17. Election of six members of the Economic and
Social Council.
18. Election of one member of the Trusteeship Coun-
cil.
19. Election of the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees.
20. Appointment of the members of the Peace Ob-
servation Commission.
21. United Nations Emergency Force:
(a) Report on the Force;
(b) Cost estimates for the maintenance of the
Force.
22. Report of the Committee for the International
Co-operation Year [resolution 1907 (XVIII) of
21 November 1963].
23. Implementation of the Declaration on the Grant-
ing of Independence to Colonial Countries and
Peoples: report of the Special Committee on the
Situation with regard to the Implementation of
the Declaration on the Granting of Independence
to Colonial Countries and Peoples [resolution
1956 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963].
24. Report of the United Nations Representative for
the Supervision of the Elections in the Cook Is-
lands [resolution 2005 (XIX) of 18 February
1965].
25. Installation of mechanical means of voting [reso-
lution 1957 (XVIII) of 12 December 1963].
26. Report of the Committee on arrangements for a
conference for the purpose of reviewing the
Charter [resolution 1993 (XVIII) of 17 Decem-
ber 1963].
27. Third International Conference on the Peaceful
Uses of Atomic Energy: report of the Secretary-
General [decision of 18 February 1965].
28. Question of general and complete disarmament:
report of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation
Committee on Disarmament [resolution 1908
(XVIII) of 27 November 1963].
29. Question of convening a conference for the pur-
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
457
pose of signing a convention on the prohibition
of the use of nuclear and thermo-nuclear weap-
ons: report of the Conference of the Eighteen-
Nation Committee on Disarmament [resolution
1909 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963].
30. Urgent need for suspension of nuclear and
thermo-nuclear tests : report of the Conference of
the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament
[resolution 1910 (XVIII) of 27 November 1963].
31. International co-operation in the peaceful uses of
outer space: report of the Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space [resolution 1963
(XVIII) of 13 December 1963].
32. The Korean question: report of the United Na-
tions Commission for the Unification and Re-
habilitation of Korea [resolutions 376 (V) of 7
October 1950 and 1964 (XVIII) of 13 Decem-
ber 1963].
33. Actions on the regional level with a view to im-
proving good neighbourly relations among Euro-
pean States having different social and political
systems [decision of 13 December 1963].
34. Effects of atomic radiation : report of the United
Nations Scientific Committee on the Effects of
Atomic Radiation [resolution 1896 (XVIII) of
11 November 1963].
35. Report of the Commissioner-General of the
United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestine Refugees in the Near East [resolutions
302 (IV) of 8 December 1949, 1912 (XVIII) of
3 December 1963 and 2002 (XIX) of 10 Feb-
ruary 1965].
36. The policies of apartheid of the Government of
the Republic of South Africa:
(a) Report of the Special Committee on the Poli-
cies of apartheid of the Government of the
Republic of South Africa [resolution 1978
A (XVIII) of 16 December 1963];
(b) Report of the Secretary-General [resolution
1979 B (XVIII) of 16 December 1963].
37. Report of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development [resolution 1995 (XIX)
of 30 December 1964].
38. Accelerated flow of capital and technical assist-
ance to the developing countries: report of the
Secretary-CJeneral [resolutions 1522 (XV) of 15
December 1960 and 1938 (XVIII) of 11 De-
cember 1963].
39. Establishment of a United Nations capital de-
velopment fund: report of the Committee on a
United Nations Capital Development Fund [reso-
lution 1936 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963].
40. Regional development:
(a) Report of the Secretary-General on the prob-
lems of regional development [recommenda-
tion of the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development contained in annex
A.IV.IO of the Final Act] ;
(b) Report of the Group of Experts on the Cre-
ation of a Regional Development Fund
[recommendation of the Conference con-
tained in annex A.rV.9 of the Pinal Act].
41. Activities in the field of industrial development:
(a) Reports of the Committee for Industrial De-
velopment on its fourth and fifth sessions
[resolution 1940 (XVIII) of 11 December
1963] ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idewt],
42. The role of the United Nations in training na-
tional technical personnel for the accelerated in-
dustrialization of the developing countries: re-
port of the Economic and Social Council [reso-
lution 1824 (XVII) of 18 December 1962].
43. The role of patents in the transfer of technology
to developing countries : report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 1935 (XVIII) of 11 De-
cember 1963].
44. Decentralization of the economic and social ac-
tivities of the United Nations :
(a) Report of the Secretary-General [resolution
1941 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963];
(b) Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad-
ministrative and Budgetary Questions
[idem'] .
45. Conversion to peaceful needs of the resources
released by disarmament:
(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council
[resolution 1931 (XVIII) of 11 December
1963] ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idern],
46. Permanent sovereignty over natural resources:
report of the Secretary-General [resolution 1803
(XVII) of 14 December 1962, section III].
47. Inflation and economic development: report of
the Secretary-General [resolution 1830 (XVII)
of 18 December 1962].
48. Population growth and economic development:
report of the Economic and Social Council [reso-
lution 1838 (XVII) of 18 December 1962].
49. World campaign for universal literacy: report
of the Secretary-General [resolution 1937
(XVIII) of 11 December 1963].
50. United Nations Institute for Training and Re-
search: report of the Secretary-General [resolu-
tion 1934 (XVIII) of 11 December 1963].
51. Progress and operations of the Special Fund
[resolutions 1240 (XIII) of 14 October 1958
(part B, paragraphs 10 and 54), 1833 (XVII) of
18 December 1962 and 1945 (XVIII) of 11 De-
cember 1963].
52. United Nations programmes of technical co-
operation :
(a) Review of activities [resolution 1833
(XVII) of 18 December 1962];
(b) Confirmation of the allocation of funds
under the Expanded Programme of Tech-
nical Assistance [resolutions 831 (IX) of
26 November 1954 and 1994 (XIX) of 30
December 1964].
458
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
53. Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Ex-
panded Programme of Technical Assistance in
a United Nations Development Programme [de-
cision of 18 February 1965].
54. World Food Programme [resolution 1714 (XVI)
of 19 December 1961, section I].
55. Assistance in cases of natural disaster [Eco-
nomic and Social Council resolution 1049
(XXXVII) of 15 August 1964].
56. World social situation:
(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council
[resolution 1916 (XVIII) of 5 December
1963] ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem].
57. Housing, building and planning:
(a) Report of the Economic and Social Council
[resolution 1917 (XVIII) of 5 December
1963] ;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General [idem].
58. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees.
59. Measures to implement the United Nations Dec-
laration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 1905 (XVIII) of 20 Novem-
ber 1963].
60. Draft International Convention on the Elimina-
tion of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
[resolution 1906 (XVIII) of 20 November 1963].
61. Draft Recommendation on Consent to Marriage,
Minimum Age for Marriage and Registration of
Marriages [decision of 12 December 1963].
62. Measures to accelerate the promotion of respect
for human rights and fundamental freedoms
[decision of 12 December 1963].
63. Manifestations of racial prejudice and national
and religious intolerance [decision of 12 Decem-
ber 1963].
64. Elimination of all forms of religious intolerance :
(a) Draft Declaration on the Elimination of All
Forms of Religious Intolerance [decision of
12 December 1963];
(b) Draft International Convention on the Elimi-
nation of All Forms of Religious Intolerance
[resolution 1781 (XVII) of 7 December
1962].
65. Draft Declaration on the Right of Asylum [de-
cision of 12 December 1963].
66. Freedom of information:
(a) Draft Convention on Freedom of Informa-
tion [decision of 12 December 1963] ;
(b) Draft Declaration on Freedom of Informa-
tion [idem].
67. Draft International Covenants on Human Rights
[resolution 1960 (XVIII) of 12 December 1963].
68. Draft Declaration on the Promotion among Youth
of the Ideals of Peace, Mutual Respect and
Understanding between Peoples [resolution 1965
(XVIII) of 13 December 1963].
69. International Year for Human Rights [resolu-
tion 1961 (XVIII) of 12 December 1963].
70. Information from Non-Self-Governing Terri-
tories transmitted under Article 73 e of the
Charter of the United Nations:
(a) Report of the Secretary-General;
(b) Report of the Special Committee on the
Situation with regard to the Implementation
of the Declaration on the Granting of Inde-
pendence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.
71. Question of South West Africa: reports of the
Special Committee on the Situation with regard
to the Implementation of the Declaration on the
Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries
and Peoples [resolution 1899 (XVIII) of 13
November 1963].
72. Special educational and training programmes for
South West Africa: report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 1901 (XVIII) of 13 Novem-
ber 1963].
73. Special training programme for Territories un-
der Portuguese administration: report of the
Secretary-General [resolution 1973 (XVIII) of
16 December 1963].
74. Offers by Member States of study and training
facilities for inhabitants of Non-Self-Goveming
Territories: report of the Secretary-General
[resolution 1974 (XVIII) of 16 December 1963].
75. Question of Oman: report of the Ad Hoe Com-
mittee on Oman [resolution 1948 (XVIII) of 11
December 1963].
76. Financial reports and accounts for the financial
years ended 31 December 1963 and 31 December
1964 and reports of the Board of Auditors:
(a) United Nations;
(b) United Nations Children's Fund;
(c) United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestine Refugees in the Near East;
(d) Voluntary funds administered by the United
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees.
77. Supplementary estimates for the financial year
1964.
78. Budget estimates for the financial years 1965
and 1966.
79. Review of salary scales of the professional and
higher categories of the international civil
service :
(a) Report of the International Civil Service
Advisory Board;
(b) Report of the Secretary-General.
80. Pattern of conferences : report of the Secretary-
General [resolution 1987 (XVIII) of 17 Decem-
ber 1963].
81. Appointments to fill vacancies in the member-
ship of subsidiary bodies of the General As-
sembly :
(a) Advisory Committee on Administrative and
Budgetary Questions;
(b) Committee on Contributions;
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
459
(c) Board of Auditors;
(d) United Nations Administrative Tribunal;
(e) United Nations Staff Pension Committee.
82. Scale of assessments for the apportionment of
the expenses of the United Nations: report of
the Committee on Contributions.
83. Audit reports relating to expenditure by spe-
cialized agencies and the International Atomic
Energy Agency:
(a) Earmarkings and contingency authorizations
from the Special Account of the Expanded
Programme of Technical Assistance;
(b) Allocations and allotments from the Special
Fund.
84. Administrative and budgetary co-ordination of
the United Nations with the specialized agencies
and the International Atomic Energy Agency:
(a) Report of the Advisory Committee on Ad-
ministrative and Budgetary Questions;
(b) Inter-organizational machinery for matters
of pay and personnel administration: report
of the Secretary-General [resolution 1981 B
(XVIII) of 17 December 1963].
85. Administrative and budgetary procedures of the
United Nations : report of the Working Group on
the Examination of the Administrative and
Budgetary Procedures of the United Nations
[resolution 1880 (S-IV) of 27 June 1963].
86. Personnel questions:
(a) Composition of the Secretariat: report of
the Secretary-General [resolution 1928
(XVIII) of 11 December 1963] ;
(b) Other personnel questions.
87. Report of the United Nations Joint Staff Pen-
sion Board.
88. United Nations International School: report of
the Secretary-General [resolution 2003 (XIX)
of 10 February 1965].
89. Reports of the International Law Commission on
the work of its sixteenth and seventeenth ses-
sions.
90. General multilateral treaties concluded under
the auspices of the League of Nations : report of
the Secretary-General [resolution 1903 (XVIII)
of 18 November 1963].
91. Technical assistance to promote the teaching,
study, dissemination and wider appreciation of
international law: report of the Special Commit-
tee on Technical Assistance to Promote the
Teaching, Study, Dissemination and Wider Ap-
preciation of International Law [resolution 1968
(XVIII) of 16 December 1963].
92. Consideration of principles of international law
concerning friendly relations and co-operation
among States in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations:
(a) Report of the Special Committee on Prin-
ciples of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among
States [resolutions 1966 (XVIII) and 1967
(XVIII) of 16 December 1963] ;
(b) Study of the principles enumerated in para-
graph 5 of General Assembly resolution
1966 (XVIII);
(c) Report of the Secretary-General on methods
of fact-finding [resolution 1967 (XVIII) of
16 December 1963].
93. Question of Tibet [item proposed by Philippines
(A/5931)].
94. Consideration of steps to be taken for progressive
development in the field of private international
law with a particular view to promoting inter-
national trade [item proposed by Hungary
(A/5933)].
95. Question of Cyprus [item proposed by Cyprus
(A/5934)].
96. Observance by Member States of the principles
relating to the sovereignty of States, their ter-
ritorial integrity, non-interference in their do-
mestic affairs, the peaceful settlement of disputes
and the condemnation of subversive activities
[item proposed by Madagascar (A/5937)].
97. Question of Cyprus: the grave situation created
in Cyprus by the policies pursued against the
Turkish community [item proposed by Turkey
(A/5938)].
98. Question of the convening of a World Disarma-
ment Conference [resolution DC/224 of 15 June
1965, of the Disarmament Commission].
Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography
Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository libraries
in the United States. U.N. printed publications may
be purchased from the Sales Section of the United
Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.
Security Council
Letter dated June 29 from the Assistant Secretary
General of the Organization of American States
transmitting a preliminary report submitted by the
chairman of the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights regarding the human rights situa-
tion in the Dominican Republic. S/6495. July 2,
1965. 20 pp.
Letter dated July 11 from the Secretary (Jeneral of
the Organization of American States transmitting
a report of the technical mission of criminologists
following investigations in Santo Domingo. S/6522.
July 12, 1965. 56 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General concerning a breach
of the cease-fire in the Dominican Republic.
S/6542. July 21, 1965. 2 pp.
Report by the Secretary-General on the situation in
the southwestern part of the Dominican Republic.
S/6553. July 22, 1965. 2 pp.
460
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
Reports by the Secretary-General on recent develop-
ments in Cyprus. S/6569, July 29, 1965, 6 pp.;
S/6569/Add.l, August 5, 1965, 8 pp.; S/6569/Add.
2, August 10, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6586, August 2, 1965,
2 pp.
Letter dated July 30 from the Permament Represent-
ative of the United States reaffirming the U.S.
position on Southeast Asia and expressing the hope
of the U.S. Government that "the members of the
Security Council will somehow find the means to
respond effectively to the challenge raised by the
present state of affairs in Southeast Asia." S/6575.
August 1, 1965. 3 pp.
Letter dated August 2 from the Acting Permanent
Representative of the U.S.S.R. regarding the "un-
lawful" payment of $1.5 million to the Belgian
Government in settlement of claims by Belgian
citizens for losses "they allegedly suffered in the
Congo as a result of the actions of United Nations
forces." S/6589. August 3, 1965. 2 pp.
Report of the Trusteeship Council to the Security
Council on the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands covering the period from June 30, 1964,
to June 30, 1965. S/6490. August 3, 1965. 66 pp.
Letter dated August 6 from the Secretary-General
in reply to the Soviet letter (S/6589) on the ques-
tion of the settlement by the U.N. Secretariat of
claims by Belgian citizens for damage to persons
and property in the Congo. S/6597. August 6,
1965. 6 pp.
TREATY INFORMATION
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Appointments
Eugene M. Braderman as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities,
Bureau of Economic Affairs, effective September 7.
(For biographic details, see Department of State
press release dated August 13.)
Richard N. Cooper as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for International Monetary Affairs, Bureau of Eco-
nomic Affairs, effective August 16. (For biographic
details, see Department of State press release dated
August 16.)
Frank E. Loy as Deputy Assistant Secretary for
Transportation and Telecommunications, Bureau of
Economic Affairs, effective August 18. (For bio-
graphic details, see Department of State press re-
lease dated August 18.)
Designations
Donald K. Palmer as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary (Economic Policy), Bureau of Inter- American
Affairs, effective August 29. (For biographic de-
tails, see Department of State press release dated
August 21.)
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Consular Relations
Vienna convention on consular relations;
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con-
sular relations concerning the acquisition of na-
tionality.
Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.'
Accession deposited: United Arab Republic (with
reservations), June 21, 1965.
Continental Shelf
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964.
TIAS 5578.
Accession deposited: France (with declarations
and reservations) , June 14, 1965.
Safety at Sea
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: United Arab Republic
(with an understanding), July 27, 1965.
International regulations for preventing collisions
at sea. Approved by the International Conference
on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965.
TIAS 5813.
Acceptance deposited: Federal Republic of Ger-
many, May 25, 1965.
War
Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners
of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.
Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950; for the United States
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and
3365, respectively.
Notification that it considers itself bound: Sierra
Leone, May 31, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at
Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.
Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part
II. TIAS 5844.
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, August 26,
1966.
* Not in force.
SEPTEMBER 13, 1965
461
BILATERAL
British Guiana
Agreement relating to investment guaranties.
Signed at Georgetown May 29, 1965.
Entered into force: August 18, 1965.
Etiiiopia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731-
1736), with exchange of notes. Signed at Addis
Ababa August 17, 1965. Entered into force Au-
gust 17, 1965.
■Malaysia
Agreement amending the agreement of April 21,
1959 (TIAS 4214), relating to investment guaran-
ties. Effected by exchange of notes at Kuala
Lumpur June 24, 1965. Entered into force June
24, 1965.
Peru
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Lima June 28 and August 11, 1965.
Entered into force August 11, 1965.
Philippines
Agreement relating to the revision of article XIII of
the military bases agreement of March 14, 1947,
as amended (TIAS 1775, 1963, 2406, 2739, 2835,
2936), on arrangements governing criminal juris-
diction, with annex, agreed minutes, and agreed
implementing arrangements. Effected by exchange
of notes at Manila August 10, 1965. Entered into
force August 10, 1965.
Sierra Leone
Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of au-
thorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Freetown August 14 and 16, 1965.
Entered into force August 16, 1965.
Viet- Nam
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended (TIAS
5821). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon
August 16, 1965. Entered into force August 16,
1965.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: August 16-29
Press releases may be obtained from the
Oflfice of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Subject
Smythe sworn in as Ambassador
to Syria (biographic details).
Harriman: U.S.-Canada Perma-
nent Joint Board on Defense.
Rusk, Goldberg, Bundy: "Viet-
Nam Perspective : Winning the
Peace," transcript of CBS-TV
interview.
Newsom sworn in as Ambassador
to Libya (biographic details).
Foreign policy conference, Flint,
Mich, (rewrite).
Messages on Alliance for Prog-
ress.
U.S. note to U.K. on Viet-Nam.
Rusk : news conference of August
27.
*Not printed.
fHeld for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
*193
Date
8/16
196
8/17
194
8/23
*195
8/24
197
8/25
*198
8/26
199
t200
8/26
8/27
462
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX September 13, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1368
Agriculture. Tabling of Agricultural Offers in
Kennedy Round Announced (Herter) . . . 452
American Republics
The Alliance for Progress: Four Years of For-
ward Movement (Johnson) 426
Palmer designated Deputy Assistant Secretary
(Economic Policy), Bureau of Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs 461
Canada. Canada and U.S. Mark Anniversary of
Joint Board on Defense (White House state-
ment, Harriman) 449
China. Viet-Nam: Winning the Peace (Rusk,
Goldberg, Bundy, transcript of CBS inter-
view) 431
Department and Foreign Service
Appointments (Braderman, Cooper, Loy) . . 461
Designations (Palmer) 461
Economic Affairs
Braderman, Cooper, and Loy appointed Deputy
Assistant Secretaries, Bureau of Economic
Affairs 461
Search for Steps To Improve International
Monetary System (Johnson) 452
Tabling of Agricultural Offers in Kennedy
Round Announced (Herter) 452
Ethiopia. Letters of Credence (Tashoma Haile-
Mariam) 453
Foreign Aid. The Alliance for Progress: Four
Years of Forward Movement (Johnson) . . 426
Health, Education, and Welfare. Artificial
Kidney Center To Be Established in Israel . 448
Iceland. Letters of Credence (Thorsteinsson) 453
Israel. Artificial Kidney Center To Be Estab-
lished in Israel 448
Japan. President Pleased by Korean Ratifica-
tion of Treaty With Japan (message) . . 448
Korea
President Pleased by Korean Ratification of
Treaty With Japan (message) 448
U.S. Welcomes Dispatch of Korean Division
to South Viet-Nam (Johnson, Moyers) . . 448
Military Affairs. Canada and U.S. Mark Anni-
versary of Joint Board on Defense (White
House statement, Harriman) 449
Presidential Documents
The Alliance for Progress: Four Years of For-
ward Movement 426
Canada and U.S. Mark Anniversary of Joint
Board on Defense 449
President Pleased by Korean Ratification of
Treaty With Japan 448
Search for Steps To Improve International
Monetary System 452
U.S. Welcomes Dispatch of Korean Division to
South Viet-Nam 448
Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To
Be Held at Flint, Michigan 453
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 461
United Kingdom. Basic U.S. Position on Viet-
Nam Reaffirmeii in Note to U.K. (text of
note) 444
United Nations
Current U.N. Documents 460
Provisional Agenda of Twentieth Session of
U.N. General Assembly 457
U.S. Finds U.N. Majority Unwilling To En-
force Article 19 (Goldberg) 454
Viet-Nam: Winning the Peace (Rusk, Gold-
berg, Bundy, transcript of CBS interview) 431
Viet-Nam
Basic U.S. Position on Viet-Nam Reaffirmed in
Note to U.K. (text of note) 444
U.S. Continues To Abide by Geneva Conven-
tions of 1949 in Viet-Nam (Rusk) ... 447
U.S. Welcomes Dispatch of Korean Division to
South Viet-Nam (Johnson, Moyers) . . . 448
Viet-Nam: Winning the Peace (Rusk, Gold-
berg, Bundy, transcript of CBS interview) 431
Name Index
Braderman, Eugene M 461
Bundy, McGeorge 431
Cooper, Richard N 461
Goldberg, Arthur J 431, 454
Harriman, W. Averell 449
Herter, Christian A 452
Hottelet, Richard 431
Johnson, President 426, 448, 449, 452
Kalb, Marvin 431
Loy, Frank E 461
Moyers, Bill D 448
Palmer, Donald K 461
Pearson, Lester B 449
Reasoner, Harry 431
Rusk, Secretary 431, 447
Tashoma Haile-Mariam 453
Thorsteinsson, Petur 453
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Why Vietnam
This report to the American people on the meaning of the conflict in Vietnam has been
compiled at the direction of President Johnson. It includes statements by the President, Secretary-
Rusk, and Secretary McNamara. An introductory section entitled "The Roots of Commitment"
contains extracts from a letter of President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and
letters of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem
in 1954, 1960, and 1961.
In a signed foreword President Johnson says : "Once again in man's age-old struggle for a
better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people
are being put to the test. ... In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people
seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor. . . . These statements . . . con-
struct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict. . . ."
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THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
^8 195
Vol. LIU, No. 1369
September 20, 1965
18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE CONSIDERS U.S. DRAFT TREATY
TO PREVENT SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
Statements by President Johnson and William C. Foster
and Text of Draft Treaty i66
OAS ACHIEVES RECONCILIATION IN DOMINICAN REPUBLIC
Statements by President Johnson and Text of Declaration to Dominican People U77
SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF AUGUST 27 U81
GEOGRAPHIC ASPECTS OF THE STRUGGLE IN VIET-NAM
Special Article by G. Etzel Pearcy i87
For index see inside back cover
18-Nation Disarmament Committee Considers U.S. Draft
Treaty To Prevent Spread of Nuclear Weapons
On Augtist 17 William C. Foster, U.S. Rep-
resentative to the 18-Nation Committee on
Disarmament, presented to the Committee,
meeting at Geneva, a U.S. draft treaty to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. Fol-
lowing is a statement by President John-
son released that day at Washington, to-
gether with statements made in the Com-
mittee by Mr. Foster on August 17 and 31
and the text of the draft treaty.
STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
White House press release dated August 17
This morning, on my instructions, the
United States delegate to the Geneva dis-
armament conference, Mr. William C. Fos-
ter, has presented a draft treaty to prevent
the spread of nuclear w^eapons.
President Kennedy gave voice to inter-
national concern over this gravest of all
unresolved human issues. He urged the dis-
armament conference to find ways to both
the understanding of urgent needs and the
undertaking of prompt action. For he knew?,
as each individual citizen senses, the time
to halt nuclear spread is before its con-
tagion takes root.
It was in that spirit that he constructed
the nuclear test ban treaty, the first hope-
ful, helpful step in the long journey toward
peace.
Now we continue that journey today in
Geneva.
This draft treaty would bind its signers
in a pledge to refrain from actions which
would lead to any further increase in the
number of nations having the power to un-
leash nuclear devastation on the world.
This United States draft is an important
step forward. It plainly demonstrates that
a treaty can be drawn which meets the le-
gitimate interests of nuclear and nonnu-
clear powers alike.
Our draft treaty is now open for discus-
sion and negotiation. The United States is
prepared to move forward with promptness
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIU, No. 1369 PUBLICATION 7952 SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
faire, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-
ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.
Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.
The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbics: 52 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15 ; single copy 80 cents.
Use of funds for printing of this pub-
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NOTE : Contents of this publication are
Dot copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
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ature.
466
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and determination to make this proposal
a reality. We call upon all those at Geneva
to join in this effort.
I speak for all my countrymen in reaf-
firming our conviction that the peace of the
world requires firm limits upon the spread
of nuclear weapons.
This has been the policy of the United
States for 20 years. The policy is still as
right as ever.
In this great issue the interests of the
people of the United States are at one with
the interests of all people everywhere. The
threat to peace — and to human life itself —
is universal. If the response is universal, the
threat can be met.
President Eisenhower and President Ken-
nedy sought, as I seek now, the pathway
to a world in which serenity may one day
endure. There is no sane description of a
nuclear war. There is only the blinding light
of man's failure to reason with his fellow
man, and then silence.
The time is now. The hour is late. The
fate of generations yet unborn is in our
hands. And "humanity with all its fears,
with all the hopes of future years, is hang-
ing breathless" on that fate.
STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER, AUGUST 17
In my opening statement at this session
of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarma-
ment, ^ I read a message from President
Johnson in which he assigned the following
objective to be pursued by the United
States delegation :
"First, to seek agreements that will limit
the perilous spread of nuclear weapons, and
make it possible for all countries to refrain
without fear from entering the nuclear arms
race."
After referring to the need to work
toward the effective limitation of nuclear
weapons and delivery systems and for a
truly comprehensive test ban treaty, the
President also said :
^ For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 333.
"No difference among any of us, on any
other issue, can be allowed to bar agree-
ment in this critical area. This is not in any
single nation's interest, nor is it in the
interest of the multitude of nations and
peoples whose future is so tied to the good
sense of those at this conference table."
It is in this spirit that I have the pleasure
today of offering for discussion and ne-
gotiation in this Committee a draft treaty
to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.
This draft is the product of close collabora-
tion among the NATO countries represented
here. It embodies important contributions
from Canada, Italy, and the United King-
dom. Although the United States has the
privilege and responsibility of sponsorship,
our allies fully share our earnest desire that
this text be received by you as a sincere
and constructive basis for negotiation.
In the course of their intensive consulta-
tions, the four Western delegations were
motivated by the single desire to come to
grips, once and for all, with the deadly
peril of nuclear anarchy. We have been in-
spired by the spirit of General Assembly
resolution 1665 (XVI) , whose unanimous call
for an international agreement to bar the
spread of nuclear weapons has gone too
long unanswered. We have sought to re-
spond as faithfully and as fully as now seems
possible to the recommendation contained in
document DC/225 of the United Nations Dis-
armament Commission, a resolution which
enjoyed the support of the overwhelming
majority of the members of the United
Nations. Finally, we sought to accommodate
the differing, and sometimes conflicting,
preoccupations of various governments in a
manner which, while sensitive to their de-
sires, gives the necessary emphasis to the
need to halt proliferation.
Let me now offer a brief explanation of
the provisions of the treaty.
Under article I of this treaty, countries
having nuclear weapons would have the
following obligations :
First, they could not transfer nuclear
weapons into the national control of any
country not having nuclear weapons. They
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
467
could not do this either directly, or indi-
rectly through a military alliance.
Second, they could not assist any such
country in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons.
Third, they could not take any other ac-
tion to increase the number of nuclear
powers in the world. By "nuclear powers"
I mean any entity having independent power
to use nuclear weapons, whether it be a
state, a regime, or some other kind of
organization. As we all know, power to use
nuclear weapons now rests only in national
hands.
Article II of the treaty would impose cor-
responding obligations upon the countries
not having nuclear weapons.
First, these countries could not seek or re-
ceive the transfer of nuclear weapons into
their national control. They could not do this
either directly, or indirectly through a mili-
tary alliance.
Second, they could not manufacture nu-
clear weapons or seek, receive, or grant
assistance in such manufacture.
Third, they could not take any other ac-
tion which would cause an increase in the
number of nuclear entities in the world
above the existing number.
This simple draft would thus prevent any
increase in the number of nuclear powers.
You will all remember President Kennedy's
fear that there would be no rest for any-
one, no stability, no real security, and no
chance for disarmament in a world with a
growing number of nuclear powers. This
draft would insure that there would be no
increase in the number, even by one.
Application of Safeguards
Under article III, all parties would under-
take to cooperate in facilitating the applica-
tion to their peaceful nuclear activities of
International Atomic Energy Agency safe-
guards, or their equivalent. Unlike other
provisions of this draft, this article does not
set forth a precise or completely formulated
obligation. But it does clearly indicate a
line of policy which all parties undertake
to implement, namely, that they will help
to bring about the application of such safe-
guards to their own peaceful nuclear ac-
tivities and to those of other countries. It
is implicit in their undertaking that they
would work to see that this is done as
rapidly as possible.
A number of countries have begun to ac-
cept safeguards on their own peaceful re-
actors. We hope that this process can be
expedited. Moreover, countries which supply
uranium and reactors can cooperate in fa-
cilitating the application of safeguards in
other countries by insisting that this be
done with respect to any material or equip-
ment which they supply.
I shall want to speak at greater length
on this important question in a later inter-
vention. But let me say now that the
United States regards this as one of the
key provisions, which enunciates an impor-
tant policy. And the application of adequate
international safeguards to peaceful nuclear
activities is not a matter which is of interest
to the nuclear powers alone. On the con-
trary, it is the nonnuclear powers which
should be especially interested in a system
of safeguards to help assure each of them
that their neighbors and others are in fact
complying with the treaty.
We have drafted the provision in its
present form to take account of the views
of all countries, including those which are not
prepared at this time to commit themselves
to accept IAEA safeguards in all applicable
circumstances. The United States will be
especially interested to receive suggestions
from the nonnuclear members of this Com-
mittee as to means of strengthening this
provision.
The next article of the treaty, article IV,
contains an important definition. It says
that by using the phrase "nuclear state"
in this treaty we mean a state possessing
independent power to use nuclear weapons
as of a particular date. Our view is that
that date should be the day when the
treaty is opened for signature. Our hope, of
course, is that this would be very soon.
Article V is an accession clause quite
similar to that in the limited nuclear test
468
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
ban treaty. It provides that the treaty will
be open to all states for signature. We have
suggested this clause because of our be-
lief that the treaty should have worldwide
application. The clause would not, of course,
affect the recognition or status of any un-
recognized regime or entity which might de-
cide to file an instrument of accession to
the treaty. Under international law and
practice, recognition of a government or
acknowledgment of the existence of a state
is brought about as the result of a deliberate
decision and course of conduct on the part
of a government intending to accord rec-
ognition. Recognition of a regime or ac-
knowledgment of an entity cannot be in-
ferred from signature or ratification of, or
accession to, a multilateral agreement. We
believe this viewpoint is generally accepted,
and it is on this basis that we have sug-
gested this clause.
One important change in this draft from
the limited test ban treaty language is that
paragraph 3 of article V explicitly rec-
ognizes the importance of obtaining wide
adherence to the treaty if it is to be ef-
fective in preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons. It does this by requiring adherence
by a certain number of governments before
the treaty goes into effect. We have left
a blank for that number. In our view, the
number should be sufficiently high so that
the treaty will be a significant antiprolifera-
tion measure but not so high as unduly to
delay its entry into force.
Article VI is a withdrawal clause fash-
ioned after the provision in the limited test
ban treaty. It contains two important ad-
ditions to that provision.
First, a party wishing to withdraw under
the limited conditions set forth must give
notice 3 months in advance to the Security
Council of the United Nations as well as to
other parties to and signatories of the
treaty. This notice must include a statement
of the extraordinary events it regards as
having jeopardized its supreme interests.
These requirements have been added because
they provide an additional brake on hasty
withdrawal action without limiting the right
of withdrawal. In addition. Security Council
notification and explanation is clearly ap-
propriate in view of the serious security
ramifications of withdrawal.
The second addition to the limited test
ban treaty formula is a provision calling
for review of the treaty after a specified
period, with the agreement of two-thirds of
the parties. This was included in part be-
cause of the wide concern recently expressed
by many participants in the discussions here
and in the Disarmament Commission that
a treaty such as this should be accompanied
by progress to halt and reduce rising
nuclear stocks. One of the preambular para-
graphs explicitly recognizes this concern. It
calls attention to the desire of all of us "to
achieve effective agreements to halt the
nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments,
including particularly nuclear arsenals."
The United States has proposed a num-
ber of measures to stop the buildup of, and
to reduce, nuclear stockpiles. We are pre-
pared to agree to them even before a treaty
such as we have tabled today is signed. But
we do not believe they should wait on this
treaty, or that this treaty should wait on
them. Let us proceed on all such proposals
at the same time, making progress wher-
ever we can.
The last article of the treaty, article
VII, deals with the problem of authentic
texts. It adds Chinese, French, and Spanish
to the languages set forth in the corre-
sponding clause of the limited test ban
treaty. This change has been made to signify
once again our desire for worldwide ad-
herence.
The Common Goal
The draft treaty I have just described
may not be a perfect instrument, nor is it
necessarily complete in its coverage of
pertinent issues. We earnestly hope, how-
ever, that our discussion will focus on such
improvements as can be agreed and that we
shall not be urged to incorporate elements
which, however desirable in theory, are
not now attainable. Insistence on such an
approach would be a sure way to prevent
agreement.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
469
We also hope that our discussion will
not be rendered pointless by the imposition
of unnecessary conditions or demands from
any quarter. As I said in an earlier inter-
vention, the danger of proliferation is world-
wide. It is not the special concern of any
one country, nor can it be averted by con-
centrating our attention on any one country.
Let us examine this draft, therefore, from
the standpoint of our common goal.
If our common goal is to halt the spread
of nuclear weapons as a means of enhancing
the security of all nations, then that — and
that alone — must govern our arguments.
Any other approach would be a monumental
folly for which we and future generations
could pay dearly, and for which we would
deserve the condemnation of mankind.
STATEMENT BY MR. FOSTER, AUGUST 31
I should like first to correct the answers
which Ambassador Tsarapkin [Soviet Rep-
resentative Semyon K. Tsarapkin] has now
given to his own questions of August 17.
My delegation has refrained from answer-
ing these questions before today because we
thought the draft treaty was itself the best
source for those answers. Since the Soviet
delegation had had no opportunity to study
the text when it posed the questions, we
thought that such an opportunity should be
provided. We also thought it inappropriate
for us to speak until the other delegations
which had participated in drafting the
treaty text had each had a turn to make
their positions clear. And, as you know, the
distinguished representatives of the United
Kingdom, Canada, and Italy have each had
that opportunity.
In light of what has been said this morn-
ing,2 however, I believe I should set the rec-
' On Aug. 31 the Soviet Representative made a
formal response to the Western draft treaty initia-
tive. He restated past Soviet objections to any non-
proliferation agreement which preserved the pos-
sibility of such nuclear sharing arrangements as the
proposed MLP/ANF. He continued to maintain that
any such arrangements within the NATO alliance
would lead to proliferation of nuclear weapons.
ord straight as to what the U. S. draft
treaty does say in answer to the questions
asked on August 17.
Question of Direct or Indirect Access
Ambassador Tsarapkin asked first
whether our draft treaty to prevent the
spread of nuclear weapons would ban access
to such weapons both directly and indi-
rectly. By directly, he said he meant through
national ownership, control, and operation.
By indirectly, he said he intended to cover
access by means of a multilateral force or
any similar body. He also asked whether the
Soviet Union should understand that this
draft treaty excludes the possibility of es-
tablishing an MLF [multilateral nuclear
force] with participation of military or other
personnel of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many.
First, let me answer as to direct access.
Articles I and II of the draft treaty would
clearly prevent the transfer of nuclear
weapons into the national control of any
nonnuclear country. They would also pre-
vent any nonnuclear country from itself ac-
quiring ownership or operation of nuclear
weapons through manufacture. This means
that I can answer affirmatively that part
of Ambassador Tsarapkin's first question
having to do with direct access.
The other part of his first question had
to do with acquiring access to nuclear weap-
ons indirectly. Articles I and II of our draft
treaty would preclude the transfer of nuclear
weapons into the national control of any
nonnuclear country, and I quote, "indirectly
through a military alliance." They would
also prohibit, and I quote again, "any other
action which would cause an increase in the
total number of States and other Organiza-
tions having independent power to use nu-
clear weapons." Thus no additional nuclear
powers could emerge, whether national or
international. This much I can clearly an-
swer affirmatively in response to that part
of his question having to do with indirect
access.
The treaty would not, however, preclude
470
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the establishment of nuclear arrangements
— such as a multilateral force within NATO
— so long as such arrangements would not
constitute an additional organization or en-
tity having the power to use nuclear weap-
ons independently of the participating na-
tions presently possessing nuclear weapons.
A new organization having such independ-
ent power could come into existence only if
a present nuclear nation should voluntarily
turn over its entire stockpile of nuclear
weapons to a collective entity and should
also voluntarily renounce its right of veto
over the collective force. Even in the event
of such a possibility, no nonnuclear nation
could acquire independent power to use nu-
clear weapons under the draft treaty. This
would be barred by the provisions which pre-
clude any transfer into the national control
of a nonnuclear country.
I hope that every delegation here will un-
derstand why our draft treaty has gone to
the trouble of including provisions to cover
such a future possibility. We are not, after
all, proposing a treaty meant only for a year
or even for a decade, but one which we hope
will remain in force indefinitely as a barrier
to the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Yet,
since we do have this long timespan in
mind, we are only being prudent when we
take account of parallel developments that
may occur in the political realm during the
same time period.
We in the United States have watched
with interest and profound satisfaction the
revival of Western Europe from the ashes
of the Second World War. A key factor in
the revival has been the creation of new
links of friendship and close cooperation
among the countries of Western Europe, in-
cluding those which before the war had a
long history of enmity. This process of draw-
ing together is still going on. As we all
know, the West European states themselves
are actively engaged in working out their
mutual problems and in deciding on the na-
ture and pace of their further progress
toward greater unity.
We here at this conference cannot put
ourselves in the position of impeding the
political evolution of Western Europe when
this has little to do with disarmament, or,
specifically, with preventing the spread of
nuclear weapons. We, therefore, have every
reason so to shape the language of our draft
treaty that if, some time in the future, the
nations of Western Europe, or a substan-
tial number of them, come to form some sort
of political union, they will not be con-
fronted with an unmanageable problem be-
cause of our inadvertence here in drafting
the text of a treaty.
We would not want to preclude for all
time any new collective political and defense
entity which might, with great effort and
patience, be created over an extended pe-
riod in Western Europe. We would not want
to preclude such an entity from possessing
and controlling nuclear weapons, if it should
in fact develop the capability to assume the
nuclear defense responsibilities of its for-
merly separate national components — some
of which are now nuclear powers. Such a
development could indeed reduce the number
of nuclear power centers.
It is obvious that Western Europe is
hardly likely to find itself reformed into
this type of new entity except after a long
course of development. Moreover, the new
entity could not have independent power
over nuclear weapons except with the ap-
proval of all the participants, including the
nuclear participants. In this sense, the issue
of the entity's future internal nuclear ar-
rangements is indeed of "more theoretical
than practical importance," as Lord Chal-
font [the U.K. Representative] put it in
his statement of August 19. For all these
reasons, the contingency I have described is
an unlikely one. However, this has little to
do with the present problem of prolifera-
tion, that is, with an increase in the num-
ber of political entities in the world now
having independent power over nuclear weap-
ons. Moreover, it certainly does not and
cannot justify any delegation on this Com-
mittee in invoking issues connected with
Europe's eventual political evolution as a
pretext for refusing to negotiate now on the
basis of the United States draft.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
471
Nuclear Arrangements Within NATO
As to Ambassador Tsarapkin's second
question concerning participation by the
Federal Republic of Germany in an MLF,
this is not really a question before this Com-
mittee. Arrangements for the participation
of interested NATO members in prepara-
tions for their own defense will obviously
not be negotiated here. If the U. S. draft
treaty should come into force, however, they
will be fully compatible with its letter and
spirit. This draft was arrived at after con-
sultation with all NATO member countries,
including those interested in new nuclear
arrangements within the alliance.
Any future decisions on nuclear matters
by NATO members will take into account
the fact that some of them are nuclear
powers while others are not. Personnel of
the Federal Republic would participate on
the same basis as those of, say, Italy or the
Netherlands. No nonnuclear country would
acquire nuclear weapons or be able to fire
them on the basis of a national decision.
Nor would any of them gain access to nu-
clear weapons design or manufacturing in-
formation, either now or in the future.
These provisions of the draft treaty reflect
the collective decision of those NATO coun-
tries now exploring new nuclear arrange-
ments within the alliance.
Therefore, if the Soviet concern about
nuclear proliferation is genuine, it should be
allayed by the draft treaty and my explana-
tion of its provisions. If, on the other hand,
the real Soviet aim is to divide or weaken
the NATO alliance, or to prevent the
growth of political harmony and strength
in Western Europe, then we can never
satisfy the Soviet Union. The NATO coun-
tries will not permit the question of their
collective nuclear defense arrangements to
become the subject of negotiation with the
Soviet Union. They will, however, make a
commitment to the Soviet Union that, be-
cause any defense arrangements adopted
will be entirely consistent with the terms of
the U. S. draft treaty if it goes into force,
these arrangements will not constitute
therefore nuclear proliferation.
It should not be thought that our effort
today to answer Ambassador Tsarapkin's
questions implies that we have none of our
own about the position of his country. On
the contrary, the U.S.S.R. is also a mighty
nuclear power, and it also participates in an
alliance of states in Eastern Europe — the
Warsaw Pact. More than this, we know that
the Soviet Union has in recent years turned
over to the armies of its East European allies
various short-range missiles which are ca-
pable of firing nuclear warheads. Yet we
have never been informed about the ar-
rangements which have been made within
the Warsaw Pact for consultation on, or
joint decisions about, the possible use of nu-
clear weapons. No Soviet statement exists
that I know of in which the U.S.S.R. ex-
plains its procedures for supplying nuclear
warheads to its allies to fit the missiles al-
ready given them.
This is a very important part of the non-
proliferation problem. I think that this Com-
mittee has a right to learn just how com-
patible with a nondissemination treaty the
Soviet arrangements with its allies really
are. Those of you who attended the recent
session of the U. N. Disarmament Commis-
sion will recall that I put a similar question
to Ambassador Tsarapkin in New York. He
has never given us an answer. I hope that
we may soon be given his reply, and I hope
that when it is given, it will help us to move
forward in our work.
Political Preconditions Advanced by U.S.S.R.
Now, having given specific answers to
Ambassador Tsarapkin's questions, I should
like to comment more generally on his state-
ment today. The burden of his remarks was
that allied nuclear defense arrangements
under consideration by some NATO coun-
tries would be incompatible with a treaty to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and
that the possibility of establishing any sort
of allied nuclear force must be renounced
before any treaty can be considered.
Such a view simply does not accord
with reality. In the light of the draft treaty
which has been tabled, it seems clear that
472
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the Soviet Union is placing political warfare
ahead of the prevention of nuclear prolifer-
ation. By continuing even at this late date
to advance such political preconditions, the
Soviet Government would be assuming a
great responsibility with respect to the wel-
fare of the entire world.
And, in this connection, let us be clear
about the real problem of military security
in Europe. By no stretch of the imagination
can the Federal Republic of Germany be
considered a threat to the security of the
Soviet Union or its neighbors. Rather, it is
the Soviet Union, with its many ready di-
visions in East Germany and with its hun-
dreds of missiles aimed at the territory of
the Federal Republic, that gives the Federal
Republic legitimate concern about its secu-
rity. It is this situation, caused by Soviet
military dispositions, and not an alleged
German desire for revenge, which explains
the efforts within the Atlantic alliance to
create some appropriate instrumentality by
which the nonnuelear members can partici-
pate in their own nuclear defense.
As I have said before, the danger of nu-
clear spread is worldwide and not the special
concern of any one country. Let us, there-
fore, return to the essential task of eliminat-
ing that threat on a worldwide basis. If we
abandon polemics and concentrate our ef-
forts on the elimination of the real obstacles
to the goal we are all enjoined to seek, then
all of us will gain. If we fail, we shall all be
exposed to this grave threat. It will matter
little how historians may assess the blame.
Role of Federal Republic of Germany
I regret that at this late stage in our work
the Soviet Representative felt called upon to
deliver another diatribe against the Federal
Republic of Germany.
At the U. N. Disarmament Commission's
session last June, Mr. Tsarapkin said it was
inappropriate for that body "to enter, di-
rectly or indirectly, overtly or covertly, into
a consideration of the position of, and a
fortiori, to condemn a state that is not rep-
resented in the United Nations." Mr. Tsa-
rapkin seemed anxious to protect the Chinese
Communists from any criticism, even if only
implied. He wished to protect a regime
which has openly denounced efforts toward
disarmament, flouted the desires of man-
kind as expressed in the limited test ban
treaty by exploding nuclear devices in the
atmosphere, ridiculed peaceful coexistence,
and fostered acts of aggression.
Yet he still seems to feel free to continue
his attacks on the Federal Republic of
Germany. In this case, the fact that the
accused party is not represented in the U. N.
or in our Committee and cannot itself reply
to those attacks does not seem to bother the
Soviet Representative in the least.
One of the basic objectives of Western
foreign policy after World War II has been
to work for reconciliation and cooperation
in Europe and to strengthen the community
of peaceful nations. The Federal Republic of
Germany has a freely elected democratic
government, and it seeks to have this right
of free self-determination available to all
Germans in East Germany as well. From
the ruins of World War II, and in spite of
the imposed division of Germany, the Fed-
eral Republic has emerged as a source of
economic assistance to many countries
around the world. It is dedicated to Euro-
pean cooperation and unity. It has publicly
renounced the use of force to achieve its
national objectives. It has entered into a
commitment to its allies not to manufacture
nuclear, bacteriological, or chemical weapons
and to this extent has already made an im-
portant contribution toward the objective of
nonproliferation. It has forsworn national-
istic military policy by integrating all of its
military forces in NATO and by placing
them under NATO command.
The draft nonproliferation treaty my dele-
gation has submitted, Mr. Chairman, should
allay any Soviet fears if they are genuine.
If, in spite of that, the Soviet Union con-
tinues to refuse to discuss a nonproliferation
agreement unless all plans for Allied nuclear
arrangements are dropped, we can only con-
clude that its objective is not the conclusion
of an effective nonproliferation treaty but
merely to use the issue to its own political
ends.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
473
TEXT OF DRAFT TREATY
Draft Treaty
To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
The Parties to this Treaty,
Desiring to promote international peace and
security,
Desiring in particular to refrain from taking steps
which will extend and intensify the arms race,
Believing that the further spread of nuclear
weapons will jeopardize these ends.
Recalling that Resolution 1665 (XVI) of the
General Assembly of the United Nations urges all
States to cooperate for these purposes,
Desiring to achieve effective agreements to halt
the nuclear arms race, and to reduce armaments,
including particularly nuclear arsenals.
Reaffirming their determination to achieve agree-
ment on general and complete disarmament under
effective international control,
Have agreed as follows:
Article I
1. Each of the nuclear States Party to this Treaty
undertakes not to transfer any nuclear weapons
into the national control of any non-nuclear State,
either directly, or indirectly through a military al-
liance; and each undertakes not to take any other
action which would cause an increase in the total
number of States and other Organizations having
independent power to use nuclear weapons.
2. Each of the nuclear States Party to this
Treaty undertakes not to assist any non-nuclear
State in the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
Article II
1. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this
Treaty undertakes not to manufacture nuclear
weapons; each undertakes not to seek or to re-
ceive the transfer of such weapons into its national
control, either directly, or indirectly through a
military alliance; and each undertakes not to take
any other action which would cause an increase in
the total number of States and other Organizations
having independent power to use nuclear weapons.
2. Each of the non-nuclear States Party to this
Treaty undertakes not to seek or to receive assist-
ance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons, or it-
self to grant such assistance.
Article III
Each of the States Party to this Treaty under-
takes to cooperate in facilitating the application of
International Atomic Energy Agency or equivalent
international safeguards on all peaceful nuclear
activities.
Article IV
In this Treaty
(A) "Nuclear State" means a State possessing
independent power to use nuclear weapons as of . . .
(B) "Non-nuclear State" means any State which
is not a nuclear State.
Article V
1. This Treaty shall be open to all States for
signature. Any State which does not sign this Treaty
before its entry into force in accordance with para-
graph 3 of this article may accede to it at any
time.
2. This Treaty shall be subject to ratification
by signatory States. Instruments of ratification and
instruments of accession shall be deposited vfith the
Governments of the United Kingdom of Great Brit-
ain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics, and the United States of Amer-
ica, which are hereby designated the Depositary
Governments.
3. This Treaty shall enter into force on the deposit
of instruments of ratification by
Governments, including those of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, and the United States
of America.
4. For States whose instruments of ratification
or accession are deposited subsequent to the entry
into force of this Treaty, it shall enter into force
on the date of the deposit of their instruments of
ratification or accession.
5. The Depositary Governments shall promptly
inform all signatory and acceding States of the
date of each signature, the date of deposit of each
instrument of ratification of and accession to this
Treaty, and the date of its entry into force.
6. This Treaty shall be registered by the Deposi-
tary Governments pursuant to Article 102 of the
Charter of the United Nations.
Article VI
1. This Treaty shall remain in force indefinitely
subject to the right of any Party to the Treaty to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraor-
dinary events related to the subject matter of the
Treaty have jeopardized the supreme interests of
its Country. It shall give notice of such withdrawal
to all other signatory and acceding States and to
the United Nations Security Council three months
in advance. Such notice shall include a statement
of the extraordinary events it regards as having
jeopardized its supreme interests.
2 years after the entry into force of this
Treaty, a conference of Parties may be held at a
date and place to be fixed by agreement of two-
thirds of the Parties in order to review the opera-
tion of the Treaty.
Article VII
This Treaty, of which the Chinese, English,
French, Russian, and Spanish texts are equally
474
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of
the Depositary Governments. Duly certified copies
of this Treaty shall be transmitted by the Deposi-
tary Governments to the Governments of the sig-
natory and acceding States.
In witness whereof the undersigned, duly author-
ized, have signed this Treaty.
Done in triplicate at the city of , the
day of one thousand nine
hundred and sixty-five.
President Calls Gemini-S Flight
a "Journey of Peace"
Statement by President Johnson ^
This is a moment of great achievement not
only for Astronauts Gordon Cooper and
Charles Conrad but for everyone whose
hopes have ridden with Gemini-5.
The successful completion of the 8-day, 3-
million-mile flight of the Gemini-5 proves
not only man's capacity for endurance in
space — it proves that man is in space to stay.
We can be — and we are — enormously
proud of all our space team. To the scien-
tists and technicians, to the controllers and
trackers — to everyone who contributed in any
way — I extend thanks of the country for a
job well done. To Gordon Cooper and Charles
Conrad and their wonderful families, I say
simply : "We are deeply proud of you."
The difficulties and disappointments of
this flight have served to increase our ap-
preciation, respect, and trust for the skill
and ability of all the men involved — at all
their posts of duty. We can face the chal-
lenges and opportunities with far greater
confidence and certainty — and this is an un-
mistakable gain.
Only 7 years ago we were neither first
nor second in space — we were not in space
at all. Today the capacity of this country for
leadership in this realm is no longer in
valid question or dispute. Openly, proudly,
we are proceeding on our course, willing al-
ways to share our knowledge, our gains,
with all mankind. I would repeat and renew
^ Made at the opening of a news conference at the
LBJ Ranch, Johnson City, Tex., on Aug. 29 (White
House press release (Austin, Tex.)).
this country's invitation to all nations to
join together to make this adventure a joint
adventure.
This globe seems smaller today than ever
before. Somehow the problems which yester-
day seemed large and ominous and insoluble
today appear less foreboding. As man in-
creases his knowledge of the heavens, why
should he fear the unknown on earth? As
man draws nearer to the stars, why should
he not also draw nearer to his neighbor?
As we push ever more deeply into the uni-
verse— probing its secrets and discovering
its way — we must also learn to cooperate
across the frontiers that divide earth's sur-
face.
No national sovereignty rules in outer
space. Those who venture there go as envoys
of the human race. Their quest must be for
all mankind — and what they find belongs to
all mankind. That is the basis of the pro-
gram of which Astronauts Cooper and Con-
rad are a part. For, as Woodrow Wilson said
of this country half a century ago, "We ask
nothing for ourselves that we do not also
ask for humanity."
And we ask peace. Peace — and the oppor-
tunity to help our neighbors — to improve
the quality of all our lives — to enlarge the
meaning of liberty for all and to secure for
all the rights and dignity intended for man
by his Creator.
This flight of Gemini-5 was a journey of
peace by men of peace. Its successful con-
clusion is a noble moment for mankind —
and a fitting opportunity for us to renew
our pledge to continue our search for a world
in which peace reigns and justice prevails.
To demonstrate the earnestness of that
pledge, and to express our commitment to
the peaceful uses of space exploration, I in-
tend to ask as many of our astronauts as
possible — when their schedule and program
permit — to visit various capitals of the
world. Some, I hope, will be able to journey
abroad soon.
Gemini is but the beginning. We resolve
to have many more such journeys — in space
and on earth — until man at last is at peace
with himself.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
475
President Comments on Several
Foreign Policy Developments
Statement by President Johnson ^
Dominican Republic
The Secretary of State and I have spent
time last night and this morning reviewing
various matters of interest around the
world.
The Secretary reported that in the Do-
minican Republic the OAS Committee is con-
tinuing its patient and determined work for
peace.2 It is clear that this work corresponds
to the real hopes of the Dominican people
and to the hopes of the whole hemisphere.
It is also clear that the OAS Committee is
right in its belief that the time for agree-
ment is now.
We have followed the negotiations closely,
and we fully support the changes which the
OAS Committee has proposed in its "Act of
Reconciliation." We believe that these
changes strengthen the document by making
clearer provisions for the procedure of dis-
armament and by reinforcing the authority
of what will be a fully sovereign provisional
government.
I am confident the Dominican people and
the members of the OAS are one in their
belief that any who continue to oppose the
OAS solution are serving no true interest of
their country. It is greatly to the credit of
the Organization of American States that
all members of its Committee and all officers
of the Inter-American Peace Force are do-
ing their best to bring all sides to agreement
on the OAS proposal in its present form.
Kashmir issue
The Secretary and I also discussed the
tense and difficult situation in Kashmir. We
are naturally greatly concerned over any
' Made at a news conference at the LBJ Ranch,
Johnson City, Tex., on Aug. 29 (White House press
release (Austin, Tex.)).
' See p. 477.
flareup involving India and Pakistan. Our
longstanding and consistent stance has been
that the Kashmir issue must and should be
solved by peaceful means. The U.N. is al-
ready involved, and we hope that the con-
structive efforts of the Secretary-General
may be successful there.
I might add that we are always acutely
interested in the course of affairs in the sub-
continent in general. It is an area to which
the U. S. has provided truly massive assist-
ance and to whose people we are deeply at-
tached.
Yemen Agreement
In the Middle East, we are happy to see the
statesmanlike agreement between King Fai-
sal [of Saudi Arabia] and President Nas-
ser [of the United Arab Republic], which
seems to offer great promise of a peaceful
settlement in Yemen. This crisis has long
been a disruptive element in the relations
between our two friends. We share their
confidence that this long-festering issue is
on the road to settlement by negotiation
rather than force.
Disarmament Negotiations
In Geneva our negotiators are continuing
their efforts to make progress toward a
sound international agreement to stop the
spread of nuclear weapons.* The cause of
peace has no more urgent task.
We regret very much that some are still
unwilling to join in serious negotiations on
the false ground that our proposals would
permit nuclear proliferation in Europe.
In the same way, we regret that these
proposals have been misunderstood by others
as if they interfered with the legitimate de-
fensive interests of any of the NATO allies.
They do nothing of the sort, and I am glad
to say that we have had full consultation
and understanding with such outstanding
leaders as Chancellor Erhard [of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany] on this point.
' See p. 466.
476
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
OAS Achieves Reconciliation in Dominican Republic
On Augiist 31 the Act of Dominican Rec-
onciliation proposed by the Ad Hoc Commit-
tee of the Organization of American States
was signed at Santo Domingo. Following are
two statements made by President Johnson
on September 1, together ivith the text of a
Declaration to the Dominican People issued
at Santo Domingo on August 8 by the Ad
Hoc Committee, which summarized the
terms of the Act of Dominican Reconcilia-
tion and appealed to the Dominican people
for their support.
STATEMENTS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON
First Statement
White House press release dated September 1
I am deeply gratified that agreement was
reached last night on a new government in
the Dominican Republic. While there are
still grave problems to be faced by the Do-
minican people, the way has been opened
for an end to strife and for the choice of
leaders through the process which all free
men cherish. The hopes of democratic and
peaceful men the whole world over have
taken new strength and nourishment from
these events today.
The road to peace and freedom is always
hard, and wherever this road is being trav-
eled successfully, there can always be found
many men and women who have given of
themselves and of their talents in great
measure. The Dominican Republic is no ex-
ception, and there have been many who
have done just this. All democratic elements
in the hemisphere are indebted to the Do-
minican leaders who have worked for this
agreement, to Ambassadors Penna Marinho,
Clairmont Duenas, and Bunker for their
outstanding statesmanship, and to the many
others who contributed so much in order
that this achievement could be made pos-
sible.
Second Statement i
I have been meeting this morning with
the Secretary General of the Organization
of American States, Dr. Jose Mora, to ex-
press my very deep appreciation and the
gratitude of the people of the United States
for the very important contributions that
were made by the OAS — the Organization of
American States — to the agreement reached
last night on a new government in the
Dominican Republic.
I want to take this special opportunity
now to thank Dr. Mora for his own very
excellent and fine work, as well as the per-
formance of his fine organization. Special
thanks must go to Ambassador Penna Ma-
rinho, Ambassador Clairmont Dueiias, and
our own Ambassador Ellsworth Bunker.
There are still grave problems facing the
Dominican people. But the way has finally
been opened for an end to strife and for the
choice of leaders through the process which
all free men cherish. I am certain that the
hopes of men who really love peace and the
democratic process have taken new strength
from these developments and these events.
In a very short time there will be a pro-
visional government in the Dominican Re-
' Made in the White House theater following a
meeting with Jose Mora, Secretary General of the
OAS (White House press release dated Sept. 1).
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
477
public- This government will need the ener-
getic support of the whole Western Hemi-
sphere as it sets about the work of restoring
peace and trying to rebuild the entire
Dominican economy. The United States and
the Organization of American States will
work together in these new tasks — shoulder
to shoulder — as we have worked together in
these recent months. We all have the same
objective. We all seek the same goals — peace
and prosperity for the hemisphere.
DECLARATION TO DOMINICAN PEOPLE
On June 18, we, the representatives of the
Organization of American States in the
Dominican Republic, appealed to the Domini-
can people to support our proposal for a solu-
tion to the conflict which has so painfully
divided this nation.* We spoke on behalf of
the free community of American nations;
we spoke in a spirit of conciliation and
brotherhood. We asked that the Dominican
people decide their future in early elections.
We proposed that an absolutely impartial
Provisional Government be formed to take
the country to those elections. Since the
declaration we have spent countless hours in
negotiations and discussions with Domini-
cans of all representative sectors of the
country in order to reach a final settlement.
Now we address ourselves again to the
Dominican people in order to seek their
support. Today we have offered both con-
tending sides — to the "Government of Na-
tional Reconstruction" and to the "Constitu-
tional Government" — our proposal for a final
settlement. It is, we believe, a fair and
reasonable proposal and neither side will win
or lose. The only victors will be the Domini-
can people.
^ A Provisional Government, headed by Hector
Garcia Godoy was sworn in at Santo Domingo on
Sept. 3.
^ For texts of a "Proposal of the Ad Hoc Com-
mittee for the Solution of the Dominican Crisis"
and a "Declaration to the Dominican People" made
public on June 18 and brought to the attention of
the U.N. Security Council on the same day, see
Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 132.
Our proposal provides that :
1. The contending sides and the people
will recognize as the sole and sovereign
government of the Dominican Republic a
Provisional Government to be formed im-
mediately by Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy, a dis-
tinguished Dominican who has come forward
to accept this great and historic responsibil-
ity with high patriotic spirit.
2. The contending sides and the people will
accept the Institutional Act,* prepared with
the assistance of distinguished Dominican
jurists, as the instrument under which the
Provisional Government will exercise its
functions.
This Act provides that :
A. The Provisional Government will con-
sist of a President and a Cabinet empowered
to exercise all normal executive and legis-
lative powers of a sovereign Dominican
government.
B. The Provisional Government will hold
general elections within nine months, turn-
ing over power to the elected government
within thirty days after these elections. All
parties whose principles are compatible with
representative democracy may participate
in the elections after complying with the
legal requirements.
C. A complete political truce will prevail
until three months prior to the holding of
elections, thus limiting the political cam-
paign to such a period.
D. The Provisional Government will guar-
antee to the Dominican people all the rights
consecrated in the American Declaration
of Rights and Duties of Man and the Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights.
3. On the day it takes office, the Provi-
sional Government will proclaim a general
amnesty and take the necessary measures
to release all political prisoners.
4. Once the Provisional Government is
installed, the process of reuniting the City
of Santo Domingo will begin and the zone
presently under the control of the "Consti-
' OAS doc. 280; available upon request from the
Pan American Union, Washington, D.C.
478
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
tutional Government" will disappear on be-
ing absorbed into the Security Zone. The
Security Zone will be maintained for a pe-
riod of thirty days as a guarantee of the
safety of its population. At the end of that
period it will cease to exist, unless the
Provisional President should consider it nec-
essary to postpone this step.
5. Public order in the Security Zone will
be the responsibility of the Provisional Presi-
dent who may call on the Inter-American
Peace Force for assistance during such a
period.
6. The Provisional Government will estab-
lish centers for the collection of arms in
possession of the civilian population.
7. The leaders of the "Constitutional Gov-
ernment" will take the responsibility for
assuring that arms in the possession of civil-
ians currently under their jurisdiction are
delivered in due course after the installa-
tion of the Provisional Government. The
Provisional Government will take appro-
priate measures to recover the arms that are
not surrendered voluntarily.
8. The Armed Forces will return to their
barracks and place themselves under the
orders of their Commander in Chief, the
Provisional President. All members of the
Armed Forces who have participated in the
conflict on the Constitutionalist side will be
permitted to rejoin their regular units with-
out discrimination or reprisals at the rank
they held on April 23, 1965.
9. No officer or enlisted man will be sub-
mitted to a court martial or subjected to pun-
ishment of any kind for acts, except com-
mon crimes, committed since April 23, 1965.
Any who wish to retire or leave the country
will be permitted to do so with appropriate
guarantees and the assistance of the Pro-
visional Government.
10. The Provisional Government will initi-
ate negotiations with the Tenth Meeting of
Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs
relating to the functions of the Inter-
American Peace Force and the manner and
the time of its withdrawal.
The foregoing proposals have been em-
bodied in an "Act of Dominican Reconcilia-
tion" ^ which has been submitted to the con-
sideration of the "Constitutional Govern-
ment," "Government of National Recon-
struction," and Dr. Garcia Godoy — we asked
them to sign it solemnly at the National
Palace. Only then can the nation begin the
arduous task of restoring its economy and
rebuilding its democratic political institu-
tions.
There are, we know, persons who hope the
Act of Dominican Reconciliation will not be
signed; persons who do not want a peaceful
and democratic solution — some dream of
making the Dominican Republic a second
Cuba ; others are determined to postpone the
electoral process indefinitely.
We, for our part, have full confidence in
the Dominican people, in their love for free-
dom, and their hatred for tyranny in any
form. Dedication to the principle of repre-
sentative democracy is a cornerstone of the
inter-American system, just as repudiation
of communism anywhere in the hemisphere
is a solemn obligation assumed by all mem-
ber states of the Organization of American
States. As representatives of that Organiza-
tion we reaffirm our intention to help the
Dominican people in their efforts to build
the democratic institutions that are the only
effective defense against communism.
However, if these institutions are to be
built, the nation's economy must be saved.
At the moment it is on the point of ruin.
During the last three months the Organiza-
tion of American States has made substan-
tial contributions to avoid a total collapse of
the Dominican economy. Thus, resources
have been provided to pay salaries of public
employees and to assist other sectors of the
economy. This emergency program is now at
an end since funds for such activities have
been exhausted. It is necessary that a Pro-
visional Government be established that can
be internationally recognized so that the
Dominican Republic may receive the eco-
nomic assistance essential to its recovery.
But the economy can be saved; the trag-
edy that separates and places the Dominican
■ OAS doc. 281.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
479
family in mourning can be ended.
Our proposal opens the way.
Patriotic Dominicans of all walks of life
have told us how desperately the country
needs a final solution.
Therefore, we call on them on behalf of
all the peoples of the hemisphere.
Dominicans from all the corners and sec-
tors of the country who truly love your
country and who sincerely want to save it :
We ask you to support our proposal for
national reconciliation. Peace, freedom and
prosperity will be your rewards!
Ad Hoc Committee
ILMAR PENNA MARINHO
Special Delegate of Brazil
Ramon de Clairmont DuEffAs
Special Delegate of El Salvador
Ellsworth Bunker
Special Delegate of the United States
Status-off-Forces Agreement
Signed With Ciiina
Press release 201 dated Ausnst 30
A status-of -forces agreement between the
United States and the Republic of China
was signed on August 30 at the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs in Taipei by Foreign Min-
ister Shen Chang-huan and Ralph N. Clough,
Charge d' Affaires ad interim of the Amer-
ican Embassy.
The agreement defines the status of U. S.
military forces, their dependents, supporting
facilities, and personnel deployed pursuant
to article VII of the Mutual Defense Treaty
of 1954 1 between the two countries. Con-
sisting of 20 articles and two accompanying
exchanges of diplomatic notes, the agree-
ment includes provisions relating to entry
and exit procedures, taxes, importation and
disposal of official and personal property,
criminal jurisdiction, and other matters. The
agreement will come into effect after com-
pletion of administrative and legislative pro-
cedures as required by the laws of the re-
spective governments.
U.S. Pledges Support to World
Population Conference
Following is the text of a letter from Pres-
ident Johnson to U.N. Secretary-General U
Thant on the occasion of the opening at
Belgrade on August 31 of the second United
Nations World Population Conference.
White House press release dated Autrust 30
August 30, 1965
My Dear Mr. Secretary-General: The
United States Government recognizes the
singular importance of the meeting of the
second United Nations World Population
Conference and pledges its full support to
your great undertaking.
As I said to the United Nations in San
Francisco,^ we must now begin to face
forthrightly the multiplying problems of
our multiplying population. Our Govern-
ment assures your conference of our whole-
hearted support to the United Nations and its
agencies in their efforts to achieve a better
world through bringing into balance the
world's resources and the world's popula-
tion.
In extending my best wishes for the suc-
cess of your conference, it is my fervent
hope that your great assemblage of popula-
tion experts will contribute significantly to
the knowledge necessary to solve this tran-
scendent problem. Second only to the search
for peace, it is humanity's greatest chal-
lenge. This week, the meeting in Belgrade
carries with it the hopes of mankind.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
3178.
^Bulletin of July 19, 1965, p. 98.
480
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27
Press release 200 dated August 27
Secretary Rusk: I should like to welcome
today a number of guests from foreign
countries who are here under our cultural
exchange program. Looking in on a press
conference is a pretty good way to see a
sample of the vigor of American democracy.
I have no opening statement. This is a
weekend press conference to give you a
chance to wrap up the week with any ques-
tions you have on your minds. I would be
glad to take your questions now.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there is a report in the
paper this morning that the United States
is offering to exchange with Hanoi demon-
strations of its desire to slow down the war.
This report has it that there is considerable
third-person activity between here and
Hanoi. One of the elements in this is said
to be that the United States is urging the
withdrawal of the 325th North Vietnamese
Division, in return for which it would stop
its bombing and otherwise lower the level of
military activity.
A. Well, I think that puts it in much too
precise a fashion. You will recall that I have
said in the last 2 or 3 weeks that we are
prepared to consider stopping of the bomb-
ing of North Viet-Nam if in fact this could
be a step toward peace. And I have also said
on many occasions that we have asked the
other side what else would happen if we
stopped the bombing. The reference to the
325th Division is an example. For example,
would the 325th Division go home? Now,
that type of question has been put to the
other side more than once, because we want
to see some peace out there. Our war aim is
peace.
On the question of third-party represent-
atives, it is quite true that there have been
many contacts through third parties or with
third parties. Perhaps it is rather a whole-
some thing that there are so many volun-
teers all over the world who are prepared to
assist in making peace if that is possible.
And so I can summarize it by saying that
the problem is not lack of contact. The prob-
lem is not that of our having excessive war
aims. We are interested in peace. I outlined
those in the last 10 days as to the basic
elements of a peaceful settlement as we see
it.i What we need is some indication that
the other side is itself interested in peace.
Q. May I just follow that up by asking —
A. Yes, please.
Q. — by asking you — you said that that
question of what would happen to the 325th
Division has been put to the other side sev-
eral times. Do you mean through third par-
ties, or are you talking about your public
declarations?
A. Well, I have said this publicly, which
I have no doubt gets to the other side, and
I have stated it at times as an example. I
mean, for example, would the 325th Divi-
sion go home? What else would happen?
What else would happen if we stopped our
bombing?
No Move Toward Peace From Other Side
Q. Mr. Secretary, has there been any re-
sponse indicating hope that the other side
will be interested ?
A. Well, I can't report any response that
' For text of a CBS News television interview with
Secretary Rusk, Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg,
and Presidential Assistant McGeorge Bundy, see
Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 431.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
481
is clearly indicative of a move toward peace
in this situation.
I sometimes am asked whether I am opti-
mistic or pessimistic. I remind you that
diplomacy is professionally committed to a
degree of optimism. Diplomacy has to oper-
ate on the basis that peace is possible. And
so we are pursuing all of these questions
and through whatever channels are needed
to be sure that, if there is a possibility of
peace, we not overlook it and that we stay
in a situation where the sheer physical
events themselves will not take command
and move everyone in a direction in which
no one wishes to go. And so to a real extent
we proceed on the basic commitments of di-
plomacy to the optimistic view that a peace
is possible; otherwise, it would be all up to
the military.
Q. Mr. Secretary, are there any of the
third-party approaches which you consider
more important than the others ?
A. Yes. [Laughter.] Next question ?
Q. Which ones, Mr. Secretary?
A. No. Of course I can't get into that.
Events in Latin America Encouraging
Q. Mr. Secretary, Senator [Thomas J.]
Dodd said in a speech this week to the Amer-
ican Legion at Portland, Oregon, that, while
ive have focused our attention on Viet-Nam,
we seem to have forgotten the Communist
problem in Latin America and particularly
Cuba. I wonder if you could bring us up to
date on how you feel about the situation in
Cuba and in Latin America in general ?
A. Well, quite frankly, I feel greatly en-
couraged about what has happened in Latin
America in the last year or so. I think events
in Venezuela and Chile, where the voters
went to the polls and defied extremist ele-
ments and strengthened constitutional de-
mocracy in those countries, were of great
significance. I think the events in Brazil
were encouraging. I think the action that
was taken in the Dominican Republic has
been a major step toward moving the Do-
minican Republic toward a constitutional
democracy which is compatible vdth the in-
stitutions of this hemisphere.
We, as you know, have discussed with our
colleagues in this hemisphere, from 1962 on-
ward, the steps that are necessary to insure
that the economic and social revolution
which is long overdue and which is needed
in this hemisphere should proceed by demo-
cratic process. And that means that Cas-
troism is not the answer. And I think there
has been unanimous recognition of this un-
derlying policy of the hemisphere toward
events here in this part of the world.
Now, it is true that Castro remains in
power in Cuba, and we can anticipate that
that will remain true for the period imme-
diately ahead. But I think that it is also
fair to say that that type of effort to pene-
trate and dominate this hemisphere by ideol-
ogies and forces external to the hemisphere
has been turned back and blunted and that
the people of this hemisphere are turning
toward their own constitutional processes
and to the Alliance for Progress for the fu-
ture.
Q. Mr. Secretary, is the American base at
Cam Ranh, South Viet-Nam, being built
with any longtime, permanent use in view?
A. No. No. We have said many times that
we have no desire for any permanent bases
in South Viet-Nam nor any desire for a per-
manent military presence in Southeast Asia.
Tensions Between India and Paicistan
Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has
seen fit to give large quantities of economic i
and military assistance to both India and 1
Pakistan. The two countries are now appar-
ently on the verge of what could be serious
warfare in Kashmir. Does this Government
feel it fit and proper to exert any initiative
toward halting this, trying to bring peace,
mediating, or making sure that U. S. weap-
ons are not used in the fighting ?
A. Well, of course we are very much in-
terested in peace between India and Paki-
stan. We have had this problem in our basket
482
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
for 17 years. As a junior officer of the De-
partment of State, I spent an enormous
amount of time on it with the Secretary of
the day, trying to find some solution through
United Nations and other approaches. We
feel that it is tragic that the two great na-
tions and peoples of that subcontinent have
not yet been able to find a way to live in
close cooperation with each other and in
complete peace with each other.
I notice that in the last day or so Pravda
has said that this kind of controversy re-
dounds only to the benefit of the American
imperialists. This is exactly contrary to the
truth. This contest, or these tensions be-
tween India and Pakistan, have in fact been
responsible for considerable burdens upon
the United States. If one can think of that
subcontinent as an area in which these two
great nations are cooperating with each
other across the board in terms of complete
confidence and friendship and, on the other
side, a situation in which they are in a state
of high tension, in controversy with each
other, the difference from the United States
point of view is very large indeed. How much
more effectively we could be of assistance to
both countries in developing their economic
and social programs and how secure they
could be in the subcontinent if they could
learn somehow to live with each other! So
we have a very large interest ourselves in
peace between these two countries.
The Secretary-General of the United Na-
tions, as you know, has called his U.N. ob-
server back for consultation. We hope very
much that this can be resolved quickly and
by peaceful means and that these two great
countries not let this crisis go further.
U.S. Position Regarding Negotiations
Q. Mr. Secretary, to go back to the Viet-
Nam situation, in recent weeks both the
United States and the Communist side have
been talking increasingly about their defi-
nitions of the Geneva agreements of 195 Jf
and ways to get back to them. Would it be
possible for you to define — in view of the
fact that the words on both sides sound so
similar in so many respects — would it be
possible for you to define the points of basic
difference at this stage and why these words
are different to each side ?
A. Well, Mr. Harder [Murray Harder, the
Washington Post] , I don't want to appear to
cut the question off too briefly, but I don't
want to negotiate these points here in this
room in this company.
What I should like to do is to negotiate
them with the other side. Now, we have in-
dicated on more than one occasion the essen-
tial elements of a peaceful solution in that
situation. We would like to come to the table
and talk about these, and, as the President
has indicated, we are prepared to talk about
what the other side wishes to put on the
table for discussion, as well as our own
point of view.
But I would suppose that the essential
difference which exists at the present time
is that the other side appears to be deter-
mined to take over South Viet-Nam and con-
trol its future by force and we are deter-
mined to see that that does not happen.
Now, if that essential difference disap-
pears, then many things can happen, but we
still have that difference in front of us, and
I just don't want to get into details here be-
cause this is not the place or the time to
negotiate. We would like to negotiate with
the other side and not just negotiate with a
phantom, based upon public discussions,
spelling out details, to get — as I put it be-
fore— to get in on a Ph.D. seminar when we
are not even in the kindergarten yet.
Q. Mr. Secretary, do you feel that it's
possible that negotiations can take place
ivith the other side while the fighting con-
tinues, as happened actually during the Ko-
rean war on occasion, or do we make it a
precondition that the fighting stop before
we start talking ?
A. When the 17 nonalined nations pro-
posed that there be negotiations without pre-
conditions, we said yes.^ The other side said
^ For text of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see ihid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
483
no. When President Johnson in Baltimore *
said that we were ready for discussions —
unconditional discussions — the other side ap-
parently rejected that as some sort of trick-
ery.
We would be prepared to discuss these
problems in any reasonable order. For ex-
ample, if there were the convening of a con-
ference, the question of a cease-fire might
well be the first item on the agenda. Or if
the governments who are responsible for the
settlement of the Southeast Asian question —
that is, those governments members of the
Geneva conference — wish to have some pre-
liminary discussion about the matter before
a formal conference was convened, all right.
We are prepared to do that.
So we don't take a flat view on the ques-
tion that you posed. What we need is some
serious contact and discussion among the
governments who can settle this matter
and bring the situation to peace.
Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
that General de Gaulle is waiting for the
right moment to try to personally negotiate
an end to the Viet-Nam war. Would we tvel-
come any such efforts by De Gaulle ?
A. Well, we are interested in a peaceful
settlement. We will be interested in what
anyone develops in that direction. We don't
exclude any possibility. Neither we nor the
other side has, so far as I know, nominated
attorneys in this field. But, nevertheless, the
fact that many governments are interested,
that there are many contacts all over the
world, is itself I think positive, because,
through this process of diplomatic osmosis,
ideas are passed back and forth. Many of
them come to nothing. We hope that one of
these days this process will turn up some
key signal that will make an important dif-
ference. This is the way that other crises
have been resolved. Thus far my own anten-
nae have not picked up this key signal, but
the antennae are very much alert.
Yes, sir?
' For an address by President Johnson at Johns
Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see ibid., p. 606.
Principles of U.S. Immigration Policy
Q. Mr. Secretary, can you say whether the
administration continues to remain opposed
to the imposition of quotas on immigrants
from Western Hemisphere countries ?
A. Well, this is a matter that, as you
know, has been under very considerable dis-
cussion in the Congress. I very much appre-
ciated the action taken by the House of
Representatives on this matter the other
day. There has been concern in the Con-
gress, both in the House and in the Senate,
about whether a change in our general im-
migration policy would lead to a large and
sudden change in the pattern of immigra-
tion into this country.
Now, we, as far as we are concerned, have
said on a number of occasions that what we
are talking about is not a substantial in-
crease in the total number of immigrants
but to get our immigration policy on the
basis of our attitude toward discrimination ;
to get rid of the national origins, national
quotas; to get rid of the Asia-Pacific Tri-
angle; to keep in effect those safeguards
with respect to employment, with respect to
security questions, with respect to health
questions; but to clarify the underlying
principle of our immigration policy.
I gather that the Senate committee has
felt that we ought to look at this matter
between now and 1968. They have suggested
there be a commission appointed to study
this matter in which the Congress might
legislate, but in the absence of legislation by
1968 there should be some total limitation
on immigration for this hemisphere. I don't
think these differences are as far-reaching
or as fundamental as one might suppose.
Because if the House bill were enacted ex-
actly as it is, I think that the executive and
the Congress would want to study the mat-
ter and keep an eye on it to see how, in fact,
immigration develops.
So I would hope that we would get a bill
promptly which would make the underlying
policy decision to eliminate quotas based
upon national origins, to eliminate the Asia-
Pacific Triangle, and go on from there to see
484
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
what would be a reasonable immigration
policy for our country. Of course, when the
Congress passes this bill this year, the Con-
gress does not abandon its interest in the
subject. And if there are changes that are
needed in the future, the Congress and the
executive can consult and bring about such
changes. But the great thing that is just
about to be achieved, I hope and I am sure,
is that we would get away from national
origins and we will get away from the Asia-
Pacific Triangle type of discrimination.
Q. Mr. Secretary, have we had any direct
or indirect approaches from any of the Com-
munist countries, including the Soviet Un-
ion, on wheat sales, and, if so, have they
raised the old problem of shipping costs?
A. No, we do not have in front of us any
inquiry or request from the Soviet Union
about wheat sales. I understand that Mr.
Moyers [Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to
the President] made a statement on that
subject at the White House today. So that so
far this is a hypothetical problem. We just
haven't seen an expression of interest in
possible purchases here.
Consular Convention With Soviet Union
Q. Mr. Secretary, recently you testified
before the Senate Foreign Relations Com^
mittee in support of the ratification of the
consular convention with the Soviet Union.*
Since then a significant amount of opposi-
tion has appeared in the Senate, based it
seems in part on testimony given by J. Edgar
Hoover, which alleged, I believe, that ratifi-
cation of the treaty would lead to an in-
crease in Soviet espionage agents in this
country. And this has led to apparently a
postponement of action on it. I wonder how
you feel about Mr. Hoover's statement.
A. Well, let me talk about how I feel
about the consular convention. [Laughter.]
I testified in public session about the con-
sular convention and pointed out that there
were two rather separate questions involved
• Ibid., Aug. 30, 1965, p. 375.
in that convention, one of which is immedi-
ate and the other of which is something for
the future.
The immediate question is to get agree-
ment on certain rights of notification and
consular access in the event that nationals
of one country might be arrested or de-
tained for any reason in the territory of the
other. From our point of view, this is a very
important development in our relations with
the Soviet Union. We have some 12,000
Americans visiting the Soviet Union each
year. They have about a thousand of their
citizens visiting the United States. We have
two quite different kinds of systems, and,
as you know, we have had irritations and
tensions in the past based upon what hap-
pens to individual citizens visiting in the
other's country. That, it seems to us, sug-
gests that there are great advantages from
the point of view of the United States in
proceeding with this consular convention.
Now, some questions have been raised be-
cause it is also true that at some stage in
the future we might wish to discuss with
the Soviet Union establishing a consulate —
an additional consulate in the Soviet Union
for us and in this country for them. At the
present time, consular duties are carried out
by elements of the embassy in the two coun-
tries, and those who carry out those con-
sular functions, as members of the embassy,
have diplomatic immunity.
Now, some concern has been expressed
about the increase in the numbers of na-
tionals of other countries who might be here
under diplomatic immunity. We have about
9,000 people in this country under diplo-
matic immunity — the diplomatic corps in
Washington, the United Nations in New
York, the OAS in Washington, and the
standing group of NATO in Washington.
Now, if we established a Soviet consulate
in this country in some city other than
Washington, that might add 10, 12, 15 to
the 9,000 who already have diplomatic im-
munity.
As you may recall, in my public testi-
mony I also pointed out that the problem
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
485
of security in this country is geared to our
requirements as an open democratic society.
We do let people move around in this coun-
try. If there are secrets to be kept, we try
to keep those secrets where they are. And
you gentlemen know a good deal about that
part of our problem. People who have se-
crets should keep their mouths shut. If
they have files, they should be maintained
secure. If there are military installations,
they should be guarded. That is the way we
deal with these matters in an open society.
So that we feel that the addition of a few
people to those large numbers of people who
have diplomatic immunity in this country
would not affect appreciably the problem of
security in an open society.
Now, these are matters that require fur-
ther clarification and explanation, further
discussion in the Senate. Frankly, I can't tell
you whether, under the present schedule of
the Senate and all the legislative matters
that they have before them before they
hope to get away, whether we can get this
before the Senate before adjournment or
not. But I have no doubt whatever about the
value to the United States of the consular
convention which has been negotiated with
the Soviet Union.
Q. Mr. Secretary, perhaps you are aware
the Department is to be picketed between
2:00 and U:00 tomorrow by a self-described
"minority group." If you are aivare of the
particular circumstances, is there anything
that you would care to say at this point
about the personnel policies at issue ?
A. Well, you have been very gentle. I un-
derstand that we are being picketed by a
group of homosexuals. [Laughter.] The pol-
icy of the Department is that we do not
employ homosexuals knowingly and that if
we discover homosexuals in our Department
we discharge them. This does not have to do
with medical or humane considerations. It
has to do with the fact that the Department
of State is a department that is concerned
with the security of the United States and
that we have to exact standards of conduct
which are far higher than the conduct of
the general society in which we operate.
This has to do with problems of blackmail
and problems of personal instability and all
sorts of things. So that I don't think that
we can give any comfort to those who might
be tempted to picket us tomorrow.
European Stake in Problems of Pacific
Q. Mr. Secretary, former Chancellor Ade-
nauer has said rather repeatedly during the
course of the present campaign in Germany
that the United States has been placing too
much attention on its Asian problems and
has not been considering its significance to
Europe sufficiently. Do you have any com-
ment to make on that ?
A. Well, I would hope that our friends in
Europe would understand that when we have
a commitment to meet and that when Amer-
icans are dying every day to meet that com-
mitment, that is something that we take se-
riously and that is something to which we
give great attention, and that our readiness
to meet our commitments is of fundamental
importance to those in Europe whose safety
depends upon our commitment. I don't want
to get into personal discussions with anyone
during the special circumstances of events
in Germany at the moment. But I do not
myself apologize to anyone for the fact that
we give a great deal of attention to the great
issues of war and peace in the Pacific. And
I have no doubt at all that those who think
about these matters long and hard in Europe
would understand why we should do so. And,
if I were a European, I would pray that the
United States would give a great deal of
attention to the problems of war and peace
in the Pacific, because they have a tremen-
dous stake in it and the dangers are there
for them as well as for the rest of the free
world.
Q. Thank you, Mr. Secretary.
486
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
stark geographic realities in South Viet-Nam create im-
posing challenges for American fighting men and their
comrades in the security forces of the Republic of Viet-Nam,
as they seek and fight the elusive guerrillas. This article,
tvritten especially for the Bulletin by the Geographer of
the Department of State, puts in perspective some of the
major geographic problems that beset U.S. activities in
that part of the world.
Geographic Aspects of the Struggle in Viet-Nam
by G. Etzel Pearcy
All physical relations between the United
States and South Viet-Nam involve distances
of global proportions. In a westerly direction
176 degrees of longitude separate Washing-
ton from Saigon ; in an easterly direction, 184
degrees. Thus the capitals of the two coun-
tries are within about 250 miles of being
halfway around the world from each other.
A direct, or great circle, route from Seattle
to Saigon measures 7,400 miles and passes
successively over the Alaska Peninsula, the
Kamchatka Peninsula, Sakhalin Island, South
Korea, the coast of mainland China, and the
eastern edge of Cambodia. A plane flying this
route would reach the midpoint of its jour-
ney directly over the Sea of Okhotsk, which
lies north of Japan. Were the flight to go
via Honolulu, 1,625 miles would be added to
the distance. By ship, the distance from San
Diego to Saigon via the shortest sea route,
skirting the coast of Japan, would run around
8,400 miles.
Modem jet aircraft seem to shrink these
overwhelming distances, but even the latest
and fastest of naval vessels would require
from a week to 10 days for the trip. In any
event, the transpacific supply lines to South
Viet-Nam are staggering in dimensions.
Sustained operations through staging points
for any significant volume of men and ma-
teriel present logistic problems too complex
to evaluate simply by route distances or ton-
miles.
The approach to South Viet-Nam is via
its east coast. On the Asian Continent much
of the quadrant containing this area is gen-
erally hostile or nonalined with the West,
forcing U.S. staging operations to take place
primarily in the western part of the Pacific
defense zone. Two outlying areas presently
controlled by the United States have rea-
sonably strategic locations along supply
routes: Guam, an unincorporated territory,
and Okinawa in the U.S.-administered part
of the Ryukyus. Even here mileages remain
high: Guam to Saigon, 2,600 miles; Oki-
nawa to Saigon, 1,825 miles. For compara-
tive purposes it might be noted that for a
plane to cross the United States from the
Atlantic to the Pacific requires a flight of
at least 2,315 miles.
South Viet-Nam, with its marginal posi-
tion on the continent, can be readily ap-
proached. But its relatively small size and
attenuated shape pose serious problems for
its defense.
Although a little larger than Florida in
area, the country in the north narrows to
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
487
INDOCHINA PENINSULA
CHINA
51825 7-65
no more than 33 miles in one place. Even
Saigon, definitely an "east coast" city, lies
only 35 miles from the Cambodian bound-
ary to the west. The widest part of the
country, in the central portion, measures
less than 130 miles. In contrast. South Viet-
Nam's eastern coast curves in a long arc for
almost 800 miles, nearly equal to California's
arcuate west coast on the opposite side of
the Pacific.
Geopoliticians cite compact shape as a de-
cided asset for defense purposes and refer
to France, with its hexagonal form, as ap-
proaching the ideal. South Viet-Nam repre-
sents the opposite extreme: a narrow ledge
of land clinging to the great interior moun-
tain system of Asia and presenting a classic
example of exposed territory. So lengthy are
the country's boundaries in relation to its
size that those who would infiltrate have a
rich choice of spots from which to select for
entry.
Diversity of Topography
A relief map shows the diversity of topog-
raphy in South Viet-Nam. About 60 percent
of the country consists of relatively high
mountains and plateau lands. While not com-
parable to the Himalayas or Rockies in
grandeur or broad dimension, the South
Vietnamese mountains are higher than the
Appalachians and present greater difficulty
for movement. Maximum elevation is 8,500
feet, about 1,500 feet lower than in North
Viet-Nam. Lowlands with little or no relief
make up most of the remaining 40 percent
of the country and are located chiefly in the
Mekong Delta area.
Thus it can be seen that well over half
of the countryside presents obstacles to
penetration and movement but offers pro-
tection to offensive forces engaged in guer-
rilla-type warfare. And even in the low-
lands, swamps and heavy vegetative growth
afford the invaders a certain immunity
against Government security forces.
The Indochina Peninsula is dominated by
a series of mountain spurs thrusting south
from the great mountain systems of Central
Asia, particularly the Yunnan Plateau of
South China. Almost all of Laos, as well as
most of both North and South Viet-Nam, is
encompassed by these outliers, which reach
to within 50 miles of Saigon. A cordillera
running from north-northwest to south-
southeast, known as the Chaine Annamitique,
forms a physical barrier separating South
Viet-Nam from Laos in the northern part
of the country and from Cambodia in the
central part. The eastern slopes of the chain
rise abruptly from the narrow coastal zone.
In places high altitudes are as much as 40
miles from the sea, but in others the east-
ward extensions of these mountain spurs
crowd to the shoreline itself and separate
the coastal region into a number of small,
partially enclosed plains.
Thus the northern two-thirds of the South
Viet-Nam littoral resembles California,
488
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
where the coast range generally follows the
shoreline, more than it does the Middle At-
lantic States, where a relatively broad plains
area lies between the coast and the Appa-
lachian ranges. In the past the impingement
of mountain spurs on this lowland fringe
north of Saigon has inhibited development,
and at present it limits the scope of opera-
tions against guerrilla strongholds in the
higher lands to the west.
With very few exceptions the southern-
most third of the country lies at an altitude
of less than 500 feet. The great Mekong
River flows through this flat landscape, its
four major distributaries emptying into the
South China Sea over a wide delta. Where
the river enters South Viet-Nam from Cam-
bodia, 125 miles from the east coast and 55
miles from the Gulf of Siam, the elevation
of the land is scarcely 15 feet above sea
level. In appearance, irrespective of cultural
features, the countryside resembles that
along the lower Mississippi between Baton
Rouge and New Orleans. An elaborate sys-
tem of waterways includes canals as well as
minor distributaries. Reliance on water
transportation is very high, severely handi-
capping strategic operations. Heavily veg-
etated areas in this low-lying region often
provide strongholds for well-armed guer-
rillas, and the Central Government finds it
exceedingly difficult to penetrate this tortu-
ous water route with its services, its au-
thority, and its security program.
By an oddity of nature the delta lands of
the Mekong seldom flood seriously. In west-
ern Cambodia the Tonle Sap, an inland lake
fluctuating in area from 1,000 to 3,900
square miles, serves as a reservoir to stabi-
lize the flow of the lower Mekong. When the
water rises, the surplus backs up into this
lake and prevents heavy flooding. In turn,
during low water the process is reversed
and from the Tonle Sap the extra accumu-
lation of water drains back into the river.
Notwithstanding this fortunate regulation
by nature, there are seasons of relatively
high water which further isolate the delta.
But the South is spared the ravaging floods
quite common to the Tonkin Delta in North
Viet-Nam, except upon rare occasions when
the Mekong picks up an unusually heavy load
on its 2,600-mile course from Tibet.
Climate and Vegetation
The thermometer in South Viet-Nam never
skyrockets; the highest temperature ever
recorded at Saigon has only been 104° F.
Washington has exceeded that by 4 degrees.
Nevertheless, a temperature which never
goes much below 80° F. definitely has a de-
bilitating effect on human energy, particu-
larly when it is accompanied by high humid-
ity. Sustained periods in the steaming low-
lands of the Mekong Delta, without benefit
of air-conditioned buildings, place a severe
strain on anyone accustomed to the climate
of higher latitudes, where a cold nip in the
air serves as a stimulus. At higher eleva-
tions temperatures are more agreeable, but
here other handicaps, such as pounding rain-
SOUTH VIET-NAM -RELIEF
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SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
489
SOUTH VIET-NAM- RAINFALL
fall and dense vegetation, may well offset
the advantage of a cool breeze.
The controlling factor in Viet-Nam's cli-
mate is its position deep in the Tropics. In
latitude the area equates -with Panama, well
known for its wilting heat, and with Senegal
on the west coast of Africa. Another basic
climatic control is Viet-Nam's location on
the southeastern margin of the great Eura-
sian landmass. Pressure differences between
continent and ocean result in major airmass
movements which pour seaward during the
winter and landward during the summer.
This dynamically effective wind system,
which reverses itself twice yearly, gives rise
to a monsoon influence — a "when the rains
come" type of climate.
For Southeast Asia in general the rainy
season thus occurs in summer, but along the
coast in the northern part of South Viet-
Nam (Hue-Da Nang area) the wettest pe-
riod lasts from September to January. This
exception is caused by the northeast mon-
soon winds, which are normally dry but are
onshore in this particular location and so
contain moisture. In short, the monsoon
does not appreciably alter temperature val-
ues but brings a notoriously wet season each
summer and fall.
While fine for the rice crop, heavy rain-
fall handicaps security measures in several
ways. Mobility is reduced, equipment be-
comes difficult to maneuver, and better pro-
tection is offered the aggressor. Air action
may be limited by the poor visibility result-
ing from high humidity and low cloud cover
during the rainy season.
The actual quantity of rain falling in
South Viet-Nam is impressive. It exceeds
that commonly experienced along the Gulf
Coast and in the Pacific Northwest, two well-
known rainy areas in the United States. At
Saigon the annual precipitation amounts to
78 inches, of which 67 inches fall during
the 6-month period from May to October.
June and September average over 13 inches
each, registering frequent downpours of tor-
rential proportions. On the exposed east
coast north of Saigon, steep slopes lift the
moist, humid air as it blows landward and
upward, unloading even greater amounts of
water. Hue, onetime capital of the old Annam-
ese Empire, annually receives 115 inches.
In their extreme form the unequal atmos-
pheric pressures give rise to typhoons which
pound the east coast of the Indochina Penin-
sula much as hurricanes plague our Atlantic
and Gulf Coasts. These devastating storms
occur from July into November; in October
and especially in November they are concen-
trated on the Vietnamese coast south of the
17th parallel.
Heavy rainfall, together with high tem-
peratures, encourages the grovii;h of a dense,
barrier-like vegetation. Over five-sixths of
South Viet-Nam has a cover of natural vege-
tation— rain forests, monsoon forests, and
some savanna lands. When the original for-
est is cut away or burned, a secondary forest
cover takes over in many places, poorer in
timber but with heavier undergrowth.
Without doubt, these tangles of vegeta-
tion are a marked disadvantage for forces
490
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
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51824 7-65
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
491
seeking out an enemy which moves quickly
on foot, with a good knowledge of the ter-
rain. For example, roadways cleared
through heavy vegetative grovs^h must be
maintained or they soon revert to the jun-
gle. In contrast, dense foliage offers excel-
lent concealment from both air and land
observation. From such terrain guerrillas
may operate with relative safety and on a
time schedule of their own making.
Transportation
Transportation facilities in South Viet-
Nam are too limited to provide unity and
cohesion within the country. Physical fac-
tors handicap the development of communi-
cations to many remote and marginal areas ;
in numerous instances towns and villages
have had little or no contact with the Cen-
tral Government.
The obstacles of inaccessibility also han-
dicap those fighting against the guerrilla
aggressors from the North. Inadequate lines
of communication allow guerrillas to infil-
trate large areas and remain under cover
while at the same time they prevent effec-
tive offensive action to rout them. American
military operations, ordinarily geared to ef-
ficient transportation systems, contrast
markedly with those of the Viet Cong along
the infiltration routes, where guerrillas slip
in with their less-than-complex supplies and
equipment.
Economic development on the Indochina
Peninsula has been largely limited to the
Mekong Delta region in the south, the Ton-
kin Basin in the north, and the lowlands
fringing the coast between them. When
Viet-Nam was partitioned in 1954, the
southern part inherited only one of the
larger lowland areas and about three-fifths
of the string of coastal lowlands. Modern
transportation facilities within the country
do not generally extend beyond these areas.
Within South Viet-Nam there are only
about 870 miles of operable railway lines,
comprising for the most part the coastal line
from Saigon to Dong Ha, 40 miles north of
Hue and within 12 miles of the demarcation
line from North Viet-Nam. From this longi-
tudinal railroad, a few short spurs branch
off, the most important of which reaches Da
Lat, high on the plateau of the same name.
This slim traffic artery completely bypasses
the extensive "back country" of South Viet-
Nam with its thousands of hamlets and
villages.
Highways in South Viet-Nam form a
rather sketchy network but have much
greater coverage than the railway lines.
When Indochina was a part of France's
colonial empire, the French established a
road pattern in some ways resembling that
of metropolitan France. The more important
routes carry numbers, identifying them with
major axes of travel between key points. For
example, National Route 14 leads from Da
Nang (Tourane) on the coast, 50 miles south
of Hue, to the northern part of the Mekong
lowlands and gives access to Saigon. The
overall route system, however, has been
truncated, for it was developed to cover
French Indochina. Now an appreciable pro-
portion of the net lies in Cambodia, Laos,
and North Viet-Nam.
Route 9 extends nearly straight westward
from Dong Ha near the coast, through Lao
Bao on the Laos boundary, to Savannakhet
on the Mekong border between Laos and
Thailand. This particular route, paralleling
the demarcation line on the south for about
10 or 15 miles, is at least partially responsi-
ble for deflecting the infiltration route of
the Viet Cong to the west into Laotian ter-
ritory. Although the demarcation line Itself
crosses relatively empty countryside and
would entice infiltrators. Route 9 provides
some access for security measures.
The northern approach to South Viet-
Nam for the Viet Cong is not limited to any
given itinerary but corresponds to a band
of rough landscape where improvised paths
and trails can carry the traffic. This zone,
as illustrated in the accompanying map, does
not correlate in any way with the estab-
lished road pattern for that part of the In-
dochina Peninsula. It serves as the principal
access route from north to south ; into it and
from it finger a labyrinth of trails for as-
492
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
sembly and deployment of the Viet Cong
forces.
Water transportation plays a heavy role
in the heart of the Mekong Delta. Some
3,000 miles of waterways crisscross these
lowlands, giving access to areas where roads
are difficult to construct and maintain. Rice
production, which is particularly important
in the well-watered delta, justifies the con-
centration of these small domestic arteries
of trade. Unfortunately the lack of approach
by land hampers security precautions, and
the Viet Cong have installed themselves in
certain of these low-lying and often satu-
rated areas. Elsewhere in South Viet-Nam
navigable waters are limited or altogether
lacking.
In North Viet-Nam watercourses provide
excellent transportation facilities in the
delta of the Red River of Tonkin. Hanoi
and the port city of Haiphong are both
in the midst of true delta country, whereas
Saigon lies somewhat off center of the Me-
kong Delta.
Air transportation in South Viet-Nam has
superficially alleviated some of the prob-
lems involving appreciable distance and in-
adequate means of movement on the surface.
Saigon is well known as one of the leading
international air terminals in Southeast
Asia, but in addition there are local flights
from here to the larger cities in South
Viet-Nam. The fact that the Viet Cong have
been unable to overrun urban areas permits
commercial air transportation to continue
even during heated warfare.
The People of Viet-Nam
The Vietnamese people range from highly
cultured and sophisticated individuals who
dwell in the larger cities to tribal folk who
eke a living out of the countryside by the
most primitive of methods. Social activities
likewise run from one extreme to another.
For example, well-to-do Vietnamese in Sai-
gon live in European-style homes, dress and
entertain as do Westerners, and send their
children abroad to school. Peasants may live
in villages amounting to nothing more than
collections of straw huts and have time only
SOUTH VIET-NAM -INFILTRATION ROUTES
to support themselves and avoid the evil
spirits.
Throughout most urban centers French
culture is at once apparent. Even though
colonial control has vanished, the French
language continues to be used by many of
the better educated Vietnamese. Most ad-
ministrative and educational practices of
the former regime also continue in use. Ob-
viously this influence wanes as one proceeds
from the urban to the rural scene. But often
even in the smallest villages there are people
who speak French by virtue of former serv-
ice with the army or administrative corps.
French methods persist in most of the rou-
tine necessary to the country's political and
economic existence. In many other ex-French
areas this same phenomenon exists : extreme
discontent with French authority but a deep
appreciation of the French way of life.
Any ethnological map of South Viet-Nam
must be considered as a segment of a larger
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
493
one encompassing the entire Indochina Pen-
insula and its environs. Ceaseless migra-
tions during past millennia have brought
numerous racial types and social patterns to
the area. Predominant influences stem not
only from what is now the Indo-Pakistan
subcontinent and China proper, but from
deep within the interior of the Asian Con-
tinent. Most of the present-day inhabitants
of South Viet-Nam, however, may be directly
related to the people of the old Annamite
Kingdom in the eastern part of the Indo-
china Peninsula. Known racially as well as
nationally as Vietnamese, they comprise
about 85 percent of South Viet-Nam's some
16 million population.
As a powerful majority the Vietnamese
south of the 17th parallel dominate the
country and represent a new national group.
Some of them claim they can spot their
kinsmen from North Viet-Nam by their
more Mongoloid features, but such a distinc-
tion might be somewhat similar to differen-
tiating Belgians from Dutchmen by look-
ing at them. Height of the men averages
around 5 feet 1 or 2 inches, and their weight
around 120 pounds. The most common phys-
ical type is characterized by straight black
hair, broad face, high cheekbones, dark eyes
with an epicanthic fold of the eyelid, and
light- or medium-brown skin.
As in the case of most orientals, mature
men may look extremely youthful. Veteran
Viet Cong soldiers, well trained in the art
of guerrilla warfare, often look very young,
giving the impression that the enemy is
comprised of youths and therefore not so
deadly.
Minority Groups
Several minority groups, while not great
in total numbers, complicate the racial pic-
ture. The Chinese, forming the largest mi-
nority, have not fared especially well politi-
cally. Their skill and energy brought them
economic success as entrepreneurs, but with
the rise of nationalism a prejudiced policy
of discrimination gave many the feeling of
persecution. Under the French they were
allowed to retain Chinese citizenship and
could appeal to their motherland in the case
of denied rights (before the Communist
conquest of mainland China) . But the Viet-
namese Government required that all
Chinese become citizens of the new state in
response to the special need for loyalty in
the face of aggression from the North by a
power friendly to their former homeland.
The second most significant minority are
the montagnards. (The word in French
means "dwellers in the mountains.") Esti-
mates of their number range from 500,000
to 700,000. These highlanders live in relative
isolation from the rest of the country, speak
their own languages, and maintain distinc-
tive cultural traditions. The remote and
sparsely settled habitat of the montagnards
is a region that is definitely vulnerable to
guerrilla infiltration. Some steps have been
taken by the Central Government to lessen
this danger, but there are probably limits
to the extent to which a sympathetic re-
sponse may be developed among a popula-
tion which is not always cognizant of the
national security problem. The Viet Cong
have gone so far as to assure these primitive
peoples in Communist propaganda that they
may have their own autonomy "when the
Communists conquer South Viet-Nam."
Another minority, the Khmers, are ac-
tually Cambodians living in South Viet-
Nam. Numbering from 350,000 to 400,000,
they are largely concentrated southwest of
Saigon. Like the montagnards, they have
not assimilated well vdth the Vietnamese.
On the other hand, they have generally not
proved to be a primary security problem.
The Chams, numbering only about 35,000, J
represent the least significant of the minori- '
ties. A fragmented remainder of a once
great people, they are poor economically.
Scattered through less desirable sections of
the south-central part of the country, they
live in humble little villages quite apart
from the general flow of Vietnamese life.
Europeans, especially French, do not en-
joy the privileges they once did under
colonial rule. Nevertheless, harking back to
profitable relationships in a different pe-
494
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
riod, there are still some close associations
between European and Vietnamese which
prove mutually beneficial.
The last extended period of peace and sta-
bility for the inhabitants of what is now
South Viet-Nam dates back to the pre-
World War II years, and even that was
marred by a serious economic depression.
Any person under 40, then, could not be
expected to have experienced any type of
life other than a troubled one. World War II
stirred up a maelstrom of national disasters
which have allowed very little opportunity
for constructive measures. Political instabil-
ity has been the general rule. What progress
has been made has been achieved in the face
of serious handicaps. It is understandable
that democratic traditions, often taken for
granted by Americans, have not had the op-
portunity to evolve in this unfortunate polit-
ical climate.
Economic Pressures
In the 1954 split of territory between
North and South Viet-Nam, the latter came
out a poor second in natural resources. In
mineral resources the division was especially
uneven; North Viet-Nam has copious quan-
tities of coal, zinc, phosphates, tin, and
graphite, while South Viet-Nam's share,
pending further investigation at least, is
quite meager. Further, the French promoted
greater industrial development in the North
than in the South.
Partially offsetting these advantages of
the North, however, is the fact that there is
a considerably greater population pressure
on the fertile lowlands around Hanoi and
Haiphong than on those tributary to Saigon.
As a result, in normal years South Viet-Nam
exports rice, while North Viet-Nam tradi-
tionally has to import rice.
The economic pattern of South Viet-Nam,
then, is hardly a complex one. Agriculture
provides the basic sustenance, ranging from
rubber and rice as the prime products en-
tering trade down to a number of provision
crops for local consumption, including corn,
cassava, and beans. Other products, com-
Dr. Pearcy's article is one of a series being'
written especially for the Bulletin by oflScers
of the Department and the Foreign Service.
Officers who may be interested in submitting
original bylined articles are invited to call the
editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Patton,
extension 5806, room 5536.
mercial in nature, are tea, coffee, tobacco,
sugar cane, and coconuts. By Western stand-
ards industrial processes are largely the
community type, wherein simple manufac-
tured goods are produced for domestic con-
sumption.
The United States by its aid program has
done much in recent years to stimulate
economic activity in South Viet-Nam, some-
what countering the war-induced decline in
production and welfare. Projects include the
improving of agricultural techniques, pest
and insect control, an agricultural credit sys-
tem, better transportation and communica-
tion facilities, and land reclamation. Full-
scale development of the country's resources
and their optimum utilization must, of
course, take place on a landscape free of
political instability and warfare. Neverthe-
less, improvement in the face of the present
difficulties has a double effect on the popu-
lation: (1) it provides more products and
increases living standards in a hard-pressed
land, and (2) it raises morale, creating
more confidence in the Central Govern-
ment.
Problems in Perspective
From a geographic point of view there
can be no doubt that the United States faces
disadvantages in Viet-Nam that far out-
weigh the advantages. While factors of re-
lief, climate, and vegetation which handicap
the defenders are not necessarily in them-
selves assets to the guerrillas, the guerrillas,
of course, take advantage of the landscape
as it is. They turn heavy foliage into cam-
ouflage, use light arms on terrain too rough
for most conventional weapons, and seek
strategic advantages during the monsoon
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
495
season, when aircraft cannot be fully effec-
tive.
Tactics of the Viet Cong are likewise
tailored to the cultural environment, includ-
ing the abstract struggle for the minds and
sympathies of the inhabitants. A recent esti-
mate identifies well over a million villagers
as dominated by Communists, with other
millions subjected to some degree of Viet
Cong control or pressure. Methods of ob-
taining cooperation from these rural inhabit-
ants vary — from terrorism to the promise
of concession. By holding small, scattered
areas, the Viet Cong can erode government
control more than they could if they gained
larger but fewer blocks of territory. Hit-
and-run tactics can be extended in more
widespread fashion for greater psychologi-
cal effect. Also, control of areas as close as
possible to Saigon tends to give the impres-
sion that a rice-roots rebellion is closing in
on the capital.
Since the South Viet-Nam conflict takes
place on the real estate of that country and
within its administrative jurisdiction,
American military measures must be molded
to the geography of the land — political, eco-
nomic, and social. To appreciate these cir-
cumstances, difficult though they be, is to
lessen the jeopardy of fighting in a strange
land.
• Reprints of the above article will soon
be available upon request from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Letters of Credence
Bulgaria
The newly appointed Ambassador of the
People's Republic of Bulgaria, Lyuben Ni-
kolov Gerasimov, presented his credentials to
President Johnson on September 1. For texts
of the Ambassador's remarks and the Presi-
dent's reply, see Department of State press
release dated September 1.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Department Establishes Foreign
Affairs Researcli Council
Press release 207 dated September 3
To implement the President's recent direc-
tive 1 on Government-sponsored contract for-
eign area research. Secretary Rusk has es-
tablished a Foreign Affairs Research Coun-
cil (RC) within the Department with
Thomas L. Hughes, Director of the Bureau of
Intelligence and Research, as chairman.
The Secretary has cited the contribution
of studies in the behavioral and social sci-
ences to the work of officials struggling with
the complex problems of foreign policy and
has welcomed the increased interest of other
Departments in social and political research
in foreign affairs.
The President directed that "no Govern-
ment sponsorship of foreign area research
should be undertaken which in the judg-
ment of the Secretary of State would ad-
versely affect United States foreign rela-
tions" and asked the Secretary to "establish
effective procedures which will enable you
to assure the propriety of Government-
sponsored social science research in the area
of foreign policy."
The new Council will formulate Depart-
ment policy for review of such contract re-
search, examine certain individual Govern-
ment-sponsored research projects, and con-
sider means of reducing foreign policy risks.
In addition to Mr. Hughes, representation
includes the Chairman of the Policy Plan-
ning Council and the Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Politico-Military Affairs and, as
appropriate, representatives of the geo-
graphic and functional bureaus. The Bureau
of Intelligence and Research's Office of Ex-
ternal Research supports the Council.
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 323.
496
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
At its first meeting last month the Council agreed on certain general principles to
guide the Department's review and clearance of Government-sponsored foreign affairs re-
search projects.
In keeping with the President's letter, the Department has consulted with the Bureau
of the Budget and letters have gone to the Department of Defense and other agencies re-
questing their help in establishing the new procedures. The Department has received ex-
cellent cooperation from those agencies with which working-level discussions have so far
been held.
The new clearance procedures for contract research will not displace voluntary ex-
change of research information among Federal agencies through the Foreign Area Re-
search Coordination Group (FAR), an interdepartmental committee which is serviced by
the Bureau of Intelligence and Research's Office of External Research. While the new
Foreign Affairs Research Council (RC) will review research projects for propriety in
terms of the President's directive, the FAR will continue its activities to coordinate on
a voluntary basis Government-sponsored foreign policy research in the social sciences.
In keeping with the Secretary's desire to make the work of FAR as effective as possi-
ble, George C. Denney, Jr., Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelhgence and Research,
has been appointed FAR chairman, and the other participating agencies are being re-
quested to raise their representation accordingly.
Confirmations
The Senate on September 1 confirmed the following
nominations:
Wilson T. M. Beale, Jr., to be Ambassador to
Jamaica. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 212 dated September 8.)
Harlan Cleveland to be the U.S. permanent rep-
resentative on the Council of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. (For biographic details, see
Department of State press release 213 dated Sep-
tember 9.)
John Gordon Main to be Ambassador to Guate-
mala. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 206 dated September 3.)
Joseph John Sisco to be an Assistant Secretary
of State. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 214 dated September 9.)
Phillips Talbot to be Ambassador to Greece. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press
release 204 dated September 2.)
Raymond L. Thurston to be Ambassador to the
Somali Republic. (For biographic details, see White
House press release dated August 10.)
TREATY INFORMATION
Current Actions
MULTILATERAL
Finance
Articles of agreement of the International Monetary
Fund. Opened for signature at Washington De-
cember 27, 1945. Entered into force December 27,
1945. TIAS 1501.
Notification of withdrawal: Indonesia, August 17,
1965.
Convention on settlement of investment disputes be-
tween states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. Enters into force
30 days after deposit of the 20th instrument of
ratification, acceptance, or approval.
Signatures: Central African Republic, August 26,
1965; Ivory Coast, June 30, 1965; Jamaica,
June 23, 1965 ; Mauritania, July 30, 1965 ; Niger,
August 23, 1965; Nigeria, July 13, 1965; Paki-
stan, July 6, 1965; Tunisia, May 5, 1965; United
Kingdom, May 26, 1965; United States, August
27, 1965.
Ratification: Nigeria, August 23, 1965.
Safety at Sea
International convention on safety of life at sea.
Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into force
November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Notification of denunciation received: United Arab
Republic, July 27, 1965 ; effective July 27, 1966.
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptances deposited: Malaysia, August 16, 1965;
Philippines, August 11, 1965.
Satellite Communications System
Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signatures: India, August 30, 1965; Ministry of
Communications of Saudi Arabia, September
1, 1965.
Slavery
Convention to suppress the slave trade and slavery,
as amended (TIAS 3532). Signed at Geneva Sep-
tember 25, 1926. Entered into force March 9, 1927;
' Not in force.
SEPTEMBER 20, 1965
497
for the United States March 21, 1929. 46 Stat.
2183.
Accession deposited: Malawi, Augiast 2, 1965.
Supplementary convention on the abolition of slav-
ery, the slave trade and institutions and practices
similar to slavery. Done at Geneva September 7,
1956. Entered into force April 30, 1957.-
Accession deposited: Malawi, Au^st 2, 1965.
Trade
Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro-
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963.
Entered into force November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809.
Signature : Jamaica, July 5, 1965.
Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
Done at Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force
for the United States November 20, 1964. TIAS
5687.
Signature: Upper Volta (subject to ratification),
June 21, 1965.
Declaration on provisional accession of United Arab
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. En-
tered into force for the United States May 3, 1963.
TIAS 5309.
Signature: Jamaica, July 5, 1965.
Declaration on provisional accession of the Federal
People's Republic of Yugoslavia to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva
November 13, 1962. Entered into force for the
United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5678.
Signature: Jamaica, July 5, 1965.
Second proces-verbal extending period of validity of
declaration on provisional accession of Argentina
to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of
November 18, 1960, as extended (TIAS 5184,
5266). Done at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered
into force for the United States December 18,
1964. TIAS 5733.
Signature: Jamaica, July 5, 1965.
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on
provisional accession of Switzerland to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November
22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done
at Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force
for the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS
5734.
Acceptances deposited: Jamaica, July 5, 1965;
Madagascar, August 10, 1965.
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of United Arab Republic to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13,
1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva Octobor 30,
1964. Entered into force for the United States
December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732.
Signature: Jamaica, July 5, 1965.
United Nations
Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963.
Ratifications deposited: Chile, August 31, 1965;
China, August 2, 1965; Ecuador, August 31,
1965; France, August 24, 1965; Greece, August
2, 1965; Panama, July 27, 1965; United States,
August 31, 1965.
Wheat
Protocol for the extension of the International
Wheat Agreement, 1962. Open for signature at
Washington March 22 through April 23, 1965.
Entered into force July 16, 1965, for part I and
parts III to VII, and August 1, 1965, for part II.
Acceptance deposited: Vatican City State, August
30, 1965.
BILATERAL
Bolivia
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Signed
at La Paz August 17, 1965. Entered into force
August 17, 1965.
Kenya
Agreement to continue in force the extradition treaty
between the United States and the United King-
dom of December 22, 1931 (47 Stat. 2122). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Nairobi May 14
and August 19, 1965. Entered into force Au-
gust 19, 1965.
Philippines
Agreement regarding the installation of a submarine
cable with a terminal facility at San Miguel Com-
munications Station, Zambales, Philippines. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Manila August 12,
1965. Entered into force August 12, 1965.
^ Not in force for the United States.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: Aug. 30-Sept. 5
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Release issued prior to August 30 which
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No.
200 of August 27.
Subject
Status-of-forces agreement with
China.
Rostow: "The Concept of a Na-
tional Market and Its Eco-
nomic Growth Implications."
Hart sworn in as Ambassador
to Turkey (biographic de-
tails).
Talbot sworn in as Ambassador
to Greece (biographic de-
tails).
Harriman: America Days cele-
bration, Turku, Finland.
Mein sworn in as Ambassador
to Guatemala (biographic de-
tails).
Department establishes Foreign
Affairs Research Council.
Rusk: 11th anniversary of
SEATO.
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
No.
Date
201
8/30
1202
8/31
*203
8/31
*204
9/2
1205
9/3
*206
9/3
207
9/3
t208
9/4
498
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX September 20, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1369
American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of August 27 481
Bulgaria. Letters of Credence (Gerasimov) . 496
China. Status-of-Forces Agreement Signed
With China 480
Congress
Confirmations (Beale, Cleveland, Mein, Sisco,
Talbot, Thurston) 497
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27 481
Department and Foreign Service
Confirmations (Beale, Cleveland, Mein, Sisco,
Talbot, Thurston) 497
Department Establishes Foreign Affairs Re-
search Council 496
Disarmament
18-Nation Disarmament Committee Considers
U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent Spread of
Nuclear Weapons (Foster, Johnson, text of
draft treaty) 466
President Comments on Several Foreign Policy
Developments (news conference statement) 476
Dominican Republic
OAS Achieves Reconciliation in Dominican
Republic (Johnson, OAS Declaration to
Dominican People) 477
President Comments on Several Foreign Policy
Developments (news conference statement) 476
Europe. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
August 27 481
Geography. Geographic Aspects of the Struggle
in Viet-Nam (Pearcy) 487
Greece. Talbot confirmed as Ambassador . . 497
Guatemala. Mein confirmed as Ambassador . . 497
Immigration and Naturalization. Secretary
Rusk's News Conference of August 27 . . 481
India
President Comments on Several Foreign Policy
Developments (news conference statement) 476
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27 481
Intelligence. Department Establishes Foreign
Affairs Research Council 496
International Organizations and Conferences
18-Nation Disarmament Committee Considers
U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent Spread of
Nuclear Weapons (Foster, Johnson, text of
draft treaty) 466
OAS Achieves Reconciliation in Dominican
Republic (Johnson, OAS Declaration to Do-
minican People) 477
Sisco confirmed as Assistant Secretary for
International Organization Affairs .... 497
Jamaica. Beale confirmed as Ambassador . . 497
Military Affairs. Status-of-Forces Agreement
Signed With China 480
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Cleveland
confirmed as U.S. permanent representative
on NATO Council 497
Pakistan
President Comments on Several Foreign Policy
Developments (news conference statement) 476
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27 481
Presidential Documents
18-Nation Disarmament Committee Considers
U.S. Draft Treaty To Prevent Spread of
Nuclear Weapons 455
OAS Achieves Reconciliation in Dominican Re-
public 477
President Calls Gemini-5 Flight a "Journey
of Peace" 475
President Comments on Several Foreign Policy
Developments 475
U.S. Pledges Support to World Population Con-
ference 4gQ
Science. President Calls Gemini-5 Flight a
"Journey of Peace" (news conference state-
ment) 475
Somali Republic. Thurston confirmed as Am-
bassador 497
Treaty Information
Current Actions 497
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27 481
Status-of-Forces Agreement Signed With China 480
U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
August 27 481
United Nations. U.S. Pledges Support to World
Population Conference (Johnson) .... 480
Viet-Nam
Geographic Aspects of the Struggle in Viet-
Nam (Pearcy) 437
Secretary Rusk's News Conference of August 27 481
Yemen. President Comments on Several Foreign
Policy Developments (news conference state-
ment) 476
Name Index
Beale, Wilson T. M., Jr 497
Cleveland, Harlan 497
Foster, William C 466
Gerasimov, Lyuben Nikolov 496
Johnson, President . . . 466, 475, 476, 477, 480
Mein, John Gordon 497
Pearcy, G. Etzel 487
Rusk, Secretary 481
Sisco, Joseph John 497
Talbot, Phillips 497
Thurston, Raymond L 497
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OFFICIAL BUSINESS
Why Vietnam
This report to the American people on the meaning of the conflict in Vietnam has been
compiled at the direction of President Johnson. It includes statements by the President, Secretary
Rusk, and Secretary McNamara. An introductory section entitled "The Roots of Commitment"
contains extracts from a letter of President Eisenhower to Prime Minister Churchill in 1954 and
letters of President Eisenhower and President Kennedy to Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem
in 1954, 1960, and 1961.
In a signed foreword President Johnson says : "Once again in man's age-old struggle for a
better life and a world of peace, the wisdom, courage, and compassion of the American people
are being put to the test. ... In meeting the present challenge, it is essential that our people
seek understanding, and that our leaders speak with candor. . . . These statements . . . con-
struct a clear definition of America's role in the Vietnam conflict. . . ."
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY
THE
DEPARTMENT
OF
STATE
BULLETIN
Vol. LIU, No. 1370
September 27, 1965
THE ANATOMY OF FOREIGN POLICY DECISIONS
Address by Secretary Rusk 502
THE CONCEPT OF A NATIONAL MARKET AND ITS
ECONOMIC GROWTH IMPLICATIONS
by W. W. Rostow, Counselor 518
UNITED STATES SUPPORTS CALL FOR INDIA-PAKISTAN CEASE-FIRE
Statements by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg
and Texts of Security Council Resolutions 526
For index see inside hack cover
In this address to the Nation's top political scientists, Sec-
retary Rusk speaks as one professional to another of what
he calls the "anatomy of foreign policy decisions." Here he
presents a checklist of the questions a policy officer m,ust
ask himself before he can recommend a course of action
on a complicated foreign policy problem.
The Anatomy of Foreign Policy Decisions
Address by Secretary Rusk
I am glad to be able to be with you this
evening. I am complimented by your invita-
tion to address the profession to which I
myself was apprenticed more than 30 years
ago. World War II and other diversions pre-
vented my becoming a master craftsman,
but I did score one success shared by at least
a few of you : I married one of my students,
and that alone gives me an enduring debt to
political science.
It is not my purpose this evening to talk to
you in these remarks about the present
^ Made before the American Political Science Asso-
ciation at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 7 (press re-
lease 211).
crises which claim the headlines. I wish, in-
stead, to talk about a professional concern
which you and we in government share : the
anatomy of foreign policy decisions. The
word is "decision" and not "opinion" or
"judgment." I put upon your agenda an
examination of the difference between con-
clusions unencumbered by official responsi-
bility and those with which you and the Na-
tion as a whole must live. I have never
forgotten a self-inflicted illustration of the
difference. After I had been in office for a
hundred days my secretary, who had been
Mr. John Foster Dulles' secretary, quietly
placed upon my desk an eight-page letter
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. Lll NO. 1370 PUBLICATION 7959 SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
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502
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
which I had written to him at the end of
his first one hundred days. I found it a
revealing document, but I do not intend to
publish it.
My attention was drawn many years ago
to the anatomy of foreign policy decisions
by two analogies. At Leavenworth, officers
destined for high command responsibilities
are schooled in the elements of a five-para-
graph field order. Seldom do commanders in
combat issue orders on the Leavenworth
template. But the schooling serves as a
checklist to insure that the commander not
overlook a critical factor in thinking about
his situation. Later I became intrigued by
the checklist followed by pilots taking off
or landing in a complicated aircraft. I must
confess that even today I am nervous if the
"no smoking — fasten seat belts" sign does
not come on. What else has been forgotten?
The fuel? The landing wheels?
What questions should a foreign policy
officer ask himself before he takes off on
a policy? How does he avoid the fatal flaw
which comes from overlooking a factor
which proves to be decisive in the flow of
events? Let me emphasize that I am not
now talking about bureaucratic procedure —
who reports to whom about what — but about
the thought processes of those who are in-
volved in a decision — it may be a desk offi-
cer or a Secretary of State or a President.
Some of you may find the subject suitable
for an interesting discussion with your stu-
dents. But I hope that some of you will give
it thought and let us have your ideas as a
means of improving our own work on your
behalf. Such a dialog between the Govern-
ment and you in this room can undoubtedly
help us, and I do not exclude the possibility
that it might help you.
Identifying the Question
The first requirement is to identify accu-
rately the question which has to be an-
swered. In many situations the very fram-
ing of the question strongly affects the
answer. I recall that, in the first days of
the United Nations, the question arose as to
whether appointments to the Secretariat, as
international civil servants, should be sub-
ject to national veto. The more specific issue
at that time was whether the Secretariat
could employ nationals of Communist coun-
tries who were themselves refugees from
their own countries. The answer was to
support the concept of an international civil
service.
Years later the question was turned
around : Should American citizens be em-
ployed by the United Nations who could not
be certified as meeting national loyalty and
security standards for employment by the
United States? To many, in the 1950's, the
answer seemed to be "No," and that is now
the general practice in the United Nations.
Let me emphasize that it is not easy to
pose the question accurately. Having served
my time in both the Department of State
and the Pentagon, I am familiar with the
typical staff paper with its headings: Prob-
lem— Facts Bearing on the Problem — Con-
siderations— Conclusions — Recommenda-
tions. But I am also familiar with the temp-
tation to reverse the sequence of thought.
I have seen such papers constructed with
the recommendation as the base, upon
which was constructed the conclusions, the
facts, and the statement of the problem. In
which case, the liveliest controversy can
occur about how to pose the question. Phys-
ics to the contraiy, pyramids can be built
from the apex downward — but it is a fragile
process which endangers the entire edifice.
Sir Winston Churchill described how an
American with whom he did much business,
Harry Hopkins, met this need to define the
question :
When the discussion flagged and all seemed
baffled, it was on these occasions he would rap out
the deadly question, "Surely, Mr. President, here is
the point we have got to settle. Are we going to
face it or not?" Faced it always was, and, being
faced, was conquered.
We will not get very far in dealing with
any problem unless the "point to settle" is
clearly defined. We must know not only what
the main question is but what its constituent
subquestions are. We must know how and by
whom it was raised, when it must be an-
swered, and by whom.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
503
Securing the Facts
Once we are satisfied that we have hon-
estly and accurately posed the question, the
policy officer must try to insure his com-
mand of the factual situation. Does he have
all of the facts relevant to the answer? Is
there further information that he must get?
Which are the crucial facts? Has he pulled
them out of the heap of jackstraws ade-
quately? Has he separated hard fact from
speculation and estimate? Is he aware of the
gradations of reliability among his facts?
Policy operates on the future — and the
future cannot be surely known. But a solid
grasp of fact — and how elusive this is — is
essential to a relevant judgment.
U.S. Interests, Objectives, and Responsibilities
Having the question and the relevant
facts before us, we then ask, which U.S.
interests, objectives, or responsibilities are
involved ? To put it more baldly, what differ-
ence does it make to us ?
To ans-<ver this, we have first to look at
the immediate political, economic, and secu-
rity interests of the United States. We need
to know which of these interests are in-
volved in the problem at hand and how they
would be affected by the alternative an-
swers.
But we have to examine a larger ques-
tion : How will the outcome of this problem
affect the building of a decent world order — •
the kind of world envisaged in the U.N.
Charter?
We ask this question not because of ab-
stract dedication to this ideal but because
the largest American interests are directly
involved in its realization. Four postwar
American administrations have recognized
that these interests could not be protected
merely by meeting immediate threats as
they arose. We have not only to put out
fires, as they break out, but also to try to
build a more fireproof structure — a more
secure world.
The military and economic facts of life
increasingly contradict the notion of na-
tional self-sufficiency which underlay the
world's political organization before World
Wars I and II. A half century of war and
revolution destroyed that organization. Our
task is to create a new one, which will recog-
nize the need for cooperation both among
like-minded countries and among those who
disagree in major respects with each other.
New institutions have been created to
help meet this need. Preeminent is the
United Nations, but we can add the Common
Market in Europe, NATO and the OECD in
Atlantic affairs, the Alliance for Progress
and the OAS in Latin America. More steps
loom ahead — an Asian Development Bank,
new institutions for regional cooperation in
Africa. In all these ways, we and others get
on with building a community of free na-
tions.
In a sense this effort can be compared to
the building of a house. A large number of
individual bricks must be put together in
ways that add up to the desired result.
Many of the specific foreign problems that
we face seem small and unexciting. But
how they fall into place will help to decide
whether the house goes up. The wise policy-
maker will also see what past American
policies or commitments are involved.
A willingness to ignore the past is some-
times described as an "imaginative" policy.
It can just as easily be the prescription for
disaster. Which is it? There lies the art of
the matter, and there are few guidelines.
The United States has too much mass and
momentum to be a hummingbird, darting in
and out of alluring blossoms to see what
nectar can be had for the whims of the
moment.
We can only shape what happens in the
world by influencing the views and actions
of other nations. And other nations will only
be moved by the United States if they be-
lieve that it will do what it says and if its
actions are reasonably predictable.
If we tell them one day that we are going
to do something, and then later say that we
have changed our minds, they will pay less
attention to what we say the next time.
Allies and potential aggressors will then
give less heed to our counsel and our warn-
ings, for neither will see these as reflecting
enduring commitments. We owe it to the
504
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
rest of the world, as well as to ourselves, to
remain steady on course.
This is not to say that past commitments
should never be changed. But the policy-
maker should be aware of the costs of
changing them before deciding whether to
set them aside.
He should also look to the future commit-
ments involved in the course that he is
proposing. What shadow will this course
cast over later policymakers?
Interests, Responsibilities, and Objectives
of Other Governments
Few foreign problems can be solved by
the United States alone. In facing most
problems, therefore, the policymaker must
assess what other governments will think
about it. Who are the other interested
parties? This means not only who claims to
have an interest but how much and what
kind of interest.
We find many countries offering free ad-
vice on foreign policy. We should not be too
impatient with them, for we were similarly
generous throughout much of our history.
We find fewer countries willing to accept a
serious responsibility in the field of action.
It is the views of the latter that we are
naturally most anxious to discover.
When planning an Asian Development
Bank, for example, we consult most closely
the other countries willing to contribute and
those for whose benefit it was conceived.
When considering how to strengthen the
alliance in Europe, we deal most intimately
with those willing to assume the burdens
and responsibilities involved.
But the policymaker must also ascertain
the views of countries that do not have a
direct stake in the matter.
The founders of this country, in declaring
its independence, spoke of their "decent
respect to the opinions of mankind." And so
it is today. While the views of bystanders
should not act as a bar to needed action, we
want to take account of them, in shaping or
explaining our action, as, indeed, we want to
know the views of those who would make
themselves our adversaries.
We want the emerging world order to be
one which can eventually encompass every
country — to be one in which each country
can freely manage its own affairs. We are
not trying to build a community which ex-
cludes anyone or is directed against anyone.
But some exclude themselves — by seeking
hegemony.
We must not stop building the house be-
cause some people want to burn it down or
take it over. We should go ahead — leaving
room for them and making sure that their
national interests are respected. If we're
successful, and it turns out to be a pretty
good house, they may come around.
So the policymaker will ask himself
whether the intended course of action ac-
cords with the legitimate interests of the
nations whose regimes form the Communist
world: to shape their own institutions, to
maintain their security, and to achieve a
prosperous future for their peoples. He will
ask himself whether it is likely to contribute
to the process of constructive change in the
Communist world.
Some evolution in Communist policy has
taken place in the last two decades. This
evolution has been the result, in part, of the
free world's successes: in deterring and
repelling aggression, in restoring security
and prosperity in Western Europe, in sup-
porting economic growth in the Southern
Hemisphere.
I hope that we will see further evolution.
Some in the Communist world appear to
realize the prohibitive costs of nuclear war.
Some may not. But the strategy of trying to
win control of Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer-
ica— thus encircling and strangling the At-
lantic world — is common to all. Their differ-
ences— which are important — are about how
to get on with their world revolution.
I was struck by the Chinese Communist
Defense Minister's approving repetition of
Mao Tse-tung's views that "the seizure of
power by armed force, the settlement of the
issues by war, is the central task and the
highest form of revolution" and that "impe-
rialism and the reactionaries are paper
tigers." I commend the full statement to your
reading.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
505
I hope that a successful defense of South
Viet-Nam will help to change this judgment
and bring the Marshal to share what he dep-
recatingly calls the revisionists' "gloomy
view of war."
But more than this will be needed: We
must help the free peoples of Asia make a
success of their efforts to build free nations.
That is the meaning of the proposals for
economic aid and cooperation which the
President made in his Baltimore speech. -
If success attends these efforts to build a
better world, we can hope that they will
over time lead to gradual change in Com-
munist countries' internal as well as external
policies. We hope for progress toward more
open societies, and toward the unfinished
business all of us have on behalf of our
own peoples, for these will make it easier to
move toward general peace.
In the meantime we continue our search
for such agreements with the Communists
as are feasible, especially on measures
which would reduce the risks of major war.
And we hold out to them the prospect of
cooperation in constructive effort, whenever
they are prepared to join.
All these are considerations which the
policy framer must bear in mind when he
asks himself: Will the intended course of
action contribute to useful evolution in the
Communist world and its relations with the
West?
The Law
If he has gotten this far, he will have
fixed the question he must answer, defined
his objective, considered our interests and
past commitments, and ascertained the rele-
vant views and interests of other countries.
But he is not yet ready to propose an
answer. There are other factors to be
weighed.
The office of the Legal Adviser in the
State Department will be quick to bring
some of these to his attention. Strengthen-
" For text of an address made by President John-
son at Johns Hopkins University on Apr. 7, see
Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
ing the United Nations and building interna-
tional law are important parts of our effort
to build a decent world order. The policy
framer, in addressing a problem, will thus
want to know what principles of interna-
tional law are involved. Are the accepted
norms of international law relevant?
He will also want to know whether the
U.N. Charter and U.N. resolutions are in-
volved and whether any treaties or agree-
ments are applicable.
The policymaker should also look to his
own legal backyard: Is there any relevant
U.S. legislation? Does the intended action
require us to make an exception, or execute
a waiver, under existing law? Will new
legislation or appropriations be required?
The test of policy by reference to law goes
beyond the technical issues of law or even
the broader objective of the rule of law. Law
is the custodian of the standard of general-
ized conduct. Our Legal Adviser is respon-
sible for putting to us the questions: What
happens if everyone else acts as we are
proposing to do? How are we prepared to
act if a similar situation arises elsewhere?
The law liberates by making it possible to
predict, with reasonable assurance, what the
other fellow is going to do. One of the most
exciting and hopeful developments of this
postwar period, even though largely un-
noticed, is the rapid growth of what Wilfred
Jenks has called "the Common Law of Man-
kind." The gravitational pull of law in policy
is and must be a powerful factor in policy
decision.
Public Opinion and Congress
The United States cannot act in secret.
This is a simple proposition which derives
from the nature of our democracy, our
power and influence outside our borders, and
the presence of a vigorous and properly
inquiring press. The bias, therefore, must be
set against action in secret, and the policy
officer is well advised to check his answer
with the question: What if the American
people knew about this tomorrow morning
at 9 o'clock?
The simple fact is that the long-range
506
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
foreign policy of the United States is deter-
mined by the American people ; on this point
I am a plebeian and cannot agree with patri-
cian friends who feel that such matters
ought to be handled by a self-anointed aris-
tocracy. Throughout my long years in gov-
ernment, I have found that the American
people expect their government to travel a
broad highway of policy which responds to
their own simple and decent purposes and
that when government wanders over toward
the soft shoulders on either side of the
road the people have a dozen ways to nudge
the public vehicle back onto the hard
surface.
I do not include Congress simply as a part
of "public opinion." President Johnson has
repeatedly reminded his colleagues that the
Government of the United States comprises
executive, legislative, and judicial branches.
The policy officer who fails to understand
this elementary truth lives in an unreal
world.
The role of Congress in foreign policy
would require a separate speech. But a few
comments can be made in passing. Congress
is an indispensable partner in the conduct
of foreign relations, and the Congress can-
not be taken for granted. Any action which
requires men, money, or legislation depends
upon the judgment of Congress; and a deci-
sion taken without consultation with Con-
gress is in the subjunctive mood.
It is fashionable in some quarters to look
upon Congress as an unfortunate obstacle
blocking the path to wise policy. This is
nonsense. It cannot be expected that 100
Senators and 435 Representatives will have
the same views on complex and sensitive
matters. But in hundreds of discussions in
executive sessions with the committees and
subcommittees of Congress I have never
once seen differences of view develop on
partisan lines. Of course, there are different
judgments, as there are in the executive
branch, when men can sit dovim privately
and enter into the full complexity of events
in a turbulent world, but these differences
are not partisan.
Further, we in the executive branch
come and go — perhaps not as fast as some
would like! Those carrying responsibility
live a decade in one calendar year. But if
you look around Washington to find those
who are veterans in carrying official re-
sponsibility for our foreign relations, you
will find an enormous reservoir of experi-
ence among the leaders of the key commit-
tees of Congress. We are fortunate that
President Johnson and Vice President
Humphrey have shared this experience, and
I myself must say that the counsel I get
from Capitol Hill is an indispensable source
of sound advice and good judgment.
Constructive solutions to key problems
should, therefore, emerge from a continuing
exchange of views between the executive
branch and the legislative branch — and be-
tween the Government and the public. The
policymaker who is thinking of launching a
novel or unexpected course of action should
look to the state of this dialog.
In so doing, he should bear in mind the
vital role played by press, radio, and televi-
sion. For it is largely through them that the
public learns about the problem with which
he is dealing. He will consider what steps
need be taken to make the facts of the case
known to these media. They are his poten-
tial partners in assisting the public to under-
stand what is going on.
The news media and foreign policy are
the subject of another speech — which I
shall probably deliver some day after I leave
public office. The genial myth of the Fourth
Estate reminds me of the Southern tradi-
tion of chivalry — it works fine until the
ladies begin to believe it.
Our key problem — both for the news me-
dia and for government — is the difficulty of
presenting the facts and policy in full
context. The private citizen cannot spend
80 hours a week on foreign policy; were he
to do so, the country would collapse. But
the brief news account or the few minutes of
radio or television news must necessarily
abstract a part of the story — few would
read or listen to more. I am encouraged to
see that news media are giving increasing
attention to context in an effort to give spot
news the background essential to better
comprehension.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
507
other Counsel
Pursuing our checklist, the policy officer
must ask himself whether he has secured
the judgment of all those whose interests
and responsibilities are engaged or who
might have a contribution to make. Within
his own Department, he must take into ac-
count the views of his colleagues who might
be shareholders in a common problem. He
must box the compass of other departments
and agencies of our own Government, each
of whom has heavy responsibilities which
extend beyond our borders and whose com-
mitments to serve and support the President
are no less than his own. He will wish to
have the views of our representatives
abroad, the private interests which might
be affected, and the judgment of private
citizens whose experiences identify them as
a source of good counsel.
Conclusion
General Marshall used to admonish his col-
leagues, "Gentlemen, don't fight the prob-
lem, solve it." Steadily the policy officer
works his way through the alternative an-
swers— testing, rejecting, or revising them.
In most matters he will find none which is
completely satisfactory. He does not live in
Utopia but in a real world filled with human
frailty — including his own. He cannot find
logical and consistent answers for situations
filled with contradictions. He is the first to
know that his answer is subject to criticism
from one flank or the other. But he cannot
avoid an answer. For inaction is itself a
policy decision.
He knows that he must recommend who
ought to do what, when, and how. He is
aware that the United States has not been
chosen to solve all the world's problems,
that we do not drum up business for our-
selves which others can handle without us.
But he is also aware that our attitude makes
a difference and that we seldom enjoy a free
ride on any major problem.
He knows that miracles are rare and few
problems will be completely and perma-
nently solved overnight. He is engaged in a
process over time, and his proposals must
be related to that process and to the entire
texture of our foreign relations.
Having made up his own mind, the policy
officer must then help his superiors to make
up theirs. He must prepare a clear and suc-
cinct presentation of the issues, the alter-
natives, and his recommended answer. He
must meet high standards of exposition and
objectivity if he is to avoid a disservice to
those who must make the final decisions.
There is a special obligation to set forth any
significant differences of view.
The level at which a final decision is
taken depends, in general, upon the serious-
ness of the issues involved. With a thousand
cables a day moving to our missions abroad,
it is obvious that the President and the
Secretary of State can deal with only the
most important. Both art and administra-
tion are required to insure that the highest
officials see what they ought to see. The
other side of the same coin is the continu-
ous process of guidance from the top to
insure that lesser decisions do in fact con-
form to settled lines of policy.
Important and complex decisions neces-
sarily require the President's personal at-
tention. He seldom enjoys the luxury of
disposing of the easy ones. He carries the
central and inescapable responsibility un-
der our constitutional system and must
have a chance to determine those matters
which affect the Nation's course.
You will recall Lincoln's words, upon an-
nouncing his Emancipation Proclamation to
the Cabinet :
There is no way in which I can have any other
man put where I am. I am here. I must do the best
I can, and bear the responsibility of taking the
course which I feel I ought to take.
Harry Truman put it more briefly with
his sign, "The buck stops here."
Responsible officials and responsible citi-
zens are called upon to put themselves in
the President's shoes, to try to understand
the complexity of the questions for which
he must find an answer. One does not expect
190 million Americans in a vibrant and
vigorous democracy to be unanimous, but
each of us can have our share of respect for
the awesome responsibilities of our Chief
508
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Executive and can pause to reflect upon the
considerations upon which his decisions are
reached.
In commenting briefly upon the structure
of foreign policy decisions, I have not had
time to go into the detail which the subject
deserves. Perhaps I have given you the
impression that it is always a time-consum-
ing process. But the pace of events does not
always afford time, and the process may
have to be telescoped into a few hours —
and, on rare occasions, perhaps even into a
few minutes. The element of pace puts a
high premium upon the preparation of policy
officers to respond promptly. But it also
puts a high premium upon a continuous
public discourse about our relations with the
rest of the world.
In that discourse the members of this
profession play a most important part. We
benefit from your articles and your books
and your debates, as well as from the ex-
changes which occur privately as many of
you are in direct contact with our own work.
You are necessarily interested in what we
think and do — as is every other citizen — and
I can also assure you that we in government
have a high appreciation for the flow of
ideas, suggestions, and constructive criti-
cism which come to us from this great
professional community.
Secretary Rusk Appears on NBC's
"American White Paper''
Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk which was recorded for
use on the National Broadcasting Company's
television program "American White Paper"
on September 7.
Press release 210 dated September 7
Q. Has anybody in the State Department
ever counted the number of underdeveloped
countries that are safe and free now ?
A. Oh, I think that — if you were to look
around the world in general — we can be en-
couraged by developments in most continents
despite such crises as Viet-Nam. There are
always 25, or 30, or 35 quarrels just on the
horizon, or potential, because of long historic
differences or because of boundary disputes
or because of other problems. But it is the
function of diplomacy to try to work toward
preventing such quarrels and crises from
breaking through the surface. But, in gen-
eral, if you look at the entire Latin American
Continent, if you look at Africa and other
parts of the world, you can see longer range
trends that are really quite encouraging.
Q. What trends do you have in mind then
that encourage you?
A. Well, I think, for example, the extraor-
dinary progress that is being made now in
this hemisphere under the Alliance for Prog-
ress is one of them. The entire hemisphere
has exceeded those growth rates proposed by
the Alliance for Progress as a target — 2i/^
percent a year — and in the Central Ameri-
can Common Market countries that growth
rate has reached 7 percent. The Alliance for
Progress machinery is no longer a matter of
planning and talk, it is a matter of action;
so tens of thousands of new homes are com-
ing into being, hundreds of new communities
have potable drinking water where they
have never had it before, tens of thousands
of new schools are going up. A great deal of
movement is present there.
In the continent of Africa I think one can
be encouraged by the way in which the
moderate voices of Africa have been stepping
forward to say that this continent is ours
and this continent should work out its prob-
lems on an African basis; we should not be
drawn into the cold war; there is no room
here for the extremists' solution. Those
things are very encouraging.
Q. We do not then seek allies necessarily?
We are not necessarily trying to develop
allies in Africa, Mr. Secretary ?
A. No, we do not draw sharp distinctions
between allies and the nonalined for this
reason. After the last war we formed, in
successive stages, 42 alliances. We did that
because we were interested in the independ-
ence of states, because for the most part
these alliances were formed because there
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
509
were threats or pressures against their inde-
pendence from somewhere else. Well, now
our central interest in the so-called nonalined
countries is their independence. So the very-
heart of our policy both toward the alined
and the nonalined is the notion of the inde-
pendence of states — so that the distinction
there is not as sharp as it might have ap-
peared some years ago. We are not going
about seeking new allies. We have 42; we
think that is enough for a while.
Q. There are some underdeveloped coun-
tries that seem less than happy at times with
the American influence, or the American
interest, in their country. You occasionally
have the slogan "Yankee, go home," which is
accompanied by the burning of some of our
buildings or the stoning of our embassies,
demonstrations, parades, and so on. When
they say, "Yankee, go home," why don't we?
A. We did in many cases. I think we have
to draw a distinction between the actions of
governments, on one side, and the actions by
groups or mobs stimulated by those who
would like to injure the American interests.
After all, there is an international Commu-
nist apparatus that goes after this point all
the time, country after country, and we
don't want that Communist apparatus to
drive us out of every country in the world
simply because they put up demonstrations.
We do expect from governments correct
relationships, the maintenance of the rights
of legation. We think governments under-
stand that there is an essential element of
reciprocity in the whole concept of good
relations. Just a very short time ago we
withdrew our diplomatic and consulate per-
sonnel from the Congo (Brazzaville) because
the Government itself was not treating our
diplomatic and consulate officials in keeping
with the requirements of diplomatic prac-
tice. ' As you know, our relations with Indo-
nesia have been very thin and very strained
in recent months, so that we are now becom-
ing more and more insistent upon the neces-
sity for correct relationships and also for a
' Bulletin of Aug. 30, 1965, p. 367.
reasonable element of reciprocity if we are
to work along with their problems.
Q. Mr. Secretary, how important are the
factors of race and color in our relationships
with emerging nations ?
A. I am not a social philosopher, but in the
broader sense I suppose that there are some
elements of tension wherever people of dif-
ferent races are in direct contact with each
other. One can find aspects of discrimina-
tion everywhere right around the world, but
nevertheless we are in a special position in
this regard. We are looked upon as the
leader of the free world. We have proclaimed
ourselves, and have deep commitments, about
these simple notions of freedom, the dignity
of man, the dignity of the individual. There-
fore, what we do here on these subjects has
an enormous influence on the rest of the
world.
I have sometimes said that there is noth-
ing that Congress has done in the past 4
years with respect to foreign policy that has
been as important as what the Congress has
done with civil rights and the voting rights
bill in these past two sessions of the Con-
gress, because this has given a substance and
a reality to what we say and think about
these great issues. We just live under the
klieg lights, and if we make mistakes in this
field, if we fail to live up to our own com-
mitments, then this is noticed eversrwhere in
the world. It doesn't do for us simply to say,
"Well, other people have discrimination too."
So that it is very important that we our-
selves make clear that racial and religious
prejudices have no place here in our society.
Issue of U.N. Assessments
Q. Mr. Secretary, at the United Nations
over the issues of the assessments that the
Russians did not pay, we did not receive
enough support from underdeveloped nations
— among other nations — to carry out a point
of view. Why was that?
A. I think that the problem arose simply
because the Soviet Union in effect said that
if article 19 was pressed by the General
Assembly, they would withdraw, and to most
510
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
of these nations the General Assembly is
their principal forum in world affairs, a
place where they can make their view known.
I think they were concerned that the U.N.
not break up over this issue, and, indeed, at
the end of the day this is one of those rea-
sons that caused us to say, all right, let the
Assembly go ahead and function, and Mr.
Goldberg pointed out this is a pretty critical
time in political affairs and that the U.N.
ought to be in business. - We regretted the
action taken because we felt that the General
Assembly ought not to surrender its impor-
tant prerogatives under the charter ; it ought
not to, in effect, amend the charter without
thinking very long and hard where that
leads them. But, nevertheless, we think that
the U.N. ought to be in business and be
prepared to sit down despite the article 19
problem.
Q. What place does the U.N. have in our
foreign policy now ?
A. Well, I think that we must recall, Mr.
Newman [NBC correspondent Edward New-
man], before the shooting stopped in World
War II, that governments of the world began
to look very hard at what kind of world we
wanted to live in if we were to prevent that
sort of thing from happening again. So we
built the United Nations, and we built it on
a basis of the lessons that we thought we
learned in World War II. Now, I think it is
fair to say that the opening sections of the
United Nations Charter make up one of the
best statements of long-range and general
foreign policy of the American people as
they look out toward the rest of the world.
We took a very active part in drafting
that charter, but in a much more important
sense the U.N. is crucial. If it represents the
lessons of World War II, we must remember
that we are not going to have a chance to
draw similar lessons from world war III and
start over again. Because there won't be
enough left after world war III; so we have
' For a statement made in the U.N. Special Com-
mittee on Peacekeeping Operations on Aug. 16 by
U.S. Representative Arthur J. Goldberg, see ibid.,
Sept. 13, 1965, p. 454.
to hang on to those lessons we learned in
World War II and make them real and draw
strength out of it in order to prevent world
war III. So I think we have come to a point
in history where man must now stop and
say, look, as the charter puts it, the scourge
of war has got to be eliminated, because if
you start looking at world war III, this
changes not only all the answers but it
changes all the questions. And just no one
can comprehend Vv'here mankind could go
after world war III. So that is why the U.N.
is so important.
U.S. stake in India-Pakistan Dispute
Q. What is our stake in the — let's say, the
dispute between India and Pakistan?
A. Well, I think one thing about that vast
subcontinent — these two great nations — one
can see a very great difference between a
subcontinent in which these two nations are
living at peace with each other and a sub-
continent in which they are face to face in
a situation of direct conflict. To me this is
a very dangerous problem because there
could be a great loss of life on both sides if
these two countries should find themselves en-
gaged in open warfare with each other — not
just loss of life from military action, but
there are the hostilities that exist between
different religions and different factions
there. If these two countries could find peace
with each other, the subcontinent could be
impregnable — from the point of view of de-
fense and safety — from the outside, and then
their resources and considerable talents
could be committed to the economic and
social development of their own people.
They've made good progress on the whole in
their economy, but all that could be brought
back down to ruin if they were to become
involved in military action against each
other. So we have very large stakes in the
peace of the subcontinent.
Q. Mr. Secretary, to what extent is prestige
and honor involved in our commitment in
Viet-Nam?
A. President Johnson has indicated that
our honor is at stake here. I should like to
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
511
emphasize that this is not just an empty
18th-century concept. It's not a question of
one prince considering himself offended by
his neighboring prince of two or three cen-
turies ago. Wrapped up in this word "honor"
is a matter of the deepest concern to the life
and death of our own nation — because it is
very important, when the President of the
United States makes a commitment and
when he says something to those to whom
we're opposed, that what he says is believed.
Now, we have a commitment to South
Viet-Nam. We also have 42 allies. The in-
tegrity of that commitment is literally the
principal pillar of peace in this present world
situation. And if the other side should dis-
cover or think that they discover that the
commitment of the United States is not
worth very much, then the structure of peace
begins to dissolve rapidly and we shall be
faced with dangers that we've never dreamed
of.
When President Eisenhower was con-
fronted by Chairman Khrushchev with an
ultimatum on Berlin in the late fifties, it
was very important that Chairman Khru-
shchev would believe our President when he
said, "No, Mr. Chairman, you don't work
with the United States on the basis of an
ultimatum." When President Kennedy was
threatened with war by Chairman Khru-
shchev over Berlin in 1961, it was very im-
portant that he believe President Kennedy
when President Kennedy said, "Mr. Chair-
man, if that's what you're going to have,
then there's not much we can do about it,
but we'll have to do what is necessary." And
again, when President Kennedy had to say
to Chairman Khrushchev, "Mr. Chairman,
the missiles must depart from Cuba," it was
of the gravest importance to the peace of
the world that the Chairman believed him
in that statement. And so when we say to
the other side, based upon a commitment
that goes back for more than a decade about
Viet-Nam, "Gentlemen, you're not going to
take over South Viet-Nam by force," it is of
the utmost importance to the peace of the
world that the other side believe that. And
that is what the President meant when he
said our honor is involved in the situation.
Secretary Discusses U.S. Policy
in Viet-Nam on Belgian TV
Following is the tratiscript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk which ivas recorded
September 1 for use on a Belgian television
program September 7.
Press release 209 dated September 7
Question: Mr. Secretary, what are the
objectives the United States is trying to ac-
complish in Viet-Nam?
Secretary Rv^k: Well, our objectives
there are very simple indeed. Our combat
forces are in South Viet-Nam solely because
tens of thousands of trained men have
been sent by North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam for the purpose of taking over
that country by force. If that should stop,
if those men should go home, if North Viet-
Nam should leave South Viet-Nam alone,
then our troops can come home and there
could be peace in the area. So that, in the
simplest sense, our war aim is peace.
Q. What efforts have been made to nego-
tiate peace in that country ?
A. Well, I doubt that we have enough
time to review all of those efforts. But
let me say that for many years we have ex-
plored through bilateral diplomacy, tradi-
tional diplomacy, the possibilities of peace
with other capitals, including the Com-
munist capitals. We tried to use the Geneva
machinery arising out of the agreements of
1954 and 1962. Efforts have been made to
use the United Nations. The Commonwealth
committee has made an effort to explore
peace. Various individuals, such as Patrick
Gordon Walker [former British Foreign
Secretary], have probed this matter. Seven-
teen nonalined nations have appealed for
negotiations without preconditions. ^ We
accepted that. The President of India pro-
posed certain solutions. We felt that was a
very constructive proposal, and we were dis-
appointed that the other side turned it
'■ For text of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S.
reply, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610.
512
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
down. There have been many informal con-
tacts in addition to these. The problem here
is not the absence of contact. There's plenty
of opportunity to get ideas back and forth.
The problem is whether Hanoi, Peiping, wish
peace.
Q. What are the actvxil present prospects
of these negotiations ?
A. It's a little hard to say exactly what
present prospects are. We have no way of
knowing what half a dozen leaders in Hanoi
are saying to each other at this moment.
But the President has directed me as Secre-
tary of State to explore, to exhaust, every
political and diplomatic possibility of bring-
ing this matter away from the battlefield to
the conference table. I would be in Geneva
tomorrow if there were anyone there to talk
to when I get there.
Q. Mr. Secretary, in what sense, in your
opinion, can the ivar in Viet-Nam be termed
aggression rather than an indigenous revo-
lution?
A. Well, part of the problem which is
responsible for our presence there has to
do with what North Viet-Nam itself is do-
ing in South Viet-Nam. They have sent, as
I said before, tens of thousands of trained
men, including some of the units of the
regular army of North Viet-Nam, into South
Viet-Nam for the purpose of seizing that
country. Now, it is true that the Viet Cong,
the National Liberation Front, includes
some South Vietnamese — considerable num-
bers of South Vietnamese. But the leader-
ship and the trained cadres, the daily
direction of the operations — these all come
from Hanoi. Now, if Hanoi would stop, then
this would not be a matter for the United
States ; this would be a matter for the South
Vietnamese. It is this external aggression
that is the critical element in our position
there.
Q. How do you see the interference in
Viet-Nam related to Communist force in
Korea or in other countries ?
A. Well, I think since 1945 we have seen
a number of instances in which the Com-
munist world has attempted to move by the
use of force. They attempted to keep their
armed forces in Iran in 1945 and 1946.
They sent guerrillas into Greece. They
brought military pressure to bear on Turkey.
They blockaded Berlin. They sent mass
divisions into South Korea. They have been
probing in many parts of the world, so that
we feel that the Communist world must
come to realize that the use of force is much
too dangerous in the 1960's, in the modern
world; that if there are differences, those
must be discussed at the conference table;
and that if mankind is to have any chance
to live in peace and to build up the economic
and social structure of all countries, regard-
less of ideology, the elementary principles
of the United Nations Charter and of inter-
national law must be observed.
I'd like to remind you that in meeting
these many attempts to use force, the
United States and other countries of the
free world have acted since 1945 but acted
with great restraint. We used an airlift in
Berlin rather than engage in mass divisions
on the ground. We had a nuclear monopoly
at the time of Korea, but we took over 100,-
000 casualties in Korea without using
nuclear weapons. President Kennedy went
to great pains to deal with the Cuban missile
crisis in such a way as to leave open the
door to a peaceful settlement. We waited
over 4 years of infiltration from North
Viet-Nam before we bombed North Viet-
Nam. So, although it has been necessary
to be firm, the free world in this postwar
period has acted with great restraint and
great prudence because our basic purpose
at the end of the day is peace.
Q. What could be the significance for
Europe of the American commitment in
Viet-Nam?
A. Well, I would hope that our friends in
Europe would understand that there is a
simple fact of aggression present in South-
east Asia, that the United States has a very
clear commitment with regard to South
Viet-Nam, and that the integrity of that
commitment by the United States is of great
importance to all of those to whom we have
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
513
commitments. Now, we have 42 allies all
over the world, including the NATO coun-
tries. I think if I were a European, I would
be rather uncomfortable if I discovered that
the commitment of the United States was
not worth very much.
Q. Has the United States shifted the focus
of its principal attention to Viet-Nam to
the detriment of its obligations in Europe?
A. No. I don't know of any obligation to
Europe which we are neglecting in any
way. We are meeting all of our obligations
wherever they exist. I would again suppose
that our friends in Europe would want us
to give a great deal of attention to the
problem in Southeast Asia, because this is
the most explosive and most dangerous
problem of war and peace that exists any-
where in the world. Now, it's true that
Southeast Asia is in the Pacific Ocean and
appears to be a long way from Europe. But
we have a commitment there, and we must
never be asked to choose between the Paci-
fic Ocean and the Atlantic Ocean. That
commitment in the Pacific is just as im-
portant as the commitment in the Atlantic.
And I would hope that our friends in Europe
would understand that, since the Com-
munist effort is worldwide, the United
States' concern must be worldwide insofar
as our 42 allies are concerned. And there-
fore we must give this attention. We're not
neglecting Europe. I think Europe has never
been either so prosperous or so safe as it is
today.
U.S. Recognizes New Dominican
Government, Offers Aid
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 4
This past week, Dominican leaders, with
important assistance from the OAS
[Organization of American States],
agreed on the establishment of a provi-
sional government under the leadership of
Dr. Hector Garcia Godoy. * This action
marked the end of an impasse which had
brought danger and hardship to the Domin-
ican people during four long and difficult
months.
Last night the provisional government,
officially installed, announced its adherence
to the Dominican Republic's international
obligations, pledged its allegiance to the
high purposes of economic, social, and
democratic progress, and requested recog-
nition by the nations of the world. This
action marked the beginning of a new road to
peace, freedom, and hope for the Domini-
can people.
Today, after consultation with other OAS
states, the U.S. Government is extending
recognition to the new provisional govern-
ment. On behalf of the people of the United
States, I extend best personal wishes to the
distinguished new President and to the
brave Dominican people.
President Garcia Godoy's government will
face many great and hard tasks over the
coming months — as he leads his country
to free elections and as he moves to rebuild
his country's economy. In the difficult but
promising days ahead, I want President Gar-
cia Godoy and the Dominican people to know
that they have our full support.
We are already discussing on an urgent
basis the resumption of certain projects
which have been interrupted since the
tragic days of last April. We are ready to
participate fully with the OAS, its com-
mittee on the Alliance for Progress, and
international financial institutions in the
important rehabilitation effort that lies
ahead. We earnestly hope that, on request of
the Dominican Government, the OAS will
take the lead in this great enterprise.
Meanwhile preliminary discussions have
established an immediate need for approxi-
mately $20 million in assistance, and we
hope that arrangements can soon be con-
cluded with the provisional government to
make this amount available. These funds
will help to defray some of the immediate
needs of economic reconstruction, which In-
' For statements made by President Johnson on
Sept. 1, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 477.
514
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
elude the rehabilitation of private industry,
a program of public works, and temporary
financing of some of the essential operating
expenses of the Government and key public
enterprise.
While no one knov^^s better than the
Dominican people how much work it will
take to clear the road to peace, progress,
and democracy, they should also know that
the whole hemisphere shares their hope for
a bright future and will work shoulder to
shoulder with them to make this hope a
reality.
Report Released on Economic
Impact of Defense and Disarmament
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT JOHNSON
TO GARDNER ACKLEY
white House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 4, for
release September 5
I want to thank you and your colleagues
for the first report of the Committee on the
Economic Impact of Defense and Disarma-
ment. 1
I established this committee at the end of
my first month as President. ^ It has devoted
itself for a year and a half to studies which
affect two of the greatest issues our Nation
faces. The first is to provide for national
defense in ways that bring no unnecessary
hardship to any American community. The
second is to keep every road open for rapid
progress toward disarmament as soon as
others will join with us.
Your report gives a comprehensive account
of the extensive efforts which our govern-
ment is making to ensure that changes in
our defense needs are brought about in ways
that are fair to all affected groups and indi-
viduals. You rightly note our achievements
in community assistance, and you rightly
^ Report of the Committee on the Economic Im-
pact of Defense and Disarmament, for sale by the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government
Printing Office, Washington, D.C. 20402; price 40
cents.
' Bulletin of Jan. 27, 1964, p. 120.
conclude that our work m this field must
be improved still further. I agree with you
that we must strengthen our aids to workers.
I agree also that this is a task for state and
local agencies and for private groups work-
ing in harmony with the Federal govern-
ment.
What I find most encouraging of all in the
report is your conclusion that our heavy
current commitment to defense is not a bar
to rapid progress toward disarmament. All
Americans will welcome your clear conclu-
sion that "there is no economic reason for
the Nation to undergo a major economic de-
cline or a slow stagnation if and when
defense outlays are reduced."
The American people will continue to be
determined that our great industrial effort
for national defense is their servant and not
their master. This is the tradition of the
armed forces themselves, and it is the con-
viction, I am sure, of those who serve in the
national defense industries, too.
This country will therefore go forward
with renewed courage and conviction to pro-
vide the defenses that freedom demands and
at the same time to press along the hard
road toward the disarmament mankind must
have.
Finally, your report gives eloquent restate-
ment to the basic principle that sound deci-
sions in a free society must be built on the
best possible information. I strongly endorse
your recommendation that your studies be
continued, just as I strongly endorse your
reaffirmation of the need for a constant
growth in the basic research which can en-
large the opportunities for peaceful progress
throughout our society.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
WHITE HOUSE ANNOUNCEMENT
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 4, for
release September 5
The White House today [September 5]
released a report to the President on the
economic impact of defense and disarma-
ment prepared by Gardner Ackley, chairman
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
515
of a special committee on that subject, and
Chairman of the Council of Economic Ad-
visers.
The report to the President concludes that
neither recent shifts in defense procurement
nor those likely in the future now pose major
problems for the national economy. It ex-
presses confidence in the ability of existing
Federal programs to sustain economic
growth and to minimize any adverse effects
of changes in defense procurement. It does
recognize, however, that such shifts can
create serious local economic problems which
require special action — not only by local
communities but also by the States and the
Federal Government.
The report commends the programs of the
Defense Department and the Atomic Energy
Commission to soften the adverse impact on
communities of necessary changes in defense
activities and to assist affected communities
to find new productive uses for former
Defense or AEC installations.
The report summarizes a year and a half
of work by a committee established by Presi-
dent Johnson in December 1963 to review
the problems then being experienced as a
result of changing defense procurement. It
was largely completed before the recently re-
quested increase in defense appropriations
and thus does not deal specifically with the
impact of prospective changes in defense
programs associated with Viet-Nam.
The Committee recommended that its work
be continued and that efforts should go
forward to learn more about the economic
impact of defense changes and about ways
to minimize their adverse effects.
In commenting on the report, Mr. Ackley
noted that there have been marked shifts in
the distribution of Department of Defense
obligations among major programs in recent
years. As the programed buildup of strategic
retaliatory force weapons approaches com-
pletion, procurement of strategic retaliatory
items such as intercontinental ballistic mis-
siles and Polaris submarines has fallen from
nearly 18 percent of defense obligations in
fiscal year 1962 to around 10 percent in
fiscal year 1965. Firms and communities
involved in production of these weapons have
been and will be adversely affected by the
reduced expenditures, although increased
space programs have filled the gap for some
of them. Moreover, there have been offset-
ting increases in expenditures on some other
types of military hardware. In many affected
communities, the rapid growth of nondefense
business has cushioned any serious adverse
impact.
Preliminary budget results show that mili-
tary and military assistance expenditures in
fiscal year 1965 were $3.86 billion below
those of fiscal year 1964. While the extent
of increased military expenses connected
with Viet-Nam is still uncertain, defense
expenditures in fiscal year 1966 would have
to grow very considerably to equal those of
fiscal year 1964 as a percentage of our
rapidly expanding gross national product.
Since GNP is currently increasing by about
$40 billion a year, national resources avail-
able for nondefense purposes will continue
to grow.
The principal recommendations of the
Committee were that a permanently consti-
tuted Federal Task Force on Community
Assistance be organized ; that this task force
and the existing agencies in the Department
of Defense and AEC should quickly bring to
communities affected by defense changes the
whole array of Federal programs that can
ease the economic impact and speed read-
justment; that policies and procedures for
advance notice of impending changes in de-
fense programs be reviewed; that prime
contractors be required to supply informa-
tion on the impact of contract changes on
subcontractors; that the Federal-State em-
ployment service be strengthened ; that inter-
area recruiting services be rapidly expanded ;
that Federal agencies take more initiative in
mortgage forbearance in emergencies created
by changes in defense programs; that con-
tinued study be given to relocation assist-
ance; that community needs continue to be
given highest priority in disposal of surplus
Federal property; that Federal agencies
516
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
should review policies governing use of
Government-owned, contractor-leased facili-
ties.
The Committee noted that the Federal
Government has a clear responsibility in
connection with the economic impact of
defense shifts. But the important responsi-
bilities of defense firms, of private groups,
and of State and local governments are
increasingly being recognized and assumed.
The Committee recommended that communi-
ties heavily dependent on defense activity
should begin as soon as possible to minimize
their vulnerability through economic diver-
sification and that Federal procurement reg-
ulations should allow expenses of defense
contractors' participation in community di-
versification planning.
In recent years the trend has been for
defense-related purchases by the Federal
Government (including for this purpose
space and atomic energy) to be a shrinking
percentage of GNP. From 10.1 percent of
GNP in 1958, these purchases declined to
something under 9 percent in 1964. Defense-
related purchases in 1958 were $44.8 billion
and $55.4 billion in 1964; but the rapid
growth of GNP has meant that the impact
of defense was relatively smaller in 1964
than in 1958.
The Committee noted that continued eco-
nomic growth will in the future require
larger adjustments in Government fiscal and
monetary policies than would be required by
any likely changes in defense budgets.
The fiscal policy adjustments necessary
because of economic growth between now
and 1970 were compared with the additional
adjustments that would be made necessary
by a hypothetical 25 percent reduction in
defense expenditures.
Even with unchanging expenditures for defense,
major fiscal action — involving adjustments on the
order of $25-30 billion beyond "built-in" require-
ments— will be required to maintain full employ-
ment.
To the extent that defense outlays are reduced, the
need for fiscal action will be increased. A hypotheti-
cal reduction of 25 percent in defense outlays would
raise the required fiscal adjustment to the $38-43
billion range.
The Committee concluded that the magni-
tude of the shifts in defense procurement
now occurring does not of itself justify any
major intensification or redirection of exist-
ing Federal programs. It noted that special
offices in the Department of Defense and
Atomic Energy Commission, as well as the
President's Task Force on Community As-
sistance, have been available to coordinate
the services of Federal agencies for commu-
nities with serious local problems.
The report emphasizes the advantages to
the Nation in transferring any research and
development capability released from defense
activity to urgent national problems such as
improved transportation, control of pollu-
tion, better housing, and better health. It
urged that greater efforts be directed to
utilize the "systems" capabilities of defense
industry on such problems and commended
the recent efforts of the State of California
to stimulate the interest of the aerospace
firms in such problems.
The Committee on the Economic Impact
of Defense and Disarmament, established by
President Johnson on December 21, 1963,
was given the assignment of providing in-
formation on the impact of changing defense
programs, of describing existing policies and
programs, of suggesting and analyzing addi-
tional program needs, and of stimulating
Government and private thinking about pro-
ductive uses of resources released from de-
fense employment. The departments and
agencies represented on the Committee and
its membership in July 1965 are listed
below :
Department of Defense: Joseph A. Califano, Jr., the
Special Assistant to the Secretary and Deputy
Secretary of Defense
Department of Commerce : Andrew F. Brimmer,
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs
Department of Labor: Stanley H. Ruttenberg, Man-
power Administrator
Atom,ic Energy Commission: James T. Ramey, Com-
missioner
National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
Walter Sohier, General Counsel
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency: Archibald
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
517
S. Alexander, Assistant Director
Office of Emergency Planning : G. Lyie Belsley, Di-
rector, Economic Affairs Office
Bureau of the Budget: William M. Capron, Assistant
Director
Office of Science and Technology : Patrick Conley
General Services Administration : Howard Greenberg,
Commissioner, Utilization and Disposal Service
Small Business Administration: Padraic P. Frucht,
Assistant Administrator for Economics
Council of Economic Advisers: Gardner Ackley,
Chairman
The Concept of a National Market and Its Economic Growtii Implications
by W. W. Rostov)
Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council ^
I can tell you, without flattery, that I
believe the skills this organization com-
mands and represents are going to prove
critical in the generation ahead to the de-
velopment of countries and regions which
contain a clear majority of the world's popu-
lation. I have in mind the developing coun-
tries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America. I also have in mind the
Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern
Europe. I would add, parenthetically, that
should Communist China come, in time, to
formulate a rational and effective develop-
ment strategy — which it now lacks — market-
ing in all its dimensions must play there,
too, a new and significant role.
To understand why this proposition is
valid, one must look at the development the-
ories and policies which have been applied
to these regions over the past generation,
examine where they now stand and where
they must go as they move forward in their
stages of development.
With a few exceptions, the developing
nations of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and
Latin America began their first purposeful
' Address made before the American Marketing
Association at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 1 (press
release 202 dated Aug. 31).
stage of modernization by concentrating
their efforts in two areas : the production of
manufactured goods in substitution for con-
sumers goods imports and the creation of
basic infrastructure — that is, roads, electric
power, ports, education, et cetera. Agricul-
ture and the modernization of rural life
were systematically neglected, yielding now
a dangerous decline in per capita food pro-
duction in some major regions.
There was a certain legitimacy in these
initial priorities. The development of an
economy, at its core, consists in the progres-
sive diffusion of the fruits of modern science
and technology. Industry is the most dra-
matic form which modern science and tech-
nology assumes; and basic infrastructure is
directly required for industrialization.
But there was also an element of irra-
tionality. Agriculture was associated with
the period of colonialism and/or with exces-
sive dependence on export markets in indus-
trial countries. It appeared to be second
order — and even faintly humiliating busi-
ness, as compared to industrialization.
The combination of these two factors —
rational and irrational — has led to a phase
of development concentrated largely in a
few cities, centered around a few industries,
518
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
and, as I say, to a systematic neglect of
what agriculture could and must contribute
by way of food, industrial raw materials,
foreign exchange, and enlarged domestic
markets.
The start of industrialization varied in
time as among the developing countries of
the contemporary world. The Latin Ameri-
can countries generally began just before or
during the Second World War, while many
others began seriously only in the years
after 1945. Some, indeed, have not yet
launched their first phase of sustained in-
dustrialization. Nevertheless, it is broadly
true that we have come to the end or are
coming to the end of the phase when the
initial, narrow postwar strategy for devel-
opment can be regarded as viable.
In one developing country after another
the perception is spreading that the next
phase of development must be based on a
systematic diffusion of the modern skills,
now largely concentrated in urban areas,
out into the countryside; on the making of
efficient national markets; and, from this
widened basis, on the generation of new
lines of diversified exports which alone
promise to earn the foreign exchange which
the developing countries will need in the
years ahead. Only this pattern of widened
domestic markets and diversified exports
promises to provide the foundation for that
deepening of the industrial structure (from
consumers goods down to capital goods and
the heavy industry sectors) which a mod-
ern industrial society requires.
If I may be permitted to use a somewhat
private vocabulary, it can be said that dur-
ing the past generation we have had in
many parts of the world a takeoff in which
the leading sectors have been import-substi-
tution industries in consumers goods fields;
and for these nations to move on into the
drive to industrial maturity requires that
they convert their somewhat isolated urban
industrial concentrations into active, dy-
namic centers which purposefully diffuse
the process of modernization out across the
nation, while they generate the capacity, on
this wider market foundation, to pay their
way as they move to full industrialization of
their societies.
This is a shorthand approximation of the
task for the next generation that lies before
the nations within the free world, which
contain most of the population of Asia, the
Middle East, Africa, and Latin America ; and
it is also the problem which must be solved
if a modern, industrialized China is really
going to emerge.
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe
The problem in the Soviet Union and
much of Eastern Europe is, of course, some-
what different. There the origins of indus-
trialization generally reach back to the last
quarter of the 19th century — in some re-
gions even earlier. These nations (with
certain exceptions) have moved forward in
the postwar generation to complete the
drive to industrial maturity. They did so
under doctrines which made the expansion
of heavy industry virtually an object in
itself; that is, heavy industry was built
either to supply military forces or to build
more heavy industry.
But they have now come to a stage in
their development where Khrushchev was
quite right in attacking what he called the
"steel eaters." He asked, you may remem-
ber, "What do you want us to do with more
steel, eat it?" It is the inevitable — and pre-
dicted— slowing down in the heavy industry
sectors which mainly accounts for the over-
all sluggishness of these economies. They
have exhausted the capacity of the heavy
industry sectors to lead in the growth
process.
Along this way, like the developing coun-
tries, the Soviet Union and the countries of
Eastern Europe have neglected agriculture.
In addition, they have kept it under forms
of collective organization which were grossly
inefficient in their use of capital and man-
power, although collective arrangements are
being diluted in parts of Eastern Europe in
an effort to provide effective incentives to
the farmer.
The next stage of development in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe must evi-
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
519
dently be based not merely on a correction
of agricultural inefficiency but upon the
turning of their relatively mature industrial
complexes to supply the things which people
want when average income levels reach the
point at which they now stand in these
countries.
If high rates of growth are to be resumed
in the Soviet Union and in Eastern Europe,
they will come about by some version of the
economic and social revolution which we in
the United States began in the 1920's and
which began to grip Western Europe and
Japan in the 1950's; that is, the revolution
centered about the rapid diffusion of the
automobile, durable consumers goods, subur-
ban housing, and all the rest of the now
familiar package.
I may say in passing that this revolution
is not to be understood in terms simply of
industrial gadgetry. Behind the desire for a
private automobile, a television set, a subur-
ban house with a little grass and a fence,
are two profound human desires which,
from all we can thus far observe, are uni-
versal; namely, a desire for mobility — for
getting over the horizon — and a desire for
privacy. The gadgets we command repre-
sent, simply, the ways modern industry has
found to satisfy these deep, legitimate, and
decent human desires.
Again, reverting to my own terms, I
would say that, just as most of the develop-
ing world is in a process of adjustment
from takeoff to the drive to technological
maturity, the Soviet Union and Eastern Eu-
rope are in a process of adjustment from
their own version of the drive to technolog-
ical maturity to the age of high mass con-
sumption.
Marketing and Agricultural Revolution
And here, of course, is where marketing
comes in.
The modernization of the countryside in
the developing countries evidently has many
dimensions. We now know enough from
practical experience to be able to say that,
assuming roads and minimum basic educa-
tion and assuming, also, a certain backlog of
relevant agricultural science, there are four
necessary and sufficient conditions for an
agricultural revolution.
First, the farmer must receive a reliable
and fair price for his product.
Second, credit must be available at rea-
sonable rates for him to make the change in
the character of his output or the shift in
productivity desired.
Third, there must be available on the spot
technical assistance that is relevant to his
soil, his weather conditions, and his change
in either output or in productivity.
Finally, there must be available at reason-
able rates two types of industrial products:
inputs such as chemical fertilizers, insecti-
cides, and farm tools ; and incentive goods —
that is, the consumers goods of good quality
he and his family would purchase in greater
quantity or work harder to get if they were
cheaper or if his income were higher.
These four conditions can be satisfied in
a good many ways. As I have wandered
about the developing areas and studied the
evidence available, I have been struck by
the variety of institutional forms in which
agricultural success stories appear — pro-
ducers cooperatives, food processing firms,
large commercial farms, et cetera; but they
all have the characteristic of organizing
around the farmer these four necessary and
sufficient conditions.
You will note that marketing enters di-
rectly into these conditions both ways; that
is, marketing from the farm to the city and
from the city to the farm.
If a farmer is to receive a fair price for
his product without a rise of food prices in
the cities, there must be a modernization of
marketing arrangements which permits this
to happen. No aspect of the developing
world troubles me more than the wide-
spread situation where the farmer gets 15
or 20 percent of the selling price of his
product — with the selling price in the city
high and great wastage occurring along the
way.
It is sometimes argued that the frag-
mented and expensive marketing arrange-
520
DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN
merits which exist for many commodities in
developing countries are, simply, an aspect
of underdevelopment vi^hich will pass away
with time and the progress of modernization
as a whole. Specifically, it is sometimes
pointed out that the modernization of mar-
keting might remove from employment peo-
ple who are now engaged, even at a low
level of productivity.
Three considerations argue against this
more complacent line of thought.
First, in many cases the marketing ar-
rangements which confront a farmer in a
developing country are what economists call
monopsonistic ; that is, the individual farmer
is confronted with a situation where there is
only one intermediary to whom he can sell
his product. At the critical point of the
harvest season the farmer is at the mercy of
such intermediaries. That inequitable bar-
gaining circumstance is often made worse
because the purchaser of the farmer's prod-
ucts is often also the only available source
of credit to the farmer. In short, traditional
marketing arrangements are not only ineffi-
cient; they often do not have the competi-
tive characteristics economists implicitly
assume.
Second, the gap between prices on the
farm and prices to the urban consumer con-
stitutes a quite special barrier between the
cities and the countryside, the effects of
which must be measured not merely in
terms of the alternative employment of la-
bor but in terms of the whole urban-rural
relationship. Specifically, archaic marketing
arrangements make it unprofitable for the
farmer to engage in higher productivity
agricultural production; and they thereby
reduce not only agricultural output but also
the size of the market for manufactured
goods. In modernizing marketing relations,
we must take into account not merely the
possible displacement of labor in the pres-
ent marketing chains but the total effects
on output and markets of what one Latin
American president has called the Chinese
wall they constitute between the city and
the countryside.
Third, quite pragmatically, where modern
marketing arrangements have been intro-
duced (through producers cooperatives, food
processing firms, commercial farming, or
other arrangements), the process of adjust-
ment in employment in the marketing sector
has not, in practice, proved difficult.
In short, I am confident that the mod-
ernization of marketing arrangements from
the farm to the city is a crusade we can
enter with a conviction that the benefits
will far outweigh the costs in readjustment.
Looked at from the other side, that is,
from the city to the countryside, the mod-
ernization of rural life demands new and
effective ways of getting to the farmer
both the things he needs to increase produc-
tivity and incentive goods.
With respect to chemical fertilizers, in-
secticides, seeds, and farm machinery, there
is a role, beyond conventional marketing, to
be undertaken by the salesman. It may be
regarded as sacrilege by some, but it has
generally proved true that the most power-
ful agent in the diffusion of new agricul-
tural technology has been the commercial
firm rather than public institutions set up
for technical assistance purposes.
I would not for a moment denigrate the
role in the United States of the county
agent nor of those who have followed in his
tradition in the developing areas; but it is
simply a fact that there are not enough
county agents out working in the villages to
do the job in contemporary developing areas.
Among other reasons, too many trained
agricultural technologists are to be found
working in government offices in the capital
city rather than in grass-roots jobs. A good,
pragmatic performance in the diffusion of
technical knowledge can be and is being
done in many parts of the world by those
who have a straight commercial interest in
selling their products. The salesman knows
he must spend his time with potential cus-
tomers.
With respect to incentive goods, we must
begin by accepting the fact that people in
the rural areas of the developing world are
poor. Until their income rises, they may not
be able to buy a great deal more than they
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
521
are buying. On the other hand, it is also
true that what they can buy in their villages
by way of manufactured goods is often
shoddy and expensive.
We know from the history of rural areas
in the United States — even the quite recent
experience of the Tennessee Valley area —
that the availability of attractive and inex-
pensive consumers goods can be an impor-
tant stimulus to production and productiv-
ity. Lower prices can yield more purchases
in the short run ; lower prices and the avail-
ability of incentive goods of good quality
can yield more output, income, and pur-
chases in the longer run. The same lesson
can be observed in Mexico and other de-
veloping areas where efforts to increase
productivity on the supply side are com-
bined with such incentives.
The technical marketing problem from
the city to the countryside consists in find-
ing ways to lower the unit cost of distribu-
tion under circumstances where rural
markets are scattered and the volume of
any one commodity to be sold at any one
point is low. The most successful solution in
developing countries is, of course, the mar-
keting of beer and soft drinks. The volume
of sales, however, is sufficient in this case to
support regular truck deliveries even at low
levels of rural income. What appears to be
required is the development of unified mar-
keting arrangements for a wide range of
consumers goods so that the overhead dis-
tribution costs for each commodity are
reduced.
As I have seen soft-drink trucks roll into
distant villages, I have often wished they
had a trailer attached containing textiles,
shoes, household equipment, flashlights,
transistor radios, books, and the other
things the villagers would buy if prices were
lower.
Producers cooperatives, food processing
plants, and other substantial institutions in
rural areas can often serve as centers for
the efficient assembly and distribution of
such incentive goods, as well as the fertili-
zers, insecticides, et cetera, needed to in-
crease productivity.
Elements in Modernization of Rural Life
I have tried to indicate concretely the
kind of marketing operations required if
those engaged in distribution are to play
their part in breaking down the Chinese
wall between urban and rural life in develop-
ing countries and assisting in the creation
of national markets. The modernization of
rural life, which lies at the heart of this
structural problem, evidently involves ele-
ments which go beyond distribution itself.
In our recent letter to the Presidents of
the Latin American Republics and to the
President of the United States, ^ the mem-
bers of CIAP — the Inter-American Commit-
tee on the Alliance for Progress — listed
seven major elements required to accelerate
the modernization of rural life. Aside from
more efficient distribution, these were:
changes in land tenure in regions of many
Latin American countries ; changes in certain
cases in government agricultural price poli-
cies; the expansion of production as well as
distribution of chemical fertilizers; expan-
sion and improvement of agricultural credit ;
the buildup of institutions such as pro-
ducers cooperatives and food processing
firms ; programs of popular cooperation and
community development. Within this whole
complex of actions designed to break the
stagnation and apathy of life and production
in rural areas, modern marketing arrange-
ments have, however, a critical role.
The range of specific actions required in
the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe is sim-
ilar to that required in the developing
areas; but the nations with Communist re-
gimes confront their inherited commitment
to collective institutions for production and
distribution. Over the years these have
proved generally inefficient and resistant to
reform, although reform efforts have been
made or are being made in several coun-
tries in the area. I know of very few govern-
ment distribution operations anywhere in
the world which have proved effective; and
I know of a good many which have required
massive subsidy to work at all. The reason
- Not printed here.
522
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
is the lack of direct interest on the part of
the bureaucrat in pressing for that extra
margin of cost cutting and that extra mar-
gin of sales which make the difference.
Nevertheless, it is clear that there is a
ferment in the Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe centered on the lack of incentives to
productivity in agriculture and on methods
for making the distribution system more
responsive to the interests and tastes of the
consumer. There is a growing awareness of
the inner contradiction between the modes
of organization which have been created in
the past out of their ideological commit-
ments and the imperatives of progress. No
one can predict the outcome of these de-
bates and the changes in policy that will
ensue; but they constitute an interesting
and important element for change on the
world scene, which is essentially hopeful.
Need To Diversify Exports
The making of national markets through
the more effective linking of urban and
rural areas bears directly on the other
great task of the developing countries in the
years ahead ; namely, their need to generate
diversified exports. A whole range of special
skills and special efforts is needed to mar-
ket new products abroad. Potential markets
must be studied with careful attention to
local tastes; distribution channels must be
established; regular and reliable flows of
supplies must be moved and financed ; qual-
ity controls must be built up; and efficient
production must be generated if the exports
are to be competitive.
For countries whose first phase of indus-
trialization has taken place internally, be-
hind high tariff barriers which protected
the local market, a quite revolutionary shift
in mentality is required before business can
generate the efficiency to face the winds of
international competition. That shift is only
beginning to take place in a few Latin Amer-
ican countries at the present time, although,
in Asia, Taiwan has made the transition to
diversified manufactured exports in good
style and South Korea is well on its way. In
highly competitive international markets it
does not take many cases of supplies that
fail to arrive on time or of uncertain quality
for the export effort to be set back.
That branch of the art of distribution
concerned with the export trade will evi-
dently be increasingly important in the
developing areas in the years ahead.
But there is a further connection worth
noting. Historically the export of manu-
factured goods has usually followed or
paralleled the development of a national
market. The classic case was that of cotton
textiles. Starting with Great Britain, one
country after another entered the textile
export trade as a kind of reflex to learning
how to produce and distribute efficiently
within its own national market, for cotton
textiles are the first modern manufactured
product likely to develop a mass market in
a relatively poor country. Other manufac-
tured goods, in turn, have flowed into
international channels as they took hold in
domestic markets — right down to Japan's
booming export of transistor radios. In con-
centrating in the years ahead on the devel-
opment of national markets, therefore, the
developing countries will also be laying the
foundations for the export of those diversi-
fied manufactures on which their future
foreign exchange earning capacity will sub-
stantially rest.
Importance of Skills of Distribution
The argument I have tried to lay before
you today has a particular significance for
the development of economic thought as well
as for public policy. Whether we are con-
scious of it or not, our ways of thinking
about the economy are still colored by ideas
that go back to the classical economists of
the 19th century and, indeed, back to the
18th-century world of the physiocrats. They
began to organize their thoughts by focusing
on the physical factors of production,
notably land and labor. The concept of the
widening of the market was introduced and
effectively dramatized, of course, by Adam
Smith. But what it took to widen the market,
beyond physical means of transport, was not
generally taken seriously by the founding
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
523
fathers of modern economic thought. In fact,
distribution (and services generally) tended
to be ignored or regarded, somehow, as an
inferior kind of economic activity. Down to
the present day it is difficult to get develop-
ment economists and policymakers to accord
to problems of efficiency in distribution the
same attention they give automatically to
problems of production, investment, and fi-
nance.
For Communists the problem is com-
pounded by the nature of Marxist econom-
ics. Karl Marx was, as an economist, rooted
in the classical tradition. His propositions
perpetuated in a particularly strong form
the tendency to denigrate distribution — so
much so that it is formally excluded from
Communist concepts of national income.
Thus, in facing now the tasks of widening
the market, both in the developing areas
and in the Soviet Union and in Eastern
Europe, governments must overcome that
most insidious of pressures; that is, the
pressures created by the sometimes un-
conscious acceptance of ideas from the past
that obscure the character and priority of
current problems.
If I am correct that men must, in the
generation ahead, diffuse the process of
modernization out over long-neglected rural
regions, creating new, efficient networks of
distribution, we shall see not merely new
and challenging tasks for those who com-
mand the skills of distribution but a new
theoretical respect and appreciation for the
art of that widening of the market which,
for so long, was taken for granted.
International Congress on Air
Technology To Be Held in U.S.
The White House announced on Septem-
ber 1 (White House press release) that the
United States will invite government and
industry representatives of the world's key
industrial nations to consider the future of
winged aircraft in an International Con-
gress on Air Technology at Hot Springs
National Park and Little Rock, Ark., Novem-
ber 15-18, 1965.
The symposium on the development of air
technology and its impact on world society
and industrial growth will be sponsored by
the Department of Commerce and the Valley
Education and Research Foundation, a non-
profit organization dedicated to the ad-
vancement of science and scientific educa-
tion serving the Arkansas River Valley
region, and the Arkansas Industrial Devel-
opment Commission.
The 1965 Congress is being initiated to
provide a technical forum for discussion of
the part winged air technology will play in
shaping tomorrow's world. The event is ex-
pected to bring together approximately 1,000
of the world's foremost technical experts in
every facet of winged air technology.
Besides the variety of topics which will be
reviewed by outstanding technical experts
and public officials, there will be displays of
United States and foreign aircraft, com-
munication and navigation equipment, me-
teorology, powerplants, instrumentation,
fabrication techniques, and inventions and
innovations looking to the future.
Senator John L. McClellan of Arkansas
has been instrumental in initiating the
event.
Administration officials participating in-
clude John T. Connor, Secretary of Com-
merce; Alan Boyd, Under Secretary of
Commerce for Transportation; Robert
White, head of the Environmental Science
Services Administration, Department of
Commerce; Gen. W. F. McKee, Adminis-
trator, Federal Aviation Agency; Gen.
John P. McConnell, Chief of Staff, U. S.
Air Force; and F. L. Thompson, Director,
Langley Laboratories, National Aeronautics
and Space Administration.
Participants from the other sponsoring
organizations include W. M. Shepherd,
chairman of the board, and Leigh A. Taylor,
president, Valley Education and Research
Foundation, and C. Hamilton Moses, chair-
man, and Carl C. Hinkle, Jr., director, Ar-
kansas Industrial Development Commission.
524
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965
Signed by President
Statement by President Johnson
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 6
Today [September 6] I am signing into
law the Foreign Assistance Act of 1965,
which provides authority to carry forward
our programs of economic and military as-
sistance in fiscal year 1966.
These programs have been a vital part of
U.S. foreign policy in four administrations of
both parties since the end of World War
II.
We have had great successes. We have
made some mistakes. Foreign assistance is
always and everywhere a limited instru-
ment and no cure-all. But I am convinced
that without the American foreign aid pro-
gram, without this expression of our hu-
manity and our highest goals, hundreds of
millions of people would have had no escape
from the chaos, frustration, and despair on
which tyranny grows and wars ignite.
Instead, these people look to the future
with hope. Much remains to be done to
make the hope a reality. The work of build-
ing modem economies and new societies is
difficult. It requires patience, strength, and
knowledge. We cannot eradicate the injustice
and deprivation of centuries in a matter of
a few years.
It also requires a sense of adventure, of
challenge, and of dedication on the part of
all Americans, not just those who serve us
so valiantly — normally without recognition
— in the quiet battle against poverty, ig-
norance, and disease that goes on every day
around the world.
The hope can become reality only if the
people and governments of the developing
nations do their part — make the hard
choices, carry forward with new legislation,
push for internal reform. We will continue
to base our assistance on the sound prin-
ciple that self-help and reform on the part
of recipients is the key to success.
We will also continue to base our program
on the principle that other developed nations
should provide more aid, on softer terms.
The resolutions adopted at the recent meet-
ing of the Development Assistance Commit-
tee of the OECD in Paris marked an im-
portant step in this direction. I urge all free-
world nations to continue in these efforts,
particularly in bringing the terms on which
aid is given within the targets established
by the Development Assistance Committee.
I should like to express my appreciation to
Chairman [J. W.] Fulbright and Chairman
[Thomas E.] Morgan and the members of
the House-Senate conference on the foreign
aid authorization for the hard work devoted
to reaching agreement on the legislation.
The matters at issue in the conference in-
volved the future content and direction of
the foreign aid program. This is also a mat-
ter of major concern to me.
The conference report ^ and the two chair-
men have urged "a review of the aid pro-
gram as presently constituted, seeking to
direct it more effectively toward the solu-
tion of the problems of the developing coun-
tries." The executive branch will, this fall,
undertake appropriate studies of the pro-
gram. It is my expectation that these studies
will provide the basis for recommendations
as to the future course of U.S. assistance
policy.
I also expect to request that the multi-
year principle approved by the Congress in
1961 and 1962 for development loans be
extended to the other categories of assist-
ance.
I am confident that next year's legislation
will mark a renewal of our long-term com-
mitment to assist those people who want to
live in peace and independence, a renewal
of the program which has been vital to U.S.
interests around the world, and a renewal
of the cooperative relationship between the
Executive and the Congress which has
shaped the great foreign policy decisions of
the postwar world.
1 H. Kept. 811, 89th Cong., 1st sess.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
525
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES
United States Supports Call
for India-Pakistan Cease-Fire
Following are statements made in the
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa-
tive Arthur J. Goldberg during debate on the
India-Pakistan question, together tvith the
texts of resolutions adopted unanimously by
the Council on September Jt and 6.
STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 4
U.S./U.N. press release 4623
I speak for my Government in total sup-
port of the joint draft resolution of the dis-
tinguished representatives of Bolivia, the
Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Nether-
lands, and Uruguay.! I vs^ould like to compli-
ment their representatives for drafting a
resolution which represents, as is apparent
from the discussion here this afternoon and
now tonight, the overwhelming sentiment of
members of the Security Council.
We are meeting here, as is apparent, in
a spirit of grave concern for peace on the
Asian subcontinent. The reverberations of
fighting between the forces of India and
Pakistan are reaching us in increasing vol-
ume. As the Secretary-General has reported -
so well and so objectively, the cease-fire has
been broken and there have been serious
breaches of the cease-fire line in Jammu
and Kashmir. Armed personnel as well as
military units of the regular forces of both
India and Pakistan have now crossed the
cease-fire line established by agreement on
July 27, 1949. And I shall not attempt to re-
capitulate the facts which have been
reported in the report of the Secretary-
General but shall only share his concern for
future peace between India and Pakistan.
'U.N. doc. S/6657 (S/RES/209).
^U.N. doc. S/6651.
The United States and, as has been made
evident here today, all other members of
this Council have viewed these events with
the greatest apprehension and concern.
Since the birth of India and Pakistan, my
Government has developed close and
friendly relations with their Governments,
relations which we wish with all sincerity
to continue. The people of the United
States have many ties based on friendship,
common interest, and shared goals with the
peoples of both India and Pakistan. These
are expressed not only in the broad pro-
grams which my Government has pursued
and is pursuing to assist the development
and security of these countries but also in
the form of many nongovernmental ex-
changes and programs, particularly in the
fields of health, education, and economic
development. And we know intimately from
our close relations with both countries the
intricacies of the underlying problem which
is at the root of today's conflict, a problem
which has been emphasized in the discus-
sions which have taken place here today.
The immediate task at hand, however, is
the cessation of conflict, a conflict, unfor-
tunately, which has been threatening since
early this year — and regrettably threaten-
ing. And we have, every one of us here
today — governments and individuals — been
watching with apprehension the upward
trend in the temperature in this area on the
subcontinent during the past year.
All the world breathed a little easier
when in June the very dangerous crisis
which had developed over the Rann of
Kutch was overcome through the wise
statesmanship of the Governments of Paki-
stan and India and the skillful good offices
of the Government of the United Kingdom.
This respite, unhappily, was all too brief.
It was emphasized in the comprehensive
and carefully prepared report submitted to
526
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
Council members by the Secretary-General
on August 31 and made public today. There
has been a disturbing increase in both the
number and scale of incidents in the area of
the cease-fire line in Kashmir since early
in this year — ^violations of the agreement
signed by the representatives of both Gov-
ernments on July 27, 1949, which estab-
lished the cease-fire line. In June the Secre-
tary-General, persevering as he does, was
able through quiet persuasion to effect a
solution of the threatening situation in the
Kargyl area, a very great contribution in
the cause of international peace and
security.
The report now before us notes that the
tempo of incidents rose again in early Au-
gust. I shall not repeat these incidents.
They are fully and, I think, objectively re-
ported in the Secretary-General's report and
in the details submitted to the Secretary-
General by General [R. H.] Nimmo, Chief
of the United Nations Military Observer
Group.
As indicated in the report, the Secretary-
General has since early August been en-
deavoring, persistently and through quiet
diplomacy, to promote a restoration of calm
and respect of the cease-fire. In his report
to the Council the Secretary-General set forth
a number of conditions which he considers
prerequisite to a restoration of the cease-fire.
And in his messages of September 1 ^ to
President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri
appealing to both leaders to respect the
cease-fire agreement, the Secretary-General
again outlines these conditions. They are, in
the view of my Government, both sound and
reasonable, and they in effect are endorsed
by the cease-fire request made in the pro-
posed resolution.
I would like to point out that cooperation
with the military observers, which is one of
the Secretary-General's proposals, must
mean full freedom of movement and access
for the observers in the discharge of their
functions. These are to observe and to re-
port any violations of the cease-fire and the
U.S. Endorses Secretary-General's
Appeal for Cease-Fire in Kashmir
Statement by Ambassador Goldberg
U.S. /U.N. press release 419 dated September 1
The United States fully endorses the appeal
made by the Secretary-General with regard
to Kashmir.' It is essential that there should
be an immediate cease-fire, that all armed
personnel which have moved across the cease-
fire line should be withdrawn, and that there
should be the fullest cooperation with the
United Nations and its observers on the
ground. The United States attaches the great-
est importance to the restoration of peace in
the area and the avoidance of any action likely
to threaten further the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security.
'U.N. doc. S/6647.
'U.N. doc. S/6647.
cease-fire line and to supervise the cease-
fire order. This clearly supervisory function
of the observer group derives from the
terms of the resolution of August 13, 1948,
of the United Nations Commission on India
and Pakistan, part I of which was the basis
for the cease-fire of January 1, 1949, which
in turn is endorsed in the Karachi agree-
ment of July 27, 1949, establishing the cease-
fire line.
Paragraph (D) of part I of this resolution
reads :
In its discretion and as the Commission may find
practicable, the Commission will appoint military
observers who, under the authority of the Commis-
sion and with the co-operation of both Commands,
will supervise the observance of the cease-fire order.
It is clear that all the conditions enumer-
ated by the Secretary-General in his appeal
are prerequisite to an effective cease-fire,
which the resolution before us endorses.
When the Secretary-General's appeal to
President Ayub and Prime Minister Shastri
was made public, with the authority of Pres-
ident Johnson I immediately announced my
Government's complete endorsement of that
appeal. I have the authority from the Presi-
dent to reiterate that endorsement here to-
day.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
527
It is all too clear that the latest develop-
ments in Kashmir bear tragic witness to the
imperative need for an immediate cease-fire.
I do not think I need to point out, after
what has been said here today, the devas-
tating consequences a war between India
and Pakistan would have on the peoples of
the subcontinent and, I dare say, on the
entire world. The world has been privileged
to witness the remarkable economic and
social progress of these two great countries
in behalf of their peoples and many of the
nations represented in this Council have been
able to contribute to this progress, and it
ought to continue under conditions of peace
in the interests of the inhabitants of both
countries.
It would be an unthinkable tragedy should
these great achievements, past, present, and
future, be annulled by a failure to end
promptly and firmly the current fighting.
And I profoundly believe that this Council
can do no less than give its fullest support
to the appeal of the Secretary-General and
to the resolution just submitted by my dis-
tinguished colleague from Malaysia, speak-
ing on behalf of the representatives and
nations which participated in the draft-
ing of this resolution. Moreover, my Govern-
ment believes that it is of the highest im-
portance to the cause of world peace and
security and, indeed, to the cause of the
charter, which is dedicated to these great
principles, that the Security Council must
clearly and unequivocally place its great au-
thority behind these grave appeals, and we
pray that the parties involved will hear our
voices and draw back from the catastrophe
which threatens them and threatens all of
us. The cost to them and to the world of
their failure to do so would be beyond any
measure that any of us here today could
even contemplate.
STATEMENT OF SEPTEMBER 6
U.S./U.N. press release 4626
In concluding this session, I know that all
members of the Security Council would
want me, as their President, to express of-
ficially our thanks and appreciation which
has been voiced by several members to the
distinguished representatives of Bolivia, the
Ivory Coast, Jordan, Malaysia, the Nether-
lands, and Uruguay for their leadership in
drafting the joint draft resolution which
now has been adopted unanimously by this
Council.* Their efforts are very much
appreciated by all of us, and I am sure by
all peace-loving people the world over.
I am sure that I express also the unani-
mous conviction of all members of the Secu-
rity Council that we had hoped on Saturday
that, in placing the authority of the Security
Council behind the urgent appeal of the
Secretary-General, the violence which had
erupted on the subcontinent might have been
arrested while still confined to Kashmir.
Such, regretfully — as the Secretary-General
has reported to us ^ — has not been the case.
The situation we are facing, as has been
discussed here tonight, has within it the
most fearful potential. Two nations with
combined populations of almost 600 million
are confronting each other and, according to
their official spokesmen, stand on the brink
of a full-scale war. Indeed, sizable elements
of their armed forces are even now locked
in combat.
This Council has acted, and acted
promptly, twice — and both times unanimous-
ly— to avert the holocaust which must surely
result if the terrible forces which have been
set in motion are not called back. It would,
in fact, be hard to visualize a catastrophe
of more grave proportions, grave and un-
thinkable in terms of the suffering which
it would surely bring to millions of people,
in terms of substance so sorely needed to
feed hungry people being wasted on the pur-
poses of war, in terms of the very future
of two great nations with whom all mem-
bers of the Council maintain friendly rela-
tions, and in terms of the serious threat to
the maintenance of international peace and
security.
The Council has called in forthright terms
for an immediate cessation of hostilities
♦U.N. doc. S/6662(S/RES/210).
' U.N. doc. S/6661.
528
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
throughout the subcontinent. Hours, even
minutes, are of the most vital importance.
I am sure I speak for every member of the
Council in urging both Pakistan and India,
as the resolution itself recites, to comply
with the Council's resolutions vi^ithout hesi-
tation, before the point of no return has
been reached.
The members of the Council have indi-
cated by unanimously adopting the resolu-
tion that we welcome in particular the state-
ment of our distinguished Secretary-General,
in light of this resolution, that he intends to
proceed promptly to the subcontinent. We
hope — we know that his prestige, his im-
partiality, his fairness, and the dignity of
his office may help bring this tragedy to a
prompt close and point the way toward es-
tablishment of an enduring peace between
these two great countries. We, the members
of the Council — indeed, the people of the
world — ask for no more; we expect no less.
TEXTS OF RESOLUTIONS
Resolution of September 4^
The Security Council,
Noting the report of the Secretary-General (S/
6651) dated 3 September 1965,
Having heard the statements of the representa-
tives of India and Pakistan,
Concerned at the deteriorating situation along the
Cease-Fire Line in Kashmir,
1. Calls upon the Governments of India and Paki-
stan to take forthvdth all steps for an immediate
cease-fire;
2. Calls upon the two Governments to respect the
Cease-Fire Line and have all armed personnel of
each party withdrawn to its own side of the line;
3. Calls upon the two Governments to co-operate
fully with the UNMOGIP [United Nations Military
Observer Group in India and Pakistan] in its task
of supervising the observance of the cease-fire;
4. Requests the Secretary-General to report to the
Council within three days on the implementation
of this resolution.
Resolution of September 6^
The Security Council,
Noting the report by the Secretary-General on
developments in the situation in Kashmir since the
adoption of the Security Council cease-fire resolu-
tion on 4 September 1965 (S/RES/209 (1965)) be-
ing document S/6661 dated 6 September 1965,
Noting with deep concern the extension of the
fighting which adds immeasurably to the serious-
ness of the situation,
1. Calls upon the parties to cease hostilities in the
entire area of conflict immediately, and promptly
withdraw all armed personnel back to the positions
held by them before 5 August 1965;
2. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every
possible effort to give effect to this resolution and
the resolution of 4 September 1965, to take all
measures possible to strengthen the UNMOGIP, and
to keep the Council promptly and currently informed
on the implementation of the resolutions and on the
situation in the area;
3. Decides to keep this issue under urgent and con-
tinuous review so that the Council may determine
what further steps may be necessary to secure
peace and security in the area.
Supplementary List of Items
Proposed for U.N. Agenda
Following is a supplementary list of items
proposed for inclusion in the agenda of the
20th regular session of the U.N. General As-
sembly.^
U.N. doc. A/5970 dated August 27
1. Review and reappraisal of the role and functions
of the Economic and Social Council [Economic
and Social Council resolution 1091 (XXXIX) of
31 July 1965].
2. Election of a member of the International Court
of Justice to fill the vacancy caused by the death
of Judge Abdel Hamid Badawi [Security Council
resolution 208 (1965) of 10 August 1965].
3. Creation of the post of United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights [item proposed by
Costa Rica (A/5963)].
4. Peaceful settlement of disputes [item proposed
by the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland (A/5964)].
5. General review of the programmes and activities
in the economic, social, technical co-operation and
related fields of the United Nations, the special-
ized agencies, the International Atomic Energy
Agency, the United Nations Children's Fund and
all other institutions and agencies related to the
United Nations system [item proposed by Malta
and Trinidad and Tobago (A/5965)].
6. The authorization and financing of future peace-
keeping operations [item proposed by Ireland
(A/5966/Rev.l)].
•U.N. doc. S/RES/209 (1965).
7 U.N. doc. S/RES/210 (1965).
^ For text of the provisional agenda, see Bulletin
of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 457.
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
529
U.S. Pledged To Cooperate
in SoSving Commodity Problems
Statement by Stanley Nehmer ^
I should like to make some general ob-
servations on commodity problems as they
exist today, offer the cooperation of my
Government to the work of this committee,
and then speak of the United States position
with regard to various questions. Needless
to say, in the discussions of the Working
Party on the Review of International Trade
in Primary Commodities, our delegation will
speak in more specific terms on particular
questions as they arise.
The work of this committee is considered
to be of great importance to my Government.
This is an historic occasion as governments
with a major interest in the production,
consumption, and trade in primary commodi-
ties meet together to discuss common prob-
lems of such great importance to all of us.
It is the hope of the United States that the
Commodities Committee will be a major
international forum for governments to come
together in a spirit of cooperation to focus
on areas where jointly we can resolve some
of the problems besetting so many of our
countries. We look to the Commodities Com-
mittee to be a worthy successor to the
Commission on International Commodity
Trade — a clearinghouse for ideas and pro-
posals for dealing with commodity problems
and a forum which can promote a more
effective overall attack on these problems.
The United States Government is con-
scious of the importance of commodity trade
throughout the world, of the major role
played by the primary commodities in the
economic welfare of the developing countries.
We are aware that precipitous price declines,
' Made before the Commodities Committee of the
Trade and Development Board of the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development at Geneva
on July 22. Mr. Nehmer is Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary of Commerce for Resources; at the time
he represented the United States on the committee,
he was Director of the Office of International
Commodities, Bureau of Economic Affairs, De-
partment of State.
or a steady slip in prices, can inhibit the
economic development processes of these
countries and frustrate their efforts to raise
the living standards of their people. We
recognize the vulnerability of economies
which depend to such a major extent on one
or two commodities. We realize that forces
of nature can deal a devastating blow as
crops are reduced or even wiped out by the
vagaries of weather and the onslaught of
plant disease.
We are mindful that one of the basic
solutions to these problems of the developing
countries is diversification of their econo-
mies, which, of course, is the process of
economic growth itself. We share the con-
cern of the developing countries, therefore,
that there is often need for international
action to ameliorate the effects of adverse
developments in the field of production, con-
sumption, and trade in the primary com-
modities.
For their part the developed countries are
also concerned when shortages of supply
develop, accompanied by precipitous price
increases in some of the basic commodities
produced by the developing countries. Nor
are the developed countries less concerned
when prices fall as precipitously as they rose.
Industrial production does not thrive under
such conditions. The continuation of high
rates of economic growth in the developed
countries is hampered by these circum-
stances.
A Time for Taking Stocl<
Two years have elapsed since the last
careful overall review of the commodity
situation in an international forum — the
Commission on International Commodity
Trade. This period has been typical of so
many periods in the past. Continued expan-
sion in the demand for raw materials and a
marked upward movement in their prices
were responsible for a substantial rise in the
value of exports of primary producing coun-
tries in 1963 and 1964. The terms of trade,
which had been deteriorating for primary
producers since 1954, also showed improve-
ment during the same period. But then, in
530
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
the second quarter of 1964, commodity
prices, except for many metals, and particu-
larly the nonferrous metals, as well as the
terms of trade, turned downward.
For the past year commodity prices have
moved erratically and generally downward,
although, as of mid-1965, they had retained
approximately half of the gains made since
the last quarter of 1962. At the same time
an increased volume of exports has more
than offset declines in price for many com-
modities. The terms of trade have lost some-
what more than half of the increase of the
last 3 years.
Of particular concern today is the problem
of cocoa. With substantial price declines over
the last few months, it is clear that cocoa
producers in Africa and Latin America are
undergoing serious problems which affect
the very heart of their economic development
efforts.
Sugar, too, is a commodity which is faced
today with serious difficulties as a result of
recent significant price declines.
There are others, to be sure, where the
present situation and anticipated develop-
ments may indicate problems for the de-
veloping countries which produce them.
The prices of tin, lead, zinc, and some
other metals are significantly higher today
than 3 years ago. No one suggests that the
present price level for these basic commodi-
ties is not making an important contribution
to the foreign exchange earnings of the
producing exporting countries. But neither
would one wish to deny that industries all
over the world look for substitutes when the
outlook is for continued price increases. Nor
can we deny that unreasonably high prices
may in some cases lay the ground for future
price instability.
This conference is a time for taking stock.
We need to study and discuss together what
is being done internationally to meet the
problems faced by the primary producing
countries. We need to reason on what can be
done in the future. We need to establish a
clear framework and direction for our ef-
forts. We need to get down to the business
of substance and not allow ourselves to get
bogged down in details of procedure.
U.S. Policy on Commodity Deliberations
The U.S. delegation pledges itself to par-
ticipate faithfully and constructively, as we
have in the years behind us, in these inter-
national deliberations on commodity prob-
lems. We want to share fully in the responsi-
bility which all of us bear as an important
burden today. The U.S. delegation will co-
operate to the maximum with those who
wish to bring about some better interna-
tional understanding and order out of
today's difficulties.
This has been the thrust of U.S. policy in
past international deliberations on com-
modity problems:
— We participated actively in the negotia-
tions of the International Coffee Agreement
and are participating actively today in its
implementation.
— We have participated in the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement from its inception
in 1949 and are now participating actively
in the negotiation of a broader cereals ar-
rangement in the Kennedy Round.
— We participated fully in the negotiation
of the Third Tin Agreement, which is now
before interested governments for considera-
tion of ratification.
— We have expressed a willingness to
study internationally a cocoa agreement, a
cotton agreement, a sugar agreement, a lead
and zinc agreement, and other international
agreements designed to help stabilize inter-
national trade in these key commodities. But
the United States has also recognized that
an international agreement is not always the
best — certainly not always the first — action
to bring order to a commodity in trouble.
Furthermore, significant differences among
the primary commodities insofar as their
supply-and-demand characteristics are con-
cerned indicate the need to select from among
a variety of techniques to attack each par-
ticular commodity market problem.
— We have supported the various inter-
governmental commodity study groups,
which are the tools for this case-by-case at-
tack on commodity problems, and which
have done so much to provide a forum for
review and action, and whose secretariats of
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
531
international civil servants are highly com-
petent in the fields with vs^hich their groups
deal. The representatives of specialized com-
modity organizations, who are meeting with
us, can contribute substantially to the work
of this committee. I am sure that our meet-
ings can insure a constructive, cooperative
relationship with these organizations in the
future.
— We actively supported the Commission
on International Commodity Trade and took
satisfaction in its development into a valu-
able body which complemented the case-by-
case approach to commodity problems. It
performed a unique task of assessing the
trends and developments in commodity trade
and their implications for policy and of
considering general techniques for dealing
with commodity problems.
— The United States was a major force
in the CICT's efforts to develop a system
of compensatory financing for primary com-
modity producers to offset short-term de-
clines in the export earnings of the develop-
ing countries, efforts which have borne fruit
in the system established by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund.
We have also wholeheartedly supported
two other international bodies whose actions
are so vital to the solution of international
commodity problems — the FAO [Food and
Agriculture Organization] and GATT [Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] .
No more competent body in the field of
agriculture exists than the FAO. This is of
particular importance today, when the world
is becoming increasingly concerned over the
inability of the developing countries to in-
crease their output of food to keep pace
with their growing population demands.
The concern of GATT for the removal of
trade barriers is vital to those developing
countries which see their efforts to expand
exports frustrated by barriers to trade in
the form of tariffs, quantitative restric-
tions, and internal taxes on consumption.
The United States is cooperating fully in
GATT with those developing countries, and,
indeed, with those developed countries which
share our concern, to seek the reduction
and elimination of these barriers. Tropical
agricultural products, so important to so
many developing countries, have been a
major focus of our support for this impor-
tant work in GATT.
The time we have for this conference is
short. The problems before us are many.
But we are meeting at an auspicious time,
during the 20th anniversary year of the
United Nations — designated by the General
Assembly in November 1964 as Inter-
national Cooperation Year. Let us truly co-
operate together in this first meeting of the
Commodities Committee.
International Concern for Social
Justice and Human Rights
statement by Franklin H. Williams ^
Once more I beg your indulgence to make
a few comments here in the plenary session
of ECOSOC on an agenda item previously
discussed in the Social Committee. I do this
for two reasons. First, as with the report of
the Commission on the Status of Women, I
consider that the subject — human rights —
deserves the special thought and considera-
tion which only this body can give it. And
secondly, I fear that over the years the
"SOC" in ECOSOC has been downgraded or
given merely passing and superficial con-
sideration.
The founders of the United Nations set
forth, as the basis of the charter, completely
interlocking aims of peace and security,
human rights, world law, and social justice.
Yet, in the workings of the U.N. machinery,
we have allowed these objectives to become
increasingly disconnected.
We in the United Nations desire and work
for a future better by far than our past. We
labor to create institutions and implement
principles of international cooperation, to
keep the peace and strengthen our economies.
But we cannot build the future we want
^ Made before the 39th session of the U.N. Econom-
ic and Social Council at Geneva, Switzerland, on
July 26. Mr. Williams was the U.S. Representative
on the Council.
532
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
unless we move our concern for social justice
and human rights to the very center of the
United Nations stage.
There are pov^'erful reasons for this.
We knovi' that education and better health
are the key that opens the door to higher
productivity — and high productivity is the
foundation of higher levels of income.
Sensibly conceived programs of social de-
fense and welfare help to create an atmos-
phere of hope, of security, of worthf ulness ;
not anger and punishment, but rehabilita-
tion ; not the scrap heap for the old and the
disabled, but a life of contribution and
dignity. In such an atmosphere, when human
life has genuine value, people can hope, can
dream, and can reach out for the better
things of life.
But firmly established human rights are
equally necessary to undergird that ideal
future. Why struggle and sacrifice for na-
tional freedom only to lose one's own? True
human freedom and dignity allow no distinc-
tion between the domestic tyrant and the
foreign oppressor! Why work harder, why
strive to achieve, if one's rights as a human
being can be arbitrarily placed in jeopardy?
Only when a human being achieves a true
sense of his own worth will he become what
the economist calls a "productive farmer,"
or a "modern factory laborer," or a "moti-
vated, hard-working service worker." Behind
the cold statistics of gross national product
and per capita income are just such people —
with a sense of their own worth, their own
rights, their own reasons for contributing
to their own and to the greater good.
A Unifying Principle
Earlier in this session I pleaded for a
conceptual framework and a unifying prin-
ciple to help this Council deal with the wide
range of urgent and complex tasks before us.
I suggested that the search for such a prin-
ciple might begin with human rights.
International concern with human rights
is the 20th century's contribution to the
science of politics. Properly understood and
applied, this concern can revolutionize the
mind of man and enable him to achieve
human solidarity in its highest sense. One
of the major differences between the United
Nations Charter and the League of Nations
Covenant is that the charter makes the pro-
motion of human rights a main purpose of
the international organization. Not only is
this concern for the individual human being
the true distinguishing feature of the United
Nations; in my opinion, it also holds out its
greatest promise.
International concern with human rights
is a practical principle, one which transcends
all natural and artificial barriers that divide
peoples and nations. It is a principle that
can satisfy the true needs and aspirations of
man.
Once we recognize this principle for what
it is, for what it might be, and for what
one day it must become, we shall be in a
better position to adapt the activities of the
United Nations in order to make the prin-
ciple operative. And adapt them we must,
for, as Secretary-General U Thant said:
"The inherent dignity and ... the equal and
inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of peace in
the world."
The basis of human rights is justice,
justice that reaches deep into the nature of
man. Those who have been denied funda-
mental freedoms know the stinging shame,
the humiliation, and the frustration that fire
a man to seek, to win, to defend forever for
all the right to be a complete person — to
live in dignity and without fear.
The work done by the United Nations and
several of the specialized agencies in this
field makes a very impressive record — a
record the more remarkable because to all
intents and purposes the principle of inter-
national concern with human rights was
first formulated at San Francisco in 1945.
If now we ask ourselves, what does all this
work really add up to? — it is only because
these efforts are not ends in themselves.
Rather, they are means to insure to every
human being a meaningful life in peace and
in dignity.
Well, then, what does it add up to? To
what extent, if any, does the charter prin-
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
533
ciple of international concern with human
rights stimulate our policies and actions here
and elsewhere in the United Nations?
We look in vain for an answer to the many
resolutions, declarations, and conventions
and to the manifold activities in the field of
human rights in which the United Nations
has engaged. The word cannot substitute for
the deed, nor can motion be taken for action.
The truth is that we have not gone beyond
the Universal Declaration in our understand-
ing and definition of human rights, nor
beyond draft covenants, in their interna-
tional protection and defense. And all ap-
peals to human rights are meaningless if
they do not contribute directly to their
fulfillment.
Preparing for the International Conference
Because we would like to see this question
of human rights take the center of the U.N.
stage, I wish to comment briefly upon the
resolution concerning the convening in 1968
of an international conference on human
rights.
It is proposed that, in addition to review-
ing progress in the human rights field, the
international conference should evaluate the
effectiveness of the methods used by the
United Nations in the field of human rights
and formulate and prepare a program of
further measures to be taken subsequent to
the celebration of Human Rights Year.
This may be a tall order for a conference
which, at best, may have only 4 weeks at its
disposal. But no one can deny that these
proposals are necessary and desirable.
Though it provides no means of enforce-
ment, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights is a common standard of achievement
for all peoples and all nations. For us in the
organized international community, the dec-
laration is a standard by which we should
continually weigh our activities against our
responsibility to advance human rights and
fundamental freedoms.
At the conference, then, we must examine
these responsibilities and ascertain their true
meaning and purpose. We must inquire into
the manner in which we have been carrying
them out. We have never yet made a real
effort to relate our responsibilities in the
field of human rights to our responsibilities
in other areas. We have never really ex-
amined the potentialities of our charter con-
cern with human rights as perhaps the
greatest force for international peace and
progress. We are concerned with the most
vital human problems, as our agenda and
debates will attest. But only rarely does it
seem that we are concerned with man him-
self. Therein may lie the reason why the
resolution of these problems so often escapes
us.
Even before the proposed conference con-
venes, we know that more resolutions, more
declarations, and more conventions will not
alone further the development of human
rights. I believe that their guarantee requires
an executive capacity on the part of the
United Nations which today it does not have.
The concept of a High Commissioner for
Human Rights advanced by the delegation
of Costa Rica before the Human Rights
Commission, and referred to here by the
United Kingdom, offers one possible ap-
proach— certainly one worthy of considera-
tion. But there are other methods and tech-
niques, tried and untried, which should be
examined separately and in relation to each
other before we discard those that are poor
or adopt those that seem promising.
In the area of human rights there is very
little we can accomplish in haste, especially
on the international level, and any gain at
the expense of principle will be illusory.
An examination of the methods used by
the United Nations in the field of human
rights and an evaluation of their effective-
ness is indispensable to the formulation and
preparation of a program of further meas-
ures to be taken consequent to the celebra-
tion of the Human Rights Year. If we cannot
learn from the past, at least let us avoid the
mistakes made in the past. One of these
mistakes has been that we have had neither
a clear notion of our immediate and long-
range objectives nor a clear picture of the
means of achieving them. We have not.
534
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
therefore, been able to plan our activities
accordingly. We should make it a rule not
to embark on new measures only to leave
other measures behind, nor to launch new
activities simply to escape the frustrations
of the old.
Role of Academic Community
In my opinion there is a great iieed to
examine the interrelationship between the
various programs bearing on human rights
within the United Nations family and to
consider ways to achieve their systematic
coordination. We could well begin this task
now, and, accordingly, my delegation and
others have tabled a simple resolution here
requesting the Secretary-General and the
Directors General of ILO [International
Labor Organization] and UNESCO [United
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization] to submit to our next session
a report on their respective machinery for
and experience in the protection of human
rights.
We cannot afford to miss the opportunity
presented by the Human Rights Year to
rationalize and strengthen our human rights
program so that it may make its full contri-
bution to the peace and progress of the
world. We have too long tended to make
trivial a great and high-souled idea, to our
own detriment and to the detriment of the
peoples of the world.
The international conference must make
headway; we can make sure that it does by
living up to our responsibilities under the
charter. Beyond that, we must look to the
scholar, the jurist, and the humanitarian to
develop the thoughts and suggest the tech-
niques for more effective activity in this
field. We can better approach our immediate
tasks and more distant responsibilities if we
are assured a constant flow of ideas which
only the academic world can provide.
As the Committee on the International
Year for Human Rights has said, we must
mobilize some of the energies and resources
of educational institutions at all levels "to
produce new thinking on the part of many
people in regard to human rights." The co-
operation of the academic community is a
matter which should command our most
earnest attention and be given the highest
priority.
Two years ago we adopted a resolution
which invited:
. . . universities, institutes, learned societies, trade
unions and other organizations which are concerned
with human rights to make available their contri-
bution to a wider knowledge and the advance of
human rights. . . .
Perhaps we should request the Secretary-
General to keep in permanent contact with
the academic world and establish the neces-
sary relations with academic institutions in
all parts of the world, which would encourage
and facilitate close cooperation between
them and the United Nations in the cause
of human rights. Or perhaps the new United
Nations Institute for Training and Research
may provide an adequate and convenient
vehicle for the stimulation of research and
some bold new thinking in this area.
American Progress in Civil Rights Field
My special concern for human rights rises
not simply from my identification as a
member of a racial minority in one of the
world's greatest societies but also, and sim-
ply, because I am an American. And Ameri-
cans, both as a people and as a nation, are
sensitive to the need for cleaning up their
own backyard and eliminating the remain-
ing human rights deprivations which still
afflict us.
We in America know the evils of discrimi-
nation. Our economy has been damaged
because we wallowed too long in the luxury
of outmoded, discriminating customs. Our
political structure has suffered because of
the violation of the basic constitutional
guarantees of a large segment of our people.
Our social problems today are staggeringly
complex and difficult, for, while we built a
great agricultural and industrial economy,
we too long delayed cutting from our social
body the destructive cancer of racism. But
the American people have finally become
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
535
aware of the rejected and forgotten; the
American conscience has been awakened to
an unjust situation which had become so
traditional that it was assumed to be un-
changeable. The painful operation has oc-
curred, and our recuperation is bringing at
last the vigorous wholesomeness which is the
promise to all our people.
President Johnson recently summed up a
decade of unparalleled progress in this area
when he reported a few days ago that the
barrier of race and color "is tumbling." - He
noted the passage of a voting rights bill
supported by three times as many Southern
Congressmen as had voted for last year's
Civil Rights Act, and he added,
We have been awakened to justice by the sound
of songs and sermons, speeches and peaceful dem-
onstrations. But the noiseless, secret vote will
thunder forth a hundred times more loudly. . . .
I am pleased to report to this Council that
the Negro American is finally at "the start-
ing line" — ready to pursue first-class citizen-
ship in his ovpn country.
The battle for complete respect of our
human rights within the American society
has been joined, and President Johnson him-
self has said, "We shall overcome." ^ This is
testimony to the validity of the democratic
system, to free speech, petition, and orga-
nized, though peaceful, protest.
We are also aware that it is insufficient
for a deprived minority to be brought to the
starting line and told, "Here is your oppor-
tunity— grasp it." India's constitution gives
recognition to such an insufficiency in
section 15(4) which states:
Nothing in this article . . . shall prevent the state
from making any special provision for the advance-
ment of any socially and educationally backward
classes of citizens.
We, too, accept the validity — no, the neces-
sity— of some form of "preferential discrimi-
^ For a statement made by President Johnson on
July 10 upon passage of the voting rights bill by
the House of Representatives, see White House
press release (Austin, Tex.) dated July 10, 1965.
° For an address by President Johnson before a
joint session of Congress on Mar. 15, see White
House press release dated Mar. 15, 1965.
nation." Our administration has adopted
policies and initiated programs designed to
close the gap of preparation to enable the
previously deprived to run the race of op-
portunity with skill and experience equal to
those never crippled by segregation or dis-
crimination. The Federal Economic Oppor-
tunity Act and a variety of local public and
private programs are directed toward over-
coming this handicap inherited from the
past.
Justice Arthur Goldberg, our new and dis-
tinguished Permanent Representative to the
United Nations, succinctly stated the chal-
lenge facing us when he said on May 2 of
this year:
In my opinion, there can be no more worthwhile
task for the United Nations, or for us, its sup-
porters, than to work for an end to discrimina-
tion of all sorts and complete security for all mi-
norities in every part of the world. Only by providing
a world environment in which differences are
tolerated and such security is guaranteed can we
hope to provide the world with a foundation for
a lasting peace.
Mr. President, the fundamental lesson of
our epoch is that the furnaces of war were
and are stoked by those who hold man and
his dignity in utter contempt. In our pre-
occupation here with the material things of
life, that is a lesson we must never forget.
Eleventh Anniversary of SEATO
Statement by Secretary Rusk
Press release 208 dated September 4, for release September 7
On this 11th anniversary of the signing
of the Southeast Asia Collective Defense
Treaty,! SEATO can face the future with
confidence. The SEATO members are better
prepared than ever to defend the region col-
lectively. Likewise, the area's susceptibility
to subversion has been reduced by unspec-
tacular but significant efforts of SEATO in
the field of countersubversion, as well as by
' For text of the treaty signed at Manila on Sept.
8, 1954, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.
536
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
its many activities in economic and social
development.
The United States has recently increased
its military and economic assistance to the
Republic of Viet-Nam. Other SEATO mem-
bers, too, have taken further steps to aid
South Viet-Nam, in keeping with the pledge
made at the latest Council meeting in May ^
to continue and to increase assistance to that
valiant nation. These actions reflect the se-
riousness with which we view our obliga-
tions.
We have the highest confidence that
SEATO will continue to make notable prog-
ress under the leadership of the dis-
tinguished statesman who recently assumed
the post of Secretary General — General
[Jesus M.] Vargas — following in the fine
tradition of his highly respected predeces-
sors, Mr. Pote Sarasin and Mr. Konthi
S uphamongkhon .
I extend the greetings of my countrymen
to our SEATO allies. The United States is
firmly dedicated to the principles for which
SEATO has always stood — peace and secu-
rity. I hope no government in the world will
make the mistake of doubting that the
United States will make good on its com-
mitments in Southeast Asia.
at Washington, D.C., October 3-9. The
President also announced that 5 additional
countries — Senegal, Dahomey, Pakistan,
Malta, and Nicaragua — will send delega-
tions to the meeting, bringing the total to
63 nations.
The symposium is a major observance of
the International Cooperation Year.
In announcing the names of the sympo-
sium chairmen, President Johnson said :
A dependable supply of fresh water is an absolute
requirement for a world seeking peace and pros-
perity. Water is needed to grow food, to permit
basic development in emerging nations, to allow
industrial expansion in others, and to increase liv-
ing standards for an increasing world population.
The symposium chairmen can lead the way toward
new paths of achieving this goal.
The developing technology of water desalting has
received enthusiastic and universal support by na-
tions, large and small, again demonstrating that
international cooperation is the key to humanity's
advancement.
TREATY INFORMATION
63 Nations To Attend Symposium
on Water Desalination
President Johnson announced on Septem-
ber 6 (White House press release (Austin,
Tex.)) the selection of 19 leading scientists
and engineers from 11 nations, the United
Nations, the United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization, and
the United States to act as session panel
chairmen of the First International Sym-
posium on Water Desalination,^ to be held
Current Actions
' For a statement made by Under Secretary Ball
on May 3 and text of a communique issued at the
close of the meeting on May 5, see ihid., June 7,
1965, p. 920.
'For background, see Bulletin of July 12, 1965,
p. 86; for names of panel chairmen and schedule
of sessions, see White House press release (Austin,
Tex.) dated Sept. 6.
MULTILATERAL
Aviation
Convention for unification of certain rules relating
to international transportation by air, and addi-
tional protocol. Done at Warsaw October 12, 1929.
Entered into force February 13, 1933. 49 Stat.
3000.
Adherence deposited: Tanzania, April 7, 1965.
Protocol to amend convention for unification of
certain rules relating to international carriage
by air signed at Warsaw October 12, 1929, supra.
Done at The Hague September 28, 1955. Entered
into force August 1, 1963.'
Ratification deposited: Greece, June 23, 1965.
Coffee
International coffee agreement, 1962, with an-
nexes. Open for signature at United Nations
Headquarters, New York, September 28 through
November 30, 1962. Entered into force December
27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Accession deposited: Haiti, August 2, 1965.
1 Not in force for the United States
SEPTEMBER 27, 1965
537
Copyright
Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September
16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 26, 1965.
Satellite Communications System
Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.=
Signature: Pakistan, September 10, 1965.
Telecommunications
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva,
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. Done
at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force
January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603.
Notification of approval: Zambia, July 19, 1965.
United Nations
Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Spain, August 5, 1965.
BILATERAL
China
Agreement on the status of United States forces in
China. Signed at Taipei August 31, 1965. Enters
into force on the date of exchange of notes indi-
cating approval by each Government in accord-
ance with its respective constitutional procedures.
Germany, Federal Republic of
Agreement extending agreement of August 2, 1955,
as extended (TIAS 3464, 4062, 4490, 4854, 5406),
relating to the lease of air navigation equipment.
Effected by exchanges of notes at Bonn/Bad
Godesberg and Bonn July 30 and August 25, 1965.
Entered into force August 25, 1965.
Kenya
Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of December 7, 1964, as amended (TIAS
5725, 5769). Effected by exchange of notes of Sep-
tember 1, 1965. Entered into force September 1,
1965.
Peru
Agreement for financing certain educational ex-
change programs. Signed at Lima January 28,
1965.
Entered into force: August 25, 1965.
DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE
Designations
Harold E. Howland as Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Educational and Cultural Affairs, effective Au-
grust 23. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release dated August 31.)
Horace G. Torbert, Jr., as Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for Congressional Relations, effective September
7. (For biographic details, see Department of State
press release dated September 3.)
" Not in force.
Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: September 6-12
Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.
Releases issued prior to September 6 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
202 of August 31 and 208 of September 4.
Subject
Rusk: interview on Belgian TV.
Rusk: interview on NBC-TV,
"American White Paper."
Rusk: American Political Science
Association.
Beale sworn in as Ambassador to
Jamaica (biographic details).
Cleveland sworn in as U.S. perma-
nent representative to NATO
(biographic details).
Sisco sworn in as Assistant Secre-
tary for International Organiza-
tion Affairs (biographic de-
tails).
Solomon: statement before con-
gressional Subcommittee on In-
ter-American Economic Rela-
tionships.
Vaughn : statement before con-
gressional Subcommittee on In-
ter-American Economic Rela-
tionships.
Johnson: message to President of
Argentina on Conference on Lat-
in American Volunteer Prob-
lems.
No.
209
210
Date
9/7
9/7
211
9/7
*212
9/8
*213
9/9
*214 9/9
t215 9/9
t216 9/10
■i-217 9/10
* Not printed.
t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.
538
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN
INDEX September 27, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1370
Agriculture. The Concept of a National Market
and Its Economic Growth Implications
(Rostow) 518
American Principles. Secretary Rusk Appears
on NBC's "American White Paper" (transcript) 509
Asia. Eleventh Anniversary of SEATO (Rusk) 536
Aviation. International Congress on Air Tech-
nology To Be Held in U.S 524
Belgium. Secretary Discusses U.S. Policy in
Viet-Nam on Belgian TV (transcript) . . . 512
Congress. Torbert designated Deputy Assistant
Secretary for Congressional Relations . . . 538
Department and Foreign Service. Designations
(Howland, Torbert) 538
Diplomacy. The Anatomy of Foreign Policy
Decisions (Rusk) 502
Disarmament. Report Released on Economic
Impact of Defense and Disarmament (John-
son, White House announcement) 515
Dominican Republic. U.S. Recognizes New Do-
minican Government, Offers Aid (Johnson) 514
Economic Affairs
The Concept of a National Market and Its Eco-
nomic Growth Implications (Rostow) . . . 518
Report Released on Economic Impact of De-
fense and Disarmament (Johnson, White
House announcement) 515
U.S. Pledged To Cooperate in Solving Com-
modity Problems (Nehmer) 530
Educational and Cultural Affairs. Howland des-
ignated Deputy Assistant Secretary . . . 538
Europe. Secretary Discusses U.S. Policy in
Viet-Nam on Belgian TV (transcript) . . 512
Foreign Aid
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 Signed by
President (Johnson) 525
U.S. Recognizes New Dominican Government,
Offers Aid (Johnson) 514
Human Rights. International Concern for So-
cial Justice and Human Rights (Franklin H.
Williams) 532
India
Secretary Rusk Appears on NBC's "American
White Paper" (transcript) 509
U.S. Endorses Secretary-General's Appeal for
Cease-Fire in Kashmir (Goldberg) .... 527
United States Supports Call for India-Pakistan
Cease-Fire (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 526
International Organizations and Conferences
International Congress on Air Technology To
Be Held in U.S 524
63 Nations To Attend Symposium on Water
Desalination 537
Military Affairs. Report Released on Economic
Impact of Defense and Disarmament (John-
son, White House announcement) .... 515
Pakistan
Secretary Rusk Appears on NBC's "American
White Paper" (transcript) 509
U.S. Endorses Secretary-General's Appeal for
Cease-Fire in Kashmir (Goldberg) .... 527
United States Supports Call for India-Pakistan
Cease-Fire (Goldberg, texts of resolutions) 526
Presidential Documents
Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 Signed by Pres-
ident 525
Report Released on Economic Impact of De-
fense and Disarmament 515
U.S. Recognizes New Dominican Government,
Offers Aid 514
Recognition. U.S. Recognizes New Dominican
Government, Offers Aid (Johnson) . . . 514
Science. 63 Nations To Attend Symposium on
Water Desalination 537
Southeast Asia Treaty Organization. Eleventh
Anniversary of SEATO (Rusk) 536
Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 537
United Nations
International Concern for Social Justice and
Human Rights (Franklin H. Williams) . . 532
Secretary Rusk Appears on NBC's "American
White Paper" (transcript) 509
Supplementary List of Items Proposed for U.N.
Agenda 529
U.S. Endorses Secretary-General's Appeal for
Cease-Fire in Kashmir (Goldberg) .... 527
U.S. Pledged To Cooperate in Solving Com-
modity Problems (Nehmer) 530
United States Supports Call for India-Paki-
stan Cease-Fire (Goldberg, texts of resolu-
tions) 526
Viet-Nam
Eleventh Anniversary of SEATO (Rusk) . . 536
Secretary Discusses U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam on
Belgium TV (transcript) 512
Secretary Rusk Appears on NBC's "American
White Paper" (transcript) 509
Name Index
Goldberg, Arthur J 526,527
Howland, Harold E 538
Johnson, President 514, 515, 525
Nehmer, Stanley 530
Rostow, W. W 518
Rusk, Secretary 502,509,512,536
Torbert, Horace G., Jr 538
Williams, Franklin H S32
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