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October U, 1965 

Addresses by President Johnson and Ambassador Arthur J, Goldberg 5A2 

Address by President Johnson 550 

Address by Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman 555 

Statements by Assistant Secretaries Vaughn and Solomon 559 

For index see inside hack cover 

World Peace Through Law 

Folloiving are texts of addresses made by 
President Johnson and Arthur J. Goldberg, 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations, 
before the Conference on World Peace 
Through Law, which met at Washington, 
D.C., September 12-18. 

let the difficulties of this task lead us into 
the twin dangers of cynicism or unreason- 
ing faith. 

For the fact is that if law cannot yet 
solve the problems of a tormented earth, it 
is steadily growing in importance and in 


White House press release dated September 16 ; as-delivered text 

I need not here reaffirm my nation's con- 
tinuing dedication to the rule of law. We will 
work to extend it to the relations between 
countries. For we believe that is the surest 
road to a fruitful and a secure peace. 

Therefore, we who seek a world of law 
must labor to understand the foundation on 
which law can rest. We must set to work 
to build it. For if the rule of law is an ideal, 
the establishment of that rule is the prac- 
tical work of practical men. We must not 

The First Condition of Law: Justice 

The first condition of law is justice. That 
law which oppresses the weak, or denies the 
fair claims of the poor, will prove a flimsy 
barrier against the rising storm of man's 
demand for justice. 

Law must not be the prisoner of plunder 
or privilege. 

Law is not the soothing keeper of the 
status quo. Law is an instrument in the 
battle for the hopes of man. And if it is not 
fashioned as such an instrument, then no 
matter how beautifully and logically framed, 
it will yield to violence and to terror. 

So if we, the fortunate of the earth, would 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
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ask other people to submit to law, then we 
ourselves must assume some responsibility 
for peoples' liberty and peoples' well-being. 

International law has been primarily con- 
cerned with relations between states. In 
pursuit of justice, it must now concern it- 
self more than in the past with the welfare 
of people. 

So I look forward to the day when the 
relief of hunger and misery and ignorance — 
in all parts of this world — will be fixed in 
legal obligation — as it now is in my own 

When our world law embodies the right 
of the despairing to hope, and the respon- 
sibility of the fortunate to help, then it will 
be strengthened a thousandfold in the cause 
of peace. 

If world conditions were largely satisfac- 
tory, it would not be difficult to evolve a 
rule of law. But we do not live in a satis- 
factory world. It is stained with evil and 
injustice, by ruthless ambition and passion- 
ate conflict. Only by fighting these forces 
do we help build a base on which the temple 
of law may rest. 

The Second Condition: Institutions 

The second condition of law is institu- 
tions. Through them law receives meaning 
and force. And institutions themselves, 
through their own actions, help to make new 
law. The United Nations General Assembly 
has done this in peacekeeping. 

The past 20 years have seen an abundant 
flowering of new international structures. 
From the Common Market and NATO to 
the IBRD and the Asian Development 
Bank, order and legal process have been im- 
posed upon spreading segments of the af- 
fairs of countries. 

Some of these institutions have played a 
large role in the prosperity of the West and 
in the keeping of the peace. Others contrib- 
ute to the progress of developing countries. 

The United States has helped to build 
many of these organizations. Their strength 
represents a victory for the cause you rep- 
resent — a legal order contributing to the 

prosperity of each and to the peace of all. 
My country intends to protect and strength- 
en those institutions, sharing the task with 
all who share our common purpose. 

Central to the hope of world peace 
through law is the United Nations. Since its 
beginning, dozens of disputes, many laced 
with violence, have come before the world 
assembly. Some have remained unresolved. 
Many have found a settlement sufficient to 
allow mankind to move forward in peace. 
And in some places the United Nations was 
able to prevent conflict and bloodshed. 

I hope we can strengthen the United Na- 
tions, not simply as a forum for debate but 
as an arena for the solution of disputes. 

That is why I have asked a great Justice 
of our Supreme Court, Arthur Goldberg, to 
become our Ambassador to the world body. 
The life of Ambassador Goldberg has been 
devoted tc resolving disputes between those 
who at first believed that they could not 
yield one iota from their positions and who 
came at last to sign a common agreement. 

And my country will fully support the 
efforts of the Secretary-General to bring 
peace between the great nations of India 
and Pakistan. 

And perhaps in the United Nations, and 
with the patient effort of individual coun- 
tries, we can also halt the terrible arms race 
which threatens to engulf the earth. Per- 
haps we can succeed through an effective 
treaty preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons, through extending the test ban 
treaty, by obtaining an agreement halting 
production of fissionable material for use in 
nuclear weapons and allocating substantial 
portions of this material to peaceful uses, 
by agreeing to reverse the arms race in 
strategic nuclear weapons delivery vehicles, 
and by working toward general and complete 
disarmament under effective international 
controls, which must be the world's goal. 

The Third Condition: Acceptance 

The third condition of law is acceptance. 
World law, if it is to bring world order, 
must reflect the judgment and the felt de- 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


sires of men and of nations. When law ig- 
nores this, as we have seen in our own his- 
tory, it itself is ignored. 

I think that we may be evolving a world 
consensus on which law can stand. The mass 
of mankind is slowly realizing the dangers 
of conflict and the futility of war. They are 
accepting their responsibility to relieve their 
own poverty and the misery of their fellow 
inhabitants of the earth. They are finding, 
in knowledge and fear and pain, that their 
common interest lies in common acceptance 
of their own obligations and the rights of 

We can see this in a hundred small ways. 
During the past year the United States was 
present at 629 international conferences. In 
the short time since I became President the 
United States has participated in more 
such conferences than during the first 150 
years of our history. 

Of course, the great issues and the great 
dangers are not resolved. In the past 12 
months there is not a single continent that 
has been spared violence. In the past 2,000 
years there has hardly been a decade with- 
out war. 

If this was all, the future would look 
dark indeed. But there is another and a 
brighter thread which runs through the his- 
tory of the race. It is man's drive to create 
and to live in harmony with his fellows. 
And that is what we call civilization. 

Law is the great civilizing machinery. It 
liberates the desires to build, and it subdues 
the desire to destroy. And if war can tear 
us apart, law can unite us — out of fear or 
love or reason, or all three. 

World peace through world law will not 
come quickly. We must work, in a variety of 
ways, to create the vital conditions which 
may bring us to that day — to build the jus- 
tice which forms it and the institutions 
which give it life, and to find the under- 
standing acceptance which will make it 
work. This means we must be willing to ac- 
cept small advances and limited goals. But 
the final objective is the largest and most 
elusive man has known: peace — peace, 
which is not simply the absence of conflict 

or even of fear but the framework for the 
fulfillment of human possibility. 

How can we dare to hope for that which 
has always escaped mankind? Perhaps it is 
because our invention draws us together to 
the point where any war is civil war. Per- 
haps the vastness of our destructive power 
makes us shrink from conflict. And perhaps, 
under the horror and murder of this car- 
nage-filled century, civilization has been 
slowly flowering — leading us toward victory 
in the endless battle between man's love for 
his fellow and man's desire to destroy him. 

Law is the greatest human invention. All 
the rest give him mastery over his world, 
but law gives him mastery over himself. 

There are those who say the rule of law 
is a fruitless and Utopian dream. It is true, 
if it comes it will come slowly. It will come 
through the practical and the wise resolu- 
tion of numberless problems. But to deny 
the possibility is to deny peace itself and to 
deny that flowering of the spirit which we 
must believe God meant for man. 

I do not deny it. I believe in it. And so 
do you. And if others join us, then the time 
may yet come when you and your colleagues 
will be honored as pathfinders toward the 
final armistice in man's war against him- 


Press release 225 dated September 17 

I have looked forward to this occasion for 
a long time. I had every expectation of ad- 
dressing this conference as a member of 
the Supreme Court of the United States. 
Now I have moved from one area dedicated 
to the rule of law to go to another. 

I might add that I hope that in so doing 
I do not justify the judgment of Sir Harold 
Nicolson, the British writer on diplomacy, 
who once said that "the worst kind of diplo- 
matists are missionaries, fanatics, and 

I said when I went to the United Nations, 
and I say again now, the effort to bring the 
rule of law to govern the relations between 



sovereign states is the greatest adventure in 
history. This great adventure is beset with 
greater peril than any in history, for never 
before has man had the power of ultimate 
destruction of himself, his environment, and 
of all future life on earth. 

Every edition of our newspapers freshly 
underlines how difficult it is to smother 
hostilities, to bank the fires even tempo- 
rarily, let alone achieve an enduring peace. 

The India-Pakistan Conflict 

This very morning I presided at a meet- 
ing of the Security Council dealing with the 
present conflict between India and Paki- 
stan. This is the most serious problem here 
at the United Nations and everywhere in 
the world at the present time. Two nations 
with more than half a billion people are con- 
fronting each other — are conducting mili- 
tary operations against each other — on 
land, on sea, and in the air — and are little 
short of the point which could be called 
full-scale war. And I would say that study- 
ing the history of the United Nations, it is 
perhaps the most serious conflict between 
member states of the United Nations of 
which this organization has ever been 

The position of the United States in this 
matter is simple and forthright. We are in 
full support of the United Nations activity 
in this area. We are in full support of the 
two resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council during the past 2 weeks and the 
efforts of the Secretary-General to give ef- 
fect to these resolutions.^ And our full 
support of these resolutions is but a contin- 
uation of our consistent attitude on the 
India-Pakistan question, which has always 
been to support a peaceful solution of all 
aspects of the dispute. 

Since the birth of India and Pakistan, my 
Government has developed close and friendly 
relations with both countries, relations 
which we sincerely want and hope and ex- 

' For statements made by Ambassador Goldberg 
in the Security Council on Sept. 4 and 6 and texts 
of the resolutions, see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1965, 
p. 526. 

pect to continue. We have many ties of 
friendship and common interest with the 
peoples of both India and Pakistan. And 
these are expressed not only in our broad 
governmental programs but also in the form 
of many nongovernmental programs and 
activities, particularly in the fields of health, 
education, and economic development. As I 
said to the Security Council a week ago 
Saturday [September 4], and I would like 
to repeat that statement, ". . . we know inti- 
mately from our close relations with both 
countries the intricacies of the underlying 
problem which is at the root of today's con- 
flict. . . ." 

Our attitude in the United Nations on the 
India-Pakistan question, today as in the 
past, continues to derive from the existence 
of this spirit of friendship with both coun- 
tries and a deep interest in world peace. 
That is why we have shared the deep con- 
cern expressed by us, together with all mem- 
bers of the Council, in the September 6 
resolution, about extension of fighting 
which adds immeasurably to the serious- 
ness of the situation. The very least the 
world community has a right to expect in 
the wake of the Council resolutions, twice 
adopted unanimously, is for the parties to 
cease hostilities and to respect the Council 
resolutions, which are evenhanded resolu- 
tions between the parties. 

These resolutions are based on a common 
conviction of all members of the Council 
that a peaceful resolution of the differences 
between the two countries can be effected 
only in conditions of peace, and not by re- 
sorting to hostilities or violence. It is the 
overriding necessity, in the face of truly dis- 
astrous consequences for both of these great 
countries and for the world, to achieve a 
halt in fighting. And this is why the Coun- 
cil requested the Secretary-General to exert 
every possible effort to give effect to the 
September 4 and 6 resolutions, and this is 
precisely what the distinguished Secretary- 
General has been doing. 

My Government, the President, his ad- 
ministration, and the American people, sup- 
port the courageous efforts of the Secretary- 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


General to give effect to the resolutions of 
the Council to bring an end to the fighting 
between these two countries and to restore 
peaceful conditions. 

As you know, the Secretary-General has 
reported to the Security Council on his mis- 
sion, and the Security Council is now con- 
sidering what further steps are appropriate 
under the circumstances. It would serve no 
good purpose for me to anticipate what ac- 
tion the Security Council might take. 

World Order and the Peacekeeping Machinery 

A commentator recently said that the 
United Nations was designed not to estab- 
lish order but to prevent trouble and pre- 
serve peace. I don't wholly agree with that, 
but I do believe that we can bring about 
order only if we succeed in our primary 
mission at the United Nations in preventing 
trouble and preserving peace. 

I have no illusions about the difficulties 
of this task or the problems that confront 
the United Nations, but I have entered my 
position with optimism about the future of 
the United Nations. During the period 
when the United Nations was experiencing 
its constitutional and financial crisis, many 
observers and many people, throughout the 
world, questioned the future of the United 
Nations. I do not share this pessimism. If 
we did not have a United Nations in ex- 
istence today, we would be re-creating a 
United Nations in order to cope with the 
same problems with which we are strug- 

As I look back on the history of my own 
country, and I draw from my experience 
here as a judge, it was not easy in the de- 
velopment of the United States of America 
to obtain adherence to the rule of law enun- 
ciated in our own Constitution. And all of 
you who are very familiar with the history 
of your own countries know of the many 
instances in every nation's history where ad- 
herence to the rule of law has only devel- 
oped after much difficulty and great frus- 

Anyone familiar with history, therefore, 
must come to the conclusion that where 

there is no alternative left to all nations ex- 
cept a painstaking march toward under- 
standing and adherence to international 
treaties and obligations, then the common 
sense and the realism of people and nations 
ultimately will prevail. 

I share Abraham Lincoln's conviction 
about the common sense of the people of the 
world and hope this will lead to a strength- 
ening rather than a weakening of the 
United Nations. 

And all of us who are devoted to the 
United Nations as an international peace- 
keeping agency must concern ourselves with 
the strengthening of its peacekeeping ma- 
chinery as much as with the strengthening 
of judicial machinery. 

In the international no less than in the 
domestic field, extension of the rule of law 
requires development of executive and legis- 
lative as well as judicial institutions. Given 
the great political divisions in the world in 
the past two decades, I am encouraged that 
the United Nations has been able to grow 
as much as it has, and to function effec- 
tively in situations not even imagined in 

If the United Nations, in these two dec- 
ades, has not always been able to fulfill 
the vision of peace and cooperation so clearly 
seen in San Francisco almost a generation 
ago, neither has it failed in its determina- 
tion to "save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war." 

In almost every one of those years, poten- 
tial sparks that in other times might well 
have set off major conflicts have been 
dampened or extinguished by United Na- 
tions activity — in Suez, in the Congo, in 
Cyprus, to mention only a few. 

We have seen unprecedented transfers 
of political power from European nations 
to newly independent states — a transfer 
made far more peacefully because of the ex- 
istence of the United Nations. 

We have brought before the conscience of 
mankind the need to extend the protection 
of law to the basic rights of all mankind. 

We have wrought an incalculable gain in 
economic and technical assistance. Who can 
measure the degree to which peace has been 



strengthened and insured when, to mention 
one example, 37 million children are cured 
of the yaws — a dreadful disease? 

And in one generation the United Na- 
tions has created more international law 
than in all previous generations in man's 
history. It has done so not only by formal 
agreements but also by wide extension of 
what might be called the "ground rules" for 
international cooperation. 

Its failures cannot obscure the record. 

If necessity is the mother of progress, I 
am hopeful, for there is no lack of necessity 
to strengthen the international peacekeep- 
ing machinery. It is imperative. 

In recent years we have witnessed a 
great refinement in techniques of generat- 
ing civil wars, in methods of infiltrating 
and subverting authentic revolutionary 
movements that almost defy timely detec- 
tion and defense. The victims of such wars 
are left to their own resources and the help 
which they can call on from others. 

So far our international peacekeeping ma- 
chinery has not been adequate to deal with 
this kind of problem. And until interna- 
tional organizations can do the job, the vic- 
tims can only turn for help to more power- 
ful friends. 

I think the United States need yield to 
no people, and no nation in history, in its 
devotion to the multilateral idea and the 
concept of collective security. But we must 
have collective security, not collective futil- 

I am hopeful that necessity will open the 
way to new inches of progress. 

I am hopeful that we will adopt practical 
and equitable means by which those willing 
to share the responsibility for peace can act 
in concert to maintain and strengthen the 
indispensable peacekeeping capacity of the 
United Nations. 

Meeting the Demands for a Better Life 

There is another vital element to the es- 
tablishment of the day when we shall bring 
about a rule of law in this world. Eleanor 
Roosevelt, who did so much to bring the 
Declaration of Human Rights to life, once 

It is not just a question of getting covenants 
written and accepted. It is a question of actually 
living and working in our countries for freedom 
and justice for each human being. And I hope that 
is what we will dedicate ourselves to in the next 10 
years, and that each of us will have the feeling 
that they must do something as individuals. Each 
of us must do something because this is one of the 
basic foundation stones if we are ever to achieve 
what the United Nations was established to achieve 
— an atmosphere in which peace can grow in the 

It avails nothing to break down the bar- 
riers, to establish the procedure of law, to 
insure civil rights in the courts, if in so 
doing we do not also create an atmosphere 
in which human dignity has meaning and 
human life a value. 

And so, if as lawyers we stay in the fore- 
front of the fight to bring about respect for 
law, we must also stay in the forefront of 
the fight to bring about a world in which 
there is freedom from want and freedom 
from the fears bred of generations of 
squalor, disease, and cheapness of human 

We must continuously remind ourselves 
that law itself does not make stability. What 
makes stability is law that solves the legiti- 
mate grievances of people. 

The late Secretary-General, Dag Ham- 
marskjold, once said that the world is in 
transition between "institutional systems of 
coexistence" and "constitutional systems of 
cooperation," which is a way of saying that 
we are slowly evolving institutions and legal 
principles which are essential to assure 
peace, justice, and order. 

If we are ever to bridge the gap between 
"institutionalized systems of coexistence" 
and "constitutional systems of cooperation," 
we must find a way to meet the urgent de- 
mand of the burgeoning millions of this 
earth who are impatient to live a better life 

Even as we recite the great accomplish- 
ments of these past decades, in and out of 
the United Nations, we know, too, how vast 
is the need, how short the time, and how 
threatening the impatience of those wha 
have not. 

Millions who for countless generations. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


accepted their condition as the fated lot of 
man now know that poverty is not ordained 
by God nor children born to die of a hun- 
dred different diseases. The same science 
that has destroyed war as a rational alter- 
native in human affairs has also given to 
us the power to conquer our environment. 

That enterprise is the heart of a world 

The Great Society cannot be guaranteed 
in this land unless it comes about in all 
lands. To this goal we have pledged our ef- 
forts, our good intentions, our vast resources, 
and our unceasing determination to succeed. 

President Johnson, in speaking at the an- 
niversary ceremonies of the founding of the 
United Nations in San Francisco, said : ^ 

We in this country are committing ourselves to 
great tasks in our own great society. We are com- 
mitted to narrow the gap between promise and per- 
formance, between equality in law and equality in 
fact, between opportunity for the numerous well-to- 
do and the still too numerous poor, between educa- 
tion for the successful and education for all of the 

It is no longer a community or a nation or a con- 
tinent but a whole generation of mankind for whom 
our promises must be kept — and kept within the next 
two decades. 

We begin anew with humility and with 

All of us in our own countries know how 
elusive is true justice, how imperfect the vir- 
tues of mortal men, and how frequent the 
stops and starts, the detours and the set- 
backs, along the path to the day when the 
light of justice may truly light the world. 

The course of history is strewn with hu- 
man failure. The history of this generation 
began with a difference — we dare not fail. 
It is that or doom — and we all know it. 

I have no illusions that peace can be 
achieved rapidly. But I have every confi- 
dence that it is going to be possible to inch 
forward to it, inch by agonizing inch. 

This we must do — for there is simply no 
alternative in a nuclear age to world peace 
through the rule of law. 

A Review of U.S. Policy 
in Latin America 

Following is the text of a report made to 
President Johnson on September 10 by 
Jack H. Vaughn, Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs. 

White Hotise press release dated September 10 

For the last 6 weeks we have been en- 
gaged in an extensive review of our Latin 
American policy, especially the Alliance for 
Progress. The review began with your meet- 
ing with the Central American Ambassa- 
dors on July 29,1 and included a visit to 
Brazil of a delegation headed by Senator 
[J.W.] Fulbright. My trip to seven Latin 
American countries — Mexico, El Salvador, 
Panama, Ecuador, Chile, Bolivia, and Peru 
— provided an opportunity for continued 
evaluation, and the review is now concluded 
with this summary report to you. 

The trip confirmed my belief that our 
Latin American policy is basically sound. 
The Alliance for Progress is going well, and 
throughout the Latin American area I find 
a fundamental harmony of purpose based 
on mutual respect and a firm resolve to 
carry out the Charter of Punta del Este. 

The peoples of Latin America and their 
leaders have responded enthusiastically to 
your policy statement of August 17,- which 
pledged your administration anew to the 
goals of the Alliance for Progress. More 
than any other factor, I believe this response 
is directly traceable to the sentence in your 
speech of August 17 : 

This is the common thread which runs through 
the Great Society in my country and the Alliance 
for Progress in all countries. 

Our neighbors to the south have watched 
with admiration the great strides we have 
made in basic reforms in our country in the 
last 2 years, and the sheer weight of the 
advances has convinced them of our resolve. 
Leader after leader in Latin America told 

'Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98. 

' Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 330. 

= For text, see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426. 



me that a nation as concerned about her 
own people as the United States is must also 
be dedicated to the welfare of other peo- 
ples as well. They view with internal inter- 
est every social and economic advance we 
make, for, as I was repeatedly told, this 
future progress is indissolubly linked to 

The problems of Latin America remain 
monumental. The poverty, disease, and illit- 
eracy which I saw there in the last 2 weeks 
weighs heavy on my heart as it must on 
anyone who feels a sense of oneness with 
the area. But I found a hope, a stirring self- 
confidence, and a will to work and grow, 
that shine forth like a diamond. And every- 
where I found new ideas and progress 
which are the fruits of our common effort. 

Self-help continues to be the watchword 
of the Alliance. I found this principle in- 
creasingly accepted, both in word and deed. 
Indeed, the renewed self-confidence engen- 
dered by the application of this principle 
explains much of the spirit and growth of 
the Alliance. I doubt that we can stress 
self-help too much. In emphasizing the par- 
ticipation of the individual in the Alliance 
— his welfare and freedom — the members of 
the Alliance must give more attention to the 
private sector for the role of this sector must 
be a leading one if the Alliance is to succeed. 
I have met with many business and labor 
leaders of both North and South America 
to discuss how the full energies of private 
initiative can be released to promote the 
Alliance objectives. They stress stable gov- 
ernment policies on which business can rely, 
mutual respect and confidence between busi- 
ness and government, a strong nonpolitical 

free labor movement, fair taxes which 
encourage investment, access to credit on 
reasonable terms, competition which en- 
courages new methods and lower prices, 
responsible business and labor leaders who 
consider the public interest as well as their 
own interests. Increasing levels of private 
investment — primarily Latin American cap- 
ital — have contributed greatly to the ad- 
vances, but all of us need to find additional 
ways to increase such investment. 

In your statement of August 17 you 
stressed the need for price stability for 
Latin American products and increased ef- 
forts to draw the economies of Latin Amer- 
ica together; you emphasized the needs of 
rural Latin America; you directed that we 
increase our effort toward those things 
which directly touch the lives of the indi- 
vidual human beings — housing, education, 
health, and food. I have personally carried 
these instructions to our Ambassadors and 
AID [Agency for International Develop- 
ment] Mission Directors. The programs 
that will be presented to the Congress in 
the coming fiscal years will increasingly 
emphasize these fundamental objectives. 

Amidst our present successes I should 
caution against any complacency or a possi- 
ble tendency to rest on our oars. Although 
the progress has been heartening, it has 
been uneven in places. All have not shared 
in the general progress. The pressure for 
change, for a fair share of the product of 
the common effort, is irresistible. We must 
press resolutely forward lest — like the run- 
ner who looks back to see if he is winning — 
we lose the race against the ancient enemies 
of mankind. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


The Legacy of James Smithson 

Address by President Johnson 

Amid this pomp and pageantry we have 
gathered to celebrate a man about whom 
we know very little but to whom we owe 
very much. James Smithson was a scientist 
who achieved no great distinction. He was 
an Englishman who never visited the 
United States. He never even expressed the 
desire to do so. 

But this man became our nation's first 
benefactor. He gave his entire fortune to 
establish this Institution, which would serve 
"for the increase and diffusion of knowl- 
edge among men." 

He had a vision which lifted him ahead 
of his time — or at least of some politicians 
of his time. One illustrious United States 
Senator argued it was beneath the dignity 
of the country to accept such a gift from 
foreigners. Congress debated 8 long years 
before deciding to receive Smithson's be- 

Yet James Smithson's life and legacy 
brought meaning to three ideas more 
powerful than anyone at that time ever 

The first idea was that learning respects 
no geographic boundaries. The Institution 
bearing his name became the first agency 
in the United States to promote scientific 
and scholarly exchange with all the nations 
in the world. 

The second idea was that partnership 
between government and private enterprise 
can serve the greater good of both. The 

' Made at the Smithsonian Institution Bicentennial 
Celebration at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 16 (White 
House press release; as-delivered text). 

Smithsonian Institution started a new kind 
of venture in this country, chartered by act 
of Congress, maintained by both public 
funds and private contributions. It inspired 
a relationship which has grovsTi and 
flowered in a thousand different ways. 

Finally, the Institution financed by 
Smithson breathed life in the idea that the 
growth and the spread of learning must be 
the first work of a nation that seeks to be 

These ideas have not always gained easy 
acceptance among those employed in my 
line of work. The government official must 
cope with the daily disorder that he finds in 
the world around him. But today, the offi- 
cial, the scholar, and the scientist cannot 
settle for limited objectives. We must pur- 
sue knowledge no matter what the conse- 
quences. We must value the tried less than 
the true. 

To split the atom, to launch the rocket, to 
explore the innermost mysteries and the 
outermost reaches of the universe — these 
are your God-given chores. And even when 
you risk bringing fresh disorder to the poli- 
tics of men and nations, these explorations 
still must go on. 

The men who founded our country were 
passionate believers in the revolutionary 
power of ideas. They knew that once a na- 
tion commits itself to the increase and dif- 
fusion of knowledge, the real revolution be- 
gins. It can never be stopped. 

In my own life, I have had cause again 
and again to bless the chance events which 
started me as a teacher. In our country and 
in our time we have recognized, with new 



passion, that learning is Dasic to our hopes 
for America. It is the taproot which gives 
sustaining life to all of our purposes. And 
whatever we seek to do to wage the war on 
poverty, to set new goals for health and 
happiness, to curb crime, or try to bring 
beauty to our cities and our countryside — 
all of these, and more, depend on education. 

But the legacy we Inherit from James 
Smithson cannot be limited to these shores. 
He called for the increase and diffusion of 
knowledge among men — not just Amer- 
icans, not just Anglo-Saxons, and not just 
the citizens of the Western World, but all 
men everywhere. 

The world we face on his bicentennial 
anniversary makes that mandate much 
more urgent than it ever was. For we know 
today that certain truths are self-evident in 
every nation on this earth: that ideas, not 
armaments, will shape our lasting prospects 
for peace; that the conduct of our foreign 
policy will advance no faster than the cur- 
riculum of our classrooms; and that the 
knowledge of our citizens is the treasure 
which grows only when it is shared. 

It would profit us little to limit the world 
exchange to those who can afford it. We 
must extend the treasure to those lands 
where learning is still a luxury for the few. 

Today, more than 700 million adults — 4 
out of 10 of the world's population — dwell 
in darkness, where they cannot read or 
write. Almost half the nations of this 
globe suffer from illiteracy among half or 
more of their people. And unless the world 
can find a way to extend the light, the 
forces of that darkness may ultimately en- 
gulf us all. 

For our part, this Government and this 
nation is prepared to join in finding the way. 
During recent years we have made many 
hopeful beginnings. But we can and we 
must do more. That is why I have directed a 
special task force within my administration 
to recommend a broad and long-range plan 
of worldwide educational endeavor. 

Secretary of State Rusk has accepted my 
request to chair this task force. Secretary 
John Gardner of the Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare has agreed to serve 

on it. Both these men have proved, in their 
past careers, how great is their devotion to 
international education. 

I intend to call on leaders in both public 
and private enterprise to join with us in 
mapping this effort. 

We must move ahead on every front and 
every level of learning. We can support 
Secretary Ripley's [Dr. S. Dillon Ripley, 
Secretary of the Smithsonian Institution] 
dream of creating a center here at the 
Smithsonian where great scholars from ev- 
ery nation will come and collaborate. At a 
more junior level, we can promote the 
growth of the school-to-school program 
started under Peace Corps auspices so that 
our children may learn about — and care 
about — each other. 

We mean to show that this nation's 
dream of a Great Society does not stop at 
the water's edge and that it is not just an 
American dream. All are welcome to share 
in it. All are invited to contribute to it. 

Together we must embark on a new and a 
noble adventure : 

First, to assist the education effort of the 
developing nations and the developing re- 

Second, to help our schools and universi- 
ties increase their knowledge of the world 
and the people who inhabit it. 

Third, to advance the exchange of stu- 
dents and teachers who travel and work 
outside their native lands. 

Fourth, to increase the free flow of books 
and ideas and art, of works of science and 

And fifth, to assemble meetings of men 
and women from every discipline and every 
culture to ponder the common problems of 

In all these endeavors I pledge that the 
United States will play its full role. By 
January I intend to present such a program 
to the Congress. 

Despite the noise of daily events, history 
is made by men and the ideas of men. We 
— and only we — can generate growing light 
in our universe, or we can allow the dark- 
ness to gather. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


De Tocqueville challenged us more than a 
century ago : "Men cannot remain strangers 
to each other, or be ignorant of what is 
taking place in any corner of the globe." 
We must banish strangeness and the igno- 

In all we do toward one another we must 
try — and try again — to live the words of the 
prophet: "I shall light a candle of under- 
standing in thine heart, which shall not be 
put out." 

Outer Space and the Advancement 
of Human Understanding 

Remarks by Under Secretary Ball ^ 

Beyond the earth's atmosphere in outer 
space is an area of infinite expanse into 
which man has not yet intruded his own 
petty quarrels and arguments. Those gallant 
and gifted few who have so far traversed 
this space become by this experience philos- 
ophers. From the heights which they com- 
mand, the earth appears grotesquely small 
and the conflicts among human beings must 
necessarily seem both petty and manageable. 

Today we are honoring two of the most 
distinguished members of this new school 
of philosophers — two men who have had a 
God's-eye view of the earth and, unlike any 
men before in history, have had that view 
continuously for well over a week's time. 

I think it altogether understandable that 
these two men should be dedicated as they 
are to the restoration and maintenance of 
peace in this small sector of the cosmos, not 
merely because they have observed the petty 
dimensions of man's quarrels but also be- 
cause they have gained a unique insight 
into man's potential to broaden his horizons 
and extend his vision beyond the clouds and 
mountains — and indeed beyond the atmos- 

phere to a universe waiting to be under- 

Tonight these two extraordinary men will 
leave with their families on a mission of 
good will to share with other scientists and 
astronauts at the 16th Annual Astronautical 
Congress in Athens some of the knowledge 
and wisdom they have acquired. Thereafter 
they will travel to the other countries rep- 
resented around this table to express a 
measure of our appreciation for the cooper- 
ation we have received in the execution of 
this great enterprise. 

Ladies and gentlemen, let me make one 
point clear to you today: that this trip 
which Astronauts Cooper and Conrad are 
undertaking is in the spirit of all that they 
and their Government have done in space — 
to extend man's knowledge, to establish a 
firmer basis for international cooperation, 
to reinforce the peace. 

May I propose a toast of gratitude and 
best wishes to these navigators of infinity, 
and to their families, and to the advance- 
ment of human understanding for which 
they have risked their lives. 

' Made at a luncheon at the Department of State 
on Sept. 15 honoring Astronauts L. Gordon Cooper, 
Jr., and Charles Conrad, Jr., and their families be- 
fore their departure on a trip to Greece, Turkey, 
Ethiopia, the Malagasy Republic, Kenya, Nigeria, 
and the Canary Islands (press release 222). 

Assistant Secretary Williams 
Visits 12 African Countries 

The Department of State announced on 
September 15 (press release 218) that As- 
sistant Secretary for African Affairs G. 
Mennen Williams would depart Washington 
September 19 for a 3-week visit to 12 Afri- 
can countries. It was his 13th official trip 
to the African Continent. 

During his tour the Assistant Secretary 
attended the independence day celebration 
at Bamako, Mali, on September 22. He par- 
ticipated in the ceremonies in Lagos on 
October 1 marking Nigeria's second anni- 
versary as a republic and its fifth anniver- 
sary as an independent nation. 

Mr. Williams' itinerary follows: Bamako, 
Mali, September 21; Freetown, Sierra Le- 
one, September 23; Monrovia, Liberia, Sep- 
tember 25; Abidjan, Ivory Coast, September 
26; Accra, Ghana, September 28; Lome, 




Togo, September 29; Cotonou, Dahomey, 
September 30; Lagos, Nigeria, October 1; 
Niamey, Niger, October 2; Ouagadougou, 
Upper Volta, October 4; Conakry, Guinea, 
October 6; Dakar, Senegal, October 8; re- 
turn to New York October 9. 

U.S. Trade Mission Visits 
Poland and Rumania 

White House press release dated September 13 

The President announced on September 
13 that the Government is sending the first 
commercial trade mission to Poland and 
Rumania, in line with the administration's 
policy of "building bridges of increased 
trade" with the people of Eastern Europe. 

The seven-man mission will explore the 
opportunities for selling more American 
products to the civilian industries in the 
two nations. Because these countries repre- 
sent largely untapped markets for Ameri- 
can manufactured products, the trade group 
will seek to identify some of the areas 
where there are the greatest opportunities 
for increasing U.S. exports. 

Poland and Rumania represent growing 
markets for products from the United 
States and the other free-world nations. 
They are striving to modernize their in- 
dustries with productive equipment. From 
1957 to 1964 U.S. exports to Poland rose 
from $73 million to $138 million, including 
surplus agricultural commodities. The trade 
agreement with Rumania was signed in 
Washington last year.^ It provided for Ex- 
port-Import Bank guarantees on short- and 
medium-term export financing and the 
granting of export licenses for a number of 
industrial facilities, as well as providing a 
number of safeguards for U.S. companies 
doing business in the country. As a result, 
U.S. exports to Rumania have increased 
significantly in the past year. 

The mission will be in Eastern Europe 
from September 18 to October 16, confer- 

' For text of a joint communique dated June 1, 
1964, see Bulletin of June 15, 1964, p. 924. 

ring with industrial leaders in Warsaw and 
Poznan, Poland, and Bucharest, Ploesti, 
Brasov, and Constanta in Rumania. 

The businessmen on the mission are 
prominent in fields which include metal- 
lurgy, electrical equipment, petrochemicals, 
synthetic fibers, machine tools, and agri- 
cultural equipment. The members of the 
mission are : 

Paul E. Pauly, director, Director, Office of Inter- 
national Trade Promotion, Bureau of International 
Commerce, U.S. Department of Commerce 

Denis A. Cooper, deputy director, Special Assistant 
to the Deputy Administrator for Procurement and 
Management Assistance, Small Business Adminis- 

Nils Anderson, Jr., Debevoise-Anderson Co., New 
York, N.Y. 

Thomas P. Collier, Thomas Collier & Associates, 
Los Angeles, Calif. 

Michael J. Deutch, consulting engineer, Washington, 

James 0. Ellison, Plarron, Rickard & McCone Co., 
San Francisco, Calif. 

Thomas G. Wyman, former Assistant Secretary of 
Commerce, agricultural producer. New York, N.Y. 

Secretary Fowler Reports 
on IVIonetary Talks in Europe 

Following is the text of a report to Pres- 
ident Johnson from Secretary of the Treas- 
ury Henry H. Fowler. 

white House press release dated September 13 

I had welcome and fruitful opportunities 
to exchange views with the governmental 
and financial authorities of seven nations 
(Belgium, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, the Netherlands, and Sweden) on how 
best we can jointly proceed in improving 
international monetary arrangements. I was 
extremely pleased with the results of my 
conversations, from which emerged a clear 
consensus that the time has come to begin 
negotiations aimed at increasing the capac- 
ity of the international monetary system to 
meet the demands of expanding trade and 
economic growth within the free world. 

During my trip, on most of which I was 
accompanied by Under Secretary of State 
George Ball and Under Secretary of the 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


Treasury for Monetary Affairs Frederick 
Darning, my colleagues and I found general 
agreement with our British and continental 
European friends on the following points: 

1. That ways will have to be developed to 
expand international liquidity — the amount 
of gold, reserve currencies, or available 
credits which nations use to finance inter- 
national trade and payments — after the 
payments deficits of the United States no 
longer exist. 

2. That such a time is rapidly approach- 
ing — the U.S. deficit is already under con- 
trol — and although there is no need for 
hasty action, neither is there a great deal of 
time to waste. 

3. That discussions of this subject must 
now be raised from the technical level to 
the high policy level, and active negotiations 
initiated at that level, and that the period 
of the annual meeting of the International 
Monetary Fund in Washington at the end 
of this month offers an excellent opportu- 
nity to concert definite procedures to those 

4. That careful preparation is necessary 
to determine the extent of basic agreement 
among the major countries which would be 
the sources of additional reserves or credit 
— the so-called Group of Ten (Belgium, 
Canada, France, Germany, Great Britain, 
Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the 
United States) — and that any agreement on 
improving the system will require assur- 
ances that such improvements will be gen- 
erally acceptable to those countries. 

5. That, for this reason, it would be ad- 
visable to provide a new mandate for the 
resumption and completion without delay of 
the unfinished work of the Deputies of the 
Ministers of the Group of Ten nations and 
in this way to begin the first stage of nego- 
tiations — hopefully next month. 

In all discussions, the United States par- 
ticipants made clear their strong conviction 
that a sound and lasting improvement in 
the international monetary system must 
serve the needs of all member nations of the 
International Monetary Fund — particularly 
the developing countries — and therefore a 

second phase of preparatory discussion and 
negotiation would be desirable before final 
intergovernmental agreements making for- 
mal structural improvements were entered 
into, in which there would be appropriate 
and adequate opportunity for the participa- 
tion of the International Monetary Fund 
and of countries other than the Group of 

I am glad to say that this position found 
support in many quarters. 

Given a successful course of preparation 
along these lines, the basis would be firmly 
fixed for a meaningful international mone- 
tary conference in the form of a special 
meeting of the Governors of the Interna- 
tional Monetary Fund or some other suit- 
able forum. 

I was extremely pleased that during the 
course of my visit we were able to partici-. 
pate in and help effect a concrete measure 
of cooperation between monetary authorities 
to deal constructively with a more immedi- 
ate and pressing problem affecting the sta- 
bility of the existing international mone- 
tary system — confidence in the British 
pound, one of the two reserve currencies on 
which the system is based. I refer to the 
action announced Friday [September 10] 
by the Bank of England, in which 10 nations, 
including the United States, and the Bank 
for International Settlements joined in new 
arrangements to counter any speculative at- 
tack on the pound. It should be emphasized 
that this action comes on the heels of indi- 
cations that Great Britain is moving en- 
couragingly toward a balance in its 
international payments and is undertaking 
an effective long-term national program to 
stabilize costs and prices that will put it in 
a stronger competitive position in world 
markets. Hence, the main purpose of the 
new arrangements is to exploit this 
strengthening situation and reinforce these 
developments. The action of the 10 cooper- 
ating countries demonstrated once again the 
strength and flexibility of the existing in- 
ternational monetary system and the speed 
with which a majority of the major indus- 
trial countries are willing to work together 
for the common good. 



FinSand and the United States, an Enduring Friendship 

by W. Averell Harriman 
Ambassador at Large^ 

I am delighted to be here in this lovely 
land and to take part in this, the 20th annual 
celebration of America Days in Finland. I 
offer my congratulations to the Turku chap- 
ter of the Finnish-American Society on the 
splendid program it has arranged. I am in- 
deed pleased to participate with you in 
these events, which have the purpose of con- 
firming the bonds of friendship and under- 
standing between our countries. 

May I also extend my appreciation to the 
city of Turku for the welcome I have ex- 
perienced here. President Johnson asked me 
particularly to bring to the people of Fin- 
land and to this city his personal greetings 
and best wishes. As you know, he visited 
your beautiful community 2 years ago and 
described it then as "Finland's cultural and 
commercial landmark through the centuries." 
I might add that he said his warm recep- 
tion by the Finnish people has become a 
memory he will always treasure. 

As one travels through Finland one can- 
not help but admire the warmth of your 
hospitality, the beauty of your countryside, 
and the rugged resolve of your national 
spirit. After seeing and experiencing this it 
is easy to understand why the Finns who 
crossed the Atlantic were able to contribute 
so much to America. 

Not half a day's drive from my office in 
Washington, on the banks of the Delaware 
River, your countrymen — among the first to 

' Address made at the America Days celebration 
at Turku, Finland, on Sept. 5 (press release 205 
dated Sept. 3, for release Sept. 4). 

settle our country more than three centuries 
ago — founded that valley's first towns, 
carved out its first roads, and raised up its 
first churches. 

Your Finnish forefathers enriched my 
country with their traditional skills of farm- 
ing, and fishing, and fur trapping — but they 
did a great deal more than just that. 

For they brought not only their skills to 
America, but their principles as well. 

Those early Finnish settlers in America 
were men who believed in freedom : freedom 
of opportunity; freedom of political expres- 
sion ; freedom to make personal dreams come 

But they knew that freedom had some- 
times to be defended by force and had al- 
ways to be guaranteed by law. And so they 
not only built the first churches in the Dela- 
ware Valley, but the first forts and the first 
courthouses as well. 

The Finnish pioneers who came to Amer- 
ica 300 years ago had a practical belief in 
the dignity and worth of the individual and 
his entitlement to the protection of just 
laws. They considered this belief worth de- 
fending and worth dying for. 

The Great Society 

We in America believe no less today. 

The United States came to birth in rev- 
olution. But the American Revolution of 1776 
was not a revolution against law. It was a 
revolution to restore to the people of Amer- 
ica the rights of the rule of law which had 
been denied them. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


It was precisely because Washington, Jef- 
ferson, and Franklin, and the others believed 
that they no longer enjoyed equal justice 
under colonial rule that they sought to set 
up a new government of law, under which 
they might have that justice. 

Our revolution has never ended. Its drive 
to safeguard the rights of "Life, Liberty, 
and the pursuit of Happiness" remains vig- 
orous and creative. 

The American revolution is in fact a "per- 
manent revolution": a revolution that seeks 
to achieve man's aspirations, not a revolu- 
tion designed to rob man of his rights. The 
choice is either the rule of law or the rule 
of coercion, either equal justice under law or 
unequal treatment under tyranny. 

Under the leadership of President John- 
son, we are determined that the American 
revolution shall build in the United States a 
truly great society. As the President has 
said : ^ 

The Great Society . . . demands an end to poverty 
and racial injustice, to which we are totally com- 
mitted in our time. But that is just the beginning. 
The Great Society is a place where every child can 
find knowledge to enrich his mind and to enlarge his 
talents. ... It is a place where men are more con- 
cerned with the quality of their goals than the 
quantity of their goods. 

The partnership in America between gov- 
ernment initiative and private enterprise has 
brought about vast economic expansion and 
social gains. But some Americans have 
lagged behind in sharing these benefits. 

President Johnson in his concept of the 
Great Society has emphasized the need for 
greater concern for the less fortunate. His 
aim is not to put low-income families on the 
dole but through education, and training, 
and new job opportunities to make it possi- 
ble for them to earn their fair share of the 
national income. 

I do not have to describe for you the 
dynamism of President Johnson. For you 
saw it for yourself when he was here, as 
Vice President, 2 years ago — at these very 

" For text of an address made by President John- 
son at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Mich., on May 22, 1964, see White House press 
release dated May 22, 1964. 

America Days celebrations. His leadership 
this past year and a half has galvanized our 
nation into a demand for legislative energy 
and imagination that is unprecedented in 
American history. 

And our Congress has responded. It en- 
acted into law the historic Civil Rights Act 
of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 ; 
the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 and 
its further expansion in 1965 ; a whole series 
of aid-to-education acts, designed to encom- 
pass the entire spectrum of education, from 
the preschool years through university post- 
graduate research; the Tax Reduction and 
Reform Act; the Indigent Legal Aid Act; 
the medical care for the aged program; the 
national wilderness conservation system ; ur- 
ban redevelopment; aid to depressed areas; 
housing for low-income families — to mention 
some of the most far-reaching, and with 
more to come. 

Much of this legislation is along lines al- 
ready familiar in Finland. You, like us, are 
building a better society within the frame- 
work of freedom and the rule of law. 

U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam 

But how can any people successfully build 
a better society within the framework of 
freedom and the rule of law while their 
land is ravaged by external aggression ? And 
some people still find their liberty limited 
and threatened by external aggression. 

That is the case in South Viet-Nam today. 

South Viet-Nam is a small country. The 
overwhelming majority of its people desire 
only to be left alone by their neighbors to 
the north. 

What is going on in South Viet-Nam is 
not a civil war. It is not a popular revolu- 
tion. It is not a free and spontaneous up- 
rising of the citizenry. It is insidious, sub- 
versive aggression from the north. It has 
been inspired, organized, directed, and sup- 
plied from the north. Yet the propaganda 
from the north euphemistically calls it a "lib- 
eration" movement. 

But ivho is being liberated from what? 

In 1954, at the time of partition, nearly 
a million Vietnamese freely chose to leave 



their homes in North Viet-Nam to escape 
from Communist rule and migrate to South 
Viet-Nam, where they settled in order to be- 
gin a new life. Only a tenth as many chose 
to go in the other direction. 

And at no time since — even when the 
government in Saigon was plagued with its 
greatest internal difficulties — has any refu- 
gee group of that sort fled from the govern- 
ment-controlled areas to the Viet Cong-con- 
trolled areas, or to North Viet-Nam. On the 
contrary, during this year alone more than 
600,000 refugees have fled from their homes 
in Viet Cong-controlled areas to seek the pro- 
tection of their South Vietnamese govern- 

Fleeing from communism is not, of course, 
confined to Viet-Nam. I hardly need recall 
similar situations that exist closer to home 
that led to the construction of the Berlin 

A decade ago we in the United States 
made a commitment to South Viet-Nam that 
we would help them to develop their country 
and to decide their own destiny without in- 
terference from the north. 

It has not been an easy commitment for 
the United States to keep. It would have 
been easier to find some pretext to with- 
draw. We have no territorial claims or eco- 
nomic interests in South Viet-Nam. We seek 
no military bases or alliances there. 

Our commitment is to the people of South 
Viet-Nam and to the future of freedom it- 

We will continue to help defend the free- 
dom of those 16 million people for as long 
a period as it is threatened and our assist- 
ance is desired. 

Hanoi has chosen the way of violence. 
What is more, Hanoi has continually esca- 
lated the conflict by increased infiltration 
of irregular and later regular North Viet- 
namese military units and by supplying 
more modern weapons. Our increased sup- 
port for South Viet-Nam has been in re- 
sponse to that escalation. 

President Johnson has offered to engage 
in unconditional discussions on Viet-Nam 
with all the governments concerned. The 

President Sends Greetings 

to Finnish-American Celebration 

Message From President Johnson ' 

My friends of Finland, this celebration of 
America Days in Turku recalls an occasion 
2 years ago when I had the privilege of open- 
ing the America Days in Helsinki. I was to 
make a few remarks, then cut a ribbon to 
open the celebration. But as the crowd pressed 
close I found part of the job done for me : The 
ceremonial ribbon had snapped in the rush 
and, as good friends, we had all cut it together. 

During our visit to Finland, Mrs. Johnson 
and I spent one sunny day in Turku. We saw 
your modern university, the handsome cathe- 
dral, and the ancient castle. We heard your 
Mayor describe Turku as a city still small 
enough for neighbors to know one another. 
We met many of those neighbors, and we have 
warm memories of their kindness. 

I have asked my old friend and Ambassa- 
dor-at-Large, Averell Harriman, to represent 
the United States in your America Days cele- 
bration this year. I know he is going to fall 
under the spell of Turku's graciousness, just 
as we did. 

I have asked him to tell you how much 
America esteems the great Finnish people. We 
here know very well how great they are, for 
they helped create America itself, and we shall 
never forget that. 

My very best wishes to you all. 

^ Delivered by Ambassador at Large W. 
Averell Harriman during the America Days 
celebration at Turku, Finland, on Sept. 5 
(White House press release (Austin, Tex.) 
dated Sept. 5). 

United States has made that offer clear on 
15 separate occasions. It has welcomed the 
efforts of other nations, which have sought 
to initiate such discussions. 

The appeal of 17 nonalined nations, in 
March of this year, was one such effort and 
was welcomed by the United States.* But 
Peiping crudely rejected that appeal and de- 
scribed its sponsors — which included states 

' For texts of the 17-nation appeal and the U.S. 
reply, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


such as Yugoslavia and India — as "monsters 
and freaks." Other initiatives have been re- 
buffed with similar rudeness. It seems clear 
that Hanoi will not agree to a conference 
until it realizes that its attempt to take over 
South Viet-Nam by force will not be per- 
mitted to succeed. 

The United States policy in Viet-Nam is 
simple and clear. We have three policy ob- 
jectives : 

First, we are going to keep our commit- 
ment to the people of South Viet-Nam, that 
they may decide their own future. We believe 
in self-determination and oppose aggression. 
We are going to continue to help them to 
resist aggression. We are going to continue 
to make it clear to Hanoi that terrorism, sub- 
version, and infiltration from the north can- 
not and will not succeed. 

Second, we seek a peaceful settlement. We 
are ready to go to the negotiating table with 
all interested governments. We lay down no 
prior conditions. We want peace. 

Third, we seek to help create a better life 
for the people of Viet-Nam and all of South- 
east Asia. President Johnson has made it 
clear that we will back the words of peace 
with the works of peace. He has called for 
a major program of economic and social de- 
velopment in the area. The United States 
has agreed to make a substantial contribu- 
tion toward this and has urged other nations 
to join in the effort. 

What the United States is doing in Viet- 
Nam is governed by those three simple ob- 

As President Johnson stated here in Fin- 
land at the America Days celebration 2 
years ago : ■• 

We do not believe that right is determined by 

might. We do believe free nations must be prepared 
and ready to use their might in support of right. 

Efforts To Control Nuclear Power 

Military force is no final solution to man's 
problems. That is why President Kennedy 
sent me to Moscow to negotiate the limited 
nuclear test ban treaty. And that is why 
Finland, and more than a hundred other 
nations of the world, signed that treaty. 

And that treaty — despite the doubters, de- 
spite the critics — stands in force today. 

Yet it was only a first step. And we desire 
to take others until nuclear power is con- 
trolled. From my recent talks in Moscow with 
Soviet leaders, I have reason to believe the 
Soviet Government also desires to undertake 
further measures. 

But even with common objectives it has 
been difficult to reach agreement. However, 
the United States is prepared to exert all its 
energies to find a method to control nuclear 

As President Johnson said in his message 
to the disarmament conference in Geneva : * 

There is only one item on the agenda of this Con- 
ference — it is the leading item on the agenda of man- 
Icind — and that one item is peace. 

You here in Finland — and we in the United 
States — share that conviction. 

Ladies and gentlemen. President Johnson 
asked me to come here to Turku — to this 
lovely city on the sea — and to tell you how 
much he values Finland's friendship. 

It is not a new friendship. It is an old one. 

It is not a friendship of convenience. It 
is one of conviction. 

It is a friendship that only free peoples 
can have with one another. 

It is a friendship that will endure. 


' Ibid., Oct. 14, 1963, p. 585. 

Ibid., Feb. 10, 1964, p. 224. 




U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America 

Folloiving are statements made by Assist- 
ant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs 
Jack H. Vaughn and Assistant Secretary for 
Economic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Inter-American 
Economic Relationships of the Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee of the Congress on Septem- 
ber 10. 


Press release 216 dated September 10 

Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 
I welcome this opportunity to testify before 
you and to exchange thoughts with you 
about ways that we in the United States 
might work to strengthen the Alliance for 
Progress. Mr. Solomon and I have been pre- 
ceded to this witness stand by distinguished 
men. I know from the brief opportunity I 
have had to study their testimony that each 
has used the occasion of these hearings to 
make still another contribution to what 
might be called the continuing dialog of re- 
sponsibility about the future of Latin Amer- 

It is appropriate also to note the record 
of achievement established by this subcom- 
mittee and its individual members. I shall 
not prolong this testimony by recounting the 
many ways our perception of inter-Ameri- 
can relationships has been enriched by the 
activities of this subcommittee and its mem- 
bers — your hearings and subsequent report 
on Private Investment in Latin America 

are a good example of this — but I cannot let 
this opportunity pass without expressing a 
special word of thanks for the balanced, yet 
provocative and always challenging, views 
and actions in the field of Latin American 
relations that you, Mr. Chairman [Senator 
John Sparkman], and the ranking minority 
member of this committee. Senator [Jacob 
K.] Javits, have contributed to our thinking. 
All who would understand Latin America 
better and who would work for a hemisphere 
where relationships between men and na- 
tions are marked by mutual respect are in- 
debted to the members of this subcommit- 
tee for your leadership. 

From my point of view, the timing of this 
hearing is particularly fortuitous. I have 
just returned from a series of conversations 
and observations in seven Latin American 
nations, and I should like to begin this 
morning by sharing with you a few impres- 
sions of what I saw and heard. 

Everywhere I went I saw people seeking 
change. The new leadership in Latin Amer- 
ica is determined that the old order must 
change and that the people must find a path 
to freedom, to justice, to opportunity. Your 
own report on Private Investment in Latin 
America stated most succinctly: "The worst 
enemy of freedom on all fronts is the con- 
centration of power." All enlightened leaders 
in Latin America agree with that proposi- 
tion, whether the concentration of power be 
in the hands of government, of the military, 
of a religious body, or of private individuals 
or corporations. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


Everywhere I went I saw progress. Ulti- 
mately everything done under the banner of 
the Alliance for Progress — our statistics, our 
macroeconometrics, our schools built, teach- 
ers trained, dwelling units completed, roads 
paved, taxes collected — come to a single goal : 
people benefited. People are living in homes 
today in Peru for whom home financing was 
never before available; technicians provided 
by the Alliance for Progress helped Peru- 
vians create a system of private savings and 
loan institutions through which savings were 
collected to build those homes. Small farm- 
ers in El Salvador are building new herds of 
higher breed stock, an innovation inspired 
by a Salvadoran extension service trained 
by United States Department of Agriculture 
specialists and financed by long-term loans 
made available from an AID loan for super- 
vised agricultural credit. The story is re- 
peated again and again. Everywhere I went 
I saw evidence that the benefits of the AUi- 
ance are reaching the people of Latin Amer- 

I observed in these last weeks that in an 
overall sense the Alliance has made two con- 
tributions of great importance. First, the re- 
form measures that have been taken — in 
land, education, public administration — have 
laid the groundwork for progress and social 
justice. And second, the real efforts that the 
nations of Latin America are making to 
halt inflation and achieve sound economic 
planning are creating the environment for 
even greater progress. 

One evidence that the Alliance is para- 
mount in the minds of the leaders of the 
hemisphere is the growing amount of com- 
ment about it. The Alliance is not an un- 
mixed blessing in the minds of many, but, 
on balance, the enlightened leaders of our 
hemisphere are firmly committed to the eco- 
nomic, political, and social goals of the Alli- 

I have given this brief summary of what 
has been achieved by the Alliance for Prog- 
ress because I thought it might help you — 
as it helps me — to consider the matter of 
Latin American integration within the con- 
text of the Alliance experience. 

Latin America's Trade Prospects 

Now I should like to discuss some other 
specific topics concerning Latin America's 
economic problems and involving special 
U. S. relationships with the area. Too often, 
perhaps, the Alliance has been characterized 
as an effort concentrating on increasing in- 
vestment in Latin America to improve 
economic growth and social improvement. 
The range of activities and multitudinous 
areas of interest which are related, because 
they also bear importantly on development, 
are treated improperly, as if they were apart 
from our common effort. 

One of these areas is international trade. 
The success of the Alliance is not only 
closely bound to the building of infrastruc- 
ture and industry, to the betterment of 
housing, health, and education, and to re- 
form and modernization of the economic and 
social structures, but it is heavily dependent 
upon a satisfactory growth and development 
of Latin America's foreign trade. Export 
earnings are vital to the viability of the de- 
velopment plans, and the United States is 
acutely aware that it must lend strong sup- 
port to Latin American efforts to diversify, 
stabilize, and increase its trade. Allow me, 
therefore, to review recent developments in 
this field and to make a few comments on 
prospects for the near future. 

Latin America's export trade has grown 
markedly in recent years and is now nearing 
the $10 billion mark. 1964 was a good year 
for most Latin American countries. A pro- 
longed industrial boom in the United States 
and Western Europe brought a sharp in- 
crease in the price of industrial raw mate- 
rials — especially metals — and the prices of 
agricultural products held at relatively high 
levels throughout most of the year, sugar 
and cocoa being notable exceptions. 

Total exports of the 19 American Repub- 
lics rose by some $700 million, or 7.5 per- 
cent, last year. Figures for the first quarter 
of 1965 — the latest available — indicate that 
trade is off about $300 million this year and 
that final figures for 1965 may stand about 
halfway between 1963 and 1964— but still 
roughly a billion dollars above 1962. 



Improved export earnings were reflected, 
as is usual, in a higher rate of imports. Im- 
ports from all sources rose to almost $8.5 
billion in 1964. In the early part of this 
year, however, they were down by some 10 
percent as a number of countries were forced 
to introduce or tighten import control meas- 
ures to meet serious balance-of-payments 
problems which arose for a variety of rea- 
sons, in most cases unassociated with trade 
problems, which I shall discuss later. 

Prediction is always dangerous, but we 
must attempt some forward analysis of Latin 
America's export prospects in order to 
assess the area's ability to carry forward its 
plans for economic development on the basis 
of its own resources and to gage the assist- 
ance which may be needed from the indus- 
trial countries. 

In large measure the trade prospects of 
Latin America, as of other countries which 
depend heavily on exports of food and indus- 
trial raw materials, are associated with the 
outlook for industrial expansion in the more 
developed countries. The OECD [Organiza- 
tion for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], which includes the major industrial 
countries of Western Europe, Japan, Canada, 
and the United States, reported at midyear 
that there is indication of a slowing down 
in the rate of growth of industrial activity 
which is already affecting both the volume 
and the price of imports of raw materials. 
In volume terms, imports into OECD coun- 
tries were rising at the rate of 8 percent per 
year from the beginning of 1962 to the mid- 
dle of 1964. The recent slowdown of growth, 
especially in Europe and Japan, has so far 
had a rather limited effect on the volume 
of imports, but this somewhat slower growth, 
combined with developments on the supply 
side, was enough to reverse the rise in com- 
modity prices beginning late in 1964. 

The big question is whether this falling 
trend in the prices of primary commodities 
is likely to continue. The general price index 
reached a peak in the early months of 
1964 under the influence of the sharp rise 
in sugar prices. The subsequent fall in 
sugar quotations more than offset the rise 

in the prices of nonferrous metals which 
continued through most of the year. Prices 
of other agricultural products were stable at 
a relatively high level until the fourth 
quarter, when they fell sharply. Food prices 
were affected by good crops of both tropical 
foodstuffs and grain; the decline in wool 
prices reflected slackening demand in Eu- 
ropean textile industries. Since the begin- 
ning of 1965 agricultural prices have moved 
little either way, but nonferrous metal 
prices, which declined at the end of 1964 
and in the early months of 1965, had re- 
covered much of their loss by midyear. For 
the second half of the year, OECD analysts 
anticipate a slowing down in growth of in- 
dustrial production from 3 percent a year 
to 2 to 21/2 percent and continued downward 
pressure on commodity prices, but not to the 
same extent as in 1964 and not for all prod- 

Outlook for Specific Commodities 

Turning from the general problem of the 
primary producers to the outlook for those 
specific commodities which figure heavily 
in Latin America's export trade, we can nar- 
row the field to nine commodities, which 
account for some 70 percent of total Latin 
American exports. 


The index of export prices for Venezuela, 
which is made up of 90 percent petroleum, 
has remained unchanged for the past 5 
years, and the outlook is for continued 
stability in the receipts from this first- 
ranking Latin American export product. 


Coffee prices have remained relatively 
stable for the past 6 months, and we are 
hopeful that with the International Coffee 
Agreement now in full effect there will be 
no sharp downward fluctuation in coffee 


Cotton prices have been among the most 
stable and should remain relatively so. With 
the rapid growth in production in countries 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


outside the United States, there is likely to 
be downward pressure on world prices. 
However, the United States is a large factor 
in the world market and has customarily- 
utilized its position as residual supplier to 
avoid market instability. 


Copper prices are well above the levels of 
recent years and show little sign of weaken- 
ing. The long-term outlook for copper is 


Beef prices are at a very satisfactory 
level. Latin America's problem here is to re- 
build its herds to be able to take advantage 
of the relatively high prices. 


Sugar presents a different picture. The 
world market price is currently at the 
lowest figure in 25 years — 1.6 cents per 
pound. However, Latin America in 1964 sold 
only about 923,000 tons out of total exports 
of 2.5 million tons, or 36 percent of its ex- 
portable supply on the world market. Un- 
der existing U.S. sugar legislation the Latin 
American countries are marketing about 1.7 
million tons in the United States at an 
average price of about 5.6 cents per pound, 
and under the administration's proposals for 
new sugar legislation they would have an 
assured market for at least this quantity 
for the next 5 years, with some increase as 
United States consumption grows. Their 
income from sugar will not be subject to 
the sharp fluctuations which affect produc- 
ers who depend entirely on the world 

This is not to indicate a lack of concern 
with the world market problem. We expect 
to make every effort to help bring to a 
successful conclusion the conference which 
has been called by the United Nations for 
September 20 to try to work out a new in- 
ternational sugar agreement, with a price 
objective which would give producing coun- 
tries a fair return for sugar sold in the 
world market as well as for that shipped 

under quota to the United States. 

Wool is of major importance to Argen- 
tina and Uruguay. Both are experiencing 
problems in marketing their crop, but these 
appear more related to their financial poli- 
cies rather than to any surplus of wool in 
world markets. If there should be a serious 
problem affecting the wool trade, interna- 
tional cooperation is assured through the 
Wool Study Group, of which the United 
States is a member as well as the major 
producing countries. 

Iron Ore 

Iron ore, which scarcely figured in Latin 
America's export trade a few years ago, is 
becoming increasingly important and now 
accounts for about 2.5 percent of total ex- 
ports. The market for iron ore is an expand- 
ing one, and as new resources are devel- 
oped there is no doubt that there will be a 
satisfactory market for them which will 
contribute increasingly to the income of 
Brazil, Venezuela, and other countries. 


The outlook for bananas varies from 
country to country. Consumption shows 
little change, as the United States accords 
free entry to bananas and demand increases 
at about the rate of our population grovi^th. 
We are working with the producing coun- 
tries to try to obtain more liberal entry for 
their bananas in European markets, where 
there are duties and where the market 
might be expanded if restrictions were 
abolished. The problem, at the moment, is 
to adjust production to match a slowly 
growing demand. One country runs into a 
disease problem, and another country in- 
creases its production to fill the gap. As 
disease-control measures become effective, 
production returns to normal in the first 
country and the second is faced with a 
problem of oversupply. The problems facing 
banana producers are recurrent, and the 
United States has urged the establishment 
of a banana study group under the Food 



and Agriculture Organization. 

Two other commodities should be men- 
tioned — fishmeal, because the outlook is so 
favorable, and cocoa, because the outlook 
is so unfavorable. The fishmeal industry 
which has grown up on the west coast of 
South America during the past 10 years is a 
resource, formerly unrecognized, which will 
contribute greatly to Latin America's in- 
come. There is a great demand for the 
product, and prices remain high despite a 
constantly growing production. 

Cocoa is relatively unimportant in the total 
trade picture of Latin America. Exports of 
cocoa and cocoa butter amount to only 
about $90 million in a total export trade of 
almost $10 billion. Nevertheless, it is im- 
portant to the development of certain areas 
in a number of countries, and the recent 
decline in prices to a 24-year low is a mat- 
ter of concern. Here, too, we are working 
intensively with international organiza- 
tions in a search for ways to prevent the 
very sharp price fluctuations which have 
been typical of cocoa. 

From the foregoing, you will conclude 
with me that while there appears little 
reason to fear any serious, widespread fall 
in export earnings, there is good cause for 
the concern which has been expressed con- 
cerning prospects for the needed substan- 
tial grow1;h in export trade. We share that 
concern and, as I have stated, we are step- 
ping up our efforts to take those actions 
which offer the best prospects for stabiliz- 
ing and improving the market prospects of 
commodities on which Latin America will 
be heavily dependent for some time to come. 

Our concern for the improvement of the 
area's export earnings has increased the 
urgency with which we view efforts to 
speed the establishment of export-oriented 
industries in Latin America, to promote ex- 
ports of the area's manufactured and semi- 
manufactured goods, and to reduce trade 
barriers generally for both commodities 
and industrial products. Therefore, in our 
assistance efforts in the hemisphere, we 

give high priority to projects which will 
increase the export potential of the vari- 
ous countries. We have stimulated and are 
cooperating with inter-American groups 
planning and organizing export promotion 
activities and intend to assist them in exe- 
cuting their programs when these are for- 
mulated and approved. 

U.S. Action in Solving Debt Problems 

Turning now from the vital topic of ex- 
port earnings, I would like to comment on a 
related factor, the external indebtedness of 
Latin American countries, and on United 
States action to assist in resolving the 
problems which have arisen from it. We 
have all been aware that debt servicing re- 
quirements are a serious burden on the bal- 
ance of payments of many of our partners 
in the Alliance, limiting their freedom to 
use current export earnings for development 
programs and thus endangering the contin- 
uance of the drive toward economic advance. 
During the past decade the rapid growth 
of external indebtedness of the Latin Amer- 
ican Republics has caused amortization 
payment obligations of a number of coun- 
tries to approach or even exceed their ca- 
pacity to pay, as measured by their foreign 
exchange earnings and reserves. 

In most of these cases the debt burden 
was caused by an excessive recourse by the 
debtor country to short- and medium-term 
suppliers' credits. A large proportion of this 
type of credit has been extended by the 
European nations; nevertheless, the Latin 
American debtor government, when it 
found itself in difficulties, has approached 
the United States Government for debt re- 
lief as well as the Europeans. Prior to 1964, 
the Export-Import Bank has provided debt 
relief to Argentina and Brazil on a bilateral 
basis, albeit concurrently with negotiations 
by these two countries with European 
governments for similar refinancings. The 
Europeans, since the mid-1950's, have ne- 
gotiated debt refinancings with Latin Ameri- 
can and other governments as a bloc, work- 
ing through ad hoc conferences which 
were convened as required. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


In 1964, when the Brazilian Government 
broached the need for debt relief to major 
creditor governments, the United States 
decided to participate as a full member of 
the Hague Club, which was convened to 
work out a multilateral creditor position 
and to negotiate an agreement with Brazil. 
Subsequently, the United States took part 
as a full member in two Paris Club meet- 
ings, one in February of this year, which 
negotiated a debt refinancing agreement 
with Chile, and the second this past June, 
which performed a similar function in the 
case of Argentina. 


Under the Hague Club agreement of July 
1, 1964, the United States, Japan, and six 
Western European governments agreed to 
reschedule or refinance the equivalent of 70 
percent of payments falling due in 1964 
and 1965 on official or officially guaranteed 
project loans and suppliers' credits. 


At a Paris Club meeting in February 1965, 
11 creditors, including the United States, 
agreed to reschedule or refinance the 
equivalent of 70 percent of principal pay- 
ments due in 1965 and 1966 on certain 
Government project credits and Govern- 
ment-guaranteed suppliers' credits to Chile. 
After a 2-year grace period, the resched- 
uled 1965 maturities are repayable between 
1968 and 1972 and the 1966 maturities be- 
tween 1969 and 1972. 


In 1962 and 1963 the Paris Club and 
the United States, acting separately, refi- 
nanced certain Argentine debts. Govern- 
ment and Government-guaranteed debt 
repayments scheduled for 1964-66 were at 
record levels, however ($519 million in 1964; 
$489 million in 1965; and $369 million in 
1966). Although a large trade surplus 
helped Argentina to get through 1964, the 
Government in the spring of 1965 sought 
another debt rescheduling from the Paris 
Club to cover 1965 and 1966 debts. In June 
1965 the representatives of the Paris Club, 

including the United States, agreed to re- 
schedule or refinance 60 percent of princi- 
pal payments due in 1965 only, and to con- 
sider the 1966 situation later in the year in 
the light of prevailing circumstances. The 
absence of a standby agreement between 
the International Monetary Fund and Ar- 
gentina was a major reason for the credi- 
tors' reluctance to reschedule over a longer 
period or in greater amounts. 

Latin American Economic Integration 

I turn now to the subject which is being 
given primary attention during this series 
of hearings and in which the subcommittee 
so often has shown a keen interest. As you 
know, the United States has long supported 
integration of the developing economies of 
Latin America. This support was first for- 
mally and most prominently expressed in 
our signing of the Charter of Punta del 
Este in 1961 and has been an integral part 
of the common effort to accelerate economic 
development in Latin America throughout 
the history of the Alliance for Progress. We 
have since reiterated in official statements, 
and through the concrete assistance we 
have rendered, the importance which the 
United States gives to the need to move 
forward with the integration of Latin 
America. It was again made explicit by 
President Johnson only a few weeks ago, on 
the anniversary of the Alliance, when he 
told Latin American Ambassadors to the 
United States : ' 

... we must try to draw the economies of Latin 
America much closer together. The experience of 
Central Am.erica reaflfirms that of Europe. Widened 
markets — the breakdown of tariff barriers — leads to 
increased trade and leads to more efficient production 
and to greater prosperity. 

United States readiness to extend support 
and encouragement in this field arises from 
our conviction that real and effective eco- 
nomic integration can, through broadening 
the markets available to Latin American 
producers, hasten the growth and diver- 
sification of industry that will lead to 
greater employment opportunities and in- 

' For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17, 
see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426. 



creased incomes. Industries limited by the 
inadequacies of prospective markets cannot 
avail themselves fully of new technology 
and rational organization which make pos- 
sible economies of scale and which enhance 
the productivity of both labor and invested 

It is this barrier to more advanced in- 
dustrialization that we, along with many 
Latin Americans, hope to see broken 
through the removal of the import barriers 
which now surround the limited national 
markets. Industries free to serve several or 
all of the Latin American countries would 
be encouraged to select optimum locations 
and produce quality goods for sale at com- 
petitive prices. There would follow, too, 
construction of useful additions to infra- 
structure and the establishment of related 
secondary production and service facilities. 

In this way it would be possible to provide 
the increased incomes and expanding em- 
ployment opportunities so acutely needed in 
a region where population is growing at a 
very rapid rate. Such industries could also 
make more economical and efficient use of 
the natural resources of the area than is the 
case at present when facilities are unneces- 
sarily duplicated in uneconomic scale in 
several countries, while, on the other hand, 
potentially productive resources lie idle for 
lack of opportunities. 

There is good reason to believe that some 
industries which an integration of regional 
markets would make possible could, within 
a short period, compete on world markets 
and help to provide a badly needed diver- 
sification of export earnings. This would 
speed the day when more Latin American 
countries are free from overdependence on 
too few primary commodities produced for 

Effective integration would gradually but 
surely change the economic structure of 
Latin America and alter the character of 
United States trade with the area. Tradi- 
tional markets for some United States ex- 
ports would become foreclosed as produc- 
tion of these items grows within the region. 
Just as surely, the area would become a 

more promising market for the increasingly 
sophisticated products of United States in- 
dustry. The area would both have a greater 
need to import than if it were less developed 
and be better able to purchase what we have 
to offer. 

We in the executive branch are convinced 
that this integration is one of the changes 
which must take place if the growing as- 
pirations of the Latin American peoples for 
vastly improved economic and social condi- 
tions are to be satisfactorily met. We wish 
to see stable democratic governments the 
rule rather than the exception in the area; 
obviously the emergence and preservation 
of such desirable political traditions is in 
large part dependent upon rapid economic 

U.S. Support of Integration 

This is why the United States has so 
often and so clearly expressed its support 
for economic integration in Latin America; 
nor have we only paid lipservice to the prin- 
ciple while remaining otherwise aloof or hos- 
tile toward efforts to accomplish this admit- 
tedly difficult task. The United States has 
given concrete evidence that its support is 

Most strikingly and most effectively, the 
United States has directly supported the 
formation and development of the Central 
American Common Market. To date, we 
have committed funds in excess of $60 mil- 
lion to be used along with contributions of 
the five member states in financing re- 
gional projects for infrastructure and in- 
dustry. Through AID we have provided ex- 
tensive technical assistance and cooperation 
which we feel sure have been of value in 
developing the institutions, policies, plans, 
and projects of that quite successful regional 
group; we continue to search for new ways 
in which we can be of assistance. 

From its inception, the Inter-American 
Development Bank was given a mandate not 
only to assist national projects but also to 
contribute to collective and complementary 
economic development in the area. In sup- 
port of these ends, the United States has 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


increased its contributions and commit- 
ments to the Bank's operating funds to 
above the billion dollar mark (in addition 
to $525 million in SPTF [Social Progress 
Trust Fund] ) and agreed to subscribe over 
$600 million in callable capital, which en- 
ables the Bank to borrovv^ substantial sums. 
It is therefore clear that the United States 
has given substantial concrete evidence of 
its willingness to support true integration. 

This subcommittee has expressed partic- 
ular interest in considering what the role 
of the United States should be as a sup- 
porter of Latin American integration ef- 
forts. I want to assure you that this ques- 
tion receives much attention in the Depart- 
partment of State; our related policies and 
the possibilities for assisting integration in 
new ways are under constant review. 

We appreciate that forward movement 
toward integration signifies important 
changes within the economic and political 
structure of each country directly involved. 
Difficult decisions relating to the exchange 
of what are regarded as gains or sacrifices 
in established or potential interests must be 
made. We recognize that it is the peoples 
and governments of Latin American coun- 
tries who have the responsibility for taking 
these decisions which determine the goals, 
the substance, and the form of their integra- 
tion efforts, and we find it natural that they 
should wish to arrive at their decisions 
without interference. 

It is our policy to encourage the Latin 
American countries to seek the advantages 
of integration in their own way, with due 
regard for the interests of other trading 
nations and with all the urgency which the 
need for accelerating development demands. 
We have been generous and reasonably 
prompt in offering financial assistance both 
through specialized institutions in Central 
America and through the Inter-American 
Bank. Considerable sums are at the disposi- 
tion of these organizations for use in projects 
connected with economic integration, and I 
feel confident that the United States will be 
forthcoming in augmenting these resources 
whenever suitable projects appear to be 
exhausting those now available. 

Within the larger of Latin America's 
organizations for integration, the Latin 
American Free Trade Area (LAFTA), there 
is a growing consensus that regional coop- 
eration in the planning and promotion of 
industrial expansion in selected industries 
must be undertaken to augment the gradual 
trade liberalization efforts now underway. 
The development of such ideas is not com- 
plete, nor have the methods for planning and 
executing regional industrial projects been 
chosen. Much work remains to be done in 
this field. However, we believe that this ap- 
proach holds promise for more rapid fruitful 
progress. If the member countries of LAFTA ■ 
agree upon such programs, provide for rea- 1 
sonable flexibility in the location of an in- 
dustry, expand prospective markets, and 
stimulate a desirable degree of competition 
through encouraging progress toward free 
intraregional trade in its products, we are 
convinced the stimulation given to private 
investors, both Latin American and others, 
will give great impetus to the creation of 
needed new industries. And, as President 
Johnson stated on August 17, the United 
States is willing to help in a venture of this 
type for the production and trade, on a con- 
tinental basis, of fertilizer, pesticides, and 
products needed to meet the urgent need for 
increased agricultural production in the 
area, which is of evident priority. 

As I have outlined it here, our actual and 
prospective role in support of Latin Ameri- 
can integration is large and growing. How- 
ever, I am aware that there is a respectable 
body of opinion which holds that, because 
the general economic integration movement 
in Latin America is progressing only slowly 
and cautiously, the United States should seek 
to stimulate it through offering to establish 
special trading relationships with regional 
groups in the area under certain conditions, 
either immediately or eventually. 

In this connection, I would call to your 
attention that many Latin American leaders 
feel strongly that their countries must avoid 
a high degree of dependence upon the United 
States. Also, the view is widespread that 
much time must pass before the economies 
of the area can deal on equal terms with that 



of the United States. Only last week, the 
President of Mexico [Gustavo Diaz Ordaz], 
among statements indicating his strong de- 
sire to see Latin American economic inte- 
gration proceed rapidly, made it quite clear 
that his country will not now consider ar- 
rangements on a larger scale which might 
include the United States and Canada. 

Because this topic is a part of the broader 
subject of the position and policies of the 
United States within the context of its 
worldwide economic relationships and re- 
sponsibilities, I have agreed with my col- 
league, Mr. Solomon, that he should discuss 
it during his remarks this morning. 


Press release 21B dated September 10 

I welcome the opportunity to discuss with 
the Joint Committee the administration's 
position on Latin American economic inte- 
gration and to consider the possibilities for 
wider hemispheric trade cooperation. My 
point of departure is the general economic 
and trade policy of the United States. 

Our worldwide trade policy can be stated 
briefly. We favor a free and open world 
trading system, based on the principle of 
nondiscrimination, with minimum restric- 
tions on the flow of goods and services across 
national boundaries. Such a system is, in our 
view, truly growth-promoting. It enables 
participants to benefit from the specializa- 
tion, the development and exchange of tech- 
nology, and the spur to productivity that 
competition provides. It serves United States 
commercial interests directly. It serves the 
interests of other trading nations. 

We learned from the disastrous experience 
of the interwar period that attempts by na- 
tions to solve their problems at each other's 
expense throttled the economic growth of all. 
Experience has amply shown that the wider 
the area of trade freedom, the larger the 
possibilities for fruitful exchange and 

We have, therefore, directed our efforts in 
the postwar period to the progressive reduc- 
tion of barriers to world trade on a multi- 

lateral basis, and we are now engaged in 
negotiations for the most ambitious reduc- 
tion of trade barriers in history, the Kennedy 

The principle underlying our trade policy 
has been equality of treatment. This prin- 
ciple has been endorsed by the Congress in 
successive trade agreement legislation, most 
recently in the Trade Expansion Act of 
1962. The same philosophy is embodied in 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
— the GATT — the instrumentality through 
which more than 60 countries, including 8 
of the 19 Latin American Republics, have 
carried out multilateral negotiations for the 
reduction of tariff barriers, subject to auto- 
matic extension to all contracting parties 
under the most-favored-nation principle. 

The GATT, however, is not a rigid instru- 
ment. It condones three major derogations 
from the MEN principle: (a) preferential 
arrangements which were in existence prior 
to the coming into force of the GATT in 
1947 — a clause which covers British Com- 
monwealth preferences and U.S.-Philippine 
preferences; (b) customs unions; and (c) 
free-trade areas. The exception for preexist- 
ing arrangements was accepted at the time 
as a political fact of life. It is worth noting 
that U.S.-Philippine preferences are now 
being phased out under a fixed schedule and 
will terminate in 1974. British Common- 
wealth preferences are now a much less sig- 
nificant factor in world trade than was once 
the case and will continue to decline in im- 
portance as a result of multilateral tariff 
reductions and declining preference margins. 

The exceptions for customs unions and 
free-trade areas reflected the widespread 
view that the trade-creating effect of re- 
gional groupings would offset the disadvan- 
tages to third countries of the commercial 
discrimination they would suffer. In other 
words, a successful regional economic group- 
ing would benefit the trade of nonmembers 
as well as members although in different 
degree. Moreover, regional economic group- 
ings can have a politically unifying force of 

In this connection, it may be noted that 
Latin America's exports to the EEC [Euro- 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


pean Economic Community] increased by 40 
percent during the 5-year period 1959-63, a 
higher rate of increase than to any other 
major market, including the United States. 

Rationale for Regional Economic Groupings 

The hearings in the past 2 days have 
amply exposed the rationale for regional 
economic groupings among developing coun- 
tries. In the postwar period, when the trade 
of the advanced countries increased dramat- 
ically in volume and value, the trade of the 
low-income countries lagged. Trade has not, 
as a general matter, been an engine of 
growth for the developing countries. The 
reasons for the less favorable trend in the 
export trade of the low-income countries are 
rooted in the basic structure of this trade 
itself. The low-income countries depend for 
85-90 percent of their export earnings on 
raw materials, in major part on agricultural 
raw materials. Demand for these traditional 
export commodities is not dynamic. Satura- 
tion in the main consuming centers, compe- 
tition from synthetics, economies in the use 
of materials, and the increasing agricultural 
self-sufficiency of some industrial countries 
have contributed to the slow growth in ex- 
port earnings, as have deteriorating prices 
of certain key commodities. 

If the low-income countries are to make 
more satisfactory progress in economic de- 
velopment, they must diversify their agricul- 
ture and expand their industry. In many 
countries, however, internal markets are too 
small to support efficient modern industrial 
plants. It is not the size of the population 
but their effective purchasing power that 
determines the size of a market, and in the 
developing countries per capita income is 
low. Thus, these countries must not only seek 
ways of expanding their domestic markets 
through greater internal trade, but they also 
require larger external markets to enable 
their enterprises to benefit from the econo- 
mies of scale and the intraindustry special- 
ization on which growth and efficiency 

That Latin American industry would bene- 
fit from a market of continental size is self- 

evident. While shielded for a time from 
export competition from the advanced coun- 
tries, enterprises would be exposed to more 
tolerable competition within the broader re- 
gional market and would reach a competitive 
position in international markets much ear- 
lier and much more effectively. 

Recognizing that the low-income countries 
may be able to move ahead more readily by 
forms of partial integration, we suggested in 
the GATT in November 1963 that considera- 
tion be given to amending the GATT so as 
to permit developing countries to undertake 
regional economic integration on a broad 
sectoral basis, that is, to sanction the estab- 
lishment of free trade in a few selected 
products by groupings of less developed 
countries. The sectors chosen should be those 
that would clearly benefit by large-scale op- 
erations for a broad market. This proposal 
and related ones submitted by other contract- 
ing parties are currently under considera- 
tion, and, although no agreed draft has yet 
emerged, the basic principle of partial eco- 
nomic integration among developing coun- 
tries is widely accepted, in addition to the 
option of forming customs unions and free- 
trade areas. 

In his remarks commemorating the fourth 
anniversary of the Alliance for Progress the 
President urged the Latin American coun- 
tries to consider the development on a conti- 
nental basis of fertilizer, pesticides, and 
other products needed to increase agricul- 
tural production. This would be a form of 
sectoral integration, free trade in certain 
chemical products needed for agriculture. 
The President made it clear that we are will- 
ing to help in such a venture. 

Let me summarize at this point. We con- 
tinue to favor a nondiscriminatory world 
trade regime. We recognize at the same time 
that common markets and free-trade areas 
can have significant salutary effects on 
member countries' economic growth and thus 
contribute to the expansion of world trade 
and world income generally. We particularly 
support Latin American economic integra- 
tion for these reasons. We see our role as 
one of encouragement and support. We shall 
continue to assist in every appropriate way. 



The President has offered to contribute from 
Alliance resources to a fund for multina- 
tional projects to link the countries of the 
region together and to help in the develop- 
ment of continent-wide industries needed to 
increase agricultural production. 

Some Forms of Special Trading Relationships 

I know the committee is interested in ex- 
ploring the possibilities for new and closer 
trade relations between the United States 
and Latin America, and indeed embracing 
the entire Western Hemisphere — relations 
that go beyond encouragement and financial 
support for Latin American integration. I 
would like, therefore, to examine some of 
these possibilities. We do, after all, have a 
special interest in Latin America. The facts 
of geography and the ties of history bind us. 
The Alliance for Progress testifies to our 
deep and special interest in Latin American 
economic and social progress. 

It would seem reasonable to begin our 
consideration by examination of the pro- 
posals that the countries of Latin America 
have themselves advanced. But the fact is 
that there is no clear-cut Latin American 
position on this matter. Some Latin Ameri- 
can spokesmen have from time to time sug- 
gested the possibility of special trade rela- 
tions with the United States, but it is not 
clear from their remarks whether what is 
desired is general tariff preferences, or pref- 
erential quotas on primary products, or other 

We might, therefore, examine objectively 
the various forms of special trading relations 
between the United States and Latin America 
that are theoretically possible and consider 
their implications. We might examine four 
possibilities which overlap to some extent: 
(1) a full-fledged customs union or free- 
trade area in this hemisphere; (2) a modi- 
fied free-trade arrangement in which Latin 
America would have unrestricted access to 
the U.S. market but would be free to retain 
or impose barriers to protect her infant in- 
dustry; (3) a hemisphere free-trade area in 
raw materials alone; (4) tariff preferences 
on manufactured goods, generalized to all 

developing countries or restricted to Latin 
America alone. 

As to the first possibility, it is unmistaka- 
bly clear that the time is not at hand for a 
full-fledged Western Hemisphere common 
market or free-trade area embracing manu- 
factures as well as raw materials. The dis- 
parity in levels of development between the 
North and South is so great that Latin 
America would be overwhelmed. Our exports 
would swamp them. Such an arrangement 
could be seriously considered only in the 
future when Latin America is an economi- 
cally mature and developed society. In an 
address to the Mexican Congress on Septem- 
ber 1, President Diaz Ordaz paid special 
attention to the desirability of economic 
integration of Latin America but made it 
explicit that such integration should be con- 
fined to Latin America and not include the 
United States, Canada, or other industrial 

As to the second possibility, that is, a 
modified free-trade area, Latin America 
would be free to retain or impose revenue 
duties and protective barriers for her infant 
industry but would enjoy free entry in the 
United States market. An arrangement of 
this kind would correspond to that between 
the European Common Market and the Asso- 
ciated African States. It would be essentially 
a preferential arrangement in which Latin 
America would enjoy advantages in the 
United States market denied to countries 
outside the hemisphere and the United 
States might enjoy special access in Latin 
American markets. 

Such an arrangement would be a signifi- 
cant departure from established United 
States trade policy and practice. A forbid- 
ding array of imponderables stands in the 
way of an easy answer to the question 
whether a United States-Latin American 
preferential arrangement of this kind would 
make economic and political sense for the 
United States and Latin America. 

In strictly economic terms, Latin America 
would need to weigh the possible benefits of 
preferential access to the large U.S. market 
against the possible losses in other markets 
if a hemisphere free-trade area spurred in- 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


dustrial countries outside the hemisphere to 
develop new preferential arrangements with 
developing countries in Africa and Asia and 
to broaden and deepen those now in effect. 

Latin America desires to encourage a 
larger flow of aid and investment from in- 
dustrial countries outside the hemisphere 
both to increase the amounts available to her 
and to diversify the sources of assistance. 
Would she suffer a diminution of aid and 
investment from other sources rather than 
the expansion she desires? 

And would she be in a position to take 
advantage of free entry into the U.S. mar- 
ket, given the high cost and modest scope 
of her industry today? Her manufactures 
would still have to compete in the U.S. 
market with large and efficient U.S. firms. 
Indeed, the rationale for a continental Latin 
American common market is precisely to 
enable her to develop the efficiency and 
scale of operations she would need to meet 
this competition. 

Very careful thought would need to be 
given to the impact on the U.S. trading 
position in other markets. The United States 
is truly a world trading nation. Latin 
America accounts for about 15 percent of 
our exports and 23 percent of our imports. 
Our exports to the EEC account for about 
17 percent, to EFTA countries about 9 per- 
cent, to Canada 18 percent, to Japan 7 per- 
cent of our total exports. Were a preferential 
American trading area to spark similar ar- 
rangements in other parts of the world 
where trade now moves on a nondiscrimina- 
tory basis. United States trading interests 
outside this hemisphere could be substan- 
tially injured. 

Whatever the balance of direct economic 
losses and gains within the hemisphere 
might be, countries outside the hemisphere 
in whose peaceful progress we have a deep 
interest could lose, and the loss could be sig- 
nificant. One can mention India, Pakistan, 
the Philippines, Thailand, Israel, Iran, Ethi- 
opia, Kenya, Taiwan — the list is obviously 
illustrative, not exhaustive. The United 
States is, after all, a country with worldwide 
interests and responsibilities. 

Free-Trade Area in Raw Materials 

The third possibility, a free-trade area in 
raw materials alone, was proposed to this 
committee by private parties at its hearings 
last year. It was proposed that barriers to 
trade in raw materials within the hemi- 
sphere be eliminated over a 10-year period 
and further that this hemisphere arrange- 
ment proceed concurrently with the develop- 
ment within Latin America alone of a full 
continental common market in all goods, raw 
materials, and manufactures alike. 

We would, of course, look with favor on 
the development of a Latin American con- 
tinental common market. The question is 
whether the proposed hemisphere arrange- 
ment in raw materials would be mutually 
beneficial and what its effects might be on 
countries outside the hemisphere. 

As the committee is aware, many key Latin 
American export commodities, such as cof- 
fee, cocoa, bananas, tin, enter the United 
States market duty free. The proposed new 
arrangement would not increase Latin Amer- 
ica's earnings from the sale of these prod- 
ucts. To enable Latin America to obtain 
special benefits from the sale of these com- 
modities, it would be necessary to give her 
special quotas in these products or to impose 
tariffs against nonhemisphere suppliers. If 
we were to do this, we would need to consider 
the effects of such action on developing 
countries outside the hemisphere whose 
trade would be injured to the extent Latin 
America was helped. 

There are other important Latin American 
raw material exports — copper is illustrative 
— which are subject to duty, but the duties 
are quite modest, and the benefit to Latin 
America that would flow from their removal, 
while real, would be correspondingly modest. 

A few important Latin American exports 
are subject to quota in the United States 
market, most notably petroleum, sugar, lead, 
and zinc. But is it realistic to contemplate 
unrestricted entry in these products, given 
the considerations of national policy that 
have led to imposition of these quotas? Nor 
can we ignore the effect on developing 
countries outside the hemisphere if the 



quotas they now enjoy were withdrawn in 
favor of hemisphere suppliers. 

We must also consider the effects in Latin 
American markets of free entry there for 
United States raw material exports. Rice, 
cotton, and wheat are illustrative. Would 
Latin American producers of these commodi- 
ties be disturbed at the prospect of unre- 
stricted entry in their markets of competing 
United States commodities? 

Proposals for Preferential Access 

The fourth possibility we might examine 
is preferential access for manufactured 

Latin America has urged the introduction 
of preferential arrangements for manufac- 
tures. But the striking fact is that she has 
not thought in hemisphere terms. Instead she 
has alined herself with the developing coun- 
tries of Asia and Africa at the U.N. Con- 
ference on Trade and Development in urging 
a system of generalized preferences from all 
advanced countries in favor of all developing 

A variety of preference schemes has been 
proposed, but one-way free trade for develop- 
ing countries' manufactures is illustrative of 
what is being urged. The rationale for the 
proposal is that low-income countries cannot 
meet the competition, in developed-country 
markets, of the manufactured exports of 
other developed countries whose greater ef- 
ficiency enables them to quote lower prices. 
Given preferential access, goods offered by 
low-income countries would be less expensive 
to importers — depending, of course, on the 
tariff rate importers must pay on the same 
type of goods coming from developed coun- 
tries. Importers attracted by the price ad- 
vantage would place orders, volume would 
increase, and over time costs would be re- 
duced so that when preferences were phased 
out these low-income manufactures could 
compete on an MFN basis. 

We have been studying the many prefer- 
ence proposals advanced by the low-income 
countries and by some of the industrial 
countries — there are substantial variations 

— but we have not been convinced that any 
of them would produce significant trade 
benefits for the developing countries as a 
group, while their adoption could do injury 
to specific countries and to the trading 
system as a whole. 

In a system of generalized preferences the 
trade possibilities for the low-income coun- 
tries would depend on the level of tariffs on 
goods offered by them. While import duties 
in advanced countries vary, rates on goods 
of export interest to the developing countries 
average about 15 percent ad valorem, some 
more, some less. Following even a moderately 
successful Kennedy Round, it is reasonable 
to foresee a reduction to less than 10 percent 
on the average. 

The questions we have asked ourselves are 
these: Are there many manufacturing en- 
terprises in the developing countries, ex- 
cluding those like textiles which are quite 
competitive already and need no preferential 
advantage, that could break into industrial 
markets against established developed coun- 
try suppliers on the basis of a 10-percent 
margin on the average? We should bear in 
mind that infant industries in the develop- 
ing countries, certainly in Latin America, 
are in many cases protected by tariffs of 100 
percent ad valorem and more. Is it likely 
that private foreign investors would be 
stimulated to locate in developing countries 
in order to enjoy the advantage of a 10- 
percent margin in the markets of the de- 
veloped countries? This advantage would be 
diluted for any one country because all low- 
income countries would be eligible. 

It is difficult to believe that the trade and 
investment effect of a 10-percent preferen- 
tial margin would be more than marginal. 
If so, the breach in the MFN principle would 
add little to economic grovirth in the under- 
developed world, but it might at the same 
time create resistance to further multilateral 
tariff reductions because such reductions 
would narrow the scope for preference mar- 
gins for the low-income countries. 

This examination of possible special hemi- 
sphere trade relations would be incomplete 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


if I failed to note the recommendation in the 
CIAP [Inter- American Committee on the 
Alliance for Progress] report of August 10 
to the Presidents of all American Republics. ^ 
The CIAP report urged consideration of a 
policy of temporary, defensive measures to 
compensate Latin America for discrimination 
arising from arrangements in other parts of 
the world. The present impact of these dis- 
criminatory arrangements is on trade in 
primary products, including several of major 
export interest to Latin America. 

The CIAP recommendation is a manifesta- 
tion of the same concern the United States 
has felt about departures from the principle 
of nondiscrimination. There have been some 
disconcerting recent developments suggest- 
ing a further proliferation of such discrimi- 
natory arrangements. 

The course we should follow seems to me 
reasonably clear. We should seek ways by 
which existing discriminatory arrangements 
can be phased out or their injurious effects 
neutralized; and we should continue to 
counsel others against the institution of new 
preferential arrangements. 

It may be, however, that our efforts in 
this direction — and we intend to pursue them 
vigorously — will be unsuccessful. In that 
event we may want to reconsider our own 
historic trade policy of nondiscrimination. 
We must retain sufficient flexibility in our 
policies to adjust to the evolution of the 
world economy and policies adopted by other 
major countries of the world. 

I have tried to be responsive to the com- 
mittee's inquiry, its interest in Latin Ameri- 
can regional integration, the MFN principle, 
and the possibilities for new hemispheric 
trade relations. But I would not want to 
conclude this statement without noting two 
points: First, the advanced countries are 
committed in the Kennedy Round of trade 
negotiations now underway to make a spe- 
cial effort to reduce barriers on trade items 

' Not printed here. 

of interest to the developing countries with- 
out asking full reciprocity from them. Sec- 
ond, here and now, and for years to come, 
the trade of Latin America, as of all the 
developing countries, is trade in primary 
products. These are indeed the lifeblood of 
their economies and the source of 85-90 
percent of their export earnings. The eco- 
nomic diversification and industrialization 
that successful integration can promote will 
necessarily be a long, slow process, and its 
salutary effects will be realized only gradu- 
ally. If we want to help Latin America and 
the developing countries in other regions 
with the major trade problem that confronts 
them today, we must take steps to improve 
commodity market conditions, to help stabi- 
lize prices at equitable and remunerative 
levels, and improve conditions of access. 

Where the root problem of instability and 
depressed prices is oversupply, we should 
work in concert with other consumer coun- 
tries and the international development 
agencies to help producing countries curb 
overproduction and find more rewarding 
uses for the resources now wasted in harvest- 
ing surplus supplies. The International Cof- 
fee Agreement is an example of our efforts 
in this direction. Coffee accounts for more 
than 16 percent of Latin America's export 
earnings. By helping to improve Latin 
America's coffee economy, within the frame- 
work of the Coffee Agreement, we can make 
a real contribution to Latin America's trade 
and growth. 

Where the root problem in commodity 
trade is competition with synthetics, we can 
give appropriate assistance to producing 
countries in improving their efficiency so as 
to enable them to meet synthetics on a price- 
and-quality basis and hold their share of the 

These are positive, practical measures to 
cope with the major trade problem of Latin 
America and of the developing countries 
generally, and to do so in ways that are , 
nondiscriminatory and beneficial to all 




Income Tax Protocol Signed 
With Federal Republic of Germany 

Press release 224 dated September 17 

On September 17 the American Ambassa- 
dor at Bonn and the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Federal Republic of Germany 
signed a protocol between the United 
States and the Federal Republic of Germany 
modifying the convention of July 22, 1954, 
for the avoidance of double taxation with 
respect to taxes on income.^ 

Modification of the 1954 convention in 
certain respects has been made advisable by 
reason of experience in the application of 
the convention since its entry into force and 
by relevant changes in the Federal Repub- 
lic's tax system. 

A major feature of the revision effected 
by the protocol is a change in the taxation 
of dividends. Under the provisions as 
amended by the protocol, dividends passing 
from one country to the other will be sub- 
ject to a reduced withholding tax of 15 per- 
cent. An exception to this rule is provided 
in respect of dividends paid by a Federal 
Republic company to a U.S. company hav- 
ing an interest of 10 percent or more in the 
Federal Republic company paying the div- 
idends. The Federal Republic tax on divi- 
dends in such case will be withheld at the 
full rate of 25 percent, whenever the div- 
idends are reinvested in the Federal Re- 
public company. In this connection, reinvest- 
ment in any calendar year totaling less than 
7.5 percent of the dividends received will be 
disregarded. On the other hand, any rein- 
vestment made by the U.S. company in the 
year prior to or following the year in which 
the dividends are paid will be taken into 

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 

account for purposes of imposing Federal 
Republic withholding tax at the full 25 
percent rate. 

Another important change effected by the 
protocol in the convention relates to know- 
how payments. Such payments will be 
treated as royalties and as such will be ex- 
empt from tax in the country of source as 
from January 1, 1963. 

The definition of the term "permanent 
establishment" and the rule governing in- 
dustrial and commercial profits are brought 
into line with the definition in other recent 
income tax conventions concluded by the 
United States. Other changes effected by 
the protocol relate to the taxation of inter- 
est and capital gains. Double taxation of 
dividends from portfolio investments in the 
United States will be avoided by crediting 
U.S. tax against Federal Republic tax. The 
convention would be extended to include 
the Federal Republic trade tax and capital 
tax. The protocol provides for a broadening 
of the exemption with respect to personal 
service income and the provisions dealing 
with governmental salaries, wages, and pen- 
sions. American nonprofit institutions 
would be accorded exemption from Federal 
Republic tax comparable with that ac- 
corded Federal Republic nonprofit institu- 
tions under U.S. law. 

Except as otherwise indicated in the pro- 
tocol, the convention as amended is to ap- 
ply as of January 1 of the year in which 
the exchange of instruments of ratification 
takes place. The article regarding taxation 
of dividends would have effect with respect 
to dividends paid on or after January 1, 

The protocol will be transmitted to the 
Senate for advice and consent of the Senate 
to ratification. 

OCTOBER 4, 1965 


Current Actions 



Convention on offenses and certain other acts com- 
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo Septem- 
ber 14, 1963.' 

Signatures: Nigeria, June 29, 1965; Pakistan, 
August 6, 1965. 


International convention to facilitate the importa- 
tion of commercial samples and advertising ma- 
terial. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered 
into force November 20, 1955; for the United 
States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 
Accession deposited: Uganda (with reservation), 
April 15, 1965. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 

Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 24, 


Ratification advised by the Senate: September 14, 
Optional protocol to the convention on diplomatic 

relations concerning the compulsory settlement of 

disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered 

into force April 24, 1964.' 

Ratification advised by the Seiuxte: September 14, 


International telecommunication convention, with six 
annexes. Signed at Geneva December 21, 1959. 
Entered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Zambia, August 23, 1965. 

United Nations 

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations 
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New York, December 17, 1963. 
Entered into force: August 31, 1965. 
Proclaimed by the President: September 13, 1965. 


Germany, Federal Republic of 

Protocol amending convention for avoidance of 
double taxation with respect to taxes on income 
of July 22, 1954 (TIAS 3133). Signed at Bonn 
September 17, 1965. Enters into force upon ex- 
change of instruments of ratification. 


Agreement amending annex C of the mutual defense 
assistance agreement of January 27, 1950 (TIAS 
2016). Effected by exchange of notes at Oslo 
August 10 and 24, 1965. Entered into force August 
24, 1965. 


' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 


The Senate on September 10 confirmed the follow- 
ing nominations: 

Mrs. Eugenie Anderson to be the representative 
of the United States on the Trusteeship Council of 
the United Nations. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated August 25.) 

Charles Frankel to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 220 dated September 15.) 

John A. Gronouski to be Ambassador to Poland. 
(For biographic details, see White House press re- 
lease (Austin, Tex.) dated August 29.) 

Raymond A. Hare to be an Assistant Secretary 
of State. (For biographic details, see Department 
of State press release 229 dated September 22.) 

James M. Nabrit, Jr., to be a deputy representative 
of the United States in the Security Council of the 
United Nations. (For biographic details, see White 
House press release dated August 25.) 

Dr. Gustav Ranis to be Assistant Administrator 
for Program Coordination, Agency for International 

James Roosevelt to be the representative of the 
United States on the Economic and Social Council of 
the United Nations. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated August 25.) 

Charles W. Yost to be the deputy representative 
of the United States to the United Nations and a 
deputy representative of the United States in the 
Security Council of the United Nations. (For bio- 
graphic details, see White House press release dated 
August 25.) 



INDEX October U, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1371 

Africa. Assistant Secretary Williams Visits 
12 African Countries 552 

American Republics 

A Review of U.S. Policy in Latin America 
(Vaughn) 548 

U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America (Solomon, 
Vaughn) 559 


Confirmations (Anderson, Frankel, Gronouski, 
Hare, Nabrit, Ranis, Roosevelt, Yost) . . 574 

U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America (Solomon, 
Vaughn) 559 

Department and Foreign Service. Confirma- 
tions (Anderson, Frankel, Gronouski, Hare, 
Nabrit, Ranis, Roosevelt, Yost) 574 

Disarmament. Finland and the United States, 
an Enduring Friendship (Harriman) . . . 555 

Economic Affairs 

Income Tax Protocol Signed With Federal 
Republic of Germany 573 

Secretary Fowler Reports on Monetary Talks 
in Europe 553 

U.S. Trade Mission Visits Poland and Rumania 553 

U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America (Solomon, 
Vaughn) 559 

Educational and Cultural Affairs 

Frankel confirmed as Assistant Secretary . . 574 
The Legacy of James Smithson (Johnson) . . 550 


Finland and the United States, an Enduring 
Friendship (Harriman) 555 

President Sends Greetings to Finnish-Ameri- 
can Celebration (message) 557 

Foreign Aid 

Ranis confirmed as Assistant Administrator 
for Program Coordination, AID .... 574 

A Review of U.S. Policy in Latin America 
(Vaughn) 548 

U.S. Trade Policy in Latin America (Solomon, 
Vaughn) 559 

Germany. Income Tax Protocol Signed With 
Federal Republic of Germany 573 

India. World Peace Through Law (Goldberg, 
Johnson) 542 

International Law. World Peace Through Law 
(Goldberg, Johnson) 542 

Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs. Hare 
confirmed as Assistant Secretary .... 574 

Pakistan. World Peace Through Law (Gold- 
berg, Johnson) 542 


Gronouski confirmed as Ambassador .... 574 
U.S. Trade Mission Visits Poland and Rumania 553 

Presidential Documents 

The Legacy of James Smithson 550 

President Sends Greetings to Finnish-Ameri- 
can Celebration 657 

World Peace Through Law 542 

Rumania. U.S. Trade Mission Visits Poland 
and Rumania 553 


The Legacy of James Smithson (Johnson). . 550 
Outer Space and the Advancement of Human 
Understanding (Ball) 552 


Treaty Information 

Current Actions 574 

Income Tax Protocol Signed With Federal 

Republic of Germany 573 

United Nations 

Confirmations (Anderson, Nabrit, Roosevelt, 

Yost) 574 

World Peace Through Law (Goldberg, John- 
son) 542 

Viet-Nam. Finland and the United States, an 

Enduring Friendship (Harriman) .... 555 

Name Index 

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 574 

Ball, George W 552 

Fowler, Henry H 553 

Frankel, Charles 574 

Goldberg, Arthur J 542 

Gronouski, John A 574 

Hare, Raymond A 574 

Harriman, W. Averell 555 

Johnson, President 542, 550, 557 

Nabrit, James M., Jr 574 

Ranis, Gustav 574 

Roosevelt, James 574 

Solomon, Anthony M 559 

Vaughn, Jack H . '. 548, 559 

Williams, G. Mennen 552 

Yost, Charles W 574 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 13-19 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to September 13 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
205 of September 3; 215 of September 9; and 
216 of September 10. 
No. Date Subject 

218 9/15 Assistant Secretary W i 1 1 i a m s 
visits 12 African countries (re- 
*219 9/14 MacArthur: Greater Bethlehem, 

Pa., United Appeal. 
*220 9/15 Frankel sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Educational and 
Cultural Affairs (biographic 
*221 9/16 Thurston sworn in as Ambassador 
to Somali Republic (biographic 
222 9/15 Ball: Astronauts luncheon. 
t223 9/16 Ball: "The Hard Problems of a 
Turbulent World" (revised). 

224 9/17 Income tax protocol with Ger- 


225 9/17 Goldberg: Conference on World 

Peace Through Law. 
t226 9/18 Sisco: "The Days Ahead for the 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 




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Canada and the United States— Principles for Partnership 
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Pearson, two former ambassadors, one Canadian and one American, formulate some guiding prin- 
ciples for U.S.-Canadian relations. "There are large opportunities," they conclude, "for mutual 
advantage in the extension of the partnership of our two countries. . . . For our part, we are 
satisfied that the process can be as mutually rewarding as it is inevitable." 



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Vol. LIU. No. 1S72 

October 11, 1965 


Statement by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 578 

by Under Secretary Ball 588 

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 593 

Special Article by Paul F. Geren 597 

For index see inside back cover 

Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society for All Men 

statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly ^ 

We meet this morning in a mood of ac- 
complishment and gratification. Just 24 
hours ago a great milestone in the life of 
the United Nations was passed. The cease- 
fire between India and Pakistan, first re- 
quested and then demanded by the Security 
Council, has happily taken effect in both 

I hope, Mr. President, it will not be amiss 
if I take a moment to pay tribute to the 
untiring work and the great contribution 
made by all of the members of the Security 
Council, permanent and nonpermanent, in 
bringing about this result. Providence and 
the rules of the Security Council placed me 
in the chair, but it was the efforts of my 
colleagues, patiently pursued, which resulted 
in the united resolutions which had such a 

^Made in plenary session on Sept. 23 (U.S. dele- 
gation press release 4649). 
' See p. 602. 

great impact in bringing about this neces- 
sary result. 

I have, Mr. President, in my public and 
private life had much to do with conflicts 
of another sort, but I have never experi- 
enced such a common dedication to the 
charter commitment as I experienced dur- 
ing the past weeks by the members and the 
nations that they represent. 

It is, I believe, a happy omen for the fu- 
ture of this great organization that such a 
grave conflict, the gravest in the history 
of the organization, can, in its initial step at 
least, have been contained by this type of 
common action. 

And for that I wish to record a personal 
note of thanks and appreciation to the men 
who labored so hard and long to bring about 
this beneficial result. And I would like to 
record the significant contribution made by 
our distinguished Secretary-General, who 


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took upon himself, pursuant to authoriza- 
tion by the Council, the arduous and diffi- 
cult role of going to the subcontinent in 
times of travail and storm and tribulation so 
as to carry the message of peace to the 
contending nations. 

Once again, in rebuttal of the skeptics and 
the cynics, the United Nations proved to be 
the decisive peacemaker. Once again the 
United Nations provided the indispensable 
and vital element, the only acceptable cata- 
lyst to help end the needless bloodshed be- 
tween the two great countries, two neigh- 
bors whose bonds of kinship and friendship 
so commonly shared by all members of the 
United Nations must swiftly be restored be- 
tween themselves. And once again — and not 
for the first time, I would like to emphasize 
— the voice of the United Nations has been 
heeded and respected. 

These are welcome and immensely signifi- 
cant developments. I am confident that I 
reflect the profound feelings of this great 
Assembly when I express deep gratification 
that the Security Council call for a cease- 
fire has been respected. And in addition to 
the role of the Security Council, it has been 
of the greatest value that the voice of the 
member states of the United Nations has 
also unitedly been heard in support of the 
Security Council's efforts. But our task is 
not over. It is now the task of the two 
parties to exercise restraint and to make 
earnest efforts to establish conditions of 
permanent — and I emphasize permanent — 
peace in the subcontinent. 

And it is now the task of the United Na- 
tions to seize this great opportunity, this 
breathing spell, this great and inescapable 
responsibility, to help reinforce and solidify 
this gain so that the cease-fire will not be 
transitory and ephemeral. It is a simple 
fact of history and a simple fact of life that 
the differences which gave rise to the re- 
cent fighting are deeply rooted. The cease- 
fire, as the Council resolution expressly 
stated, is only the first step. Next comes the 
more difficult task of finding solutions to 
the underlying sources of this conflict and 
arriving at an honorable settlement and 

conditions for lasting peace in the subcon- 

And I reflect the deep conviction of my 
own country when I say that it is in the 
common interest of both India and Pakistan 
that there be such an honorable settlement 
and conditions be restored for a lasting 
peace between those two great nations, with 
whom we have enjoyed and hope and expect 
to continue the most cordial and friendly re- 
lations. We applaud the statesmanship of 
the great leaders of those two countries re- 
sponding to the Security Council's appeal. 
We appeal to their statesmanship to go for- 
ward with the task of building a permanent 
peace in the subcontinent. 

In the spirit of operative paragraph 4 of 
the Security Council resolution of Septem- 
ber 20, the United States will cooperate 
fully with other members of the Council to 
assist toward a settlement of the political 
problem underlying the present conflict and 
cooperate fully with the Secretary-General 
in the steps that he is taking to implement 
the Council's resolution. And we stand 
ready to provide all appropriate assistance 
to the United Nations and the Secretary- 
General in strengthening its machinery for 
supervising the cease-fire. 

It is against this mood of vigor and 
achievement that I wish again to con- 
gratulate you, Mr. President [Amintore 
Fanfani, of Italy], and your country, as you 
assume the office of the President of the 
General Assembly. As a distinguished Prime 
Minister and now Foreign Minister of a great 
country, your talent, experience, understand- 
ing, and skill to direct the fortunes of this 
great world parliament have been amply 
demonstrated. Partly through your own 
labors, Italy has earned for itself a high 
place in the counsels of this organization 
and wherever there is work to be done to 
improve the life of men and to help bring 
them peace. And I am confident that under 
your leadership this Assembly and this or- 
ganization will benefit from your leadership. 

I should like also to pay tribute to our 
outgoing President, Mr. Alex Quaison- 
Sackey. He has won for himself an out- 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


standing place in the company of men who 
serve in these halls. In the short period of 
my personal acquaintance with him, I value 
extremely the fact that I can call him a 
friend. And I admire the capacity which he 
has demonstrated in probably the most dif- 
ficult General Assembly session in the his- 
tory of the organization. We continue in the 
hope that we will have the benefit of his 
counsel here, and we wish him well in the 
important post of Foreign Minister of Ghana, 
a great country on the African Continent. 

And I hope, Mr. President, you will for- 
give me also if I sadly once again record the 
loss of Adlai Stevenson. Adlai Stevenson 
was a great voice of America, not only in 
his own country but to the world. But the 
voice, the voice of America, must go on, and 
I cannot hope that my voice can be the voice 
so eloquent that it shall capture, as his voice 
did, the hearts and minds of men every- 
where. I can only offer, Mr. President, to 
this organization the fact that I share his 
dedication in the great cause of world peace 
and security, which are the aims of the 

On coming to this parliament from the 
highest court of the United States, I said 
that the work of bringing the rule of law 
to the relations between sovereign states is 
the greatest adventure in man's history. All 
of us in this hall are embarked on this ad- 
venture together. It is an adventure we 
dare not fail to conclude successfully. There 
is no alternative except the excluded one of 
doom for all mankind. 

One of my country's most distinguished 
jurists, who never reached our highest court, 
and whose career demonstrates that distinc- 
tion does not coincide with appointment to 
the highest office, once said that freedom 
cannot be preserved in constitutions if it has 
vanished from the hearts of its citizens. 
And we are charged with the daily task of 
keeping burning in the hearts of the peoples 
of this earth the fires of freedom promised 
all men by the charter of this organization 
20 years ago — freedom from fear, freedom 
from want, freedom from indignity, and 
freedom from war. We are charged, as a 

beloved participant in the deliberations of 
the United Nations once said — and you will 
recognize the words and the person — we are 
charged with the responsibility of keeping 
the candle of peace glowing. It sometimes 
appears to be a fragile candle and its light 
sometimes appears to be dim, but it has the 
strength to light the world if we really 
believe in it. 

U.S. Philosophy of Equal Opportunity 

In this 20th year of the United Nations 
we grope for the full meaning of a world 
changing rapidly under the headlong impact 
of science and technology. And we ask our- 
selves, I am sure, every day, every person 
here and millions throughout the world: 
Are we headed toward world order or world 
chaos? And this Assembly should help — 
this Assembly must help — provide the 

In my own country we are embarked under 
the leadership of President Lyndon B. John- 
son in a search for a "Great Society." 
This vision of a just domestic order is 
based on consent of the governed and due 
process of law, on individual dignity, on di- 
versity, and on the just satisfaction of po- 
litical, economic, and social aspirations. 

We in the United States reject reaction- 
ary philosophies of all extremes. We seek 
to build instead on what we regard as the 
most enlightened and progressive philosophy 
in human history, that the aim of govern- 
ment is the maximum self-fulfillment of its 
citizens and that the good life should be 
within the reach of all, rather than a mo- 
nopoly of the few. Both domestically and in 
international affairs there can be no island 
of poverty in seas of affluence. 

We espouse equality not only as a prin- 
ciple. We seek equal opportunity for all as 
an accomplished reality. And we are re- 
solved to enrich the life of our society by 
developing human, as well as natural, re- 
sources. And we are determined not merely 
to increase material production but to assure 
such equality to guarantee genuine social 
and economic justice, to eliminate poverty, 



and also to realize qualitative improvements 
in the life of our citizens — in more attrac- 
tive and functional cities, in a more beauti- 
ful countryside, and through learning and 
the arts. 

And this is not the program of any one 
group or one class or one political party in 
our country. Nor is the vision it proclaims 
exclusively American. It is a vision com- 
mon to all mankind. 

It fell to my lot for 25 years to repre- 
sent the great labor movement of our coun- 
try. And one of the great labor leaders vs^ith 
whom I was long associated, Philip Murray, 
when I asked, what was the aim of the labor 
movement to which he dedicated his life, 
paused and thought and said that the aim 
of the labor movement is a society in which 
each man shall have a rug on the floor, a 
picture on the wall, and music in the home. 
And I think that is a good goal for all of 

So what we seek for our own people in a 
Great Society at home, we seek for all man- 

President Johnson, I think, has said this 
very well, and I quote him : ^ 

We seek not fidelity to an iron faith but a 
diversity of belief as varied as man himself. We 
seek not to extend the power of America but the 
progress of humanity. We seek not to dominate 
others but to strengthen the freedom of all people. 

And the diversity of which our President 
speaks is the diversity represented in the 
membership of the United Nations — di- 
versity in its needs, in its philosophies, in 
its races, and in its institutions — yet united 
by a common bond of commitment to the 
obligations of the charter and dedicated to 
justice and social progress and the peaceful 
settlement of conflict. 

A Contrasting Doctrine of World Order 

There is regretfully, however, a contrast- 
ing doctrine of world order. It was put be- 
fore us earlier this month by the Defense 
Minister of Communist China in a "mani- 

' For text of President Johnson's state of the 
Union address of Jan. 4, see Bulletin of Jan. 
25, 1965, p. 94. 

festo" published in all of Communist China's 
newspapers and republished broadly through- 
out the world. 

The doctrine laid bare by Marshal Lin 
Piao starts from the premise that "political 
power grows out of the barrel of a gun." It 
rests, he said, on a foundation of war and 
violent revolution. And I quote him again: 
"The seizure of power by armed force, the 
settlement of the issues by war is," accord- 
ing to the Marshal and his party and the 
leaders of his country, "the central task and 
the highest form of revolution." And again 
I quote: "War can temper the people and 
push history forward. . . . War is a great 

The principle of revolutionary war, he 
says, is not just for China. It, according to 
him, and I quote him again, "holds good 
. . . for all . . . countries." The nations of 
the world are not free, according to this 
theory, to develop by their own choice in ac- 
cordance with their own needs and experi- 
ence. The nations of the world are not free, 
according to this theory, to fly their own 
flag their own way. But like it or not, the 
Marshal and the leaders of Communist China 
say they must accept the Chinese model. 

Nor does newly achieved independence 
provide immunity from this modern im- 
perialism. Quite the contrary. Chinese 
spokesmen again and again have empha- 
sized that they do not believe that the revo- 
lutions which have taken place and led to the 
national independence of many countries are 
acceptable revolutions. They do not believe 
that those countries have the right, as was 
the great privilege of my country after it 
made its revolution, to develop its social and 
economic institutions its ovsm way. The 
Marshal said, and I quote him again, "The 
Socialist revolution is the inevitable sequel 
to the national democratic revolution." In 
fact, "The more thorough the national demo- 
cratic revolution, the better the conditions 
for the Socialist revolution." But it should 
be clear that Marshal Lin is misusing the 
word "Socialist," that he means "Commu- 
nist," with the label buried in Peiping. 

This incredible manifesto is the antithesis 
of everything this organization stands for. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


It is a call to change world order by force 
and violence in a period where force and 
violence can lead to the most disastrous con- 
sequences for the entire world. It leaves no 
room for difference of tradition, of culture, 
or of national aspiration, or for the legiti- 
mate right of every people, large and small, 
to choose their own social and economic 
order their own way. It leaves no room for 
genuine self-determination. It seeks to 
squeeze every nation and every people within 
the grip of Chinese Communist conformity. 
It should be read — I know it has been read 
and pondered by everyone in this Assembly. 

Meeting the Challenge in Viet-Nam 

The apostles of this philosophy are today 
attempting to transform the country of 
South Viet-Nam into a proving ground for 
their theories. This challenge must be met, 
not in the interests of any single nation but 
in the interests of each member of this or- 
ganization. It must be met in particular in 
the interests of the smaller nations who 
cherish their right to choose and follow 
their own path of national development. 

We are helping to meet this threat be- 
cause we believe it must be met. And our 
goals in South Viet-Nam are plain and 

We seek only to insure the independence 
of South Viet-Nam, with freedom from at- 
tack and the opportunity for its people to 
determine their own future. We seek no ter- 
ritory for ourselves, no preferential position, 
no permanent military presence. We stand 
ready to withdraw our forces when Com- 
munist aggression has ended and South 
Viet-Nam is left alone to determine its ovra 
destiny in its own way by principles of self- 

And, above all, we seek a peaceful solu- 
tion. We have repeatedly stated our will- 
ingness to enter into unconditional discus- 
sions — and I reaffirm that willingness here 
today. And we have asked the members of 
the United Nations, individually and col- 
lectively, to use their influence to help bring 
about such discussions. We have asked the 
members of the Security Council and the 

Secretary-General to help get negotiations 
started. And we have offered to join in a 
massive cooperation program for the eco- 
nomic development of Southeast Asia. 

The members of the United Nations, 
under the charter, share a common re- 
sponsibility to demonstrate to those who 
use violence that violence does not pay. And 
we can meet that responsibility by using 
every means to persuade the regimes of 
Hanoi and Peiping to leave their neighbors 
alone and to begin serious discussions for a 
resolution of this conflict. 

And we must also meet that obligation by 
denying United Nations representation to 
the regime that denies, in word and in deed, 
the fundamental restraints on the use of 
force in our charter and hurls insult upon the 
peaceful efforts of the members of the 
United Nations to compose this and other 

Proposals for Reducing Nuclear Threat 

Most of us, fortunately, have already made 
our choice between the philosophy of 
violence and the philosophy of world order 
which underlies our charter. 

Yet our search for world order is gravely 
threatened by a continuing arms race, a race 
which adds nothing to the world except in- 
security and a drain of valuable resources. 

Progress has, of course, been made. We 
have already agreed to cease nuclear test- 
ing in the atmosphere, under water, and in 
outer space. We have established a direct 
communications link to help prevent war 
by accident or miscalculation. We have re- 
solved not to place weapons of mass destruc- 
tion in outer space. Today I reaffirm the 
commitment of the United States to 
that agreement. 

But the goal of general and complete 
disarmament to which we are all committed 
remains elusive. But it is a necessary and 
indispensable goal. We have to work to- 
ward it vigorously and thoughtfully and with 
good will and not be deterred by what must 
be momentary setbacks. Most of all, we 
should concentrate on immediate practical 
steps to reverse the arms spiral. 



The first priority, and, I repeat, the first 
priority, in this effort must be given to halt- 
ing the spread of nuclear weapons. If we 
do not face this problem squarely now, the 
opportunity may disappear forever. That is 
why the United States has tabled in the 
18-Nation Disarmament Committee the full 
draft of a treaty* binding its signers from 
taking any action to increase the number of 
states and other organizations having the 
power to unleash nuclear weapons. 

My Government has fully committed it- 
self to that underlying policy and urges that 
this draft become an actual treaty as soon as 
possible. We hope that other nuclear powers 
will accept the same commitment as an in- 
ternational agreement. Nuclear prolifera- 
tion can be stopped, but we must act now. 
Agreement on this issue clearly is of over- 
riding importance to world peace and se- 

We recognize, moreover, that as more and 
more nations face frankly up to this issue, 
they must make momentous decisions about 
their own security, and we understand their 
concern. As President Johnson has indicated, 
we believe assurances of support against 
threats of nuclear blackmail should be avail- 
able to nations which have forsworn a nu- 
clear capability of their own. Action by the 
Assembly can be a useful part of such as- 
surances. The United States is prepared to 
work to this end by this Assembly. Also of 
great aid in deterring the continuous pro- 
liferation of nuclear weapons would be agree- 
ment on a comprehensive test ban treaty. 

Scientists cannot distinguish between all 
quakes and underground nuclear tests, but 
the science of detection is not static and our 
vigorous research program indicates the pos- 
sibility of a substantial improvement in seis- 
mic detection capabilities. Furthermore, the 
United States is also now establishing in the 
State of Montana a Large Aperture Seismic 
Array, which we hope will hasten major ad- 
vances in the science of detection. We stand 
ready to make the results of our experimen- 
tal study available to scientists everywhere 
and to assist in the construction of similar 

' For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474. 

facilities in other countries. 

The United States will shortly issue invi- 
tations to a large number of members of the 
United Nations to send qualified observers 
to visit our Montana detection site on Oc- 
tober 12 and 13. We want to let each of them 
see this installation for himself. And we 
hope that this invitation will be accepted. 

Let me say clearly that we do not want 
inspection for the sake of inspection, or for 
any ulterior motive, and let me also say 
that we are not inflexible. We do insist on 
the minimum amount of inspection neces- 
sary under the present state of science to 
give confidence to all that a comprehensive 
test ban is actually being observed. But we 
will insist only on a number and type of in- 
spection which are essential to the attain- 
ment of this objective. 

While pressing ahead, then, on nonpro- 
liferation as our first priority, we must also 
take steps to reduce the dangers stemming 
from the high level of nuclear capabilities. 
There is no reason to wait. We are prepared 
to take practical steps here and now. 

First, we should take steps to halt the 
accumulation of strategic nuclear delivery 
vehicles. We should continue to explore a 
freeze on the number and characteristics of 
strategic nuclear offensive and defensive 

If progress is made in this field, the 
United States will also be willing to explore 
the possibility of significant reductions in 
the number of these carriers of mass de- 

Second, the United States proposes a 
verified halt in production of fissionable 
material for weapons use and the transfer 
of fissionable materials to peaceful pur- 

In connection with such a halt in fission- 
able material production we now propose 
the demonstrated destruction by the United 
States and the Soviet Union of a substan- 
tial number of nuclear weapons from their 
respective stocks. 

The United States is ready to transfer 
60,000 kilograms of weapons-grade U-235 to 
nonweapon uses if the Soviet Union would 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


be willing to transfer 40,000 kilograms. If 
the U.S.S.R. accepts this proposal, each of 
us would destroy nuclear weapons of our 
own choice so as to make available for 
peaceful purposes such amounts of fission- 
able material. 

Moreover, the United States Government 
stands ready, if the Soviet Union will do 
likewise, to add to this transfer associated 
Plutonium obtained from the destroyed weap- 
ons in an agreed quantity or ratio and to 
place the material thus transferred under 
the International Atomic Energy Agency 
or equivalent safeguards. 

We make these proposals in the interest 
of rapid and equitable progress in reducing 
the nuclear threat and as a practical demon- 
stration of our dedication to this end. 

Strengthening U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity 

A more rapid movement toward disarma- 
ment would unquestionably decrease anxiety 
throughout the world. But if we are to 
progress toward a just world community, 
we must also constantly improve our inter- 
national machinery for curbing conflict and 
resolving disputes. 

The experience in Cyprus, the continuing 
aggression in Southeast Asia, the shock of 
violence erupting in Kashmir — all lead to 
an inescapable conclusion : There is an urgent 
need to strengthen the United Nations capac- 
ity to keep the peace. 

We urge as one such step the continued 
development of a flexible United Nations 
callup system along the lines proposed by 
our distinguished Secretary-General. We 
hope member states in all regions of the 
world will earmark and train units for such 

We believe also that the military staff 
now supporting the Secretary-General is in- 
adequate and needs to be strengthened. The 
added experience and burdens of Kashmir 
and Cyprus have conclusively demonstrated 
in particular that the military staff avail- 
able to the Secretary-General at headquar- 
ters is overburdened. We must provide him 
with an enlarged staff whose size is com- 
mensurate with the tasks we entrust to him. 

The peacekeeping capacity of the United 
Nations is too basic to its purposes and to 
its very existence to allow it to be frustrat- 
ed by any one member. For this reason — 
and in this we are joined by the overwhelm- 
ing majority of United Nations members — 
we continue to believe that the General As- 
sembly must retain its residual authority to 
initiate peacekeeping operations when the 
Security Council is unable to act. Means 
must be found to pay for future peacekeep- 
ing operations which allocate the burden 
fairly. In cases where this cannot be done 
by assessment of every member, we must 
find other means, including assessment of 
those willing to be assessed, nonobligatory 
apportionment, or voluntary contribution. 

Less dramatic, but equally important, is 
machinery to promote peaceful change and 
to allow the satisfaction of just claims. 
Without a strong international institution, 
able to help in doing this, nations, like in- 
dividuals, are tempted to take matters into 
their own hands. We consequently believe 
it is time to breathe new life into article 
33 of the charter, a provision of the charter 
referred to specifically in the Security 
Council resolution adopted just the other 
day in the Kashmir dispute. It has atrophied 
too long. We must develop workable methods 
to resolve disputes before they reach the 
point of potential or actual conflict. 

If the United Nations is to serve its prim- 
ary purpose, it must be an instrument for 
the reconciliation of differences and not 
merely a forum in which they manifest 
themselves. Too often has the United Na- 
tions had to demonstrate its capacity for 
quenching fires, when it might better have 
helped prevent them in the first place. For 
this reason we welcome the initiative of the 
United Kingdom in introducing an agenda 
item on the pacific settlement of disputes. 
The United States will eagerly participate 
in exploring the many paths it may open. 

It is an item, if I may say so, Mr. Presi- 
dent, in which I take a personal interest. 
For the greater part of my adult life has 
been spent in intimate association with the 
process of third-party settlement of the dif- 



ferences and disputes which arise between a 
free labor movement and free employers. I 
have often seen disagreements become ag- 
gravated or prolonged, not because they 
were irreconcilable but simply because the 
parties involved could not agree upon the 
go-between. We in our own country have 
developed machinery such as the Federal 
Mediation and Conciliation Service that has 
filled this gap and, in so doing, greatly 
advanced the pacific settlement of labor 
disputes in our own country. 

I know also that machinery which is suc- 
cessful on the national level cannot always 
be transposed on the international level. 
Nevertheless, I am firmly convinced that 
the United Nations might also develop addi- 
tional mechanisms allowing the parties to a 
stubborn dispute to use a U.N. body of med- 
iation or conciliation. 

Above all, our basic charge of peacekeep- 
ing under the charter is to join together to 
assure peace and security. We must continue 
this quest for collective security, and we 
must renounce collective futility if we are 
to perform our charter function. 

Peaceful Uses of Outer Space 

There is an area in which we have been 
seeking to promote cooperation well before 
any dispute arises. This is in the peaceful 
uses of outer space. 

Over 7 years ago the United States in- 
scribed the first item to appear on this 
Assembly's agenda concerning the peaceful 
uses of outer space and introduced a draft 
resolution sponsored by 20 states which be- 
came the first space action this body ever 
took. That resolution was introduced in the 
First Committee by the then majority lead- 
er of the United States Senate, Senator 
Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas,^ and as Presi- 
dent he continues his interest, his dedica- 
tion and devotion, to that principle. By 
adopting that resolution ^ this Assembly 
went on record as recognizing — and I quote 

' For a statement made by Senator Johnson on 
Nov. 17, 1958, see ibid., Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977. 
* For text, see ibid., Jan. 5, 1959, p. 32. 

from the first preambular paragraph: 
"... it is the common aim that it [outer 
space] should be used for peaceful purposes 
only." That principle is one to which we 
fully subscribed then and to which we fully 
subscribe now. 

Since then the General Assembly has laid 
down valuable ground rules for activities in 
space and on celestial bodies. In accordance 
with these rules our space activities have 
been, and will continue to be, nonaggres- 
sive, peaceful, and beneficial in character. 

But these rules are not enough. Instru- 
ments from earth have already reached the 
moon and photographed Mars. And man will 
soon follow. Accordingly, we suggest that 
the United Nations begin work on a com- 
prehensive treaty on the exploration of 
celestial bodies. 

Promoting Economic and Social Well-Being 

But while we aim for the stars, we must 
also employ maximum resources to promote 
economic and social well-being here at home. 
For while the possibility of creating a just 
world society may be contingent on success 
or failure in such fields as disarmament and 
peacekeeping, our capability of creating it 
will depend on the efforts we spend not 
just to prevent disaster but to build healthy 
economic conditions everywhere. We are 
near the midpoint of the United Nations 
Development Decade. Progress has been 
made which has to be acknowledged, but we 
all need to do more and do it better. 

Much more has to be done to increase 
food production in the developing countries. 
If current population trends continue, food 
production will have to triple by the end 
of the century to provide an adequate diet 
for all. We thus fully support the proposal 
for an expanded World Food Program and 
are prepared to examine further with other 
developed countries ways of adapting oijr 
domestic agricultural abundance to meet the 
world's food deficit while it exists. 

More action is required to limit excessive 
population grovsrth. We support the program 
now underway whereby United Nations 
agencies provide advisory services and train- 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


ing in family planning to any country asking 
for such assistance, and we must all do more 
to help accelerate industrial growth in the 
developing countries, a question to which 
this Assembly, I am sure, will give special 

We must also speed up and intensify our 
efforts to enlarge the export earnings of 
the developing countries and to counteract 
excessive fluctuations in those earnings. The 
United States will continue to make special 
efforts in the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade to reduce tariffs on items of 
special interest to those countries. We shall 
also participate actively and constructively 
in the work of the new United Nations 
trade machinery. It is our hope that in deal- 
ing with the hard and difficult problems of 
trade, developed and developing countries 
will proceed in a spirit of partnership. There 
must be a free and sustained dialog and 
a common search for ways and means by 
which we can develop mutually beneficial 
trade patterns. 

And, of course, experience shows that we 
need a much greater investment in the de- 
velopment of that most important resource 
of all — trained people — and must provide 
more assistance to the educational efforts 
of the developing countries. To help get on 
with these jobs, we support the increased 
target of $200 million for the United Na- 
tions Development Program, on the under- 
standing that the arrangements worked out 
will be satisfactory to both the developing 
and developed countries. 

And we are ready to join in practical 
and concrete ways in a further expansion of 
multilateral efforts to supply capital for 
development through regional development 
banks and international institutions, such 
as the International Bank and the Inter- 
national Development Association, on the 
assurance that there will be sound admin- 
istration, as well as appropriate contribu- 
tions from others, and we would be prepared 
to increase the amount of capital flowing 
through multilateral channels. 

I recognize that we are not alone in ac- 
knowledging the need for action in these 

areas. I have singled them out because the 
United States plans to take or join 
in specific actions on each of them — not in 
the vague future but in the months ahead. 
Faster progress in the Development Decade 
is a central aim in our foreign policy. 

U.S. Dedication to Human Rights 

I come now, in conclusion of these 
thoughts, to the source from which they de- 
rived: our determination to enrich the lives 
of human beings — domestically in our 
drive to create a Great Society, internation- 
ally in our support for fundamental free- 
doms and human rights for peoples every- 
where. The ultimate object of U.N. activi- 
ties, the ultimate object of any organized 
society, domestically or internationally, is 
man — the individual. The effect upon his 
lot, his fate, his well-being — that will re- 
main the final measure of our success — 
and our failure. And if we talk about the 
competition between states, that is the only 
worthwhile competition as to which system, 
which society, best improves the lot of man 
and upgrades human dignity. 

We are well past the midpoint — indeed 
in sight of the end — of what history may 
record as the most exciting and predomi- 
nantly peaceful revolution in human affairs, 
and this is a movement vitally linked to the 
dignity of human beings — the movement of 
self-determination. This movement has seen 
people in the past few decades assert and gain 
their right to be free from colonialism, to 
self-government and independence, their 
right to be free from control by other peo- 

We applaud this historical development, 
and we are deeply committed to its success. 

Of course, among the dependent peoples 
now remaining in the world — whose aspira- 
tions for self-determination command our 
fullest sympathy — are some very small areas 
with very limited resources. Whether they 
will be able to meet the requirements of the 
charter that members are not only willing 
but also "able" to carry out their obliga- 
tion may require early consideration, as the 
Secretary-General has indicated. But I re- 



peat, we support the historical development 
of all people being able to gain their self- 
government or independence when they de- 
sire it by principles of self-determination. 

And in our concern for the rights and 
freedom of nations, we must not neglect the 
rights and freedoms of individuals — those 
who, after all, are the basic unit of any 
nation. The test of any country's dedica- 
tion to human rights is, if I may respect- 
fully suggest, not what it says in the Gen- 
eral Assembly for all the world to hear but 
what it does at home for all the world to 

Our record, like that of other countries, 
is far from perfect. But with the decision 
of our Supreme Court of 1954 and the de- 
cisions since — in which I hope you will not 
deem it amiss if I take great personal pride 
and satisfaction as having participated in 
some of them — in the passage of the Civil 
Rights Acts of 1964 and 1965, the American 
Government has put into concrete form and 
terms its full and complete commitment to 
the principle of full human rights, of free- 
dom and equality for all of our people. 

The U. N. also has a significant role in 
promoting, in the words of the charter, 
human rights and fundamental freedoms 
for all. Much has already been done, but 
the United Nations has not done enough 
in this area, and we believe much more 
will be necessary. We are therefore very 
pleased that the Government of Costa Rica 
has proposed the establishment of a High 
Commissioner for Human Rights. We think 
this is an important first step in implement- 
ing the Declaration of Human Rights, and 
we shall give this proposal our enthusiastic 

We can, out of this debate, out of the 
divergent views expressed here, distill a 
consensus. As long as we strive for such a 
consensus and accept the methods of reason 
and understanding upon which consensus is 
built, we will strengthen the fabric of this 
great community of these United Nations, 

and by its very nature, this must always be 
a community whose doors are open to those 
who would turn their backs on chaos, 
threat, and violence and seek legitimate 
ends through peaceful means. I said the 
other day I am optimistic about the fate of 
this organization, and I am optimistic be- 
cause, if we had not created this great or- 
ganization 20 years ago, we would be creat- 
ing it out of necessity today. 

The road to world order, the road to a 
rule of law in the world, is not an easy one. 
It will continue to be arduous, and beset 
by agonizing hurdles, painful decisions, dif- 
ficult compromises, and, at times, disheart- 
ening setbacks. Traveling the road will 
demand the most from each of us. I pray 
that we shall be equal to the task. 

I hope, also, that 20 years from now, 
when this Assembly convenes for its plenary 
session, it can look back on a generation of 
achievement that we begin today. 

President Johnson said:^ 

We seek to establish a harmony between man 
and society which will allow each of us to enlarge 
the meaning of his life and all of us to elevate 
the quality of our civilization. 

Out of our diversity, the welcomed di- 
versity of nations and peoples, let us be one 
in our determination to elevate the quality 
of all of our lives and to build a great 
society of and for all men. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of Mo- 
rocco, Ahmed Laraki, presented his creden- 
tials to President Johnson on September 21. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated September 21. 

' Ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


The Hard Problems of a Turbulent World 

by Under Secretary Ball 

In 1957, 8 years ago, I attended the first 
of these great industrial conferences. I 
came to San Francisco then as a private 
citizen, interested as you are in the vast 
problems and prospects of business around 
the world. 

I come here tonight as a representative 
of my Government, invited to address you 
on some of the w^orld problems that are of 
universal concern. 

But I am determined, if I can, to avoid 
making the kind of official speech that has 
its ovs'n pattern of familiar banality. Hav- 
ing worked with many of you in your pri- 
vate affairs in the past, I propose to talk 
with you tonight about certain aspects of 
the world predicament, in the same spirit of 
candor and understanding that I enjoyed in 
an earlier capacity. 

From the list of those attending this con- 
ference I find that I am speaking to three 
audiences here tonight — to industrialists 
from the highly developed countries, from 
countries in various stages of development, 
and my own countrymen. Some of my re- 
marks may have special relevance for one 
group or another, but on the larger world 
questions I doubt that there are wide dif- 
ferences of view among you. You who pro- 
duce and trade in the markets of the world 
share common experiences and face common 
difficulties. And it is my observation that 
you tend to see world problems with a re- 
markable consistency — which is not neces- 
sarily true of your statesmen. 

'■ Address made before the International Industrial 
Conference at San Francisco, Calif., on Sept. 16 
(press release 223, revised). 

Let me say a word iirst to those of you 
from abroad whom I met here 8 years ago 
and who have now come again to my coun- 
try. You will see everywhere the evidence 
that vast changes have taken place in this 
short interval. 

Since the first conference in 1957, the 
United States economy has grown prodi- 
giously. We have increased our gross na- 
tional product by $225 billion, a sum larger 
than our total gross national product at the 
start of World War II. 

The profits of our corporations after 
taxes have risen by more than two-thirds — 
and total employment by more than 8 mil- 
lion Americans. 

Our Federal Government has increased 
its annual expenditures to almost $100 bil- 
lion, and today we are spending more than 
$50 billion to maintain effective military 
power in the defense of freedom. 

The United States is now in its 55th con- 
secutive month of economic expansion. In 
1,600 days our national production has 
grovm by $160 billion — or $100 million a 
day — in real terms an aggregate increase of 

This progress is obviously gratif jang. Yet 
the most profound and significant changes 
in this country are not necessarily the rapid 
expansion of our national wealth but the 
extraordinary social transformation now in 
progress. For American society is under- 
going an alteration in depth. 

The mushroom growth of many of our 
cities is forcing us to adopt new patterns 
of life and thought. The vaulting progress 
of electronics and automation is presenting 



to both industry and labor the need for 
new solutions to age-old problems. 

Most important of all : We Americans are 
moving to correct an ancient social in- 
justice. Aided by the wise decisions of our 
Supreme Court and by far-reaching legisla- 
tive enactments by the Congress, President 
Johnson has taken long strides to assure 
that our Negro citizens — an eighth of our 
population — will be able to play a full and 
equal part in our society and to contribute 
their full talents to the development of our 

While moving against this festering evil 
of race discrimination, we have also 
launched a great offensive against poverty 
and economic inequality, a drive to create 
a richer and fuller society, a truly Great 
Society — which, in the President's words, 
will rest on "abundance and liberty for 
all ... a place where men are more con- 
cerned with the quality of their goals than 
the quantity of their goods." ^ 

We will not achieve this objective with- 
out turmoil. The crumbling of the cakes of 
custom is not a tidy process. The habits and 
prejudices of centuries cannot be reshaped 
without clamor and anguish. Taken to- 
gether, these cataclysmic changes in Ameri- 
can life constitute a revolution of consider- 
able dimensions. 

Change, the "Dominant Hallmark of the Age" 

In a sense, of course, they are part of 
the revolution taking place all over the 
world. Change is not confined to my own 
country. It is pervasive. It is, in fact, the 
dominant hallmark of the age. 

Today, in all parts of the globe, change is 
proceeding at a breathless and accelerating 
speed. Events are piling on events in a 
manner unheard of in times past. Great 
shifts and movements are occurring in the 
space of a few years that once would have 
taken centuries to achieve. 

Yet progress will not dispel the pressures 

for change. Instead it will merely generate 
the need for further action. As John F. 
Kennedy once perceptively remarked : * 

Both the successes and the setbacks . . . re- 
main on our agenda of unfinished business. For 
every apparent blessing contains the seeds of danger, 
every area of trouble gives out a ray of hope, and 
the one unchangeable certainty is that nothing is 
certain or unchangeable. 

What is happening in my own country 
is being matched in many of yours by 
events of equal scope and urgency, and the 
forces that are producing great structural 
changes within nations are, at the same 
time, producing great structural changes in 
the organization of our international af- 

As our European friends here tonight 
know full well, before the Second World 
War a handful of powers ruled the world 
through a vast system of colonial arrange- 
ments. But in the last 20 years a billion 
people who lived in a state of colonial de- 
pendency — one-third of the world's popula- 
tion — have created some 50 new nations. 

The progress of a billion people from 
colonial status to independence, begun and 
completed in such a startlingly short time, 
is an achievement of epic magnitude — an 
achievement without precedent in world 
history. I pay tribute to the wisdom of 
leaders in the colonies and metropolitan 
powers alike that this great transformation 
has been brought about with so little vio- 

Reshaping the Global Power Structures 

Yet if there has been little violence, there 
remain many difficulties. The political 
shape of the world cannot be changed so 
drastically without creating a whole series 
of new problems — problems that must be 
faced not only by those of you who are 
engaged in the world's business but by 
those of us who are engaged in the world's 

For the dismantling of the old colonial 

' For text of an address made by President 
Johnson at the University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, 
Mich., on May 22, 1964, see White House press 
release of that date. 

' For excerpts from President Kennedy's state 
of the Union address of Jan. 11, 1962, see BULLETIN 
of Jan. 29, 1962, p. 159. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


systems has resulted in a reshaping of 
power structures all over the globe. Before 
the war it was possible for metropolitan 
nations of modest size to play a role of 
great influence by exercising power directly 
over dependent peoples. But now, with the 
approaching end of the colonial age, na- 
tions must deal not with dependent peoples 
but, on a basis of mutual self-respect, with 
other fully independent nations. 

All of this represents a great forward 
stride in the building of a world capable of 
providing both dignity and equality for all 
peoples. But at the same time it profoundly 
alters the requirements for leadership. 

To play a major role in world affairs to- 
day — where power is no longer exercised 
directly over dependent peoples — is an 
arduous and intricate task, requiring that 
a nation command vast resources both of 
men and material. This point has, of course, 
been understood among the nations of West- 
em Europe — the great metropolitan powers 
that once controlled vast empires. One of 
the propulsive forces behind the desire to 
organize Western Europe on a continent- 
wide scale has been the recognition that 
only in this way could the people of Europe 
make their full contribution to world re- 

This, I am sure, you masters of industry 
fully understand. As practitioners of inter- 
national business you have acquired your 
own special wisdom. You have learned prag- 
matically—by observation and experience — 
that in this new world order there is a 
high degree of interdependence in all of 
our affairs, that commerce cannot stop at 
the water's edge, that business cannot flour- 
ish to its full potential if arbitrarily in- 
terrupted by national boundaries. 

You have, therefore, learned to organize 
your affairs on a dimension that enables 
you to make the most efficient use of the 
world's resources, and you have fulfilled 
the tradition of Marco Polo in extending your 
enterprises around the world. 

Unfortunately the lessons you have learned 
in your business are not being fully heeded 
in international politics. For, although in 
the postwar period we have made extraor- 

dinary progress in removing obstacles to 
trade, the progress that has been made to- 
ward political unity in Europe is jeopardized 
today by the assertion of an inward-looking 
nationalism that breeds disharmony where 
there should be mutual trust, suspicion where 
there should be confidence, and division 
where there should be a concerting of policies 
and a combining of strength. 

Because I returned from Europe only 
last weekend, I am acutely aware of this 
problem. I have the sad impression that, for 
the first time in 15 years, the forces of 
fragmentation may be working more in- 
sistently than the forces of unity. 

This tendency, if continued, can have la- 
mentable consequences. Not only can it lead 
to a renewal of ancient and dangerous rival- 
ries, but, if the peoples of Europe fail to 
organize themselves so as to be able to play 
a role of world responsibility commensurate 
with their resources, humanity will be de- 
nied the full benefit of their talents in the 
ordering of world affairs. 

To shed old habits is, of course, not easy. 
It is difficult for the established nations of 
Europe. It is fully as difficult for the new 
nations, faced as they are with poverty and 
inexperience, with all the complex problems 
of political and economic evolution. During 
the last two decades many of these nations 
have made heartening progress in their 
search for a better life for their people. It 
is all the more regrettable, therefore, that 
the two great nations of India and Pakistan, 
which have both worked hard for such a 
better life, should jeopardize all they have 
achieved for the sake of an old quarrel. In a 
world where economic progress must be 
purchased by the exertions of a vast number 
of men and women, the interruption of that 
progress by armed conflict between neigh- 
bors is a major world tragedy — as we all 
know tonight. 

The great changes I describe would be 
hard enough to achieve in an atmosphere of 
world security. But that quite clearly does 
not prevail today — nor will it come tomor- 
row. The constant menace of aggressive 
communism is no longer debatable. It is a 



political, economic, and social fact. It is a 
threat we have faced and are continuing to 
face — on every continent, in many countries, 
by a variety of means. The threat came first 
in Europe and the Middle East, then in 
Korea and the Far East. 

The threat has taken brutal form in Viet- 
Nam, where a young nation is under attack 
by Communist forces. The form of aggres- 
sion is insidious: undeclared war; covert 
infiltration of trained personnel, weapons, 
and supplies; stealth, terror, sabotage, and 
the exploitation of the local population — all 
to the purpose of extending Communist 
control over a country less than a dozen 
years away from colonial dependence. 

We are assisting the people of South 
Viet-Nam to meet this attack. We have com- 
mitted tens of thousands of our forces and 
great quantities of material to this effort. 
We have the necessary resources. We have 
the will to use them. We shall continue to 
do whatever is necessary — so long as it is 
necessary — and there should be no ambigu- 
ity on that score. 

Sharing Burdens of World Responsibility 

Today the United States is playing a 
large but rather lonely role of responsibility 
around the world. Our soldiers garrison out- 
posts in the far comers of the globe. Our 
Navy ranges over the world's seas and 
oceans. The might of our nuclear deterrent 
system provides security day and night, not 
merely for America but for the whole free 

This role of world involvement has not 
come easily to my country. We did not seek 
it. Our willingness to meet our obligations 
to assist free nations should not be taken 
as a desire to extend American power or 
impose American ways. 

We have no taste for empire. We do not 
wish to establish a Pax Americana. Nor do 
we desire to act as the world's gendarme. 
We do not regard the dominant role of 
American power in so many parts of the 
world as a permanent — or satisfactory — 
state of affairs. 

It is our fervent hope that other nations 

will — over the years ahead — play a pro- 
gressively larger role in the discharge of 
world responsibility. We are ready to share 
with them at any time both the decisions 
and the burdens. The logic of events — and 
of their own situation — must sooner or later 
lead nations that have in the past played a 
world role to organize themselves on a 
modern scale. And we can then work ef- 
fectively together in common tasks through- 
out the length and breadth of the globe. 

And, at the same time, over the years 
many of the newer nations of the world 
will — we fervently hope — gain in strength 
and experience. No doubt many of them, 
also, will combine their energies and re- 
sources so as to be able more effectively to 
realize their ovvti aspirations, to provide 
their own security, and to play a larger role 
on the world stage. 

And sooner or later — if I may indulge a 
further prophecy — the vast forces and 
changes that are working such a trans- 
formation on the free world will make 
themselves felt in parts of the world that 
are not now free. 

There is evidence of this already, as many 
of you who do business with Eastern Europe 
know very well. After all, the cold war, 
which we have learned to regard as a fact 
of life, is only a recent affair. It was less 
than 20 years ago that Sir Winston Church- 
ill first startled the world by pointing 
out that, "From Stettin in the Baltic to 
Trieste in the Adriatic, an Iron Curtain has 
descended across the Continent." And two 
decades are only a moment in the sweep of 

Tasks Aliead for Business and Government 

Change is the leitmotiv of our age — 
neither good nor bad in itself. It can be a 
servant of those who understand it and 
shape it. It can destroy those who refuse to 
recognize it and oppose it. This principle is 
as applicable to business as to governments 
— to you as to me. 

For great business enterprises, like gov- 
ernments, must learn to live with the world 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


as it exists and not the world that we might 
wish to see. You leaders of international 
business know full well that the mid-20th 
century is not an easy time. It is a time of 
world ferment, a time of reappraisal, a time 
of turbulence. And you know also that that 
turbulence is most often fed by the forces 
and pressures of inequality and injustice. 

Such pressures cannot be disregarded or 
simply suppressed. They cannot be long re- 
sisted without explosions. You have great 
influence in your countries — and great re- 
sponsibilities. It is the part of wisdom and 
prudence for you as businessmen to help 
channel these pressures so that, over time, 
the injustices will be corrected and the in- 
equalities rectified. This, it seems to me, is 
a simple matter of enlightened self-interest. 

But I did not come to lecture you tonight 
on your own self-interest. I do not need to. 
It is a phenomenon to confound Karl Marx 
that international business has in these 
latter years become politically sophisticated 
and that it has developed an authentic social 
consciousness, a deepening awareness of the 
forces that work in the world and the 
problems posed by those forces. 

This does not mean that those forces can 
be controlled without skill and effort. The 
world is in too great a convulsion for easy 

If you wish for stability, so do I. If it is 
easier to run a business under conditions of 
stability, it is also easier to run a Foreign 
Office. But it is unrealistic to think that we 
can, either of us, find much stability in the 
world that lies ahead. 

This is not a prediction of catastrophe. It 
is simply a realistic assessment of what we 
are in for. I am not pessimistic; I have 
every confidence that we shall be able to 
preserve the common values to which we 
are all committed, that we shall continue 
to raise the standard of living of our peoples. 

that we shall be able to make our societies 
more secure, more free, and more richly 
satisfying to all our people. 

Meanwhile, we have work to do, problems 
to face, tasks to achieve. For the great 
endeavors that lie before us in this time of 
ferment and turbulence will require all of 
the resourcefulness and imagination, all of 
the diligence and understanding, that busi- 
nesses and governments alike can command. 

U.S. Reaffirms Interest in German 
Unity in Von Steuben Day IVIessage 

Folloiving is the text of a message from 
President Johnson to Americans of German 
descent, which ivas delivered by Ambassador 
at Large W. Averell Harriman at Von Steu- 
ben Day ceremonies at New York, N.Y., on 
September 25. 

Press release 231 dated September 25. 

It is a great pleasure to extend through 
Governor Averell Harriman my warm greet- 
ings and good wishes to Americans of Ger- 
man descent who today honor the memory 
of General Friedrich Wilhelm von Steuben. 

Our nation remembers General von Steu- 
ben's name with deep gratitude. He played 
a courageous role in the fight for American 
independence. He and many other Germans 
have contributed their talents throughout 
the history of our country to building the 
fine life we now enjoy. Today Americans of 
German descent continue to help with the 
development of the Great Society we wish 
to leave our children. 

Let us join today in reaffirming the com- 
mon interest of the American and German 
peoples in the establishment of a united 
Germany in a world of freedom and peace. 

My best wishes to all of you. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 



Korea, a Free-World Partner in the Far East 

by William P. Bimdy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

Speaking tonight before this distin- 
guished assemblage of friends of Korea is 
an honor and a deep personal pleasure. As I 
look around this room, I see many who have 
played prominent roles in weaving the fab- 
ric of friendship and solidarity now exist- 
ing between the Republic of Korea and the 
United States. 

It is particularly appropriate that we are 
gathered here to honor the two American 
Presidents, one a Democrat and one a Re- 
publican, who during the years of 1950-53 
initiated and carried through the commit- 
ment of American arms to the defense of 
the Republic of Korea from Communist 
aggression, in the United Nations' first col- 
lective military action for peace. It was 
their determination and their decisions 
which led first to the commitment and 
finally to the end of that 3-year conflict, 
with the Republic of Korea's territorial in- 
tegrity and security preserved. And it was 
in that Korean war that our mutual bonds 
of friendship and trust were tested and 
tempered, as Americans and soldiers from 
15 other U.N. nations stood side by side 
with Korean fighting men in defeating the 
North Korean and Chinese Communist ag- 

Tonight, however, I wish to focus, not on 
the history of those grim days but on the 
Korea of today and its relationship to the 
United States and to the free world. The 

' Address made before the Korean Cultural and 
Freedom Foundation at Washington, D.C., on Sept. 
20 (press release 227). 

Korea I speak of is a full partner in the 
free world, politically self-reliant, progres- 
sing well economically, and not only bearing 
the major burden of its own defense but 
also making a major contribution to the 
support of the embattled Republic of Viet- 
Nam. It is a nation which is active on the 
international scene and which has estab- 
lished relations with some 75 countries, in 
contrast to its Communist rival in P'yong- 
yang, which is recognized by only 11 coun- 
tries outside of the Communist bloc. 

Many of you here tonight know Korea 
well, but it would be good for all of us to 
look closely at what has been happening in 
Korea. Korea continues to face difficult 
problems : 

The problems connected with maintain- 
ing its security against the continuing 
threat of renewed Communist aggression ; 

The problems connected with securely 
establishing its political institutions ; 

The problems of economic development; 

The problem of unification, created by 
the unnatural division of a country with 
2,000 years of recorded history, a common 
culture, and a single language. 

When we look at Korea today, we see a 
country grappling with these problems, and 
doing well. Korea has in the 17 years since 
its independence encountered the inevitable 
strains which come in creating a demo- 
cratic, economically sound society. Korea 
today has a constitutionally established 
government under its freely elected Presi- 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


dent, Chung Hee Park. While political 
events in Korea have at times been trou- 
bled, the Korean people have shovi^n true 
dedication to democratic ideals and w^illing 
acceptance of the responsibilities of free- 
dom. Since the return to civil rule, Korean 
political activities have shown a steady 
movement toward democracy and civic re- 

Partnership in IVIutuai Security 

It is in the field of mutual security that 
our ties with Korea are most explicit. 
Based on the formal commitments em- 
bodied in our 1954 mutual defense treaty ,- 
the United States continues to maintain 
powerful forces in Korea under the United 
Nations Command. Through our military as- 
sistance program we contribute to the 
maintenance of Korean forces at levels 
which, in conjunction with our own, well 
insure the security of the Republic of 
Korea. To this end we have so far provided 
military assistance to Korea of about $2.2 

But the tie that binds us firmly to Ko- 
rea's destiny is not merely a treaty or an 
assistance program. It is the simple fact 
that Korean and American fighting men 
continue jointly to guard a thin line sep- 
arating North and South Korea. It is this 
partnership in defense which deters any 
Communist would-be aggressors. Looking 
back from the first days of the Korean 
conflict until today, we can be proud of our 
own military record in Korea, and we are 
proud of our association with the coura- 
geous fighting men of Korea, an efficient, 
well-trained force guarding freedom and 
peace in the Far East. 

I might say here that it is only because of 
sacrifices of the fighting men of the Re- 
public of Korea and the U.N. forces dur- 
ing the Korean conflict and their continued 
vigilance today that Korea has been able to 
progress economically and politically, in 
security from Communist subversion and 
aggression. It is this essential element — 

- Treaties and Other International Acts Series 

security from outside aggression — which 
has permitted Korea to grapple so success- 
fully with its problems of political institu- 
tion building and economic development. 
We can hope that in the Republic of Viet- 
Nam, once the vital problem of assuring its 
security is met, the Vietnamese people's ef- 
forts to create a free, stable society will 
meet a similar success. 

Partnership in Economic Progress 

Korea's determination to maintain its 
freedom and to create stable democratic 
institutions has been matched by its deter- 
mined efforts to create a self-reliant econ- 
omy. In this area, too, we stand in close 

The Republic of Korea has indeed made 
steady, impressive progress over the years, 
first reconstructing an economy ravaged by 
3 years of war and then building a solid 
foundation for sustained growth. In the 
past 2 years the Korean economy has 
grown at the rate of over 6 percent an- 
nually. We expect such growth to continue. 

In agriculture, Korea is moving toward 
eventual self-sufficiency through emphasis 
on new techniques and on expansion of land 
in productive use. A most important indi- 
cator of Korea's maturing economy has 
been the growth of exports, the value of 
which has increased from $32 million in 
1960 to $120 million in 1964. This year's 
target is $170 million, and there is, I under- 
stand, an excellent prospect for reaching 
that goal. This would be better than a five- 
fold increase over 5 years. For this impres- 
sive achievement, the Korean people and 
their Government deserve great credit, for 
Korea is not a land richly blessed with 
natural resources. 

This progress has required great care in 
the allocation of these scarce resources, and 
it has required continuing hard work by the 
Korean people. The Korean people have 
justifiably gained hope and confidence in 
their country's continued economic develop- 
ment and in the eventual attainment of 
their goal of a self-reliant, strong economy. 
I know that the Korean Government is 



keenly aware of its responsibility to assure 
that this hope is realized. I am sure that 
maintenance of the pace of Korea's develop- 
ment in a stabilized economy will receive 
the highest priority in its planning. 

As Korea has made economic progress, 
our assistance programs have reflected that 
progress and have been modified to meet 
the evolving needs of the Korean economy. 
Our supporting assistance, once in the 
hundreds of millions, now is well under $100 
million. At the same time Korea's develop- 
ment has enabled it to make effective use 
of development loans. We have already com- 
mitted a total of $151 million in such loans 
to Korea. In the joint communique at the 
end of President Park's highly successful 
visit here last May,^ President Johnson 
said that we would make available an addi- 
tional $150 million in development loan 
funds for agreed projects. 

In keeping our assistance policies in tune 
with Korea's changing economic needs, we 
recognize the necessity for continued sup- 
porting assistance to aid in financing es- 
sential imports under programs to help 
maintain stability. We also recognize the 
necessity for providing substantial assist- 
ance in agricultural commodities while 
Korea is still working toward its goal of 
self-sufficiency in food. 

In sum, we believe the economic picture 
in Korea is one of continuing grovrth and 
improvement. The United States will con- 
tinue to play a significant role in support 
of the self-help efforts of the Koreans them- 

Partnership in Exchange of Men and Ideas 

And there are gentler ties between us — 
fully as strong and as enduring. These are 
the close cultural bonds, particularly in edu- 
cation, which have existed between our 
peoples from the beginning of the Korean- 
American relationship in 1883. American 
missionaries and teachers in Korea, and 
Korean scholars in the United States, laid 
the groundwork for our friendship well. 

Beginning in the 19th century, and growing 
in spite of obstacles and hardships, the ex- 
change of ideas and men between our two 
nations has been a highly beneficial and 
satisfactory part of our relationship. Under 
both government and private exchange pro- 
grams, the flow of students, teachers, and 
artists has become a two-way street as 
Americans learn more about Korea through 
programs and ventures such as that which 
has brought your "Little Angels" to Wash- 

Korea's Role in the Far East 

Turning to recent international develop- 
ments in the Far East, Korea's role as a 
valued free-world partner has never been 
more clearly demonstrated than this year. 
Two of the major constructive developments 
of 1965 in the Far East have involved the 
Republic of Korea — the signature of the 
Korea-Japan normalization agreements and 
the Korean decision to send a combat force 
to aid South Viet-Nam.* These developments 
have been welcomed by all friends of Korea. 

Needless to say, we well recognize that 
the Korea-Japan negotiations, the settle- 
ment itself, and the ratification have been 
matters for the two Governments concerned 
to deal with. Nevertheless, we applaud the 
resolution of these complex problems which 
hitherto had separated our two free-world 
friends. We know that the normalization of 
relations between two countries with a past 
colonial relationship inevitably brings with 
it difficult emotional problems. But the set- 
tlement will significantly strengthen the 
free world and will directly benefit the 
economies of both countries. 

When the agreements were signed. Secre- 
tary Rusk expressed our pleasure over this 
"highly constructive and important step." ^ 
At the time of the subsequent Korean ratifi- 
cation, President Johnson stated that we 
believed the establishment of normal rela- 

' For text, see Bulletin of June 14, 1965, p. 952. 

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 

^ For text of a statement of June 22 by Secretary 
Rusk, see ibid., July 12, 1965, p. 76. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


tions between the Republic of Korea and 
Japan to be an "historic step that would 
bring important and durable benefit to both 
nations and to the Free World."" This does 
not, I wish to say again, mean that the 
Korea-Japan settlement will change our 
basic policy of extending military and eco- 
nomic assistance to Korea. Our views on 
this have been often restated, most recently 
in the two Presidents' May communique. 

Partnership in Viet-Nam 

Turning to Viet-Nam, now the most ser- 
iously threatened free-world outpost on the 
edge of the Chinese Communist-dominated 
landmass, we find Korea in the forefront of 
the free-world effort. Korea has already 
sent 2,600 soldiers for noncombat duties — 
an engineer battalion, security units, and 
a first-rate hospital unit. In a dramatic 
demonstration of Korea's determination to 
join in the resistance against Communist 
aggression, and of Korea's recognition that 
the peace and security of East and Southeast 
Asia are indivisible, the Korean Government 
under President Park's leadership is now 
readying a combat division force for service 
in Viet-Nam. Having once experienced the 
horrors of Communist-directed aggression, 
the Korean people well understand the 
meaning of the present struggle in Viet- 
Nam and the importance of the free-world 
stake there. 

Americans, remembering that 15 years 
ago we fought an earlier battle of this con- 
tinuing struggle, particularly welcome and 
are encouraged by the fact that Korea now 
stands with us and our friends on the firing 
line in Viet-Nam. I can assure you that we 
for our part are determined to do everything 
we can to assist the Government of Viet- 
Nam — together with Korea and the 30 

• Ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 448. 

other countries supporting our common 
cause there — in maintaining South Viet- 
Nam's independence and territorial integ- 

A Bridge of Friendship and Faith 

In sum, the United States greatly values 
its strong ties of friendship with the Re- 
public of Korea. We seek no special advan- 
tages for ourselves in our close relationship 
with that country. We see Korea as a con- 
tributing member of the free-world com- 
munity — a key partner and bulwark for 
peace in East Asia. Korea has, through its 
own efforts and with our assistance, made 
impressive gains. We are proud of our part- 
nership in peace with Korea, in Viet-Nam 
and elsewhere. 

We hope that the coming years will see 
the fruition of Korea's aspirations for 
peace and security, unification in freedom 
in accordance with the objectives and prin- 
ciples set forth in the U.N. resolutions on 
Korea, a self-sustaining economy, and polit- 
ical stability under democratic institutions. 
We completely support — and will continue 
to assist in the achievement of — these goals, 
for they are the same objectives to which 
our policies are directed and, in fact, the 
basis for our partnership. 

There exists between the Korean and 
American peoples a bridge of friendship 
and faith, based on our common hopes and 
aspirations for a world in which all nations 
may develop in peace and security. We 
would like to think that what has been 
accomplished in Korea is a crucial example 
of what the free nations of Asia can do 
under conditions of security. And we would 
like to think of the bridge of friendship and 
faith between our two peoples as an example, 
too, of the kind of relationship that must 
prevail between the United States and all 
the free nations of Asia. 



"A radio beam takes no note of national boundaries," says 
Paul F. Geren, State Department Adviser on Telecommuni- 
cations and Transportation. In this article, written espe- 
cially for the Bulletin, Mr, Geren describes how the current 
international deadlock over the adoption of worldwide stand- 
ards for color television involves foreign policy as well as 
science and economics. 

Worldwide Standards for Color Television 

by Paul F. Geren 

The amazing technology that has multi- 
plied and diversified global communication 
possibilities has increased the demands on 
foreign policy. A radio beam takes no note 
of national boundaries, but it can only be 
transmitted internationally from facilities 
located in one nation and received by facil- 
ities in another. As in all technological 
change, how these facilities are arranged 
and coordinated belongs not only to the field 
of science but also to the area of interna- 
tional relations. Similarly, the arrange- 
ments between governments in the commu- 
nications field influence for good or bad the 
freedom, the economy, and the efficiency of 
global communication. 

The choice of color television standards 
offers a dramatic illustration of this thesis. 
As the nation with the greatest telecommu- 
nications resources, whose industry in 1953 
was the first to operate color television 
broadcasts and now has equipped over 4 mil- 
lion homes to receive and over 550 stations 
to broadcast color television, the United 
States has considerable interest in the ques- 
tion of the standards chosen for transmis- 
sion of programs from one country to an- 
other. The mutuality of government and in- 
dustry interest is symbolized by a joint 
committee on color television. 

Color television standards have been a 

subject since 1956 for Study Group XI of 
the International Radio Consultative Com- 
mittee, abbreviated to CCIR from the ini- 
tials of its French name. The CCIR is a 
permanent organ of the 127-member Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union (ITU) 
and, like its parent body, is concerned with 
facilitating international communications. 
The goal of the ITU is to help the people 
of the world talk and otherwise communi- 
cate with one another. The CCIR looks for- 
ward to a time, not many years distant, 
when color television will be widely avail- 
able in many countries. Such a time casts 
its shadow on the present in the shape of 
the problem of compatibility of systems and 
technical standards. 

Compatibility means the capacity of dif- 
ferent systems to receive and transmit to 
and from one another. It has two aspects: 
the capacity of monochrome (black and 
white) sets to receive programs transmitted 
in color, and the capacity for color televi- 
sion program interchange between different 
countries. As the CCIR so accurately per- 
ceives, the time for action to secure com- 
patibility is now, before governments, in- 
dustries, and peoples in different countries 
invest great sums in incompatible systems. 

Compatibility, or the lack of it, results 
from the choice of standards. A telephone 
in New York must have compatibility with 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


an instrument in Copenhagen if persons in 
these two places are to talk to each other. 
Additional dimensions of compatibility are 
required for the worldwide direct-dialing 
telephone system now being developed. 
Compatibility of standards has been ap- 
proached in telephones and in radio, but 
only to a much lesser extent in monochrome 
television. The difficulty in exchanging 
programs is compounded in the case of color 
television by the complexities inherent in 
color transmission. In general, the more 
complex the form of communication, the 
greater the planning required to achieve 

Such an achievement seems to come nat- 
urally in adjacent countries which commu- 
nicate extensively. More than 50 percent of 
Canadian homes with television sets are 
within reach of direct television transmis- 
sion from the United States. Similarly, 
many television sets in the United States 
are within range of Canadian television 
transmission. Because Canada and the 
United States employ compatible mono- 
chrome television standards, the receivers 
along both sides of the border can tune in 
programs from either side. Furthermore, 
when Canadian authorities recently an- 
nounced the authorization of color television 
for Canada by 1967, they likewise made 
clear that the color system would coincide 
with the standards in use in the United 

The Dutch view West German television, 
and vice versa, Luxembourg the French. 
East Germany may view West Germany's 
programs, and vice versa. This is because 
adjacent monochrome systems are by and 
large compatible. 

The long-distance exchange of programs 
via the Early Bird satellite between the 
United States and Europe employs cameras 
and gear of the American system in Europe 
to transmit programs to the United States 
and vice versa, whether in black and white 
or color. The direct exchange of programs 
between the United States and Europe 
would require a standards converter. The 
greater the degree of compatibility, the 

simpler the standards converter and the less 
the resultant technical degradation of the 
original television picture. No satisfactory 
converter has yet been developed for ex- 
change of programs between basically in- 
compatible systems. 

Deadlock at Vienna Meeting 

Some progress toward the adoption of 
worldwide standards for color television 
was expected at the CCIR meeting in Vienna 
March 24-April 7, 1965. Study Group XI 
had been assigned this question, and despite 
a basic incompatibility built into the mono- 
chrome systems, its members were unwilling 
to abandon the objective of a common sys- 
tem for transmitting color. The representa- 
tives at Vienna were persons of technical 
competence, and they sought a decision 
based on engineering facts. 

However, this meeting was preceded and 
attended by remarkable events in other 
than the technological field. On March 22, 
two days before the conference in Vienna 
was to open, France and the U.S.S.R. an- 
nounced conclusion of an agreement to 
"unite their efforts in the development and 
introduction of a joint system of color tele- 
vision based on the French SECAM system 
and its standards," and General de Gaulle 
subsequently hailed the agreement in a 
speech at the Elysee. 

At the Vienna meeting, the chairman of 
the Committee polled its members in writ- 
ing on the question: What system do you 
choose for a public color television service? 
Twenty-one countries replied in favor of the 
SECAM system: Algeria, Bulgaria, Byel- 
orussia, Cameroon, Czechoslovakia, France, 
Gabon, Greece, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mali, 
Monaco, Morocco, Niger, Poland, Rumania, 
Spain, Tunisia, Ukraine, U.S.S.R., and Upper 
Volta. Four of these countries were not even 
present but had their votes cast by others. 

The following 18 countries replied in 
favor of the QAM system, or one of its 
variants, whose technical features and name 
are explained below: Austria, Brazil, Can- 
ada, Denmark, Finland, Federal Republic of 
Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 



Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, South 
Africa, Sweden, Switzerland, United King- 
dom, and United States. 

The nations which voted for SECAM 
have some 18 million television sets in oper- 
ation, while the nations voting for QAM 
have 146 million, or eight times as many. 
The SECAM list includes no country which 
presently has color television in regular 
service, while the QAM list includes the 
two countries which do: the United States, 
which has operated commercial color televi- 
sion since 1953, and Japan, which has had 
such a service since 1960. 

As a result of this split poll of the par- 
ticipants, the CCIR could not make a rec- 
ommendation for a single system. The dead- 
locked meeting's communique stated : 

All participants are concerned that efforts to 
secure agreement on a single system must continue 
and, indeed, the procedure of the Committee will 
permit the subject, as it then stands, to be ex- 
amined in Oslo at the Xlth Plenary Assembly of 

In view of the clear need to agree on a uni- 
versal system and the present division on 
the means, the color television question has 
gathered inevitable controversy. 

The SECAM System 

The two systems, QAM and SECAM, 
differ in the method of transmitting the 
color information. In the QAM family of 
systems, which includes the color system 
used in the United States, the technique is 
to transmit simultaneously the two color 
signals, hue and saturation, using quadra- 
ture amplitude modulation — hence the ini- 
tials QAM. In the SECAM, the color sig- 
nals are transmitted sequentially, using fre- 
quency modulation of the color subcarrier. 
A memory system in the TV receiver stores 
the color information, which is then reas- 
sembled to produce the color called for by 
the camera. This explains the initials 
SECAM, which stand for sequential a 
memoire. Because of the added delay line 
and switching circuitry, SECAM receivers 
are likely in the present state of technology 
to be more expensive to manufacture. There 

is also a grave engineering defect: The 
SECAM cannot make use of the powerful 
concept of constant luminance, which pro- 
tects against noise and random interference. 

The QAM System 

The QAM family includes several vari- 
ants, all employing the simultaneous trans- 
mission of the color system but each having 
individual characteristics. The oldest of 
these in point of time, the NTSC, is based 
on the recommendations of the National 
Television System Committee (NTSC), a 
U.S. group of engineering and administra- 
tive representatives of the television indus- 
try. These color television standards were 
established by order of the United States 
Federal Communications Commission in 
1953, after an earlier false start with the 
field sequential system. The adoption of the 
NTSC standards in the United States repre- 
sents a consensus of industry engineers 
achieved by thorough field tests. The NTSC 
standards were approved by the Canadian 
Radio Technical Planning Board in 1956. The 
Japanese Government adopted the NTSC 
standards in 1960 for the regular commercial 
service which began in that year. 

In the United States, Canada, and Japan 
both color and black and white systems are 
525 lines/60 fields. These designations speci- 
fy the number of lines in a television picture 
and the number of times per second the pic- 
ture is scanned on the screen. The systems 
of color television with which the United 
Kingdom is experimenting are variants of the 
NTSC, modified for compatibility with the 
existing black and white systems using 405 
lines/50 fields and 625 lines/50 fields. The 
Netherlands is likewise experimenting with a 
variant of the NTSC using 625 lines/50 fields. 

A third member of the QAM family is 
the PAL, which has been developed in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. The PAL 
system transmits the color information si- 
multaneously but alternately, thus reversing 
the phase of the color signals. 

All the variants of the QAM employ the 
quadrature amplitude modulation technique. 
The NTSC, whether 525 lines/60 fields, 405 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


Mr. Geren's article is one of a series being 
written especially for the Bulletin by officers 
of the Department and the Foreign Service. 
Officers who may be interested in submitting 
original bylined articles are invited to call 
the editor of the Bulletin, Mrs. Madeline Pat- 
ton, extension 5806, room 5536. 

lines/50 fields, or 625 lines/50 fields, and the 
PAL color signals can be received in mono- 
chrome on existing black and white receivers 
in use in the respective countries, and pro- 
grams in color can be exchanged between 
NTSC and PAL systems that use the same 
field rates by the use of a simple standards 
converter. At present, color signals trans- 
mitted by SECAM can be received on conven- 
tional monochrome sets on the same scanning 
standard. Color signals transmitted by 
SECAM, however, cannot be received on 
color sets of any variant of the QAM 
system. A standards converter to permit 
exchange between SECAM and QAM sys- 
tems has yet to be invented. Should a con- 
verter be invented, it would have to be more 
complex than the simple converters which 
now make possible the program exchange 
between the NTSC and the PAL when the 
field repetition rates are the same. 

The achievement of compatibility in color 
television systems has been complicated by 
the existence of difference in field repeti- 
tion rates: 60 fields per second in the 
United States, Canada, Japan, and some 
countries of Latin America and Asia, and 
50 fields per second in most of Europe and 
many countries of Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa. A complete identity of stand- 
ards is impossible between two countries 
employing differing field repetition rates, 
but a measure of compatibility is possible. 
In spite of different scanning standards, it 
is worth while to strive for reduction to an 
absolute minimum of the number of vari- 
ants of a system between which conversion 
is required. Theoretically this minimum is 
two: one variant for the countries using 
50-cycle power and one for those using 60- 

Choice of Standards Only a Beginning 

In view of the dynamic character of color 
television technology, many nations are 
postponing a choice of a system, especially 
because they do not accord color television 
high priority. This is a tempting position 
for any nation now without color television 
to adopt, since in the long run the char- 
acter of the choices to be made may be al- 
tered by technological development. How- 
ever, as Lord Keynes reminded us, in the 
long run we are all dead. 

One thing is sure: When a nation fixes 
a date to begin color television operations, 
it is not possible to play Hamlet in the 
choice between systems. It is impossible to 
begin operations on no system at all, and 
it is inefficient and uneconomic to begin 
operations — as contrasted to experiments — 
on several systems. 

While the choice of a system makes possi- 
ble a beginning, it does not freeze the pos- 
sibility of improvement in the end product 
seen in color on the television screen. The 
choice of system defines the basic charac- 
teristics of the color signal, but leaves open 
the future for all improvements in the com- 
ponents and circuitry. Indeed, the improve- 
ments in color television in the United 
States have all been made within the NTSC 
variant of the QAM system, adopted in 1953. 

The suggestion made by some advocates 
of SECAM that the QAM-NTSC has ex- 
hausted its technological possibilities is a 
reckless conjecture rather than a technolog- 
ical fact. One is reminded of Karl Marx's 
claim, made in the latter half of the 19th 
century, that capitalism had exhausted its 
possibilities. This was before various coun- 
tries which he described as capitalistic had 
brought forth X-ray, radio, the automobile, 
and the airplane — ^to name a few of the un- 
exhausted possibilities. 

The dynamic character of the U.S. tele- 
vision industry is a convincing argument 
that QAM-NTSC standards are consistent 
with accelerated technological advance. 
Among the recent gains are the trend 



toward all-solid-state components, the devel- 
opment of rare-earth phosphors for kine- 
scopes, the production of a four-tube color 
television camera, the production of rectan- 
gular shadow-mask color picture tubes mak- 
ing available wider deflection, and advanced 
work on camera tubes with electrostatic 
focusing and deflection. 

On the technological horizon are possibil- 
ities more amazing still, such as the intro- 
duction of integrated circuitry and the 
conversion of color television from analog to 
digital transmission. In the case of the 
United States the choice of QAM-NTSC 
standards was not the end but only a part 
of the beginning. 

factor of great significance. Considerations 
of both private profit and public interna- 
tional responsibility indicate that the ad- 
vance should be shared. 

Third, the fact that an identity of color 
television systems cannot be immediately 
achieved should not prevent the best efforts 
in the direction of maximizing compatibil- 
ity. If more than one set of standards are to 
obtain, the number should be the smallest 
possible and the compatibility should be the 
greatest possible. The real choice the world 
faces is whether to move in the direction of 
the greatest possible measure of compati- 
bility or by default to reverse the direction 
and proliferate incompatible systems. 

The U.S. Position 

The choice of color television standards 
involves technological, economic, psycho- 
logical, and political factors. Political policy 
in this realm must obviously take account 
of the technological facts. It disregards them 
at its peril. 

We in the United States believe that ob- 
servance of the three following principles 
will serve to further the objectives of world- 
wide standards : 

First, no limits should be placed on fur- 
ther research and technological investiga- 
tion of color television. Field tests of QAM 
and SECAM systems should be available for 
countries while they are in the stage of 
choosing a system. After choice has been 
made, the system must be kept open for all 
the technological improvements which may 
be made in components. 

Second, the progress already achieved in 
the QAM-NTSC system in operation in 
the United States since 1953 and in Japan 
since 1960 should be appropriately available 
for other countries which wish to use it. 
The means of sharing this branch of prog- 
ress are the sale of equipment and compo- 
nents, the licensing of technology manufac- 
turing rights, and the entire battery of 
methods by which the television industry 
operates across national boundaries. The 
relatively long headstart in color television 
enjoyed by the United States industry is a 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Food for Peace. 1964 Annual Report on Public Law 
480. H. Doc. 130. March 31, 1965. 155 pp. 

Discriminatory Ocean Freight Rates and the Bal- 
ance of Payments. Hearings before the Subcom- 
mittee on Federal Procurement and Regulations of 
the Joint Economic Committee. Part 1. April 
7-8, 1965. 350 pp. 

Antarctica Report — 1965. Hearings before the Sub- 
committee on Territorial and Insular Affairs of 
the House Committee on Interior and Insular Af- 
fairs on H.R. 555, H.R. 2211, H.R. 4658, H.R. 5494, 
bills to provide for continuity and support of study, 
research, and development of programs for peace- 
ful uses in science, commerce, and other activities. 
April 12-June 15, 1965. 157 pp. 

Conditions in the Baltic States and in Other Coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe. Hearings before the 
Subcommittee on Europe of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. May 17-18, 1965. 92 pp. 

South Pacific Commission. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations and 
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on H.J. Res. 475 (H.J. Res. 503), to amend 
the joint resolution of January 28, 1948, providing 
for membership and participation by the United 
States in the South Pacific Commission. May 
20, 1965. 59 pp. 

Amend Section 2 of the Export Control Act of 1949. 
Hearings before a subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Banking and Currency. May 24-25, 
1965. 162 pp. 

Current Economic Indicators for the U.S.S.R. Ma- 
terials prepared for the Joint Economic Commit- 
tee. June 1965. 220 pp. [Joint Committee print.] 

To Amend Further the Peace Corps Act. Hearings 
before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 
H.R. 9026. June 2-8, 1965. 209 pp. 

International Committee of the Red Cross. Hearing 
before the Subcommittee on International Organi- 
zations and Movements of the House Committee on 
Foreign Affairs on H.R. 8715. June 7, 1965. 14 pp. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 



U.N. Security Council Demands Cease-Fire 
Between Armed Forces of India and Pakistan 

Folloiving are statements made in the 
U.N. Security Council by U.S. Representa- 
tive Arthur J. Goldberg during the Council's 
continued consideration of the India-Paki- 
stan question, together with the text of a 
resolution adopted on September 20. 


U.S./U.N. press release 4636 

I have no other speakers inscribed for 
today. And I should like to make a brief 
statement in my capacity as Permanent 
Representative of the United States. 

The United States enjoys and hopes to 
continue to enjoy friendly relations with 
both India and Pakistan. I should like to 
emphasize that we have suspended arms 
shipments to both countries, since we want, 
in support of the Security Council's resolu- 
tions calling for a cease-fire,^ to help bring 
about an end to this conflict and not to 
escalate it. It is the sense of the Security 
Council's resolutions that there be a prompt 
end and not an intensification of hostilities. 

We deplore the use of arms supplied by 
us in this conflict in contravention of solemn 
agreements. The United States, along with 
all members of this Council, profoundly 
believes that the differences between India 
and Pakistan can be resolved, must be re- 
solved, under conditions of peace. 

This is the stated objective of the Security 

Council and, as the Secretary-General has 
made clear in his report,- is his earnest 
hope and desire. We have supported the 
Security Council and the Secretary-General 
in this objective, and we shall continue this 
support in pursuit of peace on the sub- 

This completes our business today. In my 
capacity as President of the Council, I 
merely would like to say that members of 
the Council and, indeed, the entire world 
will have taken note of the momentous 
statement made by the Secretary-General 
this morning. It is now incumbent upon this 
Council again to take up its responsibilities 
as the agency of the international com- 
munity with primary responsibility for the 
maintenance of international peace and 

The Secretary-General has warned us 
that a real danger to world peace is immi- 
nent as a result of the conflict in the sub- 
continent. New and serious developments 
which have broadened the threat to the 
peace can only increase tensions and compli- 
cate the peacemaking efforts of the United 
Nations, the Security Council, and the 

We must, therefore, proceed with a sense 
of urgency and responsibility. My consulta- 
tions with the members of the Security 
Council have indicated that we may best do 
this by proceeding the balance of today 

■ For texts, see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1965, p. 529. 

= U.N. doc. S/6686. 



through private consultations regarding the 
actions we must now take. 

I, therefore, propose, unless there is ob- 
jection, that we set our next meeting for 
10:30 a.m. tomorrow, with the view to 
proceeding to the adoption of our next 
action as promptly as possible. Should, how- 
ever, consultations in the meantime with 
members of the Security Council make an 
earlier decision possible or should conditions 
in the subcontinent require, the Council 
would be called into urgent and emergency 
session. I hope the members will remain 
available at all times for this purpose, and 
I propose to continue to be in continuous 
consultation with the members of the 
Security Council. 

Hearing no objection, it is therefore so 


U.S./U.N. press release 4638 

I should now like to make a statement in 
my capacity as Permanent Representative 
of the United States. 

The United States believes it is crucial 
that the Security Council pursue urgently 
with all the capability at its disposal its 
efforts to secure an immediate and effective 
cease-fire between India and Pakistan and 
to restore peace in the subcontinent. The 
Secretary-General has reported to us in full 
on his mission of peace. The United States 
commends the Secretary-General for his 
impartial efforts to give effect to the Coun- 
cil's resolutions and achieve an honorable 
settlement. My Government fully endorses 
his proposals to the parties and urges this 
Council, in light of the seriousness of the 
situation, to proceed promptly to implement 

We agree with the comment just made 
by the distinguished representative of the 
Netherlands that time is of the very essence 
in this grave situation. 

We regard the Security Council as the 
appropriate and most effective agency to 
meet this crisis. We believe the Security 
Council must act, that it must act firmly, 

decisively, and promptly. We trust that all 
peace-loving countries will fully support its 

While we are meeting, in direct contra- 
diction to our efforts the Chinese Commu- 
nists are pursuing a course clearly designed 
to aggravate further the already grave 
situation. The world is thus confronted with 
an increased threat to peace which can only 
be designed to increase tension and to 
complicate the peacemaking efforts of the 
United Nations, the Security Council, and the 

If a cease-fire between India and Paki- 
stan was necessary at the time of our 
September 4th and 6th resolutions, it is 
imperatively necessary today. And it is 
doubly necessary that our voices be raised 
firmly against any efforts to spread the 
conflict and exploit what is already a 

I most strongly urge that we proceed here 
with our task and join in calling on both 
Governments involved in the conflict to 
cease fire immediately and to respond fav- 
orably to the Secretary-General's proposals 
in order that this threat to world peace may 
be ended before it involves more nations, 
more peoples, more suffering. 

The Secretary-General has also expressed 
the view to the two parties that the Council 
would wish to explore "as a matter of 
urgency, methods for achieving enduring 
peace between India and Pakistan" ^ and has 
noted that as late as November 1962 the 
President of Pakistan and the Prime Minis- 
ter of India agreed on the need for renewed 
efforts to resolve their outstanding differ- 
ences. We agree with the Secretary-General 
that renewed efforts to resolve these dif- 
ferences should be made and that they can 
only be effective under conditions of peace. 

The position of the United States in this 
matter is simple and forthright. We are in 
full support of the United Nations activity 
in this area. We are in full support of the 
two resolutions adopted by the Security 
Council during the past weeks and the 
efforts of the Secretary-General to give 

■ U.N. doc. S/6683. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


effect to these resolutions. And our full 
support of these resolutions is but a con- 
tinuation of our consistent attitude on the 
India-Pakistan question, which has always 
been to support a peaceful solution of all 
aspects of the differences between them. 

Since the birth of India and Pakistan as 
independent countries, my Government has 
developed relations close and friendly with 
both countries, relations which we sincerely 
want and hope and expect to continue. We 
have many ties of friendship and common 
interests with the peoples of both India and 
Pakistan. And these are expressed not only 
in our broad governmental programs but 
also in the form of many nongovernmental 
programs and activities, particularly in the 
fields of health, education, and economic 
development. And, as I said to the Security 
Council a week ago Saturday,* and I would 
like to repeat that statement, ". . . we know 
intimately from our close relations with 
both countries the intricacies of the under- 
lying problem which is at the root of today's 
conflict. . . ." 

Our attitude in the United Nations on the 
India-Pakistan question, today as in the 
past, continues to derive from the existence 
of this spirit of friendship with both coun- 
tries and a deep interest in world peace. 
That is why we have shared the deep con- 
cern expressed by us, together with all 
members of the Council, in the September 
6th resolution, about extension of fighting 
which adds immeasurably to the seriousness 
of the situation. The world community has 
a right to expect in the wake of the Security 
Council resolutions twice adopted unani- 
mously that both parties cease hostilities 
and respect the Council resolutions, which 
are even-handed resolutions between the 

These resolutions are based upon a com- 
mon conviction that a peaceful resolution of 
the differences between the two countries 
can be effected only in conditions of peace 
and not by continuing hostilities or violence. 
It is the overriding necessity of this very 
hour, in the face of truly disastrous conse- 

quences, for both of these great countries 
and for the whole world to achieve a halt 
in fighting. And this is why the Council 
requested the Secretary-General to exert 
every possible effort to give effect to the 
September 4th and 6th resolutions, and this 
is precisely what the distinguished Secre- 
tary-General did on his mission of peace to 
the subcontinent. 

The Secretary-General said of India and 

... it is not only the fate of . . . India and 
Pakistan which is at stake. Both States are linked 
in a peculiarly intricate way with the mainstream 
of world affairs. 

The threat to international peace and 
security is apparent and must be obvious 
both to the parties and every member of this 
Council. The Council must act firmly and 
quickly, and all states truly dedicated to 
peace and security and to the Charter of 
the United Nations must heed its voice. 


U.S./U.N. press release 4641 

I have no further speakers inscribed on 
my list. I would, however, like to conclude 
this session of the Security Council by 
making a few very brief comments, first as 
President of the Council and then as the 
Representative of the United States. 

As President of the Council, I first would 
like to acknowledge the important contribu- 
tion made to the work of the Council today 
in the preparation, in the drafting, in the 
negotiation of the resolution which has been 
adopted," by the distinguished Representa- 
tive of the Netherlands [J. G. de Beus] . His 
colleagues on the Council are indebted to 
him for his perseverance in drafting a fair, 
an impartial resolution which has com- 
manded the widespread support which this 
resolution has received. 

It was, as I can bear witness, not an easy 
task. To come to the broad consensus re- 

' Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1965, p. 526. 

'U.N. doc. S/6686. 

OU.N. doc. (S/6694 S/RES/211). 



fleeted by the vote in a situation of this 
complexity, of this difficulty, of this char- 
acter, is not easy. And the distinguished 
Ambassador from the Netherlands brought 
to the task the impartiality which an as- 
signment of this type clearly necessitates. 
And I, for the members of the Council, ex- 
press appreciation to him and all those who 
participated with him in bringing to frui- 
tion the work which has been done. 

This is not just another resolution. I have 
studied the resolutions adopted in the his- 
tory of this great organization. And I should 
like to point out that this resolution is a 
resolution of a unique character. It is of 
unique character because the situation 
which confronts us is unique, it is grave, it 
is difficult. And, therefore, the resolution 
is of great significance not only for the 
future of peace on the subcontinent but also 
for the entire community of the world. 

I would like to direct on behalf of the 
Council an appeal to the representatives of 
Pakistan and India. This Council has spoken 
in terms of friendship to both countries. 
This Council has spoken in terms of com- 
plete dedication to the principles of the 
charter, which requires, as a matter of 
treaty obligation, that all member nations 
pursue peaceful methods in the resolution 
of their differences. 

This resolution demands in the name of 
the members of the Council and in the 
names of peace-loving people all over the 
world an end to the bloodshed that is going 
on. The word "demand" is a word that is 
not used easily or readily in relation to 
sovereign nations; and it is only to be 
justified, it seems to me and it seems to 
the Council, in the interests of the cause of 
peace. It is no infringement on the sov- 
ereignty of any nation to ask nations to 
pursue peaceful ways. This is the commit- 
ment that we have all made as nations when 
we entered into this compact which is the 
Charter of the United Nations. 

When a resolution of this type is pre- 
sented to parties, I know from my experience 
of many years, there is an immediate re- 
action, and then perhaps there ought to be 
a subsequent and more thoughtful reaction. 

There is in this resolution the basis not only 
for achieving a cease-fire, but if there is 
the will on the part of both India and Paki- 
stan, there is the way to an ultimate resolu- 
tion of the underlying differences between 
them. There must be the will, and there 
also must be recognition by both India and 
Pakistan of what this resolution says, be- 
cause it expresses the views of the members 
of the Council to which I am sure they will 
pay the utmost attention. 

This is an even-handed resolution. It is 
an even-handed resolution in that it ad- 
dresses itself both immediately to the prob- 
lem at hand, which is the restoration of 
peace and the end to the war that is going 
on, and it addresses itself to the fact that 
there are underlying problems which require 
consideration. It seems to me that neither 
nation can deny either aspect of this resolu- 
tion, which deals with both aspects of the 
problem at hand. 

There is no question but that the situa- 
tion is urgent and that is why we have 
stayed with it these several weeks and have 
stayed with it so intensively the last few 
days. It is only by act of providence that 
I sit in this chair. And I have had the 
unique experience now of working with 
other representatives and as the representa- 
tive of my country with other nations in 
trying to cope with this problem. Surely it 
must be a source that ought to encourage 
both India and Pakistan to accept this reso- 
lution to know that not an unfriendly word 
or thought was expressed by any member 
or any nation toward either country in the 
discussions which took place. And surely it 
should be a source of thoughtful reflection 
that this Council, which represents an or- 
ganization to which they both have been so 
loyally devoted, has expressed itself the way 
it has. 

This dispute is going to be over some day, 
and it is better that it be over sooner than 
later, in terms of bloodshed, in terms of 
suffering, in terms of all the hardship that 
war can entail. It should be over — it must 
be over within the time that has been fixed 
by this Council. And then, when the fight- 
ing stops — and the fighting must stop, and 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


the fighting will ultimately stop at a greater 
cost of lives and all other things that are 
dear to people — when the fighting stops, 
this Council, as the resolution has said, will 
consider, as soon as that is done, what steps 
could be taken to assist toward a settlement 
of the political problem underlying the 
present conflict. 

What other course of action could the 
Council be asked to take ? What other course 
of conduct would the representatives of 
India and Pakistan take if, instead of being 
parties to the dispute, they were members 
of the Council? I am positive that they 
would have joined in the vote that we have 
taken here today. 

And now I would like to say a word as 
representative of my country. 

I recalled yesterday in this Council the 
history of friendly relations between the 
United States and the Governments and 
peoples of India and Pakistan. I pledged the 
best efforts of my Government, acting in 
the spirit of these friendly relations, to 
assist through the Security Council, through 
the United Nations, which is the instrument 
that we all agreed upon should act in these 
matters, to search for a peaceful settlement 
of the problems that exist between the two 

And as a representative of the Govern- 
ment of the United States — and I know, 
speaking for the people of the United States, 
who feel very deeply about this matter and 
follow it with the greatest possible concern 
— I call upon the peoples of India and 
Pakistan to understand and support the 
challenge of statesmanship which the Se- 
curity Council has made to the leaders of 
these two great countries. 

This organization, the United Nations, 
was set up to cope with the problems and 
disputes of our world, the problems and 
disputes of the kind and character which 
are here before us today. It can succeed only 
to the extent that we, the members, use it, 
and use it in the interests of peace. The 
members of the Council have used it tonight 
in the interest of peace and, in my opinion, 
have used it well. 

It is now the solemn obligation of the 
governments concerned to meet the full 
import of this resolution in the same spirit 
in which the resolution was drafted and in 
which it has been adopted. It never hurts 
any country, nor the people of the country, 
to serve the cause of peace and to use 
peaceful means to resolve their differences. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 464B 

Speaking on behalf of the members of the 
Security Council, I would like to express the 
profound appreciation of members of the 
Council to the distinguished heads of state 
of India and Pakistan, who, in compliance 
with the resolution adopted by the Security 
Council on the 20th of September 1965, 
have ordered a cease-fire between their 
armed forces so that conditions of peace 
and the end of hostilities can be brought 
about on the subcontinent. 

This is an important day in the history of 
the United Nations and in the history of the 
world. This Council and the United Nations 
have addressed themselves to the gravest 
problem perhaps with which the United 
Nations has been seized in the course of its 
history. The Security Council has debated 
this matter at length, has heard the repre- 
sentatives of the countries at length, and 
has had the benefit of the profound, im- 
partial, courageous efforts of our Secretary- 
General, who went on a mission of peace to 
the subcontinent. 

The end of bloodshed on the subcontinent 
is highly important. But, as the Security 
Council resolution of the 20th of September 
1965 clearly said, that is a first step. There 
are other steps which must be taken. The 
other steps which must be taken are for the 
parties involved and for this Security Coun- 
cil to work together to bring about condi- 
tions of permanent peace between their two 
countries. The resolution of the 20th of 
September 1965 recognized that there had 
to be a cease-fire, there had to be a with- 
drawal of forces, and there had to be a 



resolution in an honorable way, under 
peaceful conditions, of the underlying politi- 
cal problem which exists between the two 

I said in concluding our debate the other 
day that if India and Pakistan were sitting 
at the Council table instead of presenting 
their cases to the Council, they would, know- 
ing their past history of people dedicated to 
the principles of the charter and to the 
cause of international peace and justice, 
decide as the Council decided in its resolu- 

The cease-fire must be a prelude to better 
understanding so that this war, this tragic 
war which occurred, will never be repeated 
and so that these two neighbors, toward 
which all of us have great friendship, will 
resume the course of friendly relations in a 
spirit of friendly cooperation, peace, and 

The members of this Council and this 
Council will do everything they can to assist 
in what is the most noble of all tasks, and 
that is the task of bringing permanent 
peace to the area. Under the resolution 
adopted by the Security Council, the Secre- 
tary-General has been authorized to provide 
the necessary assistance to insure supervi- 
sion of the cease-fire, and that assistance 
is at the disposal of the parties under the 
text of the resolution adopted by the 
Council. And I have noted in the course of 
this debate that both the representatives of 
India and of Pakistan have stated repeatedly 
their confidence in the Secretary-General, 
in which all members of the Council are at 
one, that his efforts in this and all other 
areas are designed to assist in restoration 
of peaceful conditions in the area. 

I am sure that the announcement of the 
Government of India, through its distin- 
guished Prime Minister, which is noted in 
the report of the Secretary-General,'^ and 
the announcement made by the distin- 
guished Foreign Minister of Pakistan will 
be greeted by great relief and great acclaim 
by a very troubled world. But it is necessary. 

President Welcomes Acceptance 
of Cease-Fire by India, Paicistan 

Statement by President Johnson ^ 

I speak for every American when I com- 
mend the statesmanship and restraint shown 
by the leaders of Pakistan and India in their 
acceptance of the cease-fire call of the United 
Nations Security Council. The leadership 
shown in both nations thus takes us a long 
step away from the terrible dangers which 
have threatened the subcontinent of Asia. 

On behalf of the American people I want to 
express our deep appreciation and gratitude 
to Secretary-General U Thant for his fairness 
and firmness in the service of peace in these 
last weeks. I am especially proud of our own 
gifted Ambassador Arthur Goldberg and 
members of his new U.N. team. As President 
of the Security Council, he has given his able 
and untiring support to the efforts of the 

We now hope that both nations, in the 
spirit of the Security Council resolution, will 
move forward to peaceful settlement of their 
outstanding differences. The job of the U.N. 
has just begun. We will fully support it every 
step of the way by our actions and our words. 

^ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 22 
by Bill D. Moyers, Press Secretary to the 

' U.N. doc. S/6699 and Add. 1. 

as I have said, to go on from there and 
again to restore the conditions which will 
lead to a permanent and lasting, an honor- 
able, peace between these two great neigh- 
bors, between these two great members of 
the United Nations, and between these two 
great members of the world family. 

India and Pakistan have very much to 
contribute to the world, and the world looks 
upon these two countries with great bonds 
of affection and concern and interest. 

In the announcement that is made today, 
I, as President of the Council on behalf of 
the members of the Council, wish again to 
express our appreciation to both countries 
for honoring the Council's request. The 
Council, of course, will continue, as the 
Council resolution prescribes, its considera- 
tion of this matter so that the Council can 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


make its contribution toward a resolution 
of the problems involved. And I thank the 
Foreign Minister of Pakistan for coming 
here in his long and arduous journey. I 
thank the distinguished Minister of India 
and its representatives for their contribu- 
tion to this discussion. 


The Security Council, 

Having considered the Reports of the Secretary- 
General on his consultations with the Governments 
of India and Pakistan, 

Commending the Secretary-General for his un- 
relenting efforts in furtherance of the objectives 
of the Security Council's resolutions of 4 and 6 

Having heard the statements of the representa- 
tives of India and Pakistan, 

Noting the differing replies by the parties to an 
appeal for a cease-fire as set out in the Report of 
the Secretary-General (S/6683), but noting further 
with concern that no cease-fire has yet come into 

Convinced that an early cessation of hostilities 
is essential as a first step towards a peaceful 
settlement of the outstanding differences between 
the two countries on Kashmir and other related 

1. Demands that a cease-fire should take effect 
on Wednesday, 22 September 1965, at 0700 hours 
GMT ° and calls upon both Governments to issue 
orders for a cease-fire at that moment and a 
subsequent withdrawal of all armed personnel back 
to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965; 

2. Requests the Secretary-General to provide the 
necessary assistance to ensure supervision of the 
cease-fire and withdrawal of all armed personnel; 

3. Calls on all States to refrain from any action 
which might aggravate the situation in the area; 

4. Decides to consider as soon as operative para- 
graph 1 of the Council's resolution 210 of 6 
September has been implemented, what steps could 
be taken to assist towards a settlement of the 
political problem underlying the present conflict, 
and in the meantime calls on the two Governments 

= U.N. doc. S/RES/2H (1965); adopted by the 
Council on Sept. 20 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 1 
abstention (Jordan). 

'On Sept. 22 (U.S./U.N. press release 4646) 
Ambassador Goldberg announced that the Security 
Council had extended the time at which the cease- 
fire was to take effect to "not later than 2200 
GMT, September 22." 

to utilize all peaceful means, including those listed 
in Article 33 of the Charter, to this end; 

5. Requests the Secretary-General to exert every 
possible effort to give effect to this resolution, to 
seek a peaceful solution, and to report to the 
Security Council thereon. 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation 
to 20th U.N. General Assembly 

The Senate on September 15 confirmed 
the following to be representatives and al- 
ternate representatives of the United States 
to the 20th session of the General Assembly 
of the United Nations : 


Arthur J. Goldberg 

Charles W. Yost 

Barratt O'Hara 

Peter H. B. Frelinghuysen 

William C. Foster 

Alternate Representatives 
James M. Nabrit, Jr. 
James Roosevelt 
Mrs. Eugene Anderson 
William P. Rogers 
Miss Frances E. Willis 

Conference on Latin American 
Volunteer Problems 

Following is the text of a message sent by 
President Johnson to President Arturo U. 
Illia of Argentina on the occasion of the 
First Inter-American Conference on Latin 
American Volunteer Problems at Buenos 
Aires September 6-10. 

Press release 217 dated September 10 

September 9, 1965 
Dear Mr. President: Three years ago I 
had the pleasure of opening the Middle-Level 
Manpower Conference in Puerto Rico,i where 
41 nations assembled to discuss the problems 
of manpower development in the decade of 
the 60's. 

Out of that meeting has now emerged an 

^ For a report on the conference, see Bulletin of 
Dec. 3, 1962, p. 853. 


department of state bulletin 

ever-increasing attention by nations through- 
out the world on the subject of developing 
our youth through services in peace corps 
movements of many types. 

I am gratified to know^ that the nations of 
this hemisphere are now^ meeting in Buenos 
Aires to further intensify this vi'ork and to 
discuss ways and means of establishing more 
youth organizations in all countries. On 
behalf of the United States, whose delegates 
sit in your meeting, I send you greetings and 
request that you extend to all the delegates 
my best wishes for a successful conference. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The first 3 days of the NATO conference 
will be held at Paris. On the last day, the 
West German Government will fly the en- 
tire delegation to Munich to participate in 
an international transportation exhibit 


Current Actions 

NATO Conference To Discuss Role 
of Civil Aviation in Emergency 

White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 6, 
for release September 7 

The United States will send a representa- 
tive to Paris later this month for a North At- 
lantic Treaty Organization conference on 
the role of civil aviation in the 15 NATO 
countries in the event of an emergency. 
The President has asked the Director of the 
Office of Emergency Transportation, John 
L. McGruder, to represent the United States 
in the 4-day conference convening Septem- 
ber 21. 

Mr. McGruder will review the capa- 
bilities of this country's Civil Reserve Air 
Fleet (GRAF), under which 343 first-line 
air carrier aircraft from 22 carriers are un- 
der standby contracts with the Department 
of Defense, ready for any kind of emer- 
gency. He will also discuss this Govern- 
ment's War Air Service Program (WASP), 
which is designed to provide essential civil- 
ian routes and services during emergencies, 
and the State and Regional Defense Airlift 
(SARDA), under which smaller, noncom- 
mercial type aircraft will be utilized. 

NATO's Civil Aviation Planning Com- 
mittee (CAPC) was organized by NATO 
countries in 1956. Its purpose is to plan for 
the preservation and effective use of civil 
aircraft in the NATO countries in the 
event of war or an emergency. 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement for the application of safe^ards by the 
international Atomic Energy Agency to the bi- 
lateral agreement between the United States and 
Thailand of March 13, 1956, as amended (TIAS 
3522, 3842, 4533, 5122, 5765), for cooperation 
concerning civil uses of atomic energy. Signed at 
Vienna September 30, 1964. 
Entered into force: September 10, 1965. 

Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for touring. 
Done at New York June 4, 1954. Entered into 
force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Accession deposited: Uganda (with reservations), 
April 15, 1965. 


Convention on the international recognition of 
rights in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. 
Entered into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 

Adherence deposited: Ivory Coast, August 23, 


Convention on nature protection and wildlife pres- 
ervation in the Western Hemisphere, and annex. 
Opened for signature at the Pan American Union 
October 12, 1940. Entered into force April 30, 
1942. 56 Stat. 1354. 
Ratification deposited: Brazil, August 26, 1965. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations; 
Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on 

consular relations concerning the acquisition of 


Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.* 

Accession deposited: Kenya, July 1, 1965. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien- 
tific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done 

* Not in force. 

OCTOBER 11, 1965 


at Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into 

force May 21, 1952.'' 

Acceptance deposited: Malawi, August 17, 1965. 


Convention on settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. 
Done at Washington March 18, 1965." 
Signatures: Cameroon, September 23, 1965; 
Dahomey, September 10, 1965; Ethiopia, Sep- 
tember 21, 1965; Gabon, September 21, 1965; 
Japan, September 23, 1965; Liberia, September 
3, 1965; Upper Volta, September 16, 1965. 


Statute of international agency for research on 
cancer. Done at Geneva May 20, 1965. 
Entered into force: September 15, 1965. 

Narcotic Drugs 

Convention relating to the suppression of the abuse 
of opium and other drugs. Signed at The Hague 
January 23, 1912. Entered into force December 
31, 1914; for the United States February 11, 1915. 
38 Stat. 1912. 

Notification that it considers itself hound: Mal- 
awi, July 22, 1965. 

Convention for limiting the manufacture and 
regulating the distribution of narcotic drugs, and 
protocol of signature. Concluded at Geneva July 
13, 1931. Entered into force July 9, 1933. 48 
Stat. 1543. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Mal- 
awi, July 22, 1965. 

Protocol bringing under international control drugs 
outside the scope of the convention limiting the 
manufacture and regulating the distribution of 
narcotic drugs concluded at Geneva July 13, 
1931 (48 Stat. 1543), as amended (61 Stat. 2230; 
62 Stat. 1796). Done at Paris November 19, 1948. 
Entered into force December 1, 1949; for the 
United States September 11, 1950. TIAS 2308. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: Mal- 
awi, July 22, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

International regulations for preventing collisions 
at sea. Approved by the International Conference 
on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 
17, 1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. 
TIAS 5813. 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, August 27, 


Protocol for the prolongation of the international 
sugar agreement of December 1, 1958 (TIAS 
4389). Done at London August 1, 1963. Entered 
into force for the United States February 27, 
1964. TIAS 5744. 

Ratification deposited: Federal Republic of Ger- 
many (applicable to Land Berlin), July 28, 
Accession deposited: Sierra Leone, August 9, 1965. 


Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 
1959), with annexes and additional protocol. 
Done at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into 
force January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603. 

Notification of approval: Union of Soviet Social- 
ist Republics, August 3, 1965. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on 
trade and development and to amend annex I. 
Open for acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at 
Geneva from February 8 until December 31, 
Signature: Tanzania, September 2, 1965. 


Protocol for the extension of the International 
Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open for 
signature at Washington March 22 through 
April 23, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, 
for part I and parts III to VII, and August 1, 
1965, for part II. TIAS 5844. 

Acceptances deposited: Guatemala, September 17, 
1965; Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
(confirming statement made at time of signa- 
ture), September 20, 1965. 



Agreement concerning the establishment of an 
international arbitral tribunal to dispose of 
United States claims relating to Gut Dam. Done 
at Ottawa March 25, 1965. 
Ratified by the President: September 3, 1965. 


Agreement implementing the agreement of May 6, 
1963 (TIAS 5353), regarding radio broadcasting 
facilities. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Manila September 10, 1965. Entered into force 
September 10, 1965. 

" Not in force for the United States. 
' Not in force. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: September 20-26 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to September 20 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
217 of September 10 and 223 of September 16. 

No. Date Subject 

227 9/20 Bundy: "Korea, a Free- World 
Partner in the Far East." 

*228 9/21 Harriman: regional foreign policy 
conference, Flint, Mich, (ex- 

*229 9/22 Hare sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for Near East and South 
Asian Affairs (biographic de- 

t230 9/24 Department signs contract for sys- 
tem to handle worldwide flow 
of cables (rewrite). 
231 9/25 Johnson : message to Americans of 
German descent. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



INDEX October 11, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1372 

American Principles. The Hard Problems of a 
Turbulent World (Ball) 588 

Argentina. Conference on Latin American Vol- 
unteer Problems (Johnson) 608 

Asia. Korea, a Free-World Partner in the Far 
East (William P. Bundy) 593 

Atomic Energy. Goal of the United Nations: A 
Great Society for All Men (Goldberg) . . 578 

Aviation. NATO Conference To Discuss Role of 
Civil Aviation in Emergency 609 

China. Goal of the United Nations: A Great 
Society for All Men (Goldberg) .... 578 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 601 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 20th U.N. 
General Assembly 608 

Disarmament. Goal of the United Nations: A 
Great Society for All Men (Goldberg) ... 578 

Economic Affairs 

Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 57g 

The Hard Problems of a Turbulent World 
(Ball) 588 

Foreign Aid. Conference on Latin American Vol- 
unteer Problems (Johnson) 608 

Germany. U.S. Reaffirms Interest in German 
Unity in Von Steuben Day Message (Johnson) 592 

Human Rights 

Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 578 

The Hard Problems of a Turbulent World 
(Ball) 588 


Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 578 

President Welcomes Acceptance of Cease-Fire 
by India, Pakistan 607 

U.N. Security Council Demands Cease-Fire Be- 
tween Armed Forces of India and Pakistan 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 602 

International Organizations and Conferences. 

Conference on Latin American Volunteer 

Problems (Johnson) 608 

Korea. Korea, a Free-World Partner in the 

Far East (William P. Bundy) 593 

Morocco. Letters of Credence (Laraki) . . . 587 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization. NATO 
Conference To Discuss Role of Civil Aviation 
in Emergency 609 


Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 578 

President Welcomes Acceptance of Cease-Fire 
by India, Pakistan 607 

U.N. Security Council Demands Cease-Fire Be- 
tween Armed Forces of India and Pakistan 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 602 

Presidential Documents 

Conference on Latin American Volunteer 
Problems 608 

President Welcomes Acceptance of Cease-Fire 
by India, Pakistan 607 

U.S. Reaffirms Interest in German Unity in 
Von Steuben Day Message 592 

Science. Worldwide Standards for Color Tele- 
vision (Geren) 597 

Telecommunications. Worldwide Standards for 
Color Television (Geren) 597 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 609 
United Nations 

Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 578 

President Welcomes Acceptance of Cease-Fire 
by India, Pakistan 607 

Senate Confirms U.S. Delegation to 20th U.N. 
General Assembly 608 

U.N. Security Council Demands Cease-Fire Be- 
tween Armed Forces of India and Pakistan 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 602 


Goal of the United Nations: A Great Society 
for All Men (Goldberg) 578 

Korea, a Free-World Partner in the Far East 
(William P. Bundy) 593 

Name Index 

Anderson, Mrs. Eugenie 608 

Ball, George W 588 

Bundy, William P 593 

Foster, William C 608 

Frelinghuysen, Peter H. B 608 

Geren, Paul P 597 

Goldberg, Arthur J 578, 602, 608 

Johnson, President 592, 607, 608 

Laraki, Ahmed 587 

Nabrit, James M., Jr 608 

O'Hara, Barratt 608 

Rogers, William P 608 

Roosevelt, James 608 

Willis, Miss Frances E 608 

Yost, Charles W 608 


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For 20 years the United States has been trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 
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This pamphlet contains the text of the proposed treaty, statements by President Johnson and 
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Vol. LIII, No. 1373 

October 18, 1965 

Remarks by President Johnson and 
Statements by Thomas C. Mann and Henry H. Fowler 61U 

by U. Alexis Johnson 626 

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 

For index see inside back cover 

Improving the World's Monetary System 

The Boards of Governors of the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development, the International Monetary 
Fund, the International Finance Corpora- 
tion, and the International Development 
Association held their annual meetings at 
Washington, D.C., September 27-October 1. 
Following is the text of remarks made hy 
President Johnson before the combined 
groups on October 1, together with a state- 
ment by Under Secretary of State for 
Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann before 
the IBRD Board of Governors on Septem- 
ber 28 and a statement by Secretary of the 
Treasury Henry H. Fowler before the IMF 
Board of Governors on September 29. 


White House press release dated October 1 ; as-delivered text 

It is a great pleasure to meet with you, 
the leaders of international finance, and to 
bid you Godspeed on your labors for an- 
other year. 

This year marks the 21st birthday of 

both the International Monetary Fund and 
the World Bank. And so, from what Wood- 
row Wilson once called the '^fountains of 
enthusiasm" soon came the foundations of 

Today your two great organizations 
stand at the center of a remarkable system 
of international cooperation. They have fos- 
tered the unprecedented economic growth 
of the free world. 

The international monetary system mer- 
its a new and imaginative look — not be- 
cause its past performance has been faulty 
but because a new situation faces us. 

For nearly 20 years the United States 
spent and invested more money in foreign 
lands than it earned from its own exports 
and investments. The gold and dollar re- 
serves of our friends, particularly in the 
developed world, were strengthened — even 
while their economies grew and prospered. 

When a nation's reserves are good and 
growing it can trade with confidence. The 
nations of the free world have been doing 
just that, trading with confidence and in 
ever-increasing volume. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, aa well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents. U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 
20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, 
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Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
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XOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
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be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
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American dollar deficits have been one of 
the important factors in this greatest and 
best sustained period of prosperity that the 
world has ever known. The United States 
deficit made it possible for many nations to 
develop their own currencies as strong and 
convertible sources of international fi- 

It is no longer appropriate or possible for 
one country alone — through its deficits — to 
be largely responsible for the creation of 
world reserves. Moreover, the erosion of 
United States reserves could not go on 
indefinitely. Thus the United States has 
taken firm action to arrest the dollar drain. 
Should further action be necessary in the 
future, such action will be taken. 

I want to be very clear about this, be- 
cause we must, in our own interest and in 
the interest of those who rely on the dollar 
as a reserve currency, maintain our pay- 
ments in equilibrium. This we will do. The 
world not only expects but the world re- 
quires that the dollar be as good as gold. 

The long period of large United States 
deficits has come to an end. If growth is 
to continue and trade is to expand, we must 
provide an effective and adequate substi- 

Providing for World Growth 

This is not a matter of an immediate 
crisis. But it is a matter on which we must 
begin to act — now. We must begin now to 
provide machinery for the creation of addi- 
tional reserves. Gold alone will not be 
enough to support the healthy growth 
which the entire world demands. It will 
not be enough in the future any more than 
it has been in the past. 

There is no shortage of plans for reform- 
ing the world's monetary system. But let us 
try to choose the best. Let us remember the 
best is sometimes the enemy of the possible. 
Let us not become so preoccupied by ques- 
tions of mere detail that we end up doing 
nothing. Ours is a large and a growing 
world. It has a large and growing trade. So 
let us provide for this growth. 

Men who manage money are usually 

conservative. They should be. No one wants 
a banker who is careless with other people's 
money. But let us be clear about what it 
means in this case to be conservative. It 
does not mean inaction. Nor does it mean 
inadequate action. 

Twenty-one years ago at Bretton Woods 
it was not the course of conservatism to 
cling to the monetary system which we 
then inherited. The men who were meeting 
on the slopes of Mount Washington knew 
that they had to move ahead. And they 
were proven right. 

And so it is today. 

The job of building sound and effective 
institutions for financing world trade is 
never finished. On February 10th of this 
year, in announcing a new program to bring 
the United States balance of payments into 
equilibrium, I said : ^ 

We must press forward with our studies and be- 
yond, to action — evolving arrangements which will 
continue to meet the needs of a fast growing world 
economy. Unless we can make timely progress, in- 
ternational monetary difficulties will exercise a 
stubborn and increasingly frustrating drag on our 
policies for prosperity and progress at home and 
throughout the world. 

Now, during your meeting this week, you 
have taken a major action to assure the 
continued sound and stable growth of the 
international monetary system. I refer to 
the procedural undertakings of the Manag- 
ing Director of the Fund and the Finance 
Ministers and central bank governors of the 
10 leading industrial nations. There begin 
immediately negotiations to seek basic agree- 
ment on plans to insure, among other 
things, that the free world's future reserve 
needs are adequately met. 

So I want to congratulate the Managing 
Director and the Ministers. I look forward 
to the results of the work of their deputies 
next year. Their later collaboration with the 
Executive Directors of the International 
Monetary Fund representing all of the 103- 
nation members of the Fund will have my 
consuming interest. Meanwhile, I think it 
important that the International Monetary 

^ Bulletin of Mar. 1, 1965, p. 282. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


Fund — under the able leadership of Pierre- 
Paul Schweitzer — continue its important 
work on international monetary arrange- 
ments and cooperate actively with the 
Group of Ten. 

I am proud of the role played in the 
discussions that preceded the Ministers' 
decision by United States representatives, 
including my own Secretary of the Treas- 
ury, Henry Fowler. 

Education and International Development 

Earlier this week the farsighted Presi- 
dent of the World Bank, George Woods, 
spoke on another subject of great impor- 
tance — international development. And I 
hope that the leaders of all the other free 
nations of the world paid as close attention 
to Mr. Woods' views as I did. He spoke with 
eloquence and with directness of the prob- 
lem of development — and of the growing 
impatience of both developed and develop- 
ing nations over the pace of progress. 

One important way to help accelerate 
this pace, in my judgment — and it is a mat- 
ter that bankers ought to be as interested 
in as they are in money — is education, the 
opportunities of education. Education is the 
guardian genius of all the liberties of all 
of us, including our money supply. 

Earlier this month I announced the es- 
tablishment of a new task force to chart a 
worldwide educational endeavor for all 

At that time, I noted that today, as we 
meet here, more than 700 million adults — 
4 out of 10 of the world's population — can- 
not read or write. And that is a matter 
that ought to concern every human being 
in the world. Almost half the nations of 
the globe are crippled by illiteracy among 
half or more of their people. 

This task force will prepare a course of 
action and recommend to me ways and 
means to lighten the burden of ignorance 
and illiteracy throughout the world and 
what at least our nation can do in partici- 

' For an address made by President Johnson on 
Sept. 16, see ibid., Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550. 

pating in that advance. I would presume to 
suggest and ask you to consider how the 
World Bank and the International Monetary 
Fund, and the great leaders associated with 
these endeavors, might contribute your 
might to this effort. Perhaps the Bank and 
the Fund could expand and diversify the 
concept embodied in the Bank's Economic 
Development Institute and the IMF Insti- 

I began my career as a public school 
teacher working with the boys and girls in 
the high school back in my home State. But 
I spent my evenings teaching bankers. And 
the thing that gave me the greatest satis- 
faction was that the men that dealt with 
dollars all day would spend their evenings 
coming to learn about people, because there 
is a direct relationship. 

So I would hope that such an expanded 
program might draw upon the educational 
facilities of all the member nations of the 
World Bank and the Fund, including the 
United States of America. Where necessary, 
it would meet not only the educational ex- 
penses but also the living expenses of its 

Such a program would increase the flow 
of teachers and engineers and economists 
and administrators and technical experts 
and men who create and produce wealth 
and dollars and money and gold in those 
countries which really need them most, be- 
cause increasing educational opportunity is 
only one of the ways that we human beings 
must meet the pressing demands of the 
times and the demands upon human beings 
for development and for advance and for 
progress, as opposed to laissez faire and the 
status qiLo. 

The Needs Are Urgent 

In all of the areas of development — 
wherever you look, whatever you see in the 
areas of development — the needs are urgent. 

In my country we knew no such urgency 
in the course of our development. In the 
early days attendant to our birth, we were 
an underpopulated nation. Beyond the vil- 



lages and the towns were virgin forests and 
deep rivers and wild game and rich and 
fertile soil. In this environment a man's 
life was what he chose to make of it. The 
opportunity was there. The opportunity was 

But there is no such cushion of time 
among the developing nations of the world 
today as we meet here. In many of these 
nations the land is overcrowded. The people 
are poor. The soil is already worn out and 
tired. There is only the relentless crush of 
human needs — and a flickering of hope. 

Well, we need to nourish that hope if we 
are worthy of the title that we bear of lead- 
ers of the world. We need to nourish and 
preserve and advance and bring to fulfill- 
ment that hope. 

And in this I am not speaking solely to 
the nations represented in this room. I have 
found, in my 35 years of public life, that it 
is usually governments who find it difficult 
to communicate with each other. Little trou- 
ble in finding the pathways to friendship is 
found among the people themselves. 

In this world that is shrunk by the jet 
and frightened by the atom, the peoples — 
the peoples of every country — must urge 
and demand their governments to join to- 
gether in dealing with the problems that 
really concern people and that really matter 
in the lives of human beings. 

There is so much to be done in the world 
to develop minds and to preserve bodies. 
And no one nation alone is going to be able 
to do it. No one group of nations can suc- 
ceed — either in Viet-Nam, where, as the 
terror of aggression finally ends, the heal- 
ing hand of reconstruction must begin, or 
anywhere men set out to win a better life. 

This is work that must challenge and 
should challenge us all — every industrial 
country, including the countries of Eastern 
Europe, and including the Soviet Union. 

So this is our task. 

The world of tomorrow — peaceful, 
healthy, beautiful, educated — all this awaits 
us if only we, led by bankers, stir ourselves 
to move forward toward it. 


Press release 233 dated September 28 

It is a pleasure to welcome to Washington 
the distinguished delegations of the Inter- 
national Bank and its affiliates. I appreciate 
the opportunity to attend this meeting of 
Governors and to be allowed to make a few 
brief remarks about the outstanding role of 
the Bank in the field of international rela- 
tions today. 

We who are working in this field and 
who are concerned with the problems of 
economic development value the services 
that the Bank has rendered in the past 
year and throughout its existence of some 
20 years. We are also appreciative of the 
quality of the annual reports which enable 
us to review the many activities and proj- 
ects of the Bank under the distinguished 
leadership of its President, Mr. George D. 

The Bank has assumed an importance in 
the council of developing nations and the 
councils of those who would aid those na- 
tions that was not foreseen at its founding 
in 1944. The Bank today has come to con- 
centrate the use of its resources in the 
developing countries. In this past year it 
has taken another significant step by dif- 
ferentiating interest rates between its less 
developed members and those more devel- 
oped members that are able to cover the 
bulk of their requirements for external 
capital from market sources. 

Development, of course, is not just a 
matter of the investment of outside capital. 
While the need for capital investment con- 
tinues to grow in magnitude, the most basic 
component of the development process is 
the willingness and ability of the develop- 
ing countries to mobilize their own re- 
sources and put them to effective use in the 
process of development. This is a matter 
which is receiving greater attention today 
than ever before but still requires our most 
thoughtful consideration. 

In past years our mutual efforts in eco- 
nomic development have been concentrated 
largely on major infrastructure projects. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


which have perhaps been simpler to orga- 
nize and carry out and have required a less 
complex response from the recipient coun- 
try than is the case with industrial and 
agricultural projects in the private sector. 
It is these areas of industrial and agricul- 
tural investment that we need now to pay 
greater attention to. 

In the past year the Bank has taken two 
steps designed to promote the private in- 
dustrial sector of the developing countries' 
economies. First, the Bank has given the 
International Finance Corporation (IFC) a 
new mandate in the field of industrial 
evaluation and financing. The Bank charter 
was amended to enable it to lend to the IFC 
up to four times the subscribed capital of 
the IFC — approximately $400 million. This 
power as exercised will allow the Corpora- 
tion to greatly expand its operations and 
work even more effectively in joint ven- 
tures with private capital. Secondly, the 
Bank has published the convention on set- 
tlement of investment disputes between 
states and nationals of other states. It has 
been sent to member governments for their 
consideration with a view to securing their 
signature and ratification. Twenty coun- 
tries, including the United States, have al- 
ready signed.^ If implemented, the conven- 
tion should be an important encouragement 
to the private sector. 

Increasing Emphasis on Agriculture 

The other area of development which 
requires our most thoughtful consideration 
is agriculture. It is more difficult to in- 
crease agricultural production than it is to 
build a factory, and this fact has affected 
the emphasis of our development programs. 
Yet in a large part of the world the prob- 
lem of food production demands first pri- 

With populations in many countries 
likely, at present rates, to double every 20 
years, the problem of how to improve an 

' The Bank announced on Oct. 1 that the number 
of signatories to the convention had reached 22. 

already inadequate level of nourishment 
will require our most urgent attention. In- 
dustrial development and trade are not 
sufficient. Someone, writing in the 18th 
century, said, "A city might in that manner 
grow up to great wealth and splendour, 
while not only the country in its neighbour- 
hood, but all those to which it traded, were 
in poverty and wretchedness." The city 
must not forget the countryside, and in- 
dustry must not be preferred at the expense 
of agriculture. 

The increased emphasis which the Bank 
is placing on agriculture is warmly wel- 
comed by the United States. It is an appro- 
priate and necessary part of the total 
development effort to provide for the ra- 
tional use of surplus foodstuffs and to 
develop a sound agricultural base for prog- 
ress in the industrial sector. 

We recognize that the Bank has through 
its many infrastructure loans in the areas 
of power and transportation both directly 
and indirectly facilitated agricultural de- 
velopment. Moreover, through the com- 
mendable policy of promoting local develop- 
ment banks, it has provided small credit 
facilities which are indispensable to agri- 
culture. It was just such small credit facil- 
ities which spurred the agricultural revolu- 
tion in some European countries and the 
United States toward the end of the 19th 
and the beginning of the 20th centuries. 

Today the Bank is mobilizing its massive 
lending capability in new ways that will 
promote agricultural expansion. It has par- 
ticipated in broad land-development pro- 
grams described in the annual report as 
"comprising many inter-dependent meas- 
ures in the fields of training and extension 
work, farm credit, crop storage, livestock 
production, transportation and land settle- 
ment." Agricultural projects of the sort 
that the Bank is now undertaking should 
facilitate the transfer of resources from the 
cultivation of commodities which are in 
oversupply in world trade to commodities 
which are needed in the developing coun- 
tries themselves to raise nutritional levels. I 
Diversification of this kind is also needed 



to ease the drain on foreign exchange 
caused by the need to import food. 

Liberalization of Aid Terms 

The annual report of the Bank has called 
our attention to another problem which, 
over the past years, has been of increasing 
concern. This is the problem of debt-servic- 
ing capacity of developing countries. Ac- 
cording to the Bank's analysis, within the 
last decade the outstanding public and 
publicly guaranteed indebtedness with a 
maturity of 1 year or over has risen from 
approximately $9 billion to $33 billion. 
These figures are cited for the developing 
countries as a whole. The current annual 
service charges on this debt are estimated 
at approximately $3.5 billion. This is more 
than 10 percent of the total of their export 
earnings. For some countries the ratio of 
debt servicing to export income is substan- 
tially higher. 

The problem presented by this trend has 
received increasing attention within the 
Development Assistance Committee of the 
OECD [Organization for Economic Co- 
operation and Development], which has 
adopted specific targets for the liberaliza- 
tion of aid terms. The United States has for 
some time been granting long-term loans 
with low interest rates and long grace 
periods. We hope other aid-granting coun- 
tries will more and more pursue similar 
loan policies. 

The Bank has been a leader in this field 
and has liberalized the terms of its lending. 
The added facilities of the International 
Development Association have also allowed 
the Bank family to make loans with very 
soft repayment terms or to negotiate a loan 
package including both hard and soft ele- 
ments. We welcome in this connection the 
transfer to the IDA of $75 million of the 
Bank's net earnings and the study to be 
undertaken by the Executive Directors on 
the replenishment of IDA resources. 

Another problem which requires our at- 
tention is the need to find the means to 
stabilize foreign exchange receipts and to 
provide producing countries with a fair and 

remunerative level of earnings on their 
exports. In this regard the United States, in 
the words of President Johnson, * intends to 
"step up our efforts to prevent disastrous 
changes in the prices of those basic com- 
modities which are the lifeblood of so many 
of our economies." 

I would not want to conclude my remarks 
without noting the way in which the Bank's 
work is complemented by regional financing 
institutions: the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank, the African Development Bank, 
and the proposed Asian Development Bank. 
They are, of course, at very different stages 
of development. Each has an important role 
to play in promoting the economic and so- 
cial progress of the developing countries. 
We would hope to see them increase in 

The questions I have raised today are by 
no means all that require greater study. 
They are, however, of prime importance, 
and we can all take satisfaction that the 
Bank has taken a leading role in working 
toward their solution. 


Fellow Governors of the International 
Monetary Fund, ladies and gentlemen: We 
are complimented by the presence in our 
capital city of so many distinguished peo- 
ple, from so many nations throughout the 
world. With the addition of Zambia last week 
and of Malawi in July — to whom I extend 
my own and my country's hearty welcome 
— the Fund now numbers 103 countries. 

Each of the annual meetings of the great 
organizations for international financial 
cooperation that we take part in leaves the 
world a little changed, and changed for the 
better. What we say each year rests upon 
what we have accomplished, and what we 
have learned, in another year of worldwide 
cooperation and constructive endeavor in 
the management of our financial and eco- 
nomic problems. 

This year — my first as a Governor of the 

* Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


Fund — we can look back with special pride. 
During the year just past our processes of 
consultation and cooperation passed stem 
tests of their practical effectiveness. We 
are implementing a significant increase in 
IMF quotas. The general arrangements to 
borrow were twice called into operation, 
and the participating countries have indi- 
cated that they are prepared to continue 
the arrangements if the Fund so requests. 

I consequently look forward with confi- 
dence to continued progress in seeking a 
consensus on matters of very far-reaching 
importance for all our countries, and for a 
long time ahead. 

I hope that when we meet next year we 
will find ourselves near the final stages of 
policy agreement in the field of improved 
international monetary arrangements. 

The United States regards the Fund as 
an essential part of international financial 
arrangements. Since the inception of the 
Fund large sums in dollars have been used 
by the Fund to accommodate drawings by 
other countries. Over the years these dol- 
lars have been repaid to the Fund. In the 
last 2 years my country has also drawn on 
the Fund. Our drawings have been, in large 
part, technical arrangements making pos- 
sible the continued use of dollars in the 
settlement of the obligations of other coun- 
tries with the Fund. 

However, at the end of last July the 
United States made a regular drawing of 
$300 million through which it acquired for- 
eign currencies for its own use in financing 
international payments. 

All of these events provide evidence that 
the availability of Fund resources is in- 
creasingly important for all of the Fund 
members, large or small, industrial or de- 

The economic health of the United States 
affects world economic health in many 
ways but in no way more fundamentally 
than in the reflection of United States 
economic conditions in the strength of the 

During the past year the value of the 

dollar — and therefore the value of that 
large part of the world's monetary reserves 
kept in dollars — ^was reinforced in two 
ways: continued vigorous and sound eco- 
nomic growth in the United States, and 
progress toward eliminating our balance-of- 
payments deficit. 

In the fiscal year ending last June na- 
tional output increased by about $41 billion, 
equivalent to almost 5 percent in real terms, 
continuing the longest peacetime economic 
expansion we have known. Prospects for 
maintaining our forward momentum are 
favorable. Despite its record length of 55 
months, the current expansion has re- 
mained remarkably well-balanced and free 
from inflationary distortions. 

In our manufacturing sector, increases in 
productivity and in wages received have 
been sufficiently in harmony so that labor 
costs per unit of output over the past year 
have again been stable. Since 1960 our unit 
labor costs have declined by 3.3 percent. We 
calculate that the recent key settlement in 
the steel industry provides increased wages 
and benefits over a 39-month period equiv- 
alent to a little over 3 percent per year. We 
are hopeful that this will help sustain a 
pattern of balance between wages and pro- 
ductivity in industry generally and will be 
accompanied by a continuation of stable 

Under the stimulus of improved incen- 
tives and prospects for expanding markets, 
capital spending by private industry con- 
tinues to move ahead vigorously, as it has 
over the past 3 years, providing assurance 
against strains on capacity. 

U.S. Balance of Payments 

In the light of this continued expansion 
in the domestic economy of the United 
States it is particularly encouraging that I 
am also able to report a significant im- 
provement in the U.S. balance-of-payments 
position since the announcement of Presi- 
dent Johnson's program on February 10. In 
the second quarter of this year we experi- 
enced a surplus of $119 million, seasonally 



adjusted, compared with deficits of $780 
million in the first quarter and $1,551 mil- 
lion in the fourth quarter of 1964. 

We do not by any means conclude from 3 
months' data that our balance-of-payments 
problem has been solved. Over any short- 
term period balance-of-payments accounts 
exaggerate the effects of particular trans- 
actions, whether these be favorable or un- 
favorable. On balance we believe that our 
second-quarter figures were distorted in a 
favorable direction. 

I regard it as more prudent for us to look 
at the combined results of the first and 
second quarters of the calendar year. Dur- 
ing the first half of 1965 our balance-of- 
payments position was much improved, al- 
though there was still a deficit. This amounted 
to $661 million in the 6-month period and rep- 
resents an annual rate of about $1.3 billion. 

The figures I have used are in terms of 
the "regular" deficit concept which has 
been used generally in recent years in our 
balance-of-payments accounting. This con- 
cept has been criticized in that it includes 
in our deficit additions to private balances 
of dollars which represent working balances 
and investments by private parties. As 
many of the Governors know, we intend to 
report our balance-of-payments data on the 
official settlements basis as well as the 
usual form in order to make our figures 
more comparable with those of other coun- 
tries. On the official settlements basis our 
deficit in the first half of the year, season- 
ally adjusted, was about $400 million, or an 
annual rate of $800 million. 

This improvement gives us confidence 
that our efforts over several years, supple- 
mented by a vigorous new attack on the 
problem proposed by President Johnson last 
February, are moving the United States 
toward the equilibrium we are determined 
to attain and sustain. Our programs will be 
vigorously pursued until we are certain that 
the conditions have been created in which 
equilibrium in our international accounts 
can be sustained. In this it is clear that 
we have the support of the Congress and the 
U.S. public at large. 

Increasing Free-World Reserves 

This brings us to the heart of the matter : 
Will the free world continue in the years 
ahead to be able to increase the reserves in 
our international monetary system suffi- 
ciently and in season to be certain that the 
sound employment of the world's economic 
resources for growth and improvement is 
not crippled by inadequate financial means? 

This question must be asked because in 
the future the world's reserve needs will no 
longer be met by United States deficits and 
because in recent years additions to re- 
serves have depended so heavily upon dollar 
outflows. The record is as follows : 

The United States has supplied about 
three-quarters of the new reserves accumu- 
lated by the rest of the world since the end 
of 1958. Only about one-quarter of this 
increase came from new supplies of mone- 
tary gold and from the credit operations of 
the International Monetary Fund. We esti- 
mate that as of the end of 1964 more than 
a quarter of the official reserves of the rest 
of the world were held in the form of dol- 

Reserves deriving from the United States 
deficit grew in two forms — dollar balances 
held as such, and dollars acquired and con- 
verted into gold. The latter development, of 
course, resulted in a decline in United 
States reserves. 

Thus, we have before us a problem of 
conflicting objectives. Resolution of this 
problem is of central importance to the 
United States and to the rest of the world : 

(a) On the one hand, there is the need to 
achieve and sustain equilibrium in the U.S. 
balance of payments, in order to preserve 
the integrity of the dollar at home and 
abroad, to the end that the dollar can con- 
tinue to function as an essential part of the 
world's monetary system, and in order to 
arrest further drains on United States re- 
serves, and 

(b) On the other hand, there is the need 
to continue to supply additions to reserves 
for continued economic expansion and bet- 
terment in all our countries. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


All our countries are fully committed to 
a policy of dynamic growth in a dynamic 
-world economy. This means growing inter- 
national trade, growing domestic supplies 
of money, growing national outputs, and 
growing real incomes and profits. 

If this expansion is to occur, it is reason- 
able to expect that the free world, including 
the United States, will, in the course of 
time, face growing needs for monetary re- 
serves. We can hardly expect that either 
the industrial nations that have experi- 
enced such reserve growth or the rest of the 
world can be satisfied very long to limit 
future growth in reserves to the very mod- 
est level of new monetary gold supplies and 
such limited increases as come from normal 
IMF drawings. 

These are the principal considerations 
that led my Government to take the initia- 
tive in suggesting that it is now time to 
negotiate new monetary arrangements 
which will enable the nations of the world 
to deal with future demands upon the in- 
ternational monetary system. ^ 

Important Objectives To Keep in Mind 

It is not my intention in these remarks to 
comment on the substantive proposals and 
the issues that have already been set forth 
for us in the work of the deputies of the 
Group of Ten, the Ossola Group, and the 
reports of the International Monetary 
Fund. The process of attaining a general 
consensus on the best ways of providing 
additional reserve assets will take time and 
great effort. 

I do, however, wish to draw your atten- 
tion to some important objectives to keep in 
mind as we go forward with the work of 
improving the international monetary sys- 

1. As I have stated, we should not expect 
to rely upon the dollar to continue to supply 
the major part of the growth in world re- 
serves. The responsibility for providing re- 

° For an address made by Mr. Fowler on July 10, 
see ibid., Aug. 2, 1965, p. 209. 

serves should be shared. This means that 
other ways of creating reserve assets will be 
needed to provide assurance that their total 
will grow at a rate that will encourage a 
continuation of the impressive growth in 
world economic production and trade. 

2. The adjustment of imbalance should 
be brought about firmly but smoothly in 
order to avoid disrupting effects on other 
countries and on the system as a whole. And 
here I want to stress that it is of key impor- 
tance for surplus countries to adjust their 
positions as well as for deficit countries to 
do so. The adjustment burden not only 
should not — realistically, it cannot — rest 
solely on deficit countries. In the field of 
medium-term credit, in which the Fund has 
a preeminent place, we should assure that 
there are adequate amounts of such credit 
available to enable the adjustment process 
to function in ways consistent with the 
economic and political realities of modern 

3. We should, at the same time, perfect 
the defenses of the international monetary 
system against its vulnerability to massive 
destabilizing movements of funds. In this 
area international monetary cooperation in 
general, and especially short-term credit 
facilities among major countries, are im- 

As I have said before, in pursuing these 
objectives the United States is wedded to 
no specific plan. We are impressed with the 
wide variety of technical possibilities which 
have been developed in the writings of dis- 
tinguished economists here and abroad. 
And we have, in addition to these plans, the 
extremely valuable exploration of basic is- 
sues that has been developed by the Study 
Group on the Creation of Reserve Assets, 
under the chairmanship of Mr. Rinaldo Os- 
sola, of Italy. This report not only provides 
a useful guide to current concepts but has 
brought out clearly that the obstacles to 
progress are not questions of technical abil- 
ity to create reserve assets but policy issues 
concerning how, when, and where to create 
and distribute them. The problem is to rec- 
oncile the objectives of governmental pol- 



icies so as to find ways of making progress 
that will find broad support. 

Two Phases for Improving Monetary System 

It is therefore appropriate and gratifying 
that the Ministers of the Group of Ten have 
decided on Monday of this week [Septem- 
ber 27] to move from preliminary and 
technical consideration of improvements in 
the international monetary system to a level 
of active negotiation among responsible pol- 
icy officials. 

This is the first phase of preparation for 
new and improved international monetary 
arrangements. I urge that these negotia- 
tions to identify a broad measure of under- 
lying agreement go forward with concen- 
tration, vigor, and dispatch. 

It is commendable that the Ministers of 
the Ten have requested the active participa- 
tion in this first phase of preparation of 
the representatives of the Managing Direc- 
tor of the International Monetary Fund 
and of the OECD and the Bank for Interna- 
tional Settlements in these deliberations. 

With respect to the Fund itself, it is the 
hope of the United States that in this first 
phase of preparation the management of 
the Fund will keep the Executive Directors 
fully apprised of work going on in the 
Group of Ten and that the Fund will keep 
the Group of Ten informed of results of 
discussions and considerations by the Exec- 
utive Board of the International Monetary 

Beyond this there lies a second phase of 
preparation of the utmost importance on 
which the United States has been both in- 
sistent and persistent in its pursuit of 
appropriate preparation for an interna- 
tional monetary conference. This second 
phase should be designed primarily to as- 
sure that the basic interests of all members 
of the Fund in new arrangements for the 
future of the world monetary system will 
be adequately and appropriately considered 
and represented before significant inter- 
governmental agreements for formal struc- 
tural improvements of the monetary system 

are concluded. Within the Fund member- 
ship there are variations in the extent to 
which individual countries are able to, or 
choose to, accumulate and hold large re- 
serve balances. All, however, have a vital 
interest in the evolution of the world's mon- 
etary arrangements. 

Twenty-one years ago the Coordinating 
Committee of the Bretton Woods confer- 
ence submitted to the full conference its 
report recommending that the IMF and 
IBRD be favorably considered by govern- 
ments. The section of the report dealing 
with the IMF began with these words : * 

Since foreign trade affects the standard of life of 
every people, all countries have a vital interest in 
the system of exchange of national currencies and 
the regulations and conditions which govern its 

I believe that thought is as true and as 
important today as it was in 1944. 

It is true that only a limited number of 
countries hold the bulk of the official re- 
serves of the world. No doubt these coun- 
tries, including my own, have deep inter- 
ests and responsibilities of a unique kind in 
the system by which reserves are generated 
and regulated. But other countries, which 
are not large reserve holders, also have 
legitimate and vital interests in these mat- 
ters. This is why all the countries of the 
free world have a fair and reasonable claim 
that their views must be heard and con- 
sidered at an appropriate stage in the 
process of international monetary improve- 

I welcome the action of the Group of Ten 
Ministers and Governors in recognizing 
this essential requirement for our continued 
efforts toward improvement of the free 
world's international monetary system. The 
United States views with hearty approval 
the Managing Director's suggestions to 
make suitable arrangements so that the ef- 
forts of the Executive Directors of the IMF 
and those of the deputies of the Group of 
Ten can be directed toward a consensus as 
to desirable lines of action and the agree- 
ment of the Ministers of the Group of Ten 

•/6td., July 30, 1944, p. 114. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


on this point. We are looking forward to 
bringing together these two groups, which 
together can contribute so much experience 
and knowledge to the solution of the world's 
monetary problems, into full-fledged pre- 
paratory discussions. This combination pro- 
vides an adequate and appropriate prepara- 
tory committee for a significant international 
monetary conference, provided, of course, 
that a meaningful basis for substantive 
agreement can be reached in advance. 

Toward a Greater Society of Nations 

Let me close with a plea that, formidable 
and complex as is the task of extending 
and improving the workings of our interna- 
tional monetary system, we lift our eyes 
from it long enough to see what it is, in 
reality, that we are about. 

Let me say — and President Johnson's 
policies in this respect as in many others 
are predicated upon this — that what we are 
engaged upon is the task of creating in the 
free world an international monetary struc- 
ture strong enough, flexible enough, and 
with adequate elements of growth to pro- 
vide the financial framework for the build- 
ing of a greater society of nations. 

These international arrangements we de- 
bate, the improved international monetary 
system that we grope toward, are the ex- 
tension of the great international task of 
economic development to which so many of 
us have dedicated so much of our resources. 

I say this not to magnify our undertak- 
ings but to give them the inspiration of 
their true perspective setting. 

Let us build patiently, and strong, for 
much of our fondest hopes rest upon what 
we are undertaking in our monetary as in 
our development tasks. But there is too 
much to be done to permit us the luxury of 
delay. So let us go forward with confidence 
that the institutions and processes of inter- 
national consultation and collaboration we 
have brought into being are adequate to 
keep our problems from mastering us, and 
that they will permit, instead, that we shall 
master our problems in peace and increas- 
ing plenty. 

President Reports on Progress 
of Negotiations With Panama 

statement by President Johnson ^ 

I have today an announcement of special 
importance regarding the progress of 
treaty negotiations with Panama. 

In the past 18 months representatives of 
the United States and the Republic of Pan- 
ama have been conducting negotiations con- 
cerning the Panama Canal. 

On December 18th I told the American 
people that the United States sought fair 
play and justice, with a decent respect for 
the rights of all.^ The fact that we are large 
and that Panama is small would have no 
bearing on these discussions. We were de- 
termined then, as we are determined now, to 
do what is fair and what is right. 

I asked our representatives to sit down 
and to seek answers. I pledged that we 
would reason together, to find solutions 
that would be reasonable and right — right 
for our own people and right for the good 
people of Panama. 

Today I am happy to announce that 
areas of agreement have been successfully 
reached. I am very proud of Ambassadors 
Robert Anderson and [John N.] Irwin, 
who spoke for the United States of Amer- 
ica. I am very grateful to Ambassadors 
[Ricardo] Arias, [Diogenes] de la Rosa, 
and [Roberto] Aleman, who spoke for 
Panama. They have proven again the truth 
of our deepest conviction — that nations can 
resolve their differences honorably and 
reasonably, without violence and conflict. 

At this very moment President [Marco 
A.] Robles of Panama is announcing to 
his own people the areas of agreement 
which our two countries have now reached. 
They are the following : 

In order to meet their present and future 
needs the two countries are negotiating 
separately a new and a modern treaty to 

^Made at the White House on Sept. 24 (White 
House press release; as-delivered text). 
' Bulletin of Jan. 4, 1965, p. 5. 



replace the 1903 treaty and its amendments 
— a base-rights and status-of-forces agree- 
ment — and a treaty under which there 
might be constructed across Panama a new 
sea-level canal. 

The two countries recognize that the 
primary interest of both countries lies in 
insuring that arrangements are provided 
for effective operations and defense of the 
existing Panama Canal and any new canal 
which may be constructed in Panama in 
the future. 

With respect to the status of the negoti- 
ations on a new treaty to replace the 1903 
treaty and its amendments, general areas 
of agreement have been reached. The de- 
tails of these areas of agreement are the 
subject of current negotiations. 

The purpose is to insure that Panama will 
share with the United States responsibility 
in the administration, management, and 
the operation of the canal as may be pro- 
vided in the treaty. Panama will also share 
with the United States in the direct and 
the indirect benefits from the existence of 
this canal on its territory. 

The areas of agreement reached are the 
following : 
i 1. The 1903 treaty will be abrogated. 

2. The new treaty will effectively recog- 
nize Panama's sovereignty over the area of 
the present Canal Zone. 

3. The new treaty will terminate after a 
specified number of years or on or about 
the date of the opening of the sea-level 
canal, whichever occurs first. 

4. A primary objective of the new treaty 
will be to provide for an appropriate polit- 
ical, economic, and social integration of the 
area used in the canal operation with the 
rest of the Republic of Panama. Both coun- 
tries recognize that there is a need for an 
orderly transition to avoid abrupt and pos- 
sibly harmful dislocations. We also recog- 
nize that certain changes should be made 
over a period of time. The new canal ad- 
ministration will be empowered to make 

such changes in accordance with the guide- 
lines in the new treaty. 

5. Both countries recognize the important 
responsibility they have to be fair and help- 
ful to the employees of all nationalities who 
are serving so efficiently and well in the 
operation of this very important canal. Ap- 
propriate arrangements will be made to in- 
sure that the rights and the interests of 
these employees are safeguarded. 

The new treaties will provide for the de- 
fense of the existing canal and any sea- 
level canal which may be constructed in 
Panama. United States forces and military 
facilities will be maintained under a base- 
rights and status-of-forces agreement. 

With respect to the sea-level canal, the 
United States will make studies and site 
surveys of possible routes in Panama. Nego- 
tiations are continuing with respect to the 
methods and the conditions of financing, 
constructing, and operating a sea-level 
canal, in the light of the importance of such 
a canal to the Republic of Panama, to the 
United States of America, to world com- 
merce, and to the progress of all mankind. 

The United States and Panama will seek 
the necessary solutions to the economic 
problems which would be caused by the 
construction of a sea-level canal. 

The present canal and any new canal 
which may be constructed in the future 
shall be open at all times to the vessels of 
all nations on a nondiscriminatory basis. 
The tolls would be reasonable in the light of 
the contribution of the Republic of Panama 
and the United States of America and of 
the interests of world commerce. 

So today I take great pleasure in congratu- 
lating the negotiators for the very fine 
progress that they have made. I want to 
express my confidence in their ability to 
negotiate the details of these treaties, with- 
in the guidelines that have been agreed 
upon. All that we do is in the mutual inter- 
est and the welfare of the United States, 
Panama, and, we believe, the world at large. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


Viet-Nam Today 

by U. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Ambassador to Viet-Nam * 

I am sincerely honored at the invitation 
to address you today on a subject that has 
so long been so much my own interest, as 
well as of interest to your country and mine. 
You might well say "interest" is too mild a 
word and that "vital concern" would be a 
better phrase to describe the attitude of 
both of our countries. I would agree. 

During the years at various times various 
countries have used this term "vital con- 
cern" in many ways to mean many different 
things. Sometimes it has been "living 
space," other times it has been "military 
position," and at other times "balance of 
power" or even "markets and sources of raw 
materials." Important though any one of 
these may have seemed at the time, the im- 
portance of Southeast Asia today goes far 
beyond any of these previous uses of this 
term "vital concern." Something much more 
fundamental is involved for both Japan and 
the United States as well as the rest of the 
world. This is simply whether or not the 
world is to have peace — to put it more 
precisely, whether peoples and countries 
will be permitted to develop in their own 
way without outside interference, or 
whether they shall be subject to infiltra- 
tion, invasion, terrorism, and the other as- 
pects of what some have called "wars of 
national liberation," because their neigh- 
bors do not approve of the way they handle 
their affairs. 

This problem is not unique to Southeast 

' Address made before the Research Institute of 
Japan at Tokyo on Sept. 16. 

Asia, but we find it presented there in far 
sharper focus than any place else in the 
world. It is not a question debated solely 
between countries of one ideological per- 
suasion and the other, or even between 
countries which have for some time pro- 
fessed the ideological persuasion of a turgid 
German writer who very imperfectly under- 
stood the world in which he lived more 
than a century ago and certainly did not 
understand or foresee the world of today. 

I have a very basic view of foreign af- 
fairs, that is, that the state of relations 
between countries and their ability to co- 
operate with each other are not dependent 
on sentiment or emotion but rather on their 
common interests, which may be broad or 
narrow. It is my conviction that no country 
in the world that is jealous to maintain its 
independence and control of its own affairs 
can be indifferent to the struggle going on 
today in Southeast Asia. To be indifferent 
to this struggle would amount to acknowl- 
edging that "wars of national liberation," 
as the Communists use that term, are justi- 
fied or, in other words, that a country can 
use subversion and disguised aggression 
against a neighbor whenever it disapproves 
of the way that neighbor is handling its 
affairs. This indeed could only lead to inter- 
national anarchy. 

It is thus my conviction that not only 
Japan and the United States, but the over- 
whelming majority of other free countries 
of the world, have a common interest, and 
thus a common basis on which to cooperate 



together, each in their own way, in the out- 
come of the struggle going on in Southeast 
Asia today. 

I have spoken of Southeast Asia, and not 
only of Viet-Nam, because it is a struggle 
that transcends the borders of Viet-Nam. 
Laos has long been a scene of conflict be- 
cause of the unwillingness of one side to 
honor its solemn written word most recently 
affirmed at Geneva in 1962. Official radios 
of a country close by have announced the 
formation of a group dedicated to over- 
throwing the ancient, proud, and independ- 
ent Kingdom of Thailand. Malaysia, which 
so successfully defended itself against a 
similar attack just a few years ago, is 
again subject to threats. The independent 
countries of Africa and Latin America are 
assured that their turn will come. 

Thus it is not a question of whether this 
or that strip of geography is of strategic 
or economic importance, or whether this or 
that people have yet learned to govern 
themselves well, but whether a doctrine 
that threatens every independent people 
will be permitted to prevail in what has 
become in Viet-Nam a crucial test of its 

Background — 1954-60 

Fully to appreciate this we need to go 
back a little bit in history. I know that to 
this group much of this history is familiar, 
but I think that it is helpful to review it. 

The cease-fire agreement between the 
French and the Vietnamese Communists, 
which was part of the Geneva accords of 
1954, set up a demarcation line between 
the Communist North and the non-Commu- 
nist South, and the authorities in each zone 
undertook to respect the territory of the 
other and to refrain from operations 
against the other. The final declaration of 
the Geneva conference of 1954 provided 
that free elections under international su- 
pervision should be held throughout Viet- 
Nam in July 1956 to decide on a government 
for a unified Viet-Nam. 

In 1955 and 1956, the South Vietnamese 
Government maintained that it would agree 

to such elections if they were genuinely free 
throughout Viet-Nam and not just in the 
South. The United States, although not a 
party to the Geneva accords, consistently 
favored truly free elections under effective 
international supervision. It was clear, how- 
ever, in 1956 that Communist North Viet- 
Nam was not prepared to allow elections that 
would permit free expression of the will of 
all the people, including those in the North, 
and accordingly the elections were not held. 
It is thus a travesty on the truth to allege 
that the present situation was brought 
about by the failure of the South to carry 
out the 1954 accords. In fact, it was the 
North that was not willing to submit itself 
to the test of free elections under interna- 
tional control. 

The North had, of course, hoped that it 
would be able through rigged elections to 
bring the South under its sway in 1956. In 
this connection, it is interesting to recall 
that the true sentiments of a large number 
of people in North Viet-Nam were dramat- 
ically demonstrated when there was the 
opportunity in 1954 to choose between a 
Communist regime in the North and a non- 
Communist regime in the South. At that 
time, almost 1 million people moved from 
the North to the South, in spite of all the 
obstacles the North was able to put in their 
path, and less than one-tenth of that num- 
ber moved from the South to the North. 

Having been foiled in their election plans, 
the North then hoped that the problem of 
running a truncated South Viet-Nam would 
be so great that political and economic 
disintegration of the South would cause it 
to collapse and fall into their laps. 

This did not happen. Beset though it was 
by problems, the South made progress. 

In a short 5 years from 1955, elementary 
school enrollment more than doubled with 
the addition of 8,000 classrooms, universi- 
ties were established and expanded, many 
industries were established, a road con- 
struction program was undertaken, and a 
land reform program commenced which in 
1957 distributed 264,000 hectares to 115,000 
families. While per capita food production 
was dropping 10 percent in North Viet- 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


Nam, it was rising by 20 percent in the 
South. In short, the country was clearly 
moving forward. 

True, there were problems — problems 
common to every newly independent coun- 
try, especially those which during the 
colonial period were not prepared in trained 
personnel or political development to as- 
sume the responsibilities of independence. 
There were also problems arising from the 
various racial groups such as the Khmers, 
Chams, Nungs, and the so-called mountain 
peoples who, in addition to the Vietnamese, 
make up the country. 

There was also the unfortunate fact that 
political and religious lines among the popu- 
lation tend to coincide so that what were 
essentially political problems tended also to 
assume a religious coloration. These prob- 
lems, serious enough in themselves, were 
also aggravated both by the fact that the 
country was divided and by the fact that 
the Hanoi regime had left Communist can- 
cer cells behind. However, these problems 
did not seem unmanageable and the country 
was making steady, if unspectacular, prog- 

Hanoi's Changed Strategy 

Frustrated in their hopes of a cheap and 
easy victory, in 1960 the Communist regime 
in the North made some far-reaching deci- 
sions which they made no effort to conceal. 
The record in their own words is clear for 
all to read. 

At the Third Lao Dong (Communist) 
Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, 
Ho Chi Minh said that the North must 
"step up the national democratic people's 
revolution in the South." The Commander 
in Chief of the North Vietnamese armed 
forces. General Vo Nguyen Giap, said the 
same thing. Other similar speeches were 
made, and the Party Congress called for the 
formation of a "National United Front" in 
the South. Three months later, that is, in 
December 1960, Hanoi radio announced the 
formation of a "Front for the Liberation of 
the South." 

This is the origin of the so-called "National 

Liberation Front" in South Viet-Nam. It 
was then and still is a pure creature and 
tool of the North Vietnamese regime. Its 
so-called "leadership" contains not a single 
nationally known figure. In a true sense, it 
is as faceless to the outside world as it is 
to the Vietnamese people, and I doubt that 
even in Hanoi it has the slightest influence. 
Thus, it is not a "national front," and it is 
certainly not a "liberation front" for its 
purpose has nothing to do with "liberation" 
— quite the opposite; another case of the 
Hanoi regime trying to make people believe 
that black is white by calling it white. How- 
ever, it is remarkable how many people in 
other countries, including my own, become 
confused by this old technique. 

As the vague charge is often made that 
somehow the United States bears some re- 
sponsibility for this move by the North be- 
cause of supposed efforts to establish mili- 
tary bases or introduce forces into South 
Viet-Nam, we might note for the record 
that in the fall of 1960 there was not a 
single United States combat military person 
of any kind in South Viet-Nam and there 
were less than 600 military advisory per- 
sonnel of all kinds throughout the country 
— a situation fully consistent with the 1954 
Geneva accords. 

The formation of a purely political "liber- 
ation front" might have been manageable, 
flagrant interference though it was in the 
internal affairs of another state, but the 
Hanoi regime by no means confined itself 
to the political realm. Quite the opposite ; its 
major effort was in the military realm. 

Beginning in 1956 Hanoi undertook to 
rebuild, reorganize, and expand the covert 
military machine that was left behind in 
South Viet-Nam at the time the Viet Minh 
supposedly withdrew in 1954. Southerners 
who had moved to the North were given 
intensive training and political indoctrina- 
tion, and returned to the South as cadres. 
Covert supply lines were established, for the 
most part passing through the eastern por- 
tion of Laos near the demilitarized zone. 
This, in part, explains the intense interest 
and sensitivity toward this portion of Laos 



that has consistently been displayed by 

By 1959 Hanoi was ready to embarrass 
the Saigon government and raise doubts 
about its ability to maintain internal order 
by stepping up what had up to then been 
small-scale guerrilla actions. This was 
intensified in 1960 and by the end of 1961 
had assumed the scale of a full-fledged 
armed attack. From 1959 through 1961, at 
least 10,000 men were thus infiltrated from 
the North together with considerable quan- 
tities of arms, ammunition, and other sup- 

These cadres, combining with the disaf- 
fected elements to be found in any society, 
undertook a major campaign of terrorism 
particularly directed at local officials and 
government workers. Provincial, district, 
village, and hamlet officials were murdered 
in cold blood, teachers were assassinated, 
schools burned, antimalaria workers killed, 
and hospitals attacked to obtain medical 
supplies. Roads were mined, passenger 
trains wrecked, and bridges destroyed. In 
1960 alone, over 3,000 South Vietnamese 
were killed or kidnaped in this manner and 
200 elementary schools were forced to close. 

These are not just facts dreamed up by 
prejudiced or self-interested parties. In 
1962 the International Control Commission, 
composed of India, Canada, and Poland 
(with only Poland dissenting), found — and 
I read their words — that "there is evidence 
to show that armed and unarmed personnel, 
arms, munitions, and other supplies have 
been sent from (North Viet-Nam) to the 
South with the object of supporting, orga- 
nizing and carrying out hostile activities, 
including armed attacks, directed against 
the Armed Forces and Administration of 
the South. . . . and there is evidence to show 
that the PAVN (North Vietnamese Army) 
has allowed the North to be used for incit- 
ing, encouraging and supporting hostile 
activities in the South, aimed at the over- 
throw of the Administration in the South." 

Such a campaign, with the strong support 
and experienced direction it was given from 
the outside, would face any government 

with difficulties. Given the geography and 
favorable guerrilla terrain of South Viet- 
Nam, and the fact that even without these 
problems the Government was just begin- 
ning to get on its feet, it is no surprise that 
the Government was taxed beyond its limits 
and asked for further outside help. 

The U.S. Commitment 

Those, including the United States, who 
were members of SEATO had accepted an 
obligation with respect to Viet-Nam when 
they ratified that treaty covering Viet-Nam 
under article IV of the treaty. Thus the 
United States could not, apart from other 
considerations, turn its back when addi- 
tional help was asked if others, including 
Japan, were to have faith in its pledged 
word. However, as I have pointed out ear- 
lier, issues even larger than the pledged 
word of the United States were at stake; 
that is, was the doctrine of violent revolu- 
tion supported, supplied, and directed from 
the outside to be permitted to prevail 
against the opposition of a people of a 
country? It was a challenge that could be 
ignored only at the peril of the independ- 
ence of every free state on every continent. 

After long and careful consideration by 
the American Government, in an exchange 
of letters between President Kennedy and 
President Diem in December 1961,- Viet- 
Nam requested and the United States prom- 
ised increased assistance to defend South 
Viet-Nam against the attack it was under- 
going in violation by Hanoi of every basic 
principle of international law and specifi- 
cally in violation of the 1954 Geneva ac- 
cords, which it had signed and accepted. In 
his letter. President Kennedy specifically 
said that "If the Communist authorities in 
North Viet-Nam will stop their campaign to 
destroy the Republic of Viet-Nam, the meas- 
ures we are taking to assist your defense 
efforts will no longer be necessary." This 
continues to be our position. 

Meanwhile, in the summer of 1962, a new 
agreement on Laos was entered into after 

For texts, see Bulletin of Jan. 1, 1962, p. 13. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


long and arduous negotiations. In accord- 
ance with the agreement, the United States 
promptly withdrew the few military per- 
sonnel it had in Laos, but from the begin- 
ning Hanoi never made any pretense of 
observing the agreement and its battalions 
remain in Laos to this day in even greater 
force, and their Pathet Lao puppets continue 
to refuse to cooperate with Prime Minister 
Souvanna Phouma, who has very consci- 
entiously tried to pursue a neutral course 
for his country. Apart from its desire to 
impose its will on the long-suffering Lao- 
tian people, it is obvious that the purpose 
of Hanoi is to protect one of its important 
lines of communication in support of its 
invasion of South Viet-Nam. 

Instead of drawing back from its ill- 
fated venture, Hanoi chose to escalate the 
conflict and increased its supply of both 
men and arms and, as the supply of South- 
ern-born personnel was depleted, turned to 
the use of Northerners from its regular 
forces, in some cases as cadres and in other 
cases moving in full units, such as the ele- 
ments of the 325th Division which are now 
stationed in the highland area of South 

The Hanoi War Machine 

In order to understand the war, it is nec- 
essary to understand the organization and 
control of the Hanoi war machine in the 
South. The Viet Cong forces are organized 
into three main groups. First are what 
is known in South Viet-Nam as the "main 
force" units, or what might be called the 
"regular army." The main force, which has 
a strength of about 70,000, is organized and 
fights in regular battalions and regiments. 
Contrary to the belief of some, they no 
longer need to rely on captured or home- 
made weapons but are well armed with 
modem weapons of Communist-bloc origin, 
including recoilless rifles, machineguns, 
mortars, and light artillery. 

Below the main-force units come the 
"local forces" at the provincial or district 
level and the part-time village-based guerril- 
las, both of which employ guerrilla tactics. 

There is a very tight line of direction and 
control of all of these forces stemming di- 
rectly from Hanoi. It is in no way a popular 
peasant uprising against an unpopular gov- 
ernment. As we have seen, the political 
control stems directly from the Lao Dong 
Party in Hanoi. The military control is exer- 
cised through an extensive system of com- 
munications of all kinds stemming from 
Hanoi down to the so-called Central Office, 
located in a large, heavily forested area to 
the north of Saigon, and from the Central 
Office to seven regions extending from the 
17th parallel to the Ca Mau Peninsula. Be- 
low each regional committee there are pro- 
vincial and district-level committees, with 
the cell at the bottom of this pyramid stem- 
ming from Hanoi. Each of the committees 
has specialized units responsible for train- 
ing, personnel, subversive activities, terror- 
ism, military activities, supply, maintenance 
of bases, et cetera, designed closely to co- 
ordinate military and political activities. 
The details of the organization and the 
extent to which it operates openly or under- 
ground depend mainly on the extent of con- 
trol of any particular area. Hanoi also 
maintains direct contact with its principal 
military units in the South. 

While most personnel come overland 
through Laos, arms, ammunition, and other 
supplies come also by other land routes and 

The main-force units are based in several 
well-fortified and heavily wooded areas 
largely immune from normal methods of 
aerial observation. These areas are in gen- 
eral well known, but as the Viet Cong 
frequently move from place to place within 
an area and make extensive use of tunnels, 
their exact location at any given time is 
very difficult to determine. Normally a unit 
will spend the greater part of its time in a 
base area, resting, refitting, and meticu- 
lously planning the next operation. Frontal 
ground assaults on these base areas are 
very expensive if the Viet Cong choose to 
stand and fight, and very unproductive if 
they choose temporarily to abandon the 

It is in this situation that aerial bombing. 



particularly by larger planes able systemat- 
ically and quickly to cover an extensive 
area, has proved to be of great utility. For 
the first time the Viet Cong have no area 
of the country in which they can feel rela- 
tively secure. There are already signs that 
this is not only having considerable direct 
military effects but perhaps, even more 
importantly, psychological effects. 

Fundamental Problem of Security 

It is the presence of these increasingly 
well-equipped and well-supported main- 
force units that distinguishes the problem 
in Viet-Nam from that of some other for- 
mer guerrilla actions elsewhere and has 
done much to shape the strategy of the 
Vietnamese Government and ourselves. This 
is because no matter how successful the 
Vietnamese Government may be in its polit- 
ical, economic, and military programs in 
the countryside, the ability of regular Viet 
Cong main-force units to sally out of their 
base areas and bring about a condition of 
insecurity for the local population goes far 
to vitiate the other programs. It has be- 
come increasingly clear that the fundamen- 
tal problem is the fundamental problem of 
all governments — giving security to the 

The evidence increasingly shows that the 
great mass of the population do not want 
to live under the Viet Cong, and when their 
security is assured they will support the 
Government and its programs. In spite of 
all the undoubted imperfections of Govern- 
ment administration, people have found 
that it is far preferable to that of the Viet 
Cong. The harsh realities of Viet Cong rule 
have meant higher taxes, closing of schools, 
drafting of young boys, being cut off from 
traditional market centers, and, in general, 
harsher conditions of life. The tens and even 
hundreds of thousands of people who have 
in recent months left their homes in areas 
occupied by the Viet Cong to accept the 
hardships of becoming refugees have been a 
dramatic demonstration of the way most 
people feel about the Viet Cong. Thus, what- 
ever ideological appeal the Viet Cong may 

have had at one time, it has long since dis- 
appeared under the harsh realities of Viet 
Cong rule. 

However, back to this question of secu- 
rity. The Vietnamese forces themselves 
could readily have dealt with any genuinely 
indigenous guerrilla movement, but they 
found themselves increasingly unable to 
deal with the growing invasion from the 

Although the Vietnamese armed forces 
have more than doubled, increasing from 
247,000 in 1960 to 531,000 today, and 12,000 
a month are coming into the armed forces, 
the ratio of Government forces to Viet 
Cong forces is a little over 3 to 1, although 
in previous antiguerrilla actions in Malaya, 
Greece, and the Philippines a ratio of at 
least 10 or 15 to 1 has been found neces- 

I might note at this point that few people 
seem to know that 92 percent of the armed 
forces of the Vietnamese Government con- 
sists of volunteers and that of those now 
coming into the armed forces 80 percent in 
July, for example, were volunteers. The ceil- 
ing on Vietnamese ability to increase their 
forces is thus not so much men willing to 
fight for their country as it is the neces- 
sarily slow process of training, especially 
training leadership. That they are willing to 
fight for their country is well demonstrated 
by the fact that, from 1960 through July of 
this year, the armed forces suffered about 
117,000 casualties, of which approximately 
34,000 were killed in action. 

However, there has thus been an obvious 
gap in manpower, and in the spring of this 
year Viet-Nam asked for, and we agreed to 
begin, the introduction of some American 
ground forces, especially to deal with this 
problem of the Viet Cong and North Viet- 
namese main-force units. In addition to the 
United States, as you know, Australia and 
New Zealand have also introduced ground 
forces and the Republic of Korea has in- 
formed the Vietnamese Government that it 
is responding to its request with a division 
of ground forces. Even with these additional 
forces, the overwhelming weight of man- 
power will still be that of the Vietnamese, 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


and the role of United States and other 
non-Vietnamese forces will continue to be 
that of support to the main Vietnamese 
effort, for both we and the Vietnamese 
realize full well that the main effort must 
continue to be that of the Vietnamese them- 

Another aspect of the military strategy 
has been the air action against North Viet- 
Nam initiated and carried on by the Viet- 
namese and ourselves since last February 
as a response to the escalation of Hanoi's 
military actions in the South. Our action 
has consisted of a careful, precise, and re- 
strained application of airpower against 
military targets and military lines of com- 
munication in North Viet-Nam. It is not 
directed at the civilian population of North 
Viet-Nam but at the means by which their 
rulers are attempting to support their ag- 
gression in the South. It is not directed at 
the destruction of North Viet-Nam but 
rather at the will and ability of the leaders 
in Hanoi to continue their aggression. 

While retribution or revenge is not its 
purpose, many of the people of South Viet- 
Nam feel that it is small repayment for the 
sabotage and destruction of thousands of 
bridges and miles of road and railroad, and 
the tens of thousands of casualties, military 
and civilian, inflicted on them by Hanoi's 
agents over the years. I am satisfied that 
this action, together with the action in the 
South, ultimately will demonstrate to Hanoi 
that their present course is untenable. 

Social and Economic Problems 

However, both the Vietnamese and our- 
selves fully realize that this struggle and 
our response is and can be by no means 
purely military. The same as any under- 
developed country, Viet-Nam faces stagger- 
ing problems of political and governmental 
organization, education, the development of 
transportation, communications, power and 
industry, development of agriculture, and so 
on almost ad infinitum. From 1955 through 
1959, the military part of our cooperation 
with Viet-Nam was by far the lesser part, 
our economic assistance during that period 

being approximately $1,200 million. Even 
though the military part of our cooperation 
has, since 1960, become the larger and more 
dramatic aspect of our programs, from 1960 
to 1965 over $1 billion was devoted to what 
are broadly known as economic programs. 

This description is all too narrow for it 
covered not only what are generally known 
as economic projects but also such things as 
medicine — ranging from education and hos- 
pitals to American doctors working in pro- 
vincial hospitals — an Institute of Public 
Administration, improvement and strength- 
ening of the civil police, thousands of 
schoolrooms, radio broadcast stations, 
printing equipment, radio communication 
equipment for isolated villages, and so on. 
Very importantly, it also covered the very 
large gap between what Viet-Nam exports 
and what it must import, which, together 
with able Vietnamese financial manage- 
ment, has prevented any serious inflation. 

Other nations have also contributed. 
Japan, for example, built the Da Nhim 
hydroelectric project, which did so much to 
relieve the power shortage in Saigon. Even 
this has not been immune from Viet Cong 
destructiveness, and early this year they 
made clear their determination to keep the 
long and vulnerable transmission line cut, 
not only by cutting the wires but also by 
destroying the pylons in remote areas and 
attacking crews attempting to repair them. 
The Vietnamese also valued the contribu- 
tion made by the highly competent Japanese 
medical team which served for a time in 
Saigon hospitals. 

In addition to the normal needs of any 
developing country, Viet-Nam faces formi- 
dable problems in caring for the thousands 
of direct and indirect civilian victims of the 
terrorism directed from Hanoi and the 
hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing 
Viet Cong rule, as well as in rebuilding 
what Viet Cong sabotage destroys. At the 
present time, more than 30 countries are 
giving assistance of one kind or another in 
these fields to Viet-Nam, and, in addition 
to those furnishing military assistance, 
about a dozen have personnel in Viet-Nam 



directly contributing to meeting these limit- 
less needs of the country. 

With this help, even in time of war the 
Vietnamese Government and people have 
made impressive gains. 

School enrollment has continued to in- 
crease so that by this year approximately 
2 million students were enrolled in schools 
through university as compared with just 
over 1,300,000 in 1960; in the 2 years be- 
tween 1962 and 1964 the industrial produc- 
tion index went up 32 percent ; an additional 
distribution of land under the land reform 
program involving more than 300,000 hec- 
tares is in the process of being carried out; 
new hospitals are being built in the prov- 
inces; and so on. Thus, though their major 
energies are understandably involved in the 
military effort, Vietnamese governments 
have within the limits of their capabilities 
been making some progress in other fields 
as well. 

The present Military Directorate is plac- 
ing perhaps even greater emphasis on the 
social and economic fields, and we are ex- 
tending all possible cooperation. As an ex- 
ample of the unspectacular but basically 
important type of thing being done, we 
have, together with assistance from Aus- 
tralia and China, produced some 71/2 
million school textbooks written in Viet- 
namese by Vietnamese educators. By the 
end of next year, 14 million texts will have 
been distributed — at least four books for 
each child in school. 

The continuing needs of Viet-Nam in the 
nonmilitary fields of social and economic 
development remain great, for without 
progress in these fields, progress in the mil- 
itary field cannot be fully effective. As I 
mentioned, many countries are contributing 
to this effort and I know that the Viet- 
namese value the contributions of Japan, 
which has so much to offer. 

Political Organization 

I would like now just to say a word on 
this problem of political and governmental 
organization for I believe that there is much 
misunderstanding and lack of appreciation 

of the true situation. Governmental instabil- 
ity in Saigon is often interpreted abroad as 
a lack of seriousness of purpose by the Viet- 
namese people in fighting the war, and 
often even read as indicating some doubt 
by the Vietnamese people on continuing the 
struggle. This is not correct. 

As with any people, the Vietnamese peo- 
ple are a product of their history and 
environment, and, rather than becoming 
impatient with their handling of their dif- 
ficult political problems, we should view it 
with sympathetic understanding. A number 
of other countries that have recently 
achieved independence have achieved no 
greater stability than Viet-Nam, even 
though not facing the same problems of con- 
flict as Viet-Nam. We Americans and you 
Japanese know how long it takes and how 
much trial and error is involved in develop- 
ing firmly based democratic institutions. 
The Vietnamese have not had much time, 
and even less opportunity. 

During the colonial period, no independ- 
ent political activity was permitted and 
such activity as there was consisted of 
conspiratorial plots against the occupying 
power. Conspiracies are, of course, a poor 
atmosphere in which to learn the arts of 
responsible government. Also, if my French 
friends will pardon my saying so, the 
French-educated Vietnamese absorbed some- 
thing of the political factionalism of the 
France of that time. Neither under Presi- 
dent Diem, to whom Viet-Nam nevertheless 
owes much, was independent political activ- 
ity permitted in any real sense. Thus, it is 
less than 2 years since even the beginnings 
of political activity, as both of us know it, 
have been possible. This, taken with the 
divisions within the country along racial, 
regional, and religious lines, plus the war, 
makes it remarkable not that things have 
gone as badly as they have but rather that 
they have gone as well as they have. 

Signs of greater political maturity are 
appearing and I have no doubt that they 
will continue to increase, but their full de- 
velopment will take time and there is little 
that the kibitzing outsider can do to force 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


their pace. As in every country, soundly 
developed democracy must build upward 
from what are called the "rice roots" in this 
part of the world, and what we Americans 
call the "grassroots." This process is under- 
way in Viet-Nam. In hamlets freed from 
Viet Cong control, elections are held for 
hamlet councils. At the higher level, elec- 
tions were held just this last May for 
municipal and provincial councils. In the 
face of Viet Cong efforts at their sabotage, 
these elections were conducted throughout 
the country in a most orderly manner, and 
popular interest was high. Over half of the 
total eligible population of the country reg- 
istered to vote, and over 70 percent of the 
registered voters actually voted. This is a 
high figure in any country for purely local 

There is also one essential fact to remem- 
ber when reading of political developments 
in Saigon. There has not been a single po- 
litical figure, nor group having political 
significance, that at the time Diem was 
overthrown or since has suggested the fight 
should be given up and capitulation made 
to the Hanoi terms. This is even more true 
today than it was a year ago. 

"Peace Will Come" 

This brings us to the great question as 
to how peace is to be restored in this war- 
torn land. That peace will come is a cer- 
tainty. How it will come, I cannot say with 
certainty, for I can speak only from the 
standpoint of one side and it takes two to 
make peace — unless the struggle is to be 
carried to its ultimate conclusion. This lat- 
ter way is one possibility. With the deter- 
mination of the Vietnamese people and the 
ascending scale of help that is now being 
brought to their support, Hanoi and the Viet 
Cong can have no hope of victory. The time 
for that has now passed. 

If they choose to continue the struggle 
and are able to maintain the morale of their 
dupes, they can undoubtedly prolong for a 
long time their final destruction. This 
means continuing years of hardship for the 
long-suffering people of South Viet-Nam 

and continuing losses for those who are 
supporting them. But Hanoi is making a very 
mistaken calculation if it assumes that they 
will not be willing to make the sacrifice. The 
spirit of the common citizen of South Viet- 
Nam, including the million who fled from 
the tyranny of the North, is not easily 
broken, and the American people and others 
who have joined in the military support of 
Viet-Nam are not accustomed lightly to 
withdraw from any enterprise they may 

The other way is for Hanoi to recognize 
either explicitly or implicitly that its pres- 
ent course holds no hope of gain for itself or 
a future Viet-Nam and can only benefit 
those who call themselves its friend. No de- 
mands for indemnity or revenge have been 
made by Viet-Nam or by the United States. 
All that has been asked is that Hanoi leave 
its neighbors alone. In Communist terminol- 
ogy, all that has been asked is that Hanoi 
truly respect the principle of coexistence. 

This position of the United States, as 
well as that of the South Vietnamese, has 
been stated on almost numberless occasions. 
The position of the Government of Viet- 
Nam was most succinctly stated by its dis- 
tinguished Foreign Minister, Dr. Tran Van 
Do, last June when he outlined his govern- 
ment's four basic principles for peace as 
follows : 

1. An end to aggression and subversion; 

2. Freedom for South Viet-Nam to choose 
and shape for itself its ov^m destiny, in 
conformity with democratic principles and 
without any form of outside interference ; 

3. As soon as aggression has ceased, the 
ending of military measures now necessary 
by the Government of Viet-Nam and the 
nations which have come to its aid, and the 
removal of foreign military forces from its 
territory ; 

4. Effective guarantees for the independ- 
ence and freedom of the people of South 

These are certainly reasonable and wor- 
thy objectives. They are objectives sup- 
ported by the United States. 

My own country has often expressed sim- 



ilar views and has made clear its willingness 
unconditionally to enter into discussions 
with any government to achieve this end. 
One of the most succinct expressions of my 
Government's views was contained in its 
reply last April to the appeal from 17 na- 
tions, including India, the U.A.R., Ghana, 
Yugoslavia, and Algeria.^' (Incidentally, 
Hanoi and Peiping did not even deign to 
reply to this appeal.) In our reply we 
pointed out our basic agreement with the 
principles of self-determination and renun- 
ciation of the use of force that it set forth. 
We especially noted that we will never be 
second in the search for a peaceful settle- 
ment in Viet-Nam and that there are many 
ways to a peace there — discussion or nego- 
tiations with the governments concerned, in 
large groups or in small ones, in the reaffir- 
mation of old agreements or their strength- 
ening with new ones. 

I close with the words of President 
Johnson in a speech he made on April 7 of 
this year : * 

We will not be defeated. 
We will not grow tired. 

We will not withdraw, either openly or under the 
cloak of a meaningless agreement. 

If this is clearly understood by Hanoi, 
peace can quickly come. If it is not yet 
understood, the struggle will be longer and 
harder but, nevertheless, peace inevitably 
will come. The choice as to whether the 
time is to be long or short is up to Hanoi. 
All who are interested in peace and freedom 
can through their moral and material sup- 
port to the free people of South Viet-Nam 
hasten the day that Hanoi makes the right 

U.S. Condemns Viet Cong Execution 
of American Military Prisoners 

Department Statement ^ 

The official radio of North Viet-Nam has 
announced that the Viet Cong on Septem- 
ber 26 executed two American military 
prisoners, a captain [Humbert R. Versace] 
and a sergeant [Kenneth M. Roraback]. 
According to this radio broadcast these men 
were executed in reprisal for the Viet-Nam 
Government's execution of three Vietnamese 
in Da Nang on September 22. 

As in the case of the Viet Cong's execu- 
tion of Sergeant Harold Bennett last June,^ 
the Viet Cong have carried out two more 
acts of brutal murder against American 
military prisoners. No trial of the American 
prisoners was held, no specific offenses 
were even charged. 

These murders not only violate the sense 
of decency of all civilized men but are also 
in direct violation of the prisoners' provi- 
sions of the 1949 Geneva convention by 
which the Viet Cong's masters, that is, the 
government in Hanoi, is bound. Article 13 
of the Geneva convention expressly pro- 
hibits reprisals against prisoners. 

The United States is certain that people 
the world over will condemn these brutal 
acts by the Viet Cong and their masters in 
Hanoi. The United States Government is 
asking the International Committee of the 
Red Cross to take all possible action within 
its competence with respect to these viola- 
tions of the 1949 Geneva convention. 

^ For text, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 610. 
* Ibid., p. 606. 

^ Read to news correspondents on Sept. 27 by Rob- 
ert J. McCloskey, Director of the Office of News. 

' For a Department statement, see Bulletin of 
July 12, 1965, p. 55. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


The Days Ahead for the United Nations 

by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs * 

It is a great pleasure to be here among 
so many American friends of the United 
Nations. One hears reports that the Ameri- 
can U. N. "constituency" is shrinking. I do 
not believe these reports. I am convinced 
that, despite some setbacks, the faith of 
most Americans in the U. N. remains firm 
and undiminished. This meeting itself is 
wonderful and tangible evidence of that. 

I believe this reflects our realization that 
the United Nations must succeed. There is 
no other rational alternative in sight for 
the orderly settlement of disputes among 
nations, for restoring the peace when it has 
been broken, and for erecting a permanent 
framework for a peaceful and progressive 
world order. 

So we enter this new session of the Gen- 
eral Assembly — and I enter upon my new 
assignment as Assistant Secretary of State 
— with a good deal of hope as well as much 

It is reassuring to know that the United 
States will have at the U. N. so brilliant 
and experienced a team of representatives as 
we have on the U. S. delegation. It is a great 
privilege to act as their Washington arm. 

Ambassador Goldberg is uniquely equipped 
to deal with international strife. He has 
spent his life settling disputes and calming 
controversy at home. He has been not only a 

' Address made before the United Nations Asso- 
ciation of the U.S.A. at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 
19 (press release 226 dated Sept. 18). 

great advocate and jurist but a renowned 
mediator and conciliator. His performance 
in the Security Council this month amply 
attests to these talents. 

I look forward also to working again with 
my good friend and colleague, the very able 
Charles Yost, and with the new members of 
the U. S. Mission staff; the distinguished 
president of Howard University, Jim Na- 
brit; Jim Roosevelt, who brings to his task 
a wealth of experience as a member of a 
distinguished family and of the Congress; 
and Eugenie Anderson, who has served so 
well as our Minister to Bulgaria and our 
Ambassador to Denmark. 

I welcome, too, as members of the U.S. 
delegation two experienced and distin- 
guished members of our Congress, Barratt 
O'Hara and Peter Frelinghuysen ; our own 
Bill Foster, who has worked so well and 
hard as Director of the Disarmament 
Agency; our distinguished former Attorney 
General, William Rogers; and Frances Wil- 
lis, our former Ambassador in Norway and 
Ceylon, who has served on two previous del- 

We are most fortunate that such talented 
Americans have responded to the call to 
serve as our representatives in the U. N. 
These outstanding appointments underscore 
President Johnson's commitment to give the 
utmost support to the United Nations and 
its search for peace. 

I have been working on U. N. affairs for 



some 15 years. They have been fast-moving 
years, frustrating and satisfying, marked 
by remarkable change and remarkable prog- 

In this decade and a half : 

— We have seen overt Communist aggres- 
sion stopped in Korea by determined action 
of the United Nations, vi^ith U.S. leadership. 
But Communist aggression in a more insid- 
ious form is still taking place in Viet-Nam. 

— We have seen Europe recover from the 
ravages of war with massive American eco- 
nomic assistance. But the alliance which 
has succeeded so well in protecting the 
Continent against Communist expansion- 
ism has not yet succeeded in welding Europe 
into a united political and strategic entity. 

— We have seen the end of our monopoly 
over nuclear weapons as nuclear capabilities 
have spread to others, including the Chinese 
Communists. And the end of this prolifera- 
tion is not yet in sight, as major disarma- 
ment agreements have so far eluded us. 

— We have seen cracks develop in the 
Communist monolith, but the danger of 
Communist imperialism remains. 

— We have seen the U. N. keeping the 
peace in the Congo, Cyprus, and the Middle 
East; but it is still not adequate to some of 
the tasks at hand and the likely demands 
of the future. 

Today the human race is caught up in a 
vast struggle to adapt its ways in the face 
of headlong, rampant change : 

to adapt to the massive impact of modern 
science upon ancient traditions and institu- 
tions : 

to adapt to the increasing irrationality of 
war as a means of settling disputes; and 

to adapt to mounting pressure of new 
ideas of freedom and human dignity upon 
controlled societies. 

Fatalism — that apathy with which the 
world's multitudes once accepted their fate 
— has been replaced by an explosion in 
man's expectations. 

In this vast upheaval we have precious 
little historical experience to go upon. And 
man himself continues to be both creative 

— and reactionary; intelligent — and preju- 
diced; talented — and stubborn; cooperative 
— and selfish, all at the same time. 

It is with such forces and conditions that 
the U. N. has had to cope in its short his- 
tory. To those who ask, what has the U. N. 
done in 20 years to justify its existence, my 
first impulse is to say it has survived. It 
already has been in existence as long as its 

But it has done much more than that, as 
we all know. It has served as peacemaker 
and peacekeeper, as a meeting ground for 
harmonizing differences, as a diplomatic 
conference hall, as an insulator of big- 
power quarrels and a fire brigade to dampen 
brush fires, as a network of common under- 
takings, and as a prodder of the world's 

We are all acutely aware that the suc- 
cesses of the past are no guarantee of the 
future as the Assembly returns to work 
after being in the hospital for a year. 

The General Assembly that opens on 
Tuesday [September 21] marks the end of 
a crisis, but hopefully the beginning of a 
convalescence. The underlying financial and 
constitutional problems have not been set- 
tled. But the logjam has been broken, and 
there is much unfinished business ahead. 
There is great need for an Assembly of 
responsibility, of accountability, of con- 
structive action. This 20th session, which 
comes at the threshold of the third decade 
of the life of the U.N., will be looked upon 
as a landmark session, as a measure of the 
Assembly's capacity and maturity, as a fore- 
taste of things to come. 

Strengthening U.N.'s Peacekeeping Capacity 

As we look to the days ahead, therefore, 
we must find ways to refurbish the overall 
capacity of the United Nations. Three areas 
come readily to mind. 

First and foremost is to strengthen the 
peacekeeping capacity of the U.N. The need 
for U.N. peacekeeping is as great today 
as at any time in the post^World War II 
period. The critical situation in the sub- 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


continent and in Cyprus and the potentially- 
explosive conditions in the Middle East are 
current reminders — if we need such re- 

We must face this need squarely, even 
though the Assembly has been unwilling to 
use its powers to require every member to 
share in financing the peacekeeping burden. 

We hope the Committee of 33's call for 
voluntary contributions will be heeded and 
that both the Council and the Assembly will 
find ways to press forward with improved 
procedures for initiating, managing, and fi- 
nancing peacekeeping operations. We are 
not prepared to accept a situation in which 
the capacity of the United Nations to act for 
peace can be stopped by the negative vote 
of a single member. Nor should the effec- 
tiveness of the organization be determined 
by the level of support forthcoming from its 
least cooperative members. For its part, the 
United States will cooperate fully with 
other like-minded states to assure effective 
U.N. peacekeeping responses to critical sit- 
uations. The world is too fraught with dan- 
ger to do otherwise. Surely the nations of 
the world have learned the lessons of World 
War II and the failure of the League. We 
are unlikely to have the opportunity to learn 
these lessons again. 

And of equal importance — if peace is an 
overriding necessity for mankind regardless 
of the diverse regimes under which various 
U.N. members live — strengthening the 
peacekeeping capacity of the U.N. is in the 
interests of all members of the U.N., big 
and small alike — for the Soviet Union as 
well as the United States. For peace in an 
interdependent world, in which we literally 
live in each other's backyard, is indivisible. 
Events in the subcontinent today demon- 
strate graphically how true this is. 

Emphasizing "Quiet Diplomacy" 

The second way to refurbish the U.N. 
would be to reinvigorate its capacity to 
achieve peaceful settlements. 

One way of doing this is to place less 
emphasis on debates and resolutions and 
more on quiet diplomacy. 

The international test of the parliamen- 
tary approach is considerably different 
from the measure of its success nationally. 
Within an organized national society, the 
test is lawmaking and legislation; on the 
world stage, the primary purpose is peace- 

Parliamentary procedures should help 
promote a maximum of negotiations and 
agreement. The late Secretary-General Dag 
Hammarskjold, who gave dignity to "quiet 
diplomacy" and practiced it with consum- 
mate skill, sensed this keenly. He put it in 
this way in 1958 : 

Since the "legislative" processes of the United 
Nations do not lead to legislation, and the power 
of decision remains in the hands of the national 
governments, the value of public debate in the 
United Nations can be measured only by the degree 
to vifhich it contributes to the winning of agreement 
by the processes of diplomacy. If public debate con- 
tributes to winning consent either immediately or in 
the long run, it serves the purpose of peacemaking. 
If it does not so contribute, then it may be useless 
or even harmful exercise. 

Secretary-General U Thant is carrying on 
the tradition of Dag Hammarskjold of seek- 
ing opportunities for quiet efforts to restore 
calm and normal conditions when violence 
has threatened or erupted. We support fully 
his quiet efforts to move the Viet-Nam 
problem to the conference table. We support 
fully, too, his continuing efforts to bring 
about a cease-fire in the subcontinent. 

Improving U.N. Decisionmaking Procedures 

If quiet diplomacy can help the peace- 
keeping process, so can procedures in the 
U.N. system which will promote concilia- 
tion and consensus. This leads me to the 
third area where progress would help 
strengthen the United Nations: the need 
for realistic and practical decisionmaking in 
the U.N. as a whole. 

In the U.N. today, there are two clearly 
discernible facts which are not easy to 
combine into one political system: on the 
one hand, the sovereign equality of states, a 
principle of the charter; on the other hand, 
the uneven distribution of real power and 
real resources in the real world. Somehow 



the large and powerful nations must come 
to terms with the sovereign equality of na- 
tions, and somehow the small-country ma- 
jority in the U.N. must come to terms with 
the minority of major resource contributors 
who have been the prime supporters of the 
U.N. as an action agency for peace. 

I am encouraged that some progress has 
been made in this direction. For example, 
a procedural innovation in U.N. decision- 
making was established by the last General 
Assembly in the machinery dealing with 
trade and development. Under this proce- 
dure conciliation can be initiated and voting 
suspended on any resolution upon the mo- 
tion of a very small number of countries. It 
is intended to help promote a practical di- 
alog, a collective bargaining process, be- 
tween advanced and developing countries, 
before they become involved in the formal 
voting of resolutions. 

If used wisely and prudently, this new 
conciliation procedure should serve the in- 
terests of both the developed and develop- 
ing countries. As a minimum, these new 
procedures should influence member gov- 
ernments in the direction of compromise 
rather than sterile voting victories. They 
should help develop a consensus on propos- 
als which will enjoy general support, bene- 
fiting all partners in the trade and develop- 
ment field. 

I have, of course, touched upon only three 
areas. There are many crucial decisions 
ahead during this coming session as it deals 
with an agenda of 100 items : 

— the need to find some common ground 
in the field of disarmament; 

— to develop rules facilitating man's fur- 
ther explorations in space ; 

— to merge the central U.N. institutions 
providing preinvestment aid to less devel- 
oped countries ; 

— to cope with the increasing population, 
food, and health problems of the world ; 

— to press ahead with greater vigor in the 
field of human rights ; and 

— to decide on the work of the U.N. in 
industrialization and housing. 

Implementing the Principles of the Charter 

In all these areas the need is pressing. 
The desire for progress is universal. The 
opportunity is greater than ever before. As 
it strives to recoup the shortfalls of last 
year's session, the Assembly has it in its 
power to advance the manifold enterprises 
of the U.N. in a quite extraordinary way. 

But the gap between promise and per- 
formance will not be closed without unre- 
mitting effort. How much it can be nar- 
rowed depends on many factors : 

— on the willingness of disputing parties 
to make use of the methods of peaceful 
settlement laid down in the charter ; 

— on the determination of the Assembly 
to maintain unimpaired United Nations 
peacekeeping functions and activities ; 

— on the ability of the membership to 
deal with the serious financial plight of the 
organization ; 

— on the Assembly's success in opening 
new paths to effective arms control ; 

— on the capacity of nations and blocs to 
look beyond their own immediate short- 
term interests to the wider long-range inter- 
ests of the international community in which 
they share; 

— on the ability of the Assembly to man- 
age its proceedings so that its business may 
be carried on with efficiency and reason- 
able speed. 

It is not too much to hope that substan- 
tial progress can be made in these direc- 
tions. We intend to do our part. We believe 
that, taken as a whole, the membership is 
similarly motivated. Our belief stems from 
our conviction that men will not knowingly 
persist in contributing to their own extinc- 

We see — and our associates in the U.N, 
can all see — ^two visions of the future. One 
is a world of unrestrained nationalist and 
ideological competition, without an effec- 
tive U.N. In such a world we would expect a 
steep descent to conflict, human misery, and 
incalculable destruction. Whatever the fol- 
lies or aberrations of a few nations may 
be, we do not think the bulk of the U.N. 
membership would tread this road. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


The other vision is one of steady, if grad- 
ual, implementation of the purposes and 
principles of the U.N. Charter. Slowly but 
surely, it would bring us within sight of a 
world of law, of freedom, and of prosper- 
ity — a world not of dull conformity but of 
rich human diversity. 

We put our trust in the capacity of man 
to better his lot, and we do not think our 
faith will be misplaced. 

Social Studies Teachers Have 
Foreign Policy Briefing 

The Department of State announced on 
September 28 (press release 232) that ap- 
proximately 500 junior and senior high 
school social studies teachers from Wash- 
ington and the surrounding area would 
attend a specially planned foreign policy 
briefing at the Department of State on 
October 2. Teachers from parts of Maryland, 
West Virginia, Virginia, Pennsylvania, and 
the District of Columbia were invited to 
participate in the briefing, which was co- 
sponsored by the Department of State, the 
National Council for the Social Studies, and 
the United Nations Association, Capital Area 

Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harri- 
man; Joseph J. Sisco, Assistant Secretary 
of State for International Organization Af- 
fairs; and J. Wayne Fredericks, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for African 
Affairs, addressed the teachers. Included in 
the topics discussed were U.S. policy and 
the changing Communist world, U.S. policy 
and the developing world, and the future 
prospects of the United Nations. Oscar 
DeLima, chairman of the executive com- 
mittee of the United Nations Association 
of the United States of America, spoke on 
"The U.N.— The First Twenty Years." 

Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Public 
Affairs, presided at the meeting. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

International Council of Scientific Unions and Cer- 
tain Associated Unions. Hearing before the Sub- 
committee on International Organizations and 
Movements of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on H.R. 8716. June 7, 1965. 40 pp. 

Amending Title V of International Claims Settlement 
Act of 1949 (Cuban Claims). Hearing before the 
Subcommittee on Inter-American Affairs of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 7622. 
June 8, 1965. 42 pp. 

Background Information Relating to Southeast Asia 
and Vietnam (revised edition). Material collected 
for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. 
June 16, 1965. 233 pp. [Committee print.] 

Extend and Amend the Export Control Act of 1949. 
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency on H.R. 7105 and S. 1896. June 16, 
1965. 105 pp. 

Antireligious Activities in the Soviet Union and in 
Eastern Europe. Report to accompany S. Con. Res. 
17. H. Rept. 532. June 21, 1965. 8 pp. 

Annual Report of the Saint Lawrence Seaway Devel- 
opment Corporation, Year Ended December 31, 

1964. H. Doc. 218. June 23, 1965. 15 pp. 
Zoning for Foreign Chanceries. Hearing before Sub- 
committee No. 3 of the House District of Columbia 
Committee on H.R. 7488. June 23, 1965. 215 pp. 

IBRD and IFC Articles of Agreement. Report to ac- 
company S. 1742. S. Rept. 372. June 28, 1965. 
23 pp. 

Equalize Tariff Filing Penalties in the Intercoastal 
Shipping Act, 1933. Report to accompany H.R. 
3415. S. Rept. 374. June 28, 1965. 7 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duties on Metal Scrap. 
Report to accompany H.R. 4493. S. Rept. 379. 
June 29, 1965. 3 pp. 

Extension of Mobile Trade Fairs Program. Report 
to accompany H.R. 4525. S. Rept. 380. June 29, 

1965. 6 pp. 

Offices for the International Pacific Halibut Com- 
mission. Report to accompany S. 1975. S. Rept. 383. 
June 30, 1965. 8 pp. 

Interest Rates on Foreign Official Time Deposits. 
Report to accompany H.R. 5306. S. Rept. 385. June 
30, 1965. 5 pp. 

Taxation of Foreign Corporations. Hearing before 
Subcommittee No. 4 of the House District of Co- 
lumbia Committee on H.R. 7724 and H.R. 8058, to 
amend section 4 of the District of Columbia In- 
come and Franchise Tax Act of 1947. June 30, 
1965. 95 pp. 

United Nations Participation Act Amendments. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Organizations and Movements of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee on S. 1903. June 30- 
July 1, 1965. 42 pp. 

Removal of Tax Barriers to Foreign Investment in 
the United States. Hearings before the House 
Ways and Means Committee, along with written 
comments submitted to the committee, on H.R. 
5916. June 30-July 1, 1965. 161 pp. 

Background Information Relating to the Dominican 
Republic. Material collected for the Senate Com- 
mittee on Foreign Relations. July 1965. 100 pp. 
[Committee print.] 




Effectiveness of U.S. Delegation 
to U.N. Eniianced by New Law 

statement by President Johnson ^ 

In recent weeks the United Nations has 
once again proved its critical value to man- 
kind. Because it is the principal forum to 
which all nations may bring disputes that 
threaten world peace, it is vital that the 
organization of the United Nations reflect 
its high purposes. Each nation therefore 
has an obligation to strengthen and support 
the delegation representing it in the world 

I am happy to sign into law today a meas- 
ure that will enhance the effectiveness of 
our delegation to the U.N. In the past, only 
the chief representative of the United 
States, and his deputy, could represent this 
country before the Security Council and 
certain other major agencies of the U.N. 
This has proved unduly restrictive on the 
work of our delegation. 

Under the new law other members of our 
U.N. team may represent this country be- 
fore any organ or commission of the United 
Nations. This will provide Ambassador 
Goldberg with the flexibility he needs to 
make use of the rich and diverse talents of 
those who now serve on the American del- 
egation — Representative James Roosevelt, 
Ambassador Eugenie Anderson, and Dr. 
James Nabrit.^ 

In my experience we have never had a 

^Made on Sept. 28 (White House press release) 
following the signing of S. 1903, a bill to amend the 
United Nations Participation Act, as amended. 

" For the names of the U.S. representatives and 
alternate representatives to the 20th session of the 
U.N. General Assembly, see Bulletin of Oct. 11, 
1965, p. 608. 

stronger delegation to the United Nations 
than we have today. The outstanding men 
and women who represent us there have 
demonstrated that they possess those qual- 
ities of mind and spirit that will serve not 
only American interests in the U.N. but the 
interests of all mankind in its quest for 
peace. By this act we hope to make the full- 
est use of those qualities in every facet of 
the U.N.'s work. 

Gambia, the IVIaldive Islands, 
Singapore Admitted to U.N. 

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg ^ 

I take pleasure, Mr. President, in welcom- 
ing the three new nations as members of 
the United Nations.- 

The United States has long enjoyed 
cordial relations with Gambia. In fact, if 
my history is correct. President Franklin 
Roosevelt was the first American Presi- 
dent in his official capacity — there were 
others who did so as private citizens — ^to 
visit the African Continent, and he enjoyed 
several stops in Gambia during World War 

The United States, therefore, welcomes 
Gambia as a member of the United Na- 
tions, with the conviction that its role in this 
body will be a positive and constructive 
one. In the important work which stands 
before all of us, we wish Gambia and her 
people all success and Godspeed. 

* Made in plenary session on Sept. 21 (U.S. dele- 
gation press release 4644). Mr. Goldberg is U.S. 
Representative to the General Assembly. 

' On Sept. 21 the General Assembly by acclama- 
tion admitted Gambia, the Maldive Islands, and 
Singapore to membership in the United Nations. 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


It is also gratifying further to welcome 
to the family of nations a state which has 
achieved its independence through peaceful 
negotiation. The United States therefore 
has the pleasure of noting the admission 
of the Maldive Islands to the United Na- 
tions. We are certain that within the frame- 
work of this organization which recognizes 
the quality of all states, large and small, the 
Maldive Islands will make great progress 
toward the ultimate goal we all share of 
economic and social justice. 

And, similarly, I take particular pleasure 
in extending the welcome of our country to 
the admission of Singapore as a member of 
this great organization. It was my pleasure 
to visit Singapore last summer, and I can 
bear personal witness to the energy and ca- 
pacity of the people of that country. We con- 
fidently expect the Government and people 
of Singapore to make a significant contri- 
bution to the deliberations and counsels of 
this organization. And we are convinced 
that Singapore will apply to our common 
problem of world peace and security a dynam- 
ic and constructive approach which has 
been a hallmark of the extraordinary social, 
economic, and political development of this 
Asiatic state. 

U.S. states Views on Procedures 
To Amend U.N. Charter 

Statement by Seymour M. Finger ^ 

Today we are meeting in the sixth 
session of the Committee on Arrangements 
for a Conference for the Purpose of Review- 
ing the Charter. The United Nations Charter 
remained unchanged for 20 years until the 
recent adoption of amendments enlarging 
the Economic and Social Council and the 

"• Made in the Committee on Arrangements for 
a Conference for the Purpose of Reviewing the 
Charter on Sept. 16 (U.S./U.N. press release 4633). 
Mr. Finger is Deputy Counselor of the U.S. Mis- 
sion to the United Nations. 

Security Council.* During these 20 years, 
the charter proved adaptable to many un- 
precedented situations; this organization 
had frequent examples of the farsighted- 
ness of the drafters of the document upon 
which this organization is based. 

The United States has supported meas- 
ures upholding the charter as it now stands. 
But we recognize that even this document, 
so well conceived and so flexible, might well 
be reviewed to ascertain whether any 
changes might be needed to enable the 
organization to reflect world developments 
since 1945. A general review of the charter 
is one means of discovering areas where 
revisions might be appropriate, but, as we 
have seen in the case of the recently adopted 
amendments, such a conference is not the 
sole means of conforming the charter to the 
requirements of the membership. 

The enlargement amendments were the 
result of an increasing awareness on the 
part of a majority of member states that 
the newer members were not adequately 
represented in the major organs of the 
United Nations. Some of the changes in 
membership could be reflected without 
amending the charter, but the problem with 
respect to the composition of the Councils 
was somewhat more complex. For that rea- 
son, we have, for more than a decade, 
favored the enlargement of the Security 
Council and the Economic and Social Coun- 
cil. We are glad that agreement was reached 
on the proposed amendments and that the 
ratification process has now been com- 
pleted. So we now have an example of the 
way in which an amendment may be ob- 
tained without a general review conference 
when there is substantial agreement. 

Nevertheless, the United States continues 
to support such a conference. It is the 
opinion of my Government that a general 
review should take place in a serious and 
constructive atmosphere, where there is 
general agreement on the objectives of the 

• For background, see Bulletin of May 3, 1965, 
p. 678, and May 24, 1965, p. 827. 



conference and where we could envisage the 
enhancement of U.N. operations. 

Unfortunately, there is at present no such 
general agreement, and in these circum- 
stances there can hardly be a constructive 
atmosphere. For these reasons, the United 
States agrees with the majority of the 
members that the time is not now propitious 
and that "the auspicious international cir- 
cumstances" referred to in Resolution 992 
(X), under which, and only under which, 
such a conference should be held, are lack- 

We therefore believe that this Committee 
should not now attempt to set a time and a 
place for the holding of a general review 
conference. In the interim, it is important 
that the member states exert efforts to 
promote the further development of the 
United Nations within the framework of the 
charter in its present form. 

Senate Confirms Mrs. Lawson 
for ECOSOC Social Commission 

The Senate on September 15 confirmed 
the nomination of Mrs. Marjorie McKenzie 
Lawson to be the representative of the United 
States on the Social Commission of the 
Economic and Social Council of the United 

United States Delegations 
to International Conferences 

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference 

The Department of State announced on 
September 10 that Ambassador Julius C. 
Holmes would head the U.S. delegation to 
the Plenipotentiary Conference of the Inter- 
national Telecommunication Union, which 
convened on September 14 at Montreux, 
Switzerland, and is scheduled to continue 
into November. 

Vice chairmen of the U.S. delegation are 
Commissioner Rosel H. Hyde of the Federal 
Communications Commission and Carl W. 
Loeber of the Department of State. Senators 
Hugh Scott and Frank J. Lausche and Rep- 
resentatives Oren Harris and William L. 
Springer are participating as congressional 

The Plenipotentiary Conference is the su- 
preme organ of the ITU and normally meets 
every 5 or 6 years. Proposals for a thorough 
reorganization of the ITU in the interest of 
modernization and improved efficiency will 
occupy a prominent place on the agenda of 
the conference. The ITU will also observe 
its 100th anniversary on this occasion. 

United Nations Sugar Conference 

The Department of State announced on 
September 20 that Horace D. Godfrey, Ad- 
ministrator, Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service, Department of Agri- 
culture, would be the chairman of the U.S. 
delegation to the United Nations Sugar 
Conference, which convened that day at 
Geneva. Edward R. Fried, Deputy Assist- 
ant Secretary of State for Economic Af- 
fairs, is deputy chairman of the delegation.^ 

An invitation to the United States to 
attend was extended by the Secretary Gen- 
eral of the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development. 

The United Nations Sugar Conference, 
convened for the purpose of negotiating a 
new International Sugar Agreement to re- 
place the one which entered into force in 
1958,' will deal with economic, political 
and technical issues of considerable com- 
plexity and is expected to last approxi- 
mately a month. 

'■ For names of the other members of the U.S. 
delegation, see Department of State press release 
dated Sept. 10. 

' For names of other members of the U.S. dele- 
gation, see Department of State press release dated 
Sept. 20. 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 



Current Actions 



International air services transit agrreement. Done 
at Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force 
for the United States February 8, 1945. 59 Stat. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: Togo, 
September 16, 1965. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement for facilitating the international circula- 
tion of visual and auditory materials of an educa- 
tional, scientific, and cultural character. Done 
at Lake Success July 15, 1949. Entered into 
force August 12, 1954.' 

Accession deposited: Trinidad and Tobago, August 
31, 1965. 


International convention to facilitate the importa- 
tion of commercial samples and advertising mate- 
rial. Done at Geneva November 7, 1952. Entered 
into force November 20, 1955; for the United 
States October 17, 1957. TIAS 3920. 
Accession deposited: Kenya, September 3, 1965. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention, on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 
24, 1964.' 

Accession deposited: Cambodia (with reservation) , 
August 31, 1965. 

Optional protocol to Vienna convention on diplomatic 
relations concerning the compulsory settlement 
of disputes. Done at Vienna April 18, 1961. En- 
tered into force April 24, 1964. ' 
Accession deposited: Cambodia, August 31, 1965. 


Articles of agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development. Done at 
Washington December 27, 1945. Entered into 
force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1502. 
Signature and acceptance: Zambia, September 23, 

Articles of agreement of the International Monetary 

Fund. Done at Washington December 27, 1945. 

Entered into force December 27, 1945. TIAS 1501. 

Signature and acceptance : Zambia, September 23, 


Articles of agreement of the International Finance 
Corporation, as amended. Done at Washington 
May 25, 1955. Entered into force July 20, 1956. 
TIAS 3620, 4894. 

Signature and acceptance: Zambia, September 23, 

' Not in force for the United States. 

Articles of agreement of the International Devel- 
opment Association. Done at Washington January 
26, 1960. Entered into force September 24, 1960. 
TIAS 4607. 

Signature and acceptance: Zambia, September 23, 


Convention on consent to marriage, minimum age 
for marriage, and registration of marriages. Done 
at United Nations Headquarters, New York, De- 
cember 10, 1962. Entered into force December 
9, 1964.' 
Ratification deposited: Cuba, August 20, 1965. 


Convention of Union of Paris for the protection 
of industrial property of March 20, 1883, revised 
at Brussels December 14, 1900, at Washington 
June 2, 1911, at The Hague November 6, 1925, 
at London June 2, 1934, and at Lisbon October 
31, 1958. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. En- 
tered into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notifi-cation of accession: Philippines, August 27, 


Agreement relating to the repression of the cir- 
culation of obscene publications, signed at Paris 
May 4, 1910, as amended by the protocol signed 
at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered into force 
September 11, 1911, and May 4, 1949. 37 Stat. 
1511; TIAS 2164. 
Accession deposited: Malawi, July 22, 1965. 

United Nations 

Amendments to the Charter of the United Nations 
(59 Stat. 1031). Adopted at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New Cork, December 17, 1963. Entered 
into force August 31, 1965. TIAS 5857. 
Ratifications deposited: Burundi, August 23, 1965; 
Guatemala, August 18, 1965; Italy, August 25, 
1965; Paraguay, August 17, 1965. 

White Slave Traffic 

Protocol, with annex, amending the international 
agreement for the suppression of the white slave 
traffic, signed at Paris May 18, 1904, and the 
international convention for the suppression of the 
white slave traffic, signed at Paris May 4, 1910. 
Done at Lake Success May 4, 1949. Entered 
into force for the United States August 14, 
1950. TIAS 2332. 

Acceptance deposited: Cuba (with a declaration), 
August 4, 1965. 



Agreement for a program of scientific cooperation 
in the field of biomedicine. Signed at Accra Janu- 
ary 3, 1962. Entered into force January 3, 1962. 
TIAS 4932. 

Notification of termination by the United States: 
August 10, 1965, effective February 10, 1966. 


Agreement concerning the reciprocal acceptance of 
certificates of airworthiness for imported civil 
glider aircraft. Effected by exchange of notes at 
Washington September 16 and 27, 1965. Entered 
into force September 27, 1965. 




Three Consulates in United Kingdom 
To Close on October 31 

Department Statement 

Press release 234 dated September 30 

The American Embassy at London an- 
nounced today [September 30] that its 
consulates at Birmingham, Glasgow, and 
Southampton will be closed on October 31. 
The consulates at Belfast, Edinburgh, and 
Liverpool will be maintained. 

The closing results from the continuing 
worldwide review of United States opera- 
tions to make the most efficient and eco- 
nomical use of available resources. With the 
speed of modern communications, ease of 
travel, and modernization and improvement 
in methods of handling the heavy consular 
workload, it has been determined that the 
consulate at Edinburgh can assume the 
duties of the consulate at Glasgow and the 
duties of the consulates of Birmingham and 
Southampton can be taken over by the Em- 
bassy at London. 

The Embassy also announced that all im- 
migrant visa work in the United Kingdom, 
with the exception of Northern Ireland, 
will be conducted by the consular section of 
the Embassy at London after October 31. 
Pending cases will continue to be handled 
by the consulates at Liverpool and Glasgow 
until that date, but all new applications or 
inquiries regarding immigrant visas should 
be sent to the Embassy at London after 
October 1, 1965. Visa services for residents 
of Northern Ireland will continue to be 
handled by the consulate general at Belfast. 

The actions announced today do not re- 
flect any change whatsoever in United 
States policy toward the United Kingdom 
or the most cordial relationships which the 
consulates being closed have had with their 
respective areas. 

Computer-Based Terminal System 
To Handle Department Cable Flow 

The Department of State announced on 
September 24 (press release 230) that a 
contract had been signed on that day for a 
$3 million computer-based terminal system 
to handle its worldwide flow of cables. The 
system will represent a major advance for 
the Department in rapid, reliable, and secure 
communications. The Department and its 
posts throughout the world exchange over 
14 million message words each month. 

The Department awarded the contract for 
the new terminal system, to be delivered in 
the fall of 1966, to the International Tele- 
phone and Telegraph Corp. (ITT), Data and 
Information Systems Division. The contract 
was signed in the office of William J. 
Crockett, Deputy Under Secretary for Ad- 

The Office of Communications, under 
Deputy Assistant Secretary John W. Coffey, 
conducted the studies and developmental 
planning of the new system over the past 2 
years. The system will be produced and as- 
sembled in the ITT facilities at Paramus, 

The new system will utilize the most up- 
to-date techniques, including message dis- 
plays, thereby reducing to a minimum the 
manual handling of teletypewriter tapes and 
page copy. It will replace equipment which 
currently terminates State Department tele- 
graph and communications circuits in Wash- 
ington, D.C. It will also establish tighter 
controls over communications than formerly 
possible. At the same time, the equipment 
will provide information immediately on the 
status of all messages and the condition of 
all circuits in the system at any time. 


The Senate on September 22 confirmed the 
following nominations: 

John H. Burns to be Ambassador to the United 
Republic of Tanzania. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release (Austin, Tex.) dated 
September 6.) 

OCTOBER 18, 1965 


Richard H. Davis to be Ambassador to Rumania. 
(For biographic details, see Wliite House press 
release (Austin, Tex.) dated September 6.) 

The Senate on September 24 confirmed the nomi- 
nation of U. Alexis Johnson to be a Deputy Under 
Secretary of State. (For biographic details, see 
White House press release dated September 4.) 


Recent Releases 

For sale \by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C., 
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, except in the case of free pub- 
lications, which may be obtained from, the Office of 
Media Services, Department of State, Wiashington, 
D.C., 20520. 

Guidelines of U.S. Foreign Policy. Pamphlet based 
on an address by Secretary Rusk at the commence- 
ment exercises of George Washington University, 
Washington, D.C. Pub. 7921. General Foreign Policy 
Series 202. 16 pp. 15^. 

Whaling. Amendments to the schedule to the Inter- 
national Whaling Convention — Signed at Washington 
December 2, 1946. Adopted at the Sixteenth Meet- 
ing of the International Whaling Commission, Lon- 
don, June 26, 1964. Entered into force October 1, 
1964, and January 22, 1965. TIAS 5745. 4 pp. 5^. 

Economic and Social Development — Sino-American 
Fund. Agreement with China. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Taipei April 9, 1965. Date of entry into 
force July 1, 1965. TIAS 5782. 37 pp. 55(f. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Republic of 
Korea, relating to agreement of February 19, 1960. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Seoul April 16, 1965. 
Entered into force April 16, 1965. TIAS 5790. 2 pp. 

Ryukyu Islands — Japan-United States Consultative 
Committee. Agreement with Japan, relating to 
agreement of April 25, 1964. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Tokyo April 2, 1965. Entered into force 
April 28, 1965. TIAS 5791. 2 pp. 5(t. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Iran, amending agreement of No- 
vember 16, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Tehran April 28, 1965. Entered into force 
April 28, 1965. TIAS 5792. 2 pp. 5(S. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, 
amending agreement of September 30, 1964, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi 
April 21, 1965. Entered into force April 21, 1965. 
TIAS 5793. 3 pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Demo- 
cratic Republic of the Congo, amending the agree- 
ment of April 28, 1964, as amended. Exchange of 

notes— Dated at Leopoldville April 29, 1965. En- 
tered into force April 29, 1965. TIAS 5794. 4 pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Greece, amending agreement of 
November 17, 1964. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Athens April 9 and 27, 1965. Entered into force 
April 27, 1965. TIAS 5795. 2 pp. 54. 

Technical Cooperation — Agriculture and Natural Re- 
sources. Agreement with Brazil, amending and ex- 
tending agreement of June 26, 1953, as amended and 
extended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio de 
Janeiro December 21, 1964, and April 5, 1965. 
Entered into force April 5, 1965. Effective January 
1, 1965. TIAS 5796. 10 pp. 10<t. 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with 
Japan, modifying and supplementing convention of 
April 16, 1954, as modified and supplemented — 
Signed at Tokyo August 14, 1962. Entered into 
force May 6, 1965. With exchanges of notes and 
letters. TIAS 5798. 35 pp. 15(J. 

Tracking Stations. Agreement with Ecuador, extend- 
ing, with modifications, the agreement of February 
24, 1960— Signed at Quito May 10, 1965. Entered 
into force May 10, 1965. TIAS 5799. 5 pp. 5(f. 

Aviation — Communications Cable. Agreement with 
Panama, extending the agreement of March 31, 1949. 
Exchange of notes — Sigrned at Panama March 9 
and April 1, 1965. Operative March 31, 1964. TIAS 
5800. 3 pp. 5^. 

Aerospace Disturbances — Additional Facilities for 
Research Program. Agreement with Australia. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Canberra April 12, 
1965. Entered into force April 12, 1965. TIAS 5801. 
2 pp. 5^. 

Status of Military Mission Personnel. Agreement 
with Guatemala. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Guatemala April 29 and May 4, 1965. Entered into 
force May 4, 1965. TIAS 5802. 3 pp. 5<i. 

Postal Service. Agreement with United Nations, 
amending the agreement of March 28, 1951, as 
amended. Exchange of letters — Signed at New York 
April 15 and 19, 1965. Entered into force April 
19, 1965. TIAS 5803. 2 pp. 5<t. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Japan, 
modifying the arrangement of August 27, 1963. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington May 19, 
1965. Entered into force May 19, 1965. TIAS 5804. 
6 pp. 5<f. 

Torpedo Test Range — Strait of Georgia. Agreement 
with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa 
May 12, 1965. Entered into force May 12, 1965. 
TIAS 5805. 5 pp. 5<t. 

Education — Educational Commission and Financing 
of Exchange Programs. Agreement with United 
Kingdom — Signed at London May 10, 1965. Entered 
into force May 10, 1965. With United Kingdom note. 
TIAS 5806. 9 pp. 10^. 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Afghani- 
stan, extending the agreement of June 30, 1953, as 
extended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Kabul May 
1 and 4, 1965. Entered into force May 4, 1965. Effec- 
tive March 31, 1965. TIAS 5807. 3 pp. 5<f. 



INDEX October 18, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1373 


Confirmations (Burns, Davis, U. Alexis John- 
son) 645 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 640 

Senate Confirms Mrs. Lawson for ECOSOC 
Social Commission 643 

Department and Foreign Service 

Computer-Based Terminal System To Handle 
Department Cable Flow 645 

Confirmations (Bums, Davis, U. Alexis John- 
son 645 

Three Consulates in United Kingdom To Close 
on October 31 645 

Economic Affairs 

Improving the World's Monetary System 
(Fowler, Johnson, Mann) 614 

United Nations Sugar Conference (delegation) 643 

Gambia. Gambia, the Maldive Islands, Singa- 
pore Admitted to U.N. (Goldberg) ... 641 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Improving the World's Monetary System 
(Fowler, Johnson, Mann) 614 

ITU Plenipotentiary Conference (delegation) 643 

Maldive Islands. Gambia, the Maldive Islands, 
Singapore Admitted to U.N. (Goldberg) . 641 

Military. U.S. Condemns Viet Cong Execution 
of American Military Prisoners .... 635 

Panama. President Reports on Progress of 
Negotiations With Panama (Johnson) . . 624 

Presidential Documents 

Effectiveness of U.S. Delegation to U.N. 
Enhanced by New Law 641 

Improving the World's Monetary System . . 614 

President Reports on Progress of Negotia- 
tions With Panama 624 

Public Affairs. Social Studies Teachers Have 
Foreign Policy Briefing 640 

Publications. Recent Releases 646 

Rumania. Davis confirmed as Ambassador . 645 

Singapore. Gambia, the Maldive Islands, Singa- 
pore Admitted to U.N. (Goldberg) . . . 641 

Tanzania. Burns confirmed as Ambassador . 645 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 644 

United Kingdom. Three Consulates in United 
Kingdom To Close on October 31 ... . 645 

United Nations 

The Days Ahead for the United Nations 

(Sisco) 636 

Effectiveness of U.S. Delegation to U.N. En- 
hanced by New Law (Johnson) .... 641 

Gambia, the Maldive Islands, Singapore 

Admitted to U.N. (Goldberg) 641 

Senate Confirms Mrs. Lawson for ECOSOC 

Social Commission 643 

United Nations Sugar Conference (delegation) 643 

U.S. States Views on Procedures To Amend 

U.N. Charter (Finger) 642 


U.S. Condemns Viet Cong Execution of 

American Military Prisoners 635 

Viet-Nam Today (U. Alexis Johnson) . . . 626 

Name Index 

Bums, John H 645 

Davis, Richard H 645 

Finger, Seymour M 642 

Fowler, Henry H 614 

Goldberg, Arthur J 641 

Johnson, President 614, 624, 641 

Johnson, U. Alexis 626, 645 

Lawson, Mrs. Marjorie McKenzie 643 

Mann, Thomas C 614 

Sisco, Joseph J 636 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: Sept. 27-Oct. 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to September 27 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
226 of September 18 and 230 of September 24. 

No. Date 


232 9/28 Foreign policy briefing for social 

studies teachers (rewrite). 

233 9/28 Mann: annual meeting of IBRD 

Board of Governors. 

234 9/30 Three consulates closed in United 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printing office 






BOX 286 




To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons 

For 20 years the United States has been trying to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. The 
limited nuclear test ban treaty, to which more than 100 nations now adhere, was the "first hope- 
ful, helpful step in the long journey toward peace," President Johnson has said. 

The United States is continuing that journey. On August 17 William C. Foster, U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at Geneva, presented a 
draft treaty for the prevention of the spread of nuclear weapons. 

This pamphlet contains the text of the proposed treaty, statements by President Johnson and 
Mr. Foster, and a foreward summarizing the major disarmament proposals of the last two decades. 




To: Supt. of Doeaments 
Govt. FrintinK Office 
Washinirton, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order) . 

send me copies of To Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons. 




To tw nailed 



Coupon refund 





WASmNGTON, D.C. 20402 





Street address 

City, State, and ZIP code 







Vol. LIII, No. 137A 

October 25, 1965 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 650 

by W. Michael Blumenthal 665 


Statement by Glenn T. Seaborg 677 

For index see inside back cover 

The Future of NATO: Areas of Common Effort 

Address by Vice President Humphrey ^ 

I am happy to be able to welcome you 
here today to the United States on behalf of 
the President. I am particularly happy to 
do so as a fellow NATO Parliamentarian 
who has attended your meetings in the past, 
has always followed your activities with the 
keenest interest, and is looking forward to 
conversations with a number of old friends 
in this distinguished group. 

The tradition, in opening such interna- 
tional meetings, is for someone from the 
host country to greet the delegates with 
general and benign expressions of good will, 
I would like to do more than that. For you 
are leaders in developing political thinking 
in your countries. You are the men and 
women who provide legislation to back up 
needed policies. You are key figures in ad- 
vancing the common interests of our Atlan- 
tic partnership. 

' Made before the annual meeting of the NATO 
Parliamentarians at New York, N.Y., on Oct. 5. 

I would like to share with you some 
thoughts about the future of that partner- 

Its object is to strengthen peace. This is 
surely the supreme task of our age. In the 
nuclear era there can be no alternative. 

Peace will not be secured merely by put- 
ting out fires as they occur. We must build a 
world in which they will be less likely to 
break out in the first place. This means try- 
ing to build the kind of world order envis- 
aged in the U.N. Charter — one in which 
men everywhere can enjoy more of the good 
things of life, in which emerging countries 
can maintain and strengthen their freedom, 
in which aggression can be deterred and the 
root causes of tension and conflict can be 
effectively addressed. 

The Atlantic countries have a unique 
responsibility in building such a world. 
Their resources and talents are essential to 
the task. But even these resources and tal- 
ents will only suffice if they are concerted. 


OCTOBER 25, 19i5 

The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides tlie public and interested 
aeencies of tiie Government with infor- 
mation on developmentj In the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreiflrn policy, issued 
by the White Hou^e and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well aa special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation la included concerning treaties 
and international affreementa to which the 
United States la or may become a party 
and treatiea of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbice: S2 issues, domestic $10. 
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

NOTE: Contents of this pnblicatlon art 
not copsrrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin aa the source will 
l>e appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 




No one of us is strong enough to meet the 
needs of the day alone. That is the meaning 
of Atlantic partnership. 

An effective partnership must be based on 
the concept of equality — equality of effort 
and equality of responsibility. It is to such 
a partnership that my country is dedicated. 
As President Johnson said a few months 
ago, "None of us has sought — or will seek — 
domination over others." ^ 

To fulfill the promise of this partnership, 
we must be ready to break new ground, as 
did the statesmen who first constructed the 
alliance. They met the essential need in 
building a better world: They prevented 
war. Since NATO was created, the terri- 
torial integrity of each of its members has 
been maintained. For almost a generation 
aggression in Europe has been deterred. 

But NATO has been more than a shield 
of protection. It has been a wellspring of 
confidence and security giving impetus to 
prosperity and progress, to economic 
growth and political cooperation. 

We must make sure that it stays this 
way. We must maintain and strengthen 
NATO in the face of Soviet military pres- 
ence which changes but does not wither. We 
must preserve the structure of joint de- 
fense on which NATO's success has rested. 
It is the close integration of effort that 
distinguishes NATO from all previous alli- 
ances. But we must adapt that structure to 
changing circumstances. 

Other needs for common action also 
emerge as we move into the third decade of 
the postwar era. It is to three of these great 
needs that I would speak today. 

Helping Peoples of Southern Hemisphere 

We must concert about our actions in the 
great continents to the south — Latin Amer- 
ica, Africa, and Asia. We must help these 
peoples achieve the peace, the freedom, and 
the progress that they seek. 

This calls for action to coordinate and in- 
crease the Atlantic nations' aid to develop- 
ing countries. In this task we must take full 

'Bulletin of May 24, 1965, p. 790. 

advantage of the Development Assistance 
Committee of the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development]. 

It calls for action to expand world trade. 
This means that we cannot afford to let 
the Kennedy Round fail. 

It calls for action to enlarge world mon- 
etary reserves to meet the most pressing 
requirements of both developing and indus- 
trialized areas. 

Whether action is taken in each of these 
fields will depend, in good part, on how 
seriously your countries and mine address 
these tasks. For it is our resources and our 
skills that are in good part involved. 

The needs of emerging countries continue 
to grow. As in Europe after World War II, 
their security as well as their growth must 
be assured if they are not to become a focus 
of ever-widening conflict. 

All of us have a stake in that security. 
The Atlantic nations cannot survive as an 
island of stability in a world of chaos. The 
threats to this security may be subtle or 
indirect; that does not make them any less 

Arriving at Common Action 

A better world cannot be built by turning 
away from the difficult and dangerous busi- 
ness of meeting these threats. This is com- 
mon business, because all our interests are 
at stake. 

Political consultation should be the means 
of discharging common business — the means 
of arriving at common action. Such consul- 
tation, in its quiet way, is gradually becom- 
ing a habit in the alliance. There are now 
few subjects of international importance 
which are not discussed, day in and day out, 
by the North Atlantic Council. 

More needs to be done. The practice of 
bringing together the senior officials who 
have responsibility in home governments 
has been successful in the OECD. It may 
prove increasingly rewarding in NATO. 

Intimate and continuing concert of action 
is also fostered by parliamentary meetings 
such as this. The proposal for an Atlantic 
Assembly, which has been approved by this 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


group, looks to the same end. I hope it can 
be fulfilled. 

But let us be clear. Consultation will not 
be assured by effective mechanisms alone. 
The responsibilities and burdens of common 
effort go hand in hand. Consultation will 
be effective in the degree that it looks to 
action. Common decisions will come most 
readily to those countries willing to share in 
the effort that these decisions govern. 

Averting Spread of Nuclear Weapons 

I turn now to a second area in which joint 
action is needed — averting spread of nuclear 
weapons under national control. There will 
be no security for any of our countries if 
the authority to let loose these weapons pro- 

There are three ways in which the At- 
lantic nations can — and must — act together 
to avert this peril : 

First, we must assure that Atlantic nu- 
clear arrangements offer our European 
partners an effective alternative to national 
systems of deterrence. It is natural that 
European countries, with new strength and 
confidence, should wish to play a larger role 
in their own defense. My country is ready to 
join with them in effective action to this 
end. There will be continuing discussion of 
such action among interested nations in the 
period ahead. 

We must also consider how best to meet 
the concerns of key nonnuclear countries 
outside the Atlantic area — concerns which 
might otherwise move these countries to 
consider national deterrence. 

Last October President Johnson said, in 
speaking of the first Chinese Communist 
nuclear explosion, "The nations that do not 
seek national nuclear weapons can be sure 
that, if they need our strong support against 
some threat of nuclear blackmail, then they 
will have it." ^ I hope that interested At- 
lantic nations can work together — in the 
United Nations, in disarmament negotia- 
tions, and elsewhere — in seeking ways to 
fulfill this pledge. 

Common Approach to Arms Negotiations 

We must also continue to seek a common 
approach to arms negotiations with the 
U.S.S.R. In the recent Geneva conference a 
large measure of Western agreement was 
reached on a proposed nonproliferation 
treaty.* We hope that the Soviet Union 
will, over time, reconsider its abrupt rejec- 
tion of this proposal. 

At this same conference key nuclear-ca- 
pable countries made clear that reductions in 
existing nuclear armaments could play an 
important part in encouraging and insuring 
nonproliferation. Ambassador Goldberg has 
recently laid before the United Nations 
American proposals for freezing and reduc- 
ing nuclear capabilities.* 

In seeking to reduce armaments, as in 
other areas of negotiation with the U.S.S.R., 
Western unity vdll be essential if there is 
to be any chance of success. Atlantic na- 
tions that come together to share in nuclear 
defense should share, no less, in the search 
for prudent ways of limiting the burdens 
and dangers of that defense. 

But defense of the status quo is not good 
enough as a purpose of Atlantic action. In 
trying to build a better world we must 
seek peacefully to erode the tragic and un- 
necessary division of Europe. 

The nations of Eastern Europe are find- 
ing new paths. Closer contacts between 
these nations and the Atlantic world can 
best be sought on a basis of common under- 
standing in the West. The effort to develop 
such closer contacts is not directed against 
any nation, least of all the Soviet Union. 
We seek to end existing divisions in Europe, 
not to create new ones. 

The most grievous of these existing divi- 
sions is the enforced partition of Germany. 
The German people, like any other, must be 
allowed to choose and shape its ovra future. 
The need is to afford the German people 
that choice, while meeting the security con- 
cerns of all with a stake in European peace. 

• Ibid., Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610. 

* For text of a U.S. draft treaty, see ibid., Sept. 
20, 1965, p. 474. 

'Ibid., Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578. 



I have spoken of fields in which action is 

There is need, as well, for our alliance 
to more greatly develop our cooperation in 
such fields as outer space. For we must to- 
gether insure that space will be a source of 
man's peaceful progress and not a threat to 
that progress. 

In each of these things the key to success 
will be common effort. Atlantic nations 
which mount such effort will have done 
much to carry forward the purpose of their 
partnership — creating a better world. 

If we fail and fall apart, future genera- 
tions may well look back on our time as we 
look back on the period between the wars: 
an interlude in which men forgot the harsh 
lessons of disaster and thus lost the chance 
to build anew. 

The need is clear. It is for each of us here 
to help decide whether it will be met. 

Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations 
With Europe on BBC 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
view of Under Secretary Ball by Alistair 
Burnet, editor of the London Economist, 
taped at Washington on October 2 and 
broadcast on BBC radio on October 3. 

Press release 235 dated October 6 

Q. Mr. Ball, I am very glad to have this 
chance to talk to you in the middle of your 
other preoccupations, and in particular to 
talk to you about problems affecting Europe 
in particular. I think later on we are going 
to have a word unth Mr. \W. Averell] Har- 
riman in a later program. 

A. Good. 

Q. But what I would like to take up with 
you first of all is the whole position of East- 
West relations as they affect Europe. I 
think many people in Western Europe have 
welcomed the coming together of the United 
States and the Soviet Union on some inter- 
national problems. It may have been a com- 
pulsory coming together on things like 

India and China, but it does seem to us that 
if China is now regarded as the one dis- 
turbing and dissatisfied power in the world, 
it is a very good thing that Moscow and 
Washington should see their common in- 

But, of course, how does this leave Eu- 
rope? And there is a certain feeling and 
perhaps a certain fear in Western Europe 
that from now on America's main interest 
and its main initiative will be directed 
toward Moscow, and just possibly at the 
expense of some of the European interests 
that the United States has supported 
through thick and thin in the past 10 or 15 

What is your reaction to this kind of 
European fear? 

A. Mr. Burnet, I think that you have to 
be very careful in making any large gen- 
eralizations about the degree of cooperation 
or the degree of common interest which the 
United States and the Soviet Union may 
have. In the last few weeks, for example, in 
the case of the subcontinent we have each 
found it desirable in our own individual 
national interests to follow courses which 
have been roughly parallel in the Security 
Council of the United Nations in trying to 
bring about a cease-fire.^ On the other 
hand, in Southeast Asia the Soviet Union 
is actively supporting the regime in North 
Viet-Nam whereas the United States is, of 
course, giving full support to the South 
Vietnamese in their struggle against the 
aggressions from the North. 

Q. Yes. 

A. I mention this because there are areas, 
as there have been in the past, for example, 
in the case of the limited test ban agree- 
ment, where we can find a common interest 
which could result in some constructive 
initiative being supported by both sides, but 
we have also vast areas of disagreement, 
and I am sure that we are going to continue 
to have for a very considerable period to 

^ For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1965, 
p. 526. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


I don't think that our relations with the 
Soviet Union in this regard are any dif- 
ferent from the relations of the Western 
European countries or indeed of the United 
Kingdom, and I can't see, myself, that the 
fact that we may find these areas of com- 
mon interest with the Soviet Union — that 
this in any way diminishes our very great 
interest in the closest and most intimate 
kind of cooperation with the United King- 
dom and with the Western European coun- 

Q. / think, Mr. Ball, we can quite under- 
stand that, because Asian issues and Asian 
crises have bulked so large in recent months, 
there should be a certain downgrading of 
your administration's immediate interest in 
the kind of things that Europeans feel 
pressing in upon them. But one of the signs 
of this — and some of tis in Europe have seen 
it frankly disappointing, almost a discon- 
certing sign — has been the question of the 
NATO nuclear fleet, the multilateral force. 

In President Kennedy's time it was really 
thought in Britain that the United States 
was serious about this thought, and that it 
saw this as a major part of its policy, some- 
thing that if possible should be pushed 
through and accepted by Western Europe 
and thus become one of the pillars of the 
alliance. Now, among Europeans and what 
I might call even the Atlantic people in 
Western Europe, there has, I think, been a 
little disappointment that President John^ 
son has seemed rather ready to drop this 
idea, certainly in the course of this year. 
Now, I know that Mr. Johnson may have 
been encouraged to drop the precise defini- 
tion of the multilateral force that was once 
American policy by Mr. Wilson's {British 
Prime Minister Harold Wilsonl proposals 
about an Atlantic nuclear force, an ANF 
instead of an MLF. But what I would like 
to ask you is, what future do you think the 
multilateral force now has inside the al- 

A. I think that it is a mistake to concen- 
trate just on the multilateral force. The 
problem — which is the problem of trying to 
find the way in which the nonnuclear 

powers can participate in their own nuclear 
defense — that problem remains. I think it 
is a problem of importance, it is a problem 
of some urgency, to be regarded as a piece 
of unfinished business. 

There are actually only two ways in 
which a nonnuclear power can participate 
in its own nuclear defense. It can do so by 
building a national nuclear deterrent of its 
own. It can do so by some collective effort 
with other nations. 

We put forward a proposal for a collec- 
tive approach in the form of the multi- 
lateral force. Mr. Wilson and his Govern- 
ment put forward a proposal in the form 
of an Atlantic nuclear force. We don't take 
a doctrinaire view with regard to the pre- 
cise kind of collective approach that may 
be most useful. 

We have a feeling that the multilateral 
force is a good idea. It serves the purposes 
which seem to us to be important very well. 
But the ultimate decision on this matter has 
to be made by the nations that are going to 
participate, and this is a matter which has 
been under discussion at the technical level 
throughout this year, within a committee 
which has been working within the frame- 
work of the NATO. We certainly feel that 
this is a matter which can't be swept under 
the rug and which will have to be tackled 
again in the very near future. 

There was some reason to think that it 
was better to hold off the most earnest con- 
sideration of this until after the elections 
in Germany. We shall be having some talks 
with Mr. Erhard within a few weeks time. 
We shall also be having some talks with 
Mr. Michael Stewart [British Foreign Sec- 
retary], when he comes over in a week's 
time, and there is no question in our minds 
but that this whole problem of a participa- 
tion for the nonnuclear powers in their nu- 
clear defense is one which remains an item 
of very serious business for the Western 
Powers, and we are going to have to work 
it out. 

Q. Wouldn't it be true to say though, Mr. 
Ball, that the power that may have the most 
decisive voice in all this is, in fact, the 



Soviet Union? You see what I am coming 
around to, that if it is thought to be in the 
American interest to reach a treaty with 
the Soviet Union against the dissemination 
of nuclear weapons to other powers, then it 
does seem to m5 that the multilateral force 
is very much at risk. 

It might be a very wise decision that, in 
fact, such a treaty should be accepted with 
the Soviet Union and that the multilateral 
force should fall to the ground. But it does 
appear to us that, despite the kind of talks 
that have been going on or one hopes to 
have between the United States and West- 
em Europe, the decisive voice in this is 
really the Soviet Union and, therefore, in 
Washington's own mind it seems to us there 
is a question of priority. It is the agreement 
vnth the Soviet Union that comes first as 
against the kind of arrangement that would 
simplify things inside the Western alliance. 

A. I think that is a false option, if I may 
say so, Mr. Burnet. 

Q. Yes. 

A. I don't regard in any way the multi- 
lateral force or the Atlantic nuclear force 
or any of the proposals that have been made 
for a solution to this problem — this nuclear 
problem — as serious impediments to a non- 
proliferation or a nonacquisition agree- 
ment, because they are not dissemination in 
any real sense in the form in which either 
of those two proposals has been put for- 

Q. Mr. Ball, if I might interrupt you, the 
Russians are claiming very much that it 
does mean dissemination in their bargain^ 
ing position. 

A. Yes, but I think that one must realize 
that the Russians don't like NATO, either. 

Q. No. 

A. What they are really objecting to is 
not the multilateral force or the Atlantic 
nuclear force. They are objecting to the 
organization of Western power designed to 
resist an aggression from the East, and 
obviously they are objecting to anything 
which might amount to an increment to 
that nuclear power. 

France and the Multilateral Force 

Q. I understand. But is it possible, too, 
that one of the reasons for perhaps not 
pushing the m,ultilateral force quite so much 
is that, besides the point of somehow con- 
soling and compensating West Germany as 
the one major power in the Western alliance 
that doesn't have its own nuclear weapons, 
there is this very serious problem of how 
your country and perhaps Britain in its own 
smaller way attempts to integrate the 
French force de frappe — General de 
Gaulle's own independent deterrent inside 
the Western alliance? Now, do you see any 
prospect of this coming about? 

A. I think that the question as to whether 
that will come about or not will depend upon 
the views of the French Government at the 
particular time that the question is pre- 
sented. I think it is quite clear that Presi- 
dent de Gaulle does not anticipate the ab- 
sorption or integration of his force de 
frappe in any larger force. I think he has 
made this clear beyond any real question. 
In the near future, as long as the French 
Government has its present policies, I would 
think there was no serious chance of it. 

But what we would propose, of course, 
and what we have made quite clear, is that, 
if there is a collective force organized, there 
would always be a place available for the 
French Government and there would always 
be a willingness to discuss the possibility of 
the integration of the French force in it. 

Q. But is it still a priority of the Ameri- 
can Government to create such a force and 
to put the French Government, so to speak, 
on the spot, either to go in with it or to stay 
out in a much more visible way than now? 
I mean General de Gaulle can argue that 
this force doesn't exist at all at the moment. 

A. It certainly isn't an objective of United 
States policy to put the French Government 
on the spot. It is an objective of United 
States policy to try to find a constructive 
solution to the problem of the participation 
of nonnuclear powers in nuclear defense, 
and this is something we are going to con- 
tinue to work at and work at very seriously. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


Now, if this creates problems for the 
French Government, those are problems of 
course which we, and I am sure our other 
NATO allies, are always prepared to discuss 
with the French Government. 

Q. It does seem to tis, Mr. Ball, that it is 
one of the objectives of the French Govern- 
ment to put United States policy on the 
spot, and I think the point here is the re- 
negotiation of the NATO treaty when its 
time expires or begins to expire. We are, I 
think, coming up to the time where the 
consideration of how the NATO treaty is to 
be rewritten, if it is indeed to be rewritten 
at all, will bulk increasingly larger in the 
relations of the Western Powers themselves. 

A. I think it is important to understand 
just what we mean when we talk about a 
time when the NATO treaty is to be re- 
written. There is a provision, as you well 
know, in the NATO treaty which permits 
any member to withdraw after the initial 
20 years has passed, which would be in 1969, 
and I think the notice has to be given as 
early as 1968 if there is to be a withdrawal 
in 1969. 

Now, this presents a problem for individ- 
ual NATO members. It shouldn't present 
a problem for NATO as a whole, because 
the NATO treaty goes on unless any individ- 
ual member may wish to change its rela- 
tionship to it. But we have recognized the 
fact that from time to time there have been 
suggestions for the revision of the NATO 
treaty or the NATO organization. 

If any such suggestions are made in 
concrete form by the French Government 
or by any other member government, ob- 
viously we, along with our partners, in- 
cluding the United Kingdom, would be per- 
fectly prepared to look at those suggestions 
and to consider them and to see whether 
they seem to be useful or not. 

Q. Has not such a suggestion been put 
forward by General de Gaulle already? That 
is the point of a, say, three- or perhaps even 
four-power steering committee, so to speak, 
for NATO in all its foreign policy and 
defense attitudes. No2v, is this really a 

stumbling block for the future of the al- 
liance ? 

A. The proposal that General de Gaulle 
put forward in the now rather celebrated 
letter to President Eisenhower, which, in- 
cidentally, President Eisenhower did an- 
swer despite some of the press rumors to 
the contrary — 

Q. Yes. 

A. — the proposal which was put forward 
was not really a proposal for NATO. It was 
a proposal for a directorate, which would 
take into consideration all the problems and 
not just in the NATO area but around the 
world, and which would exercise the effective 
control over the United States deterrent. 

Q. I understand. 

Now, is this in fact something that really 
must be discussed apart from NATO? I 
mean, I think the French position now is 
that De Gaulle would wish to speak as the 
spokesman for the Six, for the integrated 
Western Europe so far as it exists and so 
far as President de Gaulle accepts it. 

A. I suppose that depends on the will of 
the other five, doesn't it? 

Q. It certainly does. But what is the will 
of the American Government? We did see 
when President Kennedy came into office 
what appeared to be a very serious initiative 
of the President himself going to Paris and 
attempting to repair some of the wounds or 
the bruises or whatever you like to call them 
that General de Gaulle appeared to feel 
about this treatment by what he calls the 
Anglo-Saxon powers. 

A. I don't think that was the atmosphere 
in which President Kennedy's visit to Eu- 
rope was undertaken at that time at all. He 
had several things that he had in mind. One 
of them was to meet Mr. Khrushchev in 
Vienna, and so on, as you recall. 

Q. Certainly. 

A. And to other capitals as well. He 
called on President de Gaulle as the head of 
a state which was a very old ally and friend 
of ours, just as he called on the heads of 
state and government in other countries. 



Q. But can I ask whether, in fact, you 
think this sort of approach to President de 
Gaulle pays off at all? I mean, should Presi- 
dent Johnson attempt to repeat it? Would 
this not be XLseful? Is not President de 
Gaulle someone who at any rate in some of 
his relationships has appeared to be moved 
by slights of the past and has also in return 
behaved perhaps toward Britain on certain 
occasions in a slightly m,ore generous way 
when he has been treated somehow as an 
equal partner, not as someone who has been 

A. Well, we certainly regard France as 
an equal partner, and we certainly maintain 
the closest relationships with the French 
Government, and there is no lack of com- 
munication with President de Gaulle. I had 
a long visit with him, myself, not over 3 
weeks ago. Mr. Rusk has seen him repeat- 
edly. I saw him myself a year ago. Our 
Ambassador in Paris, Mr. [Charles E.] Boh- 
len, sees him very frequently. There is no 
problem of communication and no lack of 
communication. I think that any problems 
we have with the French Government arise 
out of policies which may in some respects 
differ, in fact do in some respects differ. 
The problem that we have in our relation- 
ship is exactly the same problem we have 
in our relationship with our other friends 
and allies, which is to try to come to an 
understanding of one another's points of 
view and see whether or not it may be 
possible to reconcile those points of view. 

I think that in the case of the French 
Government there are some very strongly 
held policies which don't at all correspond 
with the policies in my Government. But 
this is not an unknown phenomenon, 

U.S. Economic Relationships With Europe 

Q. Do you regard it as a growing phe- 
nomenon in Europe that some of the things 
that President de Gaulle has stood for may 
be spreading into other countries? I am 
talking in particular now of the economic 
relationships between the United States and 
the countries of Western Europe. Some 
countries, Britain and France, for example. 

which did attempt to run advanced indus- 
tries, aviation industries, computer indus- 
tries, and so on, have been complaining that 
they have been rather squeezed out of this 
field by the enormous American strength 
in these advanced science-based industries. 
They have also gone on to complain, as 
President de Gaulle has done publicly, that 
American investment in Western Europe 
taking over European firms is something 
deleterious to the European position — is 
something that is resented in Europe. 

In Britain we have some examples of 
British Aluminium being bought up, of Ford 
of America acquiring Ford of Britain, of 
Chrysler in America acquiring, and really 
it seems now, of becom,ing the dominating 
partner in the Root motor firm in Britain. 

Do you really think that something can 
be worked out, particularly say in the de- 
fense industries, that would give Western 
Europe a chance of being somehow a little 
bit more of an equnl partner in these kind 
of orders, in these kind of industries which 
are so important for our own future eco- 
nomic development? 

A. You will recall, Mr. Burnet, that the 
United States, and particularly the West of 
the United States, was developed with a 
substantial inflow of British capital, and I 
must say historically it seems to us to have 
been a very good thing. 

Our own feeling is that the flow of direct 
investment and the flow of capital on a 
creditor basis which has gone forward to 
Western Europe and to the United Kingdom 
in the postwar period has contributed very 
materially to the modernization and tech- 
nical advance of those countries, particu- 
larly because capital almost always carries 
with it a certain amount of know-how, of 
specialized technical information. For our- 
selves, we look forward to the reverse flow 
increasing — as it has been in the past few 
years — and a kind of cross-fertilization of 
technology that comes about with a flow of 
capital in each direction. 

I understand the sensitivity of the prob- 
lem with respect to certain industries. I 
would say that in the United States certain 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


industries have seen it necessary, in the face 
of competition, to develop and organize 
themselves on a scale which permits them 
to serve large markets and serve them 
efficiently. I have hoped, of course, that the 
same thing would be true in Europe — that 
there would be a tendency toward the crea- 
tion of firms of a size commensurate with 
the requirements of big markets. 

To the extent that this process goes for- 
ward, of course, the competition with Amer- 
ican firms may be on a more even basis, 
because to the extent that you have larger 
firms that have command of greater re- 
sources, then there shouldn't be a disparity 
in size or in competitive ability. 

But this is a problem which we have been 
aware of because there has been a great 
deal of discussion of it — more in France, I 
would suppose, than in the United Kingdom. 

Q. Certainly. 

A. But we have always been hospitable to 
any kind of constructive suggestions as to 
how this could be met. I haven't heard very 
many of them. 

Q. Well, Mr. Ball, speaking as a Scot, I am 
very well aware of the contribution that 
American indiLstry has made to one of the 
underdeveloped areas of Britain since the 
war because of investment and know-how 
coming into that part of our country. But 
it does raise the question in our minds as 
to whether European integration is the 
thing that Britain ought to aim at, or 
whether it is a question of a rather more 
general Atlantic integration, and may it not 
be more sense for a country like Britain to 
attempt to integrate with the United States 
in some kind of free trade area. 

This was indeed put forward by one of 
your Senators, Senator [Jacob if.] Javits, a 
short while ago. What is your reaction to 
this? If Britain is indeed shut out from 
Europe by French policy for the immediate 
future, do you think the American admin- 
istration would welcome some alternative of 
this kind for British industry that needs a 
much bigger home market? 

A. You will recall that in the whole 

postwar period the policy of my Govern- 
ment has been to support the idea of inte- 
gration, of unity in Europe, primarily be- 
cause of the enormous political advantages 
it seemed to us that this offered. It would 
enable the people of Europe to play a much 
greater role in world affairs because they 
would have organized themselves on a scale 
commensurate with the requirements of a 
major world role. We therefore welcomed 
the creation of the European Economic 
Community, and we welcomed the initiative 
which Mr. Macmillan took in 1961 to apply 
for membership in the European Commu- 
nity. And I may say that it was a consider- 
able disappointment to us, on January 14, 
1963, when the French Government made 
known its opposition to British membership. 

Our own feeling is that there is a very 
compelling logic to integration in Europe 
and there is a very compelling logic to the 
association of the United Kingdom as an 
active participant in this process of inte- 
gration, in this move toward unity. We have 
a feeling that it would be good for the 
Europeans and good for the United King- 
dom and, indeed, good for the whole world. 

Now, this is a problem which we can't 
control because this involves the national 
decisions of the European governments and 
the national decision of your Government. 

You do ask whether there is an alterna- 
tive in some kind of integration relationship 
between the United Kingdom and the 
United States. I think this is a very com- 
plex question but one to which both your 
Government and my Government would 
have to give careful consideration in the 
light of our responsibilities all around the 
world and in the light of our relationship 
toward Europe and your relationship toward 
Europe. I certainly am not in a position to 
give you a categorical answer, other than 
to suggest that this is a project which has 
very far-reaching ramifications and would 
have to be most exhaustively studied before 
we could give any reply to it. 

Q. I seem to detect in your tone, Mr. Ball, a 
certain priority on these two questions, that 



you do still seem to regard Britain's role as 
preeminently one inside Europe, if only for 
the reason that this is the one that has 
been most under discussion and that appears 
to be — 

A. It has seemed to us, and it still does, 
that Great Britain could contribute very, 
very greatly to Europe, and that Europe 
could be of great benefit to the United King- 
dom, and that there is a kind of internal 
logic which would seem to us to favor this 
course of action very strongly. 

But again this is a matter, as I say, in 
which my own Government cannot control 
because we would not be an active partici- 
pant in that process. 

You raise a question about our reaction 
to another kind of proposal in which we 
would be an active participant, and I could 
only tell you today that this would require 
obviously extremely careful study because 
it would have ramifications that would af- 
fect all of our responsibilities around the 
world as it would affect yours. 

Question of German Reunification 

Q. Surely. But can I now press on with an- 
other of America's major allies inside the 
Western alliance, and that is West Ger- 

As a result of the West German elec- 
tions with the continuation of the Christian 
Democrat government, do you think that 
Germany by the way it has voted has sug- 
gested that it is now a satisfied power, one 
somehow that is so quiet that the re- 
mainder of the Western alliance can ignore 
what we all thought was the great German 
problem, the great problem of reunified^ 
tion? Do you think the United States is 
somehow now able to downgrade the ques- 
tion of German reunification and Berlin? 

A. No, we can't downgrade either ques- 
tion any more, I think, than your Govern- 
ment can or any more than the West Ger- 
man Government can. I think that the ulti- 
mate unity of the German people is essen- 
tial to the long-range stability of Europe. 

This has been our conviction ever since the 
war. It remains our conviction. And I don't 
think that we can regard this as anything 
other than a matter of first priority. 

Now, I think it is also quite clear to every- 
one that this is not something which is going 
to come about tomorrow. 

Q. Do you think that Germany is still, as 
I think one of the most distinguished Ameri- 
can correspondents, James Reston, called it, 
United States-backed policeman in Western 
Europe? Do you regard West Germany as 
America's most serious military ally? Be- 
cause this carries one corollary, if I might 
put it this way. It would be that, if this was 
so, the United States might regard Britain's 
own role as one continuing in other parts of 
the world, say particularly in the Indian 

A. We regard West Germany as a very 
important military ally of the United States, 
particularly because West Germany is ad- 
jacent to the area of greatest danger. It is, 
so to speak, on the front lines. But in an- 
other sense so are you on the front lines, 
and so are we on the front lines. 

Q. You do regard this as the area of great- 
est danger, Mr. Ball? 

A. I certainly do as far as the defense of 
Western Europe is concerned. It seems to 
us that we cannot cavalierly write off the 
danger which we have lived with ever since 
the war, namely, that there could be aggres- 
sion from the east. 

Q. Do you think, since so much is spoken 
about bringing China into the United Na- 
tions, that there is now occasion for bringing 
West Germany and indeed East Germany into 
the United Nations? 

A. On the question of bringing China into 
the United Nations, let me pose just one 
question for you. That is, do you believe, or 
do any of your countrymen believe, that dur- 
ing these last few weeks, when the United 
States and the Soviet Union have been pur- 
suing parallel courses in trying to bring 
about a cease-fire in the subcontinent, that 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


there could have been any constructive 
initiative adopted by the Security Council if 
Red China had been sitting in the seat of 
Nationalist China on the Security Council, 
ready to exercise its veto if anyone had put 
forward anything very useful or construc- 

Q. This is the old question, isn't it, Mr. 
Ball, of whether China's reaction jiidged on 
the China that is outside the United Na- 
tions would be the same as China's likely 
reactions if China were inside the United 
Nations? I do appreciate the point about 
the Chinese on the Himalayas, but never- 
theless they never took it to the extent of a 
shooting war and a serious intervention. 

A. I have some doubt as to instant and 
total conversion as applied to the influence 
of the United Nations on any one of its par- 

Q. So have I. 

A. But you raise a question about West 
Germany. I do think that it is inevitable 
that the German people will some day play 
a proper role in the United Nations and 
that this is a matter which your Govern- 
ment and my Government and other govern- 
ments must keep very much in mind. 

Q. Mr. Ball, finally — because our time is 
running out — could I return really to the 
point that I took up with you at the very 
beginning? In terms not just of the Ameri- 
can administration, but in terms of Ameri- 
can public opinion, do you think the United 
States is still so engaged in the problems of 
Europe and in the defense of Western Eu- 
rope as it was before these crises in Asia 
really blew up ? 

A. I think we still recognize the vital im- 
portance of the most intimate relationships 
between the United States and the nations 
of Western Europe for many reasons, not 
the most unimportant of which is the fact 
that between us we have about 80 percent 
of the industrial power of the free world 
and, therefore, command most of the effec- 
tive military strength and economic strength 
of the free world. We must use that 

strength together and we must use it for 
useful purposes, not only in Western Europe 
but around the world. 

There has been no diminution of American 
interest in Europe. This is one of the curi- 
ous myths that prevails from time to time. 
It is a mjrth in this case that is, I suppose, 
a reflection of the fact that we have had 
very serious preoccupations in southeastern 
Asia, just as you have very serious preoc- 
cupations with the problems of Malaysia. 
But the fact that we are very concerned 
about the developments in Southeast Asia 
does not mean at all that there has been 
any diminution or any flagging of our inter- 
ests in Europe, or any slackening of our 
conviction. The vitality of this relationship 
which we have is one which we could not 
afford, or you could not afford, to let be re- 
duced by time or circumstance. 

Q. Mr. Ball, thank you very much indeed. 
I have greatly enjoyed this chance of speak- 
ing with you. 

A. Thank you, Mr. Burnet. It is a pleas- 
ure for me, sir. 

Department To Hold Foreign Policy 
Conference for News Media 

Press release 237 dated October 8 

The Department of State will hold a 
National Foreign Policy Conference for Edi- 
tors and Broadcasters on October 28 and 29 
at Washington. 

The Secretary of State has extended invi- 
tations to editors and commentators of the 
daily and periodical press and the broad- 
casting industry in the 50 States and Puerto 

Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Under 
Secretary George W. Ball, Under Secretary 
for Economic Affairs Thomas C. Mann, 
Ambassador at Large W. Averell Harriman, 
Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy, and 
other high Government officials will address 
the conference. 

There will be opportunity for discussions 
in depth with senior officials in simultane- 



ous round-table sessions on the afternoon of 
October 28. Subjects to be covered in these 
sessions are the United Nations, Latin 
America, problems of developing countries, 
Africa, arms control, and problems of India 
and Pakistan. 

Plenary sessions will be held in the West 
Auditorium of the Department of State. 
The conference vi^ill be held under the 
"background only" ground rule. 

President Signs Immigration Bill; 
Offers Asylum to Cubans 

Remarks by President Johnson^ 

This bill that we sign today is not a rev- 
olutionary bill. It does not affect the lives 
of millions. It will not reshape the struc- 
ture of our daily lives, or really add im- 
portantly to either our wealth or our power. 

Yet it is still one of the most important 
acts of this Congress and of this adminis- 
tration. For it does repair a very deep and 
painful flaw in the fabric of American jus- 
tice. It corrects a cruel and enduring viTong 
in the conduct of the American nation. 

Speaker [John W.] McCormack and Con- 
gressman [Emanuel] Celler almost 40 years 
ago first pointed that out in their maiden 
speeches in the Congress. And this measure 
that we will sign today will really make us 
truer to ourselves both as a country and as a 
people. It will strengthen us in a hundred un- 
seen ways. 

I have come here to thank personally each 
Member of the Congress who labored so 
long and so valiantly to make this occasion 
come true today and to make this bill a 
reality . I cannot mention all their names for 
it would take much too long, but my 
gratitude and that of this nation belongs to 
the 89th Congress. 

We are indebted, too, to the vision of the 

" Made at Liberty Island, N.Y., on Oct. 3 when 
the President signed H.R. 2580, a bill to amend the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (White House 
press release (Liberty Island, N.Y.) dated Oct. 3; 
as-delivered text). 

late beloved President John Fitzgerald Ken- 
nedy and to the support given to this meas- 
ure by the then Attorney General and now 
Senator, Robert F. Kennedy. 

In the final days of consideration this bill 
had no more able champion than the pres- 
ent Attorney General, Nicholas Katzenbach, 
who, with New York's Emanuel Celler, and 
Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts, 
and Congressman [Michael A.] Feighan of 
Ohio, and Senator [A. S. Mike] Mansfield 
and Senator [Everett] Dirksen constituting 
the leadership in the Senate, and Senator 
[Jacob] Javits, helped to guide this bill to 
passage along vdth the help of the Members 
sitting in front of me today. 

This bill says simply that from this day 
forth those wishing to emigrate to America 
shall be admitted on the basis of their skills 
and their close relationship to those already 

This is a simple test, and it is a fair test. 
Those who can contribute most to this coun- 
try — to its growth, to its strength, to its 
spirit — will be the first that are admitted to 
this land. 

The fairness of this standard is so self- 
evident that we may well wonder that it 
has not always been applied. Yet the fact 
is that for over four decades the immigra- 
tion policy of the United States has been 
twisted and has been distorted by the harsh 
injustice of the national-origins quota 

Under that system the ability of new im- 
migrants to come to America depended 
upon the country of their birth. Only three 
countries were allowed to supply 70 percent 
of all the immigrants. Families were kept 
apart because a husband or a wife or a child 
had been born in the wrong place. Men of 
needed skill and talent were denied en- 
trance because they came from southern or 
eastern Europe or from one of the develop- 
ing continents. 

This system violated the basic principle of 
American democracy — the principle that 
values and rewards each man on the basis 
of his merit as a man. It has been un- 
American in the highest sense because it 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


has been untrue to the faith that brought 
thousands to these shores even before we 
were a country. 

Today, with my signature, this system is 
abolished. We can now believe that it will 
never again shadow the gate to the Amer- 
ican nation with the twin barriers of preju- 
dice and privilege. 

Our beautiful America was built by a na- 
tion of strangers. From a hundred different 
places or more, they have poured forth into 
an empty land, joining and blending in one 
mighty and irresistible tide. The land 
flourished because it was fed from so many 
sources, because it was nourished by so 
many cultures and traditions and peoples. 

And from this experience, almost unique 
in the history of nations, has come America's 
attitude toward the rest of the world. We, 
because of what we are, feel safer and 
stronger in a world as varied as the people 
who make it up — a world where no country 
rules another and all countries can deal 
with the basic problems of human dignity 
and deal with those problems in their own 

Now, under the monument which has wel- 
comed so many to our shores, the American 
nation returns to the finest of its traditions 

The days of unlimited immigration are 
past. But those who do come will come be- 
cause of what they are and not because of 
the land from which they sprung. 

When the earliest settlers poured into a 
wild continent, there was no one to ask them 
where they came from. The only question 
was: Were they sturdy enough to make the 
journey, were they strong enough to clear 
the land, were they enduring enough to make 
a home for freedom, and were they brave 
enough to die for liberty if it became neces- 
sary to do so ? 

And so it has been through all the great 
and testing moments of American history. 
This year we see in Viet-Nam men dying — 
men named Fernandez and Zajac and Ze- 
linko and Mariano and McCormick. Neither 
the enemy who killed them nor the people 
whose independence they have fought to 
save ever asked them where they or their 

parents came from. They were all Ameri- 
cans. It was for free men and for America 
that they gave their all, they gave their 
lives and selves. 

By eliminating that same question as a 
test for immigration the Congress proves 
ourselves worthy of those men and worthy 
of our owTi traditions as a nation. 

So it is in that spirit that I declare this 
afternoon to the people of Cuba that those 
who seek refuge here in America will find 
it. The dedication of America to our tradi- 
tions as an asylum for the oppressed is 
going to be upheld. 

I have directed the Departments of State 
and Justice and Health, Education, and Wel- 
fare to immediately make all the necessary 
arrangements to permit those in Cuba who 
seek freedom to make an orderly entry into 
the United States of America. 

Our first concern will be with those 
Cubans who have been separated from their 
children and their parents and their hus- 
bands and their wives that are now in this 
country. Our next concern is with those 
who are imprisoned for political reasons. 

And I will send to the Congress tomorrow 
a request for supplementary funds of $12,- 
600,000 to carry forth the commitment that 
I am making today. 

I am asking the Department of State to 
seek through the Swiss Government im- 
mediately the agreement of the Cuban gov- 
ernment in a request to the President of the 
International Red Cross Committee. The 
request is for the assistance of the Commit- 
tee in processing the movement of refugees 
from Cuba to Miami. Miami will serve as a 
port of entry and temporary stopping place 
for refugees as they settle in other parts of 
this country. 

And to all the voluntary agencies in the 
United States, I appeal for their continua- 
tion and expansion of their magnifi- 
cent work. Their help is needed in the re- 
ception and settlement of those who choose 
to leave Cuba. The Federal Government will 
work closely with these agencies in their 
tasks of charity and brotherhood. 

I want all the people of this great land of 
ours to know of the really enormous contri- 



bution which the compassionate citizens of 
Florida have made to humanity and to de- 
cency. And all States in this Union can join 
with Florida now in extending the hand of 
helpfulness and humanity to our Cuban 

The lesson of our times is sharp and clear 
in this movement of people from one land to 
another. Once again it stamps the mark of 
failure on a regime when many of its citizens 
voluntarily choose to leave the land of their 
birth for a more hopeful home in America. 
The future holds little hope for any govern- 
ment where the present holds no hope for 
the people. 

And so we Americans will welcome these 
Cuban people. For the tides of history run 
strong, and in another day they can return 
to their homeland to find it cleansed of 
terror and free from fear. 

Over my shoulder here you can see Ellis 
Island, whose vacant corridors echo today 
the joyous sounds of long-ago voices. And 
today we can all believe that the lamp of 
this grand old lady is brighter today, and 
the golden door that she guards gleams 
more brilliantly in the light of an increased 
liberty for the people from all the countries 
of the globe. 

OAS Informed of U.S. Move 
To Help Cuban Refugees 

statement by Ward P. Allen^ 

My delegation requested that this item 
be inscribed on the agenda in order to in- 
form the members of the Council of recent 
developments in a matter which is of great 
importance to all members of the Organiza- 
tion of American States. Not only do all of 
our governments have a common interest 
and responsibility in the general question 
of Cuba; we also have a special concern for 
the condition of the Cuban people, and so 

my Government wants to share our hopes 
and desires in helping the refugees. 

For more than 5 years we have all wit- 
nessed a steady outpouring of Cubans from 
their island home in search of freedom from 
an increasingly oppressive totalitarian re- 
gime. About 350,000 persons are estimated 
to have left Cuba for other lands. About 
270,000 of these are in the United States. 
In recent months these refugees have been 
arriving in this country alone at the rate of 
about 1,000 persons per month, including 
hundreds who have bravely chosen a dan- 
gerous escape by sea in small craft of all 
sizes and descriptions. 

In most, if not all, of the other countries 
here represented, the thousands of Cuban 
exiles have found refuge. We are all aware 
of the human suffering, the broken homes, 
the bewildered children which are the bit- 
ter fruits of this massive movement. Never 
before has this hemisphere been faced with 
a similar situation of such tragic magnitude. 

On September 28 Premier Castro an- 
nounced in a speech in Havana that Cubans 
with relatives in the United States who 
wished to leave Cuba would be permitted to 
do so. He made reference to the small fish- 
ing port of Camarioca as a possible gather- 
ing place and point of departure. He men- 
tioned October 10th as a date when such de- 
partures might be permitted. 

On September 30 the Department of State 
referred to Premier Castro's apparent offer .^ 

' Made before the Council of the Organization of 
American States at Washington on Oct. 6. Mr. Allen 
is Alternate U.S. Representative to the Council. 

' On Sept. 30 the following statement was read to 
news correspondents by Robert J. McCloskey, Direc- 
tor of the Office of News: 

"A study of the text of the speech [by Premier 
Castro] shows that the so-called proposal on the 
exit from Cuba of relatives of Cuban exiles in the 
United States is vague and ambiguous. The terms 
of the proposal and the form and tone in which it 
was presented raise doubts about its seriousness. 
In keeping with its humanitarian traditions, and its 
record of having given refuge and assistance to 
more than a quarter million Cubans who have fled 
from the island and who continue to enter this 
country, the United States has been and continues 
to be concerned about the problem of reuniting Cu- 
ban families. At the same time it is concerned about 

Continued on p. 66U 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


which to us seemed vague and ambiguous in 
various respects, and suggested that if he 
was indeed serious the United States was 
prepared to receive and carefully consider 
any proposal presented through diplomatic 
channels. Later this same day Premier 
Castro issued a formal statement in which 
he declared his offer to be serious and sug- 
gested that this Government communicate 
through the representatives of its interests 
in Cuba for whatever information it desired. 

On October 3 President Johnson in his ad- 
dress at the Statue of Liberty* declared that 
those Cubans who seek refuge here will find 
it. In the interest of a just, humane, and 
orderly movement of such persons he indi- 
cated that our first concern will be with 
those Cubans who have been separated from 
children, parents, and husbands and wives 
now in this country. "Our next concern," he 
said, "is with those who are imprisoned for 
political reasons." 

President Johnson also stated our inten- 
tion of seeking the agreement of the Cuban 
government in a request to the International 
Committee of the Red Cross for its assist- 
ance in processing the movement of refugees 
from Cuba to Miami. This interest was for- 
mally made known to the government of 
Cuba by the Swiss Embassy in a note de- 
livered on October 4. 

Prior to the presentation of this note. 
Premier Castro, in his speech given the 
night of October 3, appeared to reject the 
idea of such a request to the ICRC. It is our 
belief that this may have been due to a mis- 
understanding on his part of the role which 
is envisaged for the ICRC in a movement of 
persons of this kind. With its world-re- 

Continued from p. 66S 

the grave risks which persons escaping from Cuba 
by small boat encounter from preventive measures 
by the Cuban government. 

"If the Cuban regime sincerely shares these con- 
cerns, and if it has any serious official proposal to 
make, there are diplomatic channels readily avail- 
able to it. Any such proposal would be given most 
careful consideration by this Government in the light 
of applicable United States laws and regulations." 

' For text, see p. 661. 

nowned reputation for impartiality and dedi- 
cation to humanitarian values, its broad ex- 
perience in similar situations, and its staff 
of trained officers, the ICRC, we believe, 
could render great service to both countries 
in this complex and pressing matter. We 
continue to hope that the Cuban government 
will reconsider its apparently negative at- 

It is not possible at this time to estimate 
with any degree of accuracy the dimensions 
of this problem in terms of numbers of 
persons. We know that it concerns many 
thousands. In the United States alone there 
are large numbers of unaccompanied chil- 
dren, thousands of separated spouses, and 
otherwise divided families. It is our hope 
that the government of Cuba may permit 
persons in these categories to be the first 
to depart, and that this can be done in an 
orderly fashion which will enable them to 
travel in safety and permit them to be re- 
ceived and cared for in a suitable manner. 
Actions which we might take in this field 
involving transportation will, of course, be 
in full accord with the Final Act of the 
Ninth Meeting of Consultation of Foreign 
Ministers, in which it is resolved that all 
maritime transportation between the Amer- 
ican states and Cuba shall be severed except 
for transportation necessary for humani- 
tarian reasons.* 

In conclusion, I should like, first, to extend 
on behalf of my Government to all other 
member countries represented in this Coun- 
cil a warm invitation to participate with us 
in this humanitarian task. For the fate of 
all the Cuban people is our common concern, 
the sheltering of those in exile a common 
privilege. Secondly, I wish to state that my 
Government would be pleased to receive 
from the member governments the names 
of Cubans in their countries who are sepa- 
rated from immediate family members liv- 
ing in Cuba, in the event it should prove 
possible for these families to be reunited in 
your countries. 

■4 For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 10, 1964, p. 179. 



Commercial Policy at the Crossroads 

by W. Michael Blumenthal 

Deputy Special Representative for Trade Negotiations ^ 

For most of you here today, international 
trade is your business — and your livelihood. 
I therefore particularly welcome this oppor- 
tunity to meet with you. For I believe an 
intimate day-to-day contact with trade and 
traders is the surest way of understanding 
what is at stake when we speak of trade 
liberalization or the threat of a resurgent 
protectionism. International traders best 
realize the variety of efficiently produced 
commodities that commerce provides to the 
consumer; they best understand the degree 
of support our purchases abroad provide to 
the new and developing countries; and they 
are most aware of the constant exchange of 
knowledge and ideas that is stimulated by 
the exchange of products. No one is more 
acutely conscious of the problems between 
nations — nor is any other group more firmly 
convinced that understanding and coopera- 
tion are a necessity in our constantly shrink- 
ing world. 

Today I invite you to join me in a stock- 
taking of our commercial policy : What have 
been our accomplishments? What are we 
doing at present? What new problems will 
we face tomorrow? What is the direction of 
trade relations in the world ? 

The nadir of the world's trading relations 
followed the shock of the Great Depression. 
Frustration and the helplessness of conven- 
tional thinking strengthened the hand of 
those advocating protection at any cost. 

' Address made before the National Council of 
American Importers at New York, N.Y., on Sept. 

And the cost, as might be expected, was a 
corresponding loss of export markets and a 
further decline of hard-pressed export in- 
dustries. The highest tariff in our history 
was implemented in 1930, with predictable 
effect: Whereas world industrial produc- 
tion by 1936 was 11 percent higher than the 
1929 level, the volume of world trade still 
lagged 15 percent below the 1929 level. 

The protectionist philosophy of the era 
could be summed up by the proverbial peti- 
tion of French candlestick makers in the 
19th century : 

We are subjected to the intolerable competition 
of a foreign rival, who enjoys such superior facili- 
ties for the production of light that he can inundate 
our national market at reduced price. This rival is 
no other than the sun. Our petition is to pass a law 
shutting up all windows, openings, and fissures 
through which the light of the sun is used to 
penetrate our dwellings, to the prejudice of the 
profitable produce we have been enabled to bestow 
on the country. 

If any good emerged from the "beggar 
my neighbor" commercial diplomacy of the 
early thirties, it was the realization that 
there were not only the textbook "gains" 
from increased trade but also some very 
painful "losses" to industry and employ- 
ment from a substantial decline in trade. 
The pioneering efforts of Cordell Hull dem- 
onstrated and convinced a hesitant nation 
that a liberal trade policy, aimed at reduc- 
ing trade barriers to imports as well as 
exports, would ultimately produce the great- 
est gain to the greatest number of Amer- 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


Our commercial policy over the past three 
decades has been to implement just such a 
policy. An established body of principles, 
agreed to by virtually all major trading 
nations, under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade (GATT), has enabled us 
to systematically reduce and eliminate a 
wide range of tariff and other trade bar- 
riers. The average of all dutiable U.S. im- 
ports has been lowered from a high of 59.1 
percent in 1932 to 26.4 percent in 1946, and 
to less than 12 percent today. The reduction 
in the duty levels of other countries has 
been hardly less spectacular. And the Ken- 
nedy Round negotiations in Geneva are 
aimed at further reductions based on a 
general rule of a 50-percent across-the- 
board cut in existing duties. 

But trade liberalization has not been 
limited to tariff reduction: Exchange con- 
trol has been virtually abolished for major 
industrial countries; quantitative restric- 
tions have been relaxed or done away with; 
and regional free trade in the European 
Economic Community and the European 
Free Trade Association has demonstrated 
the gains from closer economic cooperation. 

Trade, as might be expected, has in- 
creased hand in hand with the lowering of 
these barriers. World exports, presently 
over $170 billion annually, have tripled 
since 1948, and U.S. exports over the same 
period have more than doubled despite re- 
cent competition from previously war- 
devastated exporting nations. 

Problem Areas in World Trade 

We can, therefore, be proud of our past 
achievements. No matter how we look at it, 
the overall expansion of trade is impressive. 
If this optimism seems paradoxical when 
we follow the debate of discontent by the 
less developed countries in the newly formed 
United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), or the tedious 
and protracted agricultural discussions in 
the GATT, it can be explained very simply: 
Our success has been very uneven. Reduc- 
tion of tariffs and other direct barriers to 

trade has received primary attention, and 
active participation has generally been lim- 
ited to the advanced industrial nations. It 
is not surprising that almost half of total 
world trade is among industrial nations, 
while exports of the less developed countries 
(LDC's) are concentrated in a relatively 
small number of raw materials and basic 
foodstuffs. Only some 6 percent of world 
trade is accounted for by trade of the many 
nonindustrial countries amongst each other. 

Thus, it is our success which is revealing 
our weaknesses. As tariffs are progressively 
reduced, the restrictive effect of other non- 
tariff barriers becomes more evident. As 
trade in industrial products continues to 
expand, the lag in trade liberalization for 
agricultural products is made more appar- 
ent. As the economies of industrial coun- 
tries are drawn into closer harmony, the 
need for creating a durable and progressive 
trading relationship with the less developed 
countries becomes more urgent. 

Looking ahead to the issues that these 
contrasts pose, let me elaborate on five sep- 
arate trade problems which will be facing 
us in coming years and comment on how we 
might deal with them. 

Nontariff Barriers 

The first of these categories is what has 
come to be known as "nontariff barriers." 
This is a catchall name covering direct 
quantitative restrictions and the numerous 
legal and administrative regulations which 
tend to discriminate against imported prod- 

As we are discovering in the Kennedy 
Round, all nations have some nontariff 
barriers which are noxious to the export 
interest of others. European road taxes, in 
general, discriminate against North Ameri- 
can type vehicles ; licensing requirements are 
often excessively burdensome; and the ASP 
[American selling price] system of valuation 
for benzenoid chemicals, as you are prob- 
ably well aware, is particularly troublesome 
for foreign exporters to the U.S. market. 
Antidumping regulations and government 



purchasing practices are problem areas com- 
mon to all trading nations but differ widely 
from country to country. 

In many cases American procedures and 
regulations are more explicit than those 
abroad, making us in a way more vulner- 
able to criticism and complaint. But just 
because a country does not have a "buy 
American act" on the statutes does not 
mean that government purchasing is free 
from discrimination against imports. On 
the contrary, the principal difficulty for 
U.S. exporters is often the lack of any well- 
defined procedure or legal recourse. There is 
much uncertainty and no assurance against 
arbitrary decisions favoring domestic inter- 

Nontariff barriers are in general more 
subtly contrived and more firmly embedded 
in a country's legal structure than tariff 
levies. They are therefore more difficult to 
remove, even when it is recognized to be of 
mutual advantage to do so. Negotiating au- 
thority often does not permit removal or 
reduction of nontariff barriers. A necessary 
balancing of concessions between countries 
is also difficult if not impossible to demon- 
strate with such varied forms of trade 
restrictions. Cooperation in finding solu- 
tions and demonstrable quid pro quo, how- 
ever defined, are prerequisite to real prog- 
ress in reducing this type of trade barrier. 
It is our task in the Kennedy Round and 
elsewhere to accomplish such balanced 

Trade in Agricultural Products 

Another major problem area is trade in 
agricultural products. It is interesting that, 
with limited exceptions, the same GATT 
rules apply to both agricultural and indus- 
trial products. This is so because there is a 
direct connection between the two sectors in 
the bargaining of reductions in trade bar- 
riers. Countries such as Australia, Canada, 
Denmark, and New Zealand, with vital 
trade interests in agricultural products, 
would find little meaning in trade negotia- 
tions which do not consider agricultural and 

industrial products together. As regards the 
United States, about one-quarter of both 
our total exports and our total imports are 
farm products and we have also made it 
clear time and again that a successful Ken- 
nedy Round must include a significant 
widening of export markets for farm prod- 

Experience, however, has taught us that 
for many agricultural products the condi- 
tions for international trade are far more 
complicated than for nonagricultural prod- 
ucts. There are domestic support programs 
which frequently have import restrictions 
tied to them. Surpluses often receive export 
subsidies. And the rapid advances in tech- 
nology and productivity put extra pressure 
on governments to ease adjustment in the 
domestic farm sector at the expense of im- 

The cumulative effect of these circum- 
stances has produced two significant re- 
sults. First, gaps between low-cost and 
high-cost producers have gradually wid- 
ened. Barley, for example, the principal 
European feed grain, is marketed for 
roughly 90 cents per bushel in Canada 
versus over $2 per bushel in West Germany ; 
poultry meat selling at 25-30 cents per 
pound in the United States is about double 
that price in Switzerland and the Common 

Second, the possibility for negotiating 
meaningful reduction of trade barriers and 
greater access for lower cost imports has 
been frustrated in quite a number of coun- 
tries by the complex and deep-rooted nature 
of existing regulations. In some European 
countries, recent years have shown a tend- 
ency in the direction of greater rather than 
less restriction for trade in agricultural 
products. The highly publicized "chicken 
war" is a glaring example of this tendency. 

The United States, as a highly efficient 
low-cost agricultural producer, has gener- 
ally maintained a liberal trading policy in 
the agricultural sector. For over half of our 
farm production, we have no support pro- 
gram. Only six products are subject to 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


quota restriction. We have consistently 
made mutual tariff reductions for agricul- 
tural products in the past, and we are will- 
ing to do it again. 

The potential gains from trade are obvi- 
ous and substantial for most farm prod- 
ucts. The question collapses to a realization 
and acceptance by major trading nations of 
these mutual benefits through a genuinely 
outward-looking trade policy. 

Failure to implement such policies, on the 
other hand, constitutes a real danger. A 
movement toward greater autarky and 
higher protection for agriculture will in- 
evitably have its impact on other sectors of 
trade as well. This danger is today the 
greatest single threat to our overall trade 
liberalization program. It requires the 
watchful attention and imagination of lead- 
ers in all countries to seek a basis for 
insuring the maintenance and expansion of 
agricultural trade and to avert the conse- 
quences of a lapse into greater restriction 
and reduced trade for these products. 

Commodity Trade 

A third area of concern is "commodity 
trade" — the raw materials and basic food- 
stuffs which are not only essential imports 
for industrial countries but are often the 
economic backbone of the exporting coun- 
tries. Colombia, for example, depends on 
coffee for 70 percent of its export earnings ; 
cocoa constitutes 60 percent of Ghana's ex- 
ports; and Malaysia receives over 50 per- 
cent of its export earnings from rubber. 

The vulnerability of export economies 
from this heavy dependence on one or two 
commodities is further aggravated by the 
highly price-sensitive world markets for 
these products, through resulting price in- 
stability and protracted periods of de- 
pressed prices. 

The United States recognizes that wide 
price fluctuations or a steady downward 
slide of commodity prices is harmful to 
international trade — and especially disrup- 
tive to the development plans of many 
low-income countries. To avoid these tend- 
encies, we have actively participated in 

certain international commodity agree- 
ments and, most recently, taken the initia- 
tive in helping to negotiate a world agree- 
ment for coffee. We have also expressed a 
willingness to study proposals to stabilize 
markets for other commodities such as 
cocoa, cotton, and sugar. 

The commodity agreements attempted 
thus far have helped to stabilize prices in 
the short run. They have also sought to in- 
fluence the longer run adjustment of supply 
to the general level of demand. This double- 
edged effect is, in fact, the key to under- 
standing the nature of successful market 
stabilization: A realistic and fair range of 
prices can only be achieved if internal re- 
forms on the part of producing countries 
are able to maintain production levels in 
approximate balance with demand. Contin- 
ued surpluses on world markets will eventu- 
ally cause any international program to fall 
apart. Circumstances vary greatly from one 
commodity to another, but structural ad- 
justment of world production in response to 
the changing patterns of consumption and 
trade underlies all commodity problems. 

Trade Between "Rich" and "Poor" Countries 

A fourth problem area, which to some 
degree overlaps the previous ones, is trade 
between the rich industrial countries and 
the poorer, less developed countries. I have 
used the words "rich" and "poor" purposely 
because this is a key to understanding the 
question of development. Economic develop- 
ment means, to a large extent, investment — 
and many less developed countries are 
simply too poor to generate internally the 
necessary capital to build an industrial 
base. Foreign exchange limitations are 
often the controlling factor in determining 
the importation of capital equipment and 
other basic needs of a developing economy, 
and almost 90 percent of the foreign ex- 
change accumulated by developing coun- 
tries comes from export earnings. Greater 
access for the exports of these countries not 
only provides the means for larger imports 
from industrial countries but enables their 
economies to break out of the vicious cycle 



of poverty and enter into a prosperous pe- 
riod of self-sustained growth. 

Greater access for LDC exports has been 
espoused by virtually all governments. The 
new United Nations body, UNCTAD, is 
testimony of this intent. The means of at- 
taining this goal, however, have not 
achieved any similar measure of unanimity. 
The most publicized form of export stim- 
ulus for LDC's is probably the tariff-prefer- 
ence issue. LDC's generally and some de- 
veloped countries have supported, with 
varying degrees of enthusiasm, the proposi- 
tion that tariffs should discriminate in 
favor of LDC's — that exports of these 
countries should face duties lower than the 
most-favored-nation (MFN) rates applying 
generally among the more advanced coun- 

The allure of this general proposition 
tarnishes, though, when we try to answer 
more specific questions. Which countries 
would qualify for such preferences? Will 
preferences distinguish between relatively 
"least" developed countries and other "less" 
developed ones? Which commodities are to 
be included? How long will preferences 
last? Will preferences necessitate other 
types of import restriction such as quota 
limitation? What will be the actual trade 
effect of a given set of preferences ? 

The more these questions are discussed, 
the more apparent it becomes that prefer- 
ences could become a serious handicap to 
the prosperous development of the exports 
of LDC's. We have yet to be convinced that 
any proposal for temporary tariff prefer- 
ences will be more effective than our pres- 
ent policy of seeking maximum MFN tariff 
reductions for products of particular trade 
interest to these countries. 

There is one aspect of export expansion 
for LDC's which I feel has not received 
adequate attention. This is trade promotion 
per se. There is a need for technical assist- 
ance in the art of salesmanship and market 
development. The GATT has recently estab- 
lished an International Trade Center in 
Geneva for this purpose. The great burden 
of responsibility in this area, however, lies 

with the experienced traders in developed 
areas — such as yourselves. It is important 
that you seek out efficient producers in the 
less developed parts of the world and en- 
courage them to overcome the inertia of 
parochialism and make the hurdle into an 
export-oriented operation. 

East-West Trade 

The last point I would like to raise is a 
problem which we are just beginning to 
come to grips with, namely, East>-West 

This is an area in which our own partici- 
pation has been minimal. Aside from ship- 
ments of foodstuffs to Poland under Public 
Law 480 and our commercial exports of 
grain to the Soviet Union early in 1964, the 
United States has normally been exporting 
not more than about $100 million worth of 
goods per year to the Soviet bloc. 

Some years ago the rate of expansion in 
East-West trade was high and there were 
expectations among many Western industri- 
alists that the historic prewar volume of 
East-West trade might soon be fully re- 
trieved and even exceeded. This hope has 
not been borne out in fact. The Soviet bloc 
has yet to develop a general sales capability 
in Western markets commensurate with its 
own present state of economic development. 

Two fundamental reasons explain, to a 
large extent, the failure of East-West trade 
to develop in a more dynamic way. In the 
first place, exports from the Soviet bloc to 
the West consist mainly of commodities and 
raw materials for which supply is growing 
ever tighter in relation to domestic require- 
ments within the Soviet bloc, or for which 
Western demand is no longer expansive. 
The U.S.S.R., one of the world's largest in- 
dustrial nations, exports less than $15 mil- 
lion per year to the West in machinery and 

The second reason for the difficulty in 
developing East-West trade lies more in the 
institutional field. If they are to participate 
normally in the world trading community, 
the Communist nations will have to open up 
their markets more effectively to Western 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


competition, permitting freer Western ac- 
cess to their real buyers. They will have to 
permit multilateralization of their trade in 
ways which they have never permitted be- 
fore. To this end, they will need to find 
means for making their currencies accept- 
ably convertible and to move toward more 
realistic pricing and costing systems. 

There are some grounds for optimism 
about gradual movement in this direction. 
The economic reforms which are being in- 
troduced in most of the Eastern European 
countries may well lead eventually to revi- 
sions in their approaches to international 
trade. The trend toward decentralization of 
decisionmaking may also cause interna- 
tional trade opportunities to be considered 
more freely and to be dealt with more 

Another sign for optimism is the appar- 
ent rising interest of some Eastern Euro- 
pean nations in the institutional structure 
which supports the expansion of interna- 
tional trade and economic relations among 
the free-world market economies. The Soviet 
Union adhered this spring to the Interna- 
tional Patent Convention.^ Poland has asked 
for a closer form of association with the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. 
And in business relations with privately 
owned firms of Western Europe, the Com- 
munist countries are showing a willingness 
to experiment with new forms of economic 
association knov^m as "joint ventures." 

These signs seem to point in the direction 
of a more flexible approach in trade rela- 
tions between East and West. This point of 
view has been recognized in a growing con- 
sensus of opinion in the United States as 

For East>-West trade, the rigidities of the 
present need not necessarily persist indef- 
initely into the future. Under present cir- 
cumstances there is hope that, in time, a 
more stable basis will develop for mutually 
advantageous trade between East and West. 

Meeting the Challenges of the Future 

These are the challenges that are facing 
us in the field of commercial policy. For our 
part, it is necessary that these challenges be 
met with wisdom, determination, and a 
well-coordinated program for action. 

Outlining these problems should also 
make it easier to understand what we are 
presently trying to accomplish. In Geneva 
we are engaged in the most ambitious ef- 
fort for trade liberalization ever undertaken 
— the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations. 
For industrial products, we are seeking a 
multilateral reduction of all tariffs by 50 
percent across the board, with only a bare 
minimum of exceptions subject to careful 
justification and scrutiny by other partici- 
pating countries. For agricultural products, 
in accordance with the ministerial resolu- 
tion of May 1963, our objective is "accept- 
able conditions of access to world markets 
... in furtherance of a significant develop- 
ment and expansion of world trade. . . ."^ 

To achieve this, we have been discussing 
not only direct trade barriers but all of the 
elements of domestic support and regulation 
affecting international trade. In May of 
this year, 12 nations exchanged proposals 
for an international grains agreement. And 
today, September 16, marks another im- 
portant step forward, with the presentation 
in Geneva of comprehensive and specific 
offers for trade liberalization in the agri- 
cultural sector. We are today making the 
most attractive offer to reduce farm trade 
barriers the United States has ever tabled 
in 30 years of trade negotiations.* Our offer 
is substantial in coverage and is based on 
the far-reaching authority contained in the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962. 

The significance of today's action is not, 
however, limited to the substance it gives to 
our stated objective for agricultural trade. 
The initiative taken by the United States in 

° For background, see Bulletin of May 17, 1965, 
p. 758. 

" For text, see ibid., June 24, 1963, p. 995. 

' For a statement by Christian A. Herter, Special 
Representative for Trade Negotiations, on Aug. 19, 
see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 452. 



maintaining the agreed schedule for agri- 
cultural offers also underlines the confi- 
dence and determination we continue to 
have in an early and successful conclusion 
of these negotiations. 

But the Kennedy Round aims at progress 
in other directions as well. The difficult 
non-tariff-barrier field is being discussed 
multilaterally with the expectation that 
mutual concessions can also be achieved in 
this sector. Special effort has been made to 
give maximum tariff reductions to the ex- 
ports of the developing countries. In par- 
ticular, the requirements of fully reciprocal 
concessions have been waived in their case. 
Finally, certain East European nations 
wish to participate in the Kennedy Round, 
and we are seeking means to actively en- 
gage these countries in the negotiations. 

We have had our share of frustration and 
delay in the Kennedy Round. Success in 
such complex and far-reaching matters is 
seldom quick or easy. But we have also made 
substantial progress, and there is every hope 
that the Kennedy Round will result in a 
significant advance toward trade liberaliza- 
tion. It is in the mutual interest of all of 
the participating countries to make the 
Kennedy Round succeed. 

However sanguine we may be, it would 
be overly optimistic to believe that the Ken- 
nedy Round will put everything right. 
These negotiations are one further step 
along the upward path of international co- 
operation in trade matters. The summit has 
yet to be conquered. Yet I see the Kennedy 
Round as the critical crossroad for our com- 
mercial policy; the alternative to a gen- 
uinely successful Kennedy Round would 
spell disillusion for many and could well 
herald a new era of protectionism and in- 
ward-looking skepticism for world trade. 

Looking back over the past three decades 
we can be justly proud of our achievements 
in expanding international trade to benefit 
all nations. Looking ahead to the next three 
decades, we are faced with new and equally 
challenging problems to surmount. We are 
now at the crossroads. The negotiations 

and decisions in coming months will set the 
precedent and spirit for our future course. 
It is incumbent on us, both within Govern- 
ment and without, to meet this challenge. 

We may speak with pride of our past 
achievements, but we dare not risk being 
complacent about the future. As in all fields 
of human endeavor, having the right goals 
is not sufficient. Our goals must be pursued 
with vigor, wisdom, and the courage to act 
in the national interest. 

You who are dedicated to furthering our 
nation's commerce share in this challenge 
as you share in our nation's achievements. 
All of us here today can commit ourselves to 
the proposition clearly put by President 
Johnson when he said : ^ 

"If we are to live together in peace, we 
must know each other better. . . . there is 
no better way to come to know each other 
than to engage in peaceful and profitable 
commerce together." 

President Authorizes IVIedicai 
Science Program Witii Japan 


White House press release dated October 2 

President Johnson announced on October 2 
the start of a United States-Japan Coopera- 
tive Medical Science Program. This joint re- 
search program, designed to pool the knowl- 
edge and resources of the two countries in 
fighting major diseases affecting the people 
of Asia, developed out of discussions be- 
tween the President and Prime Minister 
[Eisaku] Sato of Japan last January.^ 

Initial plans for the medical science pro- 
gram were made last April at a prelim- 
inary meeting of U.S. and Japanese sci- 
entists.2 The delegates at that time called 

^Ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 101. 
^ Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 133. 
" For background, see ibid., May 3, 1965, p. 667, 
and May 17, 1965, p. 761. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


for an early October meeting of a Commit- 
tee for the United States-Japan Cooperative 
Medical Science Program. The Committee, 
which is to meet annually, will use panels of 
scientific experts from both countries to de- 
velop plans for research efforts in each of 
the disease categories selected for study 
under the program. 

In planning the cooperative research at- 
tack, the conferees agreed to concentrate 
initially on those disease problems where 
United States-Japanese joint effort can best 
be expected to produce quick benefits: 
cholera, tuberculosis, leprosy, certain virus 
diseases, and parasitic diseases (primarily 
schistosomiasis and filariasis). The impor- 
tant problem of malnutrition will receive the 
foremost attention of the meeting of the 
Committee in October. 

This program is authorized by a Presi- 
dential delegation of authority under the 
International Health Research Act of 1960. 
Foreign policy guidance will be provided by 
the Department of State. 


White House press release dated October 2 

Honorable John W. Gardner 

Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare 

Washington, D. C. 20201 

October 2, 1965 

Dear Mr. Secretary : Pursuant to the au- 
thority vested in the President by section 
5(f) of the International Health Research 
Act of 1960 (PL 86-610) , you are authorized 
to undertake a joint United States-Japan 
medical research program. This program, 
designed to pool the knowledge and re- 
sources of the two countries in fighting 
major diseases affecting the people of Asia, 
results from the discussions which I had 
with Prime Minister Sato in January. It is 
known as the United States-Japan Coopera- 
tive Medical Science Program. 

The program responsibility assigned to 
you hereby will be administered within the 
limits of foreign policy as prescribed by the 
Secretary of State. 

I am pleased with this opportunity for the 
United States to participate with Japan in 
the joint solution of health problems which 
will have worldwide benefits. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

Scholars and U.S. Officials 
Discuss Hemisphere Affairs 

Jack H. Vaughn, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs and U.S. 
Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, 
announced on October 8 (press release 238) 
a 2-day series of informal discussions be- 
tween U.S. scholars in Latin American af- 
fairs and U.S. Government officials con- 
cerned with hemisphere policies. The dis- 
cussions were held October 9 and 10 at Air- 
lie House near Warrenton, Va. 

The meetings were sponsored by Educa- 
tion and World Affairs, an independent edu- 
cational organization devoted to interna- 
tional activities of colleges and universities. 
Some 25 scholars met vdth high U.S. offi- 
cials representing the White House, the De- 
partment of State (including the Agency 
for International Development), the Peace 
Corps, and the U.S. Information Agency. 

The meeting was expected to be the open- 
ing exchange of what is intended to become 
a continuous communication of information 
and ideas between the academic community 
and the Government on relations with the 
nations of Latin America. 

Professor Carl Spaeth of Stanford Uni- 
versity was chairman of the 2-day discus- 
sions. The sessions were informal and off 
the record, with no proceedings or report to 
be issued. 

Following are the members of the aca- 
demic community scheduled to attend the 
sessions : 

Richard Adams, Institute of Latin American Stud- 
ies, University of Texas 
John P. Augelli, University of Kansas, geography 
Russell Davis, Harvard University, education 
Carl Djerassi, Stanford University, chemistry 



Joseph Grunwald, Brookings Institution, economics 
Frederick Harbison, Princeton University, eco- 
Albert O. Hirschman, Harvard University, eco- 
Allan R. Holmberg', Cornell University, sociologry 
John B. Howard, Ford Foundation 
John J. Johnson, Stanford University, political 

science and history 
Joseph A. Kahl, Washington University, social 

Merle Kling, Washington University, political 

Edwin Lieuwin, University of New Mexico, 

David E. Lilienthal, Education and World Affairs 
Richard Morse, Yale University, history 
Stefan H. Robock, Indiana University, economics 
Charles Savage, Massachusetts Institute of Tech- 
nology, economics 
Theodore W. Schultz, University of Chicagro 
Kalman Silvert, Dartmouth University 
Carl Spaeth, Stanford University 
Kenneth Thompson, Rockefeller Foundation 
Raymond Vernon, Harvard University 
Herman B Wells, Indiana University 
Harry Wilhelm, Ford Foundation 
Bryce Wood, Social Science Research Council, 
social science 


President Sends Congress Reports 
on Cultural and Exhibits Programs 


White House prees release dated October 6 

To the Congress of the United States: 

Pursuant to the provisions of the Mutual 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Act of 
1961 (Public Law 87-256), I am transmit- 
ting the annual report on the International 
Educational and Cultural Exchange Pro- 
gram for the Fiscal Year 1964. 

This report suggests something of the 
experience of life in other lands which 
students, teachers, professors, lecturers, re- 

search scholars, performing artists, athletes 
and coaches, foreign leaders, writers, judges, 
doctors — indeed the whole company of the 
adventurous, the skilled, the searching — 
have shared with their counterparts abroad, 
since the exchange programs began two 
decades ago. 

In those twenty years they have become 
an established part of our commitment to 
international understanding. That commit- 
ment is expressed through Congressional 
action, through the voluntary efforts of 
thousands of individual citizens, through 
our universities and colleges, and through 
national and local community organizations 
all across the country. 

I commend the report to the thoughtful 
scrutiny of the Congress. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, October 6, 1965. 


White House press release dated October 6 

To the Congress of the United States: 

1 am transmitting the Second Annual 
Report on Special International Exhibi- 
tions, for the fiscal year 1964, pursuant to 
section 108 (b) of Public Law 87-256, the 
Mutual Educational and Cultural Exchange 
Act of 1961. 

This program is designed to reveal to 
peoples abroad the true nature and broad 
extent of our economic, social, and cultural 
attainments. These exhibitions are also de- 
signed to advance mutually profitable trade 

This American know-how is presented to 
show how it harmonizes with the host 
country's own aspirations and capabilities. 
This is done by presenting major U.S. ex- 
hibitions at selected international fairs and 
expositions, or as special events, in support 
of American foreign-policy objectives. 

This program concentrates mainly in 
Eastern Europe and the developing coun- 
tries. Hundreds of American business and 
industrial firms, private institutions, and 
individuals cooperated with government 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


agencies and contributed materials, time, 
and talent to help insure the success of these 

For people who yearn to learn more about 
us, the American pavilion is like a large 
picture window through which they can 
look and see for themselves. The steady 
stream of young and old, from all walks of 
life, flocking to our exhibitions to improve 
their knowledge of what America is and 

means is a sight not easily forgotten. 

These exhibitions are a vital adjunct to 
our country's unceasing pursuit of peace, 
freedom and human dignity for men every- 
where. I am gratified by the support the 
Congress has given this program since it 
began a decade ago. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, October 6, 1965. 


Calendar of International Conferences^ 

In Recess as of October 1, 1965 

Conference of the 18-Nation Committee on Disarmament (re- 
cessed Sept. 16, 1965). 


Mar. 14, 1962- 

Scheduled October Through December 1965 

International Conference of the Red Cross : 20th Session . . 

International Symposium on Water Desalination .... 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Non-Governmental Organiza- 

ECE Inland Transport Committee: Plenary Session . . . 

ECE Preparatory Group of Experts: 4th Meeting of Senior 
Economic Advisers. 

GATT Committee on Budget, Finance, and Administration . 

GATT Working Party on Arab Common Market 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: Committee on Gen- 
era] Principles. 

International Council for the Exploration of the Sea: 53d 
Annual Meeting. 

UNHCR Executive Committee: 15th Session 

ECE Colloquium on Housing for Elderly 

Vienna . . . 
Washington . 
New York . 

. Oct. 2-9 
. Oct. 3-9 
. Oct. 4-5 

Geneva . . 
Geneva . . 

. Oct. 4-6 
. Oct. 4-6 

Geneva . . 
Geneva . . 
Paris . . . 

. Oct. 4-8 
. Oct. 4-8 
. Oct. 4-9 

Rome . . . 

. . Oct. 4-13 

Geneva . . 
Belgium . . 

. . Oct. 4-15 
. . Oct. 4-15 

1 This schedule, v?hich was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Sept. 30, 1965, 
lists international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the 
period October-December 1965. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and 
meetings. Persons interested in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, 
compiled by the Library of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Gov- 
ernment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protec- 
tion of Industrial and Intellectual Property; CCITT, Comite consultatif international telegraphique 
et telephonique ; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Economic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic Commission for Europe; ECLA, 
Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social Council; FAO, Food and 
Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, International Atomic 
Energy Agency; ICAO, International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Com- 
mittee for European Migration; ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental 
Maritime Consultative Organization; ITU, International Telecommunication Union; OECD, Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; U.N., 
United Nations; UNCTAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNHCR, United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; WMO, World Meteorological Organi- 



ILO Tripartite Technical Meeting on Hotels, Restaurants, Geneva . 

and Similar Establishments. 

WMO Regional Association II (Asia) : 4th Session .... Tehran 

WMO Commission for Instruments and Methods of Observa- Tokyo . . 

tion: 4th Session. 

ICAO Regional Air Navigation Control /Communication: Geneva . 

Limited Middle East Meeting. 

OECD Working Party on Policies in Regional Development . Paris . . 

The Hague Conference on International Private Law: Special The Hague 

Commission on Divorce, Legal Separation, and Nullity of 


OECD Committee for Invisible Transactions Paris . 

OECD Working Party on Short-Term Prospects Paris . 

OECD Conference on Sanitary Regulations Affecting Inter- Paris . 

national Trade in Livestock and Meat. 

ECE Timber Committee Geneva 

GATT Working Group on Commodity Problems Geneva 

IMCO Working Party on Intact Stability of Ships: 5th London 


Intergovernmental Committee of the World Food Program: Rome . 

8th Session. 

South Pacific Commission: 28th Meeting Noumea 

CENTO Civil Defense Experts Ankara 

OECD Group on Export Credits and Credit Guarantees . . Paris . 

5th Lebanese International Film Festival Beirut . 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris . 

OECD Agricultural Committee Paris . 

Asian Highway Coodination Committee: 2d Ministerial Ses- Bangkok 


ECE Consultation on International Statistical Coordination Geneva . 

in Europe. 

2d FAO Technical Conference on the Improvement of Data Baghdad . 

Production and Processing. 

FAO Forestry Commission, North American : 3d Session . . Washing:ton 

GATT Working Group on Residual Restrictions Geneva 

Inter- American Conference on Conservation of Renewable Mar del Plata 

Natural Resources of the Americas. 

IMCO Expert Group on Stability of Fishing Vessels: 3d London . 


U.N. Cocoa Conference on Quotas and Prices Geneva 

ECE Conference of European Statisticians Geneva 

ILO Preparatory Technical Conference on Fishermen's Ques- Geneva 


ECE Committee on the Development of Trade Geneva 

OECD Special Group on UNCTAD Principles Paris . . 

ICAO Special Group on North Atlantic Systems Planning . Paris . . 

PAHC Permanent Executive Committee: 8th Meeting . . , Washington 

FAO Codex Alimentarius Commission: 3d Session .... Rome . . 

OECD Interim Science Committee Paris . . 

OECD Trade Committee Paris . . 

ECAFE Preparatory Meeting on Asian Development Bank . Bangkok . 

FAO Technical Working Party on Coffee Production and Rio de Janeiro 

Protection : 1st Session. 

GATT Committee on Balance-of-Payment Restrictions . . Geneva 

OECD Energry Committee: Working Party Paris . . 

IAEA Meeting on Radioisotopes in the Development of Nat- Poland 

ural Resources. 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Bulk Cargoes Other London 

Than Grain. 

International Lead and Zinc Study Group Tokyo . . 

UNCTAD Committee on Manufactures Geneva 

OECD Economic Development and Review Committee: U.S. Paris . . 


GATT Working Party on Preferences Geneva . 

UNCTAD Expert Group on International Monetary Issues . Geneva 

U.N. Special Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space . New York 

3d International Aviation Research and Development Sympo- Atlantic City 


ECE Steel Committee and Ad Hoc Working Party on the Geneva 

Competitive Use of Steel in Comparison With Other Metals 

IMCO Subcommittee on Oil Pollution London 

International North Pacific Fisheries Commission: 12th Seattle 

ECLA Working Group on National Accounts Santiago . . 

ECA Conference of African Statisticians Addis Ababa 

Oct. 4-15 

Oct. 4-16 
Oct. 4-20 

Oct. 4-23 

Oct. 5-6 
Oct. 5-14 

Oct. 7-9 
Oct. 11-12 
Oct. 11-15 

Oct. 11-15 
Oct. 11-15 
Oct. 11-15 

Oct. 11-15 

Oct. 11-20 
Oct. 12-14 
Oct. 13-14 
Oct. 13-24 
Oct. 14-15 
Oct. 14-15 
Oct. 14-15 

Oct. 14-15 

Oct. 16-25 

Oct. 17-23 
Oct. 18-22 
Oct. 18-22 

Oct. 18-22 

Oct. 18-22 
Oct. 18-22 
Oct. 18-29 

Oct. 18-Nov. 5 
Oct. 19-20 
Oct. 19-21 
Oct. 19-22 
Oct. 19-29 
Oct. 20-21 
Oct. 21-22 
Oct. 21-Nov. 1 
Oct. 23-30 

Oct. 24-Nov. 5 
Oct. 25-26 
Oct. 25-29 

Oct. 25-29 

Oct. 25-Nov. 5 
Oct. 25-Nov. 14 
Oct. 28 (1 day) 

Oct. 28-Nov. 5 
Nov. 1-3 

Nov. 8-9 

Nov. 8-12 
Nov. 8-13 

Nov. 8-17 
Nov. 8-17 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


Calendar of International Conferences and Meetings 


Scheduled October Through December 196S— Continued 

FAO Technical Committee 

U.N. ECOSOC Meeting on Application of Science and Tech- 
nology to Development. 

ILO Governing Body: 163d Session 

OECD Economic Policy Committee 

OECD Scientific Research Committee 

4th ICAO Air Navigation Conference 

3d ECAFE Regional Petroleum Symposium 

FAO Council: 45th Session 

UNESCO Intergovernmental Copyright Committee .... 

Consultative Committee on Cooperative Economic Develop- 
ment in South and Southeast Asia (Colombo Plan) : 17th 
Ministerial Meeting. 

UNCTAD Interim Coordinating Committee on International 
Commodity Arrangements. 

2d Special Inter-American Conference 

ECAFE Committee on Inland Transport and Communi- 
cations: 14th Session. 

ECE Trade Committee 

FAO Conference: 13th Session 

U.N. ECOSOC Technical Assistance Committee 

IMCO Working Group on Carriage of Dangerous Goods by 
Sea : 10th Session. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Fire Protection 

ITU CCITT Special Study Group A 

UNCTAD Committee on Shipping 

UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related 
to Trade. 

UNICEF/ECLA Conference on Children and Youth in Na- 
tional Development. 

IMCO Subcommittee on Subdivision and Stability Problems: 
4th Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Commission on Narcotic Drugs: 20th Session 

ECE Ad Hoc Group on Obstacles to Development of East- 
West Trade: 3d Session. 

GATT Committee on Trade and Development: Committee III 

South Pacific Commission: Technical Meeting on Health 

ICEM Executive Committee: 26th Session 

ICEM Governing Council: 24th Session 

Permanent Inter-American Committee on Social Security . . 

GATT Committee on Cotton Textiles 

ECE Electric Power Committee 

ECAFE Conference of Plenipotentiaries on Asian Develop- 
ment Bank. 

OECD Interim Science Committee 

IMCO Working Group on Tonnage Measurement: 7th Ses- 

GATT Committee on Trade and Development 

ECA Regional Industrial Symposium 

ILO Metal Trades Committee 

ECAFE Asian Conference on Industrialization 

FAO Council : 4th Session 

ECA Conference on Economic Cooperation in West Africa . 

ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems 

BIRPI Ad Hoc Committee Under the Nice Revision of the 
Madrid Agreement for the International Registration of 

ECAFE Regional Symposium on Industrialization .... New Delhi 

ECLA Trade Committee Santiago 

CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research: Ankara . 
Special Session. 

ECA Conference on Economic Cooperation in North Africa Tangier . 

Rome . 

Paris . 
Paris . 
Tokyo . 
Rome . 
Paris . 

Geneva . . 

Rio de Janeiro 

Geneva . 
Rome . . 
New York 

Brussels . 
New York 

Santiago . 


Geneva . 

Noumea . 



San Jose 




Paris . . 

Cairo . . 
Rome . . 
Niamey . 
Geneva . 

Nov. 8-18 
Nov. 8-19 

Nov. 8-20 
Nov. 9-10 
Nov. 9-10 
Nov. 9-Dec. 3 
Nov. 10-20 
Nov. 15-18 
Nov. 15-19 
Nov. 15-Dec. 2 

Nov. 16-22 

Nov. 17 (1 day) 
Nov. 18-24 

Nov. 18-Dec. 5 
Nov. 20-Dec. 9 
Nov. 22-26 
Nov. 22-26 

Nov. 22-26 
Nov. 22-Dec. 3 
Nov. 25-Dec. 10 
Nov. 25-Dec. 10 

Nov. 28-Dec. 11 

Nov. 29-Dec. 3 

Nov. 29-Dec. 22 





November or December 

Dec. 1-3 

Dec. 2-4 

Dec. 6-7 
Dec. 6-10 

Dec. 6-10 
Dec. 6-17 
Dec 6-18 
Dec. 6-20 
Dec. 10 (1 day) 
Dec. 13-17 
Dec. 13-17 
Dec. 13-18 

Dec. 13-20 






International Cooperation on tiie Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy 

Statement by Glenn T. Seaborg 

Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission^ 

It is a great pleasure and an honor to 
represent the United States for the fifth 
time at the General Conference of the In- 
ternational Atomic Energy Agency and to 
address my fellow delegates to this confer- 
ence. I extend congratulations to you, Am- 
bassador [Koichiro] Asakai [Japan], upon 
your election as president of the confer- 
ence, and to Director General [A. Sigvard] 
Eklund for the outstanding leadership he 
has provided the Agency. I would like to 
record here my deep sense of satisfaction 
that Dr. Eklund has agreed to serve as Di- 
rector General for 4 more years, and I know 
that this satisfaction is widely shared by 
other delegates. 

It is also a very great pleasure and honor 
to be in Japan on this occasion. I should 
like to pay special tribute to the Govern- 
ment of Japan for its magnificent hospital- 
ity as host to this conference. It was also 
my honor yesterday to address a meeting 
of the Japan Atomic Industrial Forum and 
to report on recent developments in the nu- 
clear power program of my country. 

Turning now to the business of this meet- 
ing, I am privileged to read the following 
message to the conference from the Presi- 
dent of the United States : 

[For text, see p. 678.] 

I am here in the spirit of President 

' Made before the General Conference of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency at Tokyo, 
Japan, on Sept. 22. Dr. Seaborg was U.S. Repre- 
sentative to the General Conference. 

Johnson's message, to advance on behalf of 
my Government the high principles of the 
Agency, which in the words of the statute 
are "to accelerate and enlarge the contribu- 
tion of atomic energy to peace, health and 
prosperity throughout the world" and also 
to insure that any assistance provided by, or 
under the auspices of, the IAEA is not used 
to further any military purpose. 

Let me begin by recalling that my Gov- 
ernment's broad, basic policy of interna- 
tional cooperation in the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy has been applied since 1954. 
This program has been developed with the 
assistance of many governmental agencies 
and industrial and educational organiza- 
tions both in my country and abroad. It 
has become a symbol of effective interna- 
tional cooperation devoted to the better- 
ment of mankind. Extensive international 
programs have been developed concerning 
the uses of radioisotopes and radiation 
sources, the promotion of peaceful nuclear 
research, the provision of opportunities for 
nuclear education and training, and, more 
recently, the development and use of nuclear 
power for the generation of electricity and 
for the combined production of electricity 
and desalting of sea water. 

The United Nations International Coop- 
eration Year comes at the close of the first 
decade of our Atoms for Peace program and 
provides a special occasion for taking stock. 
In this connection, I should like to recall 
that at the Third International Conference 
on the Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy held 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


President Sends Message to IAEA Conference 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson read to the General Confer- 
ence of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
at Tokyo on September 22 by U.S. Representa- 
tive Glenn T. Seaborg. 

White House press release dated September 21 

I -welcome this opportunity to speak, through 
Chairman Seaborg, to the delegates to the 
Ninth General Conference of the IAEA. I believe 
it is significant that you are meeting this year 
in Tokyo, the capital of a nation whose people 
have made such remarkable progress through 
the peaceful development of science and tech- 

Today we realize, more than ever before, the 
power of science. We also realize that the mighty 
force of science is not the domain of any one 
nation. Its great knowledge springs from sources 
in many lands. Its fullest development demands 
international responsibility and the cooperation 
of all men. This is the reason for the existence 
of the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
You are directing the atom, the greatest source 
of power which man has ever wrested from 
nature, toward peace, toward the fulfillment of 
human need. 

Since its inception in 1957, the IAEA has 
made noteworthy progress. In organizing and 
implementing international programs of scien- 
tific and technological cooperation, it has shown 
the world that men gain far more by sharing 
their knowledge and tools than by using them 

alone in secrecy and isolation. The IAEA has 
offered the advanced countries and their lesser 
developed neighbors and friends opportunities to 
work together and to share the scientific de- 
velopments of many nations. 

But the IAEA also has the solemn duty — and 
the unique opportunity — to assure the world 
that materials and equipment employed for 
peaceful uses of atomic energ:y are not used 
for any military purpose. Prevention of the 
spread of atomic weapons is one of the most 
important tasks of our times. It is my deep 
conviction that the IAEA, through its safeguards 
system, can make a crucial contribution to 
achievement of this goal. The United States 
Government is pledged to do all in its power to 
assure the success of the Agency's system. I urge 
every Member State to give its support to the 
Agency system in principle and in practice. 

There must be no resting. The work which 
you have been doing must be carried on with 
increasing effort and support. There is no stand- 
ing still in your twofold task of keeping the 
peaceful atom peaceful and directing its enor- 
mous energy toward productive uses. 

I take this opportunity to renew my country's 
pledge to assist the International Atomic Energy 
Agency in the full pursuit of those benefits 
which the peaceful atom can bestow. 

With gratitude for your past accomplishments 
I send you the best wishes of the people of the 
United States for your future endeavors. 

in Geneva last September,^ one thing above 
all became apparent as we reviewed our 
progress over the years: The degree of in- 
ternational cooperation in the development 
of nuclear energy resources in the last dec- 
ade has no counterpart in the previous de- 
velopment of international science and tech- 
nology. This international collaboration, 
carried out so successfully in the nuclear 
energy field, further strengthens the thesis 
that science can serve as a common ground 
betvi^een the nations of the world. 

I believe that the Geneva conference also 

" For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 21, 1964, 
p. 408. 

served to dramatize the fact that the prac- 
tical achievement of material vi^ell-being for 
the peoples of the developing nations must 
rest upon a structure of close international 
cooperation. Indeed, we see the possibility 
that through the uses of nuclear energy the 
developing nations may greatly shorten 
the time required to reach and maintain 
living standards presently found in the de- 
veloped countries and enter more completely 
into the scientific revolution which is in 
progress throughout the world. 

In my judgment, the establishment of the 
IAEA in 1957 was one of the most impor- 
tant events in the field of international co- 
operation during the past decade. The 



Agency, whose founding was proposed by 
the United States in 1953, has achieved in- 
ternational stature as a focal point for inter- 
national cooperation in peaceful applica- 
tions of nuclear energy. You are all familiar 
with the Agency's far-ranging program, 
which has become increasingly important 
and which the United States, in coopera- 
tion with other member states, has consist- 
ently sought to strengthen. 

International Safeguards System 

The advent of economically competitive 
nuclear power and the worldwide expansion 
of nuclear power capability have given 
special importance to the Agency's interna- 
tional safeguards system. This system of 
international control and inspection is de- 
signed to insure that nuclear power reactors 
and the nuclear materials which they use 
and generate are employed only for peaceful 
purposes. There are few more important 
steps being taken to preserve international 
peace and security than the development of 
this system. 

The Board of Governors has submitted to 
this conference for consideration a report 
on its general review of the safeguards sys- 
tem and a revised system provisionally ap- 
proved by the Board. We urge all delega- 
tions to support the resolution whereby the 
conference would take favorable note of the 
revised system. 

One of the most important factors con- 
tributing to the growth and viability of the 
Agency is its increasing concentration on 
the technical aspects of the Agency's re- 
sponsibilities. We believe that the practical 
progress which the Agency has made in 
some of its most difficult tasks is due to 
the fact that it can deal with these tasks on 
a technical basis without the injection of 
political issues. 

My Government is proud of its program 
for transferring responsibility for admin- 
istering safeguards to the IAEA. The first 
such transfer was accomplished by means 
of a trilateral agreement signed by the 
United States, Japan, and the IAEA on 

September 23, 1963. Thus far, arrangements 
of this kind have been made for the IAEA 
to administer the safeguards on nuclear 
materials and equipment supplied by the 
United States to 13 countries: Japan, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Viet-Nam, the Re- 
public of China, Norway, Greece, Austria, 
Portugal, Iran, Argentina, Israel, and South 
Africa. The United Kingdom and Canada 
have concluded similar agreements with the 
Agency and countries with which they have 
safeguards agreements, including Japan. We 
are making every effort to complete addi- 
tional agreements for the transfer of bi- 
lateral safeguards responsibilities to the 
Agency, and it is our hope that other mem- 
bers will follow the same policy. In addition, 
of course. Agency safeguards are or will be 
applied to Agency projects in Finland, Nor- 
way, the Republic of the Congo, Mexico, 
and Yugoslavia. 

In order to demonstrate the effectiveness 
and acceptability of Agency safeguards, to 
provide IAEA with staff experience, and to 
test the system in operation, the United 
States in 1962 voluntarily agreed to place 
four of its civilian prototype power and re- 
search reactors under the Agency's system. 
That agreement was renewed last year and 
extended to include a large privately owned 
U.S. power reactor, the 600-thermal-mega- 
watt Yankee reactor, which is capable of 
producing more than 100 kilograms of 
Plutonium per year. Our experience of sev- 
eral years has showTi that the Agency's 
safeguards system in no way interferes 
with the efficient operation of nuclear in- 

We are extremely pleased and encouraged 
by the offer of the United Kingdom to place 
its Bradwell nuclear power station under 
Agency safeguards. I believe it is a major 
step forward in support of the Agency's 
safeguards system. It will further demon- 
strate the Agency's system in application to 
another important type of power reactor 
and thereby contribute to the objective of 
having widely accepted international safe- 
guards with uniform standards and meth- 
ods of inspection. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


Let us now look briefly and concretely at 
the bright prospects for nuclear energy both 
in the United States and in the world, and 
at the promising future for the growth of 
international cooperation in this field, fo- 
cused through the IAEA. 

Expansion of Nuclear Power Capability 

Recent events have indicated that nuclear 
power is now a significant competitive 
source of energy for my country and in 
various places throughout the world. Fur- 
thermore, there is every indication that the 
use of nuclear power is going to increase at 
a rapidly expanding rate. Projecting cur- 
rent trends, we estimate that by 1970 the 
U.S. nuclear electrical capacity will be on 
the order of 6,000-7,000 megawatts and the 
total world nuclear capacity in 1970 will 
reach approximately 25,000 megawatts. A 
further projection indicates that there will 
be 60,000-90,000 megawatts of nuclear 
power installed in the United States by 1980 
and that by the year 2000 about 50 percent 
of the total electric power generated in the 
United States will be from nuclear energy. 
Aside from the field of electric power, the 
uses of nuclear products and energy sources 
in space, medical diagnosis and treatment, 
food sterilization and preservation, indus- 
trial processes, and ship propulsion are also 
showing substantial growth. Looking ahead, 
the promising uses of nuclear energy in 
water desalting, large-scale excavation, and 
rocket engines for extended space missions 
give us cause for optimism. 

Important strides have been made by the 
Agency in the field of desalination using 
nuclear energy, and, as a matter of policy, 
we look to the IAEA as a focal point for 
international cooperation in this field. Last 
April the Agency held another in its series 
of desalting panel meetings, at which 16 
nations and the United Nations were repre- 
sented. I understand that the Agency has 
received several requests from member 
states for advice and consultation in regard 
to the feasibility of nuclear-power desalting 

plants. Because of the growing interna- 
tional interest in desalting, the United 
States is sponsoring, and will be host to, the 
First International Symposium on Water 
Desalting, to be held in Washington from 
October 3 through 9. Over 62 nations have 
accepted our invitation to attend this sym- 
posium, at which the IAEA will chair a 
session and present a paper on the technical 
and economic aspects of nuclear energy ap- 
plications in desalting. 

The Agency continues to participate in 
the joint U.S.-Israel study of the feasibility 
of a desalting plant for Israel, and its rep- 
resentatives have made useful contribu- 
tions. It is expected that this study will be 
completed within the next few months. The 
Agency also took part in visits to the United 
Arab Republic and Tunisia to discuss water 
and power needs and to obtain information 
about proposed projects. The Agency will 
also benefit from the agreement between 
the United States and the U.S.S.R. in the 
nuclear desalting field, through full access 
to the information covered by this agree- 
ment. In addition to the activities I have 
reviewed, other cooperative studies between 
the United States and countries interested 
in the potential of nuclear desalting are 
under serious consideration. We look for- 
ward to increased participation by the 
Agency in this important field. 

The IAEA's activities have kept pace 
with the technological developments to 
which I have just referred. The Agency has 
assisted a number of its member states to 
make preliminary assessments of nuclear 
power and desalting prospects, on evalua- 
tion of reactor systems and on siting, con- 
struction, and safe operation of nuclear 
plants. The Agency has fostered the devel- 
opment of nuclear technology, of research 
and services in the life sciences and the 
physical sciences, and of health, safety, and 
waste-management standards, codes, and 
manuals. We commend the Agency for its 
work in these fields and urge continued 
efforts to strengthen these activities. 



We also commend the growth of the 
Agency's technical assistance activities, 
through which the Agency is directly con- 
cerned with promoting the application of 
nuclear science and technology to the eco- 
nomic progress of the developing countries 
by providing experts, visiting professors, 
fellowships, and equipment. Some of the 
main fields covered are radioisotope produc- 
tion and utilization, reactor operation and 
use, radiochemistry, radiation physics, solid 
state physics, instrumentation, food pres- 
ervation, health physics, and radiation pro- 

Growth of International Cooperation 

Another trend in the IAEA's program 
which we have noted with interest is the 
increase of regional and interregional proj- 
ects. The Agency's services are particularly 
necessary for this type of international co- 
operation in which a number of member 
states are involved. The report submitted to 
this conference on technical assistance indi- 
cates that in 1964 the following regional 
and interregional activities were conducted: 
11 training courses in a variety of subjects; 
the appointment of a regional officer for 
Asia and the Far East; assignments of sev- 
eral regional experts in specific subjects; 
followup survey missions to Asia, the Far 
East, Latin America, and Africa; and 
courses and research projects at the Middle 
Eastern Regional Radioisotope Center for 
Arab Countries. 

Other regional programs included re- 
search and training at the International 
Center for Theoretical Physics at Trieste; 
reactor fuel element research under a co- 
operative project in Norway, Poland, and 
Yugoslavia; sea disposal research under the 
Monaco Project; and regional spectrometer 
research at the Philippine Atomic Energy 
Research Center. The utilization of research 
reactors continues to be one of the Agency's 
most beneficial fields of activity carried out 
on a regional basis. 

Another aspect of the Agency's program 

about which we are enthusiastic is the 
growth of cooperation between the Agency 
and the United Nations and its specialized 
agencies. The third Geneva conference last 
September was successfully prepared and 
conducted through close cooperation be- 
tween the Agency and the U.N. The Agency 
has continued to work with the U.N. in con- 
nection with the International Cooperation 
Year and on general questions of energy 
and power. The Joint FAO [Food and Agri- 
culture Organization] /IAEA Division of 
Atomic Energy in Agriculture has been in 
existence in Vienna for almost a year and 
appears to be bringing about an effective 
pooling of the resources of both agencies. 
Technical liaison officers have been ex- 
changed between the Agency and the World 
Health Organization and have proved help- 
ful in promoting cooperation and avoiding 
duplication of effort between the two or- 
ganizations. UNESCO [United Nations Ed- 
ucational, Scientific and Cultural Organiza- 
tion] has assisted the International Center 
for Theoretical Physics in Trieste, and the 
Agency is collaborating with UNESCO on 
studies involved in the International Hydro- 
logical Decade. The IAEA and the Interna- 
tional Labor Organization held a joint 
meeting and reviewed a draft manual on 
safe practice in mining and milling radioac- 
tive ores. The Agency is executing projects 
for the U.N. Special Fund in Yugoslavia on 
agricultural research and training and in 
Central America on elimination of the Medi- 
terranean fruitfly. A Special Fund prein- 
vestment power study in the Philippines, 
which is due to be completed shortly, rep- 
resents a major effort by the Agency and 
is also indicative of close cooperation with 
the United Nations. 

The IAEA is also working closely with 
several regional organizations. It is carry- 
ing out a cooperative program on the use 
of radiation for food preservation with the 
European Nuclear Energy Agency and the 
Austrian Atomic Energy Society at the lat- 
ter's laboratory. The Agency and the ENEA 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


are collaborating on meetings and studies 
on questions of health, safety, and waste 
management and are jointly providing vari- 
ous standards and codes. The Agency has 
continued to assist the Inter-American Nu- 
clear Energy Commission in carrying out 
its survey of the possibilities of using nu- 
clear power in Latin America, and lANEC 
is helping the Agency with a study of train- 
ing problems in Latin America. 

I have referred to the Agency's regional 
and interagency projects to call attention to 
this relatively new trend in international 
cooperation. Of course, the bulk of the 
Agency's activities involves projects of in- 
ternational cooperation between the Agency 
and a member state. In 1964 about 86 per- 
cent of the total amount of technical assist- 
ance went to individual countries. 

I would like to pay tribute here to Japan 
and to the many other countries in all parts 
of the world which have taken special ini- 
tiative, on various occasions, to cooperate 
through the Agency. It will be recalled that 
Japan was the first country to obtain nuclear 
material through the IAEA when it pur- 
chased three tons of natural uranium in 
1959 which the Agency had received as a 
gift from Canada. In 1960 Japan and the 
United States declared their intent to trans- 
fer to the Agency the responsibility for ad- 
ministering the safeguards provisions in 
their bilateral atomic energy agreement. 
This was accomplished in 1963 through the 
signature of the first trilateral safeguards 
agreement. Japan has donated equipment 
to the Agency's laboratory. In addition, 
IAEA-sponsored training courses have been 
held in Japan on radiation health and 
safety and on the application of radioiso- 
topes in engineering, chemistry, biology, 
and agriculture. The Agency's working 
group on nuclear data met here in Tokyo 
just last week. 

On behalf of my Government, I want to 
pledge our continued best efforts to advance 
the Agency's objectives and support its pro- 
grams. We support the budget that has been 
recommended by the Board of Governors. 

For the seventh consecutive year, the United 
States is pleased to renew, for 1966, its offer 
to donate up to $50,000 worth of special 
nuclear material for use in Agency projects 
in research and medical therapy. We shall 
continue to make available on a cost-free 
basis the services of our experts, training 
opportunities in our institutions, and cer- 
tain items of equipment, as we are able to 
do so. We shall also continue to contribute 
to the Agency's library copies of all scien- 
tific and technical reports published during 
the year by the USAEC concerning peace- 
ful uses of atomic energy, and prints of 
U.S. films on this subject. 

We pledge our continued support of the 
Director General and the staff of the secre- 
tariat. In 1964 President Johnson stressed 
the need to assure that the highest caliber 
Americans be made available to staff the 
international organizations. We have made 
continuing efforts to implement this in- 
struction with respect to the IAEA. We 
have provided and shall continue to provide 
our most competent people, carefully se- 
lected for each post for which they are 

In conclusion, I would point out that the 
demands upon the Agency are growing and 
becoming increasingly challenging. The in- 
ternational scientific community and the 
governments of the member states are urged 
to devote themselves to meeting this chal- 
lenge by increasing their efforts toward in- 
ternational cooperation on the peaceful uses 
of atomic energy for the worldwide benefit 
of mankind. My Government is dedicated to 
international cooperation for peace. We 
realize, however, that the struggles of the 
past have been but a prelude to the chal- 
lenges of the future. Perhaps the greatest 
challenge will be taking the steps necessary 
to assure that the peaceful atom will pre- 
vail and that nuclear energy will be used 
internationally only to improve the condi- 
tion of mankind. Successfully meeting such 
a challenge will truly offer us our greatest 



Mr. Goldberg Comments on Speech 
by Soviet Foreign IVIinister 

statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations'^ 

Mr. Gromyko's charges against the 
United States on Viet-Nam, the Dominican 
Republic, and the Congo were merely a re- 
statement of old positions which have never 
been accepted by any United Nations body. 
We have dealt v?ith them repeatedly and 
fully, and most recently, insofar as Viet- 
Nam is concerned, in my speech yesterday.* 

Everyone knows that the war in Viet- 
Nam is caused by North Viet-Nam's mili- 
tary interference in direct violation of the 
Geneva agreement — and no amount of rhet- 
oric can change that fact. 

I have the impression today from Mr. 
Gromyko's speech that he himself realizes 
that his charges are not convincing and 
that most United Nations members are more 
interested in the unconditional negotiations 
which President Johnson has repeatedly 
oflfered to solve this problem rather than 
in stale polemics about Viet-Nam. 

Mr. Gromyko has made a proposal about 
noninterference with the affairs of nations. 
In 1949 the General Assembly adopted, at 
United States initiative, a resolution en- 
titled Essentials of Peace,* which called on 
all states "To refrain from any threats or 
acts, direct or indirect, aimed at impairing 
the freedom, independence, or integrity of 
any state, or at fomenting civil strife and 
subverting the will of the people in any 
state." The Soviet Union voted against this 
resolution. If the new Soviet item means 
the Soviets have changed their approach on 
this problem and are genuinely against in- 
terference in the affairs of other states, 
such as Peiping is now carrying on across 

^ Made to news correspondents on Sept. 24 
(U.S. /U.N. press release 4650) following an ad- 
dress made to the U.N. General Assembly on that 
day by Andrei A. Gromyko, Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of the Soviet Union. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578. 

• For text, see ibid., Nov. 28, 1949, p. 807. 

Asia, we shall be the first to welcome this 
change of heart. 

We are gratified to hear Minister Gro- 
myko's comments on the urgency and the 
fundamental importance of an agreement 
on the nondissemination of nuclear weap- 
ons. We noted his listing of undertakings 
which must be incorporated in an accept- 
able treaty for the control of dissemination. 
The United States has already proposed a 
draft treaty * which meets all these require- 
ments, and it has been put forward to form 
a basis of negotiations. 

While we have not yet seen or had a 
chance to study the new Soviet proposed 
agreement, we are gratified by their inter- 
est in submitting their proposal and will 
study it carefully in the hope that it may 
lead to useful negotiations resulting soon in 
an agreement to limit the further danger- 
ous spread of these weapons. We concur in 
Mr. Gromyko's statement of the importance 
of agreement in this field. 

We will, of course, study with care the 
other Soviet proposals in the disarmament 
field, and we trust, in turn, that the Soviet 
Union will study and respond affirmatively 
to our very specific proposals made yester- 

And we are particularly interested in the 
Soviet response to our offer of yesterday to 
transfer 60,000 kilograms of weapons-grade 
U-235 to nonweapon uses, if the Soviet 
Union would be willing to transfer 40,000 

To nonscientists like myself the impor- 
tance of this proposal may not be self-evi- 
dent, but perhaps I could illustrate by an 
example. The material which is proposed 
could produce energy equivalent to several 
years' power output by all of the developing 
countries of Asia, Africa, and Latin Amer- 
ica combined. 

And, finally, we welcome Minister Gro- 
myko's statement of his desire to have good 
relations with the United States. We, in 
turn, reciprocate this statement toward the 
Soviet Union in full measure. 

' For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474. 
' Ibid., Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed pub- 
lications may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Report of the Special Committee on the Policies 
of Apartheid of the Government of South Africa. 
S/6605. August 16, 1965. 141 pp. 

Letter dated August 17 from the Secretary General 
of the Organization of American States trans- 
mitting copies of cables sent by the Ad Hoc 
Committee regarding the situation in the Do- 
minican Republic. S/6628. August 24, 1965. 25 pp. 

Letters dated August 27 from the Representative 
of India regarding the Kashmir situation. S/6636, 
August 27, 1965, 2 pp.; S/6637, August 27, 1965, 
3 pp. 

Telegrams dated September 1 from the Secretary- 
General to the Prime Minister of India and the 
President of Pakistan appealing for restoration 
of peace in Kashmir. S/6647. September 1, 1965. 
3 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the current 
situation in Kashmir with particular reference to 
the cease-fire agreement, the cease-fire line and 
the functioning of UNMOGIP. S/6651. September 
3, 1965. 20 pp. and map. 

Report by the Secretary-General on developments 
in the situation in Kashmir since the adoption 
of the Security Council cease-fire resolution on 
September 4 (S/RES/209). S/6661. September 
6, 1965. 3 pp. 

Telegram dated September 5 from the President of 
Pakistan to the Secretary-General in reply to 
S/6647. S/6666. September 7, 1965. 9 pp. 

Telegram dated September 6 from the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs of Pakistan regarding an Indian 
attack along the borders of West Pakistan. 
S/6669. September 8, 1965. 2 pp. 

Message dated September 4 from the Prime Minis- 
ter of India in reply to S/6647. S/6672. Septem- 
ber 8, 1965. 5 pp. 

Letter dated September 8 from the Acting Perma- 
nent Representative of the U.S.S.R. transmitting 
the text of a Tass statement of September 7. 
S/6671. September 8, 1965. 4 pp. 

Message dated September 6 from the Minister of 
External Affairs of India conveying his Govern- 
ment's views regarding Security Council Resolu- 
tion 209 of September 4. S/6673. September 8, 
1965. 5 pp. 

Preliminary report by the Secretary-General on 
his visits to the Governments of India and Paki- 
stan. S/6683. September 16, 1965. 12 pp. 

Letter dated September 15 from the Representative 
of the U.S.S.R. transmitting the text oJf a message 
of A. Kosygin, Chairman of the Council of Minis- 
ters of the U.S.S.R., to Prime Minister Shastri of 
India and President Ayub Khan of Pakistan. 
S/6685. September 16, 1965. 5 pp. 

Second report by the Secretary-General on his mis- 
sion to India and Pakistan. S/6686. September 
16, 1965. 5 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on the military 
situation in the area of conflict between India 
and Pakistan. S/6687. September 16, 1965. 6 pp. 

Letter dated September 17 from the Representative 

of India enclosing the text of a statement of the 
Prime Minister of India made in Parliament 
September 16. S/6688. September 17, 1965. 5 pp. 

Letter dated September 17 from the Representative 
of India enclosing the texts of an exchange of 
notes between India and the People's Republic 
of China regarding the border situation between 
the two countries, together with a statement made 
by the Prime Minister of India in Parliament 
September 17. S/6692. September 18, 1962. 13 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on his efforts to 
give effect to Security Council Resolution 211 of 
September 20. S/6699. September 21, 1965. 5 pp. 

General Assembly 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
Information furnished by the United States con- 
cerning objects launched into orbit or beyond as 
of April 15, 1965. A/AC.105/INF.104. August 5, 
1965. 2 pp. 

Human Rights Day: Observance of the Sixteenth 
Anniversary of the Adoption of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. Report of the Sec- 
retary-General summarizing reports received from 
42 countries. A/INF/108. August 11, 1965. 16 pp. 

Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space. 
Information concerning objects launched into orbit 
or beyond by the United States. A/AC.105/INP. 
105, August 11, 1965; A/AC.105/INF.106, August 
16, 1965; A/AC.105/INF.107, August 16, 1965; 
A/AC.105/INF.108, August 16, 1965; A/AC.105 
INF.109, September 8, 1965; and A/AC.105/INF. 
Ill, September 21, 1965, 2 pp. each. 

Report of the Special Committee on Peace-Keeping 
Operations. Annexes: Records of the meetings 
and Report of the Secretary-General and the 
President of the General Assembly. A/5915/Add.l. 
August 12, 1965. 246 pp. 

Second Report of the Special Committee on Peace- 
Keeping Operations. A/5916. August 31, 1965. 1 p. 

International Year for Human Rights. Note by the 
Secretary-General. A/5945. August 20, 1965. 

Letter dated August 18 from the Acting Permanent 
Representative of the U.S.S.R. regarding Soviet 
support of the resolution on territories under 
Portuguese administration. A/5946. August 20, 
1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated August 27 from the Acting Permanent 
Representative of the U.S.S.R. regarding Soviet 
support of the resolution on the question of South 
West Africa. A/5949. August 31, 1965. 2 pp. 

Measures To Implement the United Nations Declara- 
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination. Note by the Secretary-General. 
A/5947. August 26, 1965. 5 pp. 

Supplementary List of Items Proposed for Inclu- 
sion in the Agenda of the Twentieth Regrular 
Session of the General Assembly. A/5970. August 
27, 1965. 1 p. 

Economic and Social Council 

The Role of Enterprise-to-Enterprise Arrangements 
in Supplying Financial, Managerial, and Techno- 
logical Needs of Industrial Enterprises in Develop- 
ing Countries. Fifth report of the Secretary- 
General in series of studies aimed at promoting 
the flow of private capital to developing countries. 
E/4038. June 15. 1965. 32 pp. 

Methods for Establishing Targets and Standards for 
Housing and Environmental Development. E/C. 
6/31. July 7, 1965. 138 pp. 




Current Actions 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended 
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846). Effected by ex- 
change of notes at New Delhi September 29, 1965. 
Entered into force September 29, 1965. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of May 26, 1965, as amended (TIAS 
5821, 5867). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Saigon September 23, 1965. Entered into force 
September 23, 1965. 

Cultural Relations 

Agreement on the importation of educational, scien- 
tific and cultural materials, and protocol. Done at 
Lake Success November 22, 1950. Entered into 
force May 21, 1952.' 

Acceptance deposited : Upper Volta, September 14, 


Agreement between the United States, Mexico, and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency for a 
preliminary study of a nuclear electric and de- 
salting plant. Signed at Washington October 7, 
1965. Entered into force October 7, 1965. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna April 18, 1961. Entered into force April 
24, 1964.' 

Ratification deposited: San Marino, September 8, 


Convention on the prevention and punishment of the 
crime of genocide. Done at Paris December 9, 
1948. Entered into force January 12, 1951.' 
Accession deposited: Upper Volta, September 14, 

International Court of Justice 

Statute of the International Court of Justice (59 
Stat. 1055). 

Declaration recognizing compulsory jurisdiction 
deposited: Nigeria, September 3, 1965. 

Women — Political Rights 

Convention on political rights of women. Done at 
New York March 31, 1953. Entered into force 
July 7, 1954.' 

Accession deposited: Mongolia (with reserva- 
tions), August 18, 1965. 


Congo (Leopoldville) 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of April 28, 1964, as amended (TIAS 
5565, 5662, 5711, 5794). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Leopoldville September 21 and 28, 1965. 
Entered into force September 28, 1965. 


' Not in force for the United States. 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20i02. Address requests direct to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, except in the case of free publi- 
catio7is, which may he obtained from, the Office of 
Media Services, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20520. 

UNESCO Basic Documents. This publication includes 
texts of documents creating and establishing the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization, the joint resolution providing for U.S. 
participation and membership, and other documents. 
Pub. 7491. International Organization and Confer- 
ence Series 37. 46 pp. 25^. 

Sample Questions From the Examination for For- 
eign Service Officer. A description of the written 
examination and samples of the kinds of questions 
asked in the different parts of the test. Pub. 7640. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 123. 53 pp. 
Limited distribution. 

The UN . . . action agency for peace and progress. 

Leaflet describing purpose, structure, and objectives 
of the United Nations. Pub. 7733. International Or- 
ganization and Conference Series 55. Revised Sep- 
tember 1965. 12 pp. 10(f. 

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each leaflet 
contains a map. a list of principal government of- 
ficials and U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, 
and, in some cases, a selected bibliography. Those 
listed below are available at 5^ each. 

British Guiana. Pub. 7878. 4 pp. 

Bulgaria. Pub. 7882. 8 pp. 

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United 
States. Booklet prepared for the information of men 
and women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of 
the Foreign Service to serve with the Department 
of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Pub. 7924. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 132. 32 pp. 
Limited distribution. 

OCTOBER 25, 1965 


We Will Stand in Viet-Nam. Text of a statement on 
Viet-Nam made by President Johnson at his press 
conference of July 28, 1965, at the White House. Pub. 
7937. Far Eastern Series 137. 11 pp. 15<t. 

U.S. Participation in the International Atomic 
Energy Agency. Report by the President to Congress 
for the year 1964. Pub. 7946. International Organi- 
zation and Conference Series 68. 23 pp. Limited 

Cultural Relations — Preservation of Temples of Abu 
Simbel from Inundation from Aswan High Dam. 

Agreement with the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Paris October 7 and 16, 1964. En- 
tered into force October 16, 1964. TIAS 5731. 4 pp. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreements with Israel, 
amending the agreement of December 6, 1962, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washing- 
ton May 26 and 27, 1965. Entered into force May 
27, 1965. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washing- 
ton June 22, 1965. Entered into force June 22, 1965. 
TIAS 5808. 4 pp. 5^. 

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Second 
proces-verbal extending the declaration of Novem- 
ber 12, 1959, on the provisional accession of Tunisia 
to the General Agreement. Done at Geneva Decem- 
ber 12, 1963. Effective with respect to the United 
States and Tunisia November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809. 
8 pp. 10^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia, amending the agreement of December 28, 
1961, as amended. Exchange of notes — Dated at Bel- 
grade May 21, 1965. Entered into force May 21, 1965. 
TIAS 5810. 2 pp. 5<f. 

Peace Corps. Agreement with Malawi — Signed at 
Blantyre and Zomba March 4 and April 20, 1965. 
Entered into force April 20, 1965. TIAS 5811. 5 
pp. 5^. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Chad. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Fort Lamy May 12, 1965. 
Entered into force May 12, 1965. TIAS 5812. 5 
pp. 54. 

International Regulations for Preventing Collisions 
at Sea, 1960, with annex — Approved by the Inter- 
national Conference on Safety of Life at Sea, held 
at London, May 17-June 17, 1960. Date of entry 
into force September 1, 1965. TIAS 5813. 21 pp. 15«;. 

Technical Cooperation. Agreement with Somali Re- 
public, extending the agreement of January 28 and 
February 4, 1961, as extended. Exchange of notes — 
Dated at Mogadiscio April 7 and 19, 1965. Entered 
into force April 19, 1965. TIAS 5814. 3 pp. 5*. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Portugal. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lisbon 
May 17 and 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26, 
1965. TIAS 5815. 3 pp. 5*. 

Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations 
on Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Brazil. 
Exchange of notes — Dated at Washington June 1, 
1965. Entered into force June 1, 1965. TIAS 5816. 
3 pp. 5#. 

Loan of Long Range Aid to Navigation (Loran-A) 
Equipment. Agreement with Canada. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Ottawa June 7 and 8, 1965. Entered 
into force June 8, 1965. TIAS 5817. 3 pp. 54. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Uganda. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Kampala May 29, 
1965. Entered into force May 29, 1965. TIAS 5818. 
5 pp. 54. 

Defense — Upper Atmosphere Research Facilities at 
Fort Churchill, Manitoba. Agreement with Canada, 
extending the agreement of June 14, 1960. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Ottawa June 11, 1965. Entered 
into force June 14, 1965. TIAS 5819. 3 pp. 54. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with China, 
amending the agreement of October 19, 1963, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington 
June 22, 1965. Entered into force June 22, 1965. 
TIAS 5820. 3 pp. 54. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement, with ex- 
change of notes, with Viet-Nam — Signed at Saigon 
May 26, 1965. Entered into force May 26, 1965. And 
amending agreement. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Saigon July 9, 1965. Entered into force July 9, 1965. 
TIAS 5821. 12 pp. 104. 

Insured Parcel Post. Agreement with British Colony 
of Fiji — Signed at Suva April 12, 1965, and at 
Washington April 22, 1965. Entered into force July 
1, 1965. TIAS 5822. 11 pp. 104. 

Mutual Defense Assistance — Equipment, Materials 
and Services. Agreement with Japan, additional to 
the agreement of December 4, 1964. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Tokyo June 18, 1965. Entered into 
force June 18, 1965. TIAS 5823. 8 pp. 104. 

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Belgium. Exchange of notes — Signed at Brussels 
June 15 and 18, 1965. Entered into force June 18, 
1965. TIAS 5824. 3 pp. 54. 

Seismic Observations— Project VELA UNIFORM 

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Dated 
at Ottawa May 18 and June 28 and 29, 1965. Entered 
into force June 29, 1965; effective June 28, 1965. 
TIAS 5826. 3 pp. 54. 

Radio Communications Between Amateur Stations 
on Behalf of Third Parties. Agreement with Israel. 
Exchange of notes — Dated at Washington July 7, 
1965. Entered into force August 6, 1965. TIAS 5827. 
3 pp. 5^. 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 4-10 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

No. Date 


235 10/6 Ball: BBC interview. 
t236 10/5 Bundy: "Progress and Problems 
in the Far East." 

237 10/8 Foreign policy conference for 

editors and broadcasters. 

238 10/8 Scholars and U.S. officials dis- 

cuss hemisphere affairs (re- 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



INDEX October 25, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1S7U 

American Reipublics 

OAS Informed of U.S. Move To Help Cuban 
Refugees (Allen) 663 

Scholars and U.S. Officials Discuss Hemisphere 
Affairs 672 

Atomic Energy 

International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (Seaborg) 677 

President Sends Message to IAEA Conference 678 

Congress. President Sends Congress Reports 
on Cultural and Exhibits Programs (texts of 
messages) 673 


OAS Informed of U.S. Move To Help Cuban 
Refugees (Allen) 663 

President Signs Immigration Bill; Offers Asy- 
lum to Cubans (Johnson) 661 

Disarmament. The Future of NATO: Areas 
of Common Effort (Humphrey) 650 

Economic Affairs 

Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations With Europe 
on BBC (interview with Alistair Burnet) . . 653 

Commercial Policy at the Crossroads (Blum- 
enthal) 665 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. President 
Sends Congress Reports on Cultural and Ex- 
hibits Programs (texts of messages) . . . 673 

Europe. Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations 
With Europe on BBC (interview with Alis- 
tair Burnet) 653 

Foreign Aid. The Future of NATO: Areas of 
Common Effort (Humphrey) 650 

France. Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations With 
Europe on BBC (interview with Alistair 
Burnet) 653 

Germany. Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations 
With Europe on BBC (interview with Alis- 
tair Burnet) 653 

Immigration. President Signs Immigration 
Bill; Offers Asylum to Cubans (Johnson) . 661 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Calendar of International Conferences . . . 674 

International Cooperation on the Peaceful Uses 
of Atomic Energy (Seaborg) 677 

OAS Informed of U.S. Move To Help Cuban 
Refugees (Allen) 663 

President Sends Message to IAEA Conference 678 

Japan. President Authorizes Medical Science 
Program With Japan (Johnson) 671 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations With Europe 
on BBC (interview with Alistair Burnet) . . 653 

The Future of NATO: Areas of Common Ef- 
fort (Humphrey) 650 

Presidential Documents 

President Authorizes Medical Science Program 
With Japan 671 

President Sends Congress Reports on Cultural 
and Exhibits Programs 673 

President Sends Message to IAEA Conference 678 

President Signs Immigration Bill; Offers Asy- 
lum to Cubans 661 

Public Affairs 

Department To Hold Foreign Policy Confer- 
ence for News Media 660 

Scholars and U.S. Officials Discuss Hemisphere 
Affairs 672 

Publications. Recent Releases 685 

Science. President Authorizes Medical Science 
Program with Japan (Johnson) .... 671 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 685 


Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Relations with Europe 
on BBC (interview with Alistair Burnet) . 653 

Mr. Goldberg Comments on Speech by Soviet 
Foreign Minister 683 

United Kingdom. Mr. Ball Discusses U.S. Re- 
lations With Europe on BBC (interview with 
Alistair Burnet) 653 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 684 

Mr. Goldberg Comments on Speech by Soviet 
Foreign Minister 683 

Name Index 

Allen, Ward P 663 

Ball, George W 653 

Blumenthal, W. Michael 665 

Burnet, Alistair 653 

Goldberg, Arthur J 683 

Humphrey, Hubert H 650 

Johnson, President 661, 671, 673, 678 

Seaborg, Glenn T 677 







SOCIAL 'science department 

BOX 286 



How Foreign Policy Is IVIade 

The President, the Secretary of State and other Presidential advisers, the Congress, the 
American people — these are the makers of America's foreign policy. The role that each plays in 
the policymaking process is described in this handsomely designed and illustrated pamphlet. 

At the center is the President ; he alone can make the final decisions. The Secretary of State and 
his staff at home and around the world advise and assist the President in devising and executing 
policy and coordinate the foreign affairs activities of numerous other Government agencies. 
Congress, through its legislative powers, helps to shape policy and enables the President to ful- 
fill our programs and commitments. And supporting the whole are the American people, whose 
hopes and ideals shape the goals of our foreign policy. 



To: Sui>t. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washinsrton, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order) . Please 

send me copies of How Foreign Policy Is Made. 



To be mailed 



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City, State, and ZIP code 


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MOV 17 1955 


Vol. LIU, No. 1375 

November 1, 1965 

Address by Secretary Rusk 690 

by Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. TJdall 716 

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 709 

For index see inside back cover 

The Unseen Search for Peace 

Address by Secretary Riisk'^ 

The paramount imperative of our time is 
the search for world peace — genuine peace 
in which all men can live in dignity without 
fear of their neighbors. President Johnson 
has called the search for world peace "the 
assignment of the century."^ It is an as- 
signment which springs from the deepest 
yearnings of our people and is dictated by 
the grim realities of modern weapons. It is 
one to which your Federal Government gives 
the highest priority. 

Our goal is the sort of world community 
sketched in the preamble and articles 1 and 
2 of the United Nations Charter — a world of 
independent nations, each with the institu- 
tions of its own choice but cooperating with 
one another to promote the mutual interests 

' The George Huntington Williams Memorial 
Lecture, made at Johns Hopkins University on Oct. 
16 (press release 245 dated Oct. 15). 

"Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, p. 565. 

of their citizens, a world free of aggression, 
a world which moves toward the rule of law, 
a world in which human rights are secure, 
a world of better life for all of mankind. 

That goal may seem distant. But it is a 
working guide to our foreign policy. Indeed, 
we dare not regard it as merely a dream. 
For unless it is actually achieved, the out- 
look for Homo sapiens is dark indeed. 

The citizen who skims the daily news 
summaries may wonder if we are making 
real progress toward peace. For the world 
is unruly and dangerous. A day in which 
only three or four crises make the front 
page — and only six or eight are mentioned 
in the news — is relatively quiet. The Pres- 
ident and the Secretary of State enjoy the 
dubious advantage of knowing there are ten 
or a dozen additional trouble spots which 
may erupt into crises at any moment. And 
always the President and his advisers have 
on their minds the awesome responsibilities 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a paiijy 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Price: 62 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $16 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 19, 1961). 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers* Guide to Periodical Liter- 



for protecting peace and freedom against 
those who would impose their coercive sys- 
tems on others. 

We dare not let down our guard against 
aggression. The Soviet leadership appears 
to understand what a great war would cost. 
But it remains committed to the support of 
so-called "wars of national liberation." And 
these, in the Communist lexicon, can include 
any war against any non-Communist gov- 

The Chinese Communists are blatant advo- 
cates of violence. Let anyone who doubts 
their militancy read the recent article by 
Marshal Lin Piao, their Defense Minister. It 
is as candid as Hitler's Mein Kampf. 

The militant Communists of Asia will 
have to learn that aggression does not pay. 
That is the issue involved in Viet-Nam. It 
is not without pain for us, as well as for the 
Vietnamese. But if the aggression there is 
not repelled, we would have to expect fur- 
ther and bigger aggressions in the future. 
And when it is defeated there, as it will be, 
the prospects for a stable peace in the West- 
ern Pacific and Asia will be vastly improved. 

But while we do our share — and sometimes 
more — to deter or defeat aggression, we 
work unceasingly to build the kind of world 
envisioned in the United Nations Charter. 
Now and then a constructive event cap- 
tures the headlines : the U.N. Security Coun- 
cil's action in regard to the hostilities be- 
tween India and Pakistan, the visit of Pope 
Paul to the United Nations, with his great 
message, or, to go back further, the test 
ban treaty. 

But there are myriads of constructive ef- 
forts which receive little public attention. 

I shall use this occasion to direct atten- 
tion to the unheadlined — and largely un- 
seen and unheard — search for peace. 

Multiplication of International Conferences 

One rough gage of our involvement with 
the rest of the world is the number of in- 
ternational conferences we attend. At the 
beginning of the century, the United States 
Government took part in perhaps two or 
three multilateral conferences in an aver- 

age year. In 1946, the first year after the 
Second World War, it took part in 141. This 
year we are taking part in approximately 
650. Some last only a day or two, a few last 
for months. On an average working day we 
are attending 15 to 20. 

The list of this month, October 1965, 
numbers more than 60. It includes: 

— the International Conference of the 
Red Cross, in Vienna. 

— the International Symposium on Water 
Desalination, held in Washington. As the 
large-scale desalting of sea water becomes 
cheaper, immense benefits will begin to 
flow to many countries, including the 
United States. And one can envisage the 
time when vast deserts will be cultivated. 

— the Codex Alimentarius Commission of 
the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
This is concerned with food standards, 
which will not only make food products 
safer but enable American products in the 
categories involved to compete better in 
world markets. 

— the South Pacific Commission, in Nou- 
mea, New Caledonia. This is concerned with 
the welfare of the non-self-governing terri- 
tories in the South Pacific. 

— a conference on Sanitary Regulations 
Affecting International Trade in Livestock 
and Meat, under the auspices of the Organi- 
zation for Economic Cooperation and De- 
velopment, in Paris. 

— the World Meteorological Organiza- 
tion's Commission for Instruments and 
Methods of Observation, in Tokyo. 

— a GATT Working Party on Preferences, 
in Geneva. 

— the Plenipotentiary Conference of the 
International Telecommunication Union, in 
Montreux. This began in September and 
will run into November. It is designed to 
modernize the structure of this organiza- 
tion, which deals with wired and vdreless 
communications — among other things, pre- 
venting chaos on the airwaves. 

— the International Atomic Energy Agen- 
cy's Meeting on Radioisotopes in the De- 
velopment of Natural Resources, in Poland. 

— ^the Permanent Executive Committee of 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


the Pan American Highway Congresses, in 

— the Preparatory Meeting on the Asian 
Development Bank, under the auspices of 
the Economic Commission for Asia and the 
Far East, in Bangkok. 

These are just a few of the international 
conferences at which the United States 
Government is represented this month. And 
those in which we took part earlier in the 
year dealt with problems ranging from the 
preservation of polar bears to revision of 
the international rules for seed testing; 
from oil pollution of waters by tankers to 
radio signaling devices; from coconut prod- 
ucts — the United States is the largest mar- 
ket for coconut oil — to patents. 

We don't worry about other nations' re- 
garding our postage stamps as valid. That 
was not so a century ago — that is why 
Lincoln's Postmaster General, Montgomery 
Blair, was instrumental in calling the first 
international meeting on postal matters. 

The steady and undramatic work of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization 
has made possible the safe and comfortable 
air travel which we so much take for 
granted. To cite only one example, the ICAO 
special North Atlantic meeting held in 
Montreal earlier this year established a 
North Atlantic planning group to cooperate 
in further improving civil aviation in the 
area; reduced separation distance for planes 
flying the North Atlantic (without dimin- 
ishing the safety factor), thus permitting 
an increase in traffic ; recommended specific 
improvements in air-to-ground communica- 
tion; and set up an area weather forecast 

The cooperation brought about through 
the World Meteorological Organization has 
made possible the present integrated system 
of world weather reporting, with obvious 
benefits to all nations. 

We have come a long way in the preven- 
tion of communicable diseases since the 
invention of quarantine by the Venetians in 
the 12th century. At that time ships were 
required to wait offshore for 40 days to 
make certain that no disease symptoms 

would develop. Today this kind of waiting 
around is impractical. It is better to prevent 
diseases at their source, or at least to pre- 
vent the transmission of diseases. There is 
now general agreement that international 
travelers should be immunized against cer- 
tain diseases — especially smallpox — before 
they start their journeys. As proof, each 
traveler now carries a yellow cardboard 
form on which accurate records of vaccina- 
tions and other inoculations are kept. This 
form was worked out by the World Health 
Organization. The yellow color is tradi- 
tional: the color of quarantine flags hung 
on ships! 

The World Health Organization and its 
Western Hemisphere affiliate, the Pan 
American Health Organization, have con- 
ducted programs which have had direct, 
and at times spectacular, effects in reduc- 
ing the incidence of disease and in improv- 
ing health conditions in many parts of the 
world. At the WHO conference in Geneva 
in May of this year, steps were taken to 
embark on a program for the worldwide 
eradication of smallpox by 1975. The WHO 
has also proposed a center for the reporting 
from all over the world of adverse drug 
reaction to avoid the kind of tragedy re- 
lated to the use of the drug thalidomide a 
few years ago, and the United States has 
informed the WHO that our Food and Drug 
Administration is prepared to provide facil- 
ities to process such worldwide information. 

As may be inferred from the varied sub- 
jects of these conferences, they involve 
many departments and agencies of our Gov- 
ernment. My Cabinet colleague. Secretary 
of the Interior Udall, is heading our dele- 
gation to the Inter-American Conference on j 
Conservation of Renewable Natural Re- 
sources of the Americas, which convenes 
Monday in Mar del Plata, Argentina. He 
was also honorary chairman of the Inter- | 
national Symposium on Desalination of 1 

Our representative on the Intergovern- J 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization's " 
Working Group on Carriage of Bulk Car- 
goes Other Than Grain is from the National 



Cargo Bureau in New York and his adviser 
is from our Coast Guard. A convention 
negotiated earlier this year under the aus- 
pices of the IMCO will drastically reduce 
paperwork and other red tape connected 
with maritime travel. The head of our dele- 
gation to that conference was a Deputy 
Commissioner of Customs. 

During the last fiscal year we accredited 
more than 3,100 delegates to international 
conferences. Only about two-fifths of these 
came from the Department of State. Four 
hundred and seventy were drawn from pri- 
vate life, and the rest from other parts of 
the United States Government. For example : 
the Department of Agriculture provided 149 
delegates, the Treasury Department 112, the 
Department of Commerce 176, the Depart- 
ment of Health, Education, and Welfare 45, 
the Department of Labor 37, the Federal 
Communications Commission 21, the Atomic 
Energy Commission 51, the Weather Bu- 
reau 3, the Library of Congress 3, and the 
Geological Survey 1. 

Growth of International Institutions 

I have been speaking of multilateral in- 
ternational conferences. We are also mem- 
bers of international institutions which 
operate continuously: for example, the 
World Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund, the Inter-American Bank, the Secu- 
rity Council of the United Nations, the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development. The aggregate contributions 
of such institutions to the building of peace 
is beyond computation. 

Last year we took part in and made finan- 
cial contributions to 71 international orga- 
nizations and programs. At the small end of 
the scale were sums of less than $1,000 each 
to the International Seed Testing Associa- 
tion and the International Whaling Com- 
mission. At the other end were $59 million 
to the United Nations and nine specialized 
agencies, plus $60 million for two of the 
U.N.'s economic development programs, the 
Expanded Program of Technical Assistance 
and the U.N. Special Fund. Americans are 
at work helping nearly all of these organiza- 

tions. Most of them go unheralded and un- 
sung. Yet, were they not hard at work, the 
road to peace would be a little longer and a 
little rougher. 

We are a party to approximately 4,300 
treaties and other international agreements 
in force. Some are old: the oldest is the 
Treaty of Paris of 1783 between ourselves 
and Britain, by which our independence 
was recognized. An "original duplicate 
copy" of that treaty is one of our most 
prized exhibits on the eighth floor of the 
Department of State building. 

Three-fourths of the treaties and other 
international agreements to which we are 
a party were signed in the last 25 years. 
In the phrase of Wilfred Jenks, a "common 
law of mankind" is developing. And its rate 
of growth is rising at a steep angle. 

The law of the sea, which first evolved 
slowly over the centuries, has been further 
developed and codified in recent years. In- 
ternational agreements to regulate aerial 
navigation have had to be worked out in a 
short generation. And within a few years of 
man's first thrusts outward from this 
planet, we are deeply involved in creating 
international regulations and institutions 
to govern activities in space. 

Already the United Nations has devel- 
oped a set of legal principles to govern the 
use of outer space and declared celestial 
bodies free from national appropriation. 
Already nations, including the United States 
and the Soviet Union, have agreed not to 
orbit weapons of mass destruction in outer 
space. The Legal Subcommittee of the 
United Nations Committee on Outer Space is 
in the process of formulating international 
agreements on liability for damage caused 
by the reentry of objects launched into 
outer space and on rescue and return of 
astronauts and space objects. Already the 
first international sounding-rocket range 
has been established in India and is being 
offered for United Nations sponsorship. 

To make orderly space exploration possi- 
ble at this stage, the International Tele- 
communication Union had to allocate radio^ 
frequencies for the purpose. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


To take advantage of the weather report- 
ing and forecasting potential of observation 
satellites, married to computer technology, 
the World Meteorological Organization 
plans to create a vast system of data acqui- 
sition, analysis, and distribution which de- 
pends entirely on international agreement, 
regulation, and standards. 

And to start building a single global 
communications satellite system, we have 
created a novel international institution in 
which a private American corporation 
shares ownership with 45 governments. 

Thus, discovery and invention force us to 
reach out for international agreement, to 
build international institutions, to do things 
in accordance with an expanding interna- 
tional and transnational law. 

We work incessantly on many important 
international problems. And to none do we 
give more intensive and extensive study 
than disarmament. Four years ago we set 
up an agency especially to study and deal 
with this vital problem: the Arms Control 
and Disarmament Agency. Unhappily, it 
has not yet proved possible to make prog- 
ress on international agreements to control 
and reduce armaments. But we will persist 
in our efforts, with every means within our 

And we shall of course continue to sup- 
port and do all we can to strengthen that 
organization which, in the words of Pope 
Paul VI, "represents the obligatory path of 
modern civilization and of world peace" — 
the United Nations. 

Assistance to Developing Countries 

One of the basic policies of the United 
States is assistance to the less developed 
countries of the free world in advancing eco- 
nomically, socially, and politically. These 
comprise more than 80 nations, three- 
fourths of them new since the Second World 
War, covering most of Central and South 
America and Africa and much of Asia and 
containing nearly half of the world's popu- 

The American people have welcomed the 
rise of the former colonial peoples to "the 

separate and equal station to which the 
Laws of Nature and of Nature's God entitle 
them." And we sympathize deeply with the 
aspirations of the less developed nations, 
new and old, to modernize themselves and 
achieve a better life for their peoples. We 
would want to help them move forward 
even if there were no such thing as Com- 
munist imperialism. 

These countries are at various stages of 
development. Some are at the beginning of 
the road; some are on the threshold of self- 
support. Some find themselves on a tread- 
mill because their population is increasing 
as fast as their production. Some have good 
governments; others, including some with 
rich resources, are floundering under in- 
competent leadership. Some are plagued by 
internal disorder, often caused or aggra- 
vated by the Communists. Some are wasting 
energies and resources in quarrels with 

But, overall, the less developed countries 
of the free world have been making eco- 
nomic gains. And in the Western Hem- 
isphere the great cooperative venture in so- 
cial reform and economic progress, the Al- 
liance for Progress, has been picking up mo- 
mentum — although, as on other continents, 
the rate of advance varies from nation to 

Most of our development assistance now 
goes to countries which have instituted nec- 
essary reforms and are dedicated to self- 
help measures. Some countries, chiefly 
those in Africa, receive most of their aid 
from France and the United Kingdom, but 
we too are helping, especially with educa- 
tional and technical assistance. 

More and more we are funneling aid 
through multilateral institutions and ar- 
rangements. Currently we are helping to or- 
ganize an Asian Development Bank, as Presi- 
dent Johnson proposed in his speech here 
last spring.* 

International cooperative efforts continue 
their attack on the literacy front. As Presi- 
dent Johnson has pointed out, more than 700 
million adults — 4 out of 10 of the world's 

'Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 



population — today "dwell in darkness, 
where they cannot read or write."* 

At Tehran, in Iran, last month 500 dele- 
gates from 86 countries agreed that multi- 
lateral and bilateral pilot-project efforts in 
the literacy field should now be undertaken. 
With multinational financial support, this 
action can advance the international literacy 
effort by demonstrating its place in na- 
tional development. 

The many facets of our help to develop- 
ing nations include : 

— our Food for Peace programs, made pos- 
sible by our almost miraculously bountiful 

— the Peace Corps, with more than 12,000 
men and women at work in 46 countries. 

— the technical cooperation activities of 
American universities. Under AID contracts 
alone, 70 universities are engaged in these 
efforts in 39 countries. 

— the American colleges and schools over- 
seas, under various programs of support, 
governmental and private. 

— the diverse activities of many Ameri- 
can foundations. 

— the training programs of the American 
Institute for Free Labor Development, under 
the auspices of the AFL-CIO. It has trained 
nearly 400 Latin American labor leaders in 
its school in Washington, and its 18 worker 
education programs in the field in Latin 
America have reached approximately 30,000 
trainees. Several individual unions have 
overseas education and training programs. 

— the contribution of thousands of other 
Americans through the overseas aid pro- 
grams of other voluntary groups. 

— the thousands of teachers, workers, of- 
ficials, and students brought here for train- 
ing and education. AID brought more than 
6,000 trainees here last year. And many 
thousands more came under our Depart- 
ment of State exchanges or with the help 
of American voluntary organizations. 

Just to list the programs through which 
American voluntary organizations are help- 

• Ibid., Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550. 

ing the developing nations would take longer 
than you would be willing to listen. 

Let us not underestimate the effort that 
will be required to move all the developing 
nations into the modern world. By some 
measurements the gap between them and 
the economically more advanced nations is 
widening. But let us not regard the task as 
insoluble or as one which will require cen- 
turies. Many Americans, like myself, were 
born in underdeveloped parts of the United 
States. The transformation that has oc- 
curred in these areas in a few decades dem- 
onstrates that modernization under free in- 
stitutions need not be a slow process. 

Expansion of Trade and Investment 

American business can contribute might- 
ily to the economic advance of the develop- 
ing nations. There is no substitute for pri- 
vate initiative and good management. 

The more realistic leaders of developing 
nations realize this. They welcome foreign 
investment, with the technical and admin- 
istrative skills it can provide. The contrast 
between the economic progress of these na- 
tions and the relative stagnation of those 
bound by more or less rigid socialist doc- 
trines is increasingly evident. Accordingly, 
leaders in many of the developing countries 
are moving away from old theories and 
fears. More and more they see that the pri- 
vate sector, stimulated and helped by pri- 
vate foreign investment, is an instrument of 
unrivaled efficiency for organizing human 

And American companies have become 
increasingly imaginative and resourceful in 
operating abroad in ways that do not. 
arouse fears of foreign economic domina- 
tion — for example, by cooperation with local 
capital, management contracts, and train- 
ing of local people for the higher man- 
agerial and technical jobs. 

During the last few years the United 
States Government has taken several fur- 
ther steps to help American business to ex- 
pand its role in economic development. 
These include : 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


— the organization of an International 
Executive Service Corps. 

— the negotiation of new^ investment 
guarantee agreements with nine countries 
and expansion of previous agreements with 
five countries. Altogether, we now have 
such agreements with some 80 nations. Last 
year AID alone wrote contracts to protect 
more than $225,522,000 of new American 
private investment. 

— the continued growth of development 
banks and other credit institutions. 

— the provision of more information to 
concerns interested in investing abroad. 

We are, of course, very actively engaged 
also in promoting trade. This is a continu- 
ing high-priority responsibility of our em- 
bassies abroad. 

Our trade has increased impressively — to 
an annual rate of more than $49 billion both 
ways — $21.6 billion in imports and $27.6 bil- 
lion in exports. (These were the levels for 
the second quarter of 1965, seasonally ad- 
justed.) But we want still more trade and 
shall do our best to increase the flow. The 
Kennedy Round of trade negotiations, now 
underway in Geneva, can play a major role 
in achieving this. This is the most ambi- 
tious effort for trade liberalization ever 
undertaken, and we are fully committed to 
its success. 

A rising volume of trade, with the mutual 
benefits it can bring, can help to produce 
a more stable and peaceful world. 

International Exchange Programs 

I have spoken of some of the means by 
which we are helping to build a peaceful 
world : 

— of the growth of international institu- 
tions ; 

— of the multiplication of useful interna- 
tional conferences ; 

— of the expansion of international law ; 

— of our assistance to the developing 
countries in moving forward economically, 
socially, and politically ; 

— of the expansion of international trade 
and investment. 

The unseen — or at least the unheadlined 
— search for peace embraces also the im- 
mense and ever-growing flow of peoples and 
of publications and other communications 
across international boundaries. 

I have alluded to this in connection with 
development assistance. We are equally in- 
terested in expanding and improving our 
relationships with the peoples of the eco- 
nomically advanced countries of the free 
world and with the peoples of the Com- 
munist world. 

Earlier this month President Johnson 
transmitted to the Congress a report on the 
educational and cultural exchange programs 
conducted by the Department of State. These 
programs have become, he said, "an estab- 
lished part of our commitment to interna- 
tional understanding."^ 

The Department's programs, now con- 
ducted under the Fulbright-Hays Act, are 
only a part of the total of exchanges which 
move people to and from this country. But 
during the last 16 years they have brought 
some 70,000 students, teachers, and special- 
ists in various fields to this country and 
sent nearly 30,000 Americans abroad. 

In all, 82,000 foreign students attended 
American colleges and universities last 
year; another 9,000 visitors came here as 
teachers or for research; and more than 
9,000 were serving as interns or residents 
in our hospitals. Some 22,000 Americans 
went abroad for academic purposes. And, 
very important for many reasons, among 
Americans abroad are several hundred 
thousand members of our armed services 
and their families. The statistics on pass- 
ports and visas are worth noting. In 1946 
we issued passports to approximately 189,- 
000 American citizens. In 1964 we issued 
more than 1,133,000. In 1946 we issued 
337,000 visas to foreigners. In 1964 we 
issued 1,317,000. 

In both the sciences and the arts there 
are flourishing international communities. 
Thousands of professional people go abroad 
every year to attend meetings with their 

'Ibid., Oct. 25, 1965, p. 673. 



colleagues in other countries. Scientific in- 
formation moves across international bor- 
ders as rapidly as it is published. Inter- 
national sporting events are increasing by 
leaps and bounds. And so are the import 
and export of books, magazines, newspapers, 
and cultural activities from discotheque to 
ballet and from the Beatles to symphony 

Exchange programs encourage intercom- 
munication among people in a broad variety 
of fields. Groups of foreign journalists and 
broadcasters attend study programs at In- 
diana and Syracuse Universities and gain 
inside views of American newspaper and 
radio and television operations. Experts in 
cardiology go abroad to discuss current 
techniques in this field. Agricultural and 
home economics extension leaders from 
some 40 countries come for a special semi- 
nar at South Dakota State University. So 
runs the broad sweep of this two-way flow. 

With both government and private sup- 
port, a program originated in Cleveland — 
and now embracing four additional cities — 
has brought more than 1,000 youth leaders 
and social workers from some three score 
countries to this country for 4 months of 
study, work, and observation, during the 
last 10 years. 

Since 1947 the Salzburg Seminar in 
American Studies in Austria has been a 
center of intellectual communication in 
which some 5,000 Western Europeans and 
400 Americans have participated, the latter 
as visiting faculty. This important institu- 
tion completed its 100th session last month. 

Communication Among Scientists 

In this era of scientific discovery at an 
unprecedented pace, international commu- 
nication among scientists is of great and 
growing importance. And, even more impor- 
tant, communication often leads to coopera- 

By a very rough estimate, 20,000 Ameri- 
can scientists now join wdth some 80,000 
of their foreign colleagues at approximately 
2,000 international scientific meetings every 

Several agencies of our Federal Govern- 
ment invest in scientific research performed 
by foreign investigators. This research is 
carried on in fields ranging from agricul- 
ture to zoology, and from nuclear physics 
to archeology, in countries on every conti- 
nent. Hundreds of foreign scientists thus 
work in close cooperation with their Ameri- 
can counterparts, to the mutual benefit of 
all. The Department of State necessarily 
works to see that the projects in substance 
and in their collaborative character are 
compatible with U. S. foreign objectives. 

Examples of research include those sup- 
ported by HEW's Vocational Rehabilitation 
Administration in such countries as Yugo- 
slavia, India, Pakistan, and Israel. These 
embrace methods of rehabilitating and fit- 
ting for useful work the blind and victims 
of leprosy, cardiac disorders, and other dis- 
eases. In those countries and others, our 
National Institutes of Health assist with 
P.L. 480 funds projects relating to the pre- 
vention and eventual eradication of cholera, 
the study of cancer in particular situations, 
analysis of hypertension, and many other 
matters affecting the health of mankind. 

Cooperative research in radiation sterili- 
zation technique has resulted in the elimi- 
nation of the screwworm from the Island of 
Curacao. United States scientists are cur- 
rently participating in studies in Central 
America in which irradiation techniques are 
being employed in the control of the Medi- 
terranean fruitfly. 

American and Japanese scientists, in gen- 
eral association, are measuring the age of 
rocks in the Pacific basin in order to under- 
stand the history of the earth and are 
studying the Pacific volcanic "ring of fire." 
They are trying to predict the paths of 
hurricanes and typhoons, knowledge of 
which may save hundreds of lives and mil- 
lions of dollars' worth of property each year. 

United States Government collaboration 
in, and support to, scientific research in 
Western Europe and Britain have been ex- 
tensive, ranging from such subjects as aero- 
dynamics, through radiation for the preser- 
vation of food, to meteorology. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


Ranger photographs of the moon and 
Mariner photographs of Mars have been dis- 
tributed to leading astronomers and other 
interested scientists, for their study and 
comment, in more than 40 countries, on both 
sides of the Iron Curtain, and are available 
to all for study and interpretation. Foreign 
scientists are invited to propose individual 
experiments for inclusion in the larger 
NASA satellites and in project Apollo. To 
help them in considering these opportuni- 
ties, NASA has arranged for special brief- 
ings on various aspects of satellite flights. 
Many proposals have been made and several 
selected for flight. 

The AEC supplies depositary libraries in 
62 foreign countries and in 5 international 
organizations with research and develop- 
ment reports and other important informa- 
tional material. There are currently some 
60,000 titles in the collections abroad, which 
are made readily available to the interested 
scientific workers. The AEC has initiated a 
"sister laboratory" program with foreign 
nuclear research centers. Several countries 
cooperating in the Atoms for Peace pro- 
gram are in the initial phases of nuclear 
energy development. A close relationship 
with a major U.S. research institute, such 
as that established between the Cekmece 
Center in Istanbul and the Brookhaven 
National Laboratory, or that between the 
Korean Atomic Energy Research Institute 
in Seoul and the Argonne National Labora- 
tory, facilitates interaction in reactor re- 
search programs. 

There are literally thousands of arrange- 
ments by U.S. agencies to exchange scien- 
tific and technical information with almost 
every nation in the world. The Department 
of Agriculture, for example, has some 7,000 
such arrangements with more than 120 na- 
tions, colonies, and territories, including 112 
arrangements with the U.S.S.R. and over 
250 with Eastern Europe. That Department 
alone sends out some 200,000 items per year 
and receives some 216,000. 

The little-known International Commit- 
tee for Information Retrieval by Examining 
Patent Offices (ICIREPAT) is a tightly 

knit, small, governmental organization of 
patent authorities from the United States 
and a score of other developed nations. In 
an atmosphere of friendship and smooth 
working relations, they share their profes- 
sional experiences and attack common prob- 
lems by regular meetings, exchanges of 
individuals for lengthy working visits, et 

Research Cooperation With U.S.S.R. 

The U.S. Coast and Geodetic Survey has 
agreed with sister agencies in Japan and 
the U.S.S.R. to implement a system for 
urgent exchange of warnings of impending 
tsunamis. The tsunami is a sea wave caused 
by earthquakes, which can reach huge pro- 
portions and has often caused extensive loss 
of life and property in the regions border- 
ing the Pacific Ocean. For many years the 
Coast and Geodetic Survey has been ex- 
changing data on earthquakes with most 
nations of the earth. Exchanges of such data 
between the Soviet Union and the United 
States have continued without interruption 
through all the periods of political tension 
since the Second World War. 

Sustained research cooperation with the 
Russians goes on in the Antarctic, where 
scientific bases of both countries have for 
several years had resident scientists of the 
other nationality. United States and Rus- 
sian oceanographic vessels in Antarctic 
waters have exchanged data. The Antarctic 
Treaty, in force since 1961, has been the 
vehicle for increased mutual research enter- 
prise involving also other Western nations 
and, recently, Poland and Czechoslovakia. 

International Cooperation Year 

These examples of international coopera- 
tion are only small waves in the great 
ocean of international affairs. Yet the cu- 
mulative effect is great. Cooperation is not 
only habit-forming in the specific fields in 
which it is practiced; it is also infectious. | 
Once nations get used to working with each 
other, to seeking — together — practical an- 
swers to practical problems, it then seems 



natural to look to the art of international 
cooperation for the sensible solution of other 
problems. In some ways nations are like 
people: The one who is always looking for 
opportunity to work with others is more 
likely to be successful — and happy — than 
the one who goes around with chips on both 

For almost a year now — since Interna- 
tional Cooperation Year began — private 
citizens and public officials here and abroad 
have been serving on committees to review 
activities that bring their countries into 
continuing cooperative association and to 
recommend further cooperative activities. 
The proposals of our own committees will 
be reviewed at a White House Conference 
on International Cooperation called by 
President Johnson for late next month.® 

Contacts and exchanges in many areas of 
learning and cultural achievement are in- 
creasing by leaps and bounds. 

I would be remiss as a guest if I did not 
mention the fine work of the Bologna Center 
of the Johns Hopkins University. In 10 years, 
some 500 students — American and Euro- 
pean — have spent a year there in graduate 
study in international affairs. I understand 
approximately 100 of them are now in the 
foreign service of their respective coun- 
tries; others are in business or teaching or 
in the service of international organiza- 

And I would be remiss as a citizen if I 
did not pay tribute to the many thousands 
of American citizens who help to improve 
our international relations by providing hos- 
pitality and guidance to students and other 
foreign visitors to our shores. 

Future of International Education 

Last month, at the bicentennial celebra- 
tion at the Smithsonian Institution, President 
Johnson gave to scholars from 80 nations a 
view of the future of international educa- 
tion as he would like to see it.^ He an- 

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 6, 1965, p. 383. 
' Ibid., Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550. 

nounced the creation of a special task force 
"to recommend a broad and long-range plan 
of worldwide educational endeavor." 

"We mean to show," he said, "that this 
nation's dream of a Great Society does not 
stop at the water's edge and that it is not 
just an American dream. All are welcome to 
share in it. All are invited to contribute to 

"Together we must embark on a new and 
noble adventure : 

"First, to assist the education effort of 
the developing nations and the developing 

"Second, to help our schools and universi- 
ties increase their knowledge of the world 
and the people who inhabit it. 

"Third, to advance the exchange of stu- 
dents and teachers who travel and work 
outside their native lands. 

"Fourth, to increase the free flow of 
books and ideas and art, of works of 
science and imagination. 

"And fifth, to assemble meetings of men 
and women from every discipline and every 
culture to ponder the common problems of 

And he added that : 

"In all these endeavors I pledge that the 
United States will play its full role. By 
January I intend to present such a program 
to the Congress." 

Those are some of the major parts of the 
unheadlined, and largely unseen and un- 
heard, search for peace: a search that is 
pursued day after day beneath the dan- 
gerous threats and crises of this turbulent 
world, a search to which the American 
people and Government are profoundly dedi- 
cated, to which they have devoted immense 
resources, and in which I am sure they will 
persevere. And, despite frustrations and 
setbacks, this search has made headway 
and is gathering momentum. 

The road ahead is long and rough. But we 
can push ahead with the confidence that 
comes from knowing that we are moving in 
the right direction and that the goal we seek 
is the goal of a great majority of mankind. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


U.S. Position on Importation 
of Yugoslav Tobacco 

Following is the text of a letter from the 
Secretaries of State, Defense, and Com- 
merce to the six major American cigarette 
manufacturers, together with a statement 
of the manufacturers to which the letter 

Press release 240 dated October 11 

letter to cigarette manufacturers 

October 11, 1965 
The American Tobacco Company 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation 
Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company 
P. Lorillard Company 
Philip Morris Incorporated 
R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 

Dear Sirs : It has been called to our atten- 
tion that certain organized pressure groups 
are seeking, by economic intimidation, to 
compel American cigarette companies to 
discontinue the purchase of Yugoslav to- 
bacco. This incident is the most recent in a 
series of similar attempts by such groups 
to frustrate peaceful private trade with 
Eastern European countries. We feel it im- 
portant that you understand the views of 
the United States Government on this sub- 
ject, and that these views be given the 
widest dissemination. 

Under our American system, trade is 
governed by the individual economic inter- 
ests of the trading parties. Congress and 
the Executive Branch have provided laws 
and regulations to assure that nothing is 
traded with any Communist country that 
will be detrimental to our national security 
and welfare. In the case of certain countries, 
such as Communist China, Cuba, North 
Korea and North Viet-Nam, trade is — with 
minor humanitarian exceptions — prohibited. 

On the other hand, your Government 
regards commerce in peaceful goods with 
the countries of Eastern Europe, including 
the Soviet Union, as completely compatible 
with our national interest. No American 

business enterprise should be penalized for 
purchasing or selling such goods. In fact, 
any individuals or groups that seek to in- 
timidate, boycott, blacklist, use or threaten 
economic reprisals against such American 
enterprises for carrying on lawful trade 
with Eastern European countries act harm- 
fully and irresponsibly. To yield to such 
groups is to encourage capricious interfer- 
ence with the vital processes of our Consti- 
tutional Government — interference that 
could at the end of the road make it im- 
possible for our country to conduct a co- 
herent foreign policy. 

Americans know that there are recog- 
nized and responsible ways by which they 
may object to any governmental policy with 
which they disagree. Every citizen has the 
Constitutional right to speak freely, to peti- 
tion his government for redress of griev- 
ances and to exercise the franchise. But it 
is the Federal Government that must direct 
the relations of the United States with 
other nations. Our Constitution entrusts the 
President and the Congress with the con- 
duct of United States foreign affairs. 

These principles directly apply to the 
campaign of economic intimidation now 
being mounted against your industry. The 
importation of Yugoslav tobacco, which 
constitutes less than one percent of all 
tobacco used in American cigarettes, is en- 
tirely consistent with our national security. 
The right of American business enterprises 
to purchase this tobacco on the basis of 
their freely-exercised judgment as to the 
economic desirability of such a course — 
without fear of reprisals — should be fully 
preserved if the objectives of our foreign 
policy are not to be undermined by the 
whim or prejudice of any organized pres- 
sure group. J 

We are advised that the cigarette indus- ■ 
try, after consultation with the United 
States Government, has condemned these 
threats of intimidation and has announced 
its intention to continue to purchase or not 
to purchase Yugoslav tobacco on the basis 
of individual judgments. We commend your 
industry for refusing to submit to such 



intimidation, which would have the effect 
of substituting private opinions and preju- 
dices for the declared foreign policy of the 
United States. 

Dean Rusk 
Secretary of State 

Robert S. McNamara 
Secretary of Defeiise 

John T. Connor 
Secretary of Commerce 


October 11, 1965. 

Certain cigarette manufacturers in the United 
States have recently received inquiries regarding 
the use of Yugoslav tobacco in their cigarettes and 
have been threatened with boycott unless each of 
such firms now using Yugoslav tobacco agrees not 
to use such tobacco in the future. 

On the September 26 "Face the Nation" program, 
Under Secretary of State George Ball was questioned 
about a similar situation. He was asked what the 
administration's position is on the problem of 
attempts by certain groups in this country to boy- 
cott the shipment of American goods to Eastern 
Europe. In replying, Secretary Ball pointed out that 
the policy of the United States with regard to trade 
with Eastern Europe is not merely a decision by 
this administration but by the Eisenhower and other 
recent administrations, and further said: 

"It is absolutely unacceptable that right wing or 
left wing or any other kind of group should by 
intimidation or by threat of boycott try to subvert 
or to undermine the foreign policy of the United 
States, which has to be conducted by the President 
and Congress under the American Constitution." 

All the major cigarette manufacturers endorse 
Secretary Ball's statement. They condemn and refuse 
to be influenced by any effort by any group to 
oppose or affect the foreign policy of the United 
States by economic sanctions, including boycott, di- 
rected at the industry or any member of it. 

Yugoslav tobacco is used in varying quantities in 
the manufacture of cigarettes by all but one of the 
undersigned manufacturers. However, each of the 
undersigned manufacturers recognizes the right of 
its competitors to use such tobacco and reserves the 
right itself to use or not to use such tobacco in 
accordance with its own best judgment. 

The American Tobacco Company 

Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corporation 

Liggett & Myers Tobacco Company 

P. Lorillard Company 

Philip Morris Incorporated 

R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company 

U.S.S.R. Falters in Economic Growtli 
Race Witli tlie United States 

The following memorandum, prepared by 
the Department of State in consultation 
with other interested agencies, was made 
available to the press on October U. 

September 1965 

Summary and Conclusions 

Since 1960 the U.S.S.R. has made no 
progress toward its fundamental economic 
goal of catching up with the U.S. in total 
and per capita output. The rate of growth 
in the U.S.S.R. — which in the decade of 
the 1950's was double that in the U.S. — has 
been slowing down in the 1960's, whereas 
U.S. growth has been picking up in an era 
of unprecedented prosperity and orderly 
expansion. Thus in the period 1961-65 the 
average annual rate of growth in the two 
economies has been the same, but, because 
the U.S. economy is twice as large, the abso- 
lute gap in output was widened by approx- 
imately $60 billion. 1 Rates of growth in the 
gross national product (GNP) for both 
countries are shown in Figure 1. 

Soviet growth, which in the 1950's av- 
eraged an impressive 61/^ percent a year, 
has slowed down to a yearly average of 
about 41/2 percent. This lower rate of 
growth is still respectable by the standards 
of modern industrial nations but is below 
both what the Soviet leadership has come 
to expect and what is necessary to support 
the leadership's worldwide ambitions. The 
slowdown is attributable especially to three 
fundamental developments: (1) the expan- 
sion of Soviet military programs that have 
taken high-quality men, machinery, and 
materials needed for modernizing the econ- 
omy; (2) the failure of Soviet agriculture 
to provide a rapidly expanding and reliable 
supply of food and industrial raw materials ; 
and (3) the using up of most of the possi- 
bilities for low-cost exploitation of Western 

^ Rates of growth in this memorandum have been 
calculated from data corrected for price changes. 
Dollar values are given in 1964 U.S. dollars unless 
otherwise indicated. [Footnote in original.] 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


advances in science and in manufacturing 
techniques. Furthermore, Soviet economic 
Institutions are inherently sluggish in ab- 
sorbing modern technology and turning out 
the complex products of present-day eco- 
nomic life. On the other side of the equation, 
the rise in U.S. grovi^th in the 1960's is the 
result of a combination of favorable factors, 
including vigorous and sustained spending 
by business firms on new capital plant, the 
success of government fiscal measures, and 
steady advances in consumer income and 

Comparing a market economy valued in 
dollars to a planned economy valued in 
rubles is a notoriously uncertain business. 
The present comparisons are biased in favor 
of the U.S.S.R. in that the poor quality of 
Soviet production and the failure of the 
system to respond to the demands of indus- 
try and consumers have not been fully taken 
into account. But a caution in the opposite 
direction is even more important: in spite 
of the slowdown in growth, the Soviet 
economy is still growing rapidly, and its 
very considerable energies are still being 
concentrated on uses that seriously chal- 
lenge U.S. national security interests. 

As shown in Figure 1, year-to-year rates 
of growth differ widely within both the 
Soviet and U.S. economies, but for entirely 
different reasons. In the U.S.S.R., agricul- 
ture accounts for a large part of GNP, and 
changes in weather conditions result in great 
fluctuations in agricultural production and 
hence in GNP. In the U.S., in contrast, fluc- 
tuations in annual growth are tied to 
changes in nonagricultural business inven- 
tories, in business needs for additional plant 
capacity, in consumer spending on durable 
goods, and in government fiscal policy. 

For the year 1965 a forecast of economic 
performance can be made with much 
greater assurance in the case of the U.S. 
than the U.S.S.R., where final agricultural 
results are still uncertain. In the U.S. the 
pattern of business conditions for the past 
6 months foreshadows business conditions 
for the next 6 months, especially in a period 
of sustained and balanced prosperity. The 

forecast for 1965 of the President's Council 
of Economic Advisers, for a 4-percent in- 
crease in GNP in real terms, is used in this 
memorandum. In the U.S.S.R. the overall 
rate of growth in 1965 will be much less 
than the 7 percent achieved in 1964 because 
the 12-percent increase in agricultural pro- 
duction in 1964 makes that year hard to 
improve on. In 1965, crops will show a drop 
from 1964 — a drop that may be only partly 
offset by gains in livestock which is bene- 
fiting from the large feed crops of 1964. 
Drought in the "new lands" has damaged 
the wheat crop, and on the basis of current 
evidence, Soviet agricultural output as a 
whole is estimated to drop 4 percent in 1965. 
Soviet industrial production in 1965 will 
grow at a rate of roughly 6 percent — up 
from 5 percent in 1964 because of the im- 
proved supply of agricultural raw materials 
carried over from 1964. Because of the cur- 
rent agricultural difficulties, Soviet GNP 
probably will increase only about 3 percent 
in 1965. 

The long-run slowdown in Soviet growth 
is the result of persistent underlying eco- 
nomic forces and is not likely to be reversed 
over the next five years. In 1966-70, Soviet 
growth possibly will be greater than in the 
U.S. — but this is not assured. Suppose that 
over the next five years the U.S.S.R. is able 
to halt the declining trend in the rate of 
growth which has developed in recent years 
and maintains for example a rate of 4i/^ 
percent, while the U.S. economy continues 
to grow at a rate of 4 percent. Then Soviet 
GNP in 1970 would still be about 50 pei'cent 
of U.S. GNP, and the absolute gap between 
U.S. and Soviet GNP would have widened 
by $60 billion more. 

I. Introduction 

From the beginning the leaders of the 
U.S.S.R. have made the growth race with 
the West the heart and soul of Soviet 
economic policy: 

1919 — Lenin 

. . . either perish or overtake the advanced coun- 
tries . . . and surpass them economically. 



USSR AND US ^-^sure 1 





Bate year 19SO 







Bate year /960 

1931 — Stalin 

We are fifty to a hundred years behind the ad- 
vanced countries. We must make good this distance 
in ten years. Either we do it or they will crush us. 

1961 — Khrushchev 

Some people in foreigrn countries used to ask, "Mr. 
Khrushchev, do you really expect to catch up with 
America economically?" Today no one raises this 
question in this way; instead I am asked, "Mr. 
Khrushchev ... in what year will you catch up 
with America?" . . . My reply is, "You can write 
down in your little notebook that we will overtake 
you in per capita industrial production by 1970." 

These three quotations are only a sample 
of the many statements by Khrushchev and 
his predecessors of the importance — and the 
inevitability — of catching up with the U.S. 
economically. First the U.S. would be over- 
taken in the production of major commodi- 
ties, then in total output, and finally in per 
capita output. Sheer physical growth was 
to be the criterion of success, and here the 
Soviet leaders seemed to be loading the dice 
in their own favor, for in spite of its rough 
edges the Soviet economy appeared to be a 
powerful engine of growth. However, as 

Khrushchev found out, other major require- 
ments besides growth — the military and 
space programs are the most dramatic ex- 
amples — had to be accommodated, and the 
economy became overloaded. Economic com- 
mitments grew faster than productive ca- 
pacity. Khrushchev's erratic and unsuccess- 
ful attempts to cut the suit to fit the cloth 
were an important element in the events 
leading to his downfall last October. Even 
before he was deposed, less and less was 
heard of the claim that the U.S.S.R. would 
soon overhaul the U.S. economically. Khru- 
shchev's successors have been quite cautious 
in dealing with this theme. Thus, Premier 
Kosygin has spoken of the general strength 
of the Socialist system in the economic 
competition with capitalism, but he has not 
referred specifically to catching up with 
the U.S. 

II. Slowdown in the Soviet Growth Rate 

The rate of growth of Soviet GNP has 
slowed down from about 6V2 percent in 
the 1950's to about 41/2 percent in the 
1960's. In examining the causes of the slow- 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


down, three components of Soviet GNP may 
be identified: (1) industrial production, 
which has declined fairly steadily from an 
average annual rate of growth of 8 percent 
in 1956-60 ^ down to 6 percent in 1961-65; 
(2) agricultural production, which has been 
subject to wide year-to-year fluctuations 
and has grown at an average annual rate 
of about 3 percent in 1956-65; and (3) 
trade, transportation, and other services, 
whose combined rate of growth normally 
lies somewhere between the rate for indus- 
try and the rate for agriculture but closer 
to industry. The fairly steady long-term de- 
cline in industry's rate of growth gives a 
long-term downward trend to GNP growth, 
whereas the erratic performance in agricul- 
ture leads to short-term fluctuations in 
GNP, as shown in Figure 2. 

The slowdown in Soviet economic growth 
is the result of many factors, but from the 
vantage point of mid-1965 a few key points 
may be singled out for attention : 

(1) The expansion of defense expendi- 
tures after 1958 preempted a large share of 
the high-quality resources most needed to 
modernize industry and agriculture. The 
new military programs proved to be vora- 
cious consumers of the best scientific and 
engineering talent, the most costly and com- 
plex machinery, and the newest alloys and 
other high-cost materials. 

(2) Linked with the first factor was the 
failure of agriculture to provide a reliable 
domestic source of food and raw materials 
for industry. Growth in agriculture had al- 
ways trailed growth in industry, and indeed 
the backwardness of Soviet agriculture was 
part of the price paid for rapid industrial 
growth. Under Khrushchev, large invest- 
ments were made in agriculture, yet time 
and again agriculture failed to meet the 
goals set by the central planners. The near- 
disastrous harvest of 1963 dramatized the 
failure of the Soviet leadership in dealing 
with agricultural problems; on this occasion 

' Throughout this memorandum, when a rate of 
growth is given for a period of years (say, 1961-65), 
the base period for the calculation is the preceding 
year (in this case, 1960). [Footnote in original.] 

about 11 million metric tons (mt) of wheat 
and flour had to be imported from the 
capitalistic West at a cost of almost $1 
billion. And again in 1965, agricultural 
failures are resulting in large-scale imports 
of grain and are dimming what hopes the 
Soviet leaders still cherish of restoring the 
old rates of economic grovrth. 

(3) The Soviet economy in the 1950's 
benefited greatly by adopting new technol- 
ogy and manufacturing processes from the 
West at relatively little cost. But when the 
Soviet leaders had to solve their own prob- 
lems — for example, in the space field — 
they could no longer bypass the costly re- 
search stage by leaning on the West, and 
when imported Western technology became 
more difficult to absorb in the Soviet econ- 
omy — for example, in the chemical in- 
dustry — large gains in output were no 
longer easy to achieve without incurring 
normal "start-up" costs. 

(4) Investment in new fixed plant and 
equipment in the U.S.S.R. in the 1950's in- 
creased at the amazingly rapid pace of 12 to 
13 percent a year, while GNP increased at 
61/2 percent a year. These rates meant that 
fixed investment was rapidly increasing as 
a share of Soviet GNP, from 17 percent of 
GNP in 1955 to 24 percent in 1960. After 
1960, however, when other commitments 
grew, investment increased at less than half 
its former pace and no longer grew as a 
percent of GNP. Thus the grovs^th in the 
Soviet economy in the 1950's was powered by 
a rapid step-up in investment, whereas in 
the 1960's the planners have had to settle 
for smaller percentage increases in invest- 
ment — and in overall economic growth. 
Moreover, the Soviet leaders have tried to 
compensate for the decreased rate of growth 
in investment by keeping old capacity in 
operation. Consequently, the inability to sus- 
tain the extraordinarily high rates of growth 
in investment has carried with it a general 
obsolescing of productive capacity and pro- 
duction methods. 

A number of other forces are intertwined 
in this tangle of causes of the Soviet slow- 
down — for example, the problems of man- ■ 




Figure 2 



1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965* 






* projected 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


agement in a "command" economy and the 
problems of coping with more sophisticated 
consumer tastes and of designing and pro- 
ducing a more complex output mix in both 
consumer and capital goods. As an illustra- 
tion of these difficulties, a number of ex- 
pedients adopted under Khrushchev at- 
tacked certain of these problems while mak- 
ing others worse — when construction proj- 
ects fell behind schedule, for example, 
housing was almost invariably the sector 
that suffered in the resulting reshuffle of 

Even though the Soviet economy is falter- 
ing in its growth race with the U.S., a re- 
minder is needed about the basic economic 
strength of the U.S.S.R. The present rate of 
growth is quite respectable for a modern in- 
dustrial nation. At the current average rate 
of growth of 41/2 percent, Soviet GNP would 
double in 16 years. The U.S.S.R. is maintain- 
ing a military and space establishment that 
in dollar terms costs about 80 percent of the 
U.S. military and space establishment. Fur- 
thermore, the U.S.S.R. continues to score 
spectacular space successes. In short, the 
Soviet leadership may command only half 
the economic firepower of the U.S., but 
this power is concentrated in support of 
worldwide activities of serious consequence 
to U.S. security interests. 

III. Rise in the U.S. Growth Rate 

As the Soviet growth rate has moved down 
in the last few years, the U.S. grovd;h 
rate has moved up to meet it. In mid-1965 the 
U.S. is enjoying an unparalleled stretch of 
orderly peacetime prosperity, now well into 
its fifth year. Gross national product, in- 
dustrial production, employment, investment 
in new plant, consumption — all the major 
indicators of economic performance — are 

' The reduction in the workweek in industry from 
46 to 41 hours in 1956-61 perhaps could be cited as a 
factor in the slowdown in Soviet economic growth. 
This reduction, however, was made contingent on 
there being no reduction in output per man and in 
any case is a nonrecurring factor whose effect on 
economic growth rates would be felt for a few 
years only. [Footnote in original.] 

at new heights. This memorandum does not 
purport to analyze the U.S. speedup in the 
same detail as the Soviet slowdown, but the 
following factors may be noted : 

(1) Investment by business in new plant 
and equipment has grown rapidly and has 
kept abreast of the need for additional pro- 
ductive capacity. 

(2) Consumption by household units has 
risen steadily in concert with rapidly rising 
consumer income. 

(3) Government expenditures and taxes 
have been dovetailed with the private econ- 
omy in such a way that total spending has 
moved up parallel to rising productive capa- 

An interesting aspect of U.S. performance 
in the growth race is that even in industrial 
production the U.S. has matched the U.S.S.R. | 
stride for stride in percentage growth since 
1961. Of course, in absolute terms U.S. in- 
dustrial production is growing much more 
rapidly — more than double the Soviet growth. 

IV. Prospects for Soviet Gross National 
Product in 1965 

Growth of Soviet GNP in 1965 is likely 
to be mediocre when judged by past Soviet 
standards and disappointing when compared 
with the hopes of the new regime. The 
growth in the industrial component of Soviet 
GNP can be fairly well estimated on the 
basis of information available at midyear, 
whereas the course of agricultural output 
still cannot be ascertained within wide 
limits. In industry, production should be ap- 
proximately 6 percent above the 1964 level, 
a rate of growth slightly above the 5-percent 
rate achieved in 1964. In heavy industry, 
expansion in 1965 continues in the same pat- 
tern as last year and is based on the con- 
tinuing and more-or-less-synchronized ex- 
pansion of (1) capital plant ; (2) supplies of 
fuels, construction materials, and other in- 
dustrial raw materials; and (3) technical 
skill, as reflected in increased output per 
man and machine. In consumer goods in- 
dustry, the picture in 1965 is dominated 
by the increased supply of livestock products 
and other agricultural raw materials for the 



food-processing branches, a result of the ex- 
cellent crops in 1964. 

In agriculture, crop production in 1965 is 
well below the record level of 1964. Wheat 
output has been particularly affected by 
drought in the "new lands" regions of West- 
ern Siberia, Northern Kazakhstan, and the 
Urals, which are the main spring wheat 
areas of the U.S.S.R. Since 1 July the 
U.S.S.R. has purchased about 7 million mt of 
wheat and flour from Canada and Argentina 
for delivery in 1965-66. At present the 
yield from grain crops as a whole, however, 
does not appear to be as bad as in 1963. 
In contrast to crops, output of livestock 
products has risen in 1965 because of the 
large supplies of feeds provided by the 
bumper crops of 1964. A further favorable 
factor in Soviet agriculture in 1965 stems 
from the lifting of restrictions imposed by 
Khrushchev on the size of private farm 
plots and on the number of private livestock. 
Supplies of food products, especially in lo- 
cal markets, received a fillip under the new, 
more permissive regulations. As for the 
massive investment program for agriculture, 
announced by Brezhnev in March, these plans 
for the revitalization of Soviet agriculture 
are mainly long run, and results were not 
expected to show up in 1965 except per- 
haps in the case of some of the new higher 
procurement prices. On the basis of current 
evidence, a 4-percent drop in total agricul- 
tural production is estimated for 1965. 

Agriculture accounts for something less 
than one-third of Soviet GNP and industry 
for somewhat more than one-third. The re- 
maining one-third is a diverse group of 
products and services which includes con- 
struction, transportation, trade, communica- 
tions, education, health, and government ad- 
ministration. A large segment of this mis- 
cellaneous third rises or falls according to 
the fortunes of agriculture and industry. 
For example, the transport system carries 
the products of industry and agriculture 
and the trade network distributes them. 
Thus the increase of activity in this mis- 
cellaneous third, taken as a whole, typically 
falls between the rate of growth in in- 

dustrial output and the rate of growth in 
agriculture but is closer to the industrial 
rate. In 1965, if industrial output advances 
6 percent and agricultural output falls 4 
percent, GNP as a whole will grow at about 
3 percent, or less than in any year in the 
last decade with the exception of 1963. 

V. Prospects for U.S. Gross National 
Product in 1965 

The GNP of the U.S. for 1965 can be 
predicted on a much firmer basis from the 
vantage point of September 1965 than can 
that of the U.S.S.R. because (1) fluc- 
tuations in U.S. agricultural output have rela- 
tively little effect on GNP; (2) the present 
sustained period of prosperity in the U.S. 
has a forward momentum of at least six 
months; and (3) U.S. data are published 
openly and promptly. At the beginning of 
1965 the President's Council of Economic 
Advisers forecast a GNP in 1965 in current 
dollars of $660 billion plus or minus $5 bil- 
lion. In real terms this represents a 4-per- 
cent increase plus or minus three-fourths of 
a percentage point. As of September the 
economy is on course (perhaps even a little 
ahead of schedule), and the result for the 
whole year probably will be at least a 4- 
percent gain. 

VI. Prospects for Soviet and U.S. Gross 
National Product, 1966-70 

During the new five-year period, 1966- 
70, the factors that have dictated a slow- 
down in Soviet economic growth are likely 
to persist. Attempts to restore rates of 
growth in industry would be largely at the 
expense of agriculture and perhaps defense, 
and in turn new large-scale investment in 
agriculture would reduce the extent to which 
industry could be modernized. In summary, 
the prospects for growth in GNP have not 
improved, and a matching of recent perform- 
ance is the most likely prospect. Agricul- 
tural production will continue to fluctuate 
greatly year to year because of weather, 
and in individual years growth in GNP will 
reflect this erratic movement. 

Developments in the first three quarters 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


of 1965 reinforce the estimate of a con- 
tinuation of recent growth trends in 1966-70 
as opposed to the 6- to 7-percent level of 
the 1950's. Premier Kosygin has been speak- 
ing almost wistfully of how nice it would be 
to reduce the amount of resources going for 
military purposes as opposed to consumer 
use but how impossible such a transfer is 
at this time in world affairs. Beyond the 
effect of military programs on growth rates, 
however, there have been other signs point- 
ing toward a continuation of the more mod- 
erate pace of growth as likely for the 
Soviet economy: (1) There is increasing 
evidence that the Soviet leadership is being 
pushed by a diversity of forces toward a 
more generous future allocation of resources 
to consumers — for example, the large in- 
crease in planned investment in agriculture, 
more manufactured goods for rural areas, 
higher real incomes for pensioners, and 
even private automobiles for the upper mid- 
dle class. (2) There is evidence that the 
difficulties — both political and economic — 
in reforming administrative systems and 
practices thoughout the economy are a great 
deal tougher than the "reformers" had bar- 
gained for. (3) Furthermore, the present 
economic system of the U.S.S.R. is being 
revealed as even less suited than was 
formerly believed to meeting the complex 
tasks of modern economic life — for instance, 
the system shows up as very clumsy in 
distributing workers among geographical 
areas, among industries, and among occupa- 
tions. (4) Difficulties in agriculture per- 
sist — with a resulting need for food im- 
ports instead of the traditional food ex- 
ports — and the inputs that Brezhnev talked 
about for agriculture in his speech last 
March may not be available in the quantities 
or at the time specified; consequently, for- 
eign machinery needed to modernize Soviet 
industry cannot be imported in the amounts 
hoped for by the Soviet planner because 
large food imports are necessary from time 
to time. 

As for U.S. GNP, the estimate of the 
President's Council of Economic Advisers 
is for a growth rate averaging "about 4 
percent a year." Suppose that over the next 

five years the U.S.S.R. is able to halt the 
declining trend in the rate of grovvi;h which 
has developed in recent years and maintains 
for example a rate of 4i/^ percent, while the 
U.S. economy continues to grow at a rate of 
4 percent. Soviet GNP in 1970 would still 
be about half that of the U.S., and Soviet per 
capita GNP would be about 43 percent of 
the U.S. level. Moreover, since the Soviet 
consumer's share in GNP is unlikely to rise, 
Soviet per capita consumption would remain 
little better than 30 percent of U.S. per 
capita consumption. 

Pulaski Memorial Day, 1965 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release (Bethesda Naval Hospital) dated 
October 11 

Today we pay homage to a young Polish 
nobleman who gave his life that this nation 
might be free. 

One hundred and eighty-six years ago, 
Casimir Pulaski, Brigadier General of the 
Continental Army, died of wounds received 
in the Battle of Savannah. He came to 
America because, as he once said, "Where- 
ever on the globe men are fighting for 
liberty, it is as if it were our own affair." 

And so today, as we pause to honor this 
brave man, we are reminded of the great 
bonds of friendship that have always ex- 
isted between the people of the United 
States and the people of Poland. It is now 
our intention to strengthen those bonds. We 
will build bridges across the gulf that has 
divided us for too many years now. They 
will be bridges of increased trade, of ideas, 
of visitors, and of humanitarian aid. We 
know that these bridges will be Poland's 
best hope for the future — and knowing that, 
we pledge ourselves to their completion. 

And on this anniversary of Pulaski's 
death, we also rededicate our nation to the 
cause he so nobly advanced. The torch has 
long since passed to us, and we know that 
"Wherever on the globe men are fighting 
for liberty, it is as if it were our own af- 
fair." We pledge ourselves to that cause, too. 



Progress and Problems in the Far East 

hy William P. Bundy 
Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

I am delighted to have this opportunity 
to meet with the members of the Far East- 
America Council of Commerce and Industry 
and their distinguished guests. I am keenly 
aware of the notable contribution to inter- 
national understanding which the Council 
has made over the years by bringing to- 
gether business and government leaders 
from the United States and Asia at confer- 
ences such as this for frank discussion of 
mutual problems. 

At this final session of your conference on 
the problems and prospects of Asia-United 
States economic relations, I would like to 
consider that part of Asia which we 
normally refer to as the Far East — stretch- 
ing from Burma eastward to Korea and 

Historically our interests in Asia, which 
date back to the late 18th century, were com- 
posed largely of a series of special relation- 
ships — old-style trade relationships with 
China; a major role in the opening up of 
Japan; outright control in the Philippines; 
strong bonds of sympathy, but few concrete 
ties, with Australia and New Zealand; very 
little in Southeast Asia or elsewhere. 

Today our concern with the Far East is 
much more universal. The need to restore 
Japan, the need to defend and then to re- 
build Korea, the need to assume a role in 
Southeast Asia as colonial regimes ended. 

' Address made before the Far East-America 
Council of Commerce and Industry at New York, 
N.Y., on Oct. 5 (press release 236). 

the growth of stronger overall ties with Aus- 
tralia and New Zealand — all these have 
brought our view of the Far East more and 
more into a total one. Obviously there are 
great differences in our relationships as be- 
tween one country and another, but our ob- 
jectives can now be properly stated in terms 
of the area as a whole. The differences in the 
specific courses we follow reflect differences 
in the situations and in our relationships — 
not differences in the objectives we seek. 

What we seek is very simple. It is that the 
nations of the area should develop as they 
see fit, free from external interference, 
working toward the welfare of their citizens 
under patterns of organization they them- 
selves must develop. While we may hope 
that internal political systems will evolve in 
the direction of government by consent and, 
where possible, by democratic methods, we 
have long since outgrown any idea that 
blueprints from our own experience have 
anything but a relevance of analogy. 

And these are, of course, the objectives of 
the non-Communist countries of Asia them- 

In thinking of the Far East, from Burma 
eastward, all of us are inclined to focus on 
the conflicts and crises that have troubled us 
— in Korea, in the Indochina war, and now 
in the Viet-Nam conflict and in the threat 
to the peace presented by Indonesia's con- 
frontation policy toward Malaysia and Singa- 
pore. The threat of external interference, 
primarily from the Communist nations of 
the area, has required that the non-Com- 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


munist nations, including ourselves, pay 
major attention to the problems of security 
in the Far East. 

Security is essential. But we have alvi^ays 
knovm that, even if peace prevailed in the 
Far East, there would be tremendous prob- 
lems in the political and economic develop- 
ment of the nations of the area, most of 
whom have become independent only since 
World War II. Our security involvement has 
tended to draw us deeper into the affairs of 
many of these countries than we might other- 
wise have entered. But I have little doubt 
that, had there been no security problems at 
all, we would still have found ourselves pur- 
suing the same fundamental policy of seeking 
to assist these nations to stand on their own 
feet and to move forward. 

So today I want to talk about that part of 
our policies toward the Far East. As Presi- 
dent Johnson has often said, most recently 
at the World Bank and International Mon- 
etary Fund meeting last week,^ these are 
the real things that count in the long-term 
progress of mankind. They are the things we 
would prefer to work on. 

Diversity Among Far Eastern Nations 

We all know that the nations of the Far 
East are diverse. Yet we sometimes tend to 
overlook the extent of that diversity, as well 
as certain other fundamental characteristics 
of the region. 

The economic problems and capabilities 
of the countries of the Far East vary widely, 
primarily because of differences in back- 
ground and environment and in levels of 

— The amount of agricultural land per 
capita ranges from 1.9 acres in Laos to 0.2 
acres in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. 

— Population growth rate ranges from 1 
percent in Japan (among the world's low- 
est) to over 3 percent in the Philippines 
and Malaysia. 

— Population density per square mile is 

•Bulletin of Oct. 18, 1965, p. 614. 

680 in Japan, 730 in South Korea, 900 in 
Taiwan, but only 30 in Laos. 

— Life expectancy ranges from 69 to 30 
years, and the literacy rate from over 95 to 
15 percent. 

— The number of inhabitants per physi- 
cian ranges from 900 in Japan to more than 
48,000 in Indonesia (as compared to 740 in 
the United States) . 

— The per capita gross national product 
ranges from $650 in Japan to less than $100 
in Korea, Indonesia, and Laos. 

—Of the 31,870,000 tons of crude steel 
produced in the free countries of the Far 
East in 1963, all but 370,000 tons was pro- 
duced in Japan; and Japan produced al- 
most 90 percent of the electric power gener- 
ated in the area that year. 

Such diversities in the patterns and level 
of economic development of the Far Eastern 
countries, together with the differences in 
their cultural and political backgrounds, 
have tended to militate against the develop- 
ment of the feelings of unity and mutual 
interdependence which foster regional co- 
operation. Even the threat to security posed 
by Communist China has occasionally been 
as much a divisive as a consolidating force. 

Thus, while one may think of the Far 
East in regional terms for some purposes, 
one must not delude one's self into thinking 
of it as an area anywhere near as homogene- 
ous as the Western Europe of the Marshall 
Plan and OEEC [Organization for Euro- 
pean Economic Cooperation] days. Even the 
Latin America of today, with its enormous 
variations, is far more nearly a single com- 
mon area than the Far East. 

Economic Progress 

Notwithstanding this diversity, nations 
of the Far East — at highly varied stages of 
development — have shown in the last 15 
years what can be accomplished in condi- 
tions of relative security. 

Japan's phenomenal growth and develop- 
ment is well known and provides not only an 
example for other countries in the area but 



also a valuable source of technical and fi- 
nancial assistance. Japan has become one of 
the leading industrial nations of the world, 
third in crude-steel production, second after 
Canada as a market for our exports, one of 
the five leading contributors of economic 
assistance to the developing countries of the 
world, a full-fledged member of the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and Development] "club" of Western in- 
dustrial nations, one of the so-called Group 
of Ten IMF [International Monetary 
Fund] members who consult regularly 
regarding problems of international liquid- 
ity, and in 1964 moved to article VIII of the 
IMF Charter, thereby rendering the yen 
officially a convertible currency. 

Despite the burden of high defense ex- 
penditures, the economy of the Republic of 
China in Taiwan has forged ahead. GNP in 
real terms has expanded over the past 10 
years at an average annual rate of 6 to 7 
percent, reaching a peak in 1964, when the 
rate of growth was 10.2 percent. Expansion 
and diversification of exports have brought 
Taiwan's trade into balance. Steadily im- 
proving economic conditions and an in- 
creasingly liberal attitude toward foreign 
investment are attracting a growing num- 
ber of investors from the United States, 
Japan, and overseas Chinese communities. 
This progress has placed the economy of 
Taiwan in a position to take over the burden 
of economic development, enabling us to 
discontinue our economic aid program at 
the end of June this year, although the mil- 
itary assistance program is still necessary. 
In fact, the Republic of China itself now 
provides significant and valuable technical 
assistance in Southeast Asia and Africa. 

Korean progress has also been remark- 
able. At the end of World War II Korea was 
freed of Japanese rule, but split in two — 
with most of its industrial facilities and 
sources of raw materials lost to Communist 
North Korea and with South Korea left 
with more than half the people and less 
than half the territory of the Korean Pe- 
ninsula. Less than 2 years after its inaugu- 
ration as an independent government, the 

Republic of Korea was overrun by the Com- 
munist invasion from North Korea. The 
resultant holocaust took a heavy toll in 
terms of loss of life, destruction and damage 
to homes and factories, and disruption of 
family life. It also added the burden of 2 
million more refugees to the nearly equal 
number who had arrived from the North 
before the conflict. South Korea was left 
with a population density, by 1963, of 730 
per square mile — one of the highest in the 
world — and with the need to maintain one 
of the world's largest armed forces. 

Despite the political disruptions which 
have resulted from the strains of creating a 
sound democratic society under such condi- 
tions, Korea has moved steadily toward 
democracy and civic responsibility. With 
large-scale assistance from the United 
States, the Koreans reconstructed an econ- 
omy ravaged by 3 years of war and have 
proceeded to lay the foundation for sus- 
tained growth. Over the past 2 years the 
Korean economy has grown at the rate of 6 
percent per year, agriculture is moving to- 
ward self-sufficiency through the use of 
new techniques and expansion of land in 
productive use, and exports have increased 
from $32 million in 1960 to $120 million in 
1964. We expect this growth to continue. 

The normalization of relations between 
Korea and Japan will not only strengthen 
the free world but also contribute to Ko- 
rean growth and development.^ The resolu- 
tion of the complex problems which hitherto 
separated these two free-world countries is 
an act of high statesmanship. 

Both we and the Koreans realize, of 
course, that many problems remain to be 
solved and much progress to be made before 
our mutual objectives are fully attained. But 
the willingness and ability of the Republic 
of Korea to send more than a division force 
of crack troops to South Viet-Nam * is con- 
crete evidence both of their progress and of 
their dedication to the principles for which 
we stand. 

The progress of these three countries, 

" For background, see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 448. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


none of which is richly blessed with natural 
resources, is indeed a tribute to the industry 
and ingenuity of their people. 

All but three of the countries of the Far 
East (the Republic of China, Thailand, and 
Japan) were colonies before World War II. 
The Philippines and Malaya moved success- 
fully to independence and self-government, 
putting down serious Communist insurgency 
in the process. This was the result of sound 
preparation for self-government during the 
colonial period, which unfortunately was 
lacking in the cases of Indonesia and Indo- 

The Philippines is an excellent example of 
economic advance spurred by political sta- 
bility. After the Communist Huk rebellion 
was put down by the late President Magsay- 
say in the early 1950's, the Philippines saw 
a period of remarkable growth, reaching an 
annual rate of 6 percent during the 1950's. 
The rate of growth slowed in the early 
1960's and continues at a pace barely ahead 
of the rate of population increase — which 
is one of the world's highest. Manufactur- 
ing output, construction, and agricultural 
expansion have been bright spots over this 
period. Some basic social problems remain, 
however, such as the need for land reform 
and growing unemployment in the cities. We 
continue to stand ready to help our Filipino 
friends solve these problems. At present we 
look confidently ahead to another free and 
fair election in the Philippines on November 
9 — an election in which the Filipino people 
will once again freely choose their leaders. 
Here is another demonstration of the bene- 
fits of free democratic institutions taking 
root in Asian soil. 

In many ways the economic performance 
of Malaysia and Singapore is the most im- 
pressive in Southeast Asia. Once a part of 
Malaysia, a now-independent Singapore will 
make needed adjustments in economic pol- 
icy, but these are not expected to be sub- 
stantial. Trade and investment ties should 
remain strong. 

Malaysia's per capita GNP is about $280. 
The rate of economic expansion has been 
good. The rate of investment is high for that 

part of the world — 18 percent of GNP in 
1964. Although the economy is based on the 
production and trade of primary commodi- 
ties, industrial development has been en- 
couraged by tax and tariff concessions, the 
establishment of industrial estates, and 
guarantees to foreign capital. Malaysia's 
economic development programs also stress 
agricultural diversification, land settlement 
programs, and one of the outstanding rural 
development programs in Asia. 

Many problems remain for Malaysia and 
Singapore to solve to enable them, with a 
population growth rate of more than 3 per- 
cent, to maintain an adequate growth in per 
capita GNP. Nonetheless, here again are ex- 
amples of what can be accomplished in an 
atmosphere of relative stability even while 
successfully putting down a large-scale and 
long-enduring armed Communist uprising. 

In an atmosphere of political stability 
which is quite remarkable, given the condi- 
tions in the surrounding area, Thailand has 
made excellent progress over the past dec- 
ade. Its rate of growth in terms of gross 
national product has been near the 6-percent 
level every year. This has been accomplished 
with very little inflation and without the 
balance-of-payments problems which nor- 
mally plague developing economies. In fact, 
the Thai have built up substantial exchange 
reserves and have maintained a fully con- 
vertible currency. 

At the same time the Thai have focused 
special attention on the "pockets of pov- 
erty," especially in the northeast, striving 
to bring economic and social progress to 
these blighted areas and to increase partici- 
pation by the people of these areas in the 
Government's economic development pro- 
grams. Even as Thailand has been compelled 
to take some additional measures to meet the 
threat of insurgency, particularly in the 
north and northeast, the Thai have contin- 
ued their emphasis on economic and social 
development, devoting 70 percent of their 
national budget to these purposes. We hope 
that they can continue to do this. 

Australia and New Zealand are, of course, 
special cases, with longstanding ties to Eu- 



rope and ourselves and per capita GNP 
among the highest in the world. 

Australian development in recent years 
has been strong, its GNP (at constant 
prices) having increased by more than 80 
percent over the past 15 years. This has per- 
mitted Australia to play an increasingly 
important role in the defense and security 
of the area — a challenge which Australia, 
as a member of both the ANZUS [Aus- 
tralia-New Zealand-U.S. Security Treaty] 
and SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty Orga- 
nization] pacts, has not hesitated to meet. 
Australian troops are serving today in both 
Malaysia and Viet-Nam. Australia has also 
contributed to the economic development of 
South and Southeast Asia, having provided 
technical assistance and economic aid under 
the Colombo Plan, in addition to contribu- 
tions through United Nations programs and 

New Zealand also plays an active role in 
the defense and economic development of 
the area as an active member of ANZUS 
and SEATO and as a contributor of capital 
aid and technical assistance under the Co- 
lombo Plan. 

Other nations of the area — because of se- 
curity or political problems, or because of 
their decision to forgo the opportunities that 
might have come from broader ties with the 
developed countries — have made much less 

Elements of Success 

Drawing from these experiences, espe- 
cially in Japan, Taiwan, Korea, and the 
Philippines, the elements of success in the 
field of economic development appear to be : 

— Education, perhaps more than any 
other single factor ; 

— Fiscal responsibility — ^the will and 
power to maintain basic stability ; 

— Relief, where security conditions per- 
mit, from the financial drain of defense 
spending — a major incentive for saving, 
which in turn is essential to sound economic 
growth ; 

— Growing knowledge of the world 

through widening political and economic 
contacts ; 

— Willingness and determination to meet 
competition from the outside world through 
the development and maintenance of an 
"open economy." 

These elements have all been factors, in 
varying degrees, to be sure, in the develop- 
ment of these countries over the past several 
years. Admittedly the process is time-con- 
suming and not easy, but the results — in 
terms of national well-being, security, pres- 
tige, and self-respect — are salutary. 

One factor of special importance, in the 
Far East as elsewhere, is population growth. 
We all know that even high rates of eco- 
nomic growth, involving even greater an- 
nual increases in national savings, can be 
canceled out by moderate increases in 
population. The record of the last 15 years 
in the Far East shows us again the conse- 
quences, psychological and otherwise, of 
thus "standing still." Japan has long recog- 
nized the implications of this problem. It 
must be handled by each nation in its own 
way, but it is heartening that it has at least 
been recognized as a problem by a number 
of Far Eastern countries, including Taiwan, 
South Korea, Hong Kong, and Singapore. 

Regional Cooperation 

Apart from the comparative grovd;h of 
individual countries in the Far East and 
despite the diversities among them, there 
has recently been a growing awareness 
among Asian leaders of the important role 
that regional cooperation can play, particu- 
larly in terms of economic and social de- 

In April President Johnson called upon 
the nations of Asia and all industrialized 
countries, including the Soviet Union, to 
join in an expanded effort to accelerate eco- 
nomic and social development in Southeast 
Asia.* He expressed the hope that North 
Viet-Nam would participate "as soon as 
peaceful cooperation is possible." He offered 

' Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


to seek a $1 billion United States contribu- 
tion to this effort and named Mr. Eugene 
Black to lead United States participation in 
the program. 

The President also called upon the Secre- 
tary-General of the United Nations to use 
"the prestige of his great office" to lead an 
expansion of regional economic and social 
development in Southeast Asia. For pur- 
poses of this discussion I would like to 
emphasize two developments under the aegis 
of the United Nations regional commission 
— the Economic Commission for Asia and 
the Far East — in response to the President's 

Of historic significance is the proposed 
ECAFE-sponsored Asian Development Bank, 
which will be the first institution of its kind 
to be established as the result of broad Asian 
initiative and support for the specific pur- 
pose of serving the countries of Asia — from 
Iran east to Korea and Japan. Rapid progress 
has been made in organizing this institution, 
especially since the announcement of United 
States support and participation. It is ex- 
pected that the charter of this Bank — first 
seriously discussed in late 1964 — may be 
ready for signature in December of this year. 
The Asian members of the ECAFE Consulta- 
tive Committee on the Asian Development 
Bank, who have toured the world explaining 
and discussing the proposed Bank with pro- 
spective subscribers, are to be congratulated 
for the dispatch and expertise with which 
they have carried out this task. 

Of equal significance is the ECAFE- 
sponsored Mekong Development Committee, 
the functions of which have now been ex- 
panded. The Mekong Committee has been 
operative for 8 years, collecting data, spon- 
soring studies, and — more recently — moving 
forward with projects. Several dams on Me- 
kong tributaries are under construction, and 
more work will be undertaken as a result of 
the President's proposals for expanded de- 
velopment. This work has been moving for- 
ward regardless of the fact that the com- 
mittee's work is directed by representatives 
of countries which are less than friendly 
and, in some instances, are hostile to one 

These two developments are examples of 
the fact that, despite political and cultural 
differences among the countries concerned, 
sound and viable instruments of cooperation 
can be built in Asia if they are based on 
true Asian initiative and support and if they 
are designed to serve a specific useful pur- 
pose of mutual benefit. But — and this is 
essential — it takes time, patience, and per- 

There have been proposals as far back as 
1954 for the establishment of an Asian in- 
stitution to finance economic development 
in the region. For a number of years the 
ECAFE secretariat sponsored studies of 
possible forms and methods to promote 
economic cooperation in the region. Some of 
the early proposals were vague and general 
in nature, but even the proposals for an 
Asian financial institution, which were more 
specific and had strong support in certain 
quarters, did not receive genuine broad 
Asian support until recently. As I have al- 
ready pointed out, progress has been rapid 
and purposeful ever since. 

As early as 1951 the ECAFE, Bureau of 
Flood Control initiated studies of the Lower 
Mekong as a part of its work program on 
the technical problems of international riv- 
ers. It was 1957, however, before the Mekong 
Committee was created by ECAFE. 

The development of both of these institu- 
tions is a splendid example of the political 
merits of functional organizations such as 
those under the United Nations aegis. 
Shortly before his tragic death Ambassador 
Adlai Stevenson, speaking of the United 
Nations specialized agencies, said : "* 

These agencies are an illustration ... of the 
proposition that international politics is not a game 
in which an inch gained by one player must mean an 
inch lost by another. . . . 

Organizations like these begin by taking the world 
as it is. . . . These organizations start from where 
we are and then take the next step. And that, as 
the ancient Chinese guessed long ago, is the only 
way to get from here to there. . . . 

These limited-purpose organizations bypass the 
obstacle of sovereignty. National independence is not 
infringed when a nation voluntarily accepts in its 

' Ibid., July 26, 1965, p. 142. 



own interest the restraints imposed by cooperation 
with others. Nobody has to play who doesn't want to 
play, but for those who do play, there are door prizes 
for all. 

U.S. Objectives in the Far East 

We are heartened by the momentum that 
has been built up by those working on these 
ECAFE-sponsored institutions. We hope 
that the charter of the Asian Development 
Bank — to which we plan to subscribe — can 
be approved at the proposed ministerial 
meeting in December. To us the Bank is a 
significant multilateral method of mobiliz- 
ing capital and increasing the flow of capi- 
tal into the region. We also believe that the 
Bank should be in a position to encourage 
private as well as governmental financing 
for projects in the region, and to stimulate 
regional and subregional cooperation in 
both the planning and coordination of de- 
velopment in the area. We also believe that 
the Bank can serve important fiduciary func- 
tions, such as administering special funds, 
along the lines of the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank. 

It is in this connection that Mr. Black has 
proposed, in addition to the United States 
capital subscription to the Bank, a Southeast 
Asian Regional Development Fund to be 
administered by the Bank, to which the 
United States would contribute $100 million 
— subject, of course, to congressional ap- 
proval and sufficient participation by other 
countries to make it a truly multilateral 

We have also supported the work of the 
Mekong Development Committee. The United 
States Government has recently pledged to 
contribute 50 percent of the $26 million re- 
quired to construct the first phase of the 
committee's highest priority project — the 
Nam Ngum Dam in Laos. We have also 
agreed to finance the second phase of a long- 
term detailed feasibility study of the pro- 
posed Pa-Mong multipurpose water resource 
project on the Thai-Lao border. We have 
endorsed the United Nations Secretariat's 
action to establish a "Mekong Donors Club" 
to consider the financing of additional Me- 
kong projects. 

The United States intends to continue and 
expand its bilateral efforts in Southeast 
Asia as an integral part of President John- 
son's proposal to accelerate development 
there. We are determined, however, to relate 
our bilateral and multilateral efforts so that 
the totality of United States assistance will 
be as effective as possible. 

With particular reference to cooperation 
for economic and social development in 
Southeast Asia, a promising beginning has 
been made, but much remains to be done : 

— We hope that the advanced industrial 
countries will increase their assistance to 
Southeast Asia; the terms of such assist- 
ance should be commensurate with the needs 
of the recipient countries. The IBRD's [In- 
ternational Bank for Reconstruction and 
Development] initiative in offering to form 
and lead consultative groups for assistance 
to Thailand and Malaysia should stimulate 
greater and more effective aid from a 
greater number of sources. 

— The nations and institutions of the re- 
gion should develop and sponsor new pro- 
grams in many fields hardly touched by 
existing efforts. Much can be done in the 
development of human resources through 
the sharing of specialized training or re- 
search; the Japanese-proposed agricultural 
fund and special arrangements for CIAP 
[Inter-American Committee on the Alliance 
for Progress] -type review of national de- 
velopment plans also come to mind. 

— Existing institutions should be ex- 
panded and strengthened to carry out ex- 
panding programs as effectively as possible. 
Examples of this are the action taken by 
the United Nations Secretary-General to pro- 
vide better coordination among the approx- 
imately 20 contributors to the activities of 
the Mekong Committee and current propos- 
als to create a regional transportation plan- 
ning and project promotion organ. 

— The countries of the region should fully 
demonstrate their willingness to work to- 
gether, to sacrifice shortrun interests for 
long-term advantage, and to abandon age- 
old rivalries ; otherwise they can expect little 
real benefit from increased external aid re- 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


I come back to the fundamental point about 
the diversity of the area, on the one hand, 
and the fixity of our objectives, on the 
other. No one policy or set of relationships is 
likely to evolve in the coming years for the 
ties between the Far East and the developed 
countries of the vi'orld. We shall continue to 
work where necessary on a bilateral basis, 
particularly where security factors remain a 
major element in the problem. Our own 
trade ties with individual nations should 
expand under conditions of freedom. 

We should be looking more and more, 
however, to forms of coordination among 
the developed countries and between the 
developed countries as a whole and the Far 
Eastern nations. The Asian nations we hope 
will be strengthening themselves and work- 
ing more closely together — and this trend is 
completely consistent with the growth of 
greater ties between them and the West. For 
in essence we all have the same interest: 
that the nations and people of the area 

should overcome the tremendous problems 
they face and move toward the societies that 
will meet the needs of their people and thus 
rest on a solid national foundation of stabil- 
ity and consent. 
For, as President Johnson has said : * 
"The basic conflict of our times is not 
over economic ideas or between economic 
systems. We do not believe any one people 
— or any one nation — stand as the sole 
possessors of all the truth. We do believe, 
however, that men and nations must have 
the right to develop their own systems and 
their own societies without fear of neighbors 
and without a return to the dangers and 
perils of the past. 

"To end aggression as an instrument of 
national policy would bring great opportu- 
nities for progress and better welfare to un- 
happy millions throughout all of Asia. That 
is our goal in the United States — and our 
only goal." 

' Ibid., Aug. 9, 1965, p. 245. 

A Worldwide Cooperative Effort in Water Desalination 

by Stewart L. Udall 
Secretary of the Interior * 

On behalf of the United States of America 
and President Lyndon Johnson, I welcome 
the delegates and participants to the First 
International Symposium on Water Desalina- 
tion. It is our carefully considered opinion 
that the delegates to this conference — rep- 
resenting 65 countries and 5 continents — 
constitute the most impressive array of 
water-engineering talent ever assembled in 

' Address made on Oct. 4 at opening ceremonies 
of the First International Symposium on Water 
Desalination, which was held at Washington Oct. 
3-9. Secretary Udall was honorary chairman of the 

President Johnson set the tone for our 
meeting when he said that: - 

A dependable supply of fresh water is an absolute 
requirement for a world seeking peace and pros- 
perity. Water is needed to grow food, to permit 
basic development in emerging nations, to allow in- 
dustrial expansion in others, and to increase living 
standards for an increasing world population. . . . 

The developing technology of water desalting has 
received enthusiastic and universal support by na- 
tions, large and small, again demonstrating that 
international cooperation is the key to humanity's 

I am confident of success, not only success 
in the effort to solve the engineering and 

■ Bulletin of Sept. 27, 1965, p. 537. 



technical problems which face us but more 
importantly in the effort to work together 
for the universal welfare of mankind. 

Our attention is focused on water — us- 
able, potable water. From time immemorial, 
as reflected in the literature and legend of 
every civilization and religion, man has 
sensed the obligation of stewardship over 
the planet's supply of water fit for human 
use. As our world population doubles on a 
cycle of decades, rather than centuries or 
millennia, that obligation of stewardship be- 
comes correspondingly more pressing. In the 
end man will conquer poverty, famine, and 
disease only as he masters the problems of 
water supply. 

The United States began its formal de- 
salting program in 1952. Until last year 
this country's effort concentrated on basic 
research and on the construction of demon- 
stration plants. But last year President 
Johnson saw that the time had come for 
what he called a significant leap forward. 
With the cooperation of the Congress, now 
my country is embarking on an accelerated 
desalting program.^ 

President Johnson hailed the new law, say- 
ing, "It would be difficult to exaggerate the 
power for good, the palliative effect on 
age-old animosities and problems, that would 
result from providing an abundance of water 
in lands which, for countless generations, 
have only knowTi shortage." * 

Under the new charter we hope to master 
the technology of big plants, to serve major 
population centers; and we will pursue the 
refinement of small equipment, mobile and 
versatile; and we will give equal attention 
to processes for improving the usefulness of 
underground brackish waters that repre- 
sent a major resource in many parts of the 

The United States will soon need major 
new sources of water for its great cities. 
Smaller towns on our seacoasts and many 
inland communities have similar needs. 

^ For background, see White House press releases 
dated Mar. 29 and Aug. 11, 1965. 
* White House press release dated Mar. 29, 1965. 

The world's needs run the same gamut. 
Some countries require large plants to serve 
their large cities, while in other places it is 
the smaller plants for small towns and 
islands which are needed. Our joint purpose 
at this conference is to discuss and describe 
the means whereby all of these goals can 
be achieved for the benefit of all. A variety 
of processes, engineered to fit a particular 
requirement, will supply alternatives for the 
differing needs. 

The cost of energy is a critical component 
of the costs associated with any process. 
Reducing energy costs is a goal. Our country 
will pursue this inquiry with conventional 
fuels — coal, oil, and gas — and with nuclear 

We have committed our finest talent to 
this total effort. We are eager to share what 
we know and learn. We need your help in a 
real worldwide effort if we are going to 

Work of the Symposium 

During this conference experts from col- 
leges and universities, from industry, and 
from government will present technical pa- 
pers. They will discuss progress and obstacles 
with their counterpart scientists and en- 
gineers from other countries. 

Speakers from my country will discuss in 
detail the progress we have made, the 
processes we consider hopeful, and the un- 
answered problems we have identified. We 
will listen with keen interest to the presenta- 
tions from our distinguished visitors. 

As most of you know, my Department — In- 
terior — is cooperating with the Atomic En- 
ergy Commission and the Metropolitan Water 
District of California in a feasibility and 
engineering study of a 150-million-gallon-per- 
day distillation plant. Preliminary reports 
indicate that a well-designed plant using 
nuclear energy can produce fresh water at 
seaside for 22 cents a thousand gallons and 
generate electric power for as little as 3 mills 
per kilowatt hour. 

The Southern California study is the most 
advanced of several investigations that we 
have underway. We are excited and en- 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


President Sends Message to Desalination Symposium 

Following is the text of a message from Presi- 
dent Johnson read to the First International 
Symposium on Water Desalination at Washington 
on October i by Donald F. Homig, Special Assist- 
ant to the President for Science and Technology. 

I welcome you to this international symposium. 
You represent more than 60 nations. You have 
come here from all parts of the world. And you 
have come to search — together — for a common 
solution to a common problem. 

Even while you deliberate, men are without 
water. Land lies untilled which should produce 
food for the hungry. People around the world 
are impatient for the results of your efforts. And 
I am the most impatient of all. 

Techniques to desalt water have been used in 
many places for many years — on ships at sea, 
among the islands of the Caribbean, in desert 
lands along the Persian Gulf. But if our vision 
for the future is to be realized — the vision of an 
inexhaustible supply of pure, drinkable water — 
then the cost of desalting must be drastically 

With this objective, the United States began a 
program of research and development over a dec- 
ade ago. It has already yielded heartening results. 
We have built five plants capable of testing new 

technologies. Their daily capacities range from 
a few hundred thousand gallons to more than 
2 million gallons. We have built and operated a 
score of pilot plants. We have witnessed the cost 
of desalted water cut in half and then halved 
again. To accelerate this work, we have recently 
launched a new 5-year, $200 million program of 
research and development. 

We have concrete goals in view: by 1968, to 
construct plants with the capacity of 10 million 
gallons a day; by 1970, to extend the range to 
100-million-gallon plants. We are also at work 
on smaller plants varying in size from less than 
1 million gallons to 15 million gallons per day, 
employing many different processes. 

From the creative work you perform in your 
laboratories and on your drawing boards, and 
from conferences like this one, we will gain new 
freedom from the harsh accidents of geography. 
Brackish wells will nurture crops — and the 
oceans, pure and clear, will flow from our 

The need is worldwide, so must be the effort. 
Knowledge, like thirst, belongs to all men. No 
country can be the sole possessor. We in this 
country are ready to join with every nation — to 
share our efforts, to work in every way. We 
cannot wait — for the problem will not wait. 

couraged by the results that are emerging. 
If your country has large cities or regions 
with substantial and acute water supply 
problems, you will be interested in our dis- 
cussions of this study. 

Although our large-plant effort often re- 
ceives the most attention, this is only one 
part of our total program. We are de- 
termined to develop processes that will pro- 
duce water economically in smaller quanti- 
ties. Our immediate goal is developing the 
ability to build plants which will produce 
between 1 million to 10 million gallons per 
day for 50 cents a thousand gallons. We 
expect to succeed. 

Completely new processes are under de- 
velopment. Among the newer ideas reverse 
osmosis has particularly attracted the at- 
tention of our technicians. Because the 
process has inherent technical advantages, it 
will receive special attention in our develop- 
ment scheme. 

Basic research has been substantially in- 
creased. We want to know more about water, 
and we hope to discover entirely new ways to 
make it usable, including an attack on the 
problem of pollution and chemical contami- 
nation which results in an absolute short- 
age of usable water, producing famine, dis- 
ease, and even threats to the peace. 

All of what we have learned to date will 
be available at this symposium. We expect 
to discuss our ideas and yours in an open and 
relaxed atmosphere. We will all benefit. 

A Worldwide Cooperative Effort 

Nonetheless, we hope for more from this 
conference than a mere exchange of techni- 
cal information. We must recognize water is 
our most vital resource. Man can exist with- 
out food for as much as 60 days. Without 
water, he will perish in 5. Three billion 
people on this planet are competing for the 
available fresh water, and there is essential- 



ly no more water today than there was when 
civilization began. Furthermore, it is essen- 
tially the same water. The dribble from a 
leaky faucet in our homes may be the liquid 
which slaked the thirst of a dinosaur, wa- 
tered the hanging gardens of Babylon, or re- 
freshed Hannibal at some Alpine stream. 
Man's survival is threatened by water prob- 

With so much involved for the whole 
world, I challenge the delegates to this con- 
ference to think in terms of a worldwide 
cooperative effort to solve the problems of 
desalting in the shortest possible period of 

To begin that effort my country will : 

(1) Supply to all countries represented 
here, and to others on request, a complete 
set of research and engineering studies 
published by our Office of Saline Water. We 
will expect these exchanges to be reciprocal. 
We will help establish technical desalting 
information centers at appropriate locations 
to insure maximum benefit to all countries. 

(2) We invite you, or other representa- 
tives of your country, to visit our desalting 
plants, test centers, and research laborato- 
ries. Our technicians will be equally inter- 
ested in seeing what you have accomplished. 

(3) Countries that look to desalting to 
solve water problems will need trained en- 
gineers to design and manage plants. The 
United States will be eager to participate 
in a training program designed to make 
certain that the necessary supply of trained 
technicians is developed wherever it is needed. 

(4) In cooperation with the Department 
of State, my Department will expand its pro- 
gram of assisting other countries in regional 
and national water surveys. The Atomic 
Energy Commission, where appropriate, will 
join them to seek the most economic solution 

(5) The Agency for International Develop- 
ment in reviewing its programs will give 
increased attention to water supply prob- 

(6) We will enlarge our capacity to render 
advisory and consulting services to countries 
seeking assistance in developing water re- 

sources programs to meet their present and 
future needs. These services will encompass 
the traditional water resource techniques as 
well as desalting. 

I propose that we arrange a continuing 
worldwide exchange of information related 
to desalting. My country recognizes that 
scientists from many countries have con- 
tributed substantially to the information 
that we have available now. 

As an example consider reverse osmosis. 
We plan a major effort to complete the 
development of this process. Nonetheless we 
recognize that the basic principles were first 
identified by French scientists and that 
basic patents have been awarded to Indian 

"Results That Stagger the Imagination" 

A successful worldwide cooperative effort 
that solves man's water supply problems will 
produce results that stagger the imagina- 
tion. More water means more food, less dis- 
ease, and in many countries new opportuni- 
ties for economic grovrth. 

For centuries water shortages have caused 
quarrels between neighbors, and in the 
case of international rivers these shortages 
have contributed to international tensions. 
The scientists working at this symposium 
can dream ahead to the day when large 
combination water-power plants provide 
cheap energy to drive the wheels of industry, 
electrify the countryside, and "create" 
enough fresh water to resolve sterile argu- 
ments over dry streams. 

Already international cooperation in de- 
salting is underway. Among our recent acti- 
vities in this regard was the visit of a highly 
qualified team of United States water and 
power experts to the United Arab Republic 
and Tunisia. We are currently providing 
technical advice on a desalting project in 
Saudi Arabia and are cooperating in a study 
of the feasibility of a dual-purpose desalting 
plant in Israel.^ Last November the United 

° For background, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, 
p. 635. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


States and the Soviet Union, where excel- 
lent work in desalting is being done, entered 
into an agreement to cooperate in the field 
of desalting.* 

Working together, we can assure that na- 
tions and cities will have a choice in their 
search for the best and cheapest source of 
water, that every country can have abun- 
dant, reliable, and reasonably priced pure 

A thirsty world is watching this assembly. 
Science and technology can find economic 
ways to desalt water. I am confident that this 
conference will lead to accomplishments of 
great significance to every person on our 

Welcome — and have a great conference ! 

U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on Joint 
Saline Water Feasibility Study 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

Distinguished members of the Congress, 
Secretary [of the Interior Stewart L.] Udall, 
distinguished signatories, symposium dele- 
gates,- members of the press, ladies and 
gentlemen : 

We are very pleased that you could join 
us here this afternoon. You represent more 
than 60 nations. You have come here from 
all parts of the world. You have come to 
search together for a common solution to a 
very common problem, and I think that no 
event could hold more promise for the peace 
and progress of man. 

No international gathering ever met any- 
where for a more important purpose. If 

■ For background and text of the agreement, see 
ibid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 828. 

^ Made at the White House on Oct. 7, when the 
saline water feasibility study agreement with Mexico 
and the IAEA was signed (White House press re- 
lease; as-delivered text). 

' Delegates to the First International Symposium 
on Water Desalination were invited to the signing 
ceremonies. For background, see p. 716. 

science can unlock the door to an unlimited 
supply of pure and drinkable water, I think 
it will be an event in human history as sig- 
nificant as the harnessing of the atom. 

Since the beginning of time, fresh water 
has always been one of humanity's most 
precious needs. For it many wars have been 
fought throughout history. Without it whole 
civilizations have vanished from the earth. 

Now we of this generation have an oppor- 
tunity to put an end to all of that. Our 
generation realizes that we have the power. 
It is the power which you at this conference 
really represent. That power is the power of 
science. But if we are to use that power 
effectively we must use it together. 

Nature is not impressed by the lines that 
we draw on these little maps. The clouds 
above us refuse to stop for border guards, 
and so the rain falls upon the just and the 
unjust alike. 

The earth's water belongs to all mankind. 
Together we just must find ways to make 
certain that every nation has it in full share 
and that there is really enough of it for all 

Now that is the central purpose of the in- 
ternational symposium that you have been 
attending here in Washington. Since that is 
also the purpose of the agreement that we 
are about to sign, it seemed appropriate to 
me to ask you to come here and join us in 
this ceremony. 

The United States of America and our 
good neighbor to the south, Mexico, share 
much in common, including the great areas 
which are very short of water. Together, 
with the help of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency, we are now going to explore 
a promising answer to a very difficult but a 
very mutual problem. 

This agreement will help us discover 
whether nuclear power can be applied in a 
practical and economical way to convert sea 
water to generate electricity for the great 
arid region which joins our two countries. 

President [Gustavo] Diaz Ordaz and I are 
equally determined that every effort possible 
must be made to find new water for this 
thirsty part of this continent. We are going 
to look to the oceans and to the modern tech- 



nology that you have been studying at your 
conference. We hope that that study will 
be a model for future cooperation among 
neighbors in all the regions of the world 
that are suffering from water shortage. 

We have barely left the shore for the 
start of a very long journey. None know 
better than you how difficult is the task be- 
fore us. But we cannot, we will not, we just 
must not, delay it any longer. 

Over various areas of the world today 
water is the key to man's prosperity, or 
man's poverty — the key to his comfort or to 
his misery. Every 24 hours there are nearly 
200,000 more people on this earth. A billion 
human beings also live on the ragged edge 
of starvation. Water is a prime necessity, 
for only if we have water can our growing 
populations ever be fed. Only water can 
give future generations a chance to escape 
wholesale misery and wholesale starvation. 

My country, as you know, supports with 
enthusiasm a continuing Food for Peace 
program. We support an Atoms for Peace 
program. We are committed to harnessing 
the awesome power of nuclear energy for 
the betterment of humanity. And today I 
want to announce the beginning of a Water 
for Peace program. Under this new pro- 
gram we will join in a massive cooperative 
international effort to find solutions for 
man's water problems. 

As I have already announced,^ the United 
States has already launched a new 5-year, 
$200 million program of research and de- 
velopment to lower the cost of desalting 
water. But the time has now come to move 
beyond research and development. 

Therefore, I shall present to the next ses- 
sion — I repeat, next session — of the United 
States Congress a plan and a program with 
proposals and recommendations, realizing 
that the executive makes proposals and you 
make disposals, for constructing practical 
prototype plants to make the fullest use of 

' For remarks made by President Johnson on 
Aug. 11, 1965, at the signing of S. 24, a bill to ex- 
pand, extend, and accelerate the saline water conver- 
sion program conducted by the Secretary of the 
Interior, see White House press release of that date. 

our technological discoveries. Those discov- 
eries already promise plants that are capable 
of producing up to 10 million gallons of fresh 
water every day by 1968 and 100 million gal- 
lons a day by 1970. 

But the need is worldwide. It is not lim- 
ited to any one country. Not even ours. And 
so should be our effort in trying to meet that 

Therefore, today I call upon all the na- 
tions of the world to join us in the creation 
of an international fund to bring the fruits 
of science and technology to all the corners 
of a parched and thirsty world. 

The United States is prepared to con- 
tribute its share of the resources needed for 
an international crash program to deal with 
world water resources. We ask other na- 
tions to join us in pursuit of a common ob- 
jective. That objective is: water for all 

In pursuit of that objective the United 
States, in addition to efforts that I have 
just described, is prepared to build upon the 
achievements of this desalting conference by 
announcing now that we would convene 
within a year another great conference to 
deal with all the world's water problems; 
and by announcing now to increase our sup- 
port for the scientists of more than 70 na- 
tions that are now working on water prob- 
lems for the United Nations; and to an- 
nounce now that we are willing to send our 
own best experts abroad, when requested, 
and to establish a program of grants or fel- 
lowships to bring scientists from other lands 
to our own United States to engage in fur- 
ther study and additional research. 

All this, I think, marks the beginning and 
not the end, by any means, of our efforts. 
I earnestly believe that desalting is the 
greatest and is the most hopeful promise 
that we have for the future. I have believed 
it for a long time. 

It was more than 10 years ago, as a 
United States Senator, that I warned, and I 
quote : 

We have reached a point where very serious con- 
sideration must now be given to the pressure of in- 
dividual, industrial, agricultural needs upon water 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


resources of this nation. We have already passed the 
time when we can afford to be complacent. 

Well, the problem is far greater today 
than it was 10 years ago. There are more 
people in the world for one thing. They need 
a great deal more to eat. They need a great 
deal more to drink. They need more industry 
to clothe them and more houses to house 
them. They can really never have any of 
these things without water. 

And in the decade ahead we must accom- 
plish more — much more — than in the decade 
past. And I pledge to you that as far as I 
am concerned the United States is going to 
accomplish much more. 

So the occasion which brings us together 
here this afternoon is testimony to the sin- 
cerity of our purpose. The agreement that 
we are about to sign is just one more exam- 
ple of the joint efforts that are going for- 
ward every day under the Alliance for 
Progress program. Under that program, 
last year we dispensed $159 million more 
than the combined allocation of the previous 
2 years. 

The 19 independent republics in Latin 
America and the United States have a part- 
nership. We are all working to bring to all 
the peoples of the Western Hemisphere the 
fruits of modern science and modern tech- 

So let us then extend that partnership. 
Let all of us — East and West — apply our 
science and our technology to this, the 
greatest of problems. Let future genera- 
tions remember us as those who freed man 
forever from his most ancient and dreaded 
enemies — drought and famine. 

And now our efforts to free him from the 
enemies of drought and famine are to be ex- 
tended to free him from ignorance by inter- 
national educational programs, free him 
from disease by cooperative health adven- 
tures together. 

And what a satisfaction it would be to 
everyone in this room if at some future date 
we can point back to this year when the 
United States of America was willing to put 
forth leadership to free humanity from the 
ancient enemies of mankind — poverty, il- 
literacy, ignorance, disease, thirst. 


Protocol Amending Double-Taxation 
Convention With Germany 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson transmitted to the Senate 
on September 29. 

White House press release dated September 29 

To the Senate of the United States : 

With a view to receiving the advice and 
consent of the Senate to ratification, I 
transmit the protocol ^ between the United 
States of America and the Federal Republic 
of Germany, signed at Bonn on September 
17, 1965, modifying the convention of July 
22, 1954,2 for the avoidance of double tax- 
ation with respect to taxes on income. 

I transmit also for the information of the 
Senate the report ^ of the Secretary of State 
with respect to the protocol. The protocol 
has the approval of the Department of 
State and the Department of the Treasury. 

Modification of the 1954 convention in 
certain respects has been made advisable by 
reason, not only of experience in the appli- 
cation of the convention since its entry into 
force, but also of some relevant changes in 
the tax system of the Federal Republic of 
Germany. The protocol to effect certain 
desirable modifications has been formulated 
as a result of a long period of technical 
discussions between officials of the two 

Some of the modifications are designed 
to effect improvements in the provisions of 
the convention and bring them more nearly 
into line with corresponding provisions in 
the more recent income-tax conventions con- 
cluded by the United States. The convention 
would be expanded, for some purposes, to 
cover certain Federal Republic taxes which 

' For text, see S. Ex. I, 89th Cong., 1st sess. 
' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 



are not taxes on income as such, thus in- 
creasing the tax relief available to American 
enterprises. United States residents and 
companies would also derive special benefit 
from new provisions, unilateral in applica- 
tion, that would exempt them from Federal 
Republic capital taxes with respect to cer- 
tain forms of property. American nonprofit 
institutions would be accorded exemption 
from Federal Republic tax comparable with 
that accorded Federal Republic nonprofit 
institutions under United States law. 

The protocol would make various other 
important amendments or would insert in 
the convention important new provisions re- 
lating to the taxation of industrial and 
commercial profits, the withholding tax rate 
on dividends, an extension of the tax ex- 
emption of interest to cover interest on 
debts secured by mortgages, an extension of 
the tax exemption of royalties to cover pay- 
ments for "know-how" and gains from the 
disposition of property or rights which 
give rise to royalties, a clarification of the 
provisions dealing with income from real 
property, the granting of reciprocal exemp- 
tion with respect to capital gains other than 
gains on real property, a broadening of the 
exemption with respect to personal service 
income, a broadening of the provisions deal- 
ing with governmental salaries, wages, and 
pensions to cover injury or damage sus- 
tained as a result of hostilities or political 
persecution, a modification of the credit 
article of the convention as applied to 
shareholders other than Federal Republic 
parent companies of United States sub- 
sidiaries, the disclosure of tax information 
to courts or administrative bodies concerned 
with tax assessment and collection, and an 
improvement in the convention provisions 
dealing with taxpayer claims in order to 
prevent double taxation contrary to the 

Upon entry into force, the protocol would 
become in effect an integral part of the 1954 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
September 29, 1965. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

International Coffee Agreement. Executive hearings 
before the House Committee on Ways and Means 
on S.701, an act to carry out the obligations of the 
United States under the International Coffee 
Agreement, 1962. April 13-14, 1965. 47 pp. 

The Balance of Payments Statistics. Hearing be- 
fore the Subcommittee on Economic Statistics of 
the Joint Economic Committee. Part 1, May 11, 
1965, 79 pp.; Part 2, June 8, 1965, 154 pp.; Part 
3, June 9, 1965, 56 pp. 

Balance of Payments — 1965. Hearings before a sub- 
committee of the Senate Committee on Banking 
and Currency. Part 2. May 17-August 18, 1965. 
422 pp. 

Foreign Service Act Amendments of 1965. Hear- 
ings before the Subcommittee on State Depart- 
ment Organization and Foreign Operations of the 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on H.R. 
6277. May 19-July 14, 1965. 188 pp. 

Operation of Article VII, NATO Status of Forces 
Treaty. Hearing before a subcommittee of the 
Senate Committee on Armed Services to review^ 
the operation of article VII for the period De- 
cember 1, 1963-November 30, 1964. June 25, 1965. 
28 pp. 

Yugoslavia 1964. Report to the Senate Committee 
on Foreign Relations by Senator J. W. Fulbright. 
July 1965. 23 pp. [Committee print.] 

Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. Hearing 
before the Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on Executive H, 88th Con- 
gress, 1st Session. July 6, 1965. 84 pp. 

Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms of Nickel, Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 6431. H. Rept. 595. July 7, 
1965. 5 pp. 

Interest Equalization Tax Extension Act of 1965. 
Report to accompany H.R. 4750. H. Rept. 602. 
July 7, 1965. 70 pp. 

Water Resources Developments in Spain. Report of 
the Bureau of Reclamation, Department of the 
Interior. S. Doc. 40. July 7, 1965. 101 pp. 

IBRD and IFC Articles of Agreement. Hearing 
before the House Banking and Currency Commit- 
tee on H.R. 8816 and S. 1742, which authorize the 
U.S. Governor to agree to amendments to the 
articles of agreement of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development and the In- 
ternational Finance Corporation, and for other 
purposes. July 8, 1965. 83 pp. 

Conservation of the Natural Resources of New Eng- 
land. Communication from the President trans- 
mitting a report on the Passamaquoddy-St. John 
River Basin Power Development. H. Doc. 236. 
July 12, 1965. 51 pp. 

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Silk Yarn. 
Report to accompany H.R. 5768. S. Rept. 433. 
July 13, 1965. 3 pp. 

Authorizing the Sale or Loan of Naval Vessels to 
Friendly Latin American Countries. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 7811. H. Rept. 622. July 15, 1965. 
14 pp. 

Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Italy and 
Spain. Report to accompany H.R. 7812. H. Rept. 
623. July 15, 1965. 13 pp. 

Authorizing the Loan of Naval Vessels to Turkey, 
China, and the Philippines. Report to accompany 
H.R. 7813. H. Kept. 624. July 19, 1965. 11 pp. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 



U.S. Sets Record Straight 
on Position in Viet-Nam 

statement by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly'^ 

I regret exceedingly that it is once again 
necessary that, in the exercise of my right 
to reply, I take the time of this Assembly 
to deal with remarks made by speakers who 
preceded me in reference to the situation in 
Viet-Nam. I refer specifically to some com- 
ments made by the Foreign Minister of 
Kenya. In his speech he said : "In our opin- 
ion United States intervention in Viet-Nam 
is the greatest menace to international 
peace and security." 

I must reject that statement as not con- 
sistent with the plain facts of the matter. 
The threat to peace and security in South- 
east Asia is Communist aggression, not in- 
tervention by the United States. It is Com- 
munist aggression that must stop if peace is 
to be restored to Viet-Nam, and it is Com- 
munist aggression that will be stopped. And 
peace will be restored to South Viet-Nam. 

My Government has stated and repeated 
in words of unmistakable precision exactly 
what its policy is in Southeast Asia. As long 
as 15 months ago. Ambassador Stevenson 
told the Security Council:- 

. . . the United States has no, repeat no, 
national military objective anywhere in Southeast 
Asia. United States policy for Southeast Asia is 
very simple. It is the restoration of peace so that 
the peoples of that area can go about their own 
independent business in whatever associations they 
may freely choose for themselves without interfer- 
ence from the outside. 

And in a communication I sent to the Presi- 
dent of the Security Council shortly after 

coming here to New York, my Government 
made the following summary of points with 
respect to its policy in Southeast Asia:* 

First, that the United States will continue to 
provide, in whatever measure and for whatever 
period is necessary, assistance to the people of the 
Republic of Viet-Nam in defending their independ- 
ence, their sovereignty, and their right to choose 
their own government and make their own decisions. 

Second, the United States will continue to assist 
in the economic and social advancement of South- 
east Asia, under the leadership of Asian countries 
and the United Nations, and will continue to explore 
all additional possibilities. . . . 

'Third, the United States will continue to explore, 
independently and in conjunction with others, all 
possible routes to an honorable and durable peace 
in Southeast Asia. 

Fourth, the United States stands ready, as it 
has in the past, to collaborate unconditionally with 
Members of the Security Council in the search for 
an acceptable formula to restore peace and security 
to that area of the world. 

The Foreign Minister has said that the 
United Nations is an appropriate forum to 
deal with this conflict. We agree with the 
distinguished Minister. We emphatically 
agree. We have brought it to the United 
Nations in every conceivable way in which 
it can be brought. Our President, in San 
Francisco,* invited all nations members of 
the United Nations, individually and col- 
lectively, to lend their good offices to a reso- 
lution of this dispute. I, as the representa- 
tive of the United States, delivered a let- 
ter ^ to the Secretary-General inviting the 
collaboration of this great organization to 
the end that the conflict might be trans- 
ferred from the battlefield to the conference 
table. Then in this report ^ which I read to 
the members of the Security Council, we 
again repeated that invitation. 

Mr. President, who has rejected the role 

' Made in plenary session on Oct. 7 (U.S. delega- 
tion press release 4657). 

' Bulletin of June 8, 1964, p. 907. 

» Ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278. 

* Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 98. 

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 275. 

" Ibid., p. 278. 



of the United Nations? The record is crystal 
clear. It is Red China which, with contempt 
and with insult, has rejected any role for 
the United Nations in this dispute. It is 
Hanoi which has denied the competence of 
the United Nations in this area. It is not 
the United States which is unwilling to 
bring this to the conference table. 

The Foreign Minister has said that the 
only lasting solution to the Viet-Nam crisis 
is a negotiated political settlement on the 
basis of the Geneva agreements. We have 
repeatedly said — the President of the United 
States, Secretary Rusk, I, and other spokes- 
men for the United States — that we will 
enter into unconditional negotiations in any 
appropriate forum, including a reconvening 
of the Geneva conference. There has been 
no answer from the other side. 

Finally, it has been said that the United 
States escalated the war in Viet-Nam. That 
is not the case. The war was escalated from 
the North by infiltration, by sending in 
armed regular units of the North Viet- 
namese army, by sending supplies, by ac- 
tions of terror which have continued until 
this very day, as members have seen from 
their newspapers of yesterday and today. 

We have said again and again: Let that 
aggression cease and there will be an ap- 
propriate response from the United States; 
but we shall continue to meet aggression 
when it is perpetrated upon innocent people 
who have asked us for assistance. What is 
at stake here is a fundamental principle of 
the charter : the right of the people of South 
Viet-Nam to carry on their own destiny in 
their own way, free from force and violence, 
and to determine their own destiny by the 
principle of self-determination. I would ask 
the members of the Assembly: What is 
wrong with that principle? What is wrong 
with the notion that the people of the South 
have the right to carry on in their own way, 
with their own government, under the prin- 
ciple of self-determination? This is what is 
involved, and no obscuring of the record 
can make that obscure. 

Therefore, we repeat that we are the 
ones who do not believe that political power 
comes from the barrel of a gun. We are 

the ones who have no designs or interests; 
we seek no territory, we seek no bases, we 
seek to withdraw our troops. But our 
troops cannot and will not be withdrawn so 
long as aggression is practiced upon inno- 
cent people seeking to carry on life in their 
own way. 

Red Cross Calls for Application 
of Convention to War Prisoners 

Folloiving is a statement made in the 
International Humanitarian Law Commis- 
sion on October 7 by Ambassador Robert F. 
Woodward, chairman of the U.S. delegation 
to the 20th International Conference of the 
Red Cross, which met at Vienna October 
2-9, together with the text of a U.S.-spon- 
sored resolution adopted in plenary session 
on October 9 by government and Red Cross 
delegations by a vote of 117 to 0, with 6 


Mr. Chairman: I wish to express again 
the deep appreciation of my Government 
for the great humanitarian services the 
Red Cross has carried out under the Geneva 

To increase the possibility that these in- 
valuable services may be carried out in all 
armed conflicts, the United States delega- 
tion believes that it would be useful for this 
conference to call upon all parties to the 
Geneva Convention on the Treatment of 
Prisoners of War to insure its implementa- 

Recent events have increased the concern 
of my Government about the treatment of 
prisoners of war. We have been concerned 
about access to prisoners and about ob- 
stacles to transmitting mail. But we have 
been shocked and deeply saddened by the 
brutal murder of prisoners as acts of re- 
prisal.i Now we are profoundly concerned 

^ For the texts of two Department statements 
condemning Viet Cong execution of American mili- 
tary prisoners, see Bulletin of July 12, 1965, p. 55, 
and Oct. 18, 1965, p. 635. 

NOVEMBER 1, 1965 


that other prisoners may be executed in 
violation of international law. 

For these reasons the United States dele- 
gation earnestly hopes that the resolution 
we have proposed will receive the sympa- 
thetic consideration of the delegates.^ 


The XXth International Conference of the Red 
Cross : 

Recalling the historic role of the Red Cross as 
a protector of victims of war, 

Considering that only too often prisoners of war 
find themselves helpless and that the utilization 
of prisoners of war as objects of retaliation is 

Recognizing that the International community 
has consistently demanded humane treatment for 
prisoners of war and facilitation of communica- 
tions between prisoners of war and the exterior, and 
condemned reprisals directed against them, 

Calls upon all authorities involved in an armed 
conflict to ensure that every prisoner of war is given 
the treatment and full measure of protection pre- 
scribed by the Geneva Convention of 1949 on the 
Protection of Prisoners of War, including the judi- 
cial safeguards afforded to every prisoner of war 
charged with any offense, and that the International 
Committee of the Red Cross is enabled to carry out 
its traditional humanitarian functions to ameliorate 
the conditions of prisoners of war. 


Current Actions 



Recommendations, including agreed measures for 
conservation of Antarctic fauna and flora. Adopted 
at Brussels June 2, 1964.' 

Notification of approval: Argentina, October 1, 

' A motion introduced by the Soviet delegation to 
declare the proposal "out of order" as not being 
presented under the proper agenda item was rejected 
by the Commission 50 to 7, with 10 abstentions. 

^ Not in force. 

Satellite Communications System 

Agreement establishing Interim arrangements for a 
global commercial communications satellite system. 
Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered 
into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646. 
Notifications of provisional application: Austria, 
May 6, 1965; Brazil, May 17, 1965. 


International telecommunication convention with six 

annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. 

Entered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892. 

Ratification deposited: Turkey, August 18, 1965. 
Partial revision of the radio regulations (Geneva, 

1959) with annexes and additional protocol. Done 

at Geneva November 8, 1963. Entered into force 

January 1, 1965. TIAS 5603. 

Notification of approval: Portugal, including Por- 
tuguese Overseas Provinces, August 18, 1965. 


Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20U02. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents, except in the case of free publications, 
which may be obtained from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Turkey, amending the agreement of June 
10, 1955, as amended — Signed at Washington June 
3, 1965. Entered into force July 8, 1965. TIAS. 5828. 
2 pp. 5<f. 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with the United Kingdom, extending the agree- 
ment of June 15, 1955, as amended — Signed at Wash- 
ington July 15, 1965. Entered into force July 20, 
1965. TIAS 5829. 2 pp. 5^. 

Defense — Construction of Military Facilities. Agree- 
ment with Saudi Arabia. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Jidda May 24 and June 5, 1965. Entered into force 
June 5, 1965, effective May 24, 1965. TIAS 5830. 
18 pp. io«;. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Sierra Leone, amending the agree- 
ment of January 29, 1965. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Freetowm May 5, 1965. Entered into force 
May 5, 1965. With exchange of notes — Signed at 
Freetown May 20, 1965. TIAS 5831. 4 pp. 5(f. 
Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Colombia. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Bogota June 9, 1965. 
Entered into force June 9, 1965. With related notes. 
TIAS 5832. 11 pp. lQ(t. 

Telecommunication — Coordination and Use of Radio 
Frequencies Above 30 Megacycles per Second. Agree- 
ment with Canada, revising the Technical Annex to 
the agreement of October 24, 1962. Exchange of 
notes — Signed at Ottawa June 16 and 24, 1965. En- 
tered into force June 24, 1965. TIAS 5833. 30 pp. 15(f. 



INDEX November 1, 1965 Vol. LIII, No. 1375 

Asia. Progress and Problems in the Far East 
(William P. Bundy) 709 

Atomic Energy. U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on 
Joint Saline Water Feasibility Study 
(Johnson) 720 


Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 723 

Protocol Amending Double-Taxation Conven- 
tion With Germany (Johnson) 722 

Economic Affairs 

Progress and Problems in the Far East (Wil- 
liam P. Bundy) 709 

Protocol Amending Double-Taxation Conven- 
tion With Germany (Johnson) 722 

U.S.S.R. Falters in Economic Growth Race 
With the United States (Department mem- 
orandum) 701 

U.S. Position on Importation of Yugoslav To- 
bacco (Rusk-McNamara-Connor letter, state- 
ment of cigarette manufacturers) .... 700 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. The Unseen 
Search for Peace (Rusk) 690 

Foreign Aid. The Unseen Search for Peace 
(Rusk) 690 

Germany. Protocol Amending Double-Taxation 
Convention With Germany (Johnson) . . . 722 

International Organizations and Conferences 

President Sends Message to Desalination 
Symposium 718 

Red Cross Calls for Application of Conven- 
tion to War Prisoners (Woodward, resolu- 
tion) 725 

The Unseen Search for Peace (Rusk) .... 690 

U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on Joint Saline 
Water Feasibility Study (Johnson) ... 720 

A Worldwide Cooperative Effort in Water 
Desalination (Udall) 716 

Mexico. U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on Joint 
Saline Water Feasibility Study (Johnson) . 720 

Military Affairs. Red Cross Calls for Applica- 
tion of Convention to War Prisoners 
(Woodward, resolution) 725 

Poland. Pulaski Memorial Day, 1965 (Johnson) 708 

Presidential Documents 

President Sends Message to Desalination 
Symposium 718 

Protocol Amending Double-Taxation Conven- 
tion With Germany 722 

Pulaski Memorial Day, 1965 708 

U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on Joint Saline 
Water Feasibility Study 720 

Publications. Recent Releases 726 


President Sends Message to Desalination 
Symposium 718 

The Unseen Search for Peace (Rusk) .... 690 

A Worldwide Cooperative Effort in Water 
Desalination (Udall) 716 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 726 

Protocol Amending Double-Taxation Conven- 
tion With Germany (Johnson) 722 

U.S., Mexico, IAEA Agree on Joint Saline 
Water Feasibility Study (Johnson) .... 720 

U.S.S.R. U.S.S.R. Falters in Economic Growth 
Race With the United States (Department 
memorandum) 701 

United Nations. U.S. Sets Record Straight on 
Position in Viet-Nam (Goldberg) .... 724 

Viet-Nam. U.S. Sets Record Straight on Posi- 
tion in Viet-Nam (Goldberg) 724 

Yugoslavia. U.S. Position on Importation of 
Yugoslav Tobacco (Rusk-McNamara-Connor 
letter, statement of cigarette manufac- 
turers) 700 

Name Index 

Bundy, William P 709 

Connor, John T 700 

Goldberg, Arthur J 724 

Johnson, President 708, 718, 720, 722 

McNamara, Robert S 700 

Rusk, Secretary 690, 700 

Udall, Stewart L 716 

Woodward, Robert F 725 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Release issued prior to October 11 which 
appears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 
236 of October 5. 




240 10/11 


Note to U.S.S.R. on application 
of German statute of limita- 
tions to Berlin. 

Letter to cigarette manufacturers 
on importation of Yugoslav 

Mann: Inter- American Press As- 
sociation, San Diego, Calif. 

Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Com- 
mittee: Department announce- 

Rusk: National Association of 
Retail Druggists. 

Talks with Canada on West 
Coast fishery problems. 

Rusk: "The Unseen Search for 

Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Com- 
mittee: joint communique. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 














Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. eovernment printing office 




How Foreign Policy Is IVIade 

The President, the Secretary of State and other Presidential advisers, the Congress, th 
American people — these are the makers of America's foreign policy. The role that each plays 1: 
the policymaking process is described in this handsomely designed and illustrated pamphlet. 

At the center is the President; he alone can make the final decisions. The Secretary of State an 
his staff at home and around the world advise and assist the President in devising and executing 
policy and coordinate the foreign affairs activities of numerous other Government agencies 
Congress, through its legislative powers, helps to shape policy and enables the President to fui 
fill our programs and commitments. And supporting the whole are the American people, whos 
hopes and ideals shape the goals of our foreign policy. 



To: Supt. of Documenti 
Govt. PrintinB Office 
Washingrton, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order) . Please 

send me copies of How Foreign Policy Is Made. 




To be mailed 



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Street address 

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Public Library 

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Vol. LIII, No. 1376 

November 8, 1965 

hy Under Secretary Mann 730 

hy Assistant Secretary Solomon 739 


by Thomas L. Hughes 7U7 

For index see inside back cover 

The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some fVlisconceptions 

by Under Secretary Mann^ 

In selecting a subject of current interest, 
I have chosen to speak about some of the 
issues that have arisen in the Dominican 
crisis principally because it seems to me 
that there are certain misconceptions that 
ought to be corrected. 

I should like to make it clear that my 
remarks today are not in ansvi^er to any 
particular commentary on our policies. 
There has been a great deal of comment 
both here and abroad. My simple purpose is 
to clarify a number of misconceptions. 

Nonintervention Not an Obsolete Doctrine 

It has been suggested that noninterven- 
tion is thought by some to be an obsolete 

I know of no Washington officials vi^ho 
think this way. On the contrary, I believe 

' Address made before the Inter- American Press 
Association at San Diego, Calif., on Oct. 12 (press 
release 241). 

unilateral intervention by one American 
state in the internal political affairs of an- 
other is not only proscribed in the OAS 
[Organization of American States] Charter 
but that nonintervention is a keystone of 
the structure of the inter-American system. 
American states have a treaty as well as a 
sovereign right to choose their political, so- 
cial, and economic systems free of all out- 
side interference. 

If we start from this point, it is not dif- 
ficult to identify two distinct areas of 
confusion : 

The first confusion comes from those who 
say, however obliquely, that it is necessary 
unilaterally to intervene — "support" is the 
word most often used — in favor of political 
parties of the non-Communist left. 

With all respect, this thesis is justified 
by the same rhetoric that was used to jus- 
tify our unilateral interventions in the past. 

But this thesis overlooks the fact that 
countries want to solve their internal polit- 


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ical problems in their own way. Latin 
Americans do not want a paternalistic 
United States deciding which particular 
political faction should rule their countries. 
They do not want the United States to 
launch itself again on what one scholar 
described as a "civilizing mission," no mat- 
ter how good its intentions are. 

This explains why, in the case of the 
Dominican Republic, we refrained during 
the first days of violence from "supporting" 
the outgoing government or "supporting" 
either of the factions contending for power. 
It explains why we and others thought it 
best to work for a cease-fire and to en- 
courage the rival Dominican factions to 
meet together and agree on a Dominican 
solution to a Dominican problem. It explains 
why, to use a phrase of international law, 
we offered our good offices rather than at- 
tempting to preside over a meeting for the 
purpose of proposing political solutions with 
a "made in USA" label on them. 

The second area of confusion concerns the 
response which an American state, or the 
Organization of American States as a whole, 
can make to intervention. When, in other 
words, a Communist state has intervened in 
the internal affairs of an American state 
by training, directing, financing, and or- 
ganizing indigenous Communist elements to 
take control of the government of an Ameri- 
can state by force and violence, should other 
American states be powerless to lend assist- 
ance? Are Communists free to intervene 
while democratic states are powerless to 
frustrate that intervention? 

This is not so much a question of inter- 
vention as it is of whether weak and fragile 
states should be helped to maintain their 
independence when they are under attack 
by subversive elements responding to direc- 
tion from abroad. 

Surely we have learned from the October 
1962 missile crisis that the establishment 
of Communist military bases in this hemi- 
sphere threatens the security of every 
American state. Surely we have learned that 
political control of an American state by 
Communists is but the prelude for use of 

that country as a base for further aggres- 

A number of juridical questions deserve 
consideration — not in an atmosphere of 
crisis, demanding an immediate decision, 
but in an atmosphere of calmness and ob- 
jectivity. As illustrative of the kind of ques- 
tions that ought to be considered, I pose 
these two: 

What distinctions ought to be made, on 
the one hand, between subversive activities 
which do not constitute an immediate dan- 
ger to an American state and, on the other, 
those which, because of their intensity and 
external direction, do constitute a danger to 
the peace and security of the country and 
the hemisphere? 

Second, assuming that, as I have suggested, 
certain subversive activities do constitute a 
threat to the peace and security of the 
hemisphere, what response is permitted 
within the framework of the inter-Ameri- 
can system? 

I do not offer precise answers to these 
questions at this time. I only wish to say 
that the problem of Communist subversion 
in the hemisphere is a real one. It should 
not be brushed aside on a false assumption 
that America^ states are prohibited by 
inter-American law from dealing with it. 

Seriousness of Communist Subversion 

I turn now to a political question: How 
seriously should we regard Communist sub- 
version in this hemisphere? 

I will not take your time to remind you 
of the expansionist history of the Commu- 
nist countries in recent years in Eastern 
Europe and in Asia. The history and the 
tactics used are well known. 

Only last month the Defense Minister of 
Communist China, in what was described 
as a major doctrinal article, stated that the 
United States, which he considered the 
principal obstacle to Communist domination 
of the world, must be defeated "piece by 
piece" in "peoples' wars" in Africa, Asia, 
and Latin America. This doctrine is the same 
as Lenin's. But the Minister's candor in re- 
minding us of Mao's dictum that "political 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


power grows out of the barrel of a gun" is 
revealing. Quoting Mao, he states: 

The seizure of power by armed force, the settle- 
ment of the issue by war is the central task and 
the highest form of revolution. This Marxist-Leninist 
principle of revolution holds good universally for 
China and for all other countries. 

The so-called "peoples' wars" or "wars of 
national liberation" are the tactic used in 
cases where the direct employment of mili- 
tary force is not feasible. Less than a year 
ago Communist parties from the hemisphere 
met in Havana and pledged to each other an 
increase in their coordinated efforts to sub- 
vert free institutions in this hemisphere. 

It is difficult to understand the precise 
reasons why some appear to be less con- 
cerned than others about attempts to expand 
by force and violence areas of Communist 
domination in this hemisphere. 

One point of view I have heard expressed 
as late as 2 years ago is that the "Castro 
revolution" should be looked at sympatheti- 
cally because "it has done so much for the 
Cuban people." "Please keep an open mind 
about the Castro revolution" is a phrase I 
have heard. I do not believe this view is held 
by any United States Government official, 
appointed or elected. But it still has a few 
articulate and influential proponents. If this 
were United States policy, only dictator- 
ships of the right would be opposed, not 
Communist dictatorships of the left. 

A second school of thought says in sub- 
stance that the way to preserve freedom in 
this hemisphere is to achieve rapidly a 
higher level of social justice, economic 
progress, and political democracy. I know 
of no one in the Government of the United 
States who does not have a deep and sincere 
conviction that the goals of the Alliance for 
Progress should be achieved as rapidly as 
possible. We support the Alliance goals not 
because there are Communists in the world 
but because the goals are right and good 
and because they are consistent with our 
national and hemispheric traditions and 
ideals. As President Johnson said in August 
of this year : ^ 

'Bulletin of Sept. IS, 1965, p. 426. 

... in my nation, like yours, we are still 
struggling to find justice for all of our people. 
And because we are fortunate in abundance, we 
feel that morality requires that we must also try 
to help others who seek it for their own people, 

The issue is not whether we should pursue 
the Alliance programs. The issue is not 
whether faster progress under the Alliance 
will make it more difficult for subversive 
elements to achieve their purpose. The issue 
is whether those programs, by themselves 
and standing alone, can be expected to frus- 
trate Communist subversion by force and 

This recalls to mind a story I read some- 
where several years ago. A young man went 
alone into the jungle in search of a tiger. 
When he found a tiger he began to explain 
in great detail and with considerable per- 
suasiveness why peace between tigerkind 
and mankind was desirable. To prove his 
good faith he had come without arms and 
— . The young man's statement of good will 
ended here at midsentence. At this point in 
the monolog the tiger ate the man. 

In my experience the men who have con- 
tributed most to social, economic, and polit- 
ical reform in this hemisphere are men who 
have understood that the Communist danger 
is not met by good works alone. 

Another theory points out that the new 
generations in Eastern Europe want greater 
freedom to express themselves and a higher 
standard of living. Decentralization, profit 
incentives, greater autonomy for light in- 
dustrial plants and farms, quality rather 
than quantity goals — all these and other 
topics of debate suggest a movement away 
from the old Marxist practices. Historic 
rivalries between Russia and China are 
stressed. The suggestion is made that the 
Soviet Union will, in its own interest, inevi- 
tably draw closer to Western Europe. 

I suppose everyone welcomes certain 
liberal trends in Eastern Europe. However 
limited in scope they may be — and they are 
limited — they represent a step in the right 
direction. I suppose everyone would welcome 
a decision by the Soviet Union to abandon 
the idea of world revolution by force, a 



decision to leave others alone, a decision to 
put its enormous weight on the side of those 
who hope for a truly pacific relationship 
between the Communist and the free parts 
of the world. 

We ought to welcome liberalizing thought 
and action in Eastern Europe. We ought to 
seek ways, compatible with our own security 
interests and those of the free world, gradu- 
ally to find a basis for a truly pacific rela- 
tionship with Eastern Europe. 

But it is wrong to present as a current 
reality that which is now only a hope for 
the future. All Communists still openly pro- 
claim their belief in a world revolution 
achieved by force. They are still supporting 
subversion in the Western Hemisphere. It 
would be difficult indeed to convince those 
who have lived recently for long periods in 
Latin America that Communists are not 
working harder than ever to export the 
"revolution of the Sierra Maestra to the 

Lastly, there is the thesis that we tend to 
overestimate the ability of the Communists 
to subvert free governments. 

As near as I can discover, this particular 
theory comes down to this: A number of 
Western European and Latin American gov- 
ernments have been able to stand up against 
subversive elements; therefore it is to be 
assumed that all developing nations will be 
able to do likewise. All that is needed is 
more faith in democracy. 

It is true that today there are a number 
of states in Europe and the developing areas 
of the world which have achieved the kind 
of maturity and tradition which gives them 
a large degree of security. But it is equally 
true that other states are vulnerable simply 
because they have not yet been able to 
modernize their societies and to acquire the 
maturity, broad popular support, the disci- 
plines, and the traditions which are ele- 
ments of national unity and strength. 

It is to these weaker, more fragile societies 
that Communist subversive efforts will be 
directed in the future. One has only to look 
around the world today to see that great 
differences exist between areas and between 
states in terms of their vulnerability to 

demagoguery and to the use of force ex- 
ercised by a disciplined minority. It is folly 
to assume that the experience of one nation 
or one culture is even a good indicator of 
what will happen in an entirely different 

What we can be certain of is that the 
greatest danger to freedom and to peace will 
come when the free world is confused, un- 
certain, divided, and weak — when expan- 
sionistic communism comes to believe that 
new aggressions can be committed without 

In addition to these generalities there are 
a number of misconceptions about particular 
United States actions in the recent Domini- 
can crisis.* 

Misconception: Reason for U.S. Action 

One misconception is that danger to 
American lives was more a pretext than a 
reason for United States action. 

This is demonstrably incorrect. 

Violence in the Dominican Republic began 
on April 24, 1965. By April 25-26 there had 
been a breakdown in the maintenance of 
order in the capital city. Planes of the 
Dominican Air Force were strafing and 
bombing the National Palace and other 
points. Artillery fire between the rebel and 
anti rebel forces was being exchanged in the 
eastern part of the city. Armed rebel bands 
roamed the streets looking for anyone who 
was suspected of being unsympathetic to 
their cause. The police were special targets 
and suffered heavy casualties; for all prac- 
tical purposes the police force disintegrated 
and police protection broke down com- 
pletely. Radio and telephone stations in 
Santo Domingo were in the hands of rebel 

The first important decision made in 
Washington was to evacuate, through the 
port of Jaina, all those who wished to leave. 

American tourists, unable to leave the 
capital by commercial transportation, had 
requested evacuation. On April 27 a group 

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 477, 
and Sept. 27, 1965, p. 514. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


of about 1,000 people of various nationali- 
ties, mostly women and children, gathered 
at and near the Hotel Embajador, which 
had been designated as the assembly point 
for evacuation. The American Embassy 
asked for and received promises of safe con- 
duct from both the rebel and antirebel 
groups so that they could be moved from 
the assembly point by road to Jaina, seven 
miles to the west. 

While the evacuees were being processed, 
an armed group appeared at the hotel and 
engaged in indiscriminate firing both in the 
hotel itself and on the grounds nearby, en- 
dangering the lives of many people. Only by 
good fortune was the first evacuation suc- 
cessfully carried out through Jaina on April 
27 without loss of life. 

On the following day, April 28, another 
large crowd gathered at the Hotel Embaja- 
dor desiring evacuation. By this time the 
road to Jaina was under sniper fire; our 
Embassy was informed by police authori- 
ties that they could no longer be responsible 
for the protection of American lives. 

Meanwhile the rebel government had dis- 
solved with many of its members, including 
Molina Urena, seeking asylum. There were 
no constituted authorities on the rebel side. 
There were, in fact, no constituted authori- 
ties of any kind in the city at this time and 
for several days thereafter. Total anarchy 

The second major decision was to order 
that some 500 Marines be landed for the 
purpose of protecting Americans and mak- 
ing possible the continuation of the evacua- 
tion process by helicopter. 

This small number of Marines established 
a small perimeter around the Hotel Emba- 
jador area. This permitted helicopters to 
land and take off and gave protection to 
those assembled for evacuation. 

The evacuation of the second group was 
begun as night came on the 28th. Several 
hundred more were evacuated then. Around 
5,000 persons of many nationalities were 
evacuated during the crisis. 

While the evacuation by helicopter was 
taking place, the United States Embassy 

and Chancery were under steady sniper 
fire, endangering the lives of Americans 
there. A small group of Marines was sent 
from the Hotel Embajador area to the 
United States Embassy in order to rein- 
force the Marine Guard there. 

The facts which I have outlined are un- 
disputed. Whatever may have been the re- 
quests or desires or recommendations of 
others, the action taken by Washington in 
the evening of April 28 had as its purpose 
the protection and evacuation of unarmed 

We did not consider it necessary to wait 
until innocent civilians had been killed in 
order to prove to the most skeptical that 
lives were in danger. Had we done this we 
should have been derelict in our duty to our 
citizens. These facts are also obviously rele- 
vant to the assertions that we should have 
left those desiring evacuation on the beach 
until the complex machinery of the OAS was 
able to function. 

Misconception: Use of Military Force 

It is charged that the administration as- 
sumed from the beginning that the revolu- 
tion was Communist dominated and that it 
should therefore be opposed by military 

This assertion is incorrect for the simple 
reason that when the second decision (to 
evacuate by helicopter) was taken it was 
still our hope that United States troops 
could be withdravsTi as soon as the evacua- 
tion was completed. There was a sound 
basis for this on the 28th. 

But with each passing day hope had been 
diminishing that the non-Communist ele- 
ments on the rebel side would either reach 
a cease-fire agreement with the bulk of the 
armed forces opposing them or bring the 
armed civilians and paramilitary on the 
rebel side under effective control. By the 
evening of April 29 it became clear that the 
armed forces at San Isidro would be nothing 
but observers. General Wessin, for reasons 
best known to him, elected not to support 
General Montas' column, which was split up 
as it entered the city from the west and, 



after some initial success, disintegrated. As 
it turned out, Wessin never did move his 
forces into the city. 

Whereas on the evening of the 28th it ap- 
peared that order might be restored by the 
Dominicans themselves, by the evening of 
the 29th the reverse appeared to be the case. 
Rebel bands, still without any visible cohe- 
sion except among the Communist com- 
ponents, vv^ere roaming at will into the city, 
carrying violence with them. There could be 
no assurance that order could even be main- 
tained in the balance of the country. 

The United States Government had, of 
course, long since been aware of, and con- 
cerned about, the growth of Communist in- 
fluence in the Dominican Republic. This 
concern grew when large quantities of arms 
were turned over to civilians and distributed 
by known and identified leaders of Com- 
munist parties to their partisans in the early 
days of the crisis. But there is a very im- 
portant distinction to be made between con- 
cern and a decision to use armed force. 

Thus it was not until the evening of the 
29th that a decision had to be made on 
whether the Communist elements in the 
rebel camp preeented a clear and imminent 
peril to the freedom of the Dominican na- 

I do not know what the United States 
Government might have decided that eve- 
ning had we not then been engaged in 
evacuation operations — had not the lives of 
innocent people been in danger. Perhaps 
under other circumstances we might have 
awaited developments for a while longer. 
Certainly we should have welcomed time to 
permit the OAS which, by this time was 
working on the problem, to take effective 

But these were not the facts, and this was 
not the situation. We were already engaged 
in evacuating our citizens and civilians of 
many other nationalities. Thousands re- 
mained to be evacuated. We did not wish 
to abandon them by withdrawing our men 
and helicopters from the small perimeter on 
the western edge of the town. We did not 
wish to abandon those in our Embassy 

under fire and other nationals without either 
protection or means of leaving the island. 

Against this background the third impor- 
tant decision was taken in the evening of 
April 29th. In form it was to reinforce the 
small number holding the perimeter near 
the beach and to land troops at the San 
Isidro airport a few miles east of the 

The saving of lives continued to be an ob- 
jective. But from this third decision (to 
land additional troops) flowed a number of 
actions in the following days. 

First, the small perimeter around the 
hotel was expanded into an International 
Safety Zone, a safehaven for all those who 
wished to repair to it. This was done both 
for humanitarian reasons and in response to 
requests for protection from a number of 
embassies which had come under small- 
arms fire from snipers. 

Second, a line of communication, a corri- 
dor, was established between the troops in 
the San Isidro area and the troops in the 
International Safety Zone. This corridor 
had the effect of interposing troops between 
the two contending armed factions. The 
interposition prevented a bloodbath that 
otherwise would have occurred eventually. 
It prevented a widening of the civil war. It 
helped to stabilize the countryside. It opened 
the way for a political settlement under the 
auspices of the OAS. 

Much of the confusion concerning these 
events derives from attempts to lift official 
statements out of their time context. State- 
ments made in one phase of the crisis were 
compared with statements made in another 
phase. These confusions have not been 
helpful to the American states in their ef- 
forts to find solutions to delicate and diffi- 
cult problems. 

Misconception: Degree of Communist Influence 

The degree of Communist influence in the 
rebel movement has been especially ques- 

It will not be possible, in this short 
speech, to tell the complete story of the 
degree of Communist influence and strength 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


in the rebel movement. The facts we al- 
ready have would fill a volume. Each pass- 
ing day brings additional facts to light. The 
danger will soon become apparent even to 
the most skeptical. In a very real sense the 
danger still exists. 

All those in our Government who had full 
access to official information were con- 
vinced that the landing of additional troops 
was necessary in view of the clear and pres- 
ent danger of the forcible seizure of power 
by the Communists. The evidence we have 
indicates that at that stage the paramilitary 
forces under the control of known Com- 
munists exceeded in military strength the 
forces controlled by the non-Communist 
elements within the rebel movement. Equally 
important is the fact that these non-Com- 
munist elements were working hand in glove 
with the Communists. 

The strength of the Communist com- 
ponent of the rebel side must be measured 
not only by its men and arms and its su- 
perior discipline but by the weakness, the 
divisions, and the lack of leadership within 
the rebel movement. It needs to be meas- 
ured in light of the fact that the Communists 
were operating in a total political vacuum 
during the early days of the crisis. 

There were no moderate forces on either 
the rebel or antirebel side with the will and 
the capacity to offer effective resistance to 
them. Indeed, from the dissolution of the 
Molina Urena regime on April 27 until 
Colonel Caamaiio formed his regime on May 
3 there was no identifiable leadership on the 
rebel side other than that of the Com- 

Misconception: Reform Movements and 

Next, it is said that the United States 
overlooked the fact that reform movements 
are likely to attract Communist support; 
that the United States failed to perceive 
that, if it is automatically to oppose any re- 
form movement that Communists adhere to, 
it is likely to end up opposing every reform 
movement and, in the process, make itself 
a prisoner of reactionaries. 

This theory assumes that an alliance be- 
tween the Communists and the non-Com- 
munist left in a popular front is an act of 
nature. This is really not different in es- 
sence from the Marxian theory that Com- 
munists are "in the vanguard" of all truly 
revolutionary movements. 

In Western Europe this theory has been 
proved false. By and large. Communists 
have failed to seize power there because 
European reformers were their most deter- 
mined and effective opponents. In contrast, 
non-Communist revolutionaries in Eastern 
Europe and elsewhere have formed popular 
fronts with Communists. 

The need to distinguish between a reform 
movement allied with the Communists and 
a movement dedicated to reform in freedom 
should be emphasized over and over again. 
Indeed, it is precisely the failure to make 
this distinction — the tendency of some to 
lump all "reformers" together and to eval- 
uate them solely on the basis of their 
rhetoric — that causes a great deal of the 

Many of you will recall De Tocqueville's 
conclusions about the causes of the Reign of 
Terror, which detracted from the real 
achievements of the French Revolution : 

When we closely study the French Revolution 
we find that it was conducted in precisely the same 
spirit as that which gave rise to so many books 
expounding theories of government in the abstract. 
Our revolutionaries had the same fondness for broad 
generalizations, cut-and-dried legislative systems, 
and a pedantic symmetry; the same contempt for 
hard facts; the same taste for reshaping institu- 
tions on novel, ingenious, original lines; the same 
desire to reconstruct the entire constitution accord- 
ing to the rules of logic and a preconceived system 
instead of trying to rectify its faulty parts. The 
result was nothing short of disastrous; for what 
is a merit in the writer may well be a vice in the 
statesman and the very qualities which go to make 
great literature can lead to catastrophic revolutions. 

Even the politicians' phraseology was borrowed 
largely from the books they read; it was cluttered 
up with abstract words, gaudy flowers of speech, 
sonorous cliches, and literary turns of phrase. 

Popular fronts do not have as their prin- 
cipal objective the noble purpose of demo- 
cratic reform. Their principal objective is 
political power. They are often formed by 



those who want the Communist vote in 
order to get elected to office. Sometimes 
they are formed because the help of disci- 
plined Communists is needed to overthrow a 
government. They are sometimes formed by 
politicians already in power to "buy their 
peace." The rationale I have heard is a re- 
vealing one: "I know they are dangerous. 
But I can control them." Sometimes this 
estimate proves to be correct. More often it 
does not. 

As President Kennedy said in his address 
at the Free University of Berlin on June 26, 

As I said this morning, I am not impressed by 
the opportunities open to popular fronts throughout 
the world. I do not believe that any democrat can 
successfully ride that tiger. 

But the point I wish to make is that Com- 
munist participation is not necessary in 
order to carry out reforms. There are sev- 
eral governments I can think of which are 
not allied with Communists and which are 
doing a pretty good job of reform. I am 
not conscious that this great country of ours 
has, in cooperating with these and other 
countries, become a prisoner of any group. 

Moreover, popular fronts serve Commu- 
nist ends. Communists gain from them a re- 
spectability they do not deserve. They use 
this respectability to infiltrate their parti- 
sans into the educational system, orga- 
nized worker and farm groups, the mass 
media, and, of course, the government itself. 
In participating in popular fronts politi- 
cians usually have in mind a short-term, per- 
sonal, political, selfish gain. On the other 
hand, Communists are content to work 
today in order to prepare for tomorrow. 

We do not really have to choose between 
reaction and leftist extremism. There is a 
large and growing number of people in 
Latin America dedicated to rapid and far- 
reaching reform. New political movements, 
organized on an institutional rather than a 
personalized base, give promise of organiz- 
ing and leading those who so desperately 
want to build modern societies. The Latin 

* Ibid., July 22, 1963, p. 125. 

American military contain in their ranks 
many able and dedicated men who do not de- 
serve to be smeared with the brush that 
ought to be reserved for the few. The 
church is providing leadership in many areas 
of social progress. Many of the younger 
men from all sectors of society are con- 
scious of the need for change and are help- 
ing to promote it. Organized labor is grow- 
ing in strength and could be a powerful in- 
fluence for progress. 

America's Continuing Revolution 

It is also said that our country is not 
much in sympathy with revolution and that 
our Revolution of 1776 was not much of an 
upheaval compared to the Russian and 
other revolutions. 

Perhaps these words are to be inter- 
preted as suggesting that in our revolution 
the violence was confined largely to the 
battlefields and that, consequently, it cannot 
be compared with the number of civilians 
killed under the guillotine or with the mil- 
lions who disappeared in the familiar Com- 
munist purges. If so, I fail to see why 
violence itself should be considered a de- 
sirable end. 

If, on the other hand, it is intended to 
say that the basic values of political and 
economic freedom, which were the principal 
motive force of the Revolution of 1776, are 
inferior to others, then there are dif- 
ferences in opinion which are indeed sig- 
nificant. Our political, economic, and social 
systems have produced a greater degree of 
individual freedom, a more even-handed, im- 
partial administration of law, higher levels 
of income, a more equitable distribution of 
an ever-rising national product, more equal- 
ity of opportunity, more religious freedom, a 
greater appreciation of the value of the 
spirit and of the dignity of man than has 
been heretofore achieved by any nation in 

Our revolution did not start and end in 
1776. It is a continuing phenomenon. The 
frontiers of opportunity, of knowledge, of 
health, of social justice and economic and 
political progress in our land are being 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


expanded still further in President John- 
son's program for the Great Society. 

Certainly if one compares the achieve- 
ments of our system with that of others, 
we have no need to be apologetic or de- 
fensive. On the contrary, we can take great 
pride in our accomplishments and in our de- 
termination for even greater improvement 
in the future. 

U.S.-Mexican Trade Committee 
Holds First IVIeeting 


Press release 242 dated October 12 

The Joint Mexican-U.S. Trade Committee 
will hold its first meeting at Washington 
October 13-15. The Committee consists 
of members of both Governments at techni- 
cal levels and was formed with the purpose 
of exploring and resolving mutual trade 

The head of the U.S. delegation will be 
Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary for International Trade Policy and 
Economic Defense, Department of State. 
Ambassador Hugo Margain of Mexico will 
head the Mexican delegation. Other agencies 
represented on the United States team in- 
clude the Departments of Commerce, Agri- 
culture, and Interior, as well as the Office of 
the Special Representative for Trade Nego- 
tiations. Representatives of the Mexican 
Secretariats of Industry and Commerce, Fi- 
nance and Public Credits, Agriculture and 
National Patrimony, among others, are in- 
cluded in the Mexican delegation. 


Press release 246 dated October 16 

The Joint Mexican-United States Trade 
Committee held its initial meeting in Wash- 
ington from October 13th to October 15th 
of 1965 to discuss mutual problems in 
United States-Mexican trade. The Delega- 
tion of Mexico was headed by the Ambassa- 
dor of Mexico to the United States, the 
Honorable Hugo Margain and the United 
States Delegation by Mr. Joseph Greenwald, 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Interna- 
tional Trade Policy and Economic Defense. 

The creation of this Joint Committee 
represents the first effort by both govern- 
ments to initiate and maintain a permanent 
institution for the regular exchange of views 
on ways that will promote mutually bene- 
ficial trade. 

The discussions ranged over a wide va- 
riety of subjects affecting trade between 
Mexico and the United States. Included were 
discussions on the respective commercial 
policies of the two countries; impediments 
to the expansion of trade; export promotion 
activities of the two countries; and the role 
of certain international bodies in promoting 
international trade. 

The Committee agreed to hold its second 
meeting in Mexico City in 1966. It was also 
agreed that there would be a continuing 
exchange of views on many of the matters 
discussed during the course of the meetings 
through normal diplomatic channels. 

Initiation of these mutual trade talks 
between Mexico and the United States of- 
fers great promise for increasing trade and 
understanding between the two countries. 

The cordiality and friendship that char- 
acterized the meetings augers well for future 
trading relationships between Mexico and 
the United States. 



East-West Trade 

by Anthony M. Solomon 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

It gives me great pleasure to be in Dallas 
and to participate in the stimulating pro- 
gram you have organized this week. I 
bring you personal greetings from Under 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Tom Mann. If it had been possible for him 
to do so, he would have joined in this pro- 
gram today. I have worked with Tom Mann 
for the past 2 years, first on Latin Amer- 
ican affairs and more recently on the whole 
range of matters that fall within our for- 
eign economic policy. It is on an important 
and controversial aspect of that policy that 
I would like to talk today. 

My subject is East-West trade, a subject 
that is looming increasingly large in the 
councils of the free world. I want to tell 
you something of the history of our trade 
policy with the Communist countries of 
Europe, the reasons for its various phases, 
the thinking and practice of the other de- 
mocracies in this matter, some encouraging 
developments behind the Iron Curtain, and 
the questions these have raised in the United 
States business community and in the United 
States Government. 

Because this is a controversial subject, I 
want to be sure there is no confusion as to 
what kind of trade I am referring to and 
with which countries. 

I am not talking about trade with Com- 
munist China, North Korea, or North Viet- 

' Address made before the Salesmanship Club of 
Dallas at Dallas, Tex., on Oct. 21, during Dallas 
World Trade Week (press release 249 dated Oct. 20). 

Nam. Since 1950 the United States has 
maintained an embargo on all trade and 
financial transactions with Communist 
China and North Korea. We do not permit 
American ships or aircraft to touch at the 
mainland. This embargo was extended to 
North Viet-Nam in January 1955. Each of 
these countries is engaged in aggressive 
activities, activities that we are helping the 
free countries of Asia to resist. Our trade 
embargo will continue so long as these coun- 
tries continue to incite, support, and par- 
ticipate in aggression. 

Nor am I talking about trade with Cuba. 
The United States prohibits all exports to 
Cuba, except nonsubsidized food and medi- 
cines for humanitarian needs, and embar- 
goes all imports from Cuba. We have cut off 
financial transactions with Cuba and lim- 
ited Cuban access to Western shipping serv- 
ices. Our restrictions on trade with Cuba 
are part of our total effort to isolate Castro's 
regime and reduce its ability to export sub- 
version and violence to the other American 
states. Our embargo will continue so long as 
Cuba threatens the security of the Western 

Lastly, I am not talking about trade in 
strategic goods. Strategic trade, that is, 
trade in items of military significance to 
the Communists, is embargoed not only by 
the United States but also by our European 
allies and Japan. Fourteen NATO countries 
and Japan, working together in a Coordinat- 
ing Committee, called COCOM for short, 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


maintain an agreed embargo list of items 
whose export each participating country 
controls. The list is reviewed periodically to 
add new items of technological importance 
and to delete others no longer of strategic 
significance. We can expect the system of 
COCOM controls on strategic trade to con- 
tinue in effect so long as Communist mil- 
itary capabilities are used to threaten the 
peace of the world. 

What I do want to talk about today is 
nonstrategic trade, trade in peaceful goods, 
with the countries of Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union. 

History of East-West Trade Policy 

Let me sketch briefly the history of our 
trade policy with these countries. 

From the earliest days of this Republic, 
we have regarded peaceful trade as a nor- 
mal element of international relations and 
we have not sought to interfere with trade 
because we disapproved of the philosophy or 
form of government of a trading partner. 
Consistent with this general approach, we 
placed no obstacles in the way of trade with 
the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's 
even though we did not officially recognize 
the U.S.S.R. until 1933; and at the end of 
World War II we treated trade with the 
Soviet Union no differently from trade 
with any other country. 

The sharp break came in 1948, when we 
imposed controls on strategic trade with the 
Soviet Union and its European satellites. It 
was an unprecedented but necessary re- 
sponse to Soviet aggressive expansion in 
Eastern and Central Europe. It was also an 
effective response. At the time we were 
practically the only important source of 
supply in the West for important industrial 
materials and equipment. Moreover, our 
Western allies shortly adopted parallel con- 
trols, thus establishing the COCOM system 
I have mentioned earlier. 

During the Korean war these COCOM 
controls were tightened and covered vir- 
tually all industrial equipment and raw 
materials to Communist countries. However, 
following the end of the Korean war and 

the death of Stalin, the embargo list was 
reduced and made more selective. In the 
changed political climate, our allies were no 
longer willing to maintain a general em- 
bargo. They have continued to control com- 
modities of direct military significance, in 
accordance with COCOM arrangements, but 
they have substantially expanded their 
peaceful trade with the Soviet Union. 

The United States has maintained more 
restrictive controls. We have a prior- 
approval licensing system for most exports 
to the U.S.S.R., and we continue to pro- 
hibit equipment and technical data not on 
the COCOM list if they embody technology 
more advanced than may be currently avail- 
able in other Western countries. We do per- 
mit without prior approval trade in con- 
sumer goods and in some types of equipment 
for the production of such goods. In 1963, 
when the exports of all COCOM countries to 
the Soviet Union reached $940 million. 
United States exports to the U.S.S.R. 
totaled only $20 million. 

Because the Soviet Union exercised effec- 
tive control over its European satellites and 
organized and exploited their economies in 
its own interests, our trade controls were 
initially applied equally to the Communist 
countries of Eastern Europe. But from the 
outset of our trade control program we rec- 
ognized the possibilities and the value of 
differentiating our controls and other as- 
pects of our policy as a means of responding 
to and influencing significant political de- 
velopments in the Communist world. Thus 
when Yugoslavia rebelled against the dom- 
ination of Moscow in 1948 and Moscow 
broke off its trade in an effort to force her 
back into line, we supported Yugoslavia's 
assertion of independence with trade and 
substantial military and economic aid. 

Yugoslavia's successful breakaway was a 
significant event in world history, and its 
influence was felt throughout the Eastern 
World. Yugoslavia is a Communist country 
in ideology, but it has undergone significant 
internal transformation. As is often the 
case, dogma lags behind fact. In fact there 
are now many elements of a market econ- 



omy in Yugoslavia, a liberalized system of 
foreign trade administration, a reduction in 
government intervention in the economy, 
and a moderation in political controls. These 
very developments have resulted in higher 
rates of economic growth than in nearly all 
the countries which remained in the bloc, as 
we who are wedded to a market economy 
could have foretold. About 65 percent of 
Yugoslav trade is now with the non-Com- 
munist world. The influence of that trade 
and the contacts that have flowed from it 
have had, in the opinion of your Govern- 
ment, an impact on the internal liberaliza- 
tion in Yugoslavia and can be expected to 
continue to have a salutary influence. Yugo- 
slavia does not always or even often vote 
with us in the councils of nations, but she is 
not an imperialist and aggressive power 
seeking to undermine the Western World. 

The Yugoslav experience stimulated the 
latent forces of nationalism within the 
Eastern European countries. Its influence 
was felt in Poland. The Gomulka govern- 
ment was able to reduce Soviet domination 
in Polish life. We encouraged the trend 
toward greater independence through our 
Food for Peace program, our Export-Import 
Bank credits, and our trade policy. In con- 
nection with the conclusion of a claims set- 
tlement we restored most-favored-nation 
treatment to imports from Poland and 
adopted a more liberal export licensing pol- 
icy toward her. In Poland Voice of America 
broadcasts are not jammed. United States 
magazines, films, and books are circulated. 
Catholics, who comprise 95 percent of the 
population, enjoy basic freedom of worship. 
Farmers are no longer collectivized. In Po- 
land, as in Yugoslavia, 85 percent of the 
farms are in the hands of private farmers. 
We know from Anglo-Saxon history the sig- 
nificance for freedom of an independent 
body of small farmholders. 

These steps toward internal liberalization 
should not be exaggerated. The governments 
of these countries are not representative 
governments with limited powers, tolerant 
of diversity and nonconformity. Freedom 
of speech is curtailed in both Poland and 

Yugoslavia but to a far lesser extent than 
when they were part of the monolithic 
Soviet bloc. On balance, our observers and 
experts believe that the trend, with set- 
backs from time to time, is toward the 
assertion of a national point of view and 
toward internal liberalization. 

More recently Romania has demonstrated 
its independence and has resisted outside 
efforts to put her economic development 
within the strait jacket of an economic 
plan for Communist Europe as a whole. She 
has asserted her national interests, pursued 
her economic development along lines con- 
sistent with those interests as she sees them, 
and has achieved the most dynamic economy 
in Eastern Europe. During the past year our 
willingness to trade more freely with Roma- 
nia has been a means of encouraging these 
favorable developments. ^ 

In Hungary and Czechoslovakia there are 
similar trends in the direction of improved 
relations with the West and greater national 
identity. With the possible exception of 
Albania, there is no part of the Eastern 
European area that does not show the fer- 
ment of change. 

Except for Yugoslavia and Poland we 
have not extended most-favored-nation tar- 
iff treatment to imports from countries of 
Eastern Europe, and our controls over peace- 
ful trade are more restrictive than those of 
our Western allies. In 1963, when the ex- 
ports of our European allies to the countries 
of Eastern Europe, excluding the Soviet Un- 
ion, were $1.3 billion, United States exports 
to these countries totaled about $150 mil- 

Question of Modifying U.S. Trade Policies 

The question is being asked more and 
more insistently whether developments 
within the countries of Eastern Europe war- 
rant further modifications in United States 
policy and practice on peaceful trade with 
them. This question is being actively studied 
not only in the executive branch and the 

" For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 4, 1965, 
p. 553. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


Congress but also by a variety of nongovern- 
mental organizations and most particularly 
by members of our business community. 

Even a casual student of Eastern European 
history knows that these are peoples with 
distinct national histories and close tradi- 
tional ties with Western Europe. They are 
small and economically vulnerable coun- 
tries. Should we reinforce the Iron Curtain 
by ignoring the significant changes taking 
place in Eastern Europe, or should we tailor 
our trade and related policies in accordance 
with the conditions and behavior of each of 
these countries ? 

President Johnson has recognized the 
longing of the peoples of Eastern Europe — 
and some of their rulers — for "deeper, 
steadier, and more natural relations with 
the West." He said recently and eloquently 
that "we wish to build new bridges to East- 
ern Europe — bridges of ideas, education, 
culture, trade, technical cooperation, and 
mutual understanding for peace and pros- 
perity." 3 

The business community in the United 
States has spoken up more and more force- 
fully for greater flexibility in our trade 
policy with Eastern Europe. In April 1964 
the United States Chamber of Commerce 
asked for a "prompt reexamination and re- 
evaluation of the present system of export 
controls with the objective of strengthening 
some controls and eliminating others which 
are not necessary for the security of the 
United States and which result in discrim- 
inations harmful to its competitive posi- 

In November 1964 the National Foreign 
Trade Council, in a resolution approved by 
nearly 2,000 delegates, endorsed the in- 
creasing interest being shown in develop- 
ment of trade with Eastern Europe and 
underlined the "extreme importance of 
maintaining a watchful and cautious but 
not unfriendly or inflexible approach to 
this issue." 

In May 1965 the Committee for Economic 
Development completed an exhaustive study 

it had made of East-West trade in coopera- 
tion with its counterpart organizations of 
businessmen in Western Europe and Japan. 
After a penetrating and balanced assess- 
ment of the Western interest in peaceful 
trade with Eastern Europe, the report con- 
cluded that "the interests of the West 
would be served in present circumstances by 
an expansion of East-West trade brought 
about by mutual East-West reduction of the 
obstacles to trade." It noted that "the West 
should be in a position to respond more 
affirmatively to tendencies of some Eastern 
countries to trade more freely with the 
West and to follow more market-oriented 

In one of a series of studies of East-West 
trade made by the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee, the views of an important cross 
section of 125 American businessmen and 
20 bankers were sought. One hundred and 
five of the 125 felt that trade with Eastern 
Europe should be expanded. Only nine be- 
lieved it should not be. Most of the bankers 
favored participation of the Export-Import 
Bank in guaranties of normal commercial 
credits in East-West trade. 

More recently, a committee appointed by 
President Johnson, the Special Committee 
on U.S. Trade Relations with East European 
Countries and the Soviet Union, composed 
of distinguished citizens under the chair- 
manship of J. Irwin Miller, chairman of the 
board of the Cummins Engine Company, 
made an extremely hardheaded evaluation 
of the way in which United States national 
interests may be advanced by a more cre- 
ative use of American trade relations with 
the Communist countries of Europe. 

The businessmen who have spoken so 
forthrightly are not naive about the Com- 
munist threat to our interests. They know, 
as you and I do, and as Tom Mann said 
only the other day in an address to the 
Inter-American Press Association at San 
Diego,* that Communist bloc doctrine still 
calls for world revolution. The Soviet Union 
continues to train selected candidates from 

'Ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876. 

' See p. 730. 



other lands in the arts of subversion, sends 
them out to disrupt vulnerable societies 
abroad, and finances their activities. 

But our businessmen are also aware that 
we must not be trapped and frozen by 
dogma, that we must not look at the Com- 
munist world as an undifferentiated unit. 
All are agreed that we must keep our pow- 
der dry and deny to the Communist world 
strategic goods that strengthen its military 
capabilities. But in the area of peaceful 
trade there is a broad consensus that we 
should differentiate among Communist 
countries, weigh carefully the advantages 
and the disadvantages in each case, and 
consider how the whole range of trade tools 
— export controls, most-favored-nation 
treatment, and normal commercial credits 
— can be used to effect economic and polit- 
ical change in our national interest. 

In a statement to the Senate Foreign Re- 
lations Committee last year Secretary Rusk 
summarized United States policy on trade 
with the Communist countries in these 
three points : ^ 

First, trade can be a useful instrument of policy 
in the contest with communism and in affecting 
Communist policies, provided it is adapted to the 
particular situations presented by different Commu- 
nist countries. 

Second, trading policies suited to one period in our 
relations with a particular Communist country may 
not be equally appropriate at another period. 

Third, our national purpose can be served either 
by the denial of trade or the encouragement of 
trade, depending on circumstances. Furthermore, 
the denial of trade may be either total or selective, 
again depending on circumstances. 

It is important that the steps taken in 
East-West trade policy be flexibly adapted to 
particular Communist countries at particu- 
lar times. 

Foreign policy cannot be based on slo- 
gans. A mature and responsible power must 
be discerning and discriminating in assess- 
ing its best interests. Our objectives toward 
international communism are : 

1. To prevent the Communists from ex- 
tending their domain, and to make it in- 

• Bulletin of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 474. 

creasingly costly, dangerous, and futile for 
them to try to do so — for example, our 
policy in South Viet-Nam ; 

2. To achieve agreements or understand- 
ings which lead to peace and help reduce the 
risk of a devastating war — for example, the 
test ban treaty ; and 

3. To encourage evolution within the 
Communist world toward national independ- 
ence, peaceful cooperation, and open soci- 
eties — for example, trade in peaceful goods 
with the West. 

Favorable developments in Eastern Europe 
have not been paralleled by like develop- 
ments in Communist Asia. The contrary is 
the case. But the Sino-Soviet split which 
has divided the Communist empire has 
given the countries of Eastern Europe more 
room for maneuver and an opportunity to 
assert their national interests. 

It is the Communist Chinese thesis that 
peaceful coexistence, in its true sense, is 
not possible between the free world and the 
Communist world. From this rigid dogma 
flows their call for aggression and their 
appeal to the barrel of the gun. Should we 
accept their dogma and constrict channels 
of contact and communication in Eastern 
Europe, the flow of peaceful goods, persons, 
and ideas where these can influence change 
in our direction? Were we to accept so rigid 
a view, we would be aiding Chinese Com- 
munist foreign policy, which is based en- 
tirely on looking down the gun barrel. And 
while it is the case that we have more and 
bigger guns, and will continue so long as 
necessary to multiply these guns, to rely 
solely on them is to risk Armageddon. Sure- 
ly the better course is to use other instru- 
ments available to us as well — and peaceful 
trade is one of them — prudently and wisely, 
to encourage the forces now at work toward 
peaceful intercourse and more normal rela- 

We should also remember that trade 
which can be encouraged when the time and 
circumstance are right can also be with- 
drawn when circumstances change. To 
move toward a more liberal trade policy 
with Communist Europe on a selective basis 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


does not commit us in perpetuity to con- 
tinue that policy. We do not give hostages 
to fortune. We are in full control. There is 
no conceivable danger, given the size and 
strength of our economy, that we for our 
part could become unduly dependent on 
such trade. We would benefit economically 
from such trade, and our businessmen 
would not have to cede the business to their 
Western European competitors. But the eco- 
nomic benefits to the United States are not 
the major reason; they would still be mar- 
ginal. It is the contribution such trade can 
make to the lessening of the tensions, fears, 
and suspicions that isolation encourages 
and the support that trade can give toward 
the progressive opening of the Iron Curtain 
— it is these that we value and should rec- 
ognize as the critical gains from such trade. 

Peaceful Trade With Soviet Union 

Let me turn briefly to the question of 
increased peaceful trade with the Soviet 
Union itself. It may be argued that facili- 
tating peaceful trade with the small coun- 
tries of Eastern Europe is clearly in our 
interest because it encourages national in- 
dependence and liberalization but that these 
considerations do not apply with equal force 
to peaceful trade with the U.S.S.R., the 
most powerful Communist country in the 
world. One question is whether increased 
United States trade with the U.S.S.R. 
would strengthen its power to mount for- 
eign offensives and provide it with added 
resources for subversion abroad. This 
question deserves the most careful and 
thoughtful consideration. In the time that 
remains to me today I want to suggest 
some of the considerations that bear on it 
in the hope that these will provoke you, as 
the leaders of the business community in 
Texas, to undertake a balanced analysis of 
the issue. 

To begin with, we must recognize that 
the Soviet Union has a powerful military- 
industrial base, an advanced weapons tech- 
nology and military production capability. 
The Soviet Union could not procure from us 

or our allies, nor would it permit itself to 
become dependent on us or our allies for, 
equipment related to weapons development. 
What it would seek in increased trade is 
civilian goods. But it would have to pay for 
such goods in real resources, gold or other 
commodities of real value to us. This would 
be a fair exchange. Why should we assume 
that we would lose out in such trade? Nor 
are we the sole source of civilian goods of 
a kind of interest to the Soviet Union, 
whether it is wheat or machinery. Our allies 
in Western Europe and in the Western Hem- 
isphere are prepared to make these goods 
available if the Soviet Union can afford to 
buy them. Is it the Soviet Union or our own 
farmers, businessmen, and workers that are 
disadvantaged when we put impediments in 
the way of such peaceful trade ? 

What about advanced technology, ad- 
vanced industrial plants, and our latest data 
that may not be available elsewhere? By 
and large, our business firms protect their 
advanced technology in which they have 
made heavy investment in research and 
development; they may be willing to ex- 
change their technology for what they con- 
sider equivalent advanced technology from 
other firms. Whether such an exchange 
would be feasible with the Soviet Union 
deserves further examination, but if it were 
to result, it would mean that we had gained 
something of equivalent value from certain 
advanced Soviet industrial processes. Let me 
remind you that our export licensing con- 
trols would prevent the sale of advanced 
technology that has military implications. 

There is another consideration. The pres- 
ence of American factories, machinery, and 
equipment in the Soviet Union surely can 
be a means of demonstrating the efficiency 
and excellence of American products and 
American technology. This is not a factor 
that works to our disadvantage. It works 
rather to the disadvantage of Soviet doc- 
trine by demonstrating the superiority of 
the Western system of economic organiza- 
tion. We know that the U.S.S.R. is in the 
midst of a period of critical self-examina- 
tion insofar as its economic institutions are 



concerned. The steady exposure of Soviet 
industry and agriculture to the hard facts 
of economic life internally and in world 
markets has led Soviet policymakers to 
think more and more critically about prob- 
lems of attempting to run their economy 
efficiently and improve the quality of their 

Their dilemma is that they want some of 
the benefits of Western private initiative 
and risk-taking combined with centralized 
political control and planning. But a large 
and complex industrial economy like the 
Soviet Union cannot be tightly controlled at 
the top and expect to enjoy the full benefits 
of initiative and experimentation at the lev- 
els below. The web of controls in which 
managers of enterprises are ensnared inhib- 
its innovation and experimentation. Peri- 
odically the Soviet rulers restructure the 
system, shift decisionmaking to the regions, 
then back again to the center. They are 
presently in the throes of such reorganiza- 
tion. This reorganization has new and inter- 
esting features. For example, it gives a 
greater role to profits, and it permits man- 
agers of enterprises some discretion in 
wage payments and incentives to labor. The 
Soviet reforms do not go so far as a number 
of reforms introduced recently in Eastern 
European countries, but they are a hesitant 
first step in the right direction. 

The Soviet rate of growth has been slow- 
ing down since 1960 while that of the 
United States has been picking up." During 
the 1960-65 period the Soviet rate of growth 
of gross national product has averaged 
about 4.3 percent a year, roughly the same 
as our own. Thus, during the past 5 years 
the Soviets have made no further progress 
in narrowing the relative gap between their 
economy and our ovsti. In fact, because the 
United States GNP is approximately twice 
that of the U.S.S.R., the absolute gap has 
widened by roughly $60 billion. At present 
rates of projection the Soviets by 1970 will 
be farther from matching the United States 
economically than at any time since Khru- 

* For background, see ibid., Nov. 1, 1965, p. 701. 

shchev first began talking about "catching 
up" with us. 

The fear has been expressed that peaceful 
trade might increase Soviet resources for 
mischief abroad. But if the Soviets must 
pay with real resources for what they buy 
abroad, whether from the production of 
goods or gold, they are not getting some- 
thing for nothing. They are giving up hard- 
pressed resources for what they gain. There 
is no question here of long-term credits to 
the Soviet Union. The question I am exam- 
ining is two-way trade on a commercial 
basis, not trade through aid credits. 

I think we might also give consideration 
to the implications of Soviet trade in civil- 
ian goods for its effect on the allocation of 
Soviet resources internally. If Soviet trade 
in peaceful goods with the United States 
could in fact develop substantially in vol- 
ume and value, the development would be a 
most hopeful one. It would reflect a concern 
of the Soviet regime with internal civilian 
needs rather than the singleminded and 
obsessive concentration of resources on mil- 
itary development, a concentration that has 
characterized Soviet economic planning over 
the years and has left the ordinary Soviet 
citizen with a narrow choice of low-quality 
and relatively high-cost consumer goods and 
long queues and waiting lists even to pro- 
cure many of these. 

We should welcome such a development 
if it could come to pass. When consumers 
have not enjoyed goods sturdy in quality, 
aesthetic in design, and available in quan- 
tity and variety, they accept drabness as a 
way of life. But if these goods do become 
available to them as a regular matter, it 
becomes difficult then for the regime to 
reverse direction without generating wide- 
spread and unhealthy dissatisfaction. Lux- 
ury becomes necessity, and, barring emer- 
gency situations, resources committed to 
civilian requirements tend to continue to 
be so committed. 

One last consideration I would like to put 
forward is the influence that increased 
trade with the Soviet Union might have in 
encouraging the adoption by the U.S.S.R. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


of Western standards of international be- 
havior, observance of rules of arbitration, 
protection of industrial property and copy- 
rights, limitations on freedom to engage in 
disruptive trade practices. If the U.S.S.R. 
wanted to increase its trade with the West 
substantially, it would have to bring its trade 
practices into line with those of the estab- 
lished world trading community. Only this 
summer the Soviet Union adhered to the 
International Patent Convention. '' And it 
would have to open up its economy to com- 
mercial representatives, facilitate entry and 
travel. This normalization of behavior in 
economic intercourse would not, of course, 
entail a reorientation in political thinking 
and political objectives. Trade is not so rev- 
olutionary an instrument as that. But is it 
unreasonable to believe that small steps 
toward more normal intercourse might over 
the longer term have a cumulative benefi- 
cial effect in reducing the aggressive thrust 
of Soviet policy? 

I have tried this afternoon to put forward 
food for thought, not a specific agenda for 
action. My primary concern is that what- 
ever policies we do adopt be taken on the 
basis of a full and rational examination of 
their implications and following a full ex- 
change — political, economic, and commer- 
their representatives and public servants in 

On the controversial subject of East- West 
trade, emotions run high. But the need to- 
day and tomorrow is for a hardheaded, not 
an emotional, approach to an important is- 
sue. We must first make a calculated assess- 
ment of the possibilities and the forces for 
change — political, economic, and commer- 
cial. Only then can we decide what course 
best serves the national interest. 

' For an article by Harold Levin on Soviet adher- 
ence to the International Patent Convention, see ibid., 
May 17, 1965, p. 758. 

German Statute of Limitations 
Applies to Berlin 

Press release 239 dated October 11 

Following is the text of a note delivered 
by the American Embassy at Moscow to the 
Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 
October 11. 

The Embassy of the United States of 
America presents its compliments to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics and, with refer- 
ence to the Ministry's note dated July 3, 
1965 relating to the application in Berlin of 
the Federal Law of April 13, 1965, concern- 
ing the computation of periods of limitation 
in criminal law, has the honor to state as 
follows : 

This law has been adopted and is being 
applied in Berlin in accordance with proce- 
dures authorized by the Allied Kommanda- 
tura. These procedures are consistent with 
the special status of Berlin and in no way 
derogate from Allied rights and responsi- 
bilities in Berlin. 

The law of April 13 does not, as asserted 
in the Ministry's note, afford protection 
against prosecution. On the contrary, it 
provides that newly discovered Nazi crimi- 
nals can be brought to justice. Moreover, 
as is the case in the Federal Republic, prose- 
cution will extend beyond January 1, 1970, 
in all cases where a period of limitation has 
been interrupted by judicial action. In this 
connection, the Embassy has the honor to 
draw attention to the third paragraph of its 
note of July 15, 1965.i 

It follows that the objections of the 
Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics to the application of the Federal 
Law of April 13, 1965 in Berlin are un- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 191. 



Scholars and Foreign Policy: Varieties of Research Experience 

by Thomas L. Hughes 

Director of Intelligence and Research ^ 

President McEwen, members of the Root- 
Jessup Public Affairs Council, ladies and 
gentlemen : 

Twenty years ago I was introduced to the 
history of philosophy in a class taught by the 
then Professor Robert McEwen of Carleton 
College, Minnesota. Since then our paths 
have separated, although I have reason to be- 
lieve that our basic philosophies have not. At 
any rate, when this opportunity came to con- 
front him again after a score of years, I ac- 
cepted your invitation with appropriate trep- 
idation, worried that his retrospective judg- 
ment tomorrow morning might be rather 
like that absurd couplet which Queen Vic- 
toria commanded Tennyson to write com- 
memorating both the telegraph and the ill- 
ness of the Prince of Wales : 

Across the wires the electric message came; 
He is no better; he is much the same. 

I suspect that it was in that same philos- 
ophy class that I was first made aware of 
some of the dimensions of the problem set 
for discussion tonight. I learned that in 404 
B.C. some energetic young men took over the 
government of Athens. Several of them had 
been students at a local academy of political 
science. The idea occurred to them to appoint 
a distinguished professor of politics to office. 
He accepted. His name was Plato. The gov- 
ernment — that of Critias and the Thirty 
Tyrants — was one of the worst Athens has 

' Root-Jessup Lecture, made at Hamilton College, 
Clinton, N.Y., on Oct. 21 (press release 250) . 

had, before or since. The professor lasted 
only a few months. An outraged city booted 
the government out of office. Ever since there 
has been a certain magnetic tension between 
scholars and statesmen — a tension into the 
midst of which, to my surprise, I have lately 
found myself inadvertently propelled. 

And so it came to pass that your commit- 
tee and I compromised on "Scholars and 
Foreign Policy : Varieties of Research Expe- 
rience" as a title for this lecture. I had been 
tempted by others such as "The Relevance 
of Research," "The Researcher and the Re- 
searched," "Research in Search of an Audi- 
ence," or again, aiming in the direction of 
my erstwhile philosophy professor, the more 
whimsical question: "Laocoon: Research or 
Foreign Policy?" 

At any rate you can see that I was deter- 
mined to talk about the significant but ob- 
scure topic of research and foreign policy, 
rather than opt for some other, obviously 
more glamorous, crisis that could readily 
come to mind. I had mixed motives: partly 
because two famous sons of Hamilton Col- 
lege — Elihu Root and Philip Jessup — blended 
statecraft and scholarship at their rarest 
and best ; partly because yours was the most 
respectable academic audience available 
when the need arose to speak to this subject; 
partly because new procedures setting the 
first guidelines for United States Govern- 
ment behavior in the foreign area research 
field were being readied for release in Wash- 
ington ; and partly because the State Depart- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


ment, only fitfully adjusting to its reputation 
as a "bowl of jelly" filled with "irrevocably 
conventional minds," has simultaneously 
been attacked for too vigorously disdaining 

I do have a bona fide claim to speak. The 
bureau which I head traces its lineage at 
least back to the time when Elihu Root as 
Secretary of State first modernized the De- 
partment's archaic filing system in use since 
1789. In our presumption we like to think 
that Webster's famous plea in the Dartmouth 
College case applies to our bureau of re- 
search scholars just as it applies to Hamil- 
ton: "It is a small college, but there are 
those who love it." 

We are a proud, happy, spirited little band 
of 350, and we think of things that would 
astonish you. For instance, already this week 
we have corporately encompassed about 120 
old nations, discovered two new ones, esti- 
mated three elections, cast bets on the com- 
position of two cabinets, fretted over one 
unilateral declaration of independence and 
another mutiny, noted the decline of two new 
emerging forces and the resurgence of one old 
established force, and discounted three abor- 
tive plots erroneously attributed to the CIA. 

We have done our part to sharpen under- 
standing on a variety of standard issues: 
e.g., which juntas are good ones and which 
juntas are bad ; where reunification is a hope 
and where it is a hindrance; when the case 
for counterinsurgency outweighs the case for 
insurgency, and vice versa; how a coup 
d'etat may be preferable to a coup de grace ; 
when confrontation is called for and when it 
gets in the way ; how to de-escalate unwanted 
escalations, and how to escalate wanted ones ; 
when religious fervor is a help and when it is 
a headache; where building bridges makes 
sense and where blowing them up makes 
more sense ; when self-determination is mor- 
ally indispensable and when it is not ; why it 
is sometimes so difficult for both sides to 
engage at the same time in negotiations from 

Not that we are consulted on every for- 
eign policy problem or indeed on every move 

that the State Department makes. For in- 
stance, despite its relevance to research, we 
were not consulted in advance about Yale 
University's Columbus Day publication of the 
pre-Columbian map which so reassured Scan- 
dinavia and offended the Mediterranean. The 
reaction of a monarchist newspaper in Ma- 
drid rivaled the kind of protests we have 
been receiving on government research proj- 
ects abroad: Yale's action, it said, was "an 
incredibly belligerent plan, prepared care- 
fully for some time, to pulverize the glory 
of Spain in the discovery of the new world 
by Christopher Columbus." The paper added 
with a kind of deductive logic only appreci- 
ated in New Haven that "if the discovery of 
America had been left to the Vikings, there 
would be no Yale University today." 

Nor were we consulted last week when art 
imitated life a little too closely and 9 of 
27 paintings by a surrealist Belgian Em- 
bassy wife were taken away from a special 
showing in the State Department's exhibition 
hall for dealing too frankly with the human 

Unfortunately this whole episode compli- 
cates my life even further. The State De- 
partment's art critics and custodians are — 
and hopefully will remain — anonymous. But 
the Department's research work, recently 
augmented by a new assignment of certain 
quasi-judicial functions in the government- 
research field at large, has publicly been be- 
stowed upon me. Indeed these duties have 
now become so insistent that the only time 
I have for art is en route from my office to 
the office of the Secretary of State. From 
an artistic point of view, that is an emi- 
nently sobering experience. You vdll be 
glad to know that it largely consists of a 
compulsory viewing first thing every morn- 
ing of your own benefactor and favorite son. 
For as the Secretary's private elevator halts 
at the seventh floor, its steel doors automat- 
ically open, and there, unavoidably confront- 
ing the passenger, in rich oils and soft light- 
ing, is the Honorable Elihu Root, waistcoat 
and all — a triumph of propriety over all ar- 
tistic waywardness. 




The Cast of Characters 

Consider Elihu Root's description of his 
professors here on this campus a hundred 
years ago : 

These professors were poor as the world goes, but 
they had a wealth that money cannot create. They 
loved their subjects and were happy in their work. 
They rejoiced in the exercise of their powers. They 
were content with simple pleasures. They filled the 
atmosphere about them with an enthusiasm for 
learning and literature. They sought for truth as 
one who strives in a game. They never talked or 
thought about money or investments or profits. They 
took little heed of all those things for which men 
are striving and wearing out their lives in the mar- 
ket places of a materialistic civilization. 

Neither the euphoria of secrecy nor the 
temptations of affluence were operating in 
this pastoral scene. There was no security 
curtain dividing faculty meetings then be- 
tween the "cleared and the great uncleared." 
It was long before the coming of age of 
"social science," let alone "applied" social 
science; long before professors wanted to 
make a difference in the hard, political 
world; long before "policy orientation" 
pulled academic advisers into important na- 
tional events; long before the three-way mi- 
gration began from campus to congressional 
committee to executive branch office and 
back again — and hence even longer still be- 
fore a member of the Cabinet would survey 
the Washington scene and demand that all 
Ph.D.'s be cleaned out of the Government. 

Yet the statistics have continued to rise. 
Today there are reputedly 5,000 academics 
in the Cambridge area alone who are con- 
sultants to the Government. Sixty-five per- 
cent of the total research and development 
expenditure of this country comes from the 
Federal Government, 92 percent of that going 
for defense research. One way or another, 
parts of the Government itself have now had 
experience in dealing with substantially the 
whole range of human endeavor in most parts 
of the world — and this fact itself has be- 
come both a stimulus and a magnet for 
greater academic involvement. 

Few would disagree with Harold Lass- 
well's description of the problem : 

The continuing crisis of national security in which 
we live calls for the most efficient use of the man- 
power, facilities, and resources of the American 
people. Highly trained talent is always scarce and 
costly. Hence the crisis poses the problem of utiliz- 
ing our intellectual resources with the wisest econ- 
omy. If our policy needs are to be served, what topics 
of research are most worthy of pursuit? What man- 
power and facilities should be allocated to official 
agencies and to private institutions for the prosecu- 
tion of research? What are the most promising 
methods of gathering facts and interpreting their 
significanae for policy? How can facts and inter- 
pretations be made effective in the decision-making 
process itself? 

These are the right questions, but at best 
we have made uneven progress in answering 
them. And along with the progress have 
come new sets of problems. Especially dur- 
ing the past few months, some of our leading 
scholars have outdone one another in de- 
scribing the growing predicament of schol- 
arly research and foreign policy. "American 
social science is in a crisis of ethics," says 
one distinguished critic. "Its motives, tech- 
niques, and practitioners are falling into dis- 
repute." "The scholar and the policy maker 
have become somewhat interundistinguish- 
able," says another. A third speaks of the 
"jungular quality of academic relations with 
government," of the "corrosion of scholarly 
integrity and indeed identity in the govern- 
ment-research-university relationship." Still 
another stresses: "It is in the area of for- 
eign affairs where the academic community 
and the government attract and repel one 
another with the most vigor." 

Let me set up for you a series of hypo- 
thetical characters to dramatize the atmos- 
pherics currently surrounding scholars as 
they conduct foreign area research. These 
fictional vignettes themselves will serve to 
suggest some of the current varieties of re- 
search experience as they affect U.S. for- 
eign policy. Let us consider the varying per- 
spectives as seen from the campus, from 
Washington, and from the foreign capital by 
the willing scholar, the skeptical scholar, the 
university administrator, the eager bureau- 
crat, the reluctant bureaucrat, the Congress- 
man, the American ambassador, the overre- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


searched foreigner, the foreign minister, the 
foreign scholar, and the foreign press. 

The willing scholar is deeply convinced 
that what the Government needs most is 
creative research and that what he needs 
most is funds. He can bring to foreign pol- 
icy councils the best that the academic world 
can offer to inform the decisionmaking proc- 
ess with better data, systematic analysis, 
and balanced assessment of probabilities and 
options. He can help rescue policymakers 
from misinformation, bias, intuition, and 

This willing scholar glories in his relation- 
ship with policy and action. Perhaps he has 
been asked and decided not to join the Gov- 
ernment. In any case he is happy to stay 
outside and help. He has an active desire for 
the best of both worlds and feels secure in 
preserving his integrity. He may or may not 
be caught up in intramural contentiousness 
among branches of social science. He may be 
one of the behavioral scientists who feel 
that the military services should not sponsor 
behavioral science research under any cir- 
cumstances. On the other hand, especially if 
he is devoted to large-scale research, he may 
feel that the military are the best possible 
patrons, that they have a good record of not 
imposing conditions which would infringe on 
his freedom of inquiry, and that any Depart- 
ment of State "censorship" constitutes un- 
warranted control over this freedom. 

The skeptical scholar looks on academic- 
government relations as at best a trial mar- 
riage on both sides — or even a highly big- 
amous relationship replete with conflicting 
sets of loyalties and new obligations disturb- 
ingly imposed on old, established proprieties. 
He doubts his and his colleagues' ability to 
resist official influence on their thinking and 
believes that Government-oriented research- 
ers inevitably become more responders than 
creators. He believes that when scholars be- 
come contractors or consultants to the Gov- 
ernment, they tend to find themselves sup- 
porters of Government policy and do not or- 
dinarily feel free to make basic criticism or 
to suggest alternatives outside the general 
direction of official policy. Some of the skep- 

tical scholars would draw their personal per- 
missible limit of involvement at the Peace 
Corps; others would go so far as to include 

The skeptical scholar is for "freedom of 
thought" and whatever self-interest that 
protects. He worries about the abuses of re- 
search. He is suspicious of Government in- 
fluence on the allocation of research efforts. 
He notes that proponents of competing pol- 
icy positions inside Government attack and 
counterattack, wielding their own social 
science researches and corroding the concept 
of objective research in the process. He may 
be deeply concerned about the effects of 
careless research abroad — not only because it 
embarrasses the U.S. Government and the 
academic community but also because it dries | 
up his own access to foreign contacts and " 
reduces his own acceptability overseas. And 
as a final affront, abroad he finds himself 
suspected of being in the Government's se- 
cret employ anyway, despite all his protesta- 
tions of innocence. 

The university administrator has a per- 
spective all his own. "In general the govern- 
ing need in American academic life is for 
more reading and research, not less," said 
Dean McGeorge Bundy in September 1960, in 
his waning months at Harvard. 

Our best universities . . . have never had a 
better patron than the Federal government at its 
best, .... Certainly all large-scale financial 
support creates dangers against which universities 
must be alert. But vyhat evidence is there . . . 
that the Federal government is intrinsically more 
dangerous than other backers? . . . 

Some departments in some places [Bundy con- 
tinued] are dangerously influenced by the market 
place of contract funds .... Some men build 
foolish empires; some spread themselves too thin in 
conferences and consultations; some are indeed re- 
mittance men abroad. Few if any universities have 
yet made the right place in their communities for 
the members of large-scale research installations. 

He went on to speak of "danger of a weak- 
ening, particularly among younger scientists 
and social scientists, of the great tradition of 
research and teaching as a single way of life," 
and he mentioned "the occasional but real 
problem which is created when too much 
money chases too little talent." 



These are problems enough [he concluded] but 
there is not one which cannot be dealt with intelli- 
gently, and not one which outweighs the general and 
overriding fact that American academic men, few of 
them affluent and none of them saints, are on the 
whole growing in quality and in effective service of 
all sorts, year by year. 

Most university leaders probably agree. 
Conscious of the ever-increasing contribu- 
tions of research to policy, av^^are of the 
status which recognized research brings to 
their universities, and pleased vs^ith the 
funds which often accompany prestige in re- 
search, they are willing to pay the price of 
whatever ethical paradoxes may attend 
their universities' growing involvement with 

Even for the trivial problem of the un- 
wanted but tenure-holding faculty member 
which occasionally vexes a university ad- 
ministration, foreign research may again 
provide an answer. From time to time there 
have been suggestions in the academic com- 
munity that certain Presidents are not averse 
to permitting certain of their faculty to go 
abroad on indefinitely extended sabbatical 

This is a social situation not dissimilar 
from the famous New York meeting of 
Theodore Roosevelt, Charles Evans Hughes, 
and Elihu Root on March 20, 1917. They 
were full of war talk and had just led 600 
Republicans at the Union League Club in a 
virtual declaration of war on Germany ahead 
of the Government. They met in a cafe after 
the meeting. Theodore Roosevelt was bub- 
bling over with fighting zeal and the convic- 
tion that he should have a military command 
abroad. "You must see Wilson," he declared, 
turning to Root and Hughes, "and get his 
consent to let me go." Teddy's voice deepened 
with solemnity and emotion. "I must go," he 
said, "but I will not come back. My sons will 
go too, and they will not come back." For a 
moment there was silence out of respect for 
the former President's evident sincerity. 
Then Root spoke up: "Theodore, if you can 
make Wilson believe that you will not come 
back, he will let you go." Sometimes, as we 
all understand, academic relations are like 

The eager bureaucrat by definition needs 
no convincing of the desirability of research. 
He knows that research can help him to gen- 
erate and make available new data ; discrim- 
inate between data so as to select out the 
trivial from the crucial; evaluate new data 
against already known facts and anticipate 
data not yet known ; compare events between 
different societies and through different 
time periods ; identify his alternative choices 
and assess their likely results; anticipate 
the probable courses of action of others ; and 
perhaps most important over the long run, 
order data into theoretical patterns that will 
help him understand whole classes of events. 
He knows that policy problems can be an 
important stimulation to research as well as 
a useful test of the utility of research. He 
may be in the Department of State, familiar 
with and impressed with the many current 
uses of behavioral sciences by his depart- 
ment in recruitment, management, consult- 
ants, lecturers in training programs, re- 
search contracts, professional meetings, and 
the collection and indexing of information 
as a public service on research projects. Or, 
on the contrary, he may be in another depart- 
ment of government which happens to have 
available funds — and his attitude toward the 
Department of State may best be summed 
up in the Biblical cadence, "They toil not, 
neither do they spin." He wishes the State 
Department had the initiative as well as the 
money to take the lead, but as things are, he 
is willing to do his bit where he is with what 
he has. 

The reluctant bureaucrat wants freedom 
of action : He thinks of himself as a man who 
respects action above abstraction. He believes 
in the sixth sense — only the inside profes- 
sional can handle problems. He sees academic 
research as either an ivory tower impedi- 
ment or irrelevant. He is skeptical about the 
research product, even suspicious of it. If he 
is a policymaker, his own self-esteem may be 
involved. He is not about to be deprived of 
all but the ceremonial steps in certifying 
policy, with interpreters and evaluators, 
shapers and policy-oriented advisers filling 
up the interstices of the procedures of policy- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


making. He knows that the meaning of facts 
is not self-evident. It must be construed — 
and that is his job. He has a strong feeling 
that while "factual research" may be useful, 
anything beyond that is a highly question- 
able residue from the overeagerness of social 
scientists in selling themselves. In his mind's 
eye he sees peripatetic squads of affluent 
professors and subsidized investigators 
"cross-fertilizing" their foreign travels. 
Apart from its incomprehensibility, he ques- 
tions the objectivity, currency, relevance, 
and excessive cost of the research he has 
seen. For him research is "academic" in the 
most pejorative sense. 

The Congressman's view is as varied as 
the many colored strands that make up the 
rich tapestry of congressional sentiment : the 
watchdog of the Treasury, the promoter of 
liberal arts for the new all-purpose Amer- 
ican soldier, the champion of behavioral re- 
search, the exposer of excessive govern- 
mental secrecy, the traditionalist who finds 
it hard to jettison the notion that foreign 
policy should still be considered the prerog- 
ative of the Department of State, and the 
traditionalist who finds it hard not to ask day 
after day, "Why isn't something done about 
the State Department?" One of the latter 
recently became so upset about what he 
called "that huge unidentified army of un- 
elected bureaucrats buried in the classified 
civil service ranks at sub-Cabinet levels . . . 
the career, sedentary, odd-ball, self-satisfied, 
empire-building bureaucrats infesting the 
State Department" that he has introduced 
a bill to abolish the Department itself. 

The American ambassador naturally is 
concerned with avoiding embarrassment and 
political risk, for good relations with 
foreign nationals are central to his job and 
reputation. His position often highlights the 
shortrun disadvantages over the longrun ad- 
vantages of risky research. He must broker 
the research pressures from Washington 
against needs as he sees them, factor in his 
own reporting function, consider the desire 
of the host government for some kinds of 
research and its resistance to others, assist 
American researchers in approaching their 

foreign tasks, and try to keep open his own 
lines to all elements of the society around 
him. At minimum he will insist on his right 
to be informed of all U.S. Government- 
sponsored research in his area. If he is an 
ambassador to one of the newly developing 
nations, especially if he has an academic 
background himself, he may be poignantly 
aware of the need for research — and there- 
fore of the irony that our consuming new 
interest in political development is occurring 
at just the time when doors are closing to 
sensitive foreign academic intervention. 

The overresearched foreigner, be he 
African prime minister or Asian village 
chief, is beginning to tire of relating his 
tribal antecedents to one eager American 
Ph.D. candidate after another. The number 
and aggressiveness of our overlapping re- 
searchers, the demands on the time and 
patience of the hosts, the frequent insensi- 
tivity to the nuances required by dignity 
and respect, are adding up here and there to 
embarrassment, annoyance, and distaste for I 
a new brand of "academic imperialism." The I 
guinea-pig complex begins to fuel latent ' 
suspicions of end use. Sometimes it is a 
question of simple quantitative saturation. 
Other times it is a question of ethics and 

Foreign ministers, as our protocol officers 
at home and abroad are coming to discover, 
are beginning to regard internal research in 
their countries like internal insurgency, as 
an extension of international politics. Some 
foreign governments welcome this develop- 
ment and look upon American research as a 
new means of cementing their ties with 
Washington. They see our research as a 
useful, mutually beneficial effort bringing 
extra political and economic benefits along 
with it. Whether they favor or oppose it, 
however, a decision by the U.S. Government 
to study is assumed by foreign governments 
to be a conscious political act. They all 
attribute motivations and intentions to us 
which we don't often deserve. Thus as one ^ 
scholar with field experience in Latin Amer- 
ica wrote recently : 



It is not easy to give Latin Americans a satisfac- 
tory explanation of the role of the U.S. government 
in the research activity, especially when the research 
involved is military and uses inflammatory -words 
like war . . . and insurgency in describing the 
research project. ... It is hard for Latin 
Americans to understand why the U.S. government, 
especially a military agency of it, would support re- 
search in Latin America, if not for a military pur- 

Then if something big and dramatic comes 
along, like the Army's $6 million unclassified 
counterinsurgency study in Latin America, 
"Project Camelot," the scholar looks like an 
agent. Camelot crashed into the headlines in 
Chile soon after we had landed troops in 
Santo Domingo, and it immediately became 
associated with interventionism and milita- 
rism. Camelot was seen as part of a carefully 
planned policy. Then when it was discovered 
that our Embassy didn't know about the 
project, the whole episode became all the 
more conspiratorial in impact, convincing 
more critics than ever that our Latin Amer- 
ican policy is really being made in the 
Pentagon. The fact that such projects have 
been planned without conspiratorial intent 
is immaterial. A Chilean Assembly debate 
and committee investigation followed, vdth 
an official protest, a banishment, and inde- 
terminate effects on scholars and foreign 
policy alike. 

The foreign scholar is not left unscathed 
by events of this sort. Ideological-political 
susceptibilities of intellectuals and govern- 
ment officials in host countries build upon 
one another and can speed the adverse re- 
actions. The canons of academic openness 
take on added importance. There is a quick- 
ened interest in the foreign academic com- 
munity in the revelation of sources of funds, 
premises of studies, nature of data, bases of 
conclusions of all U.S. research. Moreover, 
no other country has anything quite like our 
special phenomena of academic mobility in 
and out of government ; so this adds to every- 
one's inability to comprehend the fine dis- 
tinctions we make about auspices. A funda- 
mental American national resource — the 
credibility of the independence of private 
research — tends to disappear and get lost in 

a blurred impression of governmental in- 

The environment also includes, of course, 
the generally large and available publicity 
on "invisible government," with all of the 
lurid allegations of pernicious CIA activity. 

At minimum the foreign scholar will want 
to protect himself from an overidentification 
with American research; he will want to 
diversify his contacts and hedge his bets. As 
Gabriel Almond has pointed out: 

This problem exists even for the more sophisti- 
cated indigenous scholar who is not himself worried 
about involvement with the United States and U.S. 
sponsored research but who has to worry about the 
way in which his colleagues or his students will view 
such involvement. 

The foreign 'press affords a final perspec- 
tive. It is not only the Communist editor who 
waits for every morsel of anti-Americanism 
to exploit across his front pages and for 
whom the written words of heedlessly drafted 
research projects are an extra bonanza. Care- 
less, ill-considered, ineptly performed re- 
search abroad quickly activates the press and 
politics of most of the world, embarrassing 
our friends, delighting our foes, and promot- 
ing both the broad-brush polemics of the pro- 
fessional anti-American as well as the satiri- 
cal stilettos of Punch. The latter's subscrib- 
ers were recently treated to the following 
replay of the Camelot affair : 

The U.S. Defense Department is collating intelli- 
gence on "the internal conditions and prospects of 
certain foreign countries in case of civil strife which 
could lead to American military involvement". The 
next probe could be practically anywhere. 


This summary to be completed by Senior Agent in country 
concerned, and returned to Dept. K 88, Pentagon, Washington 

Country. Great Britain 

Current Relation to U.S. Class II Ally. No. Now 
reclassified Class III shading to Class IV. 

Current Government. Democratic, mild socialist, 

Current Opposition (if any). Democratic, mild 
socialist, ultra-weak. 

Potential "Strong Man". Nil. Monty? Old and 
pro-Mao, but anti-queer. Ask Ike. 

Potential Junta. Choose from Gavin Astor*, Ran- 
dolph Churchill*, Douglas Insole, Lord Chandos, 
Enoch Powell*, Sir Cyril Osborne, Edward Mar- 
tell. Approach names starred tactfully. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


Military Preparedness. Four thousand bearskins, 
one TSR-2, best ceremonial cannon in Europe. 
Rudimentary navy, three unexploded H-bombs 
(1956 vintage). Three new rival staff cars at 
drawing-board stage. Didn't they have that rocket 
— Blue something? Check and report. 

Mood of Populace. Apathetic. 

Indications of Communist Leanings. Eagerness to 
trade with Red China (or anybody) ; notorious 
socialized medicine; hysterical Press-inspired anti- 
Americanism over Cuba, Vietnam, Dominica, Rem- 
brandt; failure to distinguish between East and 
West Germans as objects of distaste; fury over 
American military build-up (especially arms-sales 
successes); poor evangelical record; adoption of 
Centigrade thermometer. Consult Psychological 
Dept. re their mother love quotient. 

Probable Course of Crisis. Deadlock of present US- 
tolerating government already reached, causing 
frustration among left-wing activists, esp. one 
Frank Cousins (currently "neutralised" by nebu- 
lous cabinet post). He may attempt coup with 
massive trade union backing, stimulating counter- 
coup by landowners & business interests; latter 
faction certain to founder on internal dissension 
over leadership (see Appendix G for recent his- 
tory of Conservative Party and compare our diffi- 
culties with Saigon), but will give Reds excuse to 
intervene and assume command of country. Shock 
troops of so-called intellectuals reported to be 
forming guerilla groups in Hampstead, Islington 
and most campuses. 

Suggested Military Action by US. Nil. Loss of GB 
unlikely to affect events in S.E.Asia, might even 
simplify things. Anyway, it's a little country and 
a long way away. Didn't someone say that about 
some place, some time? Check with records. 

A Firm National Policy 

I emphasized earlier that most of these il- 
lustrations were hypothetical. All the more 
need to do so, because I have three more 
characters, none of whom are hypothetical. 
I take them in order of rank, starting with — 

The President of the United States. The 
eyes of Washington were opened this sum- 
mer, partly by newspaper publicity, on some 
of the problems and issues mentioned above. 
The President quickly decided to establish 
a firm national policy on the main new issue 
that concerned the Government — ^the possi- 
bly adverse effect of Government activity in 
research on foreign relations. He wrote a 
letter which, recognizing this possible harm, 
specified that proposals for such research 

should be examined to insure their propriety 
in this respect. In his letter the President 
said :-"...! am determined that no Gov- 
ernment sponsorship of foreign area research 
should be undertaken which in the judgment 
of the Secretary of State would adversely 
affect United States foreign relations." 
Therefore he commissioned my second re- 
maining character to establish effective pro- 
cedures — and that character is the Secretary 
of State himself. 

The Secretary of State looked at this re- 
sponsibility with the eyes of a man who had 
fostered research both as a college professor 
and college dean, and as President of the 
Rockefeller Foundation — a man who has 
shown a positive and personal interest in the 
research activities in his own Department. 
Secretary Rusk stated his ovtm belief in the 
value of research when he told a congres- 
sional committee recently that "research has 
become indispensable to the intelligent 
formulation and implementation of foreign 
policy." He has repeatedly acknowledged 
the contribution that the social and behav- 
ioral sciences can make to foreign policy and 
has welcomed the increased interest of other 
Government departments in social and polit- 
ical research on foreign affairs. 

At the same time he has noted that offi- 
cial sponsorship of research can be very sen- 
sitive in our relations with foreign countries, 
and that there are stages of sensitivity that 
turn first upon the auspices of the research 
and secondly on the subject matter. 

In his experience with a major foundation, 
Secretary Rusk learned years ago that sen- 
sitivity exists whenever nationals of one 
country move into another country to inves- 
tigate matters that are sensitive there. He 
knows that some research that can be done 
on a purely private basis becomes sensitive 
when any government becomes connected 
with it. He knows that there is still a higher 
level of sensitivity if the armed forces of a 
foreign country are involved in the research. 
As he told the Congress, "the promised value 
of research undertaken to support our for- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 23, 1965, p. 323. 



eign policy must be balanced against the 
costs of doing it in terms of possible dam- 
age to our foreign relations." Clearly some- 
one has to make that initial judgment. 

The Director of Intelligence and Research 
is my remaining character. As chairman of a 
new Foreign Affairs Research Council, he 
has been given the responsibility by the Sec- 
retary for making this judgment.^ It will not 
surprise you to hear that I consider the as- 
signment a reasonable one. 

The Bureau of Intelligence and Research 

Since the end of World War II our bureau 
has been the Department's research arm. 
Our professional analysts are widely ac- 
quainted with and respected by private 
scholars specializing in foreign affairs. We 
were the first in Government to establish a 
specific staff, the Office of External Re- 
search, based on our conviction that social 
and behavioral research outside Government 
was making an essential contribution to for- 
eign policy. For 15 years this office has 
served as a bridge between Government re- 
search needs and resources and the academic 
community concerned with foreign affairs. 
Thus in the daily work of our bureau we have 
found ourselves dealing with many of the 
varieties of research experience which we 
have just discussed. 

Inside the Government our direct experi- 
ence with the policymakers has provided a 
miniature distillation of some of the overall 
problems of the scholar and foreign policy. 
In principle the interest is enormous and 
the market huge. But our scholars are more 
aware than most of the problems of research 
consumption : of the congestion of material ; 
of the proliferation and confluence of exces- 
sive paper at the top of the Government; of 
the absorption limits of even the most bril- 
liant policymakers; of the temptations to 
take arms against a sea of papers, and by 
opposing, end them; of the quantity-qual- 
ity problem, the relativities of numbers, 
talents, gaps, strains, informal roles; of the 
unevenness of interests, needs, and atten- 

' For background, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1965, p. 496. 

tion to specific subjects at specific times. 

Our own daily experience has taught us 
something about work-impact ratios and cost 
effectiveness. We know something too about 
writing for an unknown audience which may 
include a spectrum of readership from desk 
officer to President. Our own bureau is liv- 
ing testimony to the tolerance of the rest of 
the Department of State for a very vibrant, 
critical, independent group of scholars, writ- 
ing in its very midst, fearless of policy con- 

We lay no claim to extrasensory percep- 
tion about the relations of scholars and for- 
eign policy; or even about all the exhilarat- 
ing varieties of research experience. But 
whatever we are, we are not naive. 

We know something about the repertory 
of research techniques. 

We can tell a research design when we 
see one. 

We know that some questions are funda- 
mentally unresearchable. 

We understand that it makes some differ- 
ence whether one sees research from within 
or without. 

We are well aware that the temptation in- 
side the Government is to deal with the im- 
mediate and neglect the long-term and 

We know something about the problem of 
interacting bureaucracies. 

We know that there are varying margins 
of influence for research, as for all other 
active elements that affect the governmen- 
tal process. 

We know that there are disinterested in- 
siders just as there are disinterested out- 

We know that one of the problems is how 
to keep interested insiders fruitfully in touch 
with interested outsiders and still preserve 
all concerned from the taints of special in- 
terest and conflict of interest. 

We know that ideally there should be a 
better mix of research efforts within Gov- 
ernment and between Government and the 
scholarly world — a better balance between 
research and operations, between depart- 
mental in-house and external research, be- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


tween Government and private research, be- 
tween basic and applied research. 

Like all intelligent men, we stop to ask 
ourselves now and then : What is objectivity? 

We are aware that the needs of govern- 
ment have led to some distortion of academic 
development. For example, the "human re- 
lations area" files contain as many source 
papers on Viet-Nam as on all of South Amer- 

We are as concerned as anyone else over 
the tendency of bad research to drive out 

We are all in favor of letting sleeping 
dogmas lie. 

We know that there has been in the past, 
and undoubtedly is today, a cultural lag be- 
tween scholarly discovery and the making of 
policy, the advent of the Sino-Soviet rift 
being just one dramatic case in point. 

We know, as advanced social scientists 
have known right along, that Government, 
like society, needs a continuing refinement 
and clarification of its goals, a deliberate re- 
ordering of its priorities, a constant raising 
to the level of consciousness of its categories 
of preferred events. 

We are absolutely committed to the prop- 
osition that there is a greater need for re- 
search and understanding on other countries. 

Indeed we may know, better than most, 
what exciting opportunities in foreign af- 
fairs confront the research world. 

We suspect that our future needs will be 
greater than our present ones. 

We are convinced that after all the values 
are acknowledged, the preservation of two 
perspectives, one governmental and one aca- 
demic, remains indispensable, that homog- 
enization and tendencies toward it are in- 
herently undesirable. 

Indeed, the deadlines and crises of the re- 
search organizations inside Government give 
us a special stake in the detachment and 
depth to which private research at its best 
is conducive. To the degree that the private 
research community can exercise its untram- 
meled good judgment, free from outside 
pressures, any and all, real and imaginary, 
private research can continue to generate the 

basic intellectual capital on which we depend. 

Because in the past the State Department 
has not supported empirical, quantitative 
studies that require large resources, we have 
been charged with being intellectually con- 
servative. The fact is that we have never had 
the resources to be anything but conservative 
in these matters. Nevertheless we recognize 
the need to find a new balance between pri- 
vate endowments and public support to assure 
the necessary sustenance of social science re- 
search. Many of us are concerned that the 
overall flow of Government funds to social 
scientists studying foreign societies should 
not be reduced, but augmented. 

Hence, even as we assume our new role of 
screening Government-sponsored research 
for possible foreign policy damage, we are 
well aware that our major function is not to 
stifle research but to encourage it. We have 
no intention of deciding for other Govern- 
ment agencies what research is or is not im- 
portant, how much they should spend or 
whom they should hire, or what methods 
their researchers should employ. The spon- J 
soring agency has been and will continue to 
be the best judge of the value of a research 
project in meeting its own needs. State De- 
partment review is solely for the purpose of 
safeguarding our foreign relations from pre- 
dictable harm. 

The New Procedures 

I know that there has been grave concern 
over the procedures which will govern our 
new clearance responsibilities. Those proce- 
dures themselves will shortly be released. 

In the Department we have set up ma- 
chinery to review the foreign affairs re- 
search proposals of other agencies both 
thoroughly and expeditiously. This will be 
done by a Foreign Affairs Research Council, 
which I chair. The other members represent 
the Department's Policy Planning and Polit- 
ico-Military Affairs offices and our regional 
and functional bureaus. Our Office of Exter- 
nal Research will staff the Council, handling 
directly the bulk of proposals which I am 
sure can be reviewed quickly and positively 
and will not require Council action. In addi- 



tion to deciding difficult cases, the Council 
also has been charged by the Secretary with 
determining Department needs for external 
research and setting our policy with regard 
to such research. 

Our review procedures, drawn up in con- 
sultation with the Bureau of the Budget, 
will shortly be in the hands of 20 other Gov- 
ernment agencies. Let me tell you what our 
guidelines will be. First, we are concerned 
only with research projects in the social and 
behavioral sciences dealing with international 
relations, or with foreign areas and peoples, 
conducted in the United States or abroad, 
which are supported by Federal agencies. 
We have no intention and no authority to 
review either private research or research 
conducted within an agency by Government 

Second, we distinguish between two kinds 
of research: that supported by the foreign 
affairs, defense, and intelligence agencies; 
and that supported by all other Government 
agencies, such as the major domestic de- 
partments or the basic research agencies. To 
us this distinction is a very important one. 
We see a substantial difference between the 
foreign policy risks of research conducted 
abroad in support of the mission of the De- 
partment of State or the Department of 
Defense, for instance, and the research con- 
ducted with the help of such agencies as the 
Office of Education or the Department of 
Agriculture. Moreover, we think the grants 
made by the National Science Foundation to 
American scholars differ substantially from 
contracts and grants made by other U.S. 
Government agencies which are usually de- 
signed to produce answers to questions of 
operational significance to the agencies. It 
does not seem to us desirable to impose on 
private research projects supported by the 
NSF the review and clearance necessary for 
foreign affairs research funded by operating 

In the first case — the overseas operating 
agencies — we shall in general request them 
to make no commitment until we have had 
an opportunity to review the proposal and 
give them our clearance. We have told them 

that they should expect our response within 
2 weeks. In the second case — all other agen- 
cies, except the NSF — we shall ask them to 
inform us of their proposed projects. They 
will not need an explicit clearance from the 
State Department to go ahead. 

Third, the procedures will clearly state the 
belief that the sponsoring agency is the best 
judge of a project related to its mission. We 
have no intention of second-guessing any 
other Government agency. Its views as to 
the value of a study will be taken fully into 
account. Our review will not mean State 
Department endorsement of a project; rather 
the purpose is limited to the avoidance of 
damage to our foreign relations. 

Fourth, our review does not extend to 
grants to academic institutions for general 
purposes related to foreign affairs research. 
We are concerned with support of specific 
research projects having the explicit ap- 
proval of other Government agencies. 

Fifth, we are concerned with the initiation 
of projects that could stir up sensitivities 
overseas, not with controlling the findings of 
Government-supported research. We will not 
censor research reports or in any other way 
attempt to influence the findings of scholars 
whose work enjoys Government funding. 

Sixth, and most important, the responsi- 
bility for the wise expenditure of research 
funds remains in each agency under the au- 
thority of the President and the Congress. 
The State Department has not become, and 
does not wish to be, the controller for Gov- 
ernment foreign affairs research. 

In these procedures we have made every 
allowance for ease and speed so as to facil- 
itate research. We hope these procedures 
will not prove cumbersome. Should they be- 
come so in spite of our best judgment at 
present, they can easily be modified. In fact 
we plan to review the procedures in 6 
months in consultation with interested Gov- 
ernment agencies and the Bureau of the 

Hence, to all of our farflung and inter- 
ested audiences — on the campuses, in Wash- 
ington, and abroad — let me conclude by say- 
ing that we intend to carry out the Presi- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


dent's mandate for the protection of our for- 
eign relations, and of Government and pri- 
vate research, against some of the hazards 
to which they have recently been exposed. 
But we do not intend to inaugurate an age 
of procedural overkill. No one I know aspires 
to be a Lord High Executioner of foreign 
policy research. None of us have "little lists" 
(of projects) that never would be missed. 

If you as a scholar interested in foreign 
policy research should ask me whether this 
will be the winter of our discontent, I would 
say no. And if you ask me how all the am- 
biguities, uncertainties, and portentous Sol- 
omon's choices will be resolved, I can only 
think of Velasquez, who, when asked how he 
mixed his colors, replied, "With taste." We 
hope to clothe our judgments with wisdom, 
inform our doubts with discretion, implement 
the President's order — and do it with all 
deliberate speed. 

President Sends Greetings 
to OAU IVIeeting at Accra 

Following is the text of a message sent 
by President Johnson on October 21 to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Govern- 
ment of the Organization of African Unity, 
which met at Accra, Ghana, October 21-25. 

I extend to the Organization of African 
Unity the greetings of the Government and 
the people of the United States of America. 

We in the United States share with you 
a common aspiration for the advancement 
of human dignity and freedom. Your orga- 
nization provides one means for the peoples 
of Africa to realize their hopes and dreams. 
Your past work in the peaceful settlement 
of disputes has demonstrated to all the 
world the great benefits to be derived from 
cooperative action. 

I wish you success in your deliberations. 
It is our hope that they will strengthen the 
bonds among you and further advance the 
well-being of your member countries. 

Service Courts of Friendly Foreign 
Forces Witliin tlie United States 


Whereas the Act of June 30, 1944, entitled "An 
Act to implement the jurisdiction of service courts 
of friendly foreign forces within the United States, 
and for other purposes" (58 Stat. 643; 22 U.S.C. 
701-706), provides in part as follows: 

"Sec. 6. This Act shall be operative with respect 
to the military, naval, or air force of any foreign 
state only after a finding and declaration by the 
President that the powers and privileges provided 
herein are necessary for the maintenance of disci- 
pline. The President may at any time revoke such 
finding and declaration." 

Whereas there are within the United States 
military, naval, or air forces of Australia; 

Whereas the Government of Australia has made 
known its desire to exercise within the United States 
jurisdiction over offenses committed by members 
of their respective military, naval, or air forces; 

Whereas the Australian Government has recog- 
nized the right of the United States military au- 
thorities to exercise jurisdiction over certain of- 
fenses committed by members of the United States 
armed forces in Australian territory and are under- 
taking to make available appropriate facilities for 
the effective exercise of such jurisdiction: 

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, acting under 
and by virtue of the authority vested in me by 
Section 6 of the Act of June 30, 1944, do find and 
declare that the powers and privileges provided in 
that Act to implement the jurisdiction of courts 
martial or other military tribunals of friendly 
foreign forces within the United States are neces- 
sary for the maintenance of discipline of the mili- 
tary, naval, or air forces of Australia within the 
United States. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this tenth day 

of October in the year of our Lord nine- 

[selal] teen hundred and sixty-five, and of the 

Independence of the United States of 

America the one hundred and ninetieth. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

•No. 3681; 30 Fed. Reg. 13049. 



Symposium on Science and Public 
Policy Held at Department 

The Department of State announced on 
October 22 (press release 251 dated October 
21) that a symposium on "Science and Pub- 
lic Policy" would be held at the Department 
on October 22 and 23. The purpose of the 
gathering, to which foreign affairs practi- 
tioners in Government and representatives 
from academic institutions were invited, 
was to exchange experiences and ideas on 
methods used to provide training in this 
new interdisciplinary field of practical use- 
fulness and scholarly research and teaching. 

The moderator of the symposium was the 
former Acting Director of the Office of 
Scientific and Technological Affairs, E. 
M. J. Kretzmann. Speakers outside the De- 
partment of State included: W. G. McMil- 
lan, University of California at Los Ange- 
les; W. W. Grigorieff, Oak Ridge Institute 
of Nuclear Studies; W. J. Trainor, Jr., 
Carnegie Endovnnent for International 
Peace; Prof. Melvin Kranzberg, department 
of humanities, Case Institute of Technol- 
ogy; and E. B. Skolnikoff, department of 
economics and social sciences, M.I.T. 

Speakers from the Department of State 
included Howard E. Sollenberger, Acting 
Director of the Foreign Service Institute; 
Herman Pollack, Deputy Director of the 
Office of International Scientific and Tech- 
nological Affairs, Department of State; and 
L. F. Audrieth, visiting professor of science 
affairs at the Foreign Service Institute. 

A panel discussion on science affairs as 
an interdisciplinary activity concluded the 
sessions on October 23. 

The Deputy Under Secretary of State, 
William J. Crockett, addressed the sympo- 
sium at a luncheon in the Jefferson Room of 
the Department of State on October 22. 

The symposium was a direct outgrowth of 
the initial efforts on the part of the Foreign 
Service Institute to increase the science in- 
put in training programs for Foreign Serv- 
ice officers as well as representatives of 
other Government departments and agen- 

cies with foreign operational responsibil- 
ities. A high-level seminar, 4 weeks in dura- 
tion, covering the subject "Science, Technol- 
ogy, and Foreign Affairs," was held early 
in the year at the Foreign Service Institute. 
A second science seminar is scheduled to 
begin on November 15. 

U.S. and Canada Discuss 
Salmon Fisheries 

Press release 244 dated October 14 

United States and Canadian fishery ex- 
perts met at Washington October 12-14 to 
exchange preliminary views on problems of 
mutual concern related to United States and 
Canadian coastal fisheries on the west 
coasts of the two countries. The Canadian 
delegation was headed by A. W. H. Needier, 
Deputy Minister of Fisheries for Canada, 
and consisted of officials from the Cana- 
dian Department of Fisheries, the Fisheries 
Research Board of Canada, and industry 
representatives. The U.S. delegation was 
headed by William C. Herrington, Special 
Assistant for Fisheries and Wildlife to the 
Under Secretary of State for Economic 
Affairs, and consisted of officials from the 
Department of the Interior, the Alaska De- 
partment of Fish and Game, the Depart- 
ment of Fisheries of the State of Washington, 
and representatives of U.S. industry. Tech- 
nical consultants from the International 
Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission were 

Discussions centered on problems arising 
from the intermingling in the United States 
and Canadian salmon fisheries off south- 
eastern Alaska and northern British Colum- 
bia of salmon bound for both Canadian and 
United States streams, and on the adequacy 
of the provisions of the 1956 protocol^ to 
the 1930 sockeye salmon convention, which 
brought pink salmon into the convention area 
within the responsibilities of the Interna- 

'■ Treaties and Other International Acts Series 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


tional Pacific Salmon Fisheries Commission. 

The two Governments had earlier estab- 
lished joint committees of scientists to ex- 
amine technical aspects of these problems. 
The purpose of the meeting in Washington 
was to permit a joint review and discussion 
of the reports of these committees and a 
preliminary exchange of views regarding 
the implications of these reports and possi- 
ble courses of joint action. No specific 
proposals were made by either delegation. 

Tentative agreement was reached on a 
further meeting on these two questions in 
the spring of 1966 in Ottawa, when specific 
proposals for joint action will be considered. 


Foreign Aid Appropriations Act 
Signed Into Law 

statement by President Johnson 

White House press release (Bethesda Naval Hospital) dated 
October 20 

I have today [October 20] signed into 
law the Foreign Assistance and Related 
Agencies Appropriations Act for fiscal year 

This act is proof of the stark fact that 
the majority of the people in our world are 
living in desperate need. It is also proof of 
the simple fact that Americans are not go- 
ing to sit idly by while others suffer. 

Since World War II the nations of the free 
world have invested some $135 billion in 
foreign aid. The United States alone has 
contributed $115 billion of that total. I 
know of no more convincing evidence of the 
compassion in the heart of this nation. 

But compassion is not enough. While our 
wealth is great, it is not unlimited. It must 
be used not merely to apply bandaids to 

superficial wounds but to remove the causes 
of deeper and more dangerous disorders. 
That is why I do not intend for American 
aid to become an international dole. The 
Congress of the United States does not want 
that. The people of this country do not want 
that. The people who benefit from our as- 
sistance, I am sure, do not want that. 

Our assistance must and will go to those 
nations that will most use it to bring major 
and far-reaching benefits to their people. It 
will go to those willing not only to talk 
about basic social change but who will act 
immediately on these reforms. As I dis- 
charge my responsibilities under this act, I 
will look not simply to the fact of an agree- 
ment that points toward reform but to ac- 
tion already taken to bring reform to frui- 

Action, not promises, will be the stand- 
ard of our assistance. Accomplishments, not 
apologies, are what the American people 
expect from their desire to help others help 

The amount of money appropriated in 
this act is $3,218,000,000— only 7 percent less 
than my original request. This is the small- 
est reduction in such a request since the 
beginning of the Marshall Plan and reflects 
the unusual scrutiny given the measure by 
both the administration and Congress. 

When I sent the request to Congress,^ I 
pledged that these funds will be used vdsely 
and effectively and in keeping with our own 
national interests. That pledge I intend to 

I am, for example, instructing the admin- 
istrators of this program to make certain 
that every dollar spent is consistent with 
our efforts to improve our balance-of-pay- 
ments position. If the dollar does not remain 
strong, no amount of foreign aid will in the 
long run prove helpful to anyone anywhere 
in the world. 

I am also instructing the men who ad- 
minister this program to be certain these 
funds go to the people. 

And I am asking them to assure that the 

^ Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965, p. 126. 



money invested in this program produce 
long-term innovations that will hasten the 
day when others can stand proudly on their 
own feet and walk steadily toward a better 

President Reports to Congress 
on Trade Agreements Program 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson to the Congress trans- 
mitted on October 13. 

White House press release (Bethesda Naval Hospital) dated 
October 13 

To the Congress of the United States: 

This is the ninth annual report on the 
Trade Agreements Program, as required by 
section 402(a) of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962. 

In 1964, U.S. and free-world trade con- 
tinued to set fresh records. 

• U.S. exports reached a new high of 
$25.6 billion, $6.9 billion more than our im- 

• U.S. farm exports rose to $6.4 billion, 
an all-time peak. 

• Free-world exports reached a record 
$152 billion. 

• The major trading nations agreed to 
take further steps under the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade to assist exports 
from developing countries. 

The policy of two-way trade expansion 
and liberalization, initiated with the Trade 
Agreements Act of 1934 and continued by 
every Administration since that time, has 
brought great benefits to this country. In 
general, U.S. goods have enjoyed progres- 
sively easier access to foreign markets. Low- 
cost, high-quality U.S. exports, sold and 
used in every corner of the world, have pro- 
vided immediate evidence of the vitality of 
our free enterprise system. Our processors 
have gained ready access to essential raw 
materials, and have profited from the stimu- 
lus of keener competition. Consumers have 
enjoyed the wide range of choice which the 
world market provides. 

But we have only begun. We must build 
on past success to achieve greater well-being 
for America, and for all the world's peoples. 
In particular, we must make every effort to 
assure the success of the current Geneva 
negotiations, known as the Kennedy Round. 

In this International Cooperation Year of 
1965, all nations should pledge themselves 
to work together for the steady expansion 
of commerce. Continuing its steady course 
begun in 1934, the United States will do its 
part in achieving that goal. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
October 13, 1965. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Contributions to the International Council of Scien- 
tific Unions and Associated Unions. Report to ac- 
company H.R. 8862. S. Rept. 469. July 20, 1965. 
26 pp. 

International Finance Corporation. Report to accom- 
pany S. 1742. H. Rept. 644. July 22, 1965. 16 pp. 

Certain Employees of the Foreign Service of the 
United States. Report to accompany H.R. 8352. 
H. Rept. 672. July 22, 1965. 4 pp. 

Extension of Wheat Agreement Act. Report to ac- 
company S. 2294. S.Rept. 505. July 22, 1965. 4 pp. 

Report on Audit of the Saint Lawrence Seaway 
Development Corporation, Calendar Year 1964. 
H. Doc. 247. July 26, 1965. 11 pp. 

Guidelines for International Monetary Reform. 
Hearings before the Subcommittee on Interna- 
tional Exchange and Payments of the Joint Eco- 
nomic Committee. July 27-29, 1965. 191 pp. 

The Nation's Commitment in Vietnam. Statement 
by the President, July 28, 1965. H. Doc. 256. 4 pp. 

Claims of Certain Inhabitants of the Ryukyu Is- 
lands. Hearing before the Subcommittee on the 
Far East and the Pacific of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs. July 28, 1965. 45 pp. 

Consular Convention With the Soviet Union. Hear- 
ing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Re- 
lations on Executive D, 88th Congress, 2d ses- 
sion. July 30, 1965. 48 pp. 

Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments Act of 
1965. Report to accompany H.R. 7969. S. Rept. 
530. August 2, 1965. 70 pp. 

Atlantic-Pacific Canal Study. Message from the 
President transmitting the first annual report of 
the Atlantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study 
Commission. H. Doc. 253. August 3, 1965. 7 pp. 

Consular Convention With the Soviet Union. Report 
to accompany Ex. D, SSth Cong., 2d sess. Ex. 
Rept. 4. August 3, 1965. 7 pp. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 



U.N. Condemns Rhodesia's Attempt 
To Perpetuate Minority Rule 

Following is a statement by Ambassador 
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to 
the General Assembly, made in plenary ses- 
sion on October 12, together with the text 
of a resolution adopted that day. 


U.S. delegation press release 4663 dated October 12 

My Government, gravely concerned with 
the situation in Southern Rhodesia, is grati- 
fied that we have before us this morning a 
draft resolution adopted virtually unani- 
mously by the Fourth Committee and ex- 
pressing the concern of all members of this 
organization over the repeated threats by 
the present authorities in Southern Rhode- 
sia that they may soon declare unilaterally 
the independence of Southern Rhodesia. I 
note that this draft resolution is sponsored 
by 40 African and Asian members of this 
organization. I wish to applaud on behalf of 
my delegation the speed with which they 
and the other members of the Fourth Com- 
mittee have acted to make it unmistakably 
clear that we in the United Nations cannot 
and will not accept this illegal and uncon- 
stitutional action. 

Mr. President, the United States Govern- 
ment has not spared and will not spare any 
pains to make it known to the authority in 
Southern Rhodesia that we cannot con- 
done any action taken by them in defiance 
of the responsible power and expressions of 
the United Kingdom. And we are glad to do 
so again through the medium of this reso- 
lution. We cannot condone any action con- 
trary to the principles of the equal rights 
and self-determination of all the peoples of 

the territory. We have sought to impress 
upon the Rhodesian authorities our pro- 
found conviction that any action which ig- 
nores the interests and rights of the major- 
ity, as of all the peoples of Southern Rho- 
desia, can only have the most tragic conse- 
quences for that gravely troubled country. 
We have sought to persuade them that it 
would not benefit even the small minority 
of Rhodesians on whose behalf they 
threaten to embark upon this perilous path. 

The issue for my Government is simple. 
The United Kingdom, the sovereign author- 
ity, has long sought a responsible solution to 
the aspirations of Southern Rhodesians for 
independence in conformity with the Char- 
ter of the United Nations and with the prin- 
ciple that the interests of the inhabitants 
should be paramount. No political solution 
prejudicial to the interests and rights of the 
overwhelming majority of the population 
and acceptable only to the minority could be 
consistent with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter or lead to stability in | 
Southern Rhodesia. " 

You will recall, Mr. President, that the 
Prime Minister of the United Kingdom has 
publicly stated that any unilateral declara- 
tion of independence made without the 
approval of the British Parliament would 
be an open act of defiance and rebellion and 
that it would be treasonable to take steps 
to effect it. My Government shares fully the 
Prime Minister's analysis of the grave con- 
sequences which would ensue from such an 

Moreover, the United States Government 
will not recognize any regime in Southern 
Rhodesia purporting to emerge from an il- 
legal unilateral declaration of independence. 
The United States Government will take the 
necessary concrete steps, in concert with 
others, in support of that policy. 

In voting for this resolution, we shall do 
so in the hope that those who threaten this 
catastrophic course will heed the warning 
of this Assembly and draw back before it is 
too late. I hope that all members of the As- 
sembly will join in expressing the unani- 
mous view that the reckless and desperate 



step which is contemplated must not be 

We are told, Mr. President, that those 
who threaten to take these illegal actions in 
Southern Rhodesia are unyielding and de- 
termined. We must assure them here today 
that there are others who are equally un- 
yielding and equally determined — unyield- 
ing in our conviction that self-determina- 
tion must apply to all the people of South- 
em Rhodesia and determined that the 
disastrous step of unconstitutional action 
will be vigorously opposed. 


The General Assembly, 

Deeply concerned at the situation in Southern 

Noting with particular concern the repeated 
threats of the present authorities in Southern 
Rhodesia immediately to declare unilaterally the 
independence of Southern Rhodesia, in order to per- 
petuate minority rule in Southern Rhodesia, 

Noting the attitude of the Government of the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland that a unilateral declaration of independence 
for Southern Rhodesia would be an act of rebellion 
and that any measure to give it effect would be 
an act of treason, 

1. Condemns any attempt on the part of the 
Rhodesian authorities to seize independence by il- 
legal means in order to perpetuate minority rule in 
Southern Rhodesia; 

2. Declares that the perpetuation of such minority 
rule would be incompatible with the principle of 
equal rights and self-determination of peoples pro- 
claimed in the Charter of the United Nations and 
in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence 
to Colonial Countries and Peoples contained in Gen- 
eral Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 Decem- 
ber 1960; 

3. Requests the United Kingdom of Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland and all Member States not 
to accept a declaration of independence for Southern 
Rhodesia by the present authorities, which would be 
in the sole interest of the minority, and not to 
recognize any authorities purporting to emerge 
therefrom ; 

4. Calls upon the United Kingdom to take all 
possible measures to prevent a unilateral declara- 
tion of independence and, in the event of such a 

' U.N. doc. A/RES/2012(XX) ; adopted in plenary 
on Oct. 12 by a vote of 107 to 2 ( Portugal, Republic 
of South Africa), with 1 abstention (France). 

declaration, to take all steps necessary to put an 
immediate end to the rebellion, with a view to 
transferring power to a representative government 
in keeping with the aspirations of the majority of 
the people; 

5. Decides to keep the question of Southern 
Rhodesia under urgent and continued review during 
the twentieth session and to consider what further 
steps may be necessary. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Report by the Secretary-General on the financial 
situation in respect of the United Nations opera- 
tion in Cyprus, as at September 23, S/6702. 
September 23, 1965. 5 pp. 

Kashmir dispute: 

Report by the Secretary-General on his efforts to 
give effect to Security Council Resolutions 210 
of September 6 and 211 of September 20. S/6699/ 
Add. 2, September 23, 1965, 3 pp.; Add. 3, Sep- 
tember 23, 1965, 2 pp.; Add. 4, September 24, 

1965, 1 p.; Add. 5, September 27, 1965, 1 p.; Add. 
6, October 1, 1965, 3 pp.; Add. 7, October 4, 1965, 
3 pp.; Add. 8, October 5, 1965, 1 p. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the observance 
of the cease-fire under Security Council Resolu- 
tion 211 of September 20. S/6710, September 25, 

1966, 1 p.; Add. 1, September 26, 1966, 3 pp.; 
Add. 2, September 26, 1965, 2 pp.; Add. 3, Octo- 
ber 7, 1965, 7 pp. 

Report by the Secretary-General on compliance with 
the withdrawal provision of Security Council 
Resolution 211 of September 20. S/6719, Septem- 
ber 27, 1965, 3 pp.; Add. 1, October 5, 1965, 2 pp. 

Letter dated September 30 from the permanent 
representative of Syria addressed to the Secretary- 
General concerning "the horrible onslaught against 
the Arab population in Ramleh," Israel. S/6731. 
October 1, 1965. 5 pp. 

Letter dated October 1 from the permanent repre- 
sentative of Yemen addressed to the President of 
the Security Council concerning British "aggres- 
sive acts" against the Yemeni people. S/6733. 
October 1, 1965. 3 pp. 

Cable dated October 1 from the Secretary General 
of the Organization of American States addressed 
to the U.N. Secretary-General concerning the 
Dominican crisis. S/6741. October 1, 1965. 3 pp. 

Letter dated October 5 from the representatives of 
several Arab states addressed to the President 
of the Security Council concerning Yemen. S/6748. 
October 5, 1965. 2 pp. 

Letter dated October 4 from the permanent repre- 
sentative of Cambodia addressed to the President 
of the Security Council concerning allegations 
made by Thailand (S/6693). S/6749. October 5, 
1965. 3 pp. 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 



Current Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Agreement between the International Atomic Energry 
Agency, South Africa, and the United States for 
the application of safeguards by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement 
between the United States and South Africa of 
June 8, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3885, 5129), for 
cooperation concerning civil uses of atomic energy. 
Signed at Vienna February 26, 1965. 
Entered into force: October 8, 1965. 

Agreement between the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, the Philippines, and the United States for 
the application of safeguards by the International 
Atomic Energy Agency to the bilateral agreement 
between the United States and the Philippines of 
July 27, 1955, as amended (TIAS 3316, 4515, 
5677), for cooperation concerning civil uses of 
atomic energy. Signed at Vienna June 15 and 
September 24, 1965. 
Entered into force: September 24, 1965. 

Consular Relations 

Vienna convention on consular relations; 

Optional protocol to the Vienna convention on con- 
sular relations concerning the compulsory settle- 
ment of disputes. 
Done at Vienna April 24, 1963.' 
Accession deposited: Nepal, September 28, 1965. 

Diplomatic Relations 

Vienna convention on diplomatic relations. Done at 
Vienna AprU 18, 1961. Entered into force April 
24, 1964." 

Ratification deposited: Hungary (with state- 
ment) , September 24, 1965. 


International telecommunication convention with six 
annexes. Done at Geneva December 21, 1959. En- 
tered into force January 1, 1961. TIAS 4892. 
Accession deposited: Chile, September 20, 1965. 


ProcSs-verbal extending and amending declaration on 
the provisional accession of the Swiss Confeder- 
ation to the General Agreement on TariflFs and 
Trade done at Geneva November 22, 1958 (TIAS 
4461). Done at Geneva December 8, 1961. Entered 
into force for the United States January 9, 1962. 
TIAS 4957. 

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, September 15, 

Declaration on provisional accession of United Arab 
Republic to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Done at Geneva November 13, 1962. En- 
tered into force for the United States May 3, 
1963. TIAS 5309. 

^ Not in force. 
" Not in force for the United States. 

Signature: Nigeria, August 24, 1965. 

Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro- 
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 12, 1959 
(TIAS 4498). Done at Geneva December 12, 1963. 
Entered into force November 24, 1964. TIAS 5809. 
Signature: Switzerland, September 8, 1965. 

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at 
Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force for the 
United States November 20, 1964. TIAS 5687. 
Signature: Switzerland, September 8, 1965. 

Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional 
accession of United Arab Republic to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 13, 
1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva October 30, 

1964. Entered into force for the United States 
December 18, 1964. TIAS 5732. 

Signatures : Nigeria, August 24, 1965; Yugoslavia, 

September 2, 1965. 
Second proces-verbal extending declaration on provi- 
sional accession of Argentina to the General Agree- 
ment on Tariffs and Trade of November 18, 1960, 
as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at Geneva 
October 30, 1964. Entered into force for the United 
States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5733. 
Signature: Yugoslavia, September 2, 1965. 
Second proces-verbal extending the declaration on 
provisional accession of Switzerland to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 
22, 1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at 
Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for 
the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734. 
Acceptances deposited: Sierra Leone, September 

15, 1965; United Arab Republic, September 8, 




Agreement implementing section (4) of article XV 
of the treaty relating to cooperative development 
of the water resources of the Columbia River Basin 
of January 17, 1961 (TIAS 5638). Effected by ex- 
change of notes, with annex, at Washington 
October 4, 1965. Entered into force October 4, 1965. 


Agreement amending the economic aid agreement of 
July 3, 1948, as amended, with related notes. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Taipei August 11, 

1965. Entered into force August 11, 1965. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of May 22, 1963, as amended (TIAS 
5487, 5700). Effected by exchange of notes at 
Conakry September 18, 1965. Entered into force 
September 18, 1966. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of April 23, 1965. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Rabat October 8, 1965. Entered into 
force October 8, 1965. 


Agreement concerning the applicability of the public 
liability agreement of February 6, 1963 (TIAS 
5357), to the operation of the NS Savannah by a 
private company. Effected by exchange of notes 
at The Hague September 8, 1965. Entered into 
force September 8, 1965. 




President Johnson Establishes New 
Personnel System for Peace Corps 


White House press release (Bethesda Naval Hospital) dated 
October 11 

Public Law 89-134, which was enacted on 
August 24, 1965, created an entirely new 
personnel system for the Peace Corps. This 
system came into effect on October 10. 
Under it the employment of the Peace 
Corps staff, except present career em- 
ployees in the lower grades, will be limited 
to 5 years. Thus Peace Corps employees will 
be placed in essentially the same position as 
that of Peace Corps volunteers, who serve in 
the Peace Corps for a limited period of time 
and then move on to give others the same 

President Johnson has signed an Execu- 
tive order which delegates to the Secretary 
of State authority to transfer Peace Corps 
employees into this new personnel system. 
This authority in turn will be delegated by 
the Secretary to Sargent Shriver, the Direc- 
tor of the Peace Corps, who will actually put 
the system into effect. 


Administration of the Peace Corps 
IN THE Department of State 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612) and Section 301 of 
Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President 
of the United States, it is hereby ordered as follows: 

Section 1. Executive Order No. 11041 of Au- 
gust 6, 1962,' is hereby amended as follows: 

(1) By substituting for the preamble of the 
Order of the following: 

"■ 30 Fed. Reg. 13003. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 27, 1962, p. 329. 

"By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Peace Corps Act (75 Stat. 612) and Section 301 of 
Title 3 of the United States Code, and as President 
of the United States, it is ordered as follows:". 

(2) By re-lettering subsection (c) of Section 101 
as subsection (d) and by inserting immediately 
before that subsection the following: 

"(c) The functions of prescribing regulations 
and making determinations conferred upon the 
President by Section 5(b) of the Act of August 24, 
1965 (79 Stat. 551), are hereby delegated to the 
Secretary of State." 

(3) By substituting for Section 302 the following: 

"Sec. 302. Determination. Pursuant to Section 
10(d) of the Act, it is hereby determined to be in 
furtherance of the purposes of the Act that func- 
tions authorized thereby may be performed without 
regard to the applicable laws specified in Sections 1 
and 2 and with or without consideration as specified 
in Section 3 of Executive Order No. 11223 of May 12, 
1965 (30 F.R. 6635), but, except as may be inap- 
propriate, subject to limitations set forth in that 

Sec. 2. The provisions of this Order shall be 
deemed to have become effective as of August 24, 
1965, except that Section 1 (3) hereof shall be deemed 
to have become effective as of May 12, 1965. 

The White House, 
October 10, 1965. 

Position Set Up for Management 
of Inter-American Affairs 

The Department of State announced on 
October 19 the establishment of the new 
position of Deputy Assistant Secretary for 
Management in the Bureau of Inter-Ameri- 
can Affairs. Rodger C. Abraham, Executive 
Director of the Bureau, has been named to 
fill the post. The Deputy Assistant Secretary 
will continue to be responsible for providing 
executive direction to the combined adminis- 
trative operations of both the Bureau of 
Inter-American Affairs of the Department 
of State and the Bureau for Latin America 
of the Agency for International Develop- 

The establishment of the new position, the 
only position of its kind within the Depart- 

NOVEMBER 8, 1965 


ment, recognizes the complex nature of the 
management problem involved in directing 
and coordinating the administrative policies 
and processes of both the Department of 
State and the Agency for International De- 

The Deputy Assistant Secretary will con- 
tinue to be responsible to the Assistant Secre- 
tary of State for Inter-American Affairs, 
who is also U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance 
for Progress. 


The Senate on October 20 confirmed the following 
nominations : 

Hermann F. Eilts to be Ambassador to the King- 
dom of Saudi Arabia. 

William M. Rountree to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of South Africa. 

William H. Weathersby to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of the Sudan. 

Franklin H. Williams to be Ambassador to the 
Republic of Ghana. 


Rodger C. Abraham as Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Management, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, 
effective October 19. (For biographic details, see De- 
partment of State press release dated October 19.) 

June 25, 1965. Entered into force June 25, 1965. TIAS 

5836. 3 pp. 5<#. 

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Dahomey. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Cotonou March 8 and 
13, 1965. Entered into force March 13, 1965. TIAS 

5837. 5 pp. 54. 

Defense — Procurement by Non-Appropriated Fund 
Activities. Agreement with Israel. Exchange of 
notes— Signed at Washington July 20 and 26, 1965. 
Entered into force July 26, 1965. TIAS 5838. 2 pp. 54. 
Defense — Procurement of Goods and Services. 
Agreement with Israel. Exchange of notes — Dated 
at Washington July 15 and 20, 1965. Entered into 
force July 20, 1965. TIAS 5839. 4 pp. 54. 
Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade 
July 16, 1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965. With 
exchange of notes. TIAS 5840. 8 pp. IO4. 
Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement 
with Peru. Exchange of notes — Signed at Lima June 
8 and 28, 1965. Entered into force June 28, 1965. 
TIAS 5841. 3 pp. 54. 

Defense — Continued Use of Upper Atmosphere Re- 
search Facilities at Fort Churchill, Manitoba. Agree- 
ment with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Ottawa June 11, 1965. Date of entry into force 
January 1, 1966. TIAS 5842. 8 pp. IO4. 

Visas — Waiver of Nonimmigrant Visa Fees. Agree- 
ment with Brazil. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rio 
de Janeiro May 26, 1965. Entered into force July 
25, 1965. TIAS 5843. 4 pp. 54. 

Extension of International Wheat Agreement, 1962. 

Protocol with Other Governments — Open for signa- 
ture at Washington March 22 to April 23, inclusive, 
1965. Entered into force July 16, 1965, with re- 
spect to Part I and Parts III to VII, and August 1, 
1965, with respect to Part II. TIAS 5844. 45 pp. 204. 
Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Upper 
Volta. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ouagadougou 
June 18, 1965. Entered into force June 18, 1965. 
TIAS 5847. 5 pp. 54. 


Recent Releases 

For sale \hy the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
S0i02. Address requests direct to the Superintend- 
ent of Docum.ent8, except in the case of free pub- 
lications, which may be obtained from, the Office of 
Media Services, Department of State, Washington, 
D.C., 20520. 

Defense — Extension of Loan of Vessels. Agreement 
with Japan. Exchange of notes — Signed at Tokyo 
July 6, 1965. Entered into force July 6, 1965. TIAS 
5834. 7 pp. 104. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 
Agreement with Ecuador — Signed at Quito June 25, 
1965. Entered into force June 25, 1965. With ex- 
change of notes. TIAS 5835. 13 pp. IO4. 
Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with 
Australia. Exchange of notes — Signed at Canberra 

Checic List of Department of State 
Press Releases: October 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to October 18 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
239 of October 11, 241 and 242 of October 12, 
244 of October 14, and 246 of October 15. 

No. Date Subject 

Harriman: U.N. Association of 
U.S.A., Nashville (excerpts). 

Solomon: "Challenges Facing 
U.S. Trade Policy." 

249 10/20 Solomon: "East-West Trade." 

250 10/21 Hughes: "Scholars and Foreign 

Policy: Varieties of Research 

251 10/21 FSI symposium on "Science and 

Public Policy" (rewrite). 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 

*247 10/20 
t248 10/20 



INDEX November 8, 1965 Vol. LIU, No. 1376 

Africa. President Sends Greetings to OAU 

Meeting at Accra (message) 758 

American Republics 

Abraham designated Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Management 766 

Position Set Up for Management of Inter- 
American Affairs 765 

Australia. Service Courts of Friendly Foreign 
Forces Within the United States (proclama- 
tion) 758 

Canada. U.S. and Canada Discuss Salmon 

Fisheries 759 


Confirmations (Eilts, Rountree, Weathersby, 

Williams) 766 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 

Policy 761 

President Reports to Congress on Trade Agree- 
ments Program (text of message) .... 761 
Department and Foreign Service 
Confirmations (Eilts, Rountree, Weathersby, 

Williams) 766 

Designations (Abraham) 766 

Position Set Up for Management of Inter- 
American Affairs 765 

President Johnson Establishes New Personnel 

System for Peace Corps (Executive order) . 765 
Symposium on Science and Public Policy Held 

at Department 759 

Dominican Republic. The Dominican Crisis: 

Correcting Some Misconceptions (Mann) . . 730 
Economic Affairs 

East- West Trade (Solomon) 739 

President Reports to Congress on Trade Agree- 
ments Program (text of message) .... 761 
U.S. and Canada Discuss Salmon Fisheries . . 759 
U.S.-Mexican Trade Committee Holds First 

Meeting 738 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Scholars and 
Foreigrn Policy: Varieties of Research Exper- 
ience (Hughes) 747 

Europe. East-West Trade (Solomon) .... 739 

Foreign Aid 

Foreign Aid Appropriations Act Signed Into 
Law (Johnson) 760 

President Johnson Establishes New Personnel 
System for Peace Corps (Executive order) . 765 

Germany. German Statute of Limitations Ap- 
plies to Berlin (U.S. note to U.S.S.R.) ... 746 

Ghana. Williams confirmed as Ambassador . . 766 

Intelligence. Scholars and Foreign Policy: Va- 
rieties of Research Experience (Hughes) . . 747 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
President Sends Greetings to OAU Meet- 
ing at Accra (message) 758 

Mexico. U.S.-Mexican Trade Committee Holds 
First Meeting 738 

Military Affairs. Service Courts of Friendly 
Foreign Forces Within the United States 
(proclamation) 758 

Presidential Documents 

Foreign Aid Appropriations Act Signed Into 
Law 760 

President Johnson Establishes New Personnel 
System for Peace Corps 765 

President Reports to Congress on Trade Agree- 
ments Program 761 

President Sends Greetings to OAU Meeting 
at Accra 758 

Service Courts of Friendly Foreign Forces 
Within the United States 758 

Publications. Recent Releases 766 

Rhodesia. U.N. Condemns Rhodesia's Attempt 
To Perpetuate Minority Rule (Goldberg, 
text of resolution) 762 

Saudi Arabia. Eilts confirmed as Ambassador 766 

Science. Symposium on Science and Public 
Policy Held at Department 759 

South Africa. Rountree confirmed as Ambas- 
sador 766 

Sudan. Weathersby confirmed as Ambassador 766 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 764 

U.S. and Canada Discuss Salmon Fisheries . . 759 


East-West Trade (Solomon) 739 

German Statute of Limitations Applies to Ber- 
lin (U.S. note to U.S.S.R.) 746 

United Kingdom. U.N. Condemns Rhodesia's At- 
tempt To Perpetuate Minority Rule (Gold- 
berg, text of resolution) 762 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 763 

U.N. Condemns Rhodesia's Attempt to Perpet- 
uate Minority Rule (Goldberg, text of reso- 
lution) 762 

Name Index 

Abraham, Rodger C 766 

Eilts, Hermann F 766 

Goldberg, Arthur J 762 

Hughes, Thomas L 747 

Johnson, President 758, 760, 761, 765 

Mann, Thomas C 730 

Rountree, William M 766 

Solomon, Anthony M 739 

Weathersby, William H 766 

Williams, Franklin H 766 


Superintendent of Documents 
u.s. government printinq offick 




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Vol. LIII, No. 1377 

November 15, 1965 

by Assistant Secretary Bundy 770 

by Harlan Cleveland 781 

by Assistant Secretary Solomon 787 

Statement by James Roosevelt 798 

For index see inside back cover 

U.S.-Japanese Trends and Prospects 

by William P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

I greatly welcome the opportunity to 
meet with the American Assembly to discuss 
Japan. Other parts of the Far East occupy 
a great deal of our attention these days. 
But Japan, and our relations with Japan, 
are fundamental to our position in Asia. The 
Diet's current debate on the settlement with 
Korea, and Japan's emerging leadership role 
in Asian economic development, make this 
a particularly apt time to consider Japanese, 
and U.S.-Japanese, trends and prospects. 

There is increasing recognition in this 
country of the importance of Japan in world 
affairs. More and more Americans are be- 
coming aware of its great and growing sig- 
nificance in world trade, finance, and science 

' Address made before the 28th American Assem- 
bly at Arden House, Harriman, N.Y., on Oct. 30 
(press release 257 dated Oct. 29). 

and of its contributions to free-world 

But perhaps the facts still do not fully 
sink in. How many Americans appreciate 
the extent of our trade with Japan? Our ex- 
ports to Japan will exceed $2 billion this 
year, more than to any country except Can- 
ada. How many know that Japan has be- 
come one of the five great industrial centers 
of the world? That its rate of economic 
grovsi;h has far exceeded that of any other 
major nation? That it has entered an era of 
urban and suburban development and na- 
tional mass consumption comparable to that 
of Europe and America? How many Amer- 
icans really understand that an unfavorable 
course of developments in Japan could jeop- 
ardize our interests in half the globe? 

A world power in every sense of the term, 
Japan's importance is much enhanced by its 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
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location. The contrast between its great 
modern industrial society and the less devel- 
oped, generally much more slowly moving 
countries around it is stark. With a popu- 
lation about seven times Japan's, mainland 
China has a gross national product esti- 
mated to be only about a fourth larger than 
Japan's. And mainland China's margin of 
output not required for simple subsistence 
and therefore available for the development 
and projection of power is far smaller than 
Japan's. The contrast is even greater with 
Indonesia, which, with a population about 
the same as Japan's, has a GNP hardly one- 
eighth as great, with even less to spare for 
the projection of its influence abroad. 

One must visit Japan to appreciate the 
dynamism of its society, a dynamism deriv- 
ing from effective democratic government, 
free private enterprise, a trained and indus- 
trious work force, and an unremitting drive 
for progress and Improvement. On the basis 
of present trends, Japan 10 years hence will 
be even more important in the area and of 
even greater significance to our interests 
than it is today. 

The Present Situation in Japan 

What briefly is the situation in Japan 

The Economy 

Japan's extraordinary economic growth 
continues. In 1964 real GNP increased 13.9 
percent. Per capita GNP exceeds $700, some 
six times the Asian average. 

There are at present some temporary re- 
verses. The GNP increase this year is fore- 
cast at only 4 percent. But there is every 
reason to believe that the pace will soon 
quicken again. With exports at record highs, 
the growth rate is expected to continue sub- 
stantially to exceed that of the U.S. and 
Western Europe, although it probably will 
not regain the very high average levels of 
the fifties and early sixties, when there was 
tremendous private-plant modernization and 
expansion. Emphasis is increasingly shift- 
ing to long neglected and sorely needed so- 
cial investment: sanitation, harbors, roads, 

housing, and other public, or publicly sup- 
ported, projects. The standard of living is 
expected to continue its upward trend, with 
population growth remaining about 1 percent. 
Present-day Japan, as those of you who 
have been there know, is a land of energy, 
growth, and zest. Already the world's lead- 
ing shipbuilding nation, third largest pro- 
ducer of steel and electric energy, and sec- 
ond largest manufacturer of radio and tele- 
vision sets, Japan seems destined further to 
improve its standing in the years ahead. 

The Political Situation 

There has been a high degree of political 
stability since the distui-bances of 1960, not- 
withstanding the continued wide divergence 
on foreign policy issues between the con- 
servative majority and large leftist minor- 
ity. The conservatives stand for close asso- 
ciation with the free world, particularly the 
United States, while the left generally ad- 
vocates a "positive neutralism" that includes 
close relations with the Communist states. 
The leftist parties attract some 40 percent 
of the popular vote, divided approximately 
8 percent Democratic Socialist, 28 percent 
Marxist Socialist, and 4 percent Communist. 
Largely as a result of the movement of 
traditionally conservative rural people into 
the industrialized urban areas, the combined 
leftist vote has crept up an average of 1 per- 
cent a year since the war, from 22 percent 
in 1946 to 40 percent today. 

In recent years continuing prosperity and 
a growing tendency to question leftist dog- 
mas have perceptively slowed this leftward 
trend of voting strength. At the same time, 
deep divisions among the leftist parties mil- 
itate against the left's being able to win or 
maintain effective political power. The cen- 
ter of political gravity in Japan remains 
essentially middle of the road, urban and 
rural middle class, property-minded, and con- 
servative. This and their close association 
with the free world in foreign policy mat- 
ters is the strength of the conservative 
forces as they look to the future. 

Parts of the left, except for the Commu- 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


nists, have themselves shown signs of dis- 
illusionment vi^ith doctrinaire Marxist tenets 
as a prescription for Japan's internal econ- 
omy and government. This trend has been 
assisted by the emergence of new^ figures 
among the Japanese intelligentsia, more 
vi^illing than most of their long-isolated 
elders to look objectively at the present-day 
world. There is certainly a broader consen- 
sus on domestic issues than in the early 
postwar years. On international issues, par- 
ticularly since the intensification of hostil- 
ities in Viet-Nam, the split between the 
conservatives and the non-Communist left 
remains wide and deep. The conservatives, 
spurred by a somewhat disappointing show- 
ing in this year's Upper House legislative 
elections and the loss of their position as the 
leading party in the Tokyo Municipal Assem- 
bly, are showing renewed concern for mod- 
ernizing their party's structure, increasing 
their popular appeal, and maintaining their 
hold on power. 

Japanese Attitudes and Outlook 

Recent years have witnessed a significant 
revival of Japanese national spirit and am- 
bition. Apart from the simple passage of 
time since the shock of defeat, this regrovirth 
of national pride seems attributable pri- 
marily to the nation's extraordinary eco- 
nomic success, confidence and pride in its 
successfully functioning democratic institu- 
tions, its enlarging world role and status, 
and mounting (though still only partial) 
awareness of the challenge of Communist 
China. All political elements demand that 
Japan play a more active role on the world 
scene, independent of Washington or any 
other foreign influence, but opinions on 
what this role should be vary widely. 

There seems thus far to be little greater 
interest in larger defense forces and vir- 
tually no interest in sharing responsibility 
for the military defense of the Pacific area. 
Increased national feeling has, however, 
prompted a somewhat more assertive stance 
by Japanese negotiators of U.S.-Japan eco- 
nomic issues. The left not surprisingly seeks 
to direct national feeling against U.S. bases 

in Japan and the Ryukyus and against U.S. 
Viet-Nam policies. The people, overall, seem 
firmly attached to their democratic govern- 
ing system; cherish their economic gains 
and are determined to expand them; wel- 
come the protection afforded by the U.S.- 
Japan security arrangement; search hope- 
fully for a meaning and purpose in life 
which blends the virtues of traditional Jap- 
anese values with the requirements of a 
modern society; aspire to an honored and 
leading place for Japan in the world; and 
grope for a broader consensus on foreign 
policy issues vital to Japan's future welfare. 

U.S. Policy Objectives Toward Japan 

U.S. policy objectives toward Japan have 
remained constant since the early postwar 
years and were embodied in the Peace 
Treaty of 1952. These objectives envision 
a free and independent Japan forming part 
of a society of free and independent nations 
pursuing their own destiny by means re- 
spectful of the rights and interests of others. 
Over the years it has become clear that the 
great majority of Americans and Japanese 
are convinced that the destinies of our two 
countries lie in close association with each 
other and with other free nations and in 
active support of an open world society. 

As with our other major allies, this does 
not mean that there is full agreement on 
every issue and that every criticism threat- 
ens our relationship. Within an open world 
society there is room for honest difference 
of opinion. The benefit of our partnership 
is that each side contributes what it best can 
to strengthen the totality. Basically we and 
Japan share the same vision of the world. 
We both want peace, freedom, national in- 
dependence, and social and economic prog- 
ress, for ourselves and for others. The ques- 
tions which arise concern the means of 
achieving such a world, not the goal itself. 

U.S. policy objectives toward Japan may 
be considered under two broad headings — 
the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship and 
Japan's contribution to our common free- 
world goals. 



The Bilateral Relationship 

The U.S.-Japan relationship rests on solid 
ties of friendship and mutual interest. 

The ties of simple friendship should not 
be underrated. First formed in the mid-19th 
century, they survived the war and are now 
almost unique between two great nations of 
widely differing cultural and historical 
backgrounds — not to mention wide geo- 
graphic separation. Genuine respect and 
ability to work well together are an im- 
portant basis for our partnership. 

But our relations also reflect an ex- 
traordinary mutuality and complementarity 
of practical economic, security, and politi- 
cal interests : 

Economically, we share a vast trade, now 
over $4 billion a year. Japan's economic 
growth and rising living standards since the 
war have rested heavily on its trade and 
financial relationship with the United 
States. And our own prosperity has been 
enhanced by the large Japanese market, 
particularly for our agricultural products, 
and by the American consumer's access to 
Japanese low-cost, high-quality manufac- 

Militarily, we share a vital stake in 
Japan's safety from subversion or attack. 
Transfer of Japan's great human and in- 
dustrial resources to the Communist side 
would so drastically affect the balance of 
world power as to be of hardly less concern 
to us than to Japan itself. Japan's defense 
forces are assuming increasing responsi- 
bility for Japan's home defense, but politi- 
cal-military realities in the Far East continue 
to make far-reaching mutual security ar- 
rangements essential to both Japan and the 
United States. 

Politically, we and Japan share many of 
the same concepts and aims. We are tackling 
domestic problems involving the welfare of 
our populations with similar objectives. We 
work together in the United Nations and a 
multitude of lesser world and regional or- 
ganizations to advance our common interest 
in a peaceful and prosperous international 

These ties of friendship and mutual in- 

terest offer a prospect of close partnership 
for the indefinite future. But with our re- 
lations now so extensive, directly affecting 
large segments of our populations, con- 
stant, informed, and responsible attention is 
required on both sides to anticipate and 
avoid frictions where possible and — where 
they cannot be prevented — to arrive at 
prompt and statesmanlike solutions. 

Our interdependence is so great our re- 
lations might conceivably withstand grave 
strains. But we should not count on this; 
selfish, narrow stands could progressively 
sour and erode our partnership. If we wish 
the Japanese to respond to our purposes, we 
are going to have to respond to theirs. The 
U.S.-Japan relationship is reciprocal. The 
positions we adopt on matters of practical 
and prestige importance to Japan vdll in- 
evitably affect Japan's willingness to main- 
tain our alliance, to cooperate with us in the 
Ryukyus, to increase its aid to underde- 
veloped countries, to continue the essential 
degree of mutual policy coordination in 
dealing with East-West and North-South 
problems, to accelerate liberalization of its 
restrictions on imports and foreign invest- 
ment — I could go on. 

This point is not widely enough under- 
stood in this country. There seems clear 
need for a greater effort by the Government, 
universities, industrial and labor organiza- 
tions, and information media to bring home 
more effectively to the American people 
Japan's key relation to U.S. economic and 
security interests and the necessity for forth- 
coming, statesmanlike positions in our deal- 
ings with it. 

The need for improvement in the conduct 
of our bilateral relations is not confined to 
the U.S. side. When the United States finds 
it necessary to act under mutual security 
arrangements with third countries, many 
in Japan react as if we should consider only 
our obligations to Japan. They seem un- 
aware of Japan's own deep national interest 
in the stability and security of other areas of 
the Far East. When the United States takes 
an action adversely affecting a Japanese in- 
dustry, not only the industry but also the 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


Japanese press cry aloud in aggrieved com- 
plaint. Few cite the matter's minor impor- 
tance in our vast, steadily growing total 
trade, or Japan's own trade restrictions, or 
balance the U.S. position off against con- 
cessions we have made in other areas. It 
would assist the working out of U.S.-Japan 
issues if both sides would make a greater ef- 
fort to view those issues in the perspective of 
our entire relationship and common objec- 

Japan's Free-World Role 

We turn now to the second area of U.S. 
policy interest with respect to Japan — 
Japan's free-world role. 

This role — Japan's tangible and intangible 
contribution to free-world collective strength 
— has long been substantial. I have already 
mentioned Japan's home defense forces and 
the base facilities Japan affords us. In ad- 
dition, Japan since the war has delivered 
over $500 million in reparations, almost all 
capital goods, to Southeast Asian countries. 
By the end of the program in 1977 it will 
have delivered a total of nearly $1.2 billion. 
Its trade with South and Southeast Asia 
amounted to $2.5 billion in 1964. Over the 
past 3 years, it has invested $460 million of 
public and private funds in that region. 

Japan participates in ECAFE [Economic 
Commission for Asia and the Far East] , the 
Colombo Plan, and the OECD [Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Develop- 
ment], and has undertaken, subject to Diet 
approval, to subscribe $200 million to the 
Asian Development Bank's capitalization. It 
is taking the initiative in developing other 
new and promising approaches to Southeast 
Asian economic development. It has provid- 
ed nonmilitary assistance in South Viet- 
Nam and has contributed to the Foreign 
Exchange Operations Fund in Laos. 

Japan has long conducted a substantial 
and effective technical training program in 
Japan for free Asians and has sent a con- 
siderable number of Japanese technical in- 
structors and advisers abroad. It has just 
initiated an Overseas Cooperation Volun- 
teers program which, like our Peace Corps, 

will send young volunteers to developing 
countries. And Japan pursues an increas- 
ingly active diplomatic role in Southeast 
Asia. Most important of all, postwar Japan 
stands as a great, vital example to other 
Asian nations of the workability in an Asian 
environment of democratic, free-enterprise 
institutions. The example it provides of an 
Asian nation which has come so far so fast 
by free democratic means is a tremendous 
factor on our side. 

This said, it must also be noted that there 
are important areas in which Japan, as a 
major, increasingly prosperous free-world 
nation which has much to gain from peace 
and stability in the free world and much to 
lose from an extension of Communist power, 
could do more to further the common cause. 
Japan's defense effort remains very small 
in comparison with other major powers. We 
recognize that there are historical reasons 
for this. It is encouraging to see increasing 
public recognition in Japan that hopeful 
protestations of a love of peace must be 
supplemented by practical measures to 
create the conditions for peace, including 
arrangements which will insure that ag- 
gression does not succeed. 

Another of the essential conditions for 
peace and stability, which we and Japan both 
recognize is particularly pertinent to South 
and Southeast Asia, is raising the living 
standards of the people of the less developed 
areas. In this field Japan has expressed a 
particular interest, and we believe that it 
has unique qualifications to make a special 
contribution. Thus far Japan has provided 
little overseas grant aid beyond its repara- 
tions deliveries, technical training program, 
and $3 million nonmilitary assistance to 
South Viet-Nam and Laos. Its economic 
assistance has primarily taken the form of 
relatively short-term, high-interest loans 
tied directly to Japan's commercial in- 
terests. The growth of Japanese national 
feeling and desire to play a more positive 
role in world affairs is producing some 
change in this situation. The Japanese 
Government is now considering a marked 
expansion and liberalization of its South- 



east Asian economic aid programs. The pro- 
posed Asian Development Bank had its 
genesis largely in Japanese thinking, and 
Japan is assuming a leading position in the 
development of the coordinated Southeast 
Asian development plan of w^hich President 
Johnson spoke on April 1? 

In assessing the particular role which Ja- 
pan now appears most likely and best quali- 
fied to perform in the common cause of peace 
and stability in Asia, we should understand 
the factors which shape Japan's defense, Viet- 
Nam, and mainland China policies along lines 
different from those which we ourselves fol- 

Pacifist feeling dating from the war, doubt 
of the practical value of large Japanese mili- 
tary forces, and a reluctance to divert re- 
sources from economic development to mili- 
tary expenditures all influence Japanese 
thinking on its defense effort. 

Viet-Nam? For 20 years, Japan has been 
able to concentrate on economic growth, 
secure in the protection afforded by U.S. 
strategic and military commitments in the 
Pacific. Viet-Nam, like other security 
threats in Asia, could safely be ignored as 
outside the realm of Japan's immediate con- 
cern. The attitude of many Japanese was 
ambivalent. They could not look with favor 
on a Communist takeover by force of South 
Viet-Nam. That could hardly be in their na- 
tional interest. On the other hand, they 
were fearful that our mounting support of 
the South Vietnamese people could escalate 
into a general war, which might involve 
them. There was much misunderstanding 
both of the nature of the conflict in Viet- 
Nam and of our actions. However, in re- 
cent months, as our readiness to enter into 
unconditional discussions was more ex- 
plicitly associated with our determination to 
defend Viet-Nam against aggression, there 
has been growing understanding in Japan of 
the true situation in Viet-Nam. 

Japan's attitudes toward mainland China 
are even more deep-seated. Most Japanese 
maintain strong feelings of kinship and af- 
finity for mainland China. There is little 

" Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 
NOVEMBER 15, 1965 

fear that Peiping will ever attack Japan. 
The Chinese Communist nuclear explosions 
have thus far not altered the widespread 
view in Japan that the United States exag- 
gerates Peiping's military threat, even if 
not its political ambitions, and that the lat- 
ter will moderate with time and freer ex- 
posure to the outside world. 

There seems to be a tendency, even in 
Japanese conservative circles, to accord the 
Chinese Communists the same tolerance that 
is given to student radicals in Japan itself, 
in the expectation that they will outgrow 
their excesses and settle down as responsi- 
ble members of the community. The "Com- 
munist" side of Chinese Communist policies 
is consistently slighted in favor of an opti- 
mistic confidence that eventually the "Chi- 
nese" side of their nature will triumph. 
Hopes that Japan can someday play a lead- 
ing role in the economic development of 
mainland China prevail over the most blatant 
efforts of the Chinese Communists to 
utilize trade arrangements for political pur- 
poses. Above all, every Japanese knows 
that, for better or worse, mainland China is 
going to be a few hundred miles away for- 
ever, that Japan must live with its 700 mil- 
lion, rapidly growing population as best it 
can. For all these reasons the average 
Japanese is determined to avoid the devel- 
opment of a confirmed hostile attitude be- 
tween Japan and China. 

It would be unrealistic to expect any 
Japanese Government not to be influenced 
by these widely and strongly held public at- 
titudes. Neither Japanese, United States, 
nor broader free-world interest would be 
served by Japanese Government policies 
which ignored domestic realities. Such poli- 
cies could jeopardize a political balance 
under which Japan has long made vital con- 
tributions to free-world interests and is 
now moving toward a substantially increased 
contribution to Asian economic develop- 
ment, both in Southeast Asia and through 
the conclusion of an historic settlement with 

And yet these Japanese public attitudes, 
derived from Japanese experience, appear 
to us, in varying degree or in the action 


views derived from them, dangerously 
wrong. We believe that large segments of 
Japanese opinion seriously misunderstand 
the situations in Viet-Nam and Communist 
China, and that Japan gravely underesti- 
mates the threat which Chinese Communist 
domination of South and Southeast Asia 
would present to Japan's own interests. 
Japan is even more dependent on the main- 
tenance of free societies and free economic 
interchanges in the Pacific and Indian 
Oceans than we are. Chinese Communist 
domination of these areas, even if Japan it- 
self escaped engulfment, would be an even 
greater catastrophe for Japan than for the 
United States. For in these circumstances, 
it is hard indeed to imagine Communist 
China peacefully coexisting with a weak, in- 
adequately defended Japan no matter how 
the latter might protest its friendship. 
Rather, one would visualize Peiping's effort 
to control or influence its neighbors increas- 
ingly directed against Japan as Communist 
China's rival for the leadership of Asia. 

Conduct of U.S. Relations With Japan 

I have used what may be blunt language 
in thus describing the kind of problems that 
exist in our bilateral relations with Japan 
and between our respective attitudes to- 
ward the broader international situation. In 
this gathering of Americans brought to- 
gether by their keen interest in this matter, 
no purpose would be served by being less 
frank. For we are all here to seek under- 
standing and to evolve from that under- 
standing constructive suggestions as to the 
things we can do, both in our governmental 
policy and in the farflung private relation- 
ships we have with Japan in every walk of 

What, then, are we doing? 

First and foremost — and here I know I 
speak both of public policy and private at- 
titudes in this country — we maintain the 
strongest faith and confidence in the devo- 
tion to freedom and common sense of the 
Japanese people, and in the enlightened and 
skillful leadership of their Government, 

backed by the great weight of responsible 
public opinion in Japan. 

Secondly, we have developed and ex- 
panded, particularly in the last 4 years, a 
network of consultative relationships with 
the Japanese Government that is second to 
none, I venture to say, in any bilateral re- 
lationship of truly independent nations 
throughout the world. The systematic ex- 
changes of views on economic subjects 
through Cabinet visits between the two 
countries, most recently last July,* the se- 
curity consultative committee structure, 
which last met in August, the visit of Prime 
Minister [Eisaku] Sato in January,* and the 
full use of all occasions for high-level con- 
versations, such as Secretary Rusk's Sep- 
tember meeting with Foreign Minister 
[Etsusaburo] Shiina in New York — all these 
are the outward and visible signs of a con- 
sultation that is in fact on an almost daily 
basis through two embassies manned by out- 
standing representatives. Ambassador 
[Ryuji] Takeuchi in Washington and our 
Ambassador, Edwin Reischauer, in Tokyo. 
And our consultation at the government 
level is supplemented and enriched by ex- 
changes of visits by newsmen, parliamentary 
representatives, and such private initiatives 
as the Japanese-American Conference of 
Mayors and Presidents of Chambers of 
Commerce, whose session I attended only 
this week in Oakland.^ 

In short, we have built up a network of 
communication at all levels that permits us 
to look constantly at our common problems 
and work toward their solutions. 

Finally, we approach the whole of our re- 
lationship with Japan from one standpoint 
and one alone — that we should each realisti- 
cally appraise our own long-term national 
interests and effectively pursue those in- 
terests. Whatever the national differences 
in the attitudes from which we may start 
such an appraisal, we have little doubt that 

*IbU., Aug. 9, 1965, p. 242. 
♦ Ibid., Feb. 1, 1965, p. 133. 

■^ For text of an address by Mr. Bundy at the Oak- 
land conference on Oct. 25, see p. 777. 



it will continue to produce the extraordinary 
degree of understanding and cooperation 
that has governed our relations for at least 
a decade. On this sort of realistic founda- 
tion, we can go forward in confidence. 

Japan's postwar development has been an 
extraordinary success story — for Japan, for 
the United States, and for the whole free 
world. I believe this story will continue. 
With understanding and statesmanship on 
both sides, U.S.-Japan bilateral relations 
should flourish and strengthen. Only Japan 

can decide its world role. With its dynamism 
and vital stake in a society of free and inde- 
pendent nations, I am confident that it will 
be an increasingly active and important one. 
As an Asian nation, it will progressively as- 
sume the leading role in Asian economic de- 
velopment for which its resources and ex- 
perience equip it. As a world power, it will 
strengthen its contribution through the 
United Nations, through the OECD, and in 
many other ways to the cause of a better 
life for all humanity. 

Japan and the United States: The Essentials of Partnership 

by William P. Bundy 

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ' 

It is an honor to speak today to this as- 
semblage of distinguished mayors and presi- 
dents of chambers of commerce from Japan 
and the United States. I realize that you 
gentlemen have a full agenda facing you; 
that the municipal officials seek to draw 
from fellow conferees new wisdom in deal- 
ing with the pressing and common prob- 
lems of urban development in an era of ex- 
panding cities, and that perhaps a few may 
wish to exchange corridor talk on the even 
more practical problems of how to get re- 
elected ; that the chamber of commerce mem- 
bers have equally practical problems of trade 
and commercial activity to discuss. 

However, before you get engrossed in the 
arts of governing and business, I would like 

' Address made before the biennial conference of 
U.S. and Japanese Mayors and Presidents of Cham- 
bers of Commerce at Oakland, Calif., on Oct. 25 
(press release 252). 

to shift your focus to what may appear to be 
a less pressing problem, the state of U.S.- 
Japanese relations. Fourteen years ago the 
first of these biennial conferences of U.S. 
and Japanese mayors and presidents of 
chambers of commerce took place. There 
were only 21 American delegates to that 
1951 conference, a striking contrast to the 
crowded assemblage we find today. 

Yet this is symptomatic of how far Japan 
and the United States have come in develop- 
ing intimate relations that touch every as- 
pect of life in both countries. We have, for 
example, become accustomed to the constant 
and increasing interchange of people be- 
tween the two countries, not only distin- 
guished leaders like yourselves but repre- 
sentatives from every walk of life. Ameri- 
can-Japan relations are dynamic and grow- 
ing and above all increasingly beneficial to 
both our people. 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


Why then, you may ask, should one take 
the time to discuss this partnership? Be- 
cause any partnership between nations, like 
a marriage, must not be taken for granted. 
It can wither from neglect, or it can con- 
tinue to flourish and grow in vitality and 
satisfaction if it is periodically examined 
and nourished. I propose today to make such 
an examination. 

Let us take stock of the partnership be- 
tween Japan and the United States from the 
viewpoint of two essential components of a 
partnership: (1) interdependence and com- 
mon interest and (2) mutual understanding 
and accommodation. 

Interdependence and Common Interest 

The ties that bind Japan and the United 
States, in the long span of history, are not 
of a long duration ; they have only in recent 
years passed their first century. Yet they 
have survived a war and in its wake be- 
come far stronger and more durable. U.S.- 
Japanese relations are strong because they 
are built on a firm foundation of interde- 
pendence and common interest, as well as 
the bonds of simple friendships and personal 

Though our traditions and histories dif- 
fer, there is a compatibility of spirit. Both 
Japan and the United States share a dy- 
namic urge to improve their societies. 
Neither is satisfied to rest on a record of 
past success. Americans frankly admire the 
record of Japanese achievement in recent 
years. The industrial age was a comparative 
latecomer to Japan. Yet today Japan stands 
among the industrial powers of the world, 
the leading shipbuilding nation, third larg- 
est producer of steel, fourth largest producer 
of electrical energy, and innovator and sec- 
ond largest producer of radio and television 
sets. And individual income has grown in 
record proportions. 

But the United States and Japan share 
not only membership among the economic 
leaders of the world but common economic 
institutions and a common dedication to in- 
dividual initiative and free enterprise. And 
keeping pacs with the tremendous spurt of 

economic growth m both countries has been 
the expansion of bilateral trade to a level 
now over $4 billion a year. When one real- 
izes that nearly 28 percent of Japan's ex- 
ports go to the United States and that 
Japan year after year consistently ranks as 
the second largest customer for U.S. goods, 
the tremendous importance of our trade ties 
can be seen. We have found complementary 
markets for our products, and our peoples 
have mutually benefited, whether it be the 
American farmer whose grain is sold in 
Japan or the Japanese worker whose radio 
finds a ready customer in the United States. 

But the interdependence and common in- 
terest that bind Japan and the United 
States reach far beyond these economic in- 
terests and a common dedication to progress 
and growth. Politically the two countries 
also share broadly similar institutions and 
a faith that democratic institutions offer 
greater benefit to our peoples. The truth is 
that the Japanese and the American, though 
citizens of widely separated societies, share 
membership in the broader fellowship of 
human freedom. 

And finally, the United States and Japan 
view the international picture from a com- 
mon perspective. Both countries seek in their 
international relations a peaceful world in 
which every nation is able to pursue its own 
development in a manner unique to its own 
traditions and historical character and free 
from the actuality or threat of foreign in- 
terference and aggression. The security ties 
that presently link Japan and the United 
States reflect this common aspiration. The 
Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security 
provides the means through which the 
United States can contribute to the freedom 
and independence of Japan while Japan pro- 
vides military facilities which are an im- 
portant element in preserving the free 
world's security. Thus, whether it be the 
personal bonds between individual Japanese 
and Americans or the institutional rela- 
tions between our two Governments, a part- 
nership has been forged between our two 
countries based on very broad interdepend- 
ence and common interest. 



Mutual Understanding and Accommodation 

The depth of our common interest must 
not, however, deceive us or lull us into a 
false sense of complacency. Equal recogni- 
tion must be given to those highly distinc- 
tive characteristics of our societies, to those 
areas where our attitudes, our interests, and 
our policies may diverge and not follow sim- 
ilar courses. In countries such as Japan and 
the United States, whose cultural and his- 
torical origins and whose geographical posi- 
tions are so diverse, such differences are 
inevitable. This reality need not create any 
serious doubts as to the strength or durabil- 
ity of the U.S.-Japanese relationship. Di- 
versity and differences are a source of con- 
cern only if they lead to discord. 

The second essential component of the 
partnership between the United States and 
Japan is therefore a willingness to under- 
stand the problems faced by each other and 
to accommodate the differences that arise. 
There is no need for me to catalog these 
differences. Fortunately they are well rec- 
ognized, and you gentlemen are helping to 
find in your discussions the necessary ac- 
commodations. There is no more powerful 
force in the strengthening of relations be- 
tween Japan and the United States than the 
willingness of men such as yourselves to 
hear out the other side, understand his view- 
point, and seek an emerging consensus that 
bridges the gap when differences do arise. 

A Common Stake in Asia 

Today there is no issue more vital to the 
Japanese-American partnership than a mu- 
tual understanding as to how we can to- 
gether build a better future for the people 
of Asia. In this area, as I have said before, 
our goals are plainly identical — we both 
seek an Asia in which nations can live in 
peace, work for the improvement of the lives 
of their people, and rest secure from threat 
of aggression. 

In considering the best ways to approach 
these goals, however, the views of Japan 
and America are naturally not always par- 
allel. This is to be expected. Japan's location 
and historical identity with Asia undoubt- 

edly gives it a special insight, and there is 
much we can and do learn from our Jap- 
anese partners about effective approaches 
to Asia's problems. 

Japan already has made substantial con- 
tributions toward our common goals in Asia, 
by such actions as its aid to underdeveloped 
countries, its participation in the U.N. and 
in many free-world international organiza- 
tions seeking to assist less developed areas, 
and most important of all, by serving — with 
its record of achievement and growth 
through democratic means — as a source of 
inspiration and encouragement to all Asia. 

America, too, has had considerable experi- 
ence in modern times in Asia. We have been 
called upon by many Asian nations, includ- 
ing Japan, to assist in bolstering their se- 
curity and furthering their development. 
And we responded to these requests because 
the alternative would have been the collapse 
of free and independent nations. 

In the process we have learned much. But 
we know that we have much to learn, too. 
The problems of Asia are sufficiently com- 
plex that there is room for, indeed a need 
for, the wisdom and contributions of both 
our countries, as of others who share our 

Today, in Asia, the conflict in Viet-Nam 
poses a particularly crucial and difficult 
problem for both Japan and the United 
States, a problem where mutual understand- 
ing is most necessary. Many Japanese have 
insisted that the war there does not involve 
Japan's real interests, that it is not a 
struggle to turn back Communist aggression 
but a nationalistic civil war where United 
States intervention reflects what is said to 
be a dogmatic American anti-Communist 

The general concern about Viet-Nam in 
Japan is natural and desirable in view of 
Japan's role as a leading world power. And 
we can understand and sympathize with the 
fears of the Japanese people that the con- 
flict in Viet-Nam might ultimately involve 
Japan again in a general war. We fully 
share these concerns for peace in Asia. 

By the same token, we hope that the 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


Japanese people will see the Vietnamese sit- 
uation in all its dimensions and will seek to 
understand how we Americans look at the 
problem, why we are determined to perse- 
vere to an equitable solution there. We be- 
lieve that peace in the world cannot be sus- 
tained as long as small countries like South 
Viet-Nam live in fear of aggression from 
without and subversion from within. The 
facts in Viet-Nam since 1954 are that the 
Communists have attempted to overthrow 
the South Vietnamese Government by force, 
in open violation of the 1954 Geneva ac- 
cords. We have responded to the call for 
help of the Government of South Viet-Nam. 
We intend to continue that assistance until 
the South Vietnamese are guaranteed secu- 
rity and freedom to determine their own 
way of life. 

In the meantime, President Johnson has 
long since made clear our willingness at any 
time to enter unconditional discussions of 
the terms of peace with any government. 
He has even made clear that the Viet Cong 
could participate in such discussions on the 
side of the North Vietnamese. We will con- 
tinue to wait patiently for Hanoi's response 
and in the interim take those steps neces- 
sary to stem the North Vietnamese aggres- 
sion. Security, however, is only one aspect 
of the Vietnamese people's search for peace 
and national life. We agree with Japan's 
leaders that peace in Southeast Asia cannot 
be won by military means alone. Conversely, 
peace cannot be won by military subjuga- 
tion of South Viet-Nam by Hanoi. 

Before us still is the tremendous task of 
helping South Viet-Nam — and other devel- 
oping nations — to build a national livelihood 
that can satisfy the aspirations of its peo- 
ple. This is a continuing challenge to the 
imagination and energy of all free nations. 
In particular, Viet-Nam is an area where the 
partnership between Japan and the United 
States can gain new vitality and a new 
sense of mission. 

The challenge that faces the United 
States and Japan in the period ahead, stated 
simply, is to maintain the vitality of our 
partnership, to broaden our common inter- 
ests, to bridge the differences where they 
occur, and to join hands in helping advance 
the good of all Asian peoples. In both the 
United States and Japan, a basic problem 
in mobilizing the strength of the two coun- 
tries for this work is to seek out at every 
opportunity a fuller understanding of why 
and how the two nations' vital interests are 
at stake in this search for peace in Asia. 
Facing this challenge will require persever- 
ance, courage, and a spirit of accommoda- 
tion. But the goal of a soundly based peace 
is so clearly in our common interest that 
the special effort on the part of us all is 
surely justified. 

Assistant Secretary Vaughn 
Speaks in Venezuela 

The Department of State announced on 
October 22 that Jack H. Vaughn, Assistant 
Secretary for Inter-American Affairs and 
U.S. Coordinator for the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, would leave Washington that day for 
Caracas, Venezuela, for a meeting of busi- 
ness, financial, and industry leaders of the 
United States and Latin American coun- 

Mr. Vaughn addressed the 46th semian- 
nual meeting of the Executive Committee of 
the Inter-American Council for Commerce 
and Production (CICYP) on October 26. 
The chief goal of CICYP is to promote the 
role of private enterprise in economic de- 

While he was at Caracas Mr. Vaughn also 
held consultations with U.S. Ambassador 
Maurice M. Bernbaum, and en route to 
Caracas he made a brief stopover at Bogota, 
Colombia, for talks with Ambassador Covey 
T. Oliver. 



The Other End of the Telescope 

by Harlan Cleveland 

U.S. Permanent Representative on the NATO Council ^ 

One of the first pieces of mail I answered 
at my new desk in the NATO building was 
to accept your invitation to speak to the 
American Club of Paris. A more cautious 
soul might have waited until he had mas- 
tered all the policies and procedures of the 
world's most important alliance — but then I 
might never have come at all. 

As you know, I have been working mostly 
on the United Nations — that is, on the or- 
ganization of world order — for several 
years past. Talking to audiences of Amer- 
icans in the United States, I have been at 
some pains to assure them that the United 
Nations and NATO are both engaged in the 
number-one task of our times, which is 
keeping the peace; that each organization 
can do things which the other cannot; that 
they therefore are not mutually exclusive 
but mutually reinforcing; and that it lies 
within the national interest of the United 
States to provide loyal and effective support 
to both. 

Obviously this is just as true in the inter- 
national capital called Paris as it is in the 
international capital called New York. 

Yet I have found that the question put to 
me most frequently during the past few 
weeks is some variation of this: "Well, how 
does it feel to be looking at things from the 
other end of the telescope ?" 

By this, I take it, my interrogators have 
meant that after looking at the world from 

' Address made before the American Club of 
Paris on Oct. 21. 

the vantage point of the United Nations, 
things must look radically different from the 
NATO point of view. From one end, it is 
assumed, the viewer gets a diffused global 
picture and from the other end, a sharp 
focus on Europe only. 

My answer to this is that the question is 
worse than misleading. From either the 
United Nations or NATO viewpoint one 
sees, or should see, the same world. Science 
and technology are everywhere demolishing 
the barriers of time and space — rendering 
obsolescent the geography part of what used 
to be called geopolitics. 

So whether one likes it or not, we are all, 
as Adlai Stevenson used to say, in the same 
uncomfortably small and crowded spaceship 
called Planet Earth. So small is the boat we 
share, and so dangerous its journey, that 
the different nationalities in its mixed- 
manned crew cannot really afford to be 
cantankerous with each other. They must, 
on the contrary, tell each other frankly and 
courteously what they think. 

There is nothing veiy mysterious about 
what we Americans think our foreign policy 
is, because it comes so directly out of our 
own experience in trying to make diversity 
work at home. 

The object of American foreign policy is 
to use our power actively in the service of 
a world of diversity. We really believe, after 
190 years, in our own Declaration of Inde- 
pendence — and we still think the philosophy 
it contains is good (as the Declaration itself 
declares) for "all men." 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


We do not believe any one race or nation 
should own or manage the world. We don't 
even want to own or manage it ourselves. 
Indeed, we think the governance of our 
world of diversity is beyond the conception 
or the power or the skill of any one group 
of men and women, however talented. We 
foresee a "world order" with many centers 
of power, many places where important de- 
cisions are made, many international agen- 
cies of peaceful change, many devices for 
international conciliation, many checks and 
balances to prevent world order from becom- 
ing world dominion. 

We try to hasten the advent of this kind 
of world order in two rather obvious ways: 
by trying to contain violence, and by invent- 
ing international ways to deal with hundreds 
of common interests shared by few or many 
nations. Most of this work takes place be- 
hind the headlines — not because it is secret 
and certainly not because it is uninteresting 
or unimportant, but because when we are 
successful there is no public conflict and 
therefore, by journalistic tradition, no news. 

As the world's most powerful nation, we 
have a special obligation: to be also the 
world's most responsible nation. For the 
paradox of using great power in the service 
of diversity is this: We are so strong that 
we cannot do much of anything by ourselves 

A very important chunk of our strength — 
something like a third of our defense budget, 
for a start — is devoted to the North Atlan- 
tic alliance. It is designed to help hold the 
fort against organized violence while Europe 
works its way by peaceful change to a more 
decent order in which ugly manmade walls 
are no longer the symbol of its travail. The 
instrument of this policy is a complex of 
commitments and consultations called an 
alliance, and a skeleton organization of our 
common strength designed to make clear — 
both to ourselves and to those who would 
proclaim themselves our adversary — that 
these commitments are not scraps of paper 
but a living organization that carries them 
into action. 

In the past 41/2 years I have had something 

to do with all the 53 international organiza- 
tions to which the United States now belongs. 
iBut I find it does not at all reduce the 
complexity of my life to be assigned to rep- 
resent the United States at only one of the 
53. For what we are trying to do over here 
is part and parcel of what we are trying 
to do at the U.N. in New York, at the dis- 
armament talks in Geneva, in the Organiza- 
tion of American States in the Western 
Hemisphere — and out yonder in Southeast 
Asia, too. 

So I feel quite at home in my new environ- 
ment, of which you, the Americans in Paris, 
are so important a part. And there is an- 
other thing which seems homey : I can hear 
almost any day where some pundit or oracle 
has announced the imminent death of the 
organization to which I am accredited. I 
used to think that the United Nations had 
been given more premature public burials 
than any institution in history; now I am 
not so sure. It still seems to be hard for 
those not directly involved to distinguish 
between the rattle of death and the pains of 
growth. I should have thought that by now 
most people would have caught on to the 
fact that rapid changes in international 
organizations, accompanied by a sharp sense 
of crisis, are the normal condition of our 

East-West Relations 

Another thing I keep hearing in Paris is 
that the world has changed quite a bit since 
NATO was first established. Does anybody 
really think it hasn't changed? Surely to 
point out that 1965 is not 1949 is to make 
one of the safest and least instructive obser- 
vations of our time. The world has indeed 
changed. Our Atlantic world has of course 
brought about the most significant change of 
all, which is the beginning of the Soviet 
Union's conversion from ambitious outlaw to 
responsible citizen of the world community. 

We have more reason now than in 1949 to 
hope that a more liberal and more humane 
society is in the making in the Soviet 
Union ; that the Soviet regime has less lurid, 
more realistic external ambitions than Stalin 



had; that the Communist leaders — with 
good reason — are quite preoccupied with 
their considerable internal problems; that 
the Soviets more readily perceive than 
they did before the fact, as General Eisen- 
hower used to say, that "there is no alterna- 
tive to peace." 

We have even made progress in this re- 
gard — a limited ban on nuclear testing; the 
U.N.'s resolution against placing weapons of 
mass destruction in orbit; the "hot line" to 
reduce the dangers of war by accident or 
miscalculation; parallel announcements of 
intention to reduce the production of fission- 
able materials; and some tentative steps 
toward cooperation in exploring the mys- 
teries of outer space. 

We of the Atlantic community not only 
welcome this trend; we started it and have 
together nursed with patience the negotia- 
tions that led to each of these agreements. 

We have some basis for hope, too, that 
the regimes in Eastern Europe will continue 
to modify the harshness of their rule, will 
act more and more like self-respecting na- 
tions with minds and interests of their own, 
and will take more advantage of opportuni- 
ties for fruitful relations with Western Eu- 
rope and the rest of the non-Communist 
world. These changes, too, are glacier-like 
in pace but welcome in talk. 

These results have been brought about 
partly by flaws in the theory and practice of 
communism and partly by Western cohesion. 
The North Atlantic alliance was organized to 
fight off a European aggressor in a small 
war, a medium-sized war, or a big war — and 
the result has been no war at all. The forces 
assembled by NATO to serve as a credible 
deterrent against Communist aggression 
have, in fact, served as a credible deterrent 
against Communist aggression. And as a re- 
sult the Kremlin decided in the early 1960's 
to stay their hand in Europe and see what 
could be done elsewhere to ascertain the 
area in which their writ might run. They 
worked hard, despite their lack of success, 
to pick up large pieces of Africa and Asia 
set free by the old European empires. They 
aimed much of their verbal fire at targets 

outside of Western Europe — at the United 
States, at the leaders of newly independent 
countries, and at their own obstreperous and 
unruly allies in Peiping. 

But if the Soviets are aiming their talk 
over the heads of Western Europe, they are 
still aiming an enormous proportion of their 
actual military strength at targets in West- 
ern Europe. 

Anybody who gets a peek at what our 
intelligence services know about Soviet mili- 
tary technology is instantly cured of any 
tendencies to euphoria. The Soviets are 
continuing to invest very large chunks of 
their own controlled economy in developing, 
producing, and deploying more intercon- 
tinental ballistic missiles in harder sites; 
they are working on an antimissile defense ; 
they are constructing an impressive fleet 
of submarines and other instruments of 
naval warfare; and they have aimed 
medium-range ballistic missiles at every rel- 
evant target they can find in Western Eu- 

We cannot forget that this dynamic tech- 
nology is at the service of Communist 
politics; that is, at the service of a party 
which thinks it has a monopoly of truth 
and wishes it had a monopoly of power. As 
long as this is true, the rest of us are com- 
pelled to maintain an effective deterrent at 
all levels of armed conflict which are in the 
range of Soviet capabilities. That does not 
require us to behave as though the Soviet 
Union were about to pounce. But we cannot 
know what the Soviets intend to do with 
their very large and modern armed forces. 
Aggressive intent without capability would 
not be particularly dangerous; but a known 
capability combined with ambitious intent is 
not to be trifled with. It takes years to make 
significant changes in military capabilities 
— but military intentions can be changed in 
a minute or days or hours. 

So with confidence and prudence we 
maintain the strength to maintain the peace 
until alternative guarantees are available. 
And while we hope — and work hard — for 
more cooperative relations with the Soviet 
Union, the reality is that, as of this week, the 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


detente is less a reality of political settle- 
ment than a hope for future progress based 
on the maintenance of Atlantic strength. As 
of this week, the Soviets still stand pat 
against any form of verified disarmament, 
still freeze a division of Germany and harass 
the access to Berlin, and still keep trying 
to drive wedges between the members of 
the North Atlantic alliance by the familiar 
alternating current of belligerent noises and 
beguiling nostrums. 

Meanwhile the changes in the world 
environment offer new opportunities espe- 
cially for the nations which call themselves 
"Atlantic." After all, we share three-fifths 
of the world's industrial output — which is 
a rough measure of capacity to do some- 
thing about our opportunities. What we do 
with that capacity — how we decide to use 
our preponderant weight in the balance of 
world affairs — whether we use it for good 
or evil, wisely or stupidly, or even if we 
fail to agree on how to use it at all — will 
decisively influence the history of our era. 

I cannot tell you — for I do not know — 
whether the actions we allies take or fail to 
take together will measure up to the re- 
quirements of the exciting moments in 
which we are privileged to live. But I can 
perhaps suggest the major chapter head- 
ings in the continuing story of Atlantic af- 
fairs as it unrolls in the period ahead of us. 
They are all complex, all confusing, and all 
contentious — which is just a way of saying 
they are important issues in the real world. 
You will be reading about these topics in 
your newspapers and listening to them on 
your radio and television sets. Let me sug- 
gest a framework for thinking about the 
conflicts and crises, real and imagined, that 
will assault your eyes and ears in the 
months just ahead. 

Nuclear Proliferation 

One of the chapters in the Atlantic story 
is called "nuclear proliferation." 

Ever since the United States offered to 
turn over its monopoly of nuclear weapons 
to an international control organization 
under the United Nations we have been 

searching for some safe and agreed way to 
prevent the spread of such weapons around 
the world. 

After two decades of worrying about 
nuclear weapons, more informed people are 
more worried about them than ever before. 
And with good reason. 

In the hands of two or three countries, 
the awesome force and enormous range of 
modern strategic weapons has made for a 
kind of stability. But there are "little" 
nuclear weapons, too, which are potentially 
usable in situations short of general war. 
There are now five members or associate 
members of the nuclear club, and a good 
many other nations are thinking about 
whether they can afford the initiation fee. 
The prospect is that vdthin the next few 
years half a dozen countries, or perhaps as 
many as 10 or 12, could with great effort 
and disproportionate expense develop their 
own nuclear weapons. 

As things stand today, the danger of nu- 
clear spread is a problem of what countries 
other than the United States and the Soviet 
Union will decide to do. As for the United 
States, our policy of not helping prolifera- 
tion is well known. As for the Soviets, it 
would be good to have their assurance that 
they were not going to give other nations 
Soviet nuclear weapons or the means and 
know-how to make them. They did so once ; 
they got the Chinese started on the road to 
a bomb, then thought better of it in 1959. 
At the moment they show little sign of in- 
terest in spreading their nuclear know- 
how; there are not even indications that 
they work as closely vdth their allies in 
planning for the use, if necessary, of nu- 
clear weapons, as we have done with our 
Atlantic partners. 

The countries most likely to feel that they 
must have at least a symbolic national 
weapon are some of China's threatened 
neighbors, some of the rivals in the Middle 
East, and some of the industrialized na- 
tions of Western Europe. The practical ap- 
proach to nonproliferation is therefore to 
find ways of calming the fears and satisfy- 
ing the legitimate ambitions for equality and 



fraternity of those specific nations which 
could, if they wished, exercise their sov- 
ereignty by making nuclear warheads. Un- 
less these ways are found, there is bound to 
be an enormous increase in the instability of 
world politics. 

In the Atlantic area we have sought col- 
lective nuclear responsibility as the better 
alternative to nuclear proliferation. This 
search has led to agreements for joint 
targeting, arrangements for protecting and 
managing the impressive atomic power 
already located in Western Europe, proposals 
— and also arguments — about MLF [multi- 
lateral force] and ANF [Atlantic nuclear 
force]. Whatever happens, the problem will 
not go away. If we do not find practical and 
agreed ways to share the responsibility for 
nuclear weaponry, we will be adding to the 
already sufficient dangers of our turbulent 

So the public hand-wringing and private 
head-scratching on disarmament and the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons will doubt- 
less continue — and be used by many nations 
for their own purposes. But beyond the 
sounds of public debate in the General As- 
sembly and private talk at Geneva, there 
are the silent prayers of men and women 
who do not understand very much about 
nuclear energy but know only that they do 
not want their homes destroyed, their chil- 
dren burned alive, and their hopes snuffed 
out by the miscalculated rivalries of their 
political leaders. Here, in truth, is a prob- 
lem beyond ideology ; and for our own health 
and life we had all better treat it with the 
urgency it deserves. 

Crisis Management 

Another chapter in the unfolding story of 
Atlantic affairs might be called something 
like "crisis management." 

The destructive capability of modern 
weapons is such that the success of our 
strategy in the nuclear age will come if 
nuclear weapons are never used — which is 
the whole point of the nuclear deterrent. 

It is exceedingly difficult to conceive of a 
war starting with an exchange of strategic 

nuclear weapons, for rational men do not 
easily conceive of opting for insanity. But 
it is all too easy to imagine a crisis escalat- 
ing by nervous fits and false starts to nu- 
clear war. And a crisis must meet prompt 
response at its own level — within days or 
within hours — lest it get out of hand. 

An alliance unable to respond promptly to 
crisis — to provocation — to feint — to inci- 
dent — to skirmish — would be an alliance 
guaranteed not to work in the very circum- 
stances for which it primarily exists — to 
wit, to prevent war. 

So we take it that our planning must take 
into account the kind of military threat to 
Western Europe that would grow out of 
lesser threats or provocations originating in 
Berlin, or somewhere along the long NATO 
defense line, or even somewhere outside the 
NATO area as such. Our planning there- 
fore must take this possibility into account, 
and so must our advance arrangements for 
political consultation. 

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] Mc- 
Namara proposed last May that a special 
committee of defense ministers take on the 
job of recommending ways to insure that 
the technical means and organizational pro- 
cedures are in hand for coordinated re- 
sponse to nuclear crises. We hope such a 
committee will begin studying the complex 
and fascinating problems of participation in 
such crises before the end of the year — and 
no doubt you will be hearing something 
about this too. 

Cooperation in Common Tasl<s 

Another chapter to be written as we go 
along will tell the story of the evolution of 
the Atlantic community as a whole. The 
outlines of such a community of sovereign 
and independent states, working together 
as equals on the basis of consent, is neither 
clear nor complete. 

For one thing, we cannot know to what 
extent our European friends will succeed in 
developing tighter European institutions, 
that enable them to work with the United 
States on a basis more characterized by 
unity on the European side of the shrink- 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


ing pond that separates us. In any event, 
we can be sure that Atlantic cooperation will 
grow because it has to grow to serve the in- 
terests of the Atlantic nations. It will grow, 
like Topsy, organically — the way real-life or- 
ganizations do grow. It will evolve prag- 
matically out of a whole range of functional 
agreements and arrangements — out of com- 
mon research and joint ventures — among 
those nations which feel their national in- 
terests are served by pooling them in limited 
and particular ways in the common interest 
they share with their closest friends and 
allies. Those who are ready, willing, and 
able will presumably tackle together the 
tasks they perceive as common tasks — in 
whatever combinations make mutual sense at 
each stage of the game. 

It is hard not to see such tasks coming up 
in defense research and production. We 
have already had successful experience with 
coproduction bodies that have produced 
needed military hardware for the defense of 
Western Europe. Other opportunities will 
doubtless be laid in our laps by the onrush 
of science and technology. 

The Atlantic Agenda 

Our time hardly permits my referring to 
all the chapter headings in the massive 
tome of contemporary international poli- 
tics. But there is one other part of our 
story that is too often neglected in discus- 
sions of the Atlantic community — the part 
that has to do with the alliance and the 
rest of the world. 

During the early years of the alliance, of 
course, we were preoccupied with assem- 
bling and equipping and training and staff- 
ing forces formidable enough to persuade 
anyone with imperial tendencies that ag- 
gression would be folly. Improvements in 
those forces are still in order, and they 
must, of course, be kept up to date with 
modern technology. But essentially we know 
how to tackle that initial task now. While 
deterrence is maintained, the members of 
the alliance can perhaps afford to turn rela- 
tively more of their attention to what goes 
on outside the NATO area. 

We will have to consider designs for 
durable bridges between the North At- 
lantic world and Eastern Europe, for the 
division of Europe cannot remain forever. 

We will need to find ways of relating 
the peacekeeping forces on duty vdthin 
NATO to the flexible callup system which 
the United Nations has been developing for 
peacekeeping duties elsewhere. 

We will need to concert Allied policies on 
outstanding issues with the Soviet Union, 
for if we have not reached a detente in 
East-West affairs, it is not because we do 
not want to. 

And we will need to turn greater atten- 
tion to our common interests in areas which 
today are more explosive than Europe, for 
it would be a sad commentary — indeed it 
would be highly dangerous — if the Euro- 
pean members of the alliance, with all their 
resources and talent for leadership, their 
experience and their sophistication in world 
affairs, were now to leave entirely to others 
the construction of world order. 

So all in all, as one can readily see, the 
alliance has a very full plate — a long and 
substantive agenda of problems and oppor- 
tunities. Solving these problems and grasp- 
ing these opportunities will be agonizingly 
difficult — but it will be the agony of success 
of these common efforts which brought us 
together in the 1940's and will keep us to- 
gether in the 1960's and beyond. 

Those who, as they look ahead, are kept 
awake by their own fears or the gloomy 
prophecies of others, might take comfort 
from an entry Samuel Pepys made in his 
diary 300 years ago : 

Great talk among people how some of the Fa- 
natiques do say that the end of the world is at hand, 
and that next Tuesday is to be the day. Against 
which, whenever it shall be, good God fit us all ! 

We Americans are uncomfortable in the 
presence of fanatics and do not believe that 
"next Tuesday is to be the day." We are al- 
lied with 42 nations, we support the United 
Nations, we spend $50 billion a year on de- 
fense, and we are proud to be part of the 
North Atlantic alliance — precisely to make 
sure that the end of the world is indefinitely 



Whether we succeed depends partly on 
others and partly on ourselves. We might 
well prefer to be less bothered by responsi- 
bility, less distracted by the brickbats that 
are the price of power, less burdened by the 

need to understand others which is the price 
of peace. But if a world system of peaceful 
change is going to be built, we of all people 
cannot afford to be less committed to the 
project than we are. 

Challenges Facing United States Trade Policy 

by Anthony M. Solomon 

Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs i 

I was given wide latitude in choosing the 
subject of my talk today, and I chose my 
theme with deliberation. It seemed to me 
that it would be more useful to tell you 
about some of the serious challenges facing 
those of us charged with the responsibil- 
ity for charting the course of United States 
trade policy, rather than to tell you what 
you already know. 

You know the importance of foreign 
trade to your ovvm prosperity, to the pros- 
perity of this nation, and to the cause of 
peace. You know that our expanding exports 
and our large trade surplus enable us to ful- 
fill our military, political, and economic re- 
sponsibilities around the world without 
putting pressure on our balance of pay- 
ments and our gold reserves. The fact that 
in this thriving city the leaders of business 
and the academic community annually set 
aside a whole week as World Trade Week 
means that you are fully alive to the im- 
portance of foreign trade and its contribu- 
tion to our foreign policy purposes. 

But you may be less aware that we may 

^ Address made at Southern Methodist University, 
Dallas, Tex., on International Business Day of Dal- 
las World Trade Week, Oct. 21 (press release 248 
dated Oct. 20). 

be approaching a crossroad in our trade 
policy. It is the challenges that face us and 
the choices we will need to make in the years 
immediately ahead that I would like to dis- 
cuss with you today. 

The challenges come from three directions. 
The first concerns the future pattern of our 
trade relations with the rich, industrialized 
nations of the free world. The decision here 
hinges largely on the outcome of the multi- 
lateral trade negotiations now underway in 
Geneva — ^the Kennedy Round under the 
auspices of the General Agreement on Tar- 
iffs and Trade (the GATT). The challenge 
is whether the Kennedy Round can be 
brought to a successful conclusion, whether 
the rich nations of the free world are pre- 
pared to move forward in an open trading 
system and continue to profit from the spe- 
cialization, the growth and exchange of tech- 
nology, and the spur of competition that 
such a system provides, or whether the 
Kennedy Round will bog down, peter out, 
and be followed by a revival of protection- 
ism with nations and regional groups insu- 
lating themselves behind tariff walls. 

The second challenge is how the United 
States and other industrial countries pro- 
pose to deal with the trade problems of the 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


more than 100 independent nations of the 
developing world, the low-income countries 
comprising 80 percent of the population of 
the free world. For the low-income coun- 
tries, trade has not, as a general matter, 
been an engine of growth. In the postwar 
period, when world trade grew dramatically 
in volume and value, the trade of the low- 
income countries lagged. 

The challenges we face here are of two 
kinds: first, how to stabilize and improve 
the earnings of the developing countries 
from their sales of primary products, which 
constitute the bulk of their export trade, 
and how to increase their exports of manu- 
factured goods. The low-income countries 
are asking that the rules of trade be revised 
in their favor, that, with respect to manu- 
factured goods, they should as a group re- 
ceive preferential tariff, rather than most- 
favored-nation or equal tariff, treatment. 
The second aspect of this problem is the 
nature of the trade relations between the 
developed and the developing countries. 
Some developed countries accord special 
treatment to those low-income countries 
with which they have special historic ties. 
This leads to pressures by others for similar 
arrangements and raises fundamental ques- 
tions about the way trade with low-income 
countries should be organized. 

The third challenge concerns our trade 
relations with the Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. The 
question here is whether the policies we 
have followed in the last 17 years continue 
to serve our interests well or whether 
changes in the Communist world and in the 
world at large have made some aspects of 
our policy obsolete. 

I should like to consider these challenges 
one by one. 

Future Pattern of Free-World Trade 

The policy that has governed our trade 
relations since the great depression can be 
stated briefly. We have sought a free and 
open world trading system, based on the 
principle of equality of treatment, with 
minimum restrictions on the flow of goods 

and services across national boundaries. Ex- 
perience has amply demonstrated that the 
wider the area of trade freedom, the larger 
the possibilities for fruitful exchange and 

Consistent with this policy, the United 
States and other GATT countries undertook 
a series of trade negotiations in the postwar 
period beginning as early as 1947 and con- 
tinuing through the round of tariff reduc- 
tions in 1960 and 1961. The response of 
world trade has been spectacular. Since 1948 
its value has tripled, increasing even faster 
than world income. All the industrial coun- 
tries have benefited. 

The Kennedy Round is designed to con- 
tinue along this proven path, but on a far 
more ambitious scale. For industrial goods 
the aim is a multilateral reduction of all 
tariffs by 50 percent across the board with 
only a bare minimum of exceptions subject 
to careful justification and scrutiny by other 
participating countries. Last November the 
major trading countries deposited the lists 
of their exceptions from across-the-board 
cuts, and these are being examined by all 
participating countries. 

For agricultural products our objective is 
improved conditions of access so as to 
achieve a significant expansion of world 
trade. In this connection I would note that 
there has been a tendency in some European 
countries, most notably among the six mem- 
bers of the European Economic Community, 
toward greater rather than less restriction 
in the agricultural field. In May of this year 
12 nations exchanged proposals for an inter- 
national grains agreement. And a month 
ago several countries tabled offers in the 
agricultural field. The United States made 
the most attractive offer to reduce farm 
trade barriers we have ever tabled in 30 
years of trade negotiations. Our offer is, of 
course, conditional upon equivalent conces- 
sions by others. 

For the first time in the history of GATT 
trade negotiations, the removal of nontariff 
measures which discriminate against im- 
ports as much or more than tariffs them- 
selves is envisaged. These embrace quanti- 
tative restrictions and numerous legal and 



administrative regulations that impede 

What are the prospects for the Kennedy 

The preparations for the Kennedy Round 
have been long and difficult. We have had 
our share of frustration and delay. In part 
this vsras to be expected because the Kennedy 
Round is more comprehensive in scope and 
the degree of liberalization sought deeper 
than in any trade negotiations undertaken 
previously. Negotiations on nontariff bar- 
riers must of necessity be more difficult and 
tedious because of the varied forms these 
barriers take and the difficulties of calcu- 
lating the trade effects of their removal in 
order to arrive at balanced concessions. 

But the most difficult area is agriculture. 
In almost all industrial countries the farm 
sector is treated differently from manufac- 
tures. Farm income is protected by special 
payments and price supports, and these in 
turn have required a complex of regulations 
to support them, including the imposition 
of tariffs, quotas, levies, or export subsidies. 
The liberalization of agricultural trade is 
thus necessarily a more complex undertak- 
ing, affecting, as it does, domestic price 
support policies as well as the barriers to 
which these give rise. 

We have expected the bargaining to be 
hard and our patience to be tried. There has, 
however, been a setback in the timetable 
that we did not anticipate. I refer to the 
internal crisis which has arisen among the 
six members of the European Economic 
Community. What began last spring as a 
highly technical but politically sensitive is- 
sue — with a June 30 deadline — on how to 
finance the EEC's common agricultural pol- 
icy has culminated in a virtual boycott by 
France of meetings of the Community. 
With no internal decision on a common 
agricultural policy, the EEC Commission, 
which is the executive body of the European 
Common Market responsible for carrying 
out EEC negotiations with third countries, 
has been unable to obtain a mandate to 
table any agricultural offers other than 
grains in the Kennedy Round. 

About one-fourth of our total exports and 
total imports are farm products, and we 
have made it clear repeatedly that a success- 
ful Kennedy Round must include a signifi- 
cant widening of export markets for farm 

We are ready and indeed anxious to see 
the negotiations carried to a successful con- 
clusion. We are ready to lower our trade 
barriers in return for comparable action by 
our major trading partners. We continue to 
be prudently optimistic. If our efforts suc- 
ceed, we shall prosper, and in the years ahead 
we can mount new programs directed toward 
further international cooperation and trade 
liberalization. If, notwithstanding our vig- 
orous efforts to the contrary, the Kennedy 
Round grinds to a halt, we shall have to meet 
that challenge. 

Trade and the Developing Nations 

I turn now to the second issue, whether 
our commercial policy is attuned to the 
needs of the developing countries of the 
world and, if not, how in our own self-inter- 
est it should be modified. This challenge was 
brought home to the richer countries vigor- 
ously and in unmistakable terms during the 
1964 United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development in Geneva.^ Two themes 
dominated the debates at that conference: 
the need for action to improve conditions 
affecting trade in raw materials, and the 
question of preferential tariff treatment for 
the manufactured goods exported now or 
potentially by the low-income countries. 

The developing countries depend for 85-90 
percent of their export earnings on the sale 
of raw materials, in large part agricultural 
products. Their trade in these products has 
not expanded commensurately with the in- 
crease in world trade and world income be- 
cause the demand for these products is not 
dynamic. Consumers in the rich industrial 
countries do not appreciably increase their 
consumption of products like coffee, sugar, 

' For text of the preamble and recommendations 
contained in the Final Act, see Bulletin of Aug. 3, 
1964, p. 150. 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


rice, and tea as their income rises. Other 
products, like rubber, have lost ground to 
synthetics. Still others, like tin, have been 
affected by technological developments that 
have led to economies of use. And the in- 
creasing agricultural self-sufficiency of the 
industrial countries has further eroded the 
market for the primary product exports of 
the developing countries. 

While demand for their exports has grown 
slov^ly, supply has increased faster. Because 
the economies of the low-income countries 
are not flexible, they continue to produce 
and export their traditional commodities. 
Increased supply in the face of sluggish 
demand has led to falling prices. As a re- 
sult, the trade earnings of the developing 
countries have not fared too well. 

Compounding the problem of slow growth 
are the wide fluctuations to which their 
trade is subject. In the last 10 years green 
coffee has sold as high as 90 cents and as 
low as 32 cents a pound; cocoa as high as 
58 cents and as low as 13 cents. Mild reces- 
sions in the industrial countries can mean 
large changes in inventories and wide fluc- 
tuations, therefore, in the demand for the 
agricultural materials and mineral exports 
of the developing countries. 

It is difficult to argue the case for the 
free play of supply and demand when fluc- 
tuations in volume and price have an over- 
whelming impact on the economies — and 
indeed the social and political structures — of 
the developing countries. 

We are responding to this challenge. We 
are participating in specific commodity 
study groups to examine on a case-by-case 
basis what constructive action can be taken 
to improve market conditions. We are pre- 
pared to help develop and support workable 
commodity agreements, where these are indi- 
cated, that will provide increased access, 
fair prices, and greater stability for the 
commodities on which the developing coun- 
tries depend so heavily. 

Where the basic problem of instability 
and depressed prices is oversupply, we are 
working with other consumer countries and 
with international development agencies 

like the World Bank to help producing 
countries curb overproduction and shift re- 
sources to other and more rewarding uses. 
The International Coffee Agreement is an 
example of our efforts in this direction. 
Where the basic problem in commodity 
trade is competition with synthetics, we can 
give appropriate assistance to producing 
countries to help them modernize and ra- 
tionalize their production to lower cost and 
meet the price competition from synthetics. 

We have supported the arrangement de- 
veloped by the International Monetary Fund 
to provide compensatory financing to the 
developing countries when their export earn- 
ings fall off for reasons beyond their con- 
trol, and we shall give sympathetic consid- 
eration to the possibilities of supplementary 
financial assistance to help stabilize the for- 
eign exchange earnings of the developing 

In these and other ways we can help the 
low-income countries cope with their com- 
modity problem. But the basic solution for 
their trade problem is to reduce their exces- 
sive dependence on raw material exports by 
increasing the volume of their exports of 
processed and manufactured goods. 

U.S. Position on Generalized Preferences 

It is with respect to trade in these goods 
that we are now being challenged by the 
developing countries. Instead of pressing for 
lower barriers to this trade on a most-fa- 
vored-nation [MFN] basis, they are asking 
for preferential tariff treatment. They want 
all advanced countries to adopt a system of 
generalized preferences for all processed 
and manufactured goods exported by the 
poorer countries. In its simplest form this 
would mean that exports of manufactured 
goods from developed countries would have 
to pay the established MFN tariff in the 
markets of other developed countries while 
exports from the poorer countries would come 
into these markets duty-free or at substan- 
tially reduced tariff rates. 

The rationale for their proposal is that 
their "infant" manufacturers cannot meet 
the competition in developed country mar- 



kets of the manufactured exports of other 
developed countries whose greater efficiency 
enables them to quote lower prices. The ar- 
gument runs that with tariff preferences, 
manufactured goods offered by the poorer 
countries would become attractive to import- 
ers in the industrial countries. The increased 
sales thus stimulated would enable the 
poorer countries to rationalize their produc- 
tion and reduce their costs over time so that 
when preferences were phased out, they 
would be able to compete on equal terms. 

We have not been convinced that a system 
of generalized preferences for developing 
countries' manufactured goods would pro- 
duce significant trade benefits for them, 
while the adoption of a preferential regime 
could do serious injury to particular coun- 
tries and to the trading system as a whole. 

If trade barriers are significantly lowered, 
as we hope they will be, preferential mar- 
gins would be quite small. Given the high 
cost and limited range of the infant manu- 
factures of the low-income countries, it is 
unlikely that small preferential margins 
would encourage much diversion of trade in 
their favor. Indeed, one serious difficulty 
we have with the proposal is that it would 
create pressures for high barriers in the 
trade of the industrial countries so as to 
leave a significant margin for preferences 
for the exports of the poorer countries. This 
would not be a healthy development for 
world trade and world income generally. 

It seems to us that the better course is a 
vigorous effort to lower barriers across the 
board and at the same time to help the de- 
veloping countries both financially and tech- 
nically to improve the efficiency and qual- 
ity of their industrial production. The de- 
veloped countries are committed in the Ken- 
nedy Round to make a special effort to 
reduce barriers on trade items of interest to 
the developing countries without asking full 
reciprocity from them. When the Kennedy 
Round is completed, the developed countries 
can move forward to further programs of 
trade liberalization directed particularly to 
the processed and manufactured goods ex- 
ports of the developing countries. We are 

also encouraging regional and sectoral free- 
trade arrangements among developing coun- 
tries. Such arrangements should improve 
the efficiency and productivity of their in- 
fant industries through the economies of 
scale, the specialization, and the spur of 
competition that wider regional markets 
make possible. In our aid programs we can 
give assistance in marketing techniques and 
quality control, as well as capital, both pub- 
lic and private, for the development of effi- 
cient industries. This path seems to us more 
realistic and more beneficial than that of 

The position we have taken in opposition 
to preferences for developing country man- 
ufactures is not shared by many industrial 
countries. Australia has offered preferences 
to all low-income countries for a selected 
and limited number of products. The United 
Kingdom is prepared to generalize the pref- 
erences it now maintains for Common- 
wealth members to all low-income countries 
if other developed countries will do the same. 
The French and the Belgians, on the other 
hand, favor selective preferences, selective 
as to country as well as to product. Indeed, 
the EEC now has a special preferential ar- 
rangement with 18 African countries associ- 
ated with the Common Market and is mov- 
ing to extend the preferential system to 
other selected countries in Africa. 

The latter development gives us particular 
concern. While we are not persuaded that a 
system of generalized preferences would be 
helpful to the trade of the low-income coun- 
tries as a whole, under such a system these 
countries would at least enjoy equality of 
treatment. It would be the producers and 
exporters of the rich industrial countries 
who would bear the brunt of trade diver- 
sion. But a system of preferences that dis- 
criminates among developing countries pits 
the poor against the poor. The developing 
countries excluded from the preferential 
arrangement are doubly disadvantaged. 
They must face the strong competition of 
the industrial countries and also the compe- 
tition of their peers who have special and 
privileged conditions of access. Such ar- 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


rangements are not only injurious to the 
weak but also politically divisive. 

The EEC preferential arrangements with 
the 18 African associated states and the 
possibility that such arrangements will be 
extended selectively to others has been a 
matter of deep concern to the countries of 
Latin America. They foresee the contraction 
of one of their major markets, and in con- 
sequence they have asked for "temporary, 
defensive measures" to compensate them for 
the injury they fear they will sustain. Thus 
the existence of one preferential bloc be- 
tween a group of developed countries on the 
one hand and a group of developing countries 
on the other gives rise to pressures from the 
low-income countries excluded from the ar- 
rangement for the establishment of other 
such blocs. 

Were this development to proceed, it would 
be only a question of time before the free 
and open world trading system we have 
known would be transformed into a system 
of special trading blocs in which each major 
industrial nation or group of nations pro- 
vided special conditions of access to develop- 
ing countries associated with it and enjoyed 
special reciprocal benefits in these markets. 
Not only would world trade be fragmented, 
but the relationships between the rich and 
the poor would have strong overtones of 
spheres of influence. 

It has seemed to us that the better way 
to organize trade relationships between the 
developed countries on the one hand and the 
developing countries on the other is on an 
across-the-board basis, the industrial coun- 
tries united in a common effort to help the 
countries in the underdeveloped world mod- 
ernize their economies. Discriminatory com- 
mercial regimes divide the free world; a 
common effort of the rich to help the poor 
unifies it. 

We are, therefore, urging other developed 
countries to check the proliferation of dis- 
criminatory arrangements and to phase out 
those now in effect. It may be, however, that 
our efforts in this direction — and we intend 
to pursue them vigorously — will be unsuc- 
cessful. In that event we may want to re- 

consider our own historic trade policy of 
nondiscrimination. We must retain suffi- 
cient flexibility in our policies to adjust to 
the evolution of the world economy and 
policies adopted by other major countries of 
the world. 

Trade With Eastern Europe 

Let me turn now to the third major chal- 
lenge in the field of trade, the question of 
our trade with the countries of Eastern 
Europe. I will speak only briefly on this 
matter because I hope to discuss it more 
fully in another talk later today.* 

Changes are at work in the Communist 
world. The once monolithic empire directed 
and controlled from Moscow has given way 
to a divided Communist world. Two centers 
are struggling to assert their authority, and 
in the tug and pull of this struggle the 
smaller countries of the Communist world 
have been able to loosen the ties that bound 
them. Impelled by considerations of na- 
tional interest, the countries of Eastern 
Europe are moving to resume and strengthen 
their relations with the Western World. It 
is surely in our interest to encourage this 
movement and the development of closer 
links between them and ourselves. 

Through increased peaceful trade, we can, 
as President Johnson has said on a number 
of occasions, "build bridges" between the 
East and the West. Trade is a means of 
communication and contact; the movement 
of people and ideas is a corollary of the 
movement of goods. We would do well, there- 
fore, to review our trade policy and practice 
and adapt them in our own interest to the 
political circumstances and opportunities 
that present themselves in individual coun- 
tries. We should be in a position to grant 
most-favored-nation treatment to individual 
Communist countries when this is in the na- 
tional interest. There is no question here of 
trade in strategic goods or trade that would 
strengthen military capabilities. What is be- 
ing considered is trade that will encourage 
external independence and internal liberal- 
ization in individual Communist nations. 

' For text, see ibid., Nov. 8, 1965, p. 739. 



Nineteen sixty-six should be a critical 
year for United States trade policy: (1) We 
will see success or failure in the Kennedy 
Round, (2) we will probably see a focusing 
of policy in Europe on the phasing out of 
preferences or their further proliferation, 
and (3) the Congress will presumably ex- 
amine recommendations for changes in East- 
West trade policy and decide on whether to 
pass the necessary legislation. 

You, who are vitally interested in the ex- 
pansion of United States trade, will want 
to follow closely and to influence the criti- 
cal developments of the next year in these 
three vital areas. The United States as the 
world's leading commercial power and trader 
has more to lose from protectionist revivals 
following from failure in these areas. The 
best defense is the active interest of a peo- 
ple truly informed and therefore rational in 
the pursuit of their enlightened self-interest 
who are not stampeded by easy catchwords 
and regressive protectionist pressures. 

Automotive Products Agreement 
With Canada Becomes Effective 

On October 21 President Johnson signed 
the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 
and issued a proclamation and an Executive 
order pursuant thereto. Folloiving are two 
statements made by the President on Octo- 
ber 22, together with the texts of the 
proclamation and the order. 


White House press release dated October 22 

I have signed the Automotive Products 
Trade Act of 1965, H.R. 9042, with particu- 
lar pleasure. This legislation opens the way 
to a new era of even closer economic and 
commercial relations with our greatest 
trading partner, Canada. 

Last January 16, Prime Minister Lester 
Pearson of Canada and I signed an agree- 
ment looking toward free trade in automo- 

biles and automotive products between our 
two countries.! In that agreement, Canada 
promised to remove entirely its duties on 
United States automobiles and parts for the 
manufacture of automobiles. I promised to 
ask the Congress for authority to remove 
United States duties on automobiles and 
similar parts imported from Canada. 

Canada acted at once. The Canadian Gov- 
ernment revoked a plan for the remission of 
tariffs that had troubled many U.S. manu- 
facturers and that might have led to serious 
economic conflict between our two countries. 
Canada also immediately removed its duties 
of 171/2 percent on automobiles and up to 
25 percent on parts imported from the 
United States. 

The Congress has now provided me with 
the authority to remove U.S. duties on im- 
ports of Canadian automotive products cov- 
ered by the agreement. 

Thus we have ended a controversy that 
threatened to endanger our automotive 
trade with Canada, a trade that last year 
ran over one-half billion dollars in our favor. 
We have assured continuation of over 25,000 
jobs for American workers directly involved 
in producing the automotive goods we sell to 
Canada and as many more for those who 
work in the steel, textile, electrical, rubber, 
and other supporting industries. 

I am confident that as production and 
trade expand under the encouragement of 
the U.S.-Canadian agreement, both our coun- 
tries will benefit. These benefits will be felt 
by the automobile industry, our independent 
parts manufacturers, the employees of the 
automotive industry, and by our country as 
a whole. 

These benefits have, in fact, already 
begun to appear. During the first half of 
this year our trade both ways with Canada 
in automobiles, trucks, buses, and automo- 
tive parts rose nearly $120 million — over 30 
percent over last year's trade for the same 
period. Of this amount $81 million was In- 

' For text, see Bulletin of Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; 
for further background, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 
638, and May 24, 1965, p. 830. 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


creased sales of parts and vehicles by the 
United States to Canada. During this same 
period total employment in the automotive 
industry in the United States increased by 
more than 45,000 vi^orkers, and many of 
these new jobs resulted from our increased 
trade with Canada. 

Meantime, employment and production in 
Canada's automobile industry have also in- 
creased, and Canadian citizens have already 
begun to benefit from lowered prices on 

Most important, as I said on the occasion 
of signing the agreement, when it appeared 
that our two countries were on the verge of 
grave differences in our mutual trade, we 
chose instead the road to understanding in- 
stead of the road to conflict. 

Our ties with Canada are historically 
close, our relations cordial, our people dur- 
able friends. This agreement, originating in 
our common interest, arrived at for our com- 
mon benefit, will make those ties even closer 
and more fruitful for the future. 


White House press release dated October 22 

Statement by President Johnson 

I am issuing a proclamation exercising the 
authority given me by the act to remove 
United States duties on automotive products 
covered by our agreement with Canada. The 
provisions of the proclamation relating to 
duties will become effective after 60 days. 
The removal of United States duties will 
then be retroactive to January 18, 1965, the 
date Canada removed its duties on United 
States automotive products. 

H.R. 9042 also enacts special provisions 
for determining eligibility for the adjust- 
ment assistance already provided by the 
Trade Expansion Act, if there should be 
instances in which firms or workers suffer 
dislocation as a result of the agreement. 
These new eligibility provisions assure that 
there will be prompt assistance to individual 
firms or workers who may be temporarily 
affected by this trade agreement benefiting 


the Nation as a whole. To administer these 
new provisions, I am establishing a board con- 
sisting of the Secretary of the Treasury, the 
Secretary of Commerce, and the Secretary 
of Labor and delegating to it the functions 
concerning adjustment assistance conferred 
upon me by the act. 

Proclamation 3682 ~ 

Implementing Agreement Concerning Automo- 
tive Products Between the United States and 

Whereas the United States and Canada on 
January 16, 1965, entered into an Agreement Con- 
cerning Automotive Products, which provides that 
Canada shall accord duty-free treatment to imports 
of certain automotive products of the United States 
and that, after enactment of implementing legisla- 
tion, the United States shall accord duty-free treat- 
ment to certain automotive products of Canada 
retroactively to the earliest date administratively 
possible following the date on which the agreement 
has been implemented by Canada (art. II, 89th Cong. 
1st sess., H. Rept. 537, 38); 

Whereas the agreement of January 16, 1965, was 
implemented by Canada through the granting of 
the requisite duty-free treatment to United States 
products on January 18, 1965; 

Whereas titles II and IV of the Automotive 
Products Trade Act of 1965 have been enacted to 
provide for modifications of the Tariff Schedules 
of the United States (19 U.S.C. 1202) to implement 
the agreement of January 16, 1965, such modifica- 
tions to enter into force in the manner proclaimed 
by the President (79 Stat. 1016) ; 

Whereas sections 201(a) and 203 of the Automo- 
tive Products Trade Act of 1965 authorize the 
President to proclaim the modifications of the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States provided for 
in sections 403, 404, and 405 of that Act with 
retroactive effect as of the earliest date after 
January 17, 1965, which he determines to be prac- 
ticable, and section 401(b) of that Act provides 
that the rates of duty in column numbered 1 of 
the tariff schedules that are modified pursuant to 
such proclamation shall be treated as having been 
proclaimed by the President as being required to 
carry out a foreign trade agreement to which the 
United States is a party (79 Stat. 1016) ; and 

Whereas I determine that the earliest date, after 
January 17, 1965, as of which it is practicable to 
give retroactive effect to this proclamation is 
January 18, 1965: 

Now, therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, under 
the authority vested in me by the Constitution and 
the statutes, particularly sections 201(a) and 203 
of the Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965, do 

'30 Fed. Reg. 13683. 


proclaim (1) that the modifications of the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States provided for in 
sections 403 and 404 of that Act shall enter into 
force on the day following the date of this procla- 
mation, and (2) that the modifications of the tariff 
schedules provided for in section 405 of that Act 
shall enter into force on December 20, 1965, effec- 
tive with respect to articles which are or have 
been entered for consumption, or for warehouse, 
on or after January 18, 1965. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this twenty-first 

day of October in the year of our Lord 
[seal] nineteen hundred and sixty-five, and of 

the Independence of the United States of 
America the one hundred and ninetieth. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

accordance with Section 214 of the Act of May 3, 
1945 (31 U.S.C. 691). 

Sec. 4. (a) The Board may have an Executive 

(b) The Board may from time to time establish 
appropriate subsidiary bodies to assist it in carry- 
ing out the functions conferred upon it by Section 
2, above. The Board is authorized to re-delegate 
such functions as it considers appropriate, other 
than the making of final determinations, certifica- 
tions, and terminations of certifications under Sec- 
tions 302(b), (c), (d), and (g) (2) of the Act. 

The White House, 
October 21, 1965. 

Limits Terminated on Imports 
of Unmanufactured Lead and Zinc 

Executive Order 11254 3 

Establishing the Automotive Agreement 
Adjustment Assistance Board 

By virtue of the authority vested in me by the 
Automotive Products Trade Act of 1965 (approved 
October 21, 1965; hereinafter referred to as the 
Act), particularly by Section 302 (k) thereof, and as 
President of the United States, it is ordered as 
follows : 

Section 1. There is hereby established the Auto- 
motive Agreement Adjustment Assistance Board 
(hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), which shall 
consist of the Secretary of the Treasury, the Secre- 
tary of Commerce, and the Secretary of Labor. The 
Board shall elect a Chairman from among its 

Sec. 2. There are hereby delegated to the Board 
the functions conferred upon the President by Sec- 
tion 302 of the Act. 

Sec. 3. (a) The Board shall request informa- 
tion and advice from other Government agencies 
and from public sources as it may deem appropri- 
ate. The Board shall make each final determina- 
tion, under Sections 302(b), (c), or (d) of the Act, 
with respect to a firm or group of workers only 
after compliance with Section 302(f) (1) of the Act. 

(b) Upon request of the Board, the heads of 
Federal agencies shall so far as practicable provide 
the Board with information and reports relating 
to matters within the cognizance of the Board. 

(c) Each Department represented on the Board 
shall furnish necessary assistance to the Board in 

' 30 Fed. Reg., 13569. 


White House press release dated October 22 

I have today issued a proclamation termi- 
nating the limits on imports of unmanufac- 
tured lead and zinc. 

This action, which becomes effective im- 
mediately -with respect to ores and concen- 
trates and in 30 days for lead and zinc 
metals, is the result of extensive study and 
discussion within the executive branch. The 
Tariff Commission, in a unanimous decision, 
found that ending the quotas was not likely 
to have a detrimental effect on domestic 
producers. Additionally, the United States 
companies which require unmanufactured 
lead and zinc in their processing and manu- 
facturing activities have made clear their 
great need for additional lead and zinc — in 
fact, many have indicated that without im- 
mediate relief they will be forced to suspend 

The lifting of these import controls at 
this time, rather than awaiting the auto- 
matic expiration in mid-October 1967, under 
the provisions of the Trade Expansion Act 
of 1962, will prevent the loss of jobs in many 
sections of the Nation. 

Domestic lead and zinc producers who do 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


not object to greater imports at this time 
have expressed concern that future relief, if 
necessary, should not be inordinately de- 
layed. Accordingly, I have urged the mem- 
bers of the Tariff Commission to streamline 
its procedures and to redouble its efforts to 
expedite proceedings in any case where it is 
indicated that delay might bar effective re- 
lief. I am confident improvements can be 

The need for a strong and vigorous do- 
mestic lead and zinc mining industry in this 
country is obvious. Recently the Congress 
demonstrated its commitment to this goal 
by extending the Lead and Zinc Small Pro- 
ducers Stabilization Act — scheduled to ex- 
pire at the end of this year — to December 
31, 1969. I was pleased to sign this bill into 
law earlier this month, thereby continuing 
the successful program of annual payments 
to qualified small lead and zinc mine 


Termination of Quantitative Limitations on 
Imports of Unmanufactured Lead and Zinc 

1. Whereas, pursuant to Section 350 of the 
Tariff Act of 1930, the President, on October 30, 
1947, entered into, and by Proclamation No. 2761A 
of December 16, 1947 (61 Stat. (pt. 2) 1103), pro- 
claimed, effective on and after January 1, 1948, the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (61 Stat. 
(pt. 5) All; hereinafter referred to as "the General 
Agreement"), including a concession with respect 
to certain articles of unmanufactured zinc provided 
for in item 394 of Part I of Schedule XX of the 
General Agreement (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A1219) ; and, 
on April 21, 1951, entered into, and by Proclama- 
tion No. 2929 of June 2, 1951 (65 Stat. cl2), 
proclaimed, effective on and after June 6, 1951, the 
Torquay Protocol to the General Agreement, includ- 
ing concessions with respect to certain articles of 
unmanufactured lead and zinc provided for in items 
391, 392, 393, and 394 of Part I of Schedule XX of 
the Torquay Protocol (3 U.S.T. (pt. 1) 1167) ; 

2. Whereas, pursuant to Section 7 of the Trade 
Agreements Extension Act of 1951, and in accord- 
ance with the provisions of Article XIX of the 
General Agreement (61 Stat. (pt. 5) A58), the 

^No. 3683; 30 Fed. Reg. 13623. 

President by Proclamation No. 3257 of September 
22, 1958 (73 Stat. c3), proclaimed, effective on and 
after October 1, 1958, that the concessions with 
respect to the articles of unmanufactured lead and 
zinc identified in the first recital of this proclama- 
tion should be modified and that such articles 
should be subject to certain specified quantitative 
limitations, until the President should otherwise 
proclaim ; 

3. Whereas, after compliance with the require- 
ments of Section 102 of the Tariff Classification 
Act of 1962 (76 Stat. 73), the President by Procla- 
mation No. 3548 of August 21, 1963 (77 Stat. 
1017), proclaimed, effective on and after August 
31, 1963, the Tariff Schedules of the United States, 
which reflected, with modifications, and, in effect, 
superseded (1) the provisions of Proclamations 
Nos. 2761A and 2929 insofar as those proclamations 
proclaimed the concessions with respect to the 
articles of unmanufactured lead and zinc identified 
in the first recital of this proclamation (see Part 

1 and Subparts G and H of Part 2 of Schedule 6 of 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States) , and 
(2) the provisions of Proclamation No. 3257 (see 
Subpart A of Part 2 of the Appendix to the Tariff 
Schedules of the United States) ; 

4. Whereas, following my request under Section 
351(d) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 
(19 U.S.C. 1981(d) (2)), the United States Tariff 
Commission conducted an investigation, including a 
hearing, pursuant to Section 351(d) (5) of that 
Act (19 U.S.C. 1981(d) (5)), and on June 8, 1965, 
submitted to me a report (30 F.R. 7619) advising 
me of its judgment as to the probable economic 
effect on the domestic industry concerned of the 
reduction or termination of the quantitative lim- 
itations specified in Proclamation No. 3257 (now 
reflected, with modifications, in Subpart A of Part 

2 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States) ; 

5. Whereas, in relation to the possible reduction 
or termination of such quantitative limitations, I 
have received and taken into account the advice 
from the Tariff Commission, advice of the Secre- 
tary of Commerce and the Secretary of Labor in 
accordance with Section 351(c) (1) (A) of the 
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (19 U.S.C. 1981(c) 
(1) (A)), recommendations of the Special Repre- 
sentative for Trade Negotiations in accordance 
with Sections 3(b), 3(j), and 5(c) of Executive 
Order No. 11075 of January 15, 1963 (48 CFR 
1.3(b), 1.3 (j), and 1.5(c)), and advice of other 
interested agencies of the Government; and 

6. Wherbias, in accordance with Section 351(c) 
(1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, I 
have determined that the termination as herein pro- 
claimed of the quantitative limitations specified in 
Proclamation No. 3257 (now reflected, with modifi- 



cations, in Subpart A of Part 2 of the Appendix to 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States) is in the 
national interest: 

Now, THEREFORE, I, Lyndon B. JOHNSON, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, acting pur- 
suant to the authority vested in me by the Constitu- 
tion and the statutes, including Section 351 (c) 
(1) (A) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and 
in accordance with the provisions of Article XIX of 
the General Ag^reement, do proclaim that : 

(1) Proclamation No. 3257 shall be terminated. 

(2) The following parts of the Appendix to the 
Tariff Schedules of the United States (reflecting, 
with modifications, the quantitative limitations 
specified in Proclamation No. 3257) shall be re- 
voked : 

(a) Items 925.01, 925.02, 925.03, and 925.04; 

(b) The article description immediately preceding 
item 925.01; and 

(c) Headnote 2 of Subpart A of Part 2. 

(3) The concessions with respect to the articles 
of unmanufactured lead and zinc identified in the 
first recital of this proclamation shall be applied 
without quantitative limitations, in accordance with 
the provisions of Part 1 and Subparts G and H of 
Part 2 of Schedule 6 of the Tariff Schedules of 
the United States (reflecting, with modifications, 
concessions proclaimed by Proclamations Nos. 2761A 
and 2929). 

(4) The actions proclaimed in paragraphs (1), 
(2), and (3) above shall be effective as follows: 

(a) On the date of this proclamation, with respect 
to such articles provided for in items 925.01 and 
925.02 of the Appendix to the Tariff Schedules of the 
United States as are entered, or withdrawn from 
warehouse, for consumption on or after such date; 

(b) On the 30th day following the date of this 
proclamation, with respect to such articles provided 
for in items 925.03 and 925.04 of the Appendix to 
the Tariff Schedules of the United States as are 
entered, or withdrawn from warehouse, for consump- 
tion on or after the 30th day following such date. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this twenty-second 
day of October in the year of our Lord 

[seal] nineteen hundred and sixty-five, and of 
the Independence of the United States of 

America the one hundred and ninetieth. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

Foreign Policy Conference 
To Be Held at Des Moines 

The Department of State announced on 
October 26 (press release 254) that a re- 
gional foreign policy conference will be held 
at Des Moines on November 19, cosponsored 
by the Junior Leagues of Iowa. Thirty 
State and local organizations are cooperat- 
ing in the conference. Invitations have been 
extended to organization leaders and to 
members of the press, radio, and television 
in Iowa, Nebraska, Kansas, and Missouri. 

U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secre- 
tary of State for Political Affairs, will be 
the principal participant and will deliver 
the luncheon address. Other senior Govern- 
ment officials who will participate as speakers 
in the program are Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., 
Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs ; David H. Popper, Deputy 
Assistant Secretary of State for Interna- 
tional Organization Affairs ; Bartlett Harvey, 
Deputy Assistant Administrator for Pro- 
gram, Agency for International Develop- 
ment ; and Alvin Friedman, Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for International Se- 
curity Affairs (Far East). Mrs. Charlotte 
Moton Hubbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary 
of State for Public Affairs, will moderate 
the conference sessions. 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 



Toward a Better Life in Larger Freedom 

Statement by James Roosevelt 

U.S. Representative to the General Assembly ^ 

You will forgive, I am sure, a personal 
note at the outset of my remarks. But I 
cannot begin what is, in fact, my first formal 
statement in these halls without remember- 
ing the years when my father, as President 
of the United States, envisioned the found- 
ing of this meeting place of all men and 
worked with deep dedication to lay its 

The United Nations, of course, was not the 
dream of any one man. It was the dream of 
many men in many countries. 

But if any man anywhere believed in that 
dream, it was my father. It was the vision, as 
I have much reason to recall, which stirred 
the last days of his life. 

I recall, too, the years after his death 
when his belief that the peace could be built 
securely only in a world free from fear and 
free from want was given new vigor by my 
mother. She shared his dream, and she 
devoted the remainder of her life to carry- 
ing forward his hopes for world order. 

But I know that each of us equally has 
reason for pride in the heritage he brings 
here, and when we point to it we do so less 
because of sentiment than because of what 
a wise poet once wrote : 

What from your father's heritage is lent, earn it 
anew to really possess it. 

' Made in Committee II (Economic and Financial) 
on Oct. 15 (U.S. delegation press release 4664). 

In earning it, however, we dare not stop 
with the past. We have a future to earn in 
this committee, and it is nothing less than 
the betterment of man's life in larger free- 
dom. How we go about it will determine not 
only the inheritance we, in our turn, will 
bequeath to future generations but the very 
existence of those generations. 

U.N. Decade of Development 

The past has shown that the peace we 
seek will not be achieved by the resolution 
of political issues alone. Solve them and 
leave the world economically ill, and we 
beckon the holocaust we are pledged to 

But this is a truism we all know and 
appreciate. The question we face here is, 
how do we proceed to reconcile the inescap- 
able fact that we must have peace or hu- 
manity is doomed but that the peace cannot 
be kept in a world more than half in despair 
and less than half in plenty? 

The answer is the most fateful one that 
this committee, if not the entire U.N. itself, 
must provide. And it is here in this room 
that we must search for it and grasp for 
direction even as we seek for unity of pur- 

Five years ago we raised our sights and 
launched a United Nations Decade of Devel- 
opment. It was a concept filled with the hope 



of a new and dynamic beginning to the 
urgent work that is the heart of this com- 
mittee's agenda. 

We are now past the midpoint of that 
decade, and I want to say in all candor that 
we share the impatience of other committee 
members that more development progress 
has not been made. 

World economic growth in terms of per 
capita income has been uneven and, taken 
as a whole, disappointing. While industrial 
countries have grown rapidly, others have 
grown slowly. The "income gap" has thus 
widened rather than narrowed as we had 
hoped. Population increase has eaten deeply 
into gains in productivity. 

There are other disappointments. Devel- 
oped countries are often looked at with sus- 
picion and envy by the less developed. 
Wealthy nations, in turn, sometimes regard 
developing nations as wanting something for 

These are biases and prejudices and mis- 
understandings. Our work here can help to 
overcome them. 

We in the United States are convinced 
that the effectiveness of the United Nations 
as an instrument of social and economic 
development can be greatly improved. 

As a newcomer to this Assembly, I am 
overwhelmed by the number of separate 
agencies and bodies working in the same 
area, by the overlapping of tasks and dupli- 
cation of effort. I have become aware, how- 
ever, that my bewilderment at these ad- 
ministrative overlaps is shared by my 
colleagues with longer experience in the 
work of the United Nations. 

In our fast-changing world, every organi- 
zation and every government structure must 
constantly renew itself and reexamine its 
basic structure. I am happy to say that we 
are doing this at the United Nations in a 
continuing effort to keep our organization 
functioning with maximum efficiency and 
geared to the needs of the times. 

One of the important items on our agenda, 
therefore, is item 96 — "Review and reap- 
praisal of the role and functions of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council." 

We rejoice over the increase in the mem- 
bership of the Council, which will insure 
adequate representation of the developing 
countries and will thus enable the Council to 
play a greater and more effective role in 
serving their development. 

We are encouraged by the record of the 
discussion of the role of the Council at its 
summer session this year. It reflects wide 
agreement on the major functions of the 
Council as the governing body of its subsid- 
iary organs, including the regional commis- 
sions; as the principal organ responsible, 
under the authority of the General Assem- 
bly, for the coordination of economic and 
social activities within the U.N. system of 
organizations ; and as a major forum for the 
discussion of economic and social policies 
and trends. 

Last but not least, we hope that the Eco- 
nomic and Social Council can — particularly 
with its increased representation of the 
U.N. membership — better serve as a prepar- 
atory body of the General Assembly. In 
particular, the Council must be expected to 
do a better job both in drawing to the atten- 
tion of the General Assembly major issues 
confronting the world economy and in for- 
mulating proposals for relevant action by the 
General Assembly. 

Of even greater significance is item 51, 
the "Consolidation of the Special Fund and 
the Expanded Programme of Technical 
Assistance in a United Nations Development 
Programme" or, more briefly, the merger 
of these programs. Except for a few coun- 
tries, there is general acceptance among 
developed and developing countries alike of 
this merger, as was clearly shovioi in the 
recommendations laid before the Economic 
and Social Council. These are designed : 

— To eliminate the present duplication of 
machinery and to create conditions which 
would make for better planning of the pro- 
grams of assistance on the basis of country 
development plans established by the devel- 
oping countries and of requests for assist- 
ance made by them ; 

— To assure better cooperation between 
the participating agencies; 

NOVEMBER 15, 1965 


— To achieve maximum impact on actual 
development. All that is left for this com- 
mittee is to reach agreement on the size 
and composition of the Governing Council 
of the nev/ U.N. Development Program. In 
order to assure effective operation, purpose- 
ful and without waste of resources, we trust 
that this Assembly will agree on a Govern- 
ing Council small enough to act decisively 
and without loss of momentum. It should 
provide for a balance of developed and de- 
veloping countries expected to work in a 
spirit of partnership. 

We trust that the merger thus established 
will result in a substantial increase of avail- 
able resources. We are already on record as 
favoring a new target of $200 million for the 
combined programs. As needs for additional 
resources are demonstrated, I am confident 
that they will be forthcoming. 

Lastly, in the matter of organizational is- 
sues I want to refer to item 100, which was 
placed on our agenda on the initiative of two 
of the youngest members of our organiza- 
tion, the Governments of Malta and of Trini- 
dad and Tobago. 

They asked that there be undertaken a 
"General review of the programmes and 
activities in the economic, social, technical 
cooperation and related fields of the United 
Nations, the specialized agencies, the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency, the United 
Nations Children's Fund and all other insti- 
tutions and agencies related to the United 
Nations system." 

There can be no doubt about the impor- 
tance of such an undertaking, which obvi- 
ously will require most careful studies and 
preparation. The details of the proposed 
general review might well be entrusted to 
the Economic and Social Council, which, to 
this end, might set up a small expert group 
representing all the regions of the world. 

The review might build on the work ac- 
complished 5 years ago by the Council 
Committee on the Reappraisal of the Eco- 
nomic and Social Programs of the United 
Nations which preceded the action of the 
General Assembly designating this decade as 
the United Nations Decade of Development. 

My Government has also asked me to say 
that there is another issue which does not 
appear on our agenda but which is bound to 
be woven into the consideration of the items 
I have cited. It is the problem of how to 
strengthen those parts of the United Na- 
tions Secretariat which are expected to carry 
out our decisions in the economic and social 

All our operations in these fields depend 
on a strong and well-articulated Secretariat. 
As time goes on, we trust that, with the 
help of the Secretary-General and such 
bodies as the Advisory Committee on Ad- 
ministrative and Budgetary Questions, meas- 
ures will be initiated which will give our 
Secretariat the form and the resources which 
it needs to discharge its heavy responsibili- 

It is because we are so deeply concerned 
with continuing the constant improvement 
of the United Nations system that we also 
welcome the United Nations Institute for 
Training and Research established last 
spring under the able direction of Gabriel 
D'Arboussier of Senegal. 

The Institute can help the United Nations 
become more effective in both peacekeeping 
and development. Today I am pleased to an- 
nounce that my Government is pledging 
$300,000 for the operation of the Institute 
during the current year. We shall consider 
further contributions in the light of the In- 
stitute's progress. 

In addition, we shall contribute the sum 
of $100,000 to help provide for Adlai E. 
Stevenson Fellowships during the year be- 
ginning September 1966. These would be 
provided to 8 or 10 outstanding persons. 
The purpose for which these fellowships is 
intended, as we all know, was close to the 
heart of the late Adlai E. Stevenson, who 
gave so much of his life, and perhaps life 
itself, to the furtherance of international 
cooperation through the United Nations. 

Mr. Chairman, these are some of the ways 
in which we feel we can improve not only 
the efficiency but the resultant productivity 
of our organization in the latter years of our 
Decade of Development. 



Whatever our disappointments in the first 
half may have been, they will have served 
a useful purpose, not if we mourn over 
them, but if we learn from them — if we re- 
think our priorities and develop new co- 
operative programs which will reflect the 
fact that we all need to do more and do it 

Some U.S. Suggestions 

The United States is heavily committed to 
this proposition. In keeping with it, I have 
the privilege now of outlining to this com- 
mittee some suggestions that we believe will 
help us attain the common end we all seek. 

Here are our proposals, and the order in 
which I present them is not to be construed 
as indicating an order of priority. 

Increasing World Food Production 

First, world food production will have to 
triple in the next 35 years to provide every 
human being with an adequate level of nu- 
trition. Not only are sharp increases in food 
production needed, but the increases must 
be selective so as to assure adequate nutri- 
tional standards, particularly for young chil- 

Over one-half of all the deaths in the un- 
derdeveloped countries this year will be the 
deaths of children of preschool age. In 
some of the underdeveloped countries, a 
mother must have five children to assure 
that one of them will reach the age of 15. Of 
those who survive, malnutrition causes a 
high percentage of mental and physical re- 

This is a heartbreaking situation, an in- 
tolerable situation, and it simply cannot be 
allowed to continue. 

Producing the food that is needed is a 
formidable but not an impossible task. Agri- 
cultural yields can be vastly increased, by 
mechanization, by the use of fertilizers and 
the means to produce them, by land reforms 
and extension services, and by educating 
and stimulating the initiative of the individ- 
ual farmer. All these are tasks in which the 
Food and Agriculture Organization and, in- 
deed, the United Nations itself are playing a 

major role and must play an even greater 

At the last session of the Economic and 
Social Council, a near unanimous endorse- 
ment was achieved to put the experimental 
World Food Program on a continuing basis 
with an enlarged target of $275 million in 
commodities, cash, and services over a 3- 
year period. We trust that this Assembly 
will follow suit. The United States is pre- 
pared to contribute up to 50 percent of the 
required commodities and up to 40 percent 
of the needed cash and services. 

In addition, the United States, of course, 
intends to continue its Food for Peace pro-