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Address by Vice President Humphrey 523 

hy Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 529 

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 539 

Address by Secretary Rusk 5H 

For index see inside hack cover 

". . . the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the 
commitment of the United States." 

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace 

Address by Secretary Rusk ' 

It is a pleasure and privilege to be with 
you on this occasion, commemorating the 
50th anniversary of the journalism pro- 
gram of your School of Public Communica- 

As a public official, I am unavoidably 
aware of the immensity, the range and 
variety, the power, and the insatiable curios- 
ity of American journalism and journalists. 
I am aware of these every waking hour, and 
sometimes in my sleep. I am accustomed to 
reading, or hearing, many things that I al- 
ready knew, many that I didn't know but 
prove to be true, and a few that were not 
and never become true — that remain "exclu- 
sive" forever. Now and then I read, or hear, 
predictions or comments about myself — 
some critical, some favorable — with which 
I am not always able to concur. 

From time to time I have been invited to 
deliver a lecture on the press and its role 
in foreign affairs, but I have steadfastly re- 
fused to engage in that task. I prefer to 
take my crises one at a time. Perhaps, if 
you will invite me to your 75th anniversary, 
I might be willing to oblige. 

As a matter of fact, I know of no people 
better served by our media of information 
than are the American people. And I must 
confess my complete respect for the intelli- 
gence, the energy, and the breadth and 
depth of information which mark the ex- 

' Made at the Founder's Day banquet of the Boston 
University School of Public Communications at Bos- 
ton, Mass., on Mar. 14 (press release 49). 

traordinary press corps assembled in our 
National Capital. 

Among the journalists I would place 
high in that company is your distinguished 
alumnus who introduced me tonight, John 
Scali. He has made his mark in both written 
and spoken journalism. And he has also 
served, on one notable occasion, as what 
might be called a "covert Ambassador-Ex- 
traordinary" — in October 1962 during the 
Cuban missile crisis. 

We in Government share with the media 
of information the broadest common interest 
in informing the public. I sometimes regret 
that the available space and time — and in- 
deed the time of the reader or listener — do 
not permit as wide a coverage of important 
matters as some of them might deserve. I 
particularly have in mind the unsung 80 per- 
cent of our work which has to do with the 
quiet, persistent, constructive, and deeply 
satisfying process of building a decent world 
order and a decent life for man. 

It is also true that there is an inevitable 
tension between officials and reporters 
about that tiny fraction of our business — 
some 1 or 2 percent — which is or ought to 
be secret, at least temporarily. I do not 
suggest that there should be a treaty be- 
tween officials and reporters on this subject 
because the very tension itself is wholesome, 
over time, in the public interest. Without 
the inquiring reporter, some in Government 
would be tempted to be quiet about matters 
that ought to be known. So I would expect 




the reporter to seek information, and I 
would expect officials to keep their mouths 
shut about those matters on which they 
ought not to talk. Actually, secrets are not 
secret for very long — at least in the United 
States. And I can tell you quite honestly 
that I do not know of any secrets which 
could have a significant effect upon the 
judgments which citizens or commentators 
are able to make upon matters of policy or 
public interest. 

I wish to talk to you quietly this evening 
about Viet-Nam. Some of you may feel that 
enough has been said on that subject, but 
it remains dangerous and overshadows many 
other relationships in the present world 

One hears a good deal about the word 
"confusion" these days. Let me say, I hope 
without too much presumption, that I am 
not confused — and President Johnson is not 
confused — about the facts, the issues. United 
States policy, and the present attitude of 
Hanoi and Peiping. We are concerned, as 
any rational man would be, but we are not 
confused. It is my impression that there are 
some who, when they say,"I am confused," 
really mean, "I do not agree." It is impor- 
tant that all who debate these issues de- 
clare, and not conceal, their major prem- 
ises — otherwise we are not able to under- 
stand what else they are saying. 

Source of Assault on South Viet-Nam 

It is altogether clear from irrefutable evi- 
dence that the assault on South Viet-Nam 
was organized and has been directed by the 
Communist regime of North Viet-Nam. It 
has involved not only ordering into action 
Communist cadres left behind for that pur- 
pose when Viet-Nam was divided in 1954 
but the infiltration from the North of tens 
of thousands of trained men and increasing 
quantities of arms. For well over a year the 
forces infiltrated from the North have in- 
cluded organized units of regimental or 
larger strength of the regular army of 
North Viet-Nam. 

And it is not just South Viet-Nam and 
the United States which hold that view. At 

Manila, in April 1964, the SEATO Council 
of Ministers declared ^ that the attack on 
South Viet-Nam was a "Communist aggres- 
sion . . . (an) organized campaign . . . 
directed, supplied and supported by the 
Communist regime in North Vietnam, in 
flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of 
1954 and 1962." They declared "that the de- 
feat of the Communist campaign is essen- 
tial not only to the security of the Republic 
of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia." 
The United Kingdom, Australia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pak- 
istan, as well as the United States, sub- 
scribed to those declarations. Similar — but 
generally stronger — declarations were made 
by the SEATO Council of Ministers in Lon- 
don in April 1965 » and by the ANZUS 
Council of Ministers in 1964* and 1965.^ 
And these views have been endorsed by 
many other governments. 

SEATO and Other Defensive Alliances 

I have mentioned SEATO — the Southeast 
Asia Collective Defense Organization. Re- 
cently I have read some curious comments 
about it and our other defensive alliances. 

I have read that I said that the obligation 
of the United States to oppose an armed at- 
tack against the territory covered by the 
Southeast Asia treaty "did not depend on all 
other members agreeing to oppose it." That 
is neither novel nor remarkable. It is based 
on the plain language of the treaty and the 
official explanations which accompanied the 
consideration of the treaty by the Senate. If 
action under the treaty required a unani- 
mous vote, then one or more members — the 
smallest or the most distant — could veto ac- 
tion by the rest. This impediment was not 
written into SEATO, nor was it written into 

Let me pause for a few moments to re- 
flect upon the events of the past four de- 

' For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of 
May 4, 1964, p. 692. 

" Ibid., June 7, 1965, p. 923. 
*lbid., Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146. 
•'Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 135. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


cades. I graduated from college in the year 
when Japanese militarists seized Manchuria. 
It seemed a long way away, and little was 
done by the nations of the world to defend 
the peace against a flagrant aggression. In 
1935 Mussolini launched his aggression 
against Ethiopia, and it was not even possi- 
ble to organize an oil embargo against him. 
Then Hitler moved into the Rhineland, un- 
opposed, and went on to Austria, Czechoslo- 
vakia, Poland, and World War II erupted 
with its frightful costs. 

Before the guns were silent in that war, 
the nations of the world thought long and 
hard about how such a war had come about 
and how, in the words of the U.N. Charter, 
we can "save succeeding generations from 
the scourge of war, which twice in our life- 
time has brought untold sorrow to man- 
kind." The lesson of World War II was that 
it was necessary to organize and defend a 
peace — not merely to wish for it — and to 
"unite our strength to maintain international 
peace and security." 

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter is 
utterly fundamental and, although some may 
think it old-fashioned to speak of it, I 
should like to remind you of what it says : 

To maintain international peace and security, and 
to that end: to take effective collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the 
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about 
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the 
principles of justice and international lavs', adjust- 
ment or settlement of international disputes or 
situations which might lead to a breach of the 
peace; . . . 

Unhappily and tragically, the ink was not 
dry on the United Nations Charter before it 
became fully apparent that Joseph Stalin 
had turned to world revolution and a policy 
of aggressive militancy. The first major is- 
sue before the Security Council was his at- 
tempt to keep Russian forces in Iran. Then 
came guerrilla operations against Greece, 
pressure on Turkey, the Berlin blockade, 
and the Korean aggression. These moves led 
to defensive action by the free world and a 
number of mutual defense treaties — the 
Rio Pact, NATO, the ANZUS treaty with 

Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral 
treaties with the Philippines and Japan. 

Under President Eisenhower we con- 
cluded the Southeast Asia treaty, which, by 
a protocol, committed us to help the three 
non-Communist states of former French 
Indochina — South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cam- 
bodia — to repel armed attacks, if they asked 
for help.® Under Eisenhower we also en- 
tered mutual defense pacts with the Re- 
public of Korea ' and the Republic of China 
on Formosa.* 

All of those commitments to oppose ag- 
gression — through the United Nations and 
through our various defensive alliances — 
were approved by the Senate by overwhelm- 
ing majorities of both parties. And these 
and related obligations have been sustained 
over the years by authorizations, appro- 
priations, and other supporting measures 
enacted by bipartisan votes in both Houses 
of Congress. 

The Backbone of World Peace 

I have read that I have drawn "no dis- 
tinction between powerful industrial demo- 
cratic states in Europe and weak and un- 
democratic states in Asia." The answer is 
that, for the Secretary of State, our treaty 
commitments are a part of the supreme law 
of the land, and I do not believe that we can 
be honorable in Europe and dishonorable in 

I do believe that the United States must 
keep its pledged word. That is not only a 
matter of national honor but an essential to 
the preservation of peace. For the backbone 
of world peace is the integrity of the com- 
mitment of the United States. 

There would be no possibility of preserv- 
ing peace if our allies — or, even more im- 
portant, our adversaries — should come to be- 
lieve that the United States will not do what 
it says it will do. Doubt about that could 
lead to catastrophic miscalculations by our 

* For text of the treaty and protocol, see ibid., 
Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393. 

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204. 
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 899. 



adversaries. Let me illustrate by two ex- 
amples. It was necessary for both President 
Eisenhower and President Kennedy to in- 
form Mr. Khrushchev that the United 
States would not yield to an ultimatum con- 
cerning Berlin. Had Mr. Khrushchev not be- 
lieved that, there would have been war. 
Again, in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, 
had not Mr. Khrushchev believed it when 
President Kennedy said those missiles must 
go, there might have been war. 

I am honored to have my name associ- 
ated with the doctrine that the United 
States must honor its pledged word. But 
I am convinced that the American people 
subscribe to that doctrine. 

Yet I read recently that the SEATO 
treaty is just a scrap of paper. There were 
no quotation marks around "a scrap of 
paper" and no other indication of any sort 
that that is an historic phrase : that for more 
than half a century it has been associated 
with black infamy — that it was what the 
Kaiser's Chancellor called the solemn pledge 
of Germany and others to observe the neu- 
trality of Belgium. 

God help us — and the cause of freedom 
and peace — if our Government should ever 
agree with those who regard our commit- 
ments as "scraps of paper." 

The SEATO Treaty 

I read lately that I had suddenly redis- 
covered the SEATO treaty, that I had shifted 
my explanation of the legal basis of the 
American commitment in Viet-Nam because 
somebody thought the administration was 
relying too much on the congressional res- 
olution of August 1964. 

The fact is that I have always treated the 
SEATO treaty — which the Senate approved 
with only one dissenting vote — as an impor- 
tant part of our commitment to defend 
South Viet-Nam. 

That treaty was carefully considered by 
the Foreign Relations Committee. And its 
report,* urging that the Senate give its "ad- 
vice and consent" to ratification, said: 

The committee is not impervious to the risks which 
this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that accept- 
ance of these additional obligations commits the 
United States to a course of action over a vast 
expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consist- 
ent with our own highest interests. There are 
greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy 
of what he can expect of us, and in failing to dis- 
abuse him of assumptions which might lead to a 
miscalculation of our intentions. 

Now, I have never asserted that the 
Southeast Asia treaty comprises all of our 
commitment to the defense of South Viet- 
Nam. I have cited the statements of three 
successive Presidents, the various aid bills 
approved by Congress against the back- 
ground of those statements, and the SEATO 
treaty, as well as the congressional resolu- 
tion of August 1964. 

When the President asked Congress to 
pass such a resolution he specifically cited 
"the obligations of the United States under 
the Southeast Asia Treaty." »» And that res- 
olution — adopted by a combined vote of 504 
to 2 in the two Houses — contained this 

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its 
national interest and to world peace the mainte- 
nance of international peace and security in south- 
east Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the 
United States and the Charter of the United Na- 
tions and in accordance with its obligations under 
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the 
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the Presi- 
dent determines, to take all necessary steps, includ- 
ing the use of armed force, to assist any member or 
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective De- 
fense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its 

So the assertion that the administration 
has suddenly rediscovered the SEATO 
treaty is not based on fact. If I have talked 
about that treaty a little more lately it is- 
partly because North Viet-Nam has been 
escalating its aggression into a full-scale 
armed attack directly and unequivocally 
raising the solemn commitment which the 
Senate had approved — by an overwhelming- 

•S. Ex. Rept. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess. 

" For text of a message to the Congress from 
President Johnson, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, 
p. 261. 

" For text, see ibid., p. 268. 

A.PRIL 4, 1966 


I do not regard our policy in Viet-Nam as 
based only on past commitments. I believe 
that it is now just as much in our interest — 
and that of the free world — to repel Com- 
munist aggression there as it was when we 
made those earlier commitments. 

Support of Free-World Nations 

Now, I turn to the attitudes of other free- 
world nations toward the struggle in Viet- 
Nam and our support of South Viet-Nam. 
Assertions to the effect that we stand alone, 
that most of our allies disapprove, et cetera, 
are incorrect. 

Let me quote from a speech made in 
London a year ago by the Australian Minis- 
ter for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Hasluck: 

Twice in this generation, without hesitation, Aus- 
tralians have come to fight against aggression in 
Europe because we saw a war started in Europe 
was a danger, not only to Europe, but to the whole 
world. Today, we see aggression in Asia as being 
just as much a danger to the whole world as it is to 
those of us who live in or near Asia. Indeed, today 
the risk of a world war starting is more immediate 
in Asia than in any other continent. Southeast 
Asia is today the front line in the struggle for 
world security. 

Recalling that Australia had contributed 
air forces to help break the blockade of 
Berlin, Mr. Hasluck said : 

Vietnam today is no less fateful to the future of 
the world than was the Berlin crisis, and Western 
Europe is as closely concerned there in Vietnam as 
we ourselves were concerned with Berlin. 

Taking this view . . . Australia sees the actions 
of the United States in Asia as an acceptance by 
that great power of the world-wide responsibilities 
which came to it simply because it is great. We 
honor them for what they are doing in Vietnam 
and we support them in it. 

Australia has had some 1,400 combat 
troops in Viet-Nam, fighting valiantly at the 
side of the Vietnamese and ourselves. They 
have contributed to the security of South- 
east Asia in other respects including the de- 
ployment of troops for the defense of Ma- 
laysia. And they have been training Viet- 
namese officers in Australia and supplying 
surgical teams and cash aid. Last week 
Prime Minister Harold Holt announced that 
Australia was trebling its combat forces in 

Viet-Nam. We warmly welcome this addi- 
tional effort by our stanch allies in Aus- 
tralia. New Zealand has contributed an artil- 
lery company. The Australians, the New 
Zealanders, and we are bound together not 
only by treaty commitments but by common 
interests, institutions, and ideals. And we 
know from previous wars that they are 
courageous allies — very good people to have 
at your side when the going is tough. 

And here is a quotation from the distin- 
guished Foreign Minister of Thailand, 
Thanat Khoman : 

We profoundly realize that nowadays, as in the 
past, no "peace in our time" can be bought by 
sacrificing a free nation, be it South Viet-Nam 
or Southeast Asia or, for that matter, any other 
nation in the world. On the contrary, the chances 
for an enduring peace will become greater if we 
can see to it that aggression against free nations, 
either in overt or covert form, shall not be profit- 
able. . . . 

Thailand has already been designated by 
Peiping as the next target. And I would em- 
phasize that Thailand is contributing much 
more than eloquent words to the security of 
Southeast Asia. Its military forces help to 
guard the heart of the Southeast Asian 
peninsula — and the flank of Viet-Nam. It is 
helping to train South Vietnamese aviators 
and is cooperating generally in the defense 
of Southeast Asia. 

The vital significance of the struggle in 
Viet-Nam is well understood in the Philip- 
pines. President Marcos has requested the 
Philippine Congress to approve the dispatch 
to Viet-Nam of military engineers with their 
own security forces — some 2,000 men. 

The Prime Minister of Malaysia has pub- 
licly declared that "countries which subscribe 
to the United Nations Charter must help" 
South Viet-Nam to repel the "aggression" 
from the North. 

The Republic of China on Formosa is con- 
tributing technicians and commodities. 

The Republic of Korea has sent a full 
division plus a regiment of military engi- 
neers with their own security forces. The 
Koreans have fought with great gallantry 
and professional skill. Recently President 
Park asked the South Korean legislature to 



approve the dispatch of a second division. 
This would make Korea's troop contribution, 
in ratio to population, greater than our own. 

But, of course, the main burden of the 
fighting has been carried by the South 
Vietnamese, and will continue to be. They 
have nearly 700,000 men under arms. And, 
every day, they are engaged in many more 
ground actions than are the troops of the 
United States and their other allies. 

Contrary to some assertions I have read, 
the Government of Japan has understood 
our policy in regard to South Viet-Nam and 
is deeply conscious of how it relates to peace 
in Southeast Asia, in which Japan has a vital 
national interest. Japan has consistently 
supported efforts to bring Hanoi to the con- 
ference table and has extended for many 
years now valuable economic and strong 
political support to the Government of 
South Viet-Nam. Anybody who thinks that 
Japanese confidence in us would be in- 
creased by a failure to repel the aggression 
against South Viet-Nam is seriously mis- 

And the same is true of most of the Asian 
nations which are trying to adhere to "non- 
alinement." They know that they have a 
vital interest in the outcome of the struggle 
in Viet-Nam. 

The head of one nonalined government re- 
cently said privately to a representative of 
the United States that success in repelling 
the aggression against South Viet-Nam 
would assure the peace of Southeast Asia 
for a generation. 

Contrary to some assertions our role in 
Viet-Nam is not opposed by most of our 
allies in other parts of the world. With very 
few exceptions, the governments of free 
Europe understand and support our posi- 
tion. The United Kingdom has done so, under 
both its Labor government and the Conserv- 
ative government which preceded it. Al- 
though it has no troops in Viet-Nam, it has 
substantial military forces in the area, most 
of them committed to the defense of Ma- 

We have the support of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. For example, a state- 

ment from the office of the Federal Chan- 
cellor in January said: "The German Gov- 
ernment has always maintained the view 
that the defense of the freedom and inde- 
pendence of Viet-Nam by the United States 
of America is of the greatest importance 
for the entire Free World." The Federal 
Republic has made substantial nonmilitary 
contributions to South Viet-Nam and re- 
cently announced that it would send a hos- 
pital ship. 

Some of our NATO allies have feared that 
the struggle in Viet-Nam might compel us 
to reduce our forces in Europe. Manlio 
Brosio, the distinguished Secretary General 
of NATO, has correctly said : 

... a setback for the United States in Asia, for 
example, in Vietnam, would also be a grave setback 
for the whole of the West. Not only this, but an 
American retreat or a humiliating compromise in 
Vietnam, far from ending United States commit- 
ments in Asia, would extend them on an even 
greater scale to all sorts of other areas, from 
Thailand to the Philippines. 

In a recent article the former Italian Min- 
ister of Defense, Giulio Andreotti, said : 

America could have left its Viet-Nam ally to its 
own destiny, but it would have been a morally 
criminal act, without mentioning the psychological 
consequences in Asia and elsewhere. . . . the Com- 
munists . . . would do well to remember that Amer- 
icans did not give in to isolationism when, 25 years 
ago, they decided to come to fight and die on our 
continent. . . . 

A week ago tonight, in a speech in Brus- 
sels, one of the most eminent statesmen of 
Europe, Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister 
of Belgium, referred to the Soviet menace 
to Europe following the Second World War 
and said : 

At that time . . . nearly all of us were delighted 
to see the United States come to our help. . . . 
Is there anyone who would dare suggest that the 
free peoples of Asia are not menaced by Chinese 
imperialism? How can we fail to understand that 
. . . the world role of the United States "obliges 
it to take in Asia a position identical to that taken 
previously in Europe?" 

Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of 
the argument that if the United States does 
not observe one of its commitments how 
can the rest of the world believe that it will 

APRIL 4, 1966 


respect other engagements? He said he 
thought that argument was "essential" and 
that the leaders of the United States were 
right. He said also: "I do not know why 
people cannot understand that much more is 
at stake in the Viet-Nam conflict than sim- 
ply the independence or the servitude of 
South Viet-Nam." And he went on to say: 

I am astonished and stupefied when I receive 
. . . petitions asking the United States to make 
peace in Viet-Nam. ... It was not the Americans 
who wanted war. . . . Today it is they who offer to 
take peace under reasonable conditions and it is 
their adversaries who refuse to do so. . . . 

The truth is that there should be ... a broad 
movement of people from all of Europe and of all 
parties and beliefs to affirm that the conditions 
proposed by the United States are reasonable and 
that those who should be pilloried are those who 
refuse to examine those conditions and to enter 
upon a policy of peace. 

I think most Americans would wish to 
join their Government in thanking that 
great Belgian champion of freedom for his 
outspoken support. 

No, the United States does not stand 
alone assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to 
repel an aggression. The facts about the 
cause and nature of the struggle there, and 
the vital stakes involved, are increasingly 
realized throughout the free world. I know 
from my own contacts that a great majority 
of non-Communist governments understand 
and support what we are doing, even though 
some, for various reasons, have not yet said 
so publicly. And I think you will see more 
and more governments of the free world 
offering, or increasing, tangible assistance 
to South Viet-Nam. 

Nearly all the governments of the free 
world — and, I venture to say, some in the 
Communist world — understand that the 
United States has made persistent and ex- 
traordinary efforts to obtain a peaceful 
settlement in Viet-Nam — that it is Hanoi 
and Peiping which have barred the road to 
peace. We continue to seek a peaceful set- 
tlement. It must, of course, assure to the 
people of South Viet-Nam their right to 
choose their own government and order 
their own affairs in their own way. 

Quite frankly, I cannot understand those 

who say that when somebody is shooting at 
you, and you ask him to stop, you are ask- 
ing for "unconditional surrender." That 
seems to me to be an abuse of language. We 
are not asking the other side to change their 
regime, or to surrender a single acre or 
single individual. All we are asking them to 
do is to stop shooting at South Viet-Nam. 

The Right to Independence and Peace 

It is not true that we believe that the 
United States should become involved in 
every crisis or disturbance. On the contrary, 
we don't go around looking for business. We 
much prefer to see disputes settled by re- 
gional organizations or the United Nations 
or mediation or negotiation between the par- 
ties. There have been many, many disputes 
in the last 5 years in which the United 
States has not been involved. 

But when major aggression occurs, or is 
threatened, against those to whom we have 
commitments, and the intended victims lack 
the power to defend themselves and seek 
our help, we become involved. Had we not 
done so — from the assault on Greece and 
threat to Turkey through the Berlin block- 
ade and the Korean war and now the threat 
to Southeast Asia — vast areas and popula- 
tions would have fallen under the domina- 
tion of the Communist world revolution. 

And, to go on to a related point, I can 
see no possibility of a stable peace through 
spheres of influence. Who is to determine 
which are to be the "master" nations — and 
which their vassals? And what happens 
when the "master" nations engage in strug- 
gles among themselves about spheres of in- 
fluence? I cannot imagine a surer path to 
war — and much more devastating wars than 
the world has ever known. 

I would think that the United Nations 
Charter is right — that every nation, large or 
small, has a right to live in independence 
and peace, even though it is next door to a 
great power. I would think that, in the age 
of intercontinental rockets and thermonuclear 
warheads, the prospects for the survival of 
the human race are dismal unless that fun- 
damental proposition is upheld. And, I sub- 



mit, no other policy is consistent with the 
principles for which the United States has 
long stood and to which we are solemnly 
committed through the United Nations Char- 
ter and many other international agree- 
ments, including those which govern the re- 
lations of the Western Hemisphere. 

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic 
and Social Development in Asia 


This is a moment in which history and 
hope meet and move on from here as part- 
ners. Less than 1 year ago, on April 7, 1965, 
I asked for the creation of the Asian de- 
velopment plan to seek economic advance 
and social justice for all of Asia.^ I pledged 
the full support of the United States of 
America to that task. 

Today we have begun to redeem that 
pledge. The act I sign this morning author- 
izes the United States of America to ratify 
the charter of the Asian Development 
Bank. 3 Seldom have nations joined together 
in a collective venture that is so endowed 
with promise. For that reason this moment 
is a very special one for so many people. 
p First, for the Asian leaders, who con- 
ceived and organized the bank and who are 
so ably represented here today by the am- 
bassadors from their countries; for the 
people of those non-Asian nations which 
have signed the charter and whose ambas- 
sadors have come this morning to bespeak 
again their vision and generosity; finally, 
for my great friend, a true American, Eu- 
gene Black, whose energy and tact have 
been as indispensable as his experience and 

' Made at the White House on Mar. 16 (White 
House press release; as-delivered text) upon sign- 
ins: the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966 (P.L. 

' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

' For baokgrround, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015; 
Feb. 14, 1966, p. 255; and Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379. 

wisdom; and to the Congress of the United 
States and the members of both parties, 
who have acted to invest in this enterprise 
not only the resources but the faith of 190 
million people whom they represent. 

This act is an economic Magna Carta for 
the diverse lands of Asia. Its charter links 
31 countries in a union against the involun- 
tary economic servitude imposed on the 
people of Asia by time and circumstance, 
and by neighbor and nature. There is also a 
deeper meaning. This billion dollar Bank is 
a symbol that the twain have met, not as 
Kipling predicted, "at God's great Judgment 
Seat," but at the place of man's shared 

It is no longer possible to be a mere ob- 
server at that place. It is not possible and 
it is not right to neglect a people's hopes 
because the ocean is vast, or their culture is 
alien, or their language may be strange, or 
their race different, or their skin another 
color. Asia must no longer sit at the second 
table of the 20th century's concern. 

The economic network of this shrinking 
globe is too intertwined. The political order 
of continents is too involved with one an- 
other. The threat of common disaster is too 
real for all human beings to say of Asia, or 
any other continent, "Yours is another 

I believe that those who make that case 
are no less patriotic and no less sincere than 
those who believe that we cannot shorten 
the length of our reach into the world. 

But I believe equally as firmly that those 
people are wrong. And while I expect they 
will continue to make their argument of 
isolationism, for we all are determined to 
preserve their right to speak up in this land, 
I hope they, too, expect me to try to keep 
on making my case for realism. That, I 
think, is the right of the President of this 
country, and the President feels that is his 

And what is that case? It is simply that 
there is no rest from the trials of freedom, 
there is no recalling what the pace of change 
has done to the map of this big world, there 
is no reducing our responsibilities while the 

APRIL 4, 1966 


challenges of progress will not permit us to 
name the site for our duel or the weapons 
that we use. It is that we cannot turn from 
the place of shared needs and expect either 
peace or progress to follow us. 

So today we have come here to the his- 
toric East Room of the White House and 
gathered at this place to start a journey to- 
gether. The Asian Development Bank is the 
first step of what I conceive to be a very 
long journey. 

We are taking another today by announc- 
ing that we have pledged a half of the $24 
million that is needed to construct the large 
Mekong River project, the Nam Ngum tribu- 
tary project in Laos. Seven other countries 
— Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Thailand, 
Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand — are 
joining us in that effort. 

For the United States it is our first major 
commitment under our promise to expand 
economic and social development in South- 
east Asia. The Nam Ngum project is the 
Mekong Committee's highest priority under- 
taking and, like the Asian Development 
Bank, it represents a major accomplishment 
in joint cooperation in the world. 

The first phase of the project will include 
a dam and power station with an installed 
capacity up to 30,000 kilowatts. Additional 
generators up to 120,000 kilowatts can be 
installed as they are needed. An interna- 
tional transmission line, with a link across 
the Mekong River, will connect the power 
station with the capital of Laos and north- 
east Thailand. 

This is just one example of how the fruits 
of technology and the ingenuity of coopera- 
tion can bring new life to whole new regions 
of the world. More, yes, much more, awaits 
our response. Schools and hospitals can be 
built. Rivers can be tamed. New crops and 
new breeds of livestock can be developed. 
There are no bounds to the possibilities, if 
there are no limits to our dreams. 

It has been said that no statue was ever 
erected to the memory of a man or woman 
who thought it was best to let well enough 
alone. So it is with the nations that we 
represent here today. We seek no statues 


to our memory. We seek only one real 
monument, a monument with peace and 
progress for its base and justice for its 
pinnacle. Together, your lands and mine, we 
will build it. 




White House press release dated March 16 

The United States and seven other coun- 
tries have pledged $24.1 million to construct 
the largest Mekong River project to date — 
the Nam Ngum tributary project in Laos. 
The United States pledge of half this amount 
is the first major commitment under Presi- 
dent Johnson's program to expand economic 
and social development in Southeast Asia. 

The U.S. contribution will be provided by 
the Agency for International Development. 

The Nam Ngum project is the Mekong 
Committee's highest priority undertaking 
and represents a major accomplishment in 
international cooperation in the Far East. 
The United Nations took the lead in raising 
funds for the project, and the World Bank 
has agreed to administer the project. Thai- 
land and Laos have signed a convention pro- 
viding for an exchange of electric power. 

The first phase of the Nam Ngum project 
will include a dam and power station with an 
installed capacity of up to 30,000 kilowatts. 
The dam is designed so that additional gen- 
erators — up to 120,000 kilowatts — can be 
installed as needed. An international trans- 
mission line, with a link across the Mekong 
River, will connect the power station with 
Vientiane, Laos, and northeast Thailand, 
where part of the power will be used. 

The following amounts have been pledged : 

Japan $4,000,000 

Netherlands .... 3,300,000 

Canada 2,000,000 

Thailand 1,000,000 

Denmark 600.000 

Australia 500,000 

New Zealand . . 350,000 

The United States matched the total of 
these contributions, as well as an additional 



$315,000 pledged by Japan on a bilateral 
basis to Laos, in accordance with an earlier 
offer made to the Mekong Committee. 

The total pledged for the project is $24,- 

The contributions from all the developed 
countries were made on a grant basis. The 
Thai contribution is in kind: cement — to be 
repaid by electrical power after completion 
of the project. 

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in Asia 

Address by Vice President Humphrey' 

As you know, I returned a few days ago 
from a mission on behalf of the President to 
nine Asian and Pacific nations.^ Today I 
would like to share with you some of my 
conclusions about what is happening in that 
part of the world and about our policy 

I will begin with words from Confucius: 
"If a man take no thought about what is dis- 
tant, he will find sorrow near at hand." The 
war in Viet-Nam is far more than Neville 
Chamberlain's "quarrel in a remote country 
among people of whom we know nothing." 
It is the focus of a broader conflict which 
involves the whole Asian Continent. It also 
involves basic principles of international 

I will return to this later. 

Why are we in South Viet-Nam? 

We are in South Viet-Nam to repel and 
prevent the success of aggression against 
the Government and the people of that 

We are there to help assure the South 
Vietnamese people the basic right to decide 
their ovvti futures, freely and without in- 

' Made at the National Press Club, Washington, 
D.C., on Mar. 11. 

' For a memorandum to President Johnson from 
the Vice President, see Bulletin of Mar. 28, 1966, 
p. 489. 

We are there to help those people achieve 
a better standard of living for themselves 
and their children. 

We are there to help establish the prin- 
ciple that, in this nuclear age, aggression 
cannot be an acceptable means either of 
settling international disputes or of realiz- 
ing national objectives. If aggression is 
permitted to go unchecked, we cannot in 
good faith hold out much hope for the fu- 
ture of small nations or of world peace. 

This is why we are in Viet-Nam. 

We are not there to build an empire, to 
exercise domination over that part of the 
world, to establish military bases. We are 
not there to impose a government or way of 
life on other peoples. 

That last point is worth dwelling on. The 
National Liberation Front claims to be an 
authentic nationalist movement, represent- 
ing the overwhelming majority of the South 
Vietnamese people. I agree with only one 
part of the NLF's contention : That it is a 

There was a time, in the colonial days, 
when the old Viet Minh movement con- 
tained authentic nationalists. (Many of 
them are now, I might add, members of the 
South Vietnamese Government.) 

Today there are a few non-Communists 
in figurehead Viet Cong posts. The nom- 
inal leader of the NLF, for example, is not 

APRIL 4, 1966 


known as a Communist. But most of the 
Viet Cong soldiers — at least those defecting 
or captured — don't even know his name. 
(It is Nguyen Huu Tho.) But they all know 
Ho Chi Minh. 

There are in the NLF leaders of alleged 
non-Communist parties. But they are par- 
ties without any apparent membership. 

There are a good many well-known and 
recognized nationalists in South Viet-Nam 
outside the present government. Quite a 
few of them opposed the late President 
Diem and suffered in prison for their op- 
position. To this day not one of these people 
has identified himself with the National 
Liberation Front. Yet it would be easy for 
any one of them to slip into Viet Cong ter- 
ritory and do so. None has. And you can be 
sure the National Liberation Front would 
tell the world if any one of them did. 

The same is true of religious leaders, 
Buddhist and Catholic alike, of trade union 
officials, of student leaders. They differ 
widely among themselves — the Vietnamese 
are an articulate and argumentative people. 
But on one thing at least they are agreed: 
They don't want to live under Communist 

Contrary to what many people believe, you 
do not have to have overwhelming, or even 
majority, support to wage a guerrilla war. 
A determined, highly disciplined, trained, 
and well-organized minority can do that. 

Without massive American aid to the 
Greek Government after the war. Com- 
munists would have taken over that country. 
Yet subsequent elections have shown them 
to be a small minority. 

Without the aid of British and Gurkha 
troops over a period of many years, Com- 
munists would have won in Malaya. But 
subsequent elections have shown them to be 
an even smaller minority than their Greek 

Without outside aid, the overwhelming 
majority of the South Vietnamese people 
would have no hope of self-determination. 
They would be ruled by force and coercion, 
as they are today in areas under Viet Cong 

control. We are giving aid : military aid and 
political/economic/social aid. 

Allied Military Progress in Viet-Nam 

On the military front, the Vietnamese, to- 
gether with American and Allied troops, 
have made substantial progress in the past 
few months. 

A series of defeats have been inflicted on 
main-force units of the Viet Cong and North 
Vietnamese soldiers. 

Allied forces have been able to move in 
on Viet Cong strongholds which had previ- 
ously been immune to attack. 

We have been able to open up stretches of 
highway and railroad which the Viet Cong 
had long controlled. 

Mobility and firepower of Allied forces is 
impressive. Coordination among Allied 
forces has markedly improved. 

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese casual- 
ties are difficult to determine. But the best 
available figures show that they have 
doubled over 1964 and are now running sev- 
eral times current allied casualties. 

The defection rate for Viet Cong has also 
increased — partly because of a special South 
Vietnamese program to encourage defection. 
Defectors were being received at a rate of 
about 2,000 per month while I was in Saigon. 

Defectors report shortages of food and 
low morale. They report that the accuracy 
and impact of our artillery and bombing 
have been devastating. 

But we don't have to rely on the word of 
defectors alone. An article published in the 
January issue of the Viet Cong theoretical 
journal and broadcast over its radio com- 
plains of difficulty and confusion in the 
ranks. It says that Viet Cong agents, having 
organized a protest movement in the vil- 
lages, sometimes lose control of it and even 
allow it to be transformed into an anti- 
Communist demonstration. It warns that, 
although its agitators must use all sorts of 
people "partially and temporarily" in carry- 
ing out the struggle, they must wipe out the 
"influence of reactionary elements belonging 



to various religious organizations" and "be- 
ware of trade union leaders." 

A number of articles and broadcasts warn 
against defeatism and "pacifism" in the 

General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North 
Vietnamese Defense Minister] has publicly 
complained from Hanoi that the American 
commitment to Viet-Nam has given rise to 
"an extremely serious situation." And an 
article recently published in Hanoi de- 
nounces "a small number of comrades . . . 
(who) see only difficulties and not oppor- 
tunities (and) display pessimism, perplexity, 
and a reluctance to protracted re- 
sistance. . . ." Peking, in more general 
terms, has acknowledged that "in some 
lands, revolutionary struggles have tempo- 
rarily suffered reverses, and in others the 
political situation has taken an adverse 
turn." It blames these setbacks on "im- 
perialists, colonialists, and neo-colonialists, 
headed by the United States." 

We have been subject to some harsh 
words by Asian Communists. But, as Pres- 
ident Johnson has said: "We can live with 
anger in word as long as it is matched by 
caution in deed." ^ 

Things are better in Viet-Nam, militarily, 
than even a few months ago. Though we 
must be prepared for military setbacks and 
disappointments ahead, I believe we have 
reason for measured encouragement. 

Viet-Nam's Social Revolution 

There is no substitute for the use of power 
in the face of determined attack. There are 
times when it must be used. But the use of 
power, necessary as it is, can be counter- 
productive without accompanying political 
effort and the credible promise to people of 
a better life. 

The peasants of Viet-Nam — and, indeed, 
of all Asia — are rebelling against the kind 
of life they have led for ages past. They 
want security. But they also want dignity 

and self-respect, justice, and the hope of 
something better in the future. 

The Communists, in their drive for power, 
seek to use and subvert the hopes of these 
people. If they succeed, we could win many 
battles and yet lose the war. 

The struggle will be won or lost in rural 
areas. We have said this so often it has be- 
come a cliche. But it must now be proved 
by programs of actions. 

The Chinese have a saying, "Lots of noise 
on the stairs, but nobody enters the room." 
There have been, as I am fully aware, many 
promises made to the peasants over many 
years — but painfully little performance. 

The hour is late. The need for deeds as 
well as words is urgent. That is why the 
Vietnamese Government, with our support, 
is pressing the "other war" with vigor — the 
war against poverty, hunger, disease, and 
ignorance. This is the theme of the Declara- 
tion of Honolulu,* and I believe that the 
Honolulu Declaration could be a milestone 
in the history of our policy in Asia. 

They are beginning in earnest the struggle 
to win and hold the allegiance of the people 
who live in rural South Viet-Nam, in more 
than 2,600 villages and approximately 11,000 
hamlets, subject to years of Viet Cong sub- 
version and terror. This is hard and dan- 
gerous work. In 1965 alone, 354 of the peo- 
ple engaged in it were assassinated and 
something like 500 wounded. 

I do not for a moment minimize the 
practical difficulties of carrying out the so- 
cial revolution to which the Republic of 
Viet-Nam is now committed. 

Viet-Nam has experienced a quarter of a 
century of almost constant warfare, gen- 
erations of colonial domination, and a mil- 
lennium of Mandarin rule. 

History has endowed it with no full and 
readymade administrative apparatus to un- 
dertake such a monumental task. It will 
have to be carefully built. But there are a 
number of well-trained and educated high- 

'Ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390. 

• For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


and middle-level officials to form the nu- 
cleus for this effort. 

The important thing is to begin, and this 
the present government has done. Responsi- 
bility has been fixed, a spirited attack upon 
inertia and corruption has begun. There is 
determination that the whole chain of social 
and political action will be conceived and ad- 
ministered with hardheadedness and effi- 
ciency — beginning in the ministries in Sai- 
gon and going right down to the village and 
hamlet level. High standards of perform- 
ance have been set and are expected. And 
we are working with the South Vietnamese 
Government at each level to help see that 
the product matches the expectation. 

South Vietnamese cadre in hamlets and 
villages will be doubled to more than 45,000 
by the end of this year. Today, they are still 
outnumbered by Viet Cong activists. But 
the gap is steadily closing. 

Today, the South Vietnamese Govern- 
ment—late in the day, it is true— is trying 
to meet the pressing needs of the country. 
Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky was can- 
did with me when he said, "Our social revo- 
lution is 12 years late — but not too late." 

Some 800,000 people have fled to Govern- 
ment-controlled areas in South Viet-Nam 
during the past year and a half. Almost 
300,000 have already been resettled. The 
South Vietnamese Government, with allied 
help, is working to house, feed, and clothe 
these refugees. 

In the countryside schools and hospitals 
are being built. 

In Saigon a new constitution is being 
framed, and the Government is working to- 
ward a goal of national elections by the end 
of the year. 

In short, a forced-draft effort is being 
made to create a new society to replace the 
old. It deserves and requires our support. 

Meanwhile, the country faces staggering 
economic problems, the most severe of which 
is the problem of inflation. 

Despite today's inflation, the long-term 
economic prospect is good. There is new 
business investment in new industries. South 

Vietnamese land is rich and productive. The 
people are industrious, ambitious, and quick 
to learn new skills — and they are learning. 
Communications, port facilities, and trans- 
portation are being expanded. 

But full economic development certainly 
will not take place until an environment of 
violence and conflict is replaced by one of 
stability and peace. 

A "Message of Encouragement" 

My observations of Viet-Nam are not the 
product of a weekend visit to Saigon. To be 
sure, my visit there was informative. It gave 
meaning to what I had read and to the de- 
liberations of government in which I had 

As student, professor. Senator, and Vice 
President, I have been intellectually and 
directly involved in matters of national se- 
curity and foreign policy. I have read too 
many books, attended too many hearings and 
meetings, and participated in too many dis- 
cussions at the highest levels of government 
to arrive at any instant solutions to complex 
problems or to be naively optimistic about a 
troubled world. 

Having said this, I have reason to bring 
home a message of encouragement about 

I know that our opponents are diligent and 
determined. They are well-organized, and in 
many areas have a long head start on us. 

Thus far they have not responded to our 
unconditional offer of negotiation — an offer 
which still stands — nor have they responded 
to the good offices of other nations, of the 
United Nations, of the Pope and other reli- 
gious leaders who seek to bring the conflict 
to the conference table. 

And they have not responded, I am sure, 
because they still believe that time is on 
their side, that we will ultimately tire and 
withdraw, either abandoning South Viet- 
Nam or accepting a settlement which will 
give the Viet Cong an open road on one of 
its three publicly declared routes to victory. 

The first two routes — a general uprising 
and the famous Mao-Giap three-stage guer 





rilla war — have been stymied by resistance 
of the South Vietnamese Government and 
her allies. The third declared route to povi'er 
is through a coalition government. 

Should there be any doubt in Hanoi, let 
me make it once more clear : We will neither 
tire nor withdraw. We will remain in Viet- 
Nam until genuinely free elections can be 

If the Viet Cong, in those elections, gain 
honestly a voice in the government, so be it. 
But prior to elections, this Government will 
not be a party to any settlement which 
amounts to a preelection victory for Com- 
munists which cannot be won at the ballot 
box. I, for one, doubt that the South Viet- 
namese people will give that victory to the 
Communists. No Communist government has 
ever come to power through free election, 
and I doubt that one ever will. 

We will pursue, with patience and per- 
sistence, the difficult course we have set for 
ourselves — the course neither of withdrawal 
nor of massive escalation but of measured 
use of strength and perseverance in defense 
both of ally and principle. 

As the President has said: ". . . the 
pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the 
pledge of Baltimore stands open — to help 
the men of the North when they have the 
wisdom to be ready."' 

Asian Communism, a Clear and Present Danger 

At the beginning today, I said the conflict 
in Viet-Nam was the focus of a wider 
struggle taking place in Asia. 

During my recent mission I was struck by 
the depth of feeling, among almost all Asian 
leaders, that Asian communism had direct 
design on their national integrity and inde- 
pendence. Almost all cited examples of sub- 
version and in many cases direct military 
involvement by Communist troops within 
their countries. And none — without any ex- 
ception — questioned our involvement in Viet- 
Nam. There were questions about aspects 
of our policy there but none concerning the 

,1 'Ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390. 

fact of our presence there and our resistance 
to aggression. 

Among the leaders with whom I spoke, 
there was repeatedly expressed a deep con- 
cern as to whether our American purpose, 
tenacity, and will were strong enough to 
persevere in Southeast Asia. Public debate 
in America was sometimes interpreted as a 
weakening of purpose. I emphasized not 
only the firmness of our resolve but also 
our dedication to the rights of free discus- 
sion and dissent. 

For we know that John Stuart Mill's advice 
remains valid : "We can never be sure that 
the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a 
false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling 
it would be an evil still." 

Asian communism may be a subject for 
discussion here. In Asia, it is a clear and 
present danger. No single, independent na- 
tion in Asia has the strength to stand alone 
against that danger. 

I believe that the time may come when 
Asian communism may lose its fervor, when 
it may lose some of its neuroses, when it 
may realize that its objectives cannot be 
gained by aggression. But until that time I 
believe we have no choice but to help the 
nations of Southeast Asia strengthen them- 
selves for the long road ahead. 

I also said, at the beginning today, that 
some very basic principles of international 
conduct were under test in Viet-Nam. Some 
people think not. 

Of them, I ask this: Were we to with- 
draw from Viet-Nam under any conditions 
short of peace, security, and the right of 
self-determination for the South Vietnamese 
people, what conclusions would be drawn in 
the independent nations of Asia? In West- 
ern Europe? In the young, struggling coun- 
tries of Africa? In the nations of Latin 
America beset by subversion and unrest? 
What conclusions would be drawn in Hanoi 
and Peking? 

I have heard it said that our vital national 
interests are not involved in South Viet-Nam 
as they are in Europe. I heard it said 30 
years ago that our vital national interests 


APRIL 4, 1966 


were not involved in Europe as they were in 
the Western Hemisphere. This time we can- 
not afford to learn the hard way. No conti- 
nent on this earth is any longer remote from 
any other. 

And, may I add, the principles of national 
independence and self-determination should 
be no less dear to us in Asia than they are in 

We live in a time when man has finally 
achieved the ultimate in technological prog- 
ress: Man today possesses the means to 
totally destroy himself. Yet our time also 
offers man the possibility, for the first time 
in human history, of achieving well-being 
and social justice for hundreds of millions of 
people who literally live on the outside of 

Being an optimist, I have some faith in the 
ability of man to see this safely through. 

And I, for one, believe that it will not be 
seen safely through if those who seek power 
by brute force have reason to believe that 
brute force pays. 

Finally, may I add two additional observa- 

First, Asia is astir with a consciousness of 
the need for Asian initiatives in the solution 
of Asia's problems. Regional development 
and planning are increasingly being recog- 
nized as necessary for political and economic 
progress. The power of nationalism is now 

tempered by a growing realization of the 
need for cooperation among nations. Asians 
seek to preserve their national identity. They 
want gradually to create new international 
structures. But they want to pursue such 
aims themselves. They want foreign assist- 
ance when necessary, but without foreign 

Second, the American people, as well as 
their leaders, need to know more about Asia 
in general and Communist China in particu- 
lar — the relationships of that nation with 
her neighbors in Asia and the Pacific, the 
nature of Chinese Communist ideology and 
behavior, and the operational apparatus of 
Communist parties under Peking leadership 
or influence. The intellectual and political 
resources not only of the United States but 
of the entire free world should be mobilized 
for this effort. In this regard, I want to 
commend the Senate Foreign Relations Com- 
mittee for its hearings on China. 

We have not set ourselves any easy tasks. 
But the tasks, and responsibilities, of the 
most powerful nation in the history of the 
earth are not — cannot be — will not be easy. 

Let me close by making this prediction: 
Ten or twenty years hence historians will 
mark Viet-Nam as a place where our nation 
— and free peoples — were faced with a chal- 
lenge by totalitarianism and where they met 
the challenge. «i 



"Slow by sloiv, in the long of time, we will success." So 
wrote a Vietnamese student, tmdattnted by the frustrations 
of learning English. In these words. Deputy Under Secre- 
tary Johnson told a Canadian audience, are displayed the 
patience and determination that are the strength of the 
people of South Viet-Nam. 

The Issue and Goal in Viet-Nam 

by U. Alexis Johnson 

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^ 

I am deeply honored at this opportunity 
to discuss Viet-Nam before such a distin- 
guished Canadian audience. I know that, 
just as with my own countrymen, many of 
you are concerned with the situation there 
and have difficulty in sorting out seemingly 
contradictory assertions and conflicting news 
reports regarding Viet-Nam. Perhaps all too 
often people on one side of the issue or the 
other succumb to the temptation to make 
categorical statements that this course or 
that course is the only honorable course of 
action. I hope to avoid this temptation today 
and rather to discuss with you out of my 
own experience as factually as I can what is 
going on there and the role of the United 

I first want to state plainly why we, the 
United States, are in Viet-Nam; then to 
address some of the other questions. 

Why are we in Viet-Nam? The real ques- 
tion is not whether Viet-Nam, or indeed 
Southeast Asia, is of such political, strategic, 
or economic importance as to justify the loss 
of American lives and treasure. Rather, the 
question is the worldwide issue of prevent- 

' Address made before the Canadian Club of Mon- 
treal at Montreal, Canada, on Mar. 14 (press re- 
lease 50). 

ing the Communists from breaking by force 
any of the lines that were drawn in the 
various postwar settlements. 

Since the end of World War II, when the 
United States was propelled onto the center 
of the world's stage as a leading power, our 
goal, which is to say our policy, has been to 
develop and maintain a stable relationship 
among the world's powers in this uncom- 
monly volatile period of the world's history. 
Since 1945 we have committed the integrity 
of our nation to a variety of agreements 
specifically designed to maintain that stabil- 
ity, a stability whose purpose is to preserve 
the freedom of each nation to devote its 
assets and energies to its own development. 

As far as South Viet-Nam is concerned, 
acting through our representatives, we com- 
mitted ourselves by a Senate vote of 82 to 1 
to the SEATO treaty of 1954, reaffirmed by 
a vote of 502 to 2 in Congress as a whole in 
1964.2 (In assessing attitudes in the United 
States, you will want to note that 2 weeks 
ago a motion to repeal this latter resolution 
was defeated 92 to 5 in the Senate and was 
never brought to a vote in the House.) 

This is the issue. This is the goal. This 

- For text of a joint resolution of Aug. 10, 1964, 
see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


is our purpose. And our ability to honor 
these commitments is, we believe, critical to 
the well-being of every free man, woman, 
and child — for failure to honor our commit- 
ments one place cannot but call into question 
our commitments elsewhere and thus en- 
courage miscalculation by the other side. 

Many of the questions coming out of the 
present debate concern the NLF, or the so- 
called "National Liberation Front." State- 
ments are made that what is going on in 
South Viet-Nam is a purely internal revolt 
against an unpopular government by a dis- 
contented population. Any discussion of the 
NLF also involves the issue of whether or 
not the Viet Cong represent an indigenous 
uprising. What are some of the facts? 

Before 1960 no one in or out of Viet-Nam 
had even heard of the NLF. It was in that 
year that Hanoi Radio announced the forma- 
tion of the NLF. Perhaps a bit of history is 
in order here. 

The Historical Baclcground 

In bringing about the termination of hos- 
tilities in Viet-Nam, the Geneva agreement 
of 1954 3 separated North and South Viet- 
Nam from each other by a 5-mile demili- 
tarized zone. The northern part of the 
country, with its capital at Hanoi, was under 
the control of the Viet Minh, while Saigon 
became the capital of what had been central 
and South Viet-Nam. The two separate en- 
tities were obliged not to interfere with each 
other until agreement could be reached be- 
tween them on when and how they could be 
unified. In this, the situation was very sim- 
ilar to that of Germany and Korea. 

However, we have since learned quite 
dramatically that Ho Chi Minh's government 
in Hanoi never had any intention of allowing 
the South Vietnamese freely to choose their 
own government and run their own affairs 
until agreement could be reached on unifica- 
tion. There were areas of South Viet-Nam 
nominally under Viet Minh control at the 
time of the 1954 agreement. These Viet 

^ For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950- 
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State 
publication 6446, p. 750. 


Minh were ordered by Hanoi to hide their 
arms and to do what they could to frustrate 
the attempts at administration made by the 
South Vietnamese Government. Ho Chi 
Minh was reasonably convinced that the 
South Vietnamese Government would easily 
crumble with the help of the subversion 
which he directed. 

In connection with the charge that the 
United States violated the 1954 Geneva ac- 
cords by not supporting elections in 1956, I 
might note that such elections were indeed 
the goal set by the final declaration of that 
conference. The declaration stipulated that 
free elections should be held throughout 
Viet-Nam in July 1956 under international 

In 1955 and 1956 the South Vietnamese 
Government maintained that it would agree 
to such elections if they were genuinely free 
and internationally supervised throughout 
Viet-Nam and not just in South Viet-Nam. 
The United States, although not a party to 
the Geneva accords, consistently favored 
genuinely free elections under U.N. supervi- 
sion, as has been our consistent position and 
that of most members of the U.N. with 
respect to Korea. It was clear, however, in 
1956 that no more than any other Commu- 
nist government was the Hanoi government 
prepared to allow such elections, and accord- 
ingly the elections were not held. Thus it is 
a travesty on the truth to allege that the 
present situation was brought about by the 
failure of the South to carry out the 1954 
accords. In fact, it was the North that was 
not willing to submit itself to the test of 
free elections under international control. 

By 1956 Ho Chi Minh had realized that he 
would be unable to subvert the Saigon-led 
government without military action. As a 
result, in 1956 Hanoi began rebuilding, re- 
organizing, and expanding the military ma- 
chine which they had left behind in South 
Viet-Nam when the Viet Minh had sup- 
posedly withdrawn to the North. To supple- 
ment the revitalized Viet Minh in the South, 
southern-born former Vietnamese who had 
gone north were conscripted for intensive 
training and political indoctrination and were 



returned to South Viet-Nam to serve as the 
hard core of the so-called "indigenous force" 
of the Viet Cong. 

By 1959-1960 Hanoi had built up a military 
capability in the South which enabled them 
to step up their actions considerably beyond 
the small-scale guerrilla activity to which 
they had confined themselves up to that 

Origin of National Liberation Front 

Their hopes of a cheap and easy victory 
now gone, the Communist regime in the 
North made some far-reaching decisions 
which they made no effort to conceal. 

At the Third Lao Dong (Communist) 
Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960, 
Ho Chi Minh said that the North must "step 
up the national democratic people's revolu- 
tion in the South." Other similar speeches 
were made, and at its conclusion the Party 
Congress called for the formation of a 
"National United Front" in the South. Three 
months later, that is in December 1960, 
Hanoi radio announced the formation of a 
"Front for Liberation of the South." 

This is the origin of the so-called "Na- 
tional Liberation Front" in South Viet-Nam. 
It was then, and still is, a pure creature and 
tool of the North Vietnamese regime. Its 
so-called "leadership" contains not a single 
nationally known figure. In a true sense, it 
is as faceless to the outside world as it is to 
the Vietnamese people. Thus it is not a 
"national front," and it is certainly not a 
"liberation front," for its purpose has noth- 
ing to do with "liberation" — quite the op- 

Of real significance on this point is the 
fact that no one South Vietnamese political 
figure of any note whatever has ever asso- 
ciated himself with the NLF. No member 
of any Saigon government has ever defected 
to the NLF. And religious, labor, and stu- 
dent leaders have consistently refused to as- 
sociate themselves with the movement. 

It is also important that we understand 
the distinction between the NLF and the 
Viet Cong armed forces. The NLF has little 
or nothing to do with the command of the 

Viet Cong, especially the main force, or reg- 
ular Viet Cong battalions and regiments in 
the South. These main-force units and other 
Viet Cong elements are supported, supplied, 
and controlled from Hanoi, and only Hanoi 
can direct them to cease their aggression. 
The NLF is purely the political facade or, as 
the name plainly states, the political front 
for Hanoi. It cannot bring about an end to 
the fighting. This can only be done by 
Hanoi itself. 

Aggression From North Viet-Nam 

The movement of military personnel from 
North Viet-Nam into the South became so 
flagrant after 1960 that it was noticed and 
publicized by the Legal Committee of the 
International Commission for Supervision 
and Control, which, as you know, is composed 
of India, Poland, and Canada. 

The Legal Committee, with only Poland 
objecting, reported in 1962: 

. . . there is evidence to show that arms, armed 
and unarmed personnel, munitions and other sup- 
plies have been sent from the Zone in the North 
to the Zone in the South with the objective of sup- 
porting, organizing and carrying out hostile activi- 
ties, including armed attacks, directed against the 
Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in 
the South. 

. . . there is evidence that the PAVN (i.e., the 
North Vietnamese army) has allowed the Zone in 
the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and 
supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the 
South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administra- 
tion in the South. 

I might note that at that time there was 
not a single American combat soldier in 
Viet-Nam or elsewhere on the mainland of 
Southeast Asia. 

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961 the 
North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000 
men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 addi- 
tional personnel were infiltrated. And by 
the end of 1964 North Viet-Nam may well 
have moved over 40,000 armed and un- 
armed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam. To- 
day we have every reason to believe that nine 
regiments of regular North Vietnamese 
forces are fighting in organized units in 
South Viet-Nam. So you can clearly see that 
our whole involvement in South Viet-Nam 

APRIL 4, 1966 


is based on the fact that the Viet Cong is 
not an indigenous revolt — quite the contrary. 
It is as much a case of outside aggression as 
if Hanoi had boldly moved those nine regi- 
ments in marching formation across the 17th 

That is the heart of our involvement. 

Question of a Coalition Government 

Another question frequently raised in 
recent days is the attitude of the South 
Vietnamese toward now entering into a po- 
litical coalition with the NLF or the Viet 
Cong as a means of bringing the fighting 
to an end. 

To understand the attitude of the South 
Vietnamese leaders in this regard they do 
not have to refer to the experience of 
Czechoslovakia, Poland, or other such West- 
ern experiments in the postwar period. They 
look to their own experience. 

The Hanoi government, or the Viet Minh, 
as recognized by the French in 1946, was 
originally a coalition of both Communists 
and non-Communist nationalists opposing 
the French. But the image of the Viet 
Minh as a true representative government 
vanished in the eyes of anti-French but 
non-Communist Vietnamese as they were 
systematically liquidated or expelled in the 
period between 1946 and 1950. Many of the 
political leaders I met in South Viet-Nam 
spoke with great bitterness of their ex- 
perience in seeking to work with the Viet 
Minh during that period and of their rela- 
tives and friends who were dispossessed or 
assassinated as the Communists sought to 
establish their absolute control. It is thus 
not hard to understand how they feel on 
this subject. 

It is also interesting to note what the 
Viet Cong has publicly said on the ways to 
gain control of the Government. They have 
said that there are three ways. One method 
is to have a general uprising if the proper 
political base can be prepared. In this they 
have clearly failed. Another method is the 
famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary 
guerrilla war; that is the strategy they are 
now pursuing. Or the third possibility is for 

the Viet Cong to become a part of a coali- 
tion government. This they would clearly 
prefer if it became possible. 

Also pertinent to the South Vietnamese 
attitudes is the brutality and terrorism 
which they have experienced at the hands 
of the Viet Cong. From 1958 to the present 
the Viet Cong has assassinated or kid- 
naped an estimated 61,000 Vietnamese vil- 
lage leaders and Government representa- 
tives. Just this last January, for example, 
Viet Cong terrorists massacred 26 men, 
women, and children and wounded 56 others 
in a brutal sweep 40 miles south of Da Nang. 
The Viet Cong has systematically intimi- 
dated anyone who had a position of leader- 
ship in the community. Their war is not just 
directed at the South Vietnamese Armed 
Forces but equally important against the 
administrative structure of the Vietnamese 
Government. One must bear this fact 
in mind when assessing the performance of 
the Vietnamese Government, which is also 
faced by the problems of any newly inde- 
pendent country, especially one that had no 
real preparation for independence. 

The Common Commitment 

Others have raised the question of 
whether the United States is fighting in 
Viet-Nam when the non-Communist Viet- 
namese will not fight for themselves — or 
whether the United States is "going it 
alone" in South Viet-Nam. 

The simple truth is that this is just not 
the case. The South Vietnamese Armed 
Forces are at a strength of approximately 
600,000 men. Eleven thousand South Viet- 
namese soldiers lost their lives in battle last 
year — and it is very much their cause. All 
but two members of SEATO are substan- 
tially and directly contributing to the cause, 
and one nonmember, Korea, has already 
contributed more than one full division and 
has announced plans to contribute another 
division of ground forces. 

The Government of South Viet-Nam is 
very much aware that the battle they fight 
is only partially a military one. They real- 
ize that if they are to gain and hold the po- 



litical confidence of an ever-increasing por- 
tion of the population they must assure 
that a real social and economic revolution 
takes place successfully in Viet-Nam. This 
is the problem that they took the initiative 
in discussing with us at Honolulu last 
month.* I want to quote to you from the 
Declaration of Honolulu, for this sets forth 
more succinctly than anything else I know 
our purposes there : 

The President of the United States and the Chief 
of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of 
Vietnam are thus pledged again: 

to defense against aggression, 

to the work of social revolution, 

to the goal of free self-government, 

to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease, 

and to the unending quest for peace. 

Of particular significance is the fact that 
this statement came almost verbatim from 
Prime Minister Ky's own opening statement 
at the conference. Prime Minister Ky and 
his government are keenly aware of the 
magnitude of the task they face. 

The Saigon Government is faced with 
not only fighting a war but with making 
compatible the complicated regional dif- 
ferences between the Southerners, the 
Northerners, and the people of the center. 
They must deal with a great diversity of ra- 
cial groups, such as the Khmers, Chams, 
Nungs, as well as the so-called mountain 

Add to this the complication of the ever- 
growing refugee population. Even without 
the present fighting, they were already 
faced with caring for nearly 1 million refu- 
gees who fled to the South from North 
Viet-Nam following the 1954 Geneva agree- 
ment. In recent months hundreds of thou- 
sands of other refugees have left Viet Cong- 
controlled areas, particularly in the central 
part of the country. 

Another significant but relatively unpub- 
licized development in recent months has 
been the success of the chieu hoi or "open 
arms" amnesty program of the South Viet- 
namese Government. This is a program de- 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, 
p. 302. 

signed to persuade the Viet Cong and their 
supporters to return their loyalties to the 
Government. While this program has been 
nominally conducted since 1963, it has this 
last year begun to enjoy the kind of success 
that had been hoped for. 

The 1965 results are most impressive. 
More than 42,000 persons defected from the 
Viet Cong to seek Government protection 
last year. A substantial percentage of these 
were full- or part-time Viet Cong military 
and sympathizers. These figures represent 
a dramatic increase over 1964, and the first 
2 months of this year indicate that the 
number seeking Government protection con- 
tinues to grow. 

In this connection you should not be mis- 
led by the figures sometimes published on 
so-called desertion rates in the South Viet- 
namese forces. As with any young army this 
is of course a problem and a serious one, but 
this should not be mistaken for popular 
sympathy with the Viet Cong. Many of 
these "deserters" are what you and we 
would term AWOL or "absent without offi- 
cial leave." Many return to their home 
areas to tend their crops and then reenlist 
in the citizens militia in a local unit, or re- 
turn to their own units. Some leave to tend 
to family matters for a time and then reap- 
pear. Defection to the Viet Cong is very 

We are all hopeful that an ever-improving 
esprit de corps will steadily decrease the 
number of men who absent themselves in 
this manner. 

Purpose of U.S. Air Raids 

Now just a word on the bombing of 
North Viet-Nam. The purpose of these air 
raids has been and remains an attempt to 
restrict the ability of the North Vietnamese 
to move, equip, and supply their troops in 
South Viet-Nam. At no point has it been the 
mission of these air raids to destroy the 
North Vietnamese regime. 

Our action has consisted of a careful, 
precise, and restrained application of air 
power against military targets and military 
lines of supply and communication in North 

APRIL 4, 1966 


Viet-Nam. It is not dii'ected at the civilian 
population of North Viet-Nam but at the 
means by which the Hanoi government is 
attempting to support its aggression in the 
South. It is not directed at the destruction 
of North Viet-Nam but rather at the will 
and ability of the leaders in Hanoi to con- 
tinue their aggression. 

While retribution or revenge is not its 
purpose, many of the people of South Viet- 
Nam feel that it is small repayment for 
what Hanoi's agents have inflicted on them 
over the years — the sabotage and destruc- 
tion of the thousands of bridges, and miles 
of roads and railroad, and the tens of thou- 
sands of victims, military and civilian. I 
am satisfied that this action, together with 
the action in the South, ultimately will as- 
sist in demonstrating to Hanoi that their 
present course is untenable. 

Bombing raids were suspended on Decem- 
ber 24 and remained suspended until Janu- 
ary 31. Many had said that such a suspen- 
sion of air raids would open the door for ne- 
gotiations with Hanoi. We had been told 
that such a move could possibly result in the 
suspension of North Vietnamese efforts to 
infiltrate South Viet-Nam or could reduce 
their attacks there. The result was quite 
the opposite. During the pause in the bomb- 
ing, they stepped up their supply activities 
and made every possible move to reinforce 
their garrisons in the South. There was no 
reduction in the level of their terrorism and 
military activity in the South. 

As their supply efforts intensified, our 
decision to renew the action against facilities 
and supply routes supporting their aggres- 
sion in the South became imperative for the 
protection of all of the forces opposing the 
Viet Cong in the South. When announcing 
the resumption of air action. President John- 
son said :^ 

Our effort has met with understanding and sup- 
port throughout most of the world, but not in Hanoi 
and Peking. From those two capitals have come 
only denunciation and rejection. . . . 

The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that 
was published 3 days ago. They persist in aggres- 

sion. . . . Throughout these 37 days, even at mo- 
ments of truce, there has been continued violence 
against the people of South Viet-Nam, against their 
Government, against their soldiers, and against our 
own American forces. 

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We 
yield to none in our determinaiton to seek peace. We 
have given a full and decent respect to the opinions 
of those who thought that such a pause might give 
new hope for peace in the world. 

Economic and Social Development 

No one in the United States Government 
believes that the real victory in Viet-Nam is 
primarily to be a military victory. For we 
know that any significant, lasting peace — 
the kind of peace that will permit individual 
and social growth — is so intricately woven 
to the complex patterns of political, social, 
religious, and economic life as to make re- 
forms in these areas mandatory, even while 
the necessary military pursuits are taking 

You are all familiar with President John- 
son's oft-repeated pledge of $1 billion in 
economic aid to the Southeast Asian region, 
including the rebuilding of the war-torn land 
of South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam. 
You know of the provisions recently made 
through the Asian Development Bank to fur- 
ther similar goals.* 

In fact, even our programs and personnel 
are taking every opportunity to try to im- 
prove the poor economic and social condi- 
tions under which so many of the Vietnam- 
ese people live. United States armed 
forces have to date given medical treat- 
ment to 41/2 million Vietnamese. They have 
distributed over 1,600,000 tons of foodstuffs 
plus 100,000 tons of other commodities. New 
hospitals are being built in many parts of 
the land. The United States AID Mission is 
rapidly expanding its medical assistance pro- 
grams. During the past year these pro- 
grams included training some 270 Vietnam- 
ese doctors and nurses, providing serum 
for the inoculation of 7 million persons, 
mostly children, and furnishing logistical 
support and medical supplies for Army 

'Ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222. 

' See p. 521. 



medical teams operating in six provincial 
I hospitals. 

On the conviction that a truly free people 
must be literate people, a significant por- 
tion of our aid to Viet-Nam is now in the 
area of education. School enrollment has 
dramatically increased so that now over 2 
million students are enrolled in schools as 
compared to just over 1.3 million in 1960. 
With assistance from Australia and the Re- 
public of China, we have produced some 
SV2 million school textbooks written in Viet- 
namese by Vietnamese educators for the 
benefit of these and future students. By 
the end of this year we hope that 14 million 
texts will have been distributed — at least 
four books for each child in school. 

The Government of South Viet-Nam is 
keenly aware that economic growth and 
land reforms are imperative. The industrial 
production index rose 2i/^ percent between 
1962 and 1964. Since 1957, 600,000 acres of 
farmland have been distributed to 115,000 
farmers, and Prime Minister Ky has re- 
cently inaugurated a new phase of the pro- 
gram which will distribute a further 650,000 
acres to some 150,000 farmers. 

Herein lies the irony of the whole predica- 
ment. President Johnson pinpointed this for 
us in a speech last week ' when he said : 
"It is more than a shame; it is a crime — 
perhaps the greatest crime of man — that so 
much courage, and so much will, and so 
many dreams must be carelessly flung on 
the fires of death and war." 

I am convinced that, with our continued 
support, these valiant and courageous peo- 
ple will be freed from violence and terror 
to pursue that normal life to which every 
man under God is entitled. 
^ Part of the strength of these people with- 
out question is their patience and endurance. 
Theirs is the kind of patience and de- 
termination displayed in a letter recently 
received by one of my staff from an Asian 
student. The student, undaunted by the 
frustrations of learning English, wrote, 
"Slow by slow, in the long of time, we will 

If Thomas Paine were alive today, he 
could indeed say that "These are the times 
that try men's souls." But which of us 
would not agree with the words of the late 
President Kennedy when he said, "I do not 
believe that any of us would exchange places 
with any other people or any other gen- 
eration." * 

The "14 Points" 

The integrity of freedom and peace in 
Southeast Asia is no less important to free 
people than it was in Berlin or Korea. Ag- 
gression is no less aggression because it is 
taking place in what seems a distant Viet- 
Nam. We need not repeat the words 
of Neville Chamberlain, who described the 
German assault on Czechoslovakia as "a 
quarrel in a far-off country between people 
of whom we know nothing." Aggression is 
no less aggression because it moves by 
stealth beneath an Asian jungle cover or in 
the dark of the night. 

The U.S. Government has and will con- 
tinue to meet this situation soberly and re- 
sponsibly, as I am convinced this is what 
the American people always expect of their 
Government. As with any enterprise worth 
our blood and treasure, there are risks. We 
have and will continue to do all we can to 
minimize these risks, but we cannot shrjnk 
from those not of our making, for to do so 
would leave the field to the aggressor. This, 
I am sure, is not the wish of most Ameri- 
cans. An essential element of this course is 
at all times to leave open the door to an 
honorable, just, and peaceful solution. This 
we have done and will continue to do. As Sec- 
retary Rusk said the other day, we have of- 
fered everything except to turn South Viet- 
Nam over to the Communists. It is my con- 
viction that the American people do not 
want to do that. We ask for no surrender 
by Hanoi; we ask only that they stop what 
they are doing to the people of the South. 

Our Government has made its position 
known repeatedly around the world in our 
recent and continuing peace efforts. Our of- 

' Bulletin of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 441 

"Ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175. 

APRIL 4, 1966 



ficially stated position has come to be 
known as the "14 points." * Perhaps a re- 
iteration of these points is in order: 

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are 
an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia; 

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast 
Asia or on any part thereof; 

3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre- 
conditions" as the 17 nations put it; 

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions 
as President Johnson put it; 

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first 
order of business at a conference or could be the 
subject of preliminary discussions; 

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along 
with other points which others might wish to 

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia; 

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South 
Viet-Nam after peace is assured; 

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam 
to give the South Vietnamese a government of their 
own choice; 

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam 
should be determined by the Vietnamese through 
their own free decision; 

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non- 
aligned or neutral if that be their option; 

12. We would much prefer to use our resources 
for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia 
than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam 
could participate in a regional effort to which we 
would be prepared to contribute at least one billion 
dollars ; 

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would 
not have difficulty being represented and having 
their views represented if for a moment Hanoi de- 
cided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think 
that would be an insurmountable problem." '° 

14. We have said publicly and privately that we 
could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a 
step toward peace although there has not been the 
slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to 
what they would do if the bombing stopped. 

I do not minimize the trials that may lie 
ahead. However, I do feel that the tide has 
begun to turn and that, with a determina- 
tion and perseverance no less than that of 
the other side, we can achieve the objectives 
of ourselves and the free people of South 
Viet-Nam without a larger war. I am satis- 
fied that the American people do have that 
determination and perseverance. When 

• See also ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225. 

" At a new conference on July 28, 1965. 

Hanoi and Peking are convinced that this is 
the case, a peaceful solution can be found. I 
am sure that you join me in the hope that 
that day will soon come. 

14 NATO Nations Declare Alliance 
Essential to Common Security 

Folloiving is the text of a joint declaration 
agreed upon by 14 member nations of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which 
was released simultaneoiisly in each of the 
nations on March 18. 

White House press release dated March 18 

The following declaration has been agreed 
between the Heads of Governments of Bel- 
gium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic 
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxem- 
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, 
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United 

The North Atlantic Treaty and the orga- 
nization established under it are both alike 
essential to the security of our countries. 

The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its ef- 
ficacy as an instrument of defense and 
deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime 
of an integrated and interdependent military 
organization in which, as in no previous 
alliance in history, the efforts and resources 
of each are combined for the common secu- 
rity of all. We are convinced that this orga- 
nization is essential and will continue. No 
system of bilateral arrangements can be a 

The North Atlantic Treaty and the orga- 
nization are not merely instruments of the 
common defense. They meet a common 
political need and reflect the readiness and 
determination of the member countries of 
the North Atlantic community to consult and 
act together wherever possible in the safe- 
guard of their freedom and security and in 
the furtherance of international peace, prog- 
ress and prosperity. 



President Hails Fifth Anniversary 
of the Alliance for Progress 

statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated March 14 

My fellow citizens of the hemisphere: 
Since becoming President, I have often re- 
stated my own, and our country's, resolute 
commitment to the goal of a better life for 
all the people of the Western Hemisphere. 

Many Presidents have worked to shape 
that goal. 

We are proud of the good-neighbor policy 
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. 

President Eisenhower broke new and fer- 
tile ground with the Act of Bogota in 1960 
— an act growing from the understanding 
compassion of one people for another. 

President Kennedy built on these efforts 
and gave them increased emphasis with the 
announcement of the Alliance for Progress 
on March 13, 1961, 5 years ago. 

Today, by word and deed, Americans are 
helping to fulfill the hopes of those who have 
little and pray that one day they can have 

The Johnson administration seeks his- 
tory's description as a time when, the dream- 
ing and the planning having laid the founda- 
tions, the doing and building were underway. 

The last 2 years of this vast cooperative 
effort between the United States and the 
nations of Latin America are solid evidence 
that deeds are matching our words. During 
these 2 years Latin America has achieved a 
per capita growth rate of 2.5 percent. The 
average rate for the preceding 3 years was 
less than 1 percent. This recent increase of 
150 percent is a fact which friends of the 
hemisphere must note with pride — and new 
hope for the future. 

In fiscal years 1965 and 1966 those Latin 
American countries cooperating with U.S. 
programs of action are putting visible re- 
sults before their people. Together we are: 

— improving 7,000 miles of road 
— building 130,000 dwelling units 
— irrigating 136,000 new acres of farm- 

— adding 530,000 kilowatts to power gen- 
erating capacity 

— providing classrooms for 1 million stu- 

— building 450 new health facilities 

— spending $200 million to provide financ- 
ing for expansion and construction of over 
5,000 industrial firms 

— spending $250 million in providing agri- 
cultural credit to 450,000 farmers. 

Equally important, reforms are changing 
and modernizing the institutions in Latin 
America essential to the grovirth of a sense 
of community that stretches throughout the 
hemisphere. Governments, business con- 
cerns, labor unions, and cooperatives are 
working with the people of our hemisphere 
to attain economic and social progress under 
free institutions. 

— We are building the machinery of co- 
operation through the Inter-American Com- 
mittee on the Alliance for Progress. 

— We are enlisting the support of private 
groups and voluntary agencies in ever-in- 
creasing measure. The Peace Corps, Part- 
ners for the Alliance, Council on Latin 
America, AFL-CIO, private foundations and 
universities are making vital contributions. 

— We are introducing the principle of 
mutual aid among the Latin American na- 
tions. We are giving new energy to eco- 
nomic integration within Latin America. 
The Economic and Social Act of Rio de 
Janeiro, 1 approved last November, gives 
impetus to these concepts. 

— We recognize that fulfillment of all our 
goals will require continuation of our joint 
efforts beyond 1971. I said last November 
that the United States is prepared to extend 
mutual commitments beyond the period 
originally foreseen in the Charter of Punta 
del Este.2 Self-help and mutual aid will be 
yardsticks in determining the scope of our 

In country after country, nations in the 
hemisphere are acting to mobilize resources 
for public and private investment, to reform 

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998. 
'Ibid., p. 987. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


and modernize the institutions, to expand 
trade and market opportunities within and 
outside the hemisphere, and to provide a 
solid base for the support and cooperation 
of imported capital and technical assistance. 

External support is also coming in increas- 
ing measure from the Inter-American De- 
velopment Bank, the World Bank and its 
affiliates, and the United Nations. This sup- 
port has increased by about $200 million in 
the last 2 years. 

For its part, the United States has already 
committed nearly $5 billion to the nations of 
Latin America to assist them in their 
struggle to modernize and achieve a better 
life for their people. In recent months sig- 
nificant steps have been taken to give Latin 
America greater access to our markets; 

— This administration has insisted that 
our participation in the International Coffee 
Agreement be more effective. 

— This administration recommended the 
Congress withdraw the special import fee 
on sugar. 

— This administration removed the quota 
restrictions on lead and zinc* 

After a temporary period of setback, there 
are now most hopeful signs of a renewal of 
large-scale private foreign investment in 
Latin American development, often in joint 
ventures with Latin American associates. 
Business leaders interested in Latin Ameri- 
can investment have been invited to the 
Cabinet Room frequently to discuss steps to 
help the people of the hemisphere. 

Three years ago the 19 Latin American 
countries were deeply concerned over their 
trade position in the world. During the past 
2 years the trend has changed. 

Our experts now predict that export earn- 
ings for 1965 will show an increase of $1 

' For a statement by President Johnson on Oct. 
22, 1965, and text of Proclamation 3683, see ibid., 
Nov. 15, 1965, p. 795. 

billion over the 1963 level, providing addi- 
tional resources for investment in develop- 

Yet we must do more than provide money 
and technical assistance and improve trade. 
Investments must be made directly in human 
beings. In every forum I have advocated 
and directed that American resources be in- 
vested in education, health, and improved 
living and working conditions. Such efforts 
are not easy to organize. They require the 
mobilization of human resources in scarce 
supply. But they are among the most re- 
warding of all investments. 

Today I want to issue a new call to our 
sister nations in the hemisphere to enlarge 
our truly revolutionary cause — the cause of 
enlarging the lives of all our people. 

I am determined to contribute America's 
resources to this spirit of change — a spirit 
now slowly, surely, confidently growing in 
the Western Hemisphere. 

All of us in the Organization of American 
States have seen and understand the lessons 
of history. Together we are strong. Divided 
we are weak. Together we must shape the 
future to our hopes. 

In every nation in the hemisphere the 
needs and the beliefs and the prayers are 
the same. We want peace and opportunity 
— the chance to live in dignity, to choose and 
plan and work and achieve the best for our 

I believe that in the next 5 years we will 
see a continent constantly growing in pros- 
perity and in unity, growing in its capacity 
to meet the desires and needs of its own peo- 
ple and in its contribution to peace and free- 
dom in the world at large. That is what 
Bogota and Rio and Punta del Este were all 

For my own part, I want to help make all 
this a reality and "to create out of the 
human spirit, something that did not exist 
before." This is fulfillment. And this is our 




America and Britain: Unity of Purpose 

by Arthur J. Goldberg 
U.S. Representative to the United Nations^ 

We are taunted by some that we are 
standing alone in Southeast Asia. This is 
obviously not true when we consider that 
your commitment in Malaysia and the com- 
mitment of the United States and its fight- 
ing allies in Viet-Nam are the major ele- 
ments looking toward stability and resist- 
ance to aggression in that troubled area. 
The presence of valorous contingents of 
fighting men from the United States, New 
Zealand, Australia, Korea, and, last but not 
least, the Government of South Viet-Nam is 
the soundest guarantee of an ordered and 
peaceful world that we have today. But 
even if it were true that we stood alone in 
Viet-Nam, we recall that England a quarter 
of a century ago proved to the democratic 
world that to stand and fight alone is not 
necessarily final proof of a country's im- 
morality and decadence. 

Professor A. J. P. Taylor, with whom one 
need not always agree, expressed it in 
rather epic fashion in his recent work 
English History; 1914-45. If I may quote 

The British were the only people who went 
through both world wars from beginning to end. Yet 
they remained a peaceful and civilized people. Tol- 
erant, patient and generous. Traditional values 
lost much of their force. Other values took their 
place. Imperial greatness was on the way out; the 
welfare state on the way in. The British Empire 
declined; the condition of the people improved. Few 

' Address made before the Pilgrim Society at Lon- 
don, England, on Mar. 4 (U.S. /U.N. press release 

sang "Land of Hope and Glory." Fewer even sang 
"England, Arise." England has risen all the same. 

So writes Professor Taylor. 

England stands and so does that alliance 
forged by our histories, by our literature, 
our cultures, by our peoples. Whatever our 
disagreements have been, they have never 
threatened this compact based upon mutual 
faith and trust. 

For one thing, we are agreed on certain 
basic concepts of law and our dedication to 
the rule of law, both domestically and in the 
world. And we are agreed on the meaning 
of freedom, too. It was Abraham Lincoln 
who said that freedom seldom means the 
same thing to a wolf as it means to a lamb. 
Build a shelter to protect the lambs, and the 
wolves protest that the lambs have lost 
their freedom. Our peoples understand the 
true meaning of freedom and what must be 
done to conserve it. Unlike the Communist 
theoretician, Nikolai Bukharin, we are 
agreed that an unhampered multiparty sys- 
tem or a two-party system is an inseparable 
part of democracy. Before he died in one of 
Stalin's purges, Bukharin said about the So- 
viet Union, and I quote: "We might have a 
two-party system, but one of the parties 
would be in office and the other in prison." 

A World of Interdependent Nations 

Our involvement in Southeast Asia is no 
more in Southeast Asia than was your in- 
volvement in the Danzig Corridor an in- 
volvement in Danzig. Our involvement in 
Greece and Turkey in 1947 was not pri- 

APRIL 4, 1966 


marily geographic, nor was our involvement 
and yours during the 1948 Berlin blockade, 
any more than were your risks and your in- 
volvement for a decade in Malaya. Our in- 
volvement in Korea in 1950 and our involve- 
ment in the Cuban missile crisis were not 
merely geographic. All this should be obvi- 
ous to anyone who has watched the free 
world since 1945 seeking peace and relaxa- 
tion of tensions. Our involvements over- 
seas have been uppermost a part of the in- 
tegral concomitant of our search for peace, 
the consequences of a lesson learned and 
expressed by President Franklin D. Roose- 

We have learned that we cannot live alone, at 
peace; that our own well-being is dependent upon 
the well-being of other nations far away. . . . We 
have learned to be citizens of the world. . . . 

What President Roosevelt said in 1945 is 
as true today as it ever was. Should Brit- 
ain have yielded to aggression in Malaya 
and have turned over the government to the 
Communist guerrillas as the sole representa- 
tive of the people of Malaya? Yet voices are 
heard in the world today demanding sole 
representation be given to those who have 
unilaterally enunciated a doctrine of so-called 
"liberation wars" and by terror, subversion, 
intimidation, and infiltration now seek to 
enforce that doctrine in South Viet-Nam. 

I'm sure you all remember what Alice 
tells the White Queen in Through the Look- 
ing Glass: that "one can't believe impossible 
things." To which replies the White Queen : 
"I daresay you haven't had much practice. 
When I was your age, I always did it for 
half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've 
believed as many as six impossible things 
before breakfast." 

There are moments when, in reading cer- 
tain of the criticisms against our presence 
in South Viet-Nam, I feel that the White 
Queen would feel right at home with some 
of the critics, except that even she might be 
astounded at how many, many more impos- 
sible things they believe before and even 
after breakfast. 

The most unspoken and unuttered — almost 
concealed — thought of some in the fight 

against the American involvement in South- 
east Asia is : First, America cannot win the 
war in South Viet-Nam; second, while South 
Viet-Nam or, indeed, Southeast Asia may be 
important to American interests, these areas 
are not crucial to those interests. There- 
fore, since we cannot win in a war theater 
where the territory is peripheral to Ameri- 
can interests, let us retreat, let us withdraw 
with no further nonsense. 

In my view, the complete answer is that 
there would be no greater danger to world 
peace than to start segregating mankind 
and the countries they live in as either 
peripheral or crucial. Perhaps in those 
halcyon days when the Congress of Vienna 
was the supreme example of intelligent 
diplomacy, such distinctions had meaning. 
The introduction of Marxism-Leninism into 
world society and the visible determination 
by its militant exponents to implement 
that doctrine through "wars of national 
liberation" has today obliterated such dis- 
tinctions. So has the expansion of technol- 
ogy, which has made this a shrinking world 
of interdependent nations. 

U.S. Seeks No Wider War 

Some who question our involvement in 
Viet-Nam express their fears in terms of 
escalation of the war. No responsible official 
of my Government favors unlimited war nor 
is against a peaceful or "satisfactory" settle- 
ment. If I may say so, the real issue is 
withdrawal or resisting aggression until a 
just settlement based on principles is 
reached at the conference table. 

President Johnson has said over and over 
again that we seek no wider war. In his ad- 
dress on the occasion of receiving the Na- 
tional Freedom Award just a few days ago, 
he said:- 

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited ob- 
jectives. The answer is plain. The answer is "No." 

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the suc- 
cess of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not 
empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domina- 
tion. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful 
conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam. 

" Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390. 



Second, some people ask if we are caught in a 
Wind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong 
toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer, 
again, is a simple "No." 

We are using that force and only that force that 
is necessary to stop this aggression. Our fighting 
men are in Viet-Nam because tens of thousands of 
invaders came south before them. Our numbers have 
increased in Viet-Nam because the aggression of 
others has increased in Viet-Nam. The high hopes 
•of the aggressor have been dimmed, and the tide of 
the battle has been turned, and our measured use of 
force will and must be continued. But this is pru- 
dent firmness under what I believe is careful 
control. There is not, and there will not be, a 
mindless escalation. 

. . . some ask about the risks of a wider war, 
perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China. 
And again the answer is "No," never by any act of 
ours — and not if there is any reason left behind the 
wild words from Peking. 

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We 
seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our 
purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To 
any armed attack, we will reply. We have meas- 
ured the strength and the weakness of others, and 
we think we know our own. We observe in our- 
selves, and we applaud in others, a careful restraint 
in action. We can live with anger in word as long 
as it is matched by caution in deed. 

Attitude of Communist China 

But President Johnson has spoken to ears 
which hear only the echo of their own doc- 
trine. It is not Dennis Healey nor Robert Mc- 
Namara but the Red Chinese Minister, Mar- 
shal Lin Piao, who wrote 6 months ago, and 
I quote : 

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice, 
and suffering on the people. (But) the sacrifice of 
a small number of people in revolutionary wars is 
repaid by security for whole nations. . . . war can 
temper the people and push history forward. In this 
sense, war is a great school. ... In diametrical op- 
position to the Khrushchev revisionists, the (Chi- 
nese) Marxist-Leninists . . . never take a gloomy 
view of war. 

Marshal Lin Piao's statement didn't come 
out of thin air. In his book Problems of 
War and Strategy Mao Tse-tung wrote, and 
this was before 1949 : 

The seizure of power by armed forces, the settle- 
ment of an issue by war, is the central task and 
the highest form of revolution. 

When Mao wrote these words, he lacked 

nuclear capability. Today the story is dif- 
ferent, and the implications of his words 
and those of Marshal Lin are more dreadful. 

Unlike Mao and the Chinese Communist 
leadership, we seek the path of peace and an 
end to the war. Our objective, unlike theirs, 
is limited, and our desire for peace is con- 
stant. And, therefore, consistent with and 
in continuing recognition of our obligation 
to world peace and our responsibility to 
open a door where possible to peaceful 
settlement, we have said that we are ready 
to go to Geneva to discuss peace in South 
Viet-Nam or any other part of Southeast 

But it is said by some that American pol- 
icy is not sufficiently defined. This I dis- 
pute. As one with some experience in ne- 
gotiations, I would say that the matters of 
further definition at issue are better left to 
the negotiating table, particularly since we 
do not possess the mandate — nor would we 
assert one unilaterally — to determine the 
fate of South Viet-Nam without reference 
to the free expression of their will and de- 

We are taxed with being inflexible about 
Communist China, and it is said further 
that this is a barrier to peace. Yet I made 
clear, and most recently at the United Na- 
tions General Assembly, that we are ready 
to participate in an exploratory group, in- 
cluding Red China, to examine the prospects 
for a World Disarmament Conference.^ And, 
perhaps, I should remind skeptics that our 
diplomats have conferred with Red Chinese 
diplomats at the ambassadorial level on 128 
occasions; the longest and most direct 
dialog of any major Western nation with 
Communist China. And we intend and we 
want to continue these meetings in the hope 
that something may come of them. We have 
invited Red Chinese journalists to visit the 
United States and determine for themselves 
the attitude of the American people. 

I can assure you, the question of Com- 
munist China is surely one of the most 
freely discussed subjects in my country, as 


' For background, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1029. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


it is in your country. We have nothing to 
fear in our open society from contending 
opinions about China, or any other country. 
We are asked to reappraise our China policy. 
But when and where has Red China dem- 
onstrated by concrete acts its interest in a 
policy of conciliation which would justify 
such a reappraisal ? 

The torrents of abuse over Radio Peking, 
which intimidate no one, whether in Mos- 
cow, Paris, London, or Washington, voice 
hostility not conciliation. The cold shoulder 
to countries which have extended recogni- 
tion to Red China does not encourage us to 
follow the example. Mass blatant interven- 
tion by force and stealth in Africa, in India, 
in our own hemisphere, call for resistance 
not recognition. Our admiration for the Chi- 
nese people has in no way been attenuated 
by the announced policies of its ruling caste. 
America is not engaged in any belligerent 
acts toward Communist China. It is Com- 
munist China, not the United States, which, 
by the belligerent doctrines of its present 
leadership, seems to have declared a per- 
manent war of so-called "liberation" against 
its neighbors in Asia and against Africa, 
Latin America, and Europe. The recent set- 
backs experienced by Red China in these 
areas show the increasing awareness of many 
of the dangers to world peace and security 
of Chinese policy. It is being systematically 

U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam 

We are ready peacefully to coexist with 
any and all countries regardless of ideology, 
but we are strongly of the view universally 
shared by many others that it is no longer 
possible to countenance aggression against 
peace-loving peoples under whatever pre- 
text — "liberation" or so-called "peoples' 
wars." It has been suggested that in 1984 
we shall intone: "War is peace, slavery is 
freedom"; but this is not 1984, and we do 
not intend to sit idly by and let 1984 

We pray that there be no mistaking our 
resolution and purpose in Southeast Asia. 


There is some dissent in America from our 
policies in Southeast Asia, but grave prob- 
lems do not demand unanimity of opinion for 
their solution. We are a people of many 
opinions and of many voices. I believe in 
this freedom of expression as a great source 
of our strength. I would suggest, however, 
that Peking and Hanoi should make no mis- 
take about America's basic unity of purpose 
in opposing force and aggression. They 
should not be misled by seeing in action a 
freedom they cannot understand and dare 
not allow. 

There is a consensus in America in suj)- 
port of the policy of the United States in 
Viet-Nam, which policy I would summarize 
in this fashion : 

That the United States is prepared for 
discussions or negotiations without any prior 
conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the 
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a 
reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be 
envisaged and that a cease-fire might be 
the first order of business in any discus- 
sions or negotiations, that the United States 
remains prepared to withdraw its forces 
from South Viet-Nam as soon as South 
Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its 
own future without external interference, 
that the United States desires no continuing 
military presence or bases in Viet-Nam, 
that the future political structure in South 
Viet-Nam should be determined by the 
South Vietnamese people themselves 
through democratic processes, and that the 
question of the reunification of the two 
Viet-Nams should be decided by the free de- 
cision of their two peoples and that theitj 
United States will honor the results of such 

The differences in our national debate are 
concerned with how these objectives are to 
be achieved, not with the objectives them- 

Those who say that our Viet-Nam policies 
are the product of a sterile anticommunism 
misconceive our purpose and our philosophy. 
We believe in and we prefer our system, but 
we do not thereby seek forcibly to over- 


throw or subvert Communist countries. On 
the contrary, we seek common understand- 
ings, common undertakings, and peaceful 
resolution of all differences. We have no 
designs on North Viet-Nam, a Communist 
country. We do insist that this Communist 
regime cease its attempt by force, terror, 
and infiltration to enslave South Viet-Nam. 

We take our stand in Viet-Nam because 
we believe a minimum rule of law must pre- 
vail in the world. The rule of law today must 
be defined as providing that no nation may, 
by force or by the dispatch of troops across 
internationally recognized borders or de- 
marcation lines, overthrow another govern- 
ment. If such a rule of law does not prevail, 
anarchy and, ultimately, war will replace an 
uneasy and less than universal peace. 

That is why my Government regards the 
United Nations as a worthy instrument for 
the establishment of a rule of law. We 
realize that the U.N. cannot yet provide the 
final answer nor can it yet guarantee world 
peace, but this is not the fault of the U.N. 
As has v/isely been pointed out, the U.N. is 
but the reflection of the world as it is. Sir 
Alexander Cadogan once pointed out that it 
takes a musician to get harmony out of a 
Stradivarius violin, but if he does not use it 
well, "there is no sense blaming the instru- 
ment — still less smashing it to pieces." 

As I draw to a close, this would be the mo- 
ment to conjure up wild images of a clock 
with the minute hand approaching the zero 
hour of midnight. We are far, far from 
such a reality. Because of some misplaced 
optimism? No, because I believe that man- 
kind will not allow its noblest work to be ex- 
tinguished in a puff of time; because, re- 
gardless of our differences in ideology, we 
know the awful fate which awaits us if we 
fail in our peacekeeping. Somehow I find 
solace in the words of our great Chief Jus- 
tice John Marshall who wrote : 

There are principles of abstract justice which the 
Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of 
His creature, man, and which are admitted to regu- 
late in great degree the right of civilized nations. 

And a great solace and hope comes from 

this faith which our two nations have in 
each other. Our friendship and our respect 
for each other and for other peoples are in 
sharp contrast to those countries which, 
despite factitious ideology and vaunted ideal- 
ism, have chilled comradeship into enmity 
and fragmented an awesome monolith into 
a cascade of polemical shards. Our own 
hopes have not been so ambitious. Rather 
it has been the modest ambition which Mil- 
ton expressed in his Areopagitica : 

For this is not the liberty which we can hope, 
that no grievance ever should arise in the Common- 
wealth, that let no man in this world expect; but 
when complaints are freely heard, deeply consid- 
ered, and speedily reformed, then is the utmost 
sound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for. 

These eloquent words speak for you 
as they do for my country and for those 
countries which enjoy and cherish and 
jealously guard a rule of law. It is for this 
faith that we do battle today as you have 
done in the past and will in the future. 

United States and U.S.S.R. Sign 
Exchanges Agreement for 1966-67 

Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Soviet 
communique released on March 19 (press 
release 59) after the signing of an agree- 
ment 1 on exchanges in the scientific, tech- 
nical, educational, cultural, and other fields 
at Washington on that day. 

The United States of America and the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have 
signed today, March 19, 1966, an Agreement 
on Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical, 
Educational, Cultural and Other Fields for 

The Agreement was signed by John M. 
Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for 
European Affairs, for the United States, and 
by A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United 

' For text, see Department of State press release 
59 dated Mar. 19. 



:APRIL 4, 1966 


states, for the Soviet Union. The Agreement 
entered into force upon signature with effect 
from January 1, 1966 and is the fifth in a 
series of two-year exchanges agreements 
between the two countries.- The first of 
these was signed in Washington on January 
27, 1958. 

The Agreement provides for exchanges in 
the fields of science, technology, agriculture, 

' For text of the agreement for 1958-60, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243; for 1960-61, see 
ibid., Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951 ; for 1962-63, see Treaties 
and Other International Acts Series 5112; for 1964- 
65, see TIAS 5582. 

public health and medical science, education, 
performing arts, publications, exhibitions, 
motion pictures, radio and television, culture 
and the professions, and athletics. 

At the same time, as a part of the Ex- 
changes Agreement for 1966-67, Agree- 
ments were negotiated between the National 
Academy of Sciences of the United States 
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R., 
as well as between the American Council of 
Learned Societies and the Academy of Sci- 
ences of the U.S.S.R., providing for the con- 
tinuance of contacts between American and 
Soviet scientists and scholars. ■ 



Calendar of International Conferences 

Scheduled April Through June 1966 

Inter-American Juridical Committee: Special Meeting . . . 

UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to 
Trade: 2d Part of the Resumed 1st Session. 

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers 
Responsible for Economic Planning in Arab Member States 

OECD Agriculture Committee 

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission : 6th Meeting . 

Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special V^^orking Group . . 

First Pan American Congress of Soil Conservation . . . 

The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Extraor- 
dinary Session. 

Economic Commission for Europe: 21st Plenary Session. 

Rio de Janeiro . . . Apr. 1-30 

Geneva Apr. 4-13 

Tripoli Apr. 9-14 

Paris Apr. 12-15 

Washington .... Apr. 12-16 

Geneva Apr. 12-16 

Sao Paulo Apr. 12-29 

The Hague .... Apr. 13-26 

Geneva Apr. 13-29 

^ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 15, 1966, lists 
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April- 
June 1966. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interest- 
ed in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library 
of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20402. 

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of In- 
dustrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT, Internation- 
al Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Eco- 
nomic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic 
Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social 
Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA, 
International Atomic Energy Agency; lAIAS, Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; ICAO, 
International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration; 
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization: ITU, 
International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization 
for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan 
American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNC- 
TAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal 
Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization. 



ICAO Aeronautical Information Services, Aeronautical Charts 
Divisional Meeting. 

ITU CCITT Study Group XI 

lAIAS Governing Board: 5th Meeting and 11th Technical 
Advisory Council Meeting. 

FAO Group on Grains 

Inter- American Permanent Committee on Social Security: 
13th Meeting. 

IAEA Panel on Genetical Aspects of Radiosensitivity . . . 

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Pood Pro- 
gram: 9th Session. 

PAHO Executive Committee: 54th Session 

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Subcom- 
mittee on Science and Technology. 

FAO Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa 

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 

Special Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . . 

OECD Special Committee on Iron and Steel 

UNESCO Coordinating Council on International Hydro- 
logical Decade: 2d Session. 

U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission 

CENTO Ministerial Council: 14th Session 

ECE Committee on Gas: Meeting of Rapporteurs on Natural 
Gas Reserve. 

UNCTAD U.N. Sugar Conference: 2d Session of the Con- 
sultative Committee. 

ECE Steel Committee: Working Group on the Steel Market 

Inter-American Development Bank Board of Governors: 
7th Meeting. 


WMO/ECAFE Interregional Seminar (Assessment of Magni- 
tude Frequency of Flood Flows). 

International Coffee Council: 8th Session 

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development . . . 

ECE Steel Committee: Ad Hoc Group of Rapporteurs on 
World Market for Iron Ore. 

EGA Conference on North African Industrial Harmonization 

OECD Fiscal Committee 

FAO Seminar on Cooperative Farming for English-Speaking 
Countries of Asia and the Far East. 

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Special Session . . . 

FAO Atlantic Tuna Conference of Plenipotentiaries . . . 

UNESCO Executive Board: 72d Meeting 

UNCTAD U.N. Cocoa Conference: 2d Session 

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee 

ICEM Council: 25th Session 

ICEM Executive Committee: 27th Session 

19th WHO Assembly 

ITU CCITT Special Study Group B 

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices 

2d Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor . . . 

ECE Coal Committee: Group of Experts on Opencast Mining 

ITU Administrative Council 

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 4th Meeting . . . 

Economic Commission for Latin America: 11th Meeting . . 

U.N. Committee on Space Research : 9th Plenary Meeting and 
7th International Space Symposium. 

ECAFE Asian Development Bank: Preparatory Committee 

ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 10th Meeting . . 

International Secretariat for Volunteer Service: Council 

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 15th Session of Exe- 
cutive Committee. 

ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party 
on Mechanization of Agriculture. 

International Rubber Study Group: 18th Meeting .... 

IMCO Council: 16th Session 

BIRPI Committee of Governmental Experts on Administra- 
tion and Structure Matters: 2d Meeting. 

ITU Seminar on Satellite Communications 

UPU Executive Council 

UNICEF Executive Board 

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Code of Prin- 
ciples Concerning Milk and Milk Products. 

ILO Governing Body: 165th Session 

Montreal Apr. 13-May 7 

New York .... Apr. 14-22 

Bogota Apr. 17-24 

Rome Apr. 18-20 

San Jose Apr. 1&-22 

Vienna Apr. 18-22 

Rome Apr. 18-26 

Washington .... Apr. 18-26 

Geneva Apr. 18-29 

Nairobi Apr. 18-30 

Ecuador Apr. 19-20 

Washington .... Apr. 19-21 

Paris Apr. 19-21 

Paris Apr. 19-25 

New York Apr. 19^May 4 

Ankara Apr. 20-21 

Geneva Apr. 20-22 

Geneva Apr. 21-29 

Geneva Apr. 25-26 

Mexico City .... Apr. 25-29 

New York Apr. 25-May 3 

Bangkok Apr. 25-May 9 

London Apr. 25-May 13 

New York Apr. 26-May 9 

Geneva Apr. 27-28 

Tangier April 

Paris April 

New Delhi May 1-5 

London May 2-6 

Sao Paulo May 2-14 

Paris May 2-31 

New York May 2-June 3 

Paris May 3-5 

Geneva May 3-14 

Geneva May 3-14 

Geneva May 3-21 

New York May 4-6 

Paris May 4-6 

Maracay, Venezuela . May 7-14 

Geneva May 9-11 

Geneva May 9-June 10 

Edinburgh May 10-13 

Santiago May 10-13 

Vienna May 10-19 

Bangkok May 11-13 

Manila May 11-16 

Warren ton, Va. . . . May 12-14 

Geneva May 15-25 

Geneva May 1&-18 

Rome May 16-19 

London May 16-20 

Geneva May 16-27 

Washington .... May 16-27 

Bern May 17-28 

Addis Ababa .... May 19-28 

Rome May 20-25 

Geneva May 20-28 

APRIL 4, 1966 


Calendar of International Conferences — Continued 

Scheduled April Through June 1966 — Continued 

WHO Executive Board: 38th Session Geneva May 23-30 

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 23-24 

PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety .... Washington .... May 23-27 

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning .... Geneva May 24-27 

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Nationality and Registration of Dakar May 25-June 15 


WMO Executive Committee: 18th Session Geneva May 26-June 10 

PAHC Technical Committee on Financing Caracas May 31-June 3 

OECD Trade Committee Paris May 

U.N. Committee on Granting of Independence to Colonial New York May 

Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24). 

ECA Conference on West African Industrial Harmonization Niamey May 

and Economic Cooperation. 

ECA Conference on Central African Industrial Harmoniza- Leopoldville .... May 

tion and Economic Cooperation. 

GATT Consultations on Fresh Grapefruit London May 

CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research: 15th Pakistan May 


Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Session .... Montevideo .... May 

OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process .... Paris May 

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II . . Paris May 

OECD Conference on LFtilization of Scientific and Technical Paris May 


U.N. Trusteeship Council: 33d Session New York May or June 

PAO Group on Oils, Fats, and Oilseeds: 1st Session .... Rome May or June 

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 40th Session . . Rome May or June 

International Cotton Advisory Committee : Plenary Meeting Lima May or June 

50th ILO International Conference Geneva June 1-23 

ILO Governing Body: 166th Session Geneva June 1-23 

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fish- Spain June 5-11 

eries: 16th Annual Meeting. 

NATO Ministerial Council: 37th Meeting Brussels June 6-8 

PAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 10th Session . . . Rome June 6-9 

ECE Senior Economic Advisers Geneva June 6-11 

6th World Forestry Congress Madrid June 6-18 

UNCTAD U.N. Committee on Tungsten New York June 7-10 

PAHC Technical Committee on Planning and Routing of High- Rio de Janeiro . . . June 7-11 


U.N. Development Program: Governing Council "Rome June 13-14 

ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs 'Geneva June 13-14 

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 1st Session Home June 13-18 

UNCTAD Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes: New York June 13-23 

1st Session. 

PAHC Technical Committee on Terminology Buenos Aires .... June 14-18 

ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Food- Geneva June 15-17 


ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Geneva June 20-28 

UNESCO/ECLA Conference of Latin American Ministers of Buenos Aires .... June 20-30 

Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning 

UNCTAD Expert Group on International Monetary Issues: New York June 20^uly 1 

2d Session. 

FAO 2d World Land Reform Conference Rome June 20-July 2 

PAHC Technical Committee on Development of Governmental Lima June 21-25 

Highway Agencies. 

11th ITU CCIR Plenary Assembly Oslo June 22^uly 22 

SEATO Council: 11th Meeting Canberra June 27-29 

Whaling Commission: 18th Annual Meeting London June 27^uly 1 

UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st Geneva June 27-July 15 


ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 7th Session of Bangkok June 29-July 12 

Statistical Commission. 

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris June 

UNICEF Program Committee New York June 

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning . . . Geneva June 

OECD Special Committee for Oil Paris June 

OECD Energy Committee: 9th Session Paris June 

ECE Coal Committee: Subcommittee on Mining Problems . Geneva June 

ITU CCITT Asian Study Group Tokyo June 

GATT Committee III on Trade and Development .... Geneva June 

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June 


U.S. Welcomes Security Council 
Views on Viet-Nam Situation 

Followiyig are texts of a statement by 
Arthur J. Goldberg released at New York 
on February 26 upon receipt of a letter ad- 
dressed to members of the Security Council 
from Akira Matsui, President of the Secu^ 
rity Council. 


U.S./U.N. press release 4812 

The United States welcomes the letter 
which the President of the Security Council, 
Ambassador Matsui of Japan, has addressed 
to its members at the conclusion of his 
consultations with them on the problem of 
Viet-Nam. On behalf of my Government I 
should like to express my deep appreciation 
and that of my Government for the high 
purpose, the zeal, and the objectivity with 
which Ambassador Matsui has pursued 
these consultations on so difficult, complex, 
and controversial a subject. 

These consultations have demonstrated 
once again a legitimate and essential United 
Nations concern with the maintenance of in- 
ternational peace and security, wherever and 
however threatened. We are confident this 
will help to inspire Security Council members 
and others to continue and to intensify their 
efforts for a peaceful settlement. 

Indeed, we are both gratified and en- 
couraged that the Council's proceedings of 
February 1 and 2 and the consultations 
undertaken thereafter have revealed a sub- 
stantial though not unanimous consensus on 
two points: 

First, "There is general grave concern and 
growing anxiety over the continuation of 
hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire 
for the early cessation of hostilities and a 
peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam prob- 
lem"; and 

Second, "There appears also to be a feel- 
ing that the termination of the conflict in 
Viet-Nam should be sought through nego- 

tiations in an appropriate forum in order to 
work out the implementation of the Geneva 

My Government has consistently pursued 
these ends and still does so. In my state- 
ments to the Security Council in the debates 
on February 1 and 2 I said on behalf of my 
Government that we are prepared to go to 
Geneva at once to seek a settlement on the 
basis of and in implementation of the Geneva 
accords.^ Indeed, it was with a profound 
desire and determination to move toward 
such a conference that my Government de- 
cided in late December of last year to under- 
take a peace offensive unprecedented in 
intensity and scope. 

When that peace offensive was brutally 
rejected by President Ho Chi Minh in his 
letters of late January, we decided to invoke 
formally, as we had for some time sought 
informally, the assistance of the United 
Nations organ with the primary responsibil- 
ity for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. In taking this step, our 
purpose was to make it unmistakably clear 
that, despite Hanoi's rejection of our offers 
to negotiate unconditionally, their unwilling- 
ness to match in any way our unilateral 
reduction of military activities, and their 
continued insistence that negotiations are 
possible only after their sweeping precondi- 
tions are met in full, the United States will 
never rest and will leave no path unexplored 
until it has succeeded in its endeavor to 
move the conflict from the battlefield to the 
conference table. 

We deem it of importance that a substan- 
tial majority of the Council supports the 
view that negotiations in an appropriate 
forum are the way to peace in Viet-Nam. 
While Hanoi has not responded to the United 
States invitation to such a peaceful settle- 
ment, it cannot be unmindful of this expres- 
sion of world opinion. 

President Matsui's letter properly points 
out that the Council remains seized of the 
problem. We shall continue to cooperate 

' For background and texts of statements, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


with the other members of the Council in 
seeking other constructive steps toward 
peace in Viet-Nam. 

The policy of the United States remains 
constant and may be summarized as follows ; 

That the United States is prepared for 
discussions or negotiations without any prior 
conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the 
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a 
reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be 
envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the 
first order of business in any discussions or 
negotiations, that the United States re- 
mains prepared to withdraw its forces from 
South Viet-Nam as soon as South Viet-Nam 
is in a position to determine its own future 
vdthout external interference, that the 
United States desires no continuing military 
presence or bases in Viet-Nam, that the 
future political structure in South Viet-Nam 
should be determined by the South Vietnam- 
ese people themselves through democratic 
processes, and that the question of the re- 
unification of the two Viet-Nams should be 
decided by the free decision of their two 
peoples and that the United States will 
honor the results of such self-determination. 


U.N. doc. S/7168 

February 26, 1966 

As you know, at the 1273rd meeting of the Secu- 
rity Council on 2 February 1966, following the adop- 
tion of the agenda for that meeting, namely, the 
letter dated 31 January 1966, addressed to the Presi- 
dent of the Security Council by the Permanent Rep- 
resentative of the United States of America 
(S/7105),' I suggested that informal and private 
consultations be held in order to decide on the most 
effective and appropriate way of continuing our de- 
bate in the future, and that, to this end, the meeting 
be adjourned until an exact date and time could be 
arranged for the next meeting. 

That suggestion was approved without objection 
and it was so decided by the Council. 

Pursuant to that decision, I felt obliged, as Presi- 
dent of the Council for the month of February, to 

' For text, see ibid. 

make myself available in arranging the informal 
and private consultations envisaged by the Council 
in its decision. I have endeavoured to carry out this 
task with members of the Council both individually 
and collectively. I have also conferred with the 
Secretary-General, who has expressed to me his own 
views of the situation. 

It is clear to me that members of the Council have 
every right to be informed of the results of these 
consultations. I feel, indeed, that it Is my duty, as 
President of the Council, so to inform members. 

A useful exchange of views has taken place; on 
the other hand, some serious differences of views 
remain unresolved. 

The principal difference among members on the 
procedural question at issue relates to the wisdom 
of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam 
at this particular juncture. Although it was felt by 
a number of members that the Council might find 
some way to contribute towards a solution of the 
Viet-Nam problem, others took the position that 
consideration of the problem in the forum of the 
Council would not be useful under present circum- 
stances; some members, adhering to positions they 
had expressed when adoption of the provisional 
agenda was discussed on 1 and 2 February, did not 
choose to participate in consultations. 

These differences of views have made it impos- 
sible for me to report, at this stage, agreement on 
a precise course of action the Council might follow. 
They have also given rise to a general feeling that 
it would be inopportune for the Council to hold fur- 
ther debate at this time and, rather than a formal 
meeting of the Council, a report by me in the pres- 
ent form has apeared to be the most appropriate 
step that could be taken. I have decided, therefore, 
to take this step under the present extraordinary 

It would not be appropriate for me to refer, in a 
formal and public document such as this, to the 
views that individual members expressed in the 
course of informal and private consultations. Never- 
theless, throughout the Council's proceedings of 1 
and 2 February and the consultations stemming 
therefrom, I believe I could detect a certain degree 
of common feeling among many members of the 
Council which might be summarized as follows: 

1. There is general grave concern and growing 
anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet- 
Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of 
hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam 
problem ; 

2. There appears also to be a feeling that the 
termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be 
sought through negotiations in an appropriate forum 
in order to work out the implementation of the 
Geneva Accords. 

It is my understanding that the Council, having 
decided on 2 February to place on its agenda the 



item contained in the letter dated 31 January by 
the Permanent Representative of the United States 
of America (S/7105), remains seized of the Viet- 
Nam problem. 

May I conclude by expressing my personal hope 
that efforts will be continued, within and outside 
of the United Nations, by whatever means may be 
deemed appropriate, to find an early, peaceful solu- 
tion of the Viet-Nam question. 

I am requesting the Secretary-General to repro- 
duce this letter as an official document of the Coun- 

I avail myself, etc. 

Akira Matsui 
President of the Security Council 


Supplementary Tax Protocol 
Signed With United Kingdom 

Press release 57 dat^d March 17 

On March 17, 1966, Ambassador David 
K. E. Bruce and British Parliamentary Un- 
der-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs 
Lord Walston signed in London a protocol 
between the United States and the United 
Kingdom supplementing and amending the 
convention of April 16, 1945, as modified by 
supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946, 
May 25, 1954, and August 19, 1957,i for the 
avoidance of double taxation and the preven- 
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes 
on income. 

The new protocol,- upon entry into force, 
would effect substantive changes in the ex- 
isting convention which are considered de- 
sirable because of basic changes made in 
United Kingdom tax legislation. Under the 
United Kingdom Finance Act of 1965, ap- 
plicable with respect to profits earned on or 
after April 6, 1964, a United Kingdom cor- 

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 
1546, 3146, 4124. 

' For text, see Department of State press release 
64 dated Mar. 22. 

poration tax was instituted as a major ele- 
ment of the British tax system. 

The protocol will be transmitted to the 
United States Senate for advice and consent 
to ratification. 

Current Actions 



Convention on settlement of investment disputes be- 
tween states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965.' 
Signature: Cyprus, March 5, 1966. 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva 

April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964. 

TIAS 5578. 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia (with a reser- 
vation), January 28, 1966. 
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April 

29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962. 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living 
resources^ of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28. 

Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous 
zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered 
mto force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28, 

Optional protocol of signature concerning the com- 
pulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva 
April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28. 

1966. 6 . J- , 


Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as 
revised, for the protection of industrial property. 
Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered 
into force June 1, 1928; for the United States 
March 6, 1931. TS 834. 

Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28. 

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, 
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop- 
erty. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered 
into force August 1, 1938. TS 941. 
Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28, 

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, 
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop- 
erty. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered 
into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931. 
Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28 

' Not in force. 

' Not in force for the United States. 

APRIL 4, 1966 


Satellite Communications System 

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM- 
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.' 
Signature: United Arab Republic, March 17, 1966. 


Protocol for the further prolongation of the inter- 
national sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389). 
Open for signature at London November 1 through 
December 23, 1965. Entered into force January 
1, 1966. TIAS 5933. 

Signatures: Argentina,' December 23, 1965; Aus- 
tralia, December 21, 1965; Belgium, ' ' Decem- 
ber 22, 1965; Brazil," December 20, 1965; Can- 
ada, December 21, 1965; China,' December 20, 
1965; Costa Rica,' December 6, 1965; Cuba,='' " 
December 17, 1965; Czechoslovakia, December 
21, 1965; Denmark, December 17, 1965; Domini- 
can Republic,' December 20, 1965; Ecuador,' 
December 21, 1965; France, December 22, 1965; 
Federal Republic of Germany," December 16, 
1965; Haiti, December 23, 1965; Hungary,' De- 
cember 16, 1965; India,' December 23, 1965; 
Indonesia,' December 21, 1965; Ireland,' Decem- 
ber 22, 1965; Italy,' December 20, 1965; Ja- 
maica, December 15, 1965; Japan, December 16, 
1965; Madagascar,' December 22, 1965; Mexico,' 
December 20, 1965; Morocco,' December 22, 
1965; Netherlands, December 23, 1965; New 
Zealand, December 22, 1965; Nicaragua,' De- 
cember 20, 1965; Nigeria,' December 21, 1965 
Philippines,' December 10, 1965; Poland,' De 
cember 21, 1965; Portugal,' December 22, 1965 
Sierra Leone, December 21, 1965; South Africa 
December 21, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, De- 
cember 21, 1965; Tunisia,' December 20, 1965 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,' December 
17, 1965; United Kingdom,' December 23, 1965 
Upper Volta, December 23, 1965. 



Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of July 27, 1965 (TIAS 5898). Effected 
by exchange of notes at Santiago February 8, 
1966. Entered into force February 8, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed 
at Seoul March 7, 1966. Entered into force March 
7, 1966. 


Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative 
meteorological observation program in Mexico, 
with memorandum of understanding. Effected by 
exchange of notes at Mexico February 4, 1966. 
Entered into force February 4, 1966. 

Sierra Leone 

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of January 29, 1965, as amended 
(TIAS 5762, 5831). Effected by exchange of 
notes at Freetown March 10, 1966. Entered into 
force March 10, 1966. 

Somali Republic 

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28 
and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915, 
5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession 
of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation 
agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS 
3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy. 
Effected bv exchange of notes at Mogadiscio Feb- 
ruary 16 and 28, 1966. Entered into force Feb- 
ruary 28, 1966. 

' Not in force. 

' Subject to ratification. 

' Signature is made on behalf of the Belgo-Luxem- 
bourg Economic Union. 

" With a declaration. 

" Subject to acceptance. 

' Subject to reservations made upon accession to 
the International Sugar Agreement of 1958. 

' Subject to the declaration and reservations madei 
upon accession to the International Sugar Agree- 
ment of 1958. 

' Subject to reservations made upon ratification 
of the 1963 protocol to the International Sugar] 
Agreement of 1958. 




The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af- 
faire, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreiurn 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
8tat« and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of International affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general International in- 

Publications of the Department. United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govem- 


ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.. 
20402. Prick: 62 Issues, domestic $10. 
foreign $15 ; single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printing ef this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1968). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication u» 
not copyrighted and items contained hereto 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed 
in the Readers* Guide to Pericxiical Lttn^ 



INDEX April 4, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1397 

American Republics. President Hails Fifth 
Anniversarj' of the Alliance for Progress . 537 


America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold- 
berg) 539 

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace (Rusk) . 514 

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in 
Asia (Humphrey) 523 

U-S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social 
Development in Asia (Johnson) .... 521 

Communism. United States Tasks and Respon- 
sibilities in Asia (Humphrey) 523 

Congress. U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and 
Social Development in Asia (Johnson) . . 521 

Economic Affairs 

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With 
United Kingdom 549 

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in 
Asia (Humphrey) 523 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. United 
States and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchanges Agree- 
ment for 1966-67 (joint communique) . . 543 

Foreign Aid 

President Hails Fifth Anniversary of the Alli- 
ance for Progress 537 

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social 
Development in Asia (Johnson) 521 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
Calendar of International Conferences . . 544 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 14 NATO 
Nations Declare Alliance Essential to Com- 
mon Security 536 

Presidential Documents 

President Hails Fifth Anniversary of the Al- 
liance for Progress 537 

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social 
Development in Asia 521 

Science. United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Ex- 
changes Agreement for 1966-67 (joint 
communique) 543 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 549 

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With 
United Kingdom 549 

United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchanges 
Agreement for 1966-67 (joint communique) . 543 

U.S.S.R. United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Ex- 
changes Agreement for 1966-67 (joint 
communique) 543 

United Kingdom 

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold- 
berg) 539 

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With 
United Kingdom 549 

United Nations. U.S. Welcomes Security Coun- 
cil Views on Viet-Nam. Situation (Goldberg, 
Matsui) 547 


America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold- 
berg) 539 

The Issue and Goal in Viet-Nam (U. Alexis 
Johnson) 529 

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace (Rusk) . 514 

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in 
Asia (Humphrey) 523 

U.S. Welcomes Security Council Views on Viet- 
Nam Situation (Goldberg, Matsui) . . . 547 

Name Index 

Goldberg, Arthur J 539,547 

Humphrey, Vice President 523 

Johnson, President 521, 537 

Johnson, U. Alexis 529 

Matsui, Akira 547 

Rusk, Secretary 514 

Check List of Department of State 

Press Releases: March 14-20 

Press releases may be obtained from the 

Office of 

STews, Department of State, Wash- 

ington, D.C., 20520. | 






Rusk: Boston University School of 
Public Communications. 



U. Alexis Johnson: Canadian Club 

of Montreal. 



Further removal of restrictions on 
U.S. exports. 



Program for visit of Prime Min- 
ister of India. 



Treaties in Force . . .1966 re- 



Heymann desigrnated Acting Ad- 
ministrator, Bureau of Secu- 
rity and Consular Affairs (bio- 
graphic details). 



Sisco: "Hard Work Ahead for the 




Rusk: House Foreign Affairs 



Supplementary tax protocol with 
the U.K. 



Members of Board of Foreign 
Scholarships sworn in. 



U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges agree- 
ment (communique and text). 

in ted. 

* Not pr 

t Held fc 

r a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent < 
u.s. government p 




BOX 28" 





The Heart of the Problem 

Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearingi 

This pamphlet contains the statements made before the Senate Committee on Foreign I 
tions in mid-February by Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell D. Taylor in which they dis 
the interests and involvement of the United States in South Viet-Nam. 

In his testimony Secretary Rusk emphasizes that the issues posed in Viet-Nam "are dc 
intertwined with our own security" and that "the outcome of the struggle can profoundly al 
the nature of the world in which we and our children must live." 

Three basic issues are discussed by General Taylor: what we are doing in Viet-Nam, 
we are doing it, and how we can improve upon what we are doing. 



To) Snvt. of Doenmoita 
GoTt. Printtns Otfle* 
Waahiniitoii, D.a 10401 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please 

Bend me copies of The Heart of the Problem 


FOR USE OF sun. tf 

To b* 
later ... 











Street address 

City, State, and ZIP code 








Vol. LIV, No. 1398 

April 11, 1966 

Transcript of Interview 565 

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 571 

Statements by Andreas F. Lowenfeld 580 


Address by President Johnson 55^ 

For index see inside back cover 

"What is our vieiv of NATO today? We see it not as an 
alliance to make war hut as an alliance to keep peace. 
. . . For our part, the United States of America is de- 
termined to join ivith 13 of her other allies to preserve 
and to strengthen the deterrent strength of NATO." 

Our View of NATO 

Address by President Johnson 

Mr. Secretary [Secretary Rusk] , ladies and 
gentlemen : I am very pleased to address the 
Foreign Service Institute this morning and 
to come here to meet with so many Ameri- 
cans that are preparing to serve their 
country abroad. As one who believes that 
we cannot shorten our reach in the world, 
I am greatly encouraged by the number and 
the quality of those who are studying at 
this Institute. You have the gratitude of 
your countrymen and my own assurance of 

We have come a long way from the day 
that someone observed that some diplomat 
no doubt will launch a heedless word and 
lurking war leap out. That was more than 
half a century ago, when diplomacy was 
often war by another name. 

Today your task is different. Those of 
you about to go abroad represent a continu- 
ity of purpose in a generation of change. 
That purpose is to build from reason and 
moderation a world order in which the fires 
of conflict yield to the fulfillment of man's 
oldest yearnings for himself and his family. 

Your job, wherever you serve, is peace. 
That is the task that faces all of us today. 

' Made before the Foreign Service Institute at the 
Department of State, Washington, D.C., on Mar. 23 
(White House press release; as-delivered text). 

The question, as always, is. How? How do 
we, for example, maintain the security of 
the Atlantic community upon which so 
many of the world's hopes depend? 

For the answer, we must begin with the 
gray dawn of the world of 1945, when Eu- 
rope's cities lay in rubble, her farms devas- 
tated, her industries smashed, her people 
weary with war and death and defeat. 

Now, from that desolation has come 
abundance. From that weakness has come 
power. From those ashes of holocaust has 
come the rebirth of a strong and a vital 
community. The Europe of today is a new 
Europe. In place of uncertainty there is 
confidence; in place of decay, progress; in 
place of isolation, partnership; in place of 
war, peace. 

The Design of Collective Security 

If there is no single explanation for the 
difference between Europe then and Europe 
now, there is a pattern. It is a luminous 
design that is woven through the history of 
the past 20 years. It is the design of com- 
mon action, of interdependent institutions 
serving the good of the European nations 
as though they were all one. It is the design 
of collective security protecting the entire 
Atlantic community. , 

So I have come here this morning to speak 

I ail 







to you of one important part of that design. 
I speak of a structure that some of you have 
helped to build: the North Atlantic Treaty 

Let me make clear in the beginning that 
we do not believe there is any righteousness 
in standing pat. If an organization is alive 
and vital, if it is to have meaning for all 
time as well as for any particular time, it 
must grow and respond and yield to change. 
Like our Constitution, which makes the law 
of the land, the North Atlantic Treaty is 
more than just a legal document. It is the 
foundation of a living institution. That 
institution is NATO, the organization cre- 
ated to give meaning and reality to the 
alliance commitments. 

The crowded months which immediately 
preceded and followed the conclusion of the 
North Atlantic Treaty 17 years ago had 
produced an atmosphere of crisis. It was a 
crisis that was born of deep fear: fear for 
Europe's economic and political vitality, 
fear of Communist aggression, fear of Com- 
munist subversion. 

Some say that new circumstances in the 
world today call for the dismantling of this 
great organization. Of course NATO should 
adapt to the changing needs of the times, 
but we believe just as firmly that such 
change must be wrought by the member 
nations working with one another within 
the alliance. Consultation, not isolation, is 
the route to reform. We must not forget 
either in success or abundance the lessons 
that we have learned in danger and in iso- 
lation: that whatever the issue that we 
share, we have one common danger — divi- 
sion; and one common safety — unity, 

'' An Alliance To Keep the Peace 

* What is our view of NATO today? We see 
it not as an alliance to make war but as an 
alliance to keep peace. Through an era as 

: turbulent as man has ever known, and under 
I the constant threat of ultimate destruction, 
^ NATO has insured the security of the North 

• Atlantic community. It has reinforced sta- 
bility elsewhere throughout the world. 

While NATO rests on the reality that we 
must fight together if war should come to 
the Atlantic area, it rests also on the reality 
that war will not come if we act together 
during peace. It was the Foreign Minister 
of France who, in 1949, insisted that to be 
truly secure, Europe needed not only help 
in resisting attack but help in preventing 
attack. "Liberation," he said, "is not 

The success of NATO has been measured 
by many yardsticks. The most significant 
to me is the most obvious: War has been 
deterred. Through the common organiza- 
tion, we have welded the military contribu- 
tions of each of the 15 allies into a very 
effective instrument. So convincing was 
this instrument that potential aggressors 
took stock and counted as too high the price 
of satisfying their ambitions. It has been 
proved true that "one sword keeps another 
in the sheath." 

War has been deterred not only because 
of our integrated military power but because 
of the political unity of purpose to which 
that power has been directed and bent. It 
is difficult to overstate the importance of 
the bonds of culture, of political institu- 
tions, traditions, and values which form the 
bedrock of the Atlantic community. There 
is here a political integrity and an identity 
of interests that transcends personalities 
and issues of the moment. 

If our collective effort should falter and 
our common determination be eroded, the 
foundation of the Atlantic's present stabil- 
ity would certainly be shaken. The mighti- 
est arsenal in the world will deter no ag- 
gressor who knows that his victims are too 
divided to decide and too unready to re- 
spond. That was the lesson that we learned 
from two world wars. Yet a nation — not 
by the action of her friends but by her own 
decision to prepare and plan alone — could 
still imperil her own security by creating a 
situation in which response would be too 
late and too diluted. Every advance in the 
technology of war makes more unacceptable 
the old and narrow concepts of sovereignty. 

APRIL 11, 1966 


No one today can doubt the necessity of 
preventing war. It is our firm conviction 
that collective action through NATO is the 
best assurance that war will be deterred in 
the Atlantic world. 

Look at the Atlantic community through 
the eyes of those who in years past have 
yearned for conquest. The sight is sobering. 
Integrated commands, common plans, forces 
in being in advance of an emergency for 
use in any emergency — all of these testify 
to a collective readiness and the integrity 
of collective purposes. To other eyes, NATO 
can only be a clear warning of the folly of 

NATO today, therefore, must be shaped 
on the experience of the past. Reliance on 
independent action by separate forces — 
only loosely coordinated with joint forces 
and plans — twice led to world wars before 
1945. But collective action has proved suc- 
cessful in deterring war since 194.5 — during 
20 years of upheaval and grave danger. We 
reject those experiences only at our own 

Preserving NATO's Deterrent Strength 

For our part, the United States of Amer- 
ica is determined to join with 13 of her 
other allies to preserve and to strengthen 
the deterrent strength of NATO.^ We will 
urge that those principles of joint and com- 
mon preparation be extended wherever they 
can be usefully applied in the Atlantic 

We are hopeful that no member of the 
treaty will long remain withdrawn from the 
mutual affairs and obligations of the At- 

' For a joint declaration released by the United 
States and 13 other NATO nations on Mar. 18, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536. 

lantic. A place of respect and responsibility 
will await any ally who decides to return to 
the common task, for the world is still full 
of peril for those who prize and cherish 
liberty — peril and opportunity. 

These bountiful lands that are washed by 
the Atlantic, this half-billion people that are 
unmatched in arms and industry', this cradle 
of common values and splendid visions, this 
measureless storehouse of wealth, can enrich 
the life of an entire planet. 

It is this strength — of ideas as well as 
strength of arms, of peaceful purpose as 
well as power — that offers such hope for 
the reconciliation of Western Europe with 
the people of Eastern Europe. To surrender 
that strength now by isolation from one 
another would be to dim the promise of that 
day when the men and women of all Europe 
shall again move freely among each other. 

It is not a question of wealth alone. It is 
a question of heart and mind. It is a will- 
ingness to leave forever those national rival- 
ries which so often led to the useless 
squandering of lives and treasure in war. 

It is a question of the deeper spirit of 
unity of which NATO is but a symbol. That 
unity was never better expressed than when, 
at the conclusion of the North Atlantic 
Treaty in 1949, a great French leader de- 
clared that: "Nations are more and more 
convinced that their fates are closely bound 
together — that their salvation and their 
welfare must rest upon the progressive ap- 
plication of human solidarity." 

And it is to the preservation of human 
solidarity that all of our efforts today 
should be directed. So let all of you of the 
Foreign Service Institute make it your task 
as well as mine. 

Thank you and good morning. 




Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 25 

Press release 71 dated March 26 

Secretary Rusk: I regret any inconven- 
ience that might have been caused by the 
change in the hour for our press conference 
this morning. 

President Johnson and I went to Andrews 
Air Field to bid bon voyage to President 
Gursel of Turkey. President Johnson has 
been anxious to afford every hospitality and 
every facility to President Gursel, but the 
Turkish Government and people wanted him 
to return to the land of his birth and the 
country which he has served with such great 
distinction for so long. And we wish him 
a very safe and pleasant voyage. 

This is my first press conference since the 
induction of Dixon Donnelley as Assistant 
Secretary [for Public Affairs]. Under his 
guidance I expect to have perhaps somewhat 
more press conferences than I have had re- 
cently. I will take my instructions from him 
on this matter. So you can put your pres- 
sures on him. 

I am very pleased, and I know you will be, 
to announce that my friend Robert Mc- 
Closkey is being promoted to Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary of State and will remain 
as Department spokesman. I am very happy 
to salute my colleague who daily runs the 
gauntlet and who has served us so effec- 
tively and with such distinction. 

I think I won't take your time with open- 
ing statements this morning. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, I suppose ive can now 
expect much more detailed, comprehensive 
aiiswers from Mr. McCloskey, with his in- 
crease in rank. (Laughter.) 

A. Well, I notice his transcripts from time 
to time, and I think you can expect him to 
continue his sterling performance. 

APRIL 11, 1966 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you talk a little 
bit about United States policy toward Com- 
munist China, and particularly whether 
there is a prospect of changing policy on 
U.N. membership or on recognition? 

A. Well, these are not questions that can 
be talked about solely from one point of 
view. These are not one-sided questions. 
Relationships involve the other side. 

We have tried over a considerable period 
of time to find particular points at which 
relationships between ourselves and main- 
land China could be improved. We have had 
a long series of discussions in Geneva and 
Warsaw. I have personally attended the 
Geneva conference on Laos, and the Foreign 
Minister of Peiping was present. 

We have tried to encourage exchanges of 
newsmen, doctors, and scholars, and weather 
information, and all sorts of things. 

We keep running up against the problem 
of Formosa, and this is an issue which the 
United Nations will encounter. Basically, 
the authorities in Peiping indicate that 
there is no prospect for improved relations 
unless we are willing to surrender Formosa. 
We have a major, far-reaching, and dan- 
gerous disagreement at the present time on 

They have indicated to the United Na- 
tions that the expulsion of the Republic of 
China is essential if Peiping is to consider 

They have told the United Nations that 
the General Assembly must apologize for 
having called them an aggressor. 

They have suggested a reform of the 
charter to throw out what they call "im- 
perialist puppets." I do not know what per- 
centage of the present membership would 


President Gursel Returns 
To Turkey 

Statement by President Johnson, March 25 

Our distingruished friend, President Cemal 
Gursel of Turkey, came to the United States 
on February 2 for medical treatment. There 
was hope that new therapeutic procedures only 
recently developed in this country would be 
useful in treating his illness of several years. 

We were initially encouraged by his prog- 
ress at Walter Reed Hospital, only to be 
shocked by the news on February 8 that his 
health had suffered a grave new blow. Our 
best talent, coupled with the skill of the emi- 
nent Turkish doctors who accompanied the 
President, was exerted to the utmost in the 
hope that the President might return to his 
home in fully restored health. We are sad- 
dened that this hope was not to be realized. 

We have been deeply honored to have Presi- 
dent Gursel come to our country to seek medi- 
cal treatment. As he returns to his home- 
land, our prayers go with him. 

be excluded on that basis in their verbiage. 

So while it is useful and important that 
Americans consider among themselves what 
our relations with China ought to be, or 
are, or have been, we who are in government 
must deal with these questions on the basis 
of the attitude of the other side as well. 

Now, I think that it is quite clear, in view 
of what has happened even in the last few 
days, that the authorities in Peiping are not 
very easy to live with in the world. The 
Communist world has found that ; the Afro- 
Asian world has found it. 

The agreements that we have made in 
1954, and in 1962, apparently are not very 
seriously considered in Peiping. 

The offer of unconditional discussions or 
negotiations without preconditions seems to 
be of no interest. 

So we will continue to work at this prob- 
lem and think about it, and it is important 
that other people do. But those of us who 
are carrying official responsibilities have 
some rather harsh facts to come up against, 

and we have to deal with the situation as 
we can find it. And we do not find at the 
present time a serious interest in Peiping 
in improvement of relations. ( 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in their latest commevi 
the Chinese Coraviunists claim that the 
United States and Russia are collaborating 
in an evil plot to encircle the Chinese maiiOr- 
land. Are we? 

A. Well, I see no evidence myself of any 
conspiracy or a plot. I think it is true that 
Washington and Moscow understand very 
deeply what war means. When Peiping calls 
upon what they call the "revisionists" not 
to take such a "gloomy view of war," I 
think both we in Washington and our op- 
posite numbers in Moscow are inclined to 
take a rather gloomy view of war, because 
we understand what it could mean. 

But I know of no discussions between our- 
selves and Moscow that could be fairly in- 
terpreted as a plot between the two Govern- 
ments against China. 

I think there is a certain prudence in 
Washington and Moscow and a certain rec- 
ognition of the importance of keeping the 
great forces of violence under control, which 
had better be there and which all of us hope 
will continue to be there. 

As far as Washington and Moscow are 
concerned, as far as our side is concerned, 
we continue to look for particular points in 
which we might improve our relations. It 
is not easy, because there are some impor- 
tant differences between Washington and 

But the continuing charge of collusion by 
Peiping represents, I think, a special ideolog- 
ical attitude of the authorities in Peiping 
and a harshness and a militancy which is 
hard to reconcile with a serious interest in 
peace in other parts of the world. 








Hope for Nonproliferation Treaty \^ 

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with re- Hiiij 
lations between the United States and the i^. 
Soviet Union, do you think that ive are any ^ 
closer at this point to a treaty to stop the ^^ 
spread of nuclear weapons? ^.^ 



A. Well, it is hard to measure these 
matters in relative terms — closer or further 

I do believe — I say this sincerely — that 
both the Soviet Union and the United 
States and, indeed, Great Britain, France, 
possibly even Peiping, are agreed that it is 
not a good thing to see the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. I think on that central 
underlying attitude there is a recognition on 
the part of nuclear powers that prolifera- 
tion is dangerous and undesirable. 

Now, we hope very much that if we can 
all concentrate on the issue of proliferation 
and not draw in extraneous or irrelevant 
questions, we could move toward a treaty 
and solicit general acceptance throughout 
the entire world of the idea of nonprolifera- 

That alone is not all that is required. We 

would like very much to get on with more 

serious questions in the disarmament field, 

such as the reduction of armaments. We 

were beginning to make a little headway 

on that question, possibly through what 

I came to be called mutual example — that is, 

I some turning down of defense budgets. But 

I then the Viet-Nam matter arose in a way 

! that halted that possibility. 

I The burden of arms in the world is simply 

\ too great to be accepted as a part of nature, 

J and we ought to turn to it as quickly as we 

' can. 


But I hope very much that we can move 
toward a nonproliferation treaty and 
promptly, and I am convinced that we can 
if we concentrate on the issue of nonpro- 
liferation and not confuse it with issues 
which are irrelevant and which have noth- 
ing to do with proliferation. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your 
reading on the weight and importance to be 
attached to the decision of Communist 
China not to attend the gathering of the 
Communist parties in Moscotv next week? 

A. Well, since that Communist Party meet- 

r« ing will be opening in just a few days, it 

M would be rather hazardous for me to make 

comments which might prove to be wrong 

APRIL n, 1966 

within the week, and naturally I am a little 
reluctant to do that. But I think what they 
said about not attending once more re- 
flected the bitterness and the militancy and 
the suspicion and the hatred which we have 
seen so long from Peiping. 

There is no problem of encircling Peiping 
if Peiping is prepared to live at peace. 

We have ourselves alliances with Korea 
and Japan, Republic of China, Philippines, 
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. Those 
alliances only become operative if there is 
aggression, if there is an attempt made by 
Peiping to use force against its neighbors 
and to bring those alliances into operation. 

Now, I would hope myself that the authori- 
ties in Peiping would look back over the 
experiences of the last year or two and 
conclude that militancy has no future, that 
it will not be accepted by the peoples and 
governments of the world, whether in the 
free world or in the Communist world, and 
that the overriding consideration is to learn 
to live at peace with neighboring countries. 
On that basis, relations could improve and 
many things could happen. 

But the world just is not prepared to 
accept the doctrines or the threats or the 
efforts of intimidation which are coming 
out of Peiping. 

German Disarmament Proposals 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the German Government 
today sent a note containing disarmament 
proposals. Would you like to comment on 
that note? 

A. Yes. We received that note this morn- 
ing about 10 o'clock, and I believe that it is 
public, or is being made public in the course 
of the day. 

I have not had a chance to study it in 
detail, although there has been some dis- 
cussion of these matters in the NATO Coun- 
cil. But in my first reading of it, it seems 
to me that it is a very constructive and 
forward-looking communication and it is 
worth very careful study. 

I think all of you will wish to give it very 
careful thought, because it is a forthcoming 


and I think important statement of German 

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you been informed 
in any way officially or unofficially of any 
change in Hanoi's attitude toward negotia- 
tions ? 

A. No. I have seen some press speculation 
on that subject. 

I have said many times that channels are 
open and that a number of governments are 
taking part in an effort to find a basis for 
a peaceful solution. But I have seen nothing 
unusual in the last several v^^eeks that would 
indicate a change in that situation. 

I am not avi^are of the intensive diplo- 
matic activity of Hanoi to bring this matter 
to discussions, for example. I just do not 
knovi^ what this is talking about. 

France and NATO 

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, sir, 
where in your view the bulk of the NATO 
members now move in their relations with 
France? Is it primarily a question of nego- 
tiating a removal, or does the United States, 
for example, accept the French thesis that 
the troops in Germany can revert to the 
J95i agreement? 

A. Well, I think the parliamentary position 
is — the diplomatic position is that France has 
indicated to the NATO governments certain 
intentions. We have commented on those 
intentions, but we have not received from 
France detailed proposals which would be 
presumably needed for specific negotiation. 
I presume that we will be getting more 
details in the near future about just what 
it is that France has in mind. 

I would suppose that when we get that 
information, then the NATO allies will be 
in touch with each other and that more 
systematic formal discussions with the 
French Government will then take place. 
But we do not have those, and until we do 
get them, I think it would be premature for 
me to speculate on just what they might 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has 

the proble)7i of the resumption of military 
aid to India and Pakistan before it. Pakistan 
this week displayed some weapons of Chi- 
nese manufacture. Does this complicate the 
picture for this Government in resuming 
military assistance to both of those coun- 
tries? ^ 

A. Well, I think that is a matter that as 
far as we are concerned is deeply rooted in 
the prospects for peace in the subcontinent. 
We were encouraged by the Tashkent agree- 
ments. We hope very much that they will 
be pursued. Indeed, we have been very 
pleased to see that a great many of the 
things agreed upon at Tashkent have in fact 
been carried out. 

We will continue to follow the situation 
very closely, but quite frankly we have not 
come to a conclusion on the particular ques- 
tion of military aid. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes. 

Q. Yesterday President Johnson and Gen- 
eral de Gaulle talked about unprovoked ag- 
gression. Do you think that the implication 
of this term ivould change the commitment 
of article V of the NATO treaty? 

A. Well, you will recall that over the past 
four decades or more, a part of the general 
phraseology of security questions has in- 
volved this phrase "unprovoked aggression." 
You find it in the discussions of the 1920's 
and the 1930's and the attempt to organize 
security systems since the war. It is my 
impression that this phrase was a tradi- 
tional phrase and was not intended to 
modify the NATO treaty. But that is a 
matter that can be clarified in the discus- 
sions which we expect to be having with 
the French Government over the next sev- 
eral weeks or months. | 

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me if any 
consideration is being given to the recogni- 
tion of Obiter Mongolia? 

A. The word "consideration" has turned : j 
out on occasions to be a booby trap. Yes, ' t 
we do think about that from time to time, ij 
and we do have that in mind as one of the i 



questions on our agenda. But I am inclined 
to repeat to you the phrase which Mr. 
Cordell Hull used to use on about half the 
questions he got on his daily press confer- 
ences: "You can be sure that this matter is 
under the most earnest consideration." 

Peiping's Isolation Self-imposed 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Yes. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to China a 
moment, much of the discussion that has 
been going on relates to the problem of 
American -policy in the years after the pres- 
ent leadership of Peiping has gone, given 
the age of Mao and company. This has pro- 
duced the theory or thesis of containment 
without isolation, ivhich the Vice President 
seems to have embraced. Looked at from a 
longer standpoint, are you prepared to 
accept such a formulation? 

A. Well, I think it is difficult to compress 
complicated matters into such few words. I 
think I have already pointed out that in 
connection with the word "containment" we 
have a series of alliances. Those alliances 
were made following World War II and 
some of them in direct response to the ag- 
gressive attitude of Peiping. Some of them 
came out of the arrangements which were 
connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty; 
others out of the settlement or the hoped- 
for settlement of Southeast Asia in 1954. 

Now, we have alliances in the Pacific and 
in Asia, because we have a vital interest in 
peace in the Pacific and in Asia. So that if 
the sum total of our commitments in the 
Pacific add up to the word "containment," 
then I have no particular objection to it. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. — But on the question of isolation 
again, the efforts that have been made to 
break through this isolation have not been 
availing. We have made a number of efforts 
since I have been in my present position 
with little or no response from the other 
side. A good deal of this isolation is self- 
imposed, and we see evidences of that almost 

every day. But perhaps this situation will 
change. I don't know what the next genera- 
tion of Chinese leaders will look like. We 
have perhaps too little information on just 
who they will be and what their attitudes 
will be. But in the longer run, I cannot help 
but believe that all peoples and governments 
will recognize that somehow peoples and 
governments must find a way to live at 
peace with each other. 

Q. Can you define for us what is the 
United States policy toward trade with 
Communist China by the countries in West- 
ern Europe, using the steel mill issue as an 

A. Well, I commented on that recently. 
We would hope that those who are con- 
sidering the type of trade with Communist 
China which might add to their sinews of 
war, which might add to their warmaking 
capability, would take into account the 
problem of peace in that part of the world 
and be cautious about entering into arrange- 
ments which would make it more difficult 
to organize and establish a peace out there. 

I think steel is relevant to this. It is true 
that it is not — what is being considered — is 
not on the COCOM list, but nevertheless a 
substantial increase in the steel-producing 
capability of mainland China is not a very 
comfortable idea for us at the time when 
China is doing nothing to bring about peace 
in Southeast Asia. 

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America Unchanged 

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the Panama OAS 
Working Committee and in Buenos Aires 
also, there have been some suggestions the 
United States is blocking economic reforms 
in Latin America. Could you comment on 

A. Yes. I will be very glad to, because 
there seems to be some rather serious mis- 
understanding or perhaps even misrepre- 
sentation on that matter. 

I was myself at the Rio conference, and 
we made it very clear that we had an urgent 
and an elementary interest in rapid eco- 
nomic and social development in the hemi- 

APRIL 11, 1966 


sphere. And indeed you will recall that at 
that conference, President Johnson author- 
ized me to inform our colleagues in Latin 
America that we would be prepared to see 
the Alliance for Progress extended beyond 
1961— 1971— and on the basis of full self- 
help and mutual assistance. ^ One of the very 
important, and to me rather dramatic, de- 
velopments at the Rio conference was the 
acceptance by all members of the hemi- 
sphere that each should try to help the 
other in whatever ways possible, and there 
are many ways in which the Latin Ameri- 
can countries themselves are now helping 
each other in these matters of economic and 
social development. 

Q. Mr. Secretary — 

A. Now, there is no difference in policy. 
We are committed to rapid change in both 
the economic and social fields in Latin 
America. Now, when we get into specific 
questions of incorporating such ideas into 
treaties, then we do have to look at our own 
constitutional structure and the responsibil- 
ities of the Congress and the extent to which 
we can go in imposing limitations upon our 
Congress by treaty, in matters affecting 
such things as trade and aid. And so there 
is a technical and a structural problem for 
us on this matter. But as a policy matter, 
there is no retreat at all. The great impetus 
for change has been coming through the 
Alliance for Progress, much of it out of this 
country, but with warm reception and a 
general commitment on the part of others. 

Procedures on Travel of Americans Abroad 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes? 

Q. Could you explain to us ivith ivhat 
justification and on the basis of lohat au- 
thority the State Department orders the 
shadowing of some American citizens travel- 
ing abroad? 

A. In the first place, we don't order the 
shadowing of American citizens. Let me 

' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965, 
p. 985. 

just put that matter in a little context if I 
can. We have about 3^2 or 4 million pass- 
ports outstanding at any given time. We 
send a constant stream of messages abroad 
about the travel of Americans abroad. Most 
of these are on such matters as supporting 
the efforts of businessmen and their activi- 
ties, or opening doors for newsmen who are 
traveling or ask for our assistance, and then 
we have cooperation with the other govern- 
ments in the international field of dealing 
with certain types of crime and things of 
that sort. 

Now, over a period of many years, we 
have cooperated with other agencies in 
carrying out their own responsibilities and 
transmitting certain messages. In the case 
of the type of thing you referred to, perhaps 
8 or 10 of such messages might go out in 
the course of a month. One of our duties in 
the State Department is to support other 
agencies and departments of Government in 
their needs overseas. There are some 40 or 
more separate depai'tments and agencies 
who do become involved in relations with 
the rest of the world. 

Now, I have personally begun an investiga- 
tion — an examination of this particular 
issue of what ought to be said, if anything, 
to our embassies abroad about individuals 
who are traveling there about which some 
questions might have been raised. I'm not 
satisfied that our present procedures are 
exactly what they ought to be. I will be 
discussing those with the Attorney General, 
and we will establish criteria. 

For example, I can tell you quite frankly 
I don't believe that we ourselves, or anyone 
else, should be transmitting abroad un- 
evaluated information which has not been 
subjected to a real judgment as a matter of 
policy here in Washington. But this is a very 
tiny fraction of the total problem of sup- 
porting our interests overseas and clearing 
the way for the maximum enjoyment of the 
privileges of travel by American citizens. 

I do intend looking this over, and I am 
sure the Attorney General agrees with me 
that we must give every protection to the 
legitimate rights and privileges of Ameri- 



can citizens in their travels abroad. I can't 
go into detail about what I will think about 
the particular incidents that have been re- 
ported, but I am looking into it personally 
and will be in touch with the Attorney- 
General about it. 

Q. Can you make a statement of public 
policy when you're finished with this re- 
view ? 

A. Well, that question will be one of those 
questions to be examined, Mr. Roberts 
[Chalmers Roberts, the Washington Post]. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes? 

Q. Back in the early fifties, during the 
Harry Dexter White case, J. Edgar Hoover, 
testifying on the Hill, insisted that the FBI 
never did any evaluation but only collected 
material. Would you say that to character- 
ize a man in an outgoing cable as having 
deep pro-Communist convictions was an 
unevaluation ? 

A. Well, I said in my remarks just a 
moment ago that I have serious doubts about 
whether we should pass along unevaluated 
information in this field. Now, I do want 
to be very precise about one point. We were 
not asked to conduct an investigation of 
anyone traveling abroad. And we have not 
asked our embassies to conduct an investi- 
gation of anyone traveling abroad. There is 
no question of surveillance, of tailing. The 
only question involved was — if you have 
any information, then pass it along. That 
was what was involved. But not a matter 
— we don't have facilities, for example, for 
such investigations or for a surveillance of 
people overseas. 

Q. Did not that March 6 airgram request 
the Embassies in London — rather, in Paris 
and Moscow — to oversee the activities of this 
man in Moscow and to watch out? 

A. No, not in the sense of surveillance or 
tailing or anything of that sort but rather 
to report if any information in that field 
were turned up. But, again, I want to look 
at that, because I think that these matters 

do require evaluation. We are not ourselves 
— we have no responsibility ourselves for 
making such evaluations about citizens gen- 
erally. Our own investigations, of course, 
are limited to our own employees and the 
maintenance of the security of our own 
Department, where almost every job is 
sensitive and where we recognize that there 
are continuing efforts to penetrate the 

Q. Mr. Secretary — • 

A. But this is something we will be look- 
ing into. I will personally be getting into it, 
because I feel very strongly that in these 
fields where we are in the most direct 
relationships with large numbers of citizens 
of our own country with respect to pass- 
ports, and large numbers of citizens in other 
countries with respect to visas, that we 
should be fully alert to the policy implica- 
tions and that we should have the proce- 
dures — and, if you want to call them that, 
even the routine procedures which are ap- 
propriate in our kind of system. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to 
NATO, could you give us a general idea of 
ways and means under consideration by 
your Government to strengthen and possibly 
extend the integrated structure of the alli- 
ance ? 

A. I think that I would not add anything 
to what President Johnson said last Wednes- 
day 2 on that subject. We are discussing 
these matters with other allies. I think that 
there is no question that the overwhelming 
majority of the allies are determined to 
proceed with NATO on a strengthened 
basis, not necessarily because we think there 
has been a heightened threat from any- 
where but because we think that the unity 
and the strength of NATO is a very vital 
part of deterring such threats and providing 
a basis from which one can hope to improve 
relations with, for example, Eastern Eu- 

Q. Mr. Secretary, Portuguese Premier 

' See p. 554. 

APRIL 11, 1966 


Salazar has expressed a dissatisfaction with 
NATO, and I ivas wondering whether Portu- 
gal has given any official indication of this 
either to the United States or other mem- 
bers of NATO, and do you see this as a 
further erosion of the organization? 

A. I don't know what details Dr. Salazar 
might have had in mind. Portugal did take 
full part in the discussions that occurred in 
the NATO Council before the 14-nation 
declaration was made, and they adhered to 
that declaration.^ Of course, we have said 
for some years, literally years, that if any 
members of NATO wished to make sugges- 
tions about improving the organization and 
the structure of NATO, we would be very 
glad to consider them. But I have heard no 
details on what might be behind Dr. Sala- 
zar's remark. 

Yes, sir? 

The Situation in South Viet-Nam 

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reading of 
the seriousness of the current series of 
demonstrations in South Viet-Nam? Is 
Premier [Nguyen Cao'\ Ky's government in 
trouble in your estimation? 

A. Well, I think what is involved there is 
the fact that some weeks ago — and again in 
Honolulu* — Prime Minister Ky announced 
that he expected to move toward a council 
of some sort that would draft a constitution, 
that that constitution would be submitted 
to the people of South Viet-Nam on plebis- 
cite, and that this would be followed by 

Now, the opening up of this path toward 
a more representative system there has un- 
doubtedly led to certain discussions among 

" For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536. 
' For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302. 

groups about what their positions are likely ' 
to be as that development goes forward. 
This is primarily a matter for them to work 
out among themselves, and they are in regu- 
lar contact with all groups out there. We, 
of course, would hope very much that, what- 
ever their differences might be among 
themselves about the details of their in- 
ternal organization, they would not lose 
sight of the thing in which they all seem to 
agree, and that is that they don't want what 
Hanoi is trying to impose upon them. So we 
would hope this matter would settle down 
to a generally agreed basis before too long. 

Q. Mr. Secretary, is recognition of Outer 
Mongolia in any sense an early possibility? 

A. I wouldn't want to speculate on that 
question in terms of timing. As I say, this 
is one of those questions that we have not 
overlooked. We, too, are aware that the 
question is there. But I wouldn't want to 
speculate on it at this point. 

Q. Mr. Secretary? 

A. Yes, sir? 

Q. On the steel mill again, the German 
Government, after it first informed you 
about the upcoming deal, seemed to have 
the impression you Imd no objections but 
only pointed out the possibility of negative 
reactions in U.S. public opinion. Is that 
about correct? 

A. Well, I don't want to get into what 
might have been said between the two Gov- 
ernments. We do discuss these matters, and 
we are discussing these matters. But what 
I suggested the other day was that we would 
hope that those who consider such under- 
takings think soberly about questions of 
timing and questions of the general peace 
in the area. 

Q. Thank you very much, sir. 



Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation'' 

Following is the transcript of an inter- 
vieiv ivith Secretary Rusk on March 20 on 
the Columbia Broadcasting System's tele- 
vision and radio program "Face the Na- 
tion." Interviewing the Secretary were Mar- 
tin Agronsky and Marvin Kalb of CBS 
News and Adalbert de Segonzac, North 
American correspondent for France-Soir. 

Press release 61 dated March 21 

II Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, we under- 
stand that in the past 6 weeks there have 
been repeated American efforts to start 
negotiations with Hanoi. Have there been 
new American efforts? Have they im- 
proved the prospects for negotiating the 

Secretary Rusk: Actually, Mr. Agronsky, 
there has never been a time when there was 
any lack of contact with the other side. I 
don't identify anything special in the last 6 
weeks. There have been many contacts 
with the other side, direct, bilateral, or 
through the efforts of third governments. 
Our problem is that, with all of these con- 
tacts, we have not yet found a desire for 
peace on the other side. 

M [ Announcement. 1 

fl Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, since we 
apparently have had no success with our 
own efforts, and the third governments on 
our behalf have had no success, what do you 
think of the proposal of New York's Repub- 
lican Senator [Jacob K.] Javits today that 
the United States seek unconditional dis- 
cussions with Red China now with the aim 
of ending the Vietnamese war? 

Secretary Rv^k: Well, this has not been 
in the way at all. We have in fact publicly 
and privately indicated that we would be 
prepared for unconditional discussions or, as 


17 nonalined nations put it, negotiations 
without preconditions. 

We had our last talk with Peiping directly, 
bilaterally, last Wednesday in Warsaw. We 
are prepared to sit down at the table and 
talk if someone is prepared to come to the 
table and talk with us. But thus far we have 
no one at the table. As I have said many 
times, I would be in Geneva tomorrow 
afternoon if there was someone there to 
talk to. 

Now, the question of conditions to such 
talks is not necessarily a real problem. We 
would be prepared to come to the table and 
let everyone say what is on his mind with- 
out any limitations or conditions of any sort 
whatever. When everyone has said what he 
has to say, then we could take a look at 
everything and see whether there are any 
threads out of which some sort of a peaceful 
solution can be woven. But we had talked 
with Peiping many times. We had the 
129th bilateral meeting with their Ambassa- 
dor last Wednesday in Warsaw. We are 
prepared to come to a conference on South- 
east Asia or any part of it. We are prepared 
for informal, private, discreet, preliminary 
discussions. But the difficulty is that the 
other side keeps hanging up the phone. It 
is hard to get anybody to the table to talk. 

Mr. de Segonzac : Was this subject raised, 
this possibility of talking, of free talks, 
raised with the Chinese in Warsaw by your 

Secretary Rusk: Well, the very fact that 
we sat down with them for a considerable 
period for bilateral talks indicated that we 
were prepared to talk, and I would hope 
these bilateral talks would go ahead, be- 
cause even though we haven't made much 
progress in 129 talks, it is important that 

APRIL 11, 1966 



we and Peiping keep in touch with each 
other. As a matter of fact, we have been in 
touch with them on more serious subjects 
and more persistently than perhaps any gov- 
ernment that has diplomatic relations with 
Peiping, except perhaps with the Soviet Un- 
ion. But we are prepared to discuss any 
question with Hanoi, Peiping. We have tried 
to talk about disarmament. We have tried to 
talk about Southeast Asia. We have tried 
to talk about a lot of things. But we don't 
get much response. 

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, last weekend 
Vice President Humphrey said that Ameri- 
can policy toward Communist China might 
be described as containment but not neces- 
sarily isolation. Would you agree with this 
general summation of our policy toward the 
Communist Chinese? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that is a 
very shorthand way of saying it. Let us 
take the two words separately. "Contain- 
ment." One does not have to go into some 
general theory of containment. The United 
States has specific alliances with Korea, 
with Japan, the Philippines, with Thailand, 
Australia, New Zealand. South Viet-Nam is 
a protocol state under the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization. 

Now, the United States inevitably is con- 
cerned with peace in the Pacific. We are 
not just concerned with the Atlantic. We 
are a two-ocean country. We have to be. 
And that was demonstrated during World 
War n. So we have specific commitments 
and alliances, and we intend to make good 
on them. 

Now, if one wants to summarize that by 
calling it containment, all right, that is it. 
On the question of isolation, we have tried 
for a period of 12 years to try to establish 
some sort of contact that would break 
through this sense that mainland China and 
the United States were not in contact with 
each other. President Eisenhower initiated 
these talks with Peiping. We tried first to 
rescue some of our Americans on the main- 
land, which is a fundamental obligation. We 


tried to get a renunciation of force in the 
Formosa Straits between Formosa and the 
mainland. We have tried to exchange news- 
men. We will give any of you, three of you 
gentlemen, a passport today if the other 
side will give you a visa. We have tried to 
exchange doctors, scientists. We have tried, 
suggested, the exchange of scholars.* We 
have suggested the exchange of weather in- 
formation. We have tried to break through 
some of these overriding political considera- 
tions to establish some direct and practical 
and operational contacts with the other 
side. But thus far the answer has been: 
"Unless you are prepared to surrender For- 
mosa, there is nothing to talk about." 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the critics of 
the administration on this whole China 
problem these days say that many of these 
overtures by the administration are, as 
they describe it, token overtures and that 
the root issues such as China's admission to 
the United Nations possibly or American 
diplomatic recognition are not really the 
issues that the administration is directing 
its attention toward. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is — in the^ 
first place these overtures are in no sense 
in bad faith. These overtures have been in 
good faith, trying to establish some better 
contact with the people on the mainland. 
But it is true that on questions of recogni- 
tion in membership in the United Nations, 
you come up against a hard question posed 
by Peiping, not by us. They say that there 
is nothing to discuss until we are prepared] 
to recognize Peiping and surrender For- 
mosa. Now, when we say that we are not 
prepared to surrender Formosa and the 12 
or 13 million people on it, then the conversa 
tion gets to be very difficult. 

In the United Nations there are a good' 
many states there who would be prepared 
to vote for the admission of Peiping but wha 
would not be prepared to expel the Republic 
of China on Formosa, and Peiping has made} 
it clear that they are not prepared to come 

' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 28, 1966) 
p. 491. 



into the United Nations on any such basis; 
so that everybody is confronted with the 
question, What do you do about the Repub- 
lic of China on Formosa? Do you surrender 
these people or not? We are not prepared 
to surrender them. And that means, un- 
fortunately, that there is very little prospect 
that the authorities in Peiping will be in- 
terested in improved relations between 
themselves and us or indeed any real par- 
ticipation in the international community. 

Mr. Agronsky: Have we ever positively 
proposed the two-China solution? 

Secretary Rusk: Both the Republic of 
China on Formosa and Peiping have com- 
pletely rejected the two-China solution. 
Therefore, this is a fairly hypothetical and 
academic problem. We do not believe our- 
selves that Peiping shows any interest in 
this. There are major charter problems in 
the United Nations on the two-China solu- 
tion, but there is no indication that Peiping 
will accept it or have any interest in it. 

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. Secretary, some of 
your allies have taken a different tack 
than the United States. Germany, for ex- 
ample, in the last few days has announced a 
deal of a steel mill with China. They seem 
to be putting trade ahead of discussions on 
recognition purposes. Do you feel, one, they 
are wrong, and two, that this may be an- 
other way for the United States to move — 
in trade ? 

Secretary Rusk: We would hope that 
our friends in Western Europe who have 
been engaging in these conversations about 
a steel mill would, when the time comes for 
action, take into account the problem of 
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and con- 
sider whether in fact Peiping is willing to 
live at peace with its neighbors in the Pa- 
cific. Trade, as such, is not an insuperable 
obstacle. President Kennedy at one point, 
you remember, in a press conference said 
that if we had an inquiry from Peiping 
about buying wheat in this country, we 
would give it consideration. But we are 
concerned about anything that would lead 
Peiping to believe that their policy is suc- 
cessful or anything that would add to the 

strength of Peiping until there is some indi- 
cation of change in their policy. So I 
would hope that our friends in Europe 
would keep this matter under review and 
before they get into a situation where they 
are producing 2 million tons more of steel 
for Peiping that they would give some 
thought to the problems of peace. 

No Change in Peiping's Attitude 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, throughout 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
hearings last week, when these Chinese ex- 
perts were testifying, the implication 
through all the time was that we should re- 
evaluate American policy toward Commu- 
nist China. The time had come for a reap- 
praisal, for a new approach. Do you sub- 
scribe to that ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we appraise these 
things all the time, Martin. We have ex- 
perts on China in Government. They are 
very accomplished and dedicated experts. 
But these are not questions that we can 
sort out by discussions simply among Amer- 
icans, because there is Peiping. Now, we 
are dealing with a regime which has been 
thrown out of several countries in Africa, 
which had a debacle in trying to organize 
an Afro-Asian conference in accordance with 
their own views, which threatened to inter- 
vene in the India-Pakistan affair, which 
had a major setback in Indonesia because of 
their attempts to intervene in the internal 
affairs of that country, which has blocked 
the path for discussions or a conference on 
Southeast Asia. 

Now, we have to deal with the attitudes of 
Peiping. It is not just a question of debating 
among ourselves, because those who say 
"Let's be nice to Peiping" can't speak for 
Peiping, and they are not able to deliver a 
different attitude on the part of Peiping. 

Now, we are in touch with Peiping all the 
time. We have professional, direct, realistic 
conversations with Peiping, and so these are 
not matters that can be resolved solely by 
discussions on the American side. The 
Peiping factor has to be taken into account. 

Mr. Kalb: Just following up that very 

APRIL 11, 1966 


point, Mr. Secretary, does that mean that 
if there were a change of heart, one that 
we could detect, in the attitude of Commu- 
nist China, changing its policy of belligeren- 
cies, would we be prepared as a nation to 
receive that change and make adjustments 
thereto ? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, when you speculate 
about a future policy of Peiping, you are 
getting into a hypothetical situation. But 
let me talk now about our side. 

President Johnson, President Kennedy, 
President Eisenhower, and President Tru- 
man, in this postwar period, have always 
left open the door to peaceful relationships. 
They have always left it open. Now, if there 
is any indication that Peiping is prepared to 
live at peace with its neighbors — Mr. John 
Foster Dulles commented on this at one 
point — if there is any indication that Pei- 
ping is prepared to live as a loyal and decent 
member of the world community, then other 
possibilities do open up. 

But I don't want to speculate on that 
unduly, because we see no indications from 
Peiping that they are prepared to be an ac- 
tive and a loyal member of the world com- 

Let's take the recent Security Council 
consideration of the India-Pakistan affair. 
Had Peiping been sitting in the Security 
Council, they would have vetoed what other- 
wise was the unanimity of the Security 
Council on measures to bring India and 
Pakistan to a peaceful conclusion. Now, 
Peiping has not gotten along very well in 
the Communist bloc, in which it has been a 
member. It hasn't gotten along very well 
in the Afro-Asian world, in which it has 
been a regular attendant. So we have, on 
the official level — we have to consider Pei- 
ping, their attitude, what they are prepared 
to do, what their approach is, and not just 
think about it in terms of how we ourselves 
would debate this among Americans. 

Mr. de Segonzac: On the other hand, Mr. 
Secretary, there seems to be a reassess- 
ment in Peiping of their actual policy. They 
have had a certain number of defeats, and 
they seem to be worried about it. Also, 


Professor [Morton H.] Halperin, at the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said 
the other day that the Chinese are fright- 
ened of being attacked by America. Wouldn't 
it be the moment to try and do something 
which can make them feel, if there is a 
group of doves in Peiping, to give them some 
support so as to bring that change of mind 
which you are looking for? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, we haven't heard 
the flutterings of the wings of doves in 
Peiping, I must confess. They have put for- 
ward their program of world revolution 
with a militancy that has caused very great 
problems even inside the Communist world, 
quite apart from the problems it has caused 
in the free world. 

Now, again, we are in regular contact 
with Peiping. But they keep coming back 
to one or two very fundamental questions: 
"Are you prepared to surrender Formosa?" 
Our answer to that is, "No, we are not." 
"Are you prepared to accept Hanoi's pro- 
gram for South Viet-Nam?" Our answer to 
that is, "No, we are not." Now, in the face 
of this, Peiping's attitude toward us is very 

Now, the other countries, including yours, 
Mr. de Segonzac, who have diplomatic rela- 
tions with Peiping — the conversations there 
are desultory and unimportant. There is no 
real contact between London, Paris, and 
these other capitals with Peiping. Maybe 
we in the United States have a special 
problem with Peiping, because when the 
Communists first came to power in 1949, 
their first object was to erase all traces of 
100 years of good relations between the 
Chinese and the American people. There was 
a very affectionate relationship there. It 
reflected itself in health, in education, and 
in all sorts of ways. 

We pursued the open-door policy, and we 
were opposed to the carving out of special 
spheres of influence in China by other world 

The Chinese even charged that the Pei- 
ping Union Medical College, which is a very 
distinguished medical institution in China, 
had engaged in human vivisection, in order 



to discredit the American friendship with 
the Chinese people. So maybe we have a 
special problem. We cannot accept their at- 
tempt through Hanoi to seize South Viet- 
Nam. We cannot accept their effort to 
bring about the surrender of Formosa. 

Under those circumstances, I can tell you 
that our relations with Peiping are difficult, 
and we don't see openings offered by Pei- 
ping that respond to the gestures and the 
openings or the probes which we have made 
on our side for the past 10 years. 

Political Situation in Viet-Nam 

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in South Viet- 
Nam for the past week or so there have 
been reports of some considerable political 
unrest. I wonder, sir, if you can give us a 
progress report on how serious these were. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the 
first place, Marvin, there are differences of 
view among different groups in South Viet- 
Nam on how South Viet-Nam itself should 
be organized and governed — the Buddhists 
and the Catholics and the sects and the 
montagnards and the other elements there. 
But there is one thing on which they seem 
to be united, and that is that they do not 
want Hanoi ; they do not want the Viet 

Now, Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky 
and his government have announced in re- 
cent weeks, and reaffirmed that at Hono- 
lulu,^ that they wanted to move toward the 
drafting of a constitution this year, the sub- 
mission of a constitution to the people of 
Viet-Nam this year, looking toward elec- 
tions next year. 

Now, in the process in moving toward a 
more democratic situation, the groups in 
South Viet-Nam want to know where their 
interests are and how they can maneuver 
and jockey for position. But I have no 
doubt at all that Buddhists, Catholics, and 
all the rest of them combine in rejecting 
Hanoi and the National Liberation Front. 
' And just today we had word that the 
Buddhist leaders in Saigon had indicated 
that they were not trying to upset the Gov- 
ernment; but they are interested, as every- 

one else is there, in how this process of 
building a constitutional and civilian gov- 
ernment will in due course come about. 

Mr. Kalb : Do you think that we are over 
the hurdle on this? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, one keeps one's 
fingers crossed, quite frankly. But the one 
thing that the overwhelming majority of 
the South Vietnamese are united on is that 
this attempt by the Liberation Front and 
Hanoi to impose a political solution in South 
Viet-Nam by force must be rejected. And 
we would hope therefore that all of them 
would continue to join in resisting this ef- 
fort by Hanoi. And then when they get a 
secure country of their own, then they can 
afford to sort of quarrel about who runs it 
and what their own internal affairs might 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, there has 
been a lot of confusion about where the 
administration stands at this point on the 
inclusion of the Viet Cong in peace nego- 
tiations. Where do we stand at this point? 

Secretary Rtisk: I think the basic posi- 
tion on that was stated by President John- 
son last July 3 when he said that if Hanoi 
stopped its aggression, that there should be 
no insuperable obstacle in permitting the 
views of the Viet Cong to become knovsm. 

Now, we start, Martin, from the basic 
knowledge, it is not just an assumption or 
speculation, the basic knowledge that the 
Liberation Front was a creation of Hanoi 
and that the Liberation Front is directly 
connected with the aggression being pushed 
by Hanoi against the South Vietnamese. 
Now, if Hanoi decides to stop its aggression, 
the infiltration of men, units, and arms into 
South Viet-Nam, then a good many other 
questions would fall into place. 

You and I can't negotiate that question, 
because you and I cannot stop the shooting. 
I would be prepared tomorrow in Geneva to 
sit down with representatives of Hanoi and 
talk to them about this and any other ques- 
tions they want to talk about. 

For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302. 
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965. 

APRIL 11, 1966 


Mr. Agronslcy: Mr. Secretary, there are 
many more things we want to question you 
about. We will want to resume the ques- 
tioning in a moment. [Annoimcement.l 

France and the NATO Alliance 

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, France's 
President de Gaulle has argued that one of 
the reasons he wants to pull French forces 
out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza- 
tion is that NATO no longer corresponds to 
present-day realities. Would you agree? 

Secretary Ritsk: Not really, because I can 
recall as late as 1961 and '62 that we were 
involved in a major crisis over Berlin. At 
that time the Soviet Union was threatening 
war if the West did not pull its troops out 
of Berlin, and I might say that at that time 
France was unwilling to take part in any 
discussions with Moscow to try to take the 
fever out of that situation and left it to the 
United States and the United Kingdom to 
engage the Soviet Union to try to resolve 
that crisis. I think it is too soon for us to 
say that there is a disappearance of the 
threat from Eastern Europe against West- 
ern Europe. I am aware of the fact that the 
air of tension has been diminished, that we 
do see some improvement in the situation, 
and I would hope that that would continue. 

Mr. Agronsky: Do you feel that the So- 
viet Union still presents an aggressive 
threat to Western Europe? 

Secretary Rusk: When Mr. Khrushchev 
was 70 years old we all celebrated his 70th 
birthday as an affable grandfather, but 
when he was 68 and a half years old he put 
missiles into Cuba, and when he was 67 
years old he threatened President Kennedy 
with war if we did not pull our people out 
of Berlin; so I just do not think that we 
know enough about what can happen in the 

I do believe, Martin, that in the West we 
have achieved three great central ideas : 

That the deterrence of war in the North 
Atlantic community is a collective effort — 


and we have invested enormous resources 
in that; the defense budgets of the United 
States alone since 1947 have amounted to 
something like $850 billion ; 

That the determination to fight together 
in the event of a crisis is a collective effort; 

And third, that the great issues between 
East and West have to be resolved on a 
collective basis. 

And I think that one of the reasons why 
one can now quarrel a little bit about NATO 
is that it has succeeded. It has been an or- 
ganization for peace. And since the threat 
has been apparently somewhat diminished, 
there is a certain luxury in turning to lesser 
questions and raising other issues outside 
the framework of an overwhelming threat 
from the East. 

Mr. de Segonzac : You feel that the air of 
tensions, as you said, have diminished, 
NATO should stay exactly as it is, or that 
there should be some modifications such as, 
for example, including Asia in the responsi- 
bilities of the Europeans? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I do not believe 
that the NATO alliance itself should be ex- 
tended geographically to include Asia. We 
have never suggested, for example, that 
Viet-Nam was an issue involving the NATO 
alliance as such. 

We do think that every nation must con- 
sider as a matter of national interest what 
kind of result in these other parts of the 
world they consider would be in their na- 
tional interest. But I must say that I do be- 
lieve that it is vitally important for the 15 
nations of the West to act in concert on the 
major issues that might obtain between, 
say, Western Europe and Eastern Europe 
and on the security of the area of the 15 
nations, and the 14 have made it very clear 
that they do not really accept the an- 
nounced intentions of President de Gaulle 
with respect to NATO. 

Mr. Agronsky: Gentlemen, I am very 
sorry that our time is up. Thank you, Mr. 
Secretary, for being with us to "face the 



Hard Work Ahead for the United Nations 

by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs 

I am fully aware of the tremendous con- 
tributions made to American education by 
the National Education Association and its 
various departments, such as the American 
Association for Health, Physical Education, 
and Recreation. I just want to add my own 
note of appreciation for your efforts. Your 
work, inasmuch as it concerns itself with 
the building of a healthy youth and conse- 
quently a healthy America, is broadly re- 
lated to my own. For the success of our 
foreign policy is intimately intertwined 
with a healthy citizenry. By that I mean 
one that is enlightened intellectually as well 
as in top physical condition. 

No democracy can play its role in history, 
can be powerful and survive, unless it rests 
upon an informed public. When he briefs 
visitors to the State Department, Secretary 
Rusk is fond of pointing out that one of the 
two guiding stars which direct our course 
is that a government derives its just powers 
from the consent of the governed. For this 
consent to be intelligent and vital it must 
be based on knowledge. And surely funda- 
mental to this fact is a requirement that we 
have a healthy public. It is axiomatic that 
in a country where widespread sickness, dis- 
ease, and ill health prevail you cannot have 
an alert, educated, and interested public. 

' Address made before the National Convention of 
the American Association for Health, Physical Edu- 
cation, and Recreation at Chicago, 111., on Mar. 18 
(press release 55). 

Disraeli put it well back in 1877 when he 
said, "The health of the people is really the 
foundation upon which all their happiness 
and all their powers as a State depend." 

But you have responsibilities going far 
beyond your role of giving this country a 
healthy citizenry. As educators, you occupy 
one of the most respected positions in the 
professional community, even if it is one of 
the poorest paid. And through your direct 
contact with the students of today, you are 
shaping not only the bodies but the minds of 
America's leaders of tomorrow. I wish that 
educators all over the world would never 
forget this, for peace-building, like nation- 
building, depends in the last analysis not on 
some kind of economic or historical or 
dialectical determinism but on what people 
can learn. 

And learning is not only knowledge; it is 
also understanding. The search for under- 
standing is a crucial educational problem 
for our times, and there is no broader, more 
difficult, or more important kind of under- 
standing to achieve than international un- 

Of course, this is a supremely difficult 
and complicated job. All of us are subjected 
today to a cacophony of discordant sounds 
on all frequencies and in all volumes. By 
press and radio and television and in a 
constant stream of books and other pub- 
lished materials, we are flooded with infor- 
mation. We run the risk of what Stephen 

APRIL 11, 1966 



Spender has called "overwrite and under- 

We all need to absorb as much as we can, 
understand as much as we can, and convey 
as much as we can to students and to our 
communities about America's role in the 
world today. For in this age of jets and 
rockets, nations literally live in each other's 
backyards. Rapid transport, rapid commu- 
nication, have broken down the old bounda- 
ries of time and distance. A war in Kashmir, 
unrest in Cyprus, and infiltration in Viet- 
Nam can and do affect the lives of all of us 
here. We live in an age where there is 
always a clear and present danger that a 
small war left unchecked can grow into a 
conflagration with weapons that can liter- 
ally snuff out all human life. This sobering 
fact reminds us constantly of the need to 
devote our best energies to making sure that 
world war III does not happen. 

We shall do well if we can, through edu- 
cation, enable the next generation to cope 
with the conditions of its environment more 
effectively than the last one did. Several 
centuries ago we passed the time when a 
truly civilized man could have been said to 
know everything or to understand every- 
thing. But I hope we never pass the time 
when men can be trained to apply them- 
selves to the tests facing them with balance, 
good judgment, and a feeling of moral 
values and civilized standards. 

The concepts of moderation, of idealism, 
and a just political order are not outdated 
just because they found their origin among 
the ancient Greeks. These responses to 
growth and stress and strain are as neces- 
sary today as they ever were — perhaps more 
necessary because the danger to civilization 
is greater. 

And so is the habit of analysis — the avoid- 
ance of action without full forethought. The 
educated man must avoid a knee-jerk re- 
sponse to provocation. He must not be 
satisfied with platitudes either in favor of 
motherhood or against the maneating shark. 
He must analyze, earnestly and seriously, 
the problems of our day and seek to influ- 

ence his government to act constructively 
in the cause of peace. 

International Tasks Ahead 

In this spirit I suggest that the educated 
man will wish to give thought to the great 
international tasks confronting us as we 
round out the 20th century. Let me list some 
of the most obvious. 

First, we must — and I mean that we 
literally must — prevent the outbreak of nu- 
clear war if we want to have any future at 
all. And this task involves not only preserv- 
ing the peace among the present nuclear 
powers but preventing the spread of nuclear 
weapons to nations not now possessing 

Second, we must find ways in which 
states can learn to live together and deal 
with their problems without resort to vio- 
lence — simply because violence is so very 
lethal in the conditions of today. 

Third, we have to deal with the problem 
of feeding and maintaining the exploding 
populations of the world. We seem to be 
heading toward a world of 7 billion people 
by the end of the century, and more beyond, 
unless family planning becomes a reality. 

Fourth, we need to meet the growing ex- 
pectations of the peoples of the underde- 
veloped countries and to assure them of a 
significant degree of material progress if 
we are ever to have stability in interna- 
tional affairs. 

Fifth, we must find some way to conserve 
the irreplaceable natural resources of the 
planet and to prevent our atmosphere and 
our water from becoming irretrievably 

And sixth, we must give to all nations 
and all peoples a sense of dignity, equality, 
and identity in a world still rife with preju- 
dice and unwarranted privilege. Unless we 
do so, race conflicts and colonial problems 
arising from the domination of one state by 
another are bound to bedevil our future. 

With this unfinished agenda in mind it 
is well to survey the international scene and 
to note where we stand. 




Role of the United Nations 

The United Nations has become a fixture 
on the world scene. Its charter, with its 
references to economic and social progress 
and the advancement of fundamental human 
rights and freedoms, is the greatest single 
statement of humanity's purpose developed 
in this century. That is why one of the first 
official acts of new nations, great and small, 
is to seek membei*ship in the United Nations 
and to accept the obligations of the United 
Nations Charter in so doing. U.N. member- 
ship is a national status symbol and a token 
of at least theoretical acceptance of civilized 
rules of international intercourse. 

The United Nations as an institution is 
both less and more than the charter. Less, 
because as an imperfect organization oper- 
ated by fallible human beings, it has not 
been able to apply charter principles com- 
pletely in the real world. More, because it 
has broadened its activities into fields en- 
visaged only dimly, if at all, at the San 
Francisco conference. 


In its first task — the keeping of the peace 
I — the United Nations has had some impres- 
sive successes and some regrettable failures. 
It has prevented many disputes from erupt- 
ing into conflict. Simply by providing a 
channel for negotiation it was helpful in 
ending the Berlin blockade and thus in help- 
ing to remove that greatest threat to peace 
in postwar Europe. It provided the arena 
for working out the terms for the settlement 
of the Cuba missile crisis, and the U.N. 
Secretary-General played an active part in 
reaching a solution. 

What is perhaps more significant, the 
U.N. has been able to stop small wars and 
prevent them from developing into large 
ones. In widely separated areas — in Korea, 
I in Indonesia, in Kashmir, along the smolder- 
ing frontiers around Israel, in Cyprus, in 
Greece, and in the Congo — U.N. personnel 
have kept the peace, supervised truces, and 
kept belligerents apart. With ingenuity and 
effectiveness, the U.N. has built up a solid 

APRIL 11, 1966 

record in that vital area of modern state- 
craft known as "crisis management." 


Second, the United Nations has done 
what it could to help keep the nuclear genie 
in the bottle and to contain the destructive 
capabilities of modern science. Agreements 
for comprehensive and safeguarded arms 
control still elude us, and they are not likely 
to be found in a vast deliberative body like 
the U.N. General Assembly with its 117 
delegations, large and small. 

But what the Assembly does is to focus 
upon all the nuclear powers, in a very tangi- 
ble way, the fervent desire of men of good 
will everywhere that general nuclear war 
shall never be unleashed upon the world. 

An 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is 
today meeting in Geneva and discussing, 
among other things, ways to expand the test 
ban's scope and to prevent the further 
spread of nuclear weapons. The Disarma- 
ment Committee had its origin in the con- 
text of a General Assembly consideration of 
the problem of disarmament. The Assembly 
is also responsible for the passage of a 
resolution to which both the Soviets and 
Americans have subscribed, prohibiting the 
orbiting in outer space of weapons of mass 
destruction. And the Assembly has likewise 
set in motion the planning for a world 
disarmament conference which could be 
held in 1967. 


Third, the U.N. has served as a catalyst 
in bringing about the transformation — with 
remarkably little violence — of colonial terri- 
tories into independent states, and it has 
served a major role in combating race dis- 
crimination and the denial of human rights. 
Today, for example, U.N. pressures are 
manifest and important in opposing the 
consolidation of a "white supremacy" re- 
gime in Southern Rhodesia. 

In our view, some of the actions taken or 
threatened in the U.N. have been unwise or 
ineffective. Yet the record of U.N. accom- 


plishment in bringing nations to independ- 
ence, while still incomplete, is a bright 
chapter in the history of the organization. 
And that record is amply complemented by 
the work the U.N. has done for the protec- 
tion of refugees and the advancement of 
individual human rights and freedoms 
through its many declarations and conven- 

Improvement of Humxin Welfare 

Fourth, the U.N. has moved in a signifi- 
cant way into the fields of economic and 
social development, helping to improve the 
standards and the quality of life and to raise 
underprivileged peoples above the survival 
level. The specialized agencies of the U.N. 
have attacked this problem on many fronts. 

The World Bank and the International 
Development Association have made devel- 
opment loans totaling almost $7.5 billion to 
more than 85 countries for projects ranging 
from power and transportation installations 
to educational facilities. 

The World Health Organization is assist- 
ing public health programs and attacking 
communicable diseases in scores of coun- 

The Food and Agriculture Organization 
is helping to modernize the archaic agricul- 
tural practices of backward areas, thus help- 
ing to ease food shortages, and to develop 
new sources of protein such as modern 
fishing industries. 

Of particular interest to educators, 
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Sci- 
entific and Cultural Organization] is work- 
ing to eradicate illiteracy; a people unable 
to read can never master the techniques of 
modern living and modern production. 

Look where you will — at labor, transpor- 
tation, communications, the peaceful uses of 
atomic energy, the quest for scientific 
knowledge in outer space, the process of 
industrialization, the problems of population 
control, urban planning, and regional de- 
velopment — you will find United Nations 
agencies actively engaged. It is in these 
fields that 80 percent of the money available 
to the U.N. is spent. These agencies en- 

courage research, disseminate new knowl- 
edge, support political and economic and 
social development, and work in a multitude 
of ways to prepare the new nations to carry 
forward such activities on their own. 

In all these ways the U.N. serves the 
national interests of the United States and 
the cause of peace. 


You may say this is all well and good. 
But what is the U.N. doing about one of the 
gravest threats to world peace: Communist 
aggression in Viet-Nam? 

Viet-Nam, of course, is of overriding con- 
cern to all of us. Our men are fighting by 
the tens of thousands on battlefields half- 
way around the world. 

It is an unconventional and extraordinary 
conflict, quite unlike most of our previous 
military experience. It defies analysis in 
classical terms. South Viet-Nam is threat- 
ened by a massive attempt at subversion 
supplied, directed, and controlled from the 
North. This is not an internal civil war. 
We are aiding the Government and the 
people of South Viet-Nam to defend their 
territory and their right freely to determine 
their own future. 

We have been committed under three 
Presidents to help preserve the independ- 
ence of South Viet-Nam. Our troops are 
fighting alongside those of South Viet-Nam 
and our allies to demonstrate that we mean 
to honor our commitment. The integrity of 
the commitment of the United States is a 
foundation stone of the entire free world. 
We have made similar commitments to 40 
allies, and if we flinch here, the validity of 
all those commitments is necessarily im- 
paired. The effects of a defeat might be 
felt first in Southeast Asia, but the shock 
waves would travel clear around the globe. 

We make no unreasonable demands for a 
settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. Our 
position is simply stated: 

We are ready for unconditional discus- 
sions or on the basis of the Geneva accords 
of 1954 and 1962. 

We desire no continuing military presence 



or bases in Viet-Nam. 

We are prepared to withdraw our forces 
as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position 
to determine its own future without external 

We believe the future political structure 
in South Viet-Nam should be determined by 
the South Vietnamese people themselves 
through democratic processes and that the 
question of reunification of the two Viet- 
Nams should be decided by the free decision 
of their two peoples. 

You are familiar with the intensive ef- 
forts we have made in the search for peace. 
We have been in touch, time and again, with 
most governments of the world and with 
many of them through special emissaries. 
There has been an overwhelmingly favorable 
response to these efforts, except from those 
who could in fact sit down and make peace. 

Most recently we asked the U.N. Security 
Council to consider what it could do to 
contribute to a peaceful settlement.^ While 
the Council took no formal substantive ac- 
tion, consultations among the members re- 
vealed overwhelming support for our view 
that a solution should be sought through 
unconditional discussions at a Geneva con- 

We have been waiting for some word 
from Hanoi that goes beyond the bitter 
invective or charges that talk of peace is a 
trick or a deceit or a swindle. We have been 
listening for sounds other than the sounds 
of bombs and grenades and mortars in 
South Viet-Nam. I regret that I cannot 
report to you any positive and encouraging 
response to the hopes of the overwhelming 
majority of mankind. 

We intend, however, to continue our pres- 
ent course: to press for a peaceful solution 
and to pursue prudently our military action 
designed to bring a halt to Communist 

Many people have asked whether the 
United Nations could not play a greater part 
in Viet-Nam if Communist China were a 
member of the United Nations. Frankly, in 

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, 
p. 229. 

our judgment whether Peking will agree to 
a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam depends 
on much more fundamental questions than 
admission to the United Nations. 

We will continue our efforts to prevent 
the expulsion of the Republic of China from 
the U.N. or its agencies. As long as Peking 
follows its present course, it does not fulfill 
the requirements set forth in the charter 
for admission to the United Nations. In 
actuality. Communist China is keeping itself 
out of the United Nations. 

Among the conditions Communist China 
has set for its entrance into the organization 
are: (1) the expulsion of Nationalist China; 
(2) that the United Nations rescind a re- 
solution passed in 1951 condemning Red 
China for aggression in Korea; and (3) the 
expulsion of the United States and "its 
imperialist puppets." 

In view of these demands it is reasonable 
to ask whether Communist China seriously 
desires membership or whether it is only 
out to destroy the United Nations. We be- 
lieve the United Nations must continue to 
approach this issue with utmost caution and 

Two Visions of tlie Future 

Where, then, does our balance sheet 
stand? It is well over on the plus side. 

Adlai Stevenson once said we either have 
peace or we have nothing. Regardless of 
its imperfections and shortcomings, the 
United Nations is working to assure that the 
children of the world family tomorrow will 
live in conditions of peace and have what 
many lack today. 

It would be misstating a fact to imply that 
the United Nations has met every challenge 
or has accomplished all it should. This is an 
organization both of capacities and limita- 
tions. There have been and will be both 
successes and failures. 

Perhaps Plato in his search for the per- 
fect state would consider our efforts a 
failure since we are so far from the eternal 
verities of justice. But I am sure, too, that 
Aristotle, with his approach to political in- 
stitutions as something natural and derived 

APRIL 11, 1966 


from human experience, would agree that 
we are trying to reach that middle point 
between extremes which is a possible way 
of getting closer to truth and to peace. 
These observations are apt today, and I be- 
lieve that without the United Nations our 
future would be bleaker than it is today. 

We see two visions of the future. One is 
a world of unrestrained nationalist and 
ideological competition without any effec- 
tive world organization. In such a world we 
would expect a steep descent into conflict, 
human misery, and destruction. Whatever 
the follies or aberrations of a few nations 
may be, we do not believe the bulk of the 
U.N. membership would tread this road. 

The other vision is one of steady, if slow 
and gradual, implementation of the pur- 
poses and principles of the U.N. Charter. 
For never forget that the United Nations 
Charter represents the kind of a world that 
we want to live in, one free of aggression, 
one in which disputes are settled peaceably, 
one in which mankind has an opportunity 
to develop politically, economically, and so- 
cially. Slowly but surely it would bring us 
within sight of a world of law, of freedom, 
and of prosperity; a world not of dull con- 
formity but of rich human diversity. 

We put our trust in the capacity of man 
to better his life, and we do not think our 
faith is misplaced. 


President Urges Careful Review of International Agency Budgets 


White Honse press release dated March 15 

I have just sent a memorandum to Secre- 
tary of State Rusk directing him to under- 
take certain measures to improve our par- 
ticipation in international organizations. 

No nation has been a greater supporter of 
the United Nations, its specialized agencies, 
and other international organizations than 
the United States. 

— Since the end of the Second World War, 
we have provided a total of $3.6 billion in 
direct contributions. 

— In the last 10 years our annual contri- 
butions have grown from $100 million to an 
estimated $237 million — an increase of 137 

— We are today a member of some 65 
international organizations. 

We shall continue to meet our fair share 
of the financial requirements of these orga- 
nizations. But we must apply to them the 

same rigorous standards of program per- 
formance and budget review that we do to 
our own Federal programs. 

To strengthen these organizations and at 
the same time to make sure that the Ameri- 
can tax dollar is effectively spent, we have 
an obligation to review carefully their ac- 
tivities and our participation in them. In my 
memorandum to the Secretary, I said that I 
would be looking to him to see that 

— future expansion of the activities of the 
international organizations is governed by 
the tests of need and reasonableness, 

— the programs of these organizations are 
carefully reviewed so that funds are allo- 
cated to high-priority projects which are in 
the best interests of the international com- 

— each international agency operates with 
a maximum of efficiency, and 

— we clarify the objectives of our mem- 
bership in each organization and organize 



ourselves for more effective participation in 
international organization affairs. 

I have asked the Secretary to direct and 
coordinate the activities of the U.S. depart- 
ments and agencies involved in these orga- 
nizations. He will instruct our representa- 
tives along the lines I have indicated above. 

All departments and agencies will cooper- 
ate with him in carrying out this responsi- 


To Secretary Rusk 

White House presa release dated March 15 

j March 15, 1966 

The Federal Budget for 1967 contains this state- 

IJ ... we intend to play an increasingly active 
' role in reviewing the program and budgetary pro- 
posals of the various international organizations. 

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth 
what I believe that increasingly active role should 
I be. 

No nation has been a greater supporter of the 
United Nations, its specialized agencies and other 
international organizations than the United States. 
We are today a member of some 65 such agencies. 

Our continued strong support is necessary and 
: desirable 

— if the world community is to live in peace, 
— if we are to cooperate internationally in ex- 
tending the benefits of modern agriculture, health, 
and education to the less fortunate, and 

— if international problems in such fields as 
meteorology, telecommunications, and aviation are 
to be given the joint attention required for their 

The United States has by far been the largest 
financial contributor to the international organiza- 

— Since 1946, we have provided a total of $3.6 
billion in direct contributions. 

— Since 1956, our annual contributions have grown 
from ?100 million to an estimated $237 million for 
the next fiscal year, an overall increase of 137%. 

Moreover, we can expect the programs and budgets 
of these international agencies to expand further in 
future years to meet the growing needs of the world 
community. The United States shall continue to 
meet its fair share of the financial requirements of 
these organizations. 

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping 
to strengthen the international agencies so they can 
meet essential new needs, we must apply to them 
the same rigorous standards of program perform- 
ance and budget review that we do to our own Fed- 
eral programs. Our purpose in this undertaking 
must be to see that 

— future expansion of the activities of the inter- 
national organizations is governed by the teats of 
feasibility and reasonableness, 

— the programs of the organizations are vigor- 
ously scrutinized so that funds are allocated only 
to high priority projects which we are convinced are 
in the interests of the international community and 
of our own country, and 

— each international agency operates with a maxi- 
mum of effectiveness and economy. 

To achieve this purpose, we must 

— decide what we can best accomplish through 
multilateral action, as compared to action through 
our own direct programs, 

— clarify the objectives of our membership in each 
international agency, 

— organize ourselves for more effective participa- 
tion in each organization, and 

— insist that the money we spend through inter- 
national agencies is in our national interest and in 
the best interest of the world community. 

I expect you to continue to direct and coordinate 
the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies 
involved in international organization affairs and 
to instruct our representatives to those organiza- 
tions. I shall look to you to direct this Government's 
work in 

— reviewing and establishing our long-term policy 
objectives in each major international organization, 

— analyzing and determining the U.S. position on 
programs and budgetary needs of each organization 
on a timely and continuing basis, and 

— recommending steps to improve the effectiveness 
of each organization in contributing to the objec- 
tives of the world community and the United States. 

Ambassador Goldberg has unique responsibilities 
in a wide range of matters relating to the United 
Nations system. I shall continue to rely heavily on 
his advice and counsel. 

The heads of other Federal departments and agen- 
cies have significant interest in activities of the 
various international organizations. I expect them 
to provide you with expert assistance in their spe- 
cialized fields. In this work, the close cooperation 
of all agencies is needed to provide the essential 
unity of our effort. 

I expect the Director of the Bureau of the Budget 
to work with you and other agency heads to help 
assure that the positions we take on the budgets of 
international organizations reflect a searching scru- 

APRIL 11, 1966 


tiny of requirements and priorities for the expendi- 
ture of funds. 

I am sending copies of this memorandum to all 
department and agency heads. 

To Department and Agency Heads 

White House press release dated March 15 

March 15, 1966 
I have today sent the attached memorandum di- 
recting the Secretary of State to take certain actions 
which I believe are essential to effective participa- 
tion by the United States in international organiza- 

I expect the heads of all departments and agen- 
cies that contribute to the Government's activities 
in this field to give their full cooperation to the 
Secretary of State in carrying out my instructions. 
This work must receive high priority and the 
personal attention of the responsible officials in all 
agencies concerned if this Nation's interest in im- 
proving international organizations as instruments 
for peace and progress is to be fulfilled. 

President Signs Supplementai 
iVIilitary Autliorization Biii 

Remarks by President Johnson ^ 

The bill that we have come here to 
approve this morning authorizes appropria- 
tions of more than $4,800,000,000 for the 
support of the Defense Establishment of the 
United States of America. Later today the 
Congress vi^ill act upon the appropriation of 
some $13 billion.^ This is authorization for 
only a part of that appropriation, but this 
bill will help to meet the military needs 
that we have in Viet-Nam. 

I also believe that it will do something 
else. By its overwhelming vote on this 
measure, I believe the Congress has repeated 
its declaration to the American people that 
they stand behind our fighting men in 
Viet-Nam. Let me remind you that it was 

' Made on sigrning the supplemental military au- 
thorization bill (H.R. 12889) on Mar. 15 (White 
House press release; as-delivered text). 

" On Mar. 23 the Congress approved an act (H.R. 
13546) providing supplemental appropriations for 
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and sent it to 
the President, who signed the bill into law (P.L. 
89-374) on Mar. 23. 


just 25 years ago that the Congress ex- 
tended the Selective Service Act by only 1 
vote. That was in August, as I recall it, 
before Pearl Harbor in December. On the 
eve of Pearl Harbor the House of Repre- 
sentatives, of which I was then a member, 
by a vote of 203 to 202 turned this country 
from the brink of the cliff and saved the 
Army from being dismantled. 

We had refused to fortify Guam a short 
time before that. We had sent several false 
impressions throughout the world by our 
action. Now in contrast, this supplemental 
military authorization bill passed the House 
of Representatives, under the bipartisan 
leadership of the Armed Services Commit- 
tee and its members, by a vote of 392 to 4; 
it passed the Senate by a vote of 93 to 2. 
This overwhelming vote is visible confidence 
in our modern Defense Department and the 
civilians and the military who direct the 
destinies of that department. 

In all the history of military movement, 
there has never been the equal of the De- 
fense Department's accomplishment of mov- 
ing more than 100,000 men 10,000 miles in 
150 days and moving them with equipment, 
doctors, housing, ammunition, vehicles, 
planes, and support materiel. In speed, 
quantities, and efficiency, history recalls no 
similar achievement of that kind, and it 
deserves the recognition and the gratitude 
of every single American who lives securely 
in the United States today. 

The overwhelming vote on this measure 
also testifies that we may have learned 
something from recent history. It is a lesson 
which we should have learned long ago, for 
it was really one of our Founding Fathers, 
John Jay, who warned us: "It is too true, 
however disgraceful it may be to human 
nature, that nations in general will make 
war whenever they have a prospect of get- 
ting anything by it." 

I believe that many of the world's na- 
tions have since learned the final futility 
of war. Most of the world's leaders today, 
I believe, genuinely desire peace, but there 
are still a few who do not. So to those who 
ask what our present struggle in Viet-Nam 



really means, let me say: Our purpose is to 
demonstrate to the remaining advocates of 
violence that there is more human profit to 
be had from peace than there is from war. 

That is the real purpose of the more than 
200,000 brave Americans who are at this 
moment risking their lives 10,000 miles from 
home. That is the real purpose of the Con- 
gress in registering such dramatic support 
for legislation of this kind. That is the only 
purpose of the President and this adminis- 
tration in Viet-Nam. 

How sad it is that such great sums must 
be spent for the bombs and the planes and 
the gunpowders of war. How joyous it 
would be if these great resources could be 
put, instead, to the service of peace. We 
have said this and we have repeated it time 
and time again, and we will never tire of 
saying it, and I repeat it now: The people 
of Viet-Nam, North and South, have the 
same basic human needs. The people of 
Asia and the people of China have the same 
basic human needs. 

They need food, shelter, and education. 
They need an end to disease and to disaster. 
They need a future for their children. They 
need hope. They need peace. These are the 
very simple things, the basic things, the 
building blocks of life and of civilization. 
They are the vital and fundamental things 
that all men have in common, that all men 
can together seek and together achieve. 

In my Baltimore declaration of April of 
last year,^ I said to the people of the world 
how much we would welcome taking some 
of the funds that we are now spending in 
bombs and bullets and putting them in ef- 
forts to rid that area of disease and disaster 
and provide education and training. At 
that time I recommended the study and the 
creation of a Southeast Asia Development 
Bank, which will soon come into being as a 
result of the efficiency of this Congress.'' 

I ' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

I * For the President's remarks on signing the Asian 

Development Bank Act of 1966 into law on Mar. 16, 

see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521. 

So, again, this morning I repeat that we 
look forward with hope and with prayer to 
the day when the leaders who provoked and 
the leaders who continue this aggression in 
Viet-Nam will finally abandon their hope- 
less attempts at conquest. It is my greatest 
wish to some day stand here and sign an- 
other bill, one that is designed to bring 
progress and fulfillment to a Southeast Asia 
which is at peace with itself and also at 
peace with the rest of the world. 

Department To Hold Conference 
for Editors and Broadcasters 

The Department of State announced on 
March 25 (press release 70) that it will hold 
a national foreign policy conference for 
editors and broadcasters at Washington 
April 28 and 29. 

Secretary Rusk has extended invitations 
to editors and commentators of the daily 
and periodical press and the broadcasting 
industry in the 50 States and Puerto Rico. 

Secretary Rusk will address the confer- 
ence and has invited Vice President Hum- 
phrey to participate in the program. Among 
other high officials expected to participate 
are: George W. Ball, Under Secretary of 
State; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman, 
Joint Chiefs of Staff; David E. Bell, Ad- 
ministrator, Agency for International De- 
velopment; William P. Bundy, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs; 
and Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of 
State for Inter-American Affairs and U. S. 
Coordinator, Alliance for Progress. 

There will be opportunity for discussions 
in depth with other senior officials of the 
Department of State, AID, USIA, and the 
Department of Defense in concurrent round 
tables on the morning of April 29. Subjects 
to be covered in these sessions are Commu- 
nist China, the U.N. and the developing 
countries, the Geneva disarmament confer- 
ence, East-West trade, "As Others See Us" 
— USIA programs abroad, and food and 
population problems. 

APRIL 11, 1966 


The United States and the Warsaw Convention 

Statements by Andreas F. Lmvenfeld 
Deputy Legal Adviser ^ 


When your chairman asked me this morn- 
ing after the meeting whether the United 
States would like to lead off the discussion 
this afternoon, I readily agreed. We are 
well aware of the part that the United 
States has played in bringing this confer- 
ence about. 

Ours has been the most pronounced and 
expressed dissatisfaction with the Warsaw 
Convention. We have made clear our view 
that the Warsaw Convention, or, to be spe- 
cific, the limits of liability set forth in the 
convention, have outlived their time. We 
think the large and distinguished attend- 
ance here is testimony to the general recog- 
nition of the need to reexamine anew the 
convention concluded in 1929 and only very 
modestly brought up to date in the middle 
of the last decade. 

We should not wonder that there is now 
a need for a general reexamination. There 
is, after all, hardly a field as fast growing 
and fast developing as civil aviation. Let me 
say that the United States agrees with the 
observation of Dr. Binaghi [Walter Binaghi, 
President of the ICAO Council] this morn- 
ing that the Warsaw Convention was an 
excellent compromise between the world's 

' Made at the Special International Civil Aviation 
Organization Meeting on Limits for Passengers 
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Pro- 
tocol, held at Montreal, Canada, Feb. 1-15. Mr. 
Lowenfeld was chairman of the U.S. delegation. 

various legal systems. With that compro- 
mise we have no quarrel. Our quarrel 
rather is with the other compromise con- 
tained in the Warsaw Convention: the com- 
promise between the interests of the airlines 
and the interests of the traveling public. 

The principal concern of my Government 
now is to safeguard and protect our citizens, 
who are in ever greater numbers and at 
nearly all economic levels taking advantage 
of the opportunity of international travel by 
air. Our endeavor, then, at this conference 
is to redress — to bring up to date — the com- 
promise between the airlines and the travel- 
ing public, hopefully without disturbing the 
underlying legal regime of the Warsaw 
Convention, but in any event, as the Presi- 
dent of the Council suggested this morning, 
with imagination. 

U.S. Notice of Denunciation 

We are sorry that we have had to take a 
step that many of you considered abrupt: 
serving notice of denunciation of the War- 
saw Convention in advance of this meeting.' 
Let me make clear, then, that this step was 
taken not in any spirit of defiance of this 
organization or of our treaty partners. The 
United States stands steadfast in its com- 
mitment and dedication to cooperation in in- 

- For a Department announcement of Nov. 15, 
1965, and text of the notice of denunciation, see 
Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 923. 



ternational law and in international civil 

The step that we took last fall was sim- 
ply the inevitable result of our growing 
concern about the great numbers of our unin- 
formed and unprotected traveling public. 
The prospects for this conference were just 
too uncertain, and the Warsaw regime, as we 
saw it, was just too far out of line with to- 
day's conditions. Thus the United States 
felt we simply could not let any more time 
pass without doing something about the situ- 

A bit of history may be in order. As 
many of you know, the Hague Protocol has 
been the subject of a great deal of debate 
and discussion in the United States since 
the 1955 Hague conference. This past sum- 
mer the United States executive branch 
made a final attempt to secure ratification 
of the Hague Protocol. Since the $16,600 
limit of liability per passenger was almost 
universally thought in our country to be far 
too low, we made an effort to secure ap- 
proval of the Hague Protocol by coupling the 
request for ratification to a request for 
compulsory accident insurance in addition to 
the Hague limits. This plan would, by force 
of law, have been applicable only to the 
United States flag carriers ; by force of com- 
petition and persuasion, it was hoped, the 
plan would gradually have come to cover 
other international airlines as well. 

This effort on the part of my Government 
failed. The compulsory accident insurance 
legislation could not even secure a hearing in 
our Congress. Neither our Congress nor our 
executive branch supported the Hague fig- 
ure without additional protection, and had 
the Hague Protocol come to a vote in our 
Senate, there is little doubt that it would 
have been defeated. 

The debate over the Hague Protocol and 
the Warsaw Convention became widespread 
in the United States. Not only the executive 
and legislative branches of the Government 
but the press and public generally, as well 
as the courts, became stirred up about the 
problem. Thus, as I have said, the United 
States Government could not let another 

year go by without taking some action. 

Given the 6 months' notice requirement 
in article 39 and the rather uncertain re- 
sponses from the other governments we 
consulted in the late summer and early fall 
of 1965, the United States had no choice but 
to give its notice of denunciation of the 
convention when it did so. But let me re- 
peat: The action of the United States was 
taken not in any spirit of defiance or of 
arrogance. We welcome this meeting, as we 
said when it was first proposed, and as we 
said in our notice of denunciation. We hope 
the results of this meeting will permit us to 
withdraw our notice of denunciation and will 
permit us to remain within the Warsaw 
treaty system. 

If our action has given impetus to a 
prompt and serious reconsideration of the 
problem of the Warsaw Convention, then we 
are very pleased. If by our action, that some 
have called "precipitate," we have offended 
some of our friends, we are sorry, sincerely 
sorry. In any event we look forward to a 
full discussion here of all the facts and all 
the issues, free of rancor, free of prejudice, 
and in the spirit of a common endeavor to 
address a complicated and difficult problem. 

Issues Before the Conference 

To come now to the merits, I should like 
today just to give you a brief outline of the 
way the United States looks at the issues 
before this conference. 

We are mindful of the fact that the 
Warsaw Convention is one of the most 
widespread and most significant conventions 
in the area of private law. We appreciate 
the contribution made by the convention to 
the development of international aviation 
and, to a certain extent, to uniformity of 
interpretation and practice. But the over- 
riding issue in the Warsaw Convention, as 
we see it, is that it was entered into in the 
late 1920's, when international aviation was 
hardly over the experimental stage and 
when the primary need was a means to pre- 
vent the growth of international aviation 
from being choked off by one or more 
catastrophic accidents. Today, in contrast, 

APRIL 11, 1966 


international aviation is big business. We are 
over the experimental stage. We are over 
the infant industry stage. Equally impor- 
tant, the techniques, equipment, and experi- 
ence of our current international air trans- 
portation are such that the hazards of fly- 
ing have been very much reduced and are 
actuarily predictable. 

For these reasons the United States be- 
lieves that there is no longer justification 
for a convention which tips the balance 
heavily in favor of the industry and against 
the consumer. We believe that our objective 
should be an agreement that does not tip 
the balance one way or another but achieves 
a true balance between the interests of the 
traveling public and the interests of the 
aviation industry. 

We hope very much that it will be possi- 
ble to work out such an agreement. When 
the time comes — and I hope within a day or 
so — we shall have some specific proposals to 
make. In general, of course, the United 
States position is well known. But for today 
I would just like to sketch some of the con- 
siderations that we believe all of us should 
keep in mind in seeking to achieve the true 
balance that we have been speaking about. 

First — The Question of Air Safety. The 
fears of 1929 are certainly over today. The 
accident rate today is approximately 0.61 
passenger fatalities per 100 million pas- 
senger-miles. For the period 1925-1929 the 
comparable rate was 45 passenger fatalities 
per 100 million passenger-miles. In 1964 the 
ICAO figures show 284 persons killed in in- 
ternational passenger flights. Thus, despite 
the great increase in the size of aircraft and 
the prospective further substantial increase, 
we can hardly be concerned, as we were 35 
years ago, about the serious economic con- 
sequences for the industry of a single air 

Second — The Volume of Air Traffic. Air 
transportation has grown to absolutely fan- 
tastic proportions, with no sign of letup. Our 
latest figures show that 38 million persons 
traveled in scheduled international air trans- 
portation in 1964 for a total of 76 billion 
passenger-kilometers, roughly 46 billion 

passenger-miles. This compares vdth 400 
million passenger-miles total for the 5-year 
period 1925-1929, counting domestic as well 
as international air transportation. 

Thus the possibility of distribution of risk 
by airlines and, through the medium of re- 
insurance, among many airlines, is very 
great. Let us be clear on this point: We will 
hear at this conference about the question 
of insurance. The real question in this re- 
gard, it seems to us, is how to spread the 
risk most fairly and most economically 
and with the least possibility of having per- 
sons (or their families) who for one or an- 
other reason did not make specific provision 
for disaster suffer terribly for this. In short, 
it seems to us that whether they absorb the 
cost, pass it on indirectly in the fare, or 
make a special charge, the airlines as a 
group are the best locus of responsibility. 
It is the airlines, therefore, who ought to 
have the primary burden of taking out in- 
surance for air accidents. 

Third — Cost of Insurance. The insurance 
industry, as many of you must have no- 
ticed, is extraordinarily reticent with fig- 
ures. As a result, a number of misconcep- 
tions seem to have grown up about the cost 
of insurance. Our estimates, which we wish 
to discuss further in the course of the con- 
ference, indicate that insurance costs are 
approximately 1 percent of operating costs. 
If these costs rose by, say, 50 percent (our 
rough estimate at a limit of $100,000 under 
the Warsaw-Hague system), the increase in 
costs would be roughly from 1 to lYz per- 
cent of operating costs. Thus it seems to us 
that the fear of substantial additional cost 
to the carriers as a result of higher limits of 
liability is, to put it mildly, rather exag- 

Fourth — What Do We Mean by Limits of 
Liability"! In some of the communications 
the United States has received from foreign 
governments, it has been said that the United 
States is seeking to impose its standards of 
living upon all the countries of the world. 
Nothing of the sort, Mr. Chairman and del- 
egates. When we speak of limits of liability, 
we do not think of average recovery. Only 



when the limit has been very low, as under 
Warsaw, has the limit tended to be the aver- 
age — in fact generally the automatic — sum 
at which claims are settled. We mean by an 
acceptable limit of liability a figure that 
will permit most people in most countries to 
establish, in accordance with the legal sys- 
tem of the country where they and their 
families reside, a monetary value for the 
loss or injury they have suffered as the re- 
sult of an accident. 

Recovery for death or injury would pre- 
sumably be based on some combination of 
earning power, life expectancy, and (in the 
case of death) degree of dependence of the 
survivors. We would expect a realistic limit 
of liability not to be near the average re- 
covery for the world or, indeed, near the 
average recovery in the United States. We 
would expect the limit, rather, to be well 
above the average. We are, in other words, 
speaking of a true limit. If a person has a 
low income or a short life expectancy or no 
dependents or resides in a country whose 
legal system does not provide for substan- 
tial compensation for accident victims, an 
increase in limits should have no appreciable 
effect on his recovery or on the airline 
which carries him. We should not, in short, 
seek to arrive here at this conference at a 
limit based on average recoveries, since by 
definition an average means that 50 percent 
of persons affected would have been ad- 
versely affected. 

Fifth — Why Do We Have Limits of Lia- 
bility'! I would be less than candid if I did 
not say that there is a good deal of question 
in my country as to why there should be 
limits of liability at all on international air 
transportation. As most of you know, the 
United States does not in general have 
limits of liability in domestic air transpor- 
tation, on rail, bus, or automobile transpor- 
tation, or, for the most part, on marine 
transportation. A question that was more 
and more asked during the debates of last 
summer to which I made reference earlier, is 
"Why single out international air transporta- 
tion?" To put it in the most concrete terms, 
why should, say, American Airlines operate 

under a different regime of liabilities from 
Pan American or Air France or BOAC ? 

We find this question not easy to answer. 
We have examined the matter thoroughly 
and have concluded that, under current ju- 
risprudence in the United States, the ad- 
vantages provided by the present conven- 
tion — shift in the burden of proof, stated 
places of jurisdiction, and exclusion of con- 
tractual or statutory provisions limiting 
carriers' liability — are not, on the whole, 
very significant. Our law, in other words, 
grants the greater part of these protec- 
tions without a convention. You may be sure 
that had we not reached this conclusion, the 
United States would not have taken the step 
of giving notice of denunciation of the War- 
saw Convention. 

For the United States, then, the question 
comes down essentially to a balance of in- 
terests. Among these interests, a heavy one 
is the cooperation and understanding of our 
friends around the world in the international 
aviation and international law fields. We 
hope in the days ahead to be able to share 
with you all the results of our thorough, 
and I think you will find careful, studies. If 
on the basis of our joint discussions we can 
arrive at common conclusions, it ought to 
be possible to arrive at a consensus on a 
revision — and therefore preservation — of the 
Warsaw Convention. We hope very much 
that this will be the case. 


Mr. Chairman, a number of delegates have 
expressed the wish that the United States 
come forward with a positive specific pro- 
posal and with the justification for that 
proposal. Let me do this now. 

We propose that the limit of liability 
under Hague or under Warsaw be increased 
to $100,000 per passenger. We are prepared 
to consider this figure as an inclusive limit, 
that is to say, without additional provision 
for legal fees. Thus we would be prepared 
to see deletion of article 22(4) of the con- 
vention, as it was amended at The Hague. 

The justification for our proposal, it seems 

APRIL 11, 1966 


to us, has two parts: first, to show that in- 
justice, in a significant number of cases, 
would result from continued effectiveness of 
the Warsaw Convention, whether at the 
$8,300 level, at the Hague level of $16,600, 
or at some other relatively low level such as 
$50,000 per passenger; and second, to show 
that a convention with a limit such as we 
propose in the area of $100,000 per passen- 
ger would not work economic hardship, 
either on the airlines or on the traveling 

Just Compensation for Accident Victims 

Different countries and indeed different 
courts or administrative bodies within the 
same country often approach the question of 
compensation for accident victims in some- 
what different terms. Basically, however, it 
seems fair to say that the common objective 
of a system of compensation for accidental 
injury or death is to provide in monetary 
terms for the loss suffered by the victims 
or, in the case of fatal accidents, by the 

Let us, just by way of example, see what 
this means concretely: Suppose a man sup- 
ports a wife and minor children on an income 
of $10,000 a year and he is killed at the age 
of 35, with a prospective earning capacity of, 
say, 30 years or until age 65. What is the 
thinking process of the court or administra- 
tive officer or an insurance company nego- 
tiating a settlement in arriving at a just 
figure to compensate for the loss of the life 
of this person? 

One might start out typically by multiply- 
ing 30 — the number of years he may be ex- 
pected to work — by $10,000 — his annual 
earnings. The result would be a figure of 
$300,000. From this would be deducted the 
cost of living of the deceased himself, the 
amount that the minor children might be ex- 
pected to earn when they reach maturity and 
no longer need to be supported by their 
parents. Possibly, chances of remarriage of 
the widow might be taken into consideration, 
and in some countries or some cases the 
benefits payable to the survivors through 

the working of some social insurance or so- 
cial security system might be deducted. Fi- 
nally, it may be appropriate to deduct income 
or other taxes that would have been paid 
over the period by the deceased. 

Now I am not suggesting that a court, a 
jury, or an administrative official or an in- 
surance company in each case goes through 
each of these computations. But it gives us 
an idea of what it is that we are talking 
about. The theory of compensation is, after 
all, to restore the survivors, to the extent 
money can do so, to the position that they 
would have been in but for the accident. 
There is no attempt to punish the person 
responsible for the accident. 

The Effect of the Warsaw Convention 

We realize that for many of the countries 
represented here the inhibiting effect of the 
convention in aviation accidents is not easily 
demonstrated. This is so in some cases be- 
cause there is no domestic air transportation 
in the country or, in other cases, because the 
international limit, or something very close 
to it, is applicable also internally. Moreover, 
we are fully aware that in some countries 
represented here the present convention 
limits conform to the typical standards of 
compensation. But in the United States the 
difference between Warsaw and non-Warsaw 
compensation for accidents is very dramatic 

In aviation accidents covered by the War- 
saw Convention during the period 1950-1964 
the average passenger fatality settlement 
was relatively constant and averaged about 
$6,500, slightly below the Warsaw limits. In 
contrast, in accidents not covei'ed by the 
Warsaw Convention, i.e., accidents in domes- 
tic transportation, the average recovery in 
each year was substantially higher than the 
Warsaw limit. For the years 1958 through 
1964, that average comes to approximately 
$52,500, and for the 15-year period the av- 
erage was approximately $38,500. 

But in seeking the proper level for a limit, 
it is not average recoveries that we are pri- 
marily concerned with. We are concerned 



here with the percentage of persons who, at 
any given ceiling, would be deprived of their 
just due. If the limit were set exactly at the 
average, then approximately one-half of the 
persons affected would be adversely af- 
fected. Let me stress that again, as it is 
really at the heart of our position. A limit 
set at or very close to the average would 
have the result that approximately one-half 
of the persons affected by the limit would 
be deprived of the compensation that their 
legal system considers them entitled to in 
order to make them whole for their injury 
or loss. 

With this in mind, let us examine the 
experience of aviation accident claims in the 
United States settled at various levels where 
the convention was not applicable. The 
following table shows the distribution of 
settlements of the 813 aviation accident 
death claims paid over the 7 years 1958- 
1964 on behalf of the 13 major United States 
international and domestic trunkline carriers 
where the Warsaw Convention was not 
applicable : 

Amount of payment * 

Number of 



of clainw 



? 1-$ 8,292 



8,293- 16,583 



16,584- 33,000 



33,001- 50,000 



50,001- 75,000 



75,001- 100,000 



100,001- 200,000 



200,001 and up 




* In a few cases, these figures include claims subject to State 
limits on wronpfnl death actions. 

Note : Condensed from the full table made available at the 
conference. (The tables were prepared by the staff of the CAB on 
the basis of questionnaires answered by the carriers.) 

I Thus 29.3 percent of all the settlements 
were in excess of $50,000 per person. To put 

, it another way, nearly one-third of all these 
aviation accident victims would have been 
deprived of some portion of what in fact was 
received had a $50,000 limit been in force. 
23.5 percent, or nearly one-quarter, would 
have been deprived by a $75,000 limit. 17.9 
percent, or nearly one in five, would have 
been deprived by a limitation at the $100,000 

level. Of course, the lower the limit, the 
greater is not only the number of persons 
deprived of their due but also the extent of 
their denial. 

This is why we consider the $100,000 
figure proposed by the United States to be 
not at all excessive. We consider this figure 
would be a realistic and effective limit. We 
are prepared to accept and ask our Congress 
to accept the proposition that persons whose 
loss would be in excess of $100,000 should 
make some other provision for their families 
for the loss over that amount. 

Before leaving these figures relating to 
aviation accident recoveries, one other point 
should be made. We have no reason to be- 
lieve that a limit set at $100,000 per passen- 
ger would tend to become the average recov- 
ery in the United States or anywhere else. 
Even where no limit has been applicable — 
as in the great majority of our non-Warsaw 
cases — the United States experience has 
been that recoveries are spread through the 
entire range. As I have stated, the average 
recovery in aviation death cases — which of 
course is what determines insurance costs — 
has been $38,500 per passenger for the 15- 
year period 1950-1964, and $52,500 for the 
last 7 years for which figures are complete 
— 1958-1964. These figures, in the absence 
of any limit, are of course nowhere near the 
limit the United States proposes. 

Economic Cost of Increased Limits 

First, I think it is fair to assume that 
everyone here agrees that when we talk 
about increased economic costs we are talk- 
ing about insurance costs. No one expects 
any one airline or group of airlines to bear 
the cost of any given accident. We are talk- 
ing about the cost of distribution or alloca- 
tion of risks. 

What then would these increased insur- 
ance costs be? It is rather difficult to get 
insurance estimates with precision. But on 
the basis of the figures of present insurance 
costs of United States trunkline and inter- 
national carriers, and on the basis of esti- 
mates furnished by one of the two groups of 

APRIL 11, 1966 


aviation underwriters, we have been able to 
construct certain estimates: 

Amount of limit 

Percentage of in/'rea-ne 

in insurance co/tt over 

present costs 

$ 25,000 








Thus, acceptance of the United States pro- 
posal would, in our estimate, result in an 
increase in insurance cost to United States 
airlines by about one-half of the present 

Assuming the rough accuracy of these 
estimates, what would be the effect on air- 
line operating costs of an increase in limits 
of liability such as is proposed by the United 
States? What relation, in other words, does 
the figure of insurance cost bear to overall 
cost, revenue, or fares? What we have done 
to arrive at an estimate is to take the 
insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile 
for the major United States airlines, domes- 
tic and international, for the last year for 
which figures are complete — 1964. That cost 
— average insurance cost per revenue-pas- 
senger-mile — is 64 cents per 1,000 passen- 
ger-miles.3 To the base figure of 64 cents we 
have added the increases estimated above. 
The result is shown in the following table: 

Cost per 1.000 rfvrnuc 

Aviount of limit 


$ 25,000 

$ 0.71 







It is worth noting in considering the pro- 
posal of the United States, what is the dif- 
ference in cost between the United States 
proposal and other proposals that have been 
made. The difference in insurance cost be- 
tween a $50,000 limit per passenger and a 
$100,000 limit is only 15 cents per 1,000 
revenue-passenger-miles. Between $75,000 
and $100,000, the difference is only 6 cents 
per 1,000 revenue-passenger-miles. 

To translate these figures into a typical 

' This figure, incidentally, is considerably higher 
than the insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile 
for our two largest international carriers. [Author's 


international flight, the additional cost of 
insurance resulting from a move to a $100,- 
000 limit from the present Warsaw limit 
would amount to an additional 32 cents per 
1,000 passenger-miles or roughly $1 per 
passenger in a one-way trip between New 
York and London. This is in relation to a 
current standard economy fare of approxi- 
mately $250 one way. 

In short, we have before us not a parade 
of horribles, not a prospect of economic dis- 
aster for the airline industry or heavy bur- 
dens for airline passengers. Whether it is 
the airlines who would bear the increased 
cost of insurance, or whether in time this 
cost would be passed on to the passengers, 
or whether perhaps there would be some 
apportionment between carriers and passen- 
gers, what we would have if the United 
States plan were adopted would by no means 
cause a great disturbance or be a great 
economic burden. 


We do not wish to overstate the emphasis 
on figures. The United States position rests 
on a moral and social judgment as much as 
on an economic one. But we think that the 
figures, estimates, and analysis presented 
here justify our twin conclusions: 

1. The Warsaw Convention is harsh and 
unfair and represents a burden that we, the 
Government of the United States, cannot 
continue to ask our citizens to bear; 

2. The cost of meeting the figure that we 
have suggested is altogether reasonable and 
would be no great burden either to the air- 
lines of the world or to the traveling public. 

Let me, in closing, repeat my call to you 
at the opening session. Permit us to remain 
with you in the Warsaw/Hague system by 
agreeing to our proposed revision of the 
convention to $100,000 per passenger, inclu- 
sive of costs and attorneys' fees. How we 
achieve this result, whether under Hague, 
under Warsaw, or under some other method 
that has been suggested or perhaps may be 
suggested, I hope we can discuss in the days 



It is with considerable sadness that I have 
asked for the floor at this time. The United 
States delegation thought that it had come 
to Montreal well prepared with facts and 
with arguments in support of our position. 
We thought we had made a persuasive pres- 
entation for the proposition that the Warsaw 
Convention needed to be updated, and up- 
dated substantially. We believed, and still 
believe, that the United States proposal, or 
something close to it, would have been in 
the public interest. It would have secured 
justice for many persons, and at very little 

We thought that this conference would 
recognize that commercial aviation is no 
longer an infant industry entitled to special 
shelter, but that it should be treated like 
other persons or businesses dealing with the 
public. In other words, we thought this con- 
ference would recognize the principle that 
persons or firms engaged in international 
commercial aviation — whether airline, manu- 
facturer, or ground control — should, on the 
whole, be held responsible for injuries done 
to others. We believed that if this principle 
were accepted, it would be possible to main- 
tain the considerable uniformity of law and 
practice achieved by the Warsaw/Hague 
system. We believed that it would be possi- 
ble to build on the experience gained over 
the past 30-35 years to fashion new and 
imaginative solutions to the legal, economic, 
and practical problems involved in the rela- 
tions between airlines and travelers through 
many lands. We hoped that it would be 
possible to develop a consensus and to initi- 
ate action here at this conference. 

Our hopes, it is now clear, were not justi- 
fied. Despite active and stimulating discus- 
sion, and despite several valiant efforts to 
develop acceptable compromises, no proposal 
was found that clearly expressed a con- 
sensus of the countries represented. Indeed, 
it was the will of the conference not even to 
express a preference among those proposals 
that did have substantial support. We hoped 

until today that it might yet be possible to 
lay a firm foundation here for a successful 
diplomatic conference and to work out an 
interim arrangement along the lines of this 
conference's recommendations. If this had 
come about, our delegation had hoped to 
recommend to our Government that it with- 
draw the United States notice of denuncia- 
tion of the Warsaw Convention. It was not 
to be, and we are sorry. 

But we should not, Mr. Chairman and 
fellow delegates, feel too sad. From the point 
of view of the traveling public, there can be 
no doubt that this conference has had a 
wholesome effect. All the countries repre- 
sented here, and doubtless many others that 
will hear and read of the work of this con- 
ference, have come to think hard about the 
question of the obligation of airlines toward 
their passengers. Nearly all countries have 
agreed, as every one of our exploratory votes 
proved, that the Warsaw Convention limits 
are obsolete and unfair. Whatever the tim- 
ing, whatever the procedure followed, we 
may be sure that the convention will be 
brought up to date or will gradually fade 
away. In the long run, the aviation indus- 
try, which has always been proud of its posi- 
tion in the forefront of human advance, will 
not — indeed cannot — stand still on the simple 
and morally cleai--cut issue of protection of 
its customers. 

As for international cooperation, the spirit 
is so widespread, the habit so deeply in- 
grained, that it cannot be said to depend on 
any single convention. So far as the United 
States is concerned, Mr. Chairman, let me 
state again that, while we are disappointed 
that this meeting could not have reached a 
more clear-cut result, our impatience on the 
issue of compensation for accident victims 
is due only to our concern for the traveling 
public. It signifies in no way any lessening 
in our devotion to ICAO or to the traditions 
of cooperation in international aviation 
which the United States has done so much 
to promote. 

A few words may be in order, Mr. Chair- 
man, about the consequences for the airlines 

APRIL 11, 1966 


of the world of the withdrawal by the United 
States from the Warsaw Convention. 

First, we hope and expect that the uni- 
form practices established in the light of the 
Warsaw Convention will be maintained — all, 
that is, except for the famous small print 
purporting to give notice of the applicability 
of the convention and of the limits of liability 
contained therein. We do not, in other words, 
expect that the practice of interline ticket- 
ing, of remittance through the clearinghouse, 
and the like, will be affected. 

Second, we expect that nearly all airlines 
will be amenable to suit in the United States 
brought on behalf of passengers residing in 
or citizens of the United States. So far as 
residents of other countries are concerned, 
we expect that, in general, only United 
States flag airlines will be subject to suit 
in the United States. Thus there is not 
likely to be much successful "forum shop- 

Third, we expect that courts in the United 
States — and, accordingly, out-of-court settle- 
ments — will treat persons involved in air 
accidents like persons involved in any other 
accidents. Thus compensation will be based 
on the passenger's earning capacity, his life 
expectancy at the time of accident, and the 
degree of dependence of the survivors. There 
will be some high settlements and some low 
ones, and there may well be some judgments 
in favor of the carriers. 

Limitations on liability, whether statu- 
tory at the place of accident or by contract 
in the ticket, will almost certainly be dis- 
regarded on the ground that they are con- 
trary to public policy. But you may be sure 
that foreign carriers will receive full justice 
in the United States. Further, where for- 
eign residents bring suit in the United 
States, it will be the passenger's earning 
capacity, his life expectancy, and the status 
of his survivors in his own country, as well 
as that country's concepts of proper com- 
pensation for accident victims that will gen- 
erally govern the result in the United States. 

Fourth and finally, we believe the cost in 
terms of increased insurance premiums for 
carriers flying to and from the United 


States or carrying large numbers of United 
States passengers will be small — on the 
order of one-half of 1 percent of operating 
costs. For local and regional carriers, in- 
cluding some of those that may still be clas- 
sified as "infant industries," the increase in 
insurance cost as the result of United States 
withdrawal from the convention will be 
hardly noticeable. 

In closing, let me say again, Mr. Chair- 
man, what I said at the opening of the con- 
ference. The United States notice of de- 
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention was 
given not in any spirit of defiance of this or- 
ganization or of our treaty partners. 

We are grateful to ICAO for holding this 
conference, and we are grateful to all of the 
delegations for the courteous and attentive 
hearing we have had and for the resource- 
fulness and energy devoted by so many 
delegates to the effort to reach a compro- 
mise solution. We remain committed to co- 
operation in international law and in inter- 
national aviation. 

If it has not been possible to reach agree- 
ment here, we hope at least to have dem- 
onstrated to all of you that our decision has 
been a thoughtful and reasonable one, taken 
only after trying all other possible alterna- 
tives, and motivated solely by our desire to 
do the right thing for our citizens and for 
the traveling public the world over. 

U.S. Informs U.N. Security Council 
of Action on Rhodesian Agent 

Following is the text of a letter from 
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to 
the United Nations, to Akira Matsui, Presi- 
dent of the Security Council. 

U.S./U.N. press release 4813 dated February 28 

February 28, 1966 
Dear Mr. President : On instructions from 
my Government, I have the honor to trans- 
mit hereunder the text of the letter de- 
livered by my Government to Mr. 
Henry J. C. Hooper, the registered agent for 


the so-called Rhodesian Information Office 
in Washington. 

Dear Mr. Hooper: The Department of State notes 
that you entered the United States on September 17, 
1965, as a nonimmigrant, bearing an A-1 visa in 
connection with your assignment at that time as a 
diplomatic agent attached to the British Embassy. 
The Embassy informed the Department on Novem- 
ber 11, 1965 that you had ceased to be a representa- 
tive of Her Majesty's Government and were no 
longer a member of the Embassy staff. 

The Department of State has been advised by the 
Department of Justice that you have filed, on behalf 
of a so-called "Rhodesian Information Office", a 
registration statement pursuant to Section 2 of the 
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amend- 
ed. That statement lists your foreign principal as 
"Department of External Services, Ministry of In- 
formation, Government of Rhodesia." 

As you are aware the United States Government 
considers Southern Rhodesia to be a territory over 
which the United Kingdom has full and exclusive 
authority. As Secretary Rusk announced on No- 
vember 11, 1965,' this Government in no way recog- 
nizes the rebel regime which declared unilaterally 
the independence from the United Kingdom and pur- 
ported to establish a new state of "Rhodesia". 

A diplomatic agent whose official capacity has 
terminated has, of course, a reasonable time within 
which to wind up his affairs and leave this coun- 
try. More than three months have now elapsed 
since the termination of your diplomatic assignment 
with the British Embassy. Since you are no longer 
a representative of Her Majesty's Government and 
since the United States does not recognize any in- 
dependent state of "Rhodesia", I am obligated to 
inform you that you have no official capacity in 
this country. The Government of the United States 
is, therefore, not prepared to accord to you a con- 
tinuing residence on the basis of a purported official 
capacity. If you should wish to remain in the 
United States as a private citizen, the law permits 
you to make application to the Department of Jus- 
tice for an adjustment of your status under Section 
245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 
Yours sincerely, 

Thomas C. Mann 
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs 

I shall be pleased if this letter might be 
circulated as an official document of the 
Security Council. 

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances 
of my highest consideration. 

Arthur J. Goldberg 

GATT Contracting Parties 
iVIeet at Geneva 

The Department of State announced on 
March 21 (press release 60) that Henry P. 
Brodie, Counselor for Economic Affairs, 
U.S. Mission, Geneva, would head the U.S. 
delegation to the 23d session of the Con- 
tracting Parties to the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting at 
Geneva, Switzerland, from March 24 to 
April 6. The agenda will contain a number 
of topics important to United States commer- 
cial and economic policy interests, includ- 
ing several items on various aspects of the 
expansion of trade of less developed 

The GATT is the principal international 
forum where the world's trading nations 
deal with trade policy problems. Its mem- 
bers carry on over 80 percent of world 
trade. It is a multilateral trade agreement 
which replaced the pre-World War II bi- 
lateral trading system. The Kennedy Round 
of negotiations for lowering trade barriers 
is also taking place within the GATT frame- 
work, and during the 23d session the Direc- 
tor General will report to the Contracting 
Parties on progress in these negotiations. 

In recent years the Contracting Parties 
have turned increasingly to trading prob- 
lems of particular interest to the less de- 
veloped countries. On February 8, 1965, 
they signed a new part (part IV) of the 
General Agreement, designed to provide an 
institutional and legal framework for deal- 
ing with these problems.^ 

In a parallel step, GATT established a 
new Committee on Trade and Development 
(CTD) to watch over implementation of the 
new provisions. The Committee's first year 
in operation will be reviewed during the 
23d session. This will entail a discussion of 
the accomplishments of a number of special 
working parties and expert groups as- 
signed to study in detail various facets of 
the special trade problems of less developed 

' Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 894. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 28, 1964, p. 922; 
for a U.S. statement of Feb. 8, 1965, see ibid., Mar. 
8, 1965, p. 355. 

APRIL 11, 1966 


countries. In addition, the work of the 
CTD during the coming year will be mapped 
out by the Contracting Parties. 

A number of agenda items will deal with 
the continuing efforts in the GATT to reduce 
and remove import restrictions. These ef- 
forts have enjoyed considerable success in 
recent years, and the reduction of the re- 
maining restrictions continues to be an im- 
portant aspect of U.S. commercial policy. 

Regional arrangements will also re- 
ceive intensive attention at the session. 
GATT will examine recently announced plans 
for free trade areas between Australia and 
New Zealand and between the United King- 
dom and Ireland. It will also continue its 
examination of the association arrangement 
between the European Economic Community 
and a number of African nations. The 23d 
session will also review annual reports sub- 
mitted by a number of older economic inte- 
gration bodies, including the EEC, the Euro- 
pean Free Trade Area, the Central Ameri- 
can Common Market, the Latin American 
Free Trade Area, and the Central African 
Economic and Customs Union. 

Sixty-seven countries are now full con- 
tracting parties to the General Agreement. 
In addition, a number of other countries 
maintain varying degrees of association 
with the GATT, and several others have in- 
dicated their intentions to seek full mem- 
bership during the coming year. 

Current U.N. Documents: 
A Selected Bibliography 

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as 
those listed below) may be consulted at depository 
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi- 
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section 
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y. 

Security Council 

Eeports by the Secretary-General on the situation 
in the Dominican Republic. S/7032/Add. 9-14. 
January 20-February 14, 1966. 12 pp. 

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of 
India concerning the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960. 
S/7095. January 20, 1966. 3 pp. 

Letter dated January 22 from the representative 
of Thailand rejecting Cambodian charges of Thai 
aggression. S/7097. January 27, 1966. 3 pp. 

Letter dated January 24 from the representative 
of Thailand charging that Cambodian soldiers had 
fired rifles and machineguns across the border 
into Thai territory. S/7098. January 24, 1966. 1 p. 

Report of the Secretary-General on the observance 
of the India-Pakistan cease-fire. S/6710/Add. 17. 
January 28, 1966. 5 pp. 

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of 
the United States requesting that "an urgent 
meeting of the Security Council be called promptly 
to consider the situation in Viet-Nam." S/7105. 
January 31, 1966. 3 pp. 

Letter dated January 28 from the Secretary-General 
to various governments containing a further ap- 
peal for voluntary contributions for the financing 
of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. S/7107. 
February 1, 1966. 2 pp. 

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of 
the United Kingdom informing the President of 
the Security Council of his Government's imposi- 
tion of a total ban on exports to Rhodesia and ex- 
tension of the ban on imports to include all im- 
ports from Rhodesia. S/7108. February 1, 1966. 

1 p. 

Letters from representatives of various countries 
concerning actions taken in compliance with the 
Security Council resolution on Southern Rhodesia: 
Argentina, S/7094; Australia, S/7104; Austria, 
S/7115; Brazil, S/7122; Bulgaria, S/7121; Bu- 
rundi, S/7113; China, S/7130; Colombia, S/7112; 
Cyprus, S/7099; Haiti, S/7119; India, S/7092; 
Japan, S/7114; Jordan, S/7120; Liberia, S/7124; 
New Zealand, S/7093; Nicaragua, S/7139; Paki- 
stan, S/7127; Rwanda, S/7135; Ukrainian S.S.R., 
S/7110; Yemen Arab Republic, S/7118. 30 pp. 

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of 
the Ukrainian S.S.R. concerning his Government's 
compliance with the Security Council resolution on 
Portuguese territories. S/7111. February 1, 1966. 

2 pp. 

Letter dated February 3 from the representative of 
Ghana transmitting a message from President 
Nkrumah concerning the call for Security Council 
debate on Viet-Nam. S/7116. February 7, 1966. 1 p. 

Letter dated February 7 from representatives of 18 
Latin American countries concerning "the so-called 
First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia, 
Africa and Latin America," held at Havana on 
January 3. S/7123. February 8, 1966. 2 pp. 

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of 
Turkey concerning a violation of Turkish airspace 
by a Greek aircraft. S/7125. February 9, 1966. 1 p. 

Letter dated February 7 from the representative of 
Cambodia replying to the letter of the Thai repre- 
sentative (S/7098) and transmitting a communi- 
que of the Cambodian Ministry of Information 
concerning border incidents. S/7126. February 9, 
1966. 4 pp. 

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of 
Turkey concerning a recent communique issued 
after consultations between the Government of 
Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration on 
the question of Cyprus. S/7128. February 9, 1966. 
2 pp. 

Letters dated February 8 and 14 from the represent- 
ative of Greece concerning violations of Greek 
airspace by Turkish aircraft. S/7129, February 9, 
1966, and S/7137, February 14, 1966. 2 pp. 

Letter dated February 11 from the representative of 
Greece transmitting the text of the communique 
referred to in the letter from the representative of 
Turkey (S/7128) and pointing out that this text 
"reflects once more the attachment and dedication 
of the Greek Government to peace. . . ." S/7136. 
February 11, 1966. 2 pp. 



General Assembly 

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of 
Spain concerning his (Jovemment's desire to reach 
a solution of the problem of Gibraltar. A/6242. 
January 25, 1966. 3 pp. 
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: 
Report of the Working Group of the Whole. 
A/AC.105/30. January 26, 1966, 3 pp. 
U Information furnished on objects launched into 
orbit or beyond: Letter dated January 24 from 
the representative of the United States giving 
data for period of November 16-30, 1965, A/AC. 
105/INF.123, January 28, 1966, 2 pp.; letter 
dated February 8 from the representative of the 
U.S.S.R. giving data for period December 10, 
1965-Januarv 25, 1966, A/AC.105/INF.124, Feb- 
ruary 10, 1966. 4 pp. 
Report of the International Law Commission on the 
•work of the second part of its 17th session, 
Monaco, January 3-28, 1966. A/CN.4/184. Janu- 
ary 28, 1966. 16 pp. 

Trusteeship Council 

Report of the World Health Organization on its In- 
vestigation of the Complaints Contained in a 
Petition Concerning the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands. Note by the Secretary-General. 
T/1647. January 14, 1966. 42 pp. 

Economic and Social Council 

Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the sub- 
regional meeting on economic cooperation in East 
Africa. E/CN.14/346. December 10, 1965. 89 pp. 
Organization and Procedural Arrangements for the 
Implementation of Conventions and Recommen- 
dations in the Field of Human Rights: 
Report of the United Nations Educational, Scien- 
tific and Cultural Organization. E/4133. De- 
cember 16, 1965. 8 pp. 
Report of the Secretary-General. E/4143. January 
19, 1966. 41 pp. 
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East. 
Activities of the Joint ECAFE/PAO Agriculture 
Division in 1965. Report by the Executive Secre- 
tary. E/CN.11/717. January 5, 1966. 10 pp. 
Utilization of United States Agricultural Surpluses 
in the Republic of Korea — Procedures and Prob- 
lems. Study prepared by the ECAFE/FAO Agri- 
culture Division. E/CN.11/L.144. Bangkok, 1965. 
55 pp. 
Development of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report 
by the Secretary-General. E/4132. January 18, 
1966. 46 pp. 
Fourth Biennial Report on Water Resources Devel- 
opment. E/4138 (Summary). January 31, 1966. 
4 pp. 
Inflation and Economic Development. Report of the 
Secretary-General. E/4152. January 31, 1966. 49 
International Travel and Tourism. Report of the 
Secretary-General. E/4145 (Summary). February 
1, 1966. 4 pp. 
Commission on Human Rights: 

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. 
Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/452. 
January 18, 1966. 13 pp. 
Draft Declaration and Draft International Con- 
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Religious Intolerance. Note by the Secretary- 
General. E/CN.4/900. January 27, 1966. 30 pp. 
Membership of the Sub-Commission on Prevention 

of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. 
Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/901. 
February 3, 1966. 14 pp. 
Report of the 18th session of the Sub-Commission 
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities. E/CN.4/903. February 4, 1966. 
66 pp. 
Commission on the Status of Women: 

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. 
Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/896 
(E/CN.6/452). January 18, 1966. 13 pp. 
United Nations Assistance for the Advancement 
of Women. Report of the Secretary-General. E/ 
CN.6/450. January 26, 1966. 6 pp. 
Economic Rights and Opportunities for Women — 
Facilities for Assisting Employed Mothers in 
Child-Care. Memorandum by the Secretary- 
General. E/CN.6/455. January 28, 1966. 21 pp. 
Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights. 
Evaluation of the Fellowship Program. Report 
of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/897 (E/ 
CN.6/453). February 8, 1966. 25 pp. 
Social Commission. Proposed Conference of Ministers 
Responsible for Social Welfare. Analysis of com- 
ments by governments and proposals for further 
action. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/ 
401. February 10, 1966. 6 pp. 
Committee for Industrial Development: 

Industrial Technology. Textile Industries in Devel- 
oping Countries. Note by the Secretary-General. 
E/C.5/101. January 27, 1966. 151 pp. 
Industrial Technology. Promotion of Standardiza- 
tion in Developing Countries. Note by the Secre- 
tary-General. E/C.5/103. January 28, 1966. 53 


Current Actions 

APRIL 11, 1966 



International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes. 
Open for signature at United Nations Head- 
quarters, New York, September 28 through No- 
vember 30, 1962. Entered into force December 
27, 1963. TIAS 5505. 
Extension to: Hong Kong, February 14, 1966. 


Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva 
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September 
16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention con- 
cerning the application of that convention to 
the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done 
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force 
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 


Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention con- 
cerning the application of that convention to the 
works of certain international organizations. Done 
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force 
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention con- 
cerning the effective date of instruments of rati- 
fication or acceptance of or accession to that con- 
vention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. En- 
tered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324. 
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11, 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living 
resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April 
29, 1958. 
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 18, 

Entered into force: March 20, 1966. 

Postal Matters 

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with 
final protocol, general regulations with final pro- 
tocol, and convention with final protocol and regu- 
lations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 
1964. TIAS 5881. 

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, December 23, 
1965; France, December 21, 1965. 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered 
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 
Acceptance deposited: Pakistan (with a declara- 
tion), February 24, 1966. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac- 
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva 
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.' 
Acceptances : Cuba," December 28, 1965; Switzer- 
land, January 14, 1966. 
Ratification deposited: Madagascar, January 11, 


letta February 25 and March 4, 1966. 
into force March 4, 1966. 


Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 

Agreement on exchanges in the scientific, technical, 
educational, cultural and other fields in 1966—67. 
Signed at Washington March 19, 1966. Entered 
into force March 19, 1966. 


U.S. Consulate Established 
In Bechuanaland 

The Department of State announced on 
March 23 (press release 65) that a U.S. con- 
sulate is being established in the British 
protectorate of Bechuanaland. Charles H. 
Fletcher, who has been appointed the first 
U.S. consul to be stationed in that country, 
is scheduled to arrive at Gaberones, the 
capital, during the first half of April to 
assume responsibilities for U.S.-Bechuana- 
land relations. Bechuanaland on September 
30 will become the independent republic of 

From July 1964 to date, U.S. interests in 
Bechuanaland have been handled by the U.S. 
consulate at Mbabane, Swaziland, which has 
had responsibility for U.S. interests in all 
three of the former U.K. High Commission 
Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Colombo March 12, 1966. Entered into 
force March 12, 1966. 


Agreement amending and extending the agreement 
of January 15, 1966 (TIAS 5956), relating to the 
deployment of United States naval repair vessels 
to Malta. Effected by exchange of notes at Val- 

' Not in force. 

" Subject to reservations. 


The Senate on March 17 confirmed the nomina- 
tion of Dixon Donnelley to be an Assistant Secre- 
tary of State. (For biographic details, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 62 dated March 22.) 


James Wadsworth Symington as Chief of Protocol, 
effective March 22. (For biographic details, see 



Department of State press release 63 dated March 

Robert J. McCloskey to be Deputy Assistant Sec- 
retary for Public Affairs, effective March 25. (For 
biographic details, see Department of State press 
release 68 dated March 25.) 


Philip B. Heymann as Acting Administrator for 
the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effec- 
tive March 10. (For biographic details, see Depart- 
ment of State press release 54 dated March 16.) 


Department Releases 1966 Edition 
of "Treaties in Force" 

Press release 53 dated March 15 

The Department of State on March 15 released 
for publication Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties 
and Other International Agreements of the United 
States in Force on January 1, 1966. 

This is a collection showing the bilateral rela- 
tions of the United States with 139 states or entities 
and the multilateral rights and obligations of the 
contracting parties with respect to more than 380 
treaties and agreements on 74 subjects. The 1966 
edition includes some 300 new treaties and agree- 
ments, including the king crab fishery agreement 
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the 
claims agreement with Yugoslavia, the agreement 
concerning automotive products with Canada, and 
the desalination agreement between the Interna- 
tional Atomic Energy Agency, Mexico, and the 
United States. Also included in this edition are the 
new cultural exchanges agreements with France, 
the United Kingdom, Peru, and Uruguay. 

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by country or other political entity, and 
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are 
arranged by subject with names of countries which 
have become parties. Date of signature, date of 
entry into force for the United States, and citations 
to texts are furnished for each agreement. 

The publication provides information concerning 
treaty relations with numerous newly independent 
states, indicating wherever possible the provisions 
of their constitutions and independence arrange- 
ments regarding assumption of treaty obligations. 

Information on current treaty actions, supple- 
menting the information contained in Treaties in 
Force, is published weekly in the Department of 
State Bulletin. 

The 1966 edition of Treaties in Force (322 pp.; 
Department of State publication 8042) is for sale 
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for 

Recent Releases 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. 
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20102. Address requests direct to the Superintendent 
of Documents, except in the case of free publications, 
which may be obtained from, the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States. 

Booklet for the information of men and women who 
wish to enter the Officer Corps of the Foreign Serv- 
ice of the United States to serve with the Department 
of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Pub. 7924. 
Department and Foreign Service Series 132. 32 pp., 

Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy. These 
two addresses by Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant 
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, are re- 
printed from the Department of State Bulletin of 
November 8 and 15. In his addresses Mr. Solomon 
describes the challenges facing U.S. trade policy and 
the choices that must be made in the immediate 
years ahead to meet them. Pub. 8002. General For- 
eign Policy Series 809. 15 pp. 10^. 

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt from President Johnson's 
state of the Union message of January 12, 1966. 
Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy Series 211. 17 pp. 

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to 
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act). Pub. 
8019. General Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40^. 

Universal Postal Union. Constitution, convention, 
and related documents, with Other Governments, 
revising the Universal Postal Convention of Octo- 
ber 3, 1957. Signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Date of 
entry into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 325 
pp. $1. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia, amending the agreement of November 28, 
1962, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Belgrade August 19 and November 3, 1965. Entered 
into force November 3, 1965. TIAS 5903. 2 pp. 5^. 

Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road. 

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed 
at Ottawa November 17, 1965. Entered into force 
November 17, 1965. TIAS 5904. 2 pp. 5*. 

Air Service — Lease of Equipment. Agreement vrith 
the Federal Republic of Germany, extending the 
agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended. Exchange 
of notes — Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn 

APRIL 11, 1966 


July 30 and August 25, 1965. Entered into force 
August 25, 1965. Operative August 2, 1965. TIAS 
5905. 4 pp. 5(f. 

Defense — Continental Air Defense. Establishntent 
of Back-Up Interceptor Control System (BUIC). 

Agreement with Canada, supplementing and amend- 
ing tiie aarreement of September 27, 1961, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa 
November 24, 1965. Entered into force November 24, 
1965. TIAS 5907. 2 pp. 5<t. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia, 
amending the agreement of February 17, 1965. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Tunis November 29, 
1965. Entered into force November 29, 1965. TIAS 
5908. 3 pp. 5^ 

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree- 
ment with Israel, amending the agreement of July 12, 
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington April 2, 
1965. Entered into force May 13, 1965. TIAS 5909. 
2 pp. 5<t. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade 
November 22, 1965. Entered into force November 22, 
1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5910. 7 pp. 10<t. 

Defense — Ground-to-Air Communications Facilities 
in Northern Canada. Agreement with Canada. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Ottawa December 1, 
1965. Entered into force December 1, 1965. TIAS 
5911. 6 pp. 5(f. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India, 
amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as 
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi 
December 10, 1965. Entered into force December 10, 
1965. TIAS 5913. 3 pp. 54. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Austria Cooperation 
Agreement. Agreement with Austria and the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna 
June 15 and July 28, 1964. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 13, 1965. TIAS 5914. 10 pp. 10<f. 

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the 
IAEA to the United States-Portugal Cooperation 

Agreement. Agreement with Portugal and the Inter- 
national Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna 
February 24, 1965. Entered into force December 15, 
1965. TIAS 5915. 20 pp. 15(f. 

Extradition — Continued Application to Kenya of the 
United States-United Kingdom Treaty of Decem- 
ber 22, 1931. Agreement with Kenya. Exchange of 
notes — -Dated at Nairobi May 14 and August 19, 
1965. Entered into force August 19, 1965. TIAS 5916. 
2 pp. 54. 

Trade — Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From 
Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy, 
amending the agreement of July 6, 1962. Exchange 
of notes — Dated at Washington November 16, 1965. 
Entered into force November 16, 1965. TIAS 5917. 
2 pp. 5^. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of 
December 7, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Nairobi December 1, 1965. Entered into 
force December 1, 1965. TIAS 5919. 2 pp. 5^. 

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with the 
Federal Republic of Germany, modifying the con- 
vention of July 22, 1954. Signed at Bonn Septem- 
ber 17, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965. 
With memorandum of understanding signed at Bonn 
October 19, 1965. TIAS 5920. 34 pp. 15(>. 

Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with 
the Philippines, amending the agreement of April 12 
and June 7, 1948. Exchange of notes — Signed at 
Manila December 2 and 20, 1965. Entered into force 
December 20, 1965. TIAS 5921. 3 pp. 5<*. 

Defense — Support for German Armed Forces in the 
United States in Emergencies. Agreement with the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Sigmed at Bonn Octo- 
ber 21, 1965, and at Washington December 18, 1965. 
Entered into force December 18, 1965. TIAS 5922. 5 
pp. 54. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece, 
amending the agreement of October 22, 1962. Ex- 
change of notes — Signed at Athens October 22 and 
23, 1965. Entered into force October 23, 1965. Opera- 
tive October 22, 1965. TIAS 5923. 2 pp. 5*. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
■weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
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Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment as well as special articles on vari- 
OTis phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
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ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C., 
20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic ?10, 
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
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NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
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be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 



INDEX April 11, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1398 

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News 
Conference of March 25 557 

Asia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 
March 25 557 

Bechuanaland. U.S. Consulate Established in 
Bechuanaland 592 


Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 
25 557 


Confirmations (Donnelley) 592 

President Signs Supplemental Military Au- 
thorization Bill 578 

Department and Foreign Service 

Appointments (McCloskey, Symington) . . . 592 

Confirmations (Donnelley) 592 

Designations (Heymann) 593 

U.S. Consulate Established in Bechuanaland . 592 

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer- 
ence of March 25 557 

Economic Affairs. The United States and the 
Warsaw Convention (Lowenfeld) 580 

Foreign Aid 

President Urges Careful Review of Interna- 
tional Agency Budgets 576 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 
25 657 

France. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of March 25 557 

Germany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of March 25 557 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
GATT Contracting Parties Meet at Geneva . 589 

Military Affairs. President Signs Supplemen- 
tal Military Authorization Bill 578 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Our View of NATO (Johnson) 554 

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 
25 557 

Passports. Secretary Rusk's News Conference 
of March 25 557 

Presidential Documents 

Our View of NATO 554 

President Gursel Returns to Turkey .... 558 

President Signs Supplemental Military Au- 
thorization Bill 578 

President Urges Careful Review of Interna- 
tional Agency Budgets 576 

Protocol. Appointments (Symington) .... 592 

Public Affairs 

Department To Hold Conference for Editors 
and Broadcasters 579 

Donnelley confirmed as Assistant Secretary . 592 

McCloskey appointed Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary 592 


Department Releases 1966 Edition of "Treaties 
in Force" 593 

Recent Releases 593 

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Informs U.N. Security 
Council of Action on Rhodesian Agent (Gold- 
berg) 588 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 591 

Department Releases 1966 Edition of "Treaties 

in Force" 593 

The United States and the Warsaw Convention 
(Lowenfeld) 580 

Turkey. President Gursel Returns to Turkey 

(Johnson) 558 

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of 

March 25 557 

United Nations 

Current U.N. Documents 590 

Hard Work Ahead for the United Nations 

(Siseo) 571 

President Urges Careful Review of Interna- 
tional Agency Budgets 576 

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565 
U.S. Informs U.N. Security Council of Action 

on Rhodesian Agent (Goldberg) 588 


President Signs Supplemental Military Author- 
ization Bill 578 

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565 

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 25 557 

Name Index 

Donnelley, Dixon 592 

Goldberg, Arthur J 588 

Hejrman, Philip B 593 

Johnson, President .... 554, 558, 576, 578 

Lowenfeld, Andreas F 580 

McCloskey, Robert J 592 

Rusk, Secretary 557, 565 

Sisco, Joseph J 571 

Symington, James Wadsworth 592 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 21-27 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 21 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
53 of March 15 and 55 of March 18. 

No. Date Subject 

60 3/21 GATT Contracting Parties meet 

at Geneva (rewrite). 

61 3/21 Rusk: "Face the Nation." 

*62 3/22 Donnelley sworn in as Assistant 
Secretary for Public Affairs 
(biographic details). 

*63 3/22 Symington sworn in as Chief of 
Protocol (biographic details). 

*64 3/22 Supplementary protocol with 
United Kingdom for avoidance 
of double taxation (text). 
65 3/23 Stationing of consul in Bechuana- 
land (rewrite). 

*66 3/22 Meeting of voluntary agencies on 
refugees and immigration. 

♦67 3/23 Program for visit of Prime Min- 
ister of India. 

*68 3/25 McCloskey appointed Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Public Af- 
fairs (biographic details). 

t69 3/25 U.S. reply to French aide memoire 
on NATO relations. 

70 3/25 National foreign policy conference 

for editors and broadcasters 

71 3/25 Rusk: news conference of March 


* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Document« 
u.s. government printing office 

WA«HINCTON, D.C. 2040a 



Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free 

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Freedo 
Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country aboi 
the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that addrea 

"Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression, 
is not conquest ; it is not empire ; it is not foreign bases ; it is not domination. It is, simply pt 
just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam." 



To: Supt. of Documento 
Govt. Printing Office 
WashinKton, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find | (cash, check, or money order). Please 

send me copies of Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. 


EncloBed , * i 

To be maiM 

later T 

Refund g 

Coupon refmid »• I 
Postage r 









Street address 

City, State, and ZIP code 







Vol. LIV, No. 1399 

April 18, 1966 



Exchanges of Remarks, Joint Commurdque, and the President's Message 

to Congress on Food Aid to India 598 

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 608 


Transcript of Le Monde Interview 613 

Statement by Secretary Rusk 628 

For index see inside back cover 

President Johnson and Prime IVIinister Gandlii of India 
Confer at Wasliington 



Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India 
made an official visit to the United States 
March 27-April 1. She met with President 
Johnson and other top Government officials 
at Washington March 28-29. Following are 
an exchange of greetings between President 
Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi on 
March 28, an exchange of toasts at a dinner 
at the White Hoicse that evening, and the 
text of a joint communique released on 
March 29, together with the text of Presi- 
dent Johnson's message to the Congress on 
March SO outlining actions to he taken to 
alleviate India's food crisis. 


White House press release dated March 23 ; as-delivered texts 

President Johnson 

Madam Prime Minister, we are very glad 
that you are here. I feel very privileged to 
welcome you as the leader of our sister de- 
mocracy. I have even greater pleasure in wel- 
coming you as a good and gracious friend. 

Someone has said that all pleasure is 
edged with sadness. Only 2 months ago we 
looked forward to receiving your gallant 
predecessor here in our Capital in Washing- 
ton. We shared your grief in his sudden 
and untimely death. ^ 

We are reminded that three American 
Presidents — Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow 
Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt — were 
similarly stricken while engaged in that 

' For statement by President Johnson on the death 
of Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, see Bul- 
letin of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 156. 


most demanding of all public tasks, the task 
of working the hard passage from conflict 
back to peace. It is good to know that this 
task which Prime Minister Shastri had so 
ably begun is now in your strong and 
sympathetic hands. 

Our thoughts also go back to the visits of 
another great Indian leader, those in 1949, 
1956, and 1961 of your great father. Few 
have ever held a larger place in the hearts 
of the American people, and few ever will. 
We like to think, Mrs. Gandhi, that he be- 
longed to us, too. 

My countrymen and yours will be asking 
what we shall talk about during these next 
few days. Perhaps, with your permission, I 
may say just a word about that now. 

I think they can be reasonably sure that 
we will not be wasting any of our time. Our 
concern will be with very practical ques- 
tions. I look forward to getting your 
thoughts, Madam Prime Minister, on how 
peace can be obtained or made more secure, 
in Asia and throughout the world. I shall 
seek your counsel on the problems of South- 
east Asia, where India, under the Geneva 
accords, has for so long played such a special . 

I will speak of my deep desire, which I 
know you share, for the continued improve- 
ment in relations between India and her 
great sister nation, Pakistan. The United 
States values deeply the friendship of both 
India and Pakistan. Nothing, we know, is 
more painful or more costly to all concerned 
than a falling out between one's friends. 

I shall look forward, Mrs. Gandhi, to get- 
ting a better understanding of the urgent 



I economic and social problems with which 
your Government is now concerned. I will 
welcome that frankness and candor and de- 
tail that always marks conversations be- 
:tween good friends. 

Economic stability and political tran- 
quillity depend on how well we accomplish 
commonplace tasks: the production of food, 
its transportation, the supply of fertilizer, 
family planning, electricity for farm and 
village, the realization of economic growth 
I and opportunity. 

I We shall be concerned with these essen- 
tials. The solution of these problems lies, 
we know, with the Indian Government, but 
the United States believes in backing the 
efforts of those who are determined to solve 
their own problems. We know, Madam Prime 
Minister, that India under your leadership 
will have such determination. 

We want to learn how we can best help 
you and how our help can be used to the 
very best effect. Your people and ours 
share the conviction that however difficult 
the problems there are none that a strong 
and a vigorous democracy cannot solve. 

You have long been aware. Madam Prime 
Minister, of the fascination that Indian cul- 
ture holds for Americans. This extends from 
the Hindu Epics to the modern Indian novel- 
ists, and from the painters of the Ajanta Cave 
and the Akbar Court to your brilliant film 
producers of the present day. I venture to 
think that there is much about the United 
States that your students find equally in- 
teresting. Before our conversations end, I 
hope to be able to announce an imaginative 
new step to encourage and to facilitate these 
common interests. 

Well, so much for our work in the days 
ahead. I hope there will be time for some- 
thing more, for Mrs. Johnson and our 
daughters and I look forward to renewing 
an old friendship, to matching, if possible, 
in warmth and spirit your own hospitality 
in the years past. 

Let me say once more how much we 
appreciate your making this long journey 
at this busy time to visit us here in the 
United States. I think I speak for every 

American when I say that we are very 
proud and very honored to have you today 
as our guest in this country. 

Prime Minister Gandhi 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Ex- 
cellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I thank 
you, Mr. President, for your warm words of 
welcome and for this gracious reception to 
me. I have had the privilege and the great 
pleasure of visiting America many times. 
Each visit has been an education, an enlarg- 
ing of the circle of friends, and a deepening 
of understanding. 

I come today as a friend, and I bring with 
me the greetings and good will of the Indian 

Mr. President, you have visited India 
with Mrs. Johnson. We have very pleasant 
and happy memories of that occasion. You 
are known in India not only as a great 
President of a distant country but as a man 
of high idealism and a warmhearted friend 
who has come to our help in a time of need. 

You have mentioned your interest in 
peace, Mr. President. We in India are 
greatly interested and concerned about 
peace, for to us it is not only a question of 
an ideal but one of very practical necessity 
to give us time and opportunity to deal with 
those other problems and questions which 
you have mentioned; that is, to be able to 
develop our country, to give opportunity to 
our own people to stand on their feet, to 
deal with the many obstacles and difficul- 
ties which a longstanding poverty has im- 
posed on us. 

I am grateful to you for your kind invi- 
tation. As I meet you again, I recall your 
moving words on the theme of poverty. 
Declaring unconditional war on the pockets 
of poverty in your own country, you have 
said : ^ 

. . . we want to give people more opportunity. 
. . . They want education and training. They 
want a job and a wage. . . . They want their chil- 

" For text of the President's remarks at Cumber- 
land, Md., May 7, 1964, see Public Papers of the 
Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 196S-6i, vol. I, 
p. 626. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


dren to escape the poverty which has afflicted 

May I say, Mr. President, that important 
as these words are for the American people, 
they cannot mean as much to them as they 
do to us in India who have so long been 
denied the very basic decencies of life. We 
know that in our own war on poverty we 
have a noble friend, one who believes that 
the distant sufferer is his own brother. 

India and the United States cannot and 
should not take each other for granted or 
allow their relations to drift. As friends 
committed to common ideals, they can to- 
gether make this world of ours a better 
place in which to live. 

Mr. President, may I express my gratitude 
not only for the welcome you have given 
me but for the kind words which you have 
said for my father and our late Prime 
Minister, Mr. Shastri. I know how greatly 
Mr. Shastri was looking forward to his visit 
here. I hope that I shall be able to fulfill 
what he had in mind and what he had 
hoped to do. 

Mr. President, may I greet you and the 
American people on behalf of the people of 


White House press release dated March 28 : as-delivered texts 

President Johnson 

Madam Prime Minister: I have heard — 
and do in part believe — that Queen Victoria, 
speaking in a different age and under dif- 
ferent circumstances, once gave the follow- 
ing estimate of two of her prime ministers : 

"Mr. Gladstone," said she, "talks to me as 
if I were a public meeting — but Mr. Disraeli 
speaks to me as if I were a woman." 

Tonight I am very pleased to tell our 
friends who have assembled here that we 
have spoken to our gracious visitor not only 
as a woman with an understanding heart 
but also as a leader with a sense of vision 
and a builder with a valued view of faith. 

India is a vast and varied land. The roots 
of freedom and justice run deep in the 

Indian past. Its culture was full and strong 
centuries before the dawn of the Christian 

The world has listened to the wisdom of 
India spoken through the voice of an elo- 
quent leader. Once, many years ago, he 

Democracy demands discipline, tolerance and mu- 
tual regard. Freedom demands respect for the free- 
dom of others. In a democracy changes are made 
by mutual discussion and persuasion and not by 
violent means. 

These were the words of Prime Minister 
Nehru. This was the belief of Prime Min- 
ister Shastri. Their fidelity to freedom's 
cause created, with Mahatma Gandhi, a new 
nation — conceived in struggle, grown strong 
in sacrifice. 

Now, tonight, Prime Minister Gandhi 
comes to this house and to this table, the 
custodian of her nation's hope and the stew- 
ard of her nation's dreams. 

Today we here in the White House talked 
about the work and the sacrifice that is 
needed to make those dreams a modern 
reality. Together we discussed the practical 
ways that India and the United States can 
help to build a world where life is hopeful 
and where life is happier for all peoples, as 
well as the peoples of all lands. 

Prime Minister Gandhi's goal is to weld 
the Indian nation into a land where the 
words of its founding fathers come true and 
their views of its future are real. 

There is much that binds India and the 
United States together. Both our nations 
have the deep-felt obligation to the basic 
dignity of man — and the conviction that 
people can solve their problems by free 
choice far better than they can by any ar- 
rangement of force. There is in India and 
this country the strong tradition of free- 
dom that just will never die. 

I remember very clearly tonight my visit 
to India in 1961. 

I remember what I saw and what I felt 
and what I heard throughout that great 
land. The thousands of students along the 
roads and in the cities, each of them quite 
impatient to know and to learn. I saw the 



teachers and the scholars — the public serv- 
ants — and the people, searching, yearning, 
discovering, hoping. And I think of our 
I young people here and what we have done 
in the last year to achieve a new revolution 
in education — beyond the wildest dreams of 
I just a decade ago. 

Now, how can we bring into closer union 
the spirit and the courage of both our 

I have given a good deal of thought to 
that in the last few months, and tonight I 
would propose that we mark this historic 
visit of Prime Minister Gandhi with a last- 
ing endowment for the benefit of inquiring 
young minds in the Indian nation. 

So may we. Madam Prime Minister, with 
the permission of your Government and the 
American Congress, launch a new and imag- 
inative venture? We shall call it an Indo- 
American Foundation. I would propose that 
this foundation be established in India, and 
that it be endowed with $300 million in 
Indian currency owned by the United 
States. Other foundations all over the world 
will cooperate, I am sure, with an enterprise 
of this kind. 

I would suggest that this foundation be 
organized as an independent institution, 
with the distinguished citizens of both our 
countries on its board of directors. I would 
propose that the new foundation be given 
a broad charter to promote progress in all 
fields of learning: to advance science, to 
encourage research, to develop new teaching 
techniques on the farms and in the fac- 
tories, to stimulate, if you please, new ways 
to meet old problems. 

The journey to our future is over a very 
long and a very winding road. Every mile 
will be challenged by doubt. But together, 
Madam Prime Minister, we must avoid the 
detours that intrude on our safe journey 
toward a time when, as your father prom- 
ised, life will be better for all of our people. 
I So, ladies and gentlemen, let us honor 
those who are so welcome here tonight. Let 
us ask you to join in honoring the Chief of 
State whose wise and gifted Prime Minister 
we have enjoyed so much today and that 

we welcome so warmly this evening. I 
should like to ask those of you who are 
assembled here to join me now in raising 
your glass in a toast to the great President 
of India. 

Prime Minister Gandhi 

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excel- 
lencies, ladies and gentlemen: Your words, 
Mr. President, were exceedingly moving. 
You have spoken of India and her wide 
variety. We who live there are naturally 
deeply conscious of it, while at the same 
time we are fully aware of the underlying 
and the basic unity which binds together 
all our people. 

You have quoted some words of my 
father. I should like to quote something 
which you yourself have said. You said, Mr. 
President: "Reality rarely matches dreams, 
but only dreams give nobility to purpose." ' 

In the United States you have matched 
your dreams in many ways. Yet you still 
seek, and rightly, to offer the American 
people a better and a more purposeful life. 
You have called this idea the "Great So- 
ciety." In India we also have our dreams, 
which may seem trite to you who sit here 
because they appear so simple — food barely 
sufficient to keep one from hunger, shelter 
to keep out the wind and the rain, medicine 
and education by which to restore the faith 
and the hope of our nearly 500 million 

But everything in life is relative. There 
is an old proverb in my country. A person 
says, "I complained that I had no shoes 
until I met a man who had no feet." 

Mahatma Gandhi said once, and it is 
something which my father often repeated, 
that we in India had to work to wipe the 
tear from every eye. That, of course, is a 
big task, and I doubt if it can be done in 
any country. And yet we have been trying 
to do that for 18 long years. Two centuries 
of subjugation cannot be washed away so 

' For text of the President's remarks at Detroit, 
Mich., Sept. 7, 1964, see Public Papers of the Presi- 
dents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-6i, vol. II, p. 1049. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


easily. It takes time. It takes work. It 
takes courage. 

India is changing, as no doubt your ad- 
visers who have been to India have told you, 
Mr. President. Nowhere in the world can 
the contrast be so striking. We have not 
only different levels of development be- 
tween the different states but even within 
each state. We have often several centuries 
existing side by side. We have some of the 
greatest irrigation works in the world, and 
yet, in parts of our State of Rajasthan, 
desert families store precious water under 
lock and key. During a tour of some of 
these border areas a couple of months or so 
ago, I myself experienced the great hard- 
ship of doing without water and measuring 
the miles from well to well. 

Some 12 million or more bullock carts still 
churn the dust of our village roads. Yet in 
other parts of India, we are building three 
nuclear powerplants. 

Average agricultural yields are low, and 
at the same time there are areas where we 
obtain sugar cane yields that compare fa- 
vorably with those in Hawaii or in Java. 

A third of the illiterate people in the 
world are in India. Yet we are steadily 
conquering illiteracy. 

In our State of Maharashtra, village after 
village vies to achieve total literacy. Parents 
learn from their children so that the honor 
of the village is upheld. In Madras people 
have banded together to improve their 
schools. They have given 100 million rupees 
beyond what the Government spends on their 

In the Punjab, little workshops make 
lathes and pumps that have revolutionized 
the countryside. 

The seeming inconsistencies and conflicts 
of India are legion. The setbacks, and we 
have had many, are heartbreaking. Yet the 
signs of change are clear and constantly 

Sometimes critics point to an example of 
success and say, "This proves nothing. This 
is a mere drop in the ocean of Indian 
poverty." How wrong this is, for every 


success reinforces the prospect of further 
success. It shows that success is possible. 
The example and the confidence it generates 
radiates outward. 

This, Mr. President, is really our major 
problem. Years ago when we visited the 
villages to persuade people to try for a 
better life, they turned to us and said, 
"There can be no better life. God wills it 
this way. This is our lot and we have to 
suffer it." Today not a single voice will be 
heard like this. There is only one demand: 
that we do want a better life. We want 
better schools and more schools. We want 
bigger hospitals and more hospitals and all 
the other signs of progress and signs of 
raising the standards of living. 

This I think is a very big achievement. 

You talked, sir, of democracy. May I tell 
you one more story which I shared with the 
Vice President a short while ago. It hap- 
pened during our first elections. I had gone 
to speak in a village where just the day 
before the leader of an opposition party had 
spoken. When my speech was ended, an 
elderly gentleman got up from the audience 
and said, "We have listened very carefully 
to what you have said, but just the day be- 
fore somebody came" — so-and-so came — "and 
he said the exact opposite. Now, which of 
you was telling the truth?" 

Now, this you can understand is an ex- 
tremely tricky question to ask a public 
speaker. I said, "Well, I think that what I 
said was the truth, but I have no doubt that 
the gentleman thought that what he said 
was the truth. The whole point of democ- 
racy is that everybody should say whatever 
he thinks is the truth, and you, the people, 
have to really judge which is the correct 
version and which is the right version or the 
right thing for you." 

Well, this was rather a difficult explana- 
tion for them, and they said, "Now, you tell 
us, do you belong to the Congress Party?" 
I said, "I do." "Is your party in power? Is 
it forming the government?" I said, "Yes, 
it is." "Then what business have you to 
send somebody here who tells us incorrect 


things. It is your business to keep them 

This was one of the stops where I was 
supposed to stay only 10 minutes, but I 
stayed for 2 hours trying to argue out the 
whole point about elections, freedom of 
expression, and so on. I can't say that I got 
any further at the end of 2 hours. 

But now, years later, we find that we 
have got further. Nobody today in India 
would put such a question. They know that 
the different parties have their points of 
view, and these points of view are put be- 
fore the people, and the people judge, not 
always rightly, but I think they try to judge 
rightly. Certainly, from election to election 
they have shown a great maturity. 

India very definitely is on the move. Mr. 
President, the United States has given 
India valuable assistance in our struggle 
against poverty, against hunger, against 
ignorance, and against disease. We are 
grateful for this act of friendship. But we 
also know that our own "Great Society" 
must and can only rest securely on the 
quality and the extent of our own effort. 

This effort we are determined to make. 
We owe it to our friends, and even more 
so we owe it to ourselves. 

Nevertheless, I believe that it is of the 
greatest importance, to use your own words, 
to bring into closer union the spirit and 
courage of both our countries. I welcome 
your intention to set up an Indo-American 
Foundation, which will give tangible shape 
and form to this union. 

The present-day world offers the possibil- 
ity of bringing together one people with 
another. The young men and women of 
your Peace Corps are well known and well 
loved in our country. Every endeavor to 
sustain and enlarge this people-to-people 
partnership is a good effort and is welcome. 

Friendship with America is not a new 
thing for us. Those of us in India who have 
been involved with the struggle for freedom 
have knowm from our earliest days your own 
struggle here. We have been taught the 
words of your leaders, of your past great 

APRIL 18, 1966 

Presidents, and, above all, we were linked 
in friendship because of the friendship 
which President Roosevelt showed us and the 
understanding which he showed during 
some of the most difficult days of our 
independence struggle. I have no doubt it 
was also this understanding and friendly 
advice given to the British Government 
which facilitated and accelerated our own 

But there again, the major effort had to 
be on our own, and this is what we want 
today: that we should bear our burden, as 
indeed we are doing, but that a little bit of 
help should come from friends who consider 
it worthwhile to lighten the burden. 

Because, Mr. President, India's problems 
today are her own, but they are also the 
world's problems. India has a position in 
Asia which is an explosive position. India, 
if it is stable, united, democratic, I think 
can serve a great purpose. If India is not 
stable, or if there is chaos, if India fails, I 
think it is a failure of the whole democratic 
system. It is a failure of many of the values 
which you and I both hold dear. 

That is why, Mr. President, I welcome 
your words and I welcome this meeting with 
you, which has been most valuable to me. 

I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join 
with me in drinking a toast to the President 
and Mrs. Johnson, our friends, the American 
people, and the Great Society, not just for 
America but for all who dream of it, for 
all who struggle to transform those dreams 
into reality. 


white House press release dated March 29 

At the invitation of President Johnson, 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of the 
Republic of India, has been on an official 
visit to the United States of America. Dur- 
ing her visit, Prime Minister Gandhi met 
the President and members of the United 
States Government. 

The President and the Prime Minister dis- 


cussed India's efforts for the improved well- 
being of its people. Prime Minister Gandhi 
emphasized the high priority which India 
attaches to economic development. President 
Johnson assured Prime Minister Gandhi of 
the deep interest of the Government and 
the people of the United States in partici- 
pating in international efforts, particularly 
those under the leadership of the Interna- 
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop- 
ment, to assist India in its own massive 
efforts to raise the living standards of its 
people within the framework of a parlia- 
mentary democracy. 

The President and the Prime Minister 
discussed India's emergency food grain re- 
quirements resulting from last year's un- 
precedented drought. They agreed that the 
problem should be viewed not in isolation 
but in the context of an incipient world- 
wide food deficit, a challenge to humanity 
as a whole that merits the sustained and 
serious attention of all nations. 

The Prime Minister described measures 
which the Government of India is taking to 
achieve self-sufficiency in the nation's food 
production. The President assured her that, 
Congress willing, the United States will 
continue to participate generously in the 
international effort to alleviate India's im- 
mediate food deficit problem. The President 
told Mrs. Gandhi that he intended to send 
a special message to Congress shortly to 
seek its endorsement of such U.S. assist- 
ance. Both of them agreed that further 
participation of other countries in meeting 
India's emergency food needs is also highly 

Prime Minister Gandhi welcomed the 
President's proposal for the establishment 
of an Indo-U.S. Foundation to promote prog- 
ress in all fields of learning. The President 
and the Prime Minister look to this coopera- 
tive endeavour to develop new teaching 
techniques in farm and factory, to advance 
science and to increase research. 

President Johnson and Prime Minister 
Gandhi agreed that following the Tashkent 
Declaration there had already been con- 


siderable progress toward reestablishing 
the conditions of peace in the subcontinent 
and that it is necessary that this process 
continue in order that the peoples of both 
countries may concentrate their energies 
once again on the urgent tasks of national 
development. They also agreed on the im- 
portance of continuing to give full support 
to the United Nations objectives of refrain- 
ing from the use of force and of resolving 
conflicts between nations through peaceful 

During their discussions, President John- 
son and Prime Minister Gandhi reviewed 
recent developments in south and south- 
east Asia in the context of the universal 
desire of men and women everywhere to 
achieve peace that respects liberty, dignity, 
and the pursuit of a better way of life. In 
this connection the President explained the 
policies the United States is pursuing to help 
the people of the Republic of Vietnam to 
defend their freedom and to reconstruct 
their war-torn society. The Prime Minister 
explained the continuing interest and efforts 
of her country in bringing about a just and 
peaceful solution of this problem. 

Prime Minister Gandhi affirmed the de- 
termination of her nation to defend the 
freedom and territorial integrity of India 
and explained the challenge presented to it 
by the aggressive policies of the People's 
Republic of China. The Prime Minister and 
the President agreed that such aggressive 
policies pose a threat to peace, particularly 
in Asia. 

The President and the Prime Minister 
consider that the visit has reaffirmed the 
strong bonds of friendship between the 
United States and India, based upon a 
shared commitment to constitutional democ- 
racy and a common revolutionary heritage. 
Their highly informative, frank, and 
friendly discussions have contributed to a 
valuable personal understanding between 
their two countries and their two peoples. 

Prime Minister Gandhi extended a warm 
invitation to President Johnson to visit 
India. The President expressed his grati- 


tude for the invitation and his hope that 
he could visit India again. 


White House press release dated March 30 

To the Congress of the United States: 

In recent months I have been watching 
with deep concern the emerging problem of 
world food supply. And I have been espe- 
cially concerned with the prospect for India. 
During this past week I have discussed the 
Indian food problem with the Prime Minister 
of India, who has been our welcome and 
distinguished guest here in Washington. I 
am persuaded that we may stand at this mo- 
ment on the threshold of a great tragedy. 
The facts are simple; their implications are 
grave. India faces an unprecedented 
drought. Unless the world responds, India 
faces famine. 

Strong efforts by the Indian government, 
and our help, have so far averted famine. 
But in the absence of cooperative and ener- 
getic action by the United States, by other 
nations and by India herself, some millions 
of people will suffer needlessly before the 
next crop is harvested. This, in our day and 
age, must not happen. Can we let it be said 
that man, who can travel into space and ex- 
plore the stars, cannot feed his own? 

Because widespread famine must not and 
cannot be allowed to happen, I am today 
placing the facts fully before the Congress. 
I am asking the endorsement of the Con- 
gress for a program that is small neither in 
magnitude nor concept. I am asking the 
Congress, and the American people, to join 
with me in an appeal to the conscience of all 
nations that can render help. 

I invite any information that the Congress 
can supply. Our people will welcome any 
judgments the Congress can provide. The 
executive branch, this nation and the world 
will take appropriate note and give proper 
attention to any contributions in counsel 
and advice that Congressional debate may 

If we all rally to this task, the suffering 
can be limited. A sister democracy will not 
suffer the terrible strains which famine im- 
poses on free government. 

Nor is this all. The Indians are a proud 
and self-respecting people. So are their 
leaders. The natural disaster which they 
now face is not of their making. They have 
not asked our help needlessly; they deeply 
prefer to help themselves. The Indian gov- 
ernment has sound plans for strengthening 
its agricultural economy and its economic 
system. These steps will help India help her- 
self. They will prevent a recurrence of this 
disaster. I also propose action through the 
World Bank and the Agency for Interna- 
tional Development to support this strong 
initiative by the Government of India. 

The Crisis 

Since independence India has done much 
to increase her output of agricultural prod- 
ucts. Her agriculture has not been neglected. 
From 1950 to 1965 she increased food produc- 
tion 75 percent. This is a creditable achieve- 
ment. But India has had to contend with a 
continuing and relentless increase in popu- 
lation. Her people have also consumed more 
from a higher income. Accordingly, she has 
remained heavily dependent on our help. 
Last year we provided, under Public Law 480, 
more than 6 million tons of wheat, equal to 
more than two-fifths of our own consump- 
tion. To keep this supply moving, the equiv- 
alent of two fully loaded liberty ships had 
to put in at an Indian port every day of the 

Now India has been the victim of merciless 
natural disaster. Nothing is so important 
for the Indian farmer as the annual season 
of heavy rain — the monsoon. Last year, 
over large parts of India, the rains did not 
come. Crops could not be planted, or the 
young plants withered and died in the 
fields. Agricultural output, which needed to 
increase, was drastically reduced. Not since 
our own dustbowl years of the nineteen- 
thirties has there been a greater agricultural 

APRIL 18, 1966 


Indian leaders have rightly turned to the 
world for help. Pope Paul VI has endorsed 
their plea. So has the World Council of 
Churches. So has the Secretary General of 
the United Nations. So has the Director 
General of the Food and Agriculture Or- 
ganization. And so, in this message, does 
the President of the United States. 

I have said that effective action will not 
be cheap. India's need is for at least 11 to 
12 million tons of imported grain from 
January to December 1966. 

Food in this world is no longer easy to 

But find it we must. 

Here is what I propose. 

The Program 

Last fiscal year we supplied six million 
tons of food grain to India. So far in this 
fiscal year, I have allotted 6.5 million tons 
of grain for shipment to India — more than 
the total of six million tons which we had 
planned to provide as a continuation of past 
arrangements. It is even more necessary in 
this emergency to keep the pipelines full 
and flowing and to insure that there is no 
congestion of rail or sea transport. India, 
furthermore, estimates an additional six to 
seven million tons of food grain will be 
necessary through next December beyond 
what has already been committed or ex- 

I propose that the United States provide 
three and one-half million tons of that re- 
quirement, with the remaining three and a 
half million tons coming from those nations 
which have either the food to offer or the 
means to buy food. I invite those nations to 
match the amount which we will supply. 
For example, I am delighted to be informed 
that Canada is prepared to provide a million 
tons of wheat and flour to India. 

Every agriculturally advanced country 
can, by close scrutiny of its available sup- 
plies, make a substantial contribution. I 
ask that every government seek to supply 
the maximum it can spare — and then a little 
more. I ask those industrial countries which 
cannot send food to supply a generous equiv- 

alent in fertilizer, or in shipping, or in funds 
for the purchase of these requisites. All 
know the Indian balance of payments is 
badly overburdened. Food and other ma- 
terials should be supplied against payment 
in rupees, which is our practice, or as a gift. 

It is not our nature to drive a hard mathe- 
matical bargain where hunger is involved. 
Children will not know that they suffered 
hunger because American assistance was not 
matched. We will expect and press for the 
most energetic and compassionate action by 
all countries of all political faiths. But if 
their response is insufficient, and if we 
must provide more, before we stand by and 
watch children starve, we will do so. I, 
therefore, ask your endorsement for this 
emergency action. 

I have spoken mostly of bread-grains. 
The Prime Minister of India spoke also of 
other commodities which can meet part of 
the requirements or replace part of the 
need. In response to her needs, I propose 
that we allot up to 200,000 tons of com, up 
to 150 million pounds of vegetable oils, and 
up to 125 million pounds of milk powder to 
India. The vegetable oil and milk powder are 
especially needed for supplementing the 
diets of Indian children. 

In addition, India's own exchange re- 
sources can be released for food and ferti- 
lizer purchases if we make substantial ship- 
ments of cotton and tobacco. I am suggest- 
ing the allotment for this purpose of 325- 
700,000 bales of cotton and 2-4 million 
pounds of tobacco. Both of these commodi- 
ties we have in relative abundance. 

I request prompt Congressional endorse- 
ment of this action. 

I urge, also, the strong and warmhearted 
and generous support of this program by the 
American people. 

And I urge the strong and generous re- 
sponse of governments and people the world 

India is a good and deserving friend. Let 
it never be said that "bread should be so 
dear, and flesh and blood so cheap" that we 
turned in indifference from her bitter need. 




Further Action 

The Indian people want to be self- 
supporting in their food supply. 

Their government has adopted a far- 
reaching program to increase fertilizer pro- 
duction, improve water and soil manage- 
ment, provide rural credit, improve plant 
protection and control food loss. These es- 
sentials must be accompanied by a strong 
training and education program. 

I have directed the Secretary of Agricul- 
ture, in cooperation with AID, to consult 
with the Indian government to ascertain if 
there are ways and means by which we can 
strengthen this effort. We have long ex- 
perience with short courses, extension train- 
ing and similar programs. If they can be 
used, I feel certain that American agricul- 
tural experts would respond to an appeal to 
serve in India as a part of an Agricultural 
Training Corps or through an expanded 
Peace Corps. Many of our younger men and 
women would especially welcome the op- 

I am determined that in our assistance to 
the Indian government we not be narrowly 
limited by what has been done in the past. 
Let us not be afraid of our own enthusiasm. 
Let us be willing to experiment. 

The Indian government believes that there 
can be no effective solution of the Indian 
food problem that does not include popu- 
lation control. The choice is now between a 
comprehensive and humane program for 
limiting births and the brutal curb that is 
imposed by famine. As Mrs. Gandhi told 
me, the Indian government is making vigor- 
ous efforts on this front. 

Following long and careful planning and 
after discussions in recent days with Prime 
Minister Gandhi, I have proposed the estab- 
lishment of the Indo-U.S. Foundation. This 
Foundation will be financed by rupees, sur- 
plus to our need, now on deposit in India. 

It will be governed by distinguished citizens 
of both countries. It will be a vigorous and 
imaginative enterprise designed to give new 
stimulus to education and scientific research 
in India. There is no field where, I hope, this 
stimulus will be greater than in the field of 
agriculture and agricultural development. 

Finally, in these last days, the Prime 
Minister and I have talked about the pros- 
pects for the Indian economy. The threat of 
war with China and the unhappy conflict 
with Pakistan seriously interrupted India's 
economic progress. Steps had to be taken 
to protect dwindling exchange resources. 
These also had a strangling effect on the 
economy. Indian leaders are determined now 
to put their economy again on the upward 
path. Extensive discussions have been held 
with the World Bank, which heads the con- 
sortium of aid-giving countries. 

The United States interferes neither in 
the internal politics nor the internal eco- 
nomic structure of other countries. The 
record of the last fifteen years is a sufficient 
proof that we ask only for results. We are 
naturally concerned with results — with in- 
suring that our aid be used in the context 
of strong and energetic policies calculated to 
produce the most rapid possible economic 

We believe Indian plans now under dis- 
cussion show high promise. We are im- 
pressed by the vigor and determination of 
the Indian economic leadership. As their 
plans are implemented, we look forward to 
providing economic assistance on a scale 
that is related to the great needs of our sis- 
ter democracy. 

An India free from want and deprivation 
will, as Mahatma Gandhi himself once pre- 
dicted, "be a mighty force for the good of 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
March 30, 1966. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


"// the fears and agonies of the war in Viet-Nam can lead 
us another step toward collectivizing the international police 
responsibility and closer to a wider realism about the im- 
possibility of all wars, even its tragedy may be redeemed. 
It can be the prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to a 
world freed of the obsessive r-isks of annihilation." 

The Quest for Peace 

by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

The tradition for vigorous and healthy 
discussion in our country is an old one — 
with its roots in the history of our own 
Revolution, if not in the history of Western 
civilization itself. Justice Brandeis, speak- 
ing of those who won our independence, 
once said: 

They believe that freedom to think as you will and 
to speak as you think are means indispensable to 
the discovery and spread of political truth ; that 
without free speech and assembly discussion would 
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordi- 
narily adequate protection against the dissemination 
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to 
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion 
is a political duty; and that this should be a funda- 
mental principle of the American Government. 

Those of you who have studied the classics 
will find a striking similarity, a deliberate 
one, between the words of Justice Brandeis 
and those attributed to Pericles when he 
said: ". . . we Athenians . . . instead of 
looking on discussion as a stumbling block 
in the way of action, we think it an indis- 
pensable preliminary to any wise action at 

' Address made at Charter Day ceremonies at the 
University of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar. 
25 (U.S./U.N. press release 4825 dated Mar. 24). 

It is in this spirit that Americans today 
— on the campus, in our newspapers, on 
television, in various citizen forums, and in 
the Congress — should debate the vital as- 
pirations of American foreign policy — the 
aspirations directly related to our quest for 

It is in this spirit that today I wish to 
discuss with you our search for the just 
resolution of the problems of Viet-Nam and 
Communist China, upon which the success 
of our quest so intimately depends. 

I speak, too — and trust that all will listen 
— in the spirit of Cromwell's admonition: 
"My brethren ... I beseech you, bethink 
you that you may be mistaken." 

The Alternatives to War 

It is now a cliche to say that in the age 
of nuclear destruction the world can no 
longer afford or accept war as a means of 
settling its inevitable disputes. We have not 
stopped dead at the cliche but have com- 
mitted both urgency of thought and na- 
tional purpose to working out the alterna- 
tives to war. 

We know, or should know, some of the 
methods of dealing with disputes which do 
not work. The big war, the holy war, the 



ideological war, the war of unconditional 
surrender — all these are simply wars of ex- 
termination — but extermination for every- 

On the other hand, retreat before violence 
only encourages more violence. Even the 
more sophisticated forms of "retreat" — for 
instance, spheres of influence that amount 
to spheres of domination — hardly work 
better over the long run since they are 
based on an assumption that has been re- 
peatedly proved false in the 20th century: 
that peace can come if only small nations 
do what large neighbors tell them. 

In the modern world they feel they have 
their own rights. Besides, most small na- 
tions have more than one big neighbor. 
Suppose, as in the prewar Balkans of 1914, 
the signals get crossed? In any case, every- 
one is a neighbor on a planet the astronauts 
and cosmonauts can encircle in 90 minutes. 

What are the alternatives to war? We 
know them from our domestic community. 
They are practiced every day in societies 
which are wide enough to span continents. 
We abandon the right of private redressing 
of wrongs; instead, we hand over our dis- 
putes and conflicts to the impartial action 
and scrutiny of the law. 

We set up all the needed instruments of 
mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and ad- 
judication. We seek agreement or acquies- 
cence by compromise, adjustment, and im- 
partial decision. We do not permit settle- 
ment by force, and we employ an independ- 
ent police power both to check violence and 
to guarantee the peaceful resolution of dis- 
puted issues. 

To say that men do not know how to be 
rid of armed conflict is to deny generations 
of development in domestic legality. Our 
trouble lies not in ignorance of the tools but 
in the habit and pride of national sover- 
eignty which prevent us from adapting and 
using the tools in an international society. 
Just so did men long resist abandoning the 
"right" to fight duels or vendettas. 

Such principles are all very well. But 
between the idea and the reality falls the 
shadow — the shadow of Viet-Nam. Can this 

war be fitted into any wider concept of the 
search for better methods of peacekeeping? 
I think it can. No thinking American would 
support it if it could not. Let me begin by 
saying what this war is not. 

It is not emphatically a war to establish 
an American "imperialism" or an American 
"sphere of influence" in Asia. What exclu- 
sive interests have we there? Investment? 
trade? settlement? None. 

It is not a war to threaten or frustrate 
the legitimate interests of the Chinese people 
— though it seeks to discourage violence and 
aggression and play some part in persuading 
them that the imperialist world, once known 
to the Central Kingdom, is dead and will 
not be resurrected. 

It is in part, if you like, to persuade them 
that the fact that large parts of Asia — 
including all Southeast Asia and the hill 
states of the Himalayas — once, supposedly, 
paid the emperors tribute is no reason why 
they should revert to the status of vassal 
states in the 20th century. 

Again, this war is not a holy war against 
communism as an ideology. It does not seek 
unconditional surrender — from North Viet- 
Nam or anyone else. It does not seek to 
deny any segment of South Vietnamese 
opinion its part in peacefully establishing a 
stable regime. 

It does, however, preclude retreat before 
two things — first, the program of the Viet 
Cong, strongly controlled by the North, to 
impose its will by violence; and second, its 
claim to be the "sole genuine representa- 
tive" of a people, the vast majority of whom 
have rejected this claim. 

This, I believe, is the background against 
which to consider in positive terms what 
this war is about. It is, I suggest, another 
step in a limited operation of a policing 
type — an operation designed to check vio- 
lence as a means to settle international dis- 

The violence is no less total because it has 
been largely organized as a guerrilla opera- 
tion. Guerrilla warfare — entering villages 
by stealth, killing the head man, kidnaping 

APRIL 18, 1966 


the young men, breaking up the families — 
is, in a real sense, the most total of wars, 
short of nuclear destruction. 

Our Aims in Viet-Nam 

To attempt to check it, to establish the 
principle that this kind of violence, fanned 
and fed from outside, is as impermissible 
a means for settling international disputes 
as any other form of violence, is the first 
and indeed chief aim of American military 

The second, once violence stops, is equally 
compatible with what I would call the legal 
and peaceful alternative to international 
violence. It is to grant the people of South 
Viet-Nam the time, the security, and the 
opportunity to express their own prefer- 
ences as free as is humanly possible from 
coercion of any form. 

In the period after World War II we have 
witnessed — indeed, we can take pride in 
having helped to bring about — the remark- 
able phenomenon of a genuinely free expres- 
sion of will among the vanquished peoples 
of Japan and Germany while they were still 
subject to military occupation by the vic- 
tors. We have also seen Western colonialism 
— notably the British and the French — end 
again and again by the advent to power of 
the anticolonialists in truly free elections. 

What has been done before can be done 
again. And if, given the opportunity to ex- 
press their preferences free of coercion, the 
South Vietnamese people vote for the Viet 
Cong, or for a coalition, or for any other 
particular outcome, we must be and will be 
prepared to accept their judgment. I say 
frankly that we do not expect that these 
people will make such a choice, but that is 
their business. 

But if you ask me whether in view of 
Asia's colonial past, in view of the far- 
reaching differences between America and 
mainland China, in view of the fact that 
America is vast, powerful. Western, capital- 
ist, and wealthy — if you ask me whether 
ideally America is the most suitable, the 


most acceptable policeman, I can only say 
probably not, and we do not wish to be. 

Indeed, it is probably true that they 
would prefer that a regional organization of 
Asian countries themselves or the entire 
world community play the policeman's role. 
My own profound dedication to the United 
Nations and my deep interest in its growth 
spring from the belief that it is the motive 
center of an international society wherein 
law and order are not based upon power 
alone, where the police function is a collec- 
tive responsibility. I 

Role of the International Community 

In the case of Viet-Nam, nothing would 
be more heartening and welcome than to 
have the international community — acting 
through the United Nations — accept the re- 
sponsibility for the most immediate of our 
aims — that of checking the resort to vio- 
lence against South Viet-Nam. 

Similarly, we would welcome it if the in- 
ternational community were to accept the 
responsibility for creating in Viet-Nam the 
peaceful alternative to violence — the respon- 
sibility of policing reaffirmed and revital- 
ized provisions of the Geneva agreements, of 
insuring by means of effective patrol and 
supervision that the people of South Viet- 
Nam are given the security and freedom 
necessary to make their own choices con- 
cerning their government and their future. 

But it would be unrealistic not to recog- 
nize that the membership of the United 
Nations is not yet prepared to accept the 
first responsibility. And one should recall 
that the only occasion on which the mem- 
bership accepted an equivalent responsibil- 
ity was in Korea in 1950, when the Soviet 
Union was temporarily absent from the 
Security Council and when the membership 
did not yet include a host of newly inde- 
pendent countries who — for reasons we, as 
one of the earliest nonalined countries in 
modern history, cannot fail to understand — 
hesitate to take sides in issues where the 
great powers strongly disagree. 

Indeed, our recent experience in the Se- 



curity Council showed that the members of 
the Council found it impossible, in the face 
of the intransigence of a few of the mem- 
bers, to accept the much more modest 
responsibility of formally calling upon the 
parties involved in Viet-Nam to reach a 
settlement through negotiations, rather 
than fighting, in a forum of their own 

But to say that the membership of the 
United Nations is not yet prepared to accept 
the responsibility for checking the use of 
force against South Viet-Nam is not to say 
that the responsibility can be shirked or 
ignored by those committed to the rule of 
law — and we do not intend to do so. 

It seems clear that, for the immediate 
future, only a few members of the inter- 
national community are willing to join in 
the onerous and costly task of again demon- 
strating with arms that the use of force is 
not a tolerable method to settle interna- 
tional grievances or satisfy national ambi- 

This is a responsibility that we and 
others cannot escape if we are to build an 
enduring peace. It is a responsibility well 
described over a century ago by John Stuart 

The doctrine of non-intervention (he wrote), to 
be a leg-itimate principle of morality, must be ac- 
cepted by all governments. The despots must con- 
sent to be bound by it as well as the free states. 
Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries 
comes to this miserable issue, that the wrong side 
may help the wrong, but the right side must not 
help the right. Intervention to enforce non-inter- 
vention is always rightful, always moral, if not al- 
ways prudent. Though it be a mistake to give 
freedom to a people who do not value the boon, it 
cannot but be right to insist that if they do value 
it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it 
by foreign coercion. 

But we must not forget — and I assure you 
we have not — ^that our interest will be 
served by encouraging the international 
community as a whole to accept some, if not 
all, the responsibility for seeing to it that, 
once this intolerable use of force is aban- 
doned, the people of South Viet-Nam are. 

through impartial and effective policing 
and supervision, guaranteed the physical 
security necessary to permit a free choice 
concerning their own government and their 
own future. 

Acceptance of such responsibilities by the 
international community would hasten the 
withdrawal of American and other foreign 
forces from Viet-Nam. For then the with- 
drawal would be the prelude not to the con- 
doning of violence and the spread of anarchy 
but part of a new attempt to insure that 
political decisions in our inescapably inter- 
national society are based upon law, order, 
and consent — not upon force supplied and 
directed from outside. 

This is where all the nations and all the 
governments have their part to play. What- 
ever their devotion to national sovereignty 
— as in France; however their sovereignty 
is wrapped up in ideology — as in the Soviet 
Union; however deep their dedication to 
independent nonalinement — as in most 
emerging nations; all have to face a pro- 
founder, antecedent condition to sovereignty 
and independence, and that is survival itself. 

If the fears and agonies of the war in 
Viet-Nam can lead us another step toward 
collectivizing the international police re- 
sponsibility and closer to a wider realism 
about the impossibility of all wars, even its 
tragedy may be redeemed. It can be the 
prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to 
a world freed of the obsessive risk of anni- 

The Question of Communist China 

I turn now to the second issue which 
looms large in our international horizon — 
the question of Communist China. It is not 
unrelated to the question of Viet-Nam. In- 
deed, part of the difficulty in any review of 
our Chinese policy is the role being played 
by Peking in support of violence and terror 
and war — all in the guise of so-called "wars 
of national liberation" — not only in South- 
east Asia but elsewhere in Asia, in Africa, 
in Europe, and in some parts of the Ameri- 

APRIL 18, 1966 


The doctrine is one of war, to be sure, but 
"national liberation" in the lexicon of Com- 
munist China is a spurious label to cover up 
subversion and aggression. 

The recent setbacks Communist China has 
experienced in virtually every area of the 
globe, however, show that most nations are 
aware of the threats that current Commu- 
nist Chinese policy poses to their national 
existence and to world peace. 

But not even these setbacks seem to be 
swaying Mao Tse-tung and his fellow lead- 
ers, and I strongly question if any diplo- 
matic action open to the United States 
would have more effect in convincing the 
present regime to mend its ways and change 
its belief about remaking Asia in their 

What about some of the proposals con- 
cerning Communist China that are now 
being discussed? 

The Communist Chinese leaders have set 
a price for entering the U.N. And what a 
price it is! It includes not only the expul- 
sion from the U.N. of the Republic of China 
and other unnamed "imperialist lackeys" of 
the United States but the complete reorga- 
nization of the U.N., the withdrawal of a 
General Assembly resolution condemning 
Peking as an aggressor in the Korean con- 
flict, and the branding of the United States 
as an aggressor there. 

This is a price that, in my opinion, even 
most nations who support Red China's mem- 
bership will not pay. 

The unreality reflected in Peking's atti- 
tude toward U.N. membership is repeated 
in its attitude toward diplomatic recogni- 

The evidence can be found in the bitter 
experiences of those nations that have 
turned to recognition of Peking and have 
had to turn embarrassed backs on Taiwan 
and suffer continuing rebuffs and humilia- 
tion at the hands of Communist China. 

What the current discussion ultimately 
must face up to is that it is not so much a 
matter of whether we should recognize 
Communist China or support its admission 
to the U.N. Rather it is a question of 

whether the United States is prepared to 
agree that the 12 million people of Taiwan 
are to be handed over to Peking against 
their will. 

I do not agree and, I am convinced, most 
Americans do not agree. 

It is true, of course, that the figure of 
12 million is not very imposing when stacked 
up against the three-quarters of a billion 
people of mainland China. But morality in 
international relations cannot be decided by 
figures. Principle must remain our guide. 

If the United States and Communist 
China are to normalize relations, it can only 
be done through a common commitment to 
a rule of law which adjures international 

When the time comes — as we all hope it 
will — when the leaders of Communist China 
are ready to subscribe to this principle in 
full measure and to end the isolation that 
now cuts them off from the rest of the 
world, the United States will not be back- 
ward in welcoming and applauding the 

World Rule of Law 

For we stand ready to live in peace with 
any and all countries regardless of ideology. 
All we ask is that they join in seeking com- 
mon understandings, common undertakings, 
and the peaceful resolution of all differ- 
ences. That is the overall policy that guides 
our relations with Communist and non- 
Communist nations alike. I do not believe 
it requires reappraisal. 

It merits consideration by all men and 
nations who seek to live in peace. 

Our commitment to the still-distant goal 
of a world rule of law makes it all the more 
imperative that we redouble our creative 
energies to the use of the United Nations 
as an effective instrument to build and to 
keep the peace. 

We realize that it cannot yet provide the 
final answer, nor can it yet guarantee the 
peace in full. But that is more the fault of 
its members than of the U.N. I am opti- 
mistic, however, that it will in time realize 
in full the grand dream of Franklin Delano 



Roosevelt of a world free from want and 
free from fear. For, regardless of our dif- 
ferences, I do not believe mankind will let 
its noblest work be extinguished in a puff 
of time. 

Though the days before us are dark still 
and the threats many, I refer you to yet 
another somber time and the words spoken 
then by Winston Churchill, whose statue is 
to be unveiled in Washington next month: 

These are not dark days, these are great days 
. . . (he said) and we must all thank God we have 
been allowed, each of us according to our stations, 
to play a part in making these days memorable in 
the history of our race. 

In our one world today the history of the 
human race can only be memorable if man- 
kind succeeds in achieving the ancient and 
precious goal of a universal and lasting 
peace. In this quest we cannot — we dare 
not — fail. 

Under Secretary Ball Discusses 
U.S. Views on Viet-Nam and NATO 

Follotoing is the transcript of an interview 
with Under Secretary Ball at Paris on 
March 30 by Andre Fontaine of Le Monde, 
which was published in that paper on 
March 31. 

Press release 73 dated March 31, revised 

Q. Mr. Secretary, the initial reason for 
your visit to Paris rvas to make a statement 
before the NATO Council on the war in 
Viet-Nam. Are there any new develop- 
ments that need to be brought to the atten- 
tion of the Council? 

A. We decided last year to have meetings 
at regular intervals in order to review cur- 
rent problems. We had one of those meet- 
ings this morning. 

Q. Did you appeal for increased Allied as- 
sistance ? 

A. No, but several countries informed us 
through their representatives at this meet- 
ing that they intended to allocate funds for 
hospitals or relief missions. 

Q. Hoio do you explain the small amount 
of such participation especially if you com- 
pare it with what happened during the 
Korean war? 

A. Actually, this assistance is not as small 
as is believed. If the plans now under dis- 
cussion are effectively carried out, there 
will be, between Korea, Australia, New Zea- 
land, and the Philippines, a total of consider- 
ably more than 50,000 foreign troops at our 
side in Viet-Nam. As for the attitude of the 
Europeans, obviously we regret it, but it is 
definitely a very different situation from the 
one that occurred in Korea, when we were 
acting under the United Nations flag. 

Q. What are your principal objections to 
the policy of the French Government? 

A. I am not absolutely sure that I under- 
stand very well what that policy is. This is 
a matter that I discussed a year and a half 
ago with General de Gaulle and, at that time, 
he proposed a neutralization of South Viet- 
Nam. Insofar as that concerns the United 
States, we have never asked anything other 
than a neutral Viet-Nam, which means a 
country whose people would be free to de- 
cide for themselves as they see fit and not 
be compelled to accept a regime imposed by 
force. If by neutrality you mean simply a 
country that does not enter into any al- 
liance, we have no objection to that. 

Q. In case you should win, what kind 
of Viet-Nam do you visualize? 

A. A country in which the government 
and society would be strong enough to 
carry out their task in accordance with the 
freely expressed will of the people. 

Q. Do you really believe that that is 
possible ? 

A. The Vietnamese have already demon- 
strated a strong determination to be inde- 

Q. How long do you think that will take? 

A. I do not expect a prompt decision. We 
are pursuing limited objectives, and we are 
seeking to attain them, while limiting mili- 

APRIL 18, 1966 


tary operations as much as possible. This 
cannot be done in 24 hours. 

Q. Aren't you afraid that the public will 
one day have enough of this war? 

A. The largely predominant feeling is that 
we are facing a situation with which we 
must grapple as long as that is necessary. 
The opposition to the war is noisy but rather 
limited. In my opinion, the support of our 
cause is stronger than it was before. 

Q. Do you not recall that following the 
Korean war, the American leaders were de- 
termined to avoid any land war in Asia and 
that President Eisenhower was elected 
largely on his promise to put an end to the 
impasse ? 

A. Times have changed, and President 
Eisenhower has given his full support to 
President Johnson's policy. 

France and NATO 

Q. To come now to NATO, do you accept 
France's position that our country could 
remain in the alliance after leaving its mili- 
tary structures ? 

A. The organization of the North At- 
lantic Treaty and its integrated commands 
are the means that make it possible for the 
alliance to operate. If France applies the 
policy it has just announced, the deterrent 
effort exercised by the alliance will be 
diminished. Moreover, if the defense of 
France is to depend on arrangements that 
provide for a more or less loose liaison be- 
tween the separate military commands, it is 
the very security of France that will be 

Q. Do you see any chance that France 
vnll really resume its place in NATO ? 

A. Certainly, and we shall always remain 
ready to welcome it, as President Johnson 
has said.i The decisions that France has 
just taken sadden and worry the United 
States deeply. 

Q. Do you really think that there is any 
possibility of cooperation between two 

' Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 554. 

armies when one is based on the idea of the 
flexible response and the other on the doc- 
trine of massive reprisals? 

A. There are two different problems here. 
The problem of the strategic theory to be 
applied must be debated among generals, 
and it is the practical arrangements for 
close cooperation that will most effectively 
permit a solution. The other problem con- 
cerns what you call "a cooperation between 
armies without an integrated command"; 
this cooperation has never been effectively 
assured by mere liaison between the armies. 
During the War of 1914-1918 it took 4 years 
to create a combined command under the 
orders of Marshal Foch. Only then was 
considerable progress made. In 1939 and 
1940 the general-staff liaison between the 
Allies was tragically inadequate — and the 
French have good reason to know this bet- 
ter than anyone. It was only when the Allies 
succeeded in establishing an integrated com- 
mand, placed under the orders of General 
Eisenhower, that the war was won. 

Q. Do you think that the influence of 
Germany in the alliance will be increased by 
France's withdrawal from NATO? 

A. No one wants any country — including 
the United States — to occupy a dominant 
position. What we are seeking is collective 
action. It would be very regrettable if the 
present crisis were to lead to a strengthen- 
ing of national positions. 

Q. Do you think that Germany will be 
admitted to the Standing Group? 

A. I would not venture to make any fore- 
cast regarding that point. 

Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities 

Q. Do you think that the time has come 
for a new examination of the problem of the 
nuclear responsibilities of the multilateral 
force ? 

A. The sharing of nuclear responsibilities 
is a very big problem that has not yet been 
resolved. The creation of the multilateral 
force is not its only possible solution. The 
British have proposed establishing an At- 



lantic nuclear force, which is now being 
studied by the United States, the Federal 
Republic of Germany, and other member 
countries of NATO. 

Q. Hasn't President Johnson himself de- 
cided to set aside the plan for a multinu- 
clear force ? 

A. At the beginning of 1965 the political 
situation was such in Germany and else- 
where that it would have been useless to act 
I too quickly. Besides, the United States was 
not attempting to impose its ideas, but 
rather to fill a European need. However, 
the preparation of a collective plan that 
would permit the nations not in possession 
of nuclear weapons to participate in the 
decisions on nuclear power has not yet been 
finished, and that is a task which still is very 
important. The question is under study in 
the so-called McNamara committee. I do 
not wish to say any more, but I am certain 
that we must find a means of enabling the 
nations without atomic weapons to partici- 
pate in the decisions on nuclear power. 

Q. What do you make of the Soviet ob- 

A. The Soviets object to the Atlantic pact 
itself and, consequently, to anything that 
may strengthen or consolidate it. 

Q. Are you in favor of maintaining French 
troops in Germany? 

I A. That is a problem that should first be 
examined by Germany itself. It is of particu- 
lar concern to Great Britain also and the 
United States, since these two countries 
also maintain troops in Germany; and, of 
course, it concerns all the members of the 
alliance. In my opinion, the fundamental 

I question is what agreements will be made 
regarding the command. The United States 
will not take a position on this problem until 
after holding more extensive consultations. 

Q. Among the reasons for the French de- 
cision, mention has often been made of the 
desire not to let our country be drawn into 
a tvar which it did not want, and in this 
connection the mutter of sending para- 

chutists to the Congo from the base in 
Evreaux has been cited. 

A. In the event of war, the French forces 
would be assigned to an integrated com- 
mand only if the French Government de- 
cided to do so under article V of the Atlantic 
Pact. The French decision actually repre- 
sents a step backward toward the restora- 
tion of the old system of national rivalries. 
As for the Congo affair, I can tell you that 
the French Government had been notified 
and raised no objection. I can tell you 
categorically that before the takeoff of the 
American planes charged with dropping 
those parachutists, my Government asked 
the French Government whether it had any 
objection, and the Quai d'Orsay gave us its 
full assurance that it had no objection. 

In this connection I should like to make 
some remarks that I consider very impor- 

What "Integration" Means 

I am astounded to hear certain persons 
here suggest that France's participation in 
the integrated command could involve that 
country in a war against its will. It would 
be very useful if you would explain to your 
readers what integration actually means, 
for it seems to me that there is a great deal 
of confusion about it on this side of the 

In NATO there is no integration of the 
operational command in peacetime except 
with regard to certain air-defense units 
which, owing to the nature of things, must 
be capable of instantly retaliating against 
an attack. With this one exception, no 
French soldier can be given an order to 
make the slightest move by anyone but the 
French command. Even in case of war, 
troops would be placed under the opera- 
tional command of SHAPE only if the 
French Government "deemed it necessary," 
under article V of the North Atlantic 
Treaty. Consequently, for the NATO com- 
mand to be able to dispose of French forces, 
a national decision, made by the French 
Government, would be necessary. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


Without any doubt, if France is still 
bound by the North Atlantic Treaty, as the 
French Government states that it wishes to 
be, France would be under the obligation of 
remaining at the side of its allies in the 
event that one of the members of NATO 
should be the victim of armed aggression. 
This obligation results from the treaty it- 
self and not from France's remaining in 
NATO or from its participation in the inte- 
grated command. The two things have 
nothing in common. 

U.S. Position Defined 

Permit me to define our position clearly. 
What causes us the most concern about the 
measure that France proposes to take is 
that it seems to constitute a step backward 
toward a disastrous past. Since the war, we 
have constantly tried to contribute toward 
creating a state of affairs that would make 
it possible to eliminate the causes of con- 
flict — and the principal cause of past wars 
has been the effort made by each European 
nation to insure its supremacy over the 
others. Hence, we are reminded of 1914 
when we witness acts that seem to have 
been inspired by the old feelings of national 
rivalry, the old, outmoded concepts of sov- 

As two Presidents of the United States 
have said, what we desire is a partnership 
between equals, from one shore of the At- 
lantic to the other. We have been ready for 
a long time to create a state of affairs in 
which the political decisions and responsi- 
bilities are completely shared on an equal 
basis, and we are anxious to attain it. 

We wish to create a true association based 
on equality of treatment, and we have a feel- 
ing that we will not be able to obtain it fully 
if Europe does not take the course of unity. 

We can, to be sure, practice equality of 
treatment in our negotiations with the Euro- 
pean countries, but there is an aspect of 
equality that does not depend either on the 
will or the acts of the United States — 
namely, equality of dimensions and re- 
sources. Now, this difficulty itself would be 

surmounted by the establishment of a united 
Europe. With resources that would be very 
nearly the same as those of the United 
States, a unified Europe would be, in every 
respect, our equal. But this equality will 
never be achieved by the fragmentation of 
Europe, which would thus see its power and 
importance reduced. 

The unity of Europe is, of course, an af- 
fair that concerns the Europeans and not 
the Americans, but we see in it the means 
of realizing a true association between equal 
countries. I wish to repeat once again that 
domination is the thing that is farthest 
from our minds. It is association that we 

Permit me to make another point very 
clear. We believe in consultations, and I 
am always surprised to hear that we do not 
wish to consult anyone. 

When we tried, in the past, to hold con- 
sultation in the NATO Council, the French 
Government now in power stated that it did 
not consider the Council an appropriate 
forum for consultations concerning the prob- 
lems arising outside the area with which the 
treaty is concerned. 

Permit me to make another remark. We 
regret that the French Government consid- 
ered itself justified in acting unilaterally 
and has not presented its views on the re- 
form of NATO to all the members of the or- 
ganization, with a view to a common dis- 
cussion. During the last 3 years we have re- 
peatedly stated to the French Government 
that we would welcome any proposals that 
it might make to us. We have stated that 
we did not consider NATO to be a perfect 
or unalterable organization and that the 
times and conditions had changed, which 
fact could make changes in the form or 
structure of the organization necessary. 

We have been told repeatedly that pro- 
posals would be communicated to us later, 
and we have stated very clearly that the 
other members of NATO and we ourselves 
would, together, give them most careful 
study. But the French Government has 
apparently chosen to act unilaterally. 



United States and France Exchange 
Views on Atlantic Alliance 


Press release 69 dated March 25 

The United States Government acknowl- 
edges receipt of the aide memoire of the 
French Government, dated March 11, 1966,^ 
regarding French views as to the military 
relations of France with the other members 
of the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular 
with the United States. 

The aide memoire appears to be an indi- 
cation by the French Government of a pro- 
posed general course of future action by the 
French Government, rather than an invita- 
tion to discuss specific requests. The state- 
ment is not precise with regard to the 
measures that the French Government con- 
templates, nor does it indicate when and 
how it expects any such proposals to be 
given effect. The United States Govern- 
ment will also await clarification of the posi- 
tion of the French Government with regard 
to the bilateral agreements between France 
and the United States, having in mind the 
terms of those agreements as they relate to 
the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Since the bilateral agreements provide 
for military facilities utilized by the United 
States in fulfillment of its NATO commit- 
ments, the United States Government will, 
of course, also consult with the other NATO 
Allies on this subject. 


Official translation 

For years, the French Government has noted on 
numerous occasions, both publicly and in talks with 
the Allied Governments, that it considered that the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer cor- 
responded, insofar as it is concerned, to the condi- 
tions prevailing in the world at present and which 
are fundamentally different from those of 1949 and 
the following years. 

' The French aide memoire, which is dated Mar. 
10, was delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on 
Mar. 11. 

Indeed, the threats hanging over the Western 
World, in particular in Europe, which had motivated 
the conclusion of the treaty, have changed in na- 
ture. They no longer have the immediate and 
menacing character they formerly had. Moreover, 
the countries of Europe have re-established their 
economy and therefore have regained resources. In 
particular, France has equipped itself with an 
atomic armament whose very nature excludes its 
being integrated. In the third place, the nuclear 
balance between the Soviet Union and the United 
States, replacing the monopoly held by the United 
States, has changed the general conditions of de- 
fense of the West. Lastly, it is a fact that Europe 
is no longer the center of international crises. The 
center has shifted elsewhere, especially to Asia, 
where the countries of the Atlantic Alliance as a 
whole are obviously not involved. 

This evolution does not by any means lead the 
French Government to call into question the treaty 
signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. In other 
words, barring events in the coming years that 
might come to alter fundamentally the relations be- 
tween the East and the West, it does not intend to 
avail itself, in 1969, of the provisions of Article 13 
of the treaty and considers that the Alliance must 
continue as long as it appears necessary. 

This being unequivocally affirmed, the problem 
of the organization arises, that is to say, of all the 
agreements, arrangements, and decisions made after 
the signature of the treaty, whether multilateral or 
bilateral in form. The French Government con- 
siders that this organization no longer meets what 
it considers to be the essential requirements. 

Undoubtedly, the possibility of undertaking ne- 
gotiations to modify by common accord the arrange- 
ments in force could have been entertained. The 
French Government would have been happy to pro- 
pose this if it had had reason to think that such 
negotiations could lead to the result that it itself 
has in view. Unfortunately, everything indicates 
that such an undertaking would be doomed to fail- 
ure, inasmuch as France's partners appear to be, or 
declare that they are, all in favor of maintaining 
the status quo, if not of strengthening everything 
that, from the French viewpoint, seems to be now 
and henceforth unacceptable. 

Therefore, France is led to draw, insofar as it is 
concerned, the necessary conclusions, that is to say, 
to take in its own behalf the measures which seem 
to it to be essential and which are, in its view, in 
no way incompatible vrith its participation in the 
Alliance or with its participation, should the oc- 
casion arise, in military operations at the side of 
its allies. 

Already in the past, the French Government has 
taken measures of this nature with respect to its 
naval forces assigned to NATO, either in the Medi- 
terranean or in the Atlantic. It is now a question 
of its ground and air forces stationed in Germany, 

APRIL 18, 1966 


which are assigned to the Allied Command in Europe. 
France intends to put an end to such assignment. 
This decision will involve its simultaneous with- 
drawal from the two integrated commands to which 
these forces are attached, and in which it partici- 
pates within the framework of NATO, that is to 
say, the Supreme Allied Command Europe and the 
Central Europe Command, and, hence, the transfer 
outside of French territory of the headquarters of 
these two commands. 

The application of all of these measures naturally 
raises a number of problems which the French 
Government is ready, as of now, to discuss with its 
allies and, in particular, with the United States. 
It will be advisable to examine the liaisons that 
should be established between the French Command 
and the NATO Commands, as well as to determine 
the conditions under which the French forces, par- 
ticularly in Germany, would participate in time of 
war, if Article 5 of the Washington treaty were 
to be invoked, in joint military actions, both with 
respect to the command and to the operations 
themselves. This is based on the assumption in 
particular that the French ground and air forces 
now stationed in Germany will be maintained there 
under the conventions of October 23, 1954, which 
the French Government is, for its part, disposed 
to do. 

It will be advisable, furthermore, to consider the 
problems that may arise for France regarding the 
Military Committee and the Standing Group, in- 
cluding the problem of liaisons to be established, if 
necessary, between those bodies and the French 

These are, in broad outline, the measures the 
Government of Prance envisages, insofar as it is 
concerned, in order to adapt to the new conditions 
the terms of its participation in the Atlantic Alli- 
ance. It is ready to enter into discussions on the 
practical terms of application of these measures and 
hopes that adequate arrangements can be made by 
common accord among all the allies. 

The multilateral problems are not, however, the 
only ones facing the United States and France. The 
two countries have indeed concluded in the past a 
series of bilateral agreements which are still in 
force and which are the following: 

Depots of Deols — La Martinerie. 
Making available to the American forces certain 
airfields and installations in France. 
Supply lines. 

American headquarters at Saint-Germain. 

The French Government considers that these agree- 
ments as a whole no longer correspond to present 
conditions, which lead it to resume in French ter- 
ritory the complete exercise of its sovereignty, in 
other words, no longer to agree to foreign units, 
installations, or bases in France being under the 

control in any respect of authorities other than 
French authorities. It is ready to study and, if 
possible, to settle with the Government of the United 
States the practical problems resulting therefrom. 

The French Government is prepared, furthermore, 
to enter into talks on the military facilities that 
could be made available to the Government of the 
United States in French territory in the event of a 
conflict in which both countries would participate 
under the Atlantic Alliance. Such facilities could 
be the subject of an agreement to be concluded be- 
tween the two Governments. 

World Meteorological Day 

Statement by President Johnson, March 23 

White House press release dated March 23 

On June 10, 1964, at Holy Cross College, 
I pledged that this Nation would move ahead 
with plans for a worldwide weather system, 
in collaboration with other nations, toward 
a goal beneficial to all mankind.^ On the 
occasion of World Meteorological Day, I now 
reaffirm that pledge. 

Today, we recognize the efforts of scien- 
tists and technicians everywhere — working 
as individuals and working as a single 
scientific community — to improve our un- 
derstanding and prediction of the weather. 

This day symbolizes for us, and for all 
mankind, a new dawn of hope for a better, 
safer, and more meaningful life. 

In a world grown tired of wars, it com- 
mits all nations to work together in joint 
programs of peace. 

It looks to the time when all our science 
and technology, and all the wonders of the 
space age, will give us the power of which 
man has always dreamed — not the power of 
one nation over another but the power of 
the human race over the forces of nature. 

We know now that our environment is 
global and indivisible. Knowing this, it 
follows that the only way to achieve sig- 
nificant improvement of weather services 
and prediction is by vigorous international 
cooperation and by worldwide dissemina- 
tion of weather data. 

'■ For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 990. 



The instrument of this program is the 
World Meteorological Organization, a spe- 
cialized agency of the United Nations with 
a membership of 127 countries. Through 
the World Meteorological Organization the 
concept of a World Weather Watch is now 
taking shape. On this occasion, I am proud 
to say that the United States strongly 
supports international cooperation in this 
vital field. 

Much must be accomplished to transform 
hope into reality. Scientifically, we must 
move toward a better understanding of our 
environment. Technologically, we must 
move toward developing improved systems. 
But there are no insuperable obstacles — and 
the opportunities are too great for us to 

Our own nation's efforts in this world- 
wide project will continue to be coordinated 
by the Environmental Science Services Ad- 
ministration under the leadership of Secre- 
tary of Commerce John T. Connor. 

An Interagency Committee for Interna- 
tional Meteorological Programs has already 
developed a series of proposals to carry us 
well into the decade of the seventies. I have 
asked the Secretary of Commerce; Dr. Don- 
ald Hornig, my Science Adviser; and 
Charles Schultze, the Director of the 
Budget, to study these proposals and to 
recommend to me a plan of action for 
America's role in this important interna- 
tional program. 

National Maritime Day, 1966 


Today the American Merchant Marine continues 
a long tradition of essential service to the Ameri- 
can economy and defense. Throughout our history, 
American ships have contributed to the develop- 
ment of our modern economy, as well as to the 
strength and unity of the country. As this Nation's 

economy continues to expand, we will continue to 
need ships — fast, modern descendants of the 
famous "Clippers" — to carry our products to the 
far corners of the earth and return with the raw 
materials essential to our national prosperity. 

Our merchant marine is also vital to our friends 
all over the world. The transportation of surplus 
commodities to many of the underdeveloped coun- 
tries is an important part of our foreign aid pro- 

As long as the United States may be called upon 
to defend the Free World's interests anywhere on 
the globe, our ships are necessary to insure con- 
tinuous supply of the military material that helps 
to prevent or defeat aggression by any country. 

The complex task of creating and maintaining a 
merchant marine adequate to our needs for peace- 
time commerce, and sufficient for defense purposes, 
requires the efforts of government, management and 
labor and the support of all Americans. 

To remind the American people of the important 
role of the American Merchant Marine in the life of 
this Nation, the Congress in 1933 designated May 
22 of each year as National Maritime Day and re- 
quested the President to issue a proclamation an- 
nually in observance of that day. May 22, 1819, is 
the day the SS Savannah, the first steamship to 
cross the Atlantic, set forth on its historic journey 
into the future. 

Since May 22 falls on Sunday this year, it is 
appropriate that the day be observed on the follow- 
ing Monday. 

dent of the United States of America, do hereby 
urge the people of the United States to honor our 
American Merchant Marine on Monday, May 23, 
1966, by displaying the flag of the United States at 
their homes and other suitable places, and I request 
that all ships sailing under the American flag dress 
ship on that day in tribute to the American Mer- 
chant Marine. 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this 22nd day 
of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen 
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Inde- 
pendence of the United States of Amer- 
ica the one hundred and ninetieth. 


*No. 3708; 31 Fed. Reg. 4945. 

By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


The United States and Brazil: Partners in Progress 

by Lincoln Gordon 
Ambassador to Brazil ^ 

Almost 41/4 years ago, on October 31, 1961, 
I gave my first public talk as United States 
Ambassador to Brazil as a guest of the 
American Society and the American Cham- 
ber of Commerce. Now I am once again your 
guest here, this time to say a few words of 
farewell. Many farewells imply a sharp 
break in the continuity of one's life and as- 
sociations. This one, happily, does not. 

My new duties in Washington are two- 
fold: (a) to guide the relationships of our 
Government with those of our Latin Ameri- 
can sister nations and (b) to serve as 
United States Coordinator for the Alliance 
for Progress. Since Brazil represents 35 
percent of the population, area, and econ- 
omy of Latin America, it will naturally con- 
tinue to occupy a great deal of my atten- 
tion. And since the Alliance for Progress 
has been the central focus of my work here, 
as foreshadowed in that talk in October 1961, 
there, too, there will be continuity. 

But perhaps more important, these 4 
years have made Mrs. Gordon and me 
meio-brasileiros. We both leave a large 
part of our hearts here as we carry home 
with us the many lessons we have learned 
from living among the spirited, tolerant, 
friendly, good-humored, and intensely human 
people who make up this great nation. 

' Address made to the American Society and 
American Chamber of Commerce at Rio de Janeiro, 
Brazil, on Feb. 17. Mr. Gordon, U.S. Ambassador 
to Brazil since Sept. 18, 1961, was sworn in as As- 
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af- 
fairs on Mar. 9. 

Nor were we at all anxious to leave. Until 
a presidential telephone call on January 17, 
exactly 1 month ago, we fully expected to 
stay here for at least another year. We were 
happy in this prospect because we were still 
learning new lessons every day and week. 
We had only begun to experience the full 
variety and vitality of Brazil, and there was 
still much to be done in the never-ending 
task of exploring new paths for cooperation 
between our Governments and peoples. To 
these tasks I hope to contribute from my 
new vantage point, with the help of my as 
yet unnamed successor in this Embassy. 

Any man's life is divided into more or less 
sharply defined periods. My own working 
life has had many such divisions, in great 
variety. As Dean Acheson notes in his de- 
lightful recent book of memoirs Morning and 
Noon, the principal factor governing the suc- 
cession of these periods is luck — chance — 
happenstance. So far, I have indeed been 
lucky, and I do not regret any of these ex- 
periences. But two stand out as especially 
challenging and therefore especially re- 
warding: participation in the success of the 
Marshall Plan and the creative period of the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from 
1947 to 1952, and these last 4 years in 
charge of the American Embassy in Rio. 

This has not been exactly the most tran- 
quil period in Brazil's political and economic 
life or in Brazilian-American relations. 
Sometimes, in looking at the row of photo- 
graphs of my predecessors in the corridor 
outside my office, I have thought with envy 



of the era in which Ambassador [Edwin 
v.] Morgan served for no less than 21 years. 
I daresay that Brazil has changed at least 
as much since 1961 as in the whole span of 
Morgan's tenure. If I ever find time to write 
some memoirs, their central theme will deal 
with these processes of change. 

This is not to underrate the importance 
of certain dramatic events, which can make 
profound shifts in the course of history. 
Surely the Cuban missile-base crisis of Oc- 
tober 1962 and the Brazilian revolution of 
March 1964 were both such events. But we 
should also not underestimate the elements 
of continuity or the forces of political, eco- 
nomic, and social evolution which shape the 
way of life of a nation and its role in the 
constantly more interdependent society of 
nations on this globe. 

I am a strong disbeliever in the idea of his- 
torical determinism. Neither the gospel ac- 
cording to Hegel and Marx, nor Spengler, 
nor Toynbee, nor others among the ancient 
or modem fatalists provide adequate tools 
for really understanding the past or for 
predicting the future. Of course there are 
historical and social and political and eco- 
nomic forces and factors. At any given time 
these set institutional and pyschological 
and material limits to the achievement of 
individual or collective aspirations and to the 
translation of policy objectives into realities. 
But the task of policymakers and of politi- 
cal leadership is to influence and guide these 
forces, to expand the limits, and to assert 
man's capacity to reshape human institu- 
tions into patterns which conform more 
closely to his own evolving aspirations. In 
the field of economic and social progress in 
this hemisphere, this has been the philosoph- 
ical premise of the Alliance for Progress. 

Vigor of Alliance for Progress 

When I spoke to you 41,4 years ago, the 
Alliance was a new and daring innovation in 
the relations among the American Repub- 
lics, still in that phase of parental hopes and 
expectations which accompany the birth of 
a new infant. Would it survive at all? Would 

it grow into vigorous and meaningful life or 
become just another international alphabeti- 
cal nonentity? Would it really enlist "the 
full energies of the peoples and govern- 
ments of the American republics in a great 
cooperative effort" — in the brave words 
agreed to at Punta del Este?^ I well remem- 
ber the many doubts and disillusionments 
expressed in 1962 and the all-too-ready con- 
clusion of some observers that, if not already 
moribund, the Alliance had certainly died 
with the tragic assassination of President 
Kennedy in November of 1963. 

Now, however, as we approach the half- 
way mark of the original 10-year period en- 
visaged at Punta del Este, I believe we can 
say with confidence that the Alliance for 
Progress is indeed a vigorous creature, that 
its goals do in fact reflect the aspirations 
of the overwhelming majority of our peo- 
ples, and that its methods were well con- 
ceived and are constantly improving in the 
daily process of practical application. That 
is why the conference in Rio de Janeiro last 
November ^ determined to incorporate into 
the OAS Charter itself the principles of the 
Alliance for Progress as the basis for long- 
term economic and social cooperation in this 

But this is not merely a matter of words 
and juridical principles. It is a matter of 
visible results already achieved and in prog- 
ress, of new institutions created and func- 
tioning, and of new attitudes. 

The discussions last November reflected 
a whole new climate of thought about the 
nature of economic and social development, 
how to accelerate it, and how to reinforce 
national efforts through international sup- 
port, mutual aid, and regional economic in- 
tegration. Instead of dialectical debate in 
terms of mystical categories, there was a 
sober appreciation of the need to mobilize 
resources, to guide their fruitful application 
in priority areas of public and private in- 
vestment, to build and modernize institu- 

' For background and texts of documents estab- 
lishing the Alliance for Progress, see Bulletin of 
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459. 

' For background, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


tions, to train personnel, to create incentives, 
and to enlist active participation and sup- 
port from all sectors of society. 

Sloughing Off of Old Myths 

Not only in Brazil but all over the conti- 
nent there has been a sloughing off of in- 
tellectual myths which stood in the way of 
progress in freedom. The extreme case is the 
Fidelista myth, so fulsomely expounded by 
Che Guevara at Punta del Este 5 years ago. 
Where is he now, I wonder? What happened 
to that earthly paradise he promised to cre- 

But there are many other less extreme 
cases. There was the inflationist myth that 
rapid development and structural reform in 
Latin America made galloping inflation in- 
evitable. Today there is an overwhelming 
consensus that inflation not only creates 
glaring social injustice but also undermines 
any possibility of sustained and healthy de- 

There was the populist myth that certain 
goods and services could be subsidized on a 
grand scale at no cost to anyone. Today 
it is commonly accepted that subsidies are 
costly to the community, distort the balance 
of needed development, and divert fiscal re- 
sources which are indispensable to high-pri- 
ority public investment. 

There was the Socialist mjrth that the 
public and private sectors must be at war 
with one another. Today it is increasingly 
understood that their roles are more com- 
plementary than competitive and that the 
institution-building and incentive-creating 
functions of government are more efficient 
contributors to development than the placing 
of operational responsibility for productive 
enterprises in bureaucratic hands. 

And there was the technocratic myth that 
an elaborate mathematical model, beautiful 
in its internal logic and well printed on thick 
white paper, could justify the title of "Na- 
tional Development Plan," even though its 
numbers had no foundation in reality and 
there was no administrative machinery to 
convert its conclusions into real investment. 


production, and consumption. Today the plan- 
ners have learned to work with the opera- 
tors, to get their hands dirty at the project 
sites, to build their essential foundations of 
statistical and institutional facts, and to take 
greater satisfaction in modest operational re- 
sults than in mathematical elegance for its 
own sake. 

Progress Too Slow in Many Areas 

Judged by general economic measures, 
moreover, this continent is moving forward 
at a substantial pace, even though it can 
and should be even more rapid. Overall 
growth in the last 2 years has exceeded the 
minimum targets laid down at Punta del 
Este, and there is every prospect that 1966 
will see a still higher rate. But this is no 
reason for complacency or relaxation. There 
are too many areas of vital concern in 
which progress is far too slow. 

At Punta del Este, and before that at the 
Bogota conference of 1960,^ special emphasis 
was placed on education, health, housing, 
and improved rural living conditions. In all 
these fields the Alliance has made only a 
modest beginning. We must not deceive our- 
selves by the hope that somehow or other 
general economic growth will trickle down 
into adequate social investment and agricul- 
tural modernization. These areas require de- 
liberate thought and resolute action. 

I attribute the lag in these fields not so 
much to political resistances, although these ■ 
exist, especially in the case of agriculture. | 
But the fact is that it is much easier to 
build roads and dams and industrial plants 
than it is to build an adequate educational 
system, a public health service, or a modern- 
ized rural economy. They are all essential, 
but the first among these equals is educa- 

If the Latin American societies wish to 
fulfill the expressed desires of their peoples 
to become full members of modern indus- 
trialized democracies, with genuine equality 
of opportunity, then their schools and uni- 

' Ibid., Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533. 


versities must produce men and women with 
the skills necessary to achieve that goal. This 
means a long-term dedication on the part of 
each country to educational planning, the 
mobilization of resources for education, the 
training of teachers and researchers, the 
preparation of educational materials, and 
above all a basic reform of teaching meth- 
ods and specialties to meet the needs of to- 

Educational expansion and reform is of 
course primarily a national responsibility. To 
the extent that international cooperation can 
assist — and I believe that it can assist on 
a very substantial scale — President Johnson 
has made it crystal clear in his new propos- 
als 5 to our Congress that the United States 
is ready and willing to provide such assist- 
ance. To do so effectively, we have to im- 
prove our own resources of qualified man- 
power, and an important element of the 
President's new program looks to that ob- 

Educational improvement is not merely a 
governmental responsibility. Private business 
can make a vast contribution to it, through 
in-house and in-factory training programs, 
through the systematic upgrading of man- 
power at all levels, through the support of 
intermediate and advanced training courses 
for manual and clerical and managerial em- 
ployees, and through the broadening of op- 
portunities for all individuals to make full 
use of their talents. The foreign business 
community has a clear responsibility to set 
an example in this matter because of its ac- 
cess to the technology, management meth- 
ods, and educational systems of the more 
highly industrialized nations. Many of the 
American enterprises represented here today 
have already begun to do so, and I urge you 
all to redouble your efforts. 

Another front of supreme importance for 
the success of the Alliance for Progress is 
more rapid advance in the economic integra- 
tion of Latin America and in the develop- 
ment of the vast open regions in the center 

■ For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 329. 

of South America through multinational in- 
vestment projects. This is the largest area 
on earth which is readily habitable by man 
and yet still largely uninhabited. With the 
application of modem technology, with co- 
operation among the nations directly in- 
volved, and with strong international finan- 
cial and technical support, there is every 
reason to foresee a transformation of this 
area into one of the great world centers of 
productive economic activity. 

A World of Growing Interdependence 

I concluded my talk here in 1961 by an- 
swering the question, why the United States 
is interested in the Alliance for Progress. I 
said that the answer "lies in the conviction 
that a prosperous, free, and self-reliant 
Latin America is essential to the kind of 
world in which we of the northern part of 
the hemisphere can also pursue our own 
aspirations for a life in freedom and 
dignity." I can tell you today that there has 
been no weakening of that conviction, which 
President Johnson holds just as deeply as 
President Kennedy did and which is shared 
by the overwhelming majority of our Con- 
gress and our public at large. 

At home, we are strenuously engaged in 
the manifold tasks of creating what Presi- 
dent Johnson has called a Great Society. 
True equality of opportunity, regardless of 
race or family wealth, the rebuilding of 
cities, the cleansing of rivers, the humaniz- 
ing of urban life, and the constantly closer 
integration of industry with agriculture and 
of city with countryside — all these are dem- 
onstrations that we too are still a nation 
very much in the course of development. We 
do not seek to impose our patterns on other 
nations or to compel cooperation on reluctant 
partners. We are proud of our own national- 
ism and expect other people to be proud of 
theirs. But we have learned that constructive 
nationalism is not to be confused with xen- 
ophobia or isolationism. 

We foresee a world of growing inter- 
dependence in which the special values of 
each nationality will enrich the lives of other 

APRIL 18, 1966 


peoples. Within that world we foresee a 
special intimacy and cordiality of relation- 
ships in this hemisphere because we know 
the dedication of all its peoples to the 
humane values of respect for the individual, 
the democratic way of life, and progress in 
freedom. Mrs. Gordon and I have learned in 
these years how deeply devoted Brazil and 
the Brazilian people are to these values. 
That is why we can depart with regret but 
also with renewed confidence in the future 
of this country, of this continent, and of our 
continued collaboration in the great common 
enterprises which lie before us all. 

Further Steps Taken To Remove 
Restrictions on U.S. Exports 

Press release 51 dated March 14 


The governments of many countries have 
taken further steps toward eliminating or 
easing quantitative restrictions on United 
States exports. The United States has 
pressed its case for this trade liberalization 
through official government consultations 
during the last year in the major capitals 
of Western Europe, in Japan, and in Can- 
ada, as well as in Geneva under the terms 
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT). 

After World War II many countries 
adopted selective controls as a means of 
conserving their small volume of dollar 
holdings. Quantitative restrictions on im- 
ports are permitted on these grounds under 
GATT rules. The critical lack of foreign ex- 
change in many countries continued through 
the immediate postwar period and even into 
the fifties. The Department of State and 
other United States Government agencies 
have continually worked to have these re- 
strictions removed since that time. 

Since 1963 most important European coun- 
tries have dismantled virtually all quantita- 
tive restrictions on industrial items of sig- 

nificant export interest to the United States. 
An important exception is coal, which still 
remains restricted in several major Euro- 
pean countries. 

However, many Western European na- 
tions, for protective reasons, continue to re- 
strict a number of agricultural items. To 
get at this difficult problem, the United 
States has continued to utilize the complaint 
procedures under the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade. 

Following our GATT consultations with 
Germany in the last 2 years, we achieved in 
1965 more or less automatic renewal of 
tenders for United States exporters for 
sales of fresh apples, pears, canned cher- 
ries; Germany established sizable quotas 
for dried alfalfa, ice cream mix, and apple- 
sauce. Germany also removed certain im- 
port licensing arrangements which discrim- 
inated against United States bourbon. Aus- 
tria eased certain technical import require- 
ments for fresh apples and pears in 1965. 
The French have progressively increased 
import quotas on various items of fresh and 
canned fruits following our GATT consulta- 
tions with them which began in 1962. 

In addition to actions following more for- 
mal procedures of consultation under the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 
Denmark and France liberalized certain 
vegetables; New Zealand liberalized dried 
fruits; Japan liberalized a variety of vege- 
tables and animal feed; Finland liberalized 
nuts and certain oils ; Chile liberalized frozen 
chicken, peas, and potatoes; Norway in- 
creased import quotas for fresh apples and 
a few other agricultural commodities. 

In the industrial area Japan removed im- 
port restrictions on automobiles and imita- 
tion jewelry; Spain liberalized over 100 
categories of goods and enlarged the global 
quotas on a number of other items. Finland 
freed imports from licensing requirements 
on a large number of items; and Denmark 
removed the remaining restrictions on indus- 
trial items of export interest to the United 
States, particularly refrigerators, washing 
machines, gas meters, and parts of gas 





Meat and edible offals of rabbits, fresh, chilled, 
or frozen, salted, in brine, dried or smoked. 

The following vegetables, fresh or chilled: arti- 
chokes, beans, and other leguminous vegetables, 
except peas; champignons and other edible mush- 
rooms; dill, pumpkins, cress and watercress, chervil, 
parsnips, parsley, parsley-root, chives, rhubarb, 
radishes, and other edible roots, except carrots, 
celeriac, beetroot, and horseradish. The following 
vegetables (whether or not cooked) preserved by 
freezing: gherkins, cucumbers, champignons, and 
carrots. The following vegetables, provisionally 
preserved in brine, in sulphur water, or in other 
preservative solutions but not especially prepared 
for immediate consumption: artichokes, beans, and 
other leguminous vegetables, except peas; cham- 
pignons and other edible mushrooms; dill, pumpkins, 
cress and watercress, chervil, parsnips, parsley, 
parsley-root, chives, rhubarb, radishes, and other 
edible roots, except carrots, celeriac, beetroot, and 
horseradish; Jerusalem artichokes, fresh or dried, 
whole or sliced. 

Fresh blackberries and gooseberries; certain fod- 
der root products; licorice confectionery. 

Granite; transmission, conveyor, or elevator belts 
or belting, of vulcanized rubber, rubber tires and 
tubes for bicycles without motor and for bicycles 
with an auxiliary motor; wallpaper; refrigerators 
with a volume of not more than 200 liters and parts 
thereof; washing machines, for domestic use or for 
laundries, and parts thereof; gas meters and parts 


Fats and oils of fish and marine mammals, 
whether or not refined; prepared or preserved fish; 
herring in containers of less than 25 liters, and other 
fish products. 

Calcium carbide; adhesive plasters; wadding and 
gauze; medical bandages, excluding plaster ban- 
dages; perfumery, cosmetics, and toilet prepara- 
tions; household soap; polishes and creams. 

Furskins, tanned and dressed; twine, cordage, 
and rope. 

Glass beads, imitations of pearls, precious and 
semiprecious stones; pearls, precious and semi- 
precious stones, synthetic stones; articles of jewelry; 
goldsmith's and silversmith's wares of precious 
metals; articles consisting of, or incorporating, 
pearls; imitation jewelry. 

Railway rails and accessories; tubes and pipes of 
cast iron; tube and pipe fittings of cast iron; struc- 
tures of iron or steel; stoves. 

Ranges, cookers, grates, fires, and other similar 
heating equipment; central heating boilers; radi- 

ators; air heaters; other articles of iron or steel, 
sack and other binders of iron wire, thimbles and 
sewing rings, tube adjusters, joining pieces, and 
cup springs. 

Electrical signaling apparatus; circuit breakers, 
switches, circuit dividers, fuses, electric metal fila- 
ment lamps for general use; discharge lamps. 

Insulators, conduit tubing. 

Arms, ammunition, and parts. 

Brooms and brushes; squeegees of materials other 
than rubber or plastic. 


Cattle under 2 years of age; broilers; inulin; 
denatured sucrose; vegetable produce of a kind used 
for animal food. 

Hexane, heptane; paraffin; bitumen, pitch, and 
petroleum asphalt; bitumen and asphalt; bituminous 
mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitu- 
men, on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar, or on 
mineral tar pitch. 

Boric oxide and acid; aluminum sulphate; sodium 
cyanide; borax hydrate; borax anhydrous; methanol; 
methanal; acetaldehyde; lactic acid of a strength 
of more than 50 percent, its salts and esters; urea 
containing in the dry state more than 45 percent by 
weight of nitrogen; hexamethyl-enetetramine; anti- 
sera, etc., put up for retail sale, except sera of im- 
munized persons or animals and microbial vaccines; 
antisera, etc., in bulk form, except sera of immu- 
nized persons or animals and microbial vaccines; 
medicaments made from plants, put up for retail 
sale; urea containing not more than 45 percent of 
nitrogen; concentrated superphosphates (double or 
triple); certain phosphatic fertilizers; ammonium 
phosphates containing not less than 6 milligrams of 
arsenic per kg., composite and complex fertilizers; 
lozenges or similar prepared forms or in packings 
of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg.; other fer- 

Synthetic tanning substances; ordinary household 
soap; prepared glues, products suitable for use as 
glues, put up for sale by retail. 

Solid or semisolid fuels; colloidal graphite; wood 
tar; wood tar oils (other than the composite sol- 
vents and thinners); wood creosote; wood naptha; 
acetone oil ; polyurethanes ; polyamides ; polyhalo- 
ethylenes; polyvinyl acetate; polyvinylidene chloride 
in the form of liquid, flakes, chips, powder, and 
paste; polyvinyl butyral and polyvinyl formal; poly- 
acrylates, polymethacrylates, and their derivatives; 
hardened proteins (for example, hardened casein and 
hardened gelatine) ; natural resins modified by fu- 
sion and artificial resins obtained by esterification of 
natural resins or of resinic acids; chemical derivates 
of natural rubber; certain high polymers, artificial 
resins and artificial plastic materials, including 
alginic acid, its salts and esters; linoxyn. 

Silkworm cocoons; yarn of viscose rayon and of 

APRIL 18, 1966 


cuprammonium rayon (cupra), not put up for re- 
tail sale; yarn of acetate rayon and of other con- 
tinuous artificial fibers, not put up for retail sale; 
monofil of viscose rayon and of cuprammonium 
rayon (cupra) ; monofil of acetate rayon and of 
other continuous artificial fibers; yarn of viscose 
rayon and of cupra, put up for retail sale; yam of 
acetate rayon and of other continuous artificial 
fibers, put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of vis- 
cose and acetate rayon and of cupra, and of other 
continuous artificial fibers; flax, raw or processed 
but not spun; flax tow and waste (including pulled 
or garnetted rags) ; ramie, raw or processed but 
not spun; ramie noils and waste (including pulled 
or garnetted rags) ; flax or ramie yam; woven fab- 
rics of flax or of ramie; discontinuous artificial 
fibers; continuous filament tow for the manufac- 
ture of artificial fibers; waste of artificial fibers 
(continuous or discontinuous) ; artificial fibers (dis- 
continuous or waste), carded, combed, or otherwise 
prepared for spinning; yarn of artificial fibers 
(discontinuous or waste), not put up for retail sale; 
yarn of artificial fibers (discontinuous or waste), 
put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of discon- 
tinuous artificial fibers; jute, raw or retted, except 
cuttings; builders' carpentry and joinery, etc.; yam 
of vegetable textile fibers, manila hemp, pita, etc.; 
yam of vegetable textile fibers, of other fibers; 
woven fabrics of other vegetable textile fibers; 
woven pile fabrics, etc., of other textile fibers; 
narrow fabrics of artificial fibers; chenille yam, 
gimped yarn, etc.; nets and other textiles articles; 
elastic fabrics (other than knitted or crocheted) ; 
wicks of woven, plaited, or knitted textile mate- 
rials; textile hosepiping and similar tubing; knitted 
or crocheted fabric, not elastic or rubberized. 

Understockings and other articles; undergarments, 
knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rubberized, of 
other textile materials; other garments and other 
articles, knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rub- 
berized, of other textile materials; men's and boys' 
outergarments ; women's, girls', and infants' outer- 
garments of wool; women's, girls', and infants' outer- 
garments, of artificial fibers; men's and boys' 
undergarments, of artificial fibers; women's, girls', 
and infants' undergarments; shawls, scarves, muf- 
flers, mantillas, veils, and the like; collars, tuckers, 
fallals, bodice fronts, jabots, cuffs, etc.; gloves, 
mittens, mitts, stockings, socks, and sockettes, not 
being knitted or crocheted goods; makeup acces- 
sories for articles of apparel (for example, dress 
shields, shoulder and other pads, belts, muffs, sleeve 
protectors, pockets) ; traveling rugs and blankets, 
electrically heated; traveling rugs and blankets of 
other textile fibers. 

Bed linen, curtains, and other furnishing ar- 
ticles; tarpaulins, sails, and camping goods. 

Tableware and other articles of a kind commonly 
used for domestic or toilet purposes of porcelain or 

china (including biscuit porcelain and parian), 
plain ; tableware and other articles of a kind com- 
monly used for domestic or toilet purposes of other 
kinds of pottery, plain; glassware for household use 
with a low coefficient of expansion ; glassware for 
household use of toughened glass. 

Synthetic or reconstructed precious or semipre- 
cious stones, cut or otherwise worked but not 
mounted, set or strung. 

Tubes and pipes and blanks, other than seamless, 
of iron (other than cast iron) or steel, excluding 
hydroelectric conduits; high-pressure hydroelectric 
conduits of steel; metal structures; hermetically 
sealed silos with metal walls, glazed continuous feed 
and discharge type for the preservation and trans- 
formation of agricultural produce intended for feed- 
ing cattle; reservoirs, tanks, vats, and similar con- 
tainers, of iron or steel, of a capacity exceeding 
300 liters; boxes and other containers of sheet steel 
used for commercial packaging, finished for direct 
use and not folded (with a capacity of % to 10 
liters inclusive) ; compressed gas cylinders and simi- 
lar pressure containers, iron or steel; stranded 
wire, cables, cordage, etc., unprocessed, made of 
round wire of a diameter of 1 mm. or more, combined 
with textile or other fibers less than 1 mm.; com- 
bined with textile or other fibers; other, combined 
with textile or other fibers; barbed iron or steel wire; 
twisted hoop or single flat wire, barbed or not, and 
loosely twisted double wire, of kinds used for fenc- 
ing, of iron or steel ; gauze cloth, grill, netting, 
fencing, reinforcing fabric, and similar materials, 
of iron or steel wire; expanded metal, of iron or 
steel, roller and precision chain; chain and parts 
thereof, of iron or steel; anchors and grapnels and 
parts thereof, of iron or steel. 

Needles for hand sewing, etc., with a diameter 
of not more than 1 mm.; pins, hairpins, etc. 

Central heating boilers, radiators, etc.; bathtubs, 
showers, etc., of cast iron; bathtubs, showers, etc., 
of enameled steel sheet; iron or steel wool; duplex 
or twin wire for healds; cooking and heating ap- 
paratus of copper, not electrically operated; acces- 
sories for electric wiring; pins other than orna- 
mental, needles, safety pins, and the like. 

Niobium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; zirco- 
nium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; shovels, picks, 
spades, etc. ; and tool-tips and plates, etc., of sintered 
metal carbides. 

Sewing machine needles; postage-franking ma- 
chines; certain calculating machines; electric ac- 

Articles of carbon or graphite, except carbon parts 
for cinematograph projection. 

Tracklaying tractors, with a cylinder capacity of 
6,000 cc. or less. 

Automatic record players actuated directly or in- 
directly by counters or coins; recording apparatus 
for flexible records; gramophone records, etc., pre- 



pared but not recorded (wax recordings, discs, tapes, 
wires, etc.) ; gramophone records, etc., recorded 
(wax recordings, discs, matrices, and other inter- 
mediate forms). 

Brooms and brushes, of materials (other than 
artificial plastic materials) merely bound together, 
with or without handle; other brooms and brushes 
(including brushes of a kind used as parts of ma- 
chines), paint rollers, etc., except those made of 
artificial plastic materials; prepared knots and tufts 
for broom or brush making, except those made of 
artificial plastic materials; feather dusters, except 
those made of artificial plastic materials; powder 
puffs, etc., except those made of artificial plastic 

Hand sieves and hand riddles, except those made 
of artificial plastic materials; press fasteners, in- 
cluding blanks, molds, and parts; slate pencils, etc.; 
scent and similar sprays of a kind used for toilet 
purposes, and mounts and heads therefor; vacuum 
flasks and other vacuum vessels, complete with 
cases; parts thereof, other than glass inners; tailors' 
dummies and other lay figures; automata and other 
animated displays of a kind used for shop window 

Board of Foreign Scholarships 
Members Sworn In 

Press release 58 dated March 18 

Six new members and four reappoint- 
ments to the 12-man Presidentially ap- 
pointed Board of Foreign Scholarships were 
sworn in on March 17 in the presence of the 
Secretary of State, who characterized the 
Board as "part of a great human enter- 
prise . . . which has the deepest importance 
for the daily concerns of men and, in the days 
of nuclear weapons, even for the survival of 

The Board of Foreign Scholarships sets 
the policies for the Department of State's 
educational exchange program, supervises 
them, and makes the final selection of its 
academic grantees. These include more than 
5,000 students, teachers, research scholars, 
and university lecturers annually, both in 
this country and abroad. Under the chair- 
manship of historian Oscar Handlin of Har- 
vard University, it this year celebrates 20 
years of establishment. Its members are 

distinguished private citizens drawn from 
academic and public life. 

In informal remarks following the swear- 
ing-in, Secretary Rusk said : 

I know of no activity more central than the work 
of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the edu- 
cational exchanges in which your Board will be tak- 
ing the leadership. 

We have foreign students and scholars in this 
country by the many tens of thousands. We are 
sending our own young people and our own teachers 
into many lands in the other direction. I have no 
doubt that this creates a network of understanding 
that is important for the maintenance of peace — 
understanding that derives not from just a sense of 
amiability but understanding that comes from knowl- 
edge of other people. 

Following are the names of the members 
of the Board : 

New Members 

William G. Craig, head master, John Burroughs 
School, St. Louis, Mo. 

W. J. Driver, Administrator, Veterans Administra- 

Brooks Hays, Arthur Vanderbilt Professor of Po- 
litical Affairs, Rutgers University 

Teruo Ihara, associate professor of education, Uni- 
versity of Hawaii 

Frederick B. Pike, professor of Latin American his- 
tory, University of Pennsylvania 

James R. Roach, professor of government. University 
of Texas 


John Hope Franklin, professor of American history, 
University of Chicago 

Francis Keppel, Assistant Secretary for Education, 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare 

John M. Stalnaker, president. National Merit Schol- 
arship Corp. 

George E. Taylor, director, Far Eastern and Russian 
Institute, University of Washington 

Commissioner General Confirmed 
for U.S. Exhibit at Canadian Fair 

The Senate on March 17 confirmed Presi- 
dent Johnson's nomination of Stanley R. 
Tupper to be Commissioner General for U.S. 
participation in the Canadian Universal and 
International Exhibition. (For biographic 
details, see White House press release dated 
March 4.) 

APRIL 18, 1966 



The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 

Statement by Secretanj Rusk 

Thank you very much for the opportunity 
of appearing before you in support of the 
President's economic and military assistance 

The Foreign Assistance Act and the Mili- 
tary Assistance and Sales Act of 1966 will 
provide the basic authority to carry forward 
a foreign aid program which, in the words 
of President Johnson, will "help give the 
people of the less developed world the food, 
the health, the skills, and education — and 
the strength — to lead their nations to self- 
sufficient lives of plenty and freedom." ^ 

The legislation and programs before this 
committee are the result of a sober and 
searching review conducted last fall at the 
direction of the President. That review was 
a response to concerns expressed by the 
Congress and this committee and a re- 
sponse to the call for action in the confer- 
ence committee report on last year's au- 
thorization bill. 

I was an active participant in this review, 
and I am convinced that the proposals now 
before you are based on a full understand- 
ing of the lessons of the past as well as cre- 
ative thinking about the future. 

For fiscal year 1967 the President is re- 
questing new appropriations of $2,469 mil- 
lion for economic assistance programs and 
$917 million for programs of military as- 

' Made before the House Committee on Foreigrn 
Affairs on Mar. 17 (press release 56). 

' For text of President Johnson's message on for- 
eign aid, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320. 

sistance. These are minimum estimates, 
based on conservative appraisals of needs 
for the coming year. If this request should 
prove insufficient, the President will not 
hesitate to request additional funds. 

I strongly support these proposals and 
urge the approval of H.R. 12449 and H.R. 
12450 by this committee. 

Foreign Aid Basic to U.S. Security 

Foreign aid is basic to U.S. security. 

Without it, many countries undoubtedly 
would have been subverted or overrun in 
the past two decades. 

Without it, the frontiers of freedom would 
have shrunk and Americans would be living 
in a less stable and more threatening world. 

Too often, I think, we let immediate crises 
and headlines obscure the very real progress 
that is being made in so many parts of the 
world. This is often called the "quiet 
battle," and it is a battle of which all 
Americans can be proud. As the President 
said in his foreign aid message, "We will 
never know how many crises have been 
averted, how much violence avoided, or how 
many minds have been won to the cause of 
freedom in these years." 

But much remains to be done, and that is 
why we ask the Congress to provide the 
authority and funds to mount a renewed 
attack on the root causes of misery and un- 
rest on which aggression and subversion 

The economic assistance program we are 



proposing is based on two fundamental 
facts : 

— First, that the basis for successful for- 
eign aid is self-help. No amount of U.S. 
assistance can do the job unless the re- 
cipient nation itself invests the resources, 
makes the reforms, and adopts the policies 
which will lead to lasting progress. 

U.S. aid will not be provided unless na- 
tions are willing to do their part in the 
crucial task of development; it will not be 
provided where nations engage in wasteful 
foreign adventures. The President has 
made this clear in his messages to the Con- 
gress ; he has made this clear to recipient 
nations in his actions. 

— Second, that the major concern of a 
successful foreign aid program must be 
people. Our aid cannot be concerned simply 
with dollars or plans or facilities. 

That is why we are proposing a renewed 
attack in the fields of education, health, and 

Our own experience in America demon- 
strates that the vital ingredient of progress 
is people who are educated and healthy, 
people who have enough of the right food to 
eat, people who look to the future with 
hope. This is no vision or dream. It is real- 
ism rooted in experience. 

Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, 
Agency for International Development] has 
given you some of the details of these new 
initiatives in health, education, and agricul- 
ture. But I should like to say that my be- 
lief in this approach is based on my own ex- 
perience and the contrast between the life 
I knew as a boy and the life of present-day 

For I do not believe that the situation in 
many parts of the world now is so different 
from what it was not too many years ago in 
many parts of our own country. 

I believe that the rapid growth of our own 
nation and the transformation of backward 
areas into active participants in progress 
are the direct results of better education, 
improved health, and more efficient agricul- 
ture. You can chart the course of our own 
progress in school attendance statistics, 

health records, and agricultural productiv- 
ity figures. 

Our foreign aid program is designed to 
help others follow the same path of prog- 

Two Important Features 

The President's foreign aid proposals 
have two important features of particular 
interest to this committee — a split of mili- 
tary and economic assistance and a 5-year 
authorization for the entire aid program. 

The separation of the two parts of the 
foreign assistance program is designed to 
clarify the purposes and functions of each 
and to give the public a greater under- 
standing of what we are doing in our over- 
seas programs. Congressional examination 
and review of the relations of the two pro- 
grams and of their effectiveness in carrying 
out our foreign policy goals is being main- 
tained by reference of the two bills to this 
committee and to the Senate Foreign Rela- 
tions Committee. 

In addition, the President is requesting 
that the Secretary of State be given con- 
tinued responsibility to exercise supervision 
and general direction of the military assist- 
ance program [MAP]. Careful review will 
be maintained by AID and the Department 
of State to assure that MAP expenditures 
and sales are consistent with our foreign 
policy objectives. 

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] Mc- 
Namara will discuss this program with you 
in detail in the near future. But I should 
like to add my strong support for the re- 
quests which he will be presenting. 

Military assistance helps to strengthen 
our own security by building the security of 
others. It helps those nations which are 
working with us to secure peace by deter- 
ring aggression. MAP helps to build the 
shield behind which economic grovv^th can 
take place. 

But the program does more. It also con- 
tributes to the economic progress of the re- 
cipients by stressing civic action programs 
through which local troops build schools 
and roads and other essential facilities. In 

APRIL 18, 1966 


addition, we help train foreign military per- 
sonnel at schools in the United States and 
abroad, and through these courses, impart a 
new understanding of the role of the mili- 
tary in a democratic society. 

We are requesting extension of the multi- 
year principle to all authorizations for eco- 
nomic and military assistance. 

Other witnesses will deal with the specific 
requests. I should only like to underscore a 
key aspect. 

Full review will be maintained by this 
committee. The executive branch is pre- 
pared to make an annual presentation of 
the program in whatever form you may re- 
quest. But the long-term authorization will 
free this committee from the burden of an 
annual legislative cycle and enable you to 
examine the entire aid program or selected 
parts of it in whatever depth that you feel 
is necessary. In this way the informed 
judgment of this committee can be brought 
to bear in areas of particular concern; and 
I can assure you of the desire of the execu- 
tive branch to make such examinations as 
fruitful and constructive as possible. 

The Economic Assistance Program 

I should like to take a few minutes to 
discuss four particular aspects of the fiscal 
year 1967 economic assistance program. 

First, we are continuing to focus our aid 
in those nations and on those programs 
where self-help and performance are the 
strongest and where U.S. security interests 
are most directly served. 

As a result, in fiscal year 1967 : 

— 92 percent of the total country pro- 
grams is concentrated in 20 countries; 

— 84 percent of development loans is for 
8 countries; 

— 93 percent of supporting assistance is 
for 5 countries, with 72 percent in Viet-Nam 

Second, we have been continuing our 
successful efforts to reduce the adverse im- 
pact of the aid program on our balance of 
payments. With relatively small and neces- 
sary exceptions, all the funds now being ap- 

propriated for the AID program will be 
spent in the United States. As you know, 
AID is in the business of exporting U.S. 
goods and services, not U.S. dollars. 

AID offshore expenditures declined from 
nearly $1 billion in fiscal year 1960 to $515 
million in fiscal year 1964 and will be fur- 
ther reduced to about $400 million in fiscal 
year 1967. Taking into account repayments 
on past aid of $186 million, the net impact 
on the U.S. balance of payments of AID off- 
shore expenditures in fiscal year 1967 is 
estimated to be only $214 million. 

In the long run, foreign aid will be a sub- 
stantial help to our balance of payments. As 
countries which we now assist grow 
stronger, they will provide new and growing 
markets for U.S. businesses. And an in- 
creasing flow of dollars to the United States 
will result from development loan repay- 

Third, we are increasing our efforts to 
stimulate the private sector in the develop- 
ing countries and increase the role of U.S. 
private enterprise in our assistance pro- 

This is a basic aspect of our aid program. 
For until the energies of all the citizens of 
a developing nation are involved in the job 
of building a better life and until all can 
share in that life, there is no true progress. 
Their own and foreign private enterprise 
can play a vital role in stimulating and re- 
leasing these energies. In recent years there 
has been a growing understanding in the de- 
veloping nations of this fact. And there has 
been a corresponding growth in AID sup- 
port for efforts to build the private sector. 
This is being accomplished through modi- 
fication of policies by developing countries 
themselves, as well as through creation of 
institutions under the aid program. 

The U.S. Government itself can only do a 
small part of the job. It must rely increas- 
ingly on our business and labor leaders, our 
teachers and lawyers, our farmers and bank- 
ers, who have great reservoirs of knowledge 
and experience important to the attack on 
the problems of the developing nations. 

As part of our renewed efforts we will 



make greater use of the unique contribu- 
tions which U.S. private citizens can make. 
We will continue our support for the Inter- 
national Executive Service Corps and are 
encouraged by the spirit of service which 
has moved so many qualified business ex- 
ecutives to participate in its work. 

As President Johnson indicated, we ex- 
pect to carry on a frank and constructive 
review with recipient countries of obstacles 
to domestic and foreign private investment. 
We will continue to support liberalization of 
overcontrolled economies; to furnish assist- 
ance to the formation of cooperatives and 
the training of labor and business leaders; 
and to support institutions offering im- 
proved credit facilities and advisory services 
for small- and medium-sized farms and 

We are continuing our policy of encourag- 
ing U.S. private investment in the develop- 
ing countries. In support of this policy 
we are requesting that this committee dou- 
ble the authority of the investment guar- 
anty programs. 

Last August the Advisory Committee on 
Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, composed 
of distinguished citizens and chaired by Ar- 
thur K. Watson, reported its recommenda- 
tions for strengthening the participation of 
private enterprise in our foreign aid pro- 
grams. A number of these recommenda- 
tions have been adopted; others are being 
carefully studied and are providing the 
basis for new initiatives in important parts 
of the aid program. 

Fourth, we are placing increasing efforts 
on programs to combat subversion and the 
despair and frustration on which such sub- 
version grows. This is a crucial aspect of 
our aid, for as we have seen in many parts 
of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where 
insurgents are active, the energies of a peo- 
ple are diverted from the long-range job of 
peaceful development to the short-run task 
of survival. 

These programs focus in four major 

— public safety, which helps to build 
basic local security; 

— civic action, sponsored and supported by 
both the military assistance program and 
AID through which local military units par- 
ticipate in nation-building projects ; 

— rural and community development, 
which helps to build local government units 
and increase local participation in economic 
and social improvement projects ; 

— labor and youth, which are, of course, 
essential parts of the foundation for a so- 
ciety of progress and freedom. 

Aid to Areas of Concern to U.S. Security 

I should like to discuss with you some of 
the areas of particular concern to our own 
security where the foreign assistance pro- 
gram plays an important role. 

Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia 

A major portion of the funds in the fiscal 
year 1967 foreign economic aid program — 
$550 million — is for Viet-Nam. 

The crucial battle to determine the kind 
of life which the peoples of Southeast Asia 
will live continues. The battle is not simply 
a matter of guns and troops and planes. It 
also involves hard, basic work being done in 
villages to improve agricultural productiv- 
ity, increase health services, and establish 
educational systems. It is this work which 
points the way to the kind of life which the 
people of Viet-Nam can live when the guns 
are still. 

I think it is important that these works of 
peace continue even while the military 
struggle continues. That is why we and the 
leaders of South Viet-Nam reaffirmed our 
commitment to improve the life of the Viet- 
namese people in the Declaration of Hono- 
lulu.3 For we all recognize that, while we 
could win the victory on the battlefield, we 
could still lose the more important fight for 
the future well-being and progress of the 

As part of similar efforts elsewhere in 
Southeast Asia, we are stepping up our as- 
sistance to Thailand and Laos. 

There are also encouraging signs of a de- 

' For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


veloping regionalism in Asia. The countries 
of the area are beginning to look beyond 
their own borders for ways in which they 
can cooperate in the common problems of 
economic development. For some years, the 
Mekong Coordinating Committee, which in- 
cludes representatives of Thailand, Laos, 
Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam, has been 
conducting studies and preinvestment sur- 
veys for the long-range development of the 
Mekong Basin. Two smaller projects in 
Thailand are, in fact, nearly completed, and 
engineering work for the Nam Ngum Dam 
in Laos will shortly get undeinvay.* 

We do not stand alone in our efforts to 
spur development of this river basin. Six 
other outside donors — Japan, the Nether- 
lands, Canada, Denmark, Australia, and New 
Zealand— have joined with the United States 
with pledges totaling over $23 million for 
the Nam Ngum project, which will be ad- 
ministered by the World Bank. 

Another important development is the 
founding of the Asian Development Bank, 
which has been in the planning stage since 
1963 and is expected to begin operations 
later this year.^ Thirty-one countries have 
joined in providing funds for the Bank. The 
initial capitalization of the Bank is $1 bil- 
lion — $650 million from regional members 
and $350 million from nonregional members. 
Subscriptions to date are only $3 million 
short of this goal. Japan has subscribed 
$200 million, the same amount as the United 

The need for closer regional cooperation 
is particularly great in Southeast Asia. Ac- 
cordingly, the legislation before this com- 
mittee contains a new title for multilateral 
and regional programs in Southeast Asia. 
This new title is evidence of U.S. willing- 
ness to respond to new Asian initiatives 
which will accelerate social and economic 
progress and development and strengthen 
cooperation among the countries of South- 
east Asia. 

The proposed Southeast Asia title is a f ur- 

' For background, see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521. 
= Ibid. 

ther step toward the realization of the 
President's goal, spelled out in his speech at 
Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965 :* 
a broadly based international cooperative 
effort for the accelerated development of 
Southeast Asia — an effort which will offer 
the peoples of the area an alternative to 
violence and which would replace "despair 
with hope and terror with progress." 

Dominican Republic 

This past year has been one of crisis and 
turmoil in the Dominican Republic, but since 
last September there have been signs of 
progress. The Provisional Government, with 
the help of the Inter-American Peace Force, 
has retained control of the divided country. 
We are working with the peoples of the Do- 
minican Republic to assure the peaceful 
transition to power of a freely elected dem- 
ocratic government. We are also working 
with the people and providing economic as- 
sistance which will help to direct the ener- 
gies and the policies of the country toward 
peaceful reform and a better life. 

India and Pakistan 

As you know, we have just announced 
our willingness to negotiate certain economic 
development loans with India and Pakistan. 
We are prepared to continue to help if 
these two countries demonstrate their will- 
ingness to take necessary self-help meas- 
ures in the fields of agriculture and other 
priority areas and find a way to live at 
peace with each other. 

We are heartened by the progress of rec- 
onciliation shown at the United Nations 
and at Tashkent, and in the announcement 
of troop pullbacks. We look forward to the 
day when the full energies of these two 
great peoples can, with our assistance, be 
devoted to the task of building for the fu- 
ture. That job, as we all know, will be a 
staggering one, as the current food short- 
ages in India so starkly remind us. But it 
must be successful, and we are prepared to 
do our part. 


For text, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 



One of the most encouraging signs of the 
past year has been the continuing economic 
progress in Korea. For example, Korean ex- 
ports in 1965 were 50 percent larger than 
in 1964 and five times greater than in 1960. 
Industrial production rose by 16 percent last 
j^ear. Korea's gross national product in- 
creased by 9 percent in both 1963 and 1964. 

This progress has been a demonstration 
of what can happen to a country after the 
smoke of battle has cleared and the energies 
of the people are turned to the great task of 
peaceful development. Our AID program 
was once largely in the form of grants to 
support the Korean economy. The grant 
economic aid program has been declining 
steadily while our development lending has 
increased, including loans to private proj- 
ects, reflecting the ability of the country to 
make positive use of capital goods. Korea 
has provided an excellent example of what 
can be done when self-help is accompanied 
by strong United States support. 


In Africa in recent months there has 
been some further movement toward re- 
gional cooperation. More and more of 
Africa's leaders are recognizing that peace 
and economic grovsi;h receive great impetus 
from a cooperative approach to develop- 
ment. We would be glad to see the achieve- 
ment of certain steps being taken to fur- 
ther subregional cooperation and institu- 
tions such as in the proposed Economic 
Community of Eastern Africa. We look 
forward to cooperating with the new Afri- 
can Development Bank and other regional 
institutions which can play a vital role in 
drawing together the countries of this great 
continent. As the means for cooperation de- 
velop, the U.S. intends to make greater use 
of regional institutions and arrangements as 
channels for our assistance. 

Latin America — Alliance for Progress 

Last November I took part in the Second 
Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de 
Janeiro,' where I had the valuable assistance 

of Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden and 
Congressman [William S.] Mailliard. I 
conveyed to the Conference the intention of 
the United States to extend its commitment 
to the great joint effort to promote peace- 
ful change through the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. In a personal message to the Confer- 
ence, President Johnson said : 

Recognizing that fulfillment of our goals will 
require the continuation of the joint effort beyond 
1971, I wish to inform the conference — and through 
you, your respective governments — that the United 
States will be prepared to extend mutual commit- 
ment beyond the time period foreseen in the charter 
of Punta del Este. In determining the scope of the 
United States effort, we will want to examine care- 
fully with you at that time the requirements of the 
hemisphere, in the light of progress made through 
self-help measures and the contributions which by 
then some of your countries will be able to make to 
one another to further the common effort. 

The leaders of the hemisphere demon- 
strated their commitment to progress by 
adopting the Economic and Social Act of 
Rio de Janeiro last November.* This act 
added an important new element to the Al- 
liance: a commitment by all members of the 
Alliance to help one another and to provide 
assistance to achieve economic and social 
objectives set forth in the act. Although 
many members of the committee may have 
read it, I would like to submit for the rec- 
ord, Mr. Chairman, the text of the act. 

The Alliance is moving ahead. Brazil, as a 
result of farseeing and courageous deci- 
sions involving difficult measures for stabi- 
lization, development, and reform, has 
greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored 
its credit, encouraged private investment, 
set its economy moving forward, and pressed 
forward the modernization of its economic 
institutions. Chile is making important 
strides, and Colombia and Peru are taking 
the self-help steps which are expected to re- 
sult in more rapid progress and therefore 
would justify greater support from the 
United States. 

We will continue our strong support for 

For background, see ihid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985. 
For text, see ibid,, p. 998. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


successful regional integration in Central 
America and are hopeful that the move- 
ment toward greater cooperation of all the 
economies of Latin America will gain mo- 
mentum in the years ahead. In addition, we 
will continue to work with the Inter-Ameri- 
can Committee on the Alliance for Progress 
(CIAP) and the Inter-American Develop- 
ment Bank to increase regional cooperation. 

Arrangements for Coordination of Aid 

There is a growing awareness among aid- 
giving and aid-receiving countries of the ad- 
vantages of cooperation and mutual assist- 
ance. I have indicated the increasing spirit 
of cooperation among developing countries. 
Donor nations are also moving toward 
closer relationships in their aid-giving ef- 
forts. Particularly encouraging is the grow- 
ing number of arrangements for coordina- 
tion of aid among donors. 

We are continuing our efforts to 
strengthen bilateral coordination. For ex- 
ample, the United States recently agreed to 
engage in regular consultations at the Cab- 
inet level with Japan and the Federal Re- 
public of Germany. 

Formal coordination arrangements have 
been established for a number of aid-re- 
cipient countries. Aid to India and Pakistan 
is provided through World Bank consortia 
which include Western European countries, 
Japan, Canada, and the United States. Aid 
to Turkey is provided through a consortium 
of the OECD [Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development] . 

The World Bank also sponsors less formal 
coordinating mechanisms called consultative 
groups. There are now World Bank con- 
sultative groups for six countries, including 
Colombia, Thailand, and Tunisia. 

These arrangements — consortia and con- 
sultative groups — bring together donor 
countries and international financial institu- 
tions. They provide an effective forum for 
reviewing the requirements of a recipient 
country, for evaluating self-help perform- 
ance, and providing aid on a more orderly 

Foreign Aid and World Progress 

The foreign aid program, which this com- 
mittee is now considering, is essential to 
U.S. security and national interest in both 
their short- and long-range aspects. 

For the short range, the program pro- 
vides direct support to Viet-Nam, assists 
self-defense and internal security efforts in 
other countries, and helps to build the 
stability essential to a peaceful future. 

For the long range also, we need our for- 
eign aid program, because as the President 
said, ". . . we are concerned with the kind 
of world our children will live in." * 

We seek a world of progress and of 
peace, where each nation lives in inde- 
pendence. This is no dream ; it is a necessity. 
For in this age of rapid communication, 
rockets, and nuclear power, what happens 
half a world away is of vital concern to us 
and our security. 

Only as others grow in freedom, prog- 
ress, and security can we here in the 
United States be truly free and secure to 
enjoy the blessings of a better life. 

President Transmits Fourth Annual 
Report of Peace Corps to Congress 

White House press release dated March 14 

To the Congress of the United States: 

I transmit herewith from the Secretary of 
State the Fourth Annual Report of the 
Peace Corps. ^ 

This is a report of service to our neighbors 
throughout the world. It is the story of 
new opportunities for growth and learning 
among our own people. 

The expansion of the Peace Corps has 
been as dramatic as its promise. 

Five years ago today the Peace Corps was 
eleven days old. By mid-summer, 1961, 120 

•Ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320. 

' Single copies of the report are available upon 
request from the Peace Corps, Washington, D.C., 



Volunteers were serving in 3 countries. At 
the close of fiscal year 1965 there were 
8,624 Volunteers serving in 46 countries. 
Africa received 3,278 Volunteers — Latin 
America received 3,214 — the Near East and 
South Asia, 1,285, and the Far East, 847. 

There are many examples of Peace Corps 
impact. One is Afghanistan. Nine Volun- 
teers went there in 1962 to begin the Peace 
Corps' work. As of June 30, 1965, there were 
136 Volunteers in Afghanistan, located in 
19 different towns and villages. Peace Corps 
teachers reach nearly 40 per cent of all 
Afghan students at the secondary and uni- 
versity levels. 

There are other measures of progress. I 
am pleased to note that as the number of 
Volunteers has risen, the cost per Volunteer 
has declined. During fiscal year 1963, for 
example, the annual cost per Volunteer was 
$9,074. For 1965 the cost was reduced to 
$8,028. The estimate for fiscal year 1966 is 

The Peace Corps is the largest producer 
and consumer of language materials in the 
world. Since 1961, 20,000 trainees have re- 
ceived instruction in one or more of about 
60 languages in the Peace Corps training 
curricula. Twenty additional languages are 
under consideration for inclusion in future 
training programs. 

Since its inception, 150,000 Americans 
have volunteered for Peace Corps service. 
Some 15,000 have served abroad in 49 

As of June 30, 1965, 4,545 Volunteers had 
completed service and returned to the United 
States. Thirty-seven per cent of all re- 
turned Volunteers are continuing their edu- 
cation. Government service is attracting 
17.8 per cent, while another 16.4 per cent 
are teaching. The remaining 28.5 per cent 
are engaged in private business, non-profit 
organizations and miscellaneous activities. 

It is fair to say that the lives of virtually 
all Volunteers have been changed by their 
service in the Corps. They have become 
aware — in a unique and profound way — of 
the bond of suffering and hope that unites 

men and women on every continent. And 
they are returning home with a new under- 
standing of their nation and the world. 

No more valuable experience can be gained 
by any man. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

The White House, 
March 14. 1966. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 1st Session 

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments. 
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the 
House Judiciary Committee on S.693 and H.R. 
290, bills to amend the Foreign Agents Registra- 
tion Act of 1938, as amended. July 28-August 2, 

1965. 140 pp. 

89th Congress, 2d Session 

Report of Wayne L. Hays, Chairman of the Sub- 
committee on State Department Organization 
and Foreign Operations of the House Committee 
on Foreign Affairs, on a Special Study Mission 
to the Far East Combined With a Report of Ob- 
servations on Viet-Nam and a Report on the 
11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference 
held at Wellington, N.Z., November 30-December 
8, 1965. H. Rept. 1225. January 25, 1966. 12 pp. 

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings be- 
fore the Subcommittee on the Far East and the 
Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. 
Part I. January 25-February 3, 1966. 224 pp. 

Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency. H. Doc. 382. 
February 15, 1966. 32 pp. 

Asian Development Bank Act. Hearing before the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R. 
12563, to provide for the participation of the 
United States in the Asian Development Bank. 
February 16, 1966. 138 pp. 

Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization, 
Fiscal Year 1966. Report to accompany H.R. 
12169. H. Rept. 1295. February 22, 1966. 11 pp. 

Asian Development Bank. Report to accompany 
H.R. 12563. S.Rept. 1008. February 24, 1966. 
11 pp. 

Report on Activities and Accomplishments Under 
the Communications Satellite Act. H. Doc. 400. 
March 3, 1966. 10 pp. 

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee 
To Examine and Review the Administration of 
the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War 
Claims Act of 1948. S. Rept. 1051. March 4, 

1966. 5 pp. 

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Sen- 
ate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommit- 
tee on Immigration and Naturalization. S. Rept 
1052. March 4, 1966. 7 pp. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


The United Nations and Human Rights 

Statement by Morris Abram 

We welcome the discussion of violations of 
human rights in all countries. We are partic- 
ularly pleased with the inclusiveness and 
breadth of the item. 

We also realize that it is impossible to 
discuss this item without referring to mat- 
ters of internal life within states — whether 
for justified praise or deserved criticism. 
This item demonstrates that domestic 
human rights issues must be discussed in 
international bodies if human rights are to 
be discussed in a meaningful way. Human 
rights are either exercised or deprived in 
respect to a location, and all locations on this 
planet (except possibly Antarctica) are sub- 
ject to the jurisdiction of some state. There- 
fore, if we are to discuss human rights at 
all, we must discuss the practice of states or 
of people and groups within states. At this 
stage in international organization, most im- 
provements in human rights practice will 
have to come from discussion — from the 
desire of states for justified praise or the 
fear of deserved criticism — for international 
human rights enforcement machinery is 
either quite embryonic or nonexistent. 

My delegation has no reluctance to discuss 
the state of human rights in the United 

We have much to be proud of. Speech, 

^ Made in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights 
on Mar. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 4823). Mr. 
Abram is U.S. representative to the Commission. 

press, and religion are as free here as any- 
where in the world. Last night I canvassed 
the whole catalog of rights enumerated in 
the Universal Declaration to evaluate how 
closely American practice accords with those 
principles. Of course, many of the most 
fundamental of these rights are explicitly 
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and 
have been vigilantly guarded by a truly in- 
dependent judiciary. I could not help but 
compare American practice with certain 
others which have been the subject of recent 
comment in the world press. 

First, in accordance with article 13 of the 
Declaration, everyone in the United States 
has and freely enjoys the right to freedom 
of movement and the right to leave this 
country, including the right to renounce his 
citizenship. Such is not the case everywhere 
in the world. 

Second, as provided in article 19 of the 
Universal Declaration, everyone in the 
United States has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression. No man is restricted 
to the ideas which are generated in the 
United States, for we keep our ears and eyes 
open to the receipt of ideas and information 
from abroad. No matter how repugnant such 
ideas are to the government of the day, or 
to the majority of my fellow countrymen, 
these ideas pass into our country without 
hindrance. Moreover, it would be unthink- 
able for my country to charge a man with a 



crime for sending his ideas abroad, how- 
ever critical these are with regard to 
American society or its institutions. We 
listen to outside criticism and frequently 
learn and improve our conduct as a result. 

Third, our Federal Government is today 
consciously striving in every area to make 
the promise of equality to all races and 
creeds a fact, as well as an ideal. Segrega- 
tion in all its forms is opposed by Federal 
law and policy. I believe it is fair to say that 
beginning in 1938 and up to the present day 
the United States Supreme Court has invar- 
iably granted relief to every proved claim of 
violation of rights because of race. 

However, we are not content with our rec- 
ord in race relations, and this dissatisfac- 
tion is not likely to be more pointedly stated 
than has been done on repeated occasions 
by the President of the United States. There 
is prejudice, discrimination, and also segre- 
gation in the United States. But who can 
doubt the determination of the Government 
to eradicate all these evils and its really 
Herculean efforts calculated to end these 

Moreover, we have been determined to 
reach all the goals of the Universal Declara- 
tion of Human Rights without sacrificing 
any of them. For example, we are confident 
we shall eradicate discrimination against 
Negroes without depriving Negroes and 
other races of freedom of speech. We are 
not prepared to destroy freedom or to live 
with discrimination. This is the reason we 
place such a heavy emphasis on education as 
a weapon against prejudice and discrimina- 

Influence of Knowledge and Ideas 

I know that many believe that laws and 
regulations are the complete and only an- 
swer to intolerance and discrimination. We 
believe these are necessary because laws not 
only restrain antisocial conduct but perform 
an educational function as well. 

We recognize that it would be difficult, if 
not impossible, to lead people to respect the 
rights of others by education in the face of 

laws which forbade them to accord such 
respect. Thus it was necessary for segrega- 
tion laws to be nullified before men could 
really deal with one another as equals. 
Nevertheless, there is work to be done be- 
yond legalization and law enforcement if we 
are to have a truly just society. 

In the United States we have seen the 
good effects of massive studies in the cause 
and possible cures of prejudice. We don't 
know nearly as much as we should in this 
field, but we are learning. Beginning in the 
1940's an American rights organization, 
along with university scholars, began work 
on the monumental five-volume work known 
as Studies in Prejudice. 

These scholarly works have become the 
foundation for many popular renditions by 
which the basic ideas of this scholarship 
have been filtered down to the general liter- 
ate public. And these ideas have influenced 
conduct, as for example : 

We now know that prejudice is not caused 
by the supposed inadequacies of the victims 
of prejudice but is a product and respon- 
sibility of the prejudiced person. In other 
words, for a man to say he is prejudiced 
tells more unfavorable things of him than 
it does of the class or group which he 

Next, we have learned that prejudice is 
frequently a form of self-hate, externalized 
to a victim, but essentially an expression 
of the bigot's dissatisfaction with himself. 

Then, we have come to know the violently 
prejudiced person as "the authoritarian per- 
sonality," a form of emotional illness. 

Now, this new knowledge is not without 
its power. Since no one wishes to be known 
as mentally or emotionally ill or to be re- 
garded as unstable, many people have made 
great efforts to reexamine their deepest 
prejudices and to restrain their antisocial 

I can personally recall the times, before 
this new learning was widely understood, 
when prejudice enjoyed a certain snob 
value. Today, even, most segregationists, 
especially those in public life, begin their 

APRIL 18, 1966 



rationalizations by such comments as, "I'm 

not prejudiced, but " I am not saying that 

we have conquered individual prejudice by 
scholarship and knowledge, but I do say we 
are making progress in this field through 
these means. 

On the other hand, there is a very impor- 
tant area in which we have almost no knowl- 
edge — an area which should be of the great- 
est and most fundamental concern to this 

I was on the American Prosecution Staff 
at Nuremburg. I became convinced there 
that the Nazi had by some diabolical psycho- 
logical process prepared the way for 
genocide by convincing masses of people 
that other masses were not human. The 
Nazi, in fact, indoctrinated a form of collec- 
tive psychopathology which made it pos- 
sible for apparently normal humans to 
commit the most heinous crimes on other 
humans without the normal feelings of 

However, the phenomenon is not new. The 
Caesars and the Roman populace were quite 
capable of treating Christians or slaves or 
war prisoners as less than human, as sub- 
jects fit for evisceration in the Colosseum. 
In my own country the slaveholders and their 
allies dehumanized the Negro and treated 
slaves as property. In my own time this col- 
lective psychopathology lingers on in dimin- 
ishing manifestations which impede prog- 
ress and the full realization of the promise 
of our American Constitution. 

Already there are private stirrings for 
investigation of this whole area of psychol- 
ogy which has permitted and encouraged 
man's inhumanity to man. David Astor, 
editor of the London Observer, and Dr. Nor- 
man Cohn, of the University of Sussex in 
England, have been leaders in the promo- 
tion of research into this dark area to 
learn the why and the how of this collec- 
tive dehumanization process. Surely we 
have responsibility to know of this work, 
and to learn from it. 

Believe me, such studies are of more than 
academic interest and may even furnish the 

key to the prevention of some possible 
future wars. 


Denials of the Equality of Man 

I should now like to say a word about the 
particular reference in this agenda item to 
racial discrimination, segregation, colonial- 
ism, and apartheid. 

I need not tell you that my delegation de- 
plores these evils. These practices, whether 
private or governmental policies, are of 
course denials of the equality of man, cruel 
to the victim, and impoverishing to the prac- 

However, not all the human rights viola- 
tions in this world are embraced within 
these classifications — not nearly all of them. 
Last Monday, March 14, the ILO [Inter- 
national Labor Organization] brought to our 
attention the alleged situation in Burundi. 
Here color discrimination was not involved. 
Men were said to be oppressing other men 
of the same color. The documentation pre- 
sented to this Commission included such ref- 
erences as these : 

Mr. Rifant (from the United Arab Repub- 
lic) : "The case disclosed a complete disre- 
gard for all human values, with no redeem- 
ing feature whatever." Mr. ben Ezzedine 
(from Tunisia), speaking of "another case 
involving the murder of a trade union offi- 
cial" stated: "A government which com- 
mitted such acts, or allowed them to be com- 
mitted, must bear its share of responsibility 
for them." Mr. Abid Ali (of India) ob- 
served that "the Burundi Government, by its 
contemptuous refusal to furnish an explana- 
tion after repeated solicitations from the 
ILO, had admitted by implication that the 
brutal acts alleged in the complaint were 

Such serious charges by a responsible 
body should cause us deep concern. And we 
are obliged to reflect on the fact that as al- 
leged they are manifestations of the inhu- 
manity of men of the same color and nation 
to one another. 

These circumstances also show us con- 
cretely that national independence does not 



solve all problems of human rights, and that 
beyond independence lies the necessity of es- 
tablishing a rule of law which alone can pro- 
tect human rights. 

We have all seen in the press statements, 
to my knowledge, unchallenged, that in re- 
cent months 100,000 people have been exe- 
cuted in a country, without trial, following 
an attempted coup. Neither segregation, 
racial discrimination, nor apartheid were in- 
volved, but quite possibly a tenth of a mil- 
lion were slaughtered. I do not know all the 

But this I do know: No government on 
earth has the right to slaughter its people. 
Executions, except by due process of law, 
are nothing less than murder. I believe this 
fully without regard to the political convic- 
tions of the alleged victims. 

Recently, in another very advanced and 
powerful state, a trial was held and the de- 
fendants were given long prison terms, for 
either expressing opinion or imparting ideas 
across the state's frontiers. Whatever the 
exact specifications of the alleged crime, I 
should have thought the acts were of the 
character declared a human right, not a crime 
— ^by article 19 of the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights. 

Now, lest any should feel that these 
statements are invidious, let me hasten to 
say the following. 

There are grave injustices committed in 
the United States each day. Even when our 
legal system is working in accordance with 
its highest standards, because we are human, 
there may be miscarriages of justice. How- 
ever, and this is my point, self-criticism, 
which our society permits and encourages, is 
the best possible check against the exten- 
sion of and perpetuation of mistakes. 

Colonialism, segregation, racial discrimi- 
nation, and apartheid were and are viola- 
tions of human rights. Some day these shall 
be overcome, but the conquest of these evils 
will not of itself produce a millennium. I am 
firmly convinced that in the long run the 
effective protection of human rights depends 
on the full implementation of all guarantees. 

APRIL 18, 1966 

My distinguished colleagues of the 
U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, and Poland seem to 
assume that apartheid is subsumed under 
the issue of colonialism. I would respect- 
fully point out the most vivid example of 
apartheid occurs in a state of undoubted in- 

We must not blur issues. Experience 
shows that if we rid ourselves of one wrong, 
we do not cure all others. 

It is not enough to get rid of slavery; we 
must also get rid of inequality. 

It is not enough to abolish colonialism; we 
must also establish effective democracy. 

It is not enough to get rid of apartheid; 
we must also eradicate feelings of superior- 

It is not enough to adopt constitutions 
and laws ; we must also put them into prac- 

It is not enough to rely on the self-exam- 
ination of governments ; we must be willing 
to hear and heed outside critiques from dis- 
interested persons and groups. 

Human Rights an International Concern 

Finally, human rights either are an inter- 
national concern or they are not. If they are, 
then all human rights are of such concern, 
and the conduct of every state is of interest 
and justified concern to every other. My del- 
egation believes human rights are insepara- 
ble one from the other and that the human 
family is one. 

From these beliefs it follows that we 
should be prepared to examine and discuss 
the violations of all human rights, when- 
ever they occur. This is the only effective 
and honest way to promote the principles of 
human rights as promised in the charter. 

Further, only by such open and effective 
discussion can we discharge the responsibil- 
ity of this Commission to advance the fun- 
damental and essential objective of the 
United Nations — to establish world peace. 

The premise of the United Nations Char- 
ter that human rights issues have a direct 
impact on peace and international security 
has been confirmed by the events of the past 


20 years. This experience has shown that 
many international crises today involve hu- 
man rights issues, w^hether those crises arise 
from religious, ethnic, or racial disputes or 
whether they arise from attempts by one 
country, or one group within a country, to 
impose its will or economic and social sys- 
tem by force on another country or group 
within a country. In each case, widespread 
denials of human rights may ensue. In some 
cases, economic and social rights are denied. 
In others, fundamental political rights are 
abused, and often both are in jeopardy. It 
would not be difficult to accumulate a list 
of instances in which either the depriva- 
tion of human rights or the fear of such 
deprivation has contributed to conflicts in 
which the United Nations has become in- 
volved. For example, many of the disputes 
in the Middle East have their roots in re- 
ligious differences; in Rhodesia the issues 
are racial; and all of us can think of other 
instances which could be cited. 

Further, it seems to be a fact that many 
conflicts are, in part, difficult to end because 
the contending parties believe that the rights 
of their supporters will not be protected if 
the other group prevails. If there were ade- 
quate and generally accepted international 
machinery to guarantee human rights in 
practice, many a people now otherwise pre- 
occupied could turn its efforts to construc- 
tive tasks — and there are certainly a suffi- 
cient number of tasks ahead. What I am 
talking about is the problem of establishing 
a climate in which men who have been foes 
can feel confident that they will not be risk- 
ing incarceration or execution because they 
fought for what they believed was right. 

The establishment of a stable peace in 
some areas of the world may require some 
accompanying guarantees of human rights. 
In certain cases a United Nations presence 
of some kind or the presence of a human 
rights commission to which individuals have 
free access under the auspices of an appro- 
priate regional or other organization could be 
helpful. The services performed by the Inter- 
American Commission on Human Rights in 

the Dominican Republic are illustrative of 
the possibilities here. 

The distinguished representative of the 
Ukraine suggested this morning that re- 
gional commissions already established to 
deal with human rights might be of assist- 
ance in halting violations within their areas. 
We agree. We believe further that the ex- 
perience developed by these groups can be 
a resource for this Commission, and that the 
presence of observers from such commis- 
sions in our meetings would further ex- 
change of information. Mr. Chairman, my 
delegation is working on a resolution we 
hope to cosponsor for this purpose. 

East German Bid for U.N. Status 
Rejected by France, U.K., U.S. 

Following are texts of a tripartite com- 
munique issued at United Nations Head- 
quarters, Netv York, on March 3 by the 
Governments of France, the United King- 
dom, and the United States and a letter of 
March 16 addressed to the President of the 
U.N. Security Council from the representor 
tives of the three countries. 


U.S. /U.N. press release 4816 dated March 3 

The Delegations of France, the United 
Kingdom and the United States, in re- 
sponse to the announcement of an applica- 
tion of the so-called German Democratic 
Republic for admission to the United Na- 
tions, reiterate that only the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany is en- 
titled to speak on behalf of Germany as the 
representative of the German people in in- 
ternational affairs. Since it is not a state, 
the so-called German Democratic Republic 
has no right whatever to be admitted to the 
United Nations Organization. 





U.S. /U.N. press release 4821 dated March 16 

Your Excellency: With reference to the 
letters addressed to Your Excellency and to 
the Secretary General concerning the so- 
called German Democratic Republic, the 
Governments of France, the United Kingdom 
and the United States wish to state the fol- 
lowing : 

As already stated in the tripartite com- 
munique of 3 March 1966, the Government 
of the Federal Republic of Germany is the 
only government entitled to speak on behalf 
of the German people in international af- 
fairs. It is, furthermore, the only authority 
in Germany resulting from free elections. 

The great majority of the world com- 
munity has refused recognition of the so- 
called German Democratic Republic. No spe- 
cialized agency of the United Nations has 
admitted it to any form of active participa- 
tion whatever. It cannot be eligible for mem- 
bership in the United Nations which, ac- 
:ording to Article 4 of the Charter, is open 
only to States. 

In conformity with the agreements con- 
cluded at the end of the second world war, 
the Governments of France, the United 
Kingdom and of the United States share with 
the Government of the Soviet Union re- 
sponsibility for the settlement of the Ger- 
man question and for the reunification of 

In this regard, it should be recalled that at 
the Geneva Conference, on July 23, 1955, 
the Heads of Government of France, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the 
USSR declared : i 

The Heads of Government, recognizing their com- 
mon responsibility for the settlement of the German 
question and the re-unification of Germany, have 
agreed that the settlement of the German question 
and the re-unification of Germany by means of free 
elections shall be carried out in conformity with the 
national interests of the German people and the 
interests of European security. 

For their part, the Governments of 

France, the United Kingdom and the United 
States have always striven to promote a 
solution of this question by implementation 
of the principle of self-determination. They 
will continue their efforts to achieve this 
aim. Attempts to establish the so-called 
German Democratic Republic as a separate 
state can only frustrate this objective and 
thus make more difficult a peaceful settle- 
ment in Europe. 

We shall be grateful if Your Excellency 
will have this letter circulated as an official 

Lord Caradon 

Permanent Representative of the 

United Kingdom to the United Nations 

James Roosevelt 

Acting Permanent Representative of the 

United States to the United Nations 

Jacques Tine 

Acting Permanent Representative of 

France to the United Nations 


Current Actions 



Convention on settlement of investment disputes be- 
tween states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965.' 
Ratification deposited: Mauritania, January 11, 

Signatiires: China, January 13, 1966; Federal 
Republic of Germany, January 27, 1966; Greece, 
March 16, 1966; Togo, January 24, 1966. 


Constitution of the World Health Organization. 
Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended. 
Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United 
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643. 
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, February 21, 

' Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176. 

' Not in force. 

APRIL 18, 1966 


Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the 
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS 
1808, 5643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.' 
Acceptances deposited: Burma, March 8, 1966; 
Tunisia, March 9, 1966. 

Judicial Cooperation 

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and 
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial 
matters. Open for signature at The Hague No- 
vember 15, 1965.' 

Signature: United Arab Republic, March 1, 1966 
(with a declaration). 

Maritime Matters 

Convention on facilitation of international maritime 
traffic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for 
signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.' 
Acceptances deposited: Ghana, November 5, 1965; 

United Kingdom, February 24, 1966. 
Accession deposited: Zambia, December 14, 1965. 

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern- 
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS 
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.' 
Acceptance received: Singapore, February 14, 

North Atlantic Treaty 

Protocol on the status of International Military 
Headquarters. Signed at Paris August 28, 1952. 
Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978. 
Notification of denunciation: France, March 30, 
1966, effective March 31, 1967. 

on Pollution 

International convention for the prevention of pollu- 
tion of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12, 
1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the 
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900. 

' Not in force. 

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, January 12^ 

Safety at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life ai 

sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered! 

into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495. 

Notification of denunciation received: Pakistan,! 

February 24, 1966, effective May 24, 1967. 1 

International convention for the safety of life at I 

sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered/ 

into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780. 

Acceptance deposited: India, February 28, 1966 



Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Algiers February 23, 1966. Entered into 
force February 23, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV^ 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; | 
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Bogota March 10, 1966. Entered into^ 
force March 10, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title ll 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 1 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; f 
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Saigon March 21, 1966. Entered int 
force March 21, 1966. 



VOL. LIV, NO. 1399 PUBLICATION 8066 APRIL 18, 1966 

The Department of Stat* Bolletin, ■ 
weekly publication issued by the OffIc« 
of MedU ServIccB, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
afreneiea of the Government ^th Info^ 
mation on developments in the field of 
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Department of State and the Foreigii 
Service. The Bulletin inclndea selected 
press releases on foreign policy. Issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
Stat« and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is Included eonceminff treaties 
and international ajtreementa to which the 
United States Is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international In- 

Publications of the Department. United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington. D.C., 
20402. Prick : 62 issues, domestic 110, 
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents. 

Use of funds for printinjr ©f this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of 1h» 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

note: Contents of this publication ar« 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed 
in the Readers* Guide to Periodical Liter- 





INDEX April 18, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1399 

Africa. The Foreign Assistance Program for 
1967 (Rusk) 628 

American Republics 

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

The United States and Brazil : Partners in 
Progress (Gordon) 620 

Asia. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

Brazil. The United States and Brazil: Partners 
in Progress (Gordon) 620 

Canada. Commissioner General Confirmed for 
U.S. Exhibit at Canadian Fair 627 

China. The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) . . 608 


Commissioner General Confirmed for U.S. Ex- 
hibit at Canadian Fair 627 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 635 

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi 
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi, 
Johnson, joint communique, message to 
Congress) 598 

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of 
Peace Corps to Congress 634 

Economic Affairs 

Further Steps Taken To Remove Restrictions 

on U.S. Exports 624 

National Maritime Day, 1966 (proclamation) . 619 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Board of 
Foreign Scholarships Members Sworn In . . 627 

Europe. United States and France Exchange 
Views on Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide 
memoire) 617 

Foreign Aid 

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

National Maritime Day, 1966 (proclamation) . 619 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi 
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi, 
Johnson, joint commimique, message to 
Congress) 598 

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of 
Peace Corps to Congress 634 


East German Bid for U.N. Status Rejected by 

France, U.K., U.S. (communique and letter) . 640 
Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on 

Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le 

Monde interview) 613 

United States and France Exchange Views on 

Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide memoire) . 617 

Germany. East German Bid for U.N. Status 
Rejected by France, U.K., U.S. (communique 
and letter) 640 

Human Rights. The United Nations and Human 
Rights (Abram) 636 


The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi 
of India Confer at Washingrton (Gandhi, 
Johnson, joint communique, message to 
Congress) 598 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on 
Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le 
Monde interview) 613 

United States and France Exchange Views on 
Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide memoire) . . 617 

Pakistan. The Foreign Assistance Program for 
1967 (Rusk) 628 

Presidential Documents 

National Maritime Day, 1966 619 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi 

of India Confer at Washington 598 

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of 

Peace Corps to Congress 634 

World Meteorological Day 618 

Science. World Meteorological Day (Johnson) 618 

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 641 

United Kingdom. East German Bid for U.N. 
Status Rejected by France, U.K., U.S. (com- 
munique and letter) 640 

United Nations 

East German Bid for U.N. Status Rejected by 
France, U.K., U.S. (communique and letter) . 640 

The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) 608 

The United Nations and Human Rights 
(Abram) 636 


The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967 
(Rusk) 628 

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi 
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi, 
Johnson, joint communique, message to 
Congress) 598 

The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) 608 

Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on 
Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le 
Monde interview) 613 

Name Index 

Abram, Morris 636 

Ball, George W 613 

Gandhi, Indira 598 

Goldberg, Arthur J 608 

Gordon, Lincoln 620 

Johnson, President 598, 618, 619, 634 

Rusk, Secretary 628 

Tupper, Stanley R 627 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: March 28-April 3 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to March 28 which 
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
51 of March 14; 56 of March 17; 58 of March 
18; and 69 of March 25. 




t72 3/31 Gordon: Inter-American Economic 
and Social Council, Buenos 
73 3/31 Ball: Le Monde interview(revised). 

t75 4/1 Sisco: "A Fresh Look at the U.N." 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 


Superintendent of Documents 
U.S. government printinq office 






Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free 

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Frew 
Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country at 
the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that addr 

"Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression 
is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply 
just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam." 



To: Supt. of Documents 
Govt. Printing Office 
Washington. D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order). Please 

Bend me copies of Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. 


Enclosed .o 

To be mailed 

later «» 

Refund .^pH 

Coupon refmC 
Postage ~.~ 









Street address 

City, Stete, and ZIP code 







Vol. LIV, No. UOO 

April 25, 1966 

by Assistant Secretary Sisco 646 


by Ambassador George C. McGhee 657 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Hare 668 

Statement by Adrian S. Fisher and Text of Amendments 675 

For index see inside hack cover 

"It is the spirit and vision of the charter to which we must 
be dedicated if we are to carry out what President Johnson 
called the 'assignment of the century' — the pursuit of 

A Fresh Look at the United Nations 

by Joseph J. Sisco 

Assistant Secretary for International 

Organization Affairs 

It is a privilege to be here in Atlanta. The 
aim of these regional foreign policy confer- 
ences is an excellent one, embodying a basic 
democratic idea — a direct discussion of pub- 
lic policy between interested citizens and 
those charged with formulating it. 

A generation or two ago most of the major 
problems of government could be understood 
by almost every citizen. Today even many 
well-informed people do not feel fully com- 
petent to judge many public issues. Too 
many persons simply shy away from their 
consideration altogether. Let the expert, the 
man with specialized knowledge, decide them. 
Yet these decisions, the complex no less than 
the simple, determine the future of our na- 

The need for an informed, educated cit- 
izenry is therefore greater than ever. And as 
the issues grow more intricate, our obliga- 
tion to explain and discuss them becomes 
correspondingly more important. 

The institution I want to talk with you 
about today — the United Nations — is as com- 
plex as any around, as complex, in fact, as 
the 117 widely varied nations comprising it. 

We Americans are pragmatic in our ap- 
proach to most institutions. We pride our- 

' Address made before a regional foreign policy 
conference at Atlanta, Ga., on Apr. 2 (press release 
75 dated Apr. 1). 

selves on our flexibility and lack of dog- 
matism. Yet for some reason our view of 
the United Nations has often been some- 
what simplistic. We have tended to forget 
that the United Nations must inevitably re- 
flect the great diversity of views, interests, 
and goals of the members represented in the 
world body. We sometimes forget when we 
do not always get our way that the United 
States is not the only country developing the 
scenario in world affairs today. We have 
at times asked too much of the U.N. and on 
other occasions have expected too little. 

Polls show that the American people 
stz'ongly support the U.N. : 80 percent be- 
lieve the U.N. important and want the U.S. 
Government to "use it more." Of course, the 
U.N. is an important instrument of foreign 
policy, one way among others for advancing 
our causes and for cooperating with other 
countries in the myriad tasks of political 
conciliation, social progress, economic devel- 
opment, and technical cooperation. 

But we must avoid extravagant expecta- 
tions about the U.N. Those who start out by 
seeing the U.N. as a panacea for all our ills 
often end in disillusionment. And they some- 
times go to the opposite extreme of pessi- 
mism — regarding the U.N. merely as a dec- 
orative feature on the international land- 
scape. For example, a distinguished corre- 
spondent, concerned over some irresponsible 




actions by some members of the General 
Assembly, recently advised his readers that 
"the only way to preserve the organization 
so that in some distant future it may play 
the role for which it was created is to spare 
it as much as possible." A few weeks later, 
another distinguished correspondent for a 
great U.S. newspaper entitled an article 
"The U.N. Tries Hard, But . . . ." 

Now, I have been engaged in wrestling 
with the sometimes exhilarating and some- 
times frustrating problems that have faced 
us in the U.N. for the past 15 years. I try 
not to overexaggerate, but — to quote a friend 
of mine — I try not to underexaggerate 
either. I believe the beginning of wisdom lies 
in being neither a pessimist nor an optimist 
— but in being a "possibilist." I am a possi- 
bilist. In fact, I would venture to say that all 
practitioners of foreign policy must be possi- 
bilists — for politics, whether in our own Leg- 
islature or in an international forum, is the 
art of the possible. 

How does a possibilist approach foreign 
policy problems, and more specifically, how 
does he operate in the U.N. ? 

First, he keeps in mind the real options 
that are open to him. He is problem-ori- 
ented and does not grasp for utopian solu- 
tions. In the words of Winston Churchill: 
"Do not let spacious plans for a new world 
divert your energies from saving what is 
left of the old." 

He knows, in the words of President 
Franklin Roosevelt, that the structure of 
world peace "cannot be a peace of large na- 
tions or of small nations, (but) ... a peace 
which rests on the cooperative efforts of the 
whole world." 

He knows he must deal with factional 
disputes in Cyprus and disorder in the Congo 
and the effect of the price of cocoa on 
Ghana's future — and not with some amor- 
phous scheme for world order. 

He knows that, when weighing the ques- 
tion of Red China's admission to the U.N. 
or recognition, not only is our view relevant 
but also the adversaries' continued insist- 
ence that the Republic of China be elimi- 
nated or cast aside. 

He is concerned with how to recruit ob- 
servers for Kashmir, as well as how to 
achieve a more fundamental and lasting po- 
litical solution. 

Second, he adapts to changing circum- 
stances. One of the cliches about practition- 
ers of foreign policy is that we are unaware 
that the world is changing. We are either 
asleep like Rip van Winkle or are romanti- 
cally playing the old familiar tunes from our 
boyhood. I assure you that if you sat at my 
desk in Washington for one day you would 
soon be disabused of this cliche. 

In dealing with U.N. affairs we are con- 
stantly aware that we cannot escape the dra- 
matic changes of the 20 years since the 
charter was signed, and especially the 
changes in the composition and pressures in 
the U.N. during the decade of the sixties. It 
is a commonplace that change is taking 
place at a revolutionary and ever-accelerat- 
ing pace. The tough assignment is to know 
how to design and adapt machinery to pro- 
vide for peaceful change while preserving 
the underlying values — justice, economic and 
social advancement, human rights — for 
which the U.N. was created and to which our 
foreign policy is devoted. 

Third, a possibilist does not start out 
with extravagant expectations. He is not 
disillusioned when he encounters setbacks. 
He seeks limited goals. He is patient. He 
keeps probing for possibilities. The history 
of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settle- 
ment of the Viet-Nam problem illustrates 
this dramatically. 

World Changes Reflected in U.N. 

The task of the United Nations has been 
encumbered almost from the start by great- 
power conflicts. Its efforts to promote social 
progress have been hampered by discord 
and strife. It has been called upon to keep 
peace where there has been no peace in the 
hearts of men. It has been buffeted by the 
winds of racism and nationalism as the peo- 
ples of colonial lands have moved to rule 
themselves in freedom and to assert their 
right to speak and vote as equals in the 
forum of the nations. 


APRIL 25, 1966 


But through it all the U.N. has survived 
and continues to serve the cause of peace. 
That the United Nations has come this far 
is a tribute to the vision of those who drew 
the founding plans, a testimonial to the 
resiliency and relevance of the charter it- 
self. The measure of the importance which 
President Johnson attaches to the U.N. is 
demonstrated by the fact that for the first 
time in our history a Supreme Court Justice 
was asked to leave the bench to lead us in 
the U.N. forum. Justice Arthur Goldberg 
has done this brilliantly. 

One question being asked is, "Where is the 
U.N. going?" This issue concerns us not only 
because of the present financial and consti- 
tutional difficulties the U.N. faces. In deeper 
perspective, we are grappling with the ques- 
tion of how to make sure that the U.N. 
structure keeps up with the times. For in the 
words of Lord Halifax at the concluding 
session of the San Francisco conference : 

We cannot claim that our work is perfect or that 
we have created an unbreakable guaranty of peace. 
For ours is no enchanted palace to "spring into 
sight at once" by magic touch or hidden power. 
But we have, I am convinced, forged an instrument 
by which, if men are serious in wanting peace and 
are ready to make sacrifices for it, they may find 
means to win it. 

Changes in the world are inevitably re- 
flected in changes in the U.N. To be sure, 
the U.N. must continue to be representative 
of the new membership, as it has tried to 
be by enlarging the Security Council and 
the Economic and Social Council. 

The U.N. is based on the one-nation, one- 
vote principle. Of the present 117 members, 
nearly half did not exist as independent 
states when the U.N. was formed. Of the 67 
new members to enter the organization since 
1945, 34 are African states, most small and 
with limited resources. A significant shift 
in relative voting strength to small members 
has occurred in most important U.N. organs. 

If the U.N. is to be vital and viable, it 
must reflect not only the "sovereign equal- 
ity" of states but the realities of power and 
responsibility as they exist in the real 
world today. For if it does not do so, the 

U.N. will speak but no one will listen, and 
its findings will lose their value. 

The 20th General Assembly witnessed j 
several examples of excesses by the major- 
ity, in some cases overriding the charter 
provision for a two-thirds vote on an impor- 
tant question on issues affecting peace and 
security. As Ambassador Goldberg stated at 
the close of the 20th Assembly: Where ac- 
tion is taken by the Assembly in deroga- 
tion of the charter requirement for a two- 
thirds vote on important questions, "that 
action is a complete nullity. It is null and 
void." The discrepancies between voting 
power and real power will not be solved by 
formal abandonment of the one-nation, one- 
vote system. The charter on this subject is 
unlikely to be changed, and an agreement on 
a formula for weighting votes is unlikely. 
Rather, informal influence, mutual adjust- 
ment procedures, composition of subgroups, 
and the weight of political and financial con- 
tributions should help redress the balance. 
Above all, patience and understanding will 
be required, particularly by the advanced 
countries with greater experience in inter- 
national affairs. It is our hope that all 
members will see that in the long run orderly 
procedures will serve their interests and help 
move all of us toward a more stable world 
order in which the rule of law prevails. 

A Hard Look at U.N. Programs and Budgets 

We have also been taking a hard look at 
programs and budgets throughout the entire 
U.N. system. We supported the establish- 
ment of a General Assembly committee to A 
review budgetary problems in the U.N. sys- 
tem. The United States has been the main 
supporter of these programs in the past, and 
we can expect to do our full share in the 
future. We have supported U.N. programs 
because they help the developing countries to 
help themselves; because they sometimes 
avoid some of the political difficulties which 
are involved in bilateral aid, they help share 
the burden, and they provide a worldwide a, 
pool of technical help which is not available 
to any single country. But our support can ~ 




not and must not be taken for granted. 

We realize the needs are great, and the de- 
veloping countries understandably want to 
better their lot today, not in the distant fu- 
ture. But we are convinced that more of the 
needs can be met by assuring that the U.N. 
and its family of agencies are operating at 
maximum efficiency, that sound and system- 
atic budgetary procedures are followed, 
that program priorities are clearly estab- 
lished, marginal and duplicative activities 
eliminated, that undue increases in staff are 
avoided, and that reasonable and not exces- 
sive budget target levels are established. 

We are working hard to this end. As 
President Johnson stated in a memorandum 
of March 15 to the Secretary of State direct- 
ing him to undertake certain measures to 
improve our participation in international 
organizations : - 

No nation has been a greater supporter of the 
United Nations, its specialized agencies and other 
international organizations than the United States. 
. . . The United States shall continue to meet its 
fair share of the financial requirements of these 
organizations. If we are to be a constructive in- 
fluence in helping to strengthen the international 
agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we 
must apply to them the same rigorous standards of 
program performance and budget review that we 
do to our own Federal programs. 

Ambassador Goldberg and I have just re- 
turned from Geneva, where we met with 
the other major contributors to the U.N. in 
an effort to give reality to this directive. 


We consider U.N. peacekeeping an impor- 
tant security option in U.S. foreign policy. 
The U.N. has undertaken some dozen peace- 
keeping operations — all of which have served 
the national interests of the United States 
and the cause of peace. We would like to see 
the U.N. capacity to keep the peace strength- 
Jned. A U.N. Committee of 33 is examining 
rarious facets of this problem — including 
whether new arrangements are needed re- 
garding authorization of peacekeeping and 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 577. 

their management, and how these should be 
financed in the most equitable and reliable 

However, as long as there are fundamental 
differences between the U.S.S.R. and the 
United States about the role of the U.N. in 
the peacekeeping field, it will be difficult to 
make real progress toward a more reliable 
system of financing or authorizing future 
peacekeeping operations. 

The Soviets still want to subject all future 
peacekeeping operations to their total veto. 
We favor the Security Council playing the 
primary role provided in the charter. But 
subjecting peacekeeping operations entirely 
to the Soviet veto is a prescription for future 
total paralysis. 

For our part, we will support desirable 
future peacekeeping operations. We recog- 
nize that where a major power has funda- 
mental objections, those who favor a partic- 
ular peacekeeping operation may have to 
carry a heavier financial burden. We rec- 
ognize that the unwillingness of the General 
Assembly to apply the loss-of-vote sanction 
against those who refused to pay their 
peacekeeping assessments has weakened the 
principle of collective financing. But we will 
continue our efforts to preserve this concept 
wherever possible. We favor the broadest 
possible sharing of the burden by those who 
support U.N. peacekeeping. 

A system based essentially on a voluntary 
means of financing is not as reliable as we 
would like. But this need not be fatal if the 
preponderant majority of like-minded states 
who support a peacekeeping operation band 
together and make reasonable contributions. 

This ad hoc improvised system is working 
today. Blue-bereted U.N. soldiers or observ- 
ers are helping to keep the peace in Cyprus, 
in Kashmir, in the Middle East — and you 
and I, as a result, can sleep more restfully 
tonight. This is the U.N. at its best. 

Let me close with this thought. 

The key to successful U.S. policy in the 
U.N. arena, as in other arenas of our for- 
eign policy, lies in joining with other na- 
tions in common institutions. We are com- 


APRIL 25, 1966 


ing to see that the capacity to act through 
the U.N. and to fulfill the purposes of the 
charter means building the joint executive 
machinery for that end. 

Yet in the last analysis, Macaulay was 
right: "It is the spirit we are of, not the 
machinery we employ, which binds us to 

It is the spirit and vision of the charter to 
which we must be dedicated if we are to 
carry out what President Johnson called the 
"assignment of the century" — the pursuit of 
peace. * 

A great American poet said that America 
is promises. We are dedicated in our domes- 
tic society to narrowing the gap between 
promise and performance in American life. 
This is now equally true for the societies 
beyond our shores. The Charter of the U.N. 
is promises, too. It is the promise of collec- 
tive measures for peace ; it is the promise of 
constant search for friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for equal rights and 
self-determination ; it is the promise of inter- 
national cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, and cultural 
character; and it is the promise of encour- 
aging respect for human rights and funda- 
mental freedoms for all. 

It is no longer our national community 
alone but a whole generation of mankind for 
whom these promises must be kept. 

They must be kept if we are to preserve 
this planet — this fragile spaceship we share 
— from the ever-brooding threat of annihila- 

They must be kept if our kind of world — 
the world of free choice, of diversity, and of 
the truths in the Declaration of Independ- 
ence — is to have a chance to prosper. 

Let us stretch the possibilities in the char- 
ter. The U.N. can achieve the vision in the 
charter, but only with our help. The U.N. 
needs American commitment and participa- 
tion and leadership if it is to fulfill the 
great promises of the charter. 

" Ibid., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555. 


NATO: An Instrument of Peace 

Statement by President Johnson 

White House press release dated April 4 

Seventeen years ago today, with the sign- 
ing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the West- 
em nations drew together in an historic 
undertaking to safeguard the freedom, com- 
mon heritage and civilization of our peoples. 

For the United States this meant round- 
ing the last comer on the long road from 
self-imposed isolation to full acceptance of 
our responsibilities in the world. For our al- 
lies the North Atlantic Treaty signified a 
departure, no less historic, from traditional 
pursuit of national interests narrowly con- 
strued. In the treaty we together acknowl- 
edged a common destiny and the duty to 
pursue it together. 

We decided that if we didn't hang to- 
gether, we would hang separately. Nearly 
two decades of time have demonstrated the 
wisdom of those who read the lesson for 
the future in two world catastrophes out of 
the past. 

The Atlantic alliance deterred the threat- 
ened aggression which brought it into being. 
Behind the military bulwark it raised frona 
the Black Sea to the North Cape an era ot 
unprecedented growth and well-being began. 
Within the framework of security it pro- 
vided, the vision of a united Europe became 
a practical undertaking, now far advanced. 

The Atlantic alliance has succeeded per- 
haps better than its founders dared hope 
Yet we must never forget why it has pros- 

The unique quality of the alliance foi' 
peace lies in the joining of sovereign na- 
tions in an integrated system of collectiv< 
defense. We and our partners, in painstak- 
ing effort, created the peacetime planning 
agencies and integrated military commands 
called the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza 
tion. These institutions afford practical as 
surance that aggression would be met b: 
allies acting at once and as one. They hav( 


insured the peoples of the Atlantic com- 
munity 17 years of peace. 

NATO was created as an instrument of 
peace. Its objectives are to remove tempta- 
tion to aggression and to provide the foun- 
dation for seeking a settlement in Central 
Europe, based on the principle of self-deter- 
mination, providing increased security for 
East and West alike. Every lesson of our 
common experience argues that these objec- 
tives should be pursued in closest concert. 

Together with 13 other allied nations, we 

have declared our resolve to carry on, to 
strengthen and perfect our NATO system 
in this constructive spirit.* We shall not 
abandon an institution which has proved it- 
self in the hour of peril. 

We look forward to the day when unity of 
action in the Western family is fully rees- 
tablished and our common interests and as- 
pirations are again expressed through in- 
stitutions which command universal support 
among us. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536. 

How the Secretary of State Apportions His Time 

Following is a study prepared in the Bti- 
reau of Public Affairs in response to an 
academic request ^ for information on how 
the Secretary of State spends his official 
time, together ivith a portion of an interview 
with Secretary Ru^k on April 3 on the na- 
tionally syndicated television program "Open 
End," in ivhich the Secretary discussed his 
working day. 


An examination of how a Secretary of 
State spends his official time suggests that 
his activities are directed toward five major 
categories : 

1. Advising the President on foreign af- 
fairs ; 

2. Managing the Department of which he 
is head ; 

3. Consulting with the Congress ; 

4. Dealing directly with foreign officials, 
both here and abroad ; and 

5. Making American policy views known 
to the public, both domestic and foreign. 

For illustrative purposes, a study re- 
cently was made of Secretary Rusk's activi- 
ties in a single month, January 1965, which 
was selected arbitrarily. His activities are 
described below for this 1 month, under the 
five headings cited. 

Advising the President 

In addition to the heavy flow of official 
papers and telephone conversations between 
the White House and the Department of 
State, on 11 separate occasions during the 
month, the Secretary went to the White 
House to meet with the President and, on 
occasion, fellow members of the Cabinet or 
other top White House advisers. These 
White House meetings absorbed 17 hours 
during the month, a figure which does not 
include the time necessary for preparation 
before the meetings, or for subsequent im- 
plementation of policy decisions taken. 

' From Dr. Gerard J. Mangone, associate dean of 
the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and 
Public Affairs, Syracuse University, in connection 
with his forthcoming book entitled Foreign Policy 
and American Government. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


Managing the Department 

The Secretary must deal directly with 
his principal assistants so that immedi- 
ate and urgent problems are met, without 
impairing the need for coherent, longer 
range planning. Morning staff meetings help 
set the stage; a dozen of these were held 
during the month. Most problems of admin- 
istration and policy are presented in writ- 
ing; this task is performed mainly by the 
bureaus, with the assistance of the Execu- 
tive Secretariat and the Secretary's immedi- 
ate staff. Yet individual discussions are in- 
tegral to the Secretary's management func- 
tion, keeping him attuned to developments, 
and providing a rapid channel for exchang- 
ing views. During the month under con- 
sideration, over a hundred individual dis- 
cussions were held. 

During the month, the Secretary met on 
19 occasions with U.S. ambassadors in 
Washington for consultations. These meet- 
ings provide an important opportunity for 
coordination which has obvious advantages 
over exchanges of telegrams. As an in- 
centive to younger officers, the Secretary 
met once with members of the Junior For- 
eign Service Officers Club. 

Consulting With the Congress 

President Johnson has urged Cabinet 
members to make themselves available for 
discussions with Members of the Congress. 
During the month, the Secretary made 11 
separate trips to the Capitol for meetings 
with individual Members of Congress and 
congressional committees. Twenty-two hours 
were spent in these meetings. It should be 
noted that since the month under study was 
January, at the beginning of a new presi- 
dential term, the Congress did not meet 
until midmonth. Also, substantial time 
spent in preparation for congressional 
briefings, meetings, and appearances must 
be added to the figure given. 

Dealing With Foreign Officials 

During the month, the Secretary had in- 
dividual appointments with 21 foreign am- 
bassadors and 1 foreign minister. It was 

chiefly in connection with this aspect of his 
work that the Secretary was host at 13 re- 
ceptions, luncheons, or dinners in the Depart- 
ment of State, and guest at 19 dinners or 
other functions outside the Department. One 
day was spent on a trip to President John- 
son's ranch in Texas, where the President 
was conferring with the Prime Minister of 
Canada. At the end of the month, upon the 
death of Sir Winston Churchill, the Secre- 
tary flew to London for 3 days of events 
honoring the late British leader. 

Informing the Public 

During the month the Secretary held six 
"background" conferences with news re- 
porters. Unlike formal, on-the-record news 
conferences, the background conferences 
permit exploration in depth of develop- 
ments. The Secretary also appeared on 
three radio-television interviews and gave 
seven interviews to authors of magazine 
articles or books. 

This schedule of activity is based on a 
7-day working week and covers both day- 
time and evening hours. Of the 31 days in 
January 1965, the Secretary had 1 day only 
(a Sunday) without scheduled appointments. 
He was away from Washington a total of 4 
days (Texas and London) , and, in addition, 
spent half a day at a ship-commissioning 
ceremony in Virginia. Of the 251/2 working 
days in Washington, about a third of the 
Secretary's time was spent outside the De- 
partment of State building (at the White 
House, Capitol, and elsewhere). 


David Susskind, Moderator: Mr. Secre- 
tary, how many hours a day do you work 
customarily ? 

Secretary Rusk : It varies a little from day 
to day, but I get into the office around quar- 
ter to 9, or 9 o'clock, and I'm usually ready 
for bed about midnight. This frequently 
means diplomatic dinners and things of that 
sort in the evening, but if I'm not at those 
I'm usually in the office. So it's usually a 
14- or 15-hour day. 



Mr. Susskind: You work 6 days, 7 days? 

Secretary Rusk : I usually come in for part 
of the time on Sundays — hour or two — look 
at the cables and see what's going on. Satur- 
day is almost an ordinary working day. 

Mr. SusSskind: When did you last have a 
vacation ? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, when I went over 
to Mr. Churchill's funeral, I got the flu, so 
that I spent a week or 10 days in Florida 
getting — getting over the flu. Otherwise, 
I've snatched a little time, 2 or 3 days at a 
time, here and there. I hope to get a little 
longer time at some stage. 

The theory is that the Secretary of State 
gets a vacation after Congress adjourns and 
before the United Nations convenes, but 
they've been overlapping for 5 years so that 
it hasn't been easy to get away. 

Mr. Susskind : Do you feel the need to get 
away from it all, to refresh yourself, re- 
charge your battery? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we 
would all be a little more efficient if we got 
away perhaps more frequently than we do. 
But it isn't easy to get rest if responsibility 
goes along with you. And any of the senior 
officials in Government find it almost im- 
possible to go away and forget what is going 
on and forget the job. Fortunately, I have 
no insomnia; when my head hits the pillow, 
I'm asleep, and that has been a considerable 

Mr. Susskind : Are you woken much in the 
middle of the night? 

Secretary Rusk: I get a number of calls 
in the middle of the night from time to time. 
The world is round and that means that 
when it's 3 o'clock in the morning in Wash- 
ington it's 3 o'clock in the afternoon some- 
where else. So you do get the night calls from 
time to time but not as much as perhaps you 
would suppose. 

Mr. Susskind : But you're able to go right 
back to bed? 

Secretary Rusk: Oh, yes, that's a gift. 

Mr. Susskind: Do you ever have moments 
when the responsibility and complexity of 
your office is almost overwhelming? Do you 
ever feel that it's just too much? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, it's a sobering — 

it's a sobering responsibility. The world is 
extremely complicated. We're dealing with 
120 different nations. The rate of change is 
very fast. During this calendar year we'll 
have 50 elections and changes in government 
somewhere in the world. Most of those are 
of importance to the United States. And 
one needs all the help that one can get. 

Of course, the great preoccupation is to 
know best how to serve the President, be- 
cause his is the awesome and the lonely task. 
And that's what all of us are always trying 
to learn how to do better. 

But we do have a competent diplomatic 
service, a competent Department. We have 
good working relationships with the other 
departments. We have good working rela- 
tionships with the other departments of 
Government, so that the burdens are toler- 
able. What we need is wisdom. I've some- 
times said when I've seen some pickets that 
we need your prayers and not your impre- 

Mr. Susskind: Mr. Secretary, in 1968 you 
will have served two 4-year terms as Secre- 
tary of State. If President Johnson was re- 
elected and asked you to serve again in that 
office, would you be inclined to do so? 

Secretary Rusk : Well, I wouldn't want to 
anticipate even the year 1968. The Secretary 
of State serves at the pleasure of the Presi- 
dent, and the matter is, in the first instance, 
for the President to decide. I must say it's 
been a great privilege for me to serve first 
under President Kennedy and then under 
President Johnson. And I've had to leave to 
both of them the question as to my qualifica- 
tions or how long they've wanted me to serve. 
I felt it an obligation to do so and a privilege 
to do so, so long as I was qualified to do it. 

Mr. Susskind: Do you have any theory on 
how long an official should serve in such a 
demanding, challenging job? 

Secretary Rusk: It would be hard to gen- 
eralize. No, I just think I — that's a matter 
that the President would have to decide. 

• • " • • 

Mr. Susskind : How does the family of the 
Secretary of State withstand the pressures 
of the job? You're absent a good deal of the 

APRIL 25, 1966 


time, traveling much of the time, in the of- 
fice 16 hours a day. 

Secretary Rusk: Well, my wife has a 
schedule that is comparable to my own, be- 
cause she undertakes a good many things in 
my place. For example, every embassy in 
Washington has a national-day party once a 
year, a reception of some sort. Mrs. Rusk 
represents me at all of those. And she does 
a good many other things of that sort that 
are highly relevant to the job that both of 
us have. So she has a rather full schedule. 

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" 
German Note of March 25 

Following is an exchange of notes between 
the United States and the Federal Republic 
of Germany. 


PresB release 76 dated April 6 

The Government of the United States 
acknowledges receipt of the note of the 
Federal Republic of Germany of March 25 
concerning the reunification of Germany, 
disarmament, and other matters relating to 
the peace and security of Europe. The 
United States Government welcomes the 
German note as a forward-looking communi- 
cation containing many constructive sugges- 

The United States Government notes with 
satisfaction the reaffirmation expressed in 
the note of the desire of the Federal Re- 
public of Germany to live on good terms with 
all of Germany's neighbors, including the 
nations of Eastern Europe, and it hopes 
that further progress will be made toward 
this goal. It is the earnest hope of the Gov- 
ernment of the United States that all na- 
tions interested in the peace and security 

of the world will carefully study the March 
25 note and that they will find, as the Gov- 
ernment of the United States has found, 
that the note gives positive expression to 
the desire of the German people to live in 
peace and freedom and to their willingness 
to make sacrifices to achieve German reuni- 
fication. The United States Government 
supports the efforts of the German Govern- 
ment outlined in the note intended to con- 
tribute to European peace and security, dis- 
armament, and the related goal of the im- 
provement of relations between Germany 
and all of the nations of Central and Eastern 
Europe. These efforts are complementary to 
those of other governments which are also 
concerned with these problems. 

The Government of the United States 
wishes to assure the Government of the 
Federal Republic of Germany that it will 
give most careful consideration to the ideas 
and suggestions in the German note regard- 
ing disarmament and the safeguarding of 
the peace. The United States shares with 
the German Government and other govern- 
ments whose goal is a more peaceful and 
secure world, the hope that the day may 
soon arrive when Germany will be reuni- 
fied in a peaceful and equitable manner 
which will assure to the German people 
the right freely to determine their own way 
of life and destiny and will permit a united 
Germany to contribute fully to a peaceful 
and stable international community. 


Official translation 


The German people wish to live in peace and 
freedom. They consider it their greatest national 
task to remove the partition of Germany under 
which they have suffered for many years. The 
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany 
has repeatedly stated that the German people would 
be prepared also to make sacrifices for the sake of 
their reunification. They are determined to solve 
this problem by peaceful means only. 

' Delivered by the American Embassy at Bonn to 
the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Ger- 
many on Apr. 2. 

' Delivered by the German Embassy at Wash- 
ington to the Department of State on Mar. 26. 



II The thought of another war, which would destroy 
■ ' whole countries and nations, even continents, is 
unbearable to them. They want to help ensure that 
such a catastrophe can never happen, and in this 
wish they know that they are at one with all 
reasonable people. For many years now govern- 
ments have been endeavouring to solve the political 
problems which lie at the root of tension between 
world powers, and to ward off the dangers that 
arise as a result of the arms race, especially the 
increase in weapons of mass destruction. What 
there is to show for these efforts is disappointing. 
The crucial problems remain unresolved and the will 
even to discuss them seriously is not equally strong 
among the nuclear powers. 

As in the past, the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Germany still holds the view that a 
world-wide, general and controlled disarmament 
must be the objective. Nor will this objective be 
changed by monotonous propaganda which seeks 
to question and misrepresent the standpoint of the 
Federal Government on problems of disarmament 
and security. 

Moved by concern about further developments, it 
therefore has the honour to present to the United 
States Government particularly in its capacity as a 
member of the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarma- 
ment Committee in this note a survey of its policy 
for peace and to put forward some proposals on dis- 
armament, armaments control and European se- 


The Federal Government considers that, pven 
good will and honest intentions on all sides, even 
the most difficult problems between nations can be 
resolved in a peaceful and equitable manner. Thus, 
on this basis it has reached agreement with Ger- 
many's neighbours in the West on all problems that 
Were still open after the war. 

The German people desire to live on good terms 
with all, including their East European neighbours. 
Hence the Federal Government has been trying in 
various way to improve relations with the states 
and peoples of Eastern Europe. If we consider that 
there are many who look upon this policy with 
unfounded mistrust and even make every effort to 
frustrate it, the results are, on the whole, never- 
theless satisfactory. They are an encouragement to 
the Federal Government to continue on its present 

Despite the fact that the Federal Government 
has made particular efforts to cultivate relations 
with Poland, the country which suffered most of 
all among the East European nations in the Second 
World War, it has made but little progress in this 
direction. Although the Polish Government is 
obviously interested in more lively trade between 
Germany and Poland, it has hitherto not given any 
mdication that it is interested in achieving a con- 
ciliation between the two nations. Rather does it 

hamper the cultural contacts we seek, stands for 
the continued division of Germany and at the same 
time calls upon the Federal Government to rec- 
ognize the Oder-Neisse-Line, though it is gen- 
erally known that, under the allied agreements of 
1945, the settlement of frontier questions has been 
postponed until the conclusion of a peace treaty 
with the whole of Germany and that, according to 
International Law, Germany continues to exist 
within its frontiers of 31 December 1937 until such 
time as a freely elected all-German government 
recognizes other frontiers. 

If, when the occasion arises, the Poles and the 
Germans enter into negotiations on frontier ques- 
tions in the same spirit that led to the conciliation 
between Germany and her Western neighbours, 
then Poles and Germans will also find their way 
to agreement. For in this question neither emotions 
nor alone the power of the victor, but rather 
reason, must prevail. 

In recent years the Federal Government has 
established official relations with Poland, Romania, 
Hungary and Bulgaria. It is also endeavouring to 
create such relations with Czechoslovakia as well, 
and would welcome a renewal of more friendly 
relations between the people of that state and the 
German people. 

In the opinion of the Federal Government the 
Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn asunder by 
Hitler and no longer has any territorial signifi- 
cance. The Federal Government, therefore, as it has 
often declared, does not assert any territorial 
claims against Czechoslovakia; it stresses that this 
is the official statement of German policy. 

The policy pursued by the Federal Government 
is neither revanchist nor restorative. It is looking 
forward, not backwards, and its aim is an equitable 
European order on the basis of peaceful agree- 
ments, an order in which all nations can live to- 
gether freely and as good neighbours. After all, 
the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern 
Europe belong to Europe as well. 

Already by its co-operation in the reshaping of 
Western Europe, the Federal Government has 
shown that its vision goes beyond the situation of 
pre-war Europe. It is seeking new forms in in- 
ternational co-operation because it is convinced 
that the old order of nation states as we have 
known them in our continent is no longer adequate 
to cope with the enormous political, economic and 
technical tasks of this age. We can only master 
these tasks if we combine our efforts. 

The Federal Government has therefore partici- 
pated in all plans for European unification. No- 
where has the idea of European integration found 
such a response as in the Federal Republic of 
Germany, whose Basic Law (Constitution) even pro- 
vides for the cession of sovereign rights to 
supranational organizations. A policy, therefore, 
which is aimed at achieving international co-opera- 

APRIL 25, 1966 


tion and association, serves the cause of peace; it 
needs peace if it is to accomplish its aims. 


But this peace is not secure. 

The Government of the USSR has announced time 
and again that it does not want war. The Federal 
Government presumes that the Soviet Union really 
means this, but the value of Soviet assurances is 
diminished by quite unambigruous and massive 
threats like those frequently made against the 
Federal Republic, as, for instance, in the note com- 
municated by the Soviet Government on 5 February 
1963 which states : 

"It is not hard to imagine that in the event 
of a thermo-nuclear war the mighty and con- 
centrated blows of rockets and nuclear weapons 
will inevitably come down over West Germany and 
that that country would not survive a third world 

And on 16 January 1963 the then Soviet Prime 
Minister said in East Berlin that the Federal Re- 
public of Germany "if a war breaks out, will bum 
out like a candle in the very first hour." 

Only last month Soviet marshals asserted they 
could "wipe any enemy from the face of the earth 
in no time at all"; they declared that the ar- 
rogance of the West German revanchists forced 
them to keep their powder dry but that "never 
mind, the means are there of cooling down the 
hotheads." Such language reveals a mentality which 
the Federal Government can only view with con- 
cern, and it has all the more reason as the Soviet 
Union does in fact possess the strongest ground 
forces in Europe and, furthermore, has at its dis- 
posal a very large arsenal of nuclear and hydrogen 
bombs, rockets as well as a fleet of nuclear bombers 
and guided-missile submarines. It has concentrated 
both its conventional and its nuclear forces in the 
Western part of the area under its rule. 


The Federal Republic of Germany did not have 
any troops of its own until 1955. Its security de- 
pended entirely on the protection afforded by its 
Western allies. It did not join NATO until May 
1955, when it began to build up the Federal Armed 
Forces. Today the Federal Republic of Germany 
has a defensive force but does not possess nuclear 
weapons nor has it such weapons at its disposal. 

Already in the Paris agreements of 1954, the 
Federal Government renounced the production of 
weapons of mass destruction especially nuclear 
weapons, and to that extent subjected itself to in- 
ternational control by the Western European Union. 

The Federal Government is determined in accord 
with its allies to defend itself against any attack on 
its freedom. However, it is not equipped for a 
war of aggression. Nor would it be capable of 
waging such a war since it has assigned all its 

combat units to NATO, an alliance concentrated 
only on defense. Within the framework of this 
alliance it advocates, together with other allies, 
that all parties to it should share in the responsibil- 
ity for nuclear defense. It does not, however, as it 
has repeatedly declared, seek national possession 
of nuclear weapons. 

Its policy is aimed at increasing security in 
Europe and at creating a situation in which 
threats, pressures, ultimatums, and use of force, in 
any form, are impossible. Its aim is to eliminate 
the sources of political tension. It therefore ad- 
vocates both a solution of the German problem and 
a consistent disarmament policy that will contribute 
towards safeguarding the peace. 

The Government of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, however, wants to do more than just 
make these general points. It therefore has the 
honour to submit to the United States Government 
the following ideas and suggestions regarding dis- 
armament and the safeguarding of peace. 

1. The Federal Government is aware of the 
dangers involved in a proliferation of nuclear 
weapons. If it proves too difficult to arrive at a 
comprehensive settlement of the non-prolifera- 
tion problem, the Federal (Government Would con- 
sider a step by step approach advisable. There are 
obviously only two ways for a state to come into 
possession of nuclear weapons, i.e., either by pro- 
ducing these weapons itself or by obtaining them 
from a nuclear power. Both these possibilities 
should be eliminated. 

As regards the first possibility, the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, as has already been mentioned, 
renounced the production of nuclear weapons as 
early as 1954 and to that extent submitted to in- 
ternational control. In the light of this the Federal 
Government appeals to all non-nuclear states who 
are members of military alliances in East or West 
to express the same renunciation and submit to a 
similar international control. This should be fol- 
lowed by further steps concerning the non-aligrned 

To eliminate also the second possibility of spread- 
ing nuclear weapons, the Federal Government sug- 
gests that the nuclear powers come to an agreement 
not to transfer any nuclear weapons to the national 
control of other countries. 

2. Nobody will be able to claim that the nuclear 
armaments race increases security in Europe and 
throughout the world. The Federal Government 
therefore declares that it is prepared to consent 
to any agreement in which the countries concerned 
pledge themselves not to increase the number of 
nuclear weapons in Europe but to reduce them in 
stages. Such an agreement, however, would have to 
extend to the whole of Europe, preserve the overall 
balance of power, provide for effective control, and 



be linked with essential progress in the solution of 
political problems in Central Europe. 

3. As a receiving country for fissionable material 
the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted to 
international controls which ensure that such ma- 
terial is not used for the production of nuclear 
weapons. As a supplying country the Federal 
Republic of Germany, in its supply agreements 
with receiving countries outside the EURATOM 
area, is prepared in general to demand similar con- 
trols by the International Atomic Energy Agency. 
Its attitude is based on the assumption that other 
supplying countries impose the same condition. 

4. The Federal Republic of Germany and its 
Western allies have already exchanged declarations 
renouncing the use of force. As the governments 
of the Soviet Union and some other East European 
countries have repeatedly expressed their anxiety, 
unfounded as it is, over a possible German attack, 
the Federal Government proposes that formal 
declarations be exchanged also with the govern- 
ments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia 
and any other East European state, in which either 
side gives an undertaking to the other people not 
to use force to settle international disputes. 

5. To dispel the mistrust wath regard to alleged 
German aggressive intentions, the Federal Govern- 
ment also proposes bilateral agreements with the 

Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian 
and Bulgarian governments concerning the ex- 
change of military observers to attend manoeuvres 
of armed forces. 

6. Finally, the Federal Government is prepared 
to participate and to co-operate in a constructive 
spirit in a world disarmament conference, or in any 
other disarmament conference, promising success. 

The Federal Government considers that these 
suggestions and proposals stand the best chance, 
at the present stage, of being carried into effect. 
It realizes, however, that more far-reaching pro- 
posals are required if the world is to be given 
security in every respect and if it is to be guarded 
against the risk of nuclear war. It is prepared to 
co-operate also in such more comprehensive plans; 
it believes, however, that all efforts to achieve 
security, disarmament and armaments control will 
fail to bring decisive and lasting success unless 
there is a simultaneous step-by-step removal of the 
causes of tension in the world. Looking at Europe, 
that means, above all, solving the German problem 
in an equitable manner by granting to the entire 
German nation the right freely to determine its 
political way of life and its destiny. 
Washington, 25 March 1966. 

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual Responsibilities 
and Our Mutual Dependence 

by George C. McGhee 

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^ 

I am pleased to have the opportunity to 
speak to you today on the subject of 
German-American relations. You are a com- 
munity of scholars — many mature experts in 
your chosen discipline, others in the making. 
Your minds have been trained to review- 
today's events not just in terms of their 
present interest but also according to their 
significance in the longer perspective of 

' Address made at the University of Erlangen at 
Erlangen, Germany, on Feb. 18. 

Since my arrival in Germany nearly 3 
years ago, I have often referred, on occa- 
sions like this, to the strong bonds of culture 
and kinship between the German and Amer- 
ican people. Our common values and interests 
have provided a natural and easy basis for 
my discussions with your leading men of 
affairs. Rather than trace for you tonight, 
however, the separate strands of the web 
that history has woven between us, I would 
like to remind you of the significance of 
our situation as kindred nations in the world 
of today. I would like to consider with you 

APRIL 25, 1966 


where the realities of this association can 
lead us. 

The fact that the United States and the 
Federal Republic of Germany are both 
members of the North Atlantic alliance is a 
prime element in the present international 
power relationship. The essential aspect of 
our association within this alliance is that it 
has been instrumental in developing the 
military strength and unity of Europe and 
the North Atlantic area for the benefit of 
the entire free world. 

To the credit of our cooperation under 
the Marshall Plan there stand the magnif- 
icent achievements here in Germany since 
1945 of the restoration to productive vital- 
ity of a society which had been crushed by 
defeat. Ahead there lies the opportunity for 
Germany to apply your new strength to the 
task of aiding others. We Americans hope 
also to be able to work together with Ger- 
many in such an endeavor. 

The decision announced by Secretary of 
State James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart on Sep- 
tember 6, 1946,2 to help bring Germany back 
to a place of honor among the free nations 
was not intended as a simple act of charity. 
Behind this decision to free the Germans from 
quarantine and to help them revive their 
productive capacity there was the implicit 
recognition of interdependence between the 
fate of Germany and our own future. 

The policy of Secretary Byrnes was 
founded upon the obvious fact — obvious, 
that is, to those not dedicated to the aim of 
dominating others — that the recovery of 
Germany was essential to the effective res- 
toration of peace in Europe. But this policy 
was founded also upon a broader principle — 
namely, that peace is indivisible and must be 
consolidated and defended whether the arena 
is a single country, a continent, or the world. 

That this should be cardinal principle of 
American policy attests to the great distance 
that the United States itself has come in its 
abandonment of isolation. And here you 
Germans — most especially you of the 
younger generation — have something funda- 

mental in common with us. For we have both 
come a long way. It took a reluctant involve- 
ment in two world wars to convince the 
American public that the United States could 
not put off its emergence on the world stage. 

That our growing strength could not be 
consistent with a merely passive world role 
took even longer to stir the conscience of the 
American people. Today, I believe, aware- 
ness of our international responsibilities 
does rule that conscience. The proof of this 
has come again and again since that day 
at Stuttgart in September 1946 — in Berlin, 
in Greece, in Korea, and in Viet-Nam — wher- 
ever the challenge arose to stand and be 
counted in the cause of peace. 

In the view of my Government, these in- 
ternational responsibilities extend not just 
to those areas where we have specific alliance 
commitments. They are worldwide. We do not 
expect them to be construed as limiting our 
worldwide interest in keeping the peace. As 
Vice President Humphrey told the conference 
of NATO parliamentarians last October, "The 
Atlantic nations cannot survive as an island 
of stability in a world of chaos." ^ Our 
fundamental task, as he said, is to concert 
our power for the purpose of building a 
world order capable of forestalling the out- 
break of crises. 

Germany's Sense of National Purpose 

The German people have arrived at this 
juncture in history by another route. For a 
long time, the sense of national identity in 
Germany was stunted by internal divisions. 
These were expressed in a bewildering vari- 
ety of local, regional, or other parochial loy- 
alties. Political unity was achieved relative- 
ly late, and partly as a consequence of this, 
the awakening to national consciousness and 
national pride came with an upsetting sud- 

The newly emergent sense of national pur- 
pose in Germany expressed itself most 
markedly in the form of policies aimed 
frankly at the aggrandizement of German 
power. Yet there were undercurrents pres- 

" See Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1946, p. 496. 

' Ibid., Oct. 25, 1965, p. 650. 



ent that flowed in the direction of commit- 
ment to the more wholesome attributes of 
the modern nation-state. There were, for ex- 
ample, early efforts toward political de- 
mocracy and representative government ; the 
flourishing of the cosmopolitan arts — music, 
painting, and literature; a deepening sense 
of civic and social responsibility which the 
famous Iron Chancellor, Prince von Bis- 
marck himself, applied in his welfare legisla- 
tion, a model of its type for the Western 
I{ These constructive impulses were brutally 
thrust aside. But now, the German people 
have found themselves again. We see in 
being a German Government able to take a 
leading part in the advancement of human 
welfare. I have emphasized on another oc- 
casion that we, the American people, think 
it high time that the world take adequate 
account of Germany's postwar record of 
political as well as material achievement. 
Germany has proved its capacity for de- 
mocracy — as well as European and world 

It is also time to take seriously Germany's 
expressed willingness to commit its national 
resources in assisting others. If the Ger- 
mans are to have any degree of conviction 
that their effort will be worth while, they 
must be conceded a fair chance to prove the 
sincerity of their purposes. The United 
States, for one, is ready to accept the stated 
intentions of the German leaders at their 
face value. 


The most important of Germany's inter- 
national engagements is the incorporation 
of nearly half a million German soldiers, 
sailors, and airmen into NATO commands. 
These forces are deployed not only in the di- 
rect defense of their country but also of the 
alliance as a whole. Alongside them are the 
forces of other countries — men and weapons 
whose presence serves as the clearest possi- 
ble illustration of the practical interdepend- 
ence of the partners in the NATO enter- 
prise. Germany's role in this enterprise is 
central. The territory of the Federal Re- 

public represents the front line of the free- 
world position in Europe. West Germany is, 
however, no mere outpost. It is, indeed, a 
firm bastion of the alliance structure. 

For us Americans, Germany has a special 
importance as an ally. We recognize that 
Germany's welfare is an essential compo- 
nent of the European stability and grov?th 
that we set out in 1945 to reestablish. With- 
out it, the Continent could hardly be con- 
sidered defensible at all. So long as the 
Europeans continue to desire our help in 
preserving their freedom, we shall remain 
prepared to give that help. This we shall 
do, not only to honor our treaty commit- 
ments but in simple self-interest. For to 
anyone examining the situation of the 
United States as a world power in the nu- 
clear age, it must be clear that our fate is 
linked inseparably with that of free Europe. 
Our heavy investment of American men, 
material, and technology in the Federal 
Republic — and Berlin — exists in order to 
defend not just Germany or Europe but the 
United States as well. 

I cannot take seriously the notion spread 
by some that the United States does not 
feel genuinely committed to the defense of 
Germany and Europe. We adhere to that 
commitment; we have no thought of depart- 
ing from it. Let me read to you what Under 
Secretary of State George Ball told his 
friends in this country on the occasion of 
the fourth German-American Conference, 
November 1964 : * 

We have not stationed our troops in Europe to let 
them be overrun by a hostile power. We have not 
built our massive strategic nuclear force and tar- 
geted a considerable part of it against vyeapons 
whose only target is Europe with any thought that 
the force would not be used if Europe were attacked. 

European Unity 

There are other German commitments 
which involve broader and longer range 
objectives, for example, the German com- 
mitment to the goal of European unity. The 
German Government has, at every juncture 
in the evolution of the European communi- 

* Ibid., Nov. 30, 1964, p. 773. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


ties, demonstrated its readiness to place the 
common welfare of the group of nations 
ahead of its own advantage — a demonstra- 
tion above all of your conviction that the 
goal is indeed attainable. 

Your leaders are not blind to the difficul- 
ties that remain in the way of achieving 
European unity. They have combined pa- 
tience with persistence. They have been 
guided throughout by the belief that what 
unites the people of Western Europe is far 
stronger than their remaining differences. 
If the German link to the United States 
through NATO arose in the first place as a 
matter of unavoidable necessity, the German 
commitment to Europe is a matter of free 
as well as enlightened choice. 

German statesmen have not permitted in- 
cidental obstacles to deter them from mov- 
ing with all practical speed toward the ob- 
jective of a united Europe. From the first, 
they have recognized the importance of 
creating a sound basis for this new Europe 
through reconciliation with France. German 
and French policy has wisely been directed 
not only toward eliminating old rivalries but 
toward organizing effective consultation and 
cooperation where the two countries have a 
common interest. We welcome a Franco- 
German association which seeks to further, 
in proper phasing, the twin enterprises of 
European unity and Atlantic partnership. 

Let me say here that this aim is in no 
sense contradictory to the U.S. interest. 
Apart from the obvious importance of 
Franco-German friendship to the health and 
stability of the Western alliance as a whole, 
we regard the effective cooperation of these 
two great peoples as indispensable if there 
is to be any durable association among Euro- 
peans. This is true whether limited to the 
economic field — or extending to political 
forms. Only in this way can Europe's future 
be assured. 

I might remind you that the movement 
toward an integrated Europe, to which 
German national policy has dedicated itself, 
owes a great deal to the original stimulant 
of the Marshall Plan. The program of 
Marshall Plan aid was put into effect, you 

may recall, because the United States Gov- 
ernment felt it had a heavy stake in Eu- 
rope's recovery. This meant not just the 
recovery of Germany alone, or of France 
alone, but of all of Europe together. We 
still have a heavy stake in the security and 
welfare of Europe. We continue to feel that 
European unity would serve our own inter- 
est — as well as Europe's. 

Reunification and Eastern Policy 

Uppermost in most Germans' minds is the 
great unresolved problem of German reuni- 
fication. Since there are, unfortunately, 
virtually no signs of progress, patience — 
along with persistence — must still be exer- 
cised. I can assure you, however, that we 
have no intention of resigning ourselves to 
the Soviet refusal to permit Germany to be 
reunified in freedom. 

Although we, as you, have forsworn the 
use of force in its solution, our conscience 
rejects the arbitrary restraints that prevent 
people of the same nation and culture, 
members of the same families even, from 
living and working together in peace. We 
agree with your leaders when they empha- 
size that this is not exclusively a question 
of Germany's partition but also a result of 
the partition — let us rather say the disrup- 
tion — of Europe as a whole. 

My Government is equally convinced that 
German unity is the key to peace in Europe. 
Along with you, we will persist in the effort 
to persuade the Soviet leaders to discard the 
long-outmoded concept of power politics, 
which holds that territory once occupied 
should not be relinquished while force suf- 
fices to hold it. We will seek to convince 
the Soviets that their interests would be 
far better served, in the long run, if they 
allowed the barrier that cuts through the 
heart of Europe to fall away. 

When that happens, the energies of the 
Eastern European nations will be released 
for more constructive purposes. They will 
be able not only to deal more flexibly and 
effectively with their own domestic needs 
but also, through the free exchange of goods 
and ideas with their Western neighbors, to 



comprehend today's trend toward the con- 
cept of a common European citizenship. 
Thus they could regain a sense of identity 
with the European cultural and intellectual 

I am confident that, if the Soviet leaders 
would only be willing to try to understand 
your Government's effort to revive a rela- 
tionship of trust with the peoples of Eastern 
Europe, they would find less reason for will- 
fully misinterpreting your motives. They 
would cease crying their tired slogan of 
"Beware of German revanchism." We know 
what difficulties burden your effort to clear 
a pathway toward the unity of Eastern and 
Western Europe as a whole. We wish you 
well in this effort. 

International Trade 

Of great importance, not only to both 
countries but to the world, are the efforts 
we and Germany, as well as many others, 
are making to liberalize and expand world 
trade and to deal with some of the pressing 
specific trading problems. The United 
States and Germany, as the two leading 
world trading countries, have obvious and 
important roles to play in the trade field. We 
both attach the highest importance to GATT 
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] 
and to a successful Kennedy Round of tariff 
reductions. Both countries are committed in 
the Kennedy Round to make a special effort 
to reduce barriers on trade items of interest 
to the developing countries, without asking 
full reciprocity for them. 

Moving from joint German-U.S. interest 
in the Kennedy Round, our interdependence 
is most pronounced in our direct trade. 
Total trade between our two countries is 
now in the neighborhood of $3.2 billion, or 
over 2 percent of total world trade! From 
the end of World War II until 1963 the 
United States was the major foreign trade 
partner of the Federal Republic. As a result 
of the sharp expansion of trade among the 
EEC [European Economic Community] 
countries, France has now advanced to first 
place among Germany's foreign trade part- 
ners, with the United States in second posi- 

tion. The United States still retains, how- 
ever, its long-held position as the leading 
supplier to Germany. 

Total German imports from the United 
States, including defense items, amounted 
to approximately $2 billion, both in 1963 
and 1964. Commercial imports have con- 
tinued to expand, climbing an additional 11 
percent during the first 9 months in 1965 
to a level of about $1.3 billion. German 
exports to the United States (Germany's 
fourth largest customer) reached a record 
high in 1964 of $1.2 billion, a 14-percent 
increase over the preceding year. German 
exports continued to expand in 1965, in- 
creasing 18 percent over the previous year. 
The largest single group was, of course, 
motor vehicles, accounting for over one- 
third of total German exports. 

The outlook for a further expansion of 
U.S.-German trade in 1966 is favorable. 
U.S. deliveries of consumer goods to West 
Germany are expected to grow further as 
a result of the continuing upward trend of 
personal incomes and the greater competi- 
tiveness of U.S. products. West German 
agricultural imports (which account for 
about 30 percent of U.S. deliveries) will 
probably continue the upward trend in evi- 
dence for some years; in particular, grain 
imports are expected to grow further. 

In the capital goods sector, prospects are 
less favorable because investment by Ger- 
man industry in plant and equipment is 
beginning to level off. Nevertheless, demand 
for automation and electronic equipment of 
the types supplied by the United States may 
very well increase. 

Although West Germany is a major pro- 
ducer of agricultural products, whose value 
of production amounts to about DM25 bil- 
lion annually, or almost 5 percent of the 
gross national product, it is also among the 
world's largest importers of agricultural 
products. The United States has the good 
fortune to be able to supply approximately 
13 percent of Germany's total agricultural 
imports. Our major exports complement 
German requirements, especially in the raw 
materials, such as soybeans, food grains, 

APRIL 25, 1966 


cotton, tobacco, oil meal, vegetable oils, and 
hides and skins. In turn, although our im- 
ports from Germany are largely industrial, 
the United States benefits from imports of 
German wines, beers, hops, leather, and 
specially processed meat products. On bal- 
ance, each country has something agricul- 
tural to contribute to the increased well- 
being of its fellow world citizens. 

Assistance to Developing Areas 

In all the major aspects of policy that 
we have so far reviewed — NATO, European 
unity, the problem of reconstructing a di- 
vided Europe — Germany is playing a key 
and a constructive role. The German concept 
of its own national interest has followed the 
fruitful patterns of cooperative bilateral and 
multilateral association. At the same time, 
your domestic institutions have become 
firmly established. They have become ad- 
justed to the pressures of a complex indus- 
trial society. The Federal Republic of Ger- 
many has become a mature power, fully 
capable of making its own independent con- 
tribution to the solution of our international 

If we consider the responsibilities which 
both the United States and Germany recog- 
nize in the economic field, one of the most 
important relates to the developing coun- 
tries. The hallmark of today's world is the 
inescapable interdependence of the nations. 
The measure of a nation's true worth — its 
proper rank in the company of great powers 
— lies in its readiness to marshal its re- 
sources to help other nations who are less 
fortunate. It is a clear objective of our own 
national policy to do just that. This is what 
President Johnson aims at when he speaks 
of internationalizing his conception of the 
Great Society. It is not only impossible, but 
self-defeating, to deny progress to the less 
developed nations of the world. 

The exercise of international responsibil- 
ity is not just to play the policeman's role, 
however unavoidable that may sometimes 
be. Both we and the Germans have been 
ready to assist directly through our bilateral 

aid programs and in concert with other 
countries through various international in- 
stitutions such as the World Bank. We have 
both contributed extensively through these 
international agencies to improve living 
standards in the developing world. Our own 
program has been a large one. 

Today the United States Government pro- 
vides economic and technical assistance of 
significant proportions to 80 nations, com- 
prising nearly half of the world's popula- 
tion. Three-fourths of these nations did not 
exist in their present state before World 
War II. Over 20 years, beginning with the 
Marshall Plan, we have spent more than $100 
billion on aid grants and loans. Our surplus 
agriculture food grants and sales for local 
currency alone have totaled over §12 billion. 
In the current year we shall spend in the 
neighborhood of §4i/4 billion and will have 
aid programs in about 90 countries. 

We must help these countries not only to 
prevent social disorder and unrest which 
could lead to their disaffection or loss to 
the free world. We need to help them in 
organizing and developing their own human 
and material resources in the interest — ours 
as well as theirs — of building a stable free- 
world community. The resistance of the un- 
derdeveloped countries to the political dis- 
eases of our time will be effective only if 
they can develop a firm material basis for 
their political institutions. 

The Federal Republic has for some years 
been active in this field. Germany's develop- 
ment aid program began in 1960. It is the 
largest after our own in terms of numbers 
of countries assisted — more than 65. Offi- 
cial statistics reveal that more than DM26 
billion has already been expended on devel- 
opment aid, including DM10 billion by orga- 
nizations of private citizens. The program 
includes, as does our own, technical assist- 
ance grants in addition to development 
loans. Currently Germany is providing tech- 
nical assistance to over 90 countries. I note 
appreciatively that South Viet-Nam is one 
such country where extensive German eco- 
nomic aid has been given and where more 



aid of a humanitarian nature is promised. 
In addition, the German Peace Corps now 
has over 500 volunteers operating in 12 

But there is more to be done. Not least, 
there is the challenge to learn from each 
other's experience — at home and abroad. 

We see substantial possibilities, for ex- 
ample, in cooperative efforts between our 
two countries — and also on a Europe-wide 
basis — to overcome our most persistent en- 
vironmental problems. And what we can do 
for ourselves, we can help others do. Next 
month our distinguished Secretary of the 
Interior, Mr. Udall, will be visiting the 
Federal Republic.^ He will be consulting 
with governmental and business leaders 
here on problems ranging from the reduc- 
tion of air pollution to efficient management 
of natural resources. The systematic ex- 
change of information and joint study of 
our most pressing problems will be orga- 
nized on a large scale. Through these and 
other investigations, we can not only make 
progress in removing the imperfections in 
our own society but in assisting others to 
do the same. 

The Federal Republic of Germany has re- 
sources to dedicate, on behalf of all the Ger- 
man people, to the realization of the ideals 
of justice and human progress. This is not 
a task for cynics. Above and beyond the 
possession of material resources, it will re- 
quire the determination to persist for the 
sake of an ideal. For young people like your- 
selves, who can bring a fresh imagination 
to your encounters with the issues and 
problems of the contemporary world, this 
appeal should have special meaning. The 
fulfillment of this ideal will be your task — 
a task which you will share with the young 
generations of my own country and of the 
other Western democracies. As a community 
of free nations we can together help the 
world to achieve a level of development 
which earlier generations could not even 

U.S. Comments on Sales 
of Aircraft to Jordan 

Department Statement ^ 

The U.S. Government has, over the years, 
provided Jordan with limited amounts of 
arms to meet its defense requirements. We 
can confirm that an agreement has recently 
been reached between the United States 
and Jordan providing for Jordanian pur- 
chase of a limited number of military jet 
aircraft for its air defense system to replace 
older models. 

Just as we will continue to refrain from 
becoming a principal supplier of arms to 
the Near East, so does it remain our policy 
not to discuss the specifics of arms trans- 
actions as they occur. Therefore, we are 
not in a position to go into the details of the 
equipment sold in this case. 

Our sale to Jordan was made both in the 
light of Jordan's defense requirements and 
in accordance with our policy of preventing 
instability from developing the Near East. 
It is consistent with our due regard for area 
security and our general restraint as to the 
equipment supplied. We do not believe that 
this sale will be a destabilizing factor or 
contribute to imbalance in the area. In this 
connection, we continue to regret the mas- 
sive Soviet sales of arms to certain coun- 
tries of the Near East which have intensi- 
fied the arms race in that area, and we 
will continue to strive for agreed limitations 
on arms buildup there. 

Letters of Credence 


The newly appointed Ambassador of 
Laos, Khamking Souvanlasy, presented his 
credentials to President Johnson on April 6. 
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and 
the President's reply, see Department of 
State press release dated April 6. 

' For a White House announcement of Feb. 26, 
see ibid.. Mar. 21, 1966, p. 463. 

• Read to news correspondents by a Department 
spokesman on Apr. 2. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


The United States and Japan: Different Paths to Common Goals 

by Robert W. Barnett 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^ 

Distinguished authorities have already 
talked to you about social and political devel- 
opments in Japan, Japan's industrial capabil- 
ities, Japan's role in world commerce, Japan's 
potential for contributing to the growth of 
developing countries in Asia, and operational 
problems that arise when Americans do 
business with Japanese. 

My task is to discuss United States for- 
eign policy and Japan. 

I will speak briefly about the scale of 
activity, the common appreciation of en- 
vironment, and the vital links which give 
firm foundation for the partnership which 
has been established between our two coun- 
tries and how it is that we can respond dif- 
ferently to challenges in the Pacific basin 
and still contribute to a common purpose. 

What makes countries big or little? Ordi- 
nary maps show Communist China to be 27 
times the size of Japan: 3.7 million square 
miles as compared with 142,000 squai-e 
miles. Adjust that map to show Communist 
China and Japan in terms of population, and 
Communist China will be seven times as 
large as Japan: 763 million compared with 
98 million. Adjust it to compare Communist 
China's gross national product with Japan's, 
and Japan will be larger than Communist 
China. A map showing volume of world trade 
will show Japan over five times as large as 

' Address made at Palm Springs, Calif., on Mar. 
3 before a conference on "Doing Business With 
Japan," sponsored by the University of California 
at Los Angeles. 

Communist China : $16 billion of annual ex- 
ports and imports for Japan compared with 
just over $3 billion for Communist China. 

A most precious social asset is density of 
trained brains. Crosshatch a map to reflect 
this resource in Japan and in Communist 
China, and for Japan the map will be eight 
times as dark as for China: school enroll- 
ment of youths 18-24 amounts to some 3 
percent of that age in China, 25 percent in 

Communist China is justifiably seen as a 
major presence in world power relations 
today. So is Japan — in the region of which 
China is a central part and throughout the 

Problems of Common Concern 

War in Viet-Nam lies close to the heart of 
all foreign policy calculations in the Pacific 
basin. Differing involvement in the day-to- 
day military confrontation itself must not be 
permitted, however, to obscure the fact that 
Japan and the United States share a vital 
and continuing interest in the uneasy envi- 
ronment of which Viet-Nam and Communist 
China are troubled parts. In that total en- 
vironment are characteristics which existed 
before the violence of today and will persist 
after the violence has been stopped. 

What are some of them? 

The area does not enjoy a tradition of 
community such as has grown over the past 
two centuries on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Among themselves few Asian societies 




have yet come to feel deeply interdependent. 

Throughout the area, almost all of the 
countries are in the process of fashioning 
each for itself a sense of valid national 
identity and purpose. Three of the countries 
suffer the trauma of being divided. 

The area is experiencing, thanks largely 
to the beneficence of medical science and in- 
creasingly effective public health adminis- 
tration, extremely high rates of population 
growth and grovi^ing awareness of shortage 
of investment capital needed for sustained 
growth of productive capabilities. Invest- 
ment capital generated from the local sav- 
ings and brought in from outside is inade- 

Much of the area bears heavy — in Viet- 
Nam, massive — military burdens, and most 
of the area knows the crippling effects, 
psychologically, of uncertainties brought by 
fear of foreign aggression. 

Sensitive people in government, in univer- 
sities, amongst newspapermen and the gen- 
eral public, crave the reassurance of faith in 

I have had the privilege of participating 
in three of the last four annual meetings of 
the United States-Japan Joint Cabinet ses- 
sions on economic problems.^ There has 
been in this short period of time a striking 
progression by our Cabinet members from 
focus on bilateral economic links and prob- 
lems toward focus on basic problems of 
common concern, some of which I have tried 
just now to identify. Most of the time we 
think and talk alike about them. 

Differences can and do trouble the part- 
nership of the United States and Japan. At 
a 3-day meeting of the American Assembly 
last fall, we tried to sort out reasons why. 
We bear wider world responsibilities than 
does Japan. There is a disparity in our size, 
wealth, and power: Japan accounts for one- 
twelfth of United States foreign trade, 
whereas the United States accounts for al- 

most one-third of Japan's foreign trade. We 
often talk about problems from different 
starting points: Japan's attitudes toward 
China and Taiwan have a different history 
from ours. We look upon most economic prob- 
lems in business terms, while Japan often 
believes they involve matters of national 
prestige. Many Japanese and many Amer- 
icans have been approaching problems of 
security and military power differently : Ar- 
ticle 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits 
wars as an instrument of national policy, and 
many Japanese want to disregard, or regard 
as not their business, use of military force 
as a factor in national power. Our two 
languages are profoundly different and dif- 
ficult to master. There are, I am told, 27 
ways to say the single word "I" in Japanese. 

We have learned to make allowances for 
these differences and in fact turn them to 
mutual advantage. We respect and trust the 
creative potentiality of diversity among self- 
determining societies and applaud the grow- 
ing polycentrism we see among Communist 
states. From different starting points our 
two countries work together with astonishing 
harmony of purpose in the United Nations, in 
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade], in the OECD [Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development], in 
the Development Assistance Committee, in 
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], in 
the IBRD [International Bank for Recon- 
struction and Development], and in the 
"Group of Ten." We are entering into the 
great adventure of launching the Asian De- 
velopment Bank on the same footing.^ We 
will each subscribe 20 percent of the Bank's 
loan capital. 

We rely upon each other's imagination and 
initiatives in developing new thoughts for 
development possibilities in Southeast Asia. 
We applaud normalization of relations be- 
tween Japan and Korea and look to the ben- 
efits this collaboration can make for the 

' For text of a joint communique issued at the 
conclusion of the 1965 meeting, see Bulletin of Aug. 
9, 1965, p. 247. 

' For remarks made by President Johnson upon 
signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966, 
see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


growth processes of a Korea to which we 
have long been offering help in both the 
economic and defense fields. 

Japan shares our friendly feelings toward 
the people of Taiwan. 

I will add nothing to what others have said 
about the dynamism and diversity of United 
States-Japanese economic interdependence. 
Today this relation suffers few real friction 

Wonderfully rich exchanges are taking 
place between architects, scientists, doctors, 
artists of our two countries. Tourism 
delights and enriches understanding of thou- 
sands of Japanese and Americans every 

But the United States-Japanese relation- 
ship is not trouble free. 

Today, the Government in Japan supports 
President Johnson's stand against aggres- 
sion in Viet-Nam, but it confronts a press 
and public opinion which often condemns the 
United States for this involvement, in part 
because they disapprove of our policies to- 
ward Communist China and they fear escala- 
tion of hostilities. The Japanese Government 
does not conduct itself as we must in the Far 
East, and we do not insist that it do so. For 
it to assess reality, make independent deci- 
sions, and commit resources to serve its 
basic national self-interest will, we believe, 
serve common ultimate goals even though 
we may move along different paths. 

Japan's Economic and Social Development 

A great contribution Japan can make to 
our common hope for a restoration of peace 
and a resumption of effective growth proc- 
esses in the Pacific area is just to live up to 
its own potentialities for effective national 
performance. Its past accomplishments have 
been spectacular. Japan's record of economic 
development since 1952 surpasses that of 
any country in the world. From the years 
1951-53 to 1963-64 its real national income 
almost tripled. Its rate of annual gain was 
12 percent in 1960-62 and almost 10 per- 
cent in 1963-64. In 1965 there was a tem- 
porary slowdown, but in 1966 its growth is 
expected to be about 714 percent. Japan can- 

not be a simple model for all countries to 
slavishly imitate, but there are components 
for Japan's success that merit close study. 

I will mention only the following compo- 
nents: education, frugality, a low rate of 
population growth, mutual respect between 
government and business, readiness to com- 
pete, modest military spending, and a dem- 
ocratic political process. 

Compulsory education in Japan has been 
in effect many years and is accompanied by 
a high rate of attendance. Ninety-five per- 
cent of the population is literate. There is 
one teacher per 120 persons. And 25 percent 
of the total population is in school, and in- 
stitutions of higher learning carry the scien- 
tist and the scholar to the limits of their 

Frugality is the midwife of wealth. Of 
Japan's total gross national product, it 
saved 28.6 percent in 1951-53, increasing it 
to 38 percent in 1963-64. A predominant 
part of this saving went into productive 
capacity. In short, saving went into wealth- 
producing purposes. 

In 1948 a eugenics law was passed which 
legalized all techniques for effective family 
planning. A legal framework thus existed 
for bringing the Japanese population growth 
rate below 1 percent a year compared to an 
average of over 2 percent for the Far East 
as a whole, with percentages like 3.5 in 
Taiwan, 2.8 in South Korea, 3.4 in South 
Viet-Nam, 3.2 in the Philippines, and 3.2 in 
Malaysia. Japan's achievement goes far 
toward explaining why Japan was able to in- 
vest in industry instead of such economi- 
cally less productive purposes as schools, 
hospitals, housing, et cetera. In other coun- 
tries with lower incomes to begin with and 
higher rates of population growth, heavy in- 
vestment has been necessary merely to pre- 
vent decline in per capita national welfare. 

A tradition for mutual respect between 
government and business goes back for many 
decades. An illuminating discussion of how 
each helps the other is contained in William 
W. Lockwood's contribution to the American 
Assembly's The United States and Japan. 
Suffice it to say here that the Government 



is conscious of requirements of the national 
economy as a whole, but great scope is al- 
lowed the private enterpriser to compete, in- 
novate, and organize resources for effective 
economic performance — both in the indus- 
trial and agricultural sectors. It will surprise 
many to be reminded that though Japan is 
foreign-trade minded, 90 percent of Japan's 
economic life involves operations wholly 
within Japan. Japan has created a national 

Japan is a member of the OECD and 
GATT. It subscribes to the belief that max- 
imum benefit for all will come with move- 
ment toward a worldwide multilateral non- 
discriminatory competitive trading commu- 
nity. Most of its leaders accept, in principle, 
the conclusions of the U.S. Committee for 
Economic Development and Japan's own 
CED (Keizai Doyukai) that Japan has 
reached a point where it does not need to 
protect itself commercially against others 
and should be treated by others on the same 
footing as the other major industrial so- 
cieties of the world. Japan is ready to com- 
pete. It also has shown by its membership 
in the Development Assistance Committee in 
Paris, and the fact that it is the fifth larg- 
est aid-giving country in the world, that it 
recognizes a difference between what rules 
should apply among the advanced countries 
and what obligations should be borne by ad- 
vanced countries with respect to the needs 
of countries in earlier stages of economic de- 

Since 1945 only a very modest part of 
Japan's national resources has been devoted 
to military use. In 1965 only 1.3 percent of 
Japan's GNP went into its military budget. 
Relief from this burden has contributed in 
a fundamental way to Japan's capability for 
economic and social growth. 

Side by side with economic achievement 
has been the accomplishment of Japan in 
relying upon the operation of vigorous in- 
terplay between the executive and the leg- 
islative branches of the Government, under 
scrutiny of an energetic press, as the 
method of evolving national decisions. 

A degree of national consensus on domes- 

tic questions is being achieved so that it is 
in the field of foreign rather than domestic 
policy that parties of the right and of the 
left enter dispute. 

There is much from the Japanese experi- 
ence and system that others can learn, both 
in the Pacific area and elsewhere, both the 
developing countries and those which regard 
themselves as well advanced. 

U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam 

A different system, and less effective, 
has been developing since 1949 on the China 
mainland, now deeply committed to support 
of aggression in Southeast Asia. For Japan, 
no less than for other Asian countries, this 
alarming commitment is a fact of fundamen- 
tal importance, the main obstacle for that 
expansion of contacts and enlargement of 
trade and friendly relations in an environ- 
ment of national safety which the Japanese 
people greatly crave. 

The people of Japan, I think, should ap- 
plaud President Johnson's formulation on 
February 23-* of what the United States in- 
volvement in Viet-Nam does and does not 
imply for today and the future. 

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the 
success of aggression. 

Our measured use of force must be con- 
tinued. But this is prudent firmness under 
control. There is not, and there will not be, 
a mindless escalation. 

General Westmoreland's needs will be met. 

We are in Viet-Nam with five allies giving 
vital support, each with his own strength 
and in his own way, to the cause of freedom 
in Southeast Asia. 

We have threatened no one — and we will 
not. We seek the end of no regime — and we 
will not. 

The pledge of Honolulu^ will be kept, and 
the pledge of Baltimore * stands open — to 
help the men of the North when they have 
the wisdom to be ready. 

We Americans must understand how fun- 

* For text, see ibid.. Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390. 

= For background, see ihtd., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302. 

'Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


damental is the meaning of this second war — 
the war on want. 

We stand for self-determination — for free 
elections — and we will honor their result. 

Our undiscouraged efforts for peace will 

There is no computer that can tell the 
hour and day of peace, but we do know that 
it will come only to the steadfast, never to 
the weak in heart. 

We keep more than a specific treaty 

promise in Viet-Nam. We keep the faith for 

In a Far East — and a world — torn by con- 
flict and burdened with anxiety, Japan and 
the United States strive together along dif- 
ferent paths and using differing resources to 
construct a world order in which the un- 
profitability of aggression is clearly dem- 
onstrated and the possibilities for welfare, 
freedom, and self-respect by individuals 
and societies are a valid hope. 


Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign Aid 
in the Near East and South Asia 

statement by Raymond A. Hare 

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^ 

I am pleased to have this opportunity to 
discuss with you the proposals for the 1967 
foreign economic assistance programs. It so 
happens that I have had a certain amount 
of firsthand experience in these matters — 
most recently as Ambassador in Turkey — 
and out of that experience has come a con- 
viction that our assistance programs are an 
important and effective element for the 
achievement of our foreign policy objectives. 

In compliance with the desires of the Con- 
gress and the President we have carefully 

^ Made before the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on Mar. 22. For a statement on the Foreign 
Assistance Program for 1967 made before the com- 
mittee by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 17, see Bulletin 
of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 628. 

reexamined our requirements in the area 
and the extent to which the individual na- 
tions are making genuine efforts on their 
behalf. The program proposals have been 
modified to meet new circumstances, to em- 
phasize and accelerate self-help, and to focus 
attention on agriculture, health, and educa- 
tion. As they now stand, they are designed 
as the minimum consistent with the achieve- 
ment of our objectives in the Near East and 
South Asia. 

There has been no basic change during 
the past year in the great significance of 
the area to us or in the nature of the prob- 
lems with which we must grapple. Most of 
the states of the area are underdeveloped, 
subject to internal stresses and strains, 
threatened by domestic disruptive forces 



and, in some cases, by external power. They 
very much want for themselves true na- 
tional independence and the modernization 
that will meet the reasonable expectations 
of their people. Their basic objectives are 
generally, but not necessarily always, con- 
sistent with ours. 

The question of the bearing of recent 
events on the achievement of these objec- 
tives can be best introduced through a sum- 
mary review of the three subregions of the 
area. I turn first to South Asia, since 
there have been significant and dramatic 
developments in that region and since a 
large part of our assistance expenditures 
are made there. 

South Asia 

South Asia is the heartland of non-Com- 
munist mainland Asia. The will and deter- 
mination of the peoples of this region to 
withstand the pressures from Communist 
China will, in the long run, bear decisively 
on the question of whether Communist 
China can be contained and brought to re- 
spect the dictates of international law and 
society. We should not let this view of the 
importance of the region be obscured. 

The war last fall between India and Paki- 
stan was a tragic experience for us as well 
as for the belligerents, but, like many trag- 
edies, this one has been followed by con- 
structive action. The participants seem now 
to have a new and sober appreciation of the 
fact that peace on the subcontinent is es- 
sential if their universally felt aspirations 
for national security and a better life are to 
be achieved. Even the Soviet Union has 
found it has served its interests to play a 
role of moderation through the initiative 
which it took at Tashkent. 

On our side we, too, have felt the neces- 
sity of carefully reviewing our policy with 
respect to the subcontinent. In so doing we 
have concluded that future aid to India and 
Pakistan must be related rather directly to 
progress toward securing the peace between 
them, since without peace economic develop- 
ment is not possible, and without economic 
development stability is uncertain. We have 

made this quite clear to both India and Paki- 
stan. As you know, we suspended all mili- 
tary aid and sales deliveries to both coun- 
tries when the fighting broke out last fall. 
Although we have recently relaxed our pol- 
icies slightly on sales of limited and selected 
nonlethal military items, our embargo is 
otherwise still in effect. 

Our recently indicated willingness to ne- 
gotiate commodity loans of $50 million for 
Pakistan and $100 million for India reflects 
satisfaction with the progress made at the 
Tashkent conference and thereafter. We 
trust that a continuing process of reconcili- 
ation will permit the flow of free-world 
aid resources to build up once again to the 
level required to provide the critical margin 
between stagnation and progress. 

Our future economic aid to the subconti- 
nent, as to other recipients, will continue to 
be clearly contingent on the readiness of 
the recipients to undertake those measures 
of self-help which experience has shown are 
necessary if our assistance is to achieve its 
agreed objectives. We have had encourag- 
ing signs that a large measure of underlying 
agreement has developed amongst us as to 
what these measures should include. The 
new-found determination of India's Govern- 
ment to overcome its food deficit problem 
and its dependence on U.S. P.L. 480 wheat 
shipments is an outstanding case in point. 
While drought and war set back the econ- 
omy in 1965-66, the Indian Government ap- 
pears determined to do the necessary trim- 
ming and to make the necessary policy ad- 
justments to attract more foreign private 
capital and improve its general economic 
performance. With our help, coupled with 
that of others, India should be able to make 
substantial economic progress and maintain 
an influential stake for free-world interests 
in the Asian struggle against Chinese com- 

Pakistan's good economic performance is 
a matter of record. In the 5-year plan 
which ended last year, sound planning and 
increasing reliance on private initiative and 
market forces helped the economy to achieve 
impressive progress in all key sectors, and 

APRIL 25, 1966 


the GNP growth rate exceeded 5 percent. 
Like India, unfortunately, Pakistan has suf- 
fered the effects of drought and war during 
the past year. 

India and Pakistan have many essential 
assets, but they do not have the necessary 
capital. We would hope that our help, friend- 
ship, and encouragement may serve to as- 
sist them in promoting their objectives of 
economic self-sufficiency and internal and 
external stability. We would hope that this 
would also contribute to a more stable power 
balance in Asia. That is our objective. I be- 
lieve it is attainable. And I believe it is 
easily important enough, in terms of our 
interests in the seventies and eighties as we 
see them now, to justify a substantial com- 
mitment of U.S. resources in support of the 
self-help efforts of India and Pakistan them- 

Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Cyprus 

Greece, Turkey, and Iran, associated with 
the West in the NATO and CENTO [Cen- 
tral Treaty Organization] alliances, con- 
tinue to provide a stable political and mil- 
itary corridor that is significant for the en- 
tire area. With U.S. assistance and with in- 
creasing efforts on their part, each of these 
countries has stood firm against Commu- 
nist attempts at direct or indirect penetra- 
tion, and each is making renewed efforts to 
strengthen its political, social, and economic 

In Iran the Shah and his Government con- 
tinue their wide-ranging efforts to reform 
landholding, increase literacy, improve local 
government, and otherwise strengthen and 
modernize the social fabric. In addition, with 
increasing American private investment, the 
country is intensifying its efforts to mod- 
ernize its economy and make it more pro- 

In Greece a lengthy political crisis accel- 
erated the economic decline that had be- 
come evident early in 1965; thanks, how- 
ever, to courageous self-help measures by 
the Government and to external assistance, 
especially food and feed grains from the 

United States, the downward economic trend 
has been arrested. 

Free national elections in Turkey have 
brought a pragmatic, development-minded 
government into power with a substantial 
majority. Despite the many problems facing 
it, we are confident that Turkey should be 
able to continue its progress toward eco- 
nomic and social modernization in accord 
with its development plan and within a dem- 
ocratic framework. 

Although the Cyprus problem has had 
unfortunate repercussions in Turkey's rela- 
tions with Greece and also given rise to dis- 
cussion of broader foreign policy implica- 
tions, Turkey remains solidly within NATO 
and our own working relationship remains 
close and firm. 

The Cyprus situation itself is fortunately 
more quiet, but the basic problem remains 
unresolved. We continue to support efforts 
by the United Nations and by the parties 
themselves to work their way toward a last- 
ing solution to this serious problem. 

Near East 

Most states of the Near East have con- 
tinued to make economic and social progress 
despite the political tensions that surround 
and often embroil them. It is a restless 
area, sensitive to the stirrings of Arab 
nationalism and still caught up politically, 
economically, and emotionally in the per- 
sistent Arab-Israel dispute. This tangled 
matter continues to defy settlement. The 
past year witnessed no serious increases in 
tension or outbreaks of violence between the 
parties, however, and most states of the 
area are increasingly preoccupied with de- 
velopmental and other internal problems. 
At the same time much attention remains 
focused on the Yemen situation. While there 
has been no fighting there in recent months, 
the agreement of last summer between King 
Faisal [Saudi Arabia] and President Nas- 
ser [United Arab Republic] to settle the 
problem has yet to be implemented. An- 
other source of concern to which we con- 
tinue to devote considerable attention is 



the arms rivalry throughout the Near East. 
It remains our policy to support the inde- 
pendence and integrity of all states in the 
area. We continue to work with them in 
helping bring about the conditions of sta- 
bility in which an enduring Middle East 
peace can be achieved and in aiding them to 
recognize Communist blandishments for 
what they are. Most of these nations have 
shown the will and the ability to resist 
Communist penetration. By supplying selec- 
tive economic assistance we are making it 
possible for many Near Eastern countries to 
register real economic growth and thereby 
meet the aspirations of their people for 
greater opportunities and a higher standard 
of living. 

U.S. Aid a Crucial Element 

The news headlines of the year have im- 
pressed upon us the fact that in some coun- 
tries the search for modernization, national 
strength, and international peace has been 
thwarted or diverted by continuing political 
instability, as in Yemen or Syria ; by violent 
international antagonisms, as in the Indian 
subcontinent; or by food shortages, as in 
India and the U.A.R. Press and political 
leaders in some countries have been critical 
of the United States, and several have 
taken steps to "normalize" their relations 
with the Communist world. 

In charting our future course in the 
Near East and South Asia, we should 
view these manifestations — irritating, bur- 
densome, sometimes tragic — in conjunction 
with other underlying circumstances. The 
threat of direct Communist aggression has 
tended to recede somewhat; this, seen short 
term, is reassuring. What is not reassuring, 
however, is that nothing has occurred to 

give reason to believe that there has been 
any real change in Communist objectives. 

The tragic India-Pakistan conflict brought 
the populous South Asian area to the edge 
of holocaust, but both countries drew back, 
and they now appear to be committed to a 
peaceful search for solutions to their differ- 
ences. India, faced with a food crisis, is 
taking radical remedial steps. 

Though the headlines out of the area 
have emphasized war, coups, disorder, and 
poverty, it is significant that many of the 
states, embracing most of the region's pop- 
ulation and resources, have recently ef- 
fected peaceful transfers of political power. 
Throughout the area the long slow process 
of education and institution building goes 
on. The experiences of the year may have 
brought a new sense of realism: a disil- 
lusionment with simple solutions arrived at 
through war or ideological "movements," a 
new awareness of the need to respect facts, 
to exercise patience and restraint; a new 
willingness to turn inward to the hard tasks 
of self-help in development; and a new re- 
alization of the constancy of American pur- 

When there is violence and instability in 
the Middle East and South Asia, the threat 
extends to ourselves as well as to our friends 
in the area; and our resources — as well as 
theirs — are diverted. With peace and in- 
creasing stability they, with our assistance, 
can concentrate upon the building of inde- 
pendent, self-sustaining, democratic socie- 
ties. At this juncture our assistance — 
though only a fraction of the total country 
investment — is frequently the crucial ele- 
ment in the maintenance of order, the 
building of infrastructure for production, or 
the development of basic human resources. 

APRIL 25, 1966 



Department Presents Views on Senate Resolutions 
on Closer Relations Among Atlantic Nations 

Statement by John M. Leddy 

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^ 

I am happy to be able to present the 
views of the Department of State on Senate 
Resolution 128 and Senate Concurrent Res- 
olution 64, on which your subcommittee is 
holding hearings. I believe that your hear- 
ings can contribute to a better understand- 
ing of these important questions. 

The Department of State has previously 
informed the chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee of its views on these 
two resolutions by letter, and I believe that 
you have these letters from Assistant Secre- 
tary MacArthur on record.^ 

Let me begin by assuring you that the De- 
partment of State shares the goals implied 
in the two resolutions of attaining an in- 
creasingly closer relationship among the At- 
lantic nations. The reservations which we 
have about the resolutions under considera- 
tion are not reservations regarding their 
general philosophy. Rather, our reservations 
center upon how best to attain the objectives 
of the resolutions and on the scope of the 
specific goal envisaged, especially in Senate 
Concurrent Resolution 64. 

The simple, but decisive, fact is that our 
Atlantic allies do not now wish to move 

' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 24, during 
hearings on S. Res. 128, a Resolution Establishing 
a Commission for a Stronger Atlantic Union, and 
S. Con. Res. 64, a Concurrent Resolution To estab- 
lish an Atlantic Union delegation. 

' Not printed here. 

toward any type of federal political relation- 
ship with the United States, even as an ob- 
jective. Until there is an interest on the 
part of the other states concerned, we cannot 
do a great deal. 

The fundamental reason why there is little 
European interest in federal union with us 
at this time is, I think, evident. It is that 
Europe fears that it would be swallowed by 
a more powerful United States. One very 
friendly European statesman has said that 
Europe did not wish to be dissolved in the 
American cup of tea. He expressed a view 
shared by many of our friends. 

European Unification a First Requirement 

If Europe is hesitant about federation 
with us because of the inequality between 
a United States and a divided Europe, we 
can hope that Europe would be more con- 
fident in its relations with us once it had 
attained something approaching equality of 
real power. This hope has been one of the 
most compelling reasons for our support for 
European unification. We believe that this 
is a virtual requirement before political ties 
with North America of an organic sort can 
be seriously considered. 

The best prospect today for European 
unification is the European Communities, 
that is, the Common Market, the Coal and 
Steel Community, and EURATOM [Euro- 
pean Atomic Energy Community]. These 
unique institutions form, so to speak, the 



economic constitution for a politically united 
Europe. And we have done all we could 
properly do to encourage their development 
and to favor their success. 

The results so far are at once both sober- 
ing and reassuring. They are sobering be- 
cause, after almost two decades of movement 
toward a united Europe, there are still only 
six states committed to the limited goals of 
the European Communities. Great Britain, 
in particular, remains outside. Moreover, the 
Six themselves are deeply divided upon the 
political aspects of their relationship. I 
think that this very tangible European real- 
ity shows all too vividly the distance that 
separates the possible in Atlantic relations 
from the desirable. 

Yet the European Community experience 
is also reassuring. In recent months the 
Common Market has undergone the most di- 
visive crisis of its 8-year existence. But it 
has surmounted that crisis without breaking 
apart and without important weakening. I 
think that is significant. 

That experience had some instructive 
lessons for us. It showed that there were 
five European states deeply, firmly com- 
mitted to the political goals inherent in the 
European Communities. When put to a very 
severe test, these governments, public opin- 
ion, and parliaments showed the importance 
they attached to unity by their refusal to 
weaken the Community institutions. 

Consequently, I think we can have some 
confidence in the commitment of the core of 
Europe to unity. We are at the same time 
forced to recognize that there is an enor- 
mous gap between this commitment and any 
larger unity vdth the United States. 

We shall continue to collaborate with the 
European Communities to the full extent of 
their willingness and of their capability. We 
shall continue to work within the OECD 
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development] to strengthen our ties with 
our allies and to accomplish specific eco- 
nomic tasks that require close coordination. 
And we shall continue to support NATO and 
its political implications. 

Our NATO Relationship Witii Europe 

The present state of our NATO relation- 
ship with Europe is among the foremost of 
our concerns. We have always seen it as an 
institution both demanding and permitting 
growing bonds among its members. Called 
into being by the Soviet threat and fashioned 
to provide maximum security for the At- 
lantic area, it has seen the greatest degree of 
union yet attained with our allies even though 
limited to the defense of the Atlantic coun- 

Again, I believe that our current experi- 
ences with NATO are instructive and both 
sobering and reassuring. 

We have seen the firm opposition of one 
member state to continue a relationship 
which it feels impairs its freedom of action 
even in a single, although important, aspect 
of national policy. This determination to 
achieve greater freedom of national action 
at whatever cost is not encouraging. It serves 
to undermine our common security and to 
divide us. It tells us a great deal about the 
chances that a broader system of political, 
economic, or security unity embracing the 
United States would have. 

Yet there is reason for reassurance, too. 
The threat to NATO unity has brought 
home to us all the real value of the institu- 
tion. The unanimity of strong support for 
NATO and for its fundamental concepts 
among the 14 is persuasive evidence that 
this powerful Atlantic bond still holds.' 

Thus, as far as our Atlantic relations 
alone are concerned, we can see some rea- 
sonable hope of closer ties. They will enable 
us to cope with increasing success with our 
common concerns in other areas of the world. 

As this suggests, we cannot lose sight of 
the other facets of American foreign rela- 
tions. While Europe does constitute the most 
powerful grouping of states with which we 
share common objectives, it is not the only 
one. Our relations with Latin America, 
Africa, and Asia are of very great impor- 

' For text of a 14-nation declaration, see BULLETIN 
of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


tance. Our relations with them must also 
draw closer at the same time that we develop 
our relationship with Europe. 

Atlantic Union Not Now Practical 

In the light of these considerations and 
this experience, we believe that the action 
proposed in the two resolutions is not likely 
to be productive. In fact, at the present 
time, an attempt on our part to move to some 
form of Atlantic union with our Atlantic 
allies could only diminish the prospects for 
eventual attainment of such an objective. 

We are now engaged in attempting to 
minimize the harm likely to be done to 
existing institutions by the recent French 
action regarding NATO.* In responding to 
this new reality in the alliance, we are also 
considering what might be done in the proc- 
ess to strengthen Atlantic unity and the 
unity of Europe. The challenge to our com- 
mon defense system has, in itself, brought 
the rest of the alliance more tightly to- 
gether. Despite the obvious weakening of 
our unity inherent in a French decision to 
seek a separate course, we hope, and expect, 
that we will maintain our successful NATO 
structure and find ways to improve our unity 
in the process. 

Therefore, to conclude, the Department of 
State respects the high motives of those 
supporting Senate Concurrent Resolution 64 
and Senate Resolution 128 and fully supports 
closer ties between the United States and its 
allies. However, the disparity in power be- 
tween the United States and European coun- 
tries which have not yet achieved their own 
unity makes proposals for seeking far-reach- 
ing political action with our allies to achieve 
these ends impractical. Only after Europe 
has attained sufficient unity to consider it- 
self a de facto peer of the United States 
would such an undertaking have hope of 

* For an exchange of aide memoire between the 
United States and France, see ibid., Apr. 18, 1966, 
p. 617. 

success. We are working to promote that 
unity and, despite serious obstacles, believe 
that Europe has a will to unite which will 
eventually prevail. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permit- 
ting me to present these views of the Depart- 
ment of State to your subcommittee. 

Congressional Documents 
Relating to Foreign Policy 

89th Congress, 2d Session 

Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far 
East, Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan com- 
prising members of the Committee on Foreign 
Affairs. H. Rept. 1345. March 28, 1966. 89 pp. 
The American Research Hospital for Children in 
Krakow, Poland. H. Rept. 1346. March 28, 1966. 
8 pp. 
Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Corkboard In- 
sulation. Report to accompany H.R. 8376. H. 
Rept. 1353. March 28, 1966. 3 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic 
Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 10998. H. 
Rept. 1354. March 28, 1966. 2 pp. 
Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Natural Graph- 
ite. Report to accompany H.R. 11653. H. Rept. 
1355. March 28, 1966. 3 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Tan- 
ning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 12328. 
H. Rept. 1357. March 28, 1966. 3 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle. 
Report to accompany H.R. 12461. H. Rept. 1358. 
March 28, 1966. 2 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Copy- 
ing Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 
12262. H. Rept. 1356. March 28, 1966. 3 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Crude Chicory 
and Reduction in Duty on Ground Chicory. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 12463. H. Rept. 1359. 
March 28, 1966. 2 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Alu- 
mina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R. 
12657. H. Rept. 1360. March 28, 1966. 3 pp. 
Continued Suspension of Duty on Electrodes Im- 
ported for Use in Producing Aluminum. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 12997. H. Rept. 1362. 
March 28, 1966. 2 pp. 
Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of 
Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu 
Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 12617. H. 
Rept. 1406. March 31, 1966. 29 pp. 
Emergency Assistance to India. Report to ac- 
company H.J. Res. 997. H. Rept. 1408. March 
31, 1966. 6 pp. 
Tariff Treatment of Certain Woven Fabrics. Re- 
port to accompany H.R. 11029. S. Rept. 1092. 
April 1, 1966. 3 pp. 
Emergency Food Relief for India. Report to ac- 
company S.J. Res. 149. S. Rept. 1101. April 5, 
1966. 6 pp. , 





U.S. Presents Amendments to Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Committee 

Following is a statement made by U.S. 
Representative Adrian S. Fisher before the 
18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at 
Geneva on March 22, together with the text 
of amendments to the U.S. draft treaty to 
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 

U.S./U.N. release 4830 dated April 1 


The delegation of the United States 
welcomes the resumption of our discussion 
on nonproliferation. We are resuming this 
discussion today as a result of action taken 
by this Committee at its meeting on March 1 
of this year on the recommendation of the 
cochairmen that we do so. 

General Assembly Resolution 2028 adopted 
last autumn calls upon this Conference to 
give urgent consideration to the question of 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with a 
view to negotiating a treaty to prevent such 
proliferation.^ As we resume our delibera- 
tions on this subject today, I am sure we 
all feel the sense of urgency expressed in 
this resolution and a sense of obligation to 
negotiate the treaty for which it calls. 

When we last discussed the question of 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, many 
delegations expressed the view that when 
we returned to the discussion of this subject 
it would be appropriate to examine, article 
by article, the two draft treaties that lie on 
the table. The representative of the Soviet 

Union, in his intervention on March 3, stated 
that he had no objection to this method of 

The delegation of the United States be- 
lieves that it might be helpful to compare 
the articles of the two draft treaties. But it 
feels that, as this process begins, the Con- 
ference should have on the table for con- 
sideration and study certain important 
amendments which we are now introducing 
to the United States draft treaty.^ 

These amendments have been developed 
by the United States in large part as a result 
of the deliberations of this Conference. We 
are offering them because we believe that 
they will advance the negotiation of a treaty 
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. By so 
doing, we are making it clear that our posi- 
tion in negotiating an agreement on non- 
proliferation of nuclear weapons is not 
inflexible. The United States delegation 
hopes that other delegations will be equally 

It is for the purpose of presenting these 
amendments that the United States has 
asked for the privilege of speaking first 
today. The amendments are before the Com- 
mittee in Document ENDC/152/Add. 1 
dated March 21, 1966. 

The United States draft amendments deal 
directly with the principal threat of our time 
— the threat that the danger of nuclear war 
can be increased by an increase in the num- 
ber of power centers that can start such a 
war. The U.S. draft strikes at the heart of 

'■ For background and text of the resolution, see 
BtniETiN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873. 

• For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see ibid., Sept. 
20, 1965, p. 474. 

APRIL 25, 1966 


this threat by prohibiting any increase, 
even by one, in the number of power centers 
that have the right or ability to fire a nu- 
clear weapon. 

Definition of "Control" 

What we must do if we are to achieve 
the basic objective of our nonproliferation 
negotiations is to limit the number of powers 
that will be in a position to unleash nuclear 
weapons. There are two ways by which a 
non-nuclear-weapon state could obtain this 
power. One would be by obtaining from an 
existing nuclear-weapon state the right or 
ability to use these weapons. Under the U.S. 
amendments this route is barred by the pre- 
cise definition of control which I am about 
to describe. The other way in which a non- 
nuclear-weapon state could obtain this power 
would be by manufacturing nuclear weapons 
itself. This route we have also barred, as I 
shall indicate later, by paragraph 2 of ar- 
ticle I and by paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 
II of the amendments. 

One of the key elements in the U.S. 
amendments is the definition of control of 
nuclear weapons in terms of the right or 
ability to fire nuclear weapons. "Control" 
was not defined explicitly in the original 
U.S. draft, although its meaning was clearly 
implied by the prohibition of any action to 
increase the number of entities with inde- 
pendent power to use nuclear weapons. 

The discussions in this Conference, and 
further deliberation on the question, led the 
United States to the conclusion that the 
definition of "control" is too central to the 
problem of nonproliferation to be left to im- 
plication. We have therefore given it 
an exact definition. Before quoting article 
IV (c) of the U.S. amendments, I should like 
to say this : It may seem illogical in describ- 
ing amendments to begin with the last ar- 
ticle of those amendments. However, as rep- 
resentatives will see, the last article 
consists of definitions. This first appearance 
of lack of logic will therefore, I think, give 
way to a recognition that it is best first 
to define the terms one is talking about and 
then to indicate how those terms are used in 

the substantive amendments. Article IV (c) 
reads : " 'Control' means right or ability to 
fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent 
decision of an existing nuclear-weapon 

I should emphasize that the decision of the 
nuclear-weapon state would have to be ex- 
plicit; it would have to be concurrent in 
time with the event; it could not be in the 
form of a general approval given in advance. 
Moreover, it is essential to keep in mind 
that under this definition control relates 
not merely to the right but also to the ability 
to fire nuclear weapons. 

In considering the significance of this def- 
inition of control this Conference should also 
have in mind the intentions of the United 
States with respect to possible common nu- 
clear defense arrangements within alliance 
structures. I have already read, at the meet- 
ing on March 3, testimony from the Secretary 
of State of the United States before our 
Congress dealing with possible NATO nu- 
clear arrangements.^ I would like to add here 
that, while he was testifying, he was asked 
whether any plans being discussed in NATO 
contemplated that the United States would 
give up its veto over the use of U.S. weap- 
ons. Here is his reply : 

We would have to insist . . . that the United 
States be a necessary party to a decision to use 
nuclear weapons. Because the vast arsenals of the 
United States are so heavily involved in that deci- 
sion, we must be present for that decision and must 
ourselves agree to the decision taken. 

Our Secretary of Defense was asked the 
same question. He was equally explicit. Here 
is his reply : 

We have no plan to dilute our veto in any way 
and our allies are not asking us for a dilution of 
that veto. 

These clear statements of U.S. intentions 
and the clear definition of "control" in the 
U.S. draft indicate that the U.S. draft would 
not permit a non-nuclear-weapon state to 
have any relationship to nuclear weapons 
which would give it the right or ability to 

" For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before 
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Feb. 23, 
see ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 406. 



fire such weapons on its own. Furthermore, 
under provisions of the U.S. amendments 
that I will be discussing later, a nuclear- 
weapon state is prohibited from allowing a 
non-nuclear-weapon state to have a relation- 
ship to nuclear weapons which would permit 
the non-nuclear-weapon state to obtain man- 
ufacturing or design information. 

With these clear prohibitions of the U.S. 
draft in mind, we do the cause of nonpro- 
liferation a disservice if we permit ourselves 
to be diverted into theoretical discussions 
about what is meant by "access" to nuclear 
weapons. Here we should note in passing 
that U.N. Resolution 2028 does not entangle 
itself in this vague concept of "access." 

We do the cause of nonproliferation even 
less service if we let ourselves be drawn into 
a debate on whether certain collective de- 
fense arrangements might increase the in- 
fluence within an alliance of a non-nuclear- 
weapon state. This would indeed be a 
fruitless expenditure of our efforts, partic- 
ularly when those attacking these collective 
defense arrangements concede that they 
do not involve the acquisition of any inde- 
pendent ability to fire nuclear weapons. 

We have a difficult enough task ahead of 
us in negotiating a nonproliferation agree- 
ment if we concentrate — as we should and 
must — on the central issues. We should 
therefore reject diversions which may ren- 
der a difficult task impossible. 

If we but concentrate on our main task, 
we shall, despite the difficulties which now 
face us, be able to accomplish our objective: 
the negotiation of an agreement which in- 
sures that the number of power centers 
which have the right or ability to start a 
nuclear war will not be increased — not even 
by one. 

I hope I have made clear the views of 
the United States on the importance of the 
definition of "control." With this in mind, 
I should like to explain the other portions of 
our new amendments. 

First, as representatives may have already 
gathered from my remarks, we have adopted 
in our amendments the concept of "nuclear- 
weapon State" and "non-nuclear-weapon 

State." This is a concept which I believe was 
first mentioned by the distinguished repre- 
sentative of India [V. C. Trivedi] during 
our last session. These terms nuclear- 
weapon state and non-nuclear-weapon state 
are formally noted in subparagraphs (a) 
and (b) of article IV. This is the article 
dealing with definitions, but these terms, as 
they are defined, appear throughout articles 
I and II of the amendments. 

As Ambassador Trivedi has pointed out, 
there are states with important programs 
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy which 
have wisely chosen to refrain from manu- 
facturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Our 
original draft was therefore not accurate in 
defining such states as "non-nuclear." We 
believe that our amendments, by making the 
distinction between nuclear-weapon states 
and non-nuclear-weapon states, better de- 
scribe the actual problem with which we 
are dealing — the problem of preventing the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am 
happy to note that some recent speakers in 
the Committee already seem to have adopted 
this concept, following the lead which the 
representative of India gave us at the last 

The adoption of this terminology may help 
stop the talk of a "nuclear club." This phrase 
has often been used loosely in discussing 
the proliferation problem. I submit that it 
is a phrase which, with its implications of 
a high table or superior coterie, is quite in- 
consistent with the objectives of our work 

Obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States 

Let me now draw attention to our new 
article I and the obligations it establishes 
for nuclear-weapon states. Under the first 
paragraph of this new article, the nuclear- 
weapon states parties to the treaty under- 
take : "Not to transfer nuclear weapons into 
the national control of any non-nuclear- 
weapon State, or into the control of any as- 
sociation of non-nuclear-weapon States." 

The first portion of this new language 
maintains the prohibition in our prior draft 
against transfer of nuclear weapons into the 

APRIL 25, 1966 


national control of any non-nuclear-weapon 
state. The second portion forbids also the 
transfer of nuclear weapons into the control 
of any association of non-nuclear-weapon 

A close analysis of the language in article 
I of the original U.S. draft treaty dated 
August 17, 1965, showed that it might have 
been interpreted as permitting the creation 
of a new nuclear entity composed entirely 
of non-nuclear-weapon states, in the event 
that a preexisting nuclear-weapon state had 
previously unilaterally disarmed itself of 
nuclear weapons. This result was not in- 
tended, but to remove any doubt the amend- 
ment makes explicit the intent not to 
transfer control of nuclear weapons, either 
to a single non-nuclear-weapon state or to 
several such states acting together. 

Paragraph 2 of our new article I would 
oblige the nuclear-weapon states: 

Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State 
or association of such States: 

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
■weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, 
or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or 

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufac- 
ture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons. 

As representatives will realize, in sub- 
paragraph (a) of this new formulation we 
have adopted to some extent provisions con- 
tained in the Soviet articles I and II 
concerning preparations for manufacture 
and concerning testing of nuclear weapons. 
Here we have also sought to take into account 
the wise observation of the distinguished 
representative of Sweden at our meeting of 
February 24, when she pointed out that 
there was not one but a chain of decisions 
leading up to the final action of "manufac- 
ture" of nuclear weapons. 

In paragraph 2 (b) of our new article I, 
we have adopted the concept of a prohibition 
against encouraging or inducing a non-nu- 
clear-weapon state to manufacture or other- 
wise acquire its own weapons. This idea of 
a prohibition against encouragement or in- 
ducement adopts a concept that had its 
origin in article I, paragraph 2, of the treaty 
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos- 

phere, in outer space and under water. This 
concept would be equally suitable in the 
treaty we are now considering. 

I have already indicated to this Confer- 
ence why I think that the concept of access 
is not productive of progress in our work 
here. But at this stage I should also point 
out that any legitimate concerns in this 
regard should be taken care of by the 
amendment that I am now discussing and 
the comparable provisions of article II. The 
obligations of nuclear-weapon states and the 
corresponding obligations of non-nuclear- 
weapon states in these two amendments — 
articles I and II — are, so to speak, mirror 
images of one another. The amendments to 
article I make it perfectly clear that the 
nuclear-weapon states cannot do anything 
that would assist the non-nuclear-weapon 
states in manufacturing nuclear weapons, in 
preparing for their manufacture, or in test- 
ing them. They go even further and commit 
the nuclear-weapon states not to do anything 
which will encourage or induce the non-nu- 
clear-weapon states to manufacture or other- 
wise acquire their own nuclear weapons. 

This commitment must be evaluated in 
the light of the corresponding commitment 
in article II, under which, in paragraph 1, 
the non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to 
manufacture nuclear weapons and, in para- 
graph 2, not to accept assistance in the 
manufacture of nuclear weapons, in prepara- 
tion for such manufacture, or in test- 
ing nuclear weapons, or even to accept 
encouragement or inducement to acquire 
nuclear weapons otherwise. As I shall make 
clear in my discussion of paragraph 4 of 
articles I and II, respectively, these solemn 
commitments apply to units or personnel of 
a non-nuclear-weapon state which are under 
the command of a military alliance. 

I should now like to call your attention 
to paragraph 3 of our new article I, which, 
in addition to previous prohibitions, obliges 
nuclear-weapon states: "Not to take any 
other action which would cause an increase 
in the total number of States and associa- 
tions of States having control of nuclear 




This provision, together with the defini- 
tion of control, which I described earlier, 
completes the embodiment in treaty lan- 
guage of our Government's position that 
there should be no increase — not even by 
one — in the centers of nuclear power which 
have the right or ability to start a nuclear 

This provision would bar any transfer of 
control of nuclear weapons to any associa- 
tion of states — that is, it would prohibit the 
granting to any such association of the 
right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon 
without the explicit concurrent decision of 
a nuclear-weapon state — unless one of the 
members of the association was a nuclear- 
weapon state and that member gave up its 
entire nuclear arsenal to the association. 
Since this would not involve any increase 
in the number of nuclear-weapon powers, no 
proliferation would result. 

This section of the U.S. amendments is 
also related to discussions about possible 
common nuclear defense arrangements 
within alliance structures. This is a subject 
on which there has been a great deal of 
misunderstanding and some misstatements. 
It is for that reason that I should like to 
develop the implications of this section some- 
what further. 

I should like to do so by pointing out that 
where a nuclear-weapon state retains a veto 
over any use of nuclear weapons, there is 
no problem of transfer of control. That is 
because no additional state and no associa- 
tion of states gains the right or ability to 
take, on its own, a decision to use nuclear 
weapons. Neither would have the ability to 
start a nuclear war. That terrible decision 
remains in the hands of the existing nuclear- 
weapon states, and no question of transfer 
of control even arises. 

In this connection, the testimony of the 
Secretaries of State and Defense of the 
United States concerning the intentions of 
the U.S. with respect to proposed nuclear 
arrangements within NATO should make it 
quite clear that no one in NATO has been 
talking about any arrangements which would 
involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons. 

indirect Action Prohibited 

Paragraph 4 of our new article I also 
constitutes an important addition to our 
draft. It commits the nuclear-weapon states 
parties to the treaty: "Not to take any of 
the actions prohibited in the preceding para- 
graphs of this Article directly, or indirectly 
through third States or associations of 
States, or through units of the armed forces 
or military personnel of any State, even if 
such units or personnel are under the com- 
mand of a military alliance." 

Both the original U.S. draft and the Soviet 
draft reflected a concern with preventing 
the possibility of a state doing indirectly, 
in conjunction with one or several other 
states, what it could not do directly. Our 
new article I, paragraph 4, represents a re- 
finement of our previous formulation and, 
in addition, borrows from the formulations 
in all three paragraphs of the Soviet article 
I. We believe this new paragraph 4 to be 
more concise and more comprehensive than 
either our own previous formulation or the 
Soviet draft. 

I shall not go further today in describing 
our new article II, which sets forth the obli- 
gations of non-nuclear-weapon states. The 
important point about article II is that it 
corresponds in reciprocal fashion or, as I 
said earlier, it is a mirror image of the obli- 
gations required of the nuclear-weapon 
states in article I. Nor do I intend today to 
discuss the language of other articles of the 
treaty to which we have not proposed 
amendments. We shall deal with these other 
articles later as our discussion progresses. 

I have already dealt with three subpara- 
graphs of our new article IV. In particular, 
I have already noted the precise definition 
of "control" contained in subparagraph (c) 
of that article. I would emphasize once 
again our strong belief that this definition, 
taken in conjunction with our new articles 
I and II, represents the most precise prohibi- 
tions yet formulated against proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. 

It remains for me to indicate the last ele- 
ment in our new amendments, an element 
which, in our view, is of considerable im- 

APRIL 25, 1966 


portance. I refer to the bracketed portion in 
our new article IV (d) which indicates that 
a definition of "nuclear weapon" is to be 
supplied at that point. We are convinced of 
the need for such a definition but believe 
that it is not essential at this point in our 
negotiations and can be formulated at an 
appropriate technical level at the appropri- 
ate time. We do think it advisable at this 
time to call the Committee's attention to 
this question. 

Path to Agreement Now Open 

Mr. Chairman, we believe that these new 
U.S. amendments reflect better than our 
previous draft — and, with all due respect, 
better than the present Soviet draft — the 
requirements for a just, precise, and effec- 
tive treaty to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear weapons. We submit these amend- 
ments as evidence of our deep desire to 
reach agreement on this all-important ques- 
tion. We seek to move our negotiations for- 
ward. We hope the Soviet response will be 
in the same spirit so that we may look for- 
ward to a constructive period of delibera- 

I shall not try to anticipate here and now 
the reaction of the Soviet Government to 
these amendments. If the Soviet Govern- 
ment is truly concerned about preventing 
proliferation, direct or indirect, and is not 
more interested in seeking to interfere with 
justifiable and proper defense arrangements 
among allies, then it should recognize that 
we have provided in this new language the 
basis for a foolproof nonproliferation treaty 
that can be negotiated and implemented be- 
fore it is too late. 

We believe that we have today taken a 
further step toward agreement. Certainly 
that is our intention. We believe that the 
Soviet Government should recognize this in- 
tention and in our further discussions should 
respond to this effort in a constructive way. 
The path to agreement may not be wide or 
smooth, but it is now open if men of com- 
mon cause and of good will are prepared to 
make use of it. 


Amendments to the U.S. Draft Treaty To 
Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons 
(ENDC/152, August 17, 1965) 
Article I 

Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this 
treaty undertakes : 

1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the 
national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State, 
or into the control of any association of non-nuclear- 
weapon States. 

2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon 
State or association of such States — 

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, 
or in the testing of nuclear weapons ; or 

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons. 

3. Not to take any other action which would 
cause an increase in the total number of States 
and associations of States having control of 
nuclear weapons. 

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited 
in the preceding paragraphs of this Article di- 
rectly, or indirectly through third States or as- 
sociations of States, or through units of the 
armed forces or military personnel of any State, 
even if such units or personnel are under the 
command of a military alliance. 

Article II 

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States party 
to this treaty undertakes: 

1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and 
not to seek or to receive the transfer of nuclear 
weapons into its national control or into the 
control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon 
States of which it is a member. 

2. Not to seek or receive, and not to provide, 
whether alone or in any association of non- 
nuclear-weapon States: 

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear 
weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or 
in the testing of nuclear weapons; or 

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture 
or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons. 

3. Not to take any other action which would 
cause an increase in the total number of States 
and associations of States having control of 
nuclear weapons. 

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited 
in the preceding paragraphs of this Article di- 
rectly, or indirectly through third States or as- 
sociations of States, or through units of its 
armed forces or its military personnel, even if 



such units or personnel are under the command 
of a military alliance. 

Article IV 
In this treaty 

(a) "Nuclear-weapon State" means a State 
controlling: nuclear weapons as of . . . (date). 

(b) "Non-nuclear- weapon State" means any 
State which is not a "nuclear-weapon State". 

(c) "Control" means right or ability to fire 
nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision 
of an existing nuclear-weapon State. 

(d) "Nuclear weapon" means (defini- 
tion to be supplied). 



The Senate on April 1 confirmed the nomination 
of Joseph Palmer 2d to be an Assistant Secretary of 
State. (For biographic details, see Department of 
State press release 78 dated April 11.) 


Current Actions 



Automotive Traffic 

Convention concerning customs facilities for 
touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. En- 
tered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879. 
Notification that it considers itself bound: 
Malta, January 3, 1966. » 

Customs convention on the temporary importa- 
tion of private road vehicles. Done at New 
York June 4, 1954. Entered into force Decem- 
ber 15, 1957. TIAS 3943. 

Notification that it considers itself bound: 
Malta, January 3, 1966. ' 


Protocol to amend the convention for the unifica- 
tion of certain rules relating to international 
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October 
12, 1929 (TS 876). Done at The Hague Septem- 
ber 28, 1955." 

APRIL 25, 1966 

Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein, January 

3, 1966. 
Accession deposited: Spain, December 6, 1965. 


Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of 
the World Health Organization, as amended 
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 
1965. " 

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, March 3, 

Law of the Sea 

Convention on fishing and conservation of the 

living resources of the high seas. Done at 

Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force 

March 20, 1966. 

Proclaimed by the President: March 31, 1966. 
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at 

Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force 

June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578. 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands.' February 
18, 1966. 
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva 

April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 

30, 1962. TIAS 5200. 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,* February 
18, 1966. 
Convention on the territorial sea and the con- 
tiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. 

Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS 


Ratification deposited: Netherlands,' February 
18, 1966. 
Optional protocol of signature concerning the 

compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at 

(Jeneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force 

September 30, 1962." 

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 
18, 1966. 

Maritime Matters 

Amendments to the convention on the Intergov- 
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization 
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 
15, 1964. " 
Acceptance received: Yugoslavia, March 4, 1966. 


Protocol relating to military obligations in cer- 
tain cases of double nationality, concluded at 
The Hague April 12, 1930. Entered into force 
May 25, 1937. 

Accession deposited: Mauritania, March 2, 

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries 

Protocol to the International Convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), 
relating to measures of control; 

Protocol to the International Convention for the 
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), re- 

' On February 28. 1966, Malta informed the U.N. 
Secretary-General that it does not intend to main- 
tain the reservations made on its behalf by the 
United Kingdom in respect of the convention at the 
time of its extension to Malta on August 7, 1957. 

" Not in force for the United States. 

' Not in force. 

* With a declaration. 


lating to entry into force of proposals adopted 

by the Commission. 

Done at Washington November 29, 1965. Open 

for sigTiature at Washington November 29 

through December 12, 1965." 
Ratification deposited: Canada, April 1, 1966. 

Satellite Communications System 

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at 
Washington June 4, 1965. ' 
Signature: Monaco, April 7, 1966. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on 
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on 
trade and development and to amend annex I. 
Open for acceptance by signature or otherwise, 
at Geneva from February 8, 1965. 
Ratification deposited: Finland, December 14, 

Acceptances: Iceland, December 16, 1965; 

Sweden, December 17, 1965. 

Transit Trade of Land-Locked States 

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states. 
Adopted by the United Nations Conference on 
Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries at 
New York July 8, 1965. Open for signature 
until December 31, 1965. 

Signatures: Afghanistan, July 8, 1965; Argen- 
tina, December 29, 1965; Belgium, December 
30, 1965;' Bolivia, December 29, 1965;' 
Brazil, August 4, 1965; Byelorussian Soviet 
Socialist Republic, December 28, 1965;* Cam- 
eroon, August 10, 1965; Central African Re- 
public, December 30, 1965; Chile, December 
20, 1965;' Czechoslovakia, December 10, 
1965; ' Federal Republic of Germany, Decem- 
ber 20, 1965;' Holy See, December 30, 1965; 

Hungary, December 30, 1965; Italy, Decem- 
ber 31, 1965;' Luxembourg, December 28, 
1965' Nepal, July 9, 1965; Netherlands, 
December 30, 1965; Paraguay, December 23, 
1965; Rwanda, July 23, 1965; San Marino, 
July 23, 1965; Sudan, August 11, 1965;' 
Switzerland, December 10, 1965; Uganda, 
December 21, 1965; Ukrainian Soviet Social- 
ist Republic, December 31, 1965;° Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics, December 28, 
1965;" United States, December 30, 1965; 
Yugoslavia, July 8, 1965; Zambia, Decem- 
ber 23, 1965. 



Agreement relating to the reciprocal grranting of 
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio 
operators of either country to operate their sta- 
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange 
of notes at Asuncion March 18, 1966. Entered 
into force March 18, 1966. 

United Kingdom 

Interim agreement relating to the renegotiation 
of schedule XX (United States) to the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700). 
Signed at Washington April 5, 1966. Entered into 
force April 5, 1966. 

' Not in force. 

' With a declaration. 

' With reservations and a declaration. 

' With a reservation and a declaration. 

' With a reservation. 


The Department of State Bnlletin, a 
weekly pablication Issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the ForelKn 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.O., 
20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printinsr of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 



INDEX April 25, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. UOO 

Africa. Palmer confirmed as Assistant Secre- 
tary 681 

Asia. Charting the Future Course of U.S. For- 
eign Aid in the Near East and South Asia 
(Hare) 668 

Atomic Energy. U.S. Presents Amendments to 
Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Commit- 
tee (Fisher, text of amendments) .... 675 


Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign 
Aid in the Near East and South Asia (Hare) 668 

Confirmations (Palmer) 681 

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign 
Policy 674 

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu- 
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic 
Nations (Leddy) 672 

Department and Foreign Service 

Confirmations (Palmer) 681 

How the Secretary of State Apportions His 
Time 651 

Disarmament. U.S. Presents Amendments to 
Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Commit- 
tee (Fisher, text of amendments) .... 675 

Economic Affairs 

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual 
Responsibilities and Our Mutual Dependence 
(McGhee) 657 

The United States and Japan: Different Paths 
to Common Goals (Barnett) 664 


Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu- 
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic 
Nations (Leddy) 672 

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" German 
Note of March 25 (exchange of notes) . . 654 

Foreign Aid. Charting the Future Course of 
U.S. Foreign Aid in the Near East and 
South Asia (Hare) 668 


The United States and Germany: Our Mutual 
Responsibilities and Our Mutual Dependence 
(McGhee) 657 

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" German 
Note of March 25 (exchange of notes) . . 654 

International Organizations and Conferences. 
U.S. Presents Amendments to Draft Treaty 
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
18-Nation Disarmament Committee (Fisher, 
text of amendments) 675 

Japan. The United States and Japan: Differ- 
ent Paths to Common Goals (Barnett) . . 664 

Jordan. U.S. Comments on Sales of Aircraft 
to Jordan 663 

Laos. Letters of Credence (Souvanlasy) . . . 663 

Middle East 

Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign 
Aid in the Near East and South Asia (Hare) 668 

U.S. Comments on Sales of Aircraft to Jordan 663 

Military Affairs. U.S. Comments on Sales of 
Aircraft to Jordan 663 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu- 
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic 
Nations (Leddy) 672 

NATO: An Instrument of Peace (Johnson) . . 650 

Presidential Documents. NATO: An Instru- 
ment of Peace 650 

Public Affairs. A Fresh Look at the United 
Nations (Sisco) 646 

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 681 

United Nations. A Fresh Look at the United 
Nations (Sisco) 646 

Viet-Nam. The United States and Japan: Dif- 
ferent Paths to Common Goals (Barnett) . 664 

Name Index 

Barnett, Robert W 664 

Fisher, Adrian S 675 

Hare, Raymond A 668 

Johnson, President 650 

Leddy, John M 672 

McGhee, George C 657 

Palmer, Joseph 2d 681 

Rusk, Secretary 652 

Sisco, Joseph J 646 

Souvanlasy, Khamking 663 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 4-10 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

Release issued prior to April 4 which appears 
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 75 of 
April 1. 

No. Date Snblect 

♦74 4/5 Rusk: letter to Senator Edward 
M. Kennedy on procedures re- 
garding Americans traveling 
76 4/6 Reply to German note on European 
security matters. 

*77 4/8 Rusk: dedication of Churchill 

' Not printed. 








Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free 

In an address made at New York City on February 23 upon receiving the National Freedoi 
Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country aboo 
the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that addrea 

"Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression. 1 
is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply pu) 
just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam." 




To: Supt. of Docoments 
Govt. Printins Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 


Enclosed find $ (cash, check, or money order) . Please 

send me copies of Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. 



Enclosed — 

To be mailed 

later — 

Refund ~- 

Coapon refand -~ 
Postace -M* 








Street address 

City, State, and ZIP code 







Vol. LIV, No. lUOl 

May 2, 1966 


Transcript of Paris-Match Interview 695 



Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 713 



Statement by Robert M. Sayre 707 

Statement by Secretary Rixsk 686 

For index see inside back cover 

United States Policy Toward Communist China 

Statement by Secretary Rusk 

Mr. Chairman, during the last month and 
a half this distinguished committee and its 
corresponding members in the other House 
have heard testimony on Communist China 
from a number of prominent scholars and 
distinguished experts on Asia. 

I welcome these hearings. For Com- 
munist China's policies and intentions, in 
all their aspects, need to be examined — 
and reexamined continually. 

China Specialists in Government 

The Department of State and other agen- 
cies of the Government do collect, study, 
and analyze continually vi'ith the greatest 
care all the information obtainable on Com- 
munist China in order to make — and, when 
the facts warrant, revise — judgments of 
Peiping's intentions and objectives. Highly 
trained Chinese-language officers here in 
Washington and overseas — men who spe- 
cialize in Chinese history and communism — 
are working full time analyzing and ap- 
praising Peiping's moves. Numerous pri- 
vate scholars, some of whom have appeared 
before this committee in recent weeks, are 
consulted by the Department of State. And 
there are, of course, many specialists on 
Communist China in other agencies of the 
Government. These capable individuals — 
in and out of Government — systematically 
interchange and cross-check their analyses 

and estimates to provide what I believe is 
the most complete and most accurate pic- 
ture of Communist China, its leaders, and 
its policies, available to any non-Commu- 
nist government in the world. 


* Made before the Subcommittee on the Far East 
and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign 
Affairs on Mar. 16. 

Three Caveats 

Before going further, I would like to enter 
three caveats : > 

First, the experts do not always agree, 
especially in their estimates of Chinese 
Communist intentions. 

Second, the leaders we are discussing 
are both Chinese and Communist. Some of 
their words and acts can perhaps be best 
understood in terms of Chinese background 
— Chinese traits or historic Chinese ambi- 
tions. Others can perhaps be better under- 
stood in terms of their beliefs and ambitions 
as Communists. They are deeply commit- 
ted to a body of Communist doctrine devel- 
oped by Mao Tse-tung. Still other words 
and acts may be consistent with both the 
Chinese and doctrinaire Communist factors. 

We have faced a similar problem over 
the years with respect to the Soviet leader- 
ship. Some of their words and acts could 
be explained chiefly in terms of historic 
Russian imperial ambitions or Russian traits 
or practices. Others have been clearly at- 
tributable to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, or to 
interpretations of that doctrine by Stalin 
and more recent leaders. Some sovietolo- 
gists put more emphasis on the traditional 
nationalist or imperial factors, others put 



more on the Marxist-Leninist factors. There 
is no way to determine the exact weight 
which ought to be given to each of these 
two influences. 

Likewise, with regard to the Chinese 
Communists, there has been considerable 
disagreement over the respective dimen- 
sions of the two streams of influence: 
Chinese and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. Over 
the years some of the experts on China 
may not have appreciated adequately Marx- 
ist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. Likewise, some 
of the experts on Chinese Communist doc- 
trine may tend to underestimate the Chi- 
nese factors in the behavior and intentions 
of the Peiping regime. 

The third caveat is this: Predicting what 
the Chinese Communists will do next may 
be even more hazardous than usual at this 
juncture. They themselves appear to be 
taking stock. We know that some high- 
level talks have been going on and that they 
have called some of their ambassadors back 
for consultation. 

Chinese Communist Setbacl<s 

We know — the whole world knows — that 
the Chinese Communists have suffered some 
severe setbacks internationally during the 
past 14 months. They were unable to per- 
suade the Afro-Asians to accept their sub- 
stantive views on the Second Bandung 
Conference. They have found themselves in 
difficulty in several African countries. Their 
diplomatic missions have been expelled from 
Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African 
Republic. Their technicians have been ex- 
pelled from Ghana. The Governments of 
Kenya and Tunisia have warned them 
against promoting revolution in Africa. 

During the fighting between India and 
Pakistan, the Chinese Communists marched 
up hill and down again. They have been 
disappointed by the Tashkent agreement 
and the steps taken in accord with it. They 
were strongly opposed to the agreement be- 
' tween Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
which was ratified by both countries. They 
have suffered a major setback in Indonesia 

— the Indonesian Communist Party has been 

Generally, in their struggle with Moscow 
for leadership of the world Communist 
movement, the Chinese Communists appear 
to have lost ground. Even their relations 
with Castro's Cuba have sunk to the level 
of mudslinging. 

And, probably most important of all, 
Peiping sees the power of the United States 
committed in Southeast Asia to repel an ag- 
gression supported — and actively promoted 
— by Peiping. 

Will the Chinese Communist reaction to 
all these setbacks be a wild lashing out? Or 
will it be a sober decision to draw back and 
even to move toward peaceful coexistence? 

We, of course, hope it will be the latter. 
But we cannot be sure what Peiping intends 
to do. We do not expect the worst but we 
must be prepared for it. 

Our Relations With Peiping 

I will not try here today to review in de- 
tail the record of our relations with the 
Peiping regime. In the months after the 
Chinese Communist takeover in 1949 we 
watched to see whether the initial demon- 
stration of intense hostility toward the 
United States and toward Americans who 
were still resident in China was momen- 
tary, or reflected a basic Peiping policy. 
Then came the aggression against the Re- 
public of Korea, to which, at a second stage, 
the Chinese Communists committed large 
forces, thus coming into direct conflict with 
the United Nations and the United States. 

We have searched year after year for 
some sign that Communist China was ready 
to renounce the use of force to resolve dis- 
putes. We have also searched for some in- 
dication that it was ready to abandon its 
premise that the United States is its prime 

The Chinese Communist attitudes and ac- 
tions have been hostile and rigid. But a 
democracy, such as ours, does not accept 
rigidity. It seeks solutions to problems, 
however intractable they may seem. 

MAY 2, 1966 


Sino-United States Ambassadorial Talks 

We have discussed various problems vi'ith 
the Chinese Communists at international 
conferences such as the Geneva conferences 
of 1954 and 1962. 

In 1955 we began with them a series of 
bilateral conversations at the level of am- 
bassadors, first in Geneva and later in 
Warsaw. It was our hope that by direct, sys- 
tematic communication we might be able to 
reduce the sharpness of the conflict be- 
tween us. There now have been 129 of 
these meetings, the latest of which took 
place in Warsaw today. 

These exchanges have ranged widely, 
covering many subjects affecting our two 
countries. At first there was a little prog- 
ress in dealing with small specific issues, 
such as the release of Americans being 
held in Communist China. Although an un- 
derstanding was reached in this limited 
area, Peiping refused to fulfill its commit- 
ment to release all the Americans. 

I think it is accurate to say that no other 
non-Communist nation has had such ex- 
tensive conversations with the Peiping 
regime as we have had. The problem is not 
lack of contact between Peiping and Wash- 
ington. It is what, with contact, the Peiping 
regime itself says and does. 

Although they have produced almost no 
tangible results, these conversations have 
served and still serve useful purposes. They 
pei'mit us to clarify the numerous points of 
difference between us. They enable us to 
communicate in private during periods of 
crisis. They provide an opening through 
which, hopefully, light might one day pene- 
trate. But the talks have, so far, given no 
evidence of a shift or easing in Peiping's 
hostility toward the United States and its 
bellicose doctrines of world revolution. In- 
deed, the Chinese Communists have con- 
sistently demanded, privately as well as 
publicly, that we let them have Taiwan. 
And when we say that we will not abandon 
the 12 or 13 million people on Taiwan, 
against their will, they say that, until we 

change our minds about that, no improve- 
ment in relations is possible. 

Today we and Peiping are as far apart on 
matters of fundamental policy as we were 
17 years ago. 

The Basic Issues 

In assessing Peiping's policies and ac- 
tions, and the problems they present to 
American foreign policy and to the free 
peoples of the world, we must ask ourselves 
certain key questions : 

What does Peiping want, and how does it 
pursue its objectives? 

How successful has it been, and how suc- 
cessful is it likely to be in the future? 

Is it on a collision course with the United 

What are the prospects for change in its 

What policies should the United States 
adopt, or work toward, in dealing with 
Communist China? 

What Does Peiping Want? 

First, the Chinese Communist leaders seek 
to bring China on the world stage as a great 
power. They hold that China's history, size, 
and geographic position entitle it to great- 
power status. They seek to overcome the 
humiliation of 150 years of economic, cul- 
tural, and political domination by outside 

Our concern is with the way they are 
pursuing their quest for power and in- 
fluence in the world. And it is not only our 
concern but that of many other countries, in- 
cluding in recent years the Soviet Union. 

Peiping is aware that it still lacks many of 
the attributes of great-power status, and it 
chafes bitterly under this realization. 

Arming To Become a "Great Power" 

The Chinese Communists are determined 
to rectify this situation. They already have 
one of the largest armies in the world. They 
are now developing nuclear weapons and 





missile delivery systems. They are pouring 
a disproportionately large proportion of 
their industrial and scientific effort into 
military and military-related fields. 

What is all this military power for? Some 
believe it to be for defensive purposes 
alone : 

To erect a token "deterrent" nuclear 
capability against the United States or the 

To demonstrate symbolically that "China 
must be reckoned with" ; 

To react to an imaginary, almost path- 
ological, notion that the United States and 
other countries around its borders are seek- 
ing an opportunity to invade mainland China 
and destroy the Peiping regime. 

But such weapons need not serve a de- 
fensive role. They can be used directly by 
Peiping to try to intimidate its neighbors, 
or in efforts to blackmail Asian countries 
into breaking defense alliances with the 
United States, or in an attempt to create a 
nuclear "balance" in Asia in which Peiping's 
potentially almost unlimited conventional 
forces might be used with increased 

These weapons can ultimately be em- 
ployed to attack Peiping's Asian neighbors 
and, in time, even the United States or the 
Soviet Union. This would be mad and 
suicidal, as Peiping must know, despite 
cavalier statements that mainland China 
can survive nuclear war. Nevertheless, a 
potential nuclear capability, on top of enor- 
mous conventional forces, represents a new 
factor in the equilibrium of power in Asia 
that this country and its friends and allies 
cannot ignore. 

Peiping's use of power is closely related 
to what I believe are its second and third 
objectives: dominance within Asia and lead- 
ership of the Communist world revolution, 
employing Maoist tactics. Peiping is striv- 
ing to restore traditional Chinese influence 
or dominance in South, Southeast, and East 
Asia. Its concept of influence is exclusive. 
Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi reportedly told 

Prince Sihanouk recently that his country's 
"friendship" with Cambodia would be in- 
compatible with Cambodian ties with the 
United States. Peiping has tried to alienate 
North Viet-Nam and North Korea from the 
Soviet Union. It has had uneven success in 
such maneuvers. But it has not abandoned 
this objective. Where Peiping is present, it 
seeks to exclude all others. And this is not 
only true in its relations with its neighbors 
but in the Communist world as well. 

Direct Aggression 

Peiping has not refrained from the use of 
force to pursue its objectives. Following 
Korea, there were Tibet and the attacks on 
the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits. 
There have been the attacks on India. It is 
true that, since Korea, Peiping has moved 
only against weaker foes and has carefully 
avoided situations which might bring it face 
to face with the United States. It has 
probed for weaknesses around its frontier 
but drawn back when the possibility of a 
wider conflict loomed. 

While the massive and direct use of 
Chinese Communist troops in overt aggres- 
sion cannot be ruled out, Peiping's behavior 
up to now suggests it would approach any 
such decision with caution. 

If the costs and risks of a greater use of 
force were reduced by, for example, our uni- 
lateral withdrawal from the region, Peiping 
might well feel freer to use its power to in- 
timidate or overwhelm a recalcitrant op- 
ponent or to aid directly insurgent forces. 

IVIao's Doctrine of World Revolution 

As I have said, the Chinese Communist 
leaders are dedicated to a fanatical and 
bellicose Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of 
world revolution. Last fall, Lin Piao, the 
Chinese Communist Minister of Defense, 
recapitulated in a long article Peiping's 
strategy of violence for achieving Com- 
munist domination of the world. This 
strategy involves the mobilization of the 
underdeveloped areas of the world — which 

MAY 2, 1966 


the Chinese Communists compare to the 
"rural areas" — against the industrialized or 
"urban" areas. It involves the relentless 
prosecution of what they call "people's 
wars." The final stage of all this violence 
is to be what they frankly describe as 
"wars of annihilation." 

It is true that this doctrine calls for revo- 
lution by the natives of each country. In 
that sense it may be considered a "do-it- 
yourself kit." But Peiping is prepared to 
train and indoctrinate the leaders of these 
revolutions and to support them with funds, 
arms, and propaganda, as well as politically. 
It is even prepared to manufacture these 
revolutionary movements out of whole cloth. 

Peiping has encouraged and assisted — 
with arms and other means — the aggres- 
sions of the North Vietnamese Communists 
in Laos and against South Viet-Nam. It has 
publicly declared its support for so-called 
national liberation forces in Thailand, and 
there are already terrorist attacks in the re- 
mote rural areas of northeast Thailand. 
There is talk in Peiping that Malaysia is 
next on the list. The basic tactics of these 
"wars of liberation" have been set forth by 
Mao and his disciples, including General 
Giap, the North Vietnamese Communist 
Minister of Defense. They progress from the 
undermining of independent governments 
and the economic and social fabrics of so- 
ciety by terror and assassination, through 
guerrilla warfare, to large-scale military 

Peiping has sought to promote Communist 
coups and "wars of liberation" against in- 
dependent governments in Africa and Latin 
America as well as in Asia. 

Words Versus Actions 

Some say we should ignore what the Chi- 
nese Communist leaders say and judge 
them only by what they do. It is true that 
they have been more cautious in action 
than in words — more cautious in what they 
do themselves than in what they have urged 
the Soviet Union to do. Undoubtedly, they 
recognize that their power is limited. They 

have shown, in many ways, that they have 
a healthy respect for the power of the 
United States. 

But it does not follow that we should dis- 
regard the intentions and plans for the 
future which they have proclaimed. To do 
so would be to repeat the catastrophic 
miscalculation that so many people made 
about the ambitions of Hitler — and that 
many have made at various times in ap- 
praising the intentions of the Soviet leaders. 

I have noted criticism of the so-called 
analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung. 
I am perfectly aware of the important dif- 
ferences between these two and the coun- 
tries in which they have exercised power. 
The seizure of Manchuria by Japanese 
militarists, of Ethiopia by Mussolini, and of 
the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia 
by Hitler, were laboratory experiments in 
the anatomy and physiology of aggression. 
How to deal with the phenomenon of ag- 
gression was the principal problem faced in 
drafting the United Nations Charter, and 
the answer was: collective action. We do 
ourselves no service by insisting that each 
source of aggression or each instance of ag- 
gression is unique. My own view is that we 
have learned a good deal about this 
phenomenon and its potentiality for lead- 
ing into catastrophe if the problem is not 
met in a timely fashion. 

The bellicosity of the Chinese Commu- 
nists has created problems within the Com- 
munist world as well as between Peiping 
and the non-Communist world. 

Recently a leading official of a Com- 
munist state said to me that the most 
serious problem in the world today is how 
to get Peiping to move to a policy of 
"peaceful coexistence." 

Chinese Communist Fear of Attack 

At times the Communist Chinese leaders 
seem to be obsessed with the notion that 
they are being threatened and encircled. 
We have told them both publicly and pri- 
vately, and I believe have demonstrated in 



our actions in times of crisis and even 
under grave provocation, that we vi^ant no 
war with Communist China. The President 
restated this only last month in New York.^ 
We do not seek the overthrow by force of 
the Peiping regime; we do object to its at- 
tempt to overthrow other regimes by force. 

How much Peiping's "fear" of the United 
States is genuine and how much it is arti- 
ficially induced for domestic political pur- 
poses only the Chinese Communist leaders 
themselves know. I am convinced, how- 
ever, that their desire to expel our influence 
and activity from the western Pacific and 
Southeast Asia is not motivated by fears 
that we are threatening them. 

I wish I could believe that Communist 
China seeks merely a guarantee of friendly 
states around its borders, as some com- 
mentators have suggested. If it was as sim- 
ple as this, they would have only to abandon 
their policies which cause their neighbors to 
seek help from the United States. 

The trouble is that Peiping's leaders 
want neighboring countries to accept sub- 
ordination to Chinese power. They want 
them to become political and economic de- 
pendencies of Peiping. If the United States 
can be driven from Asia, this goal will be 
in their grasp. The "influence," therefore, 
that Peiping's present leaders seek in Asia 
is indeed far reaching. 

Dominance in the Communist Movement 

I had the privilege almost exactly a year 
ago of commenting at some length before 
this committee on the Sino-Soviet dispute. 
The essential nature of this conflict has not 
changed in this year. It has, if anything, in- 
tensified and widened. Its Russo-Chinese 
national aspects have become more con- 
spicuous. Both sides have clearly given in- 
creased thought to the implications of a 
wider war in Southeast Asia for their mutual 
treaty obligations. I don't know what the 
Soviets would actually do with respect to 

" Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390. 

their treaty with Communist China, but 
Peiping does not seem to be counting on 
Soviet support. 

Peiping's Desire To Maintain Sharp 
Communist-U.S. Polarity 

One of Peiping's most fundamental dif- 
ferences with Moscow centers on its desire 
to maintain the sharpest possible polariza- 
tion between the Communist world and the 
United States. Peiping argues that we are 
the "enemy of all the people in the world." 
Its national interests in Asia are served by 
maximizing Communist (and world) pres- 
sure on us and by attempting to "isolate" us. 
For this reason alone the Chinese would 
probably have opposed any Soviet attempts 
to reach understandings with us. In addi- 
tion there are ideological and psychological 
reasons for Sino-Soviet rivalry : 

The intense and deadly antagonisms that 
have always characterized schisms in the 
Marxist world ; 

Mao's belief that after Stalin's death the 
mantle of world Communist leadership 
should rightfully have passed to him and 
the Chinese Communist party ; 

Peiping's obsession, also held or pro- 
fessed by the leaders of the Soviet Union 
during the 30 years after the Bolshevik 
revolution, with a fear of being threatened 
and encircled ; 

The mixture of the psychology of the 
veterans of the long march and Chinese 
traditional attitudes which has led Pei- 
ping's leaders to believe that through a 
combination of patience, struggle, and "right 
thinking" all obstacles can be conquered; 

Peiping's professed belief that the So- 
viets are joining with the United States in 
keeping China in a position of inferiority 
and subordination. 

All these have merged to give the Sino- 
Soviet dispute a flavor and an intensity 
which rival even the current Chinese Com- 
munist antagonism for the United States 

MAY 2, 1966 


How Successful Has Peiping Been? 

We can see that the Communist Chinese 
have set vast goals for themselves, both in- 
ternally and externally. The disastrous re- 
sults of the so-called great leap forward 
have forced them to acknowledge that it 
will take them generations to achieve their 

They have wrought considerable changes 
on the mainland of China. Perhaps their 
greatest feat has been to establish their 
complete political authority throughout the 
country. They have made some progress 
in industrialization, education, and public 
health — although at the expense of human 
freedom, originality, and creativity. But 
their efforts to improve agriculture and to 
mold the Chinese people into a uniform 
Marxist pattern have been far less 

The economic, political, and social prob- 
lems still confronting the Chinese Com- 
munist leaders today are staggering. 

Economic Problems 

Peiping's economic power will almost cer- 
tainly increase over the coming years. But 
even with relatively effective birth control 
programs the population of mainland China 
may reach 1 billion by 1985. 

Where is the food to come from? Where 
are the resources for investment to come 
from? Can the rapidly increasing military 
and economic costs of great-power status 
be carried by Chinese society at the same 
time that other economic tasks vital to 
China's economic survival are carried out? 
I do not denigrate in the slightest native 
Chinese ingenuity and capacity for incred- 
ibly hard work when I suggest that the solu- 
tions to these problems are in the gravest 

Internal Political Problems 

Even more important to Peiping's leaders 
than these economic problems, however, are 
the will and morale of their own people. 
The current leaders — Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i, 
Chou En-lai, and others — are an intensely 
committed group of men whose entire lives 

symbolize their willingness to postpone the 
satisfactions of the present for the prom- 
ised glory of the future. 

Every generation is suspicious that the 
youth of today is not what it was in the good 
old days. But this has become another ob- 
session of Peiping's old men. Their domes- 
tic propaganda and their comments to 
visitors, as well as the reports of refugees, 
have all emphasized their distrust of the 
youth of the country. They fear that their 
grand designs and goals — both domestic and 
foreign — will not be pursued with zeal by 
the next generation. 

I believe their concern may be both gen- 
uine and warranted. How pleased can young 
college graduates be to be sent off to rural 
China for years for ideological hardening? 
How attractive is it to the Chinese peasant 
and worker to be called on for years of 
sacrifice to bring revolution to Africa or 
Latin America? Will Chinese scientists ac- 
cept the dogma that scientific truth can be 
found only in the pages of Mao Tse-tung's 
writings? How can professional Chinese 
Communist army officers and soldiers be 
persuaded that the words of Mao represent 
a "spiritual atomic bomb" more powerful 
than any material weapon? 

I am unaware of any new revolution 
brewing on the Chinese mainland. I have no 
evidence that the current regime does not, 
in practical terms, control effectively all of 
mainland China. But there is evidence of a 
growing psychological weariness that in 
years to come could produce a significant 
shift in the policies of a new generation of 

The dramatic succession of foreign policy 
failures during the last year, both in the 
Communist and non-Communist world, must 
be having some effect on the confidence of 
the people in the wisdom of their leaders 
and even on the leaders themselves. 

I do not predict any quick changes in 
China. Nor are there simple solutions. Pei- 
ping's present state of mind is a combina- 
tion of aggressive arrogance and obsessions 
of its own making. There are doubtless 
many reasons, cultural, historical, political. 



for this state of mind. Psychologists have 
struggled for years in an effort to charac- 
terize what is a normal personality. The 
definition of what a normal state personal- 
ity might be is beyond my abilities. I would 
be inclined, however, to advance the view 
that a country whose behavior is as violent, 
irascible, unyielding, and hostile as that of 
Communist China is led by leaders whose 
view of the world and of life itself is unreal. 
It is said that we have isolated them. But 
to me they have isolated themselves — both 
in the non-Communist and Communist world. 

We have little hope of changing the out- 
look of these leaders. They are products of 
their entire lives. They seem to be immune 
to agreement or persuasion by anyone, in- 
cluding their own allies. 

It is of no help in formulating policy to 
describe Peiping's behavior as neurotic. Its 
present policies pose grave and immediate 
problems for the United States and other 
countries. These must be dealt with now. 
The weapons and advisers that Peiping ex- 
ports to promote and assist insurrections in 
other countries cannot be met by psycho- 
analysis. At the present time there is a 
need for a counterweight of real power to 
Chinese Communist pressures. This has had 
to be supplied primarily by the United 
States and our allies. 

We should be under no illusion that by 
yielding to Peiping's bellicose demands 
today we would in some way ease the path 
toward peace in Asia. If Peiping reaps suc- 
cess from its current policies, not only its 
present leaders but those who follow will be 
emboldened to continue them. This is the 
path to increased tension and even greater 
dangers to world peace in the years ahead. 

China as a Great Power 

We expect China to become some day a 
great world power. Communist China is a 
major Asian power today. In the ordinary 
course of events, a peaceful China would be 
expected to have close relations — political, 
cultural, and economic — with the countries 
around its borders and with the United 

It is no part of the policy of the United 
States to block the peaceful attainment of 
these objectives. 

More than any other Western people, we 
have had close and warm ties with the 
Chinese people. We opposed the staking 
out of spheres of influence in China. We 
used our share of the Boxer indemnity to 
establish scholarships for Chinese students 
in the United States. We welcomed the 
revolution of Sun Yat Sen. We took the 
lead in relinquishing Western extraterri- 
torial privileges in China. We refused to 
recognize the puppet regime established by 
Japan in Manchuria. And it was our re- 
fusal to accept or endorse, even by implica- 
tion, Japan's imperial conquests and fur- 
ther designs in China that made it impos- 
sible for us to achieve a modus vivendi 
with Japan in 1940-41. 

We look forward hopefully — and confi- 
dently — to a time in the future when the 
government of mainland China will permit 
the restoration of the historic ties of friend- 
ship between the people of mainland China 
and ourselves. 

Elements of Future Policy 

What should be the main elements in our 
policy toward Communist China? 

We must take care to do nothing which 
encourages Peiping — or anyone else — to be- 
lieve that it can reap gains from its aggres- 
sive actions and designs. It is just as essen- 
tial to "contain" Communist aggression in 
Asia as it was, and is, to "contain" Com-' 
munist aggression in Europe. 

At the same time, we must continue to 
make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its 
belief that force is the best way to resolve 
disputes and gives up its violent strategy of 
world revolution, we would welcome an era 
of good relations. 

More specifically, I believe, there should 
be 10 elements in our policy. 

First, we must remain firm in our de- 
termination to help those Allied nations 
which seek our help to resist the direct or 
indirect use or threat of force against 
their territory by Peiping. 

MAY 2. 1966 


Second, we must continue to assist the 
countries of Asia in building broadly based 
effective governments, devoted to progres- 
sive economic and social policies, which can 
better withstand Asian Communist pres- 
sures and maintain the security of their 

Third, we must honor our commitments to 
the Republic of China and to the people on 
Taiwan, who do not want to live under com- 
munism. We will continue to assist in their 
defense and to try to persuade the Chinese 
Communists to join with us in renouncing 
the use of force in the area of Taiwan. 

Fourth, we will continue our efforts to pre- 
vent the expulsion of the Republic of China 
from the United Nations or its agencies. So 
long as Peiping follows its present course it 
is extremely difficult for us to see how it 
can be held to fulfill the requirements set 
forth in the charter for membership, and 
the United States opposes its membership. 
It is worth recalling that the Chinese Com- 
munists have set forth some interesting 
conditions which must be fulfilled before 
they are even willing to consider mem- 
bership : 

The United Nations resolution of 1950 
condemning Chinese Communist aggression 
in Korea must be rescinded ; 

There must be a new United Nations 
resolution condemning U.S. "aggression"; 

The United Nations must be reorganized; 

The Republic of China must be expelled; 

All other "imperialist puppets" must be 
expelled. One can only ask whether the 
Chinese Communists seriously want mem- 
bership, or whether they mean to destroy 
the United Nations. We believe the United 
Nations must approach this issue with the 
utmost caution and deliberation. 

Fifth, we should continue our efforts to 
reassure Peiping that the United States 
does not intend to attack mainland China. 
There are, of course, risks of war with 
China. This was true in 1950. It was true 
in the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955 and 
1958. It was true in the Chinese Com- 
munist drive into Indian territory in 1962. 

It is true today in Viet-Nam. But we do not 
want war. We do not intend to provoke war. 
There is no fatal inevitability of war with 
Communist China. The Chinese Communists 
have, as I have already said, acted with 
caution when they foresaw a collision with 
the United States. We have acted with re- 
straint and care in the past and we are 
doing so today. I hope that they will realize 
this and guide their actions accordingly. 

Sixth, we must keep firmly in our minds 
that there is nothing eternal about the 
policies and attitudes of Communist China. 
We must avoid assuming the existence of 
an unending and inevitable state of hostil- 
ity between ourselves and the rulers of 
mainland China. 

Seventh, when it can be done without 
jeopardizing other U.S. interests, we should 
continue to enlarge the possibilities for un- 
official contacts between Communist China 
and ourselves — contacts which may grad- 
ually assist in altering Peiping's picture of 
the United States. 

In this connection, we have gradually ex- 
panded the categories of American citizens 
who may travel to Communist China. Ameri- 
can libraries may freely purchase Chinese 
Communist publications. American citizens 
may send and receive mail from the main- 
land. We have in the past indicated that if 
the Chinese themselves were interested in 
purchasing grain we would consider such 
sales. We have indicated our willingness to 
allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to 
come to the United States. We are pre- 
pared to permit American universities to in- 
vite Chinese Communist scientists to visit 
their institutions. 

We do not expect that for the time being 
the Chinese Communists will seize upon 
these avenues of contact or exchange. All 
the evidence suggests Peiping wishes to re- 
main isolated from the United States. But 
we believe it is in our interests that such 
channels be opened and kept open. We be- 
lieve contact and communication are not 
incompatible with a firm policy of contain- 

Eighth, we should keep open our direct 



diplomatic contacts with Peiping in Warsaw. 
While these meetings frequently provide 
merely an opportunity for a reiteration of 
known positions, they play a role in en- 
abling each side to communicate informa- 
tion and attitudes in times of crisis. It is 
our hope that they might at some time be- 
come the channel for a more fruitful dialog. 

Ninth, we are prepared to sit down with 
Peiping and other countries to discuss the 
critical problems of disarmament and 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Pei- 
ping has rejected all suggestions and invita- 
tions to join in such talks. It has attacked 
the test ban treaty. It has advocated the 
further spread of nuclear weapons to non- 
nuclear countries. It is an urgent task of 
all countries to persuade Peiping to change 
its stand. 
■ Tenth, we must continue to explore and 
analyze all available information on Com- 
munist China and keep our own policies up 
to date. We hope that Peiping's policies 
may one day take account of the desire of 
the people of Asia and her own people for 
peace and security. We have said, in suc- 
cessive administrations, that when Peiping 
abandons the aggressive use of force and 
shows that it is not irrevocably hostile to 
the United States, then expanded contacts 
and improved relations may become pos- 
sible. This continues to be our position. 

These, I believe, are the essential in- 
gredients of a sound policy in regard to 
Communist China. 

I believe that they serve the interests 
not only of the United States and of the 
free world as a whole — but of the Chinese 
people. We have always known of the prag- 
matic genius of the Chinese people, and we 
can see evidence of it even today. The prac- 
tices and doctrines of the present Peiping 
regime are yielding poor returns to the 
Chinese people. I believe that the Chinese 
people, no less their neighbors and the 
American people, crave the opportunity to 

[move toward the enduring goals of man- 
kind: a better life, safety, freedom, human 
dignity, and peace. 

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions 
on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam 

Following is the text of an interview with 
Secretary Rusk hy Paris-Match for publica- 
tion in the April 16 issue of that magazine. 

Press release 79 dated April 12 

Q. Do you sincerely believe that the 
French Government's neiv NATO proposals 
are made simply to spite the United States? 

A. No. 

Q. Do you think, like so many people in 
this country [United States'], that General 
de Gaulle carries on a quarrel with the 
United States which dates back to World 
War II? 

A. There are too many American soldiers 
buried on French soil for us to think in 
terms of quarrels. There are too many fun- 
damental common interests between the 
United States and France to describe differ- 
ences on particular questions as quarrels. 
Relations among great nations are not and 
should not be determined on the basis of 
personal feelings. 

Q. Do you consider that all or part of the 
French proposals for a NATO reform are 
totally negative or incompatible with the 
American viewpoint? If so, which ones? 

A. The premise of your question is in- 
correct. France has made no proposals to 
reform NATO. From time to time over the 
past 3 years, the French Government has 
indicated that it intended to put forward 
proposals, and her allies in NATO have 
made it clear that they looked forward to 
those proposals and would give them most 
careful consideration. But instead of offer- 
ing proposals for the reform of NATO, the 
French Government has chosen to announce 
its decisions without consulting its allies in 
any serious way. 

Q. How can you say there have been no 
proposals for NATO reform? What about 
General de Gaulle's 1958 letters to the U.S. 
and the U.K.? 

A. The 1958 proposal had nothing to do 

MAY 2, 1966 


with NATO. It suggested a three-power or- 
ganization for tripartite consultations on 
world policy. In the United States reply it 
was pointed out that such an arrangement 
would be objectionable to our other allies, 
whose interests would have to be considered. 
The United States was not prepared to 
nominate itself as a member of such a 
triumvirate. We accept an obligation to 
consult with many other nations, large and 
small, where their and our vital interests 
are involved. 

Q. Do you see a link between the French 
NATO proposals today and General de 
Gaulle's forthcoming trip to Russia? 

A. We have not been informed as to what 
General de Gaulle intends to discuss in 
Russia. The question should be addressed to 
the French Government. 

Q. Does not the American Government 
prefer having a strong independent ally to 
a weak dependent one? 

A. The question confuses the real issue. 
Of course we welcome a strong France, but 
what nation is wholly independent in the 
world today? The United States is linked 
to its allies all over the world by treaties 
which are the law of our land. Each of these 
alliances restricts our independence by the 
commitments we have undertaken. I know 
of few nations that have less freedom of 
action than the United States, because our 
freedom of action is limited by our respon- 
sibilities. We want no satellites. What we 
prefer most as partners are strong nations 
which are at once dependable, independent, 
but interdependent allies. What we have 
long sought is an equal partnership with a 
Europe moving toward unity. 

Q. Do you agree that the Russian threat 
of a conventional or nuclear attack on 
Europe has diminished in the past 17 years? 
Is NATO adequate in the light of this new 

A. If the threat against Western Europe 
has diminished in the last 17 years, it has 
diminished because NATO has stood as a 
firm barrier to Soviet ambitions. We should 

not forget that as late as 1961-1962 we were 
in the midst of a major crisis over Berlin 
that threatened war. The fact that a dam 
has contained the flood waters over the 
years is no reason for dismantling it. 

Nature of the Alliance 

Q. Do you make a distinction betiveen 
NATO and the Atlantic alliance? 

A. NATO is an organization which com- 
bines three significant elements — an inte- 
grated military staff ready to assume opera- 
tional command of NATO-assigned forces 
the moment aggression occurs, common plan- 
ning through the integrated staff, and mili- 
tary forces in being. NATO, in other words, 
is the collective security system which gives 
reality to the mutual defense commitments 
of the North Atlantic Treaty. We have 
learned through experience of two world 
wars that such a collective system is essen- 
tial if aggression is not only to be defeated 
but deterred. It took nearly 4 years in the 
First World War to bring about the crea- 
tion of a combined command under Mar- 
shal Foch, and the delay cost heavily. In 
the Second World War the lack of a com- 
bined command and the inadequacy of ar- 
rangements between the allies contributed 
to the catastrophes of 1940. By not making; 
these mistakes again we have created the 
greatest possible deterrent to war. 

Q. What is your opinion of General de 
Gaulle's thesis that the military agreements 
hettvcen France and the U.S. need no longer 
be applicable because they no longer meet 
presen t conditions ? 

A. Most of those military agreements by 
their terms continue for the life of the North 
Atlantic Treaty, to which France says it in- 
tends to continue to adhere. This thesis 
strikes at the very heart of the sanctity of 
international agreements. If one party to an 
agreement is no longer bound because that 
party believes that the agreement does not 
meet present conditions, then the agreement 
has no validity of any sort. Proposals for 
changes can be considered through the 
normal processes of consultation and nego- 



tiation. The United States has more than 
4,000 agreements with other nations. We 
are concerned about actions which would 
weaken the growing fabric of international 

Q. France was the first Western country 
to side with the United States during the 
1962 Cuban crisis. Still, Cuba teas outside 
the NATO area. Hoio do you account for 
this attitude? 

A. We very much appreciated the prompt 
and forthright response of the French Gov- 
ernment during the Cuban missile crisis. The 
unanimity of NATO and the unanimity 
of the Western Hemisphere were major con- 
tributions to the peaceful settlement of a sit- 
uation that menaced the entire free world. 

Q. Would the American Government ac- 
cept French NATO bases and military in- 
stallations on American soil under French 
nominal or operational command? 

A. I am sure we would if French forces 
were needed in the United States in defense 
of the NATO area. 

Q. Would you tvish to keep American 
bases or military installations in France if 
they were under the same command ar- 
rangements as in England? 

f A. The fact is that American bases in 
England and France are today under the 
same kind of command and control arrange- 
ments. The British flag flies side by side 
with the American flag over the bases in 
England, just as the Tricolor flies side by 
side with the American flag over American 
installations in France. 

Q. Why do you refuse landing and transit 
rights in the United States to French mili- 
tary aircraft on their way to Tahiti? 

m A. We have been granting landing and 
transit rights for French military aircraft 
going to Tahiti on the understanding that 
they carry no nuclear weapons, material, or 
components for use in a weapons test. The 
United States is signatory to the nuclear test 
ban treaty, along with 105 other countries. 
By our treaty commitments we are obliged 
not to assist any country in nuclear testing 

in the atmosphere, in the sea, or in outer 
space. We do not think we should be asked 
to violate that treaty. 

NATO Without France 

Q. Could the Allied military organiza- 
tion in Europe really function without 
France ? 

A. Of course. Fourteen nations, com- 
prising 450 million people and possessing 
massive military power, will not be para- 
lyzed by the attitude of France. 

Q. Is it the American intention to give 
West Germany the comrnand of the "center 
Europe" sector if France leaves NATO? 

A. It is not for the United States to 
"give" any command to any NATO mem- 
ber. The command arrangements of NATO 
are for all the NATO members to consider 
and decide among themselves, not just one 
or a few. 

Q. What reforms of NATO tvould you 
envisage after the French withdrawal? 

A. This will be for the NATO govern- 
ments to decide on the basis of consultations 
now in process. 

Q. There is serious concern in France that 

participation in an integrated command 
and the maintenance of American airbuses 
in France may drag France into a war it 
does not want. Don't you agree that this is 
a real problem, particularly in view of the 
fact that America's involvement in Viet- 
Nam could lead to a collision betiveen the 
United States and the Soviet Union? 

A. The concern in France on this point is 
based on a misapprehension of facts. The 
NATO integrated command is essentially 
a combined planning staff ready to assume 
operational command if armed attack occurs 
against a NATO nation in the North Atlan- 
tic area, as that term is used in the North 
Atlantic Treaty. But in peacetime the inte- 
grated staff does not have operational com- 
mand over any force except certain air-de- 
fense units which must be maintained on a 
constant alert basis in Europe. Conse- 
quently, France's participation in an inte- 

MAY 2, 1966 



grated command does not place her troops 
in peacetime under the command of any 
foreign officer or staff. If war should 
break out, it would be for the French 
Government to decide that her forces should 
then be released to the integrated command. 
Under these circumstances, I cannot see how 
participation in the integrated command 
could involve France in a war. 

What might involve France in a war would 
be her continued allegiance to the North At- 
lantic Treaty, since it is required by that 
treaty to come to the defense of any signa- 
tory power subjected to armed attack in 
Europe or North America. But France, as 
I understand it, wishes to remain a party 
to the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Nor do I see any reason why France might 
be drawn into war through the maintenance 
of American airbases on French soil. Amer- 
ican planes in France do not take off except 
under regulations worked out with the 
French militaiy authorities. When, for ex- 
ample, our airplanes were used to airlift 
paratroopers to Stanleyville, this matter was 
first discussed with your Foreign Office, and 
the United States was given assurances that 
the Foreign Office would have no objection 
to the planes' taking off from Evreux for 
that purpose. 

Q. Well, after all, ivon't you agree that 
France has played and is playing a con- 
structive role in trying to alleviate the di- 
vision of Europe? 

A. No one is more interested than the 
United States in a genuine solution of East- 
West problems. After all, the United States 
has been required to spend more than $850 
billion in defense budgets since 1947; we 
can think of much better uses for such re- 
sources. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union 
could find more desirable ways of using 
comparable resources on their side. But 
East-West issues affect all the members of 
the alliance and can be solved only on the 
basis of the common interests of the peoples 
of the West and the peoples of Eastern 
Europe. We believe that a solution can best 
be found through the collective efforts of 
the Western nations and would welcome 

active French participation in a concerted 
search for these solutions, including the re- 
unification of Germany, disarmament, the 
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the 
normalization of trade and cultural relations 
between Eastern and Western Europe. But 
it does not appear that France agrees with 
this view. France elected not to participate 
in the protracted discussions that led to an 
easing of the Berlin crisis of 1961-62, and 
France is not participating in the current 
disarmament talks at Geneva. Certainly 
fragmentation within the West will only im- 
pede an ultimate East- West settlement. 

U.S. Position on Viet-Nam * 

Q. Noiv, about Viet-Nam, the United 
States ivas extremely critical of France dur- 
ing the Indochinese and the Algerian tears. 
Are you not today in the same position we 
were in a few years ago? 

A. The question is much more complicated 
than you have suggested. Following the sei- 
zure of mainland China by the Communists, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
France agreed that the security of Southeast 
Asia was of vital importance to the free 
world. The United States provided large- 
scale economic and military assistance to 
France during its struggle in Indochina. Un- 
happily, the free world was not able to reach 
a fully adequate solution in 1953 and 1954. 
But that is past history. The United States 
is not in the same position as was France a 
few years ago. We have just as vital a stake 
in peace in the Pacific Ocean as we have in 
peace in the Atlantic Ocean. We agreed, 
during World War II, with our European 
allies that the war against Hitler should be 
given first priority. But in the second- 
priority theater in the Pacific, Japanese mili- 
tarism was defeated without major redeploy- 
ments from the European theater. France 
has elected to reduce its responsibilities in 
the Pacific. The United States has major 
commitments there. 

Q. Wo7ild you remain in South Viet-Nam 
if a civilian government asked you to leave? 

A. This is a very hypothetical question 



because I do not contemplate the contingen- 
cies you describe. The treaty commitments 
of the United States turn upon the requests 
of South Viet-Nam for assistance. If that 
situation should change, there would result 
a new situation. Since I do not expect it 
to happen, I do not wish to speculate. 

Q. Would the United States be ready to 
suspend once more its air raids over North 

A. We have said over and over again that 
we would be prepared to suspend the bomb- 
ing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward 
peace. There was no bombing of North 
Viet-Nam from the beginning of increased 
North Vietnamese infiltration into South 
Viet-Nam in 1960 until February 1965. It 
is not merely a debater's point to call this 
a 4-year pause because many efforts were 
made during that period to bring about a 
peaceful settlement of the situation in South- 
east Asia. There was a brief pause in May 
of 1965, during which categorical and nega- 
tive answers were received from all Commu- 
nist capitals directly involved. There was a 
37-day pause beginning last Christmas. Dur- 
ing that time many governments, including 
our own, diligently explored the possibility 
of a peaceful settlement. The replies from 
the other side were simple, harsh, and nega- 
tive. We have had no hint or suggestion 
that the suspension of bombing would lead 
to a suspension of the infiltration of men 
and arms from North Viet-Nam into South 
Viet-Nam. The bombing of South Viet-Nam 
by North Viet-Nam continues even though 
the bombs are not carried by airplanes. The 
United States wants peace in Southeast Asia. 
If Hanoi would decide to abandon its at- 
tempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force, 
peace could come very quickly. The problem 
is one of appetite. I repeat that the United 
States would be ready to suspend its bomb- 
ing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward 

Q. Couldn't a direct dialog with China 
promote the cause of peace? 

A. I am surprised by this question. The 
United States has perhaps had more discus- 

sions on serious matters with Peiping than 
any government having diplomatic relations 
with Peiping, with the possible exception of 
the Soviet Union. We have had a direct 
dialog with Peiping for more than 10 years, 
involving 129 discussions between our and 
their Ambassadors in Geneva and Warsaw. 
The problem is not one of contact. The prob 
lem is that with contact we have not been 
able to find a basis for improved relation- 
ships. Peiping has made it very clear, ac- 
cording to their public declarations, that 
there is no possibility of improving rela- 
tions with the United States unless we are 
prepared to abandon Formosa and the 12 
million people living on that island. That 
we will not do. We hope to continue the 
dialog with Peiping, but those who expect 
some magical formula must face squarely 
the issue of the surrender of 12 million peo- 
ple on Formosa. 

U.S. Ready To Consult With France 
and NATO on French Demands 

Following are the texts of aide memoire 
exchanged between the United States and 


Press release 80 dated April 12 

The Government of the United States 
acknowledges receipt of an aide-memoire 
from the Government of the French Re- 
public on March 29, 1966. The United 
States Government has been and will con- 
tinue to be in consultation with its other 
Allies in NATO on the questions to which 
the actions of the Government of the French 
Republic give rise, and which affect the 
security of all members of NATO. 

' For an earlier exchange of aide memoire, see 
Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617. 

• Delivered by the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the 
French Foreign Office on Apr. 12. 

MAY 2, 1966 



The United States Government takes note 
of the view expressed by the French Gov- 
ernment that the measures it proposes to 
take are made necessary "because of the 
impossibility of amending, by mutual agree- 
ment and under satisfactory conditions, the 
provisions in force in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization." The United States 
Government calls the attention of the 
French Government to the fact that the 
drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty rec- 
ognized that changes might occur in the 
factors "affecting peace and security in the 
North Atlantic area." ^ They, therefore, 
provided, in Article 12 that, after ten years 
of the operation of the Treaty, any Party 
should have the right to request a consulta- 
tion of the Parties "for the purpose of re- 
viewing the Treaty." 

The United States Government recalls to 
the French Government that, having in 
mind Article 12, it has, like many other 
NATO Governments, over the past several 
years invited the French Government to 
submit any proposals it might have for the 
revision of the Treaty or the Treaty Or- 
ganization. Moreover, it has assured the 
French Government that such suggestions 
would be given the most careful considera- 
tion. The United States Government can- 
not, therefore, understand the basis upon 
which the French Government has con- 
cluded, without consulting the other Parties 
to the Treaty, that it is impossible to 
amend the NATO arrangements and that it 
must act unilaterally. The United States 
Government calls attention to the fact that 
the Declaration of Fourteen of the member 
countries dated March 18, 1966,* was is- 
sued only after the French Government had 
given notice of its intentions to act uni- 
laterally and without advance consultation. 

The United States Government takes note 
of the intention of the Government of the 
French Republic to terminate the assign- 
ment to the Allied Command in Europe of 

the French ground and air forces stationed 
in Germany on July 1, 1966. In doing so, 
the United States recalls that all forces sta- 
tioned in the area of Allied Command Eu- 
rope were, by agreement, to be placed under 
the authority of SACEUR, in conformity 
with the 1954 London Final Act » and the 
subsequent NATO Council resolution ® to 
implement Section IV of the London Final 
Act. Furthermore, the Government of the 
United States wishes to inform the Govern- 
ment of the French Republic that upon the 
termination of such assignment the Agree- 
ment dated September 6, 1960, between the 
United States and France regarding the 
NATO Atomic Stockpile of Weapons in Ger- 
many for Support of and Utilization by 
French Forces Assigned to NATO would, by 
its own terms, cease to have application. 

The United States Government further 
notes the intention of the Government of 
France to withdraw French personnel as- 
signed to NATO commands, also to take ef- 
fect July 1, 1966, and from the NATO De- 
fense College after July 23, 1966. 

The aide-memoire states that "the with- 
drawal of the French elements assigned to 
the Allied commands and to the NATO Col- 
lege entails the transfer of the headquar- 
ters of these bodies outside of French ter- 
ritory;" and that the French Government 
believes that the transfers "might be com- 
pleted by April 1, 1967." On this alleged 
basis, the French Government has de- 
nounced the Paris Protocol on the Status of 
International Military Headquarters of Au- 
gust 28, 1952, to take effect on April 1, 
1967. It is not clear to the United States 
Government why the intended withdrawals 
of French personnel should entail the re- 
moval of NATO headquarters from France 
by April 1, 1967. 

This entire subject is now under study 
among the other North Atlantic Treaty Al- 
lies. Accordingly, it has not been deter- 
mined when withdrawal of Allied Head- 
quarters would be accomplished. Consulta- 


' For text of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Bul- 
letin of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 339. 

' For text, see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536. 

For text, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515. 
For text, see ibid., Nov. 15, 1954, p. 720. 



tions on this subject will be necessary and 
it is the hope of the United States Govern- 
ment that all Governments will approach 
further discussions of this matter in the 
spirit of Allies seeking to reach agreement 
with minimum adverse effect upon the se- 
curity of the North Atlantic area and with 
as little mutual inconvenience as possible. 

The aide-memoire further states the de- 
sii'e of the Government of France to termi- 
nate United States military activities under 
certain bilateral agreements freely entered 
into between France and the United States. 
These agreements provide that they shall 
remain in force for the duration of the 
North Atlantic Treaty unless the two Gov- 
ernments by mutual consent decide before- 
hand to terminate them. They include the 
Chateauroux Depot Agreement of Febru- 
ary 27, 1951 ; the Air Bases Agreement of 
October 4, 1952 ; the United States Military 
Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953; 
and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30, 

The United States Government cannot 
agree with the suggestion of the French 
Government that April 1, 1967 "would be 
appropriate for completing the necessary 
operations" with regard to the transfer of 
personnel and installations involved in these 
agreements, but, on the contrary, believes 
that such precipitate action could jeopardize 
the security interests of all members of the 
Alliance. It notes, moreover, that the Sys- 
tem of Communications Agreement of De- 
cember 8, 1958, between the United States 
and France, provides that, if one party 
should wish to modify its terms, the parties 
will consult, and that, if they are unable to 
come to agreement within one year, that 
agreement may be terminated effective 
after a period of one additional year. The 
United States Government expresses the 
view that since this method of adjusting 
the position of the parties was considered 
to be desirable when the System of Com- 
munications Agreement was concluded on 
December 8, 1958, it remains so today and 
might appropriately be availed of in consid- 
eration of the bilateral agreements con- 

cluded earlier, which by their terms con- 
tinue for the duration of the North Atlantic 

Accordingly, while the United States in- 
tends to remove its facilities from France 
as promptly as possible in view of the atti- 
tude of the French Government, the United 
States Government would be prepared to 
give its consent to the termination of the 
agreements referred to above only on the 
condition that there be applied to all such 
agreements the provisions of consultation 
and termination set forth in the System of 
Communications Agreement. The United 
States Government is prepared to explore 
with the French Government the question 
of future United States military activities in 
France, together with arrangement for the 
use of essential facilities, and mutually 
agreed conditions for the orderly with- 
drawal of those facilities that are not to re- 
main in France. In this connection, the 
United States Government notes the will- 
ingness of the French Government to make 
special provision for activities authorized by 
the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of 
February 27, 1951 and the Pipeline Agree- 
ment of June 30, 1953. 

United States activities under these 
Agreements between France and the United 
States have been and continue to be in sup- 
port of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ac- 
cordingly, it will be necessary in this case 
as well for the United States Government 
to seek the views of its other Allies with 
regard to this aspect of consultations with 
the Government of France. 

The Government of the United States 
notes that the French Government is pre- 
pared to begin conversations regarding mu- 
tual facilities which might be made avail- 
able in the event of an armed attack within 
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty. 

Finally, the attention of the French Gov- 
ernment is called to the fact that its actions 
in withdrawing from, abrogating or repudi- 
ating existing agreements will entail finan- 
cial problems and responsibilities that must 
be taken into account in any discussion of 
these actions. 

MAY 2, 1966 




Official translation. 

In its aide-memoire of March 11, 1966, 
the French Government notified the Gov- 
ernment of the United States of America 
of the measures that it had decided to take, 
as far as it was concerned, because of the 
impossibility of amending, by mutual agree- 
ment and under satisfactory conditions, the 
provisions in force in the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization. This impossibility has 
just been confirmed by the declaration of 
fourteen of the member countries of the At- 
lantic Alliance, including the United States 
itself, dated March 18. 

In an aide-memoire dated the following 
March 25, the Government of the United 
States requested specific information on the 
measures envisaged by France and the posi- 
tion of the French Government concerning 
the bilateral agreements between the two 

The French Government has the honor to 
submit below the information thus re- 
quested : 

1. The French Government announced 
that it proposed to terminate the assign- 
ment to the allied command in Europe of 
the French ground and air forces stationed 
in Germany. 

It has the honor to inform the Govern- 
ment of the United States that this assign- 
ment will end on July 1, 1966. 

2. The re-establishment of a single na- 
tional command of the French forces will 
require the withdrawal, on the same date, of 
the French personnel assigned to the inte- 
grated allied commands. 

It is a question of the supreme command 
of the allied forces in Europe, the Central 
Europe command, the Southern Europe com- 
mand, and the commands subordinate to 
them, as well as the Defense College of 

The French higher-echelon personnel and 

' Delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on 
Mar. 29. 

the French auditors of the NATO College 
will be withdrawn after the present study 
session, which will end on July 23, 1966. 

The French Government thinks that it 
would be advisable, after the termination of 
the French participation, to establish liaison 
missions with the staffs concerned. French 
officers would thus be on the spot, in par- 
ticular to assist the allied staffs in the op- 
erations for transferring out of French ter- 
ritory. The establishment of these liaisons 
with the allied commands would also facili- 
tate the study of the conditions under 
which the French forces, particularly in 
Germany, if they continue to be stationed 
in the territory of the Federal Republic, 
might participate in time of war in joint 
military actions, both with respect to com- 
mand and to the operations properly so- 
called. It is specified in this connection 
that, in the event contemplated, French 
forces would be stationed in Germany by 
virtue of the convention of October 23, 
1954 on the presence of alien forces in the 
territory of the Federal Republic of Ger- 

3. The withdrawal of the French ele- 
ments assigned to the allied commands (su- 
preme command and Central Europe) and to 
the NATO College entails the transfer of 
the headquarters of these bodies outside 
French territory. It appears that a period 
of one year would permit taking the neces- 
sary measures for this purpose and that 
the entire operation might be completed by 
April 1, 1967. Consequently, the French 
Government, by virtue of Article 16 of the 
Protocol of August 28, 1952, on the status 
of general headquarters, is going to notify 
to the United States Government the de- 
nunciation of that Protocol, which will cease 
to be in force on March 31, 1967. 

4. Naturally, the foregoing particulars by 
no means exhaust the list of problems that 
will have to be resolved with regard to 
NATO. The French Government is pre- 
pared to discuss these other problems in 
either a bilateral or multilateral frame- 
work, whichever is appropriate. 




5. In its previous communication, the 
French Government informed the United 
States Government that it thought that cer- 
tain bilateral agreements between France 
and the United States no longer met pres- 
ent conditions, which conditions prompt it 
to resume the full exercise of its sovereignty 
in French territory. Furthermore, those 
agreements, as a whole, would no longer be 
applicable as regards the essential factor, in 
view of the decisions made by the French 
Government regarding its participation in 
the Atlantic Organization. 

It appears that, in general, the same 
date, April 1, 1967, would be appropriate 
for completing the necessary operations, 
such as the transfer of the headquarters of 
the American foi-ces in Europe (Camp des 
Loges) and of the various United States 
Army and Air Force installations. Longer 
time limits could be considered for settling 
certain complex problems, such as those 
caused, in particular, by the existence of the 
depots at Deols-La Martinerie. Special pro- 
visions could also be contemplated, if the 
Government of the United States expresses 
the desire for them, with respect to the 
conditions under which the pipeline that is 
the subject of the agreement of June 30, 
1953 could continue to operate. 

The French Government is prepared to 
begin talks at once with the Government of 
the United States regarding the practical 
measures that should be adopted with re- 
spect to these various points concerning the 
bilateral agreements. 

Lastly, if the Government of the United 
States so desires, the French Government is 
also prepared to begin conversations to de- 
fine the military facilities referred to in the 

aide-memoire of March 11 on which the two 
governments could reach mutual agreement 
in the event of a conflict in which both 
countries would participate under the At- 
lantic Alliance. 

Foreign Policy Conference 
To Be Held at Little Rock 

The Department of State announced on 
April 12 (press release 81) that it will hold 
a regional foreign policy conference in Little 
Rock, Ark., on May 5, sponsored by Little 
Rock University. About 30 community or- 
ganizations are cooperating in the confer- 

Invitations have been extended to busi- 
ness and community leaders, representatives 
of national nongovernmental organizations, 
and members of the press, radio, and tele- 
vision from Arkansas, Oklahoma, southern 
Missouri, and western Tennessee. The pur- 
pose of the meeting is to bring together 
citizen leaders and media representatives 
with government officials responsible for 
formulating and carrying out foreign policy. 

Officials scheduled to participate in the 
conference include: Under Secretary George 
W. Ball; Richard Reuter, Special Assistant 
to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace 
Program) ; J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for European Affairs; 
David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secre- 
tary for International Organization Affairs; 
Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy As- 
sistant Secretary for Public Affairs; and 
Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Work- 
ing Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs. 


MAY 2, 1966 


Continuity of Refugee and Migration Policies 

by William J. Crockett 

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration * 

I am most pleased to have this opportu- 
nity to meet with the representatives of the 
voluntary agencies which are concerned with 
solving migration and refugee problems 
around the world and to discuss the activities 
which are the mutual concern of you and 
the Department. 

I should like to begin by saying that the 
proposed elimination of the superstructure 
of the Bureau of Security and Consular 
Affairs will have no policy or organizational 
effects on the Office of Refugee and Migra- 
tion Affairs. It will not change in any way 
the great humanitarian policies on refugees 
and displaced persons as first enunciated by 
President Truman in 1948 and which are 
today fully embraced by President Johnson 
and his administration. 

Policy in this government of ours is not the 
property of one man. Policy in this govern- 
ment of ours is not dependent for its contin- 
uation and fulfillment upon the personality 
of any one of us. We are but the instru- 
ments of the President in the fulfillment of 
his administration's policies. 

And I repeat, the great humanitarian 
policies laid down by President Johnson at 
the foot of the Statue of Liberty will not be 
changed by any of us.^ 

' Address made before a meeting of representa- 
tives of American voluntary agencies engaged in 
refugee and migration activities at Washington, 
D.C., on Mar. 22. For background, see Department 
of State press release 66 dated Mar. 22. 

' For remarks made by President Johnson at 
Liberty Island, N.Y., on Oct. 3, 1965, see Bulletin 
of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661. 

Over the past several years, the Depart- 
ment has planned and put into effect several 
organizational changes designed to reduce 
the layers of supervision between the peo- 
ple who operate the programs and do the 
actual work and the top-level policy and ex- 
ecutive positions in the Department. One 
such change was that which eliminated the 
Bureau of Administration, headed by an 
Assistant Secretary for Administration. 
This change was accomplished smoothly and 
the individual programs involved have con- 
tinued to work as effectively as under the 
old arrangement, or more so. Similar 
changes, which we believe will result in a 
much stronger and harder hitting conduct 
of our foreign affairs, are being made in 
our regional bureaus, which are the heart of 
the work of the Department. 

We have every reason to feel that the 
changes proposed for the Bureau of Security 
and Consular Affairs, by removing one level 
of supervision, will place the offices compris- 
ing the Bureau in closer contact with top- 
level officals of the Department, thereby 
elevating them and making them more effec- 
tive. I want to give you the Department's 
assurances that the changes envisaged will 
in no way mean any modification of or de- 
viation from our humane policies concern- 
ing joint interests which the United States 
Government and the voluntary agencies share 
in our mutual efforts to help the unfortunate 
through the refugee and migration programs. 
Furthei", I want to assure you of our con- 
tinued determination to implement our im- 
migration laws in complete conformity with 



the President's policy and his own stated 

The Department is fully aware of and has 
the greatest admiration for the devoted and 
inspiring work which the American volun- 
tary agencies have carried out over so many 
years in providing care and assistance to 
refugees and helping them to become rees- 
tablished as independent, self-sufficient per- 
sons. Through all these years you have 
worked closely with the Department and 
other agencies of our Government which are 
concerned with refugee matters. You have 
given President Johnson warm and enthusi- 
astic support in obtaining the enactment of 
his immigration legislative program. For 
these reasons you have an understandable 
concern in what happens in the Govern- 
ment which might affect the refugee pro- 

We plan, of course, to continue the pres- 
ent Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs 
along with its experienced personnel. Under 
our general plan of reorganization, the office 
will be considered fully responsible for 
carrying out its own programs and func- 
tions and will be given my personal atten- 
tion and sympathetic support, along with 
that of other senior officers in the Depart- 

You and your associates are more aware 
than other Americans that we in the De- 
partment do not take and never have taken 
the significance of refugee situations around 
the world lightly. It may surprise even you 
to know that since the end of World War 
II the U. S. Government has spent almost $2 
billion on migration and refugee activities. 
This is more than the United States has 
contributed to the United Nations and its 
constituent organizations for all nonrefugee 

At this tense period in world affairs, I 
can assure you that we are not about to re- 
lax our interest in refugee matters. We are 
continuing our full support for the pro- 
grams which are the functional responsibil- 
ities of the Office of Refugee and Migration 
Affairs and tomorrow will begin hearings 
before the Congress on our requested appro- 

President Congratulates Agencies 
on Work With Refugees 

Following is the text of a message from 
President Johnson to Deputy Under Secretary 
William J. Crockett, which was read by Mr. 
Crockett to the voluntary agency representa- 
tives at a meeting on March 22. 

March 22, 1966 
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am glad to learn 
that you are meeting today with the leaders 
of the voluntary agencies who have done 
and are doing so much for refugees and 
migrants. I want you to extend to them my 
personal best wishes and my congratulations 
for the remarkable job they have done over 
the years to alleviate the suffering of the 
world's stateless and homeless peoples. With- 
out their dedicated support of our governmen- 
tal programs to help these victims of war and 
more recently of Communist aggression, thou- 
sands who now enjoy the blessings of freedom 
would have perished. 

I want you to assure them that we shall 
accept every effort to see that the friendly 
and humane policies related to migration and 
refugee matters initiated by our beloved Pres- 
ident Truman will continue in the same full 
force as they have been during my Administra- 

I look forward to an era of renewed gov- 
ernment cooperation and full partnership with 
these great humanitarian organizations. 

Lyndon B. Johnson 

priations for fiscal year 1967. These will in- 
clude our contributions to the Intergovern- 
mental Committee for European Migration 
and for the United Nations High Commis- 
sioner for Refugees, as well as for the work 
of the United States Escapee Program in 
Europe, the Far East Refugee Program in 
Hong Kong and Macao, assistance to Tibetan 
refugees in India and Nepal, and the move- 
ment of refugees from Cuba to the United 

You have been kept currently informed as 
to the basis for the State Department's 
having steadily reduced its appropriation re- 
quests for these programs over the past 5 
years, and we have done so again in 1967. 

MAY 2, 1966 


These reductions do not reflect any lessening 
interest in the refugee programs. Rather 
they show, first, there have been reductions 
in the size of refugee problems through the 
successful solution of the cases of many refu- 
gees, which is a great tribute to the work 
of your voluntary agencies; secondly, most 
countries of asylum are becoming increas- 
ingly prosperous and it is no longer neces- 
sary to provide the same measure of assist- 
ance to individual refugees; thirdly, the 
United States has worked consistently to in- 
crease the contributions of other govern- 
ments to refugee problems, particularly by 
their support of international organiza- 
tions ; and finally, we are always on the alert 
to find better and cheaper ways of carrying 
out our operations. This latter point is im- 
portant in view of the necessity for reducing 
the cost of all government operations wher- 
ever possible in order to finance our com- 
mitments in Viet-Nam and to improve the 
level of our society at home. 

Our appropriation request of $6 million for 
migration and refugee assistance should be 
viewed in the context of the comments I 
have just made and of the very large con- 
tributions which the United States is mak- 
ing toward refugees through other appropri- 
ations. As you know, over $40 million is be- 
ing spent annually for Cuban refugees in the 
United States, the refugee program in South 
Viet-Nam is currently at a level of $20 mil- 
lion, and we are still contributing approxi- 
mately $23 million toward the Palestine 
refugee problem each year. In addition to all 
this, large amounts of P.L. 480 surplus 
food are being distributed to refugees; this 
and other AID assistance is our main con- 
tribution to the numerous African refugee 
situations. It is therefore clear that the 
United States is not reducing its interest in 
refugee and migration problems but rather 
is devoting the necessary resources to these 
problems on a priority basis. 

We are also prepared to meet new refugee 
emergencies as they may occur. As you 
know, the Migration and Refugee Assistance 

Act of 1966 provides authority for the Pres- 
ident, when he deems it necessary in the in- 
terest of the United States, to utilize up to 
$10 million of AID funds to meet unex- 
pected refugee needs. The President will not 
hesitate to use this authority, as is indi- 
cated by his prompt approval of the funds 
for the movement of Cubans to the United 
States which began a few months ago. At the 
time he outlined his proposed plan for aiding 
Cubans at the signing of the immigration 
bill at Liberty Island, the President made 
clear in his statement "that from this day 
forth those wishing to emigrate to America 
shall be admitted on the basis of their skills 
and their close relationship to those already 
here." The President set forth the additional 
policy that, "Those who can contribute most 
to this country — to its growth, to its 
strength, to its spirit — will be the first that 
are admitted to this land." 

In this connection, we in the Department 
of State shall continue our efforts to insure 
continuation of the President's sympathetic 
and humane policy for the admission of 
refugees into the United States. We realize 
that there is still much to be done to achieve 
all that is required in the application of the 
new law, but we are steadily working to im- 
prove the situation. 

I want the remainder of time to provide 
an opportunity for me to hear your views 
and questions. At this particular meeting I 
should think it would be more productive for 
all of us if we could address ourselves to the 
broad area of refugee and migration pol- 
icies and programs and their place within the 
Department of State and leave detailed 
technical questions to a later working meet- 
ing when our technical experts can wrestle 
with them. I want to tell you again how 
much we appreciate and admire the accom- 
plishments of the voluntary agencies in the 
refugee field. I want you to know we will do 
everything we can to continue and strengthen 
our long cooperative relationship and to seek 
your advice and guidance on problems of mu- 
tual interest in this field. 



Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees 
and Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba 

statement by Robert M. Sayre 

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^ 

I am grateful for this opportunity to re- 
view with you the latest developments with 
regard to the movement of Cuban refugees 
to the United States and to comment on 
other aspects of the Cuban scene which I 
believe will be of interest. 

The present movement of refugees by U.S. 
Government-chartered aircraft from Vara- 
dero, Cuba, to the Miami International Air- 
port, which began on December 1, 1965, is 
in response to President Johnson's declara- 
tion included in his remarks at the Statue of 
Liberty on October 3, 1965, on the occasion 
of the signing of the new immigration bill, 
in which he said in part:^ 

But those who 
what they are . 
which they sprung. 

... it is in that spirit that I declare ... to the 
people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here . . . 
will find it. The dedication of America to our tradi- 
tions as an asylum for the oppressed is going to be 

I have directed the Departments of State and Jus- 
tice and Health, Education, and Welfare to . . . 
make all necessary arrangements to permit those 
in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry 
into the United States. . . . 

Our first concern will be with those Cubans who 
have been separated from their children and their 
parents and their husbands and their wives that 
are now in this country. Our next concern is with 
those who are imprisoned for political reasons. 

. come will come because of 
not because of the land from 

' Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and 
Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on 
Mar. 23. 

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661. 

A few days earlier on September 28 and 
again on September 30 the Prime Minister 
of Cuba, Fidel Castro, had declared that 
Cuban citizens who might desire to join 
their families in the United States or others 
who simply wished to live in the United 
States would be permitted to leave Cuba. 

On October 4, 1965, the Swiss Embassy 
in Havana, which represents United States 
interests in Cuba, was requested to inform 
the Cuban Government officially of the U.S. 
position as stated by the President. On 
October 5, 1965, the Cuban Government in 
a diplomatic note addressed to the Swiss 
Embassy indicated its willingness to discuss 
arrangements which would permit an or- 
derly movement to the United States. 

On October 8 a detailed proposal was 
made to the Cuban Government in which 
the principal suggestions were a system of 
priority categories, a movement of between 
3,000 and 4,000 persons per month, trans- 
portation to be provided by the United 
States Government, and the inclusion of 
persons imprisoned in Cuba for offenses of 
a political nature. The Cuban Government 
replied on October 12, 1965, indicating a 
willingness to move toward an official un- 
derstanding along the lines proposed by the 
United States, with the exception of politi- 
cal prisoners and with the added exception 
that free departure would not be granted to 
young Cubans between the ages of 15 and 
26 "who under Cuban law are subject to the 
first call for compulsory military service." 

MAY 2, 1966 


Negotiations continued, in the course of 
which the Swiss Ambassador in Havana, 
Mr. Emil Stadelhofer, traveled to Washing- 
ton on October 23 for a brief meeting with 
representatives of the Departments of State, 
Health, Education, and Welfare, and Jus- 
tice. The successful culmination of this ef- 
fort was the memorandum of understand- 
ing^* made effective on November 6, 1965, by 
an exchange of notes in Havana between the 
Embassy of Switzerland in its capacity as 
representative of the Interests of the United 
States in Cuba and the Cuban Government. 

Movement of Refugees to U.S. 

While arrangements for chartering air- 
craft were being made by the transporta- 
tion office of the Department of State work- 
ing through the Military Air Transport 
Service, arrangements were also made to 
charter vessels to bring to the United States 
from the small Cuban port of Camarioca 
those persons who were gathered there on 
the date the memorandum became effec- 
tive. This Camarioca movement resulted 
from Prime Minister Castro's offer to let 
Cubans in the United States come by small 
boat to this port and pick up their relatives 
and families— despite U.S. objections be- 
cause of the danger which this presented 
for the Cubans and those who came to get 
them. As a result, in the period roughly 
from September 30 to November 30, some 
159 small craft of every description suc- 
ceeded in making this dangerous crossing 
and returning to the United States with 
some 2,866 persons. Had it not been for an 
extraordinary and all-out effort of the U.S. 
Coast Guard in patrolling the Florida 
Straits and in shepherding these vessels, 
many lives would have been lost. On several 
occasions the Coast Guard cutters rescued 
people already in the water and from craft 
on the verge of foundering. As a humani- 
tarian gesture, and considering that the 
Cuban Government had closed the port of 
Camarioca to new departures, the U.S. 
Government picked up and transported to 

• For text, see ibid., Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850. 



Key West the remaining 1,970 persons. 

Both the sea movement from Camarioca 
and the airlift which began on December 1 
were financed in accordance with a Presi- 
dential Determination issued on November 
10, 1965, authorizing $750,000 to be utilized 
for this purpose in fiscal year 1966. This 
authorization was pursuant to section 2(c) 
of the Migration and Refugee Assistance 
Act of 1962 and the Foreign Assistance Act 
of 1961, as amended. 

Various U.S. airlines were interested in 
participating in the airlift and seven com- 
panies have done so. The flight schedule 
calls for two flights per day Monday 
through Friday. The airline companies have 
performed admirably and efficiently. On 
only one day, due to engine trouble, were the 
flights cancelled. Extra flights were added 
on each of the two following days to keep 
the movement on schedule. 

At the beginning of the movement there 
were a few delays and difficulties of an 
administrative nature, but we think it fair 
to say that for many weeks now it has been 
a smoothly functioning operation. The Em- 
bassy of Switzerland on the Cuban end has 
made a fine contribution to this success and 
merits great credit for its very hard work 
and dedication. I understand that represent- 
atives from the Departments of Justice and 
HEW will also testify before this committee 
and will, I am sure, describe the handling 
procedures and processing of the refugees. 
In the month of December 3,351 persons 
arrived on these flights ; in January, 3,464 ; 
in February, 4,031; and in March, to the 
11th, 1,594. The movement continues to be 
of persons in the first-priority category, 
that is, "immediate relatives" of persons 
now living in the United States, and appears 
likely to remain so for several more months. 
At the time it becomes possible to consider 
the movement of persons other than the 
first-priority category in accordance with 
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the memorandum of 
understanding, it is our hope that it will be 
possible to give first consideration to rela- 
tives of American citizens in accordance 
with the system of preferences which has 



been more or less traditional in our immi- 
gration laws. 

With regard to the possibility that some 
Cuban refugees might be received by other 
countries in this hemisphere, we have made 
known to the Council of the Organization 
of American States on two occasions our 
interest in this subject. On February 12, 
1966, the first response came when 106 
refugees, destined to join relatives in Costa 
Rica, were brought to Miami by an extra 
flight of the regular airlift plane. The ar- 
rangements for their onward transporta- 
tion to San Jose, including the cost, were 
made in Costa Rica. In arranging this 
movement the good offices of the Swiss Am- 
bassador were an essential factor. At the 
moment, similar movements to two other 
countries are in the planning stage and we 
are optimistic that they will ultimately be 

Internal Situation in Cuba 

It is our expectation that the refugee 
movement will continue for the foreseeable 
future. The number of Cubans who wish to 
leave is clearly in the hundreds of thousands. 
In view of the gray, bleak situation inside 
Cuba, it is not surprising that Cubans from 
all walks of life have left the island since 
the airlift began. As problems press from 
all sides and as life in Cuba becomes more 
closed and unattractive, frustrations and 
apathy increase. 

Thus, Castro's charismatic appeal has di- 
minished sharply and the enthusiasms of the 
revolution's early days are steadily giving 
way in many cases to weariness or, on the 
part of some officials, simply a grim deter- 
mination to see things through. This grow- 
ing disenchantment with the revolution 
mainly results from several factors: from 
the failure of the economy to provide the 
Cuban people with the better life they were 
promised; from Cuba's high degree of isola- 
tion from the world community, especially 
the nations of Latin America ; and, somewhat 
paradoxically, from greater control and 
organization of Cuban society, control and 
organization that are, in part at least, in- 

tended to reinstill revolutionary zeal and 

There is ample evidence that the regime 
is now in the process of moving toward an 
even more totalitarian state, with, of course, 
Castro exercising nearly absolute power. Last 
October, for example, the name of Cuba's 
single party was changed from that of the 
United Party of the Cuban Revolution to the 
Communist Party, and the party was re- 
organized along more tightly structured 
orthodox Communist lines. To insure that 
the party would maintain his authority 
Castro made certain that persons known for 
their loyalty to him were appointed to key 
positions on the Central Committee. Shortly 
before this move, Castro stated in a public 
address that people appointed to technical 
and management positions within the gov- 
ernment have to be good revolutionaries and 
that if it were a question of choosing be- 
tween revolutionary zeal and competence, 
the former quality must be decisive. 

Other manifestations of the closed society 
include purges at Cuban schools and close 
surveillance of Cuban life on an individual 
basis by a well-trained, well-organized se- 
curity apparatus. Neither activity is, of 
course, new to the Castro regime, but both 
have been reemphasized during the past 
year. Students and faculty members have 
been dismissed from universities and even 
high schools because of their attitudes, and 
the activities of informers and police agents 
have become even more extensive. The re- 
cent showcase trial of the former president 
of the FEU (the University of Havana stu- 
dent organization), the arrest of the Vice 
Minister of the Armed Forces for "crimes 
against revolutionary morals," and Castro's 
statements against officials who lead la 
dolce vita at home and abroad are addi- 
tional indications of the regime's close check 
on the private lives of its subjects and its 
desire to remove from positions of responsi- 
bility those who may be "unreliable" and, 
hence, dangerous. 

As already noted, much of the apathy and 
dissatisfaction among the Cuban people 
stems fi-om the failure of the economy. Al- 

MAY 2, 1966 


though there have been swings in both di- 
rections, the economy has remained essen- 
tially stagnant since Castro came to power. 
Shortages of common items, rationing of 
clothing and basic foodstuffs, a lack of 
spares for capital equipment that is still 
U.S.-oriented, and an inadequate transport 
and distribution system are some of the 
economy's most salient features. 

There probably was some improvement in 
1964-65, largely as a result of increased 
sugar production, which reached 6 million 
tons last year. (Rather ironically, the Cuban 
Government considered it necessary to fol- 
low capitalist practice by establishing in- 
centive programs for sugar workers.) The 
6-million-ton level was mainly achieved, 
however, at the expense of cutbacks in other 
sectors of the economy, notably in the culti- 
vation of rice, corn, and other agricultural 
products whose lands were put into sugar 
cane. Further, sugar production is likely to 
decrease this year, owing to both a severe 
drought and the generally poor performance 
of the economy. Compounding Cuba's diffi- 
culties is the low world sugar price, which 
has dropped from about 12 cents a pound in 
early 1964 to a little more than 2 cents a 
pound today. The falling sugar price is re- 
flected in Cuba's imports from the free 
world: about $350 million in 1964, an esti- 
mated $190 million in 1965, and a probable 
further drop in 1966. 

"Tricontinent Conference" 

Despite the failure at home, the Castro 
regime continues its efforts to play a role 
on the stage of international communism 
and to portray itself as the model revolution 
for this hemisphere. 

The most recent, and very important, 
manifestation of its subversive intent was 
the conference held in Havana from January 
3 to January 15, at which delegations from 
some 86 countries met together as the First 
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidar- 
ity Conference — usually referred to as the 
"Tricontinent Conference." This conference 
was sponsored by the AAPSO [Afro-Asian 

Peoples Solidarity Organization], a Cairo- 
based, Communist-dominated organization. 

The delegations attending were techni- 
cally not official representatives of their 
governments, but in the case of the Com- 
munist countries, as well as several others, 
official approval cannot be doubted. From 
this hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba, 
none of the delegations had any official tie 
or approval. They represented a variety of 
Communist, pro-Castro, Communist-front, 
and other groups, whose most evident com- 
mon denominator was opposition to the 
United States and to the duly established 
governments of Latin America. 

The tone of the Tricontinent Conference 
became increasingly strident and resulted 
in an outpouring of speeches and resolutions 
which denounced the United States both in 
general and specifically in every conceivable 
trouble spot in the world. Even more strik- 
ing than the militant cast of the proceed- 
ings was the constant extolling of armed 
violence as the principal tactic in achieving 
revolutionary victory throughout the world. 

In his opening speech of January 2, Fidel 
Castro gave an indication of the tone the 
conference was to take when he asserted 
that "any revolutionary movement any- 
where in the world can count on Cuba's 
unconditional support." He struck an even 
more aggressive posture in his closing 
speech of January 15 in which he urged 
"revolutionarj^ armed battle ... in all or 
almost all Latin American countries," men- 
tioning specifically and repeatedly Vene- 
zuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and the 
Dominican Republic. 

Certainly one of the most important dele- 
gations at the conference was that from the 
U.S.S.R., headed by Sharif Rashidov, an 
alternate member of the Soviet Presidium 
and a member of the Central Committee of 
the Soviet Communist Party. Rashidov 
stated in his address to the conference that 
his delegation was present "with the aim of 
giving all-round assistance to the unifica- 
tion of the anti-imperialist forces of the 
three continents in order to provide greater 



impetus to our common struggle against 
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonial- 
ism — led by the U.S. capitalists." Referring 
to Latin America he stated, 

We express our fraternal solidarity with the 
armed struggle being waged by the Venezuelan, 
Peruvian, Colombian, and Guatemalan patriots for 
freedom against the stooges of imperialism. . . . 
We are in solidarity with the struggle being waged 
by the peoples of British, French, and Dutch 
Guiana and the Antilles against the colonial regimes, 
and also with the struggle waged by the people of 
Puerto Rico. 

The speeches of most other delegates 
echoed the bellicose tone of the Cuban and 
Soviet speeches. The speeches of the Latin 
American delegates, for example, stressed 
the need to step up the struggle in this 
hemisphere against "imperialism," and its 
"native tools, such as the Organization of 
American States." Chief delegates of the 
Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Guatemalan 
Communist organizations, among others, 
stressed armed violence against the estab- 
lished governments as the only solution to 
Latin America's problems. 

Among the principal resolutions adopted 
by the conference were the political resolu- 
tion and the resolution on economic prob- 
lems. The first-named consists of a long 
review of the world situation as seen 
through the Communists' distorted vision, 
in which all alleged wrongs are ascribed to 
IJ.S.-led "imperialistic forces." The follow- 
ing extract will provide something of its 
flavor : 

There is particular importance in developing ef- 
fective American peoples who are under arms 
against the native oligarchies, servants of the 
United States, as in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru, 
and Guatemala, or who suffer the repression of 
military tyrannies, as in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia, 
and other coimtries. Latin America is the rear 
guard of the most powerful and brutal imperialism, 
which is the chief prop of colonialism and neo- 
colonialism throughout the world. Every blow struck 
by the Latin American peoples at their Yankee and 
native oppressors has a decisive influence in weak- 
ening U.S. imperialism. 

The economic resolution is an appeal for 
"economic emancipation" but contains, also, 
the following exhortation: 

The resolution calls upon all the participants in 
the conference to redouble their efforts in render- 
ing economic, financial, and other assistance, in- 
cluding arms and ammunition, to countries engaged 
in armed struggle for liberation. 

Moreover, there were special resolutions 
on certain countries. In our area these were 
Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, British Guiana, 
Peru, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Paraguay, and Nicaragua. 

In addition to the speeches and resolu- 
tions, the conference also took several prac- 
tical steps toward implementing the deci- 
sions which had been reached. Following 
protracted behind-the-scenes debate and in- 
fighting between the Chinese and Soviet 
factions represented in Havana, the confer- 
ence's organization committee established a 
Tricontinent Conference Solidarity Orga- 
nization with provisional headquarters in 
Havana and a Cuban as temporary Secretary 
General. It appears that the new organiza- 
tion backed by Moscow and Havana parallels 
and in many ways duplicates the older 
Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, 
over which Peking hoped to win control. 

The conference also established, as a 
subordinate body to the Tricontinent Soli- 
darity Organization, a liberation committee 
with the expressed purpose of encouraging 
and giving all the necessary aid to national 
liberation movements, "particularly those in 
arms against imperialism." The 27 Latin 
American Communist delegates to the con- 
ference remained in Havana following the 
formal conclusion of the Tricontinent Con- 
ference and unanimously agreed on the 
establishment of a Latin American Solidar- 
ity Organization (LASO) with objectives 
similar to those of the liberation committee 
mentioned above. 

From even these brief extracts it is clear 
that the conference constituted, among other 
things, a gross intervention into the internal 
affairs of this hemisphere. Those countries 
singled out as special targets were, under- 
standably, particularly outraged and took 
the initiative in the OAS [Organization of 
American States], which resulted in the 
COAS resolution of February 2 condemning 
the Tricontinent Conference for its aggres- 

MAY 2, 1966 


sive and interventionist acts and resolutions.* 
Subsequently, the Latin American repre- 
sentatives in the United Nations, as well as 
several Latin American governments on an 
individual basis, have condemned the con- 
ference on the same grounds. Castro may 
well believe that the results of the confer- 
ence were favorable to him. We believe to 
the contrary: that his brazen, arrogant call 
for subversion and violent revolution has 
driven home to the free peoples of the 
hemisphere as never before the true nature 
of the Castro-Communist goals. 

It may be argued that much of the con- 
ference's stress on armed struggle and the 
violent overthrow of duly established gov- 
ernments was due to Soviet-Chinese Com- 
munist competition within the conference 
forum — in other words, that the deeds of 
the Soviets and of the Cubans will not 
match their words. This may be, though 
certainly not from any lack of desire on 
their part to achieve the goals outlined in 
Havana. But, from a foreign policy view- 
point, we believe it must be assumed that 
there is some substance behind their words. 
The OAS countries are alert and prepared 
to counter any increased subversive efforts. 

U.S. and OAS Policy Toward Cuba 

At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of 
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the 
OAS countries, held in Punta del Este, Uru- 
guay, in January 1962,^ the ministers re- 
solved that the Government of Cuba, by vir- 
tue of its adherence to Marxism-Leninism 
and its alinement with the Communist bloc, 
had made itself incompatible with the prin- 
ciples and objectives of the inter-American 
system and should therefore be excluded 
from participation in that system. 

At the Ninth Meeting in July 1964 in 
Washington,^ the Foreign Ministers decided 
that the attempt by the Castro government 

' For a U.S. statement made in the OAS Council 
on Jan. 24, see ibid., Mar. 7, 1966, p. 383. 

° For background and texts of resolutions, see 
ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270. 

' For background and text of Final Act, see ibid., 
Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174. 

against the democratic reform government 
of Venezuela was "aggression" within the 
meaning of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal 
Assistance. They therefore resolved that 
the governments of the American states 
should not maintain diplomatic or consular 
relations with the Government of Cuba; 
should suspend all of their trade, direct or 
indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs, 
medicines, and medical equipment sent for 
humanitarian reasons; and should suspend 
all sea transportation between their coun- 
tries and Cuba except that necessary for 
reasons of a humanitarian nature. More- 
over, the foreign ministers urged the other 
nations of the free world to examine the 
possibility of effectively demonstrating 
their solidarity in achieving the purposes of 
this resolution. This step was related, of 
course, to the exertion of a policy of eco- 
nomic denial against the Castro regime so 
as to limit its potential for external trouble- 

The most recent COAS resolution regard- 
ing the Tricontinent Conference and the let- 
ter ^ addressed to the President of the U.N. 
Security Council by the Latin American rep- 
resentatives are firm indications that the free 
countries of this hemisphere remain alert 
and determined to maintain this policy. 

For our part we continue to regard the 
Communist regime in Cuba as temporary, 
and our goal remains a truly free and inde- 
pendent Cuba which, under a government 
democratically chosen by the people, will 
live in peace with its neighbors. As far as 
the U.S. Government is concerned, two as- 
pects of the present Cuban Government's 
posture are not negotiable: the Cuban re- 
gime's political and military ties of de- 
pendence with an extracontinental Commu- 
nist power and its campaign of subversion 
in the hemisphere. 

We do not consider the present govern- 
ment in Cuba a direct military threat to 
the United States or to Latin America under 
present circumstances — nor shall we permit 
it to become such a threat, as OAS actions 
in October 1962 and July 1964 demonstrated. 

U.N. doc. S/7123. 



We and the other members of the OAS do 
regard that regime as a focus of subversion 
in the hemisphere. 

In establishing our policies in the light 
of this threat of subversion, we do not con- 
template the use of military force in the 
context of existing circumstances. We have 
been pursuing and we intend to pursue — 
within the framework of the inter-Ameri- 
can system to the greatest extent possible 
— courses of action designed, on the one 
hand, to reduce the will and ability of the 
present government in Cuba to advance the 
Communist cause in Latin America through 
sabotage and terrorism; and, on the other 
hand, to assist the nations of this hemi- 

sphere in strengthening their ability to re- 
sist subversion. Related to the latter course 
of action are the long-range objectives of 
the Alliance for Progress, which seeks, 
through social and economic development of 
hemispheric countries, to eliminate the con- 
ditions which furnish a fertile field for 
subversion and revolution. 

The strategy which we and the other 
members of the OAS are following requires 
patience, tenacity, flexibility, and a high 
degree of responsibility. We intend to con- 
tinue on this course in the conviction that 
it is the most effective means, under present 
circumstances, of attaining our objective of 
a free Cuba. 


Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force 
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia 

Folloiving is a statement made bij U.S. 
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the 
Security Council on April 9, together with 
the text of a resolution adopted by the 
Council on that day. 


U.S./U.N. press release 4832 

Mr. President [Moussa L. Keita of Mali], 
I wish to join my colleagues who have pre- 
ceded me in welcoming you to your first 
meeting in the Security Council. Having also 
been President of the Council myself in the 
first meeting which I attended, when I was 
charged with convening a meeting of the 
Council too promptly, I am aware of the 
complexity of the task before you as a serv- 
ant of the Council, with such long and estab- 
lished traditions of contribution in the 

interests of peace. I welcome you as a col- 
league and as a President of the Council and 
extend to you the best wishes of my delega- 
tion and offer you full cooperation in what 
is always a very onerous task. 

I also associate myself, Mr. President, 
with the views you have expressed on behalf 
of all of the members of the Council con- 
cerning our distinguished colleague, Ambas- 
sador El-Farra [Muhammad El-Farra of 
Jordan, President of the Security Council 
during March], for his great and continu- 
ing contribution to the work of the Security 

You are doubly welcome, Mr. President, 
by me since you are also the distinguished 
Ambassador of your country to our country 
in Washington and because we enjoy 
friendly relations with your country. 

Several members of the Council have al- 

MAY 2, 1966 


ready adverted to the important constitu- 
tional and procedural issues which have 
been raised with regard to the manner in 
which this meeting of the Council has been 
set. This is not the appropriate time for us 
to debate this issue. We have a matter of 
urgency before us upon which we should act 
and act promptly. But I believe it will be 
necessary for the Council to consider the 
matter more fully in some form in the fu- 
ture, and we on that occasion, when time 
permits, will communicate our detailed 
views on this very important subject later. 

This Council is called urgently by the 
United Kingdom to address itself to an 
immediate and pressing problem: the possi- 
bility that oil may at any time be delivered 
to Southern Rhodesia from tankers calling 
at the Portuguese port of Beira. 

The general views of my Government on 
the settlement of the Southern Rhodesia 
question have been expressed several times 
before the General Assembly and this Coun- 
cil, and they are too well known to require 
a detailed statement from me at this time. 
I content myself to say that in Southern 
Rhodesia, as elsewhere, my Government is 
committed to the objectives of democratic 
government and self-determination, self- 
determination by and for all the people of 
Southern Rhodesia, not by and for the few. 

It is a matter of concern, I am sure, to 
all of us in the Council that the steps which 
we agreed on last November in pursuit of 
this common goal have not as yet had their 
full effect; and we meet again this morning 
to consider a further urgent measure which 
will contribute to the achievement of this 

From the outset I wish to make it clear 
that my Government shares the view, which 
I do not find any disagreement about in this 
Council, that the problem of Southern 
Rhodesia is a responsibility of the British 
Government — not that this Council and the 
world organization do not have an appro- 

' For U.S. statements in the General Assembly 
and the Security Council and texts of resolutions 
adopted in the two bodies, see Bulletin of Dec. 6, 
1965, p. 908. 


priate role to play in dealing with this prob- 
lem. The world has quite properly looked 
to Britain, the constitutional authority, to 
resolve this very difficult crisis. Britain has 
never hesitated to acknowledge its responsi- 
bility publicly and to the members of this 
Council — and for coming here when it did 
originally and when it does so today, it 
seems to me, as a believer in this world 
organization, that Great Britain should be 
congratulated and not condemned for mani- 
festing its recognition of its obligations 
under the charter and its respect for the 
decent opinions of mankind. The good faith 
of Britain is doubted in some circles. I can 
only say for myself and my Government 
that we believe that Britain is entirely com- 
mitted to bringing an end to the Smith 
regime, and we are convinced that this is a 
firm policy of Prime Minister Wilson and 
his government. 

Gravity of the Proposal 

It is fitting that Britain should expect 
and obtain from all of us the fullest co- 
operation in support of its efforts. It was, 
in fact, in a search for such support that 
the United Kingdom brought the problem 
of the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to the 
attention of the Security Council last No 
vember. Now Britain has returned to this 
Council to receive additional backing for 
new and very firm steps. 

I should like to say to this Council that 
what Britain is asking for in terms of sub- 
stance is not by any means inconsequential. 
On the contrary, it is one of the gravest and 
most far-reaching proposals that has been 
made to this Council. What is involved is 
not the question of two tankers, if I may 
say so with all due regard to all who have 
spoken. If we look at paragraph 5 of the 
resolution, this resolution tendered by the 
United Kingdom calls upon the Government 
of the United Kingdom to prevent by the 
use of force, if necessary, the arrival at 
Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be 
carrying oil destined for Rhodesia. 

The question of intercepting vessels on 
the high seas, the question of arresting and 


detaining them, is a matter that has a long 
history in the field of international law. 
Indeed, if we refer to history, my own 
country once went to war with Great Brit- 
ain on the question of arresting and detain- 
ing vessels on the high seas. And we are 
asked in the Security Council — and it 
should be a matter of deep consideration 
and concern for all of us — to put our sanc- 
tion upon what will be a rule of interna- 
tional law when this Council acts: Vessels 
on the high seas can be arrested and de- 
tained in the interest of international law 
which we will be making here today if we 
adopt the resolution tendered by Great 
Britain, as I hope we will do. 

Actions Taken by the United States 

It is not an easy decision for any govern- 
ment to put its support to a resolution of 
this character, both in light of our history 
and traditions and in light of all of the far- 
reaching implications that such a step as 
we are asked to take may envision. Indeed, 
for a major trading country such as the 
United States to put teeth into a program of 
denial such as the one called for by the 
Security Council last November involved an 
impressive array of steps on our part, which 
called into play very important decisions on 
our part. When I last spoke to the Council 
on this subject,^ I mentioned some of the 
measures which we had taken and I said the 
United States would consider urgently what 
else remained to be done in order to apply 
an effective across-the-board program of 
trade sanctions against Southern Rhodesia. 
I am sure the members of the Council will 
be interested in hearing what this involved 
from the standpoint of the United States 
in terms of taking such action. 

First, we refused recognition of the 
Smith regime. 

Second, we immediately instituted a com- 
prehensive embargo on the shipment of all 
arms and military equipment to Southern 

Third, we suspended action on applica- 

U.S. Views on Delay in Calling 
Security Council Meeting 

Following is a statement issued at Washing- 
ton and at the U.S. Mission to the United 
Nations in New York on April 8. 

The attitude of the Council President is un- 
precedented. Article 28 of the charter provides 
that: "The Security Council shall be so or- 
ganized as to be able to function continuously." 

The Council's own rules of procedure pro- 
vide that: "The President shall call a meeting 
of the Security Council at the request of any 
member of the Security Council." 

The President has no discretion as to vyhether 
to call a meeting. His responsibility is to fix 
the time for the meeting. In fixing the time, 
the President does not exercise an arbitrary 
or unfettered discretion. The fixing of the time 
must be related to the urgency of the request. 
The meeting of the Council he must call at the 
request of a member cannot by the nature of 
the charter and the rules be unduly delayed or 
obstructed even by a majority of the members, 
much less by a mere minority. 

Failure to comply with the procedures and 
established practices of the Security Council 
will have serious implications for its effec- 
tiveness in this and future cases, and is a cause 
of great concern to the United States Govern- 

' Ibid., pp. 912 and 920. 

tions for United States Government loans 
and credit guarantees and are issuing no 
further investment guarantees to Southern 

Fourth, we took action in support of the 
financial measures instituted by the British 
Government, including recognition of the 
authority of the newly appointed Board of 
Directors in London over the official de- 
posits of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in 
the United States. 

Fifth, we announced that at the request 
of our Government the United States im- 
porters of asbestos and lithium from South- 
ern Rhodesia had agreed to find other 

Sixth, we informed United States com- 
panies that we recognized the legal author- 
ity of the British Government to take 
actions banning the trade in Southern 

MAY 2, 1966 


Rhodesian chrome and tobacco, and we rec- 
ommended in the strongest terms to the 
United States companies that they comply 
with the British Orders-in-Council passed 
for this purpose. 

Seventh, despite our great tradition and 
in part our constitutional commitment to 
freedom of private travel, we took measures 
to discourage private travel by Americans 
to Southern Rhodesia by announcing that 
the United States Government could no 
longer assure normal protective services to 
Americans planning to travel through or in 
Southern Rhodesia. And we also said that 
American travelers intending to go to 
Southern Rhodesia must have British visas, 
not Southern Rhodesian visas, for travel to 
that country. 

Eighth, we instituted procedures which 
have cut off virtually all American exports 
of consequence. The exceptions are largely 
humanitarian items and not essential to the 
Southern Rhodesian economy. 

Ninth, we suspended the United States 
sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for the 
years 1965 and 1966. In fact, part of that 
quota was on the high seas for delivery to 
the United States when we took that ac- 
tion, and we have subjected ourselves, ob- 
viously, to legal action for the act we took 
with respect to a shipment on the high seas 
before the Security Council acted. 

Tenth, we instituted a total embargo on 
shipments of all United States petroleum 
and petroleum products into Southern Rho- 
desia. And we also advised United States 
citizens and enterprises to comply in full 
with the British Government's Order-in- 
Council prohibiting import of such products 
into Southern Rhodesia. 

In addition to these direct measures, we 
have joined the United Kingdom and other 
countries in establishing an airlift of petro- 
leum products to Zambia in order to aid 
that landlocked nation in maintaining its 
economy, a consideration which must never 
escape the minds of this Council. United 
States aircraft are being used in this opera- 
tion delivering vital cargo to Elisabethville at 


a total rate of 1 million gallons per month. 

Mr. President, these measures cannot be 
taken overnight. We took them urgently 
and as quickly as we could. And the meas- 
ures we have instituted against Southern 
Rhodesia will mean a trade loss to the 
United States of many millions of dollars. 
In addition, since the middle of January, the 
United States has allocated more than $4 
million for the Zambian airlift and for 
planned emergency maintenance of the 
Great North Road from Tanzania to Zam- 
bia. It is interesting, Mr. President, to 
reflect that this figure represents more than 
the total United States contribution for the 
United Nations Force in Cyprus covering the 
same period of time and almost two-thirds 
of the United States contributions to the 
United Nations Emergency Force in the 
Middle East for the entire year 1966. In 
short, our support for Zambia in connection 
with the implementation of the Security 
Council's November resolution on Southern 
Rhodesia is comparable in cost to the sup- 
port which we provide for the United Na- 
tions important peacekeeping operations. 

I mention these costs not to use figures 
but to emphasize that these are costs which 
we accept gladly in support of the principles 
of legality, democracy, and self-determina- 
tion in Africa. And we are glad that we 
were able to make this contribution because 
we deem the problem of Rhodesia to be a 
problem for all the world. We recognize, of 
course, the special concern of Africa in this 
problem, but we share that concern. 

Mr. President, I think this is a proper 
occasion to strongly urge other countries 
which have not as yet moved to tighten this 
ring around the Smith regime to do so with- 
out delay. As for us, we continue to support 
the United Kingdom firmly as it discharges 
its responsibilities in this effort. 

Now today we deal with a particular 
problem. The United Kingdom has brought 
to the attention of this Council the greatest 
current danger in our common effort: the 
risk of a serious breach in the program of 
oil sanctions as a result of the arrival and 


the potential arrival of tankers at Portu- 
guese ports with cargoes apparently des- 
tined for Southern Rhodesia. 

U.S. Support for Resolution 

The United States fully concurs in the 
British proposal that the Council act vigor- 
ously and promptly to meet this danger. And 
this resolution is, indeed, destined to meet 
firmly and clearly the immediate danger be- 
fore us by calling on the Portuguese Govern- 
ment, and on any government whose vessels 
may be involved, to prevent the movement 
of oil into Rhodesia through Beira and, in 
case this is not sufficient, it calls on the 
United Kingdom Government to prevent such 
movement, by force if necessary. 

Mr. President, all of us are realistic. We 
hope that these additional measures will be 
effective, but we recognize — and must recog- 
nize — the absolute necessity for moving in 
concert, step by step, as far as we can 
unitedly to meet this problem. And this 
Council, as before, remains seized of the 
problem so that the additional measures 
which become necessary, if they do become 
necessary, can be ventilated here, debated 
here, and decided upon here. 

It has always been my conviction, Mr. 
President, that we should proceed prac- 
tically to do what we can agree upon quickly 
and urgently, and then we should go on and 
consider other measures upon which other 
members of the Council may have doubts 
and reservations and see whether we can 
arrive at agreement upon such other meas- 
ures. But we should never, in my opinion, 
fail to act quickly and urgently on those 
matters which we all desire and upon which 
we can all agree quickly in the interests of 
the common goal. 

Perhaps, Mr. President, in saying so, I 
reflect a personal philosophy. As we sat 
here, I sent for a speech I made when I was 
appointed Secretary of Labor of the United 
States, where there are also many unfin- 
ished problems in my country, and I said 
this — but it is not an original idea of mine 
— I quoted a great democratic Spanish 

MAY 2, 1966 

philosopher as an illustration of my own 
philosophy, Salvador de Madariaga. And he 
said this: 

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. 
We must walk in the right direction but we must 
walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is 
desirable, to define what is possible at any time 
within the scope of what is desirable, to carry out 
what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable. 

And, Mr. President, the resolution we 
have reflects no disagreement in this Coun- 
cil. I am sure we all want to stop these 
ships, and I am sure we all want to empower 
the British Government to stop them as 
quickly and as effectively as can be done. 

The resolution we passed last November 
reflected the Council's determination to 
condemn the rebellion and to bring it to an 
end. It was paralleled by General Assembly 
action reflecting similar overwhelming sen- 
timent. Implementing actions have been 
announced since then by an impressive ma- 
jority of U.N. member nations. And, despite 
the fact that the ultimate end has not been 
achieved, we ought to take pride and satis- 
faction in what the great body of world 
opinion has done in response to an appeal 
by this Council. In fact, in my short ex- 
perience here, few issues coming before this 
body have ever produced such a unanimity 
of response, a clear indication that we have 
the same goal and dramatic evidence that, 
as we affirmed last November, the nations 
of the world will not remain idle while a 
minority violates the principles which the 
world community holds sacred. And surely 
we can, and we should, agree today on the 
specific question before us, agree that we 
should take action to prevent these oil ship- 

Time, as we have been told, is of the 
essence, and we ought to act in the spirit 
that time is of the essence. 

My Government appreciates the initiative 
which the British Government has taken 
and is ready to vote, and vote without delay, 
allowing time, of course, for reasonable de- 
bate on the resolution. We hope others will 
join us in acting with the dispatch which 
the situation calls for. 



The Security Council, 

Recalling its resolutions Nos. 216 of 12 November 
1965 and 217 of 20 November 1965 and in particular 
its call to all States to do their utmost to break off 
economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in- 
cluding an embargo on oil and petroleum products, 

Gravely concerned at reports that substantial 
supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of 
an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the ap- 
proach of a further tanker which may lead to the 
resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipe- 
line with the acquiescence of the Portuguese au- 

Considering that such supplies will afford gfreat 
assistance and encouragement to the illegal regime 
in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to re- 
main longer in being, 

1. Determines that the resulting situation con- 
stitutes a threat to the peace; 

2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to 
permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from 
Beira to Rhodesia ; 

3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to 
receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia; 

4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of 
any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carry- 
ing oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route 
for Beira; 

5. Calls upon the Government of the United King- 
dom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the 
arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to 
be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowers 
the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker 
known as the Joanna V upon her departure from 
Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there. 

U.S. Officials Named to Boards 
of Asian Development Bank 

The Senate on April 
lowing nominations to 
ment Bank;! 

1 confirmed the fol- 
the Asian Develop- 

Henry H. Fowler to be U.S. Governor ; 
William S. Gaud to be U.S. Alternate 
Governor ; and 

Bernard Zagorin to be U.S. Director. 

"U.N. doc. S/RES/221 (1966); adopted by the 
Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 ab- 
stentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, U.S.S.R., Uru- 
guay) . 

' For a White House announcement of the nomina- 
tions, see White House press release dated Mar. 17. 


U.N. Security Council Extends 
Peace Force in Cyprus 

Statement by James Roosevelt * 

Mr. President, we are indebted again to 
the Secretary-General for the excellence of 
his report - on the United Nations operation 
in Cyprus. This clear record of the past 3 
months and the useful observations have 
assisted the Security Council materially in 
its task. 

My Government, in voting for a 3-month 
extension of the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus, recognized the continuing need for 
a United Nations presence on the island. It 
is clear that this judgment was shared by 
all the other members of the Council. The 
United States has willingly, consistently, 
and fully supported the maintenance of the 
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in the past — 
by our statements in this Council, by our 
votes, and by our substantial financial con- 
tributions toward the cost of the Force. We 
continue to support the United Nations 
Force in Cyprus. | 

However, as the distinguished members of 
this Council well know, the Force has been 
in existence for nearly 2 years. It has been 
remarkably successful in keeping the peace 
during that time, although there is still 
underlying tension on the island, and, of 
course, I wish in no way to minimize the 
complexity of the situation on Cyprus. 
Nevertheless, it is the conviction of my 
Government that, after the passage of 2 
years, the time is at hand to intensify the 
search for ways to reduce that tension and 
promote a solution to the basic problem. 

In the interval since we last met to con- 
sider the question of Cyprus, my Govern- 
ment has been increasingly concerned that 
we not lose sight of the United Nations' 
eventual goal in Cyprus and that there 
should be significant movement toward a 
peaceful settlement and an agreed solution. 

'- Made in the Security Council on Mar. 16 (U.S./ 
U.N. press release 4822). Mr. Roosevelt was Acting 
U.S. Representative in the Security Council. 

• U.N. doc. S/7191. 



My Government was therefore pleased to 
learn that the Secretary-General has re- 
cently given an enlarged mandate ^ to his 
most capable Special Representative in Cy- 
prus, Ambassador [Carlos A.] Bernardes, to 
employ his good offices and to make such 
approaches as may be productive in solving 
the problems of either a local or a broader 
nature. The United States regards this step 
as having great potential for the restoration 
of peace and order. We are hopeful that the 
efforts of Ambassador Bernardes will stimu- 
late positive steps toward a settlement, and 
we believe that his experience as a principal 
architect of the March 4 [1964] resolution * 
as well as his experience in Cyprus equips 
him admirably for his task. The United 
States is reassured and encouraged by the 
report of the Secretary-General that the 
parties most directly concerned have 
adopted a helpful and cooperative attitude 
toward this extension of Ambassador Ber- 
nardes' responsibilities. 

We are keenly aware that the business of 
keeping the peace, of securing the peace, is 
not only difficult and prolonged; it is also 
costly. We hope that those who have so 
generously contributed in the past will con- 
tinue to do so and that nations who have 
not yet contributed or have not done so on 
a regular basis, especially those here in the 
Security Council, will join in voluntary con- 
tributions to the support of the Force. The 
Secretary-General has spoken earnestly and 
persuasively on this subject in his latest 
report and here today as he has in the past. 

Finally, I should like to record our shock 
and sense of loss upon the death in Decem- 
ber of General [K. S.] Thimayya, late Com- 
mander of the United Nations Force in 
Cyprus. He served the cause of peace with 
dedication and high ability. He is sorely 
missed. I also wish to pay tribute to the 

' For text, see U.N. doc. S/7180. 

' U.N. doc. S/5575. 

' In a resolution (S/7205) unanimously adopted on 
Mar. 16, the Security Council extended "once more 
the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus 
. . . for a period of three months ending 26 June 
1966. . . ." 

untiring efforts of the Secretary-General 
and his staff in fostering a solution to the 
Cyprus question. My Government again 
wishes to express its admiration and grati- 
tude for the courage, the patience, and the 
skill of the men of the Peacekeeping Force.' 


U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement 
Updating U.S. Tariff Concessions 

The Office of the Special Representative 
for Trade Negotiations announced on April 
5 that the United States and the United 
Kingdom had on that day signed an agree- 
ment to reestablish in the language of the 
new Tariff Schedules of the United States 
(TSUS) the trade agreement concessions 
previously granted to the United Kingdom 
by the United States. The agreement also 
grants several new concessions to offset the 
impairment in previous concessions inci- 
dental to bringing the TSUS into force. 

The negotiation with the United Kingdom 
was one of some 30 negotiations envisaged 
by the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to 
bring the United States tariff concessions 
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT) and a few bilateral trade 
agreements into conformance with the lan- 
guage of the TSUS. The entry into force 
in 1963 of the TSUS, recently amended by 
the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments 
Act of 1965, resulted in numerous inci- 
dental rate changes. On the whole, reduc- 
tions offset increases, but for the United 
Kingdom (and Hong Kong, for which the 
United Kingdom has accepted the GATT) 
there were greater rate increases than de- 
creases, and compensatory U.S. tariff re- 
ductions were called for. 

The United Kingdom and the United 
States have agreed that new concessions on 

MAY 2, 1966 


three tariff items covering 1964 U.S. im- 
ports valued at $2.7 million would offset the 
net rate increases of the new tariff. (Total 
U.S. imports from the United Kingdom, to- 
gether with Hong Kong, in 1964 were about 
$1.4 billion.) In addition, a duty reduction 
on aircraft parts, which had already been 
provided for in a similar agreement with 
Canada, 1 that took effect on January 1, is 
being bound also to the United Kingdom. 
The three new concessions are as follows: 


Existing New 

Duty Rate Duty Rate 

25% 20% 

45% 22.5% 

Brief Description 

222.60 Bamboo, rattan, willow 
or chip articles not 
specially provided 

531.37 Porcelain and subpor- 
celain refractory 

792.60 Ivory articles not spe- 
cially provided for 12% 8% 

All the duty reductions will be put into 
effect in five annual stages. 

The agreement will be made effective on 
May 1 through a Presidential proclama- 

The present agreement resolves issues be- 
tween the two Governments arising from 
the entry into force of the TSUS. Other 
negotiations on reductions in tariffs and 
other trade restrictions are continuing be- 
tween the two Governments at Geneva as 
part of the multilateral Kennedy Round of 
trade negotiations. 

U.S. and Mexico Extend 
Radio Agreement 

Press release 83 dated April 14 

United States and Mexican officials 
signed a protocol in Mexico City on April 
13 to extend until December 31, 1967, the 
agreement between the United States and 
Mexico on radio broadcasting in the stand- 

ard broadcast band. The existing agree- 
ment, signed in Mexico January 29, 1957, 
entered into force on June 9, 1961, for a 
5-year period. 

The protocol will be transmitted to the 
United States Senate for its advice and con- 
sent to ratification. It will also be necessary 
to obtain approval of Mexico's legislative 

Current Actions 



Memorandum of arrangement to cover reentry ex- 
periments in Australia (Sparta). Signed at Can- 
berra March 30, 1966. Entered into force March 
30, 1966. 

Signatures: Australia, United Kingdom, United 


Convention on the settlement of investment disputes 
between states and nationals of other states. Done 
at Washington March 18, 1965. ' 
Ratification deposited: Gabon, April 4, 1966. 

Pacific Settlement of Disputes 

Convention for the pacific settlement of internation- 
al disputes. Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907. 
Entered into force January 26, 1910. 
Adherence deposited: Uganda, March 1, 1966. 

Safety of Life at Sea 

International convention for the safety of life at 
sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered 
into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495. 
Denunciation received: Switzerland, March 21, 


International telecommunication convention with 
annexes and final protocol. Done at Montreux 
November 12, 1965. Enters into force January 1, 

Signatures: Afghanistan,^ Algeria,' Argentina,' 
Australia,' Austria,' Belgium,' Bolivia,' Brazil,' 
Bulgaria,' * Burma," Byelorussian Soviet Social- 
ist Republic,' Cameroon,' Canada,' Central Afri- 
can Republic,' Ceylon, Chad,' Chile,' ' China,* 
Colombia,' Congo (Brazzaville),' Congo (Leo- 
poldville),' Costa Rica," Cuba,"* Cyprus,' 
Czechoslovakia,' ' Dahomey,' ' Denmark,' Ecua- 
dor,' Ethiopia,' ' Finland,' France, Group of ter- 
ritories represented by French Overseas Post 

^ Bulletin of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 106. 
' For text of Proclamation 3712 dated Apr. 5, see 
31 Fed. Reg. 5543. 

' Not in force. 

' With reservations contained in final protocol. 
' With declarations contained in final protocol. 
* With statements contained in final protocol. 



and Telecommunications Agency, Gabon," Feder- 
al Republic of Germany,'' Ghana," Greece,'' ' Gua- 
temala," Guinea,'" Haiti, Hungary ,= " * India,"* 
Indonesia,'^ " Iran,'' Iraq," Iceland," Ireland, 
Israel,' Italy," Ivory Coast," Jamaica," Japan, 
Jordan," Kenya," " Korea," Kuwait," Laos, Leb- 
anon," Liberia," " Liechtenstein, " Luxembourg," 
Malagasy," Malaysia," Malawi," Mali," " Malta," 
Mauritania," " Mexico," Monaco, Mongolia," " ' 
Morocco," Nepal," Netherlands," " New Zealand," 
Nicaragua," Niger," Nigeria," Norway," Paki- 
stan," Panama," Paraguay," Peru," " Philip- 
pines,' ' Poland," " * Portugal," Portuguese Over- 
seas Provinces, Rhodesia, Romania," ' Rwan- 
da," " Saudi Arabia," Senegal," Sierra Leone," 
Singapore," Somali Republic," " Spain," Spanish 
Provinces in Africa, Sudan," " Sweden," Switzer- 
land," * Syrian Arab Republic," Tanzania," " 
Thailand," Togo,"" Trinidad and Tobago," Tu- 
nisia," Turkey," Uganda," " Ukrainian Soviet 
Socialist Republic," Union of Soviet Socialist Re- 
publics," United Arab Republic," United King- 
dom," " Overseas Territories for international 
relations of which United Kingdom are re- 
sponsible. United States," Territories of United 
States," Upper Volta," Vatican City, Vene- 
zuela," " Yugoslavia,' Zambia," November 12, 


British Honduras 

Investment guarantee agreement. Signed at Belize 
City February 8. 1966. Entered into force Febru- 
ary 8, 1966. 


Air transport agreement with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Ottawa January 17, 1966. Entered into 
force January 17, 1966. 


Agreement relating to the status of United States 
armed forces in China. Signed at Taipei August 
31, 1965. 
Entered into force: April 12, 1966. 

Costa Rica 

Agreement amending and extending the military 
mission agreement of December 10, 1945, as 
amended and extended (59 Stat. 1682, TIAS 2079, 
3109, 4595, 4795, 5348). Effected by exchange of 
notes at San Jose March 17 and 28, 1966. Entered 
into force March 28, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Sigiied 
at Accra April 1, 1966. Entered into force April 1, 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of 
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist- 
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed 
at Amman April 5, 1966. Entered into force April 
5, 1966. 

MAY 2, 1966 


Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Singapore March 
25, 1966. Entered into force March 25, 1966. 


Agreement superseding the agreement of March 11 
and 18, 1960, as amended June 27 and 28, 1963 
(TIAS 4463, 5393), and providing for the con- 
tinued operation and expansion of the space- 
vehicle tracking and communications station on the 
Island of Gran Canaria. Effected by exchange of 
notes at Washington April 14, 1966. Entered into 
force April 14, 1966. 

Agreement providing for a project in Spain to meas- 
ure winds and temperatures at high altitudes and 
for continuing other cooperative space research 
projects. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash- 
ington April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreements of November 14, 1961 (TIAS 4910), 
and January 31, 1963 (TIAS 5495). Effected by 
exchange of notes at Khartoum January 12 and 18, 
1966. Entered into force January 18, 1966. 


Agricultural commodities agreement under title I 
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. 
Signed at Ankara April 2, 1966. Entered into force 
April 2, 1966. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of March 21, 1966 (TIAS 5968). Ef- 
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 2, 
1966. Entered into force April 2, 1966. 


Recent Releases 

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Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C., 
20U02. Address requests direct to the Superintend- 
ent of Documents, except in the case of free publi- 
cations, which may be obtained from the Office of 
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Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which 
describe the people, history, government, economy, 
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains 
a map, a list of principal government officials and 
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some 
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are 
available at 5(f each, imless otherwise indicated. 

Angola. Pub. 7962. 8 pp. 
Austria. Pub. 7955. 7 pp. 


Bahrain. Pub. 8013. 4 pp. 

Cameroon. Pub. 8010. 8 pp. 

Central African Republic. Pub. 7970. 4 pp. 

Chile. Pub. 7998. 8 pp. 

El Salvador. Pub. 7794. 8 pp. 

Ethiopia. Pub. 7785. 8 pp. 

Gabon. Pub. 7968. 4 pp. 

The Gambia. Pub. 8014. 4 pp. 

Soviet Zone of Germany. Pub. 7957. 8 pp. 

Iraq. Pub. 7975. 4 pp. 

Ireland. Pub. 7974. 4 pp. 

Jordan. Pub. 7956. 4 pp. 

Malagasy Republic. Pub. 8015. 8 pp. 

Netherlands. Pub. 7967. 8 pp. 

Poland. Pub. 8020. 8 pp. 

Portuguese Guinea. Pub. 7966. 4 pp. 

Rumania. Pub. 7890. 8 pp. 

South Africa. Pub. 8021. 8 pp. 

Thailand. Pub. 7961. 8 pp. 

U.S.S.R. Pub. 7842. 12 pp. 10(*. 

Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet giv- 
ing concise information on the history, organization, 
and activities of the Department (including basic 
facts about the main building). Pub. 7644. Depart- 
ment and Foreign Service Series 124. 16 pp., illus. 

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States 

(Revised). Booklet for the information of men and 
women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the 
Foreign Service of the United States to serve with 
the Department of State or the U.S. Information 
Agency. Pub. 7924. Department and Foreign Service 
Series 132. 32 pp., illus. Limited distribution. 

U.S. Participation in the UN. Nineteenth annual 
report by the President to the Congress for the 
year 1964. Pub. 7943. International Organization and 
Conference Series 67. xvii, 353 pp., tables. $1.75. 

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt From the State of the 
Union Message: President Lyndon B. Johnson, Jan- 
uary 12, 1966. Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy 
Series 211. 17 pp. 15«'. 

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to 
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense 
Assistance Control Act of 1951. Pub. 8019. General 
Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40<f. 

Viet-Nam Today. Deputy Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson addresses 
the New England Press Association at Boston, Mass. 
Pub. 8039. Far Eastern Series 139. 24 pp. 15<(. 

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other 
International Agreements of the United States in 
Force on January 1, 1966. Compiled by the Treaty 
Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Depart- 
ment of State. Pub. 8042. 322 pp. $1.50. 

The Issue in Viet-Nam. Under Secretary of State 
George W. Ball's speech before the Northwestern 
University Alumni Association at Evanston, 111. Pub. 
8043. Far Eastern Series 141. 24 pp. 15i>. 

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. Text of an 
address made by President Johnson, after being 
presented with the National Freedom Award at Free- 
dom House, New York, N.Y., on February 23, 1966. 
Pub. 8048. Far Eastern Series 142. 16 pp. 15<f. 

Report to the President of the Special Committee on 
U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries 
and the Soviet Union. Pamphlet containing text of 
the Committee's report as issued by the White House. 
Pub. 8061. Commercial Policy Series 201. 22 pp. 15^. 

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Mali, 
amending the agreement of July 14, 1965. Exchange 
of notes — Signed at Bamako December 8 and 15, 
1965. Entered into force December 15, 1965. TIAS 
5906. 3 pp. 5<i. 

Trade — Renegotiation of Schedule XX (United 
States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade. Interim agreement with Canada signed at 
Washington December 17, 1965. Entered into force 
December 17, 1965. TIAS 5912. 44 pp. 20<*. 

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV. 

Agreement with Iran amending the agreement of 
November 16, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes — 
Signed at Tehran October 13, 1965. Entered into 
force October 13, 1965. TIAS 5918. 3 pp. 5<t. 

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Yugo- 
slavia, amending the agreement of October 5, 1964. 
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington Decem- 
ber 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. 
TIAS 5926. 3 pp. 5t 


The Department of State Boiletin, a 
weekly publication issned by the Office 
of Media Serrices, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, proTidea the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phases of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department. Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international agreements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

I^ublicationa of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of International relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super- 
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ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbice: 52 issues, domestic $10, 
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Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE: Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Btilletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 



INDEX Matj 2, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. HOI 

American Republics. Review of Movement of 
Cuban Refugees and Hemisphere Policy 
Toward Cuba (Sayre) 707 

Asia. U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian 
Development Bank 718 

China. United States Policy Toward Communist 
China (Rusk) 686 


Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees and 
Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) . 707 

U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian Devel- 
opment Bank 718 

United States Policy Toward Communist China 
(Rusk) 686 

Cuba. Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees 
and Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) 707 

Cyprus. U.N. Security Council Extends Peace 
Force in Cyprus (Roosevelt) 718 

Department and Foreign Service. Continuity of 
Refugee and Migration Policies (Crockett) 704 

Economic Affairs 

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S. 
Tariff Concessions 719 

U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian De- 
velopment Bank 718 

Europe. U.S. Ready To Consult With France 
and NATO on French Demands (texts of aide 
memorie) 699 


Secretary Rusk Answers Questions on NATO 
Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript of Paris- 
Match interview) 695 

U.S. Ready To Consult With France and NATO 
on French Demands (texts of aide memoire) 699 

Immigration. Review of Movement of Cuban 
Refugees and Hemisphere Policy Toward 
Cuba (Sayre) 707 

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Extend Radio Agree- 
ment 720 

Military Affairs. Secretary Rusk Answers 
Questions on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam 
(transcript of Paris-Match interview) . . . 695 

North Atlantic Treaty Organization 

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions on NATO 
Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript of Paris- 
Match interview) 695 

U.S. Ready To Consult With France and NATO 
on French Demands (texts of aide memoire) 699 

Presidential Documents. President Congratu- 
lates Agencies on Work With Refugees . . 705 

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To 
Be Held at Little Rock 703 

Publications. Recent Releases 721 


Continuity of Refugee and Migration Policies 
(Crockett) 704 

President Congratulates Agencies on Work 
With Refugees 705 

Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees and 
Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) . 707 

Southern Rhodesia. Security Council Authorizes 
U.K. To Use Force To Divert Oil Shipments 
Bound for Rhodesia (Goldberg, text of res- 
olution) 713 

Telecommunications. U.S. and Mexico Extend 
Radio Agreement 720 

Treaty Information 

Current Actions 720 

U.S. and Mexico Extend Radio Agreement . . 720 
U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S. 
Tariff Concessions 719 

United Kingdom 

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force 
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 713 

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S. 
Tariff Concessions 719 

United Nations 

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force 
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia 
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 713 

U.N. Security Council Extends Peace Force in 
Cyprus (Roosevelt) 718 

U.S. Views on Delay in Calling Security Coun- 
cil Meeting 715 

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Answers Questions 
on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript 
of Paris-Match interview) 695 

Name Index 

Crockett, William J 704 

Fowler, Henry H 718 

Gaud, William S 718 

Goldberg, Arthur J 713 

Johnson, President 705 

Roosevelt, James 718 

Rusk, Secretary 686, 695 

Sayre, Robert M 707 

Zagorin, Bernard 718 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 11-17 

Press releases may be obtained from the 
Office of News, Department of State, Wash- 
ington, D.C., 20520. 

No. Date Subject 

*78 4/11 Palmer sworn in as Assistant Sec- 
retary for African Affairs (bio- 
graphic details). 

79 4/12 Rusk : interview with Paris-Match. 

80 4/12 U.S. reply to French aide memoire 

of March 29. 

81 4/12 Regional foreign policy conference. 

Little Rock, Ark., May 5. 

t82 4/14 Space agreements with Spain. 
83 4/14 Agreement with Mexico on radio 
broadcasting bands. 

t84 4/14 Mann: Senate Subcommittee on 
Foreign Aid Expenditures. 

t85 4/14 Mann: Pan American Society. 

*86 4/15 Harriman: Democratic Midwest 
Conference, Columbus, Ohio (ex- 
cerpts) . 

187 4/15 U.S. observer delegation to CENTO 
ministerial conference. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 






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by Ambassador Goldberg 749 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Frankel 754 


President Johnson's Visit to Mexico City 726 

Address by Under Secretary Mann, Pan American Society, Neiv York City 734 

Statement by Assistant Secretary Gordon, lA-ECOSOC Meeting, Buenos Aires 738 

For index see inside back cover 

President Johnson Visits IVIexico City 

The President and Mrs. Johnson made an 
informal visit to Mexico Citxj April H.-15. 
Folio iving are texts of President Johnson's 
remarks upon his arrival there on April 14, 
his address at the dedication of the 
Abraham Lincoln statue on April 15 and 
remarks to the staff of the U.S. Embassy 
later that day, and a joint statement issued 
by President Johnson and President Gustavo 
Diaz Ordaz at the close of the visit. 


White House press release dated April 14 ; as-delivered text 

Mr. President, Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, members 
of the First Family, my friends of Mexico: 
This is almost a homecoming for the John- 
son family. Thirty-one years ago we came to 
Mexico on our honeymoon. Since then, on 
every occasion possible, we have used the 
border into your country, visited in your 
cities and your countryside, and we have 
enjoyed, on many occasions, visits from your 
leaders and your Presidents. 

I first met President Adolfo Lopez Mateos 
in the late 1950's when he came to the 
United States. Later, as President, I visited 
with him in the United States at the Cha- 
mizal at El Paso,i and in 1964 your own dis- 
tinguished President honored us with a visit 
that he and his wife made in our home in 

So when I come to Mexico I feel that I 
come to the home of my friends. We are here 
today to present to your country a statue of 
one of our most beloved and most respected 

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964, 
p. 545. 

• For background, see ihid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805. 

Presidents, Abraham Lincoln. We present 
that statue to the people that we consider 
our most treasured friends. 

Mr. President, we are grateful to you for 
this beautiful reception, for your gracious 
remarks. We will look forward to exchang- 
ing views with you in the hours that we are 
permitted together. 

I said to your distinguished and able Am- 
bassador, Ambassador [Hugo B.] Margain, 
on the way down on the plane today, that 
while we faced many trying problems in the 
world today, I did not believe there had ever 
been a period in the history of the United 
States and Mexico when we faced fewer prob- 
lems, when we had better understanding, 
and when there was a stronger friendship 
that exists between the people than exists 

That is because, Mr. President, you and 
your distinguished predecessors have under- 
stood our people and have provided a far- 
sighted leadership for your people that has 
brought us together in understanding and 

Although in other parts of the world 
neighbors fight neighbors, neighbors are in 
dispute with neighbors, there are no armies 
that patrol our borders, there are no guns 
that protect the frontiers of Mexico and the 
United States. Our people cross the bound- 
ary freely and work and play together. 

If I could have my one wish granted today, 
it would be that we could live in a world 
where we had the same peaceful relations 
with our neighbors as we have with the 
people of Mexico. But if we are to have 
peace in the world, we must try to solve the 
problems that cause the wars, the problems 



of illiteracy, the problems of ignorance, the 
problems of disease, the problems of 
poverty, the problems of misunderstanding. 

Mr. President, we salute you for the 
leadership that you are providing your own 
great nation and the contribution you are 
making to other nations in the world in a 
program that will bring peace to all human- 
kind. While war clouds hover over certain 
parts of the world as we meet here this 
afternoon, we truly and genuinely and sin- 
cerely hope that the day may soon come 
when all the world can live together in peace 
as do the people of the United States and 

Mr. President, our distinguished Secre- 
tary of State, the majority leader of the 
United States Senate, the minority leader of 
the United States Senate, leaders of our 
House of Representatives, join me on this 
occasion in thanking you for this very 
cordial welcome and in saying to you: 
Muchas gracias, Senor Presidente, muchas 
gracias, todo Mexico. 


White House press release dated April 15 : as-delivered text 

Mr. President, my friends: It is impossi- 
ble for me to tell you how proud I am to be 
here with you today in company with the 
leadership of the United States Senate, 
prominent members of the House of Repre- 
sentatives, and the Senators and Congress- 
men from the States of Illinois and Ken- 
tucky, that gave us Abraham Lincoln. The 
President of the United States could ask for 
no greater honor than to be invited to stand 
on the soil of our friend, Mexico, beside a 
leader as beloved and respected as your 
great President, Diaz Ordaz. 

For me, this occasion has a very special 
meaning. All my life I have known and 
lived with and worked alongside the sons 
and the daughters of Mexico. I have been 
here on many different occasions. My wife 
and I spent the first days of our marriage 
here in this beautiful city, Mexico City. 

To come back now to the people and the 
scenes of so many pleasant memories, to 
come as the leader of your sister Republic 
to the north, where your country is held in 
such high esteem, is for me a moment never 
to be forgotten. The tribute that your great 
Foreign Secretary Carillo Flores has just 
paid to Abraham Lincoln will touch the 
hearts of all of my countrymen. All na- 
tions rightly praise their own famous men, 
but only a truly great people pause to pay 
tribute to the great of other lands. And 
that is what Mexico is doing today. 

What Abraham Lincoln stood for is what 
binds our two nations and, indeed, this en- 
tire hemisphere together. More than geog- 
raphy and common economic interests and 
a regional system of mutual assistance, we 
are held together by common values and by 
shared beliefs. That is why we share 
equally Bolivar and Washington, San Mar- 
tin and Jefferson, Juarez and Marti and 
Lincoln. They were sons of a common 

In his time and place, Abraham Lincoln 
brought the best in our common civilization 
to bear on the cruelest problems that ever 
confronted a leader: civil war and the en- 
slavement of a minority of his people. In 
these trials he clung to the belief that 
every human being was unique and precious 
— equal in the eyes of God and before the 

He believed that the pillars of a great so- 
ciety were equality of opportunity, indi- 
vidual freedom to excel, and justice — po- 
litical and social justice — for every citizen. 
And so he walked among us, bearing on his 
shoulders the burdens of a nation's greatest 
test, proving that true greatness lies in 
loyalty to those universal principles which 
span every age. 

Now, in this age, we in this hemisphere 
are today engaged in another great test. We 
are engaged in a vast social revolution 
touching the lives of millions of people on 
two continents. And, like Lincoln's, this is 
a test of whether freedom can work. It is a 
test of whether men, through liberty, can 
overcome the weight of the past and lift 

MAY 9, 1966 


from their brothers the blight of hunger, 
the blindness of ignorance, and the burden 
of disease. 

We are in the midst of that test. We 
must demonstrate to our peoples that their 
destiny is not class struggle but common 
struggle to achieve that proud and that 
modern Latin America which is at once the 
dream of a generation and the interest of 
the world community. 

This is a battle which only the people of 
Latin America can win, but it is the desire 
of my people, our commitment and our 
privilege, to work side by side in this great 
human adventure. 

History will judge us not only by the no- 
bility of our sentiments or the poetry of 
our words. History will judge us by the ac- 
tion that we take to bring these sentiments 
to life. 

For my country's part, we are guided by 
certain basic convictions upon which our 
faith in the future rests. 

First, every member of the American 
community of nations has a natural right to 
its independence and sovereignty. No coun- 
try may abridge those rights. As your own 
Benito Juarez said: "Respect for the rights 
of others is peace." 

Second, the United States maintains its 
commitment to government by consent of 
the governed, a consent to be granted in 
free and honest elections. It does not seek 
to impose on others any form of govern- 
ment. But let us stand determined on this 
principle: Despots are not welcome in this 

Third, my administration believes that 
both stable democracy and effective eco- 
nomic development depend ultimately on so- 
cial justice. There has never been stable 
democracy where economic power and privi- 
lege were concentrated in the hands of the 
few. Where the many work, let the many 

Fourth, we believe the struggle for social 
justice and more efficient and equitable use 
of natural resources must be led by each 
country in its own behalf. My administra- 

tion will not be deterred by those who 
tenaciously or selfishly cling to special privi- 
leges from the past. And we will not be de- 
terred by those who say that to risk change 
is to risk communism. 

Fifth, we do not wish to see communism 
spread in this hemisphere, but we believe 
that the threat to the liberty and inde- 
pendence of the Latin American peoples 
from communism cannot be met merely by 
force. We will continue to concentrate our 
assistance mainly in economic and social 
fields and to encourage our Latin American 
neighbors, where possible, to limit their out- 
lays for military purposes. We are encour- 
aged that democracy flourishes in countries 
such as Mexico, where expenditures for 
education and development are high. 

Sixth, we are convinced that the future of 
Latin American industrialization, as well as 
the basic welfare of the people themselves, 
urgently requires the parallel modernization 
of rural life. This must combine more 
equitable forms of landholding and all the 
measures that are needed to raise production 
and productivity. Your two Presidents this 
morning discussed at length steps that we 
are going to take to do both. 

Seventh, we shall continue to work with 
your own able President Diaz Ordaz and 
work with our Latin American friends 
throughout the hemisphere to augment and 
to stabilize earnings from traditional ex- 
ports, while assisting efforts to expand 
those new exports on which Latin American 
trade will increasingly depend in the future. 

Eighth, we believe that the drawing to- 
gether of the economies of Latin America is 
critical to this hemisphere's future. Only in 
this way can the hemisphere develop truly 
efficient industries, expanded foreign ex- 
change earnings, and a sound foundation 
for a full Latin American partnership in 
building a peaceful world community. 

One of the challenges of hemispheric in- 
tegration is the linking of North and South 
America through the Pan American High- 
way. It is one ambition of my Presidency 
to work with the other nations of this 



hemisphere toward closing the several hun- 
dred miles of the gap that now exists. We 
must await the studies that are now nearing 
completion, but together we should look to 
the day when the old precolonial links 
across the isthmus are fully restored, the 
good lands of Panama are opened for agri- 
culture, and families and commerce can 
move anywhere between Laredo and the 
southernmost tip of Argentina. 

Senor Presidente Diaz Ordaz, my country 
takes great heart in what you in Mexico are 
doing. We see today a people who are forg- 
ing ahead. We see today a nation that is 
proud and a people that are confident. You 
are confident of the future because you are 
confident that you can secure for your 
people a constant increase in material well- 
being and social justice. You are confident 
that you can deal with all other neighbors 
in independence, friendship, and dignity. 
You are confident that you can help your 
less advanced neighbors also to move ahead 
with you. And you are confident that you 
can maintain in the modern world your own 
personality, loyal to your own traditions and 

Mexico's progress is witness that the 
goals of the Alliance are realistic and its 
methods are valid. 

I have served with four American Presi- 
dents who showed their concern and their 
friendship for Mexico and Latin America. 
Franklin Roosevelt lifted our eyes to the 
promise and problems of Latin America with 
the good-neighbor policy. Harry Truman's 
boldness brought forth Point 4 and its com- 
passion to the Western Hemisphere and to 
the entire world. Dwight Eisenhower 
plowed new, fertile, and productive fields 
with the Act of Bogota. And John F. Ken- 
nedy, building on and expanding and refin- 
ing that act, gave fresh impulse to all our 
ideals in the Alliance. 

Twenty-nine months ago, the first week 
of my Presidency, my first act as President 
of the United States was to pledge my 
country again to the faith and the direction 
of these four Presidents and their relations 

with the nations of this hemisphere." I am 
proud today to report to the Mexican people 
and to all of our Latin American friends 
that our common effort is proving itself 
with specific results. Our dreams are be- 
coming realities. 

As I speak to you here today, I have been 
involved in the executive branch of my Gov- 
ernment for 6 years. The first 3 years, the 
average growth rate in Latin America was 1 
percent. In the last 3 years of my Presi- 
dency, that growth rate is now 2.5 percent. 
This achievement, in which Mexico, the 
United States, and all the other countries of 
Latin America can take great pride, will con- 
tinue strong, I predict, in the year 1966. 
We believe that the growth rate in that year 
will exceed the 2.5 percent of this year. 

Ahead, of course, lie many problems that 
are yet to be overcome. Hard work and 
perseverance, not hope alone, will bend them 
to solution. 

At the recent meeting of the economic 
ministers in Buenos Aires,* we were right 
to take stock of what we have learned since 
1961, and to plan and to chart the course 
ahead. Now we must give necessary im- 
pulse to, as I said to your President this 
morning, new and additional initiatives. 
We must open new paths. We must breathe 
new energy into our efforts. 

To that end I will, in the months ahead, 
join with Latin American leaders in explor- 
ing the proposal of the President of Argen- 
tina for a new meeting at the very highest 
level to examine our common problems and 
to give the Alliance for Progress increased 
momentum. Such a conference should be 
prepared with the utmost care. We should 
examine every idea which might advance 
our common interest, be it old or new. 
Careful preparation need not be the enemy, 
however, of imaginative action and new 

It will take time, faith, and stubborn ef- 

' For remarks made by President Johnson on Nov. 
26, 1963, see ibid., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912. 
• See p. 738. 

MAY 9, 1966 



fort to achieve together the goals that we 
set ourselves in the Charter of Punta del 
Este 5 years ago,^ but this we must do. 
This we will do. There is no other way, in 
our time and in this hemisphere, to show 
what free men and what free nations can 
do working together. 

So let all the world know that we know 
our challenge. I saw it, riding through the 
streets of your beautiful city with your 
great President last evening. I saw it in 
the hopeful face of young Mexico, in the 
hundreds of thousands of little children who 
are the future of this great land. I saw 
young people, with minds to be educated, 
with bodies to be protected from disease. 
I saw young boys and girls who one day 
will be able to find a job and who will raise 
their families in peace. And some will lead 
this great nation tomorrow. 

This is the challenge that faces the people 
of America and faces the people of Latin 
America. This is the challenge that we will, 
shoulder to shoulder, accept. 

Once again I want to say how very proud 
and very happy I am to be here with you 
today, Sefior Presidente — you, my good and 
warm friend — and to be among your gra- 
cious people of Mexico. Very shortly I will 
return to the other side of the river, but I 
will leave, to enjoy the hospitality of your 
great people, Mrs. Johnson and my Secretary 
of State and the distinguished delegation 
from the Congress. 

Before I leave, I should like to say this: 
May we all always seek justice and peace 
together. Come what may, may we always be 
good neighbors. And may we always be good 


White House press release dated April 16 ; as-delivered text 

Secretary and Mrs. Rusk, Ambassador and 
Mrs. [Fulton] Freeman, my friends, ladies 
and gentlemen : I drove down the street with 
great pride as my eyes looked upon this 
beautiful building put here by the talented 

• For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463. 

hands of architects from my State. As I 
walked into this building, I looked back over 
my memories in government and thought 
that never in my 35 years in public service 
in Washington had our country been more 
fortunate in its selection of a Secretary of 
State than it is now with Dean Rusk. 

He is guiding our relations with other 
nations with a skill and an understanding 
and a compassion that is unequaled, in my 
judgment, in my lifetime. He has built 
around him 100 or more of the ablest am- 
bassadors that any administration has ever 
assembled to serve the interests of our na- 
tion. It gives me great pride to pay just 
tribute to the work being done by Ambassa- 
dor and Mrs. Freeman here in Mexico. 

But what really gives me the greatest 
pride and the greatest pleasure is to come 
here and look into the smiling faces that 
stand around me in this beautiful building 
and see the folks that take care of the daily 
chores and that reflect such great credit to 
the country they serve. No nation ever had 
more competent or more loyal or more dedi- 
cated public employees than the United 
States of America, and no department evei 
had more of those kinds of employees than 
the Department of State. 

I want to say to each of you at your desk 
and the tasks that engage you that youi 
President is proud of the work you do, is 
grateful to you for the loyalty that you giv€ 
and the sacrifices that you make, and thf 
credit that you reflect upon your country. 

I observed the other day a statement mj 
father made to me, when I was a little boj 
and he was talking about public service. He 
said, "To understand people, you must know 
them and to properly speak for them and 
represent them, you must love them." Foi 
that reason he always leaned over backward 
to be democratic. There was no little f armei 
from the humblest village in the land thai 
he didn't want to know, because he got mort 
from the farmer than he gave. 

I think that each of you who carry or 
with your work, serving our national inter- 
est each day, could profit by remembering 



that statement: To know the people of 
Mexico, you must understand them and to 
represent them and carry out our program 
and our purpose with them, you must love 

I have been coming across this border all 
my life. I have been working with the people 
of Mexico ever since I was a child. My first 
playmate was a little Mexican boy. We 
raced our horses together, when we were 
both just learning to ride. I remember he 
told me he didn't want to run a race with 
me, because his horse wasn't as fat as mine 
and therefore couldn't run as fast. 

I said, "I will solve that problem. We will 
make him as fat." So we got a bucket and 
got in the oat bin and fed him all afternoon. 
Then we filled him full of water and then 
we took him out and ran the race. Then 
the horse died. 

All my life the Mexican people have been 
my friends and my plajrmates, my closest 
associates and my most trusted allies, and 
my most loyal supporters. They have been 
intimidated, criticized, browbeaten, some- 
times they have been hauled into court for 
voting for me, but they have always been 

I brought my bride to Mexico City on our 
honeymoon. I have come back here at every 
opportunity. So we are very thankful we 
were given the chance to come here again 
and show the people of this nation the great 
respect and friendship we have for them 
and to say to those of you who serve my 
administration and your country so well 
that I am mighty grateful and proud of you. 


White House press release (Mexico, D.F.) dated April 16 

President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and Presi- 
dent Lyndon B. Johnson were greatly 
pleased that the occasion of the unveiling of 
a statue of Abraham Lincoln provided an 
opportunity to renew their cordial personal 
relationship and to resume their informal 
conversations begun during their meeting in 
November 1964. 

The two Chiefs of State, conscious of the 
significance of the principles for which 
Benito Juarez and Abraham Lincoln both 
fought, have reiterated in their respective 
nations their adherence to freedom, human 
dignity, and a mutual respect among peoples. 
These principles are the basis of democratic 
life. The Presidents expressed their convic- 
tion that these also constitute the foundation 
of the firm friendship between Mexico and 
the United States. The two Presidents rec- 
ognized with pleasure the high level of un- 
derstanding reached in the relations between 
their two countries in recent years. 

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed to Pres- 
ident Johnson the principles of the foreign 
policy of Mexico, in relation with the other 
American Republics, which, in addition to 
the fundamental principles of self-determi- 
nation, non-intervention, and peaceful solu- 
tion of controversies, include the need for 
maintaining constantly open the doors to 
dialogue. President Johnson reviewed with 
President Diaz Ordaz a number of problems 
of world-wide importance, and reaffirmed 
the commitment of the United States to the 
same fundamental principles, as well as its 
commitment to a continuing search for peace 
throughout the world. 

The two Heads of State reiterated the 
general opinion expressed in previous meet- 
ings of the Presidents of Mexico and the 
United States that it is in the interest of 
both countries to seek to maintain the access 
which each has to the markets of the other 
and to broaden these wherever possible. The 
Joint Trade Committee established in 1965 
was discussed by both Presidents as a major 
step forward in expanding the already large 
area of mutual interests which exist between 
the two countries in matters of commercial 

Specific problems involving border trade 
between the two countries were mentioned 
by President Diaz Ordaz. The two Presi- 
dents agreed that their two Governments 

• For text of a joint communique released at the 
close of the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Mexican 
Trade Committee, see ibid., Nov. 8, 1965, p. 738. 


MAY 9, 1966 


should study these problems with the aim of 
determining what measures could be taken 
to expand legitimate border trade in goods 
produced in both countries to the benefit of 
the border region. 

The two Presidents discussed their deep 
concern regarding the international market 
for cotton, which is the leading Mexican ex- 
port product and is also of great interest to 
the United States and to other Western 
hemisphere countries. The Presidents agreed 
that their two Governments should consult 
with each other and with other interested 
governments on the problems of production 
and marketing of cotton. Regarding the 
International Cotton Institute, created for 
the purpose of promoting the increase in 
cotton consumption, both Heads of State ex- 
pressed their determination to continue the 
support of their Governments for the 
greater success of its mission. 

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed his in- 
tention to continue the policy of promoting 
the economic development of Mexico at a 
rate substantially greater than the popula- 
tion increase, within a framework of mone- 
tary stability, which is so important in 
protecting the real income of the majority 
of the people. The two Presidents noted 
with satisfaction the increasing rate of eco- 
nomic and social progress in the hemisphere 
as a whole during the past two years and 
expressed their determination to continue 
their mutual cooperation to achieve the ob- 
jectives of the Act of Bogota of 1960, the 
Charter of Punta del Este of 1961, and the 
Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro 
of 1965.^ 

The two Presidents were in agreement 
that the Supervised Agricultural Credit Pro- 
gram under the Alliance for Progress has 
proved an excellent example of the coopera- 
tion between the public and private banking 
institutions of both countries in carrying 
out the objectives of the Act of Bogota and 
the Charter of Punta del Este, as already 
mentioned, contributing effectively to the 

' For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, 
p. 985. 


expansion of agricultural productivity and 
the modernization of rural life. 

The two Presidents expressed their deter- 
mination to improve the relations between 
the frontier cities of both countries, and to 
elevate the life of those who live in the 
border region. They agreed to create a com- 
mission which would study the manner in 
which these objectives could be realized by 
cooperative action to raise the standard of 
living of the respective communities, from 
a social and cultural as well as a material 
point of view. 

The two Presidents expressed their deter- 
mination to create an Abraham Lincoln 
Fund in Mexico and a Benito Juarez Fund 
in the United States in order to grant 
scholarships to the youth of the hemisphere 
who might be selected by a Joint Commis- 
sion in order to continue their studies in 
institutions of higher learning of both coun- 

The two Presidents agreed on the need to 
support the efforts for Latin American eco- 
nomic integration. President Diaz Ordaz ex- 
pressed his satisfaction with the recent ini- 
tiative of President Johnson in suggesting 
the creation of a special fund for the financ- 
ing of pre-investment studies of multi-na- 
tional projects in support of regional inte- 
gration.® Both Presidents expressed their 
satisfaction that this work is moving for- 
ward under the leadership of the Inter- 
American Committee on the Alliance for 
Progress (CIAP) with the active participa- 
tion of the Inter-American Development 
Bank. They also noted with satisfaction the 
progress being made toward integration 
through the work of the Latin American 
Free Trade Association and the Central 
American Common Market. 

The two Presidents were pleased to note 
the progress achieved in the acquisition of 
lands, the transfer of residents and the con- 
struction of installations provided for in the 
convention for the solution of the Chamizal 
problem. They agreed to instruct the mem- 

' For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17, 
1965, see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426. 



bers of the International Boundary and 
Water Commission to intensify their efforts 
to bring about the change in the boundary 
as soon as possible. 

The two Presidents expressed their satis- 
faction at the manner in which the agree- 
ment reached on March 22, 1965, regarding 
the problem of the salinity of the waters of 
the Colorado River, is operating.* They were 
in agreement regarding the need for mutual 
consultation before proceeding to carrying 
out works which in the future might create 
problems of a nature similar to that men- 
tioned previously. 

The two Presidents agreed on the impor- 
tance for their countries of the study which, 
under the auspices of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, is being carried out 
to determine the technical and economic 
possibilities of installing, at some point in 
Mexico near the United States border, a 
plant to desalinate sea water through the 
use of nuclear energy. 

Finally, the two Presidents requested 
their respective Foreign Secretaries to con- 
tinue their discussion of matters of common 
interest. President Diaz Ordaz expressed to 
President Johnson the deep gratitude of the 
Mexican people to the American people for 

' For background and text of the agreement, see 
ibid., Apr. 12, 1965, p. 555. 

the gift of the statue of Abraham Lincoln 
and reaffirmed that he considered it a most 
friendly act that the Chief of State of the 
United States should have desired to come 
in person to associate himself with the 
homage rendered to the Great Emancipator. 
President Johnson expressed his apprecia- 
tion for the extraordinarily generous and 
friendly reception by the Mexican Govern- 
ment and people. 


The White House announced on April 13 
(White House press release (San Antonio, 
Tex.)) that the following official delegation 
would accompany President Johnson to Mex- 
ico City : 

The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk 

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs 
Thomas C. Mann 

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af- 
fairs Lincoln Gordon and Mrs. Gordon 

Senator and Mrs. Michael J. Mansfield 

Senator and Mrs. Everett McKinley Dirksen 

Senator George D. Aiken 

Senator and Mrs. Paul H. Douglas 

Senator and Mrs. Joseph M. Montoya 

Representative and Mrs. Prank Chelf 

Representative and Mrs. Eligio de la Garza 

Representative and Mrs. Henry B. Gonzalez 

Representative and Mrs. Glenard P. Lipscomb 

Representative Edward R. Roybal 

Mr. and Mrs. Felix de Weldon 

Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Strelsin 

MAY 9, 1966 


Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and Social Progress 

hy Thomas C. Mann 

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^ 

To participate in this meeting of the Pan 
American Society with so many who have 
contributed so much to hemisphere progress 
is a particular pleasure for me. 

It was only 20-25 years ago that the in- 
tellectual and political leaders of Latin 
America first turned their talents and ener- 
gies to the task of modernizing their eco- 
nomic and social systems. Less than 25 years 
ago one heard in Latin America a great deal 
of discussion and debate about the politics 
of democracy and peace, about cultural 
values, about literature and history. The 
need of achieving a high and sustained rate 
of economic growth and the need to redress 
the social imbalance created by the exist- 
ence of extremes of poverty and wealth 
were topics seldom mentioned. Words and 
phrases such as "gross national product," 
"per capita income," and "social justice," as 
we in this country use them today, were out- 
side the vocabulary of everyday use. On the 
contrary, many asserted then that we were 
giving too much attention to the material 
things of life, to the "dollar," to "plumb- 
ing," "gadgets," and "comfort," and too little 
attention to superior Greco-Roman spiritual 

The economic and social dimensions of in- 
ter-American cooperative programs were, 

'Address prepared for delivery before the Pan 
American Society of the United States at New York, 
N.Y., on Apr. 14 (press release 85) and read by 
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af- 
fairs Robert M. Sayre. Mr. Mann accompanied 
President Johnson on his visit to Mexico Apr. 14-15. 


then, in comparative terms, only gradually 
and recently conceived of. Many of the in- 
novations which have since been adopted 
were suggested by Latin Americans, as, for 
example, the social program suggested by 
the Government of Brazil in "Operation 
Pan America." 

Allow me to suggest some of the principal 
landmarks of recent inter-American eco- 
nomic and social achievement which began 
in a program of cultural and technical co- 
operation in 1939. 

19 A2 

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs 
was established and began the first technical 
cooperation program, principally in agricul- 
ture and health. 

19 U 

The Bretton Woods agreement was signed, 
bringing into being both the International 
Monetary Fund and the International Bank. 


The Point 4 Program was formally 
launched. It extended the technical assist- 
ance program to other developing areas of 
the world and greatly enlarged our technical 
assistance efforts in Latin America. 

1957 ' 

The Development Loan Fund was created. 
A few grants and concessional loans for 
economic development had been extended 
earlier, but this was the first large-scale, 
organized approach to the problem. 






The Coffee Study Group was formed. This 
later became the International Coffee Agree- 
ment, which our Senate ratified in 1963. 


The Inter-American Development Bank 
was created with both hard- and soft-loan 
windows. And, in 1960, the Bank undertook 
to administer the Social Progress Trust Fund. 


The general treaty of economic integra- 
tion of the five Central American Republics 
was signed, setting up the first common mar- 
ket in Latin America. And in the same year 
the Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration was created. 

The Latin American Free Trade Area was 
brought into being by the Montevideo treaty. 

The Act of Bogota enlarged and for- 
malized the program for economic develop- 
ment in the hemisphere and added a new 
social dimension. This act for the first time 
recognized the need for land tenure legisla- 
tion "with a view to insuring a wider and 
more equitable distribution of the ownership 
of land in a manner consistent with the ob- 
jectives of employment, productivity and 
economic growth." It called for reforms of 
"tax systems and procedures and fiscal poli- 
cies" ; assistance to the farmer by new or 
improved marketing organizations, extension 
services, demonstration, education, and 
credit facilities ; the creation of building and 
loan and other institutions to finance low- 
cost housing and community development 
programs; expanded education and public 
health programs; mobilization of domestic 
savings and reforms of national fiscal and 
financial policies; the preparation of 
national development plans; and an annual 
consultative meeting to review measures 
taken to intensify social and economic prog- 


The program outlined at Bogota was 
launched and given new spirit and purpose 
as "The Alliance for Progress." 


The CIAP [Inter-American Committee on 
the Alliance for Progress] was created and 
began functioning. 


The levels of United States contribution 
to the cooperation effort were increased, and 
the average annual per capita income in- 
creases reached the Punta del Este goal. 


Our Congress passed the legislation per- 
mitting this country effectively to partici- 
pate in the International Coffee Agreement. 

Our Congress passed the Sugar Act with 
provisions which restored to Latin America 
their full share of the value of sugar sold 
in this market. 

Creating the Conditions for Progress 

Thus, since the 1940's, considerable prog- 
ress has been made in getting on with an 
inter-American development program. And 
any objective stocktaking must recognize 
the vital role of the private sectors through- 
out the hemisphere and especially of pri- 
vate United States financial institutions 
which have made available on a large scale 
short- and medium-term credits and, in some 
cases, long-term credits, usually at interest 
rates considerably below the world level. 

If noteworthy progress has been made 
since the midforties — and it has — then it 
is fair to say that every American Republic 
is entitled to claim its share of the credit. 
Neither economic and social progress nor 
bold, fresh ideas can be claimed as the 
monopoly of any country or any single group 
within a country. In the United States, for 
example, innovations designed to enlarge the 
scope, improve the quality, and increase the 
dimensions of the contributions of our public 
and private sectors to hemisphere progress 
have always received broad bipartisan sup- 

A great deal remains to be done. We are 
only on the threshold, only in the beginning 
stages, of our great hemisphere cooperative 

MAY 9, 1966 



program to speed up the process of eco- 
nomic and social development. The unprec- 
edented growth in population poses formi- 
dable difficulties in terms of raising per cap- 
ita income at the rate which the charter of 
Punta del Este fixes as the goal. 

To the extent that our balance-of-pay- 
ments and budgetary situations permit, I 
would hope that our own rapid economic 
growth will make it possible for us in the 
reasonably near future to raise the level of 
our contribution from both our public and 
private sectors. There is too much at stake 
for those of us here at home to grow faint- 
hearted, weary, or discouraged. 

But our national efforts and those of other 
capital-exporting countries will not be 
enough. Foreign capital and international 
trade can, after all is said and done, only 
supply missing components in otherwise fa- 
vorable situations. Only the developing coun- 
try can create, within its own territory, 
those conditions which are propitious for 
rapid economic and social progress. 

These conditions will not be created by 
rhetoric alone. It is idle to speculate on which 
group or country feels more compassion to- 
ward our fellow human beings. Compassion 
there is, I am convinced, in abundance in 
the hearts of most men. 

The kind of "heart" we need in national 
and inter-American development programs 
is the heart to sweat through programs 
which can bring economic stability while in- 
creasing the production of goods for the 
consumer as well as the productivity of the 
worker. We need the "heart" to reform 
tax policies and improve tax collections so 
that governments may have the resources 
to provide the infrastructure necessary 
for rural and industrial development as well 
as adequate educational and health facili- 
ties, without which there can be no equality 
of opportunity. We need the "heart" to 
tackle all the difficult and, at times, un- 
popular tasks required to build and to mod- 
ernize social and economic systems in order 
to bring about, in the phrase of Lincoln, 
"the greatest good for the greatest number." 
We need the "heart" to work not for that 

kind of land distribution which leaves the 
farmer poorer than before but for the kind 
of rural modernization that will permit the 
farmer to raise the living standards of his 
family and provide his children with an op- 
portunity to live more useful and creative 

There are, of course, differences of opin- 
ion between individuals and between states 
about the policies which are best designed 
to produce the ends which we seek. I do 
not believe either we in this land or those in 
other lands have a monopoly on wisdom or 
good judgment. A policy that produces good 
results in our society may not work in 
another environment or culture. I personally 
welcome a world of diversity as opposed to 
one of monotonous uniformity which dulls 
the spirit. We must remind ourselves, too, 
that each nation not only has a right to 
choose its own policies and its own path to 
progress but that they know their societies 
much better than we do. 

Some Basic Guidelines 

With these caveats, I would like to refer 
to a few basic guidelines that the experi- 
ence of many countries in the last 100 years 
seems to me to suggest are some of the 
components of successful development 

First is the value of an adequate degree 
of competition. An economy which fosters 
and protects monopolies on a wide scale, 
whether they are state-owned or family- 
owned, is one which cannot produce high- 
quality goods at a low price for its people 
because monopolies have no incentive to be- 
come efficient. The result is that the real 
income of the people — their standard of liv- 
ing — is reduced. The result is that the 
worker loses his opportunity for noninfla- 
tionary, and hence real, wage increases 
based on improved productivity. Another 
result is that inefficient industries cannot 
compete on the world market and hence can- 
not earn foreign exchange in quantities 
necessary to finance their growing develop- 
ment needs. 

Second is the need for developing coun- 




tries to compete with each other. This can 
be done within the framework of regional 
markets, such as the Central American 
Common Market and the Latin American 
Free Trade Area. And there should be prep- 
aration for eventual competition with the 
outside world. Regional trading arrange- 
ments provide regional markets of a suffi- 
cient size to justify new, large, and efficient 
industries. But the effective creation of ade- 
quate regional markets depends on the degree 
of competition permitted within the region. 

Third is the need to avoid excessive and 
unnecessary centralized controls which in- 
troduce excessive administrative delays and 
impede the decisionmaking process in farms 
and factories and in service industries. Those 
economies in the world today which operate 
in relative freedom, which make it possible 
for the private sector to exercise its in- 
genuity and initiative, are, by and large, 
those which are experiencing dynamic 
growth and earning the most foreign ex- 
change. They are also doing the most to im- 
prove the living standards of their people. 
Conversely, those economies which are bur- 
dened down with excessive controls are 
those, by and large, which are progressing 
at the slowest rate and, in some cases, begin- 
ning to look seriously at the advantages of 

And, as a corollary to this, I would sug- 
gest that we examine carefully the ad- 
vantages of each country creating, in its 
own economy, an atmosphere which en- 
courages savings by the people and the in- 
vestment of those savings in tax-paying, 
job-creating, and foreign-exchange-earning 

All this does not by any means suggest a 
laissez-faire economy of the kind which 
existed in the 1800's is desirable. Indeed, 
incentives to the private sector should be 
accompanied by measures to prevent abuse 
and exploitation of man by man. The reason 
why we have restraints built into our laws 
is that we learned long ago, as an early 
American observed, that "men are not an- 

gels." But it is far easier for government 
to prevent abuses of power by capital or 
labor than it is to manage efficiently a com- 
plex modern economy. 

Nor do I suggest that governments should 
not use their fiscal and monetary authority 
to create conditions propitious for a high 
rate of employment and utilization of plant 
capacity, or that government ownership or 
management of a limited number of enter- 
prises truly affected with a public interest is 
necessarily bad. All modern government 
policies today must take into account their 
effect on the process of development. It is 
the degree of government intervention, 
rather than any doctrine, which is impor- 

Fourth, the production of food for grow- 
ing populations deserves a higher priority 
in comparison to industries which are pro- 
moted for nationalistic or "prestige" reasons. 
Not only should industrial and agricultural 
development be balanced; they are in fact 
indivisible. One cannot proceed without the 

Fifth, we need continually to reexamine 
the whole complex range of self-help meas- 
ures so essential to national and regional 
economic and social progress. Fiscal and 
monetary discipline, for example, is not al- 
ways easy to achieve or to maintain. Like 
all countries, we have our own problems. 
But we have learned by trial and error that 
it is an essential part of any viable pro- 
gram of sustained progress, either social or 

I am sure that many of you here have 
your own ideas about what we of the "inter- 
American family" could usefully do to speed 
up the rate of progress. I am sure that there 
is considerable room for improvement on 
those ideas which I have discussed tonight. 
I would hope that all Americans from the 
Strait of Magellan to the Arctic Circle will 
continue to think and talk about these and 
other issues which really matter. If we can 
learn to do so in a friendly, tolerant fashion, 
perhaps all of us can benefit. 

MAY 9, 1966 



Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective Action 

Statement hy Lincoln Gordon 

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^ 

It is a privilege to represent my Govern- 
ment at this fourth annual meeting of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Coun- 
cil at the ministerial level. The great city 
of Buenos Aires is an especially appropriate 
setting for this meeting. We are all deeply 
indebted to President [Arturo Umberto] 
Illia, Minister [Juan Carlos] Pugliese, and 
the other Argentine authorities for their 
hospitality and for the remarkably fine en- 
vironment vi^hich they have provided for 
our work. 

We are here to review the status of the 
Alliance for Progress after almost 5 years, 
to evaluate objectively its strengths and its 
weaknesses. Above all, we are here to iden- 
tify the fields of action in which a new 
collective impulse is required and the ways 
and means to provide that impulse. 

If you will permit a personal reference, 
Mr. President, I should like to say that I 
find it an especially welcome task to partici- 
pate in this work with my colleagues and 
friends of Latin America. The seeds of the 
Alliance for Progress were planted during 
the last decade by scholars and leaders of 
public opinion from all parts of this hemi- 
sphere. They saw the need for a new co- 
operative effort, comparable in spirit to the 
Marshall Plan for European recovery al- 
though obviously different in content, meth- 
ods, and timing, since it was addressed to a 

' Made before the fourth annual meeting of the 
Inter-American Economic and Social Council at 
Buenos Aires, Argentina, on Mar. 29 (press release 
72 dated Mar. 31). 

wholly different kind of problem. This con- 
cept was endorsed by many North Ameri- 
cans concerned with inter-American rela- 
tions, including several of us who later 
became advisers to President Kennedy. 
These facts, by the way, should correct an 
often-heard error that the Alliance for 
Progress was merely a response to events in 
Cuba in 1959 and 1960. 

With the creation of the Inter-American 
Development Bank and the adoption of the 
Act of Bogota, circumstances were ripe in 
1961 for the launching of a comprehensive 
and imaginative program. Even before he 
took office, President Kennedy decided to 
make United States participation in an Al- 
liance for Progress in this hemisphere a 
cardinal element of his foreign policy. He 
won prompt enthusiasm and support from 
our own Congress, both of our political par- 
ties, and our public opinion, and a warm 
response from governments and peoples 
throughout the continent. 

It was not enough, however, to have good 
will and a valid philosophy of cooperation. 
It was necessary to work together with the 
governments of our sister nations in refin- 
ing objectives and in defining the national 
and international actions and mechanisms 
to set in motion the mobilization of re- 
sources, the institutional changes, and the 
structural reforms which would make the 
Alliance for Progress a going concern, 
bringing real and continuing benefits to our 
respective peoples. That step was well ac- 
complished at Punta del Este. 



7 ' 

During 41/2 years as United States Am- 
bassador to Brazil, my own central concern 
was the development of the Alliance for 
Progress in that great neighboring nation. 
At the halfway point of my assignment 
there, when Vice President Johnson suc- 
ceeded to our Presidency at a tragic mo- 
ment of history, I wondered, like many 
others, what the effect would be on United 
States policy toward the Alliance for Prog- 
ress. The answer was prompt in coming. 
As his first act in the field of foreign 
affairs, President Johnson invited the Latin 
American Ambassadors in Washington to 
meet with him and to learn of his un- 
equivocal resolve to carry forward our part 
of this collaborative effort — to help give it 
ever greater substance and vigor.^ 

As the United States report * to the meet- 
ing makes clear, this continuing resolve has 
been demonstrated not merely by words but 
by concrete actions year after year. The 
program continues to enjoy the support of 
our Congress, our two political parties, and 
our public opinion. Since my recent return 
to Washington as Assistant Secretary for 
Inter-American Affairs and United States 
Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress, 
President Johnson has again made clear — 
in private and public — that the Alliance 
continues to be the cornerstone of United 
States policy in the Western Hemisphere. 
His deep concern is that it should produce 
real and measurable results, that it should 
truly accelerate economic growth, greater 
social justice, and stronger democratic insti- 
tutions, and that none of us should falter in 
our sense of urgency to secure these results. 

On the plane of basic principles which 
govern our mutual collaboration in the eco- 
nomic and social fields, the Charter of Punta 
del Este was not only reaffirmed but in 
important respects broadened by the Eco- 
nomic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro, 
unanimously adopted by the Second Ex- 
traordinary Inter-American Conference last 
November.* It was also agreed there that 
the central concepts of a permanent char- 
acter should be incorporated into the basic 
charter of our organization. A special com- 

mission was established in Panama to pro- 
pose to our governments specific language 
for this new and forward-looking charter. 
Their work will now be carried forward by 
the Council and will be concluded at the 
Third Extraordinary Inter-American Con- 
ference, to take place in this city 4 months 
hence. I am certain that it will be a success- 
ful and fruitful conclusion. 

Given the necessary period for ratifica- 
tion by our various congresses, it will doubt- 
less be some time before the new charter is 
juridically in force. My own Government, 
however, considers the principles agreed to 
at Rio de Janeiro to be already operative as 
a statement of governmental policy, adopted 
by the highest organ of the inter-American 
system. Temporary differences of opinion 
as to precisely what words should be incor- 
porated into treaty obligations, consonant 
with our respective constitutional proce- 
dures and requirements, should not be mis- 
construed as differences of principle or 
policy. The United States stands by the 
principles of Punta del Este and Rio de 
Janeiro. It is our task here, as a Council 
subordinate to the conference, to work 
within those principles in developing con- 
crete programs of action for carrying for- 
ward our common enterprise. 

Balance Sheet of First S Years 

The balance sheet of these first 5 years, 
Mr. President, has been well prepared for 
us in the country reports and in the docu- 
ments of CIAP [Inter-American Committee 
on the Alliance for Progress], the secre- 
tariat, and the various international bodies 
who cooperate in the work of the Alliance, 
all masterfully summarized by our meeting 

MAY 9, 1966 

' For remarks by President Johnson on Nov. 26, 
1963, see Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1964, p. 912. 

' Report to the Inter-American Economic and 
Social Council Presented by the Government of the 
United States of America, 1966; single copies are 
available upon request from the Office of Media 
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C., 

' For background and text, see Bulletin of Dec. 
20, 1965, p. 985. 


of experts. In fact, much has been done. 
The overall indexes of growth, especially 
during the past 2 years, are promising, 
despite the unevenness which is inevitable 
in a continent as varied as ours. 

There has been a strong surge forward 
in infrastructure, notably electric power 
and transportation. Industrial expansion 
and diversification are proceeding, although 
more slowly than we would like. Social in- 
vestment still lags badly, but there has been 
notable progress in the availability of pure 
water — the first step toward improved pub- 
lic health — in the eradiction of malaria, in 
the building of primary schools, and in some 
countries in low-cost housing. Additionally, 
a whole series of new intermediate credit 
institutions has been established to provide 
reasonably priced credit in the fields of 
industry, housing, and agriculture. 

Among the sectors of least progress are 
agricultural modernization, export diversifi- 
cation, and education beyond the primary 

We have no reason to be complacent. But 
as we listen to reports from country after 
country, we can say with assurance that we 
have reached what Winston Churchill called 
the end of the beginning. And far from 
being moribund, as some journalists would 
like to pretend, the Alliance for Progress 
has never been more alive. 

It is true, as Minister Roberto Campos 
said yesterday, that the Alliance has not 
taken on the aspect of a continental charis- 
matic crusade. All of us know, however, 
that there has been a profound change of 
attitudes in these 5 years. There is a con- 
centration of governmental effort and of 
popular interest in economic and social 
progress. There is an enormous advance in 
realistic understanding of the obstacles to 
development and of the basic lines of public 
policy and institutional modernization re- 
quired to overcome them. The concept of 
more realistic planning has taken a firm 
foothold. There have been notable successes 
in coming to grips with excessive inflation. 
Tax reform is no longer simply a slogan in 
much of the hemisphere. Agrarian reform 

is no longer a demagogic banner but part of 
a growing effort to secure simultaneous 
higher agricultural output, improved pro- 
ductivity, greater social justice in land 
tenure and systems of tenancy, and greater 
integration between agriculture and indus- 
try. The movement for regional economic 
integration, in its infancy 5 years ago, has 
made important strides. 

The Alliance is benefiting from an effec- 
tive mobilization of the resources of the 
Inter-American Development Bank, the 
World Bank group, and the International 
Monetary Fund. Steady progress is being 
made by the CIAP in giving our mutual 
cooperation a truly multilateral character 
and providing it with continuity and con- 
sistency. The establishment of priorities 
and the preparation of projects for public 
investment is an increasingly understood 
art. Realistic incentives and institutional 
improvements for strengthening the private 
sector have been introduced in many coun- 
tries. And perhaps of greatest importance, 
there has been universal acceptance in the 
hemisphere of the principle of mutual as- 
sistance among all the member countries. 

These developments form part of the 
"self-help" recognized as indispensable at 
Punta del Este, not as a condition imposed 
to secure external assistance but as the basis 
for any meaningful development effort and 
the foundation for useful international co- 
operation. It is these changes of attitude 
which indeed justify Secretary General 
Mora's [Jose Mora, Organization of Amer- 
ican States] suggestion that we are now an 
alliance not only for progress but an alliance 
in progress. 

A Program of Action 

How, then, Mr. President, do we move 
forward from here? I would hope that out 
of this annual meeting of economic ministers 
would come a clear-cut program of action, 
framed in practical terms against which 
progress can be measured when we meet 
again next year. 

Let me suggest some items which might 
figure in such an action program, beginning 





with measures of critical importance in the 
national programs of the Latin American 
member countries. 

First, surely there should be an intensive 
study in each nation, beginning now, of 
manpower needs as the basis for the plan- 
ning and financing of national education 
programs. Education is not a social welfare 
luxury to be assigned marginal resources 
left over from more important objectives. 
Properly conceived and administered, it is 
a highly productive investment in human 
capital and a vital ingredient of develop- 
ment. It is indispensable to social mobility 
and a cardinal prerequisite of effective 
political democracy. Year after year has 
gone by without the development of work- 
able plans for educational modernization 
and expansion. The external financial insti- 
tutions, national and international, have for 
some years indicated their readiness to as- 
sist in such programs if sound projects were 
submitted to them. Is it too much to ask 
the governments of Latin America to have 
ready by the time of the CIES [Inter- 
American Economic and Social Council] 
meeting their plans for educational develop- 

Secondly, there is the sector of agricul- 
tural production and agrarian reform, al- 
ready commented on by Dr. Santa Cruz 
[Hernan Santa Cruz, Assistant Director- 
General for Latin American Affairs, Food 
and Agriculture Organization] and many 
other delegates to this conference. Here 
again, it would seem appropriate to recom- 
mend that each member state report in de- 
tail at the next meeting of CIES on the 
steps that have been taken during the com- 
ing year to modernize the production of 
foodstuffs and the systems of land tenure 
and tenancy. This would include actions to 
increase productivity through the produc- 
tion and use of fertilizer and pesticides, to 
provide better credit and technical assistance 
to the farmer, and to improve marketing 
and distribution methods, as well as an 
evaluation of other government measures 
such as exchange and price policies. 

Third, in the field of health, which clearly 

affects development and also strikes at our 
conscience, most national programs have 
been seriously inadequate in determining 
priorities and assigning resources. Malnu- 
trition, prevention of endemic diseases, 
training of specialized personnel, and estab- 
lishment of minimal health services in re- 
mote areas are all key elements of this 
sector, as is the burden on development in 
some areas posed by very rapid demographic 
growth. We should be able to hope for 
specific national programs in the health 
field, which might become the basis for 
significant international support. 

Fourth, tax reform, both structural and 
administrative, has made great headway in 
the last 5 years, but there is still much to 
be done. In many countries the structure of 
consumer taxes still provides artificial en- 
couragement of vertical integration of in- 
dustries through their application at several 
levels of production and distribution. Also, 
there is little use of well-known procedures 
for accelerating tax collection, such as pay- 
as-you-go systems and withholding taxes at 
the source. Such measures assist in combat- 
ing inflation as well as in mobilizing gov- 
ernmental revenues. In its country reviews 
CIAP should give special attention to fur- 
ther improvements in tax systems. 

Fifth, the report of our experts meeting 
amply demonstrates the need for closer ties 
between the planning offices of the various 
governments and the key political and ad- 
ministrative authorities responsible for 
budgetmaking, fiscal control, and public 
investment. Prompt steps would appear ad- 
visable to accomplish this end. 

U.S. Trade Policy 

Turning now to areas of policy which fall 
in the external sector and which more di- 
rectly involve multilateral cooperation, let 
me first refer to foreign trade. The docu- 
ments and speeches presented at this meet- 
ing leave no doubt as to the vital interest 
of Latin America in wider trading opportuni- 
ties and increased earnings from exports. 
Much has been said about restrictions in the 
United States market on certain commodi- 

MAY 9, 1966 


ties of major export interest to Latin Amer- 
ica. These presentations will be given most 
sympathetic consideration by my Govern- 

For over 30 years, United States foreign 
economic policy has been pointed toward 
greater liberalization of trade and more 
efficient worldwide arrangements for com- 
mercial and financial transactions. That ef- 
fort has been accelerated in the postwar 
years, with very substantial results. It is 
continuing in the current negotiations on 
the Kennedy Round and the discussions of 
international financial liquidity. We be- 
lieve that the success of these efforts will 
redound to the benefit of Latin America as 
well as other regions. 

Where considerations of national security 
or structural problems within our own econ- 
omy have led to the imposition of import 
restrictions, we have endeavored to avoid 
unduly adverse effects on Latin American 
suppliers. In the case of meat, for example, 
standby import restrictions were set sub- 
stantially above the level of recent imports 
to insure that foreign suppliers will be able 
to share in market growth. Our sugar legis- 
lation has greatly enlarged the quotas for 
Latin American sales at a premium price 
nearly three times the world level. Current 
cotton policy includes a strong disincentive 
for domestic production so that we expect 
the United States cotton area to fall this 
year by 1.3 million acres. We have recently 
removed import charges on lead and zinc. 
Only a few days ago our Secretary of the 
Interior announced the termination of im- 
port controls on residual petroleum fuels for 
the eastern district of the United States. 

In the administration of our Public Law 
480, which has been of substantial benefit 
to several Latin American development pro- 
grams, we have scrupulously sought to re- 
spect the market positions of normal sup- 
pliers, including provision for their partici- 
pation in market growth. 

Moreover, we are actively engaged in co- 
operative efforts to help stabilize and im- 
prove Latin American export earnings for 
several of the major traditional commodi- 

ties. In this field we strongly endorse the 
recommendations of the experts for reduced 
trade barriers and elimination of trade dis- 
crimination, reduced obstacles to increased 
consumption, scrupulous observance of the 
standstill principle, strengthening of exist- 
ing commodity agreements, and the encour- 
agement of new agreements or other appro- 
priate arrangements for other primary com- 
modities, and an improvement of the 
financial mechanisms presently available to 
compensate for undue price fluctuations be- 
yond the control of the exporting countries. 
Even more important for the future is the 
potential for Latin America's nontraditional 
exports. In the long run, the only satisfac- 
tory basis for an adequate capacity to im- 
port is expanded and diversified exports of 
products in growing world demand, whether 
primary, semiprocessed, or manufactured. 
Although still small in volume, the recent 
record of Latin America in nontraditional 
exports is a dynamic one. This momentum 
must not be lost. Here, again, we have 
before us action recommendations from the 
experts, including financing facilities for 
such exports, stronger national institutions 
to stimulate exports, establishment of an 
Inter-American Export Promotion Agency, 
and exploration of an international export 
credit insurance system. We will cooperate 
with action along these lines. 

In this field, trade and aid should be 
recognized as complementary rather than 
conflicting. Both public international cred- 
its and foreign private investment can play 
a large role in capitalizing new export in- 
dustries and providing techniques for pro- 
duction at competitive cost levels. 

Regarding the international monetary sys- 
tem, I wish to reaffirm the position set 
forth by our Secretary of the Treasury at 
the last meeting of the International Mone- 
tary Fund.5 This is that all nations, devel- 
oped and developing alike, have a vital in- 
terest in the nature and scope of any 
changes which may be made in this system. 

<■ Ibid., Oct. 18, 1965, p. 619. 



The views of all the countries of the free 
world, decidedly including those of Latin 
America, must be heard and considered in 
the process of international monetary im- 

Intimately related to this problem is the 
successful outcome of the current efforts of 
my Government to achieve equilibrium in 
the United States balance of payments. 
Almost all the ministers here have struggled 
with severe balance-of-payments problems 
in their own countries, and I know they will 
appreciate the special constraints which the 
present situation imposes upon us. 

One aspect of these constraints has re- 
ceived special attention at these meetings — 
the problem of tied aid. In principle, we 
accept the ideal that the assistance from all 
capital-supplying nations should be usable 
under the most advantageous possible con- 
ditions. This policy was followed by the 
United States for many years, despite our 
inability to persuade other capital-export- 
ing nations to do likewise even when they 
enjoyed balance-of-payments surpluses. But 
now, under our present balance-of-payments 
conditions, the United States has no option 
but to insure that our foreign assistance 
involves a transfer of real resources, and not 
merely financial resources, from the United 

It should also be recalled that in securing 
the voluntary cooperation of industrial con- 
cerns and financial institutions in the effort 
to correct our balance-of-payments deficit, 
special care has been taken to avoid limita- 
tions on direct investment or financial 
credits to Latin America. 

Happily, considerable progress has been 
made toward the objective of balance-of- 
payments equilibrium. We have not yet 
reached the stage, however, where any re- 
laxation of our efforts is possible. The 
struggle for freedom in Viet-Nam has to 
some extent magnified the difficulties. 
Achievement of payments equilibrium, how- 
ever, will be of benefit not only to the 
United States and its dollar but also to the 
rest of this hemisphere and to the entire 
free world. 

Program Assistance and Project Loans 

We have also noted, Mr. President, the 
concern expressed by the experts and by 
several of the delegates regarding the forms 
of external assistance, notably the relative 
merits of so-called program assistance in re- 
lation to project loans. In fact, both types 
of assistance are and have been fruitful 
means of supporting national development 
efforts. The program loan has been of 
special value in supporting integrated pro- 
grams of stabilization, development, and re- 
form, accompanied by far-reaching commit- 
ments of economic performance presented 
to and reviewed by CIAP. The counterpart 
in local currency of such loans has also been 
of great value in financing intermediate 
credit institutions and other high-priority 
investments in line with the objectives of 
the Alliance for Progress. 

Obviously, neither these local currencies 
nor local currency made available through 
project loans should be mere substitutes for 
the mobilization of local resources. They 
should be provided only when the overall 
mobilization and application of local re- 
sources meets the standards of the Alliance. 
It is equally essential that such loans be 
matched by real imports and not merely add 
excessively to foreign exchange reserves, 
since their purpose is a transfer of real 
resources for additional investment. 

Nor does the use of program loans avoid 
the necessity for project development, 
whether in the public or the private sector. 
This is an inescapable requirement of the 
development process, and it is one on which 
progress has been seriously inadequate. As 
President [George] Woods of the World 
Bank has repeatedly pointed out, redoubled 
efforts must be devoted to project formula- 
tion, whatever the form of external assist- 
ance that may be made available. 

One signal disappointment in our progress 
thus far, compared with the targets of 
Punta del Este, is the small volume of new 
private foreign investment participating in 
expanded Latin American development. The 
hindrances posed by political instability and 
by unrestrained inflation are well known. 

MAY 9, 1966 


Fortunately, recent trends appear favorable, 
but we should lose no opportunity to re- 
inforce them. 

In this connection one useful device might 
be the multilateralization of investment 
guarantees through a joint agreement pro- 
viding uniform procedures whereby individ- 
ual governments guarantee the investments 
of their nationals in other participating na- 
tions. Such an agreement could make a valu- 
able contribution toward the establishment 
of uniform standards in the relationships 
between host countries and those issuing 
guarantees to their investors. Several of the 
Latin American countries are now beginning 
to develop a flow of private investment into 
other countries of the hemisphere, a gratify- 
ing development eminently consistent with 
the spirit of the Act of Rio. 

I have asked to be circulated for the in- 
formation of the delegates a possible form 
of multilateral investment guarantee agree- 
ment to illustrate the sort of instrument I 
have in mind. I would suggest that CIAP be 
requested to consult with member govern- 
ments to determine the extent of interest 
on their part, and if there is significant 
interest, to convoke a conference for the 
negotiation of an agreement. Any such 
agreement would, of course, be kept open 
for the eventual accession of other govern- 
ments. In any such conference, it would be 
well to request representation from the 
World Bank, which is also giving intensive 
consideration to this topic. 

Financing Multinational Projects 

I mentioned earlier the heartening prog- 
ress in the movement for Latin American 
economic integration, both through the Cen- 
tral American Common Market and through 
the Latin American Free Trade Area. How 
to press forward with this vital process, and 
how best to relate these two institutions, is 
of course primarily a matter for the govern- 
ments directly involved. My Government 
heartily supports this movement and is dis- 
posed to cooperate with it. 

One especially promising area for outside 

support is in the study and eventual partici- 
pation in the financing of multinational 
projects. I need not repeat the declarations 
on this topic made by Secretary General 
Mora, CIAP Chairman [Carlos] Sanz de 
Santamaria, and Inter-American Bank Presi- 
dent Felipe Herrera. Dr. Herrera has indi- 
cated his intention to propose that the Inter- 
American Development Bank establish a fund 
for feasibility studies of multinational proj- 
ects. We will support this proposal. Moreover, 
we are prepared to reinforce the Bank's re- 
sources by providing supplementary loans 
for large-scale feasibility studies when pre- 
liminary investigation under the Bank's 
auspices indicates their desirability. The 
longrun contribution of such projects to the 
region's development can scarcely be over- 
estimated. The interior of South America 
contains the largest area on the face of the 
globe which is readily habitable by man but 
still largely unoccupied and undeveloped. 
Both here and in Central America there are 
prodigious opportunities awaiting system- 
atic study and joint action. 

Other speakers have mentioned the main 
fields: river basin development for electric 
power, irrigation, and flood control; main 
connecting highways and access roads; and 
networks of telecommunications. Others 
may come to the surface, such as natural gas 
pipelines or international complexes for fer- 
tilizer production and distribution. What is 
essential is that action be started now to 
appraise these opportunities realistically so 
that their planning and programing can be 
given proper priority in regional develop- 
ment alongside purely national projects. We 
also suggest for your consideration that, 
even now, it would be appropriate for the 
suppliers of external resources to the Alli- 
ance to plan that a regular proportion of 
their funds be made available to finance 
multinational projects. 

In this connection, also, new steps must 
be taken to improve the capacity for re- 
search and technological development for 
the special conditions of Latin America. The 
beginnings have already been made in small 
but high-quality research centers staffed by 



specialists of great talent. Surely interna- 
tional cooperation could greatly fortify these 
efforts. As two examples which readily 
come to mind, there are the field of tropical 
agriculture and the combating of endemic 
diseases which plague large areas of the 
continent. The great private foundations of 
the United States have done pioneering 
work in some of these fields, and my Gov- 
ernment is prepared to join in cooperation 
with Latin American public and private 
agencies to these ends. 

An additional virtue of such a develop- 
ment would be the attraction of gifted young 
people into scientific and technological spe- 
cialties and their retention in the service of 
Latin America, instead of their loss to more 
advanced countries, which all too often now 
occurs. Only in this way can Latin America 
come to play its full part in the mainstream 
of modern technological development, which 
is transforming the world around us from 
decade to decade. 

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to 
endorse the suggestion made yesterday by 
the delegate of Brazil concerning our own 
future method of work. It is entirely ap- 
propriate that at this 5-year mark we should 
have undertaken a comprehensive review of 
where we stand and how we should move 
forward. Our mechanisms should certainly 
continue to provide for an annual review of 
progress and problems, country by country, 
and for the region as a whole. 

At the ministerial level in future years, 
however, I believe that we should concen- 
trate our discussions on a more limited 
number of topics which could be examined 
in depth. They might include, first, a review 
of the progress made in accordance with our 
own specific program of action and then a 
thorough examination of a few issues of 
highest urgency. To this end, it might be 
well for the CIAP at a time 2 or 3 months 
in advance of the next annual meeting to 
recommend such fields for examination so 
that the proper documentation could be pre- 
pared and studied by all of us with a view 
toward thorough analysis and appropriate 
decision for action on our part. 

Spirit of the Alliance for Progress 

Mr. President, as economic ministers we 
are concerned in our daily tasks with the 
dry materials of economic policymaking — 
with budget and credit and balance-of-pay- 
ments statistics, with production and trade 
and wages and prices, with laws and decrees 
and the texts of international agreements. 
We should never forget, however, that what 
is at stake is the lives and welfare of human 
beings — their opportunities, their liberties, 
and their dignity. Even in these early years 
of the Alliance, some of us have had the 
privilege of seeing electricity and access 
roads brought to hitherto isolated communi- 
ties; of seeing healthy children where pol- 
luted water supplies had previously brought 
early death to one newborn infant out of 
two; of seeing the pride of parents and the 
hopes of children attending schools where 
for centuries the fate of each new genera- 
tion was merely to plod through life in the 
weary patterns of its forebears. Our task, 
however, is not to help change these condi- 
tions for the people; it is to change these 
conditions with the people. It is their par- 
ticipation, their full integration into the 
active life of modern society, which gives 
the Alliance for Progress its moral basis. 
This is what has enlisted the enthusiasm of 
our own Peace Corps and is increasingly 
enlisting the enthusiasm of national youth 
corps in many other member countries. 

This is also the spirit that infuses the 
concept which President Johnson has called 
the Great Society. The goals of that society 
are material in part — to cope with problems 
of urban congestion, river pollution, medical 
care for the aged, and the continuous up- 
grading of working skills. But their essen- 
tial purpose is more than material. It is to 
eliminate the last vestiges of discrimination 
and inequality of opportunity which have 
become intolerable to the national con- 
science of a free and democratic society. 
We in the United States, therefore, are also 
a nation in continuing development, guided 
by the same spirit as the Alliance for 

Nor can we lose sight of the fact that 

MAY 9, 1966 


the end of our efforts is not only economic 
and social progress. It is in equal measure 
respect for human rights and the constantly 
improved functioning of representative 
democracy. We see the objectives of devel- 
opment and democracy as indivisible. With- 
out advance in the material condition of our 
peoples, democracy cannot survive. But free- 
dom of expression, initiative in experimen- 
tation, and the capacity for responsible self- 
government are also stimuli to economic 
development as well as most precious ends 
in themselves. 

We also believe that nations developing in 
this spirit will inevitably strengthen their 
bonds of solidarity and mutual cooperation 
in a nexus of ever-growing interdependence. 
In the wider context beyond this hemisphere, 
we foresee the role of a free and increas- 
ingly prosperous Latin America as a vital 
force in the cause of peace and freedom and 
human dignity throughout the world. 

Pan American Day 

and Pan American Week, 1966 


On the fourteenth of April, seventy-six years ago, 
the nations of the Western Hemisphere formally 
pledged themselves to the joint pursuit of peace 
and justice for all our peoples. The regional system 
then freely established, and now known as the 
Organization of American States, has been a great 
instrument for cooperation throughout the Americas. 

Seven years ago the American governments at 
Buenos Aires began charting new directions for 
economic and social advancement in the hemisphere. 
In 1959, we jointly agreed to establish the Inter- 
American Development Bank to give new impetus 
to economic development. At Bogota the following 
year, social progress was recognized as a parallel 
objective for inter-American cooperation. In 1961 
at Punta del Este we joined with nineteen of our 
sister Republics in a vast collective enterprise of 
development and reform: the Alliance for Progress. 
Since assuming office in November 1963 it has been 
my deep concern that the Alliance should produce 

real and measurable results — in accelerating eco- 
nomic growth, expanding social justice, and strength- 
ening democratic institutions. 

What has been accomplished in Latin America 
in the last two years shows how far we have forged 

In political terms there is: 

— A growing number of vigorous political leaders 
commited to revolutionary change through reform in 

— Wider participation in the democratic process, 
particularly at the grass roots level. 

— Increasing appreciation of the need for full 
citizen involvement in national affairs. 

— Greater stability and a strengthening of demo- 
cratic institutions. 

— Keener awareness of the danger of communist 
subversion and greater resolve to combat it. 

In economic and financial terms: 

— The rate of growth in Gross National Product 
has exceeded the Punta del Este target. 

— The annual volume of national savings has in- 
creased by 1.5 billion dollars. 

— Central government revenues have risen by al- 
most 20 percent. 

— The annual level of exports has grown by 
close to a billion and a half dollars. 

— The annual level of imports has advanced by 
almost one billion dollars. 

— Loan authorizations and commitments from 
the United States and the international financial 
institutions have increased by 863 million dollars. 

In human terms, the Alliance in the past two years 
has made possible the training of over 100,000 school 
teachers; it has built many thousands of new schools 
and homes; it has brought safe drinking water to 
tens of millions; and it has opened up opportunities 
for fuller participation in modem industry and 

But these achievements from common endeavors 
represent only a beginning. Major deficiencies re- 
main to be overcome. Vast new opportunities for 
progress wait to be conquered. We must continue 
our present programs — quickening the pace. We 
must also move boldly toward the new frontiers. 
One of these is the economic integration of Latin 
America: the key to larger markets, greater pro- 
duction, more rational utilization of resources, 
better communication, and new levels of material 
prosperity and mutual understanding. We heartily 
support this vital process and pledge our cooperation. 

Another is to open up the vast, untapped interior 
of South America through multinational projects 
to which I referred last August.' Between Panama in 

»No. 3713; 31 Fed. Reg. 5603. 

' For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17, 
1965, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426. 



the north and Argentina in the south lie hundreds 
of thousands of square miles of fertile land ■waiting 
to be cultivated; mineral and petroleum deposits to 
be discovered and forged into new industries. We 
in the United States stand ready to help the peoples 
of Latin America in making these dreams become 
a reality. This will require a new kind of cooperation 
because these horizons touch more than one nation. 

On this anniversary, the United States strongly 
reaffirms its own continuing commitment to the 
common task of building a Western Hemisphere 
of economic abundance and political freedom in 
which every individual will have his full and equi- 
table share. 

We call upon our sister Republics to join us once 
again in renewing the hope and the promise which 
first beaconed our ancestors to the New World, and 
which are our most solemn obligations to the gener- 
ations which will come after us. 

Now, Therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, Presi- 
dent of the United States of America, do hereby pro- 
claim Thursday, April 14, 1966, as Pan American 
Day, and the week beginning April 10 and ending 
April 16 as Pan American Week; and I call upon 
the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the 
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, 
and the officials of all other areas under the flag 
of the United States to issue similar proclamations. 

I call upon my fellow countrymen to renew 
their commitment to our neighbors in this hemi- 
sphere, and to reaffirm that commitment by support 
for the Organization of American States. 

Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate it- 
self to the ideals of the inter-American system, as 
embodied in the Charter of the Organization of the 
American States, and to the goals of economic and 
social progress of the Charter of Punta del Este 
and the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,' 
which are so firmly founded on our belief in the 
dignity of man, and on our faith in the future of 

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my 
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of 
America to be affixed. 

Done at the City of Washington this sixth day of 
April in the year of our Lord nineteen 
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Indepen- 
dence of the United States of America the 
one hundred and ninetieth. 


By the President: 
Dean Rusk, 
Secretary of State. 

President Hails Congressional 
Support of Food Aid to India 


White House press release dated April 19 

I have approved H. J. Res. 997, "To sup- 
port United States participation in relieving 
victims of hunger in India and to enhance 
India's capacity to meet the nutritional 
needs of its people." 

Through this joint resolution the Con- 
gress has acted with dispatch, statesman- 
ship, and humanity. It supports and endorses 
my recent offer to enlarge our food ship- 
ments to the people of India to help them 
avoid the suffering that would otherwise 
result from the worst drought in a century.^ 

India simply cannot sustain its 500 million 
people from its drought-stricken resources 
until the next major harvest in November. 

When others were in need and we could 
help, our people have always responded 
with responsibility and compassion. How- 
ever distant other lands may be, in the end 
our people understand that we are a part of 
a human family. 

I am confident that the prompt reaction of 
the Congress will encourage the govern- 
ments of other nations to help bridge the 
gap left in India by this great natural dis- 
aster. Some nations, among them Canada, 
have already responded on a substantial 
scale. Others, with limited resources of their 
own, have, nevertheless, reached out gen- 
erously to help. 

We hope that all nations will pause now 
and ask themselves: What more can we do? 
At stake is the salvation of countless fami- 
lies and, in particular, millions of children: 
a great nation's future citizens. None of us 
can rest easy until we know in our hearts 
that we have done everything that is pos- 
sible to protect them f i-om malnutrition, hun- 
ger, and even from starvation itself. 

For text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998. 

^ For the President's message to Congress concern- 
ing the Indian food problem, see BULLETIN of April 
18, 1966, p. 605. 

MAY 9, 1966 



I am confident from my talks with Prime 
Minister [Indira] Gandhi - that the Indian 
Government will use the time gained by our 
assistance — and that of others — to mount a 
determined and effective policy to raise In- 
dia's own agricultural production. In the 
end, only by its own efforts can the people 
of India be fed. 

Our assistance has already looked beyond 
the present drought to enlarging the next 
harvest. We granted some time ago a $50 
million loan for chemical fertilizers and are 
helping Indian agriculture in many other 
ways. The assistance of many governments, 
international organizations, and private in- 
dustry will all be required in this essential 
longrun effort. 

In other times, famine in one nation was 
regarded as a fact to be passively accepted. 
Now, however imperfect our organization, 
we must learn to behave like a world com- 
munity; for modem communications have 
brought nations closer than our own States 
were, not so long ago. 

The joint resolution I approve today 
[April 19] recognizes and contributes to 
this vision of where we are and where we 
must go. 



To support United States participation in relieving victims of 
hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the 
nutritional needs of its people. 

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy 
of the United States to make maximum efficient 
use of this Nation's agricultural abundance in 
furtherance of the foreign policy of the United 

Whereas the Congress is considering legislation to 
govern the response of the United States to the 
mounting world food problem; 

Whereas critical food shortages in India threaten- 
ing the health if not the lives of tens of millions 
of people require an urgent prior response : There- 
fore be it 

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa- 

' Ibid., p. 603. 

" Public Law 89-406, 89th Cong., H. J. Res. 997, 
Apr. 19, 1966. 

tives of the United States of America in Congress 
assembled, That the Congress endorses and supports 
the President's initiative in organizing substantial 
American participation in an urgent international 
effort designed to: 

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by 
making available to India under Public Law 480 
agricultural commodities to meet India's normal im- 
port needs plus added quantities of agricultural 
commodities as the United States share in the in- 
ternational response to the Indian emergency; 

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in 
mothers and children, via a special program; 

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which 
the Government of India is planning to expand 
India's own agricultural production; 

That the Congress urges the President to join 
India in pressing on other nations the urgency of 
sharing appropriately in a truly international re- 
sponse to India's critical need. 

The Congress urges that to the extent neces- 
sary the food made available by this program be 
distributed in such manner that hungry people with- 
out money will be able to obtain food. 

President Johnson Holds Talks 
With SEATO Secretary General 

Folloiving is the text of a White House 
statement released on April 19 following 
President Johnson's meeting with Jesus Var- 
gas, Secretary General of the Southeast Asia 
Treaty Organization. 

White House press release dated April 19 

President Johnson extended a warm wel- 
come to Secretary General Vargas on behalf 
of the United States Government. The Pres- 
ident noted with pleasure that the Secre- 
tary General had had an opportunity to 
meet with the Vice President and senior of- 
ficials here in Washington, including Secre- 
tary Rusk. General Vargas also will be meet- 
ing with Secretary McNamara later today 
and with United Nations Secretary-General 
U Thant and Ambassador Goldberg in New 

The President was glad to have had an op- 
portunity to talk personally with the Secre- 
tary General, not only because the United 
States considers SEATO vital to the secu- 
rity of Southeast Asia, but also because Gen- 



eral Vargas has himself been a champion of 
the cause of freedom in his own country 
and now in a distinguished international 

Secretary General Vargas expressed his 
appreciation for the opportunity to meet 
with the President as well as other United 
States Government leaders. His visit to the 
United States was one of a series he is mak- 
ing to all SEATO member countries for the 
first time in his present capacity. He hoped 
to complete those visits prior to the next 
SEATO Council meeting, to be held in Can- 
berra at the end of June. The Secretary 

General expressed his gratitude for the very 
strong United States support for all the 
organization's activities, including joint mil- 
itary planning, countersubversion, and other 
efforts designed to deter Communist aggres- 
sion in Southeast Asia. 

The President expressed his hope that the 
Canberra Council meeting would succeed in 
furthering the objectives of the Organi- 
zation. He noted that Secretary Rusk 
was expected to head the United States dele- 
gation on that occasion. The President 
wished General Vargas every success in his 
tenure as SEATO Secretary General. 

The United Nations: A Progress Report 

by Arthur J. Goldberg 

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^ 

Your invitation gives me an opportunity 
which I value highly, because I know well 
the vital importance of close and frank con- 
tact between public officials and you gentle- 
men of the working press. And there is no 
area in which this contact is more necessary 
than in the arduous and complex search for 
international peace which we pursue at the 
United Nations. 

Today I would like to give you a short 
progress report on the major questions 
that have taken up most of our time and 
energy at the United Nations in these 9 
months since it fell to me to succeed — I will 
not say "replace," because nobody could re- 
place him — the illustrious Adlai Stevenson. 

The major questions have been, first, the 
crisis over the financing of certain U.N. 
peacekeeping operations; then the Kashmir 
crisis; then the Vietnamese question which 

' Address made before the National Press Club 
at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 19 (U.S./U.N. press 
release 4833 dated Apr. 18). 

we laid before the Security Council. In the 
background of Viet-Nam we have also the 
question of Red China's relation to the 
world community and specifically to the 
U.N. Finally, and most recently, we have 
had the crisis over Rhodesia. I would like 
to take up these topics in order, and then I 
will reply to your questions. 

Financing and Peacekeeping 

When I arrived at the U.N. the organiza- 
tion was virtually paralyzed by the contro- 
versy over the obligation of member states 
to pay their assessed share for its peace- 
keeping operations in the Middle East and 
the Congo. It had become clear that, de- 
spite the opinion of the World Court and 
our own best efforts, the majority in the As- 
sembly was not prepared to impose upon 
the delinquent member states the penalty 
laid down in article 19 of the charter — 
namely, the loss of their vote in the Gen- 
eral Assembly. 

MAY 9, 1966 


In this situation it fell to me to announce 
our distasteful decision to agree that the 
General Assembly should resume its nor- 
mal functioning with all members voting.* 
I have no regrets over this decision. What 
was most immediately urgent was that the 
organization be enabled to continue to carry 
on its business. 

But in the long run the U.N. has no more 
important objective than that of developing 
its peacekeeping capacity, and we remain 
very active in promoting that objective. 
Next week in New York the 33-member 
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Opera- 
tions will meet to consider changes in U.N. 
procedures for authorizing and financing 
peacekeeping operations. We attach great 
importance to the work of this body. The 
capacity of the United Nations to help in 
keeping the peace must not be weakened; 
it must be made stronger, and the United 
States will join wholeheartedly with those 
in the Committee and in the Assembly who 
work to make it stronger. 


Of course, even now, despite the financ- 
ing crisis, the U.N. remains a potent peace- 
keeper. This was proved last September 
when the long-smoldering conflict over 
Kashmir erupted into large-scale violence. 
The United Nations was thereby confronted 
with what was perhaps the most serious 
armed clash between two member states 
with which it had ever dealt. It was of 
course all the more alarming to the United 
States, because India and Pakistan are two 
very important nations whose friendship 
and progress we highly value and because 
just over the Himalayas Red China was 
sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick 
up the pieces. 

The cease-fire, which was the prerequisite 
to all the steps that followed, was achieved 
on September 22 as a direct outgrowth of 
the Security Council resolution 2 days ear- 
lier.* This in turn paved the way for the 
Tashkent agreement which followed in Jan- 
uary, leading to the withdrawal of forces. 
Tashkent, incidentally, offers a vivid illus- 

tration of a situation in which the Soviet 
Union perceives that its interest in a step 
toward peace runs parallel to that of the vast 
majority of nations of the world. May there 
be more such situations! 

Of course the Kashmir question remains 
on the Security Council's agenda. It is a 
deep-lying issue involving long-entrenched 
interests and emotions on both sides. But 
by moving the immediate conflict off the 
battlefield and into the conference room, we 
achieved something substantial not only for 
India and Pakistan but for the peace of the 
world. If the U.N. had done nothing else in 
1965, that achievement alone would justify 
many times over the annual cost of the 
United Nations. 


Now let me comment briefly on activity 
at the United Nations relating to the con- 
flict in Viet-Nam. 

One of my first actions after presenting 
my credentials last July was to send a let- 
ter to the President of the Security Coun- 
cil,* emphasizing the United States' con- 
tinued willingness to collaborate uncondi- 
tionally with members of the Council in 
finding a formula which would restore peace 
to Viet-Nam. This was only one step in a 
continuous process of consultation with Sec- 
retary-General U Thant and with many 
member states, particularly members of the 

Then in early January we informed all 
117 members of the United Nations of our 
unprecedented diplomatic effort — unprece- 
dented in intensity and variety — to open 
the path to negotiations; and we made 
crystal clear our willingness to begin nego- 
tiations and the goals we would seek in 

= For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, 
p. 454. 

' For background and text of resolution, see ibid., 
Oct. 11, 1965, p. 602. 

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278. 

' For text of a letter from Ambassador Goldberg 
to Secretary-General U Thant, see ibid., Jan. 24, 
1966, p. 117. 



But this effort — which included a 37- 
day unilateral suspension of bombing of 
North Viet-Nam — brought forth no helpful 
response. There was no letup in acts of war 
by Hanoi or the Viet Cong; there was no 
reduction in infiltration, in acts of terror, in 
the supply of men and arms. The response 
in words was equally negative: a restate- 
ment of old conditions and the addition of 
still another condition which the United 
States must accept before negotiations could 

It was against this background that the 
President ordered an end to the 37-day sus- 
pension of bombing of North Viet-Nam and, 
simultaneously, instructed me to request an 
urgent meeting of the Security Council.' 
Our purpose in resorting formally to the 
Council was to make it clear that even 
though all the peace moves we and others 
had made had been rebuffed, we remained 
resolved to seek a peaceful settlement. Al- 
though the Council was unable to agree on 
any formal action, the presence of the Viet- 
Nam item on its agenda gives us a reference 
point which could be highly useful in the 

On the Viet-Nam question, then, the 
United Nations up to now has served chiefly 
as a center of diplomatic communication. 
It is fair to ask whether we can realistically 
expect it to render any other kind of service 
in the search for a secure peace in Viet- 
Nam. The most immediate necessity is one 
which, in all realism, the United Nations is 
not now prepared to undertake — namely, 
the defense of South Viet-Nam against 
armed aggression. The situation is not the 
same as it was when South Korea was at- 
tacked 16 years ago, and a similar United 
Nations response cannot be expected. The 
United States must continue to help South 
Viet-Nam defend itself. As I have said be- 
fore, America is probably not the ideal po- 
liceman, nor do we wish to be; but we are 
willing to bear our part of the burden. 

In the longer run, however, we anticipate 
another need which will call for an intema- 

' For background, see ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222. 

tional instrumentality such as the United 
Nations. Once the Geneva agreements have 
been reaffirmed and revitalized as a basis 
for an end to the fighting, somebody must 
police those agreements through effective 
patrol and supervision and thereby keep the 
people of South Viet-Nam secure while they 
freely decide their government and the fu- 
ture of their homeland. 

The United States has no desire to exer- 
cise that responsibility itself, and we recog- 
nize there would be valid objections to our 
doing so. In thinking of suitable machinery 
our thoughts turn naturally to the United 
Nations or some other appropriate interna- 
tional body. The U.N. has a record for ef- 
fective, impartial, and independent actions 
in other situations where passions are high 
and suspicions ingrained. 

Meanwhile, our search for peace, as Pres- 
ident Johnson has made abundantly clear, 
will continue both steadfast and flexible. 
We will eagerly welcome any initiative, 
whether in the United Nations or else- 
where, that helps to move the Viet-Nam 
conflict from the battlefield to the confer- 
ence table. 


Now I come to a question which has be- 
come somewhat interlocked with the Viet- 
namese problem, namely, the perennial and 
multiple problem of Communist China. I 
will not rehearse past history but only 
comment briefly on the current China situa- 
tion as it relates to the United Nations. 

The argument is sometimes made that 
the Vietnamese question or the disarma- 
ment question, for example, cannot be ef- 
fectively dealt with in the United Nations 
as long as Communist China is not a mem- 
ber. This does not necessarily follow, since 
there are plenty of precedents for the par- 
ticipation of nonmembers in matters before 
the Security Council and other United Na- 
tions organs. I might add that we have been 
trying to interest Red China in exploratory 
disarmament talks outside the U.N. — but so 
far they have refused to join in such talks. 

MAY 9, 1966 


Leaving that point aside, however, the 
question recurs — as it has every year since 
1950 — what answer the United Nations 
should give to Peking's perennial claim to 
represent China in the U.N. In that context 
we still hear criticism that the United 
States has taken it upon itself to ostracize 
Red China, and that except for our strenu- 
ous efforts Red China would be sitting in the 
U.N. today, and so forth. 

I doubt that very much. The country that 
has really ostracized Red China is not the 
United States; it is Red China itself. The 
list of their conditions for deigning to ac- 
cept a seat in the United Nations is long and 
unrealistic. Among other things, they de- 
mand that the Republic of China on Taiwan 
be ejected from the United Nations, along 
with whichever other countries they have 
put on their "imperialist puppet" list. I 
don't think this would be an acceptable pro- 
posal among the members of the U.N. 

In this situation some people have ques- 
tioned whether the United States should 
continue this year the parliamentary 
strategy that we have followed in past years 
to exclude Red China at the annual session 
of the General Assembly. This is a highly 
intricate question, and no change in our 
policy has been made. Our tactics, of 
course, are under review. In any case, the 
matter of tactics ought not to obscure the 
underlying reality. The Communist revolu- 
tion in China, coming to power in 1949, put 
that enormous country under the domina- 
tion of a group which still adheres to the 
dogma that, in the words of Mao Tse- 
tung, "all political power grows out of a 
barrel of a gun." They are pressing con- 
stantly in South and Southeast Asia and 
elsewhere — even as far away as Africa and 
Latin America, although with dwindling suc- 
cess — to enlarge their power and domina- 
tion in the world by subversion and by force 
of arms. Secretary Rusk has well de- 
scribed their state of mind as "a combina- 
tion of aggressive arrogance and obsessions 
of . . . (their) own making." ' 

We desire very much, in the interest of 

world peace, to see the rulers of mainland 
China come to terms with the international 
community. Along many avenues, even in 
the face of numerous rebuffs, the United 
States has been trying to promote that re- 
sult — not by yielding to their demands, 
which would bring only further demands, 
but by such means as our 11 years of con- 
tacts with Chinese representatives in 
Geneva and Warsaw; our proposals for con- 
tacts involving newspapermen, scientists, 
and others; and our expressed desire to see 
the representatives of Peking sit down and 
discuss disarmament and the nonprolifera- 
tion of nuclear weapons with the other 
powers. They may not respond to these ap- 
peals next week or next year, but we look 
forward to the day when they will. Much is 
said about the patience and persistence of 
Communists ; but we can be patient and per- 
sistent too. 

Southern Rhodesia 

Finally, I come to the Rhodesian question 
which has most recently been the center of 
our peace efforts at the United Nations. 
When the independence movement began to 
sweep through Africa a few years ago, the 
British Government made strenuous efforts 
to conciliate the white and African com- 
munities in their Rhodesian colony and to 
find a basis by which all the people could 
participate in the political life of an inde- 
pendent Rhodesia. As you know, these ef- 
forts failed. After the so-called "unilateral 
declaration of independence" by the Smith 
regime last November, the Security Council 
adopted two very strong resolutions urging 
member states not to recognize the illegal 
Smith regime — which none have — and call- 
ing for economic sanctions, including a spe- 
cific embargo on oil and petroleum 

Our latest action in the Council arose 

' Ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 686. i 

° For background and texts of resolutions, see 
ibid., Dec 6, 1965, p. 908. 




from attempts to break that oil embargo.* 
The United Kingdom quite properly asked 
for the Security Council's instructions be- 
fore taking the drastic step of intercepting 
oil tankers on the high seas. The Council 
promptly gave the authority that was 
sought, and the British proceeded to use it 
when their frigate turned away the tanker 
Manuela on its way into the port of Beira. 

There has been some criticism from those 
who maintain that the step sanctioned by 
the Council — namely, the interception of 
ships on the high seas — was too novel and 
perhaps even unjustifiable under interna- 
tional law. 

I agree that the step was novel, but it was 
not unjustifiable. At the Council meeting I 
said, and I repeat, that we made some new 
international law that night. International 
law is not a static concept; it is a develop- 
ing concept. The United Nations Charter it- 
self was new international law, and the 
decisions made pursuant to it add to that 
body of law — the process that moves us 
inch by inch toward the still unrealized goal 
of the rule of law throughout the world. 

Article 39 of the charter gives the Se- 
curity Council the duty to determine, among 
other things, when there is a threat to 
peace and the further duty of deciding what 
to do about it. Pursuant to this article, the 
Council, wisely and properly, found that the 
imminent arrival of tankers in defiance of 
the embargo and in support of the rebel 
regime was a threat to peace. Some people 
disagree with this finding and even say 
that what has happened in Rhodesia is an 
internal matter. But I don't think anybody 
conversant with Africa can deny for a mo- 
ment the incendiary nature of the situation 
in that part of the world. Happily, article 
39 does not require the Security Council to 
hold its hand until the fire has broken into 
open flames. 

Having made its finding, the Council fur- 

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg and 
text of a resolution adopted by the Council on Apr. 
9, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 713. 

ther concluded that the necessary action to 
prevent this imminent circumvention of the 
embargo should be taken by the power 
which bears the chief responsibility in this 
whole matter — namely, the United Kingdom. 

Was the United Nations viTong to take 
this action which was, in some respects, 
without precedent? Certainly not. The 
situation itself was without precedent, and, 
as the old saying goes, "new occasions 
teach new duties." This emergency was 
one more in the record of such new occa- 
sions which have punctuated the life of the 
United Nations from its inception : Iran, the 
Berlin crisis, Korea, the Uniting-for-Peace 
resolution, Suez, and the Congo, among 
others. If in each of these novel situations 
the organization had shrunk from taking 
new steps to uphold the charter, the United 
Nations today would be a dead letter, with 
consequences that I do not like to imagine. 

Actually, what was done in the Security 
Council on April 9 is being criticized from 
two opposite directions. Some say it was too 
strong; others that it was too weak. Some 
would have us turn our backs on the whole 
situation ; others insist that it be solved in a 
single stroke. 

I think Lord Caradon, speaking for the 
British Government, wisely avoided both 
these extremes when he stressed the need 
to proceed "step by step." It is clear that 
the one step we took on April 9 has had a 
major effect on the attempt to break the 
embargo. We will know in due time whether 
further steps are necessary to achieve the 
aim which has the overwhelming backing of 
the world community: namely, the restora- 
tion of the lawful British authority in 
Rhodesia in order that all of the people of 
that country may be enabled to join in de- 
termining their national future. 

Let me conclude by expressing two con- 
victions which I have long held, but which I 
find relevant to this work at the United 

One is my belief as a lawyer, which was 
reinforced during my service on the Su- 
preme Court, that law by itself cannot 

MAY 9, 1966 


bring peace and stability. What brings 
peace and stability is just law — law that 
takes careful account of new facts and 
deals adequately with the legitimate griev- 
ances that arise. This requires a willingness 
to innovate and to work for peaceful change 
— because change itself is inevitable, and if 
we cannot keep it peaceful then heaven help 
us all. 

My second conviction is that just law can- 
not always simply be imposed. On the 
Court the most important and, I must say, 
the most satisfying words I could use were 
those at the end of an opinion: "It is so 
ordered." We can't use those words very 
often at the United Nations. Into every 

ounce of enforcement we must mix a ton of 
persuasion and conciliation and careful 
listening. And then we must not e.xpect to 
build the new Jerusalem in one day but 
must be content to proceed step by step. 

When I spoke to the Press Club in 1961, I 
remember quoting a favorite passage of 
mine by the eminent Spanish philosopher 
Salvador de Madariaga, and I want to quote 
it again because nothing could better ex- 
press my point: 

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic. 
We must walk in the right direction but we must 
walk step by step. 

Now I think the next step is for me to 
listen to your questions. Thank you. 

International Education Act of 1966 

by Charles Frankel 

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^ 


I am grateful for the privilege of appear- 
ing before you in behalf of the proposed In- 
ternational Education Act of 1966.' I be- 
lieve that this proposed legislation can open 
an important new chapter in the history of 
American education and in the history of our 
country's relations with other nations. Not 
only as a member of this administration but 
as one who has spent most of his life in 
education, and simply as a citizen, I feel par- 
ticularly honored to appear before this 
group in connection with your consideration 
of this significant proposal. 

The Secretary of Health, Education, and 
Welfare [John W. Gardner] has already ap- 

' Statement made before the Task Force on Inter- 
national Education of the House Committee on Edu- 
cation and Labor on Mar. 31. 

' For text of a message from President Johnson 
to the Congress, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, 
p. 328. 

peared before you to discuss the Interna- 
tional Education Act of 1966, which places 
special responsibilities on his Department. 
In my remarks I propose to focus upon the 
significance of this bill as it affects the De- 
partment of State and the international re- 
lations of this country. From this point of 
view, this proposed legislation is important 
for at least three reasons. 

First, it offers a better chance to Ameri- 
can citizens to acquire the education they 
need to cope with the facts of international 

Second, it strengthens the American ca- 
pacity for foreign affairs. 

Third, it takes steps that are essential if 
this country, in conjunction with other coun- 
tries, is to move ahead purposefully in a 
great effort to bring the people of the world 
closer together in mutual tolerance and un- 



With your permission I should like to say 
something about each of these purposes. Let 
me begin by addressing myself to the con- 
tribution of this proposed program to the 
education of Americans. 

It is now a truism to which I believe every- 
one gives assent that the United States lives 
in an international environment and that the 
future of our own country is intimately 
linked to the destinies of other nations 
thousands of miles away. But the full sig- 
nificance of this truism is often hidden, per- 
haps precisely because we find it so easy 
to agree with it. 

The fact is that the international environ- 
ment of the United States does not begin 
at the ocean's edge. This international en- 
vironment penetrates almost every corner of 
our society. It is revealed in the news we 
hear, the coffee we drink, the movies we see, 
the political decisions we debate. Indeed, we 
hear so much about the rest of the world 
that it is very easy to imagine that we know 
what we need to know. But this, of course, 
is not true. We do not know what we need 
to know until we can go behind the noises 
we hear and the signals of other peoples' 
existence that we receive and get some com- 
prehension of what really causes those 
noises and what those signals really mean. 
An education, to be valid, must give the in- 
dividual the information he needs to cope 
with important facts in his environment. 

Today, for the ordinary American, in- 
cluding the American who never goes over- 
seas, education must provide a capacity to 
deal with the facts of the international en- 
vironment. An education without an interna- 
tional dimension is an inadequate education 
for Americans in this century. One of the 
significant points about the legislation you 
are considering, I venture to suggest, is that 
it takes account of this consideration. It adds 
a new dimension to the Federal Govern- 
ment's interest in education. 

This brings me to the second reason why 
I hope that you will give this proposed legis- 
lation favorable consideration. In strength- 
ening the education of Americans at home, 
it also strengthens the American capacity 

for foreign affairs. To work effectively in 
ventures beyond our borders, we need more 
people with specialized skills. But in addition 
to their competence as doctors, teachers, 
agronomists, or economists, such people must 
also have special knowledge of the societies 
in which they are going to apply their skills. 

They need to have a special sensitivity and 
sympathy — a special eye and a special ear — 
for the differences in outlook and feeling 
that mark the people with whom they must 
work. Such special knowledge and sensitivity 
are not easy to come by. A difficult educa- 
tional effort is required to produce them. A 
nation like our own, which wishes to work 
collaboratively and in a spirit of equality 
with other nations, must take deliberate 
steps to insure that such an educational ef- 
fort is strong and continuing. That is one 
of the purposes, as I understand it, of the 
International Education Act of 1966. 

Moreover, as I have partly suggested 
already, we need not only more specialists 
who combine technical skills and interna- 
tional sophistication, but we also need a 
citizenry that has received, as part of its 
general education, an exposure to the com- 
plex facts of the international scene. In the 
long run, as the President has observed, 
a nation's foreign policy can progress no 
faster than the curricula of its classrooms. 
American schools and colleges have done 
much in recent years to improve the study 
and teaching of international affairs. But 
much more still needs to be done if we wish 
to insure for the decades ahead that the 
citizens of this country have the awareness 
and the resilience to generate and support 
enlightened policies and to pursue long-range 
policies with the understanding, patience, 
and resolution such policies require. 

I come now to the third reason for sug- 
gesting that the legislation you are consid- 
ering is of importance to the United States 
in its foreign relations. It is that education 
has moved front and center in this nation's 
affairs and in every nation's and that close 
cooperation between the educational systems 
of different countries is one major instru- 
ment for building the structure of peace in 

MAY 9, 1966 


diversity which has been the goal of this 
administration and those before it. 

Today, for the first time since the inven- 
tion of writing 5,000 years ago, more than 
half of mankind is literate. Nevertheless, in 
an era in which the ability to read and write 
is increasingly necessary to an individual's 
or a society's well-being, 4 out of 10 of the 
world's population are illiterate. 

Today the desire for education has become 
almost universal, and in all countries a larger 
number of people than ever before have a 
chance to realize this desire. Nevertheless, 
equality of educational opportunity remains, 
in most parts of the world, only a distant 

Today ideas, techniques, information, and 
works of art travel between the men of dif- 
ferent countries with unprecedented speed. 
This process has created new possibilities 
for cooperation and mutual understanding 
among the nations. But it has also created 
new sources of tension and misunderstand- 
ing. Over the long run the educational sys- 
tems of the nations have as much power as 
any other human agency to promote under- 
standing and sympathy at their roots. 

The legislation that is before you today 
proposes that we in this country set about 
to prepare ourselves to do our part with re- 
gard to this situation. It proposes that we 
make ourselves ready to join with others in 
finding, in the words of William James which 
the President quoted in his message, "a 
moral equivalent of war." The hope behind 
it is that if the teachers and students of 
different countries can be brought together, 
working purposefully on common projects, 
they can educate each other. Given time 
they can reduce the influence, it may be 
hoped, of such ancient human emotions as 
hostility toward the stranger. That is what 
our schools have done at home. To be sure, 
they have not wholly succeeded. Provincial- 
ism and fear of the outsider are perhaps 
inevitable facts of human nature. But the 
skeptic who doubts what education can do 
to reduce the influence of such attitudes 
should study the record of what American 
schools have done to promote habits of 

mutual respect and forbearance between dif- 
ferent kinds and groups of people. The vi- 
sion that lies behind the legislation you are 
considering is that this is possible on the 
international scene. 

Yet while this is the vision behind the 
program, the proposals before you are, I be- 
lieve, measured and modest. There are cer- 
tain things which these proposals do not 
contemplate. They do not suggest that it is 
America's duty to educate the world. They 
do not commit the American taxpayer to 
underwriting the goal of universal educa- 
tion everywhere in the world. They do not 
propose to accomplish miracles in a year — or 
ever. They are addressed, in all humility, to 
meeting certain specific needs in our country 
so that we will be better able to work with 
others to advance education and particularly 
the process of mutual international educa- 
tion. They look ahead to a shared adventure 
with other nations in which, together, we 
work to produce school systems that will re- 
lease children from the awful handicap of 
ignorance and bring them up to look on 
people in other nations with understanding 
and respect. And this hope is joined to a 
sober recognition that education needs time 
to achieve its goals. 

In sum, from the standpoint of foreign 
policy, I endorse this proposed legislation be- 
cause it lays the foundation for an interna- 
tional effort that gives proper attention to 
the crucial role that education can play in 
realizing the promise of our time and off- 
setting its perils. The legislation you are con- 
sidering gives expression to the proposition 
that education is a major and enduring 
activity of this nation and that educational 
cooperation with other nations constitutes an 
abiding national interest. It projects to the 
forefront of our national policy the convic- 
tion that the advancement of education, at 
home and abroad, is properly a national ob- 
jective of the United States, and it offers a 
program that is not a crash program for an 
emergency but a deliberate effort to seek 
such long-range goals. 

Not least, it recognizes the crucial truth 
that American educational activity at home 



and American educational activity abroad 
comprise a single interrelated whole. They 
are not separate. Each grows more effective 
as it is reinforced by the other. This pro- 
gram is offered not as a one-sided American 
venture but as a sign of our desire to work 
cooperatively with others. Its object is to 
strengthen American education so that we 
can assist other countries in strengthening 
theirs and so that, in this process, our edu- 
cation will be strengthened too. In the words 
of the President, "The knowledge of our 
citizens is one treasure which grows only 
when it is shared." ^ A truly international ed- 
ucational endeavor cannot be the work of one 
country. The passage of the International 
Education Act of 1966 would indicate that 
this country is prepared to make a contribu- 
tion to an international enterprise in which 
other nations are invited to join. 

Finally, it may be of interest to you if I 
say just a few words about the relationship 
of the International Education Act of 1966 
to the programs in mutual education and 
cultural exchange which are conducted by 
the Department of State. The programs en- 
visaged in the act before you do not in any 
way duplicate the activities of the Depart- 
ment of State but rather support and com- 
plement them. The search for people of high 
quality to take part in our programs takes 
much of our time and effort. I would hope 
and expect that the initiation of programs 
such as those contemplated in the Interna- 
tional Education Act would make it easier 
to find the people we need. Moreover, the 
programs in the Department of State have 
been aimed, in the main, at individuals apart 
from their institutional affiliations and have 
been conceived as part of our effort in other 
countries. The International Education Act 
of 1966 will focus on institutions and on the 
needs of American education at home. Ac- 
cordingly, from the point of view of the De- 
partment of State, the passage of the In- 
ternational Education Act will not obstruct 
or overlap our efforts. On the contrary, it 
will greatly aid these efforts. 

' Ibid. 

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee 
To Meet in July 

Press release 91 dated April 19 

The fifth meeting of the Joint United 
States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco- 
nomic Affairs will be held in Japan July 5 
through July 7, 1966. The agenda and de- 
tailed arrangements for the meeting will be 
announced at a later date. 

Liquidation of Banco 
Territorial de Cuba 

Press release 90 dated April 19 

The Department of State has received 
through the Government of Switzerland a 
note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
of Cuba dated March 15, 1966, reading in 
translation as follows : 

The Commission designated by the President of 
the National Bank of Cuba to liquidate, pursuant to 
Special Provision No. 6 of Law No. 930 of Febru- 
ary 23, 1961, all private banks of any kind which, 
because they were in a technical state of bankruptcy 
or insolvency, were subject on October 13, 1960 to 
intervention or other precautionary measures 
adopted by the National Bank of Cuba or the Deposit 
Insurance Fund, which banks include Banco Terri- 
torial de Cuba, S.A., whose administration, for the 
purpose of its final liquidation, has been entrusted 
to this Commission, hereby issues the following 

"On the date of issuance of tliis notice, the activi- 
ties of the said Bank are to be suspended, and its 
creditors of all kinds must submit their claims with- 
in 90 calendar days of March 15, 1966, after which 
any legal action shall be considered to have lapsed, 
and all rights the claimants may have shall be re- 
garded as waived. 

"Holders of obligations, mortgage bonds, and cou- 
pons that have matured must deposit with the pro- 
vincial offices of the National Bank of Cuba in the 
district in which they are domiciled, within 90 cal- 
endar days of March 15, 1966, whatever securities 
they hold for consideration by the Liquidating Com- 
mission. The Provincial Offices shall supply the 
official form for submitting such securities. Pay- 
ment of interest on each and every obligation and 
bond issued by Banco Territorial de Cuba, S.A., 
shall be suspended as of December 31, 1965 as a 
result of its liquidation. 

"The Liquidating Commission shall have its of- 

MAY 9, 1966 


fice at the Central Office of the National Bank of 
Cuba, located at 402 Cuba [Street], Habana." 

Anyone desiring to record a claim against 
the Liquidating Commission of Banco Ter- 
ritorial de Cuba, S.A., is informed that they 
should communicate with the Office of Spe- 
cial Consular Services of the Department of 
State if assistance is required. 

Signatures: Ecuador, April 21, 1966; Finland, 
April 21, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany, 
April 21, 1966; Guatemala, April 12, 1966; 
Israel, April 19, 1966; Saudi Arabia, April 21, 
1966 ; South Africa, April 20, 1966 ; Switzerland, 
April 4, 1966; Union of Soviet Socialist Repub- 
lics, April 18, 1966;" United Arab Republic, 
April 7, 1966; United States of America, April 
4, 1966. 

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance: 
Finland, April 21, 1966. 

Current Treaty Actions 


Atomic Energy 

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, 
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956. 
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284. 
Accepta7ice deposited: Jordan, April 18, 1966. 

Satellite Communications System 

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM- 
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.' 
Signature: Empresa Nacional de Teleconununi- 
caciones S.A. of Chile, April 22, 1966. 


Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and 
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac- 
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva 
from February 8, 1965.' 

Ratification deposited: Norway, April 1, 1966. 
Signature: Uruguay, March 30, 1966.' 


Protocol for the further extension of the Inter- 
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). 
Opened for signature at Washington April 4 
through 29, 1966.' 



Understanding concerning income tax pursuant to 
article III, paragraphs 3 and 5 of the memo- 
randum of arrangement of March 30, 1966, to 
cover reentry experiments in Australia (Sparta). 
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra March 
30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966. 

Understanding relating to claims (other than con- 
tractual claims) resulting from the memorandum 
of arrangement to cover reentry experiments in 
Australia (Sparta) of March 30, 1966. Effected 
by exchange of notes at Canberra March 30, 1966. 
Entered into force March 30, 1966. 


Protocol to amend the agreement of January 29, 
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcast- 
ing in the standard broadcast band. Signed at 
Mexico April 13, 1966. Enters into force on the 
date of exchange of ratifications. 


Agreement amending the agricultural commodities 
agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended (TIAS 
5968). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon 
April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 1966. 

' Not in force. 
' Ad referendum. 
" With reservation. 


The Department of State Bulletin, a 
weekly publication issued by the Office 
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af- 
fairs, provides the public and interested 
agencies of the Government with infor- 
mation on developments in the field of 
foreign relations and on the work of the 
Department of State and the Foreign 
Service. The Bulletin includes selected 
press releases on foreign policy, issued 
by the White House and the Department, 
and statements and addresses made by 
the President and by the Secretary of 
State and other officers of the Depart- 

ment, as well as special articles on vari- 
ous phaaes of international affairs and 
the functions of the Department, Infor- 
mation is included concerning treaties 
and international a^eements to which the 
United States is or may become a party 
and treaties of general international in- 

Publications of the Department, United 
Nations documents, and legislative mate- 
rial in the field of international relations 
are listed currently. 

The Bulletin is for sale by the Sui>er- 
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern- 

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 
20402. Pbice: 62 issues, domestic $10, 
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. 

Use of funds for printing of this pub- 
lication approved by the Director of the 
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966). 

NOTE : Contents of this publication are 
not copyrighted and items contained herein 
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart- 
ment of State Bulletin as the source will 
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed 
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- 



INDEX May 9. 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1^02 

American Repablics 

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Elffective 
Action (Gordon) 738 

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and 
Social Process (Mann) 734 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 
1966 (proclamation) 746 

President Johnson Visits Mexico City (Johnson, 
joint statement) 726 

Asia. President Johnson Holds Talks With 
SEATO Secretary General 748 

China. The United Nations: A progfress Report 
(Goldberg) 749 

Claims and Property. Liquidation of Banco Ter- 
ritorial de Cuba (text of Cuban notice) . . . 757 


International Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754 

President Hails Congressional Support of Food 
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747 

Cuba. Liquidation of Banco Territorial de Cuba 
(text of Cuban notice) 757 

Economic Affairs 

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and 
Social Progress (Mann) 734 

Liquidation of Banco Territorial de Cuba (text 
of Cuban notice) 757 

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet in July 757 

Educational and Cultural Affairs. International 
Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754 

Foreign Aid 

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective 
Action (Gordon) 738 

International Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754 

President Hails Congressional Support of Food 
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747 

President Johnson Visits Mexico City (John- 
son, joint statement) 726 


President Hails Congressional Support of Food 
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747 

The United Nations: A Progress Report (Gold- 
berg) 749 

International Organizations and Conferences 

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective 
Action (Gordon) 738 

President Johnson Holds Talks With SEATO 
Secretary General 748 

Japan. U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet 
in July 757 

Mexico. President Johnson Visits Mexico City 
(Johnson, joint statement) 726 

Pakistan. The United Nations: A Progress Re- 
port (Goldberg) 749 

Presidential Documents 

Pan American Day and Pan American Week, 
1966 746 

President Hails Congressional Support of Food 
Aid to India 747 

President Johnson Visits Mexico City .... 726 

Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations: A 
Progress Report (Goldberg) 749 

Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 758 

United Nations. The United Nations: A Prog- 
ress Report (Goldberg) 749 

Viet-Nam. The United Nations: A Progress Re- 
port (Goldberg) 749 

Name Index 

Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 726 

Frankel, Charles 754 

Goldberg, Arthur J 749 

Gordon, Lincoln 738 

Johnson, President 726, 746, 747 

Mann, Thomas C 734 

Check List of Department of State 
Press Releases: April 18-24 

Press releases may be obtained from the Of- 
fice of News, Department of State, Washing- 
ton, D.C., 20520. 

Releases issued prior to April 18 which ap- 
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 
72 of March 31, 85 of April 14, and 87 of 
April 15. 

No. Date Sobject 

*88 4/18 Rusk: statement on foreign aid 
before Senate Foreign Relations 

*89 4/19 Harriman: Canadian Press Club, 
Toronto (excerpts). 

90 4/19 Liquidation of Banco Territorial 

de Cuba (text of Cuban notice). 

91 4/19 Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Commit- 


t92 4/21 Solomon: Subcommittee on Anti- 
trust and Monopoly of Senate 
Judiciary Committee. 

t93 4/22 CENTO communique. 

* Not printed. 

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin. 



■ii GOVERNMENT PRrNTING OFFICE: 1966 20t-938/47 

Superintendent o 

u.s. oovernment pk 

washinoton, d.< 



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Vol. LIV, No. H03 

May 16, 1966 

Address by Vice President Humphrey 769 

Statement by Under Secretary Mann 78U 


by Under Secretary Ball 762 

For index see inside back cover 

"The attack that has been launched against NATO deeply 
concerns all Western nations. Let us make no mistake about 
the fact that the withdrawal of an important power from 
participation in the arrangements that give reality to the 
Western alliance tvill iveaken the common defense. More 
than that, it will iveaken the Western deterrent." 

The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis 

by Under Secretary Ball 

Not long ago a whimsical friend, still un- 
der the spell of reading all dozen volumes of 
Mr. Toynbee's massive work on the life cycle 
of nations and civilization, said to me: 
"When America has run its course, I know 
what headnote will appear in the history 
books. It will be 'The United States — a na- 
tion that died of a surfeit of pragmatism.' " 

Like a highly seasoned salad this remark 
stayed with me for several days. I am afraid 
there is a grain of truth in my friend's ir- 
reverent observation. We are a pragmatic 
people, and — especially in the area where I 
toil — pragmatism is the course of least re- 
sistance. It is easy — and tempting — to be- 
come absorbed in the operational aspects of 
foreign relations and to ignore the longer 
term implications of policy. But, if America 
is to survive as a civilization, if in fact the 
world is to survive as a healthy environ- 
ment for human beings, then we do have to 
remind ourselves of the larger framework 
of policy — something better than the habits, 
the improvisations, the expedients of years 
gone by — or we shall find ourselves repeat- 
ing old mistakes in a world where mistakes 
by great nations can mean world destruc- 

' Made before the American Society of Interna- 
tional Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 29 (press 
release 101). 

Today there is a special temptation to 
pragmatism in our relations with Western 
Europe, where we are faced once again with 
the reappearance of an assertive national- 
ism that challenges the whole structure of 
our postwar arrangements. 

Yet there is no area where it would be 
more dangerous for us to become absorbed 
merely in the operational aspects of policy, 
to make adjustments, accommodations, com- 
promises, and concessions without regard to 
our great common objectives. For our rela- 
tions with Western Europe carry a heavy 
freight of history. They form the longest 
and persistently the most important ele- 
ment of United States foreign policy. We 
have benefited greatly from events in 
Europe and we have suffered from them. 
And, at the end of the day, we cannot for- 
get that jealousies, ambitions, and aggres- 
sions in Western Europe were responsible 
for the two greatest wars of modern history 
— cataclysms that created many of the ills 
and troubles that harass us today. If we are 
to avoid new and even more terrible conflicts, 
we must know where we are going and we 
must have some sense of how we are to get 

We have not always had a sure sense of 
direction in these mattei's. 

America spent the early years of this 
centurv in a state of innocence which, in 



retrospect, seems both attractive and sur- 
prising. World War I came upon us while we 
had our backs turned, preoccupied as we 
were in transforming a continent into a na- 
tion. It took us a long time to sort the issues 
in that struggle. But in 1917 we entered the 
fight, and the weight of our effort turned 
the tide of battle. Yet in retrospect it 
seems clear enough that we did not compre- 
hend the full meaning either of the war or of 
our involvement. When we had brought the 
boys home again we had a frustrating try 
at international peacemaking. Then we 
turned our backs on the world in the inter- 
ests of what we awkwardly referred to as 

We pretended, in other words, that we 
were not a great power and that we had 
been wrong in trying to act like one. The 
fount of our foreign policy remained the ad- 
monitory passages in Washington's farewell 
address — advice given more than a century 
before to a fledgling Republic. If staying 
clear of entangling alliances had been good 
enough for the Founding Fathers, it was 
good enough for us. 

America's policy, as we told the world, was 
isolationism — the early 20th-century version 
of what would be known today as neutralism 
or nonalinement — and we meant to stick by 

The Hard Lessons of Two World Wars 

The Second World War ended our adoles- 
cence. We fought valiantly and well in all 
four corners of the earth. When the con- 
flict was over, America at long last had 
grown up, and we had learned certain hard 
lessons the hard way. 

I shall not try to review all of those 
lessons here tonight, but I think it essential 
to mention some of them. 

The first was that the United States is 
indubitably a great power and, as such, can- 
not escape involvement in the world's main 
concerns. Moreover, the world has become so 
interdependent that our interests are neces- 
sarily engaged by any new aggression in any 
strategic area of the world — and particularly 
in Europe. 

Second, we admitted with nagging con- 
science that our own neutralism had served 
as an encouragement — or at least had posed 
no discouragement — to aggressors in Europe. 
We could deter aggression in the future only 
by making it crystal clear that American 
power would be committed instantly and 
automatically if any friendly European state 
were attacked. 

Within months after the end of the war 
we began to learn another hard lesson — that 
another nation, itself also organized on a 
continent-wide basis, was bent on extending 
its dominion, and the ideological system it 
represented, through force and subversion 
around the world. As one after another of 
the European states were caught within the 
encircling net of the Iron Curtain, we awoke 
with a shock to this new and imminent 

Along with our European friends we began 
to rethink the mistakes of the past. Together 
with them we reached certain conclusions 
which we put in treaty or institutional 
form. One was the recognition — not of the 
theory but the fact — that an attack on one 
of the North Atlantic states was an attack 
on all. In the case of major aggression 
against Europe, the power of the New World 
would inevitably be called upon to redress 
the balance of the old. That, however, was 
not enough by itself. The nations of Europe 
that had been occupied, and particularly the 
leaders of France, were emphatic in telling 
us that Europeans could not endure another 
period of liberation. This time they must be 
protected, not liberated. 

We concluded with them, therefore, that 
our Western alliance must be more than an 
agreement for liberation. It must be made 
an effective deterrent so as to dissuade any 
aggressor from reckless adventures. To 
achieve this we must create an instrument 
for instant collective defense by forces in 
being, acting under common command and 
common plans. 

For this, too, we had the hard lessons of 
two world wars to guide us. 

In World War I it had taken 4 years for 
the Allied Powers to pull themselves to- 

MAY 16, 1966 


gether and agree on a combined command 
under Marshal Foch. The obstinate insist- 
ence of the individual nation-states on sov- 
ereign and separate national commands cost 
hundreds of thousands of lives. 

In the Second World War the Western 
Powers again reaped the tragic consequences 
of their unpreparedness and their blind re- 
jection of common plans and a common com- 
mand. Denmark fell, then Norway, then the 
Low Countries, then France. Almost 5 
years elapsed before the Allies accumulated 
the military strength, unified under the in- 
tegrated command of SHAEF, that made it 
possible to mount the Normandy invasion 
and win the war. 

It was against this tragic background that 
the Atlantic Powers — inspired particularly 
by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schu- 
man — undertook in 1950 to transform the 
alliance from a classical mutual defense pact 
into a full-fledged collective security system. 
An integrated command was established 
under General Eisenhower. Common plan- 
ning was undertaken. Forces were put in 
place for the defense of Europe that now 
total 2.5 million men. And over the years 
that followed the nuclear power of the 
United States was targeted against the 
Soviet rockets aimed at Europe. 

For the first time in history the Western 
Powers were acting together with little re- 
gard for special national advantage, not 
merely to meet but to deter a potential ag- 
gressor. In what otherwise would have been 
a time of grave peril, Europeans could go 
about their affairs without an overhanging 
fear of invasion. They did so, and they have 
prospered beyond their fondest dreams. 

Construction of the Western Alliance 

The construction of the Western alliance, 
and even more the building of the collective 
security system known as NATO, meant a 
great national decision for us as Americans 
and a great common achievement for the 
West. Looking across the Atlantic, we de- 
cided that we must work actively with our 
European friends in deterring aggression in 
Europe. But even more important, we and 

they concluded that peace could be per- 
manently secured only if steps were taken 
to remove the underlying causes that had 
created so many disasters in the past. 

Of all those causes one stood out above 
all others. That was the persistent rivalry 
among the individual nation-states of Europe, 
each striving in turn to gain dominance by 
force over its neighbors. From the time of 
the Treaty of Westphalia in the middle of the 
17th century for more than a century and a 
half, the peace of the world was periodi- 
cally disturbed primarily by the efforts of 
European nations — and particularly France, 
then the largest and strongest — to achieve 
hegemony over the rest of the Continent. 
Those efforts were thwarted by shifting 
coalitions of other European states aided by 
the astute diplomacy of Britain, which for 
centuries allied itself always on the side of 
the weaker group in order to maintain a 
balance. These European struggles were not 
always confined to the Continent. Through- 
out the whole of our colonial life they 
tended to spill over into the Western Hem- 
isphere, until, when we secured our inde- 
pendence, we were able to insulate ourselves 
through a policy of isolation made possible 
by the Monroe Doctrine and the British 

We thus kept aloof from the European 
wars of the 19th century while the prepon- 
derance of power shifted in Europe. France, 
worn out by the exertions of the Napoleonic 
era and outstripped by the other major 
European powers in population, was de- 
feated by the Second Reich, which under 
Bismarck's leadership had been created by 
Prussia out of 25 German kingdoms, princi- 
palities, duchies, and free cities. Yet the 
Franco-Prussian War was but a prelude of 
things to come. For in the first half of the 
20th century the two world wars, which 
had their roots in European rivalries, 
brought all of us close to disaster. 

Against this history it was clear that, if 
there was to be peace in Europe and in the 
world, the old national rivalries had to be 
replaced by something more constructive. 
Yet this was nothing America could bring 



about by itself. We could assist the Euro- 
peans to rehabilitate themselves through 
the Marshall Plan. We could encourage them 
to sublimate their national rivalries in a new 
unity. But the actual achievement of that 
unity v^as something that only the European 
peoples could create. 

Still the climate vv^as ripe for action. The 
peoples of Europe w^ere themselves 
thoroughly tired of wars that sprang from 
the competing ambitions of nation-states. 
And so they began to work brilliantly, 
principally under French leadership, on a 
whole series of measures: the Schuman Plan, 
which created the Coal and Steel Commu- 
nity ; the proposal for a European army with- 
in a European Defense Community (which, 
had it succeeded, would have avoided many 
of the problems that haunt us today) ; and 
the European Atomic Energy Community. 
Most important was the great breakthrough 
of the Treaty of Rome that changed the 
economic face of Europe by creating a vast 
Common Market. 

This then was the prospect in the early 
part of the 1960's — a Europe making mas- 
sive strides toward unity with the strong 
prospect that its geographical boundaries 
would be expanded to include the United 
Kingdom and certain other European na- 
tions, a Europe growing prosperous with its 
burgeoning Common Market under the pro- 
tective umbrella of NATO. 

The organization of Europe is, of course, 
primarily a matter for Europeans. But it is 
a matter that deeply affects the United 
States as well. The thousands of Americans 
who gave their lives in the Argonne Forest — 
or, a quarter of a century later, in the 
Battle of the Bulge — have established our 
right and indeed our obligation to speak 
frankly on issues that so critically involve 
both our safety and our future. Our fate 
and the fate of Western Europe are tied in- 
extricably together. We recognized that on 
two occasions when we sent our young men 
overseas, and Europe recognized that on 
two occasions when it called for our help in 
an extreme hour. And, whatever words may 
be uttered in the current discussion, Euro- 

peans know today that American men and 
American might will be there when they 
need us. So we are not very much impressed 
by specious homilies about doctrine that ob- 
scure the point of America's demonstrated 
reliability in times of crisis. 

We have seen in European progress to- 
ward unity the chance for a new and fruit- 
ful relationship. As President Kennedy said 
in June 1963, in his speech at the Paulskirche 
in Frankfurt,- we "look forward to a united 
Europe in an Atlantic partnership — an en- 
tity of interdependent parts, sharing equally 
both burdens and decisions and linked to- 
gether in the tasks of defense as well as the 
arts of peace." 

The Threat to European Unity 

The idea of a united Europe linked in 
equal partnership across the Atlantic had 
great resonance on both sides of the ocean. 
But already there were forces working 
against it, in particular the decision of the 
government of one European nation-state to 
separate itself from the others and to seek 
a special position of primacy in Western 
Europe. The purposes of that government 
should not be a matter for polemics; they 
are on the public record, fully expressed or 
implied in any number of official state- 

That government has sought to halt the 
drive toward European unity in the name of 
uniting Europe; to transform the European 
Common Market into a mere commercial ar- 
rangement by hobbling the powers of the 
executive; to prevent other Western Euro- 
pean nations from achieving any participa- 
tion in the management of nuclear power 
so as to preserve its own exclusive position 
as the sole nation with nuclear weapons on 
the Western European Continent; to reduce 
the influence and ultimately the presence of 
the United States in Europe; and, finally, 
to free itself from obligations to the great 
postwar system of European and Atlantic 
institutions in order to achieve freedom of 
political and diplomatic maneuver that could 

' For text, see Bulletin of July 22, 1963, p. 118. 

MAY 16, 1966 



permit it to deal, to its own advantage, with 
what it has described with a curious im- 
partiality as "the two great hegemonies." 

The attack that has been launched 
against NATO deeply concerns all Western 
nations. Let us make no mistake about the 
fact that the withdrawal of an important 
power from participation in the arrange- 
ments that give reality to the Western alli- 
ance will weaken the common defense. More 
than that, it will weaken the Western deter- 
rent. Finally, it is likely to delay and con- 
fuse the possibilities of moving toward an 
ultimate settlement of the great unfinished 
business of Europe. For it is clear to any- 
one who has closely followed the events of 
the past decade that the gradual changes 
taking place in Eastern Europe and the 
Soviet Union have been hastened, not de- 
layed, by the firm and common purpose of 
the West. And it is clear also that if the 
West ceases to stand firm and unified, if 
each individual Western nation seeks to 
make a separate deal for itself, the gains we 
have achieved will be quickly lost and the 
hope for an ultimate European settlement 
long deferred. 

Obviously the Communist world has un- 
dergone major transformations since the 
death of Stalin. But the change has not been 
without its perils for the West. The Khru- 
shchev who preached peaceful coexistence 
punctuated his message with attempted black- 
mail in Berlin, nuclear threats at the Par- 
thenon, and missiles in Cuba. Yet, it is 
plainly right to build bridges to the Com- 
munist countries, bridges of trade and travel 
across barriers that cruelly divic'e a con- 
tinent. It is right to welcome the citizens of 
East Europe to see for themselves that capi- 
talism can yield economic progress and so- 
cial justice side by side. These things are 
right, and they should be continued. 

But those bridges to the East must be 
anchored in the solid foundation of a strong 
and cohesive Western alliance. For it is onl\ 
when the security issue is beyond dispute 
that lasting progress can be made toward 
permanently improved relations with the 
Communist states. This is the basis on which 

there can be secure movement toward a 
political settlement in Europe, leading to 
the reunification of Germany in conditions 
of peace and freedom and to real progress 
toward international arms control — goals 
that we and Europe share. 

Over and above the attack on NATO there 
is, therefore, grave cause for uneasiness in 
the resurgence of a self-centered national- 
ism. For each country's nationalism is a 
force that, particularly in Europe, tends to 
create equal and opposite forces in neigh- 
boring countries. Ever since the war we 
Americans have known that the peace of 
the world depended to a great extent on the 
gamble that Europe would transform itself, 
that the nations of Western Europe would, 
after all these centuries, put aside those 
corrosive national rivalries that have been 
the cause of past disasters and sublimate 
their energies in a common purpose and a 
new unity. At the same time, we have al- 
ways recognized the danger that the Euro- 
pean people, with reflexes conditioned by 
history, might from time to time be tempted 
to lapse into the old bad habits of the past, 
to unfurl the dusty banners of other cen- 
turies, and to re-create the conditions in 
which Europe might again become the cock- 
pit of the world. 

Concept of Equal Partnership 

There are, to be sure, voices even in this 
country that tell us almost with satisfaction 
that the latter development is inevitable 
and knowledgeable men should accept it. 
After all, they say, haven't the European 
nations regularly, 12 or 13 years after each 
war, dissolved their alliances and returned 
to their old rivalries? 

This sounds strangely like the contention 
of the early 1920's that we should return to 
"normalcy." For the kind of Eui-ope en- 
visaged by these critics is a Europe no more 
suitable to the needs of today than would 
"normalcy" be for today's America. 

What exactly would these men have us 
do? The realistic hope for peace in the 
world, they contend, is not for a unified 
Western Europe but for a Europe of nation- 



states extending from the Atlantic to the 
Urals — or, in other words, a Europe in 
which each of the middle-sized states would 
seek to make its own deal with one or the 
other of the "great hegemonies" in the 
hope of establishing for itself a first-class 
power position while keeping the others in 
an inferior role. 

Such a Europe — a continent of shifting 
coalitions and changing alliances — is not 
the hope of the future; it is a nostalgic 
evocation. It would mean not progress but 
a reversion to the tragic and discredited 
pattern of the past — a return to 1914, as 
though that were good enough, and with the 
same guarantee of instability — yet made 
more dangei'ous, not less, by the ideological 
drive of the Soviet Union and the existence 
of nuclear weapons. 

To move toward such a Europe is not the 
way to reach a settlement of the unfinished 
business of the last war. It is not a way to 
remove the Iron Curtain except on terms 
that would preserve and exacerbate dis- 
crimination and inequality and thus lay the 
groundwork for new disasters in the fu- 

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting 
peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the 
European peoples. For there is a new re- 
quirement of size in the world which makes 
it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe 
are to make their full contribution to world 
affairs, they must organize themselves on a 
scale commensurate with the requirements 
of the modem age. Let us not deceive our- 
selves; no matter how adroit diplomacy 
may be, it cannot achieve first-power status 
for a nation of limited size and resources. 

The true course of Western Europe lies 
not in fragmentation but in unity — a solid 
unity that will bring not varying degrees of 
status and citizenship but equality for all. A 
united Europe will not need to seek first- 
power status; it will have it. And unity, 
moreover, will enable the gifted European 
peoples to play their major role in the 
large affairs of this turbulent world and 
make their rich and proper contribution to 

If Europe unites, the world will no longer 
be faced with the dangers of middle-sized 
states trying to play a game of maneuver 
with one another and with the "hegemo- 
nies," after the pattern of the past. There 
will be a third large center of power and 
purpose — capable, because it is strong, of 
bringing about a European settlement, com- 
petent to come to terms with the East on a 
basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain 
and reunify the German people as equal 
members of a great community. 

As this develops, and only as it develops, 
will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full 
meaning to the concept of equal partner- 
ship. For no longer will the European na- 
tions have to fear, as some apparently do, 
the preponderance of American weight in 
our common political councils or the pre- 
ponderance of American industrial strength 
in our economic affairs. There will be equal- 
ity in a realistic sense — not something en- 
acted by international law, not something 
the United States has conferred. It will be 
an equality founded on unassailable fact, 
since a united Europe will command vast 
resources of technology and production, 
brain power and material. 

"We Want a Europe Strong, Not Enfeebled" 

Americans join with Europeans in want- 
ing this kind of Europe. We want a Europe 
strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe 
independent in spirit as it is interdependent 
in fact. As President Kennedy once said,^ "It 
is not in our interest to try to dominate the 
European councils of decision. If that were 
our objective, we would prefer to see Europe 
divided and weak, enabling the United 
States to de:.! with each fragment indi- 
vidually." But what we look forward to, he 
said, is "a Europe united and strong — 
speaking with a common voice, acting with 
a common will — a world power capable of 
meeting world problems as a full and equal 

Perhaps there are some Americans who 
would like to see a fragmented Europe, but 

» Ibid. 

MAY 16, 1966 


they have not read history carefully — or if 
they have, they have not understood it. Cer- 
tainly, it is not the policy of this adminis- 
tration any more than it was the policy of 
the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Tru- 
man administrations to see Europe dis- 

For we are prepared to take our chances 
on a Western Europe united on principles of 
equality, a Europe with a common voice. To 
be sure, it will be an independent voice, not 
always agreeing with us — but then the 
United States has no monopoly of wisdom. 
What we can be sure of is that we and our 
Western European partners will agree on 
the broad outlines of the kind of world we 
want, a world of peace and freedom. For we 
draw from the deep well of Western civiliza- 
tion, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek 
together the dignity of the individual and 
not the tyranny of the mass. 

A Europe so united was the bright hope 
and the high accomplishment of the fifties. 
It remains the real hope of Europeans and 
Americans today. For, as President Johnson 
said more than a year ago : * 

"The unknown tide of future change is al- 
ready beating about the rock of the West. 
These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic, 
this half-billion people unmatched in arms 
and industry, this measureless storehouse 
of wisdom and genius can be a fortress 
against any foe, a force that will enrich the 

life of an entire planet. It is not a question 
of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of 
moving ahead with the times, and it is a ques- 
tion of vision and persistence and the will- 
ingness to surmount the barriers of national 
rivalry against which our ancestors have al- 
ways collided." 

U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing 
Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk 

Statement by Secretary Rusk * 

The United States regards the problem of 
nuclear sharing as major unfinished busi- 
ness. The development of an arrangement 
to provide participation for NATO non- 
nuclear nations, including the Federal Re- 
public of Germany, in the management of 
nuclear power is under the most serious 
discussion among interested governments. 

The United States Government has made 
no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic 
nuclear force or any other collective ap- 
proach to the problem. The position of the 
United States remains as stated in the 
communique of President Johnson and 
Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard December 
21, 1965.2 

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866. 

' Read to news correspondents by a Department 
spokesman on Apr. 27. 
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50. 






"Leadership today requires understanding of the -problems 
we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we 
seek. It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead 
and inspire others — to lead and inspire in a sense of com- 
mon enterprise." 

The Responsibilities of World Leadership 

Address by Vice President Humphrey ^ 

It is always a I'isk to speak to the press: 
They are likely to report what you say. To- 
day I will take that risk, for I have some 
thoughts I am quite willing to have repeated. 

Today our America stands as the most 
powerful, the most prosperous, and the 
freest nation in the history of the earth. 
And in our power, wealth, and freedom we 
stand as leader of the Western World. 

As a nation cautioned from the first 
against entangling alliances, this role is not 
an easy one. And, indeed, to many other na- 
tions of the world we remain a relatively 
unknown quantity. For it has been only in 
recent years that we have ventured into the 
world with any real seriousness. 

And thus we hear questions asked: Are 
we overreaching ourselves? Will we tire of 
our tasks? Will our economy be able to sup- 
port the burdens we carry at home and 
abroad? Are we equal to the role of world 

I Fair enough questions they are. For the 
answers affect the great majority of na- 
tions and the great majority of the world's 
peoples — not only because of the weight of 
our power but because of the things we 
stand for. In Tom Paine's words : "The cause 

' Made before the Associated Press at New York, 
N.Y., on Apr. 25 ; advance text. 

of America is in great measure the cause of 
all mankind." 

In the final analysis the questions asked 
about us can only be answered by how we 
measure up to the challenges before us. 

Today we face three great and interre- 
lated tasks in the world: the pursuit of 
peace, the effort to narrow the gap between 
the rich and poor nations, and the neces- 
sity of sustaining an American economy 
able to carry a thousand future burdens 
here and around the world. 

The Search for Peace 

Our search for peace finds its best ex- 
pression in our support for the kind of 
world envisioned in the United Nations 
Charter — a world where large and small 
nations might live alike in harmony without 
threat of external coercion. 

No nation has done more for peace than 
has ours since World War II. The U.N., the 
Marshall Plan, Point 4, the Alliance for Prog- 
ress, the Peace Corps, the Asian Develop- 
ment Bank, the International Monetary 
Fund and World Bank, Food for Peace, the 
nuclear test ban treaty — these have come 
from initiatives worthy of our position of 
leadership. These have come from our 
search for peace. 

But other initiatives, too, have come from 

MAY 16, 1966 



our search for peace: firmness in Berlin; 
aid to Greece and Turkey; the founding of 
NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; resistance to 
aggression in Korea; the determination that 
nuclear missiles should not be introduced 
into the hemisphere. For we have long since 
learned that peaceful development cannot 
exist in an environment of violence, aggres- 
sion, and fear. 

Today peace is at stake in Asia. Peace is 
at stake in a hundred thousand Asian vil- 
lages, in the struggle of peasants against 
a millennium of poverty, disease, and de- 

Peace is at stake in a tortured South 
Viet-Nam, in the struggle against the classic 
power tactics of communism. 

We must not lose the peace in either 
struggle. That is why we have committed 
once more — as we have had to do before — 
men, money, and resources to help the na- 
tions of Asia help themselves toward se- 
curity and independence. 

It won't be easy. It will be frustrating 
and at times heartbreaking. But if we are 
not to deny our leadership, if we are not to 
deny the principles in which we believe, we 
must stay and see it through. And the free 
nations of the world need to know that we 
have the vision and the endurance to do so. 

Those who threaten their neighbors in 
Asia should know it too. They should 
know that we will resist their aggression. 

Narrowing the Gap Between Rich and Poor 

But they should also know that we bear 
no consumptive hate against their people, 
that we have no design on their sovereignty. 
We look only toward the day when all na- 
tions may choose to live in harmony with 
their neighbors, when they may turn to- 
gether their energies to building a better 
life for their peoples. 

For this is, after all, the second great 
task before us — the desperate need to nar- 
row the widenino: gap between the rich 
and poor nations of the world. I give you 
the words of Pope John XXIII in his encyc- 
lical Mater et Magistra: 

The solidarity which binds all men and makes 
them members of the same family requires political 
communities enjoying an abundance of material 
goods not to remain indifferent to those political 
communities whose citizens suffer from poverty, 
misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elemen- 
tary rights of the human person. 

This is particularly true since, given the grow- 
ing interdependence among the peoples of the 
earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if 
glaring economic and social inequality among them 
persist. . . . 

We are all equally responsible for the under- 
nourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to 
educate one's conscience to the sense of responsi- 
bility which weighs upon each and every one, es- 
pecially upon those who are more blessed with this 
world's goods. 

We sit here today comfortably examining 
this situation. But for the disinherited and 
left out of this world, it is no matter for 
examination: It is a matter of day-to-day 

Today there are families spending their 
last day on earth because they haven't the 
strength or health to keep going. 

But those who remain — and you can be 
sure of this — those who remain will take to 
the streets, they will turn to any master, 
they will tear the fabric of peace to shreds, 
unless they have some reason to believe 
that there is hope for life and hope for 

To put this on a more immediate and 
practical level, let me call to your attention 
the foreign aid request now before the Con- 
gress. - 

The expenditure for the first year of the 
Marshall Plan was about 2 percent of our 
GNP, and 11 1/2 percent of the Federal budg- 
et. Today, thanks to the growth of our 
American economy, our foreign aid request 
is for only 0.29 percent of our GNP and 
about 1.9 percent of the Federal budget — 
that is, about 2 cents out of every tax dol- 
lar. Yet we hear the same doubts and com- 
plaints today that we heard 20 years ago. 

If someone has a substitute for foreign 
aid, I'd like to hear about it. The investment 
we make in foreign aid — in preventive med- 

- For text of President Johnson's message, see 
Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320. 



icine, if you will — is certainly less than that 
necessary to treat the symptoms of massive 
economic crisis and disorder and, yes, of 

The Marshall Plan saved Western Europe 
and the peace. It created a great new eco- 
nomic market for us. But there is more : The 
revived nations of Western Europe have not 
only repaid their Marshall Plan debts; they 
have already provided more aid to the de- 
veloping countries than they ever received 
from us. The rewards can be just as great 
tomorrow in other continents. 

If there are questions asked about our 
ability to meet this task, I think they must 
be answered affirmatively and without equiv- 

We do not seek to do this task alone nor 
should we. But how can we expect others to 
follow if we do not lead ? 

Fashioning an America Abie To Lead 

President Eisenhower described the third 
great task we face today : ". . . the firm base 
for the problem of leading the world toward 
the achievement of human aspirations — to- 
ward peace with justice in freedom — must 
be the United States." 

We must fashion an America so strong, 
so free, so able to lead, that there may be 
no question about our purposes or our en- 
durance. Basic to this is the necessity of 
building an economy of growth and oppor- 
tunity, yet stable in time when it is tested. 

I need not remind this audience of the 
Communist belief — I suppose some of them 
still hold it — ^that the United States was 
teetering on the brink of economic chaos, 
that it was just a matter of time until our 
production lines would grind to a halt, until 
an army of unemployed would seize the 
state, until economic warfare among the 
Western nations would open the door to 

I think by now some of the Communist 
doctrinists have come to realize that Lord 
Keynes was speaking to them as well as 
others when he wrote: "Practical men, who 
believe themselves to be quite exempt from 

intellectual influences, are usually the slaves 
of some defunct economist." 

The American economic miracle is the 
world's greatest success story. Last year 
alone we increased our GNP by $47 billion, 
increased our total personal income by $39 
billion, and increased our Federal cash re- 
ceipts by ^Si/'o billion. 

All this did not happen by accident. Part 
of it is certainly due to the influence of Mr. 
Keynes and the so-called New Economics. 
But I believe the basic, underlying reason 
behind our economic success is this : There is 
today a creative partnership for prosperity 
among those in our society who used to think 
of themselves as natural antagonists. 

We are dispelling old myths. How long 
has it been since we've heard old empty 
labels such as "labor boss" and "economic 

The fact is that American Government, 
business, and labor are increasingly united 
in the premise that a stronger and better 
America will be to the common benefit of 
all. Among other things, we are united in 
our determination to accomplish something 
that no nation has previously dared to try : to 
make every citizen in our society a full and 
productive member of our society. 

And so today we make national invest- 
ments in our country and in our people — 
investments in productivity', in opportunity, 
in enterprise, in greater social justice, in 
self-help. That is what our Great Society 
programs are all about. 

Education, medical care, war against pov- 
erty, programs of retraining and redevelop- 
ment, better cities and transportation, an 
even more productive agriculture, yes, equal- 
ity at the ballot box and before the law — 
these are the most basic investments of all 
in an America able to keep its commitments 
both at home and abroad. 

As the President has said so often, it is 
not a matter of a Great Society or fulfill- 
ment of our international responsibilities. It 
is not a matter of guns or butter, foreign 
aid or domestic education. They are tied to- 
gether, and you cannot separate them. 

MAY 16, 1966 


If we can build a society operating on all 
its cylinders, others in the world may have 
some hope of doing the same. If we cannot, 
what hope may others have ? 

To make our free system work, to sustain 
it, to keep our pledges all the while — this 
indeed is the way to erase any doubts the 
world may have about our ability to fulfill 
the responsibility of leadership. 

In closing, may I say a word about the 
nature of that responsibility. 

Leadership in today's world requires far 
more than a large stock of gunboats and a 
hard fist at the conference table. 

Leadership today requires more than the 
ability to go it alone — although we must not 
be afraid to do so when necessary. 

Leadership today requires understand- 
ing of the problems we face, of the resources 
at hand, and of the objectives we seek. 

It requires the ability, perhaps even more, 
to lead and inspire others — to lead and in- 
spire in a sense of common enterprise. For as 
strong and rich as we may become, our goal 
of a just and peaceful world will never be 
achieved by America alone. 

It will be achieved only when the re- 
sources of strong and weak, rich and poor 
alike, are allocated, in the most efficient 
manner possible, to challenges that are far 
too great for any one nation or group of 
nations to attempt to overcome. 

This, then, is the test of ourselves: not 
to march alone but to march in such a way 
that others will wish to join us. 

I will add one caveat: In none of this 
should we expect either friendship or grati- 
tude. We have already eaten breakfast to the 
accompaniment, in our morning newspapers, 
of too many "Yankee Go Home" signs, too 
many riots, too many denunciations of our- 
selves, to believe that leadership can reward 
us with international laurel wreaths. 

I think the most we can expect is this: 
that those who question us will one day find 
no reason to question; that in the world 
there may be no doubt that Americans have 
the vision, the endurance, and the courage 
to stand and see it through for what we be- 
lieve in. 

Secretary Comments on Peiping's 
Militancy in Southeast Asia 

Following is the transcript of an interview 
with Secretary Rusk by John Scali for the 
American Broadcasting Company's hour- 
long television program, "Red China: Year 
of the Gun?" on April 27. 

Press release 100 dated April 27 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, who is to blame 
for the isolation of China from the free 
world? Is our policy at fault? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this goes 
back for many years. I think that undoubt- 
edly there have been problems on both sides. 
But in these more recent years I think that 
it is clear that the attitudes in Peiping 
have isolated them from most of the rest of 
the world. For example, they are having 
great difficulties inside the Communist 
world. They refused to attend the 23d Con- 
gress of the Communist Party in Moscow. 
They have had similar difficulties in the 
Afro-Asian world. They had a debacle last 
year in attempting to work out arrangements 
for a second Bandung conference. Their 
policies have caused deep divisions between 
themselves and almost everyone else. 

Now, as far as the United States is con- 
cerned, we have been engaged in conversa- 
tions with them for more than 10 years. We 
have had our 129th bilateral talk with 
them — talks that were carried on in Geneva 
and in Warsaw. We will be having another 
one with them next month. We have been in 
closer touch with them, I suppose, than al- 
most any government that has diplomatic 
relations with them, with the exception pos- 
sibly of Moscow. 

This is not a deliberate attempt by every- 
one else to forget Peiping or to freeze them 
out of the total situation. We know they are 
there. We know that they ought to be drawn 
into the major questions, such as peace in 
Southeast Asia, such as disarmament. And 
many efforts have been made to bring them 
into those discussions. But their own at- 
titude has made it very difficult to get them 



into a position of real discussion with those 
with whom they bitterly disagree. 

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how can we be 
sure that the Chinese won't miscalculate the 
depth of our determination, for example, in 
Viet-Nam, unless we have regular sys- 
temized discussions with them, perhaps 
through diplomatic recognition? 

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that 
formal diplomatic recognition is required for 
discussions. I have already indicated we have 
had 129 talks with them ourselves and we 
will soon have another one. Formal relation- 
ships with them run into a very serious and 
central obstacle. 

You will recall that the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee had a series of hear- 
ings about China, and in connection with 
that and in other discussions it has been in- 
dicated that we have tried to exchange 
newsmen and scholars and doctors and we 
have tried to establish some sort of better 
contact with Peiping.^ 

Well, in a very important article in the 
People's Daily, signed by "Observer" — 
which is the pen name for some very high 
official — they said once again publicly that: 

So long as the United States Government does 
not change its hostile policy toward China and re- 
fuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and 
the Taiwan Straits, the normalization of Sino- 
American relations is entirely out of the question. 
And so is the solution of such a concrete question 
as the exchange of visits between personnel of the 
two countries. 

Now, there they said publicly only last 
month what we have been saying privately 
for 10 years. In effect, that there is nothing 
to discuss until we are prepared to sur- 
render Formosa, and when we indicate that 
we can't surrender these 13 million people 
on Formosa as far as we are concerned, then 
the conversation gets to be very difficult and 
very strained, very formal, very unproduc- 

Mr. Scali: In fighting the war in Viet- 

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the 
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of 
the House Committee on Foreign^ Affairs, see Bul- 
letin of May 2, 1966, p. 686. 

Nam, do we seek to avoid military moves 
which the Chinese might regard as a prel- 
ude to an American invasion of the China 

Secretary Rus