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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

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DEPARTMENT

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STATE

BULLETIN

UNITED STATES TASKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN ASIA
Address by Vice President Humphrey 523

THE ISSUE AND GOAL IN VIET-NAM
hy Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 529

AMERICA AND BRITAIN: UNITY AND PURPOSE
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 539

KEEPING OUR COMMITMENT TO PEACE
Address by Secretary Rusk 5H

For index see inside hack cover

". . . the backbone of world peace is the integrity of the
commitment of the United States."

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace

Address by Secretary Rusk '

It is a pleasure and privilege to be with
you on this occasion, commemorating the
50th anniversary of the journalism pro-
gram of your School of Public Communica-
tions.

As a public official, I am unavoidably
aware of the immensity, the range and
variety, the power, and the insatiable curios-
ity of American journalism and journalists.
I am aware of these every waking hour, and
sometimes in my sleep. I am accustomed to
reading, or hearing, many things that I al-
ready knew, many that I didn't know but
prove to be true, and a few that were not
and never become true — that remain "exclu-
sive" forever. Now and then I read, or hear,
predictions or comments about myself —
some critical, some favorable — with which
I am not always able to concur.

From time to time I have been invited to
deliver a lecture on the press and its role
in foreign affairs, but I have steadfastly re-
fused to engage in that task. I prefer to
take my crises one at a time. Perhaps, if
you will invite me to your 75th anniversary,
I might be willing to oblige.

As a matter of fact, I know of no people
better served by our media of information
than are the American people. And I must
confess my complete respect for the intelli-
gence, the energy, and the breadth and
depth of information which mark the ex-

' Made at the Founder's Day banquet of the Boston
University School of Public Communications at Bos-
ton, Mass., on Mar. 14 (press release 49).

traordinary press corps assembled in our
National Capital.

Among the journalists I would place
high in that company is your distinguished
alumnus who introduced me tonight, John
Scali. He has made his mark in both written
and spoken journalism. And he has also
served, on one notable occasion, as what
might be called a "covert Ambassador-Ex-
traordinary"— in October 1962 during the
Cuban missile crisis.

We in Government share with the media
of information the broadest common interest
in informing the public. I sometimes regret
that the available space and time — and in-
deed the time of the reader or listener — do
not permit as wide a coverage of important
matters as some of them might deserve. I
particularly have in mind the unsung 80 per-
cent of our work which has to do with the
quiet, persistent, constructive, and deeply
satisfying process of building a decent world
order and a decent life for man.

It is also true that there is an inevitable
tension between officials and reporters
about that tiny fraction of our business —
some 1 or 2 percent — which is or ought to
be secret, at least temporarily. I do not
suggest that there should be a treaty be-
tween officials and reporters on this subject
because the very tension itself is wholesome,
over time, in the public interest. Without
the inquiring reporter, some in Government
would be tempted to be quiet about matters
that ought to be known. So I would expect

514

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

V&l

the reporter to seek information, and I
would expect officials to keep their mouths
shut about those matters on which they
ought not to talk. Actually, secrets are not
secret for very long — at least in the United
States. And I can tell you quite honestly
that I do not know of any secrets which
could have a significant effect upon the
judgments which citizens or commentators
are able to make upon matters of policy or
public interest.

I wish to talk to you quietly this evening
about Viet-Nam. Some of you may feel that
enough has been said on that subject, but
it remains dangerous and overshadows many
other relationships in the present world
scene.

One hears a good deal about the word
"confusion" these days. Let me say, I hope
without too much presumption, that I am
not confused — and President Johnson is not
confused — about the facts, the issues. United
States policy, and the present attitude of
Hanoi and Peiping. We are concerned, as
any rational man would be, but we are not
confused. It is my impression that there are
some who, when they say,"I am confused,"
really mean, "I do not agree." It is impor-
tant that all who debate these issues de-
clare, and not conceal, their major prem-
ises— otherwise we are not able to under-
stand what else they are saying.

Source of Assault on South Viet-Nam

It is altogether clear from irrefutable evi-
dence that the assault on South Viet-Nam
was organized and has been directed by the
Communist regime of North Viet-Nam. It
has involved not only ordering into action
Communist cadres left behind for that pur-
pose when Viet-Nam was divided in 1954
but the infiltration from the North of tens
of thousands of trained men and increasing
quantities of arms. For well over a year the
forces infiltrated from the North have in-
cluded organized units of regimental or
larger strength of the regular army of
North Viet-Nam.

And it is not just South Viet-Nam and
the United States which hold that view. At

Manila, in April 1964, the SEATO Council
of Ministers declared ^ that the attack on
South Viet-Nam was a "Communist aggres-
sion . . . (an) organized campaign . . .
directed, supplied and supported by the
Communist regime in North Vietnam, in
flagrant violation of the Geneva Accords of
1954 and 1962." They declared "that the de-
feat of the Communist campaign is essen-
tial not only to the security of the Republic
of Vietnam, but to that of South-East Asia."
The United Kingdom, Australia, New
Zealand, the Philippines, Thailand, and Pak-
istan, as well as the United States, sub-
scribed to those declarations. Similar — but
generally stronger — declarations were made
by the SEATO Council of Ministers in Lon-
don in April 1965 » and by the ANZUS
Council of Ministers in 1964* and 1965.^
And these views have been endorsed by
many other governments.

SEATO and Other Defensive Alliances

I have mentioned SEATO — the Southeast
Asia Collective Defense Organization. Re-
cently I have read some curious comments
about it and our other defensive alliances.

I have read that I said that the obligation
of the United States to oppose an armed at-
tack against the territory covered by the
Southeast Asia treaty "did not depend on all
other members agreeing to oppose it." That
is neither novel nor remarkable. It is based
on the plain language of the treaty and the
official explanations which accompanied the
consideration of the treaty by the Senate. If
action under the treaty required a unani-
mous vote, then one or more members — the
smallest or the most distant — could veto ac-
tion by the rest. This impediment was not
written into SEATO, nor was it written into
NATO.

Let me pause for a few moments to re-
flect upon the events of the past four de-

' For text of a communique, see BULLETIN of
May 4, 1964, p. 692.

" Ibid., June 7, 1965, p. 923.
*lbid., Aug. 3, 1964, p. 146.
•'Ibid., July 19, 1965, p. 135.

APRIL 4, 1966

515

cades. I graduated from college in the year
when Japanese militarists seized Manchuria.
It seemed a long way away, and little was
done by the nations of the world to defend
the peace against a flagrant aggression. In
1935 Mussolini launched his aggression
against Ethiopia, and it was not even possi-
ble to organize an oil embargo against him.
Then Hitler moved into the Rhineland, un-
opposed, and went on to Austria, Czechoslo-
vakia, Poland, and World War II erupted
with its frightful costs.

Before the guns were silent in that war,
the nations of the world thought long and
hard about how such a war had come about
and how, in the words of the U.N. Charter,
we can "save succeeding generations from
the scourge of war, which twice in our life-
time has brought untold sorrow to man-
kind." The lesson of World War II was that
it was necessary to organize and defend a
peace — not merely to wish for it — and to
"unite our strength to maintain international
peace and security."

Article 1 of the United Nations Charter is
utterly fundamental and, although some may
think it old-fashioned to speak of it, I
should like to remind you of what it says :

To maintain international peace and security, and
to that end: to take effective collective measures
for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about
by peaceful means, and in conformity with the
principles of justice and international lavs', adjust-
ment or settlement of international disputes or
situations which might lead to a breach of the
peace; . . .

Unhappily and tragically, the ink was not
dry on the United Nations Charter before it
became fully apparent that Joseph Stalin
had turned to world revolution and a policy
of aggressive militancy. The first major is-
sue before the Security Council was his at-
tempt to keep Russian forces in Iran. Then
came guerrilla operations against Greece,
pressure on Turkey, the Berlin blockade,
and the Korean aggression. These moves led
to defensive action by the free world and a
number of mutual defense treaties — the
Rio Pact, NATO, the ANZUS treaty with

Australia and New Zealand, and bilateral
treaties with the Philippines and Japan.

Under President Eisenhower we con-
cluded the Southeast Asia treaty, which, by
a protocol, committed us to help the three
non-Communist states of former French
Indochina — South Viet-Nam, Laos, and Cam-
bodia— to repel armed attacks, if they asked
for help.® Under Eisenhower we also en-
tered mutual defense pacts with the Re-
public of Korea ' and the Republic of China
on Formosa.*

All of those commitments to oppose ag-
gression— through the United Nations and
through our various defensive alliances —
were approved by the Senate by overwhelm-
ing majorities of both parties. And these
and related obligations have been sustained
over the years by authorizations, appro-
priations, and other supporting measures
enacted by bipartisan votes in both Houses
of Congress.

The Backbone of World Peace

I have read that I have drawn "no dis-
tinction between powerful industrial demo-
cratic states in Europe and weak and un-
democratic states in Asia." The answer is
that, for the Secretary of State, our treaty
commitments are a part of the supreme law
of the land, and I do not believe that we can
be honorable in Europe and dishonorable in
Asia.

I do believe that the United States must
keep its pledged word. That is not only a
matter of national honor but an essential to
the preservation of peace. For the backbone
of world peace is the integrity of the com-
mitment of the United States.

There would be no possibility of preserv-
ing peace if our allies — or, even more im-
portant, our adversaries — should come to be-
lieve that the United States will not do what
it says it will do. Doubt about that could
lead to catastrophic miscalculations by our

* For text of the treaty and protocol, see ibid.,
Sept. 20, 1954, p. 393.

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 17, 1953, p. 204.
' For text, see ibid., Dec. 13, 1954, p. 899.

516

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

adversaries. Let me illustrate by two ex-
amples. It was necessary for both President
Eisenhower and President Kennedy to in-
form Mr. Khrushchev that the United
States would not yield to an ultimatum con-
cerning Berlin. Had Mr. Khrushchev not be-
lieved that, there would have been war.
Again, in the Cuban missile crisis of 1962,
had not Mr. Khrushchev believed it when
President Kennedy said those missiles must
go, there might have been war.

I am honored to have my name associ-
ated with the doctrine that the United
States must honor its pledged word. But
I am convinced that the American people
subscribe to that doctrine.

Yet I read recently that the SEATO
treaty is just a scrap of paper. There were
no quotation marks around "a scrap of
paper" and no other indication of any sort
that that is an historic phrase : that for more
than half a century it has been associated
with black infamy — that it was what the
Kaiser's Chancellor called the solemn pledge
of Germany and others to observe the neu-
trality of Belgium.

God help us — and the cause of freedom
and peace — if our Government should ever
agree with those who regard our commit-
ments as "scraps of paper."

The SEATO Treaty

I read lately that I had suddenly redis-
covered the SEATO treaty, that I had shifted
my explanation of the legal basis of the
American commitment in Viet-Nam because
somebody thought the administration was
relying too much on the congressional res-
olution of August 1964.

The fact is that I have always treated the
SEATO treaty — which the Senate approved
with only one dissenting vote — as an impor-
tant part of our commitment to defend
South Viet-Nam.

That treaty was carefully considered by
the Foreign Relations Committee. And its
report,* urging that the Senate give its "ad-
vice and consent" to ratification, said:

The committee is not impervious to the risks which
this treaty entails. It fully appreciates that accept-
ance of these additional obligations commits the
United States to a course of action over a vast
expanse of the Pacific. Yet these risks are consist-
ent with our own highest interests. There are
greater hazards in not advising a potential enemy
of what he can expect of us, and in failing to dis-
abuse him of assumptions which might lead to a
miscalculation of our intentions.

Now, I have never asserted that the
Southeast Asia treaty comprises all of our
commitment to the defense of South Viet-
Nam. I have cited the statements of three
successive Presidents, the various aid bills
approved by Congress against the back-
ground of those statements, and the SEATO
treaty, as well as the congressional resolu-
tion of August 1964.

When the President asked Congress to
pass such a resolution he specifically cited
"the obligations of the United States under
the Southeast Asia Treaty." »» And that res-
olution— adopted by a combined vote of 504
to 2 in the two Houses — contained this
language:"

Sec. 2. The United States regards as vital to its
national interest and to world peace the mainte-
nance of international peace and security in south-
east Asia. Consonant with the Constitution of the
United States and the Charter of the United Na-
tions and in accordance with its obligations under
the Southeast Asia Collective Defense Treaty, the
United States is, therefore, prepared, as the Presi-
dent determines, to take all necessary steps, includ-
ing the use of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collective De-
fense Treaty requesting assistance in defense of its
freedom.

So the assertion that the administration
has suddenly rediscovered the SEATO
treaty is not based on fact. If I have talked
about that treaty a little more lately it is-
partly because North Viet-Nam has been
escalating its aggression into a full-scale
armed attack directly and unequivocally
raising the solemn commitment which the
Senate had approved — by an overwhelming-
vote.

•S. Ex. Rept. 1, 84th Cong., 1st sess.

" For text of a message to the Congress from
President Johnson, see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964,
p. 261.

" For text, see ibid., p. 268.

A.PRIL 4, 1966

51,7

I do not regard our policy in Viet-Nam as
based only on past commitments. I believe
that it is now just as much in our interest —
and that of the free world — to repel Com-
munist aggression there as it was when we
made those earlier commitments.

Support of Free-World Nations

Now, I turn to the attitudes of other free-
world nations toward the struggle in Viet-
Nam and our support of South Viet-Nam.
Assertions to the effect that we stand alone,
that most of our allies disapprove, et cetera,
are incorrect.

Let me quote from a speech made in
London a year ago by the Australian Minis-
ter for External Affairs, Mr. Paul Hasluck:

Twice in this generation, without hesitation, Aus-
tralians have come to fight against aggression in
Europe because we saw a war started in Europe
was a danger, not only to Europe, but to the whole
world. Today, we see aggression in Asia as being
just as much a danger to the whole world as it is to
those of us who live in or near Asia. Indeed, today
the risk of a world war starting is more immediate
in Asia than in any other continent. Southeast
Asia is today the front line in the struggle for
world security.

Recalling that Australia had contributed
air forces to help break the blockade of
Berlin, Mr. Hasluck said :

Vietnam today is no less fateful to the future of
the world than was the Berlin crisis, and Western
Europe is as closely concerned there in Vietnam as
we ourselves were concerned with Berlin.

Taking this view . . . Australia sees the actions
of the United States in Asia as an acceptance by
that great power of the world-wide responsibilities
which came to it simply because it is great. We
honor them for what they are doing in Vietnam
and we support them in it.

Australia has had some 1,400 combat
troops in Viet-Nam, fighting valiantly at the
side of the Vietnamese and ourselves. They
have contributed to the security of South-
east Asia in other respects including the de-
ployment of troops for the defense of Ma-
laysia. And they have been training Viet-
namese officers in Australia and supplying
surgical teams and cash aid. Last week
Prime Minister Harold Holt announced that
Australia was trebling its combat forces in

Viet-Nam. We warmly welcome this addi-
tional effort by our stanch allies in Aus-
tralia. New Zealand has contributed an artil-
lery company. The Australians, the New
Zealanders, and we are bound together not
only by treaty commitments but by common
interests, institutions, and ideals. And we
know from previous wars that they are
courageous allies — very good people to have
at your side when the going is tough.

And here is a quotation from the distin-
guished Foreign Minister of Thailand,
Thanat Khoman :

We profoundly realize that nowadays, as in the
past, no "peace in our time" can be bought by
sacrificing a free nation, be it South Viet-Nam
or Southeast Asia or, for that matter, any other
nation in the world. On the contrary, the chances
for an enduring peace will become greater if we
can see to it that aggression against free nations,
either in overt or covert form, shall not be profit-
able. . . .

Thailand has already been designated by
Peiping as the next target. And I would em-
phasize that Thailand is contributing much
more than eloquent words to the security of
Southeast Asia. Its military forces help to
guard the heart of the Southeast Asian
peninsula — and the flank of Viet-Nam. It is
helping to train South Vietnamese aviators
and is cooperating generally in the defense
of Southeast Asia.

The vital significance of the struggle in
Viet-Nam is well understood in the Philip-
pines. President Marcos has requested the
Philippine Congress to approve the dispatch
to Viet-Nam of military engineers with their
own security forces — some 2,000 men.

The Prime Minister of Malaysia has pub-
licly declared that "countries which subscribe
to the United Nations Charter must help"
South Viet-Nam to repel the "aggression"
from the North.

The Republic of China on Formosa is con-
tributing technicians and commodities.

The Republic of Korea has sent a full
division plus a regiment of military engi-
neers with their own security forces. The
Koreans have fought with great gallantry
and professional skill. Recently President
Park asked the South Korean legislature to

518

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

approve the dispatch of a second division.
This would make Korea's troop contribution,
in ratio to population, greater than our own.

But, of course, the main burden of the
fighting has been carried by the South
Vietnamese, and will continue to be. They
have nearly 700,000 men under arms. And,
every day, they are engaged in many more
ground actions than are the troops of the
United States and their other allies.

Contrary to some assertions I have read,
the Government of Japan has understood
our policy in regard to South Viet-Nam and
is deeply conscious of how it relates to peace
in Southeast Asia, in which Japan has a vital
national interest. Japan has consistently
supported efforts to bring Hanoi to the con-
ference table and has extended for many
years now valuable economic and strong
political support to the Government of
South Viet-Nam. Anybody who thinks that
Japanese confidence in us would be in-
creased by a failure to repel the aggression
against South Viet-Nam is seriously mis-
taken.

And the same is true of most of the Asian
nations which are trying to adhere to "non-
alinement." They know that they have a
vital interest in the outcome of the struggle
in Viet-Nam.

The head of one nonalined government re-
cently said privately to a representative of
the United States that success in repelling
the aggression against South Viet-Nam
would assure the peace of Southeast Asia
for a generation.

Contrary to some assertions our role in
Viet-Nam is not opposed by most of our
allies in other parts of the world. With very
few exceptions, the governments of free
Europe understand and support our posi-
tion. The United Kingdom has done so, under
both its Labor government and the Conserv-
ative government which preceded it. Al-
though it has no troops in Viet-Nam, it has
substantial military forces in the area, most
of them committed to the defense of Ma-
laysia.

We have the support of the Federal Re-
public of Germany. For example, a state-

ment from the office of the Federal Chan-
cellor in January said: "The German Gov-
ernment has always maintained the view
that the defense of the freedom and inde-
pendence of Viet-Nam by the United States
of America is of the greatest importance
for the entire Free World." The Federal
Republic has made substantial nonmilitary
contributions to South Viet-Nam and re-
cently announced that it would send a hos-
pital ship.

Some of our NATO allies have feared that
the struggle in Viet-Nam might compel us
to reduce our forces in Europe. Manlio
Brosio, the distinguished Secretary General
of NATO, has correctly said :

... a setback for the United States in Asia, for
example, in Vietnam, would also be a grave setback
for the whole of the West. Not only this, but an
American retreat or a humiliating compromise in
Vietnam, far from ending United States commit-
ments in Asia, would extend them on an even
greater scale to all sorts of other areas, from
Thailand to the Philippines.

In a recent article the former Italian Min-
ister of Defense, Giulio Andreotti, said :

America could have left its Viet-Nam ally to its
own destiny, but it would have been a morally
criminal act, without mentioning the psychological
consequences in Asia and elsewhere. . . . the Com-
munists . . . would do well to remember that Amer-
icans did not give in to isolationism when, 25 years
ago, they decided to come to fight and die on our
continent. . . .

A week ago tonight, in a speech in Brus-
sels, one of the most eminent statesmen of
Europe, Paul-Henri Spaak, Foreign Minister
of Belgium, referred to the Soviet menace
to Europe following the Second World War
and said :

At that time . . . nearly all of us were delighted
to see the United States come to our help. . . .
Is there anyone who would dare suggest that the
free peoples of Asia are not menaced by Chinese
imperialism? How can we fail to understand that
. . . the world role of the United States "obliges
it to take in Asia a position identical to that taken
previously in Europe?"

Mr. Spaak emphasized the importance of
the argument that if the United States does
not observe one of its commitments how
can the rest of the world believe that it will

APRIL 4, 1966

519

respect other engagements? He said he
thought that argument was "essential" and
that the leaders of the United States were
right. He said also: "I do not know why
people cannot understand that much more is
at stake in the Viet-Nam conflict than sim-
ply the independence or the servitude of
South Viet-Nam." And he went on to say:

I am astonished and stupefied when I receive
. . . petitions asking the United States to make
peace in Viet-Nam. ... It was not the Americans
who wanted war. . . . Today it is they who offer to
take peace under reasonable conditions and it is
their adversaries who refuse to do so. . . .

The truth is that there should be ... a broad
movement of people from all of Europe and of all
parties and beliefs to affirm that the conditions
proposed by the United States are reasonable and
that those who should be pilloried are those who
refuse to examine those conditions and to enter
upon a policy of peace.

I think most Americans would wish to
join their Government in thanking that
great Belgian champion of freedom for his
outspoken support.

No, the United States does not stand
alone assisting the Republic of Viet-Nam to
repel an aggression. The facts about the
cause and nature of the struggle there, and
the vital stakes involved, are increasingly
realized throughout the free world. I know
from my own contacts that a great majority
of non-Communist governments understand
and support what we are doing, even though
some, for various reasons, have not yet said
so publicly. And I think you will see more
and more governments of the free world
offering, or increasing, tangible assistance
to South Viet-Nam.

Nearly all the governments of the free
world — and, I venture to say, some in the
Communist world — understand that the
United States has made persistent and ex-
traordinary efforts to obtain a peaceful
settlement in Viet-Nam — that it is Hanoi
and Peiping which have barred the road to
peace. We continue to seek a peaceful set-
tlement. It must, of course, assure to the
people of South Viet-Nam their right to
choose their own government and order
their own affairs in their own way.

Quite frankly, I cannot understand those

who say that when somebody is shooting at
you, and you ask him to stop, you are ask-
ing for "unconditional surrender." That
seems to me to be an abuse of language. We
are not asking the other side to change their
regime, or to surrender a single acre or
single individual. All we are asking them to
do is to stop shooting at South Viet-Nam.

The Right to Independence and Peace

It is not true that we believe that the
United States should become involved in
every crisis or disturbance. On the contrary,
we don't go around looking for business. We
much prefer to see disputes settled by re-
gional organizations or the United Nations
or mediation or negotiation between the par-
ties. There have been many, many disputes
in the last 5 years in which the United
States has not been involved.

But when major aggression occurs, or is
threatened, against those to whom we have
commitments, and the intended victims lack
the power to defend themselves and seek
our help, we become involved. Had we not
done so — from the assault on Greece and
threat to Turkey through the Berlin block-
ade and the Korean war and now the threat
to Southeast Asia — vast areas and popula-
tions would have fallen under the domina-
tion of the Communist world revolution.

And, to go on to a related point, I can
see no possibility of a stable peace through
spheres of influence. Who is to determine
which are to be the "master" nations — and
which their vassals? And what happens
when the "master" nations engage in strug-
gles among themselves about spheres of in-
fluence? I cannot imagine a surer path to
war — and much more devastating wars than
the world has ever known.

I would think that the United Nations
Charter is right — that every nation, large or
small, has a right to live in independence
and peace, even though it is next door to a
great power. I would think that, in the age
of intercontinental rockets and thermonuclear
warheads, the prospects for the survival of
the human race are dismal unless that fun-
damental proposition is upheld. And, I sub-

520

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

mit, no other policy is consistent with the
principles for which the United States has
long stood and to which we are solemnly
committed through the United Nations Char-
ter and many other international agree-
ments, including those which govern the re-
lations of the Western Hemisphere.

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic
and Social Development in Asia

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON I

This is a moment in which history and
hope meet and move on from here as part-
ners. Less than 1 year ago, on April 7, 1965,
I asked for the creation of the Asian de-
velopment plan to seek economic advance
and social justice for all of Asia.^ I pledged
the full support of the United States of
America to that task.

Today we have begun to redeem that
pledge. The act I sign this morning author-
izes the United States of America to ratify
the charter of the Asian Development
Bank. 3 Seldom have nations joined together
in a collective venture that is so endowed
with promise. For that reason this moment
is a very special one for so many people.
p First, for the Asian leaders, who con-
ceived and organized the bank and who are
so ably represented here today by the am-
bassadors from their countries; for the
people of those non-Asian nations which
have signed the charter and whose ambas-
sadors have come this morning to bespeak
again their vision and generosity; finally,
for my great friend, a true American, Eu-
gene Black, whose energy and tact have
been as indispensable as his experience and

' Made at the White House on Mar. 16 (White
House press release; as-delivered text) upon sign-
ins: the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966 (P.L.
89-369).

' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

' For baokgrround, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1015;
Feb. 14, 1966, p. 255; and Mar. 7, 1966, p. 379.

wisdom; and to the Congress of the United
States and the members of both parties,
who have acted to invest in this enterprise
not only the resources but the faith of 190
million people whom they represent.

This act is an economic Magna Carta for
the diverse lands of Asia. Its charter links
31 countries in a union against the involun-
tary economic servitude imposed on the
people of Asia by time and circumstance,
and by neighbor and nature. There is also a
deeper meaning. This billion dollar Bank is
a symbol that the twain have met, not as
Kipling predicted, "at God's great Judgment
Seat," but at the place of man's shared
needs.

It is no longer possible to be a mere ob-
server at that place. It is not possible and
it is not right to neglect a people's hopes
because the ocean is vast, or their culture is
alien, or their language may be strange, or
their race different, or their skin another
color. Asia must no longer sit at the second
table of the 20th century's concern.

The economic network of this shrinking
globe is too intertwined. The political order
of continents is too involved with one an-
other. The threat of common disaster is too
real for all human beings to say of Asia, or
any other continent, "Yours is another
sphere."

I believe that those who make that case
are no less patriotic and no less sincere than
those who believe that we cannot shorten
the length of our reach into the world.

But I believe equally as firmly that those
people are wrong. And while I expect they
will continue to make their argument of
isolationism, for we all are determined to
preserve their right to speak up in this land,
I hope they, too, expect me to try to keep
on making my case for realism. That, I
think, is the right of the President of this
country, and the President feels that is his
duty.

And what is that case? It is simply that
there is no rest from the trials of freedom,
there is no recalling what the pace of change
has done to the map of this big world, there
is no reducing our responsibilities while the

APRIL 4, 1966

521

challenges of progress will not permit us to
name the site for our duel or the weapons
that we use. It is that we cannot turn from
the place of shared needs and expect either
peace or progress to follow us.

So today we have come here to the his-
toric East Room of the White House and
gathered at this place to start a journey to-
gether. The Asian Development Bank is the
first step of what I conceive to be a very
long journey.

We are taking another today by announc-
ing that we have pledged a half of the $24
million that is needed to construct the large
Mekong River project, the Nam Ngum tribu-
tary project in Laos. Seven other countries
— Japan, the Netherlands, Canada, Thailand,
Denmark, Australia, and New Zealand — are
joining us in that effort.

For the United States it is our first major
commitment under our promise to expand
economic and social development in South-
east Asia. The Nam Ngum project is the
Mekong Committee's highest priority under-
taking and, like the Asian Development
Bank, it represents a major accomplishment
in joint cooperation in the world.

The first phase of the project will include
a dam and power station with an installed
capacity up to 30,000 kilowatts. Additional
generators up to 120,000 kilowatts can be
installed as they are needed. An interna-
tional transmission line, with a link across
the Mekong River, will connect the power
station with the capital of Laos and north-
east Thailand.

This is just one example of how the fruits
of technology and the ingenuity of coopera-
tion can bring new life to whole new regions
of the world. More, yes, much more, awaits
our response. Schools and hospitals can be
built. Rivers can be tamed. New crops and
new breeds of livestock can be developed.
There are no bounds to the possibilities, if
there are no limits to our dreams.

It has been said that no statue was ever
erected to the memory of a man or woman
who thought it was best to let well enough
alone. So it is with the nations that we
represent here today. We seek no statues

1

to our memory. We seek only one real
monument, a monument with peace and
progress for its base and justice for its
pinnacle. Together, your lands and mine, we
will build it.

f

ANNOUNCEMENT OF PLEDGES '

TO MEKONG RIVER PROJECT i

White House press release dated March 16

The United States and seven other coun-
tries have pledged $24.1 million to construct
the largest Mekong River project to date —
the Nam Ngum tributary project in Laos.
The United States pledge of half this amount
is the first major commitment under Presi-
dent Johnson's program to expand economic
and social development in Southeast Asia.

The U.S. contribution will be provided by
the Agency for International Development.

The Nam Ngum project is the Mekong
Committee's highest priority undertaking
and represents a major accomplishment in
international cooperation in the Far East.
The United Nations took the lead in raising
funds for the project, and the World Bank
has agreed to administer the project. Thai-
land and Laos have signed a convention pro-
viding for an exchange of electric power.

The first phase of the Nam Ngum project
will include a dam and power station with an
installed capacity of up to 30,000 kilowatts.
The dam is designed so that additional gen-
erators— up to 120,000 kilowatts — can be
installed as needed. An international trans-
mission line, with a link across the Mekong
River, will connect the power station with
Vientiane, Laos, and northeast Thailand,
where part of the power will be used.

The following amounts have been pledged :

Japan $4,000,000

Netherlands .... 3,300,000

Canada 2,000,000

Thailand 1,000,000

Denmark 600.000

Australia 500,000

New Zealand . . 350,000

The United States matched the total of
these contributions, as well as an additional

522

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN^

$315,000 pledged by Japan on a bilateral
basis to Laos, in accordance with an earlier
offer made to the Mekong Committee.

The total pledged for the project is $24,-
130,000.

The contributions from all the developed
countries were made on a grant basis. The
Thai contribution is in kind: cement — to be
repaid by electrical power after completion
of the project.

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in Asia

Address by Vice President Humphrey'

As you know, I returned a few days ago
from a mission on behalf of the President to
nine Asian and Pacific nations.^ Today I
would like to share with you some of my
conclusions about what is happening in that
part of the world and about our policy
there.

I will begin with words from Confucius:
"If a man take no thought about what is dis-
tant, he will find sorrow near at hand." The
war in Viet-Nam is far more than Neville
Chamberlain's "quarrel in a remote country
among people of whom we know nothing."
It is the focus of a broader conflict which
involves the whole Asian Continent. It also
involves basic principles of international
conduct.

I will return to this later.

Why are we in South Viet-Nam?

We are in South Viet-Nam to repel and
prevent the success of aggression against
the Government and the people of that
country.

We are there to help assure the South
Vietnamese people the basic right to decide
their ovvti futures, freely and without in-
timidation.

' Made at the National Press Club, Washington,
D.C., on Mar. 11.

' For a memorandum to President Johnson from
the Vice President, see Bulletin of Mar. 28, 1966,
p. 489.

We are there to help those people achieve
a better standard of living for themselves
and their children.

We are there to help establish the prin-
ciple that, in this nuclear age, aggression
cannot be an acceptable means either of
settling international disputes or of realiz-
ing national objectives. If aggression is
permitted to go unchecked, we cannot in
good faith hold out much hope for the fu-
ture of small nations or of world peace.

This is why we are in Viet-Nam.

We are not there to build an empire, to
exercise domination over that part of the
world, to establish military bases. We are
not there to impose a government or way of
life on other peoples.

That last point is worth dwelling on. The
National Liberation Front claims to be an
authentic nationalist movement, represent-
ing the overwhelming majority of the South
Vietnamese people. I agree with only one
part of the NLF's contention : That it is a
front.

There was a time, in the colonial days,
when the old Viet Minh movement con-
tained authentic nationalists. (Many of
them are now, I might add, members of the
South Vietnamese Government.)

Today there are a few non-Communists
in figurehead Viet Cong posts. The nom-
inal leader of the NLF, for example, is not

APRIL 4, 1966

523

known as a Communist. But most of the
Viet Cong soldiers — at least those defecting
or captured — don't even know his name.
(It is Nguyen Huu Tho.) But they all know
Ho Chi Minh.

There are in the NLF leaders of alleged
non-Communist parties. But they are par-
ties without any apparent membership.

There are a good many well-known and
recognized nationalists in South Viet-Nam
outside the present government. Quite a
few of them opposed the late President
Diem and suffered in prison for their op-
position. To this day not one of these people
has identified himself with the National
Liberation Front. Yet it would be easy for
any one of them to slip into Viet Cong ter-
ritory and do so. None has. And you can be
sure the National Liberation Front would
tell the world if any one of them did.

The same is true of religious leaders,
Buddhist and Catholic alike, of trade union
officials, of student leaders. They differ
widely among themselves — the Vietnamese
are an articulate and argumentative people.
But on one thing at least they are agreed:
They don't want to live under Communist
rule.

Contrary to what many people believe, you
do not have to have overwhelming, or even
majority, support to wage a guerrilla war.
A determined, highly disciplined, trained,
and well-organized minority can do that.

Without massive American aid to the
Greek Government after the war. Com-
munists would have taken over that country.
Yet subsequent elections have shown them
to be a small minority.

Without the aid of British and Gurkha
troops over a period of many years, Com-
munists would have won in Malaya. But
subsequent elections have shown them to be
an even smaller minority than their Greek
comrades.

Without outside aid, the overwhelming
majority of the South Vietnamese people
would have no hope of self-determination.
They would be ruled by force and coercion,
as they are today in areas under Viet Cong

control. We are giving aid : military aid and
political/economic/social aid.

Allied Military Progress in Viet-Nam

On the military front, the Vietnamese, to-
gether with American and Allied troops,
have made substantial progress in the past
few months.

A series of defeats have been inflicted on
main-force units of the Viet Cong and North
Vietnamese soldiers.

Allied forces have been able to move in
on Viet Cong strongholds which had previ-
ously been immune to attack.

We have been able to open up stretches of
highway and railroad which the Viet Cong
had long controlled.

Mobility and firepower of Allied forces is
impressive. Coordination among Allied
forces has markedly improved.

Viet Cong and North Vietnamese casual-
ties are difficult to determine. But the best
available figures show that they have
doubled over 1964 and are now running sev-
eral times current allied casualties.

The defection rate for Viet Cong has also
increased — partly because of a special South
Vietnamese program to encourage defection.
Defectors were being received at a rate of
about 2,000 per month while I was in Saigon.

Defectors report shortages of food and
low morale. They report that the accuracy
and impact of our artillery and bombing
have been devastating.

But we don't have to rely on the word of
defectors alone. An article published in the
January issue of the Viet Cong theoretical
journal and broadcast over its radio com-
plains of difficulty and confusion in the
ranks. It says that Viet Cong agents, having
organized a protest movement in the vil-
lages, sometimes lose control of it and even
allow it to be transformed into an anti-
Communist demonstration. It warns that,
although its agitators must use all sorts of
people "partially and temporarily" in carry-
ing out the struggle, they must wipe out the
"influence of reactionary elements belonging

524

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to various religious organizations" and "be-
ware of trade union leaders."

A number of articles and broadcasts warn
against defeatism and "pacifism" in the
ranks.

General Giap [Vo Nguyen Giap, North
Vietnamese Defense Minister] has publicly
complained from Hanoi that the American
commitment to Viet-Nam has given rise to
"an extremely serious situation." And an
article recently published in Hanoi de-
nounces "a small number of comrades . . .
(who) see only difficulties and not oppor-
tunities (and) display pessimism, perplexity,
and a reluctance to protracted re-
sistance. . . ." Peking, in more general
terms, has acknowledged that "in some
lands, revolutionary struggles have tempo-
rarily suffered reverses, and in others the
political situation has taken an adverse
turn." It blames these setbacks on "im-
perialists, colonialists, and neo-colonialists,
headed by the United States."

We have been subject to some harsh
words by Asian Communists. But, as Pres-
ident Johnson has said: "We can live with
anger in word as long as it is matched by
caution in deed." ^

Things are better in Viet-Nam, militarily,
than even a few months ago. Though we
must be prepared for military setbacks and
disappointments ahead, I believe we have
reason for measured encouragement.

Viet-Nam's Social Revolution

There is no substitute for the use of power
in the face of determined attack. There are
times when it must be used. But the use of
power, necessary as it is, can be counter-
productive without accompanying political
effort and the credible promise to people of
a better life.

The peasants of Viet-Nam — and, indeed,
of all Asia — are rebelling against the kind
of life they have led for ages past. They
want security. But they also want dignity

and self-respect, justice, and the hope of
something better in the future.

The Communists, in their drive for power,
seek to use and subvert the hopes of these
people. If they succeed, we could win many
battles and yet lose the war.

The struggle will be won or lost in rural
areas. We have said this so often it has be-
come a cliche. But it must now be proved
by programs of actions.

The Chinese have a saying, "Lots of noise
on the stairs, but nobody enters the room."
There have been, as I am fully aware, many
promises made to the peasants over many
years — but painfully little performance.

The hour is late. The need for deeds as
well as words is urgent. That is why the
Vietnamese Government, with our support,
is pressing the "other war" with vigor — the
war against poverty, hunger, disease, and
ignorance. This is the theme of the Declara-
tion of Honolulu,* and I believe that the
Honolulu Declaration could be a milestone
in the history of our policy in Asia.

They are beginning in earnest the struggle
to win and hold the allegiance of the people
who live in rural South Viet-Nam, in more
than 2,600 villages and approximately 11,000
hamlets, subject to years of Viet Cong sub-
version and terror. This is hard and dan-
gerous work. In 1965 alone, 354 of the peo-
ple engaged in it were assassinated and
something like 500 wounded.

I do not for a moment minimize the
practical difficulties of carrying out the so-
cial revolution to which the Republic of
Viet-Nam is now committed.

Viet-Nam has experienced a quarter of a
century of almost constant warfare, gen-
erations of colonial domination, and a mil-
lennium of Mandarin rule.

History has endowed it with no full and
readymade administrative apparatus to un-
dertake such a monumental task. It will
have to be carefully built. But there are a
number of well-trained and educated high-

'Ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

• For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305.

APRIL 4, 1966

525

and middle-level officials to form the nu-
cleus for this effort.

The important thing is to begin, and this
the present government has done. Responsi-
bility has been fixed, a spirited attack upon
inertia and corruption has begun. There is
determination that the whole chain of social
and political action will be conceived and ad-
ministered with hardheadedness and effi-
ciency— beginning in the ministries in Sai-
gon and going right down to the village and
hamlet level. High standards of perform-
ance have been set and are expected. And
we are working with the South Vietnamese
Government at each level to help see that
the product matches the expectation.

South Vietnamese cadre in hamlets and
villages will be doubled to more than 45,000
by the end of this year. Today, they are still
outnumbered by Viet Cong activists. But
the gap is steadily closing.

Today, the South Vietnamese Govern-
ment—late in the day, it is true— is trying
to meet the pressing needs of the country.
Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky was can-
did with me when he said, "Our social revo-
lution is 12 years late — but not too late."

Some 800,000 people have fled to Govern-
ment-controlled areas in South Viet-Nam
during the past year and a half. Almost
300,000 have already been resettled. The
South Vietnamese Government, with allied
help, is working to house, feed, and clothe
these refugees.

In the countryside schools and hospitals
are being built.

In Saigon a new constitution is being
framed, and the Government is working to-
ward a goal of national elections by the end
of the year.

In short, a forced-draft effort is being
made to create a new society to replace the
old. It deserves and requires our support.

Meanwhile, the country faces staggering
economic problems, the most severe of which
is the problem of inflation.

Despite today's inflation, the long-term
economic prospect is good. There is new
business investment in new industries. South

Vietnamese land is rich and productive. The
people are industrious, ambitious, and quick
to learn new skills — and they are learning.
Communications, port facilities, and trans-
portation are being expanded.

But full economic development certainly
will not take place until an environment of
violence and conflict is replaced by one of
stability and peace.

A "Message of Encouragement"

My observations of Viet-Nam are not the
product of a weekend visit to Saigon. To be
sure, my visit there was informative. It gave
meaning to what I had read and to the de-
liberations of government in which I had
participated.

As student, professor. Senator, and Vice
President, I have been intellectually and
directly involved in matters of national se-
curity and foreign policy. I have read too
many books, attended too many hearings and
meetings, and participated in too many dis-
cussions at the highest levels of government
to arrive at any instant solutions to complex
problems or to be naively optimistic about a
troubled world.

Having said this, I have reason to bring
home a message of encouragement about
Viet-Nam.

I know that our opponents are diligent and
determined. They are well-organized, and in
many areas have a long head start on us.

Thus far they have not responded to our
unconditional offer of negotiation — an offer
which still stands — nor have they responded
to the good offices of other nations, of the
United Nations, of the Pope and other reli-
gious leaders who seek to bring the conflict
to the conference table.

And they have not responded, I am sure,
because they still believe that time is on
their side, that we will ultimately tire and
withdraw, either abandoning South Viet-
Nam or accepting a settlement which will
give the Viet Cong an open road on one of
its three publicly declared routes to victory.

The first two routes — a general uprising
and the famous Mao-Giap three-stage guer

'

I

526

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN!

rilla war — have been stymied by resistance
of the South Vietnamese Government and
her allies. The third declared route to povi'er
is through a coalition government.

Should there be any doubt in Hanoi, let
me make it once more clear : We will neither
tire nor withdraw. We will remain in Viet-
Nam until genuinely free elections can be
held.

If the Viet Cong, in those elections, gain
honestly a voice in the government, so be it.
But prior to elections, this Government will
not be a party to any settlement which
amounts to a preelection victory for Com-
munists which cannot be won at the ballot
box. I, for one, doubt that the South Viet-
namese people will give that victory to the
Communists. No Communist government has
ever come to power through free election,
and I doubt that one ever will.

We will pursue, with patience and per-
sistence, the difficult course we have set for
ourselves — the course neither of withdrawal
nor of massive escalation but of measured
use of strength and perseverance in defense
both of ally and principle.

As the President has said: ". . . the
pledge of Honolulu will be kept, and the
pledge of Baltimore stands open — to help
the men of the North when they have the
wisdom to be ready."'

I
Asian Communism, a Clear and Present Danger

At the beginning today, I said the conflict
in Viet-Nam was the focus of a wider
struggle taking place in Asia.

During my recent mission I was struck by
the depth of feeling, among almost all Asian
leaders, that Asian communism had direct
design on their national integrity and inde-
pendence. Almost all cited examples of sub-
version and in many cases direct military
involvement by Communist troops within
their countries. And none — without any ex-
ception— questioned our involvement in Viet-
Nam. There were questions about aspects
of our policy there but none concerning the

,1 'Ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

fact of our presence there and our resistance
to aggression.

Among the leaders with whom I spoke,
there was repeatedly expressed a deep con-
cern as to whether our American purpose,
tenacity, and will were strong enough to
persevere in Southeast Asia. Public debate
in America was sometimes interpreted as a
weakening of purpose. I emphasized not
only the firmness of our resolve but also
our dedication to the rights of free discus-
sion and dissent.

For we know that John Stuart Mill's advice
remains valid : "We can never be sure that
the opinion we are endeavoring to stifle is a
false opinion; and if we were sure, stifling
it would be an evil still."

Asian communism may be a subject for
discussion here. In Asia, it is a clear and
present danger. No single, independent na-
tion in Asia has the strength to stand alone
against that danger.

I believe that the time may come when
Asian communism may lose its fervor, when
it may lose some of its neuroses, when it
may realize that its objectives cannot be
gained by aggression. But until that time I
believe we have no choice but to help the
nations of Southeast Asia strengthen them-
selves for the long road ahead.

I also said, at the beginning today, that
some very basic principles of international
conduct were under test in Viet-Nam. Some
people think not.

Of them, I ask this: Were we to with-
draw from Viet-Nam under any conditions
short of peace, security, and the right of
self-determination for the South Vietnamese
people, what conclusions would be drawn in
the independent nations of Asia? In West-
ern Europe? In the young, struggling coun-
tries of Africa? In the nations of Latin
America beset by subversion and unrest?
What conclusions would be drawn in Hanoi
and Peking?

I have heard it said that our vital national
interests are not involved in South Viet-Nam
as they are in Europe. I heard it said 30
years ago that our vital national interests

I

APRIL 4, 1966

527

were not involved in Europe as they were in
the Western Hemisphere. This time we can-
not afford to learn the hard way. No conti-
nent on this earth is any longer remote from
any other.

And, may I add, the principles of national
independence and self-determination should
be no less dear to us in Asia than they are in
Europe.

We live in a time when man has finally
achieved the ultimate in technological prog-
ress: Man today possesses the means to
totally destroy himself. Yet our time also
offers man the possibility, for the first time
in human history, of achieving well-being
and social justice for hundreds of millions of
people who literally live on the outside of
civilization.

Being an optimist, I have some faith in the
ability of man to see this safely through.

And I, for one, believe that it will not be
seen safely through if those who seek power
by brute force have reason to believe that
brute force pays.

Finally, may I add two additional observa-
tions.

First, Asia is astir with a consciousness of
the need for Asian initiatives in the solution
of Asia's problems. Regional development
and planning are increasingly being recog-
nized as necessary for political and economic
progress. The power of nationalism is now

tempered by a growing realization of the
need for cooperation among nations. Asians
seek to preserve their national identity. They
want gradually to create new international
structures. But they want to pursue such
aims themselves. They want foreign assist-
ance when necessary, but without foreign
domination.

Second, the American people, as well as
their leaders, need to know more about Asia
in general and Communist China in particu-
lar— the relationships of that nation with
her neighbors in Asia and the Pacific, the
nature of Chinese Communist ideology and
behavior, and the operational apparatus of
Communist parties under Peking leadership
or influence. The intellectual and political
resources not only of the United States but
of the entire free world should be mobilized
for this effort. In this regard, I want to
commend the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee for its hearings on China.

We have not set ourselves any easy tasks.
But the tasks, and responsibilities, of the
most powerful nation in the history of the
earth are not — cannot be — will not be easy.

Let me close by making this prediction:
Ten or twenty years hence historians will
mark Viet-Nam as a place where our nation
— and free peoples — were faced with a chal-
lenge by totalitarianism and where they met
the challenge. «i

528

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

"Slow by sloiv, in the long of time, we will success." So
wrote a Vietnamese student, tmdattnted by the frustrations
of learning English. In these words. Deputy Under Secre-
tary Johnson told a Canadian audience, are displayed the
patience and determination that are the strength of the
people of South Viet-Nam.

The Issue and Goal in Viet-Nam

by U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Under Secretary for Political Affairs ^

I am deeply honored at this opportunity
to discuss Viet-Nam before such a distin-
guished Canadian audience. I know that,
just as with my own countrymen, many of
you are concerned with the situation there
and have difficulty in sorting out seemingly
contradictory assertions and conflicting news
reports regarding Viet-Nam. Perhaps all too
often people on one side of the issue or the
other succumb to the temptation to make
categorical statements that this course or
that course is the only honorable course of
action. I hope to avoid this temptation today
and rather to discuss with you out of my
own experience as factually as I can what is
going on there and the role of the United
States.

I first want to state plainly why we, the
United States, are in Viet-Nam; then to
address some of the other questions.

Why are we in Viet-Nam? The real ques-
tion is not whether Viet-Nam, or indeed
Southeast Asia, is of such political, strategic,
or economic importance as to justify the loss
of American lives and treasure. Rather, the
question is the worldwide issue of prevent-

' Address made before the Canadian Club of Mon-
treal at Montreal, Canada, on Mar. 14 (press re-
lease 50).

ing the Communists from breaking by force
any of the lines that were drawn in the
various postwar settlements.

Since the end of World War II, when the
United States was propelled onto the center
of the world's stage as a leading power, our
goal, which is to say our policy, has been to
develop and maintain a stable relationship
among the world's powers in this uncom-
monly volatile period of the world's history.
Since 1945 we have committed the integrity
of our nation to a variety of agreements
specifically designed to maintain that stabil-
ity, a stability whose purpose is to preserve
the freedom of each nation to devote its
assets and energies to its own development.

As far as South Viet-Nam is concerned,
acting through our representatives, we com-
mitted ourselves by a Senate vote of 82 to 1
to the SEATO treaty of 1954, reaffirmed by
a vote of 502 to 2 in Congress as a whole in
1964.2 (In assessing attitudes in the United
States, you will want to note that 2 weeks
ago a motion to repeal this latter resolution
was defeated 92 to 5 in the Senate and was
never brought to a vote in the House.)

This is the issue. This is the goal. This

- For text of a joint resolution of Aug. 10, 1964,
see Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

APRIL 4, 1966

529

is our purpose. And our ability to honor
these commitments is, we believe, critical to
the well-being of every free man, woman,
and child — for failure to honor our commit-
ments one place cannot but call into question
our commitments elsewhere and thus en-
courage miscalculation by the other side.

Many of the questions coming out of the
present debate concern the NLF, or the so-
called "National Liberation Front." State-
ments are made that what is going on in
South Viet-Nam is a purely internal revolt
against an unpopular government by a dis-
contented population. Any discussion of the
NLF also involves the issue of whether or
not the Viet Cong represent an indigenous
uprising. What are some of the facts?

Before 1960 no one in or out of Viet-Nam
had even heard of the NLF. It was in that
year that Hanoi Radio announced the forma-
tion of the NLF. Perhaps a bit of history is
in order here.

The Historical Baclcground

In bringing about the termination of hos-
tilities in Viet-Nam, the Geneva agreement
of 1954 3 separated North and South Viet-
Nam from each other by a 5-mile demili-
tarized zone. The northern part of the
country, with its capital at Hanoi, was under
the control of the Viet Minh, while Saigon
became the capital of what had been central
and South Viet-Nam. The two separate en-
tities were obliged not to interfere with each
other until agreement could be reached be-
tween them on when and how they could be
unified. In this, the situation was very sim-
ilar to that of Germany and Korea.

However, we have since learned quite
dramatically that Ho Chi Minh's government
in Hanoi never had any intention of allowing
the South Vietnamese freely to choose their
own government and run their own affairs
until agreement could be reached on unifica-
tion. There were areas of South Viet-Nam
nominally under Viet Minh control at the
time of the 1954 agreement. These Viet

^ For text, see American Foreign Policy, 1950-
1955, Basic Documents, vol. I, Department of State
publication 6446, p. 750.

530

Minh were ordered by Hanoi to hide their
arms and to do what they could to frustrate
the attempts at administration made by the
South Vietnamese Government. Ho Chi
Minh was reasonably convinced that the
South Vietnamese Government would easily
crumble with the help of the subversion
which he directed.

In connection with the charge that the
United States violated the 1954 Geneva ac-
cords by not supporting elections in 1956, I
might note that such elections were indeed
the goal set by the final declaration of that
conference. The declaration stipulated that
free elections should be held throughout
Viet-Nam in July 1956 under international
supervision.

In 1955 and 1956 the South Vietnamese
Government maintained that it would agree
to such elections if they were genuinely free
and internationally supervised throughout
Viet-Nam and not just in South Viet-Nam.
The United States, although not a party to
the Geneva accords, consistently favored
genuinely free elections under U.N. supervi-
sion, as has been our consistent position and
that of most members of the U.N. with
respect to Korea. It was clear, however, in
1956 that no more than any other Commu-
nist government was the Hanoi government
prepared to allow such elections, and accord-
ingly the elections were not held. Thus it is
a travesty on the truth to allege that the
present situation was brought about by the
failure of the South to carry out the 1954
accords. In fact, it was the North that was
not willing to submit itself to the test of
free elections under international control.

By 1956 Ho Chi Minh had realized that he
would be unable to subvert the Saigon-led
government without military action. As a
result, in 1956 Hanoi began rebuilding, re-
organizing, and expanding the military ma-
chine which they had left behind in South
Viet-Nam when the Viet Minh had sup-
posedly withdrawn to the North. To supple-
ment the revitalized Viet Minh in the South,
southern-born former Vietnamese who had
gone north were conscripted for intensive
training and political indoctrination and were

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

i

returned to South Viet-Nam to serve as the
hard core of the so-called "indigenous force"
of the Viet Cong.

By 1959-1960 Hanoi had built up a military
capability in the South which enabled them
to step up their actions considerably beyond
the small-scale guerrilla activity to which
they had confined themselves up to that
time.

Origin of National Liberation Front

Their hopes of a cheap and easy victory
now gone, the Communist regime in the
North made some far-reaching decisions
which they made no effort to conceal.

At the Third Lao Dong (Communist)
Party Congress in Hanoi in September 1960,
Ho Chi Minh said that the North must "step
up the national democratic people's revolu-
tion in the South." Other similar speeches
were made, and at its conclusion the Party
Congress called for the formation of a
"National United Front" in the South. Three
months later, that is in December 1960,
Hanoi radio announced the formation of a
"Front for Liberation of the South."

This is the origin of the so-called "Na-
tional Liberation Front" in South Viet-Nam.
It was then, and still is, a pure creature and
tool of the North Vietnamese regime. Its
so-called "leadership" contains not a single
nationally known figure. In a true sense, it
is as faceless to the outside world as it is to
the Vietnamese people. Thus it is not a
"national front," and it is certainly not a
"liberation front," for its purpose has noth-
ing to do with "liberation" — quite the op-
posite.

Of real significance on this point is the
fact that no one South Vietnamese political
figure of any note whatever has ever asso-
ciated himself with the NLF. No member
of any Saigon government has ever defected
to the NLF. And religious, labor, and stu-
dent leaders have consistently refused to as-
sociate themselves with the movement.

It is also important that we understand
the distinction between the NLF and the
Viet Cong armed forces. The NLF has little
or nothing to do with the command of the

Viet Cong, especially the main force, or reg-
ular Viet Cong battalions and regiments in
the South. These main-force units and other
Viet Cong elements are supported, supplied,
and controlled from Hanoi, and only Hanoi
can direct them to cease their aggression.
The NLF is purely the political facade or, as
the name plainly states, the political front
for Hanoi. It cannot bring about an end to
the fighting. This can only be done by
Hanoi itself.

Aggression From North Viet-Nam

The movement of military personnel from
North Viet-Nam into the South became so
flagrant after 1960 that it was noticed and
publicized by the Legal Committee of the
International Commission for Supervision
and Control, which, as you know, is composed
of India, Poland, and Canada.

The Legal Committee, with only Poland
objecting, reported in 1962:

. . . there is evidence to show that arms, armed
and unarmed personnel, munitions and other sup-
plies have been sent from the Zone in the North
to the Zone in the South with the objective of sup-
porting, organizing and carrying out hostile activi-
ties, including armed attacks, directed against the
Armed Forces and Administration of the Zone in
the South.

. . . there is evidence that the PAVN (i.e., the
North Vietnamese army) has allowed the Zone in
the North to be used for inciting, encouraging and
supporting hostile activities in the Zone in the
South, aimed at the overthrow of the Administra-
tion in the South.

I might note that at that time there was
not a single American combat soldier in
Viet-Nam or elsewhere on the mainland of
Southeast Asia.

In the 3-year period from 1959 to 1961 the
North Viet-Nam regime infiltrated 10,000
men into the South. In 1962, 13,000 addi-
tional personnel were infiltrated. And by
the end of 1964 North Viet-Nam may well
have moved over 40,000 armed and un-
armed guerrillas into South Viet-Nam. To-
day we have every reason to believe that nine
regiments of regular North Vietnamese
forces are fighting in organized units in
South Viet-Nam. So you can clearly see that
our whole involvement in South Viet-Nam

APRIL 4, 1966

531

is based on the fact that the Viet Cong is
not an indigenous revolt — quite the contrary.
It is as much a case of outside aggression as
if Hanoi had boldly moved those nine regi-
ments in marching formation across the 17th
parallel.

That is the heart of our involvement.

Question of a Coalition Government

Another question frequently raised in
recent days is the attitude of the South
Vietnamese toward now entering into a po-
litical coalition with the NLF or the Viet
Cong as a means of bringing the fighting
to an end.

To understand the attitude of the South
Vietnamese leaders in this regard they do
not have to refer to the experience of
Czechoslovakia, Poland, or other such West-
ern experiments in the postwar period. They
look to their own experience.

The Hanoi government, or the Viet Minh,
as recognized by the French in 1946, was
originally a coalition of both Communists
and non-Communist nationalists opposing
the French. But the image of the Viet
Minh as a true representative government
vanished in the eyes of anti-French but
non-Communist Vietnamese as they were
systematically liquidated or expelled in the
period between 1946 and 1950. Many of the
political leaders I met in South Viet-Nam
spoke with great bitterness of their ex-
perience in seeking to work with the Viet
Minh during that period and of their rela-
tives and friends who were dispossessed or
assassinated as the Communists sought to
establish their absolute control. It is thus
not hard to understand how they feel on
this subject.

It is also interesting to note what the
Viet Cong has publicly said on the ways to
gain control of the Government. They have
said that there are three ways. One method
is to have a general uprising if the proper
political base can be prepared. In this they
have clearly failed. Another method is the
famed Mao-Giap three-stage revolutionary
guerrilla war; that is the strategy they are
now pursuing. Or the third possibility is for

the Viet Cong to become a part of a coali-
tion government. This they would clearly
prefer if it became possible.

Also pertinent to the South Vietnamese
attitudes is the brutality and terrorism
which they have experienced at the hands
of the Viet Cong. From 1958 to the present
the Viet Cong has assassinated or kid-
naped an estimated 61,000 Vietnamese vil-
lage leaders and Government representa-
tives. Just this last January, for example,
Viet Cong terrorists massacred 26 men,
women, and children and wounded 56 others
in a brutal sweep 40 miles south of Da Nang.
The Viet Cong has systematically intimi-
dated anyone who had a position of leader-
ship in the community. Their war is not just
directed at the South Vietnamese Armed
Forces but equally important against the
administrative structure of the Vietnamese
Government. One must bear this fact
in mind when assessing the performance of
the Vietnamese Government, which is also
faced by the problems of any newly inde-
pendent country, especially one that had no
real preparation for independence.

The Common Commitment

Others have raised the question of
whether the United States is fighting in
Viet-Nam when the non-Communist Viet-
namese will not fight for themselves — or
whether the United States is "going it
alone" in South Viet-Nam.

The simple truth is that this is just not
the case. The South Vietnamese Armed
Forces are at a strength of approximately
600,000 men. Eleven thousand South Viet-
namese soldiers lost their lives in battle last
year — and it is very much their cause. All
but two members of SEATO are substan-
tially and directly contributing to the cause,
and one nonmember, Korea, has already
contributed more than one full division and
has announced plans to contribute another
division of ground forces.

The Government of South Viet-Nam is
very much aware that the battle they fight
is only partially a military one. They real-
ize that if they are to gain and hold the po-

532

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

litical confidence of an ever-increasing por-
tion of the population they must assure
that a real social and economic revolution
takes place successfully in Viet-Nam. This
is the problem that they took the initiative
in discussing with us at Honolulu last
month.* I want to quote to you from the
Declaration of Honolulu, for this sets forth
more succinctly than anything else I know
our purposes there :

The President of the United States and the Chief
of State and Prime Minister of the Republic of
Vietnam are thus pledged again:

to defense against aggression,

to the work of social revolution,

to the goal of free self-government,

to the attack on hunger, ignorance, and disease,

and to the unending quest for peace.

Of particular significance is the fact that
this statement came almost verbatim from
Prime Minister Ky's own opening statement
at the conference. Prime Minister Ky and
his government are keenly aware of the
magnitude of the task they face.

The Saigon Government is faced with
not only fighting a war but with making
compatible the complicated regional dif-
ferences between the Southerners, the
Northerners, and the people of the center.
They must deal with a great diversity of ra-
cial groups, such as the Khmers, Chams,
Nungs, as well as the so-called mountain
peoples.

Add to this the complication of the ever-
growing refugee population. Even without
the present fighting, they were already
faced with caring for nearly 1 million refu-
gees who fled to the South from North
Viet-Nam following the 1954 Geneva agree-
ment. In recent months hundreds of thou-
sands of other refugees have left Viet Cong-
controlled areas, particularly in the central
part of the country.

Another significant but relatively unpub-
licized development in recent months has
been the success of the chieu hoi or "open
arms" amnesty program of the South Viet-
namese Government. This is a program de-

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966,
p. 302.

signed to persuade the Viet Cong and their
supporters to return their loyalties to the
Government. While this program has been
nominally conducted since 1963, it has this
last year begun to enjoy the kind of success
that had been hoped for.

The 1965 results are most impressive.
More than 42,000 persons defected from the
Viet Cong to seek Government protection
last year. A substantial percentage of these
were full- or part-time Viet Cong military
and sympathizers. These figures represent
a dramatic increase over 1964, and the first
2 months of this year indicate that the
number seeking Government protection con-
tinues to grow.

In this connection you should not be mis-
led by the figures sometimes published on
so-called desertion rates in the South Viet-
namese forces. As with any young army this
is of course a problem and a serious one, but
this should not be mistaken for popular
sympathy with the Viet Cong. Many of
these "deserters" are what you and we
would term AWOL or "absent without offi-
cial leave." Many return to their home
areas to tend their crops and then reenlist
in the citizens militia in a local unit, or re-
turn to their own units. Some leave to tend
to family matters for a time and then reap-
pear. Defection to the Viet Cong is very
rare.

We are all hopeful that an ever-improving
esprit de corps will steadily decrease the
number of men who absent themselves in
this manner.

Purpose of U.S. Air Raids

Now just a word on the bombing of
North Viet-Nam. The purpose of these air
raids has been and remains an attempt to
restrict the ability of the North Vietnamese
to move, equip, and supply their troops in
South Viet-Nam. At no point has it been the
mission of these air raids to destroy the
North Vietnamese regime.

Our action has consisted of a careful,
precise, and restrained application of air
power against military targets and military
lines of supply and communication in North

APRIL 4, 1966

633

Viet-Nam. It is not dii'ected at the civilian
population of North Viet-Nam but at the
means by which the Hanoi government is
attempting to support its aggression in the
South. It is not directed at the destruction
of North Viet-Nam but rather at the will
and ability of the leaders in Hanoi to con-
tinue their aggression.

While retribution or revenge is not its
purpose, many of the people of South Viet-
Nam feel that it is small repayment for
what Hanoi's agents have inflicted on them
over the years — the sabotage and destruc-
tion of the thousands of bridges, and miles
of roads and railroad, and the tens of thou-
sands of victims, military and civilian. I
am satisfied that this action, together with
the action in the South, ultimately will as-
sist in demonstrating to Hanoi that their
present course is untenable.

Bombing raids were suspended on Decem-
ber 24 and remained suspended until Janu-
ary 31. Many had said that such a suspen-
sion of air raids would open the door for ne-
gotiations with Hanoi. We had been told
that such a move could possibly result in the
suspension of North Vietnamese efforts to
infiltrate South Viet-Nam or could reduce
their attacks there. The result was quite
the opposite. During the pause in the bomb-
ing, they stepped up their supply activities
and made every possible move to reinforce
their garrisons in the South. There was no
reduction in the level of their terrorism and
military activity in the South.

As their supply efforts intensified, our
decision to renew the action against facilities
and supply routes supporting their aggres-
sion in the South became imperative for the
protection of all of the forces opposing the
Viet Cong in the South. When announcing
the resumption of air action. President John-
son said :^

Our effort has met with understanding and sup-
port throughout most of the world, but not in Hanoi
and Peking. From those two capitals have come
only denunciation and rejection. . . .

The answer of Hanoi to all is the answer that
was published 3 days ago. They persist in aggres-

sion. . . . Throughout these 37 days, even at mo-
ments of truce, there has been continued violence
against the people of South Viet-Nam, against their
Government, against their soldiers, and against our
own American forces.

We do not regret the pause in the bombing. We
yield to none in our determinaiton to seek peace. We
have given a full and decent respect to the opinions
of those who thought that such a pause might give
new hope for peace in the world.

Economic and Social Development

No one in the United States Government
believes that the real victory in Viet-Nam is
primarily to be a military victory. For we
know that any significant, lasting peace —
the kind of peace that will permit individual
and social growth — is so intricately woven
to the complex patterns of political, social,
religious, and economic life as to make re-
forms in these areas mandatory, even while
the necessary military pursuits are taking
place.

You are all familiar with President John-
son's oft-repeated pledge of $1 billion in
economic aid to the Southeast Asian region,
including the rebuilding of the war-torn land
of South Viet-Nam and North Viet-Nam.
You know of the provisions recently made
through the Asian Development Bank to fur-
ther similar goals.*

In fact, even our programs and personnel
are taking every opportunity to try to im-
prove the poor economic and social condi-
tions under which so many of the Vietnam-
ese people live. United States armed
forces have to date given medical treat-
ment to 41/2 million Vietnamese. They have
distributed over 1,600,000 tons of foodstuffs
plus 100,000 tons of other commodities. New
hospitals are being built in many parts of
the land. The United States AID Mission is
rapidly expanding its medical assistance pro-
grams. During the past year these pro-
grams included training some 270 Vietnam-
ese doctors and nurses, providing serum
for the inoculation of 7 million persons,
mostly children, and furnishing logistical
support and medical supplies for Army

'Ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222.

' See p. 521.

534

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

medical teams operating in six provincial
I hospitals.

On the conviction that a truly free people
must be literate people, a significant por-
tion of our aid to Viet-Nam is now in the
area of education. School enrollment has
dramatically increased so that now over 2
million students are enrolled in schools as
compared to just over 1.3 million in 1960.
With assistance from Australia and the Re-
public of China, we have produced some
SV2 million school textbooks written in Viet-
namese by Vietnamese educators for the
benefit of these and future students. By
the end of this year we hope that 14 million
texts will have been distributed — at least
four books for each child in school.

The Government of South Viet-Nam is
keenly aware that economic growth and
land reforms are imperative. The industrial
production index rose 2i/^ percent between
1962 and 1964. Since 1957, 600,000 acres of
farmland have been distributed to 115,000
farmers, and Prime Minister Ky has re-
cently inaugurated a new phase of the pro-
gram which will distribute a further 650,000
acres to some 150,000 farmers.

Herein lies the irony of the whole predica-
ment. President Johnson pinpointed this for
us in a speech last week ' when he said :
"It is more than a shame; it is a crime —
perhaps the greatest crime of man — that so
much courage, and so much will, and so
many dreams must be carelessly flung on
the fires of death and war."

I am convinced that, with our continued
support, these valiant and courageous peo-
ple will be freed from violence and terror
to pursue that normal life to which every
man under God is entitled.
^ Part of the strength of these people with-
out question is their patience and endurance.
Theirs is the kind of patience and de-
termination displayed in a letter recently
received by one of my staff from an Asian
student. The student, undaunted by the
frustrations of learning English, wrote,
"Slow by slow, in the long of time, we will
success."

If Thomas Paine were alive today, he
could indeed say that "These are the times
that try men's souls." But which of us
would not agree with the words of the late
President Kennedy when he said, "I do not
believe that any of us would exchange places
with any other people or any other gen-
eration." *

The "14 Points"

The integrity of freedom and peace in
Southeast Asia is no less important to free
people than it was in Berlin or Korea. Ag-
gression is no less aggression because it is
taking place in what seems a distant Viet-
Nam. We need not repeat the words
of Neville Chamberlain, who described the
German assault on Czechoslovakia as "a
quarrel in a far-off country between people
of whom we know nothing." Aggression is
no less aggression because it moves by
stealth beneath an Asian jungle cover or in
the dark of the night.

The U.S. Government has and will con-
tinue to meet this situation soberly and re-
sponsibly, as I am convinced this is what
the American people always expect of their
Government. As with any enterprise worth
our blood and treasure, there are risks. We
have and will continue to do all we can to
minimize these risks, but we cannot shrjnk
from those not of our making, for to do so
would leave the field to the aggressor. This,
I am sure, is not the wish of most Ameri-
cans. An essential element of this course is
at all times to leave open the door to an
honorable, just, and peaceful solution. This
we have done and will continue to do. As Sec-
retary Rusk said the other day, we have of-
fered everything except to turn South Viet-
Nam over to the Communists. It is my con-
viction that the American people do not
want to do that. We ask for no surrender
by Hanoi; we ask only that they stop what
they are doing to the people of the South.

Our Government has made its position
known repeatedly around the world in our
recent and continuing peace efforts. Our of-

' Bulletin of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 441

"Ibid., Feb. 6, 1961, p. 175.

APRIL 4, 1966

535

III

ficially stated position has come to be
known as the "14 points." * Perhaps a re-
iteration of these points is in order:

1. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 and 1962 are
an adequate basis for peace in Southeast Asia;

2. We would welcome a conference on Southeast
Asia or on any part thereof;

3. We would welcome "negotiations without pre-
conditions" as the 17 nations put it;

4. We would welcome unconditional discussions
as President Johnson put it;

5. A cessation of hostilities could be the first
order of business at a conference or could be the
subject of preliminary discussions;

6. Hanoi's four points could be discussed along
with other points which others might wish to
propose;

7. We want no U.S. bases in Southeast Asia;

8. We do not desire to retain U.S. troops in South
Viet-Nam after peace is assured;

9. We support free elections in South Viet-Nam
to give the South Vietnamese a government of their
own choice;

10. The question of reunification of Viet-Nam
should be determined by the Vietnamese through
their own free decision;

11. The countries of Southeast Asia can be non-
aligned or neutral if that be their option;

12. We would much prefer to use our resources
for the economic reconstruction of Southeast Asia
than in war. If there is peace, North Viet-Nam
could participate in a regional effort to which we
would be prepared to contribute at least one billion
dollars ;

13. The President has said "The Viet Cong would
not have difficulty being represented and having
their views represented if for a moment Hanoi de-
cided she wanted to cease aggression. I don't think
that would be an insurmountable problem." '°

14. We have said publicly and privately that we
could stop the bombing of North Viet-Nam as a
step toward peace although there has not been the
slightest hint or suggestion from the other side as to
what they would do if the bombing stopped.

I do not minimize the trials that may lie
ahead. However, I do feel that the tide has
begun to turn and that, with a determina-
tion and perseverance no less than that of
the other side, we can achieve the objectives
of ourselves and the free people of South
Viet-Nam without a larger war. I am satis-
fied that the American people do have that
determination and perseverance. When

• See also ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

" At a new conference on July 28, 1965.

Hanoi and Peking are convinced that this is
the case, a peaceful solution can be found. I
am sure that you join me in the hope that
that day will soon come.

14 NATO Nations Declare Alliance
Essential to Common Security

Folloiving is the text of a joint declaration
agreed upon by 14 member nations of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which
was released simultaneoiisly in each of the
nations on March 18.

White House press release dated March 18

The following declaration has been agreed
between the Heads of Governments of Bel-
gium, Canada, Denmark, Federal Republic
of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Italy, Luxem-
bourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,
Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United
States.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the orga-
nization established under it are both alike
essential to the security of our countries.

The Atlantic Alliance has ensured its ef-
ficacy as an instrument of defense and
deterrence by the maintenance in peacetime
of an integrated and interdependent military
organization in which, as in no previous
alliance in history, the efforts and resources
of each are combined for the common secu-
rity of all. We are convinced that this orga-
nization is essential and will continue. No
system of bilateral arrangements can be a
substitute.

The North Atlantic Treaty and the orga-
nization are not merely instruments of the
common defense. They meet a common
political need and reflect the readiness and
determination of the member countries of
the North Atlantic community to consult and
act together wherever possible in the safe-
guard of their freedom and security and in
the furtherance of international peace, prog-
ress and prosperity.

536

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President Hails Fifth Anniversary
of the Alliance for Progress

statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated March 14

My fellow citizens of the hemisphere:
Since becoming President, I have often re-
stated my own, and our country's, resolute
commitment to the goal of a better life for
all the people of the Western Hemisphere.

Many Presidents have worked to shape
that goal.

We are proud of the good-neighbor policy
of President Franklin D. Roosevelt.

President Eisenhower broke new and fer-
tile ground with the Act of Bogota in 1960
— an act growing from the understanding
compassion of one people for another.

President Kennedy built on these efforts
and gave them increased emphasis with the
announcement of the Alliance for Progress
on March 13, 1961, 5 years ago.

Today, by word and deed, Americans are
helping to fulfill the hopes of those who have
little and pray that one day they can have
more.

The Johnson administration seeks his-
tory's description as a time when, the dream-
ing and the planning having laid the founda-
tions, the doing and building were underway.

The last 2 years of this vast cooperative
effort between the United States and the
nations of Latin America are solid evidence
that deeds are matching our words. During
these 2 years Latin America has achieved a
per capita growth rate of 2.5 percent. The
average rate for the preceding 3 years was
less than 1 percent. This recent increase of
150 percent is a fact which friends of the
hemisphere must note with pride — and new
hope for the future.

In fiscal years 1965 and 1966 those Latin
American countries cooperating with U.S.
programs of action are putting visible re-
sults before their people. Together we are:

— improving 7,000 miles of road
— building 130,000 dwelling units
— irrigating 136,000 new acres of farm-
land

— adding 530,000 kilowatts to power gen-
erating capacity

— providing classrooms for 1 million stu-
dents

— building 450 new health facilities

— spending $200 million to provide financ-
ing for expansion and construction of over
5,000 industrial firms

— spending $250 million in providing agri-
cultural credit to 450,000 farmers.

Equally important, reforms are changing
and modernizing the institutions in Latin
America essential to the grovirth of a sense
of community that stretches throughout the
hemisphere. Governments, business con-
cerns, labor unions, and cooperatives are
working with the people of our hemisphere
to attain economic and social progress under
free institutions.

— We are building the machinery of co-
operation through the Inter-American Com-
mittee on the Alliance for Progress.

— We are enlisting the support of private
groups and voluntary agencies in ever-in-
creasing measure. The Peace Corps, Part-
ners for the Alliance, Council on Latin
America, AFL-CIO, private foundations and
universities are making vital contributions.

— We are introducing the principle of
mutual aid among the Latin American na-
tions. We are giving new energy to eco-
nomic integration within Latin America.
The Economic and Social Act of Rio de
Janeiro, 1 approved last November, gives
impetus to these concepts.

— We recognize that fulfillment of all our
goals will require continuation of our joint
efforts beyond 1971. I said last November
that the United States is prepared to extend
mutual commitments beyond the period
originally foreseen in the Charter of Punta
del Este.2 Self-help and mutual aid will be
yardsticks in determining the scope of our
contribution.

In country after country, nations in the
hemisphere are acting to mobilize resources
for public and private investment, to reform

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.
'Ibid., p. 987.

APRIL 4, 1966

537

and modernize the institutions, to expand
trade and market opportunities within and
outside the hemisphere, and to provide a
solid base for the support and cooperation
of imported capital and technical assistance.

External support is also coming in increas-
ing measure from the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank, the World Bank and its
affiliates, and the United Nations. This sup-
port has increased by about $200 million in
the last 2 years.

For its part, the United States has already
committed nearly $5 billion to the nations of
Latin America to assist them in their
struggle to modernize and achieve a better
life for their people. In recent months sig-
nificant steps have been taken to give Latin
America greater access to our markets;

— This administration has insisted that
our participation in the International Coffee
Agreement be more effective.

— This administration recommended the
Congress withdraw the special import fee
on sugar.

— This administration removed the quota
restrictions on lead and zinc*

After a temporary period of setback, there
are now most hopeful signs of a renewal of
large-scale private foreign investment in
Latin American development, often in joint
ventures with Latin American associates.
Business leaders interested in Latin Ameri-
can investment have been invited to the
Cabinet Room frequently to discuss steps to
help the people of the hemisphere.

Three years ago the 19 Latin American
countries were deeply concerned over their
trade position in the world. During the past
2 years the trend has changed.

Our experts now predict that export earn-
ings for 1965 will show an increase of $1

' For a statement by President Johnson on Oct.
22, 1965, and text of Proclamation 3683, see ibid.,
Nov. 15, 1965, p. 795.

billion over the 1963 level, providing addi-
tional resources for investment in develop-
ment.

Yet we must do more than provide money
and technical assistance and improve trade.
Investments must be made directly in human
beings. In every forum I have advocated
and directed that American resources be in-
vested in education, health, and improved
living and working conditions. Such efforts
are not easy to organize. They require the
mobilization of human resources in scarce
supply. But they are among the most re-
warding of all investments.

Today I want to issue a new call to our
sister nations in the hemisphere to enlarge
our truly revolutionary cause — the cause of
enlarging the lives of all our people.

I am determined to contribute America's
resources to this spirit of change — a spirit
now slowly, surely, confidently growing in
the Western Hemisphere.

All of us in the Organization of American
States have seen and understand the lessons
of history. Together we are strong. Divided
we are weak. Together we must shape the
future to our hopes.

In every nation in the hemisphere the
needs and the beliefs and the prayers are
the same. We want peace and opportunity
— the chance to live in dignity, to choose and
plan and work and achieve the best for our
families.

I believe that in the next 5 years we will
see a continent constantly growing in pros-
perity and in unity, growing in its capacity
to meet the desires and needs of its own peo-
ple and in its contribution to peace and free-
dom in the world at large. That is what
Bogota and Rio and Punta del Este were all
about.

For my own part, I want to help make all
this a reality and "to create out of the
human spirit, something that did not exist
before." This is fulfillment. And this is our
commitment.

n

538

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose

by Arthur J. Goldberg
U.S. Representative to the United Nations^

We are taunted by some that we are
standing alone in Southeast Asia. This is
obviously not true when we consider that
your commitment in Malaysia and the com-
mitment of the United States and its fight-
ing allies in Viet-Nam are the major ele-
ments looking toward stability and resist-
ance to aggression in that troubled area.
The presence of valorous contingents of
fighting men from the United States, New
Zealand, Australia, Korea, and, last but not
least, the Government of South Viet-Nam is
the soundest guarantee of an ordered and
peaceful world that we have today. But
even if it were true that we stood alone in
Viet-Nam, we recall that England a quarter
of a century ago proved to the democratic
world that to stand and fight alone is not
necessarily final proof of a country's im-
morality and decadence.

Professor A. J. P. Taylor, with whom one
need not always agree, expressed it in
rather epic fashion in his recent work
English History; 1914-45. If I may quote
him:

The British were the only people who went
through both world wars from beginning to end. Yet
they remained a peaceful and civilized people. Tol-
erant, patient and generous. Traditional values
lost much of their force. Other values took their
place. Imperial greatness was on the way out; the
welfare state on the way in. The British Empire
declined; the condition of the people improved. Few

' Address made before the Pilgrim Society at Lon-
don, England, on Mar. 4 (U.S. /U.N. press release
4817).

sang "Land of Hope and Glory." Fewer even sang
"England, Arise." England has risen all the same.

So writes Professor Taylor.

England stands and so does that alliance
forged by our histories, by our literature,
our cultures, by our peoples. Whatever our
disagreements have been, they have never
threatened this compact based upon mutual
faith and trust.

For one thing, we are agreed on certain
basic concepts of law and our dedication to
the rule of law, both domestically and in the
world. And we are agreed on the meaning
of freedom, too. It was Abraham Lincoln
who said that freedom seldom means the
same thing to a wolf as it means to a lamb.
Build a shelter to protect the lambs, and the
wolves protest that the lambs have lost
their freedom. Our peoples understand the
true meaning of freedom and what must be
done to conserve it. Unlike the Communist
theoretician, Nikolai Bukharin, we are
agreed that an unhampered multiparty sys-
tem or a two-party system is an inseparable
part of democracy. Before he died in one of
Stalin's purges, Bukharin said about the So-
viet Union, and I quote: "We might have a
two-party system, but one of the parties
would be in office and the other in prison."

A World of Interdependent Nations

Our involvement in Southeast Asia is no
more in Southeast Asia than was your in-
volvement in the Danzig Corridor an in-
volvement in Danzig. Our involvement in
Greece and Turkey in 1947 was not pri-

APRIL 4, 1966

539

marily geographic, nor was our involvement
and yours during the 1948 Berlin blockade,
any more than were your risks and your in-
volvement for a decade in Malaya. Our in-
volvement in Korea in 1950 and our involve-
ment in the Cuban missile crisis were not
merely geographic. All this should be obvi-
ous to anyone who has watched the free
world since 1945 seeking peace and relaxa-
tion of tensions. Our involvements over-
seas have been uppermost a part of the in-
tegral concomitant of our search for peace,
the consequences of a lesson learned and
expressed by President Franklin D. Roose-
velt:

We have learned that we cannot live alone, at
peace; that our own well-being is dependent upon
the well-being of other nations far away. . . . We
have learned to be citizens of the world. . . .

What President Roosevelt said in 1945 is
as true today as it ever was. Should Brit-
ain have yielded to aggression in Malaya
and have turned over the government to the
Communist guerrillas as the sole representa-
tive of the people of Malaya? Yet voices are
heard in the world today demanding sole
representation be given to those who have
unilaterally enunciated a doctrine of so-called
"liberation wars" and by terror, subversion,
intimidation, and infiltration now seek to
enforce that doctrine in South Viet-Nam.

I'm sure you all remember what Alice
tells the White Queen in Through the Look-
ing Glass: that "one can't believe impossible
things." To which replies the White Queen :
"I daresay you haven't had much practice.
When I was your age, I always did it for
half-an-hour a day. Why, sometimes I've
believed as many as six impossible things
before breakfast."

There are moments when, in reading cer-
tain of the criticisms against our presence
in South Viet-Nam, I feel that the White
Queen would feel right at home with some
of the critics, except that even she might be
astounded at how many, many more impos-
sible things they believe before and even
after breakfast.

The most unspoken and unuttered — almost
concealed — thought of some in the fight

against the American involvement in South-
east Asia is : First, America cannot win the
war in South Viet-Nam; second, while South
Viet-Nam or, indeed, Southeast Asia may be
important to American interests, these areas
are not crucial to those interests. There-
fore, since we cannot win in a war theater
where the territory is peripheral to Ameri-
can interests, let us retreat, let us withdraw
with no further nonsense.

In my view, the complete answer is that
there would be no greater danger to world
peace than to start segregating mankind
and the countries they live in as either
peripheral or crucial. Perhaps in those
halcyon days when the Congress of Vienna
was the supreme example of intelligent
diplomacy, such distinctions had meaning.
The introduction of Marxism-Leninism into
world society and the visible determination
by its militant exponents to implement
that doctrine through "wars of national
liberation" has today obliterated such dis-
tinctions. So has the expansion of technol-
ogy, which has made this a shrinking world
of interdependent nations.

U.S. Seeks No Wider War

Some who question our involvement in
Viet-Nam express their fears in terms of
escalation of the war. No responsible official
of my Government favors unlimited war nor
is against a peaceful or "satisfactory" settle-
ment. If I may say so, the real issue is
withdrawal or resisting aggression until a
just settlement based on principles is
reached at the conference table.

President Johnson has said over and over
again that we seek no wider war. In his ad-
dress on the occasion of receiving the Na-
tional Freedom Award just a few days ago,
he said:-

First, some ask if this is a war for unlimited ob-
jectives. The answer is plain. The answer is "No."

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the suc-
cess of aggression. It is not conquest; it is not
empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domina-
tion. It is, simply put, just to prevent the forceful
conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam.

" Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

540

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Second, some people ask if we are caught in a
Wind escalation of force that is pulling us headlong
toward a wider war that no one wants. The answer,
again, is a simple "No."

We are using that force and only that force that
is necessary to stop this aggression. Our fighting
men are in Viet-Nam because tens of thousands of
invaders came south before them. Our numbers have
increased in Viet-Nam because the aggression of
others has increased in Viet-Nam. The high hopes
•of the aggressor have been dimmed, and the tide of
the battle has been turned, and our measured use of
force will and must be continued. But this is pru-
dent firmness under what I believe is careful
control. There is not, and there will not be, a
mindless escalation.

. . . some ask about the risks of a wider war,
perhaps against the vast land armies of Red China.
And again the answer is "No," never by any act of
ours — and not if there is any reason left behind the
wild words from Peking.

We have threatened no one, and we will not. We
seek the end of no regime, and we will not. Our
purpose is solely to defend against aggression. To
any armed attack, we will reply. We have meas-
ured the strength and the weakness of others, and
we think we know our own. We observe in our-
selves, and we applaud in others, a careful restraint
in action. We can live with anger in word as long
as it is matched by caution in deed.

Attitude of Communist China

But President Johnson has spoken to ears
which hear only the echo of their own doc-
trine. It is not Dennis Healey nor Robert Mc-
Namara but the Red Chinese Minister, Mar-
shal Lin Piao, who wrote 6 months ago, and
I quote :

We know that war brings destruction, sacrifice,
and suffering on the people. (But) the sacrifice of
a small number of people in revolutionary wars is
repaid by security for whole nations. . . . war can
temper the people and push history forward. In this
sense, war is a great school. ... In diametrical op-
position to the Khrushchev revisionists, the (Chi-
nese) Marxist-Leninists . . . never take a gloomy
view of war.

Marshal Lin Piao's statement didn't come
out of thin air. In his book Problems of
War and Strategy Mao Tse-tung wrote, and
this was before 1949 :

The seizure of power by armed forces, the settle-
ment of an issue by war, is the central task and
the highest form of revolution.

When Mao wrote these words, he lacked

nuclear capability. Today the story is dif-
ferent, and the implications of his words
and those of Marshal Lin are more dreadful.

Unlike Mao and the Chinese Communist
leadership, we seek the path of peace and an
end to the war. Our objective, unlike theirs,
is limited, and our desire for peace is con-
stant. And, therefore, consistent with and
in continuing recognition of our obligation
to world peace and our responsibility to
open a door where possible to peaceful
settlement, we have said that we are ready
to go to Geneva to discuss peace in South
Viet-Nam or any other part of Southeast
Asia.

But it is said by some that American pol-
icy is not sufficiently defined. This I dis-
pute. As one with some experience in ne-
gotiations, I would say that the matters of
further definition at issue are better left to
the negotiating table, particularly since we
do not possess the mandate — nor would we
assert one unilaterally — to determine the
fate of South Viet-Nam without reference
to the free expression of their will and de-
termination.

We are taxed with being inflexible about
Communist China, and it is said further
that this is a barrier to peace. Yet I made
clear, and most recently at the United Na-
tions General Assembly, that we are ready
to participate in an exploratory group, in-
cluding Red China, to examine the prospects
for a World Disarmament Conference.^ And,
perhaps, I should remind skeptics that our
diplomats have conferred with Red Chinese
diplomats at the ambassadorial level on 128
occasions; the longest and most direct
dialog of any major Western nation with
Communist China. And we intend and we
want to continue these meetings in the hope
that something may come of them. We have
invited Red Chinese journalists to visit the
United States and determine for themselves
the attitude of the American people.

I can assure you, the question of Com-
munist China is surely one of the most
freely discussed subjects in my country, as

II

' For background, see ibid., Dec. 27, 1965, p. 1029.

APRIL 4, 1966

541

it is in your country. We have nothing to
fear in our open society from contending
opinions about China, or any other country.
We are asked to reappraise our China policy.
But when and where has Red China dem-
onstrated by concrete acts its interest in a
policy of conciliation which would justify
such a reappraisal ?

The torrents of abuse over Radio Peking,
which intimidate no one, whether in Mos-
cow, Paris, London, or Washington, voice
hostility not conciliation. The cold shoulder
to countries which have extended recogni-
tion to Red China does not encourage us to
follow the example. Mass blatant interven-
tion by force and stealth in Africa, in India,
in our own hemisphere, call for resistance
not recognition. Our admiration for the Chi-
nese people has in no way been attenuated
by the announced policies of its ruling caste.
America is not engaged in any belligerent
acts toward Communist China. It is Com-
munist China, not the United States, which,
by the belligerent doctrines of its present
leadership, seems to have declared a per-
manent war of so-called "liberation" against
its neighbors in Asia and against Africa,
Latin America, and Europe. The recent set-
backs experienced by Red China in these
areas show the increasing awareness of many
of the dangers to world peace and security
of Chinese policy. It is being systematically
rejected.

U.S. Policy in Viet-Nam

We are ready peacefully to coexist with
any and all countries regardless of ideology,
but we are strongly of the view universally
shared by many others that it is no longer
possible to countenance aggression against
peace-loving peoples under whatever pre-
text— "liberation" or so-called "peoples'
wars." It has been suggested that in 1984
we shall intone: "War is peace, slavery is
freedom"; but this is not 1984, and we do
not intend to sit idly by and let 1984
happen.

We pray that there be no mistaking our
resolution and purpose in Southeast Asia.

542

There is some dissent in America from our
policies in Southeast Asia, but grave prob-
lems do not demand unanimity of opinion for
their solution. We are a people of many
opinions and of many voices. I believe in
this freedom of expression as a great source
of our strength. I would suggest, however,
that Peking and Hanoi should make no mis-
take about America's basic unity of purpose
in opposing force and aggression. They
should not be misled by seeing in action a
freedom they cannot understand and dare
not allow.

There is a consensus in America in suj)-
port of the policy of the United States in
Viet-Nam, which policy I would summarize
in this fashion :

That the United States is prepared for
discussions or negotiations without any prior
conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a
reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be
envisaged and that a cease-fire might be
the first order of business in any discus-
sions or negotiations, that the United States
remains prepared to withdraw its forces
from South Viet-Nam as soon as South
Viet-Nam is in a position to determine its
own future without external interference,
that the United States desires no continuing
military presence or bases in Viet-Nam,
that the future political structure in South
Viet-Nam should be determined by the
South Vietnamese people themselves
through democratic processes, and that the
question of the reunification of the two
Viet-Nams should be decided by the free de-
cision of their two peoples and that theitj
United States will honor the results of such
self-determination.

The differences in our national debate are
concerned with how these objectives are to
be achieved, not with the objectives them-
selves.

Those who say that our Viet-Nam policies
are the product of a sterile anticommunism
misconceive our purpose and our philosophy.
We believe in and we prefer our system, but
we do not thereby seek forcibly to over-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

throw or subvert Communist countries. On
the contrary, we seek common understand-
ings, common undertakings, and peaceful
resolution of all differences. We have no
designs on North Viet-Nam, a Communist
country. We do insist that this Communist
regime cease its attempt by force, terror,
and infiltration to enslave South Viet-Nam.

We take our stand in Viet-Nam because
we believe a minimum rule of law must pre-
vail in the world. The rule of law today must
be defined as providing that no nation may,
by force or by the dispatch of troops across
internationally recognized borders or de-
marcation lines, overthrow another govern-
ment. If such a rule of law does not prevail,
anarchy and, ultimately, war will replace an
uneasy and less than universal peace.

That is why my Government regards the
United Nations as a worthy instrument for
the establishment of a rule of law. We
realize that the U.N. cannot yet provide the
final answer nor can it yet guarantee world
peace, but this is not the fault of the U.N.
As has v/isely been pointed out, the U.N. is
but the reflection of the world as it is. Sir
Alexander Cadogan once pointed out that it
takes a musician to get harmony out of a
Stradivarius violin, but if he does not use it
well, "there is no sense blaming the instru-
ment— still less smashing it to pieces."

As I draw to a close, this would be the mo-
ment to conjure up wild images of a clock
with the minute hand approaching the zero
hour of midnight. We are far, far from
such a reality. Because of some misplaced
optimism? No, because I believe that man-
kind will not allow its noblest work to be ex-
tinguished in a puff of time; because, re-
gardless of our differences in ideology, we
know the awful fate which awaits us if we
fail in our peacekeeping. Somehow I find
solace in the words of our great Chief Jus-
tice John Marshall who wrote :

There are principles of abstract justice which the
Creator of all things has impressed on the mind of
His creature, man, and which are admitted to regu-
late in great degree the right of civilized nations.

And a great solace and hope comes from

this faith which our two nations have in
each other. Our friendship and our respect
for each other and for other peoples are in
sharp contrast to those countries which,
despite factitious ideology and vaunted ideal-
ism, have chilled comradeship into enmity
and fragmented an awesome monolith into
a cascade of polemical shards. Our own
hopes have not been so ambitious. Rather
it has been the modest ambition which Mil-
ton expressed in his Areopagitica :

For this is not the liberty which we can hope,
that no grievance ever should arise in the Common-
wealth, that let no man in this world expect; but
when complaints are freely heard, deeply consid-
ered, and speedily reformed, then is the utmost
sound of civil liberty attained that wise men look for.

These eloquent words speak for you
as they do for my country and for those
countries which enjoy and cherish and
jealously guard a rule of law. It is for this
faith that we do battle today as you have
done in the past and will in the future.

United States and U.S.S.R. Sign
Exchanges Agreement for 1966-67

Following is the text of a joint U.S.-Soviet
communique released on March 19 (press
release 59) after the signing of an agree-
ment 1 on exchanges in the scientific, tech-
nical, educational, cultural, and other fields
at Washington on that day.

The United States of America and the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics have
signed today, March 19, 1966, an Agreement
on Exchanges in the Scientific, Technical,
Educational, Cultural and Other Fields for
1966-1967.

The Agreement was signed by John M.
Leddy, Assistant Secretary of State for
European Affairs, for the United States, and
by A. F. Dobrynin, Ambassador of the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United

' For text, see Department of State press release
59 dated Mar. 19.

II

II

:APRIL 4, 1966

543

states, for the Soviet Union. The Agreement
entered into force upon signature with effect
from January 1, 1966 and is the fifth in a
series of two-year exchanges agreements
between the two countries.- The first of
these was signed in Washington on January
27, 1958.

The Agreement provides for exchanges in
the fields of science, technology, agriculture,

' For text of the agreement for 1958-60, see
Bulletin of Feb. 17, 1958, p. 243; for 1960-61, see
ibid., Dec. 28, 1959, p. 951 ; for 1962-63, see Treaties
and Other International Acts Series 5112; for 1964-
65, see TIAS 5582.

public health and medical science, education,
performing arts, publications, exhibitions,
motion pictures, radio and television, culture
and the professions, and athletics.

At the same time, as a part of the Ex-
changes Agreement for 1966-67, Agree-
ments were negotiated between the National
Academy of Sciences of the United States
and the Academy of Sciences of the U.S.S.R.,
as well as between the American Council of
Learned Societies and the Academy of Sci-
ences of the U.S.S.R., providing for the con-
tinuance of contacts between American and
Soviet scientists and scholars. ■

1

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Calendar of International Conferences

Scheduled April Through June 1966

Inter-American Juridical Committee: Special Meeting . . .

UNCTAD Committee on Invisibles and Financing Related to
Trade: 2d Part of the Resumed 1st Session.

UNESCO Conference of Ministers of Education and Ministers
Responsible for Economic Planning in Arab Member States

OECD Agriculture Committee

Inter-American Nuclear Energy Commission : 6th Meeting .

Lead and Zinc Study Group: Special V^^orking Group . .

First Pan American Congress of Soil Conservation . . .

The Hague Conference on Private International Law: Extraor-
dinary Session.

Economic Commission for Europe: 21st Plenary Session.

Rio de Janeiro . . . Apr. 1-30

Geneva Apr. 4-13

Tripoli Apr. 9-14

Paris Apr. 12-15

Washington .... Apr. 12-16

Geneva Apr. 12-16

Sao Paulo Apr. 12-29

The Hague .... Apr. 13-26

Geneva Apr. 13-29

^ This schedule, which was prepared in the Office of International Conferences on Mar. 15, 1966, lists
international conferences in which the U.S. Government expects to participate officially in the period April-
June 1966. The list does not include numerous nongovernmental conferences and meetings. Persons interest-
ed in these are referred to the World List of Future International Meetings, compiled by the Library
of Congress and available from the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20402.

Following is a key to the abbreviations: BIRPI, United International Bureaus for the Protection of In-
dustrial and Intellectual Property; CCIR, International Radio Consultative Committee; CCITT, Internation-
al Telephone and Telegraph Consultative Committee; CENTO, Central Treaty Organization; ECA, Eco-
nomic Commission for Africa; ECAFE, Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East; ECE, Economic
Commission for Europe; ECLA, Economic Commission for Latin America; ECOSOC, Economic and Social
Council; FAO, Food and Agriculture Organization; GATT, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade; IAEA,
International Atomic Energy Agency; lAIAS, Inter- American Institute of Agricultural Sciences; ICAO,
International Civil Aviation Organization; ICEM, Intergovernmental Committee for European Migration;
ILO, International Labor Organization; IMCO, Intergovernmental Maritime Consultative Organization: ITU,
International Telecommunication Union; NATO, North Atlantic Treaty Organization; OECD, Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Development; PAHC, Pan American Highway Congresses; PAHO, Pan
American Health Organization; SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organization; U.N., United Nations; UNC-
TAD, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development; UNESCO, United Nations Educational,
Scientific and Cultural Organization; UNICEF, United Nations Children's Fund; UPU, Universal Postal
Union; WHO, World Health Organization; WMO, World Meteorological Organization.

544

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ICAO Aeronautical Information Services, Aeronautical Charts
Divisional Meeting.

ITU CCITT Study Group XI

lAIAS Governing Board: 5th Meeting and 11th Technical
Advisory Council Meeting.

FAO Group on Grains

Inter- American Permanent Committee on Social Security:
13th Meeting.

IAEA Panel on Genetical Aspects of Radiosensitivity . . .

FAO Intergovernmental Committee of the World Pood Pro-
gram: 9th Session.

PAHO Executive Committee: 54th Session

U.N. Committee on Peaceful Uses of Outer Space: Subcom-
mittee on Science and Technology.

FAO Meeting on Dairy Problems in Africa

Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission

Special Inter-American Port and Harbor Conference . . .

OECD Special Committee on Iron and Steel

UNESCO Coordinating Council on International Hydro-
logical Decade: 2d Session.

U.N. ECOSOC Social Commission

CENTO Ministerial Council: 14th Session

ECE Committee on Gas: Meeting of Rapporteurs on Natural
Gas Reserve.

UNCTAD U.N. Sugar Conference: 2d Session of the Con-
sultative Committee.

ECE Steel Committee: Working Group on the Steel Market

Inter-American Development Bank Board of Governors:
7th Meeting.

ITU CCITT Study Group XIII

WMO/ECAFE Interregional Seminar (Assessment of Magni-
tude Frequency of Flood Flows).

International Coffee Council: 8th Session

U.N. ECOSOC Committee on Industrial Development . . .

ECE Steel Committee: Ad Hoc Group of Rapporteurs on
World Market for Iron Ore.

EGA Conference on North African Industrial Harmonization

OECD Fiscal Committee

FAO Seminar on Cooperative Farming for English-Speaking
Countries of Asia and the Far East.

IMCO Maritime Safety Committee: Special Session . . .

FAO Atlantic Tuna Conference of Plenipotentiaries . . .

UNESCO Executive Board: 72d Meeting

UNCTAD U.N. Cocoa Conference: 2d Session

OECD Manpower and Social Affairs Committee

ICEM Council: 25th Session

ICEM Executive Committee: 27th Session

19th WHO Assembly

ITU CCITT Special Study Group B

OECD Committee of Experts on Restrictive Business Practices

2d Inter-American Conference of Ministers of Labor . . .

ECE Coal Committee: Group of Experts on Opencast Mining

ITU Administrative Council

Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission: 4th Meeting . . .

Economic Commission for Latin America: 11th Meeting . .

U.N. Committee on Space Research : 9th Plenary Meeting and
7th International Space Symposium.

ECAFE Asian Development Bank: Preparatory Committee

ECAFE Subcommittee on Electric Power: 10th Meeting . .

International Secretariat for Volunteer Service: Council
Meeting.

U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees: 15th Session of Exe-
cutive Committee.

ECE Committee on Agricultural Problems: Working Party
on Mechanization of Agriculture.

International Rubber Study Group: 18th Meeting ....

IMCO Council: 16th Session

BIRPI Committee of Governmental Experts on Administra-
tion and Structure Matters: 2d Meeting.

ITU Seminar on Satellite Communications

UPU Executive Council

UNICEF Executive Board

FAO Committee of Government Experts on the Code of Prin-
ciples Concerning Milk and Milk Products.

ILO Governing Body: 165th Session

Montreal Apr. 13-May 7

New York .... Apr. 14-22

Bogota Apr. 17-24

Rome Apr. 18-20

San Jose Apr. 1&-22

Vienna Apr. 18-22

Rome Apr. 18-26

Washington .... Apr. 18-26

Geneva Apr. 18-29

Nairobi Apr. 18-30

Ecuador Apr. 19-20

Washington .... Apr. 19-21

Paris Apr. 19-21

Paris Apr. 19-25

New York Apr. 19^May 4

Ankara Apr. 20-21

Geneva Apr. 20-22

Geneva Apr. 21-29

Geneva Apr. 25-26

Mexico City .... Apr. 25-29

New York Apr. 25-May 3

Bangkok Apr. 25-May 9

London Apr. 25-May 13

New York Apr. 26-May 9

Geneva Apr. 27-28

Tangier April

Paris April

New Delhi May 1-5

London May 2-6

Sao Paulo May 2-14

Paris May 2-31

New York May 2-June 3

Paris May 3-5

Geneva May 3-14

Geneva May 3-14

Geneva May 3-21

New York May 4-6

Paris May 4-6

Maracay, Venezuela . May 7-14

Geneva May 9-11

Geneva May 9-June 10

Edinburgh May 10-13

Santiago May 10-13

Vienna May 10-19

Bangkok May 11-13

Manila May 11-16

Warren ton, Va. . . . May 12-14

Geneva May 15-25

Geneva May 1&-18

Rome May 16-19

London May 16-20

Geneva May 16-27

Washington .... May 16-27

Bern May 17-28

Addis Ababa .... May 19-28

Rome May 20-25

Geneva May 20-28

APRIL 4, 1966

545

Calendar of International Conferences — Continued

Scheduled April Through June 1966 — Continued

WHO Executive Board: 38th Session Geneva May 23-30

OECD Maritime Transport Committee Paris May 23-24

PAHC Technical Committee on Traffic and Safety .... Washington .... May 23-27

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning .... Geneva May 24-27

ICAO Legal Subcommittee on Nationality and Registration of Dakar May 25-June 15

Aircraft.

WMO Executive Committee: 18th Session Geneva May 26-June 10

PAHC Technical Committee on Financing Caracas May 31-June 3

OECD Trade Committee Paris May

U.N. Committee on Granting of Independence to Colonial New York May

Countries and Peoples (Committee of 24).

ECA Conference on West African Industrial Harmonization Niamey May

and Economic Cooperation.

ECA Conference on Central African Industrial Harmoniza- Leopoldville .... May

tion and Economic Cooperation.

GATT Consultations on Fresh Grapefruit London May

CENTO Council for Scientific Education and Research: 15th Pakistan May

Meeting.

Pan American Highway Congresses: 10th Session .... Montevideo .... May

OECD Working Party on the Adjustment Process .... Paris May

OECD Economic Policy Committee: Working Party II . . Paris May

OECD Conference on LFtilization of Scientific and Technical Paris May

Personnel.

U.N. Trusteeship Council: 33d Session New York May or June

PAO Group on Oils, Fats, and Oilseeds: 1st Session .... Rome May or June

FAO Committee on Commodity Problems: 40th Session . . Rome May or June

International Cotton Advisory Committee : Plenary Meeting Lima May or June

50th ILO International Conference Geneva June 1-23

ILO Governing Body: 166th Session Geneva June 1-23

International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic Fish- Spain June 5-11

eries: 16th Annual Meeting.

NATO Ministerial Council: 37th Meeting Brussels June 6-8

PAO Desert Locust Control Committee: 10th Session . . . Rome June 6-9

ECE Senior Economic Advisers Geneva June 6-11

6th World Forestry Congress Madrid June 6-18

UNCTAD U.N. Committee on Tungsten New York June 7-10

PAHC Technical Committee on Planning and Routing of High- Rio de Janeiro . . . June 7-11

ways.

U.N. Development Program: Governing Council "Rome June 13-14

ECE Working Party on Transport of Perishable Foodstuffs 'Geneva June 13-14

FAO Committee on Fisheries: 1st Session Home June 13-18

UNCTAD Permanent Group on Synthetics and Substitutes: New York June 13-23

1st Session.

PAHC Technical Committee on Terminology Buenos Aires .... June 14-18

ECE Working Party on Standardization of Perishable Food- Geneva June 15-17

stuffs.

ECE Working Party on the Transport of Dangerous Goods Geneva June 20-28

UNESCO/ECLA Conference of Latin American Ministers of Buenos Aires .... June 20-30

Education and Ministers Responsible for Economic Planning

UNCTAD Expert Group on International Monetary Issues: New York June 20^uly 1

2d Session.

FAO 2d World Land Reform Conference Rome June 20-July 2

PAHC Technical Committee on Development of Governmental Lima June 21-25

Highway Agencies.

11th ITU CCIR Plenary Assembly Oslo June 22^uly 22

SEATO Council: 11th Meeting Canberra June 27-29

Whaling Commission: 18th Annual Meeting London June 27^uly 1

UNCTAD Permanent Subcommittee on Commodities: 1st Geneva June 27-July 15

Session.

ECAFE Conference of Asian Statisticians: 7th Session of Bangkok June 29-July 12

Statistical Commission.

OECD Agriculture Committee Paris June

UNICEF Program Committee New York June

ECE Committee on Housing, Building and Planning . . . Geneva June

OECD Special Committee for Oil Paris June

OECD Energy Committee: 9th Session Paris June

ECE Coal Committee: Subcommittee on Mining Problems . Geneva June

ITU CCITT Asian Study Group Tokyo June

GATT Committee III on Trade and Development .... Geneva June

IAEA Board of Governors Vienna June

54g DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

U.S. Welcomes Security Council
Views on Viet-Nam Situation

Followiyig are texts of a statement by
Arthur J. Goldberg released at New York
on February 26 upon receipt of a letter ad-
dressed to members of the Security Council
from Akira Matsui, President of the Secu^
rity Council.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4812

The United States welcomes the letter
which the President of the Security Council,
Ambassador Matsui of Japan, has addressed
to its members at the conclusion of his
consultations with them on the problem of
Viet-Nam. On behalf of my Government I
should like to express my deep appreciation
and that of my Government for the high
purpose, the zeal, and the objectivity with
which Ambassador Matsui has pursued
these consultations on so difficult, complex,
and controversial a subject.

These consultations have demonstrated
once again a legitimate and essential United
Nations concern with the maintenance of in-
ternational peace and security, wherever and
however threatened. We are confident this
will help to inspire Security Council members
and others to continue and to intensify their
efforts for a peaceful settlement.

Indeed, we are both gratified and en-
couraged that the Council's proceedings of
February 1 and 2 and the consultations
undertaken thereafter have revealed a sub-
stantial though not unanimous consensus on
two points:

First, "There is general grave concern and
growing anxiety over the continuation of
hostilities in Viet-Nam and a strong desire
for the early cessation of hostilities and a
peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam prob-
lem"; and

Second, "There appears also to be a feel-
ing that the termination of the conflict in
Viet-Nam should be sought through nego-

tiations in an appropriate forum in order to
work out the implementation of the Geneva
Accords."

My Government has consistently pursued
these ends and still does so. In my state-
ments to the Security Council in the debates
on February 1 and 2 I said on behalf of my
Government that we are prepared to go to
Geneva at once to seek a settlement on the
basis of and in implementation of the Geneva
accords.^ Indeed, it was with a profound
desire and determination to move toward
such a conference that my Government de-
cided in late December of last year to under-
take a peace offensive unprecedented in
intensity and scope.

When that peace offensive was brutally
rejected by President Ho Chi Minh in his
letters of late January, we decided to invoke
formally, as we had for some time sought
informally, the assistance of the United
Nations organ with the primary responsibil-
ity for the maintenance of international
peace and security. In taking this step, our
purpose was to make it unmistakably clear
that, despite Hanoi's rejection of our offers
to negotiate unconditionally, their unwilling-
ness to match in any way our unilateral
reduction of military activities, and their
continued insistence that negotiations are
possible only after their sweeping precondi-
tions are met in full, the United States will
never rest and will leave no path unexplored
until it has succeeded in its endeavor to
move the conflict from the battlefield to the
conference table.

We deem it of importance that a substan-
tial majority of the Council supports the
view that negotiations in an appropriate
forum are the way to peace in Viet-Nam.
While Hanoi has not responded to the United
States invitation to such a peaceful settle-
ment, it cannot be unmindful of this expres-
sion of world opinion.

President Matsui's letter properly points
out that the Council remains seized of the
problem. We shall continue to cooperate

' For background and texts of statements, see
Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.

APRIL 4, 1966

547

with the other members of the Council in
seeking other constructive steps toward
peace in Viet-Nam.

The policy of the United States remains
constant and may be summarized as follows ;

That the United States is prepared for
discussions or negotiations without any prior
conditions whatsoever or on the basis of the
Geneva accords of 1954 and 1962, that a
reciprocal reduction of hostilities could be
envisaged and that a cease-fire might be the
first order of business in any discussions or
negotiations, that the United States re-
mains prepared to withdraw its forces from
South Viet-Nam as soon as South Viet-Nam
is in a position to determine its own future
vdthout external interference, that the
United States desires no continuing military
presence or bases in Viet-Nam, that the
future political structure in South Viet-Nam
should be determined by the South Vietnam-
ese people themselves through democratic
processes, and that the question of the re-
unification of the two Viet-Nams should be
decided by the free decision of their two
peoples and that the United States will
honor the results of such self-determination.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR MATSUI

U.N. doc. S/7168

February 26, 1966

As you know, at the 1273rd meeting of the Secu-
rity Council on 2 February 1966, following the adop-
tion of the agenda for that meeting, namely, the
letter dated 31 January 1966, addressed to the Presi-
dent of the Security Council by the Permanent Rep-
resentative of the United States of America
(S/7105),' I suggested that informal and private
consultations be held in order to decide on the most
effective and appropriate way of continuing our de-
bate in the future, and that, to this end, the meeting
be adjourned until an exact date and time could be
arranged for the next meeting.

That suggestion was approved without objection
and it was so decided by the Council.

Pursuant to that decision, I felt obliged, as Presi-
dent of the Council for the month of February, to

' For text, see ibid.

make myself available in arranging the informal
and private consultations envisaged by the Council
in its decision. I have endeavoured to carry out this
task with members of the Council both individually
and collectively. I have also conferred with the
Secretary-General, who has expressed to me his own
views of the situation.

It is clear to me that members of the Council have
every right to be informed of the results of these
consultations. I feel, indeed, that it Is my duty, as
President of the Council, so to inform members.

A useful exchange of views has taken place; on
the other hand, some serious differences of views
remain unresolved.

The principal difference among members on the
procedural question at issue relates to the wisdom
of the Council considering the problem of Viet-Nam
at this particular juncture. Although it was felt by
a number of members that the Council might find
some way to contribute towards a solution of the
Viet-Nam problem, others took the position that
consideration of the problem in the forum of the
Council would not be useful under present circum-
stances; some members, adhering to positions they
had expressed when adoption of the provisional
agenda was discussed on 1 and 2 February, did not
choose to participate in consultations.

These differences of views have made it impos-
sible for me to report, at this stage, agreement on
a precise course of action the Council might follow.
They have also given rise to a general feeling that
it would be inopportune for the Council to hold fur-
ther debate at this time and, rather than a formal
meeting of the Council, a report by me in the pres-
ent form has apeared to be the most appropriate
step that could be taken. I have decided, therefore,
to take this step under the present extraordinary
circumstances.

It would not be appropriate for me to refer, in a
formal and public document such as this, to the
views that individual members expressed in the
course of informal and private consultations. Never-
theless, throughout the Council's proceedings of 1
and 2 February and the consultations stemming
therefrom, I believe I could detect a certain degree
of common feeling among many members of the
Council which might be summarized as follows:

1. There is general grave concern and growing
anxiety over the continuation of hostilities in Viet-
Nam and a strong desire for the early cessation of
hostilities and a peaceful solution of the Viet-Nam
problem ;

2. There appears also to be a feeling that the
termination of the conflict in Viet-Nam should be
sought through negotiations in an appropriate forum
in order to work out the implementation of the
Geneva Accords.

It is my understanding that the Council, having
decided on 2 February to place on its agenda the

548

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

item contained in the letter dated 31 January by
the Permanent Representative of the United States
of America (S/7105), remains seized of the Viet-
Nam problem.

May I conclude by expressing my personal hope
that efforts will be continued, within and outside
of the United Nations, by whatever means may be
deemed appropriate, to find an early, peaceful solu-
tion of the Viet-Nam question.

I am requesting the Secretary-General to repro-
duce this letter as an official document of the Coun-
cil.

I avail myself, etc.

Akira Matsui
President of the Security Council

TREATY INFORMATION

Supplementary Tax Protocol
Signed With United Kingdom

Press release 57 dat^d March 17

On March 17, 1966, Ambassador David
K. E. Bruce and British Parliamentary Un-
der-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
Lord Walston signed in London a protocol
between the United States and the United
Kingdom supplementing and amending the
convention of April 16, 1945, as modified by
supplementary protocols of June 6, 1946,
May 25, 1954, and August 19, 1957,i for the
avoidance of double taxation and the preven-
tion of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes
on income.

The new protocol,- upon entry into force,
would effect substantive changes in the ex-
isting convention which are considered de-
sirable because of basic changes made in
United Kingdom tax legislation. Under the
United Kingdom Finance Act of 1965, ap-
plicable with respect to profits earned on or
after April 6, 1964, a United Kingdom cor-

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
1546, 3146, 4124.

' For text, see Department of State press release
64 dated Mar. 22.

poration tax was instituted as a major ele-
ment of the British tax system.

The protocol will be transmitted to the
United States Senate for advice and consent
to ratification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes be-
tween states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Signature: Cyprus, March 5, 1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on the continental shelf. Done at Geneva

April 29, 1958. Entered into force June 10, 1964.

TIAS 5578.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia (with a reser-
vation), January 28, 1966.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva April

29, 1958. Entered into force September 30, 1962.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28,
1966.
Convention on fishing and conservation of the living
resources^ of the high seas. Done at Geneva April

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28.

1966.
Convention on the territorial sea and the contiguous
zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered
mto force September 10, 1964. TIAS 5639.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28,

1966.
Optional protocol of signature concerning the com-
pulsory settlement of disputes. Done at Geneva
April 29, 1958. Entered into force September 30,
1962.'
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, January 28.

1966. 6 . J- ,

Property

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883, as
revised, for the protection of industrial property.
Done at The Hague November 6, 1925. Entered
into force June 1, 1928; for the United States
March 6, 1931. TS 834.

Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28.
1966.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Signed at London June 2, 1934. Entered
into force August 1, 1938. TS 941.
Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28,
1966.

Convention of Union of Paris of March 20, 1883,
as revised, for the protection of industrial prop-
erty. Done at Lisbon October 31, 1958. Entered
into force January 4, 1962. TIAS 4931.
Notification of accession: Bulgaria, February 28
1966.

' Not in force.

' Not in force for the United States.

APRIL 4, 1966

549

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: United Arab Republic, March 17, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the inter-
national sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Open for signature at London November 1 through
December 23, 1965. Entered into force January
1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Signatures: Argentina,' December 23, 1965; Aus-
tralia, December 21, 1965; Belgium, ' ' Decem-
ber 22, 1965; Brazil," December 20, 1965; Can-
ada, December 21, 1965; China,' December 20,
1965; Costa Rica,' December 6, 1965; Cuba,='' "
December 17, 1965; Czechoslovakia, December
21, 1965; Denmark, December 17, 1965; Domini-
can Republic,' December 20, 1965; Ecuador,'
December 21, 1965; France, December 22, 1965;
Federal Republic of Germany," December 16,
1965; Haiti, December 23, 1965; Hungary,' De-
cember 16, 1965; India,' December 23, 1965;
Indonesia,' December 21, 1965; Ireland,' Decem-
ber 22, 1965; Italy,' December 20, 1965; Ja-
maica, December 15, 1965; Japan, December 16,
1965; Madagascar,' December 22, 1965; Mexico,'
December 20, 1965; Morocco,' December 22,
1965; Netherlands, December 23, 1965; New
Zealand, December 22, 1965; Nicaragua,' De-
cember 20, 1965; Nigeria,' December 21, 1965
Philippines,' December 10, 1965; Poland,' De
cember 21, 1965; Portugal,' December 22, 1965
Sierra Leone, December 21, 1965; South Africa
December 21, 1965; Trinidad and Tobago, De-
cember 21, 1965; Tunisia,' December 20, 1965
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,' December
17, 1965; United Kingdom,' December 23, 1965
Upper Volta, December 23, 1965.

BILATERAL

Chile

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of July 27, 1965 (TIAS 5898). Effected
by exchange of notes at Santiago February 8,
1966. Entered into force February 8, 1966.

Korea

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Seoul March 7, 1966. Entered into force March
7, 1966.

Mexico

Agreement for the continuation of a cooperative
meteorological observation program in Mexico,
with memorandum of understanding. Effected by
exchange of notes at Mexico February 4, 1966.
Entered into force February 4, 1966.

Sierra Leone

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of January 29, 1965, as amended
(TIAS 5762, 5831). Effected by exchange of
notes at Freetown March 10, 1966. Entered into
force March 10, 1966.

Somali Republic

Agreement extending the agreement of January 28
and February 4, 1961, as extended (TIAS 4915,
5332, 5508, 5738, 5814), concerning the succession
of Somali Republic to the technical cooperation
agreement of June 28, 1954, as amended (TIAS
3150, 4392), between the United States and Italy.
Effected bv exchange of notes at Mogadiscio Feb-
ruary 16 and 28, 1966. Entered into force Feb-
ruary 28, 1966.

' Not in force.

' Subject to ratification.

' Signature is made on behalf of the Belgo-Luxem-
bourg Economic Union.

" With a declaration.

" Subject to acceptance.

' Subject to reservations made upon accession to
the International Sugar Agreement of 1958.

' Subject to the declaration and reservations madei
upon accession to the International Sugar Agree-
ment of 1958.

' Subject to reservations made upon ratification
of the 1963 protocol to the International Sugar]
Agreement of 1958.

I

I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. IIV, NO. 1397

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af-
faire, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreiurn
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
8tat« and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of International affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general International in-
terest.

Publications of the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govem-

PUBLICATION 80S9 APRIL 4, 19&6

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C..
20402. Prick: 62 Issues, domestic $10.
foreign $15 ; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printing ef this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1968).

NOTE: Contents of this publication u»
not copyrighted and items contained hereto
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed
in the Readers* Guide to Pericxiical Lttn^
ature.

550

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX April 4, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1397

American Republics. President Hails Fifth
Anniversarj' of the Alliance for Progress . 537

Asia

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold-
berg) 539

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace (Rusk) . 514

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in
Asia (Humphrey) 523

U-S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social
Development in Asia (Johnson) .... 521

Communism. United States Tasks and Respon-
sibilities in Asia (Humphrey) 523

Congress. U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and
Social Development in Asia (Johnson) . . 521

Economic Affairs

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With
United Kingdom 549

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in
Asia (Humphrey) 523

Educational and Cultural Affairs. United
States and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchanges Agree-
ment for 1966-67 (joint communique) . . 543

Foreign Aid

President Hails Fifth Anniversary of the Alli-
ance for Progress 537

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social
Development in Asia (Johnson) 521

International Organizations and Conferences.
Calendar of International Conferences . . 544

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. 14 NATO
Nations Declare Alliance Essential to Com-
mon Security 536

Presidential Documents

President Hails Fifth Anniversary of the Al-
liance for Progress 537

U.S. To Cooperate in Economic and Social
Development in Asia 521

Science. United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Ex-
changes Agreement for 1966-67 (joint
communique) 543

Treaty Information

Current Actions 549

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With
United Kingdom 549

United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Exchanges
Agreement for 1966-67 (joint communique) . 543

U.S.S.R. United States and U.S.S.R. Sign Ex-
changes Agreement for 1966-67 (joint
communique) 543

United Kingdom

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold-
berg) 539

Supplementary Tax Protocol Signed With
United Kingdom 549

United Nations. U.S. Welcomes Security Coun-
cil Views on Viet-Nam. Situation (Goldberg,
Matsui) 547

Viet-Nam

America and Britain: Unity of Purpose (Gold-
berg) 539

The Issue and Goal in Viet-Nam (U. Alexis
Johnson) 529

Keeping Our Commitment to Peace (Rusk) . 514

United States Tasks and Responsibilities in
Asia (Humphrey) 523

U.S. Welcomes Security Council Views on Viet-
Nam Situation (Goldberg, Matsui) . . . 547

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J 539,547

Humphrey, Vice President 523

Johnson, President 521, 537

Johnson, U. Alexis 529

Matsui, Akira 547

Rusk, Secretary 514

Check List of Department of State

Press Releases: March 14-20

Press releases may be obtained from the

Office of

STews, Department of State, Wash-

ington, D.C., 20520. |

No.

Date

Snbject

49

3/14

Rusk: Boston University School of
Public Communications.

50

3/14

U. Alexis Johnson: Canadian Club

of Montreal.

t51

3/14

Further removal of restrictions on
U.S. exports.

*52

3/14

Program for visit of Prime Min-
ister of India.

t53

3/15

Treaties in Force . . .1966 re-
leased.

*54

3/16

Heymann desigrnated Acting Ad-
ministrator, Bureau of Secu-
rity and Consular Affairs (bio-
graphic details).

t55

3/18

Sisco: "Hard Work Ahead for the

U.N."

156

3/17

Rusk: House Foreign Affairs
Committee.

57

3/17

Supplementary tax protocol with
the U.K.

t58

3/18

Members of Board of Foreign
Scholarships sworn in.

59

3/19

U.S.-U.S.S.R. exchanges agree-
ment (communique and text).

in ted.

* Not pr

t Held fc

r a later issue of the Bulletin.

il GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFFICE; 1966 201-937/4I

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I

i

The Heart of the Problem

Secretary Rusk, General Taylor Review Viet-Nam Policy in Senate Hearingi

This pamphlet contains the statements made before the Senate Committee on Foreign I
tions in mid-February by Secretary Rusk and General Maxwell D. Taylor in which they dis
the interests and involvement of the United States in South Viet-Nam.

In his testimony Secretary Rusk emphasizes that the issues posed in Viet-Nam "are dc
intertwined with our own security" and that "the outcome of the struggle can profoundly al
the nature of the world in which we and our children must live."

Three basic issues are discussed by General Taylor: what we are doing in Viet-Nam,
we are doing it, and how we can improve upon what we are doing.

PUBLICATION 8054 20 CE

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1398

April 11, 1966

SECRETARY RUSK APPEARS ON "FACE THE, NATION"
Transcript of Interview 565

HARD WORK AHEAD FOR THE UNITED NATIONS
by Assistant Secretary Sisco 571

THE UNITED STATES AND THE WARSAW CONVENTION
Statements by Andreas F. Lowenfeld 580

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MARCH 25 557

OUR VIEW OF NATO
Address by President Johnson 55^

For index see inside back cover

"What is our vieiv of NATO today? We see it not as an
alliance to make war hut as an alliance to keep peace.
. . . For our part, the United States of America is de-
termined to join ivith 13 of her other allies to preserve
and to strengthen the deterrent strength of NATO."

Our View of NATO

Address by President Johnson

Mr. Secretary [Secretary Rusk] , ladies and
gentlemen : I am very pleased to address the
Foreign Service Institute this morning and
to come here to meet with so many Ameri-
cans that are preparing to serve their
country abroad. As one who believes that
we cannot shorten our reach in the world,
I am greatly encouraged by the number and
the quality of those who are studying at
this Institute. You have the gratitude of
your countrymen and my own assurance of
support.

We have come a long way from the day
that someone observed that some diplomat
no doubt will launch a heedless word and
lurking war leap out. That was more than
half a century ago, when diplomacy was
often war by another name.

Today your task is different. Those of
you about to go abroad represent a continu-
ity of purpose in a generation of change.
That purpose is to build from reason and
moderation a world order in which the fires
of conflict yield to the fulfillment of man's
oldest yearnings for himself and his family.

Your job, wherever you serve, is peace.
That is the task that faces all of us today.

' Made before the Foreign Service Institute at the
Department of State, Washington, D.C., on Mar. 23
(White House press release; as-delivered text).

The question, as always, is. How? How do
we, for example, maintain the security of
the Atlantic community upon which so
many of the world's hopes depend?

For the answer, we must begin with the
gray dawn of the world of 1945, when Eu-
rope's cities lay in rubble, her farms devas-
tated, her industries smashed, her people
weary with war and death and defeat.

Now, from that desolation has come
abundance. From that weakness has come
power. From those ashes of holocaust has
come the rebirth of a strong and a vital
community. The Europe of today is a new
Europe. In place of uncertainty there is
confidence; in place of decay, progress; in
place of isolation, partnership; in place of
war, peace.

The Design of Collective Security

If there is no single explanation for the
difference between Europe then and Europe
now, there is a pattern. It is a luminous
design that is woven through the history of
the past 20 years. It is the design of com-
mon action, of interdependent institutions
serving the good of the European nations
as though they were all one. It is the design
of collective security protecting the entire
Atlantic community. ,

So I have come here this morning to speak

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554

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to you of one important part of that design.
I speak of a structure that some of you have
helped to build: the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization.

Let me make clear in the beginning that
we do not believe there is any righteousness
in standing pat. If an organization is alive
and vital, if it is to have meaning for all
time as well as for any particular time, it
must grow and respond and yield to change.
Like our Constitution, which makes the law
of the land, the North Atlantic Treaty is
more than just a legal document. It is the
foundation of a living institution. That
institution is NATO, the organization cre-
ated to give meaning and reality to the
alliance commitments.

The crowded months which immediately
preceded and followed the conclusion of the
North Atlantic Treaty 17 years ago had
produced an atmosphere of crisis. It was a
crisis that was born of deep fear: fear for
Europe's economic and political vitality,
fear of Communist aggression, fear of Com-
munist subversion.

Some say that new circumstances in the
world today call for the dismantling of this
great organization. Of course NATO should
adapt to the changing needs of the times,
but we believe just as firmly that such
change must be wrought by the member
nations working with one another within
the alliance. Consultation, not isolation, is
the route to reform. We must not forget
either in success or abundance the lessons
that we have learned in danger and in iso-
lation: that whatever the issue that we
share, we have one common danger — divi-
sion; and one common safety — unity,
1

'' An Alliance To Keep the Peace

* What is our view of NATO today? We see
it not as an alliance to make war but as an
alliance to keep peace. Through an era as

: turbulent as man has ever known, and under
I the constant threat of ultimate destruction,
^ NATO has insured the security of the North

• Atlantic community. It has reinforced sta-
bility elsewhere throughout the world.

While NATO rests on the reality that we
must fight together if war should come to
the Atlantic area, it rests also on the reality
that war will not come if we act together
during peace. It was the Foreign Minister
of France who, in 1949, insisted that to be
truly secure, Europe needed not only help
in resisting attack but help in preventing
attack. "Liberation," he said, "is not
enough."

The success of NATO has been measured
by many yardsticks. The most significant
to me is the most obvious: War has been
deterred. Through the common organiza-
tion, we have welded the military contribu-
tions of each of the 15 allies into a very
effective instrument. So convincing was
this instrument that potential aggressors
took stock and counted as too high the price
of satisfying their ambitions. It has been
proved true that "one sword keeps another
in the sheath."

War has been deterred not only because
of our integrated military power but because
of the political unity of purpose to which
that power has been directed and bent. It
is difficult to overstate the importance of
the bonds of culture, of political institu-
tions, traditions, and values which form the
bedrock of the Atlantic community. There
is here a political integrity and an identity
of interests that transcends personalities
and issues of the moment.

If our collective effort should falter and
our common determination be eroded, the
foundation of the Atlantic's present stabil-
ity would certainly be shaken. The mighti-
est arsenal in the world will deter no ag-
gressor who knows that his victims are too
divided to decide and too unready to re-
spond. That was the lesson that we learned
from two world wars. Yet a nation — not
by the action of her friends but by her own
decision to prepare and plan alone — could
still imperil her own security by creating a
situation in which response would be too
late and too diluted. Every advance in the
technology of war makes more unacceptable
the old and narrow concepts of sovereignty.

APRIL 11, 1966

555

No one today can doubt the necessity of
preventing war. It is our firm conviction
that collective action through NATO is the
best assurance that war will be deterred in
the Atlantic world.

Look at the Atlantic community through
the eyes of those who in years past have
yearned for conquest. The sight is sobering.
Integrated commands, common plans, forces
in being in advance of an emergency for
use in any emergency — all of these testify
to a collective readiness and the integrity
of collective purposes. To other eyes, NATO
can only be a clear warning of the folly of
aggression.

NATO today, therefore, must be shaped
on the experience of the past. Reliance on
independent action by separate forces —
only loosely coordinated with joint forces
and plans — twice led to world wars before
1945. But collective action has proved suc-
cessful in deterring war since 194.5 — during
20 years of upheaval and grave danger. We
reject those experiences only at our own
peril.

Preserving NATO's Deterrent Strength

For our part, the United States of Amer-
ica is determined to join with 13 of her
other allies to preserve and to strengthen
the deterrent strength of NATO.^ We will
urge that those principles of joint and com-
mon preparation be extended wherever they
can be usefully applied in the Atlantic
alliance.

We are hopeful that no member of the
treaty will long remain withdrawn from the
mutual affairs and obligations of the At-

' For a joint declaration released by the United
States and 13 other NATO nations on Mar. 18, see
Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

lantic. A place of respect and responsibility
will await any ally who decides to return to
the common task, for the world is still full
of peril for those who prize and cherish
liberty — peril and opportunity.

These bountiful lands that are washed by
the Atlantic, this half-billion people that are
unmatched in arms and industry', this cradle
of common values and splendid visions, this
measureless storehouse of wealth, can enrich
the life of an entire planet.

It is this strength — of ideas as well as
strength of arms, of peaceful purpose as
well as power — that offers such hope for
the reconciliation of Western Europe with
the people of Eastern Europe. To surrender
that strength now by isolation from one
another would be to dim the promise of that
day when the men and women of all Europe
shall again move freely among each other.

It is not a question of wealth alone. It is
a question of heart and mind. It is a will-
ingness to leave forever those national rival-
ries which so often led to the useless
squandering of lives and treasure in war.

It is a question of the deeper spirit of
unity of which NATO is but a symbol. That
unity was never better expressed than when,
at the conclusion of the North Atlantic
Treaty in 1949, a great French leader de-
clared that: "Nations are more and more
convinced that their fates are closely bound
together — that their salvation and their
welfare must rest upon the progressive ap-
plication of human solidarity."

And it is to the preservation of human
solidarity that all of our efforts today
should be directed. So let all of you of the
Foreign Service Institute make it your task
as well as mine.

Thank you and good morning.

I

556

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 25

Press release 71 dated March 26

Secretary Rusk: I regret any inconven-
ience that might have been caused by the
change in the hour for our press conference
this morning.

President Johnson and I went to Andrews
Air Field to bid bon voyage to President
Gursel of Turkey. President Johnson has
been anxious to afford every hospitality and
every facility to President Gursel, but the
Turkish Government and people wanted him
to return to the land of his birth and the
country which he has served with such great
distinction for so long. And we wish him
a very safe and pleasant voyage.

This is my first press conference since the
induction of Dixon Donnelley as Assistant
Secretary [for Public Affairs]. Under his
guidance I expect to have perhaps somewhat
more press conferences than I have had re-
cently. I will take my instructions from him
on this matter. So you can put your pres-
sures on him.

I am very pleased, and I know you will be,
to announce that my friend Robert Mc-
Closkey is being promoted to Deputy As-
sistant Secretary of State and will remain
as Department spokesman. I am very happy
to salute my colleague who daily runs the
gauntlet and who has served us so effec-
tively and with such distinction.

I think I won't take your time with open-
ing statements this morning.

Q. Mr. Secretary, I suppose ive can now
expect much more detailed, comprehensive
aiiswers from Mr. McCloskey, with his in-
crease in rank. (Laughter.)

A. Well, I notice his transcripts from time
to time, and I think you can expect him to
continue his sterling performance.

APRIL 11, 1966

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you talk a little
bit about United States policy toward Com-
munist China, and particularly whether
there is a prospect of changing policy on
U.N. membership or on recognition?

A. Well, these are not questions that can
be talked about solely from one point of
view. These are not one-sided questions.
Relationships involve the other side.

We have tried over a considerable period
of time to find particular points at which
relationships between ourselves and main-
land China could be improved. We have had
a long series of discussions in Geneva and
Warsaw. I have personally attended the
Geneva conference on Laos, and the Foreign
Minister of Peiping was present.

We have tried to encourage exchanges of
newsmen, doctors, and scholars, and weather
information, and all sorts of things.

We keep running up against the problem
of Formosa, and this is an issue which the
United Nations will encounter. Basically,
the authorities in Peiping indicate that
there is no prospect for improved relations
unless we are willing to surrender Formosa.
We have a major, far-reaching, and dan-
gerous disagreement at the present time on
Viet-Nam.

They have indicated to the United Na-
tions that the expulsion of the Republic of
China is essential if Peiping is to consider
membership.

They have told the United Nations that
the General Assembly must apologize for
having called them an aggressor.

They have suggested a reform of the
charter to throw out what they call "im-
perialist puppets." I do not know what per-
centage of the present membership would

557

President Gursel Returns
To Turkey

Statement by President Johnson, March 25

Our distingruished friend, President Cemal
Gursel of Turkey, came to the United States
on February 2 for medical treatment. There
was hope that new therapeutic procedures only
recently developed in this country would be
useful in treating his illness of several years.

We were initially encouraged by his prog-
ress at Walter Reed Hospital, only to be
shocked by the news on February 8 that his
health had suffered a grave new blow. Our
best talent, coupled with the skill of the emi-
nent Turkish doctors who accompanied the
President, was exerted to the utmost in the
hope that the President might return to his
home in fully restored health. We are sad-
dened that this hope was not to be realized.

We have been deeply honored to have Presi-
dent Gursel come to our country to seek medi-
cal treatment. As he returns to his home-
land, our prayers go with him.

be excluded on that basis in their verbiage.

So while it is useful and important that
Americans consider among themselves what
our relations with China ought to be, or
are, or have been, we who are in government
must deal with these questions on the basis
of the attitude of the other side as well.

Now, I think that it is quite clear, in view
of what has happened even in the last few
days, that the authorities in Peiping are not
very easy to live with in the world. The
Communist world has found that ; the Afro-
Asian world has found it.

The agreements that we have made in
1954, and in 1962, apparently are not very
seriously considered in Peiping.

The offer of unconditional discussions or
negotiations without preconditions seems to
be of no interest.

So we will continue to work at this prob-
lem and think about it, and it is important
that other people do. But those of us who
are carrying official responsibilities have
some rather harsh facts to come up against,

and we have to deal with the situation as
we can find it. And we do not find at the
present time a serious interest in Peiping
in improvement of relations. (

Q. Mr. Secretary, in their latest commevi
the Chinese Coraviunists claim that the
United States and Russia are collaborating
in an evil plot to encircle the Chinese maiiOr-
land. Are we?

A. Well, I see no evidence myself of any
conspiracy or a plot. I think it is true that
Washington and Moscow understand very
deeply what war means. When Peiping calls
upon what they call the "revisionists" not
to take such a "gloomy view of war," I
think both we in Washington and our op-
posite numbers in Moscow are inclined to
take a rather gloomy view of war, because
we understand what it could mean.

But I know of no discussions between our-
selves and Moscow that could be fairly in-
terpreted as a plot between the two Govern-
ments against China.

I think there is a certain prudence in
Washington and Moscow and a certain rec-
ognition of the importance of keeping the
great forces of violence under control, which
had better be there and which all of us hope
will continue to be there.

As far as Washington and Moscow are
concerned, as far as our side is concerned,
we continue to look for particular points in
which we might improve our relations. It
is not easy, because there are some impor-
tant differences between Washington and
Moscow.

But the continuing charge of collusion by
Peiping represents, I think, a special ideolog-
ical attitude of the authorities in Peiping
and a harshness and a militancy which is
hard to reconcile with a serious interest in
peace in other parts of the world.

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Hope for Nonproliferation Treaty \^

Q. Mr. Secretary, in connection with re- Hiiij
lations between the United States and the i^.
Soviet Union, do you think that ive are any ^
closer at this point to a treaty to stop the ^^
spread of nuclear weapons? ^.^

558

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN ,,

A. Well, it is hard to measure these
matters in relative terms — closer or further
away.

I do believe — I say this sincerely — that
both the Soviet Union and the United
States and, indeed, Great Britain, France,
possibly even Peiping, are agreed that it is
not a good thing to see the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. I think on that central
underlying attitude there is a recognition on
the part of nuclear powers that prolifera-
tion is dangerous and undesirable.

Now, we hope very much that if we can
all concentrate on the issue of proliferation
and not draw in extraneous or irrelevant
questions, we could move toward a treaty
and solicit general acceptance throughout
the entire world of the idea of nonprolifera-
tion.

That alone is not all that is required. We

would like very much to get on with more

serious questions in the disarmament field,

such as the reduction of armaments. We

were beginning to make a little headway

on that question, possibly through what

I came to be called mutual example — that is,

I some turning down of defense budgets. But

I then the Viet-Nam matter arose in a way

! that halted that possibility.

I The burden of arms in the world is simply

\ too great to be accepted as a part of nature,

J and we ought to turn to it as quickly as we

' can.

<i

But I hope very much that we can move
toward a nonproliferation treaty and
promptly, and I am convinced that we can
if we concentrate on the issue of nonpro-
liferation and not confuse it with issues
which are irrelevant and which have noth-
ing to do with proliferation.

Q. Mr. Secretary, will you give us your
reading on the weight and importance to be
attached to the decision of Communist
China not to attend the gathering of the
Communist parties in Moscotv next week?

A. Well, since that Communist Party meet-

r« ing will be opening in just a few days, it

M would be rather hazardous for me to make

comments which might prove to be wrong

APRIL n, 1966

within the week, and naturally I am a little
reluctant to do that. But I think what they
said about not attending once more re-
flected the bitterness and the militancy and
the suspicion and the hatred which we have
seen so long from Peiping.

There is no problem of encircling Peiping
if Peiping is prepared to live at peace.

We have ourselves alliances with Korea
and Japan, Republic of China, Philippines,
Thailand, Australia, New Zealand. Those
alliances only become operative if there is
aggression, if there is an attempt made by
Peiping to use force against its neighbors
and to bring those alliances into operation.

Now, I would hope myself that the authori-
ties in Peiping would look back over the
experiences of the last year or two and
conclude that militancy has no future, that
it will not be accepted by the peoples and
governments of the world, whether in the
free world or in the Communist world, and
that the overriding consideration is to learn
to live at peace with neighboring countries.
On that basis, relations could improve and
many things could happen.

But the world just is not prepared to
accept the doctrines or the threats or the
efforts of intimidation which are coming
out of Peiping.

German Disarmament Proposals

Q. Mr. Secretary, the German Government
today sent a note containing disarmament
proposals. Would you like to comment on
that note?

A. Yes. We received that note this morn-
ing about 10 o'clock, and I believe that it is
public, or is being made public in the course
of the day.

I have not had a chance to study it in
detail, although there has been some dis-
cussion of these matters in the NATO Coun-
cil. But in my first reading of it, it seems
to me that it is a very constructive and
forward-looking communication and it is
worth very careful study.

I think all of you will wish to give it very
careful thought, because it is a forthcoming

559

and I think important statement of German
policy.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have you been informed
in any way officially or unofficially of any
change in Hanoi's attitude toward negotia-
tions ?

A. No. I have seen some press speculation
on that subject.

I have said many times that channels are
open and that a number of governments are
taking part in an effort to find a basis for
a peaceful solution. But I have seen nothing
unusual in the last several v^^eeks that would
indicate a change in that situation.

I am not avi^are of the intensive diplo-
matic activity of Hanoi to bring this matter
to discussions, for example. I just do not
knovi^ what this is talking about.

France and NATO

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you tell us, sir,
where in your view the bulk of the NATO
members now move in their relations with
France? Is it primarily a question of nego-
tiating a removal, or does the United States,
for example, accept the French thesis that
the troops in Germany can revert to the
J95i agreement?

A. Well, I think the parliamentary position
is — the diplomatic position is that France has
indicated to the NATO governments certain
intentions. We have commented on those
intentions, but we have not received from
France detailed proposals which would be
presumably needed for specific negotiation.
I presume that we will be getting more
details in the near future about just what
it is that France has in mind.

I would suppose that when we get that
information, then the NATO allies will be
in touch with each other and that more
systematic formal discussions with the
French Government will then take place.
But we do not have those, and until we do
get them, I think it would be premature for
me to speculate on just what they might
contain.

Q. Mr. Secretary, the United States has

the proble)7i of the resumption of military
aid to India and Pakistan before it. Pakistan
this week displayed some weapons of Chi-
nese manufacture. Does this complicate the
picture for this Government in resuming
military assistance to both of those coun-
tries? ^

A. Well, I think that is a matter that as
far as we are concerned is deeply rooted in
the prospects for peace in the subcontinent.
We were encouraged by the Tashkent agree-
ments. We hope very much that they will
be pursued. Indeed, we have been very
pleased to see that a great many of the
things agreed upon at Tashkent have in fact
been carried out.

We will continue to follow the situation
very closely, but quite frankly we have not
come to a conclusion on the particular ques-
tion of military aid.

Q. Mr. Secretary —

A. Yes.

Q. Yesterday President Johnson and Gen-
eral de Gaulle talked about unprovoked ag-
gression. Do you think that the implication
of this term ivould change the commitment
of article V of the NATO treaty?

A. Well, you will recall that over the past
four decades or more, a part of the general
phraseology of security questions has in-
volved this phrase "unprovoked aggression."
You find it in the discussions of the 1920's
and the 1930's and the attempt to organize
security systems since the war. It is my
impression that this phrase was a tradi-
tional phrase and was not intended to
modify the NATO treaty. But that is a
matter that can be clarified in the discus-
sions which we expect to be having with
the French Government over the next sev-
eral weeks or months. |

Q. Mr. Secretary, can you tell me if any
consideration is being given to the recogni-
tion of Obiter Mongolia?

A. The word "consideration" has turned : j
out on occasions to be a booby trap. Yes, ' t
we do think about that from time to time, ij
and we do have that in mind as one of the i

560

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

questions on our agenda. But I am inclined
to repeat to you the phrase which Mr.
Cordell Hull used to use on about half the
questions he got on his daily press confer-
ences: "You can be sure that this matter is
under the most earnest consideration."

Peiping's Isolation Self-imposed

Q. Mr. Secretary —

A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, to return to China a
moment, much of the discussion that has
been going on relates to the problem of
American -policy in the years after the pres-
ent leadership of Peiping has gone, given
the age of Mao and company. This has pro-
duced the theory or thesis of containment
without isolation, ivhich the Vice President
seems to have embraced. Looked at from a
longer standpoint, are you prepared to
accept such a formulation?

A. Well, I think it is difficult to compress
complicated matters into such few words. I
think I have already pointed out that in
connection with the word "containment" we
have a series of alliances. Those alliances
were made following World War II and
some of them in direct response to the ag-
gressive attitude of Peiping. Some of them
came out of the arrangements which were
connected with the Japanese Peace Treaty;
others out of the settlement or the hoped-
for settlement of Southeast Asia in 1954.

Now, we have alliances in the Pacific and
in Asia, because we have a vital interest in
peace in the Pacific and in Asia. So that if
the sum total of our commitments in the
Pacific add up to the word "containment,"
then I have no particular objection to it.

Q. Mr. Secretary —

A. — But on the question of isolation
again, the efforts that have been made to
break through this isolation have not been
availing. We have made a number of efforts
since I have been in my present position
with little or no response from the other
side. A good deal of this isolation is self-
imposed, and we see evidences of that almost

every day. But perhaps this situation will
change. I don't know what the next genera-
tion of Chinese leaders will look like. We
have perhaps too little information on just
who they will be and what their attitudes
will be. But in the longer run, I cannot help
but believe that all peoples and governments
will recognize that somehow peoples and
governments must find a way to live at
peace with each other.

Q. Can you define for us what is the
United States policy toward trade with
Communist China by the countries in West-
ern Europe, using the steel mill issue as an
example?

A. Well, I commented on that recently.
We would hope that those who are con-
sidering the type of trade with Communist
China which might add to their sinews of
war, which might add to their warmaking
capability, would take into account the
problem of peace in that part of the world
and be cautious about entering into arrange-
ments which would make it more difficult
to organize and establish a peace out there.

I think steel is relevant to this. It is true
that it is not — what is being considered — is
not on the COCOM list, but nevertheless a
substantial increase in the steel-producing
capability of mainland China is not a very
comfortable idea for us at the time when
China is doing nothing to bring about peace
in Southeast Asia.

U.S. Policy Toward Latin America Unchanged

Q. Mr. Secretary, at the Panama OAS
Working Committee and in Buenos Aires
also, there have been some suggestions the
United States is blocking economic reforms
in Latin America. Could you comment on
that?

A. Yes. I will be very glad to, because
there seems to be some rather serious mis-
understanding or perhaps even misrepre-
sentation on that matter.

I was myself at the Rio conference, and
we made it very clear that we had an urgent
and an elementary interest in rapid eco-
nomic and social development in the hemi-

APRIL 11, 1966

561

sphere. And indeed you will recall that at
that conference, President Johnson author-
ized me to inform our colleagues in Latin
America that we would be prepared to see
the Alliance for Progress extended beyond
1961— 1971— and on the basis of full self-
help and mutual assistance. ^ One of the very
important, and to me rather dramatic, de-
velopments at the Rio conference was the
acceptance by all members of the hemi-
sphere that each should try to help the
other in whatever ways possible, and there
are many ways in which the Latin Ameri-
can countries themselves are now helping
each other in these matters of economic and
social development.

Q. Mr. Secretary —

A. Now, there is no difference in policy.
We are committed to rapid change in both
the economic and social fields in Latin
America. Now, when we get into specific
questions of incorporating such ideas into
treaties, then we do have to look at our own
constitutional structure and the responsibil-
ities of the Congress and the extent to which
we can go in imposing limitations upon our
Congress by treaty, in matters affecting
such things as trade and aid. And so there
is a technical and a structural problem for
us on this matter. But as a policy matter,
there is no retreat at all. The great impetus
for change has been coming through the
Alliance for Progress, much of it out of this
country, but with warm reception and a
general commitment on the part of others.

Procedures on Travel of Americans Abroad

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Could you explain to us ivith ivhat
justification and on the basis of lohat au-
thority the State Department orders the
shadowing of some American citizens travel-
ing abroad?

A. In the first place, we don't order the
shadowing of American citizens. Let me

' For background, see Bulletin of Dec. 20, 1965,
p. 985.

just put that matter in a little context if I
can. We have about 3^2 or 4 million pass-
ports outstanding at any given time. We
send a constant stream of messages abroad
about the travel of Americans abroad. Most
of these are on such matters as supporting
the efforts of businessmen and their activi-
ties, or opening doors for newsmen who are
traveling or ask for our assistance, and then
we have cooperation with the other govern-
ments in the international field of dealing
with certain types of crime and things of
that sort.

Now, over a period of many years, we
have cooperated with other agencies in
carrying out their own responsibilities and
transmitting certain messages. In the case
of the type of thing you referred to, perhaps
8 or 10 of such messages might go out in
the course of a month. One of our duties in
the State Department is to support other
agencies and departments of Government in
their needs overseas. There are some 40 or
more separate depai'tments and agencies
who do become involved in relations with
the rest of the world.

Now, I have personally begun an investiga-
tion— an examination of this particular
issue of what ought to be said, if anything,
to our embassies abroad about individuals
who are traveling there about which some
questions might have been raised. I'm not
satisfied that our present procedures are
exactly what they ought to be. I will be
discussing those with the Attorney General,
and we will establish criteria.

For example, I can tell you quite frankly
I don't believe that we ourselves, or anyone
else, should be transmitting abroad un-
evaluated information which has not been
subjected to a real judgment as a matter of
policy here in Washington. But this is a very
tiny fraction of the total problem of sup-
porting our interests overseas and clearing
the way for the maximum enjoyment of the
privileges of travel by American citizens.

I do intend looking this over, and I am
sure the Attorney General agrees with me
that we must give every protection to the
legitimate rights and privileges of Ameri-

562

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

can citizens in their travels abroad. I can't
go into detail about what I will think about
the particular incidents that have been re-
ported, but I am looking into it personally
and will be in touch with the Attorney-
General about it.

Q. Can you make a statement of public
policy when you're finished with this re-
view ?

A. Well, that question will be one of those
questions to be examined, Mr. Roberts
[Chalmers Roberts, the Washington Post].

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes?

Q. Back in the early fifties, during the
Harry Dexter White case, J. Edgar Hoover,
testifying on the Hill, insisted that the FBI
never did any evaluation but only collected
material. Would you say that to character-
ize a man in an outgoing cable as having
deep pro-Communist convictions was an
unevaluation ?

A. Well, I said in my remarks just a
moment ago that I have serious doubts about
whether we should pass along unevaluated
information in this field. Now, I do want
to be very precise about one point. We were
not asked to conduct an investigation of
anyone traveling abroad. And we have not
asked our embassies to conduct an investi-
gation of anyone traveling abroad. There is
no question of surveillance, of tailing. The
only question involved was — if you have
any information, then pass it along. That
was what was involved. But not a matter
— we don't have facilities, for example, for
such investigations or for a surveillance of
people overseas.

Q. Did not that March 6 airgram request
the Embassies in London — rather, in Paris
and Moscow — to oversee the activities of this
man in Moscow and to watch out?

A. No, not in the sense of surveillance or
tailing or anything of that sort but rather
to report if any information in that field
were turned up. But, again, I want to look
at that, because I think that these matters

do require evaluation. We are not ourselves
— we have no responsibility ourselves for
making such evaluations about citizens gen-
erally. Our own investigations, of course,
are limited to our own employees and the
maintenance of the security of our own
Department, where almost every job is
sensitive and where we recognize that there
are continuing efforts to penetrate the
Department.

Q. Mr. Secretary — •

A. But this is something we will be look-
ing into. I will personally be getting into it,
because I feel very strongly that in these
fields where we are in the most direct
relationships with large numbers of citizens
of our own country with respect to pass-
ports, and large numbers of citizens in other
countries with respect to visas, that we
should be fully alert to the policy implica-
tions and that we should have the proce-
dures— and, if you want to call them that,
even the routine procedures which are ap-
propriate in our kind of system.

Q. Mr. Secretary, if I may return to
NATO, could you give us a general idea of
ways and means under consideration by
your Government to strengthen and possibly
extend the integrated structure of the alli-
ance ?

A. I think that I would not add anything
to what President Johnson said last Wednes-
day 2 on that subject. We are discussing
these matters with other allies. I think that
there is no question that the overwhelming
majority of the allies are determined to
proceed with NATO on a strengthened
basis, not necessarily because we think there
has been a heightened threat from any-
where but because we think that the unity
and the strength of NATO is a very vital
part of deterring such threats and providing
a basis from which one can hope to improve
relations with, for example, Eastern Eu-
rope.

Q. Mr. Secretary, Portuguese Premier

' See p. 554.

APRIL 11, 1966

563

Salazar has expressed a dissatisfaction with
NATO, and I ivas wondering whether Portu-
gal has given any official indication of this
either to the United States or other mem-
bers of NATO, and do you see this as a
further erosion of the organization?

A. I don't know what details Dr. Salazar
might have had in mind. Portugal did take
full part in the discussions that occurred in
the NATO Council before the 14-nation
declaration was made, and they adhered to
that declaration.^ Of course, we have said
for some years, literally years, that if any
members of NATO wished to make sugges-
tions about improving the organization and
the structure of NATO, we would be very
glad to consider them. But I have heard no
details on what might be behind Dr. Sala-
zar's remark.

Yes, sir?

The Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, what is your reading of
the seriousness of the current series of
demonstrations in South Viet-Nam? Is
Premier [Nguyen Cao'\ Ky's government in
trouble in your estimation?

A. Well, I think what is involved there is
the fact that some weeks ago — and again in
Honolulu* — Prime Minister Ky announced
that he expected to move toward a council
of some sort that would draft a constitution,
that that constitution would be submitted
to the people of South Viet-Nam on plebis-
cite, and that this would be followed by
elections.

Now, the opening up of this path toward
a more representative system there has un-
doubtedly led to certain discussions among

" For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.
' For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

groups about what their positions are likely '
to be as that development goes forward.
This is primarily a matter for them to work
out among themselves, and they are in regu-
lar contact with all groups out there. We,
of course, would hope very much that, what-
ever their differences might be among
themselves about the details of their in-
ternal organization, they would not lose
sight of the thing in which they all seem to
agree, and that is that they don't want what
Hanoi is trying to impose upon them. So we
would hope this matter would settle down
to a generally agreed basis before too long.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is recognition of Outer
Mongolia in any sense an early possibility?

A. I wouldn't want to speculate on that
question in terms of timing. As I say, this
is one of those questions that we have not
overlooked. We, too, are aware that the
question is there. But I wouldn't want to
speculate on it at this point.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes, sir?

Q. On the steel mill again, the German
Government, after it first informed you
about the upcoming deal, seemed to have
the impression you Imd no objections but
only pointed out the possibility of negative
reactions in U.S. public opinion. Is that
about correct?

A. Well, I don't want to get into what
might have been said between the two Gov-
ernments. We do discuss these matters, and
we are discussing these matters. But what
I suggested the other day was that we would
hope that those who consider such under-
takings think soberly about questions of
timing and questions of the general peace
in the area.

Q. Thank you very much, sir.

564

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation''

Following is the transcript of an inter-
vieiv ivith Secretary Rusk on March 20 on
the Columbia Broadcasting System's tele-
vision and radio program "Face the Na-
tion." Interviewing the Secretary were Mar-
tin Agronsky and Marvin Kalb of CBS
News and Adalbert de Segonzac, North
American correspondent for France-Soir.

Press release 61 dated March 21

II Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, we under-
stand that in the past 6 weeks there have
been repeated American efforts to start
negotiations with Hanoi. Have there been
new American efforts? Have they im-
proved the prospects for negotiating the
war?

Secretary Rusk: Actually, Mr. Agronsky,
there has never been a time when there was
any lack of contact with the other side. I
don't identify anything special in the last 6
weeks. There have been many contacts
with the other side, direct, bilateral, or
through the efforts of third governments.
Our problem is that, with all of these con-
tacts, we have not yet found a desire for
peace on the other side.

M [ Announcement. 1

fl Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, since we
apparently have had no success with our
own efforts, and the third governments on
our behalf have had no success, what do you
think of the proposal of New York's Repub-
lican Senator [Jacob K.] Javits today that
the United States seek unconditional dis-
cussions with Red China now with the aim
of ending the Vietnamese war?

Secretary Rv^k: Well, this has not been
in the way at all. We have in fact publicly
and privately indicated that we would be
prepared for unconditional discussions or, as

II

17 nonalined nations put it, negotiations
without preconditions.

We had our last talk with Peiping directly,
bilaterally, last Wednesday in Warsaw. We
are prepared to sit down at the table and
talk if someone is prepared to come to the
table and talk with us. But thus far we have
no one at the table. As I have said many
times, I would be in Geneva tomorrow
afternoon if there was someone there to
talk to.

Now, the question of conditions to such
talks is not necessarily a real problem. We
would be prepared to come to the table and
let everyone say what is on his mind with-
out any limitations or conditions of any sort
whatever. When everyone has said what he
has to say, then we could take a look at
everything and see whether there are any
threads out of which some sort of a peaceful
solution can be woven. But we had talked
with Peiping many times. We had the
129th bilateral meeting with their Ambassa-
dor last Wednesday in Warsaw. We are
prepared to come to a conference on South-
east Asia or any part of it. We are prepared
for informal, private, discreet, preliminary
discussions. But the difficulty is that the
other side keeps hanging up the phone. It
is hard to get anybody to the table to talk.

Mr. de Segonzac : Was this subject raised,
this possibility of talking, of free talks,
raised with the Chinese in Warsaw by your
Ambassador?

Secretary Rusk: Well, the very fact that
we sat down with them for a considerable
period for bilateral talks indicated that we
were prepared to talk, and I would hope
these bilateral talks would go ahead, be-
cause even though we haven't made much
progress in 129 talks, it is important that

APRIL 11, 1966

565

h

we and Peiping keep in touch with each
other. As a matter of fact, we have been in
touch with them on more serious subjects
and more persistently than perhaps any gov-
ernment that has diplomatic relations with
Peiping, except perhaps with the Soviet Un-
ion. But we are prepared to discuss any
question with Hanoi, Peiping. We have tried
to talk about disarmament. We have tried to
talk about Southeast Asia. We have tried
to talk about a lot of things. But we don't
get much response.

U.S. Policy Toward Communist China

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, last weekend
Vice President Humphrey said that Ameri-
can policy toward Communist China might
be described as containment but not neces-
sarily isolation. Would you agree with this
general summation of our policy toward the
Communist Chinese?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that is a
very shorthand way of saying it. Let us
take the two words separately. "Contain-
ment." One does not have to go into some
general theory of containment. The United
States has specific alliances with Korea,
with Japan, the Philippines, with Thailand,
Australia, New Zealand. South Viet-Nam is
a protocol state under the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization.

Now, the United States inevitably is con-
cerned with peace in the Pacific. We are
not just concerned with the Atlantic. We
are a two-ocean country. We have to be.
And that was demonstrated during World
War n. So we have specific commitments
and alliances, and we intend to make good
on them.

Now, if one wants to summarize that by
calling it containment, all right, that is it.
On the question of isolation, we have tried
for a period of 12 years to try to establish
some sort of contact that would break
through this sense that mainland China and
the United States were not in contact with
each other. President Eisenhower initiated
these talks with Peiping. We tried first to
rescue some of our Americans on the main-
land, which is a fundamental obligation. We

I

tried to get a renunciation of force in the
Formosa Straits between Formosa and the
mainland. We have tried to exchange news-
men. We will give any of you, three of you
gentlemen, a passport today if the other
side will give you a visa. We have tried to
exchange doctors, scientists. We have tried,
suggested, the exchange of scholars.* We
have suggested the exchange of weather in-
formation. We have tried to break through
some of these overriding political considera-
tions to establish some direct and practical
and operational contacts with the other
side. But thus far the answer has been:
"Unless you are prepared to surrender For-
mosa, there is nothing to talk about."

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, the critics of
the administration on this whole China
problem these days say that many of these
overtures by the administration are, as
they describe it, token overtures and that
the root issues such as China's admission to
the United Nations possibly or American
diplomatic recognition are not really the
issues that the administration is directing
its attention toward.

Secretary Rusk: Well, this is — in the^
first place these overtures are in no sense
in bad faith. These overtures have been in
good faith, trying to establish some better
contact with the people on the mainland.
But it is true that on questions of recogni-
tion in membership in the United Nations,
you come up against a hard question posed
by Peiping, not by us. They say that there
is nothing to discuss until we are prepared]
to recognize Peiping and surrender For-
mosa. Now, when we say that we are not
prepared to surrender Formosa and the 12
or 13 million people on it, then the conversa
tion gets to be very difficult.

In the United Nations there are a good'
many states there who would be prepared
to vote for the admission of Peiping but wha
would not be prepared to expel the Republic
of China on Formosa, and Peiping has made}
it clear that they are not prepared to come

' For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 28, 1966)
p. 491.

566

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

into the United Nations on any such basis;
so that everybody is confronted with the
question, What do you do about the Repub-
lic of China on Formosa? Do you surrender
these people or not? We are not prepared
to surrender them. And that means, un-
fortunately, that there is very little prospect
that the authorities in Peiping will be in-
terested in improved relations between
themselves and us or indeed any real par-
ticipation in the international community.

Mr. Agronsky: Have we ever positively
proposed the two-China solution?

Secretary Rusk: Both the Republic of
China on Formosa and Peiping have com-
pletely rejected the two-China solution.
Therefore, this is a fairly hypothetical and
academic problem. We do not believe our-
selves that Peiping shows any interest in
this. There are major charter problems in
the United Nations on the two-China solu-
tion, but there is no indication that Peiping
will accept it or have any interest in it.

Mr. de Segonzac: Mr. Secretary, some of
your allies have taken a different tack
than the United States. Germany, for ex-
ample, in the last few days has announced a
deal of a steel mill with China. They seem
to be putting trade ahead of discussions on
recognition purposes. Do you feel, one, they
are wrong, and two, that this may be an-
other way for the United States to move —
in trade ?

Secretary Rusk: We would hope that
our friends in Western Europe who have
been engaging in these conversations about
a steel mill would, when the time comes for
action, take into account the problem of
peace in the Pacific Ocean area and con-
sider whether in fact Peiping is willing to
live at peace with its neighbors in the Pa-
cific. Trade, as such, is not an insuperable
obstacle. President Kennedy at one point,
you remember, in a press conference said
that if we had an inquiry from Peiping
about buying wheat in this country, we
would give it consideration. But we are
concerned about anything that would lead
Peiping to believe that their policy is suc-
cessful or anything that would add to the

strength of Peiping until there is some indi-
cation of change in their policy. So I
would hope that our friends in Europe
would keep this matter under review and
before they get into a situation where they
are producing 2 million tons more of steel
for Peiping that they would give some
thought to the problems of peace.

No Change in Peiping's Attitude

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, throughout
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearings last week, when these Chinese ex-
perts were testifying, the implication
through all the time was that we should re-
evaluate American policy toward Commu-
nist China. The time had come for a reap-
praisal, for a new approach. Do you sub-
scribe to that ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we appraise these
things all the time, Martin. We have ex-
perts on China in Government. They are
very accomplished and dedicated experts.
But these are not questions that we can
sort out by discussions simply among Amer-
icans, because there is Peiping. Now, we
are dealing with a regime which has been
thrown out of several countries in Africa,
which had a debacle in trying to organize
an Afro-Asian conference in accordance with
their own views, which threatened to inter-
vene in the India-Pakistan affair, which
had a major setback in Indonesia because of
their attempts to intervene in the internal
affairs of that country, which has blocked
the path for discussions or a conference on
Southeast Asia.

Now, we have to deal with the attitudes of
Peiping. It is not just a question of debating
among ourselves, because those who say
"Let's be nice to Peiping" can't speak for
Peiping, and they are not able to deliver a
different attitude on the part of Peiping.

Now, we are in touch with Peiping all the
time. We have professional, direct, realistic
conversations with Peiping, and so these are
not matters that can be resolved solely by
discussions on the American side. The
Peiping factor has to be taken into account.

Mr. Kalb: Just following up that very

APRIL 11, 1966

567

point, Mr. Secretary, does that mean that
if there were a change of heart, one that
we could detect, in the attitude of Commu-
nist China, changing its policy of belligeren-
cies, would we be prepared as a nation to
receive that change and make adjustments
thereto ?

Secretary Rusk : Well, when you speculate
about a future policy of Peiping, you are
getting into a hypothetical situation. But
let me talk now about our side.

President Johnson, President Kennedy,
President Eisenhower, and President Tru-
man, in this postwar period, have always
left open the door to peaceful relationships.
They have always left it open. Now, if there
is any indication that Peiping is prepared to
live at peace with its neighbors — Mr. John
Foster Dulles commented on this at one
point — if there is any indication that Pei-
ping is prepared to live as a loyal and decent
member of the world community, then other
possibilities do open up.

But I don't want to speculate on that
unduly, because we see no indications from
Peiping that they are prepared to be an ac-
tive and a loyal member of the world com-
munity.

Let's take the recent Security Council
consideration of the India-Pakistan affair.
Had Peiping been sitting in the Security
Council, they would have vetoed what other-
wise was the unanimity of the Security
Council on measures to bring India and
Pakistan to a peaceful conclusion. Now,
Peiping has not gotten along very well in
the Communist bloc, in which it has been a
member. It hasn't gotten along very well
in the Afro-Asian world, in which it has
been a regular attendant. So we have, on
the official level — we have to consider Pei-
ping, their attitude, what they are prepared
to do, what their approach is, and not just
think about it in terms of how we ourselves
would debate this among Americans.

Mr. de Segonzac: On the other hand, Mr.
Secretary, there seems to be a reassess-
ment in Peiping of their actual policy. They
have had a certain number of defeats, and
they seem to be worried about it. Also,

II

Professor [Morton H.] Halperin, at the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said
the other day that the Chinese are fright-
ened of being attacked by America. Wouldn't
it be the moment to try and do something
which can make them feel, if there is a
group of doves in Peiping, to give them some
support so as to bring that change of mind
which you are looking for?

Secretary Rusk: Well, we haven't heard
the flutterings of the wings of doves in
Peiping, I must confess. They have put for-
ward their program of world revolution
with a militancy that has caused very great
problems even inside the Communist world,
quite apart from the problems it has caused
in the free world.

Now, again, we are in regular contact
with Peiping. But they keep coming back
to one or two very fundamental questions:
"Are you prepared to surrender Formosa?"
Our answer to that is, "No, we are not."
"Are you prepared to accept Hanoi's pro-
gram for South Viet-Nam?" Our answer to
that is, "No, we are not." Now, in the face
of this, Peiping's attitude toward us is very
adamant.

Now, the other countries, including yours,
Mr. de Segonzac, who have diplomatic rela-
tions with Peiping — the conversations there
are desultory and unimportant. There is no
real contact between London, Paris, and
these other capitals with Peiping. Maybe
we in the United States have a special
problem with Peiping, because when the
Communists first came to power in 1949,
their first object was to erase all traces of
100 years of good relations between the
Chinese and the American people. There was
a very affectionate relationship there. It
reflected itself in health, in education, and
in all sorts of ways.

We pursued the open-door policy, and we
were opposed to the carving out of special
spheres of influence in China by other world
powers.

The Chinese even charged that the Pei-
ping Union Medical College, which is a very
distinguished medical institution in China,
had engaged in human vivisection, in order

568

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to discredit the American friendship with
the Chinese people. So maybe we have a
special problem. We cannot accept their at-
tempt through Hanoi to seize South Viet-
Nam. We cannot accept their effort to
bring about the surrender of Formosa.

Under those circumstances, I can tell you
that our relations with Peiping are difficult,
and we don't see openings offered by Pei-
ping that respond to the gestures and the
openings or the probes which we have made
on our side for the past 10 years.

Political Situation in Viet-Nam

Mr. Kalb: Mr. Secretary, in South Viet-
Nam for the past week or so there have
been reports of some considerable political
unrest. I wonder, sir, if you can give us a
progress report on how serious these were.

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that in the
first place, Marvin, there are differences of
view among different groups in South Viet-
Nam on how South Viet-Nam itself should
be organized and governed — the Buddhists
and the Catholics and the sects and the
montagnards and the other elements there.
But there is one thing on which they seem
to be united, and that is that they do not
want Hanoi ; they do not want the Viet
Cong.

Now, Prime Minister [Nguyen Cao] Ky
and his government have announced in re-
cent weeks, and reaffirmed that at Hono-
lulu,^ that they wanted to move toward the
drafting of a constitution this year, the sub-
mission of a constitution to the people of
Viet-Nam this year, looking toward elec-
tions next year.

Now, in the process in moving toward a
more democratic situation, the groups in
South Viet-Nam want to know where their
interests are and how they can maneuver
and jockey for position. But I have no
doubt at all that Buddhists, Catholics, and
all the rest of them combine in rejecting
Hanoi and the National Liberation Front.
' And just today we had word that the
Buddhist leaders in Saigon had indicated
that they were not trying to upset the Gov-
ernment; but they are interested, as every-

one else is there, in how this process of
building a constitutional and civilian gov-
ernment will in due course come about.

Mr. Kalb : Do you think that we are over
the hurdle on this?

Secretary Rusk: Well, one keeps one's
fingers crossed, quite frankly. But the one
thing that the overwhelming majority of
the South Vietnamese are united on is that
this attempt by the Liberation Front and
Hanoi to impose a political solution in South
Viet-Nam by force must be rejected. And
we would hope therefore that all of them
would continue to join in resisting this ef-
fort by Hanoi. And then when they get a
secure country of their own, then they can
afford to sort of quarrel about who runs it
and what their own internal affairs might
be.

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, there has
been a lot of confusion about where the
administration stands at this point on the
inclusion of the Viet Cong in peace nego-
tiations. Where do we stand at this point?

Secretary Rtisk: I think the basic posi-
tion on that was stated by President John-
son last July 3 when he said that if Hanoi
stopped its aggression, that there should be
no insuperable obstacle in permitting the
views of the Viet Cong to become knovsm.

Now, we start, Martin, from the basic
knowledge, it is not just an assumption or
speculation, the basic knowledge that the
Liberation Front was a creation of Hanoi
and that the Liberation Front is directly
connected with the aggression being pushed
by Hanoi against the South Vietnamese.
Now, if Hanoi decides to stop its aggression,
the infiltration of men, units, and arms into
South Viet-Nam, then a good many other
questions would fall into place.

You and I can't negotiate that question,
because you and I cannot stop the shooting.
I would be prepared tomorrow in Geneva to
sit down with representatives of Hanoi and
talk to them about this and any other ques-
tions they want to talk about.

For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.
' At a news conference on July 28, 1965.

APRIL 11, 1966

569

Mr. Agronslcy: Mr. Secretary, there are
many more things we want to question you
about. We will want to resume the ques-
tioning in a moment. [Annoimcement.l

France and the NATO Alliance

Mr. Agronsky: Mr. Secretary, France's
President de Gaulle has argued that one of
the reasons he wants to pull French forces
out of the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza-
tion is that NATO no longer corresponds to
present-day realities. Would you agree?

Secretary Ritsk: Not really, because I can
recall as late as 1961 and '62 that we were
involved in a major crisis over Berlin. At
that time the Soviet Union was threatening
war if the West did not pull its troops out
of Berlin, and I might say that at that time
France was unwilling to take part in any
discussions with Moscow to try to take the
fever out of that situation and left it to the
United States and the United Kingdom to
engage the Soviet Union to try to resolve
that crisis. I think it is too soon for us to
say that there is a disappearance of the
threat from Eastern Europe against West-
ern Europe. I am aware of the fact that the
air of tension has been diminished, that we
do see some improvement in the situation,
and I would hope that that would continue.

Mr. Agronsky: Do you feel that the So-
viet Union still presents an aggressive
threat to Western Europe?

Secretary Rusk: When Mr. Khrushchev
was 70 years old we all celebrated his 70th
birthday as an affable grandfather, but
when he was 68 and a half years old he put
missiles into Cuba, and when he was 67
years old he threatened President Kennedy
with war if we did not pull our people out
of Berlin; so I just do not think that we
know enough about what can happen in the
future.

I do believe, Martin, that in the West we
have achieved three great central ideas :

That the deterrence of war in the North
Atlantic community is a collective effort —

570

and we have invested enormous resources
in that; the defense budgets of the United
States alone since 1947 have amounted to
something like $850 billion ;

That the determination to fight together
in the event of a crisis is a collective effort;

And third, that the great issues between
East and West have to be resolved on a
collective basis.

And I think that one of the reasons why
one can now quarrel a little bit about NATO
is that it has succeeded. It has been an or-
ganization for peace. And since the threat
has been apparently somewhat diminished,
there is a certain luxury in turning to lesser
questions and raising other issues outside
the framework of an overwhelming threat
from the East.

Mr. de Segonzac : You feel that the air of
tensions, as you said, have diminished,
NATO should stay exactly as it is, or that
there should be some modifications such as,
for example, including Asia in the responsi-
bilities of the Europeans?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I do not believe
that the NATO alliance itself should be ex-
tended geographically to include Asia. We
have never suggested, for example, that
Viet-Nam was an issue involving the NATO
alliance as such.

We do think that every nation must con-
sider as a matter of national interest what
kind of result in these other parts of the
world they consider would be in their na-
tional interest. But I must say that I do be-
lieve that it is vitally important for the 15
nations of the West to act in concert on the
major issues that might obtain between,
say, Western Europe and Eastern Europe
and on the security of the area of the 15
nations, and the 14 have made it very clear
that they do not really accept the an-
nounced intentions of President de Gaulle
with respect to NATO.

Mr. Agronsky: Gentlemen, I am very
sorry that our time is up. Thank you, Mr.
Secretary, for being with us to "face the
nation."

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

t

Hard Work Ahead for the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for International Organization Affairs

I am fully aware of the tremendous con-
tributions made to American education by
the National Education Association and its
various departments, such as the American
Association for Health, Physical Education,
and Recreation. I just want to add my own
note of appreciation for your efforts. Your
work, inasmuch as it concerns itself with
the building of a healthy youth and conse-
quently a healthy America, is broadly re-
lated to my own. For the success of our
foreign policy is intimately intertwined
with a healthy citizenry. By that I mean
one that is enlightened intellectually as well
as in top physical condition.

No democracy can play its role in history,
can be powerful and survive, unless it rests
upon an informed public. When he briefs
visitors to the State Department, Secretary
Rusk is fond of pointing out that one of the
two guiding stars which direct our course
is that a government derives its just powers
from the consent of the governed. For this
consent to be intelligent and vital it must
be based on knowledge. And surely funda-
mental to this fact is a requirement that we
have a healthy public. It is axiomatic that
in a country where widespread sickness, dis-
ease, and ill health prevail you cannot have
an alert, educated, and interested public.

' Address made before the National Convention of
the American Association for Health, Physical Edu-
cation, and Recreation at Chicago, 111., on Mar. 18
(press release 55).

Disraeli put it well back in 1877 when he
said, "The health of the people is really the
foundation upon which all their happiness
and all their powers as a State depend."

But you have responsibilities going far
beyond your role of giving this country a
healthy citizenry. As educators, you occupy
one of the most respected positions in the
professional community, even if it is one of
the poorest paid. And through your direct
contact with the students of today, you are
shaping not only the bodies but the minds of
America's leaders of tomorrow. I wish that
educators all over the world would never
forget this, for peace-building, like nation-
building, depends in the last analysis not on
some kind of economic or historical or
dialectical determinism but on what people
can learn.

And learning is not only knowledge; it is
also understanding. The search for under-
standing is a crucial educational problem
for our times, and there is no broader, more
difficult, or more important kind of under-
standing to achieve than international un-
derstanding.

Of course, this is a supremely difficult
and complicated job. All of us are subjected
today to a cacophony of discordant sounds
on all frequencies and in all volumes. By
press and radio and television and in a
constant stream of books and other pub-
lished materials, we are flooded with infor-
mation. We run the risk of what Stephen

APRIL 11, 1966

571

ri

Spender has called "overwrite and under-
think."

We all need to absorb as much as we can,
understand as much as we can, and convey
as much as we can to students and to our
communities about America's role in the
world today. For in this age of jets and
rockets, nations literally live in each other's
backyards. Rapid transport, rapid commu-
nication, have broken down the old bounda-
ries of time and distance. A war in Kashmir,
unrest in Cyprus, and infiltration in Viet-
Nam can and do affect the lives of all of us
here. We live in an age where there is
always a clear and present danger that a
small war left unchecked can grow into a
conflagration with weapons that can liter-
ally snuff out all human life. This sobering
fact reminds us constantly of the need to
devote our best energies to making sure that
world war III does not happen.

We shall do well if we can, through edu-
cation, enable the next generation to cope
with the conditions of its environment more
effectively than the last one did. Several
centuries ago we passed the time when a
truly civilized man could have been said to
know everything or to understand every-
thing. But I hope we never pass the time
when men can be trained to apply them-
selves to the tests facing them with balance,
good judgment, and a feeling of moral
values and civilized standards.

The concepts of moderation, of idealism,
and a just political order are not outdated
just because they found their origin among
the ancient Greeks. These responses to
growth and stress and strain are as neces-
sary today as they ever were — perhaps more
necessary because the danger to civilization
is greater.

And so is the habit of analysis — the avoid-
ance of action without full forethought. The
educated man must avoid a knee-jerk re-
sponse to provocation. He must not be
satisfied with platitudes either in favor of
motherhood or against the maneating shark.
He must analyze, earnestly and seriously,
the problems of our day and seek to influ-

ence his government to act constructively
in the cause of peace.

International Tasks Ahead

In this spirit I suggest that the educated
man will wish to give thought to the great
international tasks confronting us as we
round out the 20th century. Let me list some
of the most obvious.

First, we must — and I mean that we
literally must — prevent the outbreak of nu-
clear war if we want to have any future at
all. And this task involves not only preserv-
ing the peace among the present nuclear
powers but preventing the spread of nuclear
weapons to nations not now possessing
them.

Second, we must find ways in which
states can learn to live together and deal
with their problems without resort to vio-
lence— simply because violence is so very
lethal in the conditions of today.

Third, we have to deal with the problem
of feeding and maintaining the exploding
populations of the world. We seem to be
heading toward a world of 7 billion people
by the end of the century, and more beyond,
unless family planning becomes a reality.

Fourth, we need to meet the growing ex-
pectations of the peoples of the underde-
veloped countries and to assure them of a
significant degree of material progress if
we are ever to have stability in interna-
tional affairs.

Fifth, we must find some way to conserve
the irreplaceable natural resources of the
planet and to prevent our atmosphere and
our water from becoming irretrievably
polluted.

And sixth, we must give to all nations
and all peoples a sense of dignity, equality,
and identity in a world still rife with preju-
dice and unwarranted privilege. Unless we
do so, race conflicts and colonial problems
arising from the domination of one state by
another are bound to bedevil our future.

With this unfinished agenda in mind it
is well to survey the international scene and
to note where we stand.

t

572

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Role of the United Nations

The United Nations has become a fixture
on the world scene. Its charter, with its
references to economic and social progress
and the advancement of fundamental human
rights and freedoms, is the greatest single
statement of humanity's purpose developed
in this century. That is why one of the first
official acts of new nations, great and small,
is to seek membei*ship in the United Nations
and to accept the obligations of the United
Nations Charter in so doing. U.N. member-
ship is a national status symbol and a token
of at least theoretical acceptance of civilized
rules of international intercourse.

The United Nations as an institution is
both less and more than the charter. Less,
because as an imperfect organization oper-
ated by fallible human beings, it has not
been able to apply charter principles com-
pletely in the real world. More, because it
has broadened its activities into fields en-
visaged only dimly, if at all, at the San
Francisco conference.

Peacekeeping

In its first task — the keeping of the peace
I — the United Nations has had some impres-
sive successes and some regrettable failures.
It has prevented many disputes from erupt-
ing into conflict. Simply by providing a
channel for negotiation it was helpful in
ending the Berlin blockade and thus in help-
ing to remove that greatest threat to peace
in postwar Europe. It provided the arena
for working out the terms for the settlement
of the Cuba missile crisis, and the U.N.
Secretary-General played an active part in
reaching a solution.

What is perhaps more significant, the
U.N. has been able to stop small wars and
prevent them from developing into large
ones. In widely separated areas — in Korea,
I in Indonesia, in Kashmir, along the smolder-
ing frontiers around Israel, in Cyprus, in
Greece, and in the Congo — U.N. personnel
have kept the peace, supervised truces, and
kept belligerents apart. With ingenuity and
effectiveness, the U.N. has built up a solid

APRIL 11, 1966

record in that vital area of modern state-
craft known as "crisis management."

DisarTnament

Second, the United Nations has done
what it could to help keep the nuclear genie
in the bottle and to contain the destructive
capabilities of modern science. Agreements
for comprehensive and safeguarded arms
control still elude us, and they are not likely
to be found in a vast deliberative body like
the U.N. General Assembly with its 117
delegations, large and small.

But what the Assembly does is to focus
upon all the nuclear powers, in a very tangi-
ble way, the fervent desire of men of good
will everywhere that general nuclear war
shall never be unleashed upon the world.

An 18-Nation Disarmament Committee is
today meeting in Geneva and discussing,
among other things, ways to expand the test
ban's scope and to prevent the further
spread of nuclear weapons. The Disarma-
ment Committee had its origin in the con-
text of a General Assembly consideration of
the problem of disarmament. The Assembly
is also responsible for the passage of a
resolution to which both the Soviets and
Americans have subscribed, prohibiting the
orbiting in outer space of weapons of mass
destruction. And the Assembly has likewise
set in motion the planning for a world
disarmament conference which could be
held in 1967.

Decolonization

Third, the U.N. has served as a catalyst
in bringing about the transformation — with
remarkably little violence — of colonial terri-
tories into independent states, and it has
served a major role in combating race dis-
crimination and the denial of human rights.
Today, for example, U.N. pressures are
manifest and important in opposing the
consolidation of a "white supremacy" re-
gime in Southern Rhodesia.

In our view, some of the actions taken or
threatened in the U.N. have been unwise or
ineffective. Yet the record of U.N. accom-

573

plishment in bringing nations to independ-
ence, while still incomplete, is a bright
chapter in the history of the organization.
And that record is amply complemented by
the work the U.N. has done for the protec-
tion of refugees and the advancement of
individual human rights and freedoms
through its many declarations and conven-
tions.

Improvement of Humxin Welfare

Fourth, the U.N. has moved in a signifi-
cant way into the fields of economic and
social development, helping to improve the
standards and the quality of life and to raise
underprivileged peoples above the survival
level. The specialized agencies of the U.N.
have attacked this problem on many fronts.

The World Bank and the International
Development Association have made devel-
opment loans totaling almost $7.5 billion to
more than 85 countries for projects ranging
from power and transportation installations
to educational facilities.

The World Health Organization is assist-
ing public health programs and attacking
communicable diseases in scores of coun-
tries.

The Food and Agriculture Organization
is helping to modernize the archaic agricul-
tural practices of backward areas, thus help-
ing to ease food shortages, and to develop
new sources of protein such as modern
fishing industries.

Of particular interest to educators,
UNESCO [United Nations Educational, Sci-
entific and Cultural Organization] is work-
ing to eradicate illiteracy; a people unable
to read can never master the techniques of
modern living and modern production.

Look where you will — at labor, transpor-
tation, communications, the peaceful uses of
atomic energy, the quest for scientific
knowledge in outer space, the process of
industrialization, the problems of population
control, urban planning, and regional de-
velopment— you will find United Nations
agencies actively engaged. It is in these
fields that 80 percent of the money available
to the U.N. is spent. These agencies en-

courage research, disseminate new knowl-
edge, support political and economic and
social development, and work in a multitude
of ways to prepare the new nations to carry
forward such activities on their own.

In all these ways the U.N. serves the
national interests of the United States and
the cause of peace.

Viet-Nam

You may say this is all well and good.
But what is the U.N. doing about one of the
gravest threats to world peace: Communist
aggression in Viet-Nam?

Viet-Nam, of course, is of overriding con-
cern to all of us. Our men are fighting by
the tens of thousands on battlefields half-
way around the world.

It is an unconventional and extraordinary
conflict, quite unlike most of our previous
military experience. It defies analysis in
classical terms. South Viet-Nam is threat-
ened by a massive attempt at subversion
supplied, directed, and controlled from the
North. This is not an internal civil war.
We are aiding the Government and the
people of South Viet-Nam to defend their
territory and their right freely to determine
their own future.

We have been committed under three
Presidents to help preserve the independ-
ence of South Viet-Nam. Our troops are
fighting alongside those of South Viet-Nam
and our allies to demonstrate that we mean
to honor our commitment. The integrity of
the commitment of the United States is a
foundation stone of the entire free world.
We have made similar commitments to 40
allies, and if we flinch here, the validity of
all those commitments is necessarily im-
paired. The effects of a defeat might be
felt first in Southeast Asia, but the shock
waves would travel clear around the globe.

We make no unreasonable demands for a
settlement of the Viet-Nam problem. Our
position is simply stated:

We are ready for unconditional discus-
sions or on the basis of the Geneva accords
of 1954 and 1962.

We desire no continuing military presence

574

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

or bases in Viet-Nam.

We are prepared to withdraw our forces
as soon as South Viet-Nam is in a position
to determine its own future without external
interference.

We believe the future political structure
in South Viet-Nam should be determined by
the South Vietnamese people themselves
through democratic processes and that the
question of reunification of the two Viet-
Nams should be decided by the free decision
of their two peoples.

You are familiar with the intensive ef-
forts we have made in the search for peace.
We have been in touch, time and again, with
most governments of the world and with
many of them through special emissaries.
There has been an overwhelmingly favorable
response to these efforts, except from those
who could in fact sit down and make peace.

Most recently we asked the U.N. Security
Council to consider what it could do to
contribute to a peaceful settlement.^ While
the Council took no formal substantive ac-
tion, consultations among the members re-
vealed overwhelming support for our view
that a solution should be sought through
unconditional discussions at a Geneva con-
ference.

We have been waiting for some word
from Hanoi that goes beyond the bitter
invective or charges that talk of peace is a
trick or a deceit or a swindle. We have been
listening for sounds other than the sounds
of bombs and grenades and mortars in
South Viet-Nam. I regret that I cannot
report to you any positive and encouraging
response to the hopes of the overwhelming
majority of mankind.

We intend, however, to continue our pres-
ent course: to press for a peaceful solution
and to pursue prudently our military action
designed to bring a halt to Communist
aggression.

Many people have asked whether the
United Nations could not play a greater part
in Viet-Nam if Communist China were a
member of the United Nations. Frankly, in

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 14, 1966,
p. 229.

our judgment whether Peking will agree to
a peaceful settlement in Viet-Nam depends
on much more fundamental questions than
admission to the United Nations.

We will continue our efforts to prevent
the expulsion of the Republic of China from
the U.N. or its agencies. As long as Peking
follows its present course, it does not fulfill
the requirements set forth in the charter
for admission to the United Nations. In
actuality. Communist China is keeping itself
out of the United Nations.

Among the conditions Communist China
has set for its entrance into the organization
are: (1) the expulsion of Nationalist China;
(2) that the United Nations rescind a re-
solution passed in 1951 condemning Red
China for aggression in Korea; and (3) the
expulsion of the United States and "its
imperialist puppets."

In view of these demands it is reasonable
to ask whether Communist China seriously
desires membership or whether it is only
out to destroy the United Nations. We be-
lieve the United Nations must continue to
approach this issue with utmost caution and
deliberation.

Two Visions of tlie Future

Where, then, does our balance sheet
stand? It is well over on the plus side.

Adlai Stevenson once said we either have
peace or we have nothing. Regardless of
its imperfections and shortcomings, the
United Nations is working to assure that the
children of the world family tomorrow will
live in conditions of peace and have what
many lack today.

It would be misstating a fact to imply that
the United Nations has met every challenge
or has accomplished all it should. This is an
organization both of capacities and limita-
tions. There have been and will be both
successes and failures.

Perhaps Plato in his search for the per-
fect state would consider our efforts a
failure since we are so far from the eternal
verities of justice. But I am sure, too, that
Aristotle, with his approach to political in-
stitutions as something natural and derived

APRIL 11, 1966

575

from human experience, would agree that
we are trying to reach that middle point
between extremes which is a possible way
of getting closer to truth and to peace.
These observations are apt today, and I be-
lieve that without the United Nations our
future would be bleaker than it is today.

We see two visions of the future. One is
a world of unrestrained nationalist and
ideological competition without any effec-
tive world organization. In such a world we
would expect a steep descent into conflict,
human misery, and destruction. Whatever
the follies or aberrations of a few nations
may be, we do not believe the bulk of the
U.N. membership would tread this road.

The other vision is one of steady, if slow
and gradual, implementation of the pur-
poses and principles of the U.N. Charter.
For never forget that the United Nations
Charter represents the kind of a world that
we want to live in, one free of aggression,
one in which disputes are settled peaceably,
one in which mankind has an opportunity
to develop politically, economically, and so-
cially. Slowly but surely it would bring us
within sight of a world of law, of freedom,
and of prosperity; a world not of dull con-
formity but of rich human diversity.

We put our trust in the capacity of man
to better his life, and we do not think our
faith is misplaced.

f

President Urges Careful Review of International Agency Budgets

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White Honse press release dated March 15

I have just sent a memorandum to Secre-
tary of State Rusk directing him to under-
take certain measures to improve our par-
ticipation in international organizations.

No nation has been a greater supporter of
the United Nations, its specialized agencies,
and other international organizations than
the United States.

— Since the end of the Second World War,
we have provided a total of $3.6 billion in
direct contributions.

— In the last 10 years our annual contri-
butions have grown from $100 million to an
estimated $237 million — an increase of 137
percent.

— We are today a member of some 65
international organizations.

We shall continue to meet our fair share
of the financial requirements of these orga-
nizations. But we must apply to them the

same rigorous standards of program per-
formance and budget review that we do to
our own Federal programs.

To strengthen these organizations and at
the same time to make sure that the Ameri-
can tax dollar is effectively spent, we have
an obligation to review carefully their ac-
tivities and our participation in them. In my
memorandum to the Secretary, I said that I
would be looking to him to see that

— future expansion of the activities of the
international organizations is governed by
the tests of need and reasonableness,

— the programs of these organizations are
carefully reviewed so that funds are allo-
cated to high-priority projects which are in
the best interests of the international com-
munity,

— each international agency operates with
a maximum of efficiency, and

— we clarify the objectives of our mem-
bership in each organization and organize

576

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

ourselves for more effective participation in
international organization affairs.

I have asked the Secretary to direct and
coordinate the activities of the U.S. depart-
ments and agencies involved in these orga-
nizations. He will instruct our representa-
tives along the lines I have indicated above.

All departments and agencies will cooper-
ate with him in carrying out this responsi-
bility.

!

TEXTS OF MEMORANDUMS
To Secretary Rusk

White House presa release dated March 15

j March 15, 1966

The Federal Budget for 1967 contains this state-
ment:

IJ ... we intend to play an increasingly active
' role in reviewing the program and budgetary pro-
posals of the various international organizations.

The purpose of this memorandum is to set forth
what I believe that increasingly active role should
I be.

No nation has been a greater supporter of the
United Nations, its specialized agencies and other
international organizations than the United States.
We are today a member of some 65 such agencies.

Our continued strong support is necessary and
: desirable

— if the world community is to live in peace,
— if we are to cooperate internationally in ex-
tending the benefits of modern agriculture, health,
and education to the less fortunate, and

— if international problems in such fields as
meteorology, telecommunications, and aviation are
to be given the joint attention required for their
resolution.

The United States has by far been the largest
financial contributor to the international organiza-
tions.

— Since 1946, we have provided a total of $3.6
billion in direct contributions.

— Since 1956, our annual contributions have grown
from ?100 million to an estimated $237 million for
the next fiscal year, an overall increase of 137%.

Moreover, we can expect the programs and budgets
of these international agencies to expand further in
future years to meet the growing needs of the world
community. The United States shall continue to
meet its fair share of the financial requirements of
these organizations.

If we are to be a constructive influence in helping
to strengthen the international agencies so they can
meet essential new needs, we must apply to them
the same rigorous standards of program perform-
ance and budget review that we do to our own Fed-
eral programs. Our purpose in this undertaking
must be to see that

— future expansion of the activities of the inter-
national organizations is governed by the teats of
feasibility and reasonableness,

— the programs of the organizations are vigor-
ously scrutinized so that funds are allocated only
to high priority projects which we are convinced are
in the interests of the international community and
of our own country, and

— each international agency operates with a maxi-
mum of effectiveness and economy.

To achieve this purpose, we must

— decide what we can best accomplish through
multilateral action, as compared to action through
our own direct programs,

— clarify the objectives of our membership in each
international agency,

— organize ourselves for more effective participa-
tion in each organization, and

— insist that the money we spend through inter-
national agencies is in our national interest and in
the best interest of the world community.

I expect you to continue to direct and coordinate
the activities of the U.S. departments and agencies
involved in international organization affairs and
to instruct our representatives to those organiza-
tions. I shall look to you to direct this Government's
work in

— reviewing and establishing our long-term policy
objectives in each major international organization,

— analyzing and determining the U.S. position on
programs and budgetary needs of each organization
on a timely and continuing basis, and

— recommending steps to improve the effectiveness
of each organization in contributing to the objec-
tives of the world community and the United States.

Ambassador Goldberg has unique responsibilities
in a wide range of matters relating to the United
Nations system. I shall continue to rely heavily on
his advice and counsel.

The heads of other Federal departments and agen-
cies have significant interest in activities of the
various international organizations. I expect them
to provide you with expert assistance in their spe-
cialized fields. In this work, the close cooperation
of all agencies is needed to provide the essential
unity of our effort.

I expect the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
to work with you and other agency heads to help
assure that the positions we take on the budgets of
international organizations reflect a searching scru-

APRIL 11, 1966

577

tiny of requirements and priorities for the expendi-
ture of funds.

I am sending copies of this memorandum to all
department and agency heads.

To Department and Agency Heads

White House press release dated March 15

March 15, 1966
I have today sent the attached memorandum di-
recting the Secretary of State to take certain actions
which I believe are essential to effective participa-
tion by the United States in international organiza-
tions.

I expect the heads of all departments and agen-
cies that contribute to the Government's activities
in this field to give their full cooperation to the
Secretary of State in carrying out my instructions.
This work must receive high priority and the
personal attention of the responsible officials in all
agencies concerned if this Nation's interest in im-
proving international organizations as instruments
for peace and progress is to be fulfilled.

President Signs Supplementai
iVIilitary Autliorization Biii

Remarks by President Johnson ^

The bill that we have come here to
approve this morning authorizes appropria-
tions of more than $4,800,000,000 for the
support of the Defense Establishment of the
United States of America. Later today the
Congress vi^ill act upon the appropriation of
some $13 billion.^ This is authorization for
only a part of that appropriation, but this
bill will help to meet the military needs
that we have in Viet-Nam.

I also believe that it will do something
else. By its overwhelming vote on this
measure, I believe the Congress has repeated
its declaration to the American people that
they stand behind our fighting men in
Viet-Nam. Let me remind you that it was

' Made on sigrning the supplemental military au-
thorization bill (H.R. 12889) on Mar. 15 (White
House press release; as-delivered text).

" On Mar. 23 the Congress approved an act (H.R.
13546) providing supplemental appropriations for
the fiscal year ending June 30, 1966, and sent it to
the President, who signed the bill into law (P.L.
89-374) on Mar. 23.

578

just 25 years ago that the Congress ex-
tended the Selective Service Act by only 1
vote. That was in August, as I recall it,
before Pearl Harbor in December. On the
eve of Pearl Harbor the House of Repre-
sentatives, of which I was then a member,
by a vote of 203 to 202 turned this country
from the brink of the cliff and saved the
Army from being dismantled.

We had refused to fortify Guam a short
time before that. We had sent several false
impressions throughout the world by our
action. Now in contrast, this supplemental
military authorization bill passed the House
of Representatives, under the bipartisan
leadership of the Armed Services Commit-
tee and its members, by a vote of 392 to 4;
it passed the Senate by a vote of 93 to 2.
This overwhelming vote is visible confidence
in our modern Defense Department and the
civilians and the military who direct the
destinies of that department.

In all the history of military movement,
there has never been the equal of the De-
fense Department's accomplishment of mov-
ing more than 100,000 men 10,000 miles in
150 days and moving them with equipment,
doctors, housing, ammunition, vehicles,
planes, and support materiel. In speed,
quantities, and efficiency, history recalls no
similar achievement of that kind, and it
deserves the recognition and the gratitude
of every single American who lives securely
in the United States today.

The overwhelming vote on this measure
also testifies that we may have learned
something from recent history. It is a lesson
which we should have learned long ago, for
it was really one of our Founding Fathers,
John Jay, who warned us: "It is too true,
however disgraceful it may be to human
nature, that nations in general will make
war whenever they have a prospect of get-
ting anything by it."

I believe that many of the world's na-
tions have since learned the final futility
of war. Most of the world's leaders today,
I believe, genuinely desire peace, but there
are still a few who do not. So to those who
ask what our present struggle in Viet-Nam

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

J

really means, let me say: Our purpose is to
demonstrate to the remaining advocates of
violence that there is more human profit to
be had from peace than there is from war.

That is the real purpose of the more than
200,000 brave Americans who are at this
moment risking their lives 10,000 miles from
home. That is the real purpose of the Con-
gress in registering such dramatic support
for legislation of this kind. That is the only
purpose of the President and this adminis-
tration in Viet-Nam.

How sad it is that such great sums must
be spent for the bombs and the planes and
the gunpowders of war. How joyous it
would be if these great resources could be
put, instead, to the service of peace. We
have said this and we have repeated it time
and time again, and we will never tire of
saying it, and I repeat it now: The people
of Viet-Nam, North and South, have the
same basic human needs. The people of
Asia and the people of China have the same
basic human needs.

They need food, shelter, and education.
They need an end to disease and to disaster.
They need a future for their children. They
need hope. They need peace. These are the
very simple things, the basic things, the
building blocks of life and of civilization.
They are the vital and fundamental things
that all men have in common, that all men
can together seek and together achieve.

In my Baltimore declaration of April of
last year,^ I said to the people of the world
how much we would welcome taking some
of the funds that we are now spending in
bombs and bullets and putting them in ef-
forts to rid that area of disease and disaster
and provide education and training. At
that time I recommended the study and the
creation of a Southeast Asia Development
Bank, which will soon come into being as a
result of the efficiency of this Congress.''

I ' Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

I * For the President's remarks on signing the Asian

Development Bank Act of 1966 into law on Mar. 16,

see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

So, again, this morning I repeat that we
look forward with hope and with prayer to
the day when the leaders who provoked and
the leaders who continue this aggression in
Viet-Nam will finally abandon their hope-
less attempts at conquest. It is my greatest
wish to some day stand here and sign an-
other bill, one that is designed to bring
progress and fulfillment to a Southeast Asia
which is at peace with itself and also at
peace with the rest of the world.

Department To Hold Conference
for Editors and Broadcasters

The Department of State announced on
March 25 (press release 70) that it will hold
a national foreign policy conference for
editors and broadcasters at Washington
April 28 and 29.

Secretary Rusk has extended invitations
to editors and commentators of the daily
and periodical press and the broadcasting
industry in the 50 States and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the confer-
ence and has invited Vice President Hum-
phrey to participate in the program. Among
other high officials expected to participate
are: George W. Ball, Under Secretary of
State; Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff; David E. Bell, Ad-
ministrator, Agency for International De-
velopment; William P. Bundy, Assistant
Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs;
and Lincoln Gordon, Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs and U. S.
Coordinator, Alliance for Progress.

There will be opportunity for discussions
in depth with other senior officials of the
Department of State, AID, USIA, and the
Department of Defense in concurrent round
tables on the morning of April 29. Subjects
to be covered in these sessions are Commu-
nist China, the U.N. and the developing
countries, the Geneva disarmament confer-
ence, East-West trade, "As Others See Us"
— USIA programs abroad, and food and
population problems.

APRIL 11, 1966

579

The United States and the Warsaw Convention

Statements by Andreas F. Lmvenfeld
Deputy Legal Adviser ^

OPENING STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

When your chairman asked me this morn-
ing after the meeting whether the United
States would like to lead off the discussion
this afternoon, I readily agreed. We are
well aware of the part that the United
States has played in bringing this confer-
ence about.

Ours has been the most pronounced and
expressed dissatisfaction with the Warsaw
Convention. We have made clear our view
that the Warsaw Convention, or, to be spe-
cific, the limits of liability set forth in the
convention, have outlived their time. We
think the large and distinguished attend-
ance here is testimony to the general recog-
nition of the need to reexamine anew the
convention concluded in 1929 and only very
modestly brought up to date in the middle
of the last decade.

We should not wonder that there is now
a need for a general reexamination. There
is, after all, hardly a field as fast growing
and fast developing as civil aviation. Let me
say that the United States agrees with the
observation of Dr. Binaghi [Walter Binaghi,
President of the ICAO Council] this morn-
ing that the Warsaw Convention was an
excellent compromise between the world's

' Made at the Special International Civil Aviation
Organization Meeting on Limits for Passengers
Under the Warsaw Convention and the Hague Pro-
tocol, held at Montreal, Canada, Feb. 1-15. Mr.
Lowenfeld was chairman of the U.S. delegation.

various legal systems. With that compro-
mise we have no quarrel. Our quarrel
rather is with the other compromise con-
tained in the Warsaw Convention: the com-
promise between the interests of the airlines
and the interests of the traveling public.

The principal concern of my Government
now is to safeguard and protect our citizens,
who are in ever greater numbers and at
nearly all economic levels taking advantage
of the opportunity of international travel by
air. Our endeavor, then, at this conference
is to redress — to bring up to date — the com-
promise between the airlines and the travel-
ing public, hopefully without disturbing the
underlying legal regime of the Warsaw
Convention, but in any event, as the Presi-
dent of the Council suggested this morning,
with imagination.

U.S. Notice of Denunciation

We are sorry that we have had to take a
step that many of you considered abrupt:
serving notice of denunciation of the War-
saw Convention in advance of this meeting.'
Let me make clear, then, that this step was
taken not in any spirit of defiance of this
organization or of our treaty partners. The
United States stands steadfast in its com-
mitment and dedication to cooperation in in-

- For a Department announcement of Nov. 15,
1965, and text of the notice of denunciation, see
Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 923.

580

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ternational law and in international civil
aviation.

The step that we took last fall was sim-
ply the inevitable result of our growing
concern about the great numbers of our unin-
formed and unprotected traveling public.
The prospects for this conference were just
too uncertain, and the Warsaw regime, as we
saw it, was just too far out of line with to-
day's conditions. Thus the United States
felt we simply could not let any more time
pass without doing something about the situ-
ation.

A bit of history may be in order. As
many of you know, the Hague Protocol has
been the subject of a great deal of debate
and discussion in the United States since
the 1955 Hague conference. This past sum-
mer the United States executive branch
made a final attempt to secure ratification
of the Hague Protocol. Since the $16,600
limit of liability per passenger was almost
universally thought in our country to be far
too low, we made an effort to secure ap-
proval of the Hague Protocol by coupling the
request for ratification to a request for
compulsory accident insurance in addition to
the Hague limits. This plan would, by force
of law, have been applicable only to the
United States flag carriers ; by force of com-
petition and persuasion, it was hoped, the
plan would gradually have come to cover
other international airlines as well.

This effort on the part of my Government
failed. The compulsory accident insurance
legislation could not even secure a hearing in
our Congress. Neither our Congress nor our
executive branch supported the Hague fig-
ure without additional protection, and had
the Hague Protocol come to a vote in our
Senate, there is little doubt that it would
have been defeated.

The debate over the Hague Protocol and
the Warsaw Convention became widespread
in the United States. Not only the executive
and legislative branches of the Government
but the press and public generally, as well
as the courts, became stirred up about the
problem. Thus, as I have said, the United
States Government could not let another

year go by without taking some action.

Given the 6 months' notice requirement
in article 39 and the rather uncertain re-
sponses from the other governments we
consulted in the late summer and early fall
of 1965, the United States had no choice but
to give its notice of denunciation of the
convention when it did so. But let me re-
peat: The action of the United States was
taken not in any spirit of defiance or of
arrogance. We welcome this meeting, as we
said when it was first proposed, and as we
said in our notice of denunciation. We hope
the results of this meeting will permit us to
withdraw our notice of denunciation and will
permit us to remain within the Warsaw
treaty system.

If our action has given impetus to a
prompt and serious reconsideration of the
problem of the Warsaw Convention, then we
are very pleased. If by our action, that some
have called "precipitate," we have offended
some of our friends, we are sorry, sincerely
sorry. In any event we look forward to a
full discussion here of all the facts and all
the issues, free of rancor, free of prejudice,
and in the spirit of a common endeavor to
address a complicated and difficult problem.

Issues Before the Conference

To come now to the merits, I should like
today just to give you a brief outline of the
way the United States looks at the issues
before this conference.

We are mindful of the fact that the
Warsaw Convention is one of the most
widespread and most significant conventions
in the area of private law. We appreciate
the contribution made by the convention to
the development of international aviation
and, to a certain extent, to uniformity of
interpretation and practice. But the over-
riding issue in the Warsaw Convention, as
we see it, is that it was entered into in the
late 1920's, when international aviation was
hardly over the experimental stage and
when the primary need was a means to pre-
vent the growth of international aviation
from being choked off by one or more
catastrophic accidents. Today, in contrast,

APRIL 11, 1966

581

international aviation is big business. We are
over the experimental stage. We are over
the infant industry stage. Equally impor-
tant, the techniques, equipment, and experi-
ence of our current international air trans-
portation are such that the hazards of fly-
ing have been very much reduced and are
actuarily predictable.

For these reasons the United States be-
lieves that there is no longer justification
for a convention which tips the balance
heavily in favor of the industry and against
the consumer. We believe that our objective
should be an agreement that does not tip
the balance one way or another but achieves
a true balance between the interests of the
traveling public and the interests of the
aviation industry.

We hope very much that it will be possi-
ble to work out such an agreement. When
the time comes — and I hope within a day or
so — we shall have some specific proposals to
make. In general, of course, the United
States position is well known. But for today
I would just like to sketch some of the con-
siderations that we believe all of us should
keep in mind in seeking to achieve the true
balance that we have been speaking about.

First — The Question of Air Safety. The
fears of 1929 are certainly over today. The
accident rate today is approximately 0.61
passenger fatalities per 100 million pas-
senger-miles. For the period 1925-1929 the
comparable rate was 45 passenger fatalities
per 100 million passenger-miles. In 1964 the
ICAO figures show 284 persons killed in in-
ternational passenger flights. Thus, despite
the great increase in the size of aircraft and
the prospective further substantial increase,
we can hardly be concerned, as we were 35
years ago, about the serious economic con-
sequences for the industry of a single air
disaster.

Second — The Volume of Air Traffic. Air
transportation has grown to absolutely fan-
tastic proportions, with no sign of letup. Our
latest figures show that 38 million persons
traveled in scheduled international air trans-
portation in 1964 for a total of 76 billion
passenger-kilometers, roughly 46 billion

passenger-miles. This compares vdth 400
million passenger-miles total for the 5-year
period 1925-1929, counting domestic as well
as international air transportation.

Thus the possibility of distribution of risk
by airlines and, through the medium of re-
insurance, among many airlines, is very
great. Let us be clear on this point: We will
hear at this conference about the question
of insurance. The real question in this re-
gard, it seems to us, is how to spread the
risk most fairly and most economically
and with the least possibility of having per-
sons (or their families) who for one or an-
other reason did not make specific provision
for disaster suffer terribly for this. In short,
it seems to us that whether they absorb the
cost, pass it on indirectly in the fare, or
make a special charge, the airlines as a
group are the best locus of responsibility.
It is the airlines, therefore, who ought to
have the primary burden of taking out in-
surance for air accidents.

Third — Cost of Insurance. The insurance
industry, as many of you must have no-
ticed, is extraordinarily reticent with fig-
ures. As a result, a number of misconcep-
tions seem to have grown up about the cost
of insurance. Our estimates, which we wish
to discuss further in the course of the con-
ference, indicate that insurance costs are
approximately 1 percent of operating costs.
If these costs rose by, say, 50 percent (our
rough estimate at a limit of $100,000 under
the Warsaw-Hague system), the increase in
costs would be roughly from 1 to lYz per-
cent of operating costs. Thus it seems to us
that the fear of substantial additional cost
to the carriers as a result of higher limits of
liability is, to put it mildly, rather exag-
gerated.

Fourth — What Do We Mean by Limits of
Liability"! In some of the communications
the United States has received from foreign
governments, it has been said that the United
States is seeking to impose its standards of
living upon all the countries of the world.
Nothing of the sort, Mr. Chairman and del-
egates. When we speak of limits of liability,
we do not think of average recovery. Only

582

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

when the limit has been very low, as under
Warsaw, has the limit tended to be the aver-
age— in fact generally the automatic — sum
at which claims are settled. We mean by an
acceptable limit of liability a figure that
will permit most people in most countries to
establish, in accordance with the legal sys-
tem of the country where they and their
families reside, a monetary value for the
loss or injury they have suffered as the re-
sult of an accident.

Recovery for death or injury would pre-
sumably be based on some combination of
earning power, life expectancy, and (in the
case of death) degree of dependence of the
survivors. We would expect a realistic limit
of liability not to be near the average re-
covery for the world or, indeed, near the
average recovery in the United States. We
would expect the limit, rather, to be well
above the average. We are, in other words,
speaking of a true limit. If a person has a
low income or a short life expectancy or no
dependents or resides in a country whose
legal system does not provide for substan-
tial compensation for accident victims, an
increase in limits should have no appreciable
effect on his recovery or on the airline
which carries him. We should not, in short,
seek to arrive here at this conference at a
limit based on average recoveries, since by
definition an average means that 50 percent
of persons affected would have been ad-
versely affected.

Fifth — Why Do We Have Limits of Lia-
bility'! I would be less than candid if I did
not say that there is a good deal of question
in my country as to why there should be
limits of liability at all on international air
transportation. As most of you know, the
United States does not in general have
limits of liability in domestic air transpor-
tation, on rail, bus, or automobile transpor-
tation, or, for the most part, on marine
transportation. A question that was more
and more asked during the debates of last
summer to which I made reference earlier, is
"Why single out international air transporta-
tion?" To put it in the most concrete terms,
why should, say, American Airlines operate

under a different regime of liabilities from
Pan American or Air France or BOAC ?

We find this question not easy to answer.
We have examined the matter thoroughly
and have concluded that, under current ju-
risprudence in the United States, the ad-
vantages provided by the present conven-
tion— shift in the burden of proof, stated
places of jurisdiction, and exclusion of con-
tractual or statutory provisions limiting
carriers' liability — are not, on the whole,
very significant. Our law, in other words,
grants the greater part of these protec-
tions without a convention. You may be sure
that had we not reached this conclusion, the
United States would not have taken the step
of giving notice of denunciation of the War-
saw Convention.

For the United States, then, the question
comes down essentially to a balance of in-
terests. Among these interests, a heavy one
is the cooperation and understanding of our
friends around the world in the international
aviation and international law fields. We
hope in the days ahead to be able to share
with you all the results of our thorough,
and I think you will find careful, studies. If
on the basis of our joint discussions we can
arrive at common conclusions, it ought to
be possible to arrive at a consensus on a
revision — and therefore preservation — of the
Warsaw Convention. We hope very much
that this will be the case.

SECOND STATEMENT, FEBRUARY 1

Mr. Chairman, a number of delegates have
expressed the wish that the United States
come forward with a positive specific pro-
posal and with the justification for that
proposal. Let me do this now.

We propose that the limit of liability
under Hague or under Warsaw be increased
to $100,000 per passenger. We are prepared
to consider this figure as an inclusive limit,
that is to say, without additional provision
for legal fees. Thus we would be prepared
to see deletion of article 22(4) of the con-
vention, as it was amended at The Hague.

The justification for our proposal, it seems

APRIL 11, 1966

583

to us, has two parts: first, to show that in-
justice, in a significant number of cases,
would result from continued effectiveness of
the Warsaw Convention, whether at the
$8,300 level, at the Hague level of $16,600,
or at some other relatively low level such as
$50,000 per passenger; and second, to show
that a convention with a limit such as we
propose in the area of $100,000 per passen-
ger would not work economic hardship,
either on the airlines or on the traveling
public.

Just Compensation for Accident Victims

Different countries and indeed different
courts or administrative bodies within the
same country often approach the question of
compensation for accident victims in some-
what different terms. Basically, however, it
seems fair to say that the common objective
of a system of compensation for accidental
injury or death is to provide in monetary
terms for the loss suffered by the victims
or, in the case of fatal accidents, by the
survivors.

Let us, just by way of example, see what
this means concretely: Suppose a man sup-
ports a wife and minor children on an income
of $10,000 a year and he is killed at the age
of 35, with a prospective earning capacity of,
say, 30 years or until age 65. What is the
thinking process of the court or administra-
tive officer or an insurance company nego-
tiating a settlement in arriving at a just
figure to compensate for the loss of the life
of this person?

One might start out typically by multiply-
ing 30 — the number of years he may be ex-
pected to work — by $10,000 — his annual
earnings. The result would be a figure of
$300,000. From this would be deducted the
cost of living of the deceased himself, the
amount that the minor children might be ex-
pected to earn when they reach maturity and
no longer need to be supported by their
parents. Possibly, chances of remarriage of
the widow might be taken into consideration,
and in some countries or some cases the
benefits payable to the survivors through

the working of some social insurance or so-
cial security system might be deducted. Fi-
nally, it may be appropriate to deduct income
or other taxes that would have been paid
over the period by the deceased.

Now I am not suggesting that a court, a
jury, or an administrative official or an in-
surance company in each case goes through
each of these computations. But it gives us
an idea of what it is that we are talking
about. The theory of compensation is, after
all, to restore the survivors, to the extent
money can do so, to the position that they
would have been in but for the accident.
There is no attempt to punish the person
responsible for the accident.

The Effect of the Warsaw Convention

We realize that for many of the countries
represented here the inhibiting effect of the
convention in aviation accidents is not easily
demonstrated. This is so in some cases be-
cause there is no domestic air transportation
in the country or, in other cases, because the
international limit, or something very close
to it, is applicable also internally. Moreover,
we are fully aware that in some countries
represented here the present convention
limits conform to the typical standards of
compensation. But in the United States the
difference between Warsaw and non-Warsaw
compensation for accidents is very dramatic
indeed.

In aviation accidents covered by the War-
saw Convention during the period 1950-1964
the average passenger fatality settlement
was relatively constant and averaged about
$6,500, slightly below the Warsaw limits. In
contrast, in accidents not covei'ed by the
Warsaw Convention, i.e., accidents in domes-
tic transportation, the average recovery in
each year was substantially higher than the
Warsaw limit. For the years 1958 through
1964, that average comes to approximately
$52,500, and for the 15-year period the av-
erage was approximately $38,500.

But in seeking the proper level for a limit,
it is not average recoveries that we are pri-
marily concerned with. We are concerned

584

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

here with the percentage of persons who, at
any given ceiling, would be deprived of their
just due. If the limit were set exactly at the
average, then approximately one-half of the
persons affected would be adversely af-
fected. Let me stress that again, as it is
really at the heart of our position. A limit
set at or very close to the average would
have the result that approximately one-half
of the persons affected by the limit would
be deprived of the compensation that their
legal system considers them entitled to in
order to make them whole for their injury
or loss.

With this in mind, let us examine the
experience of aviation accident claims in the
United States settled at various levels where
the convention was not applicable. The
following table shows the distribution of
settlements of the 813 aviation accident
death claims paid over the 7 years 1958-
1964 on behalf of the 13 major United States
international and domestic trunkline carriers
where the Warsaw Convention was not
applicable :

Amount of payment *

Number of

Perc.e-nt

claims

of clainw

0

53

6.5

? 1-$ 8,292

194

23.9

8,293- 16,583

159

19.5

16,584- 33,000

115

14.1

33,001- 50,000

54

6.6

50,001- 75,000

47

5.8

75,001- 100,000

45

5.6

100,001- 200,000

110

13.5

200,001 and up

36
813

4.4

100.0

* In a few cases, these figures include claims subject to State
limits on wronpfnl death actions.

Note : Condensed from the full table made available at the
conference. (The tables were prepared by the staff of the CAB on
the basis of questionnaires answered by the carriers.)

I Thus 29.3 percent of all the settlements
were in excess of $50,000 per person. To put

, it another way, nearly one-third of all these
aviation accident victims would have been
deprived of some portion of what in fact was
received had a $50,000 limit been in force.
23.5 percent, or nearly one-quarter, would
have been deprived by a $75,000 limit. 17.9
percent, or nearly one in five, would have
been deprived by a limitation at the $100,000

level. Of course, the lower the limit, the
greater is not only the number of persons
deprived of their due but also the extent of
their denial.

This is why we consider the $100,000
figure proposed by the United States to be
not at all excessive. We consider this figure
would be a realistic and effective limit. We
are prepared to accept and ask our Congress
to accept the proposition that persons whose
loss would be in excess of $100,000 should
make some other provision for their families
for the loss over that amount.

Before leaving these figures relating to
aviation accident recoveries, one other point
should be made. We have no reason to be-
lieve that a limit set at $100,000 per passen-
ger would tend to become the average recov-
ery in the United States or anywhere else.
Even where no limit has been applicable —
as in the great majority of our non-Warsaw
cases — the United States experience has
been that recoveries are spread through the
entire range. As I have stated, the average
recovery in aviation death cases — which of
course is what determines insurance costs —
has been $38,500 per passenger for the 15-
year period 1950-1964, and $52,500 for the
last 7 years for which figures are complete
— 1958-1964. These figures, in the absence
of any limit, are of course nowhere near the
limit the United States proposes.

Economic Cost of Increased Limits

First, I think it is fair to assume that
everyone here agrees that when we talk
about increased economic costs we are talk-
ing about insurance costs. No one expects
any one airline or group of airlines to bear
the cost of any given accident. We are talk-
ing about the cost of distribution or alloca-
tion of risks.

What then would these increased insur-
ance costs be? It is rather difficult to get
insurance estimates with precision. But on
the basis of the figures of present insurance
costs of United States trunkline and inter-
national carriers, and on the basis of esti-
mates furnished by one of the two groups of

APRIL 11, 1966

585

aviation underwriters, we have been able to
construct certain estimates:

Amount of limit

Percentage of in/'rea-ne

in insurance co/tt over

present costs

$ 25,000

9

50,000

26

75,000

38

100,000

48

Thus, acceptance of the United States pro-
posal would, in our estimate, result in an
increase in insurance cost to United States
airlines by about one-half of the present
cost.

Assuming the rough accuracy of these
estimates, what would be the effect on air-
line operating costs of an increase in limits
of liability such as is proposed by the United
States? What relation, in other words, does
the figure of insurance cost bear to overall
cost, revenue, or fares? What we have done
to arrive at an estimate is to take the
insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile
for the major United States airlines, domes-
tic and international, for the last year for
which figures are complete — 1964. That cost
— average insurance cost per revenue-pas-
senger-mile— is 64 cents per 1,000 passen-
ger-miles.3 To the base figure of 64 cents we
have added the increases estimated above.
The result is shown in the following table:

Cost per 1.000 rfvrnuc

Aviount of limit

pa^senger-milcx

$ 25,000

$ 0.71

50,000

0.81

75,000

0.90

100,000

0.96

It is worth noting in considering the pro-
posal of the United States, what is the dif-
ference in cost between the United States
proposal and other proposals that have been
made. The difference in insurance cost be-
tween a $50,000 limit per passenger and a
$100,000 limit is only 15 cents per 1,000
revenue-passenger-miles. Between $75,000
and $100,000, the difference is only 6 cents
per 1,000 revenue-passenger-miles.

To translate these figures into a typical

' This figure, incidentally, is considerably higher
than the insurance cost per revenue-passenger-mile
for our two largest international carriers. [Author's
footnote.]

586

international flight, the additional cost of
insurance resulting from a move to a $100,-
000 limit from the present Warsaw limit
would amount to an additional 32 cents per
1,000 passenger-miles or roughly $1 per
passenger in a one-way trip between New
York and London. This is in relation to a
current standard economy fare of approxi-
mately $250 one way.

In short, we have before us not a parade
of horribles, not a prospect of economic dis-
aster for the airline industry or heavy bur-
dens for airline passengers. Whether it is
the airlines who would bear the increased
cost of insurance, or whether in time this
cost would be passed on to the passengers,
or whether perhaps there would be some
apportionment between carriers and passen-
gers, what we would have if the United
States plan were adopted would by no means
cause a great disturbance or be a great
economic burden.

Conclusion

We do not wish to overstate the emphasis
on figures. The United States position rests
on a moral and social judgment as much as
on an economic one. But we think that the
figures, estimates, and analysis presented
here justify our twin conclusions:

1. The Warsaw Convention is harsh and
unfair and represents a burden that we, the
Government of the United States, cannot
continue to ask our citizens to bear;

2. The cost of meeting the figure that we
have suggested is altogether reasonable and
would be no great burden either to the air-
lines of the world or to the traveling public.

Let me, in closing, repeat my call to you
at the opening session. Permit us to remain
with you in the Warsaw/Hague system by
agreeing to our proposed revision of the
convention to $100,000 per passenger, inclu-
sive of costs and attorneys' fees. How we
achieve this result, whether under Hague,
under Warsaw, or under some other method
that has been suggested or perhaps may be
suggested, I hope we can discuss in the days
ahead.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

CLOSING STATEMENT, FE3RUARY 14

It is with considerable sadness that I have
asked for the floor at this time. The United
States delegation thought that it had come
to Montreal well prepared with facts and
with arguments in support of our position.
We thought we had made a persuasive pres-
entation for the proposition that the Warsaw
Convention needed to be updated, and up-
dated substantially. We believed, and still
believe, that the United States proposal, or
something close to it, would have been in
the public interest. It would have secured
justice for many persons, and at very little
cost.

We thought that this conference would
recognize that commercial aviation is no
longer an infant industry entitled to special
shelter, but that it should be treated like
other persons or businesses dealing with the
public. In other words, we thought this con-
ference would recognize the principle that
persons or firms engaged in international
commercial aviation — whether airline, manu-
facturer, or ground control — should, on the
whole, be held responsible for injuries done
to others. We believed that if this principle
were accepted, it would be possible to main-
tain the considerable uniformity of law and
practice achieved by the Warsaw/Hague
system. We believed that it would be possi-
ble to build on the experience gained over
the past 30-35 years to fashion new and
imaginative solutions to the legal, economic,
and practical problems involved in the rela-
tions between airlines and travelers through
many lands. We hoped that it would be
possible to develop a consensus and to initi-
ate action here at this conference.

Our hopes, it is now clear, were not justi-
fied. Despite active and stimulating discus-
sion, and despite several valiant efforts to
develop acceptable compromises, no proposal
was found that clearly expressed a con-
sensus of the countries represented. Indeed,
it was the will of the conference not even to
express a preference among those proposals
that did have substantial support. We hoped

until today that it might yet be possible to
lay a firm foundation here for a successful
diplomatic conference and to work out an
interim arrangement along the lines of this
conference's recommendations. If this had
come about, our delegation had hoped to
recommend to our Government that it with-
draw the United States notice of denuncia-
tion of the Warsaw Convention. It was not
to be, and we are sorry.

But we should not, Mr. Chairman and
fellow delegates, feel too sad. From the point
of view of the traveling public, there can be
no doubt that this conference has had a
wholesome effect. All the countries repre-
sented here, and doubtless many others that
will hear and read of the work of this con-
ference, have come to think hard about the
question of the obligation of airlines toward
their passengers. Nearly all countries have
agreed, as every one of our exploratory votes
proved, that the Warsaw Convention limits
are obsolete and unfair. Whatever the tim-
ing, whatever the procedure followed, we
may be sure that the convention will be
brought up to date or will gradually fade
away. In the long run, the aviation indus-
try, which has always been proud of its posi-
tion in the forefront of human advance, will
not — indeed cannot — stand still on the simple
and morally cleai--cut issue of protection of
its customers.

As for international cooperation, the spirit
is so widespread, the habit so deeply in-
grained, that it cannot be said to depend on
any single convention. So far as the United
States is concerned, Mr. Chairman, let me
state again that, while we are disappointed
that this meeting could not have reached a
more clear-cut result, our impatience on the
issue of compensation for accident victims
is due only to our concern for the traveling
public. It signifies in no way any lessening
in our devotion to ICAO or to the traditions
of cooperation in international aviation
which the United States has done so much
to promote.

A few words may be in order, Mr. Chair-
man, about the consequences for the airlines

APRIL 11, 1966

587

of the world of the withdrawal by the United
States from the Warsaw Convention.

First, we hope and expect that the uni-
form practices established in the light of the
Warsaw Convention will be maintained — all,
that is, except for the famous small print
purporting to give notice of the applicability
of the convention and of the limits of liability
contained therein. We do not, in other words,
expect that the practice of interline ticket-
ing, of remittance through the clearinghouse,
and the like, will be affected.

Second, we expect that nearly all airlines
will be amenable to suit in the United States
brought on behalf of passengers residing in
or citizens of the United States. So far as
residents of other countries are concerned,
we expect that, in general, only United
States flag airlines will be subject to suit
in the United States. Thus there is not
likely to be much successful "forum shop-
ping."

Third, we expect that courts in the United
States — and, accordingly, out-of-court settle-
ments— will treat persons involved in air
accidents like persons involved in any other
accidents. Thus compensation will be based
on the passenger's earning capacity, his life
expectancy at the time of accident, and the
degree of dependence of the survivors. There
will be some high settlements and some low
ones, and there may well be some judgments
in favor of the carriers.

Limitations on liability, whether statu-
tory at the place of accident or by contract
in the ticket, will almost certainly be dis-
regarded on the ground that they are con-
trary to public policy. But you may be sure
that foreign carriers will receive full justice
in the United States. Further, where for-
eign residents bring suit in the United
States, it will be the passenger's earning
capacity, his life expectancy, and the status
of his survivors in his own country, as well
as that country's concepts of proper com-
pensation for accident victims that will gen-
erally govern the result in the United States.

Fourth and finally, we believe the cost in
terms of increased insurance premiums for
carriers flying to and from the United

588

States or carrying large numbers of United
States passengers will be small — on the
order of one-half of 1 percent of operating
costs. For local and regional carriers, in-
cluding some of those that may still be clas-
sified as "infant industries," the increase in
insurance cost as the result of United States
withdrawal from the convention will be
hardly noticeable.

In closing, let me say again, Mr. Chair-
man, what I said at the opening of the con-
ference. The United States notice of de-
nunciation of the Warsaw Convention was
given not in any spirit of defiance of this or-
ganization or of our treaty partners.

We are grateful to ICAO for holding this
conference, and we are grateful to all of the
delegations for the courteous and attentive
hearing we have had and for the resource-
fulness and energy devoted by so many
delegates to the effort to reach a compro-
mise solution. We remain committed to co-
operation in international law and in inter-
national aviation.

If it has not been possible to reach agree-
ment here, we hope at least to have dem-
onstrated to all of you that our decision has
been a thoughtful and reasonable one, taken
only after trying all other possible alterna-
tives, and motivated solely by our desire to
do the right thing for our citizens and for
the traveling public the world over.

U.S. Informs U.N. Security Council
of Action on Rhodesian Agent

Following is the text of a letter from
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, to Akira Matsui, Presi-
dent of the Security Council.

U.S./U.N. press release 4813 dated February 28

February 28, 1966
Dear Mr. President : On instructions from
my Government, I have the honor to trans-
mit hereunder the text of the letter de-
livered by my Government to Mr.
Henry J. C. Hooper, the registered agent for

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the so-called Rhodesian Information Office
in Washington.

Dear Mr. Hooper: The Department of State notes
that you entered the United States on September 17,
1965, as a nonimmigrant, bearing an A-1 visa in
connection with your assignment at that time as a
diplomatic agent attached to the British Embassy.
The Embassy informed the Department on Novem-
ber 11, 1965 that you had ceased to be a representa-
tive of Her Majesty's Government and were no
longer a member of the Embassy staff.

The Department of State has been advised by the
Department of Justice that you have filed, on behalf
of a so-called "Rhodesian Information Office", a
registration statement pursuant to Section 2 of the
Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938, as amend-
ed. That statement lists your foreign principal as
"Department of External Services, Ministry of In-
formation, Government of Rhodesia."

As you are aware the United States Government
considers Southern Rhodesia to be a territory over
which the United Kingdom has full and exclusive
authority. As Secretary Rusk announced on No-
vember 11, 1965,' this Government in no way recog-
nizes the rebel regime which declared unilaterally
the independence from the United Kingdom and pur-
ported to establish a new state of "Rhodesia".

A diplomatic agent whose official capacity has
terminated has, of course, a reasonable time within
which to wind up his affairs and leave this coun-
try. More than three months have now elapsed
since the termination of your diplomatic assignment
with the British Embassy. Since you are no longer
a representative of Her Majesty's Government and
since the United States does not recognize any in-
dependent state of "Rhodesia", I am obligated to
inform you that you have no official capacity in
this country. The Government of the United States
is, therefore, not prepared to accord to you a con-
tinuing residence on the basis of a purported official
capacity. If you should wish to remain in the
United States as a private citizen, the law permits
you to make application to the Department of Jus-
tice for an adjustment of your status under Section
245 of the Immigration and Nationality Act.
Yours sincerely,

Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs

I shall be pleased if this letter might be
circulated as an official document of the
Security Council.

Please accept, Excellency, the assurances
of my highest consideration.

Arthur J. Goldberg

GATT Contracting Parties
iVIeet at Geneva

The Department of State announced on
March 21 (press release 60) that Henry P.
Brodie, Counselor for Economic Affairs,
U.S. Mission, Geneva, would head the U.S.
delegation to the 23d session of the Con-
tracting Parties to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) meeting at
Geneva, Switzerland, from March 24 to
April 6. The agenda will contain a number
of topics important to United States commer-
cial and economic policy interests, includ-
ing several items on various aspects of the
expansion of trade of less developed
countries.

The GATT is the principal international
forum where the world's trading nations
deal with trade policy problems. Its mem-
bers carry on over 80 percent of world
trade. It is a multilateral trade agreement
which replaced the pre-World War II bi-
lateral trading system. The Kennedy Round
of negotiations for lowering trade barriers
is also taking place within the GATT frame-
work, and during the 23d session the Direc-
tor General will report to the Contracting
Parties on progress in these negotiations.

In recent years the Contracting Parties
have turned increasingly to trading prob-
lems of particular interest to the less de-
veloped countries. On February 8, 1965,
they signed a new part (part IV) of the
General Agreement, designed to provide an
institutional and legal framework for deal-
ing with these problems.^

In a parallel step, GATT established a
new Committee on Trade and Development
(CTD) to watch over implementation of the
new provisions. The Committee's first year
in operation will be reviewed during the
23d session. This will entail a discussion of
the accomplishments of a number of special
working parties and expert groups as-
signed to study in detail various facets of
the special trade problems of less developed

' Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 894.

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 28, 1964, p. 922;
for a U.S. statement of Feb. 8, 1965, see ibid., Mar.
8, 1965, p. 355.

APRIL 11, 1966

589

countries. In addition, the work of the
CTD during the coming year will be mapped
out by the Contracting Parties.

A number of agenda items will deal with
the continuing efforts in the GATT to reduce
and remove import restrictions. These ef-
forts have enjoyed considerable success in
recent years, and the reduction of the re-
maining restrictions continues to be an im-
portant aspect of U.S. commercial policy.

Regional arrangements will also re-
ceive intensive attention at the session.
GATT will examine recently announced plans
for free trade areas between Australia and
New Zealand and between the United King-
dom and Ireland. It will also continue its
examination of the association arrangement
between the European Economic Community
and a number of African nations. The 23d
session will also review annual reports sub-
mitted by a number of older economic inte-
gration bodies, including the EEC, the Euro-
pean Free Trade Area, the Central Ameri-
can Common Market, the Latin American
Free Trade Area, and the Central African
Economic and Customs Union.

Sixty-seven countries are now full con-
tracting parties to the General Agreement.
In addition, a number of other countries
maintain varying degrees of association
with the GATT, and several others have in-
dicated their intentions to seek full mem-
bership during the coming year.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as
those listed below) may be consulted at depository
libraries in the United States. U.N. printed publi-
cations may be purchased from the Sales Section
of the United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Eeports by the Secretary-General on the situation
in the Dominican Republic. S/7032/Add. 9-14.
January 20-February 14, 1966. 12 pp.

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of
India concerning the Indus Waters Treaty, 1960.
S/7095. January 20, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 22 from the representative
of Thailand rejecting Cambodian charges of Thai
aggression. S/7097. January 27, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 24 from the representative
of Thailand charging that Cambodian soldiers had
fired rifles and machineguns across the border
into Thai territory. S/7098. January 24, 1966. 1 p.

Report of the Secretary-General on the observance
of the India-Pakistan cease-fire. S/6710/Add. 17.
January 28, 1966. 5 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of
the United States requesting that "an urgent
meeting of the Security Council be called promptly
to consider the situation in Viet-Nam." S/7105.
January 31, 1966. 3 pp.

Letter dated January 28 from the Secretary-General
to various governments containing a further ap-
peal for voluntary contributions for the financing
of the United Nations Force in Cyprus. S/7107.
February 1, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of
the United Kingdom informing the President of
the Security Council of his Government's imposi-
tion of a total ban on exports to Rhodesia and ex-
tension of the ban on imports to include all im-
ports from Rhodesia. S/7108. February 1, 1966.

1 p.

Letters from representatives of various countries
concerning actions taken in compliance with the
Security Council resolution on Southern Rhodesia:
Argentina, S/7094; Australia, S/7104; Austria,
S/7115; Brazil, S/7122; Bulgaria, S/7121; Bu-
rundi, S/7113; China, S/7130; Colombia, S/7112;
Cyprus, S/7099; Haiti, S/7119; India, S/7092;
Japan, S/7114; Jordan, S/7120; Liberia, S/7124;
New Zealand, S/7093; Nicaragua, S/7139; Paki-
stan, S/7127; Rwanda, S/7135; Ukrainian S.S.R.,
S/7110; Yemen Arab Republic, S/7118. 30 pp.

Letter dated January 31 from the representative of
the Ukrainian S.S.R. concerning his Government's
compliance with the Security Council resolution on
Portuguese territories. S/7111. February 1, 1966.

2 pp.

Letter dated February 3 from the representative of
Ghana transmitting a message from President
Nkrumah concerning the call for Security Council
debate on Viet-Nam. S/7116. February 7, 1966. 1 p.

Letter dated February 7 from representatives of 18
Latin American countries concerning "the so-called
First Solidarity Conference of the Peoples of Asia,
Africa and Latin America," held at Havana on
January 3. S/7123. February 8, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of
Turkey concerning a violation of Turkish airspace
by a Greek aircraft. S/7125. February 9, 1966. 1 p.

Letter dated February 7 from the representative of
Cambodia replying to the letter of the Thai repre-
sentative (S/7098) and transmitting a communi-
que of the Cambodian Ministry of Information
concerning border incidents. S/7126. February 9,
1966. 4 pp.

Letter dated February 8 from the representative of
Turkey concerning a recent communique issued
after consultations between the Government of
Greece and the Greek Cypriot administration on
the question of Cyprus. S/7128. February 9, 1966.
2 pp.

Letters dated February 8 and 14 from the represent-
ative of Greece concerning violations of Greek
airspace by Turkish aircraft. S/7129, February 9,
1966, and S/7137, February 14, 1966. 2 pp.

Letter dated February 11 from the representative of
Greece transmitting the text of the communique
referred to in the letter from the representative of
Turkey (S/7128) and pointing out that this text
"reflects once more the attachment and dedication
of the Greek Government to peace. . . ." S/7136.
February 11, 1966. 2 pp.

590

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

General Assembly

Letter dated January 20 from the representative of
Spain concerning his (Jovemment's desire to reach
a solution of the problem of Gibraltar. A/6242.
January 25, 1966. 3 pp.
Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space:
Report of the Working Group of the Whole.
A/AC.105/30. January 26, 1966, 3 pp.
U Information furnished on objects launched into
orbit or beyond: Letter dated January 24 from
the representative of the United States giving
data for period of November 16-30, 1965, A/AC.
105/INF.123, January 28, 1966, 2 pp.; letter
dated February 8 from the representative of the
U.S.S.R. giving data for period December 10,
1965-Januarv 25, 1966, A/AC.105/INF.124, Feb-
ruary 10, 1966. 4 pp.
Report of the International Law Commission on the
•work of the second part of its 17th session,
Monaco, January 3-28, 1966. A/CN.4/184. Janu-
ary 28, 1966. 16 pp.

Trusteeship Council

Report of the World Health Organization on its In-
vestigation of the Complaints Contained in a
Petition Concerning the Trust Territory of the
Pacific Islands. Note by the Secretary-General.
T/1647. January 14, 1966. 42 pp.

Economic and Social Council

Economic Commission for Africa. Report of the sub-
regional meeting on economic cooperation in East
Africa. E/CN.14/346. December 10, 1965. 89 pp.
Organization and Procedural Arrangements for the
Implementation of Conventions and Recommen-
dations in the Field of Human Rights:
Report of the United Nations Educational, Scien-
tific and Cultural Organization. E/4133. De-
cember 16, 1965. 8 pp.
Report of the Secretary-General. E/4143. January
19, 1966. 41 pp.
Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East.
Activities of the Joint ECAFE/PAO Agriculture
Division in 1965. Report by the Executive Secre-
tary. E/CN.11/717. January 5, 1966. 10 pp.
Utilization of United States Agricultural Surpluses
in the Republic of Korea — Procedures and Prob-
lems. Study prepared by the ECAFE/FAO Agri-
culture Division. E/CN.11/L.144. Bangkok, 1965.
55 pp.
Development of Non-Agricultural Resources. Report
by the Secretary-General. E/4132. January 18,
1966. 46 pp.
Fourth Biennial Report on Water Resources Devel-
opment. E/4138 (Summary). January 31, 1966.
4 pp.
Inflation and Economic Development. Report of the
Secretary-General. E/4152. January 31, 1966. 49
pp.
International Travel and Tourism. Report of the
Secretary-General. E/4145 (Summary). February
1, 1966. 4 pp.
Commission on Human Rights:

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights.
Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.6/452.
January 18, 1966. 13 pp.
Draft Declaration and Draft International Con-
vention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Religious Intolerance. Note by the Secretary-
General. E/CN.4/900. January 27, 1966. 30 pp.
Membership of the Sub-Commission on Prevention

of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
Note by the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/901.
February 3, 1966. 14 pp.
Report of the 18th session of the Sub-Commission
on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection
of Minorities. E/CN.4/903. February 4, 1966.
66 pp.
Commission on the Status of Women:

Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights.
Report of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/896
(E/CN.6/452). January 18, 1966. 13 pp.
United Nations Assistance for the Advancement
of Women. Report of the Secretary-General. E/
CN.6/450. January 26, 1966. 6 pp.
Economic Rights and Opportunities for Women —
Facilities for Assisting Employed Mothers in
Child-Care. Memorandum by the Secretary-
General. E/CN.6/455. January 28, 1966. 21 pp.
Advisory Services in the Field of Human Rights.
Evaluation of the Fellowship Program. Report
of the Secretary-General. E/CN.4/897 (E/
CN.6/453). February 8, 1966. 25 pp.
Social Commission. Proposed Conference of Ministers
Responsible for Social Welfare. Analysis of com-
ments by governments and proposals for further
action. Report by the Secretary-General. E/CN.5/
401. February 10, 1966. 6 pp.
Committee for Industrial Development:

Industrial Technology. Textile Industries in Devel-
oping Countries. Note by the Secretary-General.
E/C.5/101. January 27, 1966. 151 pp.
Industrial Technology. Promotion of Standardiza-
tion in Developing Countries. Note by the Secre-
tary-General. E/C.5/103. January 28, 1966. 53
pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

APRIL 11, 1966

MULTILATERAL

Coffee

International coffee agreement, 1962, with annexes.
Open for signature at United Nations Head-
quarters, New York, September 28 through No-
vember 30, 1962. Entered into force December
27, 1963. TIAS 5505.
Extension to: Hong Kong, February 14, 1966.

Copyright

Universal copyright convention. Done at Geneva
September 6, 1952. Entered into force September
16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11,
1966.

Protocol 1 to the universal copyright convention con-
cerning the application of that convention to
the works of stateless persons and refugees. Done
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.

591

Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11,
1966.

Protocol 2 to the universal copyright convention con-
cerning the application of that convention to the
works of certain international organizations. Done
at Geneva September 6, 1952. Entered into force
September 16, 1955. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11,
1966.

Protocol 3 to the universal copyright convention con-
cerning the effective date of instruments of rati-
fication or acceptance of or accession to that con-
vention. Done at Geneva September 6, 1952. En-
tered into force August 19, 1954. TIAS 3324.
Ratification deposited: Yugoslavia, February 11,
1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of the living
resources of the high seas. Done at Geneva April
29, 1958.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 18,

1966.
Entered into force: March 20, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final pro-
tocol, and convention with final protocol and regu-
lations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. TIAS 5881.

Ratifications deposited: Denmark, December 23,
1965; France, December 21, 1965.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Pakistan (with a declara-
tion), February 24, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac-
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.'
Acceptances : Cuba," December 28, 1965; Switzer-
land, January 14, 1966.
Ratification deposited: Madagascar, January 11,
1966.

BILATERAL

letta February 25 and March 4, 1966.
into force March 4, 1966.

Entered

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Agreement on exchanges in the scientific, technical,
educational, cultural and other fields in 1966—67.
Signed at Washington March 19, 1966. Entered
into force March 19, 1966.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

U.S. Consulate Established
In Bechuanaland

The Department of State announced on
March 23 (press release 65) that a U.S. con-
sulate is being established in the British
protectorate of Bechuanaland. Charles H.
Fletcher, who has been appointed the first
U.S. consul to be stationed in that country,
is scheduled to arrive at Gaberones, the
capital, during the first half of April to
assume responsibilities for U.S.-Bechuana-
land relations. Bechuanaland on September
30 will become the independent republic of
Botswana.

From July 1964 to date, U.S. interests in
Bechuanaland have been handled by the U.S.
consulate at Mbabane, Swaziland, which has
had responsibility for U.S. interests in all
three of the former U.K. High Commission
Territories of Bechuanaland, Basutoland, and
Swaziland.

Ceylon

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Colombo March 12, 1966. Entered into
force March 12, 1966.

Malta

Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of January 15, 1966 (TIAS 5956), relating to the
deployment of United States naval repair vessels
to Malta. Effected by exchange of notes at Val-

' Not in force.

" Subject to reservations.

Confirmations

The Senate on March 17 confirmed the nomina-
tion of Dixon Donnelley to be an Assistant Secre-
tary of State. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 62 dated March 22.)

Appointments

James Wadsworth Symington as Chief of Protocol,
effective March 22. (For biographic details, see

592

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Department of State press release 63 dated March
22.)

Robert J. McCloskey to be Deputy Assistant Sec-
retary for Public Affairs, effective March 25. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press
release 68 dated March 25.)

Designations

Philip B. Heymann as Acting Administrator for
the Bureau of Security and Consular Affairs, effec-
tive March 10. (For biographic details, see Depart-
ment of State press release 54 dated March 16.)

PUBLICATIONS

Department Releases 1966 Edition
of "Treaties in Force"

Press release 53 dated March 15

The Department of State on March 15 released
for publication Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties
and Other International Agreements of the United
States in Force on January 1, 1966.

This is a collection showing the bilateral rela-
tions of the United States with 139 states or entities
and the multilateral rights and obligations of the
contracting parties with respect to more than 380
treaties and agreements on 74 subjects. The 1966
edition includes some 300 new treaties and agree-
ments, including the king crab fishery agreement
with the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the
claims agreement with Yugoslavia, the agreement
concerning automotive products with Canada, and
the desalination agreement between the Interna-
tional Atomic Energy Agency, Mexico, and the
United States. Also included in this edition are the
new cultural exchanges agreements with France,
the United Kingdom, Peru, and Uruguay.

The bilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by country or other political entity, and
the multilateral treaties and other agreements are
arranged by subject with names of countries which
have become parties. Date of signature, date of
entry into force for the United States, and citations
to texts are furnished for each agreement.

The publication provides information concerning
treaty relations with numerous newly independent
states, indicating wherever possible the provisions
of their constitutions and independence arrange-
ments regarding assumption of treaty obligations.

Information on current treaty actions, supple-
menting the information contained in Treaties in
Force, is published weekly in the Department of
State Bulletin.

The 1966 edition of Treaties in Force (322 pp.;
Department of State publication 8042) is for sale
by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 20402, for
$1.50.

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20102. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from, the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States.

Booklet for the information of men and women who
wish to enter the Officer Corps of the Foreign Serv-
ice of the United States to serve with the Department
of State or the U.S. Information Agency. Pub. 7924.
Department and Foreign Service Series 132. 32 pp.,
illus.

Challenges and Choices in U.S. Trade Policy. These
two addresses by Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, are re-
printed from the Department of State Bulletin of
November 8 and 15. In his addresses Mr. Solomon
describes the challenges facing U.S. trade policy and
the choices that must be made in the immediate
years ahead to meet them. Pub. 8002. General For-
eign Policy Series 809. 15 pp. 10^.

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt from President Johnson's
state of the Union message of January 12, 1966.
Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy Series 211. 17 pp.
15flS.

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951 (Battle Act). Pub.
8019. General Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40^.

Universal Postal Union. Constitution, convention,
and related documents, with Other Governments,
revising the Universal Postal Convention of Octo-
ber 3, 1957. Signed at Vienna July 10, 1964. Date of
entry into force January 1, 1966. TIAS 5881. 325
pp. $1.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Yugo-
slavia, amending the agreement of November 28,
1962, as amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Belgrade August 19 and November 3, 1965. Entered
into force November 3, 1965. TIAS 5903. 2 pp. 5^.

Defense — Winter Maintenance of Haines Road.

Agreement with Canada. Exchange of notes — Signed
at Ottawa November 17, 1965. Entered into force
November 17, 1965. TIAS 5904. 2 pp. 5*.

Air Service — Lease of Equipment. Agreement vrith
the Federal Republic of Germany, extending the
agreement of August 2, 1955, as extended. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Bonn/Bad Godesberg and Bonn

APRIL 11, 1966

593

July 30 and August 25, 1965. Entered into force
August 25, 1965. Operative August 2, 1965. TIAS
5905. 4 pp. 5(f.

Defense — Continental Air Defense. Establishntent
of Back-Up Interceptor Control System (BUIC).

Agreement with Canada, supplementing and amend-
ing tiie aarreement of September 27, 1961, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Ottawa
November 24, 1965. Entered into force November 24,
1965. TIAS 5907. 2 pp. 5<t.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Tunisia,
amending the agreement of February 17, 1965. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Tunis November 29,
1965. Entered into force November 29, 1965. TIAS
5908. 3 pp. 5^

Atomic Energy — Cooperation for Civil Uses. Agree-
ment with Israel, amending the agreement of July 12,
1955, as amended. Signed at Washington April 2,
1965. Entered into force May 13, 1965. TIAS 5909.
2 pp. 5<t.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Yugoslavia — Signed at Belgrade
November 22, 1965. Entered into force November 22,
1965. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5910. 7 pp. 10<t.

Defense — Ground-to-Air Communications Facilities
in Northern Canada. Agreement with Canada. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Ottawa December 1,
1965. Entered into force December 1, 1965. TIAS
5911. 6 pp. 5(f.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with India,
amending the agreement of September 30, 1964, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at New Delhi
December 10, 1965. Entered into force December 10,
1965. TIAS 5913. 3 pp. 54.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Austria Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Austria and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna
June 15 and July 28, 1964. Entered into force Decem-
ber 13, 1965. TIAS 5914. 10 pp. 10<f.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Portugal Cooperation

Agreement. Agreement with Portugal and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency. Signed at Vienna
February 24, 1965. Entered into force December 15,
1965. TIAS 5915. 20 pp. 15(f.

Extradition — Continued Application to Kenya of the
United States-United Kingdom Treaty of Decem-
ber 22, 1931. Agreement with Kenya. Exchange of
notes — -Dated at Nairobi May 14 and August 19,
1965. Entered into force August 19, 1965. TIAS 5916.
2 pp. 54.

Trade — Exports of Cotton Velveteen Fabrics From
Italy to the United States. Agreement with Italy,
amending the agreement of July 6, 1962. Exchange
of notes — Dated at Washington November 16, 1965.
Entered into force November 16, 1965. TIAS 5917.
2 pp. 5^.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Kenya, amending the agreement of
December 7, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Nairobi December 1, 1965. Entered into
force December 1, 1965. TIAS 5919. 2 pp. 5^.

Double Taxation — Taxes on Income. Protocol with the
Federal Republic of Germany, modifying the con-
vention of July 22, 1954. Signed at Bonn Septem-
ber 17, 1965. Entered into force December 27, 1965.
With memorandum of understanding signed at Bonn
October 19, 1965. TIAS 5920. 34 pp. 15(>.

Exchange of Official Publications. Agreement with
the Philippines, amending the agreement of April 12
and June 7, 1948. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Manila December 2 and 20, 1965. Entered into force
December 20, 1965. TIAS 5921. 3 pp. 5<*.

Defense — Support for German Armed Forces in the
United States in Emergencies. Agreement with the
Federal Republic of Germany. Sigmed at Bonn Octo-
ber 21, 1965, and at Washington December 18, 1965.
Entered into force December 18, 1965. TIAS 5922. 5
pp. 54.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Greece,
amending the agreement of October 22, 1962. Ex-
change of notes — Signed at Athens October 22 and
23, 1965. Entered into force October 23, 1965. Opera-
tive October 22, 1965. TIAS 5923. 2 pp. 5*.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUllETtN VOL. IIV, NO. 1398 PUBLICATION 8063 APRIL 11, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a
■weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment as well as special articles on vari-
OTis phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents. U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office. Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic ?10,
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

694

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX April 11, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1398

American Republics. Secretary Rusk's News
Conference of March 25 557

Asia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
March 25 557

Bechuanaland. U.S. Consulate Established in
Bechuanaland 592

China

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March
25 557

Congress

Confirmations (Donnelley) 592

President Signs Supplemental Military Au-
thorization Bill 578

Department and Foreign Service

Appointments (McCloskey, Symington) . . . 592

Confirmations (Donnelley) 592

Designations (Heymann) 593

U.S. Consulate Established in Bechuanaland . 592

Disarmament. Secretary Rusk's News Confer-
ence of March 25 557

Economic Affairs. The United States and the
Warsaw Convention (Lowenfeld) 580

Foreign Aid

President Urges Careful Review of Interna-
tional Agency Budgets 576

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March
25 657

France. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of March 25 557

Germany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of March 25 557

International Organizations and Conferences.
GATT Contracting Parties Meet at Geneva . 589

Military Affairs. President Signs Supplemen-
tal Military Authorization Bill 578

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Our View of NATO (Johnson) 554

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March
25 557

Passports. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of March 25 557

Presidential Documents

Our View of NATO 554

President Gursel Returns to Turkey .... 558

President Signs Supplemental Military Au-
thorization Bill 578

President Urges Careful Review of Interna-
tional Agency Budgets 576

Protocol. Appointments (Symington) .... 592

Public Affairs

Department To Hold Conference for Editors
and Broadcasters 579

Donnelley confirmed as Assistant Secretary . 592

McCloskey appointed Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary 592

Publications

Department Releases 1966 Edition of "Treaties
in Force" 593

Recent Releases 593

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Informs U.N. Security
Council of Action on Rhodesian Agent (Gold-
berg) 588

Treaty Information

Current Actions 591

Department Releases 1966 Edition of "Treaties

in Force" 593

The United States and the Warsaw Convention
(Lowenfeld) 580

Turkey. President Gursel Returns to Turkey

(Johnson) 558

U.S.S.R. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of

March 25 557

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 590

Hard Work Ahead for the United Nations

(Siseo) 571

President Urges Careful Review of Interna-
tional Agency Budgets 576

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565
U.S. Informs U.N. Security Council of Action

on Rhodesian Agent (Goldberg) 588

Viet-Nam

President Signs Supplemental Military Author-
ization Bill 578

Secretary Rusk Appears on "Face the Nation" 565

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of March 25 557

Name Index

Donnelley, Dixon 592

Goldberg, Arthur J 588

Hejrman, Philip B 593

Johnson, President .... 554, 558, 576, 578

Lowenfeld, Andreas F 580

McCloskey, Robert J 592

Rusk, Secretary 557, 565

Sisco, Joseph J 571

Symington, James Wadsworth 592

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 21-27

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 21 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
53 of March 15 and 55 of March 18.

No. Date Subject

60 3/21 GATT Contracting Parties meet

at Geneva (rewrite).

61 3/21 Rusk: "Face the Nation."

*62 3/22 Donnelley sworn in as Assistant
Secretary for Public Affairs
(biographic details).

*63 3/22 Symington sworn in as Chief of
Protocol (biographic details).

*64 3/22 Supplementary protocol with
United Kingdom for avoidance
of double taxation (text).
65 3/23 Stationing of consul in Bechuana-
land (rewrite).

*66 3/22 Meeting of voluntary agencies on
refugees and immigration.

♦67 3/23 Program for visit of Prime Min-
ister of India.

*68 3/25 McCloskey appointed Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Public Af-
fairs (biographic details).

t69 3/25 U.S. reply to French aide memoire
on NATO relations.

70 3/25 National foreign policy conference

for editors and broadcasters
(rewrite).

71 3/25 Rusk: news conference of March

25.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

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Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country aboi
the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that addrea

"Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression,
is not conquest ; it is not empire ; it is not foreign bases ; it is not domination. It is, simply pt
just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1399

April 18, 1966

PRESIDENT JOHNSON AND PRIME MINISTER GANDHI OF INDIA

CONFER AT WASHINGTON

Exchanges of Remarks, Joint Commurdque, and the President's Message

to Congress on Food Aid to India 598

THE QUEST FOR PEACE
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 608

NDER SECRETARY BALL DISCUSSES U.S. VIEWS ON VIET-NAM AND NATO

Transcript of Le Monde Interview 613

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR 1967
Statement by Secretary Rusk 628

For index see inside back cover

President Johnson and Prime IVIinister Gandlii of India
Confer at Wasliington

I

I

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India
made an official visit to the United States
March 27-April 1. She met with President
Johnson and other top Government officials
at Washington March 28-29. Following are
an exchange of greetings between President
Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi on
March 28, an exchange of toasts at a dinner
at the White Hoicse that evening, and the
text of a joint communique released on
March 29, together with the text of Presi-
dent Johnson's message to the Congress on
March SO outlining actions to he taken to
alleviate India's food crisis.

EXCHANGE OF GREETINGS

White House press release dated March 23 ; as-delivered texts

President Johnson

Madam Prime Minister, we are very glad
that you are here. I feel very privileged to
welcome you as the leader of our sister de-
mocracy. I have even greater pleasure in wel-
coming you as a good and gracious friend.

Someone has said that all pleasure is
edged with sadness. Only 2 months ago we
looked forward to receiving your gallant
predecessor here in our Capital in Washing-
ton. We shared your grief in his sudden
and untimely death. ^

We are reminded that three American
Presidents — Abraham Lincoln, Woodrow
Wilson, and Franklin D. Roosevelt — were
similarly stricken while engaged in that

' For statement by President Johnson on the death
of Prime Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri, see Bul-
letin of Jan. 31, 1966, p. 156.

I

most demanding of all public tasks, the task
of working the hard passage from conflict
back to peace. It is good to know that this
task which Prime Minister Shastri had so
ably begun is now in your strong and
sympathetic hands.

Our thoughts also go back to the visits of
another great Indian leader, those in 1949,
1956, and 1961 of your great father. Few
have ever held a larger place in the hearts
of the American people, and few ever will.
We like to think, Mrs. Gandhi, that he be-
longed to us, too.

My countrymen and yours will be asking
what we shall talk about during these next
few days. Perhaps, with your permission, I
may say just a word about that now.

I think they can be reasonably sure that
we will not be wasting any of our time. Our
concern will be with very practical ques-
tions. I look forward to getting your
thoughts, Madam Prime Minister, on how
peace can be obtained or made more secure,
in Asia and throughout the world. I shall
seek your counsel on the problems of South-
east Asia, where India, under the Geneva
accords, has for so long played such a special .
role.

I will speak of my deep desire, which I
know you share, for the continued improve-
ment in relations between India and her
great sister nation, Pakistan. The United
States values deeply the friendship of both
India and Pakistan. Nothing, we know, is
more painful or more costly to all concerned
than a falling out between one's friends.

I shall look forward, Mrs. Gandhi, to get-
ting a better understanding of the urgent

598

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I economic and social problems with which
your Government is now concerned. I will
welcome that frankness and candor and de-
tail that always marks conversations be-
:tween good friends.

Economic stability and political tran-
quillity depend on how well we accomplish
commonplace tasks: the production of food,
its transportation, the supply of fertilizer,
family planning, electricity for farm and
village, the realization of economic growth
I and opportunity.

I We shall be concerned with these essen-
tials. The solution of these problems lies,
we know, with the Indian Government, but
the United States believes in backing the
efforts of those who are determined to solve
their own problems. We know, Madam Prime
Minister, that India under your leadership
will have such determination.

We want to learn how we can best help
you and how our help can be used to the
very best effect. Your people and ours
share the conviction that however difficult
the problems there are none that a strong
and a vigorous democracy cannot solve.

You have long been aware. Madam Prime
Minister, of the fascination that Indian cul-
ture holds for Americans. This extends from
the Hindu Epics to the modern Indian novel-
ists, and from the painters of the Ajanta Cave
and the Akbar Court to your brilliant film
producers of the present day. I venture to
think that there is much about the United
States that your students find equally in-
teresting. Before our conversations end, I
hope to be able to announce an imaginative
new step to encourage and to facilitate these
common interests.

Well, so much for our work in the days
ahead. I hope there will be time for some-
thing more, for Mrs. Johnson and our
daughters and I look forward to renewing
an old friendship, to matching, if possible,
in warmth and spirit your own hospitality
in the years past.

Let me say once more how much we
appreciate your making this long journey
at this busy time to visit us here in the
United States. I think I speak for every

American when I say that we are very
proud and very honored to have you today
as our guest in this country.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Ex-
cellencies, ladies and gentlemen: I thank
you, Mr. President, for your warm words of
welcome and for this gracious reception to
me. I have had the privilege and the great
pleasure of visiting America many times.
Each visit has been an education, an enlarg-
ing of the circle of friends, and a deepening
of understanding.

I come today as a friend, and I bring with
me the greetings and good will of the Indian
people.

Mr. President, you have visited India
with Mrs. Johnson. We have very pleasant
and happy memories of that occasion. You
are known in India not only as a great
President of a distant country but as a man
of high idealism and a warmhearted friend
who has come to our help in a time of need.

You have mentioned your interest in
peace, Mr. President. We in India are
greatly interested and concerned about
peace, for to us it is not only a question of
an ideal but one of very practical necessity
to give us time and opportunity to deal with
those other problems and questions which
you have mentioned; that is, to be able to
develop our country, to give opportunity to
our own people to stand on their feet, to
deal with the many obstacles and difficul-
ties which a longstanding poverty has im-
posed on us.

I am grateful to you for your kind invi-
tation. As I meet you again, I recall your
moving words on the theme of poverty.
Declaring unconditional war on the pockets
of poverty in your own country, you have
said : ^

. . . we want to give people more opportunity.
. . . They want education and training. They
want a job and a wage. . . . They want their chil-

" For text of the President's remarks at Cumber-
land, Md., May 7, 1964, see Public Papers of the
Presidents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 196S-6i, vol. I,
p. 626.

APRIL 18, 1966

599

dren to escape the poverty which has afflicted
them.

May I say, Mr. President, that important
as these words are for the American people,
they cannot mean as much to them as they
do to us in India who have so long been
denied the very basic decencies of life. We
know that in our own war on poverty we
have a noble friend, one who believes that
the distant sufferer is his own brother.

India and the United States cannot and
should not take each other for granted or
allow their relations to drift. As friends
committed to common ideals, they can to-
gether make this world of ours a better
place in which to live.

Mr. President, may I express my gratitude
not only for the welcome you have given
me but for the kind words which you have
said for my father and our late Prime
Minister, Mr. Shastri. I know how greatly
Mr. Shastri was looking forward to his visit
here. I hope that I shall be able to fulfill
what he had in mind and what he had
hoped to do.

Mr. President, may I greet you and the
American people on behalf of the people of
India.

EXCHANGE OF TOASTS

White House press release dated March 28 : as-delivered texts

President Johnson

Madam Prime Minister: I have heard —
and do in part believe — that Queen Victoria,
speaking in a different age and under dif-
ferent circumstances, once gave the follow-
ing estimate of two of her prime ministers :

"Mr. Gladstone," said she, "talks to me as
if I were a public meeting — but Mr. Disraeli
speaks to me as if I were a woman."

Tonight I am very pleased to tell our
friends who have assembled here that we
have spoken to our gracious visitor not only
as a woman with an understanding heart
but also as a leader with a sense of vision
and a builder with a valued view of faith.

India is a vast and varied land. The roots
of freedom and justice run deep in the

Indian past. Its culture was full and strong
centuries before the dawn of the Christian
era.

The world has listened to the wisdom of
India spoken through the voice of an elo-
quent leader. Once, many years ago, he
said:

Democracy demands discipline, tolerance and mu-
tual regard. Freedom demands respect for the free-
dom of others. In a democracy changes are made
by mutual discussion and persuasion and not by
violent means.

These were the words of Prime Minister
Nehru. This was the belief of Prime Min-
ister Shastri. Their fidelity to freedom's
cause created, with Mahatma Gandhi, a new
nation — conceived in struggle, grown strong
in sacrifice.

Now, tonight, Prime Minister Gandhi
comes to this house and to this table, the
custodian of her nation's hope and the stew-
ard of her nation's dreams.

Today we here in the White House talked
about the work and the sacrifice that is
needed to make those dreams a modern
reality. Together we discussed the practical
ways that India and the United States can
help to build a world where life is hopeful
and where life is happier for all peoples, as
well as the peoples of all lands.

Prime Minister Gandhi's goal is to weld
the Indian nation into a land where the
words of its founding fathers come true and
their views of its future are real.

There is much that binds India and the
United States together. Both our nations
have the deep-felt obligation to the basic
dignity of man — and the conviction that
people can solve their problems by free
choice far better than they can by any ar-
rangement of force. There is in India and
this country the strong tradition of free-
dom that just will never die.

I remember very clearly tonight my visit
to India in 1961.

I remember what I saw and what I felt
and what I heard throughout that great
land. The thousands of students along the
roads and in the cities, each of them quite
impatient to know and to learn. I saw the

600

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

teachers and the scholars — the public serv-
ants— and the people, searching, yearning,
discovering, hoping. And I think of our
I young people here and what we have done
in the last year to achieve a new revolution
in education — beyond the wildest dreams of
I just a decade ago.

Now, how can we bring into closer union
the spirit and the courage of both our
countries?

I have given a good deal of thought to
that in the last few months, and tonight I
would propose that we mark this historic
visit of Prime Minister Gandhi with a last-
ing endowment for the benefit of inquiring
young minds in the Indian nation.

So may we. Madam Prime Minister, with
the permission of your Government and the
American Congress, launch a new and imag-
inative venture? We shall call it an Indo-
American Foundation. I would propose that
this foundation be established in India, and
that it be endowed with $300 million in
Indian currency owned by the United
States. Other foundations all over the world
will cooperate, I am sure, with an enterprise
of this kind.

I would suggest that this foundation be
organized as an independent institution,
with the distinguished citizens of both our
countries on its board of directors. I would
propose that the new foundation be given
a broad charter to promote progress in all
fields of learning: to advance science, to
encourage research, to develop new teaching
techniques on the farms and in the fac-
tories, to stimulate, if you please, new ways
to meet old problems.

The journey to our future is over a very
long and a very winding road. Every mile
will be challenged by doubt. But together,
Madam Prime Minister, we must avoid the
detours that intrude on our safe journey
toward a time when, as your father prom-
ised, life will be better for all of our people.
I So, ladies and gentlemen, let us honor
those who are so welcome here tonight. Let
us ask you to join in honoring the Chief of
State whose wise and gifted Prime Minister
we have enjoyed so much today and that

we welcome so warmly this evening. I
should like to ask those of you who are
assembled here to join me now in raising
your glass in a toast to the great President
of India.

Prime Minister Gandhi

Mr. President, Mrs. Johnson, Your Excel-
lencies, ladies and gentlemen: Your words,
Mr. President, were exceedingly moving.
You have spoken of India and her wide
variety. We who live there are naturally
deeply conscious of it, while at the same
time we are fully aware of the underlying
and the basic unity which binds together
all our people.

You have quoted some words of my
father. I should like to quote something
which you yourself have said. You said, Mr.
President: "Reality rarely matches dreams,
but only dreams give nobility to purpose." '

In the United States you have matched
your dreams in many ways. Yet you still
seek, and rightly, to offer the American
people a better and a more purposeful life.
You have called this idea the "Great So-
ciety." In India we also have our dreams,
which may seem trite to you who sit here
because they appear so simple — food barely
sufficient to keep one from hunger, shelter
to keep out the wind and the rain, medicine
and education by which to restore the faith
and the hope of our nearly 500 million
people.

But everything in life is relative. There
is an old proverb in my country. A person
says, "I complained that I had no shoes
until I met a man who had no feet."

Mahatma Gandhi said once, and it is
something which my father often repeated,
that we in India had to work to wipe the
tear from every eye. That, of course, is a
big task, and I doubt if it can be done in
any country. And yet we have been trying
to do that for 18 long years. Two centuries
of subjugation cannot be washed away so

' For text of the President's remarks at Detroit,
Mich., Sept. 7, 1964, see Public Papers of the Presi-
dents, Lyndon B. Johnson, 1963-6i, vol. II, p. 1049.

APRIL 18, 1966

601

easily. It takes time. It takes work. It
takes courage.

India is changing, as no doubt your ad-
visers who have been to India have told you,
Mr. President. Nowhere in the world can
the contrast be so striking. We have not
only different levels of development be-
tween the different states but even within
each state. We have often several centuries
existing side by side. We have some of the
greatest irrigation works in the world, and
yet, in parts of our State of Rajasthan,
desert families store precious water under
lock and key. During a tour of some of
these border areas a couple of months or so
ago, I myself experienced the great hard-
ship of doing without water and measuring
the miles from well to well.

Some 12 million or more bullock carts still
churn the dust of our village roads. Yet in
other parts of India, we are building three
nuclear powerplants.

Average agricultural yields are low, and
at the same time there are areas where we
obtain sugar cane yields that compare fa-
vorably with those in Hawaii or in Java.

A third of the illiterate people in the
world are in India. Yet we are steadily
conquering illiteracy.

In our State of Maharashtra, village after
village vies to achieve total literacy. Parents
learn from their children so that the honor
of the village is upheld. In Madras people
have banded together to improve their
schools. They have given 100 million rupees
beyond what the Government spends on their
schools.

In the Punjab, little workshops make
lathes and pumps that have revolutionized
the countryside.

The seeming inconsistencies and conflicts
of India are legion. The setbacks, and we
have had many, are heartbreaking. Yet the
signs of change are clear and constantly
growing.

Sometimes critics point to an example of
success and say, "This proves nothing. This
is a mere drop in the ocean of Indian
poverty." How wrong this is, for every

602

success reinforces the prospect of further
success. It shows that success is possible.
The example and the confidence it generates
radiates outward.

This, Mr. President, is really our major
problem. Years ago when we visited the
villages to persuade people to try for a
better life, they turned to us and said,
"There can be no better life. God wills it
this way. This is our lot and we have to
suffer it." Today not a single voice will be
heard like this. There is only one demand:
that we do want a better life. We want
better schools and more schools. We want
bigger hospitals and more hospitals and all
the other signs of progress and signs of
raising the standards of living.

This I think is a very big achievement.

You talked, sir, of democracy. May I tell
you one more story which I shared with the
Vice President a short while ago. It hap-
pened during our first elections. I had gone
to speak in a village where just the day
before the leader of an opposition party had
spoken. When my speech was ended, an
elderly gentleman got up from the audience
and said, "We have listened very carefully
to what you have said, but just the day be-
fore somebody came" — so-and-so came — "and
he said the exact opposite. Now, which of
you was telling the truth?"

Now, this you can understand is an ex-
tremely tricky question to ask a public
speaker. I said, "Well, I think that what I
said was the truth, but I have no doubt that
the gentleman thought that what he said
was the truth. The whole point of democ-
racy is that everybody should say whatever
he thinks is the truth, and you, the people,
have to really judge which is the correct
version and which is the right version or the
right thing for you."

Well, this was rather a difficult explana-
tion for them, and they said, "Now, you tell
us, do you belong to the Congress Party?"
I said, "I do." "Is your party in power? Is
it forming the government?" I said, "Yes,
it is." "Then what business have you to
send somebody here who tells us incorrect

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

things. It is your business to keep them
away."

This was one of the stops where I was
supposed to stay only 10 minutes, but I
stayed for 2 hours trying to argue out the
whole point about elections, freedom of
expression, and so on. I can't say that I got
any further at the end of 2 hours.

But now, years later, we find that we
have got further. Nobody today in India
would put such a question. They know that
the different parties have their points of
view, and these points of view are put be-
fore the people, and the people judge, not
always rightly, but I think they try to judge
rightly. Certainly, from election to election
they have shown a great maturity.

India very definitely is on the move. Mr.
President, the United States has given
India valuable assistance in our struggle
against poverty, against hunger, against
ignorance, and against disease. We are
grateful for this act of friendship. But we
also know that our own "Great Society"
must and can only rest securely on the
quality and the extent of our own effort.

This effort we are determined to make.
We owe it to our friends, and even more
so we owe it to ourselves.

Nevertheless, I believe that it is of the
greatest importance, to use your own words,
to bring into closer union the spirit and
courage of both our countries. I welcome
your intention to set up an Indo-American
Foundation, which will give tangible shape
and form to this union.

The present-day world offers the possibil-
ity of bringing together one people with
another. The young men and women of
your Peace Corps are well known and well
loved in our country. Every endeavor to
sustain and enlarge this people-to-people
partnership is a good effort and is welcome.

Friendship with America is not a new
thing for us. Those of us in India who have
been involved with the struggle for freedom
have knowm from our earliest days your own
struggle here. We have been taught the
words of your leaders, of your past great

APRIL 18, 1966

Presidents, and, above all, we were linked
in friendship because of the friendship
which President Roosevelt showed us and the
understanding which he showed during
some of the most difficult days of our
independence struggle. I have no doubt it
was also this understanding and friendly
advice given to the British Government
which facilitated and accelerated our own
freedom.

But there again, the major effort had to
be on our own, and this is what we want
today: that we should bear our burden, as
indeed we are doing, but that a little bit of
help should come from friends who consider
it worthwhile to lighten the burden.

Because, Mr. President, India's problems
today are her own, but they are also the
world's problems. India has a position in
Asia which is an explosive position. India,
if it is stable, united, democratic, I think
can serve a great purpose. If India is not
stable, or if there is chaos, if India fails, I
think it is a failure of the whole democratic
system. It is a failure of many of the values
which you and I both hold dear.

That is why, Mr. President, I welcome
your words and I welcome this meeting with
you, which has been most valuable to me.

I invite you, ladies and gentlemen, to join
with me in drinking a toast to the President
and Mrs. Johnson, our friends, the American
people, and the Great Society, not just for
America but for all who dream of it, for
all who struggle to transform those dreams
into reality.

JOINT COMMUNIQUE

white House press release dated March 29

At the invitation of President Johnson,
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, Prime Minister of the
Republic of India, has been on an official
visit to the United States of America. Dur-
ing her visit, Prime Minister Gandhi met
the President and members of the United
States Government.

The President and the Prime Minister dis-

603

cussed India's efforts for the improved well-
being of its people. Prime Minister Gandhi
emphasized the high priority which India
attaches to economic development. President
Johnson assured Prime Minister Gandhi of
the deep interest of the Government and
the people of the United States in partici-
pating in international efforts, particularly
those under the leadership of the Interna-
tional Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment, to assist India in its own massive
efforts to raise the living standards of its
people within the framework of a parlia-
mentary democracy.

The President and the Prime Minister
discussed India's emergency food grain re-
quirements resulting from last year's un-
precedented drought. They agreed that the
problem should be viewed not in isolation
but in the context of an incipient world-
wide food deficit, a challenge to humanity
as a whole that merits the sustained and
serious attention of all nations.

The Prime Minister described measures
which the Government of India is taking to
achieve self-sufficiency in the nation's food
production. The President assured her that,
Congress willing, the United States will
continue to participate generously in the
international effort to alleviate India's im-
mediate food deficit problem. The President
told Mrs. Gandhi that he intended to send
a special message to Congress shortly to
seek its endorsement of such U.S. assist-
ance. Both of them agreed that further
participation of other countries in meeting
India's emergency food needs is also highly
desirable.

Prime Minister Gandhi welcomed the
President's proposal for the establishment
of an Indo-U.S. Foundation to promote prog-
ress in all fields of learning. The President
and the Prime Minister look to this coopera-
tive endeavour to develop new teaching
techniques in farm and factory, to advance
science and to increase research.

President Johnson and Prime Minister
Gandhi agreed that following the Tashkent
Declaration there had already been con-

604

siderable progress toward reestablishing
the conditions of peace in the subcontinent
and that it is necessary that this process
continue in order that the peoples of both
countries may concentrate their energies
once again on the urgent tasks of national
development. They also agreed on the im-
portance of continuing to give full support
to the United Nations objectives of refrain-
ing from the use of force and of resolving
conflicts between nations through peaceful
means.

During their discussions, President John-
son and Prime Minister Gandhi reviewed
recent developments in south and south-
east Asia in the context of the universal
desire of men and women everywhere to
achieve peace that respects liberty, dignity,
and the pursuit of a better way of life. In
this connection the President explained the
policies the United States is pursuing to help
the people of the Republic of Vietnam to
defend their freedom and to reconstruct
their war-torn society. The Prime Minister
explained the continuing interest and efforts
of her country in bringing about a just and
peaceful solution of this problem.

Prime Minister Gandhi affirmed the de-
termination of her nation to defend the
freedom and territorial integrity of India
and explained the challenge presented to it
by the aggressive policies of the People's
Republic of China. The Prime Minister and
the President agreed that such aggressive
policies pose a threat to peace, particularly
in Asia.

The President and the Prime Minister
consider that the visit has reaffirmed the
strong bonds of friendship between the
United States and India, based upon a
shared commitment to constitutional democ-
racy and a common revolutionary heritage.
Their highly informative, frank, and
friendly discussions have contributed to a
valuable personal understanding between
their two countries and their two peoples.

Prime Minister Gandhi extended a warm
invitation to President Johnson to visit
India. The President expressed his grati-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tude for the invitation and his hope that
he could visit India again.

MESSAGE TO CONGRESS

White House press release dated March 30

To the Congress of the United States:

In recent months I have been watching
with deep concern the emerging problem of
world food supply. And I have been espe-
cially concerned with the prospect for India.
During this past week I have discussed the
Indian food problem with the Prime Minister
of India, who has been our welcome and
distinguished guest here in Washington. I
am persuaded that we may stand at this mo-
ment on the threshold of a great tragedy.
The facts are simple; their implications are
grave. India faces an unprecedented
drought. Unless the world responds, India
faces famine.

Strong efforts by the Indian government,
and our help, have so far averted famine.
But in the absence of cooperative and ener-
getic action by the United States, by other
nations and by India herself, some millions
of people will suffer needlessly before the
next crop is harvested. This, in our day and
age, must not happen. Can we let it be said
that man, who can travel into space and ex-
plore the stars, cannot feed his own?

Because widespread famine must not and
cannot be allowed to happen, I am today
placing the facts fully before the Congress.
I am asking the endorsement of the Con-
gress for a program that is small neither in
magnitude nor concept. I am asking the
Congress, and the American people, to join
with me in an appeal to the conscience of all
nations that can render help.

I invite any information that the Congress
can supply. Our people will welcome any
judgments the Congress can provide. The
executive branch, this nation and the world
will take appropriate note and give proper
attention to any contributions in counsel
and advice that Congressional debate may
produce.

If we all rally to this task, the suffering
can be limited. A sister democracy will not
suffer the terrible strains which famine im-
poses on free government.

Nor is this all. The Indians are a proud
and self-respecting people. So are their
leaders. The natural disaster which they
now face is not of their making. They have
not asked our help needlessly; they deeply
prefer to help themselves. The Indian gov-
ernment has sound plans for strengthening
its agricultural economy and its economic
system. These steps will help India help her-
self. They will prevent a recurrence of this
disaster. I also propose action through the
World Bank and the Agency for Interna-
tional Development to support this strong
initiative by the Government of India.

The Crisis

Since independence India has done much
to increase her output of agricultural prod-
ucts. Her agriculture has not been neglected.
From 1950 to 1965 she increased food produc-
tion 75 percent. This is a creditable achieve-
ment. But India has had to contend with a
continuing and relentless increase in popu-
lation. Her people have also consumed more
from a higher income. Accordingly, she has
remained heavily dependent on our help.
Last year we provided, under Public Law 480,
more than 6 million tons of wheat, equal to
more than two-fifths of our own consump-
tion. To keep this supply moving, the equiv-
alent of two fully loaded liberty ships had
to put in at an Indian port every day of the
year.

Now India has been the victim of merciless
natural disaster. Nothing is so important
for the Indian farmer as the annual season
of heavy rain — the monsoon. Last year,
over large parts of India, the rains did not
come. Crops could not be planted, or the
young plants withered and died in the
fields. Agricultural output, which needed to
increase, was drastically reduced. Not since
our own dustbowl years of the nineteen-
thirties has there been a greater agricultural
disaster.

APRIL 18, 1966

605

Indian leaders have rightly turned to the
world for help. Pope Paul VI has endorsed
their plea. So has the World Council of
Churches. So has the Secretary General of
the United Nations. So has the Director
General of the Food and Agriculture Or-
ganization. And so, in this message, does
the President of the United States.

I have said that effective action will not
be cheap. India's need is for at least 11 to
12 million tons of imported grain from
January to December 1966.

Food in this world is no longer easy to
find.

But find it we must.

Here is what I propose.

The Program

Last fiscal year we supplied six million
tons of food grain to India. So far in this
fiscal year, I have allotted 6.5 million tons
of grain for shipment to India — more than
the total of six million tons which we had
planned to provide as a continuation of past
arrangements. It is even more necessary in
this emergency to keep the pipelines full
and flowing and to insure that there is no
congestion of rail or sea transport. India,
furthermore, estimates an additional six to
seven million tons of food grain will be
necessary through next December beyond
what has already been committed or ex-
pected.

I propose that the United States provide
three and one-half million tons of that re-
quirement, with the remaining three and a
half million tons coming from those nations
which have either the food to offer or the
means to buy food. I invite those nations to
match the amount which we will supply.
For example, I am delighted to be informed
that Canada is prepared to provide a million
tons of wheat and flour to India.

Every agriculturally advanced country
can, by close scrutiny of its available sup-
plies, make a substantial contribution. I
ask that every government seek to supply
the maximum it can spare — and then a little
more. I ask those industrial countries which
cannot send food to supply a generous equiv-

alent in fertilizer, or in shipping, or in funds
for the purchase of these requisites. All
know the Indian balance of payments is
badly overburdened. Food and other ma-
terials should be supplied against payment
in rupees, which is our practice, or as a gift.

It is not our nature to drive a hard mathe-
matical bargain where hunger is involved.
Children will not know that they suffered
hunger because American assistance was not
matched. We will expect and press for the
most energetic and compassionate action by
all countries of all political faiths. But if
their response is insufficient, and if we
must provide more, before we stand by and
watch children starve, we will do so. I,
therefore, ask your endorsement for this
emergency action.

I have spoken mostly of bread-grains.
The Prime Minister of India spoke also of
other commodities which can meet part of
the requirements or replace part of the
need. In response to her needs, I propose
that we allot up to 200,000 tons of com, up
to 150 million pounds of vegetable oils, and
up to 125 million pounds of milk powder to
India. The vegetable oil and milk powder are
especially needed for supplementing the
diets of Indian children.

In addition, India's own exchange re-
sources can be released for food and ferti-
lizer purchases if we make substantial ship-
ments of cotton and tobacco. I am suggest-
ing the allotment for this purpose of 325-
700,000 bales of cotton and 2-4 million
pounds of tobacco. Both of these commodi-
ties we have in relative abundance.

I request prompt Congressional endorse-
ment of this action.

I urge, also, the strong and warmhearted
and generous support of this program by the
American people.

And I urge the strong and generous re-
sponse of governments and people the world
around.

India is a good and deserving friend. Let
it never be said that "bread should be so
dear, and flesh and blood so cheap" that we
turned in indifference from her bitter need.

606

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

J

Further Action

The Indian people want to be self-
supporting in their food supply.

Their government has adopted a far-
reaching program to increase fertilizer pro-
duction, improve water and soil manage-
ment, provide rural credit, improve plant
protection and control food loss. These es-
sentials must be accompanied by a strong
training and education program.

I have directed the Secretary of Agricul-
ture, in cooperation with AID, to consult
with the Indian government to ascertain if
there are ways and means by which we can
strengthen this effort. We have long ex-
perience with short courses, extension train-
ing and similar programs. If they can be
used, I feel certain that American agricul-
tural experts would respond to an appeal to
serve in India as a part of an Agricultural
Training Corps or through an expanded
Peace Corps. Many of our younger men and
women would especially welcome the op-
portunity.

I am determined that in our assistance to
the Indian government we not be narrowly
limited by what has been done in the past.
Let us not be afraid of our own enthusiasm.
Let us be willing to experiment.

The Indian government believes that there
can be no effective solution of the Indian
food problem that does not include popu-
lation control. The choice is now between a
comprehensive and humane program for
limiting births and the brutal curb that is
imposed by famine. As Mrs. Gandhi told
me, the Indian government is making vigor-
ous efforts on this front.

Following long and careful planning and
after discussions in recent days with Prime
Minister Gandhi, I have proposed the estab-
lishment of the Indo-U.S. Foundation. This
Foundation will be financed by rupees, sur-
plus to our need, now on deposit in India.

It will be governed by distinguished citizens
of both countries. It will be a vigorous and
imaginative enterprise designed to give new
stimulus to education and scientific research
in India. There is no field where, I hope, this
stimulus will be greater than in the field of
agriculture and agricultural development.

Finally, in these last days, the Prime
Minister and I have talked about the pros-
pects for the Indian economy. The threat of
war with China and the unhappy conflict
with Pakistan seriously interrupted India's
economic progress. Steps had to be taken
to protect dwindling exchange resources.
These also had a strangling effect on the
economy. Indian leaders are determined now
to put their economy again on the upward
path. Extensive discussions have been held
with the World Bank, which heads the con-
sortium of aid-giving countries.

The United States interferes neither in
the internal politics nor the internal eco-
nomic structure of other countries. The
record of the last fifteen years is a sufficient
proof that we ask only for results. We are
naturally concerned with results — with in-
suring that our aid be used in the context
of strong and energetic policies calculated to
produce the most rapid possible economic
development.

We believe Indian plans now under dis-
cussion show high promise. We are im-
pressed by the vigor and determination of
the Indian economic leadership. As their
plans are implemented, we look forward to
providing economic assistance on a scale
that is related to the great needs of our sis-
ter democracy.

An India free from want and deprivation
will, as Mahatma Gandhi himself once pre-
dicted, "be a mighty force for the good of
mankind."

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House,
March 30, 1966.

APRIL 18, 1966

607

"// the fears and agonies of the war in Viet-Nam can lead
us another step toward collectivizing the international police
responsibility and closer to a wider realism about the im-
possibility of all wars, even its tragedy may be redeemed.
It can be the prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to a
world freed of the obsessive r-isks of annihilation."

The Quest for Peace

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

The tradition for vigorous and healthy
discussion in our country is an old one —
with its roots in the history of our own
Revolution, if not in the history of Western
civilization itself. Justice Brandeis, speak-
ing of those who won our independence,
once said:

They believe that freedom to think as you will and
to speak as you think are means indispensable to
the discovery and spread of political truth ; that
without free speech and assembly discussion would
be futile; that with them, discussion affords ordi-
narily adequate protection against the dissemination
of noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to
freedom is an inert people; that public discussion
is a political duty; and that this should be a funda-
mental principle of the American Government.

Those of you who have studied the classics
will find a striking similarity, a deliberate
one, between the words of Justice Brandeis
and those attributed to Pericles when he
said: ". . . we Athenians . . . instead of
looking on discussion as a stumbling block
in the way of action, we think it an indis-
pensable preliminary to any wise action at
all."

' Address made at Charter Day ceremonies at the
University of California, Berkeley, Calif., on Mar.
25 (U.S./U.N. press release 4825 dated Mar. 24).

It is in this spirit that Americans today
— on the campus, in our newspapers, on
television, in various citizen forums, and in
the Congress — should debate the vital as-
pirations of American foreign policy — the
aspirations directly related to our quest for
peace.

It is in this spirit that today I wish to
discuss with you our search for the just
resolution of the problems of Viet-Nam and
Communist China, upon which the success
of our quest so intimately depends.

I speak, too — and trust that all will listen
— in the spirit of Cromwell's admonition:
"My brethren ... I beseech you, bethink
you that you may be mistaken."

The Alternatives to War

It is now a cliche to say that in the age
of nuclear destruction the world can no
longer afford or accept war as a means of
settling its inevitable disputes. We have not
stopped dead at the cliche but have com-
mitted both urgency of thought and na-
tional purpose to working out the alterna-
tives to war.

We know, or should know, some of the
methods of dealing with disputes which do
not work. The big war, the holy war, the

608

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ideological war, the war of unconditional
surrender — all these are simply wars of ex-
termination— but extermination for every-
body.

On the other hand, retreat before violence
only encourages more violence. Even the
more sophisticated forms of "retreat" — for
instance, spheres of influence that amount
to spheres of domination — hardly work
better over the long run since they are
based on an assumption that has been re-
peatedly proved false in the 20th century:
that peace can come if only small nations
do what large neighbors tell them.

In the modern world they feel they have
their own rights. Besides, most small na-
tions have more than one big neighbor.
Suppose, as in the prewar Balkans of 1914,
the signals get crossed? In any case, every-
one is a neighbor on a planet the astronauts
and cosmonauts can encircle in 90 minutes.

What are the alternatives to war? We
know them from our domestic community.
They are practiced every day in societies
which are wide enough to span continents.
We abandon the right of private redressing
of wrongs; instead, we hand over our dis-
putes and conflicts to the impartial action
and scrutiny of the law.

We set up all the needed instruments of
mediation, arbitration, negotiation, and ad-
judication. We seek agreement or acquies-
cence by compromise, adjustment, and im-
partial decision. We do not permit settle-
ment by force, and we employ an independ-
ent police power both to check violence and
to guarantee the peaceful resolution of dis-
puted issues.

To say that men do not know how to be
rid of armed conflict is to deny generations
of development in domestic legality. Our
trouble lies not in ignorance of the tools but
in the habit and pride of national sover-
eignty which prevent us from adapting and
using the tools in an international society.
Just so did men long resist abandoning the
"right" to fight duels or vendettas.

Such principles are all very well. But
between the idea and the reality falls the
shadow — the shadow of Viet-Nam. Can this

war be fitted into any wider concept of the
search for better methods of peacekeeping?
I think it can. No thinking American would
support it if it could not. Let me begin by
saying what this war is not.

It is not emphatically a war to establish
an American "imperialism" or an American
"sphere of influence" in Asia. What exclu-
sive interests have we there? Investment?
trade? settlement? None.

It is not a war to threaten or frustrate
the legitimate interests of the Chinese people
— though it seeks to discourage violence and
aggression and play some part in persuading
them that the imperialist world, once known
to the Central Kingdom, is dead and will
not be resurrected.

It is in part, if you like, to persuade them
that the fact that large parts of Asia —
including all Southeast Asia and the hill
states of the Himalayas — once, supposedly,
paid the emperors tribute is no reason why
they should revert to the status of vassal
states in the 20th century.

Again, this war is not a holy war against
communism as an ideology. It does not seek
unconditional surrender — from North Viet-
Nam or anyone else. It does not seek to
deny any segment of South Vietnamese
opinion its part in peacefully establishing a
stable regime.

It does, however, preclude retreat before
two things — first, the program of the Viet
Cong, strongly controlled by the North, to
impose its will by violence; and second, its
claim to be the "sole genuine representa-
tive" of a people, the vast majority of whom
have rejected this claim.

This, I believe, is the background against
which to consider in positive terms what
this war is about. It is, I suggest, another
step in a limited operation of a policing
type — an operation designed to check vio-
lence as a means to settle international dis-
putes.

The violence is no less total because it has
been largely organized as a guerrilla opera-
tion. Guerrilla warfare — entering villages
by stealth, killing the head man, kidnaping

APRIL 18, 1966

609

the young men, breaking up the families —
is, in a real sense, the most total of wars,
short of nuclear destruction.

Our Aims in Viet-Nam

To attempt to check it, to establish the
principle that this kind of violence, fanned
and fed from outside, is as impermissible
a means for settling international disputes
as any other form of violence, is the first
and indeed chief aim of American military
action.

The second, once violence stops, is equally
compatible with what I would call the legal
and peaceful alternative to international
violence. It is to grant the people of South
Viet-Nam the time, the security, and the
opportunity to express their own prefer-
ences as free as is humanly possible from
coercion of any form.

In the period after World War II we have
witnessed — indeed, we can take pride in
having helped to bring about — the remark-
able phenomenon of a genuinely free expres-
sion of will among the vanquished peoples
of Japan and Germany while they were still
subject to military occupation by the vic-
tors. We have also seen Western colonialism
— notably the British and the French — end
again and again by the advent to power of
the anticolonialists in truly free elections.

What has been done before can be done
again. And if, given the opportunity to ex-
press their preferences free of coercion, the
South Vietnamese people vote for the Viet
Cong, or for a coalition, or for any other
particular outcome, we must be and will be
prepared to accept their judgment. I say
frankly that we do not expect that these
people will make such a choice, but that is
their business.

But if you ask me whether in view of
Asia's colonial past, in view of the far-
reaching differences between America and
mainland China, in view of the fact that
America is vast, powerful. Western, capital-
ist, and wealthy — if you ask me whether
ideally America is the most suitable, the

I

most acceptable policeman, I can only say
probably not, and we do not wish to be.

Indeed, it is probably true that they
would prefer that a regional organization of
Asian countries themselves or the entire
world community play the policeman's role.
My own profound dedication to the United
Nations and my deep interest in its growth
spring from the belief that it is the motive
center of an international society wherein
law and order are not based upon power
alone, where the police function is a collec-
tive responsibility. I

Role of the International Community

In the case of Viet-Nam, nothing would
be more heartening and welcome than to
have the international community — acting
through the United Nations — accept the re-
sponsibility for the most immediate of our
aims — that of checking the resort to vio-
lence against South Viet-Nam.

Similarly, we would welcome it if the in-
ternational community were to accept the
responsibility for creating in Viet-Nam the
peaceful alternative to violence — the respon-
sibility of policing reaffirmed and revital-
ized provisions of the Geneva agreements, of
insuring by means of effective patrol and
supervision that the people of South Viet-
Nam are given the security and freedom
necessary to make their own choices con-
cerning their government and their future.

But it would be unrealistic not to recog-
nize that the membership of the United
Nations is not yet prepared to accept the
first responsibility. And one should recall
that the only occasion on which the mem-
bership accepted an equivalent responsibil-
ity was in Korea in 1950, when the Soviet
Union was temporarily absent from the
Security Council and when the membership
did not yet include a host of newly inde-
pendent countries who — for reasons we, as
one of the earliest nonalined countries in
modern history, cannot fail to understand —
hesitate to take sides in issues where the
great powers strongly disagree.

Indeed, our recent experience in the Se-

610

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

curity Council showed that the members of
the Council found it impossible, in the face
of the intransigence of a few of the mem-
bers, to accept the much more modest
responsibility of formally calling upon the
parties involved in Viet-Nam to reach a
settlement through negotiations, rather
than fighting, in a forum of their own
choosing.

But to say that the membership of the
United Nations is not yet prepared to accept
the responsibility for checking the use of
force against South Viet-Nam is not to say
that the responsibility can be shirked or
ignored by those committed to the rule of
law — and we do not intend to do so.

It seems clear that, for the immediate
future, only a few members of the inter-
national community are willing to join in
the onerous and costly task of again demon-
strating with arms that the use of force is
not a tolerable method to settle interna-
tional grievances or satisfy national ambi-
tions.

This is a responsibility that we and
others cannot escape if we are to build an
enduring peace. It is a responsibility well
described over a century ago by John Stuart
Mill:

The doctrine of non-intervention (he wrote), to
be a leg-itimate principle of morality, must be ac-
cepted by all governments. The despots must con-
sent to be bound by it as well as the free states.
Unless they do, the profession of it by free countries
comes to this miserable issue, that the wrong side
may help the wrong, but the right side must not
help the right. Intervention to enforce non-inter-
vention is always rightful, always moral, if not al-
ways prudent. Though it be a mistake to give
freedom to a people who do not value the boon, it
cannot but be right to insist that if they do value
it, they shall not be hindered from the pursuit of it
by foreign coercion.

But we must not forget — and I assure you
we have not — ^that our interest will be
served by encouraging the international
community as a whole to accept some, if not
all, the responsibility for seeing to it that,
once this intolerable use of force is aban-
doned, the people of South Viet-Nam are.

through impartial and effective policing
and supervision, guaranteed the physical
security necessary to permit a free choice
concerning their own government and their
own future.

Acceptance of such responsibilities by the
international community would hasten the
withdrawal of American and other foreign
forces from Viet-Nam. For then the with-
drawal would be the prelude not to the con-
doning of violence and the spread of anarchy
but part of a new attempt to insure that
political decisions in our inescapably inter-
national society are based upon law, order,
and consent — not upon force supplied and
directed from outside.

This is where all the nations and all the
governments have their part to play. What-
ever their devotion to national sovereignty
— as in France; however their sovereignty
is wrapped up in ideology — as in the Soviet
Union; however deep their dedication to
independent nonalinement — as in most
emerging nations; all have to face a pro-
founder, antecedent condition to sovereignty
and independence, and that is survival itself.

If the fears and agonies of the war in
Viet-Nam can lead us another step toward
collectivizing the international police re-
sponsibility and closer to a wider realism
about the impossibility of all wars, even its
tragedy may be redeemed. It can be the
prelude, if not to a golden age, at least to
a world freed of the obsessive risk of anni-
hilation.

The Question of Communist China

I turn now to the second issue which
looms large in our international horizon —
the question of Communist China. It is not
unrelated to the question of Viet-Nam. In-
deed, part of the difficulty in any review of
our Chinese policy is the role being played
by Peking in support of violence and terror
and war — all in the guise of so-called "wars
of national liberation" — not only in South-
east Asia but elsewhere in Asia, in Africa,
in Europe, and in some parts of the Ameri-
cas.

APRIL 18, 1966

611

The doctrine is one of war, to be sure, but
"national liberation" in the lexicon of Com-
munist China is a spurious label to cover up
subversion and aggression.

The recent setbacks Communist China has
experienced in virtually every area of the
globe, however, show that most nations are
aware of the threats that current Commu-
nist Chinese policy poses to their national
existence and to world peace.

But not even these setbacks seem to be
swaying Mao Tse-tung and his fellow lead-
ers, and I strongly question if any diplo-
matic action open to the United States
would have more effect in convincing the
present regime to mend its ways and change
its belief about remaking Asia in their
image.

What about some of the proposals con-
cerning Communist China that are now
being discussed?

The Communist Chinese leaders have set
a price for entering the U.N. And what a
price it is! It includes not only the expul-
sion from the U.N. of the Republic of China
and other unnamed "imperialist lackeys" of
the United States but the complete reorga-
nization of the U.N., the withdrawal of a
General Assembly resolution condemning
Peking as an aggressor in the Korean con-
flict, and the branding of the United States
as an aggressor there.

This is a price that, in my opinion, even
most nations who support Red China's mem-
bership will not pay.

The unreality reflected in Peking's atti-
tude toward U.N. membership is repeated
in its attitude toward diplomatic recogni-
tion.

The evidence can be found in the bitter
experiences of those nations that have
turned to recognition of Peking and have
had to turn embarrassed backs on Taiwan
and suffer continuing rebuffs and humilia-
tion at the hands of Communist China.

What the current discussion ultimately
must face up to is that it is not so much a
matter of whether we should recognize
Communist China or support its admission
to the U.N. Rather it is a question of

whether the United States is prepared to
agree that the 12 million people of Taiwan
are to be handed over to Peking against
their will.

I do not agree and, I am convinced, most
Americans do not agree.

It is true, of course, that the figure of
12 million is not very imposing when stacked
up against the three-quarters of a billion
people of mainland China. But morality in
international relations cannot be decided by
figures. Principle must remain our guide.

If the United States and Communist
China are to normalize relations, it can only
be done through a common commitment to
a rule of law which adjures international
violence.

When the time comes — as we all hope it
will — when the leaders of Communist China
are ready to subscribe to this principle in
full measure and to end the isolation that
now cuts them off from the rest of the
world, the United States will not be back-
ward in welcoming and applauding the
change.

World Rule of Law

For we stand ready to live in peace with
any and all countries regardless of ideology.
All we ask is that they join in seeking com-
mon understandings, common undertakings,
and the peaceful resolution of all differ-
ences. That is the overall policy that guides
our relations with Communist and non-
Communist nations alike. I do not believe
it requires reappraisal.

It merits consideration by all men and
nations who seek to live in peace.

Our commitment to the still-distant goal
of a world rule of law makes it all the more
imperative that we redouble our creative
energies to the use of the United Nations
as an effective instrument to build and to
keep the peace.

We realize that it cannot yet provide the
final answer, nor can it yet guarantee the
peace in full. But that is more the fault of
its members than of the U.N. I am opti-
mistic, however, that it will in time realize
in full the grand dream of Franklin Delano

612

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Roosevelt of a world free from want and
free from fear. For, regardless of our dif-
ferences, I do not believe mankind will let
its noblest work be extinguished in a puff
of time.

Though the days before us are dark still
and the threats many, I refer you to yet
another somber time and the words spoken
then by Winston Churchill, whose statue is
to be unveiled in Washington next month:

These are not dark days, these are great days
. . . (he said) and we must all thank God we have
been allowed, each of us according to our stations,
to play a part in making these days memorable in
the history of our race.

In our one world today the history of the
human race can only be memorable if man-
kind succeeds in achieving the ancient and
precious goal of a universal and lasting
peace. In this quest we cannot — we dare
not — fail.

Under Secretary Ball Discusses
U.S. Views on Viet-Nam and NATO

Follotoing is the transcript of an interview
with Under Secretary Ball at Paris on
March 30 by Andre Fontaine of Le Monde,
which was published in that paper on
March 31.

Press release 73 dated March 31, revised

Q. Mr. Secretary, the initial reason for
your visit to Paris rvas to make a statement
before the NATO Council on the war in
Viet-Nam. Are there any new develop-
ments that need to be brought to the atten-
tion of the Council?

A. We decided last year to have meetings
at regular intervals in order to review cur-
rent problems. We had one of those meet-
ings this morning.

Q. Did you appeal for increased Allied as-
sistance ?

A. No, but several countries informed us
through their representatives at this meet-
ing that they intended to allocate funds for
hospitals or relief missions.

Q. Hoio do you explain the small amount
of such participation especially if you com-
pare it with what happened during the
Korean war?

A. Actually, this assistance is not as small
as is believed. If the plans now under dis-
cussion are effectively carried out, there
will be, between Korea, Australia, New Zea-
land, and the Philippines, a total of consider-
ably more than 50,000 foreign troops at our
side in Viet-Nam. As for the attitude of the
Europeans, obviously we regret it, but it is
definitely a very different situation from the
one that occurred in Korea, when we were
acting under the United Nations flag.

Q. What are your principal objections to
the policy of the French Government?

A. I am not absolutely sure that I under-
stand very well what that policy is. This is
a matter that I discussed a year and a half
ago with General de Gaulle and, at that time,
he proposed a neutralization of South Viet-
Nam. Insofar as that concerns the United
States, we have never asked anything other
than a neutral Viet-Nam, which means a
country whose people would be free to de-
cide for themselves as they see fit and not
be compelled to accept a regime imposed by
force. If by neutrality you mean simply a
country that does not enter into any al-
liance, we have no objection to that.

Q. In case you should win, what kind
of Viet-Nam do you visualize?

A. A country in which the government
and society would be strong enough to
carry out their task in accordance with the
freely expressed will of the people.

Q. Do you really believe that that is
possible ?

A. The Vietnamese have already demon-
strated a strong determination to be inde-
pendent.

Q. How long do you think that will take?

A. I do not expect a prompt decision. We
are pursuing limited objectives, and we are
seeking to attain them, while limiting mili-

APRIL 18, 1966

613

tary operations as much as possible. This
cannot be done in 24 hours.

Q. Aren't you afraid that the public will
one day have enough of this war?

A. The largely predominant feeling is that
we are facing a situation with which we
must grapple as long as that is necessary.
The opposition to the war is noisy but rather
limited. In my opinion, the support of our
cause is stronger than it was before.

Q. Do you not recall that following the
Korean war, the American leaders were de-
termined to avoid any land war in Asia and
that President Eisenhower was elected
largely on his promise to put an end to the
impasse ?

A. Times have changed, and President
Eisenhower has given his full support to
President Johnson's policy.

France and NATO

Q. To come now to NATO, do you accept
France's position that our country could
remain in the alliance after leaving its mili-
tary structures ?

A. The organization of the North At-
lantic Treaty and its integrated commands
are the means that make it possible for the
alliance to operate. If France applies the
policy it has just announced, the deterrent
effort exercised by the alliance will be
diminished. Moreover, if the defense of
France is to depend on arrangements that
provide for a more or less loose liaison be-
tween the separate military commands, it is
the very security of France that will be
diminished.

Q. Do you see any chance that France
vnll really resume its place in NATO ?

A. Certainly, and we shall always remain
ready to welcome it, as President Johnson
has said.i The decisions that France has
just taken sadden and worry the United
States deeply.

Q. Do you really think that there is any
possibility of cooperation between two

' Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 554.

armies when one is based on the idea of the
flexible response and the other on the doc-
trine of massive reprisals?

A. There are two different problems here.
The problem of the strategic theory to be
applied must be debated among generals,
and it is the practical arrangements for
close cooperation that will most effectively
permit a solution. The other problem con-
cerns what you call "a cooperation between
armies without an integrated command";
this cooperation has never been effectively
assured by mere liaison between the armies.
During the War of 1914-1918 it took 4 years
to create a combined command under the
orders of Marshal Foch. Only then was
considerable progress made. In 1939 and
1940 the general-staff liaison between the
Allies was tragically inadequate — and the
French have good reason to know this bet-
ter than anyone. It was only when the Allies
succeeded in establishing an integrated com-
mand, placed under the orders of General
Eisenhower, that the war was won.

Q. Do you think that the influence of
Germany in the alliance will be increased by
France's withdrawal from NATO?

A. No one wants any country — including
the United States — to occupy a dominant
position. What we are seeking is collective
action. It would be very regrettable if the
present crisis were to lead to a strengthen-
ing of national positions.

Q. Do you think that Germany will be
admitted to the Standing Group?

A. I would not venture to make any fore-
cast regarding that point.

Sharing of Nuclear Responsibilities

Q. Do you think that the time has come
for a new examination of the problem of the
nuclear responsibilities of the multilateral
force ?

A. The sharing of nuclear responsibilities
is a very big problem that has not yet been
resolved. The creation of the multilateral
force is not its only possible solution. The
British have proposed establishing an At-

614

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lantic nuclear force, which is now being
studied by the United States, the Federal
Republic of Germany, and other member
countries of NATO.

Q. Hasn't President Johnson himself de-
cided to set aside the plan for a multinu-
clear force ?

A. At the beginning of 1965 the political
situation was such in Germany and else-
where that it would have been useless to act
I too quickly. Besides, the United States was
not attempting to impose its ideas, but
rather to fill a European need. However,
the preparation of a collective plan that
would permit the nations not in possession
of nuclear weapons to participate in the
decisions on nuclear power has not yet been
finished, and that is a task which still is very
important. The question is under study in
the so-called McNamara committee. I do
not wish to say any more, but I am certain
that we must find a means of enabling the
nations without atomic weapons to partici-
pate in the decisions on nuclear power.

Q. What do you make of the Soviet ob-
jections?

A. The Soviets object to the Atlantic pact
itself and, consequently, to anything that
may strengthen or consolidate it.

Q. Are you in favor of maintaining French
troops in Germany?

I A. That is a problem that should first be
examined by Germany itself. It is of particu-
lar concern to Great Britain also and the
United States, since these two countries
also maintain troops in Germany; and, of
course, it concerns all the members of the
alliance. In my opinion, the fundamental

I question is what agreements will be made
regarding the command. The United States
will not take a position on this problem until
after holding more extensive consultations.

Q. Among the reasons for the French de-
cision, mention has often been made of the
desire not to let our country be drawn into
a tvar which it did not want, and in this
connection the mutter of sending para-

chutists to the Congo from the base in
Evreaux has been cited.

A. In the event of war, the French forces
would be assigned to an integrated com-
mand only if the French Government de-
cided to do so under article V of the Atlantic
Pact. The French decision actually repre-
sents a step backward toward the restora-
tion of the old system of national rivalries.
As for the Congo affair, I can tell you that
the French Government had been notified
and raised no objection. I can tell you
categorically that before the takeoff of the
American planes charged with dropping
those parachutists, my Government asked
the French Government whether it had any
objection, and the Quai d'Orsay gave us its
full assurance that it had no objection.

In this connection I should like to make
some remarks that I consider very impor-
tant.

What "Integration" Means

I am astounded to hear certain persons
here suggest that France's participation in
the integrated command could involve that
country in a war against its will. It would
be very useful if you would explain to your
readers what integration actually means,
for it seems to me that there is a great deal
of confusion about it on this side of the
ocean.

In NATO there is no integration of the
operational command in peacetime except
with regard to certain air-defense units
which, owing to the nature of things, must
be capable of instantly retaliating against
an attack. With this one exception, no
French soldier can be given an order to
make the slightest move by anyone but the
French command. Even in case of war,
troops would be placed under the opera-
tional command of SHAPE only if the
French Government "deemed it necessary,"
under article V of the North Atlantic
Treaty. Consequently, for the NATO com-
mand to be able to dispose of French forces,
a national decision, made by the French
Government, would be necessary.

APRIL 18, 1966

615

Without any doubt, if France is still
bound by the North Atlantic Treaty, as the
French Government states that it wishes to
be, France would be under the obligation of
remaining at the side of its allies in the
event that one of the members of NATO
should be the victim of armed aggression.
This obligation results from the treaty it-
self and not from France's remaining in
NATO or from its participation in the inte-
grated command. The two things have
nothing in common.

U.S. Position Defined

Permit me to define our position clearly.
What causes us the most concern about the
measure that France proposes to take is
that it seems to constitute a step backward
toward a disastrous past. Since the war, we
have constantly tried to contribute toward
creating a state of affairs that would make
it possible to eliminate the causes of con-
flict— and the principal cause of past wars
has been the effort made by each European
nation to insure its supremacy over the
others. Hence, we are reminded of 1914
when we witness acts that seem to have
been inspired by the old feelings of national
rivalry, the old, outmoded concepts of sov-
ereignty.

As two Presidents of the United States
have said, what we desire is a partnership
between equals, from one shore of the At-
lantic to the other. We have been ready for
a long time to create a state of affairs in
which the political decisions and responsi-
bilities are completely shared on an equal
basis, and we are anxious to attain it.

We wish to create a true association based
on equality of treatment, and we have a feel-
ing that we will not be able to obtain it fully
if Europe does not take the course of unity.

We can, to be sure, practice equality of
treatment in our negotiations with the Euro-
pean countries, but there is an aspect of
equality that does not depend either on the
will or the acts of the United States —
namely, equality of dimensions and re-
sources. Now, this difficulty itself would be

surmounted by the establishment of a united
Europe. With resources that would be very
nearly the same as those of the United
States, a unified Europe would be, in every
respect, our equal. But this equality will
never be achieved by the fragmentation of
Europe, which would thus see its power and
importance reduced.

The unity of Europe is, of course, an af-
fair that concerns the Europeans and not
the Americans, but we see in it the means
of realizing a true association between equal
countries. I wish to repeat once again that
domination is the thing that is farthest
from our minds. It is association that we
want.

Permit me to make another point very
clear. We believe in consultations, and I
am always surprised to hear that we do not
wish to consult anyone.

When we tried, in the past, to hold con-
sultation in the NATO Council, the French
Government now in power stated that it did
not consider the Council an appropriate
forum for consultations concerning the prob-
lems arising outside the area with which the
treaty is concerned.

Permit me to make another remark. We
regret that the French Government consid-
ered itself justified in acting unilaterally
and has not presented its views on the re-
form of NATO to all the members of the or-
ganization, with a view to a common dis-
cussion. During the last 3 years we have re-
peatedly stated to the French Government
that we would welcome any proposals that
it might make to us. We have stated that
we did not consider NATO to be a perfect
or unalterable organization and that the
times and conditions had changed, which
fact could make changes in the form or
structure of the organization necessary.

We have been told repeatedly that pro-
posals would be communicated to us later,
and we have stated very clearly that the
other members of NATO and we ourselves
would, together, give them most careful
study. But the French Government has
apparently chosen to act unilaterally.

616

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

United States and France Exchange
Views on Atlantic Alliance

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 25

Press release 69 dated March 25

The United States Government acknowl-
edges receipt of the aide memoire of the
French Government, dated March 11, 1966,^
regarding French views as to the military
relations of France with the other members
of the Atlantic Alliance, and in particular
with the United States.

The aide memoire appears to be an indi-
cation by the French Government of a pro-
posed general course of future action by the
French Government, rather than an invita-
tion to discuss specific requests. The state-
ment is not precise with regard to the
measures that the French Government con-
templates, nor does it indicate when and
how it expects any such proposals to be
given effect. The United States Govern-
ment will also await clarification of the posi-
tion of the French Government with regard
to the bilateral agreements between France
and the United States, having in mind the
terms of those agreements as they relate to
the North Atlantic Treaty.

Since the bilateral agreements provide
for military facilities utilized by the United
States in fulfillment of its NATO commit-
ments, the United States Government will,
of course, also consult with the other NATO
Allies on this subject.

FRENCH AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 10

Official translation

For years, the French Government has noted on
numerous occasions, both publicly and in talks with
the Allied Governments, that it considered that the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization no longer cor-
responded, insofar as it is concerned, to the condi-
tions prevailing in the world at present and which
are fundamentally different from those of 1949 and
the following years.

' The French aide memoire, which is dated Mar.
10, was delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on
Mar. 11.

Indeed, the threats hanging over the Western
World, in particular in Europe, which had motivated
the conclusion of the treaty, have changed in na-
ture. They no longer have the immediate and
menacing character they formerly had. Moreover,
the countries of Europe have re-established their
economy and therefore have regained resources. In
particular, France has equipped itself with an
atomic armament whose very nature excludes its
being integrated. In the third place, the nuclear
balance between the Soviet Union and the United
States, replacing the monopoly held by the United
States, has changed the general conditions of de-
fense of the West. Lastly, it is a fact that Europe
is no longer the center of international crises. The
center has shifted elsewhere, especially to Asia,
where the countries of the Atlantic Alliance as a
whole are obviously not involved.

This evolution does not by any means lead the
French Government to call into question the treaty
signed at Washington on April 4, 1949. In other
words, barring events in the coming years that
might come to alter fundamentally the relations be-
tween the East and the West, it does not intend to
avail itself, in 1969, of the provisions of Article 13
of the treaty and considers that the Alliance must
continue as long as it appears necessary.

This being unequivocally affirmed, the problem
of the organization arises, that is to say, of all the
agreements, arrangements, and decisions made after
the signature of the treaty, whether multilateral or
bilateral in form. The French Government con-
siders that this organization no longer meets what
it considers to be the essential requirements.

Undoubtedly, the possibility of undertaking ne-
gotiations to modify by common accord the arrange-
ments in force could have been entertained. The
French Government would have been happy to pro-
pose this if it had had reason to think that such
negotiations could lead to the result that it itself
has in view. Unfortunately, everything indicates
that such an undertaking would be doomed to fail-
ure, inasmuch as France's partners appear to be, or
declare that they are, all in favor of maintaining
the status quo, if not of strengthening everything
that, from the French viewpoint, seems to be now
and henceforth unacceptable.

Therefore, France is led to draw, insofar as it is
concerned, the necessary conclusions, that is to say,
to take in its own behalf the measures which seem
to it to be essential and which are, in its view, in
no way incompatible vrith its participation in the
Alliance or with its participation, should the oc-
casion arise, in military operations at the side of
its allies.

Already in the past, the French Government has
taken measures of this nature with respect to its
naval forces assigned to NATO, either in the Medi-
terranean or in the Atlantic. It is now a question
of its ground and air forces stationed in Germany,

APRIL 18, 1966

617

which are assigned to the Allied Command in Europe.
France intends to put an end to such assignment.
This decision will involve its simultaneous with-
drawal from the two integrated commands to which
these forces are attached, and in which it partici-
pates within the framework of NATO, that is to
say, the Supreme Allied Command Europe and the
Central Europe Command, and, hence, the transfer
outside of French territory of the headquarters of
these two commands.

The application of all of these measures naturally
raises a number of problems which the French
Government is ready, as of now, to discuss with its
allies and, in particular, with the United States.
It will be advisable to examine the liaisons that
should be established between the French Command
and the NATO Commands, as well as to determine
the conditions under which the French forces, par-
ticularly in Germany, would participate in time of
war, if Article 5 of the Washington treaty were
to be invoked, in joint military actions, both with
respect to the command and to the operations
themselves. This is based on the assumption in
particular that the French ground and air forces
now stationed in Germany will be maintained there
under the conventions of October 23, 1954, which
the French Government is, for its part, disposed
to do.

It will be advisable, furthermore, to consider the
problems that may arise for France regarding the
Military Committee and the Standing Group, in-
cluding the problem of liaisons to be established, if
necessary, between those bodies and the French
Command.

These are, in broad outline, the measures the
Government of Prance envisages, insofar as it is
concerned, in order to adapt to the new conditions
the terms of its participation in the Atlantic Alli-
ance. It is ready to enter into discussions on the
practical terms of application of these measures and
hopes that adequate arrangements can be made by
common accord among all the allies.

The multilateral problems are not, however, the
only ones facing the United States and France. The
two countries have indeed concluded in the past a
series of bilateral agreements which are still in
force and which are the following:

Depots of Deols — La Martinerie.
Making available to the American forces certain
airfields and installations in France.
Supply lines.

American headquarters at Saint-Germain.
Pipeline.

The French Government considers that these agree-
ments as a whole no longer correspond to present
conditions, which lead it to resume in French ter-
ritory the complete exercise of its sovereignty, in
other words, no longer to agree to foreign units,
installations, or bases in France being under the

control in any respect of authorities other than
French authorities. It is ready to study and, if
possible, to settle with the Government of the United
States the practical problems resulting therefrom.

The French Government is prepared, furthermore,
to enter into talks on the military facilities that
could be made available to the Government of the
United States in French territory in the event of a
conflict in which both countries would participate
under the Atlantic Alliance. Such facilities could
be the subject of an agreement to be concluded be-
tween the two Governments.

World Meteorological Day

Statement by President Johnson, March 23

White House press release dated March 23

On June 10, 1964, at Holy Cross College,
I pledged that this Nation would move ahead
with plans for a worldwide weather system,
in collaboration with other nations, toward
a goal beneficial to all mankind.^ On the
occasion of World Meteorological Day, I now
reaffirm that pledge.

Today, we recognize the efforts of scien-
tists and technicians everywhere — working
as individuals and working as a single
scientific community — to improve our un-
derstanding and prediction of the weather.

This day symbolizes for us, and for all
mankind, a new dawn of hope for a better,
safer, and more meaningful life.

In a world grown tired of wars, it com-
mits all nations to work together in joint
programs of peace.

It looks to the time when all our science
and technology, and all the wonders of the
space age, will give us the power of which
man has always dreamed — not the power of
one nation over another but the power of
the human race over the forces of nature.

We know now that our environment is
global and indivisible. Knowing this, it
follows that the only way to achieve sig-
nificant improvement of weather services
and prediction is by vigorous international
cooperation and by worldwide dissemina-
tion of weather data.

'■ For text, see Bulletin of June 29, 1964, p. 990.

618

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN ,

The instrument of this program is the
World Meteorological Organization, a spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations with
a membership of 127 countries. Through
the World Meteorological Organization the
concept of a World Weather Watch is now
taking shape. On this occasion, I am proud
to say that the United States strongly
supports international cooperation in this
vital field.

Much must be accomplished to transform
hope into reality. Scientifically, we must
move toward a better understanding of our
environment. Technologically, we must
move toward developing improved systems.
But there are no insuperable obstacles — and
the opportunities are too great for us to
ignore.

Our own nation's efforts in this world-
wide project will continue to be coordinated
by the Environmental Science Services Ad-
ministration under the leadership of Secre-
tary of Commerce John T. Connor.

An Interagency Committee for Interna-
tional Meteorological Programs has already
developed a series of proposals to carry us
well into the decade of the seventies. I have
asked the Secretary of Commerce; Dr. Don-
ald Hornig, my Science Adviser; and
Charles Schultze, the Director of the
Budget, to study these proposals and to
recommend to me a plan of action for
America's role in this important interna-
tional program.

National Maritime Day, 1966

A PROCLAMATION*

Today the American Merchant Marine continues
a long tradition of essential service to the Ameri-
can economy and defense. Throughout our history,
American ships have contributed to the develop-
ment of our modern economy, as well as to the
strength and unity of the country. As this Nation's

economy continues to expand, we will continue to
need ships — fast, modern descendants of the
famous "Clippers" — to carry our products to the
far corners of the earth and return with the raw
materials essential to our national prosperity.

Our merchant marine is also vital to our friends
all over the world. The transportation of surplus
commodities to many of the underdeveloped coun-
tries is an important part of our foreign aid pro-
gram.

As long as the United States may be called upon
to defend the Free World's interests anywhere on
the globe, our ships are necessary to insure con-
tinuous supply of the military material that helps
to prevent or defeat aggression by any country.

The complex task of creating and maintaining a
merchant marine adequate to our needs for peace-
time commerce, and sufficient for defense purposes,
requires the efforts of government, management and
labor and the support of all Americans.

To remind the American people of the important
role of the American Merchant Marine in the life of
this Nation, the Congress in 1933 designated May
22 of each year as National Maritime Day and re-
quested the President to issue a proclamation an-
nually in observance of that day. May 22, 1819, is
the day the SS Savannah, the first steamship to
cross the Atlantic, set forth on its historic journey
into the future.

Since May 22 falls on Sunday this year, it is
appropriate that the day be observed on the follow-
ing Monday.

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
urge the people of the United States to honor our
American Merchant Marine on Monday, May 23,
1966, by displaying the flag of the United States at
their homes and other suitable places, and I request
that all ships sailing under the American flag dress
ship on that day in tribute to the American Mer-
chant Marine.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 22nd day
of March, in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of Amer-
ica the one hundred and ninetieth.

IUmJUwA^/VMwCi

*No. 3708; 31 Fed. Reg. 4945.

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

APRIL 18, 1966

619

The United States and Brazil: Partners in Progress

by Lincoln Gordon
Ambassador to Brazil ^

Almost 41/4 years ago, on October 31, 1961,
I gave my first public talk as United States
Ambassador to Brazil as a guest of the
American Society and the American Cham-
ber of Commerce. Now I am once again your
guest here, this time to say a few words of
farewell. Many farewells imply a sharp
break in the continuity of one's life and as-
sociations. This one, happily, does not.

My new duties in Washington are two-
fold: (a) to guide the relationships of our
Government with those of our Latin Ameri-
can sister nations and (b) to serve as
United States Coordinator for the Alliance
for Progress. Since Brazil represents 35
percent of the population, area, and econ-
omy of Latin America, it will naturally con-
tinue to occupy a great deal of my atten-
tion. And since the Alliance for Progress
has been the central focus of my work here,
as foreshadowed in that talk in October 1961,
there, too, there will be continuity.

But perhaps more important, these 4
years have made Mrs. Gordon and me
meio-brasileiros. We both leave a large
part of our hearts here as we carry home
with us the many lessons we have learned
from living among the spirited, tolerant,
friendly, good-humored, and intensely human
people who make up this great nation.

' Address made to the American Society and
American Chamber of Commerce at Rio de Janeiro,
Brazil, on Feb. 17. Mr. Gordon, U.S. Ambassador
to Brazil since Sept. 18, 1961, was sworn in as As-
sistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs on Mar. 9.

Nor were we at all anxious to leave. Until
a presidential telephone call on January 17,
exactly 1 month ago, we fully expected to
stay here for at least another year. We were
happy in this prospect because we were still
learning new lessons every day and week.
We had only begun to experience the full
variety and vitality of Brazil, and there was
still much to be done in the never-ending
task of exploring new paths for cooperation
between our Governments and peoples. To
these tasks I hope to contribute from my
new vantage point, with the help of my as
yet unnamed successor in this Embassy.

Any man's life is divided into more or less
sharply defined periods. My own working
life has had many such divisions, in great
variety. As Dean Acheson notes in his de-
lightful recent book of memoirs Morning and
Noon, the principal factor governing the suc-
cession of these periods is luck — chance —
happenstance. So far, I have indeed been
lucky, and I do not regret any of these ex-
periences. But two stand out as especially
challenging and therefore especially re-
warding: participation in the success of the
Marshall Plan and the creative period of the
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, from
1947 to 1952, and these last 4 years in
charge of the American Embassy in Rio.

This has not been exactly the most tran-
quil period in Brazil's political and economic
life or in Brazilian-American relations.
Sometimes, in looking at the row of photo-
graphs of my predecessors in the corridor
outside my office, I have thought with envy

620

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of the era in which Ambassador [Edwin
v.] Morgan served for no less than 21 years.
I daresay that Brazil has changed at least
as much since 1961 as in the whole span of
Morgan's tenure. If I ever find time to write
some memoirs, their central theme will deal
with these processes of change.

This is not to underrate the importance
of certain dramatic events, which can make
profound shifts in the course of history.
Surely the Cuban missile-base crisis of Oc-
tober 1962 and the Brazilian revolution of
March 1964 were both such events. But we
should also not underestimate the elements
of continuity or the forces of political, eco-
nomic, and social evolution which shape the
way of life of a nation and its role in the
constantly more interdependent society of
nations on this globe.

I am a strong disbeliever in the idea of his-
torical determinism. Neither the gospel ac-
cording to Hegel and Marx, nor Spengler,
nor Toynbee, nor others among the ancient
or modem fatalists provide adequate tools
for really understanding the past or for
predicting the future. Of course there are
historical and social and political and eco-
nomic forces and factors. At any given time
these set institutional and pyschological
and material limits to the achievement of
individual or collective aspirations and to the
translation of policy objectives into realities.
But the task of policymakers and of politi-
cal leadership is to influence and guide these
forces, to expand the limits, and to assert
man's capacity to reshape human institu-
tions into patterns which conform more
closely to his own evolving aspirations. In
the field of economic and social progress in
this hemisphere, this has been the philosoph-
ical premise of the Alliance for Progress.

Vigor of Alliance for Progress

When I spoke to you 41,4 years ago, the
Alliance was a new and daring innovation in
the relations among the American Repub-
lics, still in that phase of parental hopes and
expectations which accompany the birth of
a new infant. Would it survive at all? Would

it grow into vigorous and meaningful life or
become just another international alphabeti-
cal nonentity? Would it really enlist "the
full energies of the peoples and govern-
ments of the American republics in a great
cooperative effort" — in the brave words
agreed to at Punta del Este?^ I well remem-
ber the many doubts and disillusionments
expressed in 1962 and the all-too-ready con-
clusion of some observers that, if not already
moribund, the Alliance had certainly died
with the tragic assassination of President
Kennedy in November of 1963.

Now, however, as we approach the half-
way mark of the original 10-year period en-
visaged at Punta del Este, I believe we can
say with confidence that the Alliance for
Progress is indeed a vigorous creature, that
its goals do in fact reflect the aspirations
of the overwhelming majority of our peo-
ples, and that its methods were well con-
ceived and are constantly improving in the
daily process of practical application. That
is why the conference in Rio de Janeiro last
November ^ determined to incorporate into
the OAS Charter itself the principles of the
Alliance for Progress as the basis for long-
term economic and social cooperation in this
hemisphere.

But this is not merely a matter of words
and juridical principles. It is a matter of
visible results already achieved and in prog-
ress, of new institutions created and func-
tioning, and of new attitudes.

The discussions last November reflected
a whole new climate of thought about the
nature of economic and social development,
how to accelerate it, and how to reinforce
national efforts through international sup-
port, mutual aid, and regional economic in-
tegration. Instead of dialectical debate in
terms of mystical categories, there was a
sober appreciation of the need to mobilize
resources, to guide their fruitful application
in priority areas of public and private in-
vestment, to build and modernize institu-

' For background and texts of documents estab-
lishing the Alliance for Progress, see Bulletin of
Sept. 11, 1961, p. 459.

' For background, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

APRIL 18, 1966

621

tions, to train personnel, to create incentives,
and to enlist active participation and sup-
port from all sectors of society.

Sloughing Off of Old Myths

Not only in Brazil but all over the conti-
nent there has been a sloughing off of in-
tellectual myths which stood in the way of
progress in freedom. The extreme case is the
Fidelista myth, so fulsomely expounded by
Che Guevara at Punta del Este 5 years ago.
Where is he now, I wonder? What happened
to that earthly paradise he promised to cre-
ate?

But there are many other less extreme
cases. There was the inflationist myth that
rapid development and structural reform in
Latin America made galloping inflation in-
evitable. Today there is an overwhelming
consensus that inflation not only creates
glaring social injustice but also undermines
any possibility of sustained and healthy de-
velopment.

There was the populist myth that certain
goods and services could be subsidized on a
grand scale at no cost to anyone. Today
it is commonly accepted that subsidies are
costly to the community, distort the balance
of needed development, and divert fiscal re-
sources which are indispensable to high-pri-
ority public investment.

There was the Socialist mjrth that the
public and private sectors must be at war
with one another. Today it is increasingly
understood that their roles are more com-
plementary than competitive and that the
institution-building and incentive-creating
functions of government are more efficient
contributors to development than the placing
of operational responsibility for productive
enterprises in bureaucratic hands.

And there was the technocratic myth that
an elaborate mathematical model, beautiful
in its internal logic and well printed on thick
white paper, could justify the title of "Na-
tional Development Plan," even though its
numbers had no foundation in reality and
there was no administrative machinery to
convert its conclusions into real investment.

622

production, and consumption. Today the plan-
ners have learned to work with the opera-
tors, to get their hands dirty at the project
sites, to build their essential foundations of
statistical and institutional facts, and to take
greater satisfaction in modest operational re-
sults than in mathematical elegance for its
own sake.

Progress Too Slow in Many Areas

Judged by general economic measures,
moreover, this continent is moving forward
at a substantial pace, even though it can
and should be even more rapid. Overall
growth in the last 2 years has exceeded the
minimum targets laid down at Punta del
Este, and there is every prospect that 1966
will see a still higher rate. But this is no
reason for complacency or relaxation. There
are too many areas of vital concern in
which progress is far too slow.

At Punta del Este, and before that at the
Bogota conference of 1960,^ special emphasis
was placed on education, health, housing,
and improved rural living conditions. In all
these fields the Alliance has made only a
modest beginning. We must not deceive our-
selves by the hope that somehow or other
general economic growth will trickle down
into adequate social investment and agricul-
tural modernization. These areas require de-
liberate thought and resolute action.

I attribute the lag in these fields not so
much to political resistances, although these ■
exist, especially in the case of agriculture. |
But the fact is that it is much easier to
build roads and dams and industrial plants
than it is to build an adequate educational
system, a public health service, or a modern-
ized rural economy. They are all essential,
but the first among these equals is educa-
tion.

If the Latin American societies wish to
fulfill the expressed desires of their peoples
to become full members of modern indus-
trialized democracies, with genuine equality
of opportunity, then their schools and uni-

' Ibid., Oct. 3, 1960, p. 533.

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

versities must produce men and women with
the skills necessary to achieve that goal. This
means a long-term dedication on the part of
each country to educational planning, the
mobilization of resources for education, the
training of teachers and researchers, the
preparation of educational materials, and
above all a basic reform of teaching meth-
ods and specialties to meet the needs of to-
morrow.

Educational expansion and reform is of
course primarily a national responsibility. To
the extent that international cooperation can
assist — and I believe that it can assist on
a very substantial scale — President Johnson
has made it crystal clear in his new propos-
als 5 to our Congress that the United States
is ready and willing to provide such assist-
ance. To do so effectively, we have to im-
prove our own resources of qualified man-
power, and an important element of the
President's new program looks to that ob-
jective.

Educational improvement is not merely a
governmental responsibility. Private business
can make a vast contribution to it, through
in-house and in-factory training programs,
through the systematic upgrading of man-
power at all levels, through the support of
intermediate and advanced training courses
for manual and clerical and managerial em-
ployees, and through the broadening of op-
portunities for all individuals to make full
use of their talents. The foreign business
community has a clear responsibility to set
an example in this matter because of its ac-
cess to the technology, management meth-
ods, and educational systems of the more
highly industrialized nations. Many of the
American enterprises represented here today
have already begun to do so, and I urge you
all to redouble your efforts.

Another front of supreme importance for
the success of the Alliance for Progress is
more rapid advance in the economic integra-
tion of Latin America and in the develop-
ment of the vast open regions in the center

■ For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 329.

of South America through multinational in-
vestment projects. This is the largest area
on earth which is readily habitable by man
and yet still largely uninhabited. With the
application of modem technology, with co-
operation among the nations directly in-
volved, and with strong international finan-
cial and technical support, there is every
reason to foresee a transformation of this
area into one of the great world centers of
productive economic activity.

A World of Growing Interdependence

I concluded my talk here in 1961 by an-
swering the question, why the United States
is interested in the Alliance for Progress. I
said that the answer "lies in the conviction
that a prosperous, free, and self-reliant
Latin America is essential to the kind of
world in which we of the northern part of
the hemisphere can also pursue our own
aspirations for a life in freedom and
dignity." I can tell you today that there has
been no weakening of that conviction, which
President Johnson holds just as deeply as
President Kennedy did and which is shared
by the overwhelming majority of our Con-
gress and our public at large.

At home, we are strenuously engaged in
the manifold tasks of creating what Presi-
dent Johnson has called a Great Society.
True equality of opportunity, regardless of
race or family wealth, the rebuilding of
cities, the cleansing of rivers, the humaniz-
ing of urban life, and the constantly closer
integration of industry with agriculture and
of city with countryside — all these are dem-
onstrations that we too are still a nation
very much in the course of development. We
do not seek to impose our patterns on other
nations or to compel cooperation on reluctant
partners. We are proud of our own national-
ism and expect other people to be proud of
theirs. But we have learned that constructive
nationalism is not to be confused with xen-
ophobia or isolationism.

We foresee a world of growing inter-
dependence in which the special values of
each nationality will enrich the lives of other

APRIL 18, 1966

623

peoples. Within that world we foresee a
special intimacy and cordiality of relation-
ships in this hemisphere because we know
the dedication of all its peoples to the
humane values of respect for the individual,
the democratic way of life, and progress in
freedom. Mrs. Gordon and I have learned in
these years how deeply devoted Brazil and
the Brazilian people are to these values.
That is why we can depart with regret but
also with renewed confidence in the future
of this country, of this continent, and of our
continued collaboration in the great common
enterprises which lie before us all.

Further Steps Taken To Remove
Restrictions on U.S. Exports

Press release 51 dated March 14

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The governments of many countries have
taken further steps toward eliminating or
easing quantitative restrictions on United
States exports. The United States has
pressed its case for this trade liberalization
through official government consultations
during the last year in the major capitals
of Western Europe, in Japan, and in Can-
ada, as well as in Geneva under the terms
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT).

After World War II many countries
adopted selective controls as a means of
conserving their small volume of dollar
holdings. Quantitative restrictions on im-
ports are permitted on these grounds under
GATT rules. The critical lack of foreign ex-
change in many countries continued through
the immediate postwar period and even into
the fifties. The Department of State and
other United States Government agencies
have continually worked to have these re-
strictions removed since that time.

Since 1963 most important European coun-
tries have dismantled virtually all quantita-
tive restrictions on industrial items of sig-

nificant export interest to the United States.
An important exception is coal, which still
remains restricted in several major Euro-
pean countries.

However, many Western European na-
tions, for protective reasons, continue to re-
strict a number of agricultural items. To
get at this difficult problem, the United
States has continued to utilize the complaint
procedures under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade.

Following our GATT consultations with
Germany in the last 2 years, we achieved in
1965 more or less automatic renewal of
tenders for United States exporters for
sales of fresh apples, pears, canned cher-
ries; Germany established sizable quotas
for dried alfalfa, ice cream mix, and apple-
sauce. Germany also removed certain im-
port licensing arrangements which discrim-
inated against United States bourbon. Aus-
tria eased certain technical import require-
ments for fresh apples and pears in 1965.
The French have progressively increased
import quotas on various items of fresh and
canned fruits following our GATT consulta-
tions with them which began in 1962.

In addition to actions following more for-
mal procedures of consultation under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
Denmark and France liberalized certain
vegetables; New Zealand liberalized dried
fruits; Japan liberalized a variety of vege-
tables and animal feed; Finland liberalized
nuts and certain oils ; Chile liberalized frozen
chicken, peas, and potatoes; Norway in-
creased import quotas for fresh apples and
a few other agricultural commodities.

In the industrial area Japan removed im-
port restrictions on automobiles and imita-
tion jewelry; Spain liberalized over 100
categories of goods and enlarged the global
quotas on a number of other items. Finland
freed imports from licensing requirements
on a large number of items; and Denmark
removed the remaining restrictions on indus-
trial items of export interest to the United
States, particularly refrigerators, washing
machines, gas meters, and parts of gas
meters.

624

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

IMPORT LIBERALIZATIONS

Denmark

Meat and edible offals of rabbits, fresh, chilled,
or frozen, salted, in brine, dried or smoked.

The following vegetables, fresh or chilled: arti-
chokes, beans, and other leguminous vegetables,
except peas; champignons and other edible mush-
rooms; dill, pumpkins, cress and watercress, chervil,
parsnips, parsley, parsley-root, chives, rhubarb,
radishes, and other edible roots, except carrots,
celeriac, beetroot, and horseradish. The following
vegetables (whether or not cooked) preserved by
freezing: gherkins, cucumbers, champignons, and
carrots. The following vegetables, provisionally
preserved in brine, in sulphur water, or in other
preservative solutions but not especially prepared
for immediate consumption: artichokes, beans, and
other leguminous vegetables, except peas; cham-
pignons and other edible mushrooms; dill, pumpkins,
cress and watercress, chervil, parsnips, parsley,
parsley-root, chives, rhubarb, radishes, and other
edible roots, except carrots, celeriac, beetroot, and
horseradish; Jerusalem artichokes, fresh or dried,
whole or sliced.

Fresh blackberries and gooseberries; certain fod-
der root products; licorice confectionery.

Granite; transmission, conveyor, or elevator belts
or belting, of vulcanized rubber, rubber tires and
tubes for bicycles without motor and for bicycles
with an auxiliary motor; wallpaper; refrigerators
with a volume of not more than 200 liters and parts
thereof; washing machines, for domestic use or for
laundries, and parts thereof; gas meters and parts
thereof.

Finland

Fats and oils of fish and marine mammals,
whether or not refined; prepared or preserved fish;
herring in containers of less than 25 liters, and other
fish products.

Calcium carbide; adhesive plasters; wadding and
gauze; medical bandages, excluding plaster ban-
dages; perfumery, cosmetics, and toilet prepara-
tions; household soap; polishes and creams.

Furskins, tanned and dressed; twine, cordage,
and rope.

Glass beads, imitations of pearls, precious and
semiprecious stones; pearls, precious and semi-
precious stones, synthetic stones; articles of jewelry;
goldsmith's and silversmith's wares of precious
metals; articles consisting of, or incorporating,
pearls; imitation jewelry.

Railway rails and accessories; tubes and pipes of
cast iron; tube and pipe fittings of cast iron; struc-
tures of iron or steel; stoves.

Ranges, cookers, grates, fires, and other similar
heating equipment; central heating boilers; radi-

ators; air heaters; other articles of iron or steel,
sack and other binders of iron wire, thimbles and
sewing rings, tube adjusters, joining pieces, and
cup springs.

Electrical signaling apparatus; circuit breakers,
switches, circuit dividers, fuses, electric metal fila-
ment lamps for general use; discharge lamps.

Insulators, conduit tubing.

Arms, ammunition, and parts.

Brooms and brushes; squeegees of materials other
than rubber or plastic.

Spain

Cattle under 2 years of age; broilers; inulin;
denatured sucrose; vegetable produce of a kind used
for animal food.

Hexane, heptane; paraffin; bitumen, pitch, and
petroleum asphalt; bitumen and asphalt; bituminous
mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitu-
men, on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar, or on
mineral tar pitch.

Boric oxide and acid; aluminum sulphate; sodium
cyanide; borax hydrate; borax anhydrous; methanol;
methanal; acetaldehyde; lactic acid of a strength
of more than 50 percent, its salts and esters; urea
containing in the dry state more than 45 percent by
weight of nitrogen; hexamethyl-enetetramine; anti-
sera, etc., put up for retail sale, except sera of im-
munized persons or animals and microbial vaccines;
antisera, etc., in bulk form, except sera of immu-
nized persons or animals and microbial vaccines;
medicaments made from plants, put up for retail
sale; urea containing not more than 45 percent of
nitrogen; concentrated superphosphates (double or
triple); certain phosphatic fertilizers; ammonium
phosphates containing not less than 6 milligrams of
arsenic per kg., composite and complex fertilizers;
lozenges or similar prepared forms or in packings
of a gross weight not exceeding 10 kg.; other fer-
tilizers.

Synthetic tanning substances; ordinary household
soap; prepared glues, products suitable for use as
glues, put up for sale by retail.

Solid or semisolid fuels; colloidal graphite; wood
tar; wood tar oils (other than the composite sol-
vents and thinners); wood creosote; wood naptha;
acetone oil ; polyurethanes ; polyamides ; polyhalo-
ethylenes; polyvinyl acetate; polyvinylidene chloride
in the form of liquid, flakes, chips, powder, and
paste; polyvinyl butyral and polyvinyl formal; poly-
acrylates, polymethacrylates, and their derivatives;
hardened proteins (for example, hardened casein and
hardened gelatine) ; natural resins modified by fu-
sion and artificial resins obtained by esterification of
natural resins or of resinic acids; chemical derivates
of natural rubber; certain high polymers, artificial
resins and artificial plastic materials, including
alginic acid, its salts and esters; linoxyn.

Silkworm cocoons; yarn of viscose rayon and of

APRIL 18, 1966

625

cuprammonium rayon (cupra), not put up for re-
tail sale; yarn of acetate rayon and of other con-
tinuous artificial fibers, not put up for retail sale;
monofil of viscose rayon and of cuprammonium
rayon (cupra) ; monofil of acetate rayon and of
other continuous artificial fibers; yarn of viscose
rayon and of cupra, put up for retail sale; yam of
acetate rayon and of other continuous artificial
fibers, put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of vis-
cose and acetate rayon and of cupra, and of other
continuous artificial fibers; flax, raw or processed
but not spun; flax tow and waste (including pulled
or garnetted rags) ; ramie, raw or processed but
not spun; ramie noils and waste (including pulled
or garnetted rags) ; flax or ramie yam; woven fab-
rics of flax or of ramie; discontinuous artificial
fibers; continuous filament tow for the manufac-
ture of artificial fibers; waste of artificial fibers
(continuous or discontinuous) ; artificial fibers (dis-
continuous or waste), carded, combed, or otherwise
prepared for spinning; yarn of artificial fibers
(discontinuous or waste), not put up for retail sale;
yarn of artificial fibers (discontinuous or waste),
put up for retail sale; woven fabrics of discon-
tinuous artificial fibers; jute, raw or retted, except
cuttings; builders' carpentry and joinery, etc.; yam
of vegetable textile fibers, manila hemp, pita, etc.;
yam of vegetable textile fibers, of other fibers;
woven fabrics of other vegetable textile fibers;
woven pile fabrics, etc., of other textile fibers;
narrow fabrics of artificial fibers; chenille yam,
gimped yarn, etc.; nets and other textiles articles;
elastic fabrics (other than knitted or crocheted) ;
wicks of woven, plaited, or knitted textile mate-
rials; textile hosepiping and similar tubing; knitted
or crocheted fabric, not elastic or rubberized.

Understockings and other articles; undergarments,
knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rubberized, of
other textile materials; other garments and other
articles, knitted or crocheted, not elastic nor rub-
berized, of other textile materials; men's and boys'
outergarments ; women's, girls', and infants' outer-
garments of wool; women's, girls', and infants' outer-
garments, of artificial fibers; men's and boys'
undergarments, of artificial fibers; women's, girls',
and infants' undergarments; shawls, scarves, muf-
flers, mantillas, veils, and the like; collars, tuckers,
fallals, bodice fronts, jabots, cuffs, etc.; gloves,
mittens, mitts, stockings, socks, and sockettes, not
being knitted or crocheted goods; makeup acces-
sories for articles of apparel (for example, dress
shields, shoulder and other pads, belts, muffs, sleeve
protectors, pockets) ; traveling rugs and blankets,
electrically heated; traveling rugs and blankets of
other textile fibers.

Bed linen, curtains, and other furnishing ar-
ticles; tarpaulins, sails, and camping goods.

Tableware and other articles of a kind commonly
used for domestic or toilet purposes of porcelain or

china (including biscuit porcelain and parian),
plain ; tableware and other articles of a kind com-
monly used for domestic or toilet purposes of other
kinds of pottery, plain; glassware for household use
with a low coefficient of expansion ; glassware for
household use of toughened glass.

Synthetic or reconstructed precious or semipre-
cious stones, cut or otherwise worked but not
mounted, set or strung.

Tubes and pipes and blanks, other than seamless,
of iron (other than cast iron) or steel, excluding
hydroelectric conduits; high-pressure hydroelectric
conduits of steel; metal structures; hermetically
sealed silos with metal walls, glazed continuous feed
and discharge type for the preservation and trans-
formation of agricultural produce intended for feed-
ing cattle; reservoirs, tanks, vats, and similar con-
tainers, of iron or steel, of a capacity exceeding
300 liters; boxes and other containers of sheet steel
used for commercial packaging, finished for direct
use and not folded (with a capacity of % to 10
liters inclusive) ; compressed gas cylinders and simi-
lar pressure containers, iron or steel; stranded
wire, cables, cordage, etc., unprocessed, made of
round wire of a diameter of 1 mm. or more, combined
with textile or other fibers less than 1 mm.; com-
bined with textile or other fibers; other, combined
with textile or other fibers; barbed iron or steel wire;
twisted hoop or single flat wire, barbed or not, and
loosely twisted double wire, of kinds used for fenc-
ing, of iron or steel ; gauze cloth, grill, netting,
fencing, reinforcing fabric, and similar materials,
of iron or steel wire; expanded metal, of iron or
steel, roller and precision chain; chain and parts
thereof, of iron or steel; anchors and grapnels and
parts thereof, of iron or steel.

Needles for hand sewing, etc., with a diameter
of not more than 1 mm.; pins, hairpins, etc.

Central heating boilers, radiators, etc.; bathtubs,
showers, etc., of cast iron; bathtubs, showers, etc.,
of enameled steel sheet; iron or steel wool; duplex
or twin wire for healds; cooking and heating ap-
paratus of copper, not electrically operated; acces-
sories for electric wiring; pins other than orna-
mental, needles, safety pins, and the like.

Niobium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; zirco-
nium, unwrought, of nuclear quality; shovels, picks,
spades, etc. ; and tool-tips and plates, etc., of sintered
metal carbides.

Sewing machine needles; postage-franking ma-
chines; certain calculating machines; electric ac-
cumulators.

Articles of carbon or graphite, except carbon parts
for cinematograph projection.

Tracklaying tractors, with a cylinder capacity of
6,000 cc. or less.

Automatic record players actuated directly or in-
directly by counters or coins; recording apparatus
for flexible records; gramophone records, etc., pre-

626

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

pared but not recorded (wax recordings, discs, tapes,
wires, etc.) ; gramophone records, etc., recorded
(wax recordings, discs, matrices, and other inter-
mediate forms).

Brooms and brushes, of materials (other than
artificial plastic materials) merely bound together,
with or without handle; other brooms and brushes
(including brushes of a kind used as parts of ma-
chines), paint rollers, etc., except those made of
artificial plastic materials; prepared knots and tufts
for broom or brush making, except those made of
artificial plastic materials; feather dusters, except
those made of artificial plastic materials; powder
puffs, etc., except those made of artificial plastic
materials.

Hand sieves and hand riddles, except those made
of artificial plastic materials; press fasteners, in-
cluding blanks, molds, and parts; slate pencils, etc.;
scent and similar sprays of a kind used for toilet
purposes, and mounts and heads therefor; vacuum
flasks and other vacuum vessels, complete with
cases; parts thereof, other than glass inners; tailors'
dummies and other lay figures; automata and other
animated displays of a kind used for shop window
dressing.

Board of Foreign Scholarships
Members Sworn In

Press release 58 dated March 18

Six new members and four reappoint-
ments to the 12-man Presidentially ap-
pointed Board of Foreign Scholarships were
sworn in on March 17 in the presence of the
Secretary of State, who characterized the
Board as "part of a great human enter-
prise . . . which has the deepest importance
for the daily concerns of men and, in the days
of nuclear weapons, even for the survival of
man."

The Board of Foreign Scholarships sets
the policies for the Department of State's
educational exchange program, supervises
them, and makes the final selection of its
academic grantees. These include more than
5,000 students, teachers, research scholars,
and university lecturers annually, both in
this country and abroad. Under the chair-
manship of historian Oscar Handlin of Har-
vard University, it this year celebrates 20
years of establishment. Its members are

distinguished private citizens drawn from
academic and public life.

In informal remarks following the swear-
ing-in, Secretary Rusk said :

I know of no activity more central than the work
of the Board of Foreign Scholarships and the edu-
cational exchanges in which your Board will be tak-
ing the leadership.

We have foreign students and scholars in this
country by the many tens of thousands. We are
sending our own young people and our own teachers
into many lands in the other direction. I have no
doubt that this creates a network of understanding
that is important for the maintenance of peace —
understanding that derives not from just a sense of
amiability but understanding that comes from knowl-
edge of other people.

Following are the names of the members
of the Board :

New Members

William G. Craig, head master, John Burroughs
School, St. Louis, Mo.

W. J. Driver, Administrator, Veterans Administra-
tion

Brooks Hays, Arthur Vanderbilt Professor of Po-
litical Affairs, Rutgers University

Teruo Ihara, associate professor of education, Uni-
versity of Hawaii

Frederick B. Pike, professor of Latin American his-
tory, University of Pennsylvania

James R. Roach, professor of government. University
of Texas

Reappointments

John Hope Franklin, professor of American history,
University of Chicago

Francis Keppel, Assistant Secretary for Education,
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare

John M. Stalnaker, president. National Merit Schol-
arship Corp.

George E. Taylor, director, Far Eastern and Russian
Institute, University of Washington

Commissioner General Confirmed
for U.S. Exhibit at Canadian Fair

The Senate on March 17 confirmed Presi-
dent Johnson's nomination of Stanley R.
Tupper to be Commissioner General for U.S.
participation in the Canadian Universal and
International Exhibition. (For biographic
details, see White House press release dated
March 4.)

APRIL 18, 1966

627

THE CONGRESS

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967

Statement by Secretanj Rusk

Thank you very much for the opportunity
of appearing before you in support of the
President's economic and military assistance
programs.

The Foreign Assistance Act and the Mili-
tary Assistance and Sales Act of 1966 will
provide the basic authority to carry forward
a foreign aid program which, in the words
of President Johnson, will "help give the
people of the less developed world the food,
the health, the skills, and education — and
the strength — to lead their nations to self-
sufficient lives of plenty and freedom." ^

The legislation and programs before this
committee are the result of a sober and
searching review conducted last fall at the
direction of the President. That review was
a response to concerns expressed by the
Congress and this committee and a re-
sponse to the call for action in the confer-
ence committee report on last year's au-
thorization bill.

I was an active participant in this review,
and I am convinced that the proposals now
before you are based on a full understand-
ing of the lessons of the past as well as cre-
ative thinking about the future.

For fiscal year 1967 the President is re-
questing new appropriations of $2,469 mil-
lion for economic assistance programs and
$917 million for programs of military as-

' Made before the House Committee on Foreigrn
Affairs on Mar. 17 (press release 56).

' For text of President Johnson's message on for-
eign aid, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

sistance. These are minimum estimates,
based on conservative appraisals of needs
for the coming year. If this request should
prove insufficient, the President will not
hesitate to request additional funds.

I strongly support these proposals and
urge the approval of H.R. 12449 and H.R.
12450 by this committee.

Foreign Aid Basic to U.S. Security

Foreign aid is basic to U.S. security.

Without it, many countries undoubtedly
would have been subverted or overrun in
the past two decades.

Without it, the frontiers of freedom would
have shrunk and Americans would be living
in a less stable and more threatening world.

Too often, I think, we let immediate crises
and headlines obscure the very real progress
that is being made in so many parts of the
world. This is often called the "quiet
battle," and it is a battle of which all
Americans can be proud. As the President
said in his foreign aid message, "We will
never know how many crises have been
averted, how much violence avoided, or how
many minds have been won to the cause of
freedom in these years."

But much remains to be done, and that is
why we ask the Congress to provide the
authority and funds to mount a renewed
attack on the root causes of misery and un-
rest on which aggression and subversion
feed.

The economic assistance program we are

628

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

proposing is based on two fundamental
facts :

— First, that the basis for successful for-
eign aid is self-help. No amount of U.S.
assistance can do the job unless the re-
cipient nation itself invests the resources,
makes the reforms, and adopts the policies
which will lead to lasting progress.

U.S. aid will not be provided unless na-
tions are willing to do their part in the
crucial task of development; it will not be
provided where nations engage in wasteful
foreign adventures. The President has
made this clear in his messages to the Con-
gress ; he has made this clear to recipient
nations in his actions.

— Second, that the major concern of a
successful foreign aid program must be
people. Our aid cannot be concerned simply
with dollars or plans or facilities.

That is why we are proposing a renewed
attack in the fields of education, health, and
agriculture.

Our own experience in America demon-
strates that the vital ingredient of progress
is people who are educated and healthy,
people who have enough of the right food to
eat, people who look to the future with
hope. This is no vision or dream. It is real-
ism rooted in experience.

Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator,
Agency for International Development] has
given you some of the details of these new
initiatives in health, education, and agricul-
ture. But I should like to say that my be-
lief in this approach is based on my own ex-
perience and the contrast between the life
I knew as a boy and the life of present-day
America.

For I do not believe that the situation in
many parts of the world now is so different
from what it was not too many years ago in
many parts of our own country.

I believe that the rapid growth of our own
nation and the transformation of backward
areas into active participants in progress
are the direct results of better education,
improved health, and more efficient agricul-
ture. You can chart the course of our own
progress in school attendance statistics,

health records, and agricultural productiv-
ity figures.

Our foreign aid program is designed to
help others follow the same path of prog-
ress.

Two Important Features

The President's foreign aid proposals
have two important features of particular
interest to this committee — a split of mili-
tary and economic assistance and a 5-year
authorization for the entire aid program.

The separation of the two parts of the
foreign assistance program is designed to
clarify the purposes and functions of each
and to give the public a greater under-
standing of what we are doing in our over-
seas programs. Congressional examination
and review of the relations of the two pro-
grams and of their effectiveness in carrying
out our foreign policy goals is being main-
tained by reference of the two bills to this
committee and to the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee.

In addition, the President is requesting
that the Secretary of State be given con-
tinued responsibility to exercise supervision
and general direction of the military assist-
ance program [MAP]. Careful review will
be maintained by AID and the Department
of State to assure that MAP expenditures
and sales are consistent with our foreign
policy objectives.

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] Mc-
Namara will discuss this program with you
in detail in the near future. But I should
like to add my strong support for the re-
quests which he will be presenting.

Military assistance helps to strengthen
our own security by building the security of
others. It helps those nations which are
working with us to secure peace by deter-
ring aggression. MAP helps to build the
shield behind which economic grovv^th can
take place.

But the program does more. It also con-
tributes to the economic progress of the re-
cipients by stressing civic action programs
through which local troops build schools
and roads and other essential facilities. In

APRIL 18, 1966

629

addition, we help train foreign military per-
sonnel at schools in the United States and
abroad, and through these courses, impart a
new understanding of the role of the mili-
tary in a democratic society.

We are requesting extension of the multi-
year principle to all authorizations for eco-
nomic and military assistance.

Other witnesses will deal with the specific
requests. I should only like to underscore a
key aspect.

Full review will be maintained by this
committee. The executive branch is pre-
pared to make an annual presentation of
the program in whatever form you may re-
quest. But the long-term authorization will
free this committee from the burden of an
annual legislative cycle and enable you to
examine the entire aid program or selected
parts of it in whatever depth that you feel
is necessary. In this way the informed
judgment of this committee can be brought
to bear in areas of particular concern; and
I can assure you of the desire of the execu-
tive branch to make such examinations as
fruitful and constructive as possible.

The Economic Assistance Program

I should like to take a few minutes to
discuss four particular aspects of the fiscal
year 1967 economic assistance program.

First, we are continuing to focus our aid
in those nations and on those programs
where self-help and performance are the
strongest and where U.S. security interests
are most directly served.

As a result, in fiscal year 1967 :

— 92 percent of the total country pro-
grams is concentrated in 20 countries;

— 84 percent of development loans is for
8 countries;

— 93 percent of supporting assistance is
for 5 countries, with 72 percent in Viet-Nam
alone.

Second, we have been continuing our
successful efforts to reduce the adverse im-
pact of the aid program on our balance of
payments. With relatively small and neces-
sary exceptions, all the funds now being ap-

propriated for the AID program will be
spent in the United States. As you know,
AID is in the business of exporting U.S.
goods and services, not U.S. dollars.

AID offshore expenditures declined from
nearly $1 billion in fiscal year 1960 to $515
million in fiscal year 1964 and will be fur-
ther reduced to about $400 million in fiscal
year 1967. Taking into account repayments
on past aid of $186 million, the net impact
on the U.S. balance of payments of AID off-
shore expenditures in fiscal year 1967 is
estimated to be only $214 million.

In the long run, foreign aid will be a sub-
stantial help to our balance of payments. As
countries which we now assist grow
stronger, they will provide new and growing
markets for U.S. businesses. And an in-
creasing flow of dollars to the United States
will result from development loan repay-
ments.

Third, we are increasing our efforts to
stimulate the private sector in the develop-
ing countries and increase the role of U.S.
private enterprise in our assistance pro-
grams.

This is a basic aspect of our aid program.
For until the energies of all the citizens of
a developing nation are involved in the job
of building a better life and until all can
share in that life, there is no true progress.
Their own and foreign private enterprise
can play a vital role in stimulating and re-
leasing these energies. In recent years there
has been a growing understanding in the de-
veloping nations of this fact. And there has
been a corresponding growth in AID sup-
port for efforts to build the private sector.
This is being accomplished through modi-
fication of policies by developing countries
themselves, as well as through creation of
institutions under the aid program.

The U.S. Government itself can only do a
small part of the job. It must rely increas-
ingly on our business and labor leaders, our
teachers and lawyers, our farmers and bank-
ers, who have great reservoirs of knowledge
and experience important to the attack on
the problems of the developing nations.

As part of our renewed efforts we will

630

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

make greater use of the unique contribu-
tions which U.S. private citizens can make.
We will continue our support for the Inter-
national Executive Service Corps and are
encouraged by the spirit of service which
has moved so many qualified business ex-
ecutives to participate in its work.

As President Johnson indicated, we ex-
pect to carry on a frank and constructive
review with recipient countries of obstacles
to domestic and foreign private investment.
We will continue to support liberalization of
overcontrolled economies; to furnish assist-
ance to the formation of cooperatives and
the training of labor and business leaders;
and to support institutions offering im-
proved credit facilities and advisory services
for small- and medium-sized farms and
businesses.

We are continuing our policy of encourag-
ing U.S. private investment in the develop-
ing countries. In support of this policy
we are requesting that this committee dou-
ble the authority of the investment guar-
anty programs.

Last August the Advisory Committee on
Private Enterprise in Foreign Aid, composed
of distinguished citizens and chaired by Ar-
thur K. Watson, reported its recommenda-
tions for strengthening the participation of
private enterprise in our foreign aid pro-
grams. A number of these recommenda-
tions have been adopted; others are being
carefully studied and are providing the
basis for new initiatives in important parts
of the aid program.

Fourth, we are placing increasing efforts
on programs to combat subversion and the
despair and frustration on which such sub-
version grows. This is a crucial aspect of
our aid, for as we have seen in many parts
of Latin America, Africa, and Asia, where
insurgents are active, the energies of a peo-
ple are diverted from the long-range job of
peaceful development to the short-run task
of survival.

These programs focus in four major
areas:

— public safety, which helps to build
basic local security;

— civic action, sponsored and supported by
both the military assistance program and
AID through which local military units par-
ticipate in nation-building projects ;

— rural and community development,
which helps to build local government units
and increase local participation in economic
and social improvement projects ;

— labor and youth, which are, of course,
essential parts of the foundation for a so-
ciety of progress and freedom.

Aid to Areas of Concern to U.S. Security

I should like to discuss with you some of
the areas of particular concern to our own
security where the foreign assistance pro-
gram plays an important role.

Viet-Nam and Southeast Asia

A major portion of the funds in the fiscal
year 1967 foreign economic aid program —
$550 million — is for Viet-Nam.

The crucial battle to determine the kind
of life which the peoples of Southeast Asia
will live continues. The battle is not simply
a matter of guns and troops and planes. It
also involves hard, basic work being done in
villages to improve agricultural productiv-
ity, increase health services, and establish
educational systems. It is this work which
points the way to the kind of life which the
people of Viet-Nam can live when the guns
are still.

I think it is important that these works of
peace continue even while the military
struggle continues. That is why we and the
leaders of South Viet-Nam reaffirmed our
commitment to improve the life of the Viet-
namese people in the Declaration of Hono-
lulu.3 For we all recognize that, while we
could win the victory on the battlefield, we
could still lose the more important fight for
the future well-being and progress of the
people.

As part of similar efforts elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, we are stepping up our as-
sistance to Thailand and Laos.

There are also encouraging signs of a de-

' For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 305.

APRIL 18, 1966

631

veloping regionalism in Asia. The countries
of the area are beginning to look beyond
their own borders for ways in which they
can cooperate in the common problems of
economic development. For some years, the
Mekong Coordinating Committee, which in-
cludes representatives of Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, and South Viet-Nam, has been
conducting studies and preinvestment sur-
veys for the long-range development of the
Mekong Basin. Two smaller projects in
Thailand are, in fact, nearly completed, and
engineering work for the Nam Ngum Dam
in Laos will shortly get undeinvay.*

We do not stand alone in our efforts to
spur development of this river basin. Six
other outside donors — Japan, the Nether-
lands, Canada, Denmark, Australia, and New
Zealand— have joined with the United States
with pledges totaling over $23 million for
the Nam Ngum project, which will be ad-
ministered by the World Bank.

Another important development is the
founding of the Asian Development Bank,
which has been in the planning stage since
1963 and is expected to begin operations
later this year.^ Thirty-one countries have
joined in providing funds for the Bank. The
initial capitalization of the Bank is $1 bil-
lion— $650 million from regional members
and $350 million from nonregional members.
Subscriptions to date are only $3 million
short of this goal. Japan has subscribed
$200 million, the same amount as the United
States.

The need for closer regional cooperation
is particularly great in Southeast Asia. Ac-
cordingly, the legislation before this com-
mittee contains a new title for multilateral
and regional programs in Southeast Asia.
This new title is evidence of U.S. willing-
ness to respond to new Asian initiatives
which will accelerate social and economic
progress and development and strengthen
cooperation among the countries of South-
east Asia.

The proposed Southeast Asia title is a f ur-

' For background, see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.
= Ibid.

ther step toward the realization of the
President's goal, spelled out in his speech at
Johns Hopkins University on April 7, 1965 :*
a broadly based international cooperative
effort for the accelerated development of
Southeast Asia — an effort which will offer
the peoples of the area an alternative to
violence and which would replace "despair
with hope and terror with progress."

Dominican Republic

This past year has been one of crisis and
turmoil in the Dominican Republic, but since
last September there have been signs of
progress. The Provisional Government, with
the help of the Inter-American Peace Force,
has retained control of the divided country.
We are working with the peoples of the Do-
minican Republic to assure the peaceful
transition to power of a freely elected dem-
ocratic government. We are also working
with the people and providing economic as-
sistance which will help to direct the ener-
gies and the policies of the country toward
peaceful reform and a better life.

India and Pakistan

As you know, we have just announced
our willingness to negotiate certain economic
development loans with India and Pakistan.
We are prepared to continue to help if
these two countries demonstrate their will-
ingness to take necessary self-help meas-
ures in the fields of agriculture and other
priority areas and find a way to live at
peace with each other.

We are heartened by the progress of rec-
onciliation shown at the United Nations
and at Tashkent, and in the announcement
of troop pullbacks. We look forward to the
day when the full energies of these two
great peoples can, with our assistance, be
devoted to the task of building for the fu-
ture. That job, as we all know, will be a
staggering one, as the current food short-
ages in India so starkly remind us. But it
must be successful, and we are prepared to
do our part.

632

For text, see ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Korea

One of the most encouraging signs of the
past year has been the continuing economic
progress in Korea. For example, Korean ex-
ports in 1965 were 50 percent larger than
in 1964 and five times greater than in 1960.
Industrial production rose by 16 percent last
j^ear. Korea's gross national product in-
creased by 9 percent in both 1963 and 1964.

This progress has been a demonstration
of what can happen to a country after the
smoke of battle has cleared and the energies
of the people are turned to the great task of
peaceful development. Our AID program
was once largely in the form of grants to
support the Korean economy. The grant
economic aid program has been declining
steadily while our development lending has
increased, including loans to private proj-
ects, reflecting the ability of the country to
make positive use of capital goods. Korea
has provided an excellent example of what
can be done when self-help is accompanied
by strong United States support.

Africa

In Africa in recent months there has
been some further movement toward re-
gional cooperation. More and more of
Africa's leaders are recognizing that peace
and economic grovsi;h receive great impetus
from a cooperative approach to develop-
ment. We would be glad to see the achieve-
ment of certain steps being taken to fur-
ther subregional cooperation and institu-
tions such as in the proposed Economic
Community of Eastern Africa. We look
forward to cooperating with the new Afri-
can Development Bank and other regional
institutions which can play a vital role in
drawing together the countries of this great
continent. As the means for cooperation de-
velop, the U.S. intends to make greater use
of regional institutions and arrangements as
channels for our assistance.

Latin America — Alliance for Progress

Last November I took part in the Second
Special Inter-American Conference at Rio de
Janeiro,' where I had the valuable assistance

of Congressman [Armistead I.] Selden and
Congressman [William S.] Mailliard. I
conveyed to the Conference the intention of
the United States to extend its commitment
to the great joint effort to promote peace-
ful change through the Alliance for Prog-
ress. In a personal message to the Confer-
ence, President Johnson said :

Recognizing that fulfillment of our goals will
require the continuation of the joint effort beyond
1971, I wish to inform the conference — and through
you, your respective governments — that the United
States will be prepared to extend mutual commit-
ment beyond the time period foreseen in the charter
of Punta del Este. In determining the scope of the
United States effort, we will want to examine care-
fully with you at that time the requirements of the
hemisphere, in the light of progress made through
self-help measures and the contributions which by
then some of your countries will be able to make to
one another to further the common effort.

The leaders of the hemisphere demon-
strated their commitment to progress by
adopting the Economic and Social Act of
Rio de Janeiro last November.* This act
added an important new element to the Al-
liance: a commitment by all members of the
Alliance to help one another and to provide
assistance to achieve economic and social
objectives set forth in the act. Although
many members of the committee may have
read it, I would like to submit for the rec-
ord, Mr. Chairman, the text of the act.

The Alliance is moving ahead. Brazil, as a
result of farseeing and courageous deci-
sions involving difficult measures for stabi-
lization, development, and reform, has
greatly reduced its inflation rate, restored
its credit, encouraged private investment,
set its economy moving forward, and pressed
forward the modernization of its economic
institutions. Chile is making important
strides, and Colombia and Peru are taking
the self-help steps which are expected to re-
sult in more rapid progress and therefore
would justify greater support from the
United States.

We will continue our strong support for

For background, see ihid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.
For text, see ibid,, p. 998.

APRIL 18, 1966

633

successful regional integration in Central
America and are hopeful that the move-
ment toward greater cooperation of all the
economies of Latin America will gain mo-
mentum in the years ahead. In addition, we
will continue to work with the Inter-Ameri-
can Committee on the Alliance for Progress
(CIAP) and the Inter-American Develop-
ment Bank to increase regional cooperation.

Arrangements for Coordination of Aid

There is a growing awareness among aid-
giving and aid-receiving countries of the ad-
vantages of cooperation and mutual assist-
ance. I have indicated the increasing spirit
of cooperation among developing countries.
Donor nations are also moving toward
closer relationships in their aid-giving ef-
forts. Particularly encouraging is the grow-
ing number of arrangements for coordina-
tion of aid among donors.

We are continuing our efforts to
strengthen bilateral coordination. For ex-
ample, the United States recently agreed to
engage in regular consultations at the Cab-
inet level with Japan and the Federal Re-
public of Germany.

Formal coordination arrangements have
been established for a number of aid-re-
cipient countries. Aid to India and Pakistan
is provided through World Bank consortia
which include Western European countries,
Japan, Canada, and the United States. Aid
to Turkey is provided through a consortium
of the OECD [Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development] .

The World Bank also sponsors less formal
coordinating mechanisms called consultative
groups. There are now World Bank con-
sultative groups for six countries, including
Colombia, Thailand, and Tunisia.

These arrangements — consortia and con-
sultative groups — bring together donor
countries and international financial institu-
tions. They provide an effective forum for
reviewing the requirements of a recipient
country, for evaluating self-help perform-
ance, and providing aid on a more orderly
basis.

Foreign Aid and World Progress

The foreign aid program, which this com-
mittee is now considering, is essential to
U.S. security and national interest in both
their short- and long-range aspects.

For the short range, the program pro-
vides direct support to Viet-Nam, assists
self-defense and internal security efforts in
other countries, and helps to build the
stability essential to a peaceful future.

For the long range also, we need our for-
eign aid program, because as the President
said, ". . . we are concerned with the kind
of world our children will live in." *

We seek a world of progress and of
peace, where each nation lives in inde-
pendence. This is no dream ; it is a necessity.
For in this age of rapid communication,
rockets, and nuclear power, what happens
half a world away is of vital concern to us
and our security.

Only as others grow in freedom, prog-
ress, and security can we here in the
United States be truly free and secure to
enjoy the blessings of a better life.

President Transmits Fourth Annual
Report of Peace Corps to Congress

White House press release dated March 14

To the Congress of the United States:

I transmit herewith from the Secretary of
State the Fourth Annual Report of the
Peace Corps. ^

This is a report of service to our neighbors
throughout the world. It is the story of
new opportunities for growth and learning
among our own people.

The expansion of the Peace Corps has
been as dramatic as its promise.

Five years ago today the Peace Corps was
eleven days old. By mid-summer, 1961, 120

•Ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

' Single copies of the report are available upon
request from the Peace Corps, Washington, D.C.,
20526.

634

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Volunteers were serving in 3 countries. At
the close of fiscal year 1965 there were
8,624 Volunteers serving in 46 countries.
Africa received 3,278 Volunteers — Latin
America received 3,214 — the Near East and
South Asia, 1,285, and the Far East, 847.

There are many examples of Peace Corps
impact. One is Afghanistan. Nine Volun-
teers went there in 1962 to begin the Peace
Corps' work. As of June 30, 1965, there were
136 Volunteers in Afghanistan, located in
19 different towns and villages. Peace Corps
teachers reach nearly 40 per cent of all
Afghan students at the secondary and uni-
versity levels.

There are other measures of progress. I
am pleased to note that as the number of
Volunteers has risen, the cost per Volunteer
has declined. During fiscal year 1963, for
example, the annual cost per Volunteer was
$9,074. For 1965 the cost was reduced to
$8,028. The estimate for fiscal year 1966 is
$7,832.

The Peace Corps is the largest producer
and consumer of language materials in the
world. Since 1961, 20,000 trainees have re-
ceived instruction in one or more of about
60 languages in the Peace Corps training
curricula. Twenty additional languages are
under consideration for inclusion in future
training programs.

Since its inception, 150,000 Americans
have volunteered for Peace Corps service.
Some 15,000 have served abroad in 49
nations.

As of June 30, 1965, 4,545 Volunteers had
completed service and returned to the United
States. Thirty-seven per cent of all re-
turned Volunteers are continuing their edu-
cation. Government service is attracting
17.8 per cent, while another 16.4 per cent
are teaching. The remaining 28.5 per cent
are engaged in private business, non-profit
organizations and miscellaneous activities.

It is fair to say that the lives of virtually
all Volunteers have been changed by their
service in the Corps. They have become
aware — in a unique and profound way — of
the bond of suffering and hope that unites

men and women on every continent. And
they are returning home with a new under-
standing of their nation and the world.

No more valuable experience can be gained
by any man.

Lyndon B. Johnson

The White House,
March 14. 1966.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 1st Session

Foreign Agents Registration Act Amendments.
Hearings before Subcommittee No. 3 of the
House Judiciary Committee on S.693 and H.R.
290, bills to amend the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act of 1938, as amended. July 28-August 2,

1965. 140 pp.

89th Congress, 2d Session

Report of Wayne L. Hays, Chairman of the Sub-
committee on State Department Organization
and Foreign Operations of the House Committee
on Foreign Affairs, on a Special Study Mission
to the Far East Combined With a Report of Ob-
servations on Viet-Nam and a Report on the
11th Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference
held at Wellington, N.Z., November 30-December
8, 1965. H. Rept. 1225. January 25, 1966. 12 pp.

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings be-
fore the Subcommittee on the Far East and the
Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee.
Part I. January 25-February 3, 1966. 224 pp.

Fifth Annual Report of the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency. H. Doc. 382.
February 15, 1966. 32 pp.

Asian Development Bank Act. Hearing before the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on H.R.
12563, to provide for the participation of the
United States in the Asian Development Bank.
February 16, 1966. 138 pp.

Supplemental Foreign Assistance Authorization,
Fiscal Year 1966. Report to accompany H.R.
12169. H. Rept. 1295. February 22, 1966. 11 pp.

Asian Development Bank. Report to accompany
H.R. 12563. S.Rept. 1008. February 24, 1966.
11 pp.

Report on Activities and Accomplishments Under
the Communications Satellite Act. H. Doc. 400.
March 3, 1966. 10 pp.

Trading With the Enemy Act. Report of the Senate
Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommittee
To Examine and Review the Administration of
the Trading With the Enemy Act and the War
Claims Act of 1948. S. Rept. 1051. March 4,

1966. 5 pp.

Immigration and Naturalization. Report of the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee made by its Subcommit-
tee on Immigration and Naturalization. S. Rept
1052. March 4, 1966. 7 pp.

APRIL 18, 1966

635

The United Nations and Human Rights

Statement by Morris Abram

We welcome the discussion of violations of
human rights in all countries. We are partic-
ularly pleased with the inclusiveness and
breadth of the item.

We also realize that it is impossible to
discuss this item without referring to mat-
ters of internal life within states — whether
for justified praise or deserved criticism.
This item demonstrates that domestic
human rights issues must be discussed in
international bodies if human rights are to
be discussed in a meaningful way. Human
rights are either exercised or deprived in
respect to a location, and all locations on this
planet (except possibly Antarctica) are sub-
ject to the jurisdiction of some state. There-
fore, if we are to discuss human rights at
all, we must discuss the practice of states or
of people and groups within states. At this
stage in international organization, most im-
provements in human rights practice will
have to come from discussion — from the
desire of states for justified praise or the
fear of deserved criticism — for international
human rights enforcement machinery is
either quite embryonic or nonexistent.

My delegation has no reluctance to discuss
the state of human rights in the United
States.

We have much to be proud of. Speech,

^ Made in the U.N. Commission on Human Rights
on Mar. 21 (U.S./U.N. press release 4823). Mr.
Abram is U.S. representative to the Commission.

press, and religion are as free here as any-
where in the world. Last night I canvassed
the whole catalog of rights enumerated in
the Universal Declaration to evaluate how
closely American practice accords with those
principles. Of course, many of the most
fundamental of these rights are explicitly
guaranteed by the Federal Constitution and
have been vigilantly guarded by a truly in-
dependent judiciary. I could not help but
compare American practice with certain
others which have been the subject of recent
comment in the world press.

First, in accordance with article 13 of the
Declaration, everyone in the United States
has and freely enjoys the right to freedom
of movement and the right to leave this
country, including the right to renounce his
citizenship. Such is not the case everywhere
in the world.

Second, as provided in article 19 of the
Universal Declaration, everyone in the
United States has the right to freedom of
opinion and expression. No man is restricted
to the ideas which are generated in the
United States, for we keep our ears and eyes
open to the receipt of ideas and information
from abroad. No matter how repugnant such
ideas are to the government of the day, or
to the majority of my fellow countrymen,
these ideas pass into our country without
hindrance. Moreover, it would be unthink-
able for my country to charge a man with a

636

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

crime for sending his ideas abroad, how-
ever critical these are with regard to
American society or its institutions. We
listen to outside criticism and frequently
learn and improve our conduct as a result.

Third, our Federal Government is today
consciously striving in every area to make
the promise of equality to all races and
creeds a fact, as well as an ideal. Segrega-
tion in all its forms is opposed by Federal
law and policy. I believe it is fair to say that
beginning in 1938 and up to the present day
the United States Supreme Court has invar-
iably granted relief to every proved claim of
violation of rights because of race.

However, we are not content with our rec-
ord in race relations, and this dissatisfac-
tion is not likely to be more pointedly stated
than has been done on repeated occasions
by the President of the United States. There
is prejudice, discrimination, and also segre-
gation in the United States. But who can
doubt the determination of the Government
to eradicate all these evils and its really
Herculean efforts calculated to end these
evils.

Moreover, we have been determined to
reach all the goals of the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights without sacrificing
any of them. For example, we are confident
we shall eradicate discrimination against
Negroes without depriving Negroes and
other races of freedom of speech. We are
not prepared to destroy freedom or to live
with discrimination. This is the reason we
place such a heavy emphasis on education as
a weapon against prejudice and discrimina-
tion.

Influence of Knowledge and Ideas

I know that many believe that laws and
regulations are the complete and only an-
swer to intolerance and discrimination. We
believe these are necessary because laws not
only restrain antisocial conduct but perform
an educational function as well.

We recognize that it would be difficult, if
not impossible, to lead people to respect the
rights of others by education in the face of

laws which forbade them to accord such
respect. Thus it was necessary for segrega-
tion laws to be nullified before men could
really deal with one another as equals.
Nevertheless, there is work to be done be-
yond legalization and law enforcement if we
are to have a truly just society.

In the United States we have seen the
good effects of massive studies in the cause
and possible cures of prejudice. We don't
know nearly as much as we should in this
field, but we are learning. Beginning in the
1940's an American rights organization,
along with university scholars, began work
on the monumental five-volume work known
as Studies in Prejudice.

These scholarly works have become the
foundation for many popular renditions by
which the basic ideas of this scholarship
have been filtered down to the general liter-
ate public. And these ideas have influenced
conduct, as for example :

We now know that prejudice is not caused
by the supposed inadequacies of the victims
of prejudice but is a product and respon-
sibility of the prejudiced person. In other
words, for a man to say he is prejudiced
tells more unfavorable things of him than
it does of the class or group which he
despises.

Next, we have learned that prejudice is
frequently a form of self-hate, externalized
to a victim, but essentially an expression
of the bigot's dissatisfaction with himself.

Then, we have come to know the violently
prejudiced person as "the authoritarian per-
sonality," a form of emotional illness.

Now, this new knowledge is not without
its power. Since no one wishes to be known
as mentally or emotionally ill or to be re-
garded as unstable, many people have made
great efforts to reexamine their deepest
prejudices and to restrain their antisocial
expressions.

I can personally recall the times, before
this new learning was widely understood,
when prejudice enjoyed a certain snob
value. Today, even, most segregationists,
especially those in public life, begin their

APRIL 18, 1966

637

I

rationalizations by such comments as, "I'm

not prejudiced, but " I am not saying that

we have conquered individual prejudice by
scholarship and knowledge, but I do say we
are making progress in this field through
these means.

On the other hand, there is a very impor-
tant area in which we have almost no knowl-
edge— an area which should be of the great-
est and most fundamental concern to this
Commission.

I was on the American Prosecution Staff
at Nuremburg. I became convinced there
that the Nazi had by some diabolical psycho-
logical process prepared the way for
genocide by convincing masses of people
that other masses were not human. The
Nazi, in fact, indoctrinated a form of collec-
tive psychopathology which made it pos-
sible for apparently normal humans to
commit the most heinous crimes on other
humans without the normal feelings of
guilt.

However, the phenomenon is not new. The
Caesars and the Roman populace were quite
capable of treating Christians or slaves or
war prisoners as less than human, as sub-
jects fit for evisceration in the Colosseum.
In my own country the slaveholders and their
allies dehumanized the Negro and treated
slaves as property. In my own time this col-
lective psychopathology lingers on in dimin-
ishing manifestations which impede prog-
ress and the full realization of the promise
of our American Constitution.

Already there are private stirrings for
investigation of this whole area of psychol-
ogy which has permitted and encouraged
man's inhumanity to man. David Astor,
editor of the London Observer, and Dr. Nor-
man Cohn, of the University of Sussex in
England, have been leaders in the promo-
tion of research into this dark area to
learn the why and the how of this collec-
tive dehumanization process. Surely we
have responsibility to know of this work,
and to learn from it.

Believe me, such studies are of more than
academic interest and may even furnish the

key to the prevention of some possible
future wars.

11

Denials of the Equality of Man

I should now like to say a word about the
particular reference in this agenda item to
racial discrimination, segregation, colonial-
ism, and apartheid.

I need not tell you that my delegation de-
plores these evils. These practices, whether
private or governmental policies, are of
course denials of the equality of man, cruel
to the victim, and impoverishing to the prac-
titioner.

However, not all the human rights viola-
tions in this world are embraced within
these classifications — not nearly all of them.
Last Monday, March 14, the ILO [Inter-
national Labor Organization] brought to our
attention the alleged situation in Burundi.
Here color discrimination was not involved.
Men were said to be oppressing other men
of the same color. The documentation pre-
sented to this Commission included such ref-
erences as these :

Mr. Rifant (from the United Arab Repub-
lic) : "The case disclosed a complete disre-
gard for all human values, with no redeem-
ing feature whatever." Mr. ben Ezzedine
(from Tunisia), speaking of "another case
involving the murder of a trade union offi-
cial" stated: "A government which com-
mitted such acts, or allowed them to be com-
mitted, must bear its share of responsibility
for them." Mr. Abid Ali (of India) ob-
served that "the Burundi Government, by its
contemptuous refusal to furnish an explana-
tion after repeated solicitations from the
ILO, had admitted by implication that the
brutal acts alleged in the complaint were
true."

Such serious charges by a responsible
body should cause us deep concern. And we
are obliged to reflect on the fact that as al-
leged they are manifestations of the inhu-
manity of men of the same color and nation
to one another.

These circumstances also show us con-
cretely that national independence does not

638

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

solve all problems of human rights, and that
beyond independence lies the necessity of es-
tablishing a rule of law which alone can pro-
tect human rights.

We have all seen in the press statements,
to my knowledge, unchallenged, that in re-
cent months 100,000 people have been exe-
cuted in a country, without trial, following
an attempted coup. Neither segregation,
racial discrimination, nor apartheid were in-
volved, but quite possibly a tenth of a mil-
lion were slaughtered. I do not know all the
facts.

But this I do know: No government on
earth has the right to slaughter its people.
Executions, except by due process of law,
are nothing less than murder. I believe this
fully without regard to the political convic-
tions of the alleged victims.

Recently, in another very advanced and
powerful state, a trial was held and the de-
fendants were given long prison terms, for
either expressing opinion or imparting ideas
across the state's frontiers. Whatever the
exact specifications of the alleged crime, I
should have thought the acts were of the
character declared a human right, not a crime
— ^by article 19 of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights.

Now, lest any should feel that these
statements are invidious, let me hasten to
say the following.

There are grave injustices committed in
the United States each day. Even when our
legal system is working in accordance with
its highest standards, because we are human,
there may be miscarriages of justice. How-
ever, and this is my point, self-criticism,
which our society permits and encourages, is
the best possible check against the exten-
sion of and perpetuation of mistakes.

Colonialism, segregation, racial discrimi-
nation, and apartheid were and are viola-
tions of human rights. Some day these shall
be overcome, but the conquest of these evils
will not of itself produce a millennium. I am
firmly convinced that in the long run the
effective protection of human rights depends
on the full implementation of all guarantees.

APRIL 18, 1966

My distinguished colleagues of the
U.S.S.R., the Ukraine, and Poland seem to
assume that apartheid is subsumed under
the issue of colonialism. I would respect-
fully point out the most vivid example of
apartheid occurs in a state of undoubted in-
dependence.

We must not blur issues. Experience
shows that if we rid ourselves of one wrong,
we do not cure all others.

It is not enough to get rid of slavery; we
must also get rid of inequality.

It is not enough to abolish colonialism; we
must also establish effective democracy.

It is not enough to get rid of apartheid;
we must also eradicate feelings of superior-
ity.

It is not enough to adopt constitutions
and laws ; we must also put them into prac-
tice.

It is not enough to rely on the self-exam-
ination of governments ; we must be willing
to hear and heed outside critiques from dis-
interested persons and groups.

Human Rights an International Concern

Finally, human rights either are an inter-
national concern or they are not. If they are,
then all human rights are of such concern,
and the conduct of every state is of interest
and justified concern to every other. My del-
egation believes human rights are insepara-
ble one from the other and that the human
family is one.

From these beliefs it follows that we
should be prepared to examine and discuss
the violations of all human rights, when-
ever they occur. This is the only effective
and honest way to promote the principles of
human rights as promised in the charter.

Further, only by such open and effective
discussion can we discharge the responsibil-
ity of this Commission to advance the fun-
damental and essential objective of the
United Nations — to establish world peace.

The premise of the United Nations Char-
ter that human rights issues have a direct
impact on peace and international security
has been confirmed by the events of the past

639

20 years. This experience has shown that
many international crises today involve hu-
man rights issues, w^hether those crises arise
from religious, ethnic, or racial disputes or
whether they arise from attempts by one
country, or one group within a country, to
impose its will or economic and social sys-
tem by force on another country or group
within a country. In each case, widespread
denials of human rights may ensue. In some
cases, economic and social rights are denied.
In others, fundamental political rights are
abused, and often both are in jeopardy. It
would not be difficult to accumulate a list
of instances in which either the depriva-
tion of human rights or the fear of such
deprivation has contributed to conflicts in
which the United Nations has become in-
volved. For example, many of the disputes
in the Middle East have their roots in re-
ligious differences; in Rhodesia the issues
are racial; and all of us can think of other
instances which could be cited.

Further, it seems to be a fact that many
conflicts are, in part, difficult to end because
the contending parties believe that the rights
of their supporters will not be protected if
the other group prevails. If there were ade-
quate and generally accepted international
machinery to guarantee human rights in
practice, many a people now otherwise pre-
occupied could turn its efforts to construc-
tive tasks — and there are certainly a suffi-
cient number of tasks ahead. What I am
talking about is the problem of establishing
a climate in which men who have been foes
can feel confident that they will not be risk-
ing incarceration or execution because they
fought for what they believed was right.

The establishment of a stable peace in
some areas of the world may require some
accompanying guarantees of human rights.
In certain cases a United Nations presence
of some kind or the presence of a human
rights commission to which individuals have
free access under the auspices of an appro-
priate regional or other organization could be
helpful. The services performed by the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights in

the Dominican Republic are illustrative of
the possibilities here.

The distinguished representative of the
Ukraine suggested this morning that re-
gional commissions already established to
deal with human rights might be of assist-
ance in halting violations within their areas.
We agree. We believe further that the ex-
perience developed by these groups can be
a resource for this Commission, and that the
presence of observers from such commis-
sions in our meetings would further ex-
change of information. Mr. Chairman, my
delegation is working on a resolution we
hope to cosponsor for this purpose.

East German Bid for U.N. Status
Rejected by France, U.K., U.S.

Following are texts of a tripartite com-
munique issued at United Nations Head-
quarters, Netv York, on March 3 by the
Governments of France, the United King-
dom, and the United States and a letter of
March 16 addressed to the President of the
U.N. Security Council from the representor
tives of the three countries.

TRIPARTITE COMMUNIQUE

U.S. /U.N. press release 4816 dated March 3

The Delegations of France, the United
Kingdom and the United States, in re-
sponse to the announcement of an applica-
tion of the so-called German Democratic
Republic for admission to the United Na-
tions, reiterate that only the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany is en-
titled to speak on behalf of Germany as the
representative of the German people in in-
ternational affairs. Since it is not a state,
the so-called German Democratic Republic
has no right whatever to be admitted to the
United Nations Organization.

640

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

TRIPARTITE LETTER

U.S. /U.N. press release 4821 dated March 16

Your Excellency: With reference to the
letters addressed to Your Excellency and to
the Secretary General concerning the so-
called German Democratic Republic, the
Governments of France, the United Kingdom
and the United States wish to state the fol-
lowing :

As already stated in the tripartite com-
munique of 3 March 1966, the Government
of the Federal Republic of Germany is the
only government entitled to speak on behalf
of the German people in international af-
fairs. It is, furthermore, the only authority
in Germany resulting from free elections.

The great majority of the world com-
munity has refused recognition of the so-
called German Democratic Republic. No spe-
cialized agency of the United Nations has
admitted it to any form of active participa-
tion whatever. It cannot be eligible for mem-
bership in the United Nations which, ac-
:ording to Article 4 of the Charter, is open
only to States.

In conformity with the agreements con-
cluded at the end of the second world war,
the Governments of France, the United
Kingdom and of the United States share with
the Government of the Soviet Union re-
sponsibility for the settlement of the Ger-
man question and for the reunification of
Germany.

In this regard, it should be recalled that at
the Geneva Conference, on July 23, 1955,
the Heads of Government of France, the
United Kingdom, the United States and the
USSR declared : i

The Heads of Government, recognizing their com-
mon responsibility for the settlement of the German
question and the re-unification of Germany, have
agreed that the settlement of the German question
and the re-unification of Germany by means of free
elections shall be carried out in conformity with the
national interests of the German people and the
interests of European security.

For their part, the Governments of

France, the United Kingdom and the United
States have always striven to promote a
solution of this question by implementation
of the principle of self-determination. They
will continue their efforts to achieve this
aim. Attempts to establish the so-called
German Democratic Republic as a separate
state can only frustrate this objective and
thus make more difficult a peaceful settle-
ment in Europe.

We shall be grateful if Your Excellency
will have this letter circulated as an official
document.

Lord Caradon

Permanent Representative of the

United Kingdom to the United Nations

James Roosevelt

Acting Permanent Representative of the

United States to the United Nations

Jacques Tine

Acting Permanent Representative of

France to the United Nations

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Finance

Convention on settlement of investment disputes be-
tween states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Ratification deposited: Mauritania, January 11,

1966.
Signatiires: China, January 13, 1966; Federal
Republic of Germany, January 27, 1966; Greece,
March 16, 1966; Togo, January 24, 1966.

Health

Constitution of the World Health Organization.
Done at New York July 22, 1946, as amended.
Entered into force April 7, 1948; for the United
States June 21, 1948. TIAS 1808, 4643.
Acceptance deposited: Singapore, February 21,
1966.

' Bulletin of Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

' Not in force.

APRIL 18, 1966

641

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization, as amended (TIAS
1808, 5643). Adopted at Geneva May 20, 1965.'
Acceptances deposited: Burma, March 8, 1966;
Tunisia, March 9, 1966.

Judicial Cooperation

Convention on the service abroad of judicial and
extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial
matters. Open for signature at The Hague No-
vember 15, 1965.'

Signature: United Arab Republic, March 1, 1966
(with a declaration).

Maritime Matters

Convention on facilitation of international maritime
traffic. Done at London April 9, 1965. Open for
signature April 9 to October 9, 1965.'
Acceptances deposited: Ghana, November 5, 1965;

United Kingdom, February 24, 1966.
Accession deposited: Zambia, December 14, 1965.

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.'
Acceptance received: Singapore, February 14,
1966.

North Atlantic Treaty

Protocol on the status of International Military
Headquarters. Signed at Paris August 28, 1952.
Entered into force April 10, 1954. TIAS 2978.
Notification of denunciation: France, March 30,
1966, effective March 31, 1967.

on Pollution

International convention for the prevention of pollu-
tion of the sea by oil. Done at London May 12,
1954. Entered into force July 26, 1958; for the
United States December 8, 1961. TIAS 4900.

' Not in force.

Acceptance deposited: Switzerland, January 12^
1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life ai

sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered!

into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.

Notification of denunciation received: Pakistan,!

February 24, 1966, effective May 24, 1967. 1

International convention for the safety of life at I

sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered/

into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.

Acceptance deposited: India, February 28, 1966

BILATERAL

Algeria

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Algiers February 23, 1966. Entered into
force February 23, 1966.

Colombia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV^
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; |
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Bogota March 10, 1966. Entered into^
force March 10, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agricultural commodities agreement under title ll
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As- 1
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; f
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Saigon March 21, 1966. Entered int
force March 21, 1966.

i

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

VOL. LIV, NO. 1399 PUBLICATION 8066 APRIL 18, 1966

The Department of Stat* Bolletin, ■
weekly publication issued by the OffIc«
of MedU ServIccB, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
afreneiea of the Government ^th Info^
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreigii
Service. The Bulletin inclndea selected
press releases on foreign policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
Stat« and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is Included eonceminff treaties
and international ajtreementa to which the
United States Is or may become a party
and treaties of general international In-
terest.

Publications of the Department. United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington. D.C.,
20402. Prick : 62 issues, domestic 110,
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printinjr ©f this pub-
lication approved by the Director of 1h»
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

note: Contents of this publication ar«
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin Is indexed
in the Readers* Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

642

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

1

I

INDEX April 18, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1399

Africa. The Foreign Assistance Program for
1967 (Rusk) 628

American Republics

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

The United States and Brazil : Partners in
Progress (Gordon) 620

Asia. The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

Brazil. The United States and Brazil: Partners
in Progress (Gordon) 620

Canada. Commissioner General Confirmed for
U.S. Exhibit at Canadian Fair 627

China. The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) . . 608

Congress

Commissioner General Confirmed for U.S. Ex-
hibit at Canadian Fair 627

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 635

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi,
Johnson, joint communique, message to
Congress) 598

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of
Peace Corps to Congress 634

Economic Affairs

Further Steps Taken To Remove Restrictions

on U.S. Exports 624

National Maritime Day, 1966 (proclamation) . 619

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Board of
Foreign Scholarships Members Sworn In . . 627

Europe. United States and France Exchange
Views on Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide
memoire) 617

Foreign Aid

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

National Maritime Day, 1966 (proclamation) . 619

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi,
Johnson, joint commimique, message to
Congress) 598

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of
Peace Corps to Congress 634

France

East German Bid for U.N. Status Rejected by

France, U.K., U.S. (communique and letter) . 640
Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on

Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le

Monde interview) 613

United States and France Exchange Views on

Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide memoire) . 617

Germany. East German Bid for U.N. Status
Rejected by France, U.K., U.S. (communique
and letter) 640

Human Rights. The United Nations and Human
Rights (Abram) 636

India

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi
of India Confer at Washingrton (Gandhi,
Johnson, joint communique, message to
Congress) 598

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on
Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le
Monde interview) 613

United States and France Exchange Views on
Atlantic Alliance (texts of aide memoire) . . 617

Pakistan. The Foreign Assistance Program for
1967 (Rusk) 628

Presidential Documents

National Maritime Day, 1966 619

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi

of India Confer at Washington 598

President Transmits Fourth Annual Report of

Peace Corps to Congress 634

World Meteorological Day 618

Science. World Meteorological Day (Johnson) 618

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 641

United Kingdom. East German Bid for U.N.
Status Rejected by France, U.K., U.S. (com-
munique and letter) 640

United Nations

East German Bid for U.N. Status Rejected by
France, U.K., U.S. (communique and letter) . 640

The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) 608

The United Nations and Human Rights
(Abram) 636

Viet-Nam

The Foreign Assistance Program for 1967
(Rusk) 628

President Johnson and Prime Minister Gandhi
of India Confer at Washington (Gandhi,
Johnson, joint communique, message to
Congress) 598

The Quest for Peace (Goldberg) 608

Under Secretary Ball Discusses U.S. Views on
Viet-Nam and NATO (transcript of Le
Monde interview) 613

Name Index

Abram, Morris 636

Ball, George W 613

Gandhi, Indira 598

Goldberg, Arthur J 608

Gordon, Lincoln 620

Johnson, President 598, 618, 619, 634

Rusk, Secretary 628

Tupper, Stanley R 627

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: March 28-April 3

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to March 28 which
appear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
51 of March 14; 56 of March 17; 58 of March
18; and 69 of March 25.

No.

Date

Subject

t72 3/31 Gordon: Inter-American Economic
and Social Council, Buenos
Aires.
73 3/31 Ball: Le Monde interview(revised).

t75 4/1 Sisco: "A Fresh Look at the U.N."

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. UOO

April 25, 1966

A FRESH LOOK AT THE UNITED NATIONS
by Assistant Secretary Sisco 646

THE UNITED STATES AND GERMANY: OUR MUTUAL RESPONSIBILITIES

AND OUR MUTUAL DEPENDENCE
by Ambassador George C. McGhee 657

CHARTING THE FUTURE COURSE OF U.S. FOREIGN AID
IN THE NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA
Statement by Assistant Secretary Hare 668

U.S. PRESENTS AMENDMENTS TO DRAFT TREATY ON NONPROLIFERATION
OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN 18-NATION DISARMAMENT COMMITTEE
Statement by Adrian S. Fisher and Text of Amendments 675

For index see inside hack cover

"It is the spirit and vision of the charter to which we must
be dedicated if we are to carry out what President Johnson
called the 'assignment of the century' — the pursuit of
peace."

A Fresh Look at the United Nations

by Joseph J. Sisco

Assistant Secretary for International

Organization Affairs

It is a privilege to be here in Atlanta. The
aim of these regional foreign policy confer-
ences is an excellent one, embodying a basic
democratic idea — a direct discussion of pub-
lic policy between interested citizens and
those charged with formulating it.

A generation or two ago most of the major
problems of government could be understood
by almost every citizen. Today even many
well-informed people do not feel fully com-
petent to judge many public issues. Too
many persons simply shy away from their
consideration altogether. Let the expert, the
man with specialized knowledge, decide them.
Yet these decisions, the complex no less than
the simple, determine the future of our na-
tion.

The need for an informed, educated cit-
izenry is therefore greater than ever. And as
the issues grow more intricate, our obliga-
tion to explain and discuss them becomes
correspondingly more important.

The institution I want to talk with you
about today — the United Nations — is as com-
plex as any around, as complex, in fact, as
the 117 widely varied nations comprising it.

We Americans are pragmatic in our ap-
proach to most institutions. We pride our-

' Address made before a regional foreign policy
conference at Atlanta, Ga., on Apr. 2 (press release
75 dated Apr. 1).

selves on our flexibility and lack of dog-
matism. Yet for some reason our view of
the United Nations has often been some-
what simplistic. We have tended to forget
that the United Nations must inevitably re-
flect the great diversity of views, interests,
and goals of the members represented in the
world body. We sometimes forget when we
do not always get our way that the United
States is not the only country developing the
scenario in world affairs today. We have
at times asked too much of the U.N. and on
other occasions have expected too little.

Polls show that the American people
stz'ongly support the U.N. : 80 percent be-
lieve the U.N. important and want the U.S.
Government to "use it more." Of course, the
U.N. is an important instrument of foreign
policy, one way among others for advancing
our causes and for cooperating with other
countries in the myriad tasks of political
conciliation, social progress, economic devel-
opment, and technical cooperation.

But we must avoid extravagant expecta-
tions about the U.N. Those who start out by
seeing the U.N. as a panacea for all our ills
often end in disillusionment. And they some-
times go to the opposite extreme of pessi-
mism— regarding the U.N. merely as a dec-
orative feature on the international land-
scape. For example, a distinguished corre-
spondent, concerned over some irresponsible

646

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

i

actions by some members of the General
Assembly, recently advised his readers that
"the only way to preserve the organization
so that in some distant future it may play
the role for which it was created is to spare
it as much as possible." A few weeks later,
another distinguished correspondent for a
great U.S. newspaper entitled an article
"The U.N. Tries Hard, But . . . ."

Now, I have been engaged in wrestling
with the sometimes exhilarating and some-
times frustrating problems that have faced
us in the U.N. for the past 15 years. I try
not to overexaggerate, but — to quote a friend
of mine — I try not to underexaggerate
either. I believe the beginning of wisdom lies
in being neither a pessimist nor an optimist
— but in being a "possibilist." I am a possi-
bilist. In fact, I would venture to say that all
practitioners of foreign policy must be possi-
bilists — for politics, whether in our own Leg-
islature or in an international forum, is the
art of the possible.

How does a possibilist approach foreign
policy problems, and more specifically, how
does he operate in the U.N. ?

First, he keeps in mind the real options
that are open to him. He is problem-ori-
ented and does not grasp for utopian solu-
tions. In the words of Winston Churchill:
"Do not let spacious plans for a new world
divert your energies from saving what is
left of the old."

He knows, in the words of President
Franklin Roosevelt, that the structure of
world peace "cannot be a peace of large na-
tions or of small nations, (but) ... a peace
which rests on the cooperative efforts of the
whole world."

He knows he must deal with factional
disputes in Cyprus and disorder in the Congo
and the effect of the price of cocoa on
Ghana's future — and not with some amor-
phous scheme for world order.

He knows that, when weighing the ques-
tion of Red China's admission to the U.N.
or recognition, not only is our view relevant
but also the adversaries' continued insist-
ence that the Republic of China be elimi-
nated or cast aside.

He is concerned with how to recruit ob-
servers for Kashmir, as well as how to
achieve a more fundamental and lasting po-
litical solution.

Second, he adapts to changing circum-
stances. One of the cliches about practition-
ers of foreign policy is that we are unaware
that the world is changing. We are either
asleep like Rip van Winkle or are romanti-
cally playing the old familiar tunes from our
boyhood. I assure you that if you sat at my
desk in Washington for one day you would
soon be disabused of this cliche.

In dealing with U.N. affairs we are con-
stantly aware that we cannot escape the dra-
matic changes of the 20 years since the
charter was signed, and especially the
changes in the composition and pressures in
the U.N. during the decade of the sixties. It
is a commonplace that change is taking
place at a revolutionary and ever-accelerat-
ing pace. The tough assignment is to know
how to design and adapt machinery to pro-
vide for peaceful change while preserving
the underlying values — justice, economic and
social advancement, human rights — for
which the U.N. was created and to which our
foreign policy is devoted.

Third, a possibilist does not start out
with extravagant expectations. He is not
disillusioned when he encounters setbacks.
He seeks limited goals. He is patient. He
keeps probing for possibilities. The history
of our efforts to achieve a peaceful settle-
ment of the Viet-Nam problem illustrates
this dramatically.

World Changes Reflected in U.N.

The task of the United Nations has been
encumbered almost from the start by great-
power conflicts. Its efforts to promote social
progress have been hampered by discord
and strife. It has been called upon to keep
peace where there has been no peace in the
hearts of men. It has been buffeted by the
winds of racism and nationalism as the peo-
ples of colonial lands have moved to rule
themselves in freedom and to assert their
right to speak and vote as equals in the
forum of the nations.

i

APRIL 25, 1966

647

But through it all the U.N. has survived
and continues to serve the cause of peace.
That the United Nations has come this far
is a tribute to the vision of those who drew
the founding plans, a testimonial to the
resiliency and relevance of the charter it-
self. The measure of the importance which
President Johnson attaches to the U.N. is
demonstrated by the fact that for the first
time in our history a Supreme Court Justice
was asked to leave the bench to lead us in
the U.N. forum. Justice Arthur Goldberg
has done this brilliantly.

One question being asked is, "Where is the
U.N. going?" This issue concerns us not only
because of the present financial and consti-
tutional difficulties the U.N. faces. In deeper
perspective, we are grappling with the ques-
tion of how to make sure that the U.N.
structure keeps up with the times. For in the
words of Lord Halifax at the concluding
session of the San Francisco conference :

We cannot claim that our work is perfect or that
we have created an unbreakable guaranty of peace.
For ours is no enchanted palace to "spring into
sight at once" by magic touch or hidden power.
But we have, I am convinced, forged an instrument
by which, if men are serious in wanting peace and
are ready to make sacrifices for it, they may find
means to win it.

Changes in the world are inevitably re-
flected in changes in the U.N. To be sure,
the U.N. must continue to be representative
of the new membership, as it has tried to
be by enlarging the Security Council and
the Economic and Social Council.

The U.N. is based on the one-nation, one-
vote principle. Of the present 117 members,
nearly half did not exist as independent
states when the U.N. was formed. Of the 67
new members to enter the organization since
1945, 34 are African states, most small and
with limited resources. A significant shift
in relative voting strength to small members
has occurred in most important U.N. organs.

If the U.N. is to be vital and viable, it
must reflect not only the "sovereign equal-
ity" of states but the realities of power and
responsibility as they exist in the real
world today. For if it does not do so, the

U.N. will speak but no one will listen, and
its findings will lose their value.

The 20th General Assembly witnessed j
several examples of excesses by the major-
ity, in some cases overriding the charter
provision for a two-thirds vote on an impor-
tant question on issues affecting peace and
security. As Ambassador Goldberg stated at
the close of the 20th Assembly: Where ac-
tion is taken by the Assembly in deroga-
tion of the charter requirement for a two-
thirds vote on important questions, "that
action is a complete nullity. It is null and
void." The discrepancies between voting
power and real power will not be solved by
formal abandonment of the one-nation, one-
vote system. The charter on this subject is
unlikely to be changed, and an agreement on
a formula for weighting votes is unlikely.
Rather, informal influence, mutual adjust-
ment procedures, composition of subgroups,
and the weight of political and financial con-
tributions should help redress the balance.
Above all, patience and understanding will
be required, particularly by the advanced
countries with greater experience in inter-
national affairs. It is our hope that all
members will see that in the long run orderly
procedures will serve their interests and help
move all of us toward a more stable world
order in which the rule of law prevails.

A Hard Look at U.N. Programs and Budgets

We have also been taking a hard look at
programs and budgets throughout the entire
U.N. system. We supported the establish-
ment of a General Assembly committee to A
review budgetary problems in the U.N. sys-
tem. The United States has been the main
supporter of these programs in the past, and
we can expect to do our full share in the
future. We have supported U.N. programs
because they help the developing countries to
help themselves; because they sometimes
avoid some of the political difficulties which
are involved in bilateral aid, they help share
the burden, and they provide a worldwide a,
pool of technical help which is not available
to any single country. But our support can ~

648

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

not and must not be taken for granted.

We realize the needs are great, and the de-
veloping countries understandably want to
better their lot today, not in the distant fu-
ture. But we are convinced that more of the
needs can be met by assuring that the U.N.
and its family of agencies are operating at
maximum efficiency, that sound and system-
atic budgetary procedures are followed,
that program priorities are clearly estab-
lished, marginal and duplicative activities
eliminated, that undue increases in staff are
avoided, and that reasonable and not exces-
sive budget target levels are established.

We are working hard to this end. As
President Johnson stated in a memorandum
of March 15 to the Secretary of State direct-
ing him to undertake certain measures to
improve our participation in international
organizations : -

No nation has been a greater supporter of the
United Nations, its specialized agencies and other
international organizations than the United States.
. . . The United States shall continue to meet its
fair share of the financial requirements of these
organizations. If we are to be a constructive in-
fluence in helping to strengthen the international
agencies so they can meet essential new needs, we
must apply to them the same rigorous standards of
program performance and budget review that we
do to our own Federal programs.

Ambassador Goldberg and I have just re-
turned from Geneva, where we met with
the other major contributors to the U.N. in
an effort to give reality to this directive.

Peacekeeping

We consider U.N. peacekeeping an impor-
tant security option in U.S. foreign policy.
The U.N. has undertaken some dozen peace-
keeping operations — all of which have served
the national interests of the United States
and the cause of peace. We would like to see
the U.N. capacity to keep the peace strength-
Jned. A U.N. Committee of 33 is examining
rarious facets of this problem — including
whether new arrangements are needed re-
garding authorization of peacekeeping and

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 11, 1966, p. 577.

their management, and how these should be
financed in the most equitable and reliable
manner.

However, as long as there are fundamental
differences between the U.S.S.R. and the
United States about the role of the U.N. in
the peacekeeping field, it will be difficult to
make real progress toward a more reliable
system of financing or authorizing future
peacekeeping operations.

The Soviets still want to subject all future
peacekeeping operations to their total veto.
We favor the Security Council playing the
primary role provided in the charter. But
subjecting peacekeeping operations entirely
to the Soviet veto is a prescription for future
total paralysis.

For our part, we will support desirable
future peacekeeping operations. We recog-
nize that where a major power has funda-
mental objections, those who favor a partic-
ular peacekeeping operation may have to
carry a heavier financial burden. We rec-
ognize that the unwillingness of the General
Assembly to apply the loss-of-vote sanction
against those who refused to pay their
peacekeeping assessments has weakened the
principle of collective financing. But we will
continue our efforts to preserve this concept
wherever possible. We favor the broadest
possible sharing of the burden by those who
support U.N. peacekeeping.

A system based essentially on a voluntary
means of financing is not as reliable as we
would like. But this need not be fatal if the
preponderant majority of like-minded states
who support a peacekeeping operation band
together and make reasonable contributions.

This ad hoc improvised system is working
today. Blue-bereted U.N. soldiers or observ-
ers are helping to keep the peace in Cyprus,
in Kashmir, in the Middle East — and you
and I, as a result, can sleep more restfully
tonight. This is the U.N. at its best.

Let me close with this thought.

The key to successful U.S. policy in the
U.N. arena, as in other arenas of our for-
eign policy, lies in joining with other na-
tions in common institutions. We are com-

I

APRIL 25, 1966

649

ing to see that the capacity to act through
the U.N. and to fulfill the purposes of the
charter means building the joint executive
machinery for that end.

Yet in the last analysis, Macaulay was
right: "It is the spirit we are of, not the
machinery we employ, which binds us to
others."

It is the spirit and vision of the charter to
which we must be dedicated if we are to
carry out what President Johnson called the
"assignment of the century" — the pursuit of
peace. *

A great American poet said that America
is promises. We are dedicated in our domes-
tic society to narrowing the gap between
promise and performance in American life.
This is now equally true for the societies
beyond our shores. The Charter of the U.N.
is promises, too. It is the promise of collec-
tive measures for peace ; it is the promise of
constant search for friendly relations among
nations based on respect for equal rights and
self-determination ; it is the promise of inter-
national cooperation in solving international
problems of an economic, social, and cultural
character; and it is the promise of encour-
aging respect for human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all.

It is no longer our national community
alone but a whole generation of mankind for
whom these promises must be kept.

They must be kept if we are to preserve
this planet — this fragile spaceship we share
— from the ever-brooding threat of annihila-
tion.

They must be kept if our kind of world —
the world of free choice, of diversity, and of
the truths in the Declaration of Independ-
ence— is to have a chance to prosper.

Let us stretch the possibilities in the char-
ter. The U.N. can achieve the vision in the
charter, but only with our help. The U.N.
needs American commitment and participa-
tion and leadership if it is to fulfill the
great promises of the charter.

" Ibid., Oct. 19, 1964, p. 555.

650

NATO: An Instrument of Peace

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated April 4

Seventeen years ago today, with the sign-
ing of the North Atlantic Treaty, the West-
em nations drew together in an historic
undertaking to safeguard the freedom, com-
mon heritage and civilization of our peoples.

For the United States this meant round-
ing the last comer on the long road from
self-imposed isolation to full acceptance of
our responsibilities in the world. For our al-
lies the North Atlantic Treaty signified a
departure, no less historic, from traditional
pursuit of national interests narrowly con-
strued. In the treaty we together acknowl-
edged a common destiny and the duty to
pursue it together.

We decided that if we didn't hang to-
gether, we would hang separately. Nearly
two decades of time have demonstrated the
wisdom of those who read the lesson for
the future in two world catastrophes out of
the past.

The Atlantic alliance deterred the threat-
ened aggression which brought it into being.
Behind the military bulwark it raised frona
the Black Sea to the North Cape an era ot
unprecedented growth and well-being began.
Within the framework of security it pro-
vided, the vision of a united Europe became
a practical undertaking, now far advanced.

The Atlantic alliance has succeeded per-
haps better than its founders dared hope
Yet we must never forget why it has pros-
pered.

The unique quality of the alliance foi'
peace lies in the joining of sovereign na-
tions in an integrated system of collectiv<
defense. We and our partners, in painstak-
ing effort, created the peacetime planning
agencies and integrated military commands
called the North Atlantic Treaty Organiza
tion. These institutions afford practical as
surance that aggression would be met b:
allies acting at once and as one. They hav(

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETD

insured the peoples of the Atlantic com-
munity 17 years of peace.

NATO was created as an instrument of
peace. Its objectives are to remove tempta-
tion to aggression and to provide the foun-
dation for seeking a settlement in Central
Europe, based on the principle of self-deter-
mination, providing increased security for
East and West alike. Every lesson of our
common experience argues that these objec-
tives should be pursued in closest concert.

Together with 13 other allied nations, we

have declared our resolve to carry on, to
strengthen and perfect our NATO system
in this constructive spirit.* We shall not
abandon an institution which has proved it-
self in the hour of peril.

We look forward to the day when unity of
action in the Western family is fully rees-
tablished and our common interests and as-
pirations are again expressed through in-
stitutions which command universal support
among us.

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

How the Secretary of State Apportions His Time

Following is a study prepared in the Bti-
reau of Public Affairs in response to an
academic request ^ for information on how
the Secretary of State spends his official
time, together ivith a portion of an interview
with Secretary Ru^k on April 3 on the na-
tionally syndicated television program "Open
End," in ivhich the Secretary discussed his
working day.

SECRETARY'S PRINCIPAL ACTIVITIES

An examination of how a Secretary of
State spends his official time suggests that
his activities are directed toward five major
categories :

1. Advising the President on foreign af-
fairs ;

2. Managing the Department of which he
is head ;

3. Consulting with the Congress ;

4. Dealing directly with foreign officials,
both here and abroad ; and

5. Making American policy views known
to the public, both domestic and foreign.

For illustrative purposes, a study re-
cently was made of Secretary Rusk's activi-
ties in a single month, January 1965, which
was selected arbitrarily. His activities are
described below for this 1 month, under the
five headings cited.

Advising the President

In addition to the heavy flow of official
papers and telephone conversations between
the White House and the Department of
State, on 11 separate occasions during the
month, the Secretary went to the White
House to meet with the President and, on
occasion, fellow members of the Cabinet or
other top White House advisers. These
White House meetings absorbed 17 hours
during the month, a figure which does not
include the time necessary for preparation
before the meetings, or for subsequent im-
plementation of policy decisions taken.

' From Dr. Gerard J. Mangone, associate dean of
the Maxwell Graduate School of Citizenship and
Public Affairs, Syracuse University, in connection
with his forthcoming book entitled Foreign Policy
and American Government.

APRIL 25, 1966

651

Managing the Department

The Secretary must deal directly with
his principal assistants so that immedi-
ate and urgent problems are met, without
impairing the need for coherent, longer
range planning. Morning staff meetings help
set the stage; a dozen of these were held
during the month. Most problems of admin-
istration and policy are presented in writ-
ing; this task is performed mainly by the
bureaus, with the assistance of the Execu-
tive Secretariat and the Secretary's immedi-
ate staff. Yet individual discussions are in-
tegral to the Secretary's management func-
tion, keeping him attuned to developments,
and providing a rapid channel for exchang-
ing views. During the month under con-
sideration, over a hundred individual dis-
cussions were held.

During the month, the Secretary met on
19 occasions with U.S. ambassadors in
Washington for consultations. These meet-
ings provide an important opportunity for
coordination which has obvious advantages
over exchanges of telegrams. As an in-
centive to younger officers, the Secretary
met once with members of the Junior For-
eign Service Officers Club.

Consulting With the Congress

President Johnson has urged Cabinet
members to make themselves available for
discussions with Members of the Congress.
During the month, the Secretary made 11
separate trips to the Capitol for meetings
with individual Members of Congress and
congressional committees. Twenty-two hours
were spent in these meetings. It should be
noted that since the month under study was
January, at the beginning of a new presi-
dential term, the Congress did not meet
until midmonth. Also, substantial time
spent in preparation for congressional
briefings, meetings, and appearances must
be added to the figure given.

Dealing With Foreign Officials

During the month, the Secretary had in-
dividual appointments with 21 foreign am-
bassadors and 1 foreign minister. It was

chiefly in connection with this aspect of his
work that the Secretary was host at 13 re-
ceptions, luncheons, or dinners in the Depart-
ment of State, and guest at 19 dinners or
other functions outside the Department. One
day was spent on a trip to President John-
son's ranch in Texas, where the President
was conferring with the Prime Minister of
Canada. At the end of the month, upon the
death of Sir Winston Churchill, the Secre-
tary flew to London for 3 days of events
honoring the late British leader.

Informing the Public

During the month the Secretary held six
"background" conferences with news re-
porters. Unlike formal, on-the-record news
conferences, the background conferences
permit exploration in depth of develop-
ments. The Secretary also appeared on
three radio-television interviews and gave
seven interviews to authors of magazine
articles or books.

This schedule of activity is based on a
7-day working week and covers both day-
time and evening hours. Of the 31 days in
January 1965, the Secretary had 1 day only
(a Sunday) without scheduled appointments.
He was away from Washington a total of 4
days (Texas and London) , and, in addition,
spent half a day at a ship-commissioning
ceremony in Virginia. Of the 251/2 working
days in Washington, about a third of the
Secretary's time was spent outside the De-
partment of State building (at the White
House, Capitol, and elsewhere).

EXCERPT FROM "OPEN END" INTERVIEW

David Susskind, Moderator: Mr. Secre-
tary, how many hours a day do you work
customarily ?

Secretary Rusk : It varies a little from day
to day, but I get into the office around quar-
ter to 9, or 9 o'clock, and I'm usually ready
for bed about midnight. This frequently
means diplomatic dinners and things of that
sort in the evening, but if I'm not at those
I'm usually in the office. So it's usually a
14- or 15-hour day.

652

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Mr. Susskind: You work 6 days, 7 days?

Secretary Rusk : I usually come in for part
of the time on Sundays — hour or two — look
at the cables and see what's going on. Satur-
day is almost an ordinary working day.

Mr. SusSskind: When did you last have a
vacation ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, when I went over
to Mr. Churchill's funeral, I got the flu, so
that I spent a week or 10 days in Florida
getting — getting over the flu. Otherwise,
I've snatched a little time, 2 or 3 days at a
time, here and there. I hope to get a little
longer time at some stage.

The theory is that the Secretary of State
gets a vacation after Congress adjourns and
before the United Nations convenes, but
they've been overlapping for 5 years so that
it hasn't been easy to get away.

Mr. Susskind : Do you feel the need to get
away from it all, to refresh yourself, re-
charge your battery?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that we
would all be a little more efficient if we got
away perhaps more frequently than we do.
But it isn't easy to get rest if responsibility
goes along with you. And any of the senior
officials in Government find it almost im-
possible to go away and forget what is going
on and forget the job. Fortunately, I have
no insomnia; when my head hits the pillow,
I'm asleep, and that has been a considerable
resource.

Mr. Susskind : Are you woken much in the
middle of the night?

Secretary Rusk: I get a number of calls
in the middle of the night from time to time.
The world is round and that means that
when it's 3 o'clock in the morning in Wash-
ington it's 3 o'clock in the afternoon some-
where else. So you do get the night calls from
time to time but not as much as perhaps you
would suppose.

Mr. Susskind : But you're able to go right
back to bed?

Secretary Rusk: Oh, yes, that's a gift.

Mr. Susskind: Do you ever have moments
when the responsibility and complexity of
your office is almost overwhelming? Do you
ever feel that it's just too much?

Secretary Rusk: Well, it's a sobering —

it's a sobering responsibility. The world is
extremely complicated. We're dealing with
120 different nations. The rate of change is
very fast. During this calendar year we'll
have 50 elections and changes in government
somewhere in the world. Most of those are
of importance to the United States. And
one needs all the help that one can get.

Of course, the great preoccupation is to
know best how to serve the President, be-
cause his is the awesome and the lonely task.
And that's what all of us are always trying
to learn how to do better.

But we do have a competent diplomatic
service, a competent Department. We have
good working relationships with the other
departments. We have good working rela-
tionships with the other departments of
Government, so that the burdens are toler-
able. What we need is wisdom. I've some-
times said when I've seen some pickets that
we need your prayers and not your impre-
cations.

Mr. Susskind: Mr. Secretary, in 1968 you
will have served two 4-year terms as Secre-
tary of State. If President Johnson was re-
elected and asked you to serve again in that
office, would you be inclined to do so?

Secretary Rusk : Well, I wouldn't want to
anticipate even the year 1968. The Secretary
of State serves at the pleasure of the Presi-
dent, and the matter is, in the first instance,
for the President to decide. I must say it's
been a great privilege for me to serve first
under President Kennedy and then under
President Johnson. And I've had to leave to
both of them the question as to my qualifica-
tions or how long they've wanted me to serve.
I felt it an obligation to do so and a privilege
to do so, so long as I was qualified to do it.

Mr. Susskind: Do you have any theory on
how long an official should serve in such a
demanding, challenging job?

Secretary Rusk: It would be hard to gen-
eralize. No, I just think I — that's a matter
that the President would have to decide.

• • " • •

Mr. Susskind : How does the family of the
Secretary of State withstand the pressures
of the job? You're absent a good deal of the

APRIL 25, 1966

653

time, traveling much of the time, in the of-
fice 16 hours a day.

Secretary Rusk: Well, my wife has a
schedule that is comparable to my own, be-
cause she undertakes a good many things in
my place. For example, every embassy in
Washington has a national-day party once a
year, a reception of some sort. Mrs. Rusk
represents me at all of those. And she does
a good many other things of that sort that
are highly relevant to the job that both of
us have. So she has a rather full schedule.

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking"
German Note of March 25

Following is an exchange of notes between
the United States and the Federal Republic
of Germany.

U.S. NOTE OF APRIL 2 i

PresB release 76 dated April 6

The Government of the United States
acknowledges receipt of the note of the
Federal Republic of Germany of March 25
concerning the reunification of Germany,
disarmament, and other matters relating to
the peace and security of Europe. The
United States Government welcomes the
German note as a forward-looking communi-
cation containing many constructive sugges-
tions.

The United States Government notes with
satisfaction the reaffirmation expressed in
the note of the desire of the Federal Re-
public of Germany to live on good terms with
all of Germany's neighbors, including the
nations of Eastern Europe, and it hopes
that further progress will be made toward
this goal. It is the earnest hope of the Gov-
ernment of the United States that all na-
tions interested in the peace and security

of the world will carefully study the March
25 note and that they will find, as the Gov-
ernment of the United States has found,
that the note gives positive expression to
the desire of the German people to live in
peace and freedom and to their willingness
to make sacrifices to achieve German reuni-
fication. The United States Government
supports the efforts of the German Govern-
ment outlined in the note intended to con-
tribute to European peace and security, dis-
armament, and the related goal of the im-
provement of relations between Germany
and all of the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe. These efforts are complementary to
those of other governments which are also
concerned with these problems.

The Government of the United States
wishes to assure the Government of the
Federal Republic of Germany that it will
give most careful consideration to the ideas
and suggestions in the German note regard-
ing disarmament and the safeguarding of
the peace. The United States shares with
the German Government and other govern-
ments whose goal is a more peaceful and
secure world, the hope that the day may
soon arrive when Germany will be reuni-
fied in a peaceful and equitable manner
which will assure to the German people
the right freely to determine their own way
of life and destiny and will permit a united
Germany to contribute fully to a peaceful
and stable international community.

GERMAN NOTE OF MARCH 25 2

Official translation

I

The German people wish to live in peace and
freedom. They consider it their greatest national
task to remove the partition of Germany under
which they have suffered for many years. The
Government of the Federal Republic of Germany
has repeatedly stated that the German people would
be prepared also to make sacrifices for the sake of
their reunification. They are determined to solve
this problem by peaceful means only.

' Delivered by the American Embassy at Bonn to
the Foreign Office of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many on Apr. 2.

' Delivered by the German Embassy at Wash-
ington to the Department of State on Mar. 26.

654

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

II The thought of another war, which would destroy
■ ' whole countries and nations, even continents, is
unbearable to them. They want to help ensure that
such a catastrophe can never happen, and in this
wish they know that they are at one with all
reasonable people. For many years now govern-
ments have been endeavouring to solve the political
problems which lie at the root of tension between
world powers, and to ward off the dangers that
arise as a result of the arms race, especially the
increase in weapons of mass destruction. What
there is to show for these efforts is disappointing.
The crucial problems remain unresolved and the will
even to discuss them seriously is not equally strong
among the nuclear powers.

As in the past, the Government of the Federal
Republic of Germany still holds the view that a
world-wide, general and controlled disarmament
must be the objective. Nor will this objective be
changed by monotonous propaganda which seeks
to question and misrepresent the standpoint of the
Federal Government on problems of disarmament
and security.

Moved by concern about further developments, it
therefore has the honour to present to the United
States Government particularly in its capacity as a
member of the Geneva Eighteen Nation Disarma-
ment Committee in this note a survey of its policy
for peace and to put forward some proposals on dis-
armament, armaments control and European se-
curity.

II

The Federal Government considers that, pven
good will and honest intentions on all sides, even
the most difficult problems between nations can be
resolved in a peaceful and equitable manner. Thus,
on this basis it has reached agreement with Ger-
many's neighbours in the West on all problems that
Were still open after the war.

The German people desire to live on good terms
with all, including their East European neighbours.
Hence the Federal Government has been trying in
various way to improve relations with the states
and peoples of Eastern Europe. If we consider that
there are many who look upon this policy with
unfounded mistrust and even make every effort to
frustrate it, the results are, on the whole, never-
theless satisfactory. They are an encouragement to
the Federal Government to continue on its present
course.

Despite the fact that the Federal Government
has made particular efforts to cultivate relations
with Poland, the country which suffered most of
all among the East European nations in the Second
World War, it has made but little progress in this
direction. Although the Polish Government is
obviously interested in more lively trade between
Germany and Poland, it has hitherto not given any
mdication that it is interested in achieving a con-
ciliation between the two nations. Rather does it

hamper the cultural contacts we seek, stands for
the continued division of Germany and at the same
time calls upon the Federal Government to rec-
ognize the Oder-Neisse-Line, though it is gen-
erally known that, under the allied agreements of
1945, the settlement of frontier questions has been
postponed until the conclusion of a peace treaty
with the whole of Germany and that, according to
International Law, Germany continues to exist
within its frontiers of 31 December 1937 until such
time as a freely elected all-German government
recognizes other frontiers.

If, when the occasion arises, the Poles and the
Germans enter into negotiations on frontier ques-
tions in the same spirit that led to the conciliation
between Germany and her Western neighbours,
then Poles and Germans will also find their way
to agreement. For in this question neither emotions
nor alone the power of the victor, but rather
reason, must prevail.

In recent years the Federal Government has
established official relations with Poland, Romania,
Hungary and Bulgaria. It is also endeavouring to
create such relations with Czechoslovakia as well,
and would welcome a renewal of more friendly
relations between the people of that state and the
German people.

In the opinion of the Federal Government the
Munich Agreement of 1938 was torn asunder by
Hitler and no longer has any territorial signifi-
cance. The Federal Government, therefore, as it has
often declared, does not assert any territorial
claims against Czechoslovakia; it stresses that this
is the official statement of German policy.

The policy pursued by the Federal Government
is neither revanchist nor restorative. It is looking
forward, not backwards, and its aim is an equitable
European order on the basis of peaceful agree-
ments, an order in which all nations can live to-
gether freely and as good neighbours. After all,
the Soviet Union and the countries of Eastern
Europe belong to Europe as well.

Already by its co-operation in the reshaping of
Western Europe, the Federal Government has
shown that its vision goes beyond the situation of
pre-war Europe. It is seeking new forms in in-
ternational co-operation because it is convinced
that the old order of nation states as we have
known them in our continent is no longer adequate
to cope with the enormous political, economic and
technical tasks of this age. We can only master
these tasks if we combine our efforts.

The Federal Government has therefore partici-
pated in all plans for European unification. No-
where has the idea of European integration found
such a response as in the Federal Republic of
Germany, whose Basic Law (Constitution) even pro-
vides for the cession of sovereign rights to
supranational organizations. A policy, therefore,
which is aimed at achieving international co-opera-

APRIL 25, 1966

655

tion and association, serves the cause of peace; it
needs peace if it is to accomplish its aims.

Ill

But this peace is not secure.

The Government of the USSR has announced time
and again that it does not want war. The Federal
Government presumes that the Soviet Union really
means this, but the value of Soviet assurances is
diminished by quite unambigruous and massive
threats like those frequently made against the
Federal Republic, as, for instance, in the note com-
municated by the Soviet Government on 5 February
1963 which states :

"It is not hard to imagine that in the event
of a thermo-nuclear war the mighty and con-
centrated blows of rockets and nuclear weapons
will inevitably come down over West Germany and
that that country would not survive a third world
war."

And on 16 January 1963 the then Soviet Prime
Minister said in East Berlin that the Federal Re-
public of Germany "if a war breaks out, will bum
out like a candle in the very first hour."

Only last month Soviet marshals asserted they
could "wipe any enemy from the face of the earth
in no time at all"; they declared that the ar-
rogance of the West German revanchists forced
them to keep their powder dry but that "never
mind, the means are there of cooling down the
hotheads." Such language reveals a mentality which
the Federal Government can only view with con-
cern, and it has all the more reason as the Soviet
Union does in fact possess the strongest ground
forces in Europe and, furthermore, has at its dis-
posal a very large arsenal of nuclear and hydrogen
bombs, rockets as well as a fleet of nuclear bombers
and guided-missile submarines. It has concentrated
both its conventional and its nuclear forces in the
Western part of the area under its rule.

IV

The Federal Republic of Germany did not have
any troops of its own until 1955. Its security de-
pended entirely on the protection afforded by its
Western allies. It did not join NATO until May
1955, when it began to build up the Federal Armed
Forces. Today the Federal Republic of Germany
has a defensive force but does not possess nuclear
weapons nor has it such weapons at its disposal.

Already in the Paris agreements of 1954, the
Federal Government renounced the production of
weapons of mass destruction especially nuclear
weapons, and to that extent subjected itself to in-
ternational control by the Western European Union.

The Federal Government is determined in accord
with its allies to defend itself against any attack on
its freedom. However, it is not equipped for a
war of aggression. Nor would it be capable of
waging such a war since it has assigned all its

combat units to NATO, an alliance concentrated
only on defense. Within the framework of this
alliance it advocates, together with other allies,
that all parties to it should share in the responsibil-
ity for nuclear defense. It does not, however, as it
has repeatedly declared, seek national possession
of nuclear weapons.

Its policy is aimed at increasing security in
Europe and at creating a situation in which
threats, pressures, ultimatums, and use of force, in
any form, are impossible. Its aim is to eliminate
the sources of political tension. It therefore ad-
vocates both a solution of the German problem and
a consistent disarmament policy that will contribute
towards safeguarding the peace.

The Government of the Federal Republic of
Germany, however, wants to do more than just
make these general points. It therefore has the
honour to submit to the United States Government
the following ideas and suggestions regarding dis-
armament and the safeguarding of peace.

1. The Federal Government is aware of the
dangers involved in a proliferation of nuclear
weapons. If it proves too difficult to arrive at a
comprehensive settlement of the non-prolifera-
tion problem, the Federal (Government Would con-
sider a step by step approach advisable. There are
obviously only two ways for a state to come into
possession of nuclear weapons, i.e., either by pro-
ducing these weapons itself or by obtaining them
from a nuclear power. Both these possibilities
should be eliminated.

As regards the first possibility, the Federal Re-
public of Germany, as has already been mentioned,
renounced the production of nuclear weapons as
early as 1954 and to that extent submitted to in-
ternational control. In the light of this the Federal
Government appeals to all non-nuclear states who
are members of military alliances in East or West
to express the same renunciation and submit to a
similar international control. This should be fol-
lowed by further steps concerning the non-aligrned
states.

To eliminate also the second possibility of spread-
ing nuclear weapons, the Federal Government sug-
gests that the nuclear powers come to an agreement
not to transfer any nuclear weapons to the national
control of other countries.

2. Nobody will be able to claim that the nuclear
armaments race increases security in Europe and
throughout the world. The Federal Government
therefore declares that it is prepared to consent
to any agreement in which the countries concerned
pledge themselves not to increase the number of
nuclear weapons in Europe but to reduce them in
stages. Such an agreement, however, would have to
extend to the whole of Europe, preserve the overall
balance of power, provide for effective control, and

656

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

be linked with essential progress in the solution of
political problems in Central Europe.

3. As a receiving country for fissionable material
the Federal Republic of Germany has submitted to
international controls which ensure that such ma-
terial is not used for the production of nuclear
weapons. As a supplying country the Federal
Republic of Germany, in its supply agreements
with receiving countries outside the EURATOM
area, is prepared in general to demand similar con-
trols by the International Atomic Energy Agency.
Its attitude is based on the assumption that other
supplying countries impose the same condition.

4. The Federal Republic of Germany and its
Western allies have already exchanged declarations
renouncing the use of force. As the governments
of the Soviet Union and some other East European
countries have repeatedly expressed their anxiety,
unfounded as it is, over a possible German attack,
the Federal Government proposes that formal
declarations be exchanged also with the govern-
ments of the Soviet Union, Poland, Czechoslovakia
and any other East European state, in which either
side gives an undertaking to the other people not
to use force to settle international disputes.

5. To dispel the mistrust wath regard to alleged
German aggressive intentions, the Federal Govern-
ment also proposes bilateral agreements with the

Soviet, Polish, Czechoslovak, Hungarian, Romanian
and Bulgarian governments concerning the ex-
change of military observers to attend manoeuvres
of armed forces.

6. Finally, the Federal Government is prepared
to participate and to co-operate in a constructive
spirit in a world disarmament conference, or in any
other disarmament conference, promising success.

VI
The Federal Government considers that these
suggestions and proposals stand the best chance,
at the present stage, of being carried into effect.
It realizes, however, that more far-reaching pro-
posals are required if the world is to be given
security in every respect and if it is to be guarded
against the risk of nuclear war. It is prepared to
co-operate also in such more comprehensive plans;
it believes, however, that all efforts to achieve
security, disarmament and armaments control will
fail to bring decisive and lasting success unless
there is a simultaneous step-by-step removal of the
causes of tension in the world. Looking at Europe,
that means, above all, solving the German problem
in an equitable manner by granting to the entire
German nation the right freely to determine its
political way of life and its destiny.
Washington, 25 March 1966.

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual Responsibilities
and Our Mutual Dependence

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany ^

I am pleased to have the opportunity to
speak to you today on the subject of
German-American relations. You are a com-
munity of scholars — many mature experts in
your chosen discipline, others in the making.
Your minds have been trained to review-
today's events not just in terms of their
present interest but also according to their
significance in the longer perspective of
history.

' Address made at the University of Erlangen at
Erlangen, Germany, on Feb. 18.

Since my arrival in Germany nearly 3
years ago, I have often referred, on occa-
sions like this, to the strong bonds of culture
and kinship between the German and Amer-
ican people. Our common values and interests
have provided a natural and easy basis for
my discussions with your leading men of
affairs. Rather than trace for you tonight,
however, the separate strands of the web
that history has woven between us, I would
like to remind you of the significance of
our situation as kindred nations in the world
of today. I would like to consider with you

APRIL 25, 1966

657

where the realities of this association can
lead us.

The fact that the United States and the
Federal Republic of Germany are both
members of the North Atlantic alliance is a
prime element in the present international
power relationship. The essential aspect of
our association within this alliance is that it
has been instrumental in developing the
military strength and unity of Europe and
the North Atlantic area for the benefit of
the entire free world.

To the credit of our cooperation under
the Marshall Plan there stand the magnif-
icent achievements here in Germany since
1945 of the restoration to productive vital-
ity of a society which had been crushed by
defeat. Ahead there lies the opportunity for
Germany to apply your new strength to the
task of aiding others. We Americans hope
also to be able to work together with Ger-
many in such an endeavor.

The decision announced by Secretary of
State James F. Byrnes in Stuttgart on Sep-
tember 6, 1946,2 to help bring Germany back
to a place of honor among the free nations
was not intended as a simple act of charity.
Behind this decision to free the Germans from
quarantine and to help them revive their
productive capacity there was the implicit
recognition of interdependence between the
fate of Germany and our own future.

The policy of Secretary Byrnes was
founded upon the obvious fact — obvious,
that is, to those not dedicated to the aim of
dominating others — that the recovery of
Germany was essential to the effective res-
toration of peace in Europe. But this policy
was founded also upon a broader principle —
namely, that peace is indivisible and must be
consolidated and defended whether the arena
is a single country, a continent, or the world.

That this should be cardinal principle of
American policy attests to the great distance
that the United States itself has come in its
abandonment of isolation. And here you
Germans — most especially you of the
younger generation — have something funda-

mental in common with us. For we have both
come a long way. It took a reluctant involve-
ment in two world wars to convince the
American public that the United States could
not put off its emergence on the world stage.

That our growing strength could not be
consistent with a merely passive world role
took even longer to stir the conscience of the
American people. Today, I believe, aware-
ness of our international responsibilities
does rule that conscience. The proof of this
has come again and again since that day
at Stuttgart in September 1946 — in Berlin,
in Greece, in Korea, and in Viet-Nam — wher-
ever the challenge arose to stand and be
counted in the cause of peace.

In the view of my Government, these in-
ternational responsibilities extend not just
to those areas where we have specific alliance
commitments. They are worldwide. We do not
expect them to be construed as limiting our
worldwide interest in keeping the peace. As
Vice President Humphrey told the conference
of NATO parliamentarians last October, "The
Atlantic nations cannot survive as an island
of stability in a world of chaos." ^ Our
fundamental task, as he said, is to concert
our power for the purpose of building a
world order capable of forestalling the out-
break of crises.

Germany's Sense of National Purpose

The German people have arrived at this
juncture in history by another route. For a
long time, the sense of national identity in
Germany was stunted by internal divisions.
These were expressed in a bewildering vari-
ety of local, regional, or other parochial loy-
alties. Political unity was achieved relative-
ly late, and partly as a consequence of this,
the awakening to national consciousness and
national pride came with an upsetting sud-
denness.

The newly emergent sense of national pur-
pose in Germany expressed itself most
markedly in the form of policies aimed
frankly at the aggrandizement of German
power. Yet there were undercurrents pres-

" See Bulletin of Sept. 15, 1946, p. 496.

' Ibid., Oct. 25, 1965, p. 650.

668

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ent that flowed in the direction of commit-
ment to the more wholesome attributes of
the modern nation-state. There were, for ex-
ample, early efforts toward political de-
mocracy and representative government ; the
flourishing of the cosmopolitan arts — music,
painting, and literature; a deepening sense
of civic and social responsibility which the
famous Iron Chancellor, Prince von Bis-
marck himself, applied in his welfare legisla-
tion, a model of its type for the Western
World.
I{ These constructive impulses were brutally
thrust aside. But now, the German people
have found themselves again. We see in
being a German Government able to take a
leading part in the advancement of human
welfare. I have emphasized on another oc-
casion that we, the American people, think
it high time that the world take adequate
account of Germany's postwar record of
political as well as material achievement.
Germany has proved its capacity for de-
mocracy— as well as European and world
citizenship.

It is also time to take seriously Germany's
expressed willingness to commit its national
resources in assisting others. If the Ger-
mans are to have any degree of conviction
that their effort will be worth while, they
must be conceded a fair chance to prove the
sincerity of their purposes. The United
States, for one, is ready to accept the stated
intentions of the German leaders at their
face value.

NATO

The most important of Germany's inter-
national engagements is the incorporation
of nearly half a million German soldiers,
sailors, and airmen into NATO commands.
These forces are deployed not only in the di-
rect defense of their country but also of the
alliance as a whole. Alongside them are the
forces of other countries — men and weapons
whose presence serves as the clearest possi-
ble illustration of the practical interdepend-
ence of the partners in the NATO enter-
prise. Germany's role in this enterprise is
central. The territory of the Federal Re-

public represents the front line of the free-
world position in Europe. West Germany is,
however, no mere outpost. It is, indeed, a
firm bastion of the alliance structure.

For us Americans, Germany has a special
importance as an ally. We recognize that
Germany's welfare is an essential compo-
nent of the European stability and grov?th
that we set out in 1945 to reestablish. With-
out it, the Continent could hardly be con-
sidered defensible at all. So long as the
Europeans continue to desire our help in
preserving their freedom, we shall remain
prepared to give that help. This we shall
do, not only to honor our treaty commit-
ments but in simple self-interest. For to
anyone examining the situation of the
United States as a world power in the nu-
clear age, it must be clear that our fate is
linked inseparably with that of free Europe.
Our heavy investment of American men,
material, and technology in the Federal
Republic — and Berlin — exists in order to
defend not just Germany or Europe but the
United States as well.

I cannot take seriously the notion spread
by some that the United States does not
feel genuinely committed to the defense of
Germany and Europe. We adhere to that
commitment; we have no thought of depart-
ing from it. Let me read to you what Under
Secretary of State George Ball told his
friends in this country on the occasion of
the fourth German-American Conference,
November 1964 : *

We have not stationed our troops in Europe to let
them be overrun by a hostile power. We have not
built our massive strategic nuclear force and tar-
geted a considerable part of it against vyeapons
whose only target is Europe with any thought that
the force would not be used if Europe were attacked.

European Unity

There are other German commitments
which involve broader and longer range
objectives, for example, the German com-
mitment to the goal of European unity. The
German Government has, at every juncture
in the evolution of the European communi-

* Ibid., Nov. 30, 1964, p. 773.

APRIL 25, 1966

659

ties, demonstrated its readiness to place the
common welfare of the group of nations
ahead of its own advantage — a demonstra-
tion above all of your conviction that the
goal is indeed attainable.

Your leaders are not blind to the difficul-
ties that remain in the way of achieving
European unity. They have combined pa-
tience with persistence. They have been
guided throughout by the belief that what
unites the people of Western Europe is far
stronger than their remaining differences.
If the German link to the United States
through NATO arose in the first place as a
matter of unavoidable necessity, the German
commitment to Europe is a matter of free
as well as enlightened choice.

German statesmen have not permitted in-
cidental obstacles to deter them from mov-
ing with all practical speed toward the ob-
jective of a united Europe. From the first,
they have recognized the importance of
creating a sound basis for this new Europe
through reconciliation with France. German
and French policy has wisely been directed
not only toward eliminating old rivalries but
toward organizing effective consultation and
cooperation where the two countries have a
common interest. We welcome a Franco-
German association which seeks to further,
in proper phasing, the twin enterprises of
European unity and Atlantic partnership.

Let me say here that this aim is in no
sense contradictory to the U.S. interest.
Apart from the obvious importance of
Franco-German friendship to the health and
stability of the Western alliance as a whole,
we regard the effective cooperation of these
two great peoples as indispensable if there
is to be any durable association among Euro-
peans. This is true whether limited to the
economic field — or extending to political
forms. Only in this way can Europe's future
be assured.

I might remind you that the movement
toward an integrated Europe, to which
German national policy has dedicated itself,
owes a great deal to the original stimulant
of the Marshall Plan. The program of
Marshall Plan aid was put into effect, you

may recall, because the United States Gov-
ernment felt it had a heavy stake in Eu-
rope's recovery. This meant not just the
recovery of Germany alone, or of France
alone, but of all of Europe together. We
still have a heavy stake in the security and
welfare of Europe. We continue to feel that
European unity would serve our own inter-
est— as well as Europe's.

Reunification and Eastern Policy

Uppermost in most Germans' minds is the
great unresolved problem of German reuni-
fication. Since there are, unfortunately,
virtually no signs of progress, patience —
along with persistence — must still be exer-
cised. I can assure you, however, that we
have no intention of resigning ourselves to
the Soviet refusal to permit Germany to be
reunified in freedom.

Although we, as you, have forsworn the
use of force in its solution, our conscience
rejects the arbitrary restraints that prevent
people of the same nation and culture,
members of the same families even, from
living and working together in peace. We
agree with your leaders when they empha-
size that this is not exclusively a question
of Germany's partition but also a result of
the partition — let us rather say the disrup-
tion— of Europe as a whole.

My Government is equally convinced that
German unity is the key to peace in Europe.
Along with you, we will persist in the effort
to persuade the Soviet leaders to discard the
long-outmoded concept of power politics,
which holds that territory once occupied
should not be relinquished while force suf-
fices to hold it. We will seek to convince
the Soviets that their interests would be
far better served, in the long run, if they
allowed the barrier that cuts through the
heart of Europe to fall away.

When that happens, the energies of the
Eastern European nations will be released
for more constructive purposes. They will
be able not only to deal more flexibly and
effectively with their own domestic needs
but also, through the free exchange of goods
and ideas with their Western neighbors, to

660

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

comprehend today's trend toward the con-
cept of a common European citizenship.
Thus they could regain a sense of identity
with the European cultural and intellectual
heritage.

I am confident that, if the Soviet leaders
would only be willing to try to understand
your Government's effort to revive a rela-
tionship of trust with the peoples of Eastern
Europe, they would find less reason for will-
fully misinterpreting your motives. They
would cease crying their tired slogan of
"Beware of German revanchism." We know
what difficulties burden your effort to clear
a pathway toward the unity of Eastern and
Western Europe as a whole. We wish you
well in this effort.

International Trade

Of great importance, not only to both
countries but to the world, are the efforts
we and Germany, as well as many others,
are making to liberalize and expand world
trade and to deal with some of the pressing
specific trading problems. The United
States and Germany, as the two leading
world trading countries, have obvious and
important roles to play in the trade field. We
both attach the highest importance to GATT
[General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade]
and to a successful Kennedy Round of tariff
reductions. Both countries are committed in
the Kennedy Round to make a special effort
to reduce barriers on trade items of interest
to the developing countries, without asking
full reciprocity for them.

Moving from joint German-U.S. interest
in the Kennedy Round, our interdependence
is most pronounced in our direct trade.
Total trade between our two countries is
now in the neighborhood of $3.2 billion, or
over 2 percent of total world trade! From
the end of World War II until 1963 the
United States was the major foreign trade
partner of the Federal Republic. As a result
of the sharp expansion of trade among the
EEC [European Economic Community]
countries, France has now advanced to first
place among Germany's foreign trade part-
ners, with the United States in second posi-

tion. The United States still retains, how-
ever, its long-held position as the leading
supplier to Germany.

Total German imports from the United
States, including defense items, amounted
to approximately $2 billion, both in 1963
and 1964. Commercial imports have con-
tinued to expand, climbing an additional 11
percent during the first 9 months in 1965
to a level of about $1.3 billion. German
exports to the United States (Germany's
fourth largest customer) reached a record
high in 1964 of $1.2 billion, a 14-percent
increase over the preceding year. German
exports continued to expand in 1965, in-
creasing 18 percent over the previous year.
The largest single group was, of course,
motor vehicles, accounting for over one-
third of total German exports.

The outlook for a further expansion of
U.S.-German trade in 1966 is favorable.
U.S. deliveries of consumer goods to West
Germany are expected to grow further as
a result of the continuing upward trend of
personal incomes and the greater competi-
tiveness of U.S. products. West German
agricultural imports (which account for
about 30 percent of U.S. deliveries) will
probably continue the upward trend in evi-
dence for some years; in particular, grain
imports are expected to grow further.

In the capital goods sector, prospects are
less favorable because investment by Ger-
man industry in plant and equipment is
beginning to level off. Nevertheless, demand
for automation and electronic equipment of
the types supplied by the United States may
very well increase.

Although West Germany is a major pro-
ducer of agricultural products, whose value
of production amounts to about DM25 bil-
lion annually, or almost 5 percent of the
gross national product, it is also among the
world's largest importers of agricultural
products. The United States has the good
fortune to be able to supply approximately
13 percent of Germany's total agricultural
imports. Our major exports complement
German requirements, especially in the raw
materials, such as soybeans, food grains,

APRIL 25, 1966

661

cotton, tobacco, oil meal, vegetable oils, and
hides and skins. In turn, although our im-
ports from Germany are largely industrial,
the United States benefits from imports of
German wines, beers, hops, leather, and
specially processed meat products. On bal-
ance, each country has something agricul-
tural to contribute to the increased well-
being of its fellow world citizens.

Assistance to Developing Areas

In all the major aspects of policy that
we have so far reviewed — NATO, European
unity, the problem of reconstructing a di-
vided Europe — Germany is playing a key
and a constructive role. The German concept
of its own national interest has followed the
fruitful patterns of cooperative bilateral and
multilateral association. At the same time,
your domestic institutions have become
firmly established. They have become ad-
justed to the pressures of a complex indus-
trial society. The Federal Republic of Ger-
many has become a mature power, fully
capable of making its own independent con-
tribution to the solution of our international
problems.

If we consider the responsibilities which
both the United States and Germany recog-
nize in the economic field, one of the most
important relates to the developing coun-
tries. The hallmark of today's world is the
inescapable interdependence of the nations.
The measure of a nation's true worth — its
proper rank in the company of great powers
— lies in its readiness to marshal its re-
sources to help other nations who are less
fortunate. It is a clear objective of our own
national policy to do just that. This is what
President Johnson aims at when he speaks
of internationalizing his conception of the
Great Society. It is not only impossible, but
self-defeating, to deny progress to the less
developed nations of the world.

The exercise of international responsibil-
ity is not just to play the policeman's role,
however unavoidable that may sometimes
be. Both we and the Germans have been
ready to assist directly through our bilateral

aid programs and in concert with other
countries through various international in-
stitutions such as the World Bank. We have
both contributed extensively through these
international agencies to improve living
standards in the developing world. Our own
program has been a large one.

Today the United States Government pro-
vides economic and technical assistance of
significant proportions to 80 nations, com-
prising nearly half of the world's popula-
tion. Three-fourths of these nations did not
exist in their present state before World
War II. Over 20 years, beginning with the
Marshall Plan, we have spent more than $100
billion on aid grants and loans. Our surplus
agriculture food grants and sales for local
currency alone have totaled over §12 billion.
In the current year we shall spend in the
neighborhood of §4i/4 billion and will have
aid programs in about 90 countries.

We must help these countries not only to
prevent social disorder and unrest which
could lead to their disaffection or loss to
the free world. We need to help them in
organizing and developing their own human
and material resources in the interest — ours
as well as theirs — of building a stable free-
world community. The resistance of the un-
derdeveloped countries to the political dis-
eases of our time will be effective only if
they can develop a firm material basis for
their political institutions.

The Federal Republic has for some years
been active in this field. Germany's develop-
ment aid program began in 1960. It is the
largest after our own in terms of numbers
of countries assisted — more than 65. Offi-
cial statistics reveal that more than DM26
billion has already been expended on devel-
opment aid, including DM10 billion by orga-
nizations of private citizens. The program
includes, as does our own, technical assist-
ance grants in addition to development
loans. Currently Germany is providing tech-
nical assistance to over 90 countries. I note
appreciatively that South Viet-Nam is one
such country where extensive German eco-
nomic aid has been given and where more

662

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

aid of a humanitarian nature is promised.
In addition, the German Peace Corps now
has over 500 volunteers operating in 12
countries.

But there is more to be done. Not least,
there is the challenge to learn from each
other's experience — at home and abroad.

We see substantial possibilities, for ex-
ample, in cooperative efforts between our
two countries — and also on a Europe-wide
basis — to overcome our most persistent en-
vironmental problems. And what we can do
for ourselves, we can help others do. Next
month our distinguished Secretary of the
Interior, Mr. Udall, will be visiting the
Federal Republic.^ He will be consulting
with governmental and business leaders
here on problems ranging from the reduc-
tion of air pollution to efficient management
of natural resources. The systematic ex-
change of information and joint study of
our most pressing problems will be orga-
nized on a large scale. Through these and
other investigations, we can not only make
progress in removing the imperfections in
our own society but in assisting others to
do the same.

The Federal Republic of Germany has re-
sources to dedicate, on behalf of all the Ger-
man people, to the realization of the ideals
of justice and human progress. This is not
a task for cynics. Above and beyond the
possession of material resources, it will re-
quire the determination to persist for the
sake of an ideal. For young people like your-
selves, who can bring a fresh imagination
to your encounters with the issues and
problems of the contemporary world, this
appeal should have special meaning. The
fulfillment of this ideal will be your task —
a task which you will share with the young
generations of my own country and of the
other Western democracies. As a community
of free nations we can together help the
world to achieve a level of development
which earlier generations could not even
imagine.

U.S. Comments on Sales
of Aircraft to Jordan

Department Statement ^

The U.S. Government has, over the years,
provided Jordan with limited amounts of
arms to meet its defense requirements. We
can confirm that an agreement has recently
been reached between the United States
and Jordan providing for Jordanian pur-
chase of a limited number of military jet
aircraft for its air defense system to replace
older models.

Just as we will continue to refrain from
becoming a principal supplier of arms to
the Near East, so does it remain our policy
not to discuss the specifics of arms trans-
actions as they occur. Therefore, we are
not in a position to go into the details of the
equipment sold in this case.

Our sale to Jordan was made both in the
light of Jordan's defense requirements and
in accordance with our policy of preventing
instability from developing the Near East.
It is consistent with our due regard for area
security and our general restraint as to the
equipment supplied. We do not believe that
this sale will be a destabilizing factor or
contribute to imbalance in the area. In this
connection, we continue to regret the mas-
sive Soviet sales of arms to certain coun-
tries of the Near East which have intensi-
fied the arms race in that area, and we
will continue to strive for agreed limitations
on arms buildup there.

Letters of Credence

Laos

The newly appointed Ambassador of
Laos, Khamking Souvanlasy, presented his
credentials to President Johnson on April 6.
For texts of the Ambassador's remarks and
the President's reply, see Department of
State press release dated April 6.

' For a White House announcement of Feb. 26,
see ibid.. Mar. 21, 1966, p. 463.

• Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on Apr. 2.

APRIL 25, 1966

663

The United States and Japan: Different Paths to Common Goals

by Robert W. Barnett

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^

Distinguished authorities have already
talked to you about social and political devel-
opments in Japan, Japan's industrial capabil-
ities, Japan's role in world commerce, Japan's
potential for contributing to the growth of
developing countries in Asia, and operational
problems that arise when Americans do
business with Japanese.

My task is to discuss United States for-
eign policy and Japan.

I will speak briefly about the scale of
activity, the common appreciation of en-
vironment, and the vital links which give
firm foundation for the partnership which
has been established between our two coun-
tries and how it is that we can respond dif-
ferently to challenges in the Pacific basin
and still contribute to a common purpose.

What makes countries big or little? Ordi-
nary maps show Communist China to be 27
times the size of Japan: 3.7 million square
miles as compared with 142,000 squai-e
miles. Adjust that map to show Communist
China and Japan in terms of population, and
Communist China will be seven times as
large as Japan: 763 million compared with
98 million. Adjust it to compare Communist
China's gross national product with Japan's,
and Japan will be larger than Communist
China. A map showing volume of world trade
will show Japan over five times as large as

' Address made at Palm Springs, Calif., on Mar.
3 before a conference on "Doing Business With
Japan," sponsored by the University of California
at Los Angeles.

Communist China : $16 billion of annual ex-
ports and imports for Japan compared with
just over $3 billion for Communist China.

A most precious social asset is density of
trained brains. Crosshatch a map to reflect
this resource in Japan and in Communist
China, and for Japan the map will be eight
times as dark as for China: school enroll-
ment of youths 18-24 amounts to some 3
percent of that age in China, 25 percent in
Japan.

Communist China is justifiably seen as a
major presence in world power relations
today. So is Japan — in the region of which
China is a central part and throughout the
world.

Problems of Common Concern

War in Viet-Nam lies close to the heart of
all foreign policy calculations in the Pacific
basin. Differing involvement in the day-to-
day military confrontation itself must not be
permitted, however, to obscure the fact that
Japan and the United States share a vital
and continuing interest in the uneasy envi-
ronment of which Viet-Nam and Communist
China are troubled parts. In that total en-
vironment are characteristics which existed
before the violence of today and will persist
after the violence has been stopped.

What are some of them?

The area does not enjoy a tradition of
community such as has grown over the past
two centuries on both sides of the Atlantic.
Among themselves few Asian societies

664

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

«

have yet come to feel deeply interdependent.

Throughout the area, almost all of the
countries are in the process of fashioning
each for itself a sense of valid national
identity and purpose. Three of the countries
suffer the trauma of being divided.

The area is experiencing, thanks largely
to the beneficence of medical science and in-
creasingly effective public health adminis-
tration, extremely high rates of population
growth and grovi^ing awareness of shortage
of investment capital needed for sustained
growth of productive capabilities. Invest-
ment capital generated from the local sav-
ings and brought in from outside is inade-
quate.

Much of the area bears heavy — in Viet-
Nam, massive — military burdens, and most
of the area knows the crippling effects,
psychologically, of uncertainties brought by
fear of foreign aggression.

Sensitive people in government, in univer-
sities, amongst newspapermen and the gen-
eral public, crave the reassurance of faith in
system.

I have had the privilege of participating
in three of the last four annual meetings of
the United States-Japan Joint Cabinet ses-
sions on economic problems.^ There has
been in this short period of time a striking
progression by our Cabinet members from
focus on bilateral economic links and prob-
lems toward focus on basic problems of
common concern, some of which I have tried
just now to identify. Most of the time we
think and talk alike about them.

Differences can and do trouble the part-
nership of the United States and Japan. At
a 3-day meeting of the American Assembly
last fall, we tried to sort out reasons why.
We bear wider world responsibilities than
does Japan. There is a disparity in our size,
wealth, and power: Japan accounts for one-
twelfth of United States foreign trade,
whereas the United States accounts for al-

most one-third of Japan's foreign trade. We
often talk about problems from different
starting points: Japan's attitudes toward
China and Taiwan have a different history
from ours. We look upon most economic prob-
lems in business terms, while Japan often
believes they involve matters of national
prestige. Many Japanese and many Amer-
icans have been approaching problems of
security and military power differently : Ar-
ticle 9 of the Japanese Constitution prohibits
wars as an instrument of national policy, and
many Japanese want to disregard, or regard
as not their business, use of military force
as a factor in national power. Our two
languages are profoundly different and dif-
ficult to master. There are, I am told, 27
ways to say the single word "I" in Japanese.

We have learned to make allowances for
these differences and in fact turn them to
mutual advantage. We respect and trust the
creative potentiality of diversity among self-
determining societies and applaud the grow-
ing polycentrism we see among Communist
states. From different starting points our
two countries work together with astonishing
harmony of purpose in the United Nations, in
the GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade], in the OECD [Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development], in
the Development Assistance Committee, in
the IMF [International Monetary Fund], in
the IBRD [International Bank for Recon-
struction and Development], and in the
"Group of Ten." We are entering into the
great adventure of launching the Asian De-
velopment Bank on the same footing.^ We
will each subscribe 20 percent of the Bank's
loan capital.

We rely upon each other's imagination and
initiatives in developing new thoughts for
development possibilities in Southeast Asia.
We applaud normalization of relations be-
tween Japan and Korea and look to the ben-
efits this collaboration can make for the

' For text of a joint communique issued at the
conclusion of the 1965 meeting, see Bulletin of Aug.
9, 1965, p. 247.

' For remarks made by President Johnson upon
signing the Asian Development Bank Act of 1966,
see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 521.

APRIL 25, 1966

665

growth processes of a Korea to which we
have long been offering help in both the
economic and defense fields.

Japan shares our friendly feelings toward
the people of Taiwan.

I will add nothing to what others have said
about the dynamism and diversity of United
States-Japanese economic interdependence.
Today this relation suffers few real friction
points.

Wonderfully rich exchanges are taking
place between architects, scientists, doctors,
artists of our two countries. Tourism
delights and enriches understanding of thou-
sands of Japanese and Americans every
year.

But the United States-Japanese relation-
ship is not trouble free.

Today, the Government in Japan supports
President Johnson's stand against aggres-
sion in Viet-Nam, but it confronts a press
and public opinion which often condemns the
United States for this involvement, in part
because they disapprove of our policies to-
ward Communist China and they fear escala-
tion of hostilities. The Japanese Government
does not conduct itself as we must in the Far
East, and we do not insist that it do so. For
it to assess reality, make independent deci-
sions, and commit resources to serve its
basic national self-interest will, we believe,
serve common ultimate goals even though
we may move along different paths.

Japan's Economic and Social Development

A great contribution Japan can make to
our common hope for a restoration of peace
and a resumption of effective growth proc-
esses in the Pacific area is just to live up to
its own potentialities for effective national
performance. Its past accomplishments have
been spectacular. Japan's record of economic
development since 1952 surpasses that of
any country in the world. From the years
1951-53 to 1963-64 its real national income
almost tripled. Its rate of annual gain was
12 percent in 1960-62 and almost 10 per-
cent in 1963-64. In 1965 there was a tem-
porary slowdown, but in 1966 its growth is
expected to be about 714 percent. Japan can-

not be a simple model for all countries to
slavishly imitate, but there are components
for Japan's success that merit close study.

I will mention only the following compo-
nents: education, frugality, a low rate of
population growth, mutual respect between
government and business, readiness to com-
pete, modest military spending, and a dem-
ocratic political process.

Compulsory education in Japan has been
in effect many years and is accompanied by
a high rate of attendance. Ninety-five per-
cent of the population is literate. There is
one teacher per 120 persons. And 25 percent
of the total population is in school, and in-
stitutions of higher learning carry the scien-
tist and the scholar to the limits of their
ability.

Frugality is the midwife of wealth. Of
Japan's total gross national product, it
saved 28.6 percent in 1951-53, increasing it
to 38 percent in 1963-64. A predominant
part of this saving went into productive
capacity. In short, saving went into wealth-
producing purposes.

In 1948 a eugenics law was passed which
legalized all techniques for effective family
planning. A legal framework thus existed
for bringing the Japanese population growth
rate below 1 percent a year compared to an
average of over 2 percent for the Far East
as a whole, with percentages like 3.5 in
Taiwan, 2.8 in South Korea, 3.4 in South
Viet-Nam, 3.2 in the Philippines, and 3.2 in
Malaysia. Japan's achievement goes far
toward explaining why Japan was able to in-
vest in industry instead of such economi-
cally less productive purposes as schools,
hospitals, housing, et cetera. In other coun-
tries with lower incomes to begin with and
higher rates of population growth, heavy in-
vestment has been necessary merely to pre-
vent decline in per capita national welfare.

A tradition for mutual respect between
government and business goes back for many
decades. An illuminating discussion of how
each helps the other is contained in William
W. Lockwood's contribution to the American
Assembly's The United States and Japan.
Suffice it to say here that the Government

666

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN ll

is conscious of requirements of the national
economy as a whole, but great scope is al-
lowed the private enterpriser to compete, in-
novate, and organize resources for effective
economic performance — both in the indus-
trial and agricultural sectors. It will surprise
many to be reminded that though Japan is
foreign-trade minded, 90 percent of Japan's
economic life involves operations wholly
within Japan. Japan has created a national
market.

Japan is a member of the OECD and
GATT. It subscribes to the belief that max-
imum benefit for all will come with move-
ment toward a worldwide multilateral non-
discriminatory competitive trading commu-
nity. Most of its leaders accept, in principle,
the conclusions of the U.S. Committee for
Economic Development and Japan's own
CED (Keizai Doyukai) that Japan has
reached a point where it does not need to
protect itself commercially against others
and should be treated by others on the same
footing as the other major industrial so-
cieties of the world. Japan is ready to com-
pete. It also has shown by its membership
in the Development Assistance Committee in
Paris, and the fact that it is the fifth larg-
est aid-giving country in the world, that it
recognizes a difference between what rules
should apply among the advanced countries
and what obligations should be borne by ad-
vanced countries with respect to the needs
of countries in earlier stages of economic de-
velopment.

Since 1945 only a very modest part of
Japan's national resources has been devoted
to military use. In 1965 only 1.3 percent of
Japan's GNP went into its military budget.
Relief from this burden has contributed in
a fundamental way to Japan's capability for
economic and social growth.

Side by side with economic achievement
has been the accomplishment of Japan in
relying upon the operation of vigorous in-
terplay between the executive and the leg-
islative branches of the Government, under
scrutiny of an energetic press, as the
method of evolving national decisions.

A degree of national consensus on domes-

tic questions is being achieved so that it is
in the field of foreign rather than domestic
policy that parties of the right and of the
left enter dispute.

There is much from the Japanese experi-
ence and system that others can learn, both
in the Pacific area and elsewhere, both the
developing countries and those which regard
themselves as well advanced.

U.S. Commitment in Viet-Nam

A different system, and less effective,
has been developing since 1949 on the China
mainland, now deeply committed to support
of aggression in Southeast Asia. For Japan,
no less than for other Asian countries, this
alarming commitment is a fact of fundamen-
tal importance, the main obstacle for that
expansion of contacts and enlargement of
trade and friendly relations in an environ-
ment of national safety which the Japanese
people greatly crave.

The people of Japan, I think, should ap-
plaud President Johnson's formulation on
February 23-* of what the United States in-
volvement in Viet-Nam does and does not
imply for today and the future.

Our purpose in Viet-Nam is to prevent the
success of aggression.

Our measured use of force must be con-
tinued. But this is prudent firmness under
control. There is not, and there will not be,
a mindless escalation.

General Westmoreland's needs will be met.

We are in Viet-Nam with five allies giving
vital support, each with his own strength
and in his own way, to the cause of freedom
in Southeast Asia.

We have threatened no one — and we will
not. We seek the end of no regime — and we
will not.

The pledge of Honolulu^ will be kept, and
the pledge of Baltimore * stands open — to
help the men of the North when they have
the wisdom to be ready.

We Americans must understand how fun-

* For text, see ibid.. Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

= For background, see ihtd., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

'Ibid., Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.

APRIL 25, 1966

667

damental is the meaning of this second war —
the war on want.

We stand for self-determination — for free
elections — and we will honor their result.

Our undiscouraged efforts for peace will
continue.

There is no computer that can tell the
hour and day of peace, but we do know that
it will come only to the steadfast, never to
the weak in heart.

We keep more than a specific treaty

promise in Viet-Nam. We keep the faith for
freedom.

In a Far East — and a world — torn by con-
flict and burdened with anxiety, Japan and
the United States strive together along dif-
ferent paths and using differing resources to
construct a world order in which the un-
profitability of aggression is clearly dem-
onstrated and the possibilities for welfare,
freedom, and self-respect by individuals
and societies are a valid hope.

THE CONGRESS

Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign Aid
in the Near East and South Asia

statement by Raymond A. Hare

Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs ^

I am pleased to have this opportunity to
discuss with you the proposals for the 1967
foreign economic assistance programs. It so
happens that I have had a certain amount
of firsthand experience in these matters —
most recently as Ambassador in Turkey —
and out of that experience has come a con-
viction that our assistance programs are an
important and effective element for the
achievement of our foreign policy objectives.

In compliance with the desires of the Con-
gress and the President we have carefully

^ Made before the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on Mar. 22. For a statement on the Foreign
Assistance Program for 1967 made before the com-
mittee by Secretary Rusk on Mar. 17, see Bulletin
of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 628.

reexamined our requirements in the area
and the extent to which the individual na-
tions are making genuine efforts on their
behalf. The program proposals have been
modified to meet new circumstances, to em-
phasize and accelerate self-help, and to focus
attention on agriculture, health, and educa-
tion. As they now stand, they are designed
as the minimum consistent with the achieve-
ment of our objectives in the Near East and
South Asia.

There has been no basic change during
the past year in the great significance of
the area to us or in the nature of the prob-
lems with which we must grapple. Most of
the states of the area are underdeveloped,
subject to internal stresses and strains,
threatened by domestic disruptive forces

668

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN h

and, in some cases, by external power. They
very much want for themselves true na-
tional independence and the modernization
that will meet the reasonable expectations
of their people. Their basic objectives are
generally, but not necessarily always, con-
sistent with ours.

The question of the bearing of recent
events on the achievement of these objec-
tives can be best introduced through a sum-
mary review of the three subregions of the
area. I turn first to South Asia, since
there have been significant and dramatic
developments in that region and since a
large part of our assistance expenditures
are made there.

South Asia

South Asia is the heartland of non-Com-
munist mainland Asia. The will and deter-
mination of the peoples of this region to
withstand the pressures from Communist
China will, in the long run, bear decisively
on the question of whether Communist
China can be contained and brought to re-
spect the dictates of international law and
society. We should not let this view of the
importance of the region be obscured.

The war last fall between India and Paki-
stan was a tragic experience for us as well
as for the belligerents, but, like many trag-
edies, this one has been followed by con-
structive action. The participants seem now
to have a new and sober appreciation of the
fact that peace on the subcontinent is es-
sential if their universally felt aspirations
for national security and a better life are to
be achieved. Even the Soviet Union has
found it has served its interests to play a
role of moderation through the initiative
which it took at Tashkent.

On our side we, too, have felt the neces-
sity of carefully reviewing our policy with
respect to the subcontinent. In so doing we
have concluded that future aid to India and
Pakistan must be related rather directly to
progress toward securing the peace between
them, since without peace economic develop-
ment is not possible, and without economic
development stability is uncertain. We have

made this quite clear to both India and Paki-
stan. As you know, we suspended all mili-
tary aid and sales deliveries to both coun-
tries when the fighting broke out last fall.
Although we have recently relaxed our pol-
icies slightly on sales of limited and selected
nonlethal military items, our embargo is
otherwise still in effect.

Our recently indicated willingness to ne-
gotiate commodity loans of $50 million for
Pakistan and $100 million for India reflects
satisfaction with the progress made at the
Tashkent conference and thereafter. We
trust that a continuing process of reconcili-
ation will permit the flow of free-world
aid resources to build up once again to the
level required to provide the critical margin
between stagnation and progress.

Our future economic aid to the subconti-
nent, as to other recipients, will continue to
be clearly contingent on the readiness of
the recipients to undertake those measures
of self-help which experience has shown are
necessary if our assistance is to achieve its
agreed objectives. We have had encourag-
ing signs that a large measure of underlying
agreement has developed amongst us as to
what these measures should include. The
new-found determination of India's Govern-
ment to overcome its food deficit problem
and its dependence on U.S. P.L. 480 wheat
shipments is an outstanding case in point.
While drought and war set back the econ-
omy in 1965-66, the Indian Government ap-
pears determined to do the necessary trim-
ming and to make the necessary policy ad-
justments to attract more foreign private
capital and improve its general economic
performance. With our help, coupled with
that of others, India should be able to make
substantial economic progress and maintain
an influential stake for free-world interests
in the Asian struggle against Chinese com-
munism.

Pakistan's good economic performance is
a matter of record. In the 5-year plan
which ended last year, sound planning and
increasing reliance on private initiative and
market forces helped the economy to achieve
impressive progress in all key sectors, and

APRIL 25, 1966

669

the GNP growth rate exceeded 5 percent.
Like India, unfortunately, Pakistan has suf-
fered the effects of drought and war during
the past year.

India and Pakistan have many essential
assets, but they do not have the necessary
capital. We would hope that our help, friend-
ship, and encouragement may serve to as-
sist them in promoting their objectives of
economic self-sufficiency and internal and
external stability. We would hope that this
would also contribute to a more stable power
balance in Asia. That is our objective. I be-
lieve it is attainable. And I believe it is
easily important enough, in terms of our
interests in the seventies and eighties as we
see them now, to justify a substantial com-
mitment of U.S. resources in support of the
self-help efforts of India and Pakistan them-
selves.

Greece, Turkey, Iran, and Cyprus

Greece, Turkey, and Iran, associated with
the West in the NATO and CENTO [Cen-
tral Treaty Organization] alliances, con-
tinue to provide a stable political and mil-
itary corridor that is significant for the en-
tire area. With U.S. assistance and with in-
creasing efforts on their part, each of these
countries has stood firm against Commu-
nist attempts at direct or indirect penetra-
tion, and each is making renewed efforts to
strengthen its political, social, and economic
structure.

In Iran the Shah and his Government con-
tinue their wide-ranging efforts to reform
landholding, increase literacy, improve local
government, and otherwise strengthen and
modernize the social fabric. In addition, with
increasing American private investment, the
country is intensifying its efforts to mod-
ernize its economy and make it more pro-
ductive.

In Greece a lengthy political crisis accel-
erated the economic decline that had be-
come evident early in 1965; thanks, how-
ever, to courageous self-help measures by
the Government and to external assistance,
especially food and feed grains from the

United States, the downward economic trend
has been arrested.

Free national elections in Turkey have
brought a pragmatic, development-minded
government into power with a substantial
majority. Despite the many problems facing
it, we are confident that Turkey should be
able to continue its progress toward eco-
nomic and social modernization in accord
with its development plan and within a dem-
ocratic framework.

Although the Cyprus problem has had
unfortunate repercussions in Turkey's rela-
tions with Greece and also given rise to dis-
cussion of broader foreign policy implica-
tions, Turkey remains solidly within NATO
and our own working relationship remains
close and firm.

The Cyprus situation itself is fortunately
more quiet, but the basic problem remains
unresolved. We continue to support efforts
by the United Nations and by the parties
themselves to work their way toward a last-
ing solution to this serious problem.

Near East

Most states of the Near East have con-
tinued to make economic and social progress
despite the political tensions that surround
and often embroil them. It is a restless
area, sensitive to the stirrings of Arab
nationalism and still caught up politically,
economically, and emotionally in the per-
sistent Arab-Israel dispute. This tangled
matter continues to defy settlement. The
past year witnessed no serious increases in
tension or outbreaks of violence between the
parties, however, and most states of the
area are increasingly preoccupied with de-
velopmental and other internal problems.
At the same time much attention remains
focused on the Yemen situation. While there
has been no fighting there in recent months,
the agreement of last summer between King
Faisal [Saudi Arabia] and President Nas-
ser [United Arab Republic] to settle the
problem has yet to be implemented. An-
other source of concern to which we con-
tinue to devote considerable attention is

670

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the arms rivalry throughout the Near East.
It remains our policy to support the inde-
pendence and integrity of all states in the
area. We continue to work with them in
helping bring about the conditions of sta-
bility in which an enduring Middle East
peace can be achieved and in aiding them to
recognize Communist blandishments for
what they are. Most of these nations have
shown the will and the ability to resist
Communist penetration. By supplying selec-
tive economic assistance we are making it
possible for many Near Eastern countries to
register real economic growth and thereby
meet the aspirations of their people for
greater opportunities and a higher standard
of living.

U.S. Aid a Crucial Element

The news headlines of the year have im-
pressed upon us the fact that in some coun-
tries the search for modernization, national
strength, and international peace has been
thwarted or diverted by continuing political
instability, as in Yemen or Syria ; by violent
international antagonisms, as in the Indian
subcontinent; or by food shortages, as in
India and the U.A.R. Press and political
leaders in some countries have been critical
of the United States, and several have
taken steps to "normalize" their relations
with the Communist world.

In charting our future course in the
Near East and South Asia, we should
view these manifestations — irritating, bur-
densome, sometimes tragic — in conjunction
with other underlying circumstances. The
threat of direct Communist aggression has
tended to recede somewhat; this, seen short
term, is reassuring. What is not reassuring,
however, is that nothing has occurred to

give reason to believe that there has been
any real change in Communist objectives.

The tragic India-Pakistan conflict brought
the populous South Asian area to the edge
of holocaust, but both countries drew back,
and they now appear to be committed to a
peaceful search for solutions to their differ-
ences. India, faced with a food crisis, is
taking radical remedial steps.

Though the headlines out of the area
have emphasized war, coups, disorder, and
poverty, it is significant that many of the
states, embracing most of the region's pop-
ulation and resources, have recently ef-
fected peaceful transfers of political power.
Throughout the area the long slow process
of education and institution building goes
on. The experiences of the year may have
brought a new sense of realism: a disil-
lusionment with simple solutions arrived at
through war or ideological "movements," a
new awareness of the need to respect facts,
to exercise patience and restraint; a new
willingness to turn inward to the hard tasks
of self-help in development; and a new re-
alization of the constancy of American pur-
pose.

When there is violence and instability in
the Middle East and South Asia, the threat
extends to ourselves as well as to our friends
in the area; and our resources — as well as
theirs — are diverted. With peace and in-
creasing stability they, with our assistance,
can concentrate upon the building of inde-
pendent, self-sustaining, democratic socie-
ties. At this juncture our assistance —
though only a fraction of the total country
investment — is frequently the crucial ele-
ment in the maintenance of order, the
building of infrastructure for production, or
the development of basic human resources.

APRIL 25, 1966

671

ki

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolutions
on Closer Relations Among Atlantic Nations

Statement by John M. Leddy

Assistant Secretary for European Affairs ^

I am happy to be able to present the
views of the Department of State on Senate
Resolution 128 and Senate Concurrent Res-
olution 64, on which your subcommittee is
holding hearings. I believe that your hear-
ings can contribute to a better understand-
ing of these important questions.

The Department of State has previously
informed the chairman of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee of its views on these
two resolutions by letter, and I believe that
you have these letters from Assistant Secre-
tary MacArthur on record.^

Let me begin by assuring you that the De-
partment of State shares the goals implied
in the two resolutions of attaining an in-
creasingly closer relationship among the At-
lantic nations. The reservations which we
have about the resolutions under considera-
tion are not reservations regarding their
general philosophy. Rather, our reservations
center upon how best to attain the objectives
of the resolutions and on the scope of the
specific goal envisaged, especially in Senate
Concurrent Resolution 64.

The simple, but decisive, fact is that our
Atlantic allies do not now wish to move

' Made before a subcommittee of the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on Mar. 24, during
hearings on S. Res. 128, a Resolution Establishing
a Commission for a Stronger Atlantic Union, and
S. Con. Res. 64, a Concurrent Resolution To estab-
lish an Atlantic Union delegation.

' Not printed here.

toward any type of federal political relation-
ship with the United States, even as an ob-
jective. Until there is an interest on the
part of the other states concerned, we cannot
do a great deal.

The fundamental reason why there is little
European interest in federal union with us
at this time is, I think, evident. It is that
Europe fears that it would be swallowed by
a more powerful United States. One very
friendly European statesman has said that
Europe did not wish to be dissolved in the
American cup of tea. He expressed a view
shared by many of our friends.

European Unification a First Requirement

If Europe is hesitant about federation
with us because of the inequality between
a United States and a divided Europe, we
can hope that Europe would be more con-
fident in its relations with us once it had
attained something approaching equality of
real power. This hope has been one of the
most compelling reasons for our support for
European unification. We believe that this
is a virtual requirement before political ties
with North America of an organic sort can
be seriously considered.

The best prospect today for European
unification is the European Communities,
that is, the Common Market, the Coal and
Steel Community, and EURATOM [Euro-
pean Atomic Energy Community]. These
unique institutions form, so to speak, the

672

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

economic constitution for a politically united
Europe. And we have done all we could
properly do to encourage their development
and to favor their success.

The results so far are at once both sober-
ing and reassuring. They are sobering be-
cause, after almost two decades of movement
toward a united Europe, there are still only
six states committed to the limited goals of
the European Communities. Great Britain,
in particular, remains outside. Moreover, the
Six themselves are deeply divided upon the
political aspects of their relationship. I
think that this very tangible European real-
ity shows all too vividly the distance that
separates the possible in Atlantic relations
from the desirable.

Yet the European Community experience
is also reassuring. In recent months the
Common Market has undergone the most di-
visive crisis of its 8-year existence. But it
has surmounted that crisis without breaking
apart and without important weakening. I
think that is significant.

That experience had some instructive
lessons for us. It showed that there were
five European states deeply, firmly com-
mitted to the political goals inherent in the
European Communities. When put to a very
severe test, these governments, public opin-
ion, and parliaments showed the importance
they attached to unity by their refusal to
weaken the Community institutions.

Consequently, I think we can have some
confidence in the commitment of the core of
Europe to unity. We are at the same time
forced to recognize that there is an enor-
mous gap between this commitment and any
larger unity vdth the United States.

We shall continue to collaborate with the
European Communities to the full extent of
their willingness and of their capability. We
shall continue to work within the OECD
[Organization for Economic Cooperation and
Development] to strengthen our ties with
our allies and to accomplish specific eco-
nomic tasks that require close coordination.
And we shall continue to support NATO and
its political implications.

Our NATO Relationship Witii Europe

The present state of our NATO relation-
ship with Europe is among the foremost of
our concerns. We have always seen it as an
institution both demanding and permitting
growing bonds among its members. Called
into being by the Soviet threat and fashioned
to provide maximum security for the At-
lantic area, it has seen the greatest degree of
union yet attained with our allies even though
limited to the defense of the Atlantic coun-
tries.

Again, I believe that our current experi-
ences with NATO are instructive and both
sobering and reassuring.

We have seen the firm opposition of one
member state to continue a relationship
which it feels impairs its freedom of action
even in a single, although important, aspect
of national policy. This determination to
achieve greater freedom of national action
at whatever cost is not encouraging. It serves
to undermine our common security and to
divide us. It tells us a great deal about the
chances that a broader system of political,
economic, or security unity embracing the
United States would have.

Yet there is reason for reassurance, too.
The threat to NATO unity has brought
home to us all the real value of the institu-
tion. The unanimity of strong support for
NATO and for its fundamental concepts
among the 14 is persuasive evidence that
this powerful Atlantic bond still holds.'

Thus, as far as our Atlantic relations
alone are concerned, we can see some rea-
sonable hope of closer ties. They will enable
us to cope with increasing success with our
common concerns in other areas of the world.

As this suggests, we cannot lose sight of
the other facets of American foreign rela-
tions. While Europe does constitute the most
powerful grouping of states with which we
share common objectives, it is not the only
one. Our relations with Latin America,
Africa, and Asia are of very great impor-

' For text of a 14-nation declaration, see BULLETIN
of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

APRIL 25, 1966

673

tance. Our relations with them must also
draw closer at the same time that we develop
our relationship with Europe.

Atlantic Union Not Now Practical

In the light of these considerations and
this experience, we believe that the action
proposed in the two resolutions is not likely
to be productive. In fact, at the present
time, an attempt on our part to move to some
form of Atlantic union with our Atlantic
allies could only diminish the prospects for
eventual attainment of such an objective.

We are now engaged in attempting to
minimize the harm likely to be done to
existing institutions by the recent French
action regarding NATO.* In responding to
this new reality in the alliance, we are also
considering what might be done in the proc-
ess to strengthen Atlantic unity and the
unity of Europe. The challenge to our com-
mon defense system has, in itself, brought
the rest of the alliance more tightly to-
gether. Despite the obvious weakening of
our unity inherent in a French decision to
seek a separate course, we hope, and expect,
that we will maintain our successful NATO
structure and find ways to improve our unity
in the process.

Therefore, to conclude, the Department of
State respects the high motives of those
supporting Senate Concurrent Resolution 64
and Senate Resolution 128 and fully supports
closer ties between the United States and its
allies. However, the disparity in power be-
tween the United States and European coun-
tries which have not yet achieved their own
unity makes proposals for seeking far-reach-
ing political action with our allies to achieve
these ends impractical. Only after Europe
has attained sufficient unity to consider it-
self a de facto peer of the United States
would such an undertaking have hope of

* For an exchange of aide memoire between the
United States and France, see ibid., Apr. 18, 1966,
p. 617.

success. We are working to promote that
unity and, despite serious obstacles, believe
that Europe has a will to unite which will
eventually prevail.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for permit-
ting me to present these views of the Depart-
ment of State to your subcommittee.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Report of the Special Study Mission to the Far
East, Southeast Asia, India, and Pakistan com-
prising members of the Committee on Foreign
Affairs. H. Rept. 1345. March 28, 1966. 89 pp.
The American Research Hospital for Children in
Krakow, Poland. H. Rept. 1346. March 28, 1966.
8 pp.
Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Corkboard In-
sulation. Report to accompany H.R. 8376. H.
Rept. 1353. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic
Acid. Report to accompany H.R. 10998. H.
Rept. 1354. March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Natural Graph-
ite. Report to accompany H.R. 11653. H. Rept.
1355. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Tan-
ning Extracts. Report to accompany H.R. 12328.
H. Rept. 1357. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Istle.
Report to accompany H.R. 12461. H. Rept. 1358.
March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Copy-
ing Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R.
12262. H. Rept. 1356. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Crude Chicory
and Reduction in Duty on Ground Chicory. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 12463. H. Rept. 1359.
March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Alu-
mina and Bauxite. Report to accompany H.R.
12657. H. Rept. 1360. March 28, 1966. 3 pp.
Continued Suspension of Duty on Electrodes Im-
ported for Use in Producing Aluminum. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 12997. H. Rept. 1362.
March 28, 1966. 2 pp.
Amending the Act Providing for Promotion of
Economic and Social Development in the Ryukyu
Islands. Report to accompany H.R. 12617. H.
Rept. 1406. March 31, 1966. 29 pp.
Emergency Assistance to India. Report to ac-
company H.J. Res. 997. H. Rept. 1408. March
31, 1966. 6 pp.
Tariff Treatment of Certain Woven Fabrics. Re-
port to accompany H.R. 11029. S. Rept. 1092.
April 1, 1966. 3 pp.
Emergency Food Relief for India. Report to ac-
company S.J. Res. 149. S. Rept. 1101. April 5,
1966. 6 pp. ,

i

674

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Presents Amendments to Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation
of Nuclear Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Committee

Following is a statement made by U.S.
Representative Adrian S. Fisher before the
18-Nation Committee on Disarmament at
Geneva on March 22, together with the text
of amendments to the U.S. draft treaty to
prevent the spread of nuclear weapons.

U.S./U.N. release 4830 dated April 1

STATEMENT BY MR. FISHER

The delegation of the United States
welcomes the resumption of our discussion
on nonproliferation. We are resuming this
discussion today as a result of action taken
by this Committee at its meeting on March 1
of this year on the recommendation of the
cochairmen that we do so.

General Assembly Resolution 2028 adopted
last autumn calls upon this Conference to
give urgent consideration to the question of
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons with a
view to negotiating a treaty to prevent such
proliferation.^ As we resume our delibera-
tions on this subject today, I am sure we
all feel the sense of urgency expressed in
this resolution and a sense of obligation to
negotiate the treaty for which it calls.

When we last discussed the question of
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, many
delegations expressed the view that when
we returned to the discussion of this subject
it would be appropriate to examine, article
by article, the two draft treaties that lie on
the table. The representative of the Soviet

Union, in his intervention on March 3, stated
that he had no objection to this method of
proceeding.

The delegation of the United States be-
lieves that it might be helpful to compare
the articles of the two draft treaties. But it
feels that, as this process begins, the Con-
ference should have on the table for con-
sideration and study certain important
amendments which we are now introducing
to the United States draft treaty.^

These amendments have been developed
by the United States in large part as a result
of the deliberations of this Conference. We
are offering them because we believe that
they will advance the negotiation of a treaty
to stop the spread of nuclear weapons. By so
doing, we are making it clear that our posi-
tion in negotiating an agreement on non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons is not
inflexible. The United States delegation
hopes that other delegations will be equally
flexible.

It is for the purpose of presenting these
amendments that the United States has
asked for the privilege of speaking first
today. The amendments are before the Com-
mittee in Document ENDC/152/Add. 1
dated March 21, 1966.

The United States draft amendments deal
directly with the principal threat of our time
— the threat that the danger of nuclear war
can be increased by an increase in the num-
ber of power centers that can start such a
war. The U.S. draft strikes at the heart of

'■ For background and text of the resolution, see
BtniETiN of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 873.

• For text of the U.S. draft treaty, see ibid., Sept.
20, 1965, p. 474.

APRIL 25, 1966

675

this threat by prohibiting any increase,
even by one, in the number of power centers
that have the right or ability to fire a nu-
clear weapon.

Definition of "Control"

What we must do if we are to achieve
the basic objective of our nonproliferation
negotiations is to limit the number of powers
that will be in a position to unleash nuclear
weapons. There are two ways by which a
non-nuclear-weapon state could obtain this
power. One would be by obtaining from an
existing nuclear-weapon state the right or
ability to use these weapons. Under the U.S.
amendments this route is barred by the pre-
cise definition of control which I am about
to describe. The other way in which a non-
nuclear-weapon state could obtain this power
would be by manufacturing nuclear weapons
itself. This route we have also barred, as I
shall indicate later, by paragraph 2 of ar-
ticle I and by paragraphs 1 and 2 of article
II of the amendments.

One of the key elements in the U.S.
amendments is the definition of control of
nuclear weapons in terms of the right or
ability to fire nuclear weapons. "Control"
was not defined explicitly in the original
U.S. draft, although its meaning was clearly
implied by the prohibition of any action to
increase the number of entities with inde-
pendent power to use nuclear weapons.

The discussions in this Conference, and
further deliberation on the question, led the
United States to the conclusion that the
definition of "control" is too central to the
problem of nonproliferation to be left to im-
plication. We have therefore given it
an exact definition. Before quoting article
IV (c) of the U.S. amendments, I should like
to say this : It may seem illogical in describ-
ing amendments to begin with the last ar-
ticle of those amendments. However, as rep-
resentatives will see, the last article
consists of definitions. This first appearance
of lack of logic will therefore, I think, give
way to a recognition that it is best first
to define the terms one is talking about and
then to indicate how those terms are used in

the substantive amendments. Article IV (c)
reads : " 'Control' means right or ability to
fire nuclear weapons without the concurrent
decision of an existing nuclear-weapon
State."

I should emphasize that the decision of the
nuclear-weapon state would have to be ex-
plicit; it would have to be concurrent in
time with the event; it could not be in the
form of a general approval given in advance.
Moreover, it is essential to keep in mind
that under this definition control relates
not merely to the right but also to the ability
to fire nuclear weapons.

In considering the significance of this def-
inition of control this Conference should also
have in mind the intentions of the United
States with respect to possible common nu-
clear defense arrangements within alliance
structures. I have already read, at the meet-
ing on March 3, testimony from the Secretary
of State of the United States before our
Congress dealing with possible NATO nu-
clear arrangements.^ I would like to add here
that, while he was testifying, he was asked
whether any plans being discussed in NATO
contemplated that the United States would
give up its veto over the use of U.S. weap-
ons. Here is his reply :

We would have to insist . . . that the United
States be a necessary party to a decision to use
nuclear weapons. Because the vast arsenals of the
United States are so heavily involved in that deci-
sion, we must be present for that decision and must
ourselves agree to the decision taken.

Our Secretary of Defense was asked the
same question. He was equally explicit. Here
is his reply :

We have no plan to dilute our veto in any way
and our allies are not asking us for a dilution of
that veto.

These clear statements of U.S. intentions
and the clear definition of "control" in the
U.S. draft indicate that the U.S. draft would
not permit a non-nuclear-weapon state to
have any relationship to nuclear weapons
which would give it the right or ability to

" For a statement made by Secretary Rusk before
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy on Feb. 23,
see ibid., Mar. 14, 1966, p. 406.

676

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

fire such weapons on its own. Furthermore,
under provisions of the U.S. amendments
that I will be discussing later, a nuclear-
weapon state is prohibited from allowing a
non-nuclear-weapon state to have a relation-
ship to nuclear weapons which would permit
the non-nuclear-weapon state to obtain man-
ufacturing or design information.

With these clear prohibitions of the U.S.
draft in mind, we do the cause of nonpro-
liferation a disservice if we permit ourselves
to be diverted into theoretical discussions
about what is meant by "access" to nuclear
weapons. Here we should note in passing
that U.N. Resolution 2028 does not entangle
itself in this vague concept of "access."

We do the cause of nonproliferation even
less service if we let ourselves be drawn into
a debate on whether certain collective de-
fense arrangements might increase the in-
fluence within an alliance of a non-nuclear-
weapon state. This would indeed be a
fruitless expenditure of our efforts, partic-
ularly when those attacking these collective
defense arrangements concede that they
do not involve the acquisition of any inde-
pendent ability to fire nuclear weapons.

We have a difficult enough task ahead of
us in negotiating a nonproliferation agree-
ment if we concentrate — as we should and
must — on the central issues. We should
therefore reject diversions which may ren-
der a difficult task impossible.

If we but concentrate on our main task,
we shall, despite the difficulties which now
face us, be able to accomplish our objective:
the negotiation of an agreement which in-
sures that the number of power centers
which have the right or ability to start a
nuclear war will not be increased — not even
by one.

I hope I have made clear the views of
the United States on the importance of the
definition of "control." With this in mind,
I should like to explain the other portions of
our new amendments.

First, as representatives may have already
gathered from my remarks, we have adopted
in our amendments the concept of "nuclear-
weapon State" and "non-nuclear-weapon

State." This is a concept which I believe was
first mentioned by the distinguished repre-
sentative of India [V. C. Trivedi] during
our last session. These terms nuclear-
weapon state and non-nuclear-weapon state
are formally noted in subparagraphs (a)
and (b) of article IV. This is the article
dealing with definitions, but these terms, as
they are defined, appear throughout articles
I and II of the amendments.

As Ambassador Trivedi has pointed out,
there are states with important programs
for peaceful uses of nuclear energy which
have wisely chosen to refrain from manu-
facturing or acquiring nuclear weapons. Our
original draft was therefore not accurate in
defining such states as "non-nuclear." We
believe that our amendments, by making the
distinction between nuclear-weapon states
and non-nuclear-weapon states, better de-
scribe the actual problem with which we
are dealing — the problem of preventing the
proliferation of nuclear weapons. I am
happy to note that some recent speakers in
the Committee already seem to have adopted
this concept, following the lead which the
representative of India gave us at the last
session.

The adoption of this terminology may help
stop the talk of a "nuclear club." This phrase
has often been used loosely in discussing
the proliferation problem. I submit that it
is a phrase which, with its implications of
a high table or superior coterie, is quite in-
consistent with the objectives of our work
here.

Obligations of Nuclear-Weapon States

Let me now draw attention to our new
article I and the obligations it establishes
for nuclear-weapon states. Under the first
paragraph of this new article, the nuclear-
weapon states parties to the treaty under-
take : "Not to transfer nuclear weapons into
the national control of any non-nuclear-
weapon State, or into the control of any as-
sociation of non-nuclear-weapon States."

The first portion of this new language
maintains the prohibition in our prior draft
against transfer of nuclear weapons into the

APRIL 25, 1966

677

national control of any non-nuclear-weapon
state. The second portion forbids also the
transfer of nuclear weapons into the control
of any association of non-nuclear-weapon
states.

A close analysis of the language in article
I of the original U.S. draft treaty dated
August 17, 1965, showed that it might have
been interpreted as permitting the creation
of a new nuclear entity composed entirely
of non-nuclear-weapon states, in the event
that a preexisting nuclear-weapon state had
previously unilaterally disarmed itself of
nuclear weapons. This result was not in-
tended, but to remove any doubt the amend-
ment makes explicit the intent not to
transfer control of nuclear weapons, either
to a single non-nuclear-weapon state or to
several such states acting together.

Paragraph 2 of our new article I would
oblige the nuclear-weapon states:

Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon State
or association of such States:

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
■weapons, in preparations for such manufacture,
or in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufac-
ture or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

As representatives will realize, in sub-
paragraph (a) of this new formulation we
have adopted to some extent provisions con-
tained in the Soviet articles I and II
concerning preparations for manufacture
and concerning testing of nuclear weapons.
Here we have also sought to take into account
the wise observation of the distinguished
representative of Sweden at our meeting of
February 24, when she pointed out that
there was not one but a chain of decisions
leading up to the final action of "manufac-
ture" of nuclear weapons.

In paragraph 2 (b) of our new article I,
we have adopted the concept of a prohibition
against encouraging or inducing a non-nu-
clear-weapon state to manufacture or other-
wise acquire its own weapons. This idea of
a prohibition against encouragement or in-
ducement adopts a concept that had its
origin in article I, paragraph 2, of the treaty
banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmos-

phere, in outer space and under water. This
concept would be equally suitable in the
treaty we are now considering.

I have already indicated to this Confer-
ence why I think that the concept of access
is not productive of progress in our work
here. But at this stage I should also point
out that any legitimate concerns in this
regard should be taken care of by the
amendment that I am now discussing and
the comparable provisions of article II. The
obligations of nuclear-weapon states and the
corresponding obligations of non-nuclear-
weapon states in these two amendments —
articles I and II — are, so to speak, mirror
images of one another. The amendments to
article I make it perfectly clear that the
nuclear-weapon states cannot do anything
that would assist the non-nuclear-weapon
states in manufacturing nuclear weapons, in
preparing for their manufacture, or in test-
ing them. They go even further and commit
the nuclear-weapon states not to do anything
which will encourage or induce the non-nu-
clear-weapon states to manufacture or other-
wise acquire their own nuclear weapons.

This commitment must be evaluated in
the light of the corresponding commitment
in article II, under which, in paragraph 1,
the non-nuclear-weapon states agree not to
manufacture nuclear weapons and, in para-
graph 2, not to accept assistance in the
manufacture of nuclear weapons, in prepara-
tion for such manufacture, or in test-
ing nuclear weapons, or even to accept
encouragement or inducement to acquire
nuclear weapons otherwise. As I shall make
clear in my discussion of paragraph 4 of
articles I and II, respectively, these solemn
commitments apply to units or personnel of
a non-nuclear-weapon state which are under
the command of a military alliance.

I should now like to call your attention
to paragraph 3 of our new article I, which,
in addition to previous prohibitions, obliges
nuclear-weapon states: "Not to take any
other action which would cause an increase
in the total number of States and associa-
tions of States having control of nuclear
weapons."

u

678

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

This provision, together with the defini-
tion of control, which I described earlier,
completes the embodiment in treaty lan-
guage of our Government's position that
there should be no increase — not even by
one — in the centers of nuclear power which
have the right or ability to start a nuclear
war.

This provision would bar any transfer of
control of nuclear weapons to any associa-
tion of states — that is, it would prohibit the
granting to any such association of the
right or ability to fire a nuclear weapon
without the explicit concurrent decision of
a nuclear-weapon state — unless one of the
members of the association was a nuclear-
weapon state and that member gave up its
entire nuclear arsenal to the association.
Since this would not involve any increase
in the number of nuclear-weapon powers, no
proliferation would result.

This section of the U.S. amendments is
also related to discussions about possible
common nuclear defense arrangements
within alliance structures. This is a subject
on which there has been a great deal of
misunderstanding and some misstatements.
It is for that reason that I should like to
develop the implications of this section some-
what further.

I should like to do so by pointing out that
where a nuclear-weapon state retains a veto
over any use of nuclear weapons, there is
no problem of transfer of control. That is
because no additional state and no associa-
tion of states gains the right or ability to
take, on its own, a decision to use nuclear
weapons. Neither would have the ability to
start a nuclear war. That terrible decision
remains in the hands of the existing nuclear-
weapon states, and no question of transfer
of control even arises.

In this connection, the testimony of the
Secretaries of State and Defense of the
United States concerning the intentions of
the U.S. with respect to proposed nuclear
arrangements within NATO should make it
quite clear that no one in NATO has been
talking about any arrangements which would
involve the proliferation of nuclear weapons.

indirect Action Prohibited

Paragraph 4 of our new article I also
constitutes an important addition to our
draft. It commits the nuclear-weapon states
parties to the treaty: "Not to take any of
the actions prohibited in the preceding para-
graphs of this Article directly, or indirectly
through third States or associations of
States, or through units of the armed forces
or military personnel of any State, even if
such units or personnel are under the com-
mand of a military alliance."

Both the original U.S. draft and the Soviet
draft reflected a concern with preventing
the possibility of a state doing indirectly,
in conjunction with one or several other
states, what it could not do directly. Our
new article I, paragraph 4, represents a re-
finement of our previous formulation and,
in addition, borrows from the formulations
in all three paragraphs of the Soviet article
I. We believe this new paragraph 4 to be
more concise and more comprehensive than
either our own previous formulation or the
Soviet draft.

I shall not go further today in describing
our new article II, which sets forth the obli-
gations of non-nuclear-weapon states. The
important point about article II is that it
corresponds in reciprocal fashion or, as I
said earlier, it is a mirror image of the obli-
gations required of the nuclear-weapon
states in article I. Nor do I intend today to
discuss the language of other articles of the
treaty to which we have not proposed
amendments. We shall deal with these other
articles later as our discussion progresses.

I have already dealt with three subpara-
graphs of our new article IV. In particular,
I have already noted the precise definition
of "control" contained in subparagraph (c)
of that article. I would emphasize once
again our strong belief that this definition,
taken in conjunction with our new articles
I and II, represents the most precise prohibi-
tions yet formulated against proliferation of
nuclear weapons.

It remains for me to indicate the last ele-
ment in our new amendments, an element
which, in our view, is of considerable im-

APRIL 25, 1966

679

portance. I refer to the bracketed portion in
our new article IV (d) which indicates that
a definition of "nuclear weapon" is to be
supplied at that point. We are convinced of
the need for such a definition but believe
that it is not essential at this point in our
negotiations and can be formulated at an
appropriate technical level at the appropri-
ate time. We do think it advisable at this
time to call the Committee's attention to
this question.

Path to Agreement Now Open

Mr. Chairman, we believe that these new
U.S. amendments reflect better than our
previous draft — and, with all due respect,
better than the present Soviet draft — the
requirements for a just, precise, and effec-
tive treaty to prevent the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. We submit these amend-
ments as evidence of our deep desire to
reach agreement on this all-important ques-
tion. We seek to move our negotiations for-
ward. We hope the Soviet response will be
in the same spirit so that we may look for-
ward to a constructive period of delibera-
tions.

I shall not try to anticipate here and now
the reaction of the Soviet Government to
these amendments. If the Soviet Govern-
ment is truly concerned about preventing
proliferation, direct or indirect, and is not
more interested in seeking to interfere with
justifiable and proper defense arrangements
among allies, then it should recognize that
we have provided in this new language the
basis for a foolproof nonproliferation treaty
that can be negotiated and implemented be-
fore it is too late.

We believe that we have today taken a
further step toward agreement. Certainly
that is our intention. We believe that the
Soviet Government should recognize this in-
tention and in our further discussions should
respond to this effort in a constructive way.
The path to agreement may not be wide or
smooth, but it is now open if men of com-
mon cause and of good will are prepared to
make use of it.

AMENDMENTS TO U.S. DRAFT TREATY

Amendments to the U.S. Draft Treaty To
Prevent the Spread of Nuclear Weapons
(ENDC/152, August 17, 1965)
Article I

Each of the nuclear-weapon States party to this
treaty undertakes :

1. Not to transfer nuclear weapons into the
national control of any non-nuclear-weapon State,
or into the control of any association of non-nuclear-
weapon States.

2. Not to provide to any non-nuclear-weapon
State or association of such States —

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, in preparations for such manufacture,
or in the testing of nuclear weapons ; or

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture
or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

3. Not to take any other action which would
cause an increase in the total number of States
and associations of States having control of
nuclear weapons.

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited
in the preceding paragraphs of this Article di-
rectly, or indirectly through third States or as-
sociations of States, or through units of the
armed forces or military personnel of any State,
even if such units or personnel are under the
command of a military alliance.

Article II

Each of the non-nuclear-weapon States party
to this treaty undertakes:

1. Not to manufacture nuclear weapons, and
not to seek or to receive the transfer of nuclear
weapons into its national control or into the
control of any association of non-nuclear-weapon
States of which it is a member.

2. Not to seek or receive, and not to provide,
whether alone or in any association of non-
nuclear-weapon States:

(a) assistance in the manufacture of nuclear
weapons, in preparations for such manufacture, or
in the testing of nuclear weapons; or

(b) encouragement or inducement to manufacture
or otherwise acquire its own nuclear weapons.

3. Not to take any other action which would
cause an increase in the total number of States
and associations of States having control of
nuclear weapons.

4. Not to take any of the actions prohibited
in the preceding paragraphs of this Article di-
rectly, or indirectly through third States or as-
sociations of States, or through units of its
armed forces or its military personnel, even if

680

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

such units or personnel are under the command
of a military alliance.

Article IV
In this treaty

(a) "Nuclear-weapon State" means a State
controlling: nuclear weapons as of . . . (date).

(b) "Non-nuclear- weapon State" means any
State which is not a "nuclear-weapon State".

(c) "Control" means right or ability to fire
nuclear weapons without the concurrent decision
of an existing nuclear-weapon State.

(d) "Nuclear weapon" means (defini-
tion to be supplied).

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on April 1 confirmed the nomination
of Joseph Palmer 2d to be an Assistant Secretary of
State. (For biographic details, see Department of
State press release 78 dated April 11.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

I

MULTILATERAL

Automotive Traffic

Convention concerning customs facilities for
touring. Done at New York June 4, 1954. En-
tered into force September 11, 1957. TIAS 3879.
Notification that it considers itself bound:
Malta, January 3, 1966. »

Customs convention on the temporary importa-
tion of private road vehicles. Done at New
York June 4, 1954. Entered into force Decem-
ber 15, 1957. TIAS 3943.

Notification that it considers itself bound:
Malta, January 3, 1966. '

Aviation

Protocol to amend the convention for the unifica-
tion of certain rules relating to international
carriage by air signed at Warsaw on October
12, 1929 (TS 876). Done at The Hague Septem-
ber 28, 1955."

APRIL 25, 1966

Ratification deposited: Liechtenstein, January

3, 1966.
Accession deposited: Spain, December 6, 1965.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of
the World Health Organization, as amended
(TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva May 20,
1965. "

Acceptance deposited: Sierra Leone, March 3,
1966.

Law of the Sea

Convention on fishing and conservation of the

living resources of the high seas. Done at

Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force

March 20, 1966.

Proclaimed by the President: March 31, 1966.
Convention on the continental shelf. Done at

Geneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force

June 10, 1964. TIAS 5578.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands.' February
18, 1966.
Convention on the high seas. Done at Geneva

April 29, 1958. Entered into force September

30, 1962. TIAS 5200.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,* February
18, 1966.
Convention on the territorial sea and the con-
tiguous zone. Done at Geneva April 29, 1958.

Entered into force September 10, 1964. TIAS

5639.

Ratification deposited: Netherlands,' February
18, 1966.
Optional protocol of signature concerning the

compulsory settlement of disputes. Done at

(Jeneva April 29, 1958. Entered into force

September 30, 1962."

Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February
18, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergov-
ernmental Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September
15, 1964. "
Acceptance received: Yugoslavia, March 4, 1966.

Nationality

Protocol relating to military obligations in cer-
tain cases of double nationality, concluded at
The Hague April 12, 1930. Entered into force
May 25, 1937.

Accession deposited: Mauritania, March 2,
1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089),
relating to measures of control;

Protocol to the International Convention for the
Northwest Atlantic Fisheries (TIAS 2089), re-

' On February 28. 1966, Malta informed the U.N.
Secretary-General that it does not intend to main-
tain the reservations made on its behalf by the
United Kingdom in respect of the convention at the
time of its extension to Malta on August 7, 1957.

" Not in force for the United States.

' Not in force.

* With a declaration.

681

lating to entry into force of proposals adopted

by the Commission.

Done at Washington November 29, 1965. Open

for sigTiature at Washington November 29

through December 12, 1965."
Ratification deposited: Canada, April 1, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration. Done at
Washington June 4, 1965. '
Signature: Monaco, April 7, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade to introduce a part IV on
trade and development and to amend annex I.
Open for acceptance by signature or otherwise,
at Geneva from February 8, 1965.
Ratification deposited: Finland, December 14,

1965.
Acceptances: Iceland, December 16, 1965;

Sweden, December 17, 1965.

Transit Trade of Land-Locked States

Convention on transit trade of land-locked states.
Adopted by the United Nations Conference on
Transit Trade of Land-locked Countries at
New York July 8, 1965. Open for signature
until December 31, 1965.

Signatures: Afghanistan, July 8, 1965; Argen-
tina, December 29, 1965; Belgium, December
30, 1965;' Bolivia, December 29, 1965;'
Brazil, August 4, 1965; Byelorussian Soviet
Socialist Republic, December 28, 1965;* Cam-
eroon, August 10, 1965; Central African Re-
public, December 30, 1965; Chile, December
20, 1965;' Czechoslovakia, December 10,
1965; ' Federal Republic of Germany, Decem-
ber 20, 1965;' Holy See, December 30, 1965;

Hungary, December 30, 1965; Italy, Decem-
ber 31, 1965;' Luxembourg, December 28,
1965' Nepal, July 9, 1965; Netherlands,
December 30, 1965; Paraguay, December 23,
1965; Rwanda, July 23, 1965; San Marino,
July 23, 1965; Sudan, August 11, 1965;'
Switzerland, December 10, 1965; Uganda,
December 21, 1965; Ukrainian Soviet Social-
ist Republic, December 31, 1965;° Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, December 28,
1965;" United States, December 30, 1965;
Yugoslavia, July 8, 1965; Zambia, Decem-
ber 23, 1965.

BILATERAL

Paraguay

Agreement relating to the reciprocal grranting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Asuncion March 18, 1966. Entered
into force March 18, 1966.

United Kingdom

Interim agreement relating to the renegotiation
of schedule XX (United States) to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (TIAS 1700).
Signed at Washington April 5, 1966. Entered into
force April 5, 1966.

' Not in force.

' With a declaration.

' With reservations and a declaration.

' With a reservation and a declaration.

' With a reservation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1400 PUBLICATION a0«8 APRIL 25, 1966

The Department of State Bnlletin, a
weekly pablication Issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the ForelKn
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.O.,
20402. Price: 52 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printinsr of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

682

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX April 25, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. UOO

Africa. Palmer confirmed as Assistant Secre-
tary 681

Asia. Charting the Future Course of U.S. For-
eign Aid in the Near East and South Asia
(Hare) 668

Atomic Energy. U.S. Presents Amendments to
Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee (Fisher, text of amendments) .... 675

Congress

Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign
Aid in the Near East and South Asia (Hare) 668

Confirmations (Palmer) 681

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 674

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu-
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic
Nations (Leddy) 672

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Palmer) 681

How the Secretary of State Apportions His
Time 651

Disarmament. U.S. Presents Amendments to
Draft Treaty on Nonproliferation of Nuclear
Weapons in 18-Nation Disarmament Commit-
tee (Fisher, text of amendments) .... 675

Economic Affairs

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual
Responsibilities and Our Mutual Dependence
(McGhee) 657

The United States and Japan: Different Paths
to Common Goals (Barnett) 664

Europe

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu-
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic
Nations (Leddy) 672

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" German
Note of March 25 (exchange of notes) . . 654

Foreign Aid. Charting the Future Course of
U.S. Foreign Aid in the Near East and
South Asia (Hare) 668

Germany

The United States and Germany: Our Mutual
Responsibilities and Our Mutual Dependence
(McGhee) 657

U.S. Welcomes "Forward-Looking" German
Note of March 25 (exchange of notes) . . 654

International Organizations and Conferences.
U.S. Presents Amendments to Draft Treaty
on Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons in
18-Nation Disarmament Committee (Fisher,
text of amendments) 675

Japan. The United States and Japan: Differ-
ent Paths to Common Goals (Barnett) . . 664

Jordan. U.S. Comments on Sales of Aircraft
to Jordan 663

Laos. Letters of Credence (Souvanlasy) . . . 663

Middle East

Charting the Future Course of U.S. Foreign
Aid in the Near East and South Asia (Hare) 668

U.S. Comments on Sales of Aircraft to Jordan 663

Military Affairs. U.S. Comments on Sales of
Aircraft to Jordan 663

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Department Presents Views on Senate Resolu-
tions on Closer Relations Among Atlantic
Nations (Leddy) 672

NATO: An Instrument of Peace (Johnson) . . 650

Presidential Documents. NATO: An Instru-
ment of Peace 650

Public Affairs. A Fresh Look at the United
Nations (Sisco) 646

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 681

United Nations. A Fresh Look at the United
Nations (Sisco) 646

Viet-Nam. The United States and Japan: Dif-
ferent Paths to Common Goals (Barnett) . 664

Name Index

Barnett, Robert W 664

Fisher, Adrian S 675

Hare, Raymond A 668

Johnson, President 650

Leddy, John M 672

McGhee, George C 657

Palmer, Joseph 2d 681

Rusk, Secretary 652

Sisco, Joseph J 646

Souvanlasy, Khamking 663

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 4-10

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to April 4 which appears
in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 75 of
April 1.

No. Date Snblect

♦74 4/5 Rusk: letter to Senator Edward
M. Kennedy on procedures re-
garding Americans traveling
abroad.
76 4/6 Reply to German note on European
security matters.

*77 4/8 Rusk: dedication of Churchill
statue.

' Not printed.

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OFFICIAU BUSINESS

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free

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Award, President Johnson answers many of the questions still being asked in this country aboo
the United States purpose in Viet-Nam. This 16-page pamphlet contains the text of that addrea

"Our purpose in Viet-Nam," the President said, "is to prevent the success of aggression. 1
is not conquest; it is not empire; it is not foreign bases; it is not domination. It is, simply pu)
just to prevent the forceful conquest of South Viet-Nam by North Viet-Nam."

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THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. lUOl

May 2, 1966

SECRETARY RUSK ANSWERS QUESTIONS ON NATO ISSUES AND VIET-NAM

Transcript of Paris-Match Interview 695

SECURITY COUNCIL AUTHORIZES U.K. TO USE FORCE

TO DIVERT OIL SHIPMENTS BOUND FOR RHODESIA

Statement by Ambassador Goldberg and Text of Resolution 713

REVIEW OF MOVEMENT OF CUBAN REFUGEES

AND HEMISPHERE POLICY TOWARD CUBA

Statement by Robert M. Sayre 707

UNITED STATES POLICY TOWARD COMMUNIST CHINA
Statement by Secretary Rixsk 686

For index see inside back cover

United States Policy Toward Communist China

Statement by Secretary Rusk

Mr. Chairman, during the last month and
a half this distinguished committee and its
corresponding members in the other House
have heard testimony on Communist China
from a number of prominent scholars and
distinguished experts on Asia.

I welcome these hearings. For Com-
munist China's policies and intentions, in
all their aspects, need to be examined —
and reexamined continually.

China Specialists in Government

The Department of State and other agen-
cies of the Government do collect, study,
and analyze continually vi'ith the greatest
care all the information obtainable on Com-
munist China in order to make — and, when
the facts warrant, revise — judgments of
Peiping's intentions and objectives. Highly
trained Chinese-language officers here in
Washington and overseas — men who spe-
cialize in Chinese history and communism —
are working full time analyzing and ap-
praising Peiping's moves. Numerous pri-
vate scholars, some of whom have appeared
before this committee in recent weeks, are
consulted by the Department of State. And
there are, of course, many specialists on
Communist China in other agencies of the
Government. These capable individuals —
in and out of Government — systematically
interchange and cross-check their analyses

and estimates to provide what I believe is
the most complete and most accurate pic-
ture of Communist China, its leaders, and
its policies, available to any non-Commu-
nist government in the world.

I

* Made before the Subcommittee on the Far East
and the Pacific of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs on Mar. 16.

Three Caveats

Before going further, I would like to enter
three caveats : >

First, the experts do not always agree,
especially in their estimates of Chinese
Communist intentions.

Second, the leaders we are discussing
are both Chinese and Communist. Some of
their words and acts can perhaps be best
understood in terms of Chinese background
— Chinese traits or historic Chinese ambi-
tions. Others can perhaps be better under-
stood in terms of their beliefs and ambitions
as Communists. They are deeply commit-
ted to a body of Communist doctrine devel-
oped by Mao Tse-tung. Still other words
and acts may be consistent with both the
Chinese and doctrinaire Communist factors.

We have faced a similar problem over
the years with respect to the Soviet leader-
ship. Some of their words and acts could
be explained chiefly in terms of historic
Russian imperial ambitions or Russian traits
or practices. Others have been clearly at-
tributable to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, or to
interpretations of that doctrine by Stalin
and more recent leaders. Some sovietolo-
gists put more emphasis on the traditional
nationalist or imperial factors, others put

686

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN ||

more on the Marxist-Leninist factors. There
is no way to determine the exact weight
which ought to be given to each of these
two influences.

Likewise, with regard to the Chinese
Communists, there has been considerable
disagreement over the respective dimen-
sions of the two streams of influence:
Chinese and Marxist-Leninist-Maoist. Over
the years some of the experts on China
may not have appreciated adequately Marx-
ist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine. Likewise, some
of the experts on Chinese Communist doc-
trine may tend to underestimate the Chi-
nese factors in the behavior and intentions
of the Peiping regime.

The third caveat is this: Predicting what
the Chinese Communists will do next may
be even more hazardous than usual at this
juncture. They themselves appear to be
taking stock. We know that some high-
level talks have been going on and that they
have called some of their ambassadors back
for consultation.

Chinese Communist Setbacl<s

We know — the whole world knows — that
the Chinese Communists have suffered some
severe setbacks internationally during the
past 14 months. They were unable to per-
suade the Afro-Asians to accept their sub-
stantive views on the Second Bandung
Conference. They have found themselves in
difficulty in several African countries. Their
diplomatic missions have been expelled from
Burundi, Dahomey, and the Central African
Republic. Their technicians have been ex-
pelled from Ghana. The Governments of
Kenya and Tunisia have warned them
against promoting revolution in Africa.

During the fighting between India and
Pakistan, the Chinese Communists marched
up hill and down again. They have been
disappointed by the Tashkent agreement
and the steps taken in accord with it. They
were strongly opposed to the agreement be-
' tween Japan and the Republic of Korea,
which was ratified by both countries. They
have suffered a major setback in Indonesia

— the Indonesian Communist Party has been
decimated.

Generally, in their struggle with Moscow
for leadership of the world Communist
movement, the Chinese Communists appear
to have lost ground. Even their relations
with Castro's Cuba have sunk to the level
of mudslinging.

And, probably most important of all,
Peiping sees the power of the United States
committed in Southeast Asia to repel an ag-
gression supported — and actively promoted
— by Peiping.

Will the Chinese Communist reaction to
all these setbacks be a wild lashing out? Or
will it be a sober decision to draw back and
even to move toward peaceful coexistence?

We, of course, hope it will be the latter.
But we cannot be sure what Peiping intends
to do. We do not expect the worst but we
must be prepared for it.

Our Relations With Peiping

I will not try here today to review in de-
tail the record of our relations with the
Peiping regime. In the months after the
Chinese Communist takeover in 1949 we
watched to see whether the initial demon-
stration of intense hostility toward the
United States and toward Americans who
were still resident in China was momen-
tary, or reflected a basic Peiping policy.
Then came the aggression against the Re-
public of Korea, to which, at a second stage,
the Chinese Communists committed large
forces, thus coming into direct conflict with
the United Nations and the United States.

We have searched year after year for
some sign that Communist China was ready
to renounce the use of force to resolve dis-
putes. We have also searched for some in-
dication that it was ready to abandon its
premise that the United States is its prime
enemy.

The Chinese Communist attitudes and ac-
tions have been hostile and rigid. But a
democracy, such as ours, does not accept
rigidity. It seeks solutions to problems,
however intractable they may seem.

MAY 2, 1966

687

Sino-United States Ambassadorial Talks

We have discussed various problems vi'ith
the Chinese Communists at international
conferences such as the Geneva conferences
of 1954 and 1962.

In 1955 we began with them a series of
bilateral conversations at the level of am-
bassadors, first in Geneva and later in
Warsaw. It was our hope that by direct, sys-
tematic communication we might be able to
reduce the sharpness of the conflict be-
tween us. There now have been 129 of
these meetings, the latest of which took
place in Warsaw today.

These exchanges have ranged widely,
covering many subjects affecting our two
countries. At first there was a little prog-
ress in dealing with small specific issues,
such as the release of Americans being
held in Communist China. Although an un-
derstanding was reached in this limited
area, Peiping refused to fulfill its commit-
ment to release all the Americans.

I think it is accurate to say that no other
non-Communist nation has had such ex-
tensive conversations with the Peiping
regime as we have had. The problem is not
lack of contact between Peiping and Wash-
ington. It is what, with contact, the Peiping
regime itself says and does.

Although they have produced almost no
tangible results, these conversations have
served and still serve useful purposes. They
pei'mit us to clarify the numerous points of
difference between us. They enable us to
communicate in private during periods of
crisis. They provide an opening through
which, hopefully, light might one day pene-
trate. But the talks have, so far, given no
evidence of a shift or easing in Peiping's
hostility toward the United States and its
bellicose doctrines of world revolution. In-
deed, the Chinese Communists have con-
sistently demanded, privately as well as
publicly, that we let them have Taiwan.
And when we say that we will not abandon
the 12 or 13 million people on Taiwan,
against their will, they say that, until we

change our minds about that, no improve-
ment in relations is possible.

Today we and Peiping are as far apart on
matters of fundamental policy as we were
17 years ago.

I
The Basic Issues

In assessing Peiping's policies and ac-
tions, and the problems they present to
American foreign policy and to the free
peoples of the world, we must ask ourselves
certain key questions :

What does Peiping want, and how does it
pursue its objectives?

How successful has it been, and how suc-
cessful is it likely to be in the future?

Is it on a collision course with the United
States?

What are the prospects for change in its
policies?

What policies should the United States
adopt, or work toward, in dealing with
Communist China?

What Does Peiping Want?

First, the Chinese Communist leaders seek
to bring China on the world stage as a great
power. They hold that China's history, size,
and geographic position entitle it to great-
power status. They seek to overcome the
humiliation of 150 years of economic, cul-
tural, and political domination by outside
powers.

Our concern is with the way they are
pursuing their quest for power and in-
fluence in the world. And it is not only our
concern but that of many other countries, in-
cluding in recent years the Soviet Union.

Peiping is aware that it still lacks many of
the attributes of great-power status, and it
chafes bitterly under this realization.

Arming To Become a "Great Power"

The Chinese Communists are determined
to rectify this situation. They already have
one of the largest armies in the world. They
are now developing nuclear weapons and

I

688

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

missile delivery systems. They are pouring
a disproportionately large proportion of
their industrial and scientific effort into
military and military-related fields.

What is all this military power for? Some
believe it to be for defensive purposes
alone :

To erect a token "deterrent" nuclear
capability against the United States or the
U.S.S.R.;

To demonstrate symbolically that "China
must be reckoned with" ;

To react to an imaginary, almost path-
ological, notion that the United States and
other countries around its borders are seek-
ing an opportunity to invade mainland China
and destroy the Peiping regime.

But such weapons need not serve a de-
fensive role. They can be used directly by
Peiping to try to intimidate its neighbors,
or in efforts to blackmail Asian countries
into breaking defense alliances with the
United States, or in an attempt to create a
nuclear "balance" in Asia in which Peiping's
potentially almost unlimited conventional
forces might be used with increased
effect.

These weapons can ultimately be em-
ployed to attack Peiping's Asian neighbors
and, in time, even the United States or the
Soviet Union. This would be mad and
suicidal, as Peiping must know, despite
cavalier statements that mainland China
can survive nuclear war. Nevertheless, a
potential nuclear capability, on top of enor-
mous conventional forces, represents a new
factor in the equilibrium of power in Asia
that this country and its friends and allies
cannot ignore.

Peiping's use of power is closely related
to what I believe are its second and third
objectives: dominance within Asia and lead-
ership of the Communist world revolution,
employing Maoist tactics. Peiping is striv-
ing to restore traditional Chinese influence
or dominance in South, Southeast, and East
Asia. Its concept of influence is exclusive.
Foreign Minister Ch'en Yi reportedly told

Prince Sihanouk recently that his country's
"friendship" with Cambodia would be in-
compatible with Cambodian ties with the
United States. Peiping has tried to alienate
North Viet-Nam and North Korea from the
Soviet Union. It has had uneven success in
such maneuvers. But it has not abandoned
this objective. Where Peiping is present, it
seeks to exclude all others. And this is not
only true in its relations with its neighbors
but in the Communist world as well.

Direct Aggression

Peiping has not refrained from the use of
force to pursue its objectives. Following
Korea, there were Tibet and the attacks on
the offshore islands in the Taiwan Straits.
There have been the attacks on India. It is
true that, since Korea, Peiping has moved
only against weaker foes and has carefully
avoided situations which might bring it face
to face with the United States. It has
probed for weaknesses around its frontier
but drawn back when the possibility of a
wider conflict loomed.

While the massive and direct use of
Chinese Communist troops in overt aggres-
sion cannot be ruled out, Peiping's behavior
up to now suggests it would approach any
such decision with caution.

If the costs and risks of a greater use of
force were reduced by, for example, our uni-
lateral withdrawal from the region, Peiping
might well feel freer to use its power to in-
timidate or overwhelm a recalcitrant op-
ponent or to aid directly insurgent forces.

IVIao's Doctrine of World Revolution

As I have said, the Chinese Communist
leaders are dedicated to a fanatical and
bellicose Marxist-Leninist-Maoist doctrine of
world revolution. Last fall, Lin Piao, the
Chinese Communist Minister of Defense,
recapitulated in a long article Peiping's
strategy of violence for achieving Com-
munist domination of the world. This
strategy involves the mobilization of the
underdeveloped areas of the world — which

MAY 2, 1966

689

the Chinese Communists compare to the
"rural areas" — against the industrialized or
"urban" areas. It involves the relentless
prosecution of what they call "people's
wars." The final stage of all this violence
is to be what they frankly describe as
"wars of annihilation."

It is true that this doctrine calls for revo-
lution by the natives of each country. In
that sense it may be considered a "do-it-
yourself kit." But Peiping is prepared to
train and indoctrinate the leaders of these
revolutions and to support them with funds,
arms, and propaganda, as well as politically.
It is even prepared to manufacture these
revolutionary movements out of whole cloth.

Peiping has encouraged and assisted —
with arms and other means — the aggres-
sions of the North Vietnamese Communists
in Laos and against South Viet-Nam. It has
publicly declared its support for so-called
national liberation forces in Thailand, and
there are already terrorist attacks in the re-
mote rural areas of northeast Thailand.
There is talk in Peiping that Malaysia is
next on the list. The basic tactics of these
"wars of liberation" have been set forth by
Mao and his disciples, including General
Giap, the North Vietnamese Communist
Minister of Defense. They progress from the
undermining of independent governments
and the economic and social fabrics of so-
ciety by terror and assassination, through
guerrilla warfare, to large-scale military
action.

Peiping has sought to promote Communist
coups and "wars of liberation" against in-
dependent governments in Africa and Latin
America as well as in Asia.

Words Versus Actions

Some say we should ignore what the Chi-
nese Communist leaders say and judge
them only by what they do. It is true that
they have been more cautious in action
than in words — more cautious in what they
do themselves than in what they have urged
the Soviet Union to do. Undoubtedly, they
recognize that their power is limited. They

have shown, in many ways, that they have
a healthy respect for the power of the
United States.

But it does not follow that we should dis-
regard the intentions and plans for the
future which they have proclaimed. To do
so would be to repeat the catastrophic
miscalculation that so many people made
about the ambitions of Hitler — and that
many have made at various times in ap-
praising the intentions of the Soviet leaders.

I have noted criticism of the so-called
analogy between Hitler and Mao Tse-tung.
I am perfectly aware of the important dif-
ferences between these two and the coun-
tries in which they have exercised power.
The seizure of Manchuria by Japanese
militarists, of Ethiopia by Mussolini, and of
the Rhineland, Austria, and Czechoslovakia
by Hitler, were laboratory experiments in
the anatomy and physiology of aggression.
How to deal with the phenomenon of ag-
gression was the principal problem faced in
drafting the United Nations Charter, and
the answer was: collective action. We do
ourselves no service by insisting that each
source of aggression or each instance of ag-
gression is unique. My own view is that we
have learned a good deal about this
phenomenon and its potentiality for lead-
ing into catastrophe if the problem is not
met in a timely fashion.

The bellicosity of the Chinese Commu-
nists has created problems within the Com-
munist world as well as between Peiping
and the non-Communist world.

Recently a leading official of a Com-
munist state said to me that the most
serious problem in the world today is how
to get Peiping to move to a policy of
"peaceful coexistence."

Chinese Communist Fear of Attack

At times the Communist Chinese leaders
seem to be obsessed with the notion that
they are being threatened and encircled.
We have told them both publicly and pri-
vately, and I believe have demonstrated in

690

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

our actions in times of crisis and even
under grave provocation, that we vi^ant no
war with Communist China. The President
restated this only last month in New York.^
We do not seek the overthrow by force of
the Peiping regime; we do object to its at-
tempt to overthrow other regimes by force.

How much Peiping's "fear" of the United
States is genuine and how much it is arti-
ficially induced for domestic political pur-
poses only the Chinese Communist leaders
themselves know. I am convinced, how-
ever, that their desire to expel our influence
and activity from the western Pacific and
Southeast Asia is not motivated by fears
that we are threatening them.

I wish I could believe that Communist
China seeks merely a guarantee of friendly
states around its borders, as some com-
mentators have suggested. If it was as sim-
ple as this, they would have only to abandon
their policies which cause their neighbors to
seek help from the United States.

The trouble is that Peiping's leaders
want neighboring countries to accept sub-
ordination to Chinese power. They want
them to become political and economic de-
pendencies of Peiping. If the United States
can be driven from Asia, this goal will be
in their grasp. The "influence," therefore,
that Peiping's present leaders seek in Asia
is indeed far reaching.

Dominance in the Communist Movement

I had the privilege almost exactly a year
ago of commenting at some length before
this committee on the Sino-Soviet dispute.
The essential nature of this conflict has not
changed in this year. It has, if anything, in-
tensified and widened. Its Russo-Chinese
national aspects have become more con-
spicuous. Both sides have clearly given in-
creased thought to the implications of a
wider war in Southeast Asia for their mutual
treaty obligations. I don't know what the
Soviets would actually do with respect to

" Bulletin of Mar. 14, 1966, p. 390.

their treaty with Communist China, but
Peiping does not seem to be counting on
Soviet support.

Peiping's Desire To Maintain Sharp
Communist-U.S. Polarity

One of Peiping's most fundamental dif-
ferences with Moscow centers on its desire
to maintain the sharpest possible polariza-
tion between the Communist world and the
United States. Peiping argues that we are
the "enemy of all the people in the world."
Its national interests in Asia are served by
maximizing Communist (and world) pres-
sure on us and by attempting to "isolate" us.
For this reason alone the Chinese would
probably have opposed any Soviet attempts
to reach understandings with us. In addi-
tion there are ideological and psychological
reasons for Sino-Soviet rivalry :

The intense and deadly antagonisms that
have always characterized schisms in the
Marxist world ;

Mao's belief that after Stalin's death the
mantle of world Communist leadership
should rightfully have passed to him and
the Chinese Communist party ;

Peiping's obsession, also held or pro-
fessed by the leaders of the Soviet Union
during the 30 years after the Bolshevik
revolution, with a fear of being threatened
and encircled ;

The mixture of the psychology of the
veterans of the long march and Chinese
traditional attitudes which has led Pei-
ping's leaders to believe that through a
combination of patience, struggle, and "right
thinking" all obstacles can be conquered;
and

Peiping's professed belief that the So-
viets are joining with the United States in
keeping China in a position of inferiority
and subordination.

All these have merged to give the Sino-
Soviet dispute a flavor and an intensity
which rival even the current Chinese Com-
munist antagonism for the United States
itself.

MAY 2, 1966

691

How Successful Has Peiping Been?

We can see that the Communist Chinese
have set vast goals for themselves, both in-
ternally and externally. The disastrous re-
sults of the so-called great leap forward
have forced them to acknowledge that it
will take them generations to achieve their
goals.

They have wrought considerable changes
on the mainland of China. Perhaps their
greatest feat has been to establish their
complete political authority throughout the
country. They have made some progress
in industrialization, education, and public
health — although at the expense of human
freedom, originality, and creativity. But
their efforts to improve agriculture and to
mold the Chinese people into a uniform
Marxist pattern have been far less
successful.

The economic, political, and social prob-
lems still confronting the Chinese Com-
munist leaders today are staggering.

Economic Problems

Peiping's economic power will almost cer-
tainly increase over the coming years. But
even with relatively effective birth control
programs the population of mainland China
may reach 1 billion by 1985.

Where is the food to come from? Where
are the resources for investment to come
from? Can the rapidly increasing military
and economic costs of great-power status
be carried by Chinese society at the same
time that other economic tasks vital to
China's economic survival are carried out?
I do not denigrate in the slightest native
Chinese ingenuity and capacity for incred-
ibly hard work when I suggest that the solu-
tions to these problems are in the gravest
doubt.

Internal Political Problems

Even more important to Peiping's leaders
than these economic problems, however, are
the will and morale of their own people.
The current leaders — Mao, Liu Shao-ch'i,
Chou En-lai, and others — are an intensely
committed group of men whose entire lives

symbolize their willingness to postpone the
satisfactions of the present for the prom-
ised glory of the future.

Every generation is suspicious that the
youth of today is not what it was in the good
old days. But this has become another ob-
session of Peiping's old men. Their domes-
tic propaganda and their comments to
visitors, as well as the reports of refugees,
have all emphasized their distrust of the
youth of the country. They fear that their
grand designs and goals — both domestic and
foreign — will not be pursued with zeal by
the next generation.

I believe their concern may be both gen-
uine and warranted. How pleased can young
college graduates be to be sent off to rural
China for years for ideological hardening?
How attractive is it to the Chinese peasant
and worker to be called on for years of
sacrifice to bring revolution to Africa or
Latin America? Will Chinese scientists ac-
cept the dogma that scientific truth can be
found only in the pages of Mao Tse-tung's
writings? How can professional Chinese
Communist army officers and soldiers be
persuaded that the words of Mao represent
a "spiritual atomic bomb" more powerful
than any material weapon?

I am unaware of any new revolution
brewing on the Chinese mainland. I have no
evidence that the current regime does not,
in practical terms, control effectively all of
mainland China. But there is evidence of a
growing psychological weariness that in
years to come could produce a significant
shift in the policies of a new generation of
leaders.

The dramatic succession of foreign policy
failures during the last year, both in the
Communist and non-Communist world, must
be having some effect on the confidence of
the people in the wisdom of their leaders
and even on the leaders themselves.

I do not predict any quick changes in
China. Nor are there simple solutions. Pei-
ping's present state of mind is a combina-
tion of aggressive arrogance and obsessions
of its own making. There are doubtless
many reasons, cultural, historical, political.

692

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

for this state of mind. Psychologists have
struggled for years in an effort to charac-
terize what is a normal personality. The
definition of what a normal state personal-
ity might be is beyond my abilities. I would
be inclined, however, to advance the view
that a country whose behavior is as violent,
irascible, unyielding, and hostile as that of
Communist China is led by leaders whose
view of the world and of life itself is unreal.
It is said that we have isolated them. But
to me they have isolated themselves — both
in the non-Communist and Communist world.

We have little hope of changing the out-
look of these leaders. They are products of
their entire lives. They seem to be immune
to agreement or persuasion by anyone, in-
cluding their own allies.

It is of no help in formulating policy to
describe Peiping's behavior as neurotic. Its
present policies pose grave and immediate
problems for the United States and other
countries. These must be dealt with now.
The weapons and advisers that Peiping ex-
ports to promote and assist insurrections in
other countries cannot be met by psycho-
analysis. At the present time there is a
need for a counterweight of real power to
Chinese Communist pressures. This has had
to be supplied primarily by the United
States and our allies.

We should be under no illusion that by
yielding to Peiping's bellicose demands
today we would in some way ease the path
toward peace in Asia. If Peiping reaps suc-
cess from its current policies, not only its
present leaders but those who follow will be
emboldened to continue them. This is the
path to increased tension and even greater
dangers to world peace in the years ahead.

China as a Great Power

We expect China to become some day a
great world power. Communist China is a
major Asian power today. In the ordinary
course of events, a peaceful China would be
expected to have close relations — political,
cultural, and economic — with the countries
around its borders and with the United
States.

It is no part of the policy of the United
States to block the peaceful attainment of
these objectives.

More than any other Western people, we
have had close and warm ties with the
Chinese people. We opposed the staking
out of spheres of influence in China. We
used our share of the Boxer indemnity to
establish scholarships for Chinese students
in the United States. We welcomed the
revolution of Sun Yat Sen. We took the
lead in relinquishing Western extraterri-
torial privileges in China. We refused to
recognize the puppet regime established by
Japan in Manchuria. And it was our re-
fusal to accept or endorse, even by implica-
tion, Japan's imperial conquests and fur-
ther designs in China that made it impos-
sible for us to achieve a modus vivendi
with Japan in 1940-41.

We look forward hopefully — and confi-
dently— to a time in the future when the
government of mainland China will permit
the restoration of the historic ties of friend-
ship between the people of mainland China
and ourselves.

Elements of Future Policy

What should be the main elements in our
policy toward Communist China?

We must take care to do nothing which
encourages Peiping — or anyone else — to be-
lieve that it can reap gains from its aggres-
sive actions and designs. It is just as essen-
tial to "contain" Communist aggression in
Asia as it was, and is, to "contain" Com-'
munist aggression in Europe.

At the same time, we must continue to
make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its
belief that force is the best way to resolve
disputes and gives up its violent strategy of
world revolution, we would welcome an era
of good relations.

More specifically, I believe, there should
be 10 elements in our policy.

First, we must remain firm in our de-
termination to help those Allied nations
which seek our help to resist the direct or
indirect use or threat of force against
their territory by Peiping.

MAY 2. 1966

693

Second, we must continue to assist the
countries of Asia in building broadly based
effective governments, devoted to progres-
sive economic and social policies, which can
better withstand Asian Communist pres-
sures and maintain the security of their
people.

Third, we must honor our commitments to
the Republic of China and to the people on
Taiwan, who do not want to live under com-
munism. We will continue to assist in their
defense and to try to persuade the Chinese
Communists to join with us in renouncing
the use of force in the area of Taiwan.

Fourth, we will continue our efforts to pre-
vent the expulsion of the Republic of China
from the United Nations or its agencies. So
long as Peiping follows its present course it
is extremely difficult for us to see how it
can be held to fulfill the requirements set
forth in the charter for membership, and
the United States opposes its membership.
It is worth recalling that the Chinese Com-
munists have set forth some interesting
conditions which must be fulfilled before
they are even willing to consider mem-
bership :

The United Nations resolution of 1950
condemning Chinese Communist aggression
in Korea must be rescinded ;

There must be a new United Nations
resolution condemning U.S. "aggression";

The United Nations must be reorganized;

The Republic of China must be expelled;

All other "imperialist puppets" must be
expelled. One can only ask whether the
Chinese Communists seriously want mem-
bership, or whether they mean to destroy
the United Nations. We believe the United
Nations must approach this issue with the
utmost caution and deliberation.

Fifth, we should continue our efforts to
reassure Peiping that the United States
does not intend to attack mainland China.
There are, of course, risks of war with
China. This was true in 1950. It was true
in the Taiwan Straits crises of 1955 and
1958. It was true in the Chinese Com-
munist drive into Indian territory in 1962.

It is true today in Viet-Nam. But we do not
want war. We do not intend to provoke war.
There is no fatal inevitability of war with
Communist China. The Chinese Communists
have, as I have already said, acted with
caution when they foresaw a collision with
the United States. We have acted with re-
straint and care in the past and we are
doing so today. I hope that they will realize
this and guide their actions accordingly.

Sixth, we must keep firmly in our minds
that there is nothing eternal about the
policies and attitudes of Communist China.
We must avoid assuming the existence of
an unending and inevitable state of hostil-
ity between ourselves and the rulers of
mainland China.

Seventh, when it can be done without
jeopardizing other U.S. interests, we should
continue to enlarge the possibilities for un-
official contacts between Communist China
and ourselves — contacts which may grad-
ually assist in altering Peiping's picture of
the United States.

In this connection, we have gradually ex-
panded the categories of American citizens
who may travel to Communist China. Ameri-
can libraries may freely purchase Chinese
Communist publications. American citizens
may send and receive mail from the main-
land. We have in the past indicated that if
the Chinese themselves were interested in
purchasing grain we would consider such
sales. We have indicated our willingness to
allow Chinese Communist newspapermen to
come to the United States. We are pre-
pared to permit American universities to in-
vite Chinese Communist scientists to visit
their institutions.

We do not expect that for the time being
the Chinese Communists will seize upon
these avenues of contact or exchange. All
the evidence suggests Peiping wishes to re-
main isolated from the United States. But
we believe it is in our interests that such
channels be opened and kept open. We be-
lieve contact and communication are not
incompatible with a firm policy of contain-
ment.

Eighth, we should keep open our direct

694

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

diplomatic contacts with Peiping in Warsaw.
While these meetings frequently provide
merely an opportunity for a reiteration of
known positions, they play a role in en-
abling each side to communicate informa-
tion and attitudes in times of crisis. It is
our hope that they might at some time be-
come the channel for a more fruitful dialog.

Ninth, we are prepared to sit down with
Peiping and other countries to discuss the
critical problems of disarmament and
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons. Pei-
ping has rejected all suggestions and invita-
tions to join in such talks. It has attacked
the test ban treaty. It has advocated the
further spread of nuclear weapons to non-
nuclear countries. It is an urgent task of
all countries to persuade Peiping to change
its stand.
■ Tenth, we must continue to explore and
analyze all available information on Com-
munist China and keep our own policies up
to date. We hope that Peiping's policies
may one day take account of the desire of
the people of Asia and her own people for
peace and security. We have said, in suc-
cessive administrations, that when Peiping
abandons the aggressive use of force and
shows that it is not irrevocably hostile to
the United States, then expanded contacts
and improved relations may become pos-
sible. This continues to be our position.

These, I believe, are the essential in-
gredients of a sound policy in regard to
Communist China.

I believe that they serve the interests
not only of the United States and of the
free world as a whole — but of the Chinese
people. We have always known of the prag-
matic genius of the Chinese people, and we
can see evidence of it even today. The prac-
tices and doctrines of the present Peiping
regime are yielding poor returns to the
Chinese people. I believe that the Chinese
people, no less their neighbors and the
American people, crave the opportunity to

[move toward the enduring goals of man-
kind: a better life, safety, freedom, human
dignity, and peace.

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions
on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam

Following is the text of an interview with
Secretary Rusk hy Paris-Match for publica-
tion in the April 16 issue of that magazine.

Press release 79 dated April 12

Q. Do you sincerely believe that the
French Government's neiv NATO proposals
are made simply to spite the United States?

A. No.

Q. Do you think, like so many people in
this country [United States'], that General
de Gaulle carries on a quarrel with the
United States which dates back to World
War II?

A. There are too many American soldiers
buried on French soil for us to think in
terms of quarrels. There are too many fun-
damental common interests between the
United States and France to describe differ-
ences on particular questions as quarrels.
Relations among great nations are not and
should not be determined on the basis of
personal feelings.

Q. Do you consider that all or part of the
French proposals for a NATO reform are
totally negative or incompatible with the
American viewpoint? If so, which ones?

A. The premise of your question is in-
correct. France has made no proposals to
reform NATO. From time to time over the
past 3 years, the French Government has
indicated that it intended to put forward
proposals, and her allies in NATO have
made it clear that they looked forward to
those proposals and would give them most
careful consideration. But instead of offer-
ing proposals for the reform of NATO, the
French Government has chosen to announce
its decisions without consulting its allies in
any serious way.

Q. How can you say there have been no
proposals for NATO reform? What about
General de Gaulle's 1958 letters to the U.S.
and the U.K.?

A. The 1958 proposal had nothing to do

MAY 2, 1966

695

with NATO. It suggested a three-power or-
ganization for tripartite consultations on
world policy. In the United States reply it
was pointed out that such an arrangement
would be objectionable to our other allies,
whose interests would have to be considered.
The United States was not prepared to
nominate itself as a member of such a
triumvirate. We accept an obligation to
consult with many other nations, large and
small, where their and our vital interests
are involved.

Q. Do you see a link between the French
NATO proposals today and General de
Gaulle's forthcoming trip to Russia?

A. We have not been informed as to what
General de Gaulle intends to discuss in
Russia. The question should be addressed to
the French Government.

Q. Does not the American Government
prefer having a strong independent ally to
a weak dependent one?

A. The question confuses the real issue.
Of course we welcome a strong France, but
what nation is wholly independent in the
world today? The United States is linked
to its allies all over the world by treaties
which are the law of our land. Each of these
alliances restricts our independence by the
commitments we have undertaken. I know
of few nations that have less freedom of
action than the United States, because our
freedom of action is limited by our respon-
sibilities. We want no satellites. What we
prefer most as partners are strong nations
which are at once dependable, independent,
but interdependent allies. What we have
long sought is an equal partnership with a
Europe moving toward unity.

Q. Do you agree that the Russian threat
of a conventional or nuclear attack on
Europe has diminished in the past 17 years?
Is NATO adequate in the light of this new
situation?

A. If the threat against Western Europe
has diminished in the last 17 years, it has
diminished because NATO has stood as a
firm barrier to Soviet ambitions. We should

not forget that as late as 1961-1962 we were
in the midst of a major crisis over Berlin
that threatened war. The fact that a dam
has contained the flood waters over the
years is no reason for dismantling it.

Nature of the Alliance

Q. Do you make a distinction betiveen
NATO and the Atlantic alliance?

A. NATO is an organization which com-
bines three significant elements — an inte-
grated military staff ready to assume opera-
tional command of NATO-assigned forces
the moment aggression occurs, common plan-
ning through the integrated staff, and mili-
tary forces in being. NATO, in other words,
is the collective security system which gives
reality to the mutual defense commitments
of the North Atlantic Treaty. We have
learned through experience of two world
wars that such a collective system is essen-
tial if aggression is not only to be defeated
but deterred. It took nearly 4 years in the
First World War to bring about the crea-
tion of a combined command under Mar-
shal Foch, and the delay cost heavily. In
the Second World War the lack of a com-
bined command and the inadequacy of ar-
rangements between the allies contributed
to the catastrophes of 1940. By not making;
these mistakes again we have created the
greatest possible deterrent to war.

Q. What is your opinion of General de
Gaulle's thesis that the military agreements
hettvcen France and the U.S. need no longer
be applicable because they no longer meet
presen t conditions ?

A. Most of those military agreements by
their terms continue for the life of the North
Atlantic Treaty, to which France says it in-
tends to continue to adhere. This thesis
strikes at the very heart of the sanctity of
international agreements. If one party to an
agreement is no longer bound because that
party believes that the agreement does not
meet present conditions, then the agreement
has no validity of any sort. Proposals for
changes can be considered through the
normal processes of consultation and nego-

696

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tiation. The United States has more than
4,000 agreements with other nations. We
are concerned about actions which would
weaken the growing fabric of international
law.

Q. France was the first Western country
to side with the United States during the
1962 Cuban crisis. Still, Cuba teas outside
the NATO area. Hoio do you account for
this attitude?

A. We very much appreciated the prompt
and forthright response of the French Gov-
ernment during the Cuban missile crisis. The
unanimity of NATO and the unanimity
of the Western Hemisphere were major con-
tributions to the peaceful settlement of a sit-
uation that menaced the entire free world.

Q. Would the American Government ac-
cept French NATO bases and military in-
stallations on American soil under French
nominal or operational command?

A. I am sure we would if French forces
were needed in the United States in defense
of the NATO area.

Q. Would you tvish to keep American
bases or military installations in France if
they were under the same command ar-
rangements as in England?

f A. The fact is that American bases in
England and France are today under the
same kind of command and control arrange-
ments. The British flag flies side by side
with the American flag over the bases in
England, just as the Tricolor flies side by
side with the American flag over American
installations in France.

Q. Why do you refuse landing and transit
rights in the United States to French mili-
tary aircraft on their way to Tahiti?

m A. We have been granting landing and
transit rights for French military aircraft
going to Tahiti on the understanding that
they carry no nuclear weapons, material, or
components for use in a weapons test. The
United States is signatory to the nuclear test
ban treaty, along with 105 other countries.
By our treaty commitments we are obliged
not to assist any country in nuclear testing

in the atmosphere, in the sea, or in outer
space. We do not think we should be asked
to violate that treaty.

NATO Without France

Q. Could the Allied military organiza-
tion in Europe really function without
France ?

A. Of course. Fourteen nations, com-
prising 450 million people and possessing
massive military power, will not be para-
lyzed by the attitude of France.

Q. Is it the American intention to give
West Germany the comrnand of the "center
Europe" sector if France leaves NATO?

A. It is not for the United States to
"give" any command to any NATO mem-
ber. The command arrangements of NATO
are for all the NATO members to consider
and decide among themselves, not just one
or a few.

Q. What reforms of NATO tvould you
envisage after the French withdrawal?

A. This will be for the NATO govern-
ments to decide on the basis of consultations
now in process.

Q. There is serious concern in France that

participation in an integrated command
and the maintenance of American airbuses
in France may drag France into a war it
does not want. Don't you agree that this is
a real problem, particularly in view of the
fact that America's involvement in Viet-
Nam could lead to a collision betiveen the
United States and the Soviet Union?

A. The concern in France on this point is
based on a misapprehension of facts. The
NATO integrated command is essentially
a combined planning staff ready to assume
operational command if armed attack occurs
against a NATO nation in the North Atlan-
tic area, as that term is used in the North
Atlantic Treaty. But in peacetime the inte-
grated staff does not have operational com-
mand over any force except certain air-de-
fense units which must be maintained on a
constant alert basis in Europe. Conse-
quently, France's participation in an inte-

MAY 2, 1966

697

I

grated command does not place her troops
in peacetime under the command of any
foreign officer or staff. If war should
break out, it would be for the French
Government to decide that her forces should
then be released to the integrated command.
Under these circumstances, I cannot see how
participation in the integrated command
could involve France in a war.

What might involve France in a war would
be her continued allegiance to the North At-
lantic Treaty, since it is required by that
treaty to come to the defense of any signa-
tory power subjected to armed attack in
Europe or North America. But France, as
I understand it, wishes to remain a party
to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Nor do I see any reason why France might
be drawn into war through the maintenance
of American airbases on French soil. Amer-
ican planes in France do not take off except
under regulations worked out with the
French militaiy authorities. When, for ex-
ample, our airplanes were used to airlift
paratroopers to Stanleyville, this matter was
first discussed with your Foreign Office, and
the United States was given assurances that
the Foreign Office would have no objection
to the planes' taking off from Evreux for
that purpose.

Q. Well, after all, ivon't you agree that
France has played and is playing a con-
structive role in trying to alleviate the di-
vision of Europe?

A. No one is more interested than the
United States in a genuine solution of East-
West problems. After all, the United States
has been required to spend more than $850
billion in defense budgets since 1947; we
can think of much better uses for such re-
sources. Undoubtedly, the Soviet Union
could find more desirable ways of using
comparable resources on their side. But
East-West issues affect all the members of
the alliance and can be solved only on the
basis of the common interests of the peoples
of the West and the peoples of Eastern
Europe. We believe that a solution can best
be found through the collective efforts of
the Western nations and would welcome

active French participation in a concerted
search for these solutions, including the re-
unification of Germany, disarmament, the
nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, and the
normalization of trade and cultural relations
between Eastern and Western Europe. But
it does not appear that France agrees with
this view. France elected not to participate
in the protracted discussions that led to an
easing of the Berlin crisis of 1961-62, and
France is not participating in the current
disarmament talks at Geneva. Certainly
fragmentation within the West will only im-
pede an ultimate East- West settlement.

U.S. Position on Viet-Nam *

Q. Noiv, about Viet-Nam, the United
States ivas extremely critical of France dur-
ing the Indochinese and the Algerian tears.
Are you not today in the same position we
were in a few years ago?

A. The question is much more complicated
than you have suggested. Following the sei-
zure of mainland China by the Communists,
the United States, the United Kingdom, and
France agreed that the security of Southeast
Asia was of vital importance to the free
world. The United States provided large-
scale economic and military assistance to
France during its struggle in Indochina. Un-
happily, the free world was not able to reach
a fully adequate solution in 1953 and 1954.
But that is past history. The United States
is not in the same position as was France a
few years ago. We have just as vital a stake
in peace in the Pacific Ocean as we have in
peace in the Atlantic Ocean. We agreed,
during World War II, with our European
allies that the war against Hitler should be
given first priority. But in the second-
priority theater in the Pacific, Japanese mili-
tarism was defeated without major redeploy-
ments from the European theater. France
has elected to reduce its responsibilities in
the Pacific. The United States has major
commitments there.

Q. Wo7ild you remain in South Viet-Nam
if a civilian government asked you to leave?

A. This is a very hypothetical question

698

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

because I do not contemplate the contingen-
cies you describe. The treaty commitments
of the United States turn upon the requests
of South Viet-Nam for assistance. If that
situation should change, there would result
a new situation. Since I do not expect it
to happen, I do not wish to speculate.

Q. Would the United States be ready to
suspend once more its air raids over North
Viet-Nam?

A. We have said over and over again that
we would be prepared to suspend the bomb-
ing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward
peace. There was no bombing of North
Viet-Nam from the beginning of increased
North Vietnamese infiltration into South
Viet-Nam in 1960 until February 1965. It
is not merely a debater's point to call this
a 4-year pause because many efforts were
made during that period to bring about a
peaceful settlement of the situation in South-
east Asia. There was a brief pause in May
of 1965, during which categorical and nega-
tive answers were received from all Commu-
nist capitals directly involved. There was a
37-day pause beginning last Christmas. Dur-
ing that time many governments, including
our own, diligently explored the possibility
of a peaceful settlement. The replies from
the other side were simple, harsh, and nega-
tive. We have had no hint or suggestion
that the suspension of bombing would lead
to a suspension of the infiltration of men
and arms from North Viet-Nam into South
Viet-Nam. The bombing of South Viet-Nam
by North Viet-Nam continues even though
the bombs are not carried by airplanes. The
United States wants peace in Southeast Asia.
If Hanoi would decide to abandon its at-
tempt to seize South Viet-Nam by force,
peace could come very quickly. The problem
is one of appetite. I repeat that the United
States would be ready to suspend its bomb-
ing of North Viet-Nam as a step toward
peace.

Q. Couldn't a direct dialog with China
promote the cause of peace?

A. I am surprised by this question. The
United States has perhaps had more discus-

sions on serious matters with Peiping than
any government having diplomatic relations
with Peiping, with the possible exception of
the Soviet Union. We have had a direct
dialog with Peiping for more than 10 years,
involving 129 discussions between our and
their Ambassadors in Geneva and Warsaw.
The problem is not one of contact. The prob
lem is that with contact we have not been
able to find a basis for improved relation-
ships. Peiping has made it very clear, ac-
cording to their public declarations, that
there is no possibility of improving rela-
tions with the United States unless we are
prepared to abandon Formosa and the 12
million people living on that island. That
we will not do. We hope to continue the
dialog with Peiping, but those who expect
some magical formula must face squarely
the issue of the surrender of 12 million peo-
ple on Formosa.

U.S. Ready To Consult With France
and NATO on French Demands

Following are the texts of aide memoire
exchanged between the United States and
France.^

U.S. AIDE MEMOIRE OF APRIL 12'

Press release 80 dated April 12

The Government of the United States
acknowledges receipt of an aide-memoire
from the Government of the French Re-
public on March 29, 1966. The United
States Government has been and will con-
tinue to be in consultation with its other
Allies in NATO on the questions to which
the actions of the Government of the French
Republic give rise, and which affect the
security of all members of NATO.

' For an earlier exchange of aide memoire, see
Bulletin of Apr. 18, 1966, p. 617.

• Delivered by the U.S. Embassy at Paris to the
French Foreign Office on Apr. 12.

MAY 2, 1966

699

iti

The United States Government takes note
of the view expressed by the French Gov-
ernment that the measures it proposes to
take are made necessary "because of the
impossibility of amending, by mutual agree-
ment and under satisfactory conditions, the
provisions in force in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization." The United States
Government calls the attention of the
French Government to the fact that the
drafters of the North Atlantic Treaty rec-
ognized that changes might occur in the
factors "affecting peace and security in the
North Atlantic area." ^ They, therefore,
provided, in Article 12 that, after ten years
of the operation of the Treaty, any Party
should have the right to request a consulta-
tion of the Parties "for the purpose of re-
viewing the Treaty."

The United States Government recalls to
the French Government that, having in
mind Article 12, it has, like many other
NATO Governments, over the past several
years invited the French Government to
submit any proposals it might have for the
revision of the Treaty or the Treaty Or-
ganization. Moreover, it has assured the
French Government that such suggestions
would be given the most careful considera-
tion. The United States Government can-
not, therefore, understand the basis upon
which the French Government has con-
cluded, without consulting the other Parties
to the Treaty, that it is impossible to
amend the NATO arrangements and that it
must act unilaterally. The United States
Government calls attention to the fact that
the Declaration of Fourteen of the member
countries dated March 18, 1966,* was is-
sued only after the French Government had
given notice of its intentions to act uni-
laterally and without advance consultation.

The United States Government takes note
of the intention of the Government of the
French Republic to terminate the assign-
ment to the Allied Command in Europe of

the French ground and air forces stationed
in Germany on July 1, 1966. In doing so,
the United States recalls that all forces sta-
tioned in the area of Allied Command Eu-
rope were, by agreement, to be placed under
the authority of SACEUR, in conformity
with the 1954 London Final Act » and the
subsequent NATO Council resolution ® to
implement Section IV of the London Final
Act. Furthermore, the Government of the
United States wishes to inform the Govern-
ment of the French Republic that upon the
termination of such assignment the Agree-
ment dated September 6, 1960, between the
United States and France regarding the
NATO Atomic Stockpile of Weapons in Ger-
many for Support of and Utilization by
French Forces Assigned to NATO would, by
its own terms, cease to have application.

The United States Government further
notes the intention of the Government of
France to withdraw French personnel as-
signed to NATO commands, also to take ef-
fect July 1, 1966, and from the NATO De-
fense College after July 23, 1966.

The aide-memoire states that "the with-
drawal of the French elements assigned to
the Allied commands and to the NATO Col-
lege entails the transfer of the headquar-
ters of these bodies outside of French ter-
ritory;" and that the French Government
believes that the transfers "might be com-
pleted by April 1, 1967." On this alleged
basis, the French Government has de-
nounced the Paris Protocol on the Status of
International Military Headquarters of Au-
gust 28, 1952, to take effect on April 1,
1967. It is not clear to the United States
Government why the intended withdrawals
of French personnel should entail the re-
moval of NATO headquarters from France
by April 1, 1967.

This entire subject is now under study
among the other North Atlantic Treaty Al-
lies. Accordingly, it has not been deter-
mined when withdrawal of Allied Head-
quarters would be accomplished. Consulta-

1

' For text of the North Atlantic Treaty, see Bul-
letin of Mar. 20, 1949, p. 339.

' For text, see ibid., Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

For text, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1954, p. 515.
For text, see ibid., Nov. 15, 1954, p. 720.

700

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions on this subject will be necessary and
it is the hope of the United States Govern-
ment that all Governments will approach
further discussions of this matter in the
spirit of Allies seeking to reach agreement
with minimum adverse effect upon the se-
curity of the North Atlantic area and with
as little mutual inconvenience as possible.

The aide-memoire further states the de-
sii'e of the Government of France to termi-
nate United States military activities under
certain bilateral agreements freely entered
into between France and the United States.
These agreements provide that they shall
remain in force for the duration of the
North Atlantic Treaty unless the two Gov-
ernments by mutual consent decide before-
hand to terminate them. They include the
Chateauroux Depot Agreement of Febru-
ary 27, 1951 ; the Air Bases Agreement of
October 4, 1952 ; the United States Military
Headquarters Agreement of June 17, 1953;
and the Pipeline Agreement of June 30,
1953.

The United States Government cannot
agree with the suggestion of the French
Government that April 1, 1967 "would be
appropriate for completing the necessary
operations" with regard to the transfer of
personnel and installations involved in these
agreements, but, on the contrary, believes
that such precipitate action could jeopardize
the security interests of all members of the
Alliance. It notes, moreover, that the Sys-
tem of Communications Agreement of De-
cember 8, 1958, between the United States
and France, provides that, if one party
should wish to modify its terms, the parties
will consult, and that, if they are unable to
come to agreement within one year, that
agreement may be terminated effective
after a period of one additional year. The
United States Government expresses the
view that since this method of adjusting
the position of the parties was considered
to be desirable when the System of Com-
munications Agreement was concluded on
December 8, 1958, it remains so today and
might appropriately be availed of in consid-
eration of the bilateral agreements con-

cluded earlier, which by their terms con-
tinue for the duration of the North Atlantic
Treaty.

Accordingly, while the United States in-
tends to remove its facilities from France
as promptly as possible in view of the atti-
tude of the French Government, the United
States Government would be prepared to
give its consent to the termination of the
agreements referred to above only on the
condition that there be applied to all such
agreements the provisions of consultation
and termination set forth in the System of
Communications Agreement. The United
States Government is prepared to explore
with the French Government the question
of future United States military activities in
France, together with arrangement for the
use of essential facilities, and mutually
agreed conditions for the orderly with-
drawal of those facilities that are not to re-
main in France. In this connection, the
United States Government notes the will-
ingness of the French Government to make
special provision for activities authorized by
the Chateauroux Depot Agreement of
February 27, 1951 and the Pipeline Agree-
ment of June 30, 1953.

United States activities under these
Agreements between France and the United
States have been and continue to be in sup-
port of the North Atlantic Treaty. Ac-
cordingly, it will be necessary in this case
as well for the United States Government
to seek the views of its other Allies with
regard to this aspect of consultations with
the Government of France.

The Government of the United States
notes that the French Government is pre-
pared to begin conversations regarding mu-
tual facilities which might be made avail-
able in the event of an armed attack within
the terms of the North Atlantic Treaty.

Finally, the attention of the French Gov-
ernment is called to the fact that its actions
in withdrawing from, abrogating or repudi-
ating existing agreements will entail finan-
cial problems and responsibilities that must
be taken into account in any discussion of
these actions.

MAY 2, 1966

701

I

FRENCH AIDE MEMOIRE OF MARCH 29^

Official translation.

In its aide-memoire of March 11, 1966,
the French Government notified the Gov-
ernment of the United States of America
of the measures that it had decided to take,
as far as it was concerned, because of the
impossibility of amending, by mutual agree-
ment and under satisfactory conditions, the
provisions in force in the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization. This impossibility has
just been confirmed by the declaration of
fourteen of the member countries of the At-
lantic Alliance, including the United States
itself, dated March 18.

In an aide-memoire dated the following
March 25, the Government of the United
States requested specific information on the
measures envisaged by France and the posi-
tion of the French Government concerning
the bilateral agreements between the two
countries.

The French Government has the honor to
submit below the information thus re-
quested :

1. The French Government announced
that it proposed to terminate the assign-
ment to the allied command in Europe of
the French ground and air forces stationed
in Germany.

It has the honor to inform the Govern-
ment of the United States that this assign-
ment will end on July 1, 1966.

2. The re-establishment of a single na-
tional command of the French forces will
require the withdrawal, on the same date, of
the French personnel assigned to the inte-
grated allied commands.

It is a question of the supreme command
of the allied forces in Europe, the Central
Europe command, the Southern Europe com-
mand, and the commands subordinate to
them, as well as the Defense College of
NATO.

The French higher-echelon personnel and

' Delivered to the U.S. Embassy at Paris on
Mar. 29.

the French auditors of the NATO College
will be withdrawn after the present study
session, which will end on July 23, 1966.

The French Government thinks that it
would be advisable, after the termination of
the French participation, to establish liaison
missions with the staffs concerned. French
officers would thus be on the spot, in par-
ticular to assist the allied staffs in the op-
erations for transferring out of French ter-
ritory. The establishment of these liaisons
with the allied commands would also facili-
tate the study of the conditions under
which the French forces, particularly in
Germany, if they continue to be stationed
in the territory of the Federal Republic,
might participate in time of war in joint
military actions, both with respect to com-
mand and to the operations properly so-
called. It is specified in this connection
that, in the event contemplated, French
forces would be stationed in Germany by
virtue of the convention of October 23,
1954 on the presence of alien forces in the
territory of the Federal Republic of Ger-
many.

3. The withdrawal of the French ele-
ments assigned to the allied commands (su-
preme command and Central Europe) and to
the NATO College entails the transfer of
the headquarters of these bodies outside
French territory. It appears that a period
of one year would permit taking the neces-
sary measures for this purpose and that
the entire operation might be completed by
April 1, 1967. Consequently, the French
Government, by virtue of Article 16 of the
Protocol of August 28, 1952, on the status
of general headquarters, is going to notify
to the United States Government the de-
nunciation of that Protocol, which will cease
to be in force on March 31, 1967.

4. Naturally, the foregoing particulars by
no means exhaust the list of problems that
will have to be resolved with regard to
NATO. The French Government is pre-
pared to discuss these other problems in
either a bilateral or multilateral frame-
work, whichever is appropriate.

V

702

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

5. In its previous communication, the
French Government informed the United
States Government that it thought that cer-
tain bilateral agreements between France
and the United States no longer met pres-
ent conditions, which conditions prompt it
to resume the full exercise of its sovereignty
in French territory. Furthermore, those
agreements, as a whole, would no longer be
applicable as regards the essential factor, in
view of the decisions made by the French
Government regarding its participation in
the Atlantic Organization.

It appears that, in general, the same
date, April 1, 1967, would be appropriate
for completing the necessary operations,
such as the transfer of the headquarters of
the American foi-ces in Europe (Camp des
Loges) and of the various United States
Army and Air Force installations. Longer
time limits could be considered for settling
certain complex problems, such as those
caused, in particular, by the existence of the
depots at Deols-La Martinerie. Special pro-
visions could also be contemplated, if the
Government of the United States expresses
the desire for them, with respect to the
conditions under which the pipeline that is
the subject of the agreement of June 30,
1953 could continue to operate.

The French Government is prepared to
begin talks at once with the Government of
the United States regarding the practical
measures that should be adopted with re-
spect to these various points concerning the
bilateral agreements.

Lastly, if the Government of the United
States so desires, the French Government is
also prepared to begin conversations to de-
fine the military facilities referred to in the

aide-memoire of March 11 on which the two
governments could reach mutual agreement
in the event of a conflict in which both
countries would participate under the At-
lantic Alliance.

Foreign Policy Conference
To Be Held at Little Rock

The Department of State announced on
April 12 (press release 81) that it will hold
a regional foreign policy conference in Little
Rock, Ark., on May 5, sponsored by Little
Rock University. About 30 community or-
ganizations are cooperating in the confer-
ence.

Invitations have been extended to busi-
ness and community leaders, representatives
of national nongovernmental organizations,
and members of the press, radio, and tele-
vision from Arkansas, Oklahoma, southern
Missouri, and western Tennessee. The pur-
pose of the meeting is to bring together
citizen leaders and media representatives
with government officials responsible for
formulating and carrying out foreign policy.

Officials scheduled to participate in the
conference include: Under Secretary George
W. Ball; Richard Reuter, Special Assistant
to the Secretary of State (Food for Peace
Program) ; J. Robert Schaetzel, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for European Affairs;
David H. Popper, Deputy Assistant Secre-
tary for International Organization Affairs;
Mrs. Charlotte Moton Hubbard, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Public Affairs; and
Robert H. Miller, Director, Viet-Nam Work-
ing Group, Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs.

I

MAY 2, 1966

703

Continuity of Refugee and Migration Policies

by William J. Crockett

Deputy Under Secretary for Administration *

I am most pleased to have this opportu-
nity to meet with the representatives of the
voluntary agencies which are concerned with
solving migration and refugee problems
around the world and to discuss the activities
which are the mutual concern of you and
the Department.

I should like to begin by saying that the
proposed elimination of the superstructure
of the Bureau of Security and Consular
Affairs will have no policy or organizational
effects on the Office of Refugee and Migra-
tion Affairs. It will not change in any way
the great humanitarian policies on refugees
and displaced persons as first enunciated by
President Truman in 1948 and which are
today fully embraced by President Johnson
and his administration.

Policy in this government of ours is not the
property of one man. Policy in this govern-
ment of ours is not dependent for its contin-
uation and fulfillment upon the personality
of any one of us. We are but the instru-
ments of the President in the fulfillment of
his administration's policies.

And I repeat, the great humanitarian
policies laid down by President Johnson at
the foot of the Statue of Liberty will not be
changed by any of us.^

' Address made before a meeting of representa-
tives of American voluntary agencies engaged in
refugee and migration activities at Washington,
D.C., on Mar. 22. For background, see Department
of State press release 66 dated Mar. 22.

' For remarks made by President Johnson at
Liberty Island, N.Y., on Oct. 3, 1965, see Bulletin
of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

Over the past several years, the Depart-
ment has planned and put into effect several
organizational changes designed to reduce
the layers of supervision between the peo-
ple who operate the programs and do the
actual work and the top-level policy and ex-
ecutive positions in the Department. One
such change was that which eliminated the
Bureau of Administration, headed by an
Assistant Secretary for Administration.
This change was accomplished smoothly and
the individual programs involved have con-
tinued to work as effectively as under the
old arrangement, or more so. Similar
changes, which we believe will result in a
much stronger and harder hitting conduct
of our foreign affairs, are being made in
our regional bureaus, which are the heart of
the work of the Department.

We have every reason to feel that the
changes proposed for the Bureau of Security
and Consular Affairs, by removing one level
of supervision, will place the offices compris-
ing the Bureau in closer contact with top-
level officals of the Department, thereby
elevating them and making them more effec-
tive. I want to give you the Department's
assurances that the changes envisaged will
in no way mean any modification of or de-
viation from our humane policies concern-
ing joint interests which the United States
Government and the voluntary agencies share
in our mutual efforts to help the unfortunate
through the refugee and migration programs.
Furthei", I want to assure you of our con-
tinued determination to implement our im-
migration laws in complete conformity with

704

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the President's policy and his own stated
objectives.

The Department is fully aware of and has
the greatest admiration for the devoted and
inspiring work which the American volun-
tary agencies have carried out over so many
years in providing care and assistance to
refugees and helping them to become rees-
tablished as independent, self-sufficient per-
sons. Through all these years you have
worked closely with the Department and
other agencies of our Government which are
concerned with refugee matters. You have
given President Johnson warm and enthusi-
astic support in obtaining the enactment of
his immigration legislative program. For
these reasons you have an understandable
concern in what happens in the Govern-
ment which might affect the refugee pro-
grams.

We plan, of course, to continue the pres-
ent Office of Refugee and Migration Affairs
along with its experienced personnel. Under
our general plan of reorganization, the office
will be considered fully responsible for
carrying out its own programs and func-
tions and will be given my personal atten-
tion and sympathetic support, along with
that of other senior officers in the Depart-
ment.

You and your associates are more aware
than other Americans that we in the De-
partment do not take and never have taken
the significance of refugee situations around
the world lightly. It may surprise even you
to know that since the end of World War
II the U. S. Government has spent almost $2
billion on migration and refugee activities.
This is more than the United States has
contributed to the United Nations and its
constituent organizations for all nonrefugee
purposes.

At this tense period in world affairs, I
can assure you that we are not about to re-
lax our interest in refugee matters. We are
continuing our full support for the pro-
grams which are the functional responsibil-
ities of the Office of Refugee and Migration
Affairs and tomorrow will begin hearings
before the Congress on our requested appro-

President Congratulates Agencies
on Work With Refugees

Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson to Deputy Under Secretary
William J. Crockett, which was read by Mr.
Crockett to the voluntary agency representa-
tives at a meeting on March 22.

March 22, 1966
Dear Mr. Secretary: I am glad to learn
that you are meeting today with the leaders
of the voluntary agencies who have done
and are doing so much for refugees and
migrants. I want you to extend to them my
personal best wishes and my congratulations
for the remarkable job they have done over
the years to alleviate the suffering of the
world's stateless and homeless peoples. With-
out their dedicated support of our governmen-
tal programs to help these victims of war and
more recently of Communist aggression, thou-
sands who now enjoy the blessings of freedom
would have perished.

I want you to assure them that we shall
accept every effort to see that the friendly
and humane policies related to migration and
refugee matters initiated by our beloved Pres-
ident Truman will continue in the same full
force as they have been during my Administra-
tion.

I look forward to an era of renewed gov-
ernment cooperation and full partnership with
these great humanitarian organizations.
Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

priations for fiscal year 1967. These will in-
clude our contributions to the Intergovern-
mental Committee for European Migration
and for the United Nations High Commis-
sioner for Refugees, as well as for the work
of the United States Escapee Program in
Europe, the Far East Refugee Program in
Hong Kong and Macao, assistance to Tibetan
refugees in India and Nepal, and the move-
ment of refugees from Cuba to the United
States.

You have been kept currently informed as
to the basis for the State Department's
having steadily reduced its appropriation re-
quests for these programs over the past 5
years, and we have done so again in 1967.

MAY 2, 1966

705

These reductions do not reflect any lessening
interest in the refugee programs. Rather
they show, first, there have been reductions
in the size of refugee problems through the
successful solution of the cases of many refu-
gees, which is a great tribute to the work
of your voluntary agencies; secondly, most
countries of asylum are becoming increas-
ingly prosperous and it is no longer neces-
sary to provide the same measure of assist-
ance to individual refugees; thirdly, the
United States has worked consistently to in-
crease the contributions of other govern-
ments to refugee problems, particularly by
their support of international organiza-
tions ; and finally, we are always on the alert
to find better and cheaper ways of carrying
out our operations. This latter point is im-
portant in view of the necessity for reducing
the cost of all government operations wher-
ever possible in order to finance our com-
mitments in Viet-Nam and to improve the
level of our society at home.

Our appropriation request of $6 million for
migration and refugee assistance should be
viewed in the context of the comments I
have just made and of the very large con-
tributions which the United States is mak-
ing toward refugees through other appropri-
ations. As you know, over $40 million is be-
ing spent annually for Cuban refugees in the
United States, the refugee program in South
Viet-Nam is currently at a level of $20 mil-
lion, and we are still contributing approxi-
mately $23 million toward the Palestine
refugee problem each year. In addition to all
this, large amounts of P.L. 480 surplus
food are being distributed to refugees; this
and other AID assistance is our main con-
tribution to the numerous African refugee
situations. It is therefore clear that the
United States is not reducing its interest in
refugee and migration problems but rather
is devoting the necessary resources to these
problems on a priority basis.

We are also prepared to meet new refugee
emergencies as they may occur. As you
know, the Migration and Refugee Assistance

Act of 1966 provides authority for the Pres-
ident, when he deems it necessary in the in-
terest of the United States, to utilize up to
$10 million of AID funds to meet unex-
pected refugee needs. The President will not
hesitate to use this authority, as is indi-
cated by his prompt approval of the funds
for the movement of Cubans to the United
States which began a few months ago. At the
time he outlined his proposed plan for aiding
Cubans at the signing of the immigration
bill at Liberty Island, the President made
clear in his statement "that from this day
forth those wishing to emigrate to America
shall be admitted on the basis of their skills
and their close relationship to those already
here." The President set forth the additional
policy that, "Those who can contribute most
to this country — to its growth, to its
strength, to its spirit — will be the first that
are admitted to this land."

In this connection, we in the Department
of State shall continue our efforts to insure
continuation of the President's sympathetic
and humane policy for the admission of
refugees into the United States. We realize
that there is still much to be done to achieve
all that is required in the application of the
new law, but we are steadily working to im-
prove the situation.

I want the remainder of time to provide
an opportunity for me to hear your views
and questions. At this particular meeting I
should think it would be more productive for
all of us if we could address ourselves to the
broad area of refugee and migration pol-
icies and programs and their place within the
Department of State and leave detailed
technical questions to a later working meet-
ing when our technical experts can wrestle
with them. I want to tell you again how
much we appreciate and admire the accom-
plishments of the voluntary agencies in the
refugee field. I want you to know we will do
everything we can to continue and strengthen
our long cooperative relationship and to seek
your advice and guidance on problems of mu-
tual interest in this field.

706

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees
and Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba

statement by Robert M. Sayre

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^

I am grateful for this opportunity to re-
view with you the latest developments with
regard to the movement of Cuban refugees
to the United States and to comment on
other aspects of the Cuban scene which I
believe will be of interest.

The present movement of refugees by U.S.
Government-chartered aircraft from Vara-
dero, Cuba, to the Miami International Air-
port, which began on December 1, 1965, is
in response to President Johnson's declara-
tion included in his remarks at the Statue of
Liberty on October 3, 1965, on the occasion
of the signing of the new immigration bill,
in which he said in part:^

But those who
what they are .
which they sprung.

... it is in that spirit that I declare ... to the
people of Cuba that those who seek refuge here . . .
will find it. The dedication of America to our tradi-
tions as an asylum for the oppressed is going to be
upheld.

I have directed the Departments of State and Jus-
tice and Health, Education, and Welfare to . . .
make all necessary arrangements to permit those
in Cuba who seek freedom to make an orderly entry
into the United States. . . .

Our first concern will be with those Cubans who
have been separated from their children and their
parents and their husbands and their wives that
are now in this country. Our next concern is with
those who are imprisoned for political reasons.

. come will come because of
not because of the land from

' Made before the Subcommittee on Refugees and
Escapees of the Senate Judiciary Committee on
Mar. 23.

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

A few days earlier on September 28 and
again on September 30 the Prime Minister
of Cuba, Fidel Castro, had declared that
Cuban citizens who might desire to join
their families in the United States or others
who simply wished to live in the United
States would be permitted to leave Cuba.

On October 4, 1965, the Swiss Embassy
in Havana, which represents United States
interests in Cuba, was requested to inform
the Cuban Government officially of the U.S.
position as stated by the President. On
October 5, 1965, the Cuban Government in
a diplomatic note addressed to the Swiss
Embassy indicated its willingness to discuss
arrangements which would permit an or-
derly movement to the United States.

On October 8 a detailed proposal was
made to the Cuban Government in which
the principal suggestions were a system of
priority categories, a movement of between
3,000 and 4,000 persons per month, trans-
portation to be provided by the United
States Government, and the inclusion of
persons imprisoned in Cuba for offenses of
a political nature. The Cuban Government
replied on October 12, 1965, indicating a
willingness to move toward an official un-
derstanding along the lines proposed by the
United States, with the exception of politi-
cal prisoners and with the added exception
that free departure would not be granted to
young Cubans between the ages of 15 and
26 "who under Cuban law are subject to the
first call for compulsory military service."

MAY 2, 1966

707

Negotiations continued, in the course of
which the Swiss Ambassador in Havana,
Mr. Emil Stadelhofer, traveled to Washing-
ton on October 23 for a brief meeting with
representatives of the Departments of State,
Health, Education, and Welfare, and Jus-
tice. The successful culmination of this ef-
fort was the memorandum of understand-
ing^* made effective on November 6, 1965, by
an exchange of notes in Havana between the
Embassy of Switzerland in its capacity as
representative of the Interests of the United
States in Cuba and the Cuban Government.

Movement of Refugees to U.S.

While arrangements for chartering air-
craft were being made by the transporta-
tion office of the Department of State work-
ing through the Military Air Transport
Service, arrangements were also made to
charter vessels to bring to the United States
from the small Cuban port of Camarioca
those persons who were gathered there on
the date the memorandum became effec-
tive. This Camarioca movement resulted
from Prime Minister Castro's offer to let
Cubans in the United States come by small
boat to this port and pick up their relatives
and families— despite U.S. objections be-
cause of the danger which this presented
for the Cubans and those who came to get
them. As a result, in the period roughly
from September 30 to November 30, some
159 small craft of every description suc-
ceeded in making this dangerous crossing
and returning to the United States with
some 2,866 persons. Had it not been for an
extraordinary and all-out effort of the U.S.
Coast Guard in patrolling the Florida
Straits and in shepherding these vessels,
many lives would have been lost. On several
occasions the Coast Guard cutters rescued
people already in the water and from craft
on the verge of foundering. As a humani-
tarian gesture, and considering that the
Cuban Government had closed the port of
Camarioca to new departures, the U.S.
Government picked up and transported to

• For text, see ibid., Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850.

708

\

Key West the remaining 1,970 persons.

Both the sea movement from Camarioca
and the airlift which began on December 1
were financed in accordance with a Presi-
dential Determination issued on November
10, 1965, authorizing $750,000 to be utilized
for this purpose in fiscal year 1966. This
authorization was pursuant to section 2(c)
of the Migration and Refugee Assistance
Act of 1962 and the Foreign Assistance Act
of 1961, as amended.

Various U.S. airlines were interested in
participating in the airlift and seven com-
panies have done so. The flight schedule
calls for two flights per day Monday
through Friday. The airline companies have
performed admirably and efficiently. On
only one day, due to engine trouble, were the
flights cancelled. Extra flights were added
on each of the two following days to keep
the movement on schedule.

At the beginning of the movement there
were a few delays and difficulties of an
administrative nature, but we think it fair
to say that for many weeks now it has been
a smoothly functioning operation. The Em-
bassy of Switzerland on the Cuban end has
made a fine contribution to this success and
merits great credit for its very hard work
and dedication. I understand that represent-
atives from the Departments of Justice and
HEW will also testify before this committee
and will, I am sure, describe the handling
procedures and processing of the refugees.
In the month of December 3,351 persons
arrived on these flights ; in January, 3,464 ;
in February, 4,031; and in March, to the
11th, 1,594. The movement continues to be
of persons in the first-priority category,
that is, "immediate relatives" of persons
now living in the United States, and appears
likely to remain so for several more months.
At the time it becomes possible to consider
the movement of persons other than the
first-priority category in accordance with
paragraphs 8 and 9 of the memorandum of
understanding, it is our hope that it will be
possible to give first consideration to rela-
tives of American citizens in accordance
with the system of preferences which has

J

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

been more or less traditional in our immi-
gration laws.

With regard to the possibility that some
Cuban refugees might be received by other
countries in this hemisphere, we have made
known to the Council of the Organization
of American States on two occasions our
interest in this subject. On February 12,
1966, the first response came when 106
refugees, destined to join relatives in Costa
Rica, were brought to Miami by an extra
flight of the regular airlift plane. The ar-
rangements for their onward transporta-
tion to San Jose, including the cost, were
made in Costa Rica. In arranging this
movement the good offices of the Swiss Am-
bassador were an essential factor. At the
moment, similar movements to two other
countries are in the planning stage and we
are optimistic that they will ultimately be
realized.

Internal Situation in Cuba

It is our expectation that the refugee
movement will continue for the foreseeable
future. The number of Cubans who wish to
leave is clearly in the hundreds of thousands.
In view of the gray, bleak situation inside
Cuba, it is not surprising that Cubans from
all walks of life have left the island since
the airlift began. As problems press from
all sides and as life in Cuba becomes more
closed and unattractive, frustrations and
apathy increase.

Thus, Castro's charismatic appeal has di-
minished sharply and the enthusiasms of the
revolution's early days are steadily giving
way in many cases to weariness or, on the
part of some officials, simply a grim deter-
mination to see things through. This grow-
ing disenchantment with the revolution
mainly results from several factors: from
the failure of the economy to provide the
Cuban people with the better life they were
promised; from Cuba's high degree of isola-
tion from the world community, especially
the nations of Latin America ; and, somewhat
paradoxically, from greater control and
organization of Cuban society, control and
organization that are, in part at least, in-

tended to reinstill revolutionary zeal and
drive.

There is ample evidence that the regime
is now in the process of moving toward an
even more totalitarian state, with, of course,
Castro exercising nearly absolute power. Last
October, for example, the name of Cuba's
single party was changed from that of the
United Party of the Cuban Revolution to the
Communist Party, and the party was re-
organized along more tightly structured
orthodox Communist lines. To insure that
the party would maintain his authority
Castro made certain that persons known for
their loyalty to him were appointed to key
positions on the Central Committee. Shortly
before this move, Castro stated in a public
address that people appointed to technical
and management positions within the gov-
ernment have to be good revolutionaries and
that if it were a question of choosing be-
tween revolutionary zeal and competence,
the former quality must be decisive.

Other manifestations of the closed society
include purges at Cuban schools and close
surveillance of Cuban life on an individual
basis by a well-trained, well-organized se-
curity apparatus. Neither activity is, of
course, new to the Castro regime, but both
have been reemphasized during the past
year. Students and faculty members have
been dismissed from universities and even
high schools because of their attitudes, and
the activities of informers and police agents
have become even more extensive. The re-
cent showcase trial of the former president
of the FEU (the University of Havana stu-
dent organization), the arrest of the Vice
Minister of the Armed Forces for "crimes
against revolutionary morals," and Castro's
statements against officials who lead la
dolce vita at home and abroad are addi-
tional indications of the regime's close check
on the private lives of its subjects and its
desire to remove from positions of responsi-
bility those who may be "unreliable" and,
hence, dangerous.

As already noted, much of the apathy and
dissatisfaction among the Cuban people
stems fi-om the failure of the economy. Al-

MAY 2, 1966

709

though there have been swings in both di-
rections, the economy has remained essen-
tially stagnant since Castro came to power.
Shortages of common items, rationing of
clothing and basic foodstuffs, a lack of
spares for capital equipment that is still
U.S.-oriented, and an inadequate transport
and distribution system are some of the
economy's most salient features.

There probably was some improvement in
1964-65, largely as a result of increased
sugar production, which reached 6 million
tons last year. (Rather ironically, the Cuban
Government considered it necessary to fol-
low capitalist practice by establishing in-
centive programs for sugar workers.) The
6-million-ton level was mainly achieved,
however, at the expense of cutbacks in other
sectors of the economy, notably in the culti-
vation of rice, corn, and other agricultural
products whose lands were put into sugar
cane. Further, sugar production is likely to
decrease this year, owing to both a severe
drought and the generally poor performance
of the economy. Compounding Cuba's diffi-
culties is the low world sugar price, which
has dropped from about 12 cents a pound in
early 1964 to a little more than 2 cents a
pound today. The falling sugar price is re-
flected in Cuba's imports from the free
world: about $350 million in 1964, an esti-
mated $190 million in 1965, and a probable
further drop in 1966.

"Tricontinent Conference"

Despite the failure at home, the Castro
regime continues its efforts to play a role
on the stage of international communism
and to portray itself as the model revolution
for this hemisphere.

The most recent, and very important,
manifestation of its subversive intent was
the conference held in Havana from January
3 to January 15, at which delegations from
some 86 countries met together as the First
Afro-Asian-Latin American Peoples Solidar-
ity Conference — usually referred to as the
"Tricontinent Conference." This conference
was sponsored by the AAPSO [Afro-Asian

Peoples Solidarity Organization], a Cairo-
based, Communist-dominated organization.

The delegations attending were techni-
cally not official representatives of their
governments, but in the case of the Com-
munist countries, as well as several others,
official approval cannot be doubted. From
this hemisphere, with the exception of Cuba,
none of the delegations had any official tie
or approval. They represented a variety of
Communist, pro-Castro, Communist-front,
and other groups, whose most evident com-
mon denominator was opposition to the
United States and to the duly established
governments of Latin America.

The tone of the Tricontinent Conference
became increasingly strident and resulted
in an outpouring of speeches and resolutions
which denounced the United States both in
general and specifically in every conceivable
trouble spot in the world. Even more strik-
ing than the militant cast of the proceed-
ings was the constant extolling of armed
violence as the principal tactic in achieving
revolutionary victory throughout the world.

In his opening speech of January 2, Fidel
Castro gave an indication of the tone the
conference was to take when he asserted
that "any revolutionary movement any-
where in the world can count on Cuba's
unconditional support." He struck an even
more aggressive posture in his closing
speech of January 15 in which he urged
"revolutionarj^ armed battle ... in all or
almost all Latin American countries," men-
tioning specifically and repeatedly Vene-
zuela, Colombia, Guatemala, Peru, and the
Dominican Republic.

Certainly one of the most important dele-
gations at the conference was that from the
U.S.S.R., headed by Sharif Rashidov, an
alternate member of the Soviet Presidium
and a member of the Central Committee of
the Soviet Communist Party. Rashidov
stated in his address to the conference that
his delegation was present "with the aim of
giving all-round assistance to the unifica-
tion of the anti-imperialist forces of the
three continents in order to provide greater

710

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

impetus to our common struggle against
imperialism, colonialism, and neo-colonial-
ism — led by the U.S. capitalists." Referring
to Latin America he stated,

We express our fraternal solidarity with the
armed struggle being waged by the Venezuelan,
Peruvian, Colombian, and Guatemalan patriots for
freedom against the stooges of imperialism. . . .
We are in solidarity with the struggle being waged
by the peoples of British, French, and Dutch
Guiana and the Antilles against the colonial regimes,
and also with the struggle waged by the people of
Puerto Rico.

The speeches of most other delegates
echoed the bellicose tone of the Cuban and
Soviet speeches. The speeches of the Latin
American delegates, for example, stressed
the need to step up the struggle in this
hemisphere against "imperialism," and its
"native tools, such as the Organization of
American States." Chief delegates of the
Venezuelan, Peruvian, and Guatemalan
Communist organizations, among others,
stressed armed violence against the estab-
lished governments as the only solution to
Latin America's problems.

Among the principal resolutions adopted
by the conference were the political resolu-
tion and the resolution on economic prob-
lems. The first-named consists of a long
review of the world situation as seen
through the Communists' distorted vision,
in which all alleged wrongs are ascribed to
IJ.S.-led "imperialistic forces." The follow-
ing extract will provide something of its
flavor :

There is particular importance in developing ef-
fective American peoples who are under arms
against the native oligarchies, servants of the
United States, as in Venezuela, Colombia, Peru,
and Guatemala, or who suffer the repression of
military tyrannies, as in Brazil, Ecuador, Bolivia,
and other coimtries. Latin America is the rear
guard of the most powerful and brutal imperialism,
which is the chief prop of colonialism and neo-
colonialism throughout the world. Every blow struck
by the Latin American peoples at their Yankee and
native oppressors has a decisive influence in weak-
ening U.S. imperialism.

The economic resolution is an appeal for
"economic emancipation" but contains, also,
the following exhortation:

The resolution calls upon all the participants in
the conference to redouble their efforts in render-
ing economic, financial, and other assistance, in-
cluding arms and ammunition, to countries engaged
in armed struggle for liberation.

Moreover, there were special resolutions
on certain countries. In our area these were
Venezuela, Colombia, Brazil, British Guiana,
Peru, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti,
Paraguay, and Nicaragua.

In addition to the speeches and resolu-
tions, the conference also took several prac-
tical steps toward implementing the deci-
sions which had been reached. Following
protracted behind-the-scenes debate and in-
fighting between the Chinese and Soviet
factions represented in Havana, the confer-
ence's organization committee established a
Tricontinent Conference Solidarity Orga-
nization with provisional headquarters in
Havana and a Cuban as temporary Secretary
General. It appears that the new organiza-
tion backed by Moscow and Havana parallels
and in many ways duplicates the older
Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization,
over which Peking hoped to win control.

The conference also established, as a
subordinate body to the Tricontinent Soli-
darity Organization, a liberation committee
with the expressed purpose of encouraging
and giving all the necessary aid to national
liberation movements, "particularly those in
arms against imperialism." The 27 Latin
American Communist delegates to the con-
ference remained in Havana following the
formal conclusion of the Tricontinent Con-
ference and unanimously agreed on the
establishment of a Latin American Solidar-
ity Organization (LASO) with objectives
similar to those of the liberation committee
mentioned above.

From even these brief extracts it is clear
that the conference constituted, among other
things, a gross intervention into the internal
affairs of this hemisphere. Those countries
singled out as special targets were, under-
standably, particularly outraged and took
the initiative in the OAS [Organization of
American States], which resulted in the
COAS resolution of February 2 condemning
the Tricontinent Conference for its aggres-

MAY 2, 1966

711

sive and interventionist acts and resolutions.*
Subsequently, the Latin American repre-
sentatives in the United Nations, as well as
several Latin American governments on an
individual basis, have condemned the con-
ference on the same grounds. Castro may
well believe that the results of the confer-
ence were favorable to him. We believe to
the contrary: that his brazen, arrogant call
for subversion and violent revolution has
driven home to the free peoples of the
hemisphere as never before the true nature
of the Castro-Communist goals.

It may be argued that much of the con-
ference's stress on armed struggle and the
violent overthrow of duly established gov-
ernments was due to Soviet-Chinese Com-
munist competition within the conference
forum — in other words, that the deeds of
the Soviets and of the Cubans will not
match their words. This may be, though
certainly not from any lack of desire on
their part to achieve the goals outlined in
Havana. But, from a foreign policy view-
point, we believe it must be assumed that
there is some substance behind their words.
The OAS countries are alert and prepared
to counter any increased subversive efforts.

U.S. and OAS Policy Toward Cuba

At the Eighth Meeting of Consultation of
the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the
OAS countries, held in Punta del Este, Uru-
guay, in January 1962,^ the ministers re-
solved that the Government of Cuba, by vir-
tue of its adherence to Marxism-Leninism
and its alinement with the Communist bloc,
had made itself incompatible with the prin-
ciples and objectives of the inter-American
system and should therefore be excluded
from participation in that system.

At the Ninth Meeting in July 1964 in
Washington,^ the Foreign Ministers decided
that the attempt by the Castro government

' For a U.S. statement made in the OAS Council
on Jan. 24, see ibid., Mar. 7, 1966, p. 383.

° For background and texts of resolutions, see
ibid., Feb. 19, 1962, p. 270.

' For background and text of Final Act, see ibid.,
Aug. 10, 1964, p. 174.

against the democratic reform government
of Venezuela was "aggression" within the
meaning of the Rio Treaty of Reciprocal
Assistance. They therefore resolved that
the governments of the American states
should not maintain diplomatic or consular
relations with the Government of Cuba;
should suspend all of their trade, direct or
indirect, with Cuba, except in foodstuffs,
medicines, and medical equipment sent for
humanitarian reasons; and should suspend
all sea transportation between their coun-
tries and Cuba except that necessary for
reasons of a humanitarian nature. More-
over, the foreign ministers urged the other
nations of the free world to examine the
possibility of effectively demonstrating
their solidarity in achieving the purposes of
this resolution. This step was related, of
course, to the exertion of a policy of eco-
nomic denial against the Castro regime so
as to limit its potential for external trouble-
making.

The most recent COAS resolution regard-
ing the Tricontinent Conference and the let-
ter ^ addressed to the President of the U.N.
Security Council by the Latin American rep-
resentatives are firm indications that the free
countries of this hemisphere remain alert
and determined to maintain this policy.

For our part we continue to regard the
Communist regime in Cuba as temporary,
and our goal remains a truly free and inde-
pendent Cuba which, under a government
democratically chosen by the people, will
live in peace with its neighbors. As far as
the U.S. Government is concerned, two as-
pects of the present Cuban Government's
posture are not negotiable: the Cuban re-
gime's political and military ties of de-
pendence with an extracontinental Commu-
nist power and its campaign of subversion
in the hemisphere.

We do not consider the present govern-
ment in Cuba a direct military threat to
the United States or to Latin America under
present circumstances — nor shall we permit
it to become such a threat, as OAS actions
in October 1962 and July 1964 demonstrated.

U.N. doc. S/7123.

712

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

We and the other members of the OAS do
regard that regime as a focus of subversion
in the hemisphere.

In establishing our policies in the light
of this threat of subversion, we do not con-
template the use of military force in the
context of existing circumstances. We have
been pursuing and we intend to pursue —
within the framework of the inter-Ameri-
can system to the greatest extent possible
— courses of action designed, on the one
hand, to reduce the will and ability of the
present government in Cuba to advance the
Communist cause in Latin America through
sabotage and terrorism; and, on the other
hand, to assist the nations of this hemi-

sphere in strengthening their ability to re-
sist subversion. Related to the latter course
of action are the long-range objectives of
the Alliance for Progress, which seeks,
through social and economic development of
hemispheric countries, to eliminate the con-
ditions which furnish a fertile field for
subversion and revolution.

The strategy which we and the other
members of the OAS are following requires
patience, tenacity, flexibility, and a high
degree of responsibility. We intend to con-
tinue on this course in the conviction that
it is the most effective means, under present
circumstances, of attaining our objective of
a free Cuba.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia

Folloiving is a statement made bij U.S.
Representative Arthur J. Goldberg in the
Security Council on April 9, together with
the text of a resolution adopted by the
Council on that day.

STATEMENT BY AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S./U.N. press release 4832

Mr. President [Moussa L. Keita of Mali],
I wish to join my colleagues who have pre-
ceded me in welcoming you to your first
meeting in the Security Council. Having also
been President of the Council myself in the
first meeting which I attended, when I was
charged with convening a meeting of the
Council too promptly, I am aware of the
complexity of the task before you as a serv-
ant of the Council, with such long and estab-
lished traditions of contribution in the

interests of peace. I welcome you as a col-
league and as a President of the Council and
extend to you the best wishes of my delega-
tion and offer you full cooperation in what
is always a very onerous task.

I also associate myself, Mr. President,
with the views you have expressed on behalf
of all of the members of the Council con-
cerning our distinguished colleague, Ambas-
sador El-Farra [Muhammad El-Farra of
Jordan, President of the Security Council
during March], for his great and continu-
ing contribution to the work of the Security
Council.

You are doubly welcome, Mr. President,
by me since you are also the distinguished
Ambassador of your country to our country
in Washington and because we enjoy
friendly relations with your country.

Several members of the Council have al-

MAY 2, 1966

713

ready adverted to the important constitu-
tional and procedural issues which have
been raised with regard to the manner in
which this meeting of the Council has been
set. This is not the appropriate time for us
to debate this issue. We have a matter of
urgency before us upon which we should act
and act promptly. But I believe it will be
necessary for the Council to consider the
matter more fully in some form in the fu-
ture, and we on that occasion, when time
permits, will communicate our detailed
views on this very important subject later.

This Council is called urgently by the
United Kingdom to address itself to an
immediate and pressing problem: the possi-
bility that oil may at any time be delivered
to Southern Rhodesia from tankers calling
at the Portuguese port of Beira.

The general views of my Government on
the settlement of the Southern Rhodesia
question have been expressed several times
before the General Assembly and this Coun-
cil, and they are too well known to require
a detailed statement from me at this time.
I content myself to say that in Southern
Rhodesia, as elsewhere, my Government is
committed to the objectives of democratic
government and self-determination, self-
determination by and for all the people of
Southern Rhodesia, not by and for the few.

It is a matter of concern, I am sure, to
all of us in the Council that the steps which
we agreed on last November in pursuit of
this common goal have not as yet had their
full effect; and we meet again this morning
to consider a further urgent measure which
will contribute to the achievement of this
goal.i

From the outset I wish to make it clear
that my Government shares the view, which
I do not find any disagreement about in this
Council, that the problem of Southern
Rhodesia is a responsibility of the British
Government — not that this Council and the
world organization do not have an appro-

' For U.S. statements in the General Assembly
and the Security Council and texts of resolutions
adopted in the two bodies, see Bulletin of Dec. 6,
1965, p. 908.

714

priate role to play in dealing with this prob-
lem. The world has quite properly looked
to Britain, the constitutional authority, to
resolve this very difficult crisis. Britain has
never hesitated to acknowledge its responsi-
bility publicly and to the members of this
Council — and for coming here when it did
originally and when it does so today, it
seems to me, as a believer in this world
organization, that Great Britain should be
congratulated and not condemned for mani-
festing its recognition of its obligations
under the charter and its respect for the
decent opinions of mankind. The good faith
of Britain is doubted in some circles. I can
only say for myself and my Government
that we believe that Britain is entirely com-
mitted to bringing an end to the Smith
regime, and we are convinced that this is a
firm policy of Prime Minister Wilson and
his government.

Gravity of the Proposal

It is fitting that Britain should expect
and obtain from all of us the fullest co-
operation in support of its efforts. It was,
in fact, in a search for such support that
the United Kingdom brought the problem
of the Southern Rhodesian rebellion to the
attention of the Security Council last No
vember. Now Britain has returned to this
Council to receive additional backing for
new and very firm steps.

I should like to say to this Council that
what Britain is asking for in terms of sub-
stance is not by any means inconsequential.
On the contrary, it is one of the gravest and
most far-reaching proposals that has been
made to this Council. What is involved is
not the question of two tankers, if I may
say so with all due regard to all who have
spoken. If we look at paragraph 5 of the
resolution, this resolution tendered by the
United Kingdom calls upon the Government
of the United Kingdom to prevent by the
use of force, if necessary, the arrival at
Beira of vessels reasonably believed to be
carrying oil destined for Rhodesia.

The question of intercepting vessels on
the high seas, the question of arresting and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

detaining them, is a matter that has a long
history in the field of international law.
Indeed, if we refer to history, my own
country once went to war with Great Brit-
ain on the question of arresting and detain-
ing vessels on the high seas. And we are
asked in the Security Council — and it
should be a matter of deep consideration
and concern for all of us — to put our sanc-
tion upon what will be a rule of interna-
tional law when this Council acts: Vessels
on the high seas can be arrested and de-
tained in the interest of international law
which we will be making here today if we
adopt the resolution tendered by Great
Britain, as I hope we will do.

Actions Taken by the United States

It is not an easy decision for any govern-
ment to put its support to a resolution of
this character, both in light of our history
and traditions and in light of all of the far-
reaching implications that such a step as
we are asked to take may envision. Indeed,
for a major trading country such as the
United States to put teeth into a program of
denial such as the one called for by the
Security Council last November involved an
impressive array of steps on our part, which
called into play very important decisions on
our part. When I last spoke to the Council
on this subject,^ I mentioned some of the
measures which we had taken and I said the
United States would consider urgently what
else remained to be done in order to apply
an effective across-the-board program of
trade sanctions against Southern Rhodesia.
I am sure the members of the Council will
be interested in hearing what this involved
from the standpoint of the United States
in terms of taking such action.

First, we refused recognition of the
Smith regime.

Second, we immediately instituted a com-
prehensive embargo on the shipment of all
arms and military equipment to Southern
Rhodesia.

Third, we suspended action on applica-

U.S. Views on Delay in Calling
Security Council Meeting

Following is a statement issued at Washing-
ton and at the U.S. Mission to the United
Nations in New York on April 8.

The attitude of the Council President is un-
precedented. Article 28 of the charter provides
that: "The Security Council shall be so or-
ganized as to be able to function continuously."

The Council's own rules of procedure pro-
vide that: "The President shall call a meeting
of the Security Council at the request of any
member of the Security Council."

The President has no discretion as to vyhether
to call a meeting. His responsibility is to fix
the time for the meeting. In fixing the time,
the President does not exercise an arbitrary
or unfettered discretion. The fixing of the time
must be related to the urgency of the request.
The meeting of the Council he must call at the
request of a member cannot by the nature of
the charter and the rules be unduly delayed or
obstructed even by a majority of the members,
much less by a mere minority.

Failure to comply with the procedures and
established practices of the Security Council
will have serious implications for its effec-
tiveness in this and future cases, and is a cause
of great concern to the United States Govern-
ment.

' Ibid., pp. 912 and 920.

tions for United States Government loans
and credit guarantees and are issuing no
further investment guarantees to Southern
Rhodesia.

Fourth, we took action in support of the
financial measures instituted by the British
Government, including recognition of the
authority of the newly appointed Board of
Directors in London over the official de-
posits of the Reserve Bank of Rhodesia in
the United States.

Fifth, we announced that at the request
of our Government the United States im-
porters of asbestos and lithium from South-
ern Rhodesia had agreed to find other
sources.

Sixth, we informed United States com-
panies that we recognized the legal author-
ity of the British Government to take
actions banning the trade in Southern

MAY 2, 1966

715

Rhodesian chrome and tobacco, and we rec-
ommended in the strongest terms to the
United States companies that they comply
with the British Orders-in-Council passed
for this purpose.

Seventh, despite our great tradition and
in part our constitutional commitment to
freedom of private travel, we took measures
to discourage private travel by Americans
to Southern Rhodesia by announcing that
the United States Government could no
longer assure normal protective services to
Americans planning to travel through or in
Southern Rhodesia. And we also said that
American travelers intending to go to
Southern Rhodesia must have British visas,
not Southern Rhodesian visas, for travel to
that country.

Eighth, we instituted procedures which
have cut off virtually all American exports
of consequence. The exceptions are largely
humanitarian items and not essential to the
Southern Rhodesian economy.

Ninth, we suspended the United States
sugar quota for Southern Rhodesia for the
years 1965 and 1966. In fact, part of that
quota was on the high seas for delivery to
the United States when we took that ac-
tion, and we have subjected ourselves, ob-
viously, to legal action for the act we took
with respect to a shipment on the high seas
before the Security Council acted.

Tenth, we instituted a total embargo on
shipments of all United States petroleum
and petroleum products into Southern Rho-
desia. And we also advised United States
citizens and enterprises to comply in full
with the British Government's Order-in-
Council prohibiting import of such products
into Southern Rhodesia.

In addition to these direct measures, we
have joined the United Kingdom and other
countries in establishing an airlift of petro-
leum products to Zambia in order to aid
that landlocked nation in maintaining its
economy, a consideration which must never
escape the minds of this Council. United
States aircraft are being used in this opera-
tion delivering vital cargo to Elisabethville at

716

a total rate of 1 million gallons per month.

Mr. President, these measures cannot be
taken overnight. We took them urgently
and as quickly as we could. And the meas-
ures we have instituted against Southern
Rhodesia will mean a trade loss to the
United States of many millions of dollars.
In addition, since the middle of January, the
United States has allocated more than $4
million for the Zambian airlift and for
planned emergency maintenance of the
Great North Road from Tanzania to Zam-
bia. It is interesting, Mr. President, to
reflect that this figure represents more than
the total United States contribution for the
United Nations Force in Cyprus covering the
same period of time and almost two-thirds
of the United States contributions to the
United Nations Emergency Force in the
Middle East for the entire year 1966. In
short, our support for Zambia in connection
with the implementation of the Security
Council's November resolution on Southern
Rhodesia is comparable in cost to the sup-
port which we provide for the United Na-
tions important peacekeeping operations.

I mention these costs not to use figures
but to emphasize that these are costs which
we accept gladly in support of the principles
of legality, democracy, and self-determina-
tion in Africa. And we are glad that we
were able to make this contribution because
we deem the problem of Rhodesia to be a
problem for all the world. We recognize, of
course, the special concern of Africa in this
problem, but we share that concern.

Mr. President, I think this is a proper
occasion to strongly urge other countries
which have not as yet moved to tighten this
ring around the Smith regime to do so with-
out delay. As for us, we continue to support
the United Kingdom firmly as it discharges
its responsibilities in this effort.

Now today we deal with a particular
problem. The United Kingdom has brought
to the attention of this Council the greatest
current danger in our common effort: the
risk of a serious breach in the program of
oil sanctions as a result of the arrival and

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the potential arrival of tankers at Portu-
guese ports with cargoes apparently des-
tined for Southern Rhodesia.

U.S. Support for Resolution

The United States fully concurs in the
British proposal that the Council act vigor-
ously and promptly to meet this danger. And
this resolution is, indeed, destined to meet
firmly and clearly the immediate danger be-
fore us by calling on the Portuguese Govern-
ment, and on any government whose vessels
may be involved, to prevent the movement
of oil into Rhodesia through Beira and, in
case this is not sufficient, it calls on the
United Kingdom Government to prevent such
movement, by force if necessary.

Mr. President, all of us are realistic. We
hope that these additional measures will be
effective, but we recognize — and must recog-
nize— the absolute necessity for moving in
concert, step by step, as far as we can
unitedly to meet this problem. And this
Council, as before, remains seized of the
problem so that the additional measures
which become necessary, if they do become
necessary, can be ventilated here, debated
here, and decided upon here.

It has always been my conviction, Mr.
President, that we should proceed prac-
tically to do what we can agree upon quickly
and urgently, and then we should go on and
consider other measures upon which other
members of the Council may have doubts
and reservations and see whether we can
arrive at agreement upon such other meas-
ures. But we should never, in my opinion,
fail to act quickly and urgently on those
matters which we all desire and upon which
we can all agree quickly in the interests of
the common goal.

Perhaps, Mr. President, in saying so, I
reflect a personal philosophy. As we sat
here, I sent for a speech I made when I was
appointed Secretary of Labor of the United
States, where there are also many unfin-
ished problems in my country, and I said
this — but it is not an original idea of mine
— I quoted a great democratic Spanish

MAY 2, 1966

philosopher as an illustration of my own
philosophy, Salvador de Madariaga. And he
said this:

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic.
We must walk in the right direction but we must
walk step by step. Our tasks are to define what is
desirable, to define what is possible at any time
within the scope of what is desirable, to carry out
what is possible in the spirit of what is desirable.

And, Mr. President, the resolution we
have reflects no disagreement in this Coun-
cil. I am sure we all want to stop these
ships, and I am sure we all want to empower
the British Government to stop them as
quickly and as effectively as can be done.

The resolution we passed last November
reflected the Council's determination to
condemn the rebellion and to bring it to an
end. It was paralleled by General Assembly
action reflecting similar overwhelming sen-
timent. Implementing actions have been
announced since then by an impressive ma-
jority of U.N. member nations. And, despite
the fact that the ultimate end has not been
achieved, we ought to take pride and satis-
faction in what the great body of world
opinion has done in response to an appeal
by this Council. In fact, in my short ex-
perience here, few issues coming before this
body have ever produced such a unanimity
of response, a clear indication that we have
the same goal and dramatic evidence that,
as we affirmed last November, the nations
of the world will not remain idle while a
minority violates the principles which the
world community holds sacred. And surely
we can, and we should, agree today on the
specific question before us, agree that we
should take action to prevent these oil ship-
ments.

Time, as we have been told, is of the
essence, and we ought to act in the spirit
that time is of the essence.

My Government appreciates the initiative
which the British Government has taken
and is ready to vote, and vote without delay,
allowing time, of course, for reasonable de-
bate on the resolution. We hope others will
join us in acting with the dispatch which
the situation calls for.

717

TEXT OF RESOLUTION^

The Security Council,

Recalling its resolutions Nos. 216 of 12 November
1965 and 217 of 20 November 1965 and in particular
its call to all States to do their utmost to break off
economic relations with Southern Rhodesia, in-
cluding an embargo on oil and petroleum products,

Gravely concerned at reports that substantial
supplies of oil may reach Rhodesia as the result of
an oil tanker having arrived at Beira and the ap-
proach of a further tanker which may lead to the
resumption of pumping through the CPMR pipe-
line with the acquiescence of the Portuguese au-
thorities.

Considering that such supplies will afford gfreat
assistance and encouragement to the illegal regime
in Southern Rhodesia, thereby enabling it to re-
main longer in being,

1. Determines that the resulting situation con-
stitutes a threat to the peace;

2. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to
permit oil to be pumped through the pipeline from
Beira to Rhodesia ;

3. Calls upon the Portuguese Government not to
receive at Beira oil destined for Rhodesia;

4. Calls upon all States to ensure the diversion of
any of their vessels reasonably believed to be carry-
ing oil destined for Rhodesia which may be en route
for Beira;

5. Calls upon the Government of the United King-
dom to prevent by the use of force if necessary the
arrival at Beira of vessels reasonably believed to
be carrying oil destined for Rhodesia, and empowers
the United Kingdom to arrest and detain the tanker
known as the Joanna V upon her departure from
Beira in the event her oil cargo is discharged there.

U.S. Officials Named to Boards
of Asian Development Bank

The Senate on April
lowing nominations to
ment Bank;!

1 confirmed the fol-
the Asian Develop-

Henry H. Fowler to be U.S. Governor ;
William S. Gaud to be U.S. Alternate
Governor ; and

Bernard Zagorin to be U.S. Director.

"U.N. doc. S/RES/221 (1966); adopted by the
Council on Apr. 9 by a vote of 10 to 0, with 5 ab-
stentions (Bulgaria, France, Mali, U.S.S.R., Uru-
guay) .

' For a White House announcement of the nomina-
tions, see White House press release dated Mar. 17.

718

U.N. Security Council Extends
Peace Force in Cyprus

Statement by James Roosevelt *

Mr. President, we are indebted again to
the Secretary-General for the excellence of
his report - on the United Nations operation
in Cyprus. This clear record of the past 3
months and the useful observations have
assisted the Security Council materially in
its task.

My Government, in voting for a 3-month
extension of the United Nations Force in
Cyprus, recognized the continuing need for
a United Nations presence on the island. It
is clear that this judgment was shared by
all the other members of the Council. The
United States has willingly, consistently,
and fully supported the maintenance of the
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus in the past —
by our statements in this Council, by our
votes, and by our substantial financial con-
tributions toward the cost of the Force. We
continue to support the United Nations
Force in Cyprus. |

However, as the distinguished members of
this Council well know, the Force has been
in existence for nearly 2 years. It has been
remarkably successful in keeping the peace
during that time, although there is still
underlying tension on the island, and, of
course, I wish in no way to minimize the
complexity of the situation on Cyprus.
Nevertheless, it is the conviction of my
Government that, after the passage of 2
years, the time is at hand to intensify the
search for ways to reduce that tension and
promote a solution to the basic problem.

In the interval since we last met to con-
sider the question of Cyprus, my Govern-
ment has been increasingly concerned that
we not lose sight of the United Nations'
eventual goal in Cyprus and that there
should be significant movement toward a
peaceful settlement and an agreed solution.

'- Made in the Security Council on Mar. 16 (U.S./
U.N. press release 4822). Mr. Roosevelt was Acting
U.S. Representative in the Security Council.

• U.N. doc. S/7191.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

My Government was therefore pleased to
learn that the Secretary-General has re-
cently given an enlarged mandate ^ to his
most capable Special Representative in Cy-
prus, Ambassador [Carlos A.] Bernardes, to
employ his good offices and to make such
approaches as may be productive in solving
the problems of either a local or a broader
nature. The United States regards this step
as having great potential for the restoration
of peace and order. We are hopeful that the
efforts of Ambassador Bernardes will stimu-
late positive steps toward a settlement, and
we believe that his experience as a principal
architect of the March 4 [1964] resolution *
as well as his experience in Cyprus equips
him admirably for his task. The United
States is reassured and encouraged by the
report of the Secretary-General that the
parties most directly concerned have
adopted a helpful and cooperative attitude
toward this extension of Ambassador Ber-
nardes' responsibilities.

We are keenly aware that the business of
keeping the peace, of securing the peace, is
not only difficult and prolonged; it is also
costly. We hope that those who have so
generously contributed in the past will con-
tinue to do so and that nations who have
not yet contributed or have not done so on
a regular basis, especially those here in the
Security Council, will join in voluntary con-
tributions to the support of the Force. The
Secretary-General has spoken earnestly and
persuasively on this subject in his latest
report and here today as he has in the past.

Finally, I should like to record our shock
and sense of loss upon the death in Decem-
ber of General [K. S.] Thimayya, late Com-
mander of the United Nations Force in
Cyprus. He served the cause of peace with
dedication and high ability. He is sorely
missed. I also wish to pay tribute to the

' For text, see U.N. doc. S/7180.

' U.N. doc. S/5575.

' In a resolution (S/7205) unanimously adopted on
Mar. 16, the Security Council extended "once more
the stationing of the United Nations Force in Cyprus
. . . for a period of three months ending 26 June
1966. . . ."

untiring efforts of the Secretary-General
and his staff in fostering a solution to the
Cyprus question. My Government again
wishes to express its admiration and grati-
tude for the courage, the patience, and the
skill of the men of the Peacekeeping Force.'

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement
Updating U.S. Tariff Concessions

The Office of the Special Representative
for Trade Negotiations announced on April
5 that the United States and the United
Kingdom had on that day signed an agree-
ment to reestablish in the language of the
new Tariff Schedules of the United States
(TSUS) the trade agreement concessions
previously granted to the United Kingdom
by the United States. The agreement also
grants several new concessions to offset the
impairment in previous concessions inci-
dental to bringing the TSUS into force.

The negotiation with the United Kingdom
was one of some 30 negotiations envisaged
by the Tariff Classification Act of 1962 to
bring the United States tariff concessions
in the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and a few bilateral trade
agreements into conformance with the lan-
guage of the TSUS. The entry into force
in 1963 of the TSUS, recently amended by
the Tariff Schedules Technical Amendments
Act of 1965, resulted in numerous inci-
dental rate changes. On the whole, reduc-
tions offset increases, but for the United
Kingdom (and Hong Kong, for which the
United Kingdom has accepted the GATT)
there were greater rate increases than de-
creases, and compensatory U.S. tariff re-
ductions were called for.

The United Kingdom and the United
States have agreed that new concessions on

MAY 2, 1966

719

three tariff items covering 1964 U.S. im-
ports valued at $2.7 million would offset the
net rate increases of the new tariff. (Total
U.S. imports from the United Kingdom, to-
gether with Hong Kong, in 1964 were about
$1.4 billion.) In addition, a duty reduction
on aircraft parts, which had already been
provided for in a similar agreement with
Canada, 1 that took effect on January 1, is
being bound also to the United Kingdom.
The three new concessions are as follows:

TSVS
No.

Existing New

Duty Rate Duty Rate

25% 20%

45% 22.5%

Brief Description

222.60 Bamboo, rattan, willow
or chip articles not
specially provided
for

531.37 Porcelain and subpor-
celain refractory
articles

792.60 Ivory articles not spe-
cially provided for 12% 8%

All the duty reductions will be put into
effect in five annual stages.

The agreement will be made effective on
May 1 through a Presidential proclama-
tion.2

The present agreement resolves issues be-
tween the two Governments arising from
the entry into force of the TSUS. Other
negotiations on reductions in tariffs and
other trade restrictions are continuing be-
tween the two Governments at Geneva as
part of the multilateral Kennedy Round of
trade negotiations.

U.S. and Mexico Extend
Radio Agreement

Press release 83 dated April 14

United States and Mexican officials
signed a protocol in Mexico City on April
13 to extend until December 31, 1967, the
agreement between the United States and
Mexico on radio broadcasting in the stand-

ard broadcast band. The existing agree-
ment, signed in Mexico January 29, 1957,
entered into force on June 9, 1961, for a
5-year period.

The protocol will be transmitted to the
United States Senate for its advice and con-
sent to ratification. It will also be necessary
to obtain approval of Mexico's legislative
body.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Defense

Memorandum of arrangement to cover reentry ex-
periments in Australia (Sparta). Signed at Can-
berra March 30, 1966. Entered into force March
30, 1966.

Signatures: Australia, United Kingdom, United
States.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965. '
Ratification deposited: Gabon, April 4, 1966.

Pacific Settlement of Disputes

Convention for the pacific settlement of internation-
al disputes. Signed at The Hague October 18, 1907.
Entered into force January 26, 1910.
Adherence deposited: Uganda, March 1, 1966.

Safety of Life at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered
into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciation received: Switzerland, March 21,
1966.

Telecommunications

International telecommunication convention with
annexes and final protocol. Done at Montreux
November 12, 1965. Enters into force January 1,
1967.

Signatures: Afghanistan,^ Algeria,' Argentina,'
Australia,' Austria,' Belgium,' Bolivia,' Brazil,'
Bulgaria,' * Burma," Byelorussian Soviet Social-
ist Republic,' Cameroon,' Canada,' Central Afri-
can Republic,' Ceylon, Chad,' Chile,' ' China,*
Colombia,' Congo (Brazzaville),' Congo (Leo-
poldville),' Costa Rica," Cuba,"* Cyprus,'
Czechoslovakia,' ' Dahomey,' ' Denmark,' Ecua-
dor,' Ethiopia,' ' Finland,' France, Group of ter-
ritories represented by French Overseas Post

^ Bulletin of Jan. 17, 1966, p. 106.
' For text of Proclamation 3712 dated Apr. 5, see
31 Fed. Reg. 5543.

' Not in force.

' With reservations contained in final protocol.
' With declarations contained in final protocol.
* With statements contained in final protocol.

720

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and Telecommunications Agency, Gabon," Feder-
al Republic of Germany,'' Ghana," Greece,'' ' Gua-
temala," Guinea,'" Haiti, Hungary ,= " * India,"*
Indonesia,'^ " Iran,'' Iraq," Iceland," Ireland,
Israel,' Italy," Ivory Coast," Jamaica," Japan,
Jordan," Kenya," " Korea," Kuwait," Laos, Leb-
anon," Liberia," " Liechtenstein, " Luxembourg,"
Malagasy," Malaysia," Malawi," Mali," " Malta,"
Mauritania," " Mexico," Monaco, Mongolia," " '
Morocco," Nepal," Netherlands," " New Zealand,"
Nicaragua," Niger," Nigeria," Norway," Paki-
stan," Panama," Paraguay," Peru," " Philip-
pines,' ' Poland," " * Portugal," Portuguese Over-
seas Provinces, Rhodesia, Romania," ' Rwan-
da," " Saudi Arabia," Senegal," Sierra Leone,"
Singapore," Somali Republic," " Spain," Spanish
Provinces in Africa, Sudan," " Sweden," Switzer-
land," * Syrian Arab Republic," Tanzania," "
Thailand," Togo,"" Trinidad and Tobago," Tu-
nisia," Turkey," Uganda," " Ukrainian Soviet
Socialist Republic," Union of Soviet Socialist Re-
publics," United Arab Republic," United King-
dom," " Overseas Territories for international
relations of which United Kingdom are re-
sponsible. United States," Territories of United
States," Upper Volta," Vatican City, Vene-
zuela," " Yugoslavia,' Zambia," November 12,
1965.

BILATERAL

British Honduras

Investment guarantee agreement. Signed at Belize
City February 8. 1966. Entered into force Febru-
ary 8, 1966.

Canada

Air transport agreement with exchange of notes.
Signed at Ottawa January 17, 1966. Entered into
force January 17, 1966.

China

Agreement relating to the status of United States
armed forces in China. Signed at Taipei August
31, 1965.
Entered into force: April 12, 1966.

Costa Rica

Agreement amending and extending the military
mission agreement of December 10, 1945, as
amended and extended (59 Stat. 1682, TIAS 2079,
3109, 4595, 4795, 5348). Effected by exchange of
notes at San Jose March 17 and 28, 1966. Entered
into force March 28, 1966.

Ghana

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Sigiied
at Accra April 1, 1966. Entered into force April 1,
1966.

Jordan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I of
the Agricultural Trade Development and Assist-
ance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Amman April 5, 1966. Entered into force April
5, 1966.

MAY 2, 1966

Singapore

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Singapore March
25, 1966. Entered into force March 25, 1966.

Spain

Agreement superseding the agreement of March 11
and 18, 1960, as amended June 27 and 28, 1963
(TIAS 4463, 5393), and providing for the con-
tinued operation and expansion of the space-
vehicle tracking and communications station on the
Island of Gran Canaria. Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington April 14, 1966. Entered into
force April 14, 1966.

Agreement providing for a project in Spain to meas-
ure winds and temperatures at high altitudes and
for continuing other cooperative space research
projects. Effected by exchange of notes at Wash-
ington April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14,
1966.

Sudan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreements of November 14, 1961 (TIAS 4910),
and January 31, 1963 (TIAS 5495). Effected by
exchange of notes at Khartoum January 12 and 18,
1966. Entered into force January 18, 1966.

Turl<ey

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Ankara April 2, 1966. Entered into force
April 2, 1966.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of March 21, 1966 (TIAS 5968). Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Saigon April 2,
1966. Entered into force April 2, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C.,
20U02. Address requests direct to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, except in the case of free publi-
cations, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.

Background Notes. Short, factual summaries which
describe the people, history, government, economy,
and foreign relations of each country. Each contains
a map, a list of principal government officials and
U.S. diplomatic and consular officers, and, in some
cases, a selected bibliography. Those listed below are
available at 5(f each, imless otherwise indicated.

Angola. Pub. 7962. 8 pp.
Austria. Pub. 7955. 7 pp.

721

Bahrain. Pub. 8013. 4 pp.

Cameroon. Pub. 8010. 8 pp.

Central African Republic. Pub. 7970. 4 pp.

Chile. Pub. 7998. 8 pp.

El Salvador. Pub. 7794. 8 pp.

Ethiopia. Pub. 7785. 8 pp.

Gabon. Pub. 7968. 4 pp.

The Gambia. Pub. 8014. 4 pp.

Soviet Zone of Germany. Pub. 7957. 8 pp.

Iraq. Pub. 7975. 4 pp.

Ireland. Pub. 7974. 4 pp.

Jordan. Pub. 7956. 4 pp.

Malagasy Republic. Pub. 8015. 8 pp.

Netherlands. Pub. 7967. 8 pp.

Poland. Pub. 8020. 8 pp.

Portuguese Guinea. Pub. 7966. 4 pp.

Rumania. Pub. 7890. 8 pp.

South Africa. Pub. 8021. 8 pp.

Thailand. Pub. 7961. 8 pp.

U.S.S.R. Pub. 7842. 12 pp. 10(*.

Your Department of State (Revised). Pamphlet giv-
ing concise information on the history, organization,
and activities of the Department (including basic
facts about the main building). Pub. 7644. Depart-
ment and Foreign Service Series 124. 16 pp., illus.
15^

A Career in the Foreign Service of the United States

(Revised). Booklet for the information of men and
women who wish to enter the Officer Corps of the
Foreign Service of the United States to serve with
the Department of State or the U.S. Information
Agency. Pub. 7924. Department and Foreign Service
Series 132. 32 pp., illus. Limited distribution.

U.S. Participation in the UN. Nineteenth annual
report by the President to the Congress for the
year 1964. Pub. 7943. International Organization and
Conference Series 67. xvii, 353 pp., tables. $1.75.

Foreign Affairs. Excerpt From the State of the
Union Message: President Lyndon B. Johnson, Jan-
uary 12, 1966. Pub. 8011. General Foreign Policy
Series 211. 17 pp. 15«'.

The Battle Act Report, 1965. Eighteenth report to
Congress on operations under the Mutual Defense
Assistance Control Act of 1951. Pub. 8019. General
Foreign Policy Series 210. 124 pp. 40<f.

Viet-Nam Today. Deputy Under Secretary of State
for Political Affairs U. Alexis Johnson addresses
the New England Press Association at Boston, Mass.
Pub. 8039. Far Eastern Series 139. 24 pp. 15<(.

Treaties in Force: A List of Treaties and Other
International Agreements of the United States in
Force on January 1, 1966. Compiled by the Treaty
Affairs Staff, Office of the Legal Adviser, Depart-
ment of State. Pub. 8042. 322 pp. $1.50.

The Issue in Viet-Nam. Under Secretary of State
George W. Ball's speech before the Northwestern
University Alumni Association at Evanston, 111. Pub.
8043. Far Eastern Series 141. 24 pp. 15i>.

Viet-Nam: The Struggle To Be Free. Text of an
address made by President Johnson, after being
presented with the National Freedom Award at Free-
dom House, New York, N.Y., on February 23, 1966.
Pub. 8048. Far Eastern Series 142. 16 pp. 15<f.

Report to the President of the Special Committee on
U.S. Trade Relations with East European Countries
and the Soviet Union. Pamphlet containing text of
the Committee's report as issued by the White House.
Pub. 8061. Commercial Policy Series 201. 22 pp. 15^.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Mali,
amending the agreement of July 14, 1965. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Bamako December 8 and 15,
1965. Entered into force December 15, 1965. TIAS
5906. 3 pp. 5<i.

Trade — Renegotiation of Schedule XX (United
States) to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. Interim agreement with Canada signed at
Washington December 17, 1965. Entered into force
December 17, 1965. TIAS 5912. 44 pp. 20<*.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Iran amending the agreement of
November 16, 1964, as amended. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Tehran October 13, 1965. Entered into
force October 13, 1965. TIAS 5918. 3 pp. 5<t.

Trade in Cotton Textiles. Agreement with Yugo-
slavia, amending the agreement of October 5, 1964.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Washington Decem-
ber 30, 1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965.
TIAS 5926. 3 pp. 5t

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1401 PUBLICATION 8072 MAY 2, 1966

The Department of State Boiletin, a
weekly publication issned by the Office
of Media Serrices, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, proTidea the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

I^ublicationa of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbice: 52 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Btilletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

722

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX Matj 2, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. HOI

American Republics. Review of Movement of
Cuban Refugees and Hemisphere Policy
Toward Cuba (Sayre) 707

Asia. U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian
Development Bank 718

China. United States Policy Toward Communist
China (Rusk) 686

Confess

Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees and
Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) . 707

U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian Devel-
opment Bank 718

United States Policy Toward Communist China
(Rusk) 686

Cuba. Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees
and Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) 707

Cyprus. U.N. Security Council Extends Peace
Force in Cyprus (Roosevelt) 718

Department and Foreign Service. Continuity of
Refugee and Migration Policies (Crockett) 704

Economic Affairs

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S.
Tariff Concessions 719

U.S. Officials Named to Boards of Asian De-
velopment Bank 718

Europe. U.S. Ready To Consult With France
and NATO on French Demands (texts of aide
memorie) 699

France

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions on NATO
Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript of Paris-
Match interview) 695

U.S. Ready To Consult With France and NATO
on French Demands (texts of aide memoire) 699

Immigration. Review of Movement of Cuban
Refugees and Hemisphere Policy Toward
Cuba (Sayre) 707

Mexico. U.S. and Mexico Extend Radio Agree-
ment 720

Military Affairs. Secretary Rusk Answers
Questions on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam
(transcript of Paris-Match interview) . . . 695

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Secretary Rusk Answers Questions on NATO
Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript of Paris-
Match interview) 695

U.S. Ready To Consult With France and NATO
on French Demands (texts of aide memoire) 699

Presidential Documents. President Congratu-
lates Agencies on Work With Refugees . . 705

Public Affairs. Foreign Policy Conference To
Be Held at Little Rock 703

Publications. Recent Releases 721

Refugees

Continuity of Refugee and Migration Policies
(Crockett) 704

President Congratulates Agencies on Work
With Refugees 705

Review of Movement of Cuban Refugees and
Hemisphere Policy Toward Cuba (Sayre) . 707

Southern Rhodesia. Security Council Authorizes
U.K. To Use Force To Divert Oil Shipments
Bound for Rhodesia (Goldberg, text of res-
olution) 713

Telecommunications. U.S. and Mexico Extend
Radio Agreement 720

Treaty Information

Current Actions 720

U.S. and Mexico Extend Radio Agreement . . 720
U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S.
Tariff Concessions 719

United Kingdom

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 713

U.S. and U.K. Sign Agreement Updating U.S.
Tariff Concessions 719

United Nations

Security Council Authorizes U.K. To Use Force
To Divert Oil Shipments Bound for Rhodesia
(Goldberg, text of resolution) 713

U.N. Security Council Extends Peace Force in
Cyprus (Roosevelt) 718

U.S. Views on Delay in Calling Security Coun-
cil Meeting 715

Viet-Nam. Secretary Rusk Answers Questions
on NATO Issues and Viet-Nam (transcript
of Paris-Match interview) 695

Name Index

Crockett, William J 704

Fowler, Henry H 718

Gaud, William S 718

Goldberg, Arthur J 713

Johnson, President 705

Roosevelt, James 718

Rusk, Secretary 686, 695

Sayre, Robert M 707

Zagorin, Bernard 718

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 11-17

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

No. Date Subject

*78 4/11 Palmer sworn in as Assistant Sec-
retary for African Affairs (bio-
graphic details).

79 4/12 Rusk : interview with Paris-Match.

80 4/12 U.S. reply to French aide memoire

of March 29.

81 4/12 Regional foreign policy conference.

Little Rock, Ark., May 5.

t82 4/14 Space agreements with Spain.
83 4/14 Agreement with Mexico on radio
broadcasting bands.

t84 4/14 Mann: Senate Subcommittee on
Foreign Aid Expenditures.

t85 4/14 Mann: Pan American Society.

*86 4/15 Harriman: Democratic Midwest
Conference, Columbus, Ohio (ex-
cerpts) .

187 4/15 U.S. observer delegation to CENTO
ministerial conference.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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BULLETIN

THE UNITED NATIONS: A PROGRESS REPORT
by Ambassador Goldberg 749

INTERNATIONAL EDUCATION ACT OF 1966
Statement by Assistant Secretary Frankel 754

THE INTER-AMERICAN PARTNERSHIP

President Johnson's Visit to Mexico City 726

Address by Under Secretary Mann, Pan American Society, Neiv York City 734

Statement by Assistant Secretary Gordon, lA-ECOSOC Meeting, Buenos Aires 738

For index see inside back cover

President Johnson Visits IVIexico City

The President and Mrs. Johnson made an
informal visit to Mexico Citxj April H.-15.
Folio iving are texts of President Johnson's
remarks upon his arrival there on April 14,
his address at the dedication of the
Abraham Lincoln statue on April 15 and
remarks to the staff of the U.S. Embassy
later that day, and a joint statement issued
by President Johnson and President Gustavo
Diaz Ordaz at the close of the visit.

REMARKS AT AIRPORT, APRIL 14

White House press release dated April 14 ; as-delivered text

Mr. President, Mrs. Diaz Ordaz, members
of the First Family, my friends of Mexico:
This is almost a homecoming for the John-
son family. Thirty-one years ago we came to
Mexico on our honeymoon. Since then, on
every occasion possible, we have used the
border into your country, visited in your
cities and your countryside, and we have
enjoyed, on many occasions, visits from your
leaders and your Presidents.

I first met President Adolfo Lopez Mateos
in the late 1950's when he came to the
United States. Later, as President, I visited
with him in the United States at the Cha-
mizal at El Paso,i and in 1964 your own dis-
tinguished President honored us with a visit
that he and his wife made in our home in
Texas.2

So when I come to Mexico I feel that I
come to the home of my friends. We are here
today to present to your country a statue of
one of our most beloved and most respected

' For background, see Bulletin of Oct. 19, 1964,
p. 545.

• For background, see ihid., Dec. 7, 1964, p. 805.

Presidents, Abraham Lincoln. We present
that statue to the people that we consider
our most treasured friends.

Mr. President, we are grateful to you for
this beautiful reception, for your gracious
remarks. We will look forward to exchang-
ing views with you in the hours that we are
permitted together.

I said to your distinguished and able Am-
bassador, Ambassador [Hugo B.] Margain,
on the way down on the plane today, that
while we faced many trying problems in the
world today, I did not believe there had ever
been a period in the history of the United
States and Mexico when we faced fewer prob-
lems, when we had better understanding,
and when there was a stronger friendship
that exists between the people than exists
today.

That is because, Mr. President, you and
your distinguished predecessors have under-
stood our people and have provided a far-
sighted leadership for your people that has
brought us together in understanding and
friendship.

Although in other parts of the world
neighbors fight neighbors, neighbors are in
dispute with neighbors, there are no armies
that patrol our borders, there are no guns
that protect the frontiers of Mexico and the
United States. Our people cross the bound-
ary freely and work and play together.

If I could have my one wish granted today,
it would be that we could live in a world
where we had the same peaceful relations
with our neighbors as we have with the
people of Mexico. But if we are to have
peace in the world, we must try to solve the
problems that cause the wars, the problems

726

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of illiteracy, the problems of ignorance, the
problems of disease, the problems of
poverty, the problems of misunderstanding.

Mr. President, we salute you for the
leadership that you are providing your own
great nation and the contribution you are
making to other nations in the world in a
program that will bring peace to all human-
kind. While war clouds hover over certain
parts of the world as we meet here this
afternoon, we truly and genuinely and sin-
cerely hope that the day may soon come
when all the world can live together in peace
as do the people of the United States and
Mexico.

Mr. President, our distinguished Secre-
tary of State, the majority leader of the
United States Senate, the minority leader of
the United States Senate, leaders of our
House of Representatives, join me on this
occasion in thanking you for this very
cordial welcome and in saying to you:
Muchas gracias, Senor Presidente, muchas
gracias, todo Mexico.

ADDRESS AT DEDICATION OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN STATUE, APRIL 15

White House press release dated April 15 : as-delivered text

Mr. President, my friends: It is impossi-
ble for me to tell you how proud I am to be
here with you today in company with the
leadership of the United States Senate,
prominent members of the House of Repre-
sentatives, and the Senators and Congress-
men from the States of Illinois and Ken-
tucky, that gave us Abraham Lincoln. The
President of the United States could ask for
no greater honor than to be invited to stand
on the soil of our friend, Mexico, beside a
leader as beloved and respected as your
great President, Diaz Ordaz.

For me, this occasion has a very special
meaning. All my life I have known and
lived with and worked alongside the sons
and the daughters of Mexico. I have been
here on many different occasions. My wife
and I spent the first days of our marriage
here in this beautiful city, Mexico City.

To come back now to the people and the
scenes of so many pleasant memories, to
come as the leader of your sister Republic
to the north, where your country is held in
such high esteem, is for me a moment never
to be forgotten. The tribute that your great
Foreign Secretary Carillo Flores has just
paid to Abraham Lincoln will touch the
hearts of all of my countrymen. All na-
tions rightly praise their own famous men,
but only a truly great people pause to pay
tribute to the great of other lands. And
that is what Mexico is doing today.

What Abraham Lincoln stood for is what
binds our two nations and, indeed, this en-
tire hemisphere together. More than geog-
raphy and common economic interests and
a regional system of mutual assistance, we
are held together by common values and by
shared beliefs. That is why we share
equally Bolivar and Washington, San Mar-
tin and Jefferson, Juarez and Marti and
Lincoln. They were sons of a common
heritage.

In his time and place, Abraham Lincoln
brought the best in our common civilization
to bear on the cruelest problems that ever
confronted a leader: civil war and the en-
slavement of a minority of his people. In
these trials he clung to the belief that
every human being was unique and precious
— equal in the eyes of God and before the
law.

He believed that the pillars of a great so-
ciety were equality of opportunity, indi-
vidual freedom to excel, and justice — po-
litical and social justice — for every citizen.
And so he walked among us, bearing on his
shoulders the burdens of a nation's greatest
test, proving that true greatness lies in
loyalty to those universal principles which
span every age.

Now, in this age, we in this hemisphere
are today engaged in another great test. We
are engaged in a vast social revolution
touching the lives of millions of people on
two continents. And, like Lincoln's, this is
a test of whether freedom can work. It is a
test of whether men, through liberty, can
overcome the weight of the past and lift

MAY 9, 1966

727

from their brothers the blight of hunger,
the blindness of ignorance, and the burden
of disease.

We are in the midst of that test. We
must demonstrate to our peoples that their
destiny is not class struggle but common
struggle to achieve that proud and that
modern Latin America which is at once the
dream of a generation and the interest of
the world community.

This is a battle which only the people of
Latin America can win, but it is the desire
of my people, our commitment and our
privilege, to work side by side in this great
human adventure.

History will judge us not only by the no-
bility of our sentiments or the poetry of
our words. History will judge us by the ac-
tion that we take to bring these sentiments
to life.

For my country's part, we are guided by
certain basic convictions upon which our
faith in the future rests.

First, every member of the American
community of nations has a natural right to
its independence and sovereignty. No coun-
try may abridge those rights. As your own
Benito Juarez said: "Respect for the rights
of others is peace."

Second, the United States maintains its
commitment to government by consent of
the governed, a consent to be granted in
free and honest elections. It does not seek
to impose on others any form of govern-
ment. But let us stand determined on this
principle: Despots are not welcome in this
hemisphere.

Third, my administration believes that
both stable democracy and effective eco-
nomic development depend ultimately on so-
cial justice. There has never been stable
democracy where economic power and privi-
lege were concentrated in the hands of the
few. Where the many work, let the many
earn.

Fourth, we believe the struggle for social
justice and more efficient and equitable use
of natural resources must be led by each
country in its own behalf. My administra-

tion will not be deterred by those who
tenaciously or selfishly cling to special privi-
leges from the past. And we will not be de-
terred by those who say that to risk change
is to risk communism.

Fifth, we do not wish to see communism
spread in this hemisphere, but we believe
that the threat to the liberty and inde-
pendence of the Latin American peoples
from communism cannot be met merely by
force. We will continue to concentrate our
assistance mainly in economic and social
fields and to encourage our Latin American
neighbors, where possible, to limit their out-
lays for military purposes. We are encour-
aged that democracy flourishes in countries
such as Mexico, where expenditures for
education and development are high.

Sixth, we are convinced that the future of
Latin American industrialization, as well as
the basic welfare of the people themselves,
urgently requires the parallel modernization
of rural life. This must combine more
equitable forms of landholding and all the
measures that are needed to raise production
and productivity. Your two Presidents this
morning discussed at length steps that we
are going to take to do both.

Seventh, we shall continue to work with
your own able President Diaz Ordaz and
work with our Latin American friends
throughout the hemisphere to augment and
to stabilize earnings from traditional ex-
ports, while assisting efforts to expand
those new exports on which Latin American
trade will increasingly depend in the future.

Eighth, we believe that the drawing to-
gether of the economies of Latin America is
critical to this hemisphere's future. Only in
this way can the hemisphere develop truly
efficient industries, expanded foreign ex-
change earnings, and a sound foundation
for a full Latin American partnership in
building a peaceful world community.

One of the challenges of hemispheric in-
tegration is the linking of North and South
America through the Pan American High-
way. It is one ambition of my Presidency
to work with the other nations of this

728

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

hemisphere toward closing the several hun-
dred miles of the gap that now exists. We
must await the studies that are now nearing
completion, but together we should look to
the day when the old precolonial links
across the isthmus are fully restored, the
good lands of Panama are opened for agri-
culture, and families and commerce can
move anywhere between Laredo and the
southernmost tip of Argentina.

Senor Presidente Diaz Ordaz, my country
takes great heart in what you in Mexico are
doing. We see today a people who are forg-
ing ahead. We see today a nation that is
proud and a people that are confident. You
are confident of the future because you are
confident that you can secure for your
people a constant increase in material well-
being and social justice. You are confident
that you can deal with all other neighbors
in independence, friendship, and dignity.
You are confident that you can help your
less advanced neighbors also to move ahead
with you. And you are confident that you
can maintain in the modern world your own
personality, loyal to your own traditions and
aspirations.

Mexico's progress is witness that the
goals of the Alliance are realistic and its
methods are valid.

I have served with four American Presi-
dents who showed their concern and their
friendship for Mexico and Latin America.
Franklin Roosevelt lifted our eyes to the
promise and problems of Latin America with
the good-neighbor policy. Harry Truman's
boldness brought forth Point 4 and its com-
passion to the Western Hemisphere and to
the entire world. Dwight Eisenhower
plowed new, fertile, and productive fields
with the Act of Bogota. And John F. Ken-
nedy, building on and expanding and refin-
ing that act, gave fresh impulse to all our
ideals in the Alliance.

Twenty-nine months ago, the first week
of my Presidency, my first act as President
of the United States was to pledge my
country again to the faith and the direction
of these four Presidents and their relations

with the nations of this hemisphere." I am
proud today to report to the Mexican people
and to all of our Latin American friends
that our common effort is proving itself
with specific results. Our dreams are be-
coming realities.

As I speak to you here today, I have been
involved in the executive branch of my Gov-
ernment for 6 years. The first 3 years, the
average growth rate in Latin America was 1
percent. In the last 3 years of my Presi-
dency, that growth rate is now 2.5 percent.
This achievement, in which Mexico, the
United States, and all the other countries of
Latin America can take great pride, will con-
tinue strong, I predict, in the year 1966.
We believe that the growth rate in that year
will exceed the 2.5 percent of this year.

Ahead, of course, lie many problems that
are yet to be overcome. Hard work and
perseverance, not hope alone, will bend them
to solution.

At the recent meeting of the economic
ministers in Buenos Aires,* we were right
to take stock of what we have learned since
1961, and to plan and to chart the course
ahead. Now we must give necessary im-
pulse to, as I said to your President this
morning, new and additional initiatives.
We must open new paths. We must breathe
new energy into our efforts.

To that end I will, in the months ahead,
join with Latin American leaders in explor-
ing the proposal of the President of Argen-
tina for a new meeting at the very highest
level to examine our common problems and
to give the Alliance for Progress increased
momentum. Such a conference should be
prepared with the utmost care. We should
examine every idea which might advance
our common interest, be it old or new.
Careful preparation need not be the enemy,
however, of imaginative action and new
adventures.

It will take time, faith, and stubborn ef-

' For remarks made by President Johnson on Nov.
26, 1963, see ibid., Dec. 16, 1963, p. 912.
• See p. 738.

MAY 9, 1966

II

729

fort to achieve together the goals that we
set ourselves in the Charter of Punta del
Este 5 years ago,^ but this we must do.
This we will do. There is no other way, in
our time and in this hemisphere, to show
what free men and what free nations can
do working together.

So let all the world know that we know
our challenge. I saw it, riding through the
streets of your beautiful city with your
great President last evening. I saw it in
the hopeful face of young Mexico, in the
hundreds of thousands of little children who
are the future of this great land. I saw
young people, with minds to be educated,
with bodies to be protected from disease.
I saw young boys and girls who one day
will be able to find a job and who will raise
their families in peace. And some will lead
this great nation tomorrow.

This is the challenge that faces the people
of America and faces the people of Latin
America. This is the challenge that we will,
shoulder to shoulder, accept.

Once again I want to say how very proud
and very happy I am to be here with you
today, Sefior Presidente — you, my good and
warm friend — and to be among your gra-
cious people of Mexico. Very shortly I will
return to the other side of the river, but I
will leave, to enjoy the hospitality of your
great people, Mrs. Johnson and my Secretary
of State and the distinguished delegation
from the Congress.

Before I leave, I should like to say this:
May we all always seek justice and peace
together. Come what may, may we always be
good neighbors. And may we always be good
amigos.

REMARKS AT U.S. EMBASSY, APRIL 15

White House press release dated April 16 ; as-delivered text

Secretary and Mrs. Rusk, Ambassador and
Mrs. [Fulton] Freeman, my friends, ladies
and gentlemen : I drove down the street with
great pride as my eyes looked upon this
beautiful building put here by the talented

• For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

hands of architects from my State. As I
walked into this building, I looked back over
my memories in government and thought
that never in my 35 years in public service
in Washington had our country been more
fortunate in its selection of a Secretary of
State than it is now with Dean Rusk.

He is guiding our relations with other
nations with a skill and an understanding
and a compassion that is unequaled, in my
judgment, in my lifetime. He has built
around him 100 or more of the ablest am-
bassadors that any administration has ever
assembled to serve the interests of our na-
tion. It gives me great pride to pay just
tribute to the work being done by Ambassa-
dor and Mrs. Freeman here in Mexico.

But what really gives me the greatest
pride and the greatest pleasure is to come
here and look into the smiling faces that
stand around me in this beautiful building
and see the folks that take care of the daily
chores and that reflect such great credit to
the country they serve. No nation ever had
more competent or more loyal or more dedi-
cated public employees than the United
States of America, and no department evei
had more of those kinds of employees than
the Department of State.

I want to say to each of you at your desk
and the tasks that engage you that youi
President is proud of the work you do, is
grateful to you for the loyalty that you giv€
and the sacrifices that you make, and thf
credit that you reflect upon your country.

I observed the other day a statement mj
father made to me, when I was a little boj
and he was talking about public service. He
said, "To understand people, you must know
them and to properly speak for them and
represent them, you must love them." Foi
that reason he always leaned over backward
to be democratic. There was no little f armei
from the humblest village in the land thai
he didn't want to know, because he got mort
from the farmer than he gave.

I think that each of you who carry or
with your work, serving our national inter-
est each day, could profit by remembering

730

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETI^

that statement: To know the people of
Mexico, you must understand them and to
represent them and carry out our program
and our purpose with them, you must love
them.

I have been coming across this border all
my life. I have been working with the people
of Mexico ever since I was a child. My first
playmate was a little Mexican boy. We
raced our horses together, when we were
both just learning to ride. I remember he
told me he didn't want to run a race with
me, because his horse wasn't as fat as mine
and therefore couldn't run as fast.

I said, "I will solve that problem. We will
make him as fat." So we got a bucket and
got in the oat bin and fed him all afternoon.
Then we filled him full of water and then
we took him out and ran the race. Then
the horse died.

All my life the Mexican people have been
my friends and my plajrmates, my closest
associates and my most trusted allies, and
my most loyal supporters. They have been
intimidated, criticized, browbeaten, some-
times they have been hauled into court for
voting for me, but they have always been
there.

I brought my bride to Mexico City on our
honeymoon. I have come back here at every
opportunity. So we are very thankful we
were given the chance to come here again
and show the people of this nation the great
respect and friendship we have for them
and to say to those of you who serve my
administration and your country so well
that I am mighty grateful and proud of you.

JOINT STATEMENT, APRIL 15

White House press release (Mexico, D.F.) dated April 16

President Gustavo Diaz Ordaz and Presi-
dent Lyndon B. Johnson were greatly
pleased that the occasion of the unveiling of
a statue of Abraham Lincoln provided an
opportunity to renew their cordial personal
relationship and to resume their informal
conversations begun during their meeting in
November 1964.

The two Chiefs of State, conscious of the
significance of the principles for which
Benito Juarez and Abraham Lincoln both
fought, have reiterated in their respective
nations their adherence to freedom, human
dignity, and a mutual respect among peoples.
These principles are the basis of democratic
life. The Presidents expressed their convic-
tion that these also constitute the foundation
of the firm friendship between Mexico and
the United States. The two Presidents rec-
ognized with pleasure the high level of un-
derstanding reached in the relations between
their two countries in recent years.

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed to Pres-
ident Johnson the principles of the foreign
policy of Mexico, in relation with the other
American Republics, which, in addition to
the fundamental principles of self-determi-
nation, non-intervention, and peaceful solu-
tion of controversies, include the need for
maintaining constantly open the doors to
dialogue. President Johnson reviewed with
President Diaz Ordaz a number of problems
of world-wide importance, and reaffirmed
the commitment of the United States to the
same fundamental principles, as well as its
commitment to a continuing search for peace
throughout the world.

The two Heads of State reiterated the
general opinion expressed in previous meet-
ings of the Presidents of Mexico and the
United States that it is in the interest of
both countries to seek to maintain the access
which each has to the markets of the other
and to broaden these wherever possible. The
Joint Trade Committee established in 1965
was discussed by both Presidents as a major
step forward in expanding the already large
area of mutual interests which exist between
the two countries in matters of commercial
interchange."

Specific problems involving border trade
between the two countries were mentioned
by President Diaz Ordaz. The two Presi-
dents agreed that their two Governments

• For text of a joint communique released at the
close of the first meeting of the Joint U.S.-Mexican
Trade Committee, see ibid., Nov. 8, 1965, p. 738.

J

MAY 9, 1966

731

should study these problems with the aim of
determining what measures could be taken
to expand legitimate border trade in goods
produced in both countries to the benefit of
the border region.

The two Presidents discussed their deep
concern regarding the international market
for cotton, which is the leading Mexican ex-
port product and is also of great interest to
the United States and to other Western
hemisphere countries. The Presidents agreed
that their two Governments should consult
with each other and with other interested
governments on the problems of production
and marketing of cotton. Regarding the
International Cotton Institute, created for
the purpose of promoting the increase in
cotton consumption, both Heads of State ex-
pressed their determination to continue the
support of their Governments for the
greater success of its mission.

President Diaz Ordaz reaffirmed his in-
tention to continue the policy of promoting
the economic development of Mexico at a
rate substantially greater than the popula-
tion increase, within a framework of mone-
tary stability, which is so important in
protecting the real income of the majority
of the people. The two Presidents noted
with satisfaction the increasing rate of eco-
nomic and social progress in the hemisphere
as a whole during the past two years and
expressed their determination to continue
their mutual cooperation to achieve the ob-
jectives of the Act of Bogota of 1960, the
Charter of Punta del Este of 1961, and the
Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro
of 1965.^

The two Presidents were in agreement
that the Supervised Agricultural Credit Pro-
gram under the Alliance for Progress has
proved an excellent example of the coopera-
tion between the public and private banking
institutions of both countries in carrying
out the objectives of the Act of Bogota and
the Charter of Punta del Este, as already
mentioned, contributing effectively to the

' For background and text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965,
p. 985.

732

expansion of agricultural productivity and
the modernization of rural life.

The two Presidents expressed their deter-
mination to improve the relations between
the frontier cities of both countries, and to
elevate the life of those who live in the
border region. They agreed to create a com-
mission which would study the manner in
which these objectives could be realized by
cooperative action to raise the standard of
living of the respective communities, from
a social and cultural as well as a material
point of view.

The two Presidents expressed their deter-
mination to create an Abraham Lincoln
Fund in Mexico and a Benito Juarez Fund
in the United States in order to grant
scholarships to the youth of the hemisphere
who might be selected by a Joint Commis-
sion in order to continue their studies in
institutions of higher learning of both coun-
tries.

The two Presidents agreed on the need to
support the efforts for Latin American eco-
nomic integration. President Diaz Ordaz ex-
pressed his satisfaction with the recent ini-
tiative of President Johnson in suggesting
the creation of a special fund for the financ-
ing of pre-investment studies of multi-na-
tional projects in support of regional inte-
gration.® Both Presidents expressed their
satisfaction that this work is moving for-
ward under the leadership of the Inter-
American Committee on the Alliance for
Progress (CIAP) with the active participa-
tion of the Inter-American Development
Bank. They also noted with satisfaction the
progress being made toward integration
through the work of the Latin American
Free Trade Association and the Central
American Common Market.

The two Presidents were pleased to note
the progress achieved in the acquisition of
lands, the transfer of residents and the con-
struction of installations provided for in the
convention for the solution of the Chamizal
problem. They agreed to instruct the mem-

' For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17,
1965, see ibid., Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

bers of the International Boundary and
Water Commission to intensify their efforts
to bring about the change in the boundary
as soon as possible.

The two Presidents expressed their satis-
faction at the manner in which the agree-
ment reached on March 22, 1965, regarding
the problem of the salinity of the waters of
the Colorado River, is operating.* They were
in agreement regarding the need for mutual
consultation before proceeding to carrying
out works which in the future might create
problems of a nature similar to that men-
tioned previously.

The two Presidents agreed on the impor-
tance for their countries of the study which,
under the auspices of the International
Atomic Energy Agency, is being carried out
to determine the technical and economic
possibilities of installing, at some point in
Mexico near the United States border, a
plant to desalinate sea water through the
use of nuclear energy.

Finally, the two Presidents requested
their respective Foreign Secretaries to con-
tinue their discussion of matters of common
interest. President Diaz Ordaz expressed to
President Johnson the deep gratitude of the
Mexican people to the American people for

' For background and text of the agreement, see
ibid., Apr. 12, 1965, p. 555.

the gift of the statue of Abraham Lincoln
and reaffirmed that he considered it a most
friendly act that the Chief of State of the
United States should have desired to come
in person to associate himself with the
homage rendered to the Great Emancipator.
President Johnson expressed his apprecia-
tion for the extraordinarily generous and
friendly reception by the Mexican Govern-
ment and people.

OFFICIAL DELEGATION

The White House announced on April 13
(White House press release (San Antonio,
Tex.)) that the following official delegation
would accompany President Johnson to Mex-
ico City :

The Secretary of State and Mrs. Rusk

Under Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Thomas C. Mann

Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Af-
fairs Lincoln Gordon and Mrs. Gordon

Senator and Mrs. Michael J. Mansfield

Senator and Mrs. Everett McKinley Dirksen

Senator George D. Aiken

Senator and Mrs. Paul H. Douglas

Senator and Mrs. Joseph M. Montoya

Representative and Mrs. Prank Chelf

Representative and Mrs. Eligio de la Garza

Representative and Mrs. Henry B. Gonzalez

Representative and Mrs. Glenard P. Lipscomb

Representative Edward R. Roybal

Mr. and Mrs. Felix de Weldon

Mr. and Mrs. Alfred Strelsin

MAY 9, 1966

733

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and Social Progress

hy Thomas C. Mann

Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

To participate in this meeting of the Pan
American Society with so many who have
contributed so much to hemisphere progress
is a particular pleasure for me.

It was only 20-25 years ago that the in-
tellectual and political leaders of Latin
America first turned their talents and ener-
gies to the task of modernizing their eco-
nomic and social systems. Less than 25 years
ago one heard in Latin America a great deal
of discussion and debate about the politics
of democracy and peace, about cultural
values, about literature and history. The
need of achieving a high and sustained rate
of economic growth and the need to redress
the social imbalance created by the exist-
ence of extremes of poverty and wealth
were topics seldom mentioned. Words and
phrases such as "gross national product,"
"per capita income," and "social justice," as
we in this country use them today, were out-
side the vocabulary of everyday use. On the
contrary, many asserted then that we were
giving too much attention to the material
things of life, to the "dollar," to "plumb-
ing," "gadgets," and "comfort," and too little
attention to superior Greco-Roman spiritual
values.

The economic and social dimensions of in-
ter-American cooperative programs were,

'Address prepared for delivery before the Pan
American Society of the United States at New York,
N.Y., on Apr. 14 (press release 85) and read by
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-
fairs Robert M. Sayre. Mr. Mann accompanied
President Johnson on his visit to Mexico Apr. 14-15.

734

then, in comparative terms, only gradually
and recently conceived of. Many of the in-
novations which have since been adopted
were suggested by Latin Americans, as, for
example, the social program suggested by
the Government of Brazil in "Operation
Pan America."

Allow me to suggest some of the principal
landmarks of recent inter-American eco-
nomic and social achievement which began
in a program of cultural and technical co-
operation in 1939.

19 A2

The Institute of Inter-American Affairs
was established and began the first technical
cooperation program, principally in agricul-
ture and health.

19 U

The Bretton Woods agreement was signed,
bringing into being both the International
Monetary Fund and the International Bank.

19Jf9

The Point 4 Program was formally
launched. It extended the technical assist-
ance program to other developing areas of
the world and greatly enlarged our technical
assistance efforts in Latin America.

1957 '

The Development Loan Fund was created.
A few grants and concessional loans for
economic development had been extended
earlier, but this was the first large-scale,
organized approach to the problem.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

III

I

i

1958

The Coffee Study Group was formed. This
later became the International Coffee Agree-
ment, which our Senate ratified in 1963.

1959

The Inter-American Development Bank
was created with both hard- and soft-loan
windows. And, in 1960, the Bank undertook
to administer the Social Progress Trust Fund.

1960

The general treaty of economic integra-
tion of the five Central American Republics
was signed, setting up the first common mar-
ket in Latin America. And in the same year
the Central American Bank for Economic
Integration was created.

The Latin American Free Trade Area was
brought into being by the Montevideo treaty.

The Act of Bogota enlarged and for-
malized the program for economic develop-
ment in the hemisphere and added a new
social dimension. This act for the first time
recognized the need for land tenure legisla-
tion "with a view to insuring a wider and
more equitable distribution of the ownership
of land in a manner consistent with the ob-
jectives of employment, productivity and
economic growth." It called for reforms of
"tax systems and procedures and fiscal poli-
cies" ; assistance to the farmer by new or
improved marketing organizations, extension
services, demonstration, education, and
credit facilities ; the creation of building and
loan and other institutions to finance low-
cost housing and community development
programs; expanded education and public
health programs; mobilization of domestic
savings and reforms of national fiscal and
financial policies; the preparation of
national development plans; and an annual
consultative meeting to review measures
taken to intensify social and economic prog-
ress.

1961

The program outlined at Bogota was
launched and given new spirit and purpose
as "The Alliance for Progress."

196^

The CIAP [Inter-American Committee on
the Alliance for Progress] was created and
began functioning.

1964-65

The levels of United States contribution
to the cooperation effort were increased, and
the average annual per capita income in-
creases reached the Punta del Este goal.

1965

Our Congress passed the legislation per-
mitting this country effectively to partici-
pate in the International Coffee Agreement.

Our Congress passed the Sugar Act with
provisions which restored to Latin America
their full share of the value of sugar sold
in this market.

Creating the Conditions for Progress

Thus, since the 1940's, considerable prog-
ress has been made in getting on with an
inter-American development program. And
any objective stocktaking must recognize
the vital role of the private sectors through-
out the hemisphere and especially of pri-
vate United States financial institutions
which have made available on a large scale
short- and medium-term credits and, in some
cases, long-term credits, usually at interest
rates considerably below the world level.

If noteworthy progress has been made
since the midforties — and it has — then it
is fair to say that every American Republic
is entitled to claim its share of the credit.
Neither economic and social progress nor
bold, fresh ideas can be claimed as the
monopoly of any country or any single group
within a country. In the United States, for
example, innovations designed to enlarge the
scope, improve the quality, and increase the
dimensions of the contributions of our public
and private sectors to hemisphere progress
have always received broad bipartisan sup-
port.

A great deal remains to be done. We are
only on the threshold, only in the beginning
stages, of our great hemisphere cooperative

MAY 9, 1966

I

735

program to speed up the process of eco-
nomic and social development. The unprec-
edented growth in population poses formi-
dable difficulties in terms of raising per cap-
ita income at the rate which the charter of
Punta del Este fixes as the goal.

To the extent that our balance-of-pay-
ments and budgetary situations permit, I
would hope that our own rapid economic
growth will make it possible for us in the
reasonably near future to raise the level of
our contribution from both our public and
private sectors. There is too much at stake
for those of us here at home to grow faint-
hearted, weary, or discouraged.

But our national efforts and those of other
capital-exporting countries will not be
enough. Foreign capital and international
trade can, after all is said and done, only
supply missing components in otherwise fa-
vorable situations. Only the developing coun-
try can create, within its own territory,
those conditions which are propitious for
rapid economic and social progress.

These conditions will not be created by
rhetoric alone. It is idle to speculate on which
group or country feels more compassion to-
ward our fellow human beings. Compassion
there is, I am convinced, in abundance in
the hearts of most men.

The kind of "heart" we need in national
and inter-American development programs
is the heart to sweat through programs
which can bring economic stability while in-
creasing the production of goods for the
consumer as well as the productivity of the
worker. We need the "heart" to reform
tax policies and improve tax collections so
that governments may have the resources
to provide the infrastructure necessary
for rural and industrial development as well
as adequate educational and health facili-
ties, without which there can be no equality
of opportunity. We need the "heart" to
tackle all the difficult and, at times, un-
popular tasks required to build and to mod-
ernize social and economic systems in order
to bring about, in the phrase of Lincoln,
"the greatest good for the greatest number."
We need the "heart" to work not for that

kind of land distribution which leaves the
farmer poorer than before but for the kind
of rural modernization that will permit the
farmer to raise the living standards of his
family and provide his children with an op-
portunity to live more useful and creative
lives.

There are, of course, differences of opin-
ion between individuals and between states
about the policies which are best designed
to produce the ends which we seek. I do
not believe either we in this land or those in
other lands have a monopoly on wisdom or
good judgment. A policy that produces good
results in our society may not work in
another environment or culture. I personally
welcome a world of diversity as opposed to
one of monotonous uniformity which dulls
the spirit. We must remind ourselves, too,
that each nation not only has a right to
choose its own policies and its own path to
progress but that they know their societies
much better than we do.

Some Basic Guidelines

With these caveats, I would like to refer
to a few basic guidelines that the experi-
ence of many countries in the last 100 years
seems to me to suggest are some of the
components of successful development
policies.

First is the value of an adequate degree
of competition. An economy which fosters
and protects monopolies on a wide scale,
whether they are state-owned or family-
owned, is one which cannot produce high-
quality goods at a low price for its people
because monopolies have no incentive to be-
come efficient. The result is that the real
income of the people — their standard of liv-
ing— is reduced. The result is that the
worker loses his opportunity for noninfla-
tionary, and hence real, wage increases
based on improved productivity. Another
result is that inefficient industries cannot
compete on the world market and hence can-
not earn foreign exchange in quantities
necessary to finance their growing develop-
ment needs.

Second is the need for developing coun-

736

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

tries to compete with each other. This can
be done within the framework of regional
markets, such as the Central American
Common Market and the Latin American
Free Trade Area. And there should be prep-
aration for eventual competition with the
outside world. Regional trading arrange-
ments provide regional markets of a suffi-
cient size to justify new, large, and efficient
industries. But the effective creation of ade-
quate regional markets depends on the degree
of competition permitted within the region.

Third is the need to avoid excessive and
unnecessary centralized controls which in-
troduce excessive administrative delays and
impede the decisionmaking process in farms
and factories and in service industries. Those
economies in the world today which operate
in relative freedom, which make it possible
for the private sector to exercise its in-
genuity and initiative, are, by and large,
those which are experiencing dynamic
growth and earning the most foreign ex-
change. They are also doing the most to im-
prove the living standards of their people.
Conversely, those economies which are bur-
dened down with excessive controls are
those, by and large, which are progressing
at the slowest rate and, in some cases, begin-
ning to look seriously at the advantages of
"decentralization."

And, as a corollary to this, I would sug-
gest that we examine carefully the ad-
vantages of each country creating, in its
own economy, an atmosphere which en-
courages savings by the people and the in-
vestment of those savings in tax-paying,
job-creating, and foreign-exchange-earning
enterprises.

All this does not by any means suggest a
laissez-faire economy of the kind which
existed in the 1800's is desirable. Indeed,
incentives to the private sector should be
accompanied by measures to prevent abuse
and exploitation of man by man. The reason
why we have restraints built into our laws
is that we learned long ago, as an early
American observed, that "men are not an-

gels." But it is far easier for government
to prevent abuses of power by capital or
labor than it is to manage efficiently a com-
plex modern economy.

Nor do I suggest that governments should
not use their fiscal and monetary authority
to create conditions propitious for a high
rate of employment and utilization of plant
capacity, or that government ownership or
management of a limited number of enter-
prises truly affected with a public interest is
necessarily bad. All modern government
policies today must take into account their
effect on the process of development. It is
the degree of government intervention,
rather than any doctrine, which is impor-
tant.

Fourth, the production of food for grow-
ing populations deserves a higher priority
in comparison to industries which are pro-
moted for nationalistic or "prestige" reasons.
Not only should industrial and agricultural
development be balanced; they are in fact
indivisible. One cannot proceed without the
other.

Fifth, we need continually to reexamine
the whole complex range of self-help meas-
ures so essential to national and regional
economic and social progress. Fiscal and
monetary discipline, for example, is not al-
ways easy to achieve or to maintain. Like
all countries, we have our own problems.
But we have learned by trial and error that
it is an essential part of any viable pro-
gram of sustained progress, either social or
economic.

I am sure that many of you here have
your own ideas about what we of the "inter-
American family" could usefully do to speed
up the rate of progress. I am sure that there
is considerable room for improvement on
those ideas which I have discussed tonight.
I would hope that all Americans from the
Strait of Magellan to the Arctic Circle will
continue to think and talk about these and
other issues which really matter. If we can
learn to do so in a friendly, tolerant fashion,
perhaps all of us can benefit.

MAY 9, 1966

737

..I

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective Action

Statement hy Lincoln Gordon

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^

It is a privilege to represent my Govern-
ment at this fourth annual meeting of the
Inter-American Economic and Social Coun-
cil at the ministerial level. The great city
of Buenos Aires is an especially appropriate
setting for this meeting. We are all deeply
indebted to President [Arturo Umberto]
Illia, Minister [Juan Carlos] Pugliese, and
the other Argentine authorities for their
hospitality and for the remarkably fine en-
vironment vi^hich they have provided for
our work.

We are here to review the status of the
Alliance for Progress after almost 5 years,
to evaluate objectively its strengths and its
weaknesses. Above all, we are here to iden-
tify the fields of action in which a new
collective impulse is required and the ways
and means to provide that impulse.

If you will permit a personal reference,
Mr. President, I should like to say that I
find it an especially welcome task to partici-
pate in this work with my colleagues and
friends of Latin America. The seeds of the
Alliance for Progress were planted during
the last decade by scholars and leaders of
public opinion from all parts of this hemi-
sphere. They saw the need for a new co-
operative effort, comparable in spirit to the
Marshall Plan for European recovery al-
though obviously different in content, meth-
ods, and timing, since it was addressed to a

' Made before the fourth annual meeting of the
Inter-American Economic and Social Council at
Buenos Aires, Argentina, on Mar. 29 (press release
72 dated Mar. 31).

wholly different kind of problem. This con-
cept was endorsed by many North Ameri-
cans concerned with inter-American rela-
tions, including several of us who later
became advisers to President Kennedy.
These facts, by the way, should correct an
often-heard error that the Alliance for
Progress was merely a response to events in
Cuba in 1959 and 1960.

With the creation of the Inter-American
Development Bank and the adoption of the
Act of Bogota, circumstances were ripe in
1961 for the launching of a comprehensive
and imaginative program. Even before he
took office, President Kennedy decided to
make United States participation in an Al-
liance for Progress in this hemisphere a
cardinal element of his foreign policy. He
won prompt enthusiasm and support from
our own Congress, both of our political par-
ties, and our public opinion, and a warm
response from governments and peoples
throughout the continent.

It was not enough, however, to have good
will and a valid philosophy of cooperation.
It was necessary to work together with the
governments of our sister nations in refin-
ing objectives and in defining the national
and international actions and mechanisms
to set in motion the mobilization of re-
sources, the institutional changes, and the
structural reforms which would make the
Alliance for Progress a going concern,
bringing real and continuing benefits to our
respective peoples. That step was well ac-
complished at Punta del Este.

738

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

7 '

During 41/2 years as United States Am-
bassador to Brazil, my own central concern
was the development of the Alliance for
Progress in that great neighboring nation.
At the halfway point of my assignment
there, when Vice President Johnson suc-
ceeded to our Presidency at a tragic mo-
ment of history, I wondered, like many
others, what the effect would be on United
States policy toward the Alliance for Prog-
ress. The answer was prompt in coming.
As his first act in the field of foreign
affairs, President Johnson invited the Latin
American Ambassadors in Washington to
meet with him and to learn of his un-
equivocal resolve to carry forward our part
of this collaborative effort — to help give it
ever greater substance and vigor.^

As the United States report * to the meet-
ing makes clear, this continuing resolve has
been demonstrated not merely by words but
by concrete actions year after year. The
program continues to enjoy the support of
our Congress, our two political parties, and
our public opinion. Since my recent return
to Washington as Assistant Secretary for
Inter-American Affairs and United States
Coordinator for the Alliance for Progress,
President Johnson has again made clear —
in private and public — that the Alliance
continues to be the cornerstone of United
States policy in the Western Hemisphere.
His deep concern is that it should produce
real and measurable results, that it should
truly accelerate economic growth, greater
social justice, and stronger democratic insti-
tutions, and that none of us should falter in
our sense of urgency to secure these results.

On the plane of basic principles which
govern our mutual collaboration in the eco-
nomic and social fields, the Charter of Punta
del Este was not only reaffirmed but in
important respects broadened by the Eco-
nomic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,
unanimously adopted by the Second Ex-
traordinary Inter-American Conference last
November.* It was also agreed there that
the central concepts of a permanent char-
acter should be incorporated into the basic
charter of our organization. A special com-

mission was established in Panama to pro-
pose to our governments specific language
for this new and forward-looking charter.
Their work will now be carried forward by
the Council and will be concluded at the
Third Extraordinary Inter-American Con-
ference, to take place in this city 4 months
hence. I am certain that it will be a success-
ful and fruitful conclusion.

Given the necessary period for ratifica-
tion by our various congresses, it will doubt-
less be some time before the new charter is
juridically in force. My own Government,
however, considers the principles agreed to
at Rio de Janeiro to be already operative as
a statement of governmental policy, adopted
by the highest organ of the inter-American
system. Temporary differences of opinion
as to precisely what words should be incor-
porated into treaty obligations, consonant
with our respective constitutional proce-
dures and requirements, should not be mis-
construed as differences of principle or
policy. The United States stands by the
principles of Punta del Este and Rio de
Janeiro. It is our task here, as a Council
subordinate to the conference, to work
within those principles in developing con-
crete programs of action for carrying for-
ward our common enterprise.

Balance Sheet of First S Years

The balance sheet of these first 5 years,
Mr. President, has been well prepared for
us in the country reports and in the docu-
ments of CIAP [Inter-American Committee
on the Alliance for Progress], the secre-
tariat, and the various international bodies
who cooperate in the work of the Alliance,
all masterfully summarized by our meeting

MAY 9, 1966

' For remarks by President Johnson on Nov. 26,
1963, see Bulletin of Dec. 16, 1964, p. 912.

' Report to the Inter-American Economic and
Social Council Presented by the Government of the
United States of America, 1966; single copies are
available upon request from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, D.C.,
20520.

' For background and text, see Bulletin of Dec.
20, 1965, p. 985.

739

of experts. In fact, much has been done.
The overall indexes of growth, especially
during the past 2 years, are promising,
despite the unevenness which is inevitable
in a continent as varied as ours.

There has been a strong surge forward
in infrastructure, notably electric power
and transportation. Industrial expansion
and diversification are proceeding, although
more slowly than we would like. Social in-
vestment still lags badly, but there has been
notable progress in the availability of pure
water — the first step toward improved pub-
lic health — in the eradiction of malaria, in
the building of primary schools, and in some
countries in low-cost housing. Additionally,
a whole series of new intermediate credit
institutions has been established to provide
reasonably priced credit in the fields of
industry, housing, and agriculture.

Among the sectors of least progress are
agricultural modernization, export diversifi-
cation, and education beyond the primary
level.

We have no reason to be complacent. But
as we listen to reports from country after
country, we can say with assurance that we
have reached what Winston Churchill called
the end of the beginning. And far from
being moribund, as some journalists would
like to pretend, the Alliance for Progress
has never been more alive.

It is true, as Minister Roberto Campos
said yesterday, that the Alliance has not
taken on the aspect of a continental charis-
matic crusade. All of us know, however,
that there has been a profound change of
attitudes in these 5 years. There is a con-
centration of governmental effort and of
popular interest in economic and social
progress. There is an enormous advance in
realistic understanding of the obstacles to
development and of the basic lines of public
policy and institutional modernization re-
quired to overcome them. The concept of
more realistic planning has taken a firm
foothold. There have been notable successes
in coming to grips with excessive inflation.
Tax reform is no longer simply a slogan in
much of the hemisphere. Agrarian reform

is no longer a demagogic banner but part of
a growing effort to secure simultaneous
higher agricultural output, improved pro-
ductivity, greater social justice in land
tenure and systems of tenancy, and greater
integration between agriculture and indus-
try. The movement for regional economic
integration, in its infancy 5 years ago, has
made important strides.

The Alliance is benefiting from an effec-
tive mobilization of the resources of the
Inter-American Development Bank, the
World Bank group, and the International
Monetary Fund. Steady progress is being
made by the CIAP in giving our mutual
cooperation a truly multilateral character
and providing it with continuity and con-
sistency. The establishment of priorities
and the preparation of projects for public
investment is an increasingly understood
art. Realistic incentives and institutional
improvements for strengthening the private
sector have been introduced in many coun-
tries. And perhaps of greatest importance,
there has been universal acceptance in the
hemisphere of the principle of mutual as-
sistance among all the member countries.

These developments form part of the
"self-help" recognized as indispensable at
Punta del Este, not as a condition imposed
to secure external assistance but as the basis
for any meaningful development effort and
the foundation for useful international co-
operation. It is these changes of attitude
which indeed justify Secretary General
Mora's [Jose Mora, Organization of Amer-
ican States] suggestion that we are now an
alliance not only for progress but an alliance
in progress.

A Program of Action

How, then, Mr. President, do we move
forward from here? I would hope that out
of this annual meeting of economic ministers
would come a clear-cut program of action,
framed in practical terms against which
progress can be measured when we meet
again next year.

Let me suggest some items which might
figure in such an action program, beginning

Pri
to
aii(

740

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

with measures of critical importance in the
national programs of the Latin American
member countries.

First, surely there should be an intensive
study in each nation, beginning now, of
manpower needs as the basis for the plan-
ning and financing of national education
programs. Education is not a social welfare
luxury to be assigned marginal resources
left over from more important objectives.
Properly conceived and administered, it is
a highly productive investment in human
capital and a vital ingredient of develop-
ment. It is indispensable to social mobility
and a cardinal prerequisite of effective
political democracy. Year after year has
gone by without the development of work-
able plans for educational modernization
and expansion. The external financial insti-
tutions, national and international, have for
some years indicated their readiness to as-
sist in such programs if sound projects were
submitted to them. Is it too much to ask
the governments of Latin America to have
ready by the time of the CIES [Inter-
American Economic and Social Council]
meeting their plans for educational develop-
ment?

Secondly, there is the sector of agricul-
tural production and agrarian reform, al-
ready commented on by Dr. Santa Cruz
[Hernan Santa Cruz, Assistant Director-
General for Latin American Affairs, Food
and Agriculture Organization] and many
other delegates to this conference. Here
again, it would seem appropriate to recom-
mend that each member state report in de-
tail at the next meeting of CIES on the
steps that have been taken during the com-
ing year to modernize the production of
foodstuffs and the systems of land tenure
and tenancy. This would include actions to
increase productivity through the produc-
tion and use of fertilizer and pesticides, to
provide better credit and technical assistance
to the farmer, and to improve marketing
and distribution methods, as well as an
evaluation of other government measures
such as exchange and price policies.

Third, in the field of health, which clearly

affects development and also strikes at our
conscience, most national programs have
been seriously inadequate in determining
priorities and assigning resources. Malnu-
trition, prevention of endemic diseases,
training of specialized personnel, and estab-
lishment of minimal health services in re-
mote areas are all key elements of this
sector, as is the burden on development in
some areas posed by very rapid demographic
growth. We should be able to hope for
specific national programs in the health
field, which might become the basis for
significant international support.

Fourth, tax reform, both structural and
administrative, has made great headway in
the last 5 years, but there is still much to
be done. In many countries the structure of
consumer taxes still provides artificial en-
couragement of vertical integration of in-
dustries through their application at several
levels of production and distribution. Also,
there is little use of well-known procedures
for accelerating tax collection, such as pay-
as-you-go systems and withholding taxes at
the source. Such measures assist in combat-
ing inflation as well as in mobilizing gov-
ernmental revenues. In its country reviews
CIAP should give special attention to fur-
ther improvements in tax systems.

Fifth, the report of our experts meeting
amply demonstrates the need for closer ties
between the planning offices of the various
governments and the key political and ad-
ministrative authorities responsible for
budgetmaking, fiscal control, and public
investment. Prompt steps would appear ad-
visable to accomplish this end.

U.S. Trade Policy

Turning now to areas of policy which fall
in the external sector and which more di-
rectly involve multilateral cooperation, let
me first refer to foreign trade. The docu-
ments and speeches presented at this meet-
ing leave no doubt as to the vital interest
of Latin America in wider trading opportuni-
ties and increased earnings from exports.
Much has been said about restrictions in the
United States market on certain commodi-

MAY 9, 1966

741

ties of major export interest to Latin Amer-
ica. These presentations will be given most
sympathetic consideration by my Govern-
ment.

For over 30 years, United States foreign
economic policy has been pointed toward
greater liberalization of trade and more
efficient worldwide arrangements for com-
mercial and financial transactions. That ef-
fort has been accelerated in the postwar
years, with very substantial results. It is
continuing in the current negotiations on
the Kennedy Round and the discussions of
international financial liquidity. We be-
lieve that the success of these efforts will
redound to the benefit of Latin America as
well as other regions.

Where considerations of national security
or structural problems within our own econ-
omy have led to the imposition of import
restrictions, we have endeavored to avoid
unduly adverse effects on Latin American
suppliers. In the case of meat, for example,
standby import restrictions were set sub-
stantially above the level of recent imports
to insure that foreign suppliers will be able
to share in market growth. Our sugar legis-
lation has greatly enlarged the quotas for
Latin American sales at a premium price
nearly three times the world level. Current
cotton policy includes a strong disincentive
for domestic production so that we expect
the United States cotton area to fall this
year by 1.3 million acres. We have recently
removed import charges on lead and zinc.
Only a few days ago our Secretary of the
Interior announced the termination of im-
port controls on residual petroleum fuels for
the eastern district of the United States.

In the administration of our Public Law
480, which has been of substantial benefit
to several Latin American development pro-
grams, we have scrupulously sought to re-
spect the market positions of normal sup-
pliers, including provision for their partici-
pation in market growth.

Moreover, we are actively engaged in co-
operative efforts to help stabilize and im-
prove Latin American export earnings for
several of the major traditional commodi-

ties. In this field we strongly endorse the
recommendations of the experts for reduced
trade barriers and elimination of trade dis-
crimination, reduced obstacles to increased
consumption, scrupulous observance of the
standstill principle, strengthening of exist-
ing commodity agreements, and the encour-
agement of new agreements or other appro-
priate arrangements for other primary com-
modities, and an improvement of the
financial mechanisms presently available to
compensate for undue price fluctuations be-
yond the control of the exporting countries.
Even more important for the future is the
potential for Latin America's nontraditional
exports. In the long run, the only satisfac-
tory basis for an adequate capacity to im-
port is expanded and diversified exports of
products in growing world demand, whether
primary, semiprocessed, or manufactured.
Although still small in volume, the recent
record of Latin America in nontraditional
exports is a dynamic one. This momentum
must not be lost. Here, again, we have
before us action recommendations from the
experts, including financing facilities for
such exports, stronger national institutions
to stimulate exports, establishment of an
Inter-American Export Promotion Agency,
and exploration of an international export
credit insurance system. We will cooperate
with action along these lines.

In this field, trade and aid should be
recognized as complementary rather than
conflicting. Both public international cred-
its and foreign private investment can play
a large role in capitalizing new export in-
dustries and providing techniques for pro-
duction at competitive cost levels.

Regarding the international monetary sys-
tem, I wish to reaffirm the position set
forth by our Secretary of the Treasury at
the last meeting of the International Mone-
tary Fund.5 This is that all nations, devel-
oped and developing alike, have a vital in-
terest in the nature and scope of any
changes which may be made in this system.

<■ Ibid., Oct. 18, 1965, p. 619.

742

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

The views of all the countries of the free
world, decidedly including those of Latin
America, must be heard and considered in
the process of international monetary im-
provement.

Intimately related to this problem is the
successful outcome of the current efforts of
my Government to achieve equilibrium in
the United States balance of payments.
Almost all the ministers here have struggled
with severe balance-of-payments problems
in their own countries, and I know they will
appreciate the special constraints which the
present situation imposes upon us.

One aspect of these constraints has re-
ceived special attention at these meetings —
the problem of tied aid. In principle, we
accept the ideal that the assistance from all
capital-supplying nations should be usable
under the most advantageous possible con-
ditions. This policy was followed by the
United States for many years, despite our
inability to persuade other capital-export-
ing nations to do likewise even when they
enjoyed balance-of-payments surpluses. But
now, under our present balance-of-payments
conditions, the United States has no option
but to insure that our foreign assistance
involves a transfer of real resources, and not
merely financial resources, from the United
States.

It should also be recalled that in securing
the voluntary cooperation of industrial con-
cerns and financial institutions in the effort
to correct our balance-of-payments deficit,
special care has been taken to avoid limita-
tions on direct investment or financial
credits to Latin America.

Happily, considerable progress has been
made toward the objective of balance-of-
payments equilibrium. We have not yet
reached the stage, however, where any re-
laxation of our efforts is possible. The
struggle for freedom in Viet-Nam has to
some extent magnified the difficulties.
Achievement of payments equilibrium, how-
ever, will be of benefit not only to the
United States and its dollar but also to the
rest of this hemisphere and to the entire
free world.

Program Assistance and Project Loans

We have also noted, Mr. President, the
concern expressed by the experts and by
several of the delegates regarding the forms
of external assistance, notably the relative
merits of so-called program assistance in re-
lation to project loans. In fact, both types
of assistance are and have been fruitful
means of supporting national development
efforts. The program loan has been of
special value in supporting integrated pro-
grams of stabilization, development, and re-
form, accompanied by far-reaching commit-
ments of economic performance presented
to and reviewed by CIAP. The counterpart
in local currency of such loans has also been
of great value in financing intermediate
credit institutions and other high-priority
investments in line with the objectives of
the Alliance for Progress.

Obviously, neither these local currencies
nor local currency made available through
project loans should be mere substitutes for
the mobilization of local resources. They
should be provided only when the overall
mobilization and application of local re-
sources meets the standards of the Alliance.
It is equally essential that such loans be
matched by real imports and not merely add
excessively to foreign exchange reserves,
since their purpose is a transfer of real
resources for additional investment.

Nor does the use of program loans avoid
the necessity for project development,
whether in the public or the private sector.
This is an inescapable requirement of the
development process, and it is one on which
progress has been seriously inadequate. As
President [George] Woods of the World
Bank has repeatedly pointed out, redoubled
efforts must be devoted to project formula-
tion, whatever the form of external assist-
ance that may be made available.

One signal disappointment in our progress
thus far, compared with the targets of
Punta del Este, is the small volume of new
private foreign investment participating in
expanded Latin American development. The
hindrances posed by political instability and
by unrestrained inflation are well known.

MAY 9, 1966

743

Fortunately, recent trends appear favorable,
but we should lose no opportunity to re-
inforce them.

In this connection one useful device might
be the multilateralization of investment
guarantees through a joint agreement pro-
viding uniform procedures whereby individ-
ual governments guarantee the investments
of their nationals in other participating na-
tions. Such an agreement could make a valu-
able contribution toward the establishment
of uniform standards in the relationships
between host countries and those issuing
guarantees to their investors. Several of the
Latin American countries are now beginning
to develop a flow of private investment into
other countries of the hemisphere, a gratify-
ing development eminently consistent with
the spirit of the Act of Rio.

I have asked to be circulated for the in-
formation of the delegates a possible form
of multilateral investment guarantee agree-
ment to illustrate the sort of instrument I
have in mind. I would suggest that CIAP be
requested to consult with member govern-
ments to determine the extent of interest
on their part, and if there is significant
interest, to convoke a conference for the
negotiation of an agreement. Any such
agreement would, of course, be kept open
for the eventual accession of other govern-
ments. In any such conference, it would be
well to request representation from the
World Bank, which is also giving intensive
consideration to this topic.

Financing Multinational Projects

I mentioned earlier the heartening prog-
ress in the movement for Latin American
economic integration, both through the Cen-
tral American Common Market and through
the Latin American Free Trade Area. How
to press forward with this vital process, and
how best to relate these two institutions, is
of course primarily a matter for the govern-
ments directly involved. My Government
heartily supports this movement and is dis-
posed to cooperate with it.

One especially promising area for outside

support is in the study and eventual partici-
pation in the financing of multinational
projects. I need not repeat the declarations
on this topic made by Secretary General
Mora, CIAP Chairman [Carlos] Sanz de
Santamaria, and Inter-American Bank Presi-
dent Felipe Herrera. Dr. Herrera has indi-
cated his intention to propose that the Inter-
American Development Bank establish a fund
for feasibility studies of multinational proj-
ects. We will support this proposal. Moreover,
we are prepared to reinforce the Bank's re-
sources by providing supplementary loans
for large-scale feasibility studies when pre-
liminary investigation under the Bank's
auspices indicates their desirability. The
longrun contribution of such projects to the
region's development can scarcely be over-
estimated. The interior of South America
contains the largest area on the face of the
globe which is readily habitable by man but
still largely unoccupied and undeveloped.
Both here and in Central America there are
prodigious opportunities awaiting system-
atic study and joint action.

Other speakers have mentioned the main
fields: river basin development for electric
power, irrigation, and flood control; main
connecting highways and access roads; and
networks of telecommunications. Others
may come to the surface, such as natural gas
pipelines or international complexes for fer-
tilizer production and distribution. What is
essential is that action be started now to
appraise these opportunities realistically so
that their planning and programing can be
given proper priority in regional develop-
ment alongside purely national projects. We
also suggest for your consideration that,
even now, it would be appropriate for the
suppliers of external resources to the Alli-
ance to plan that a regular proportion of
their funds be made available to finance
multinational projects.

In this connection, also, new steps must
be taken to improve the capacity for re-
search and technological development for
the special conditions of Latin America. The
beginnings have already been made in small
but high-quality research centers staffed by

744

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

specialists of great talent. Surely interna-
tional cooperation could greatly fortify these
efforts. As two examples which readily
come to mind, there are the field of tropical
agriculture and the combating of endemic
diseases which plague large areas of the
continent. The great private foundations of
the United States have done pioneering
work in some of these fields, and my Gov-
ernment is prepared to join in cooperation
with Latin American public and private
agencies to these ends.

An additional virtue of such a develop-
ment would be the attraction of gifted young
people into scientific and technological spe-
cialties and their retention in the service of
Latin America, instead of their loss to more
advanced countries, which all too often now
occurs. Only in this way can Latin America
come to play its full part in the mainstream
of modern technological development, which
is transforming the world around us from
decade to decade.

Finally, Mr. President, I should like to
endorse the suggestion made yesterday by
the delegate of Brazil concerning our own
future method of work. It is entirely ap-
propriate that at this 5-year mark we should
have undertaken a comprehensive review of
where we stand and how we should move
forward. Our mechanisms should certainly
continue to provide for an annual review of
progress and problems, country by country,
and for the region as a whole.

At the ministerial level in future years,
however, I believe that we should concen-
trate our discussions on a more limited
number of topics which could be examined
in depth. They might include, first, a review
of the progress made in accordance with our
own specific program of action and then a
thorough examination of a few issues of
highest urgency. To this end, it might be
well for the CIAP at a time 2 or 3 months
in advance of the next annual meeting to
recommend such fields for examination so
that the proper documentation could be pre-
pared and studied by all of us with a view
toward thorough analysis and appropriate
decision for action on our part.

Spirit of the Alliance for Progress

Mr. President, as economic ministers we
are concerned in our daily tasks with the
dry materials of economic policymaking —
with budget and credit and balance-of-pay-
ments statistics, with production and trade
and wages and prices, with laws and decrees
and the texts of international agreements.
We should never forget, however, that what
is at stake is the lives and welfare of human
beings — their opportunities, their liberties,
and their dignity. Even in these early years
of the Alliance, some of us have had the
privilege of seeing electricity and access
roads brought to hitherto isolated communi-
ties; of seeing healthy children where pol-
luted water supplies had previously brought
early death to one newborn infant out of
two; of seeing the pride of parents and the
hopes of children attending schools where
for centuries the fate of each new genera-
tion was merely to plod through life in the
weary patterns of its forebears. Our task,
however, is not to help change these condi-
tions for the people; it is to change these
conditions with the people. It is their par-
ticipation, their full integration into the
active life of modern society, which gives
the Alliance for Progress its moral basis.
This is what has enlisted the enthusiasm of
our own Peace Corps and is increasingly
enlisting the enthusiasm of national youth
corps in many other member countries.

This is also the spirit that infuses the
concept which President Johnson has called
the Great Society. The goals of that society
are material in part — to cope with problems
of urban congestion, river pollution, medical
care for the aged, and the continuous up-
grading of working skills. But their essen-
tial purpose is more than material. It is to
eliminate the last vestiges of discrimination
and inequality of opportunity which have
become intolerable to the national con-
science of a free and democratic society.
We in the United States, therefore, are also
a nation in continuing development, guided
by the same spirit as the Alliance for
Progress.

Nor can we lose sight of the fact that

MAY 9, 1966

745

the end of our efforts is not only economic
and social progress. It is in equal measure
respect for human rights and the constantly
improved functioning of representative
democracy. We see the objectives of devel-
opment and democracy as indivisible. With-
out advance in the material condition of our
peoples, democracy cannot survive. But free-
dom of expression, initiative in experimen-
tation, and the capacity for responsible self-
government are also stimuli to economic
development as well as most precious ends
in themselves.

We also believe that nations developing in
this spirit will inevitably strengthen their
bonds of solidarity and mutual cooperation
in a nexus of ever-growing interdependence.
In the wider context beyond this hemisphere,
we foresee the role of a free and increas-
ingly prosperous Latin America as a vital
force in the cause of peace and freedom and
human dignity throughout the world.

Pan American Day

and Pan American Week, 1966

A PROCLAMATION'

On the fourteenth of April, seventy-six years ago,
the nations of the Western Hemisphere formally
pledged themselves to the joint pursuit of peace
and justice for all our peoples. The regional system
then freely established, and now known as the
Organization of American States, has been a great
instrument for cooperation throughout the Americas.

Seven years ago the American governments at
Buenos Aires began charting new directions for
economic and social advancement in the hemisphere.
In 1959, we jointly agreed to establish the Inter-
American Development Bank to give new impetus
to economic development. At Bogota the following
year, social progress was recognized as a parallel
objective for inter-American cooperation. In 1961
at Punta del Este we joined with nineteen of our
sister Republics in a vast collective enterprise of
development and reform: the Alliance for Progress.
Since assuming office in November 1963 it has been
my deep concern that the Alliance should produce

real and measurable results — in accelerating eco-
nomic growth, expanding social justice, and strength-
ening democratic institutions.

What has been accomplished in Latin America
in the last two years shows how far we have forged
ahead.

In political terms there is:

— A growing number of vigorous political leaders
commited to revolutionary change through reform in
freedom.

— Wider participation in the democratic process,
particularly at the grass roots level.

— Increasing appreciation of the need for full
citizen involvement in national affairs.

— Greater stability and a strengthening of demo-
cratic institutions.

— Keener awareness of the danger of communist
subversion and greater resolve to combat it.

In economic and financial terms:

— The rate of growth in Gross National Product
has exceeded the Punta del Este target.

— The annual volume of national savings has in-
creased by 1.5 billion dollars.

— Central government revenues have risen by al-
most 20 percent.

— The annual level of exports has grown by
close to a billion and a half dollars.

— The annual level of imports has advanced by
almost one billion dollars.

— Loan authorizations and commitments from
the United States and the international financial
institutions have increased by 863 million dollars.

In human terms, the Alliance in the past two years
has made possible the training of over 100,000 school
teachers; it has built many thousands of new schools
and homes; it has brought safe drinking water to
tens of millions; and it has opened up opportunities
for fuller participation in modem industry and
agriculture.

But these achievements from common endeavors
represent only a beginning. Major deficiencies re-
main to be overcome. Vast new opportunities for
progress wait to be conquered. We must continue
our present programs — quickening the pace. We
must also move boldly toward the new frontiers.
One of these is the economic integration of Latin
America: the key to larger markets, greater pro-
duction, more rational utilization of resources,
better communication, and new levels of material
prosperity and mutual understanding. We heartily
support this vital process and pledge our cooperation.

Another is to open up the vast, untapped interior
of South America through multinational projects
to which I referred last August.' Between Panama in

»No. 3713; 31 Fed. Reg. 5603.

' For an address by President Johnson on Aug. 17,
1965, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965, p. 426.

746

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the north and Argentina in the south lie hundreds
of thousands of square miles of fertile land ■waiting
to be cultivated; mineral and petroleum deposits to
be discovered and forged into new industries. We
in the United States stand ready to help the peoples
of Latin America in making these dreams become
a reality. This will require a new kind of cooperation
because these horizons touch more than one nation.

On this anniversary, the United States strongly
reaffirms its own continuing commitment to the
common task of building a Western Hemisphere
of economic abundance and political freedom in
which every individual will have his full and equi-
table share.

We call upon our sister Republics to join us once
again in renewing the hope and the promise which
first beaconed our ancestors to the New World, and
which are our most solemn obligations to the gener-
ations which will come after us.

Now, Therefore, I, Lyndon B. Johnson, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby pro-
claim Thursday, April 14, 1966, as Pan American
Day, and the week beginning April 10 and ending
April 16 as Pan American Week; and I call upon
the Governors of the fifty States of the Union, the
Governor of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico,
and the officials of all other areas under the flag
of the United States to issue similar proclamations.

I call upon my fellow countrymen to renew
their commitment to our neighbors in this hemi-
sphere, and to reaffirm that commitment by support
for the Organization of American States.

Further, I call upon this Nation to rededicate it-
self to the ideals of the inter-American system, as
embodied in the Charter of the Organization of the
American States, and to the goals of economic and
social progress of the Charter of Punta del Este
and the Economic and Social Act of Rio de Janeiro,'
which are so firmly founded on our belief in the
dignity of man, and on our faith in the future of
freedom.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this sixth day of
April in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Indepen-
dence of the United States of America the
one hundred and ninetieth.

VT-

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

President Hails Congressional
Support of Food Aid to India

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

White House press release dated April 19

I have approved H. J. Res. 997, "To sup-
port United States participation in relieving
victims of hunger in India and to enhance
India's capacity to meet the nutritional
needs of its people."

Through this joint resolution the Con-
gress has acted with dispatch, statesman-
ship, and humanity. It supports and endorses
my recent offer to enlarge our food ship-
ments to the people of India to help them
avoid the suffering that would otherwise
result from the worst drought in a century.^

India simply cannot sustain its 500 million
people from its drought-stricken resources
until the next major harvest in November.

When others were in need and we could
help, our people have always responded
with responsibility and compassion. How-
ever distant other lands may be, in the end
our people understand that we are a part of
a human family.

I am confident that the prompt reaction of
the Congress will encourage the govern-
ments of other nations to help bridge the
gap left in India by this great natural dis-
aster. Some nations, among them Canada,
have already responded on a substantial
scale. Others, with limited resources of their
own, have, nevertheless, reached out gen-
erously to help.

We hope that all nations will pause now
and ask themselves: What more can we do?
At stake is the salvation of countless fami-
lies and, in particular, millions of children:
a great nation's future citizens. None of us
can rest easy until we know in our hearts
that we have done everything that is pos-
sible to protect them f i-om malnutrition, hun-
ger, and even from starvation itself.

For text, see ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 998.

^ For the President's message to Congress concern-
ing the Indian food problem, see BULLETIN of April
18, 1966, p. 605.

MAY 9, 1966

747

I

I am confident from my talks with Prime
Minister [Indira] Gandhi - that the Indian
Government will use the time gained by our
assistance — and that of others — to mount a
determined and effective policy to raise In-
dia's own agricultural production. In the
end, only by its own efforts can the people
of India be fed.

Our assistance has already looked beyond
the present drought to enlarging the next
harvest. We granted some time ago a $50
million loan for chemical fertilizers and are
helping Indian agriculture in many other
ways. The assistance of many governments,
international organizations, and private in-
dustry will all be required in this essential
longrun effort.

In other times, famine in one nation was
regarded as a fact to be passively accepted.
Now, however imperfect our organization,
we must learn to behave like a world com-
munity; for modem communications have
brought nations closer than our own States
were, not so long ago.

The joint resolution I approve today
[April 19] recognizes and contributes to
this vision of where we are and where we
must go.

TEXT OF CONGRESSIONAL RESOLUTION

JOINT RESOLUTION'

To support United States participation in relieving victims of
hunger in India and to enhance India's capacity to meet the
nutritional needs of its people.

Whereas the Congress has declared it to be the policy
of the United States to make maximum efficient
use of this Nation's agricultural abundance in
furtherance of the foreign policy of the United
States;

Whereas the Congress is considering legislation to
govern the response of the United States to the
mounting world food problem;

Whereas critical food shortages in India threaten-
ing the health if not the lives of tens of millions
of people require an urgent prior response : There-
fore be it

Resolved by the Senate and House of Representa-

' Ibid., p. 603.

" Public Law 89-406, 89th Cong., H. J. Res. 997,
Apr. 19, 1966.

tives of the United States of America in Congress
assembled, That the Congress endorses and supports
the President's initiative in organizing substantial
American participation in an urgent international
effort designed to:

(a) Help meet India's pressing food shortages by
making available to India under Public Law 480
agricultural commodities to meet India's normal im-
port needs plus added quantities of agricultural
commodities as the United States share in the in-
ternational response to the Indian emergency;

(b) Help combat malnutrition, especially in
mothers and children, via a special program;

(c) Encourage and assist those measures which
the Government of India is planning to expand
India's own agricultural production;

That the Congress urges the President to join
India in pressing on other nations the urgency of
sharing appropriately in a truly international re-
sponse to India's critical need.

The Congress urges that to the extent neces-
sary the food made available by this program be
distributed in such manner that hungry people with-
out money will be able to obtain food.

President Johnson Holds Talks
With SEATO Secretary General

Folloiving is the text of a White House
statement released on April 19 following
President Johnson's meeting with Jesus Var-
gas, Secretary General of the Southeast Asia
Treaty Organization.

White House press release dated April 19

President Johnson extended a warm wel-
come to Secretary General Vargas on behalf
of the United States Government. The Pres-
ident noted with pleasure that the Secre-
tary General had had an opportunity to
meet with the Vice President and senior of-
ficials here in Washington, including Secre-
tary Rusk. General Vargas also will be meet-
ing with Secretary McNamara later today
and with United Nations Secretary-General
U Thant and Ambassador Goldberg in New
York.

The President was glad to have had an op-
portunity to talk personally with the Secre-
tary General, not only because the United
States considers SEATO vital to the secu-
rity of Southeast Asia, but also because Gen-

748

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

eral Vargas has himself been a champion of
the cause of freedom in his own country
and now in a distinguished international
capacity.

Secretary General Vargas expressed his
appreciation for the opportunity to meet
with the President as well as other United
States Government leaders. His visit to the
United States was one of a series he is mak-
ing to all SEATO member countries for the
first time in his present capacity. He hoped
to complete those visits prior to the next
SEATO Council meeting, to be held in Can-
berra at the end of June. The Secretary

General expressed his gratitude for the very
strong United States support for all the
organization's activities, including joint mil-
itary planning, countersubversion, and other
efforts designed to deter Communist aggres-
sion in Southeast Asia.

The President expressed his hope that the
Canberra Council meeting would succeed in
furthering the objectives of the Organi-
zation. He noted that Secretary Rusk
was expected to head the United States dele-
gation on that occasion. The President
wished General Vargas every success in his
tenure as SEATO Secretary General.

The United Nations: A Progress Report

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

Your invitation gives me an opportunity
which I value highly, because I know well
the vital importance of close and frank con-
tact between public officials and you gentle-
men of the working press. And there is no
area in which this contact is more necessary
than in the arduous and complex search for
international peace which we pursue at the
United Nations.

Today I would like to give you a short
progress report on the major questions
that have taken up most of our time and
energy at the United Nations in these 9
months since it fell to me to succeed — I will
not say "replace," because nobody could re-
place him — the illustrious Adlai Stevenson.

The major questions have been, first, the
crisis over the financing of certain U.N.
peacekeeping operations; then the Kashmir
crisis; then the Vietnamese question which

' Address made before the National Press Club
at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 19 (U.S./U.N. press
release 4833 dated Apr. 18).

we laid before the Security Council. In the
background of Viet-Nam we have also the
question of Red China's relation to the
world community and specifically to the
U.N. Finally, and most recently, we have
had the crisis over Rhodesia. I would like
to take up these topics in order, and then I
will reply to your questions.

Financing and Peacekeeping

When I arrived at the U.N. the organiza-
tion was virtually paralyzed by the contro-
versy over the obligation of member states
to pay their assessed share for its peace-
keeping operations in the Middle East and
the Congo. It had become clear that, de-
spite the opinion of the World Court and
our own best efforts, the majority in the As-
sembly was not prepared to impose upon
the delinquent member states the penalty
laid down in article 19 of the charter —
namely, the loss of their vote in the Gen-
eral Assembly.

MAY 9, 1966

749

In this situation it fell to me to announce
our distasteful decision to agree that the
General Assembly should resume its nor-
mal functioning with all members voting.*
I have no regrets over this decision. What
was most immediately urgent was that the
organization be enabled to continue to carry
on its business.

But in the long run the U.N. has no more
important objective than that of developing
its peacekeeping capacity, and we remain
very active in promoting that objective.
Next week in New York the 33-member
Special Committee on Peacekeeping Opera-
tions will meet to consider changes in U.N.
procedures for authorizing and financing
peacekeeping operations. We attach great
importance to the work of this body. The
capacity of the United Nations to help in
keeping the peace must not be weakened;
it must be made stronger, and the United
States will join wholeheartedly with those
in the Committee and in the Assembly who
work to make it stronger.

Kashmir

Of course, even now, despite the financ-
ing crisis, the U.N. remains a potent peace-
keeper. This was proved last September
when the long-smoldering conflict over
Kashmir erupted into large-scale violence.
The United Nations was thereby confronted
with what was perhaps the most serious
armed clash between two member states
with which it had ever dealt. It was of
course all the more alarming to the United
States, because India and Pakistan are two
very important nations whose friendship
and progress we highly value and because
just over the Himalayas Red China was
sitting, eagerly waiting for a chance to pick
up the pieces.

The cease-fire, which was the prerequisite
to all the steps that followed, was achieved
on September 22 as a direct outgrowth of
the Security Council resolution 2 days ear-
lier.* This in turn paved the way for the
Tashkent agreement which followed in Jan-
uary, leading to the withdrawal of forces.
Tashkent, incidentally, offers a vivid illus-

tration of a situation in which the Soviet
Union perceives that its interest in a step
toward peace runs parallel to that of the vast
majority of nations of the world. May there
be more such situations!

Of course the Kashmir question remains
on the Security Council's agenda. It is a
deep-lying issue involving long-entrenched
interests and emotions on both sides. But
by moving the immediate conflict off the
battlefield and into the conference room, we
achieved something substantial not only for
India and Pakistan but for the peace of the
world. If the U.N. had done nothing else in
1965, that achievement alone would justify
many times over the annual cost of the
United Nations.

Viet-Nam

Now let me comment briefly on activity
at the United Nations relating to the con-
flict in Viet-Nam.

One of my first actions after presenting
my credentials last July was to send a let-
ter to the President of the Security Coun-
cil,* emphasizing the United States' con-
tinued willingness to collaborate uncondi-
tionally with members of the Council in
finding a formula which would restore peace
to Viet-Nam. This was only one step in a
continuous process of consultation with Sec-
retary-General U Thant and with many
member states, particularly members of the
Council.

Then in early January we informed all
117 members of the United Nations of our
unprecedented diplomatic effort — unprece-
dented in intensity and variety — to open
the path to negotiations; and we made
crystal clear our willingness to begin nego-
tiations and the goals we would seek in
them.*

= For background, see Bulletin of Sept. 13, 1965,
p. 454.

' For background and text of resolution, see ibid.,
Oct. 11, 1965, p. 602.

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 16, 1965, p. 278.

' For text of a letter from Ambassador Goldberg
to Secretary-General U Thant, see ibid., Jan. 24,
1966, p. 117.

750

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

But this effort — which included a 37-
day unilateral suspension of bombing of
North Viet-Nam — brought forth no helpful
response. There was no letup in acts of war
by Hanoi or the Viet Cong; there was no
reduction in infiltration, in acts of terror, in
the supply of men and arms. The response
in words was equally negative: a restate-
ment of old conditions and the addition of
still another condition which the United
States must accept before negotiations could
begin.

It was against this background that the
President ordered an end to the 37-day sus-
pension of bombing of North Viet-Nam and,
simultaneously, instructed me to request an
urgent meeting of the Security Council.'
Our purpose in resorting formally to the
Council was to make it clear that even
though all the peace moves we and others
had made had been rebuffed, we remained
resolved to seek a peaceful settlement. Al-
though the Council was unable to agree on
any formal action, the presence of the Viet-
Nam item on its agenda gives us a reference
point which could be highly useful in the
future.

On the Viet-Nam question, then, the
United Nations up to now has served chiefly
as a center of diplomatic communication.
It is fair to ask whether we can realistically
expect it to render any other kind of service
in the search for a secure peace in Viet-
Nam. The most immediate necessity is one
which, in all realism, the United Nations is
not now prepared to undertake — namely,
the defense of South Viet-Nam against
armed aggression. The situation is not the
same as it was when South Korea was at-
tacked 16 years ago, and a similar United
Nations response cannot be expected. The
United States must continue to help South
Viet-Nam defend itself. As I have said be-
fore, America is probably not the ideal po-
liceman, nor do we wish to be; but we are
willing to bear our part of the burden.

In the longer run, however, we anticipate
another need which will call for an intema-

' For background, see ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 222.

tional instrumentality such as the United
Nations. Once the Geneva agreements have
been reaffirmed and revitalized as a basis
for an end to the fighting, somebody must
police those agreements through effective
patrol and supervision and thereby keep the
people of South Viet-Nam secure while they
freely decide their government and the fu-
ture of their homeland.

The United States has no desire to exer-
cise that responsibility itself, and we recog-
nize there would be valid objections to our
doing so. In thinking of suitable machinery
our thoughts turn naturally to the United
Nations or some other appropriate interna-
tional body. The U.N. has a record for ef-
fective, impartial, and independent actions
in other situations where passions are high
and suspicions ingrained.

Meanwhile, our search for peace, as Pres-
ident Johnson has made abundantly clear,
will continue both steadfast and flexible.
We will eagerly welcome any initiative,
whether in the United Nations or else-
where, that helps to move the Viet-Nam
conflict from the battlefield to the confer-
ence table.

China

Now I come to a question which has be-
come somewhat interlocked with the Viet-
namese problem, namely, the perennial and
multiple problem of Communist China. I
will not rehearse past history but only
comment briefly on the current China situa-
tion as it relates to the United Nations.

The argument is sometimes made that
the Vietnamese question or the disarma-
ment question, for example, cannot be ef-
fectively dealt with in the United Nations
as long as Communist China is not a mem-
ber. This does not necessarily follow, since
there are plenty of precedents for the par-
ticipation of nonmembers in matters before
the Security Council and other United Na-
tions organs. I might add that we have been
trying to interest Red China in exploratory
disarmament talks outside the U.N. — but so
far they have refused to join in such talks.

MAY 9, 1966

751

Leaving that point aside, however, the
question recurs — as it has every year since
1950 — what answer the United Nations
should give to Peking's perennial claim to
represent China in the U.N. In that context
we still hear criticism that the United
States has taken it upon itself to ostracize
Red China, and that except for our strenu-
ous efforts Red China would be sitting in the
U.N. today, and so forth.

I doubt that very much. The country that
has really ostracized Red China is not the
United States; it is Red China itself. The
list of their conditions for deigning to ac-
cept a seat in the United Nations is long and
unrealistic. Among other things, they de-
mand that the Republic of China on Taiwan
be ejected from the United Nations, along
with whichever other countries they have
put on their "imperialist puppet" list. I
don't think this would be an acceptable pro-
posal among the members of the U.N.

In this situation some people have ques-
tioned whether the United States should
continue this year the parliamentary
strategy that we have followed in past years
to exclude Red China at the annual session
of the General Assembly. This is a highly
intricate question, and no change in our
policy has been made. Our tactics, of
course, are under review. In any case, the
matter of tactics ought not to obscure the
underlying reality. The Communist revolu-
tion in China, coming to power in 1949, put
that enormous country under the domina-
tion of a group which still adheres to the
dogma that, in the words of Mao Tse-
tung, "all political power grows out of a
barrel of a gun." They are pressing con-
stantly in South and Southeast Asia and
elsewhere — even as far away as Africa and
Latin America, although with dwindling suc-
cess— to enlarge their power and domina-
tion in the world by subversion and by force
of arms. Secretary Rusk has well de-
scribed their state of mind as "a combina-
tion of aggressive arrogance and obsessions
of . . . (their) own making." '

We desire very much, in the interest of

world peace, to see the rulers of mainland
China come to terms with the international
community. Along many avenues, even in
the face of numerous rebuffs, the United
States has been trying to promote that re-
sult— not by yielding to their demands,
which would bring only further demands,
but by such means as our 11 years of con-
tacts with Chinese representatives in
Geneva and Warsaw; our proposals for con-
tacts involving newspapermen, scientists,
and others; and our expressed desire to see
the representatives of Peking sit down and
discuss disarmament and the nonprolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons with the other
powers. They may not respond to these ap-
peals next week or next year, but we look
forward to the day when they will. Much is
said about the patience and persistence of
Communists ; but we can be patient and per-
sistent too.

Southern Rhodesia

Finally, I come to the Rhodesian question
which has most recently been the center of
our peace efforts at the United Nations.
When the independence movement began to
sweep through Africa a few years ago, the
British Government made strenuous efforts
to conciliate the white and African com-
munities in their Rhodesian colony and to
find a basis by which all the people could
participate in the political life of an inde-
pendent Rhodesia. As you know, these ef-
forts failed. After the so-called "unilateral
declaration of independence" by the Smith
regime last November, the Security Council
adopted two very strong resolutions urging
member states not to recognize the illegal
Smith regime — which none have — and call-
ing for economic sanctions, including a spe-
cific embargo on oil and petroleum
products.*

Our latest action in the Council arose

' Ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 686. i

° For background and texts of resolutions, see
ibid., Dec 6, 1965, p. 908.

i

752

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

from attempts to break that oil embargo.*
The United Kingdom quite properly asked
for the Security Council's instructions be-
fore taking the drastic step of intercepting
oil tankers on the high seas. The Council
promptly gave the authority that was
sought, and the British proceeded to use it
when their frigate turned away the tanker
Manuela on its way into the port of Beira.

There has been some criticism from those
who maintain that the step sanctioned by
the Council — namely, the interception of
ships on the high seas — was too novel and
perhaps even unjustifiable under interna-
tional law.

I agree that the step was novel, but it was
not unjustifiable. At the Council meeting I
said, and I repeat, that we made some new
international law that night. International
law is not a static concept; it is a develop-
ing concept. The United Nations Charter it-
self was new international law, and the
decisions made pursuant to it add to that
body of law — the process that moves us
inch by inch toward the still unrealized goal
of the rule of law throughout the world.

Article 39 of the charter gives the Se-
curity Council the duty to determine, among
other things, when there is a threat to
peace and the further duty of deciding what
to do about it. Pursuant to this article, the
Council, wisely and properly, found that the
imminent arrival of tankers in defiance of
the embargo and in support of the rebel
regime was a threat to peace. Some people
disagree with this finding and even say
that what has happened in Rhodesia is an
internal matter. But I don't think anybody
conversant with Africa can deny for a mo-
ment the incendiary nature of the situation
in that part of the world. Happily, article
39 does not require the Security Council to
hold its hand until the fire has broken into
open flames.

Having made its finding, the Council fur-

' For a statement by Ambassador Goldberg and
text of a resolution adopted by the Council on Apr.
9, see ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 713.

ther concluded that the necessary action to
prevent this imminent circumvention of the
embargo should be taken by the power
which bears the chief responsibility in this
whole matter — namely, the United Kingdom.

Was the United Nations viTong to take
this action which was, in some respects,
without precedent? Certainly not. The
situation itself was without precedent, and,
as the old saying goes, "new occasions
teach new duties." This emergency was
one more in the record of such new occa-
sions which have punctuated the life of the
United Nations from its inception : Iran, the
Berlin crisis, Korea, the Uniting-for-Peace
resolution, Suez, and the Congo, among
others. If in each of these novel situations
the organization had shrunk from taking
new steps to uphold the charter, the United
Nations today would be a dead letter, with
consequences that I do not like to imagine.

Actually, what was done in the Security
Council on April 9 is being criticized from
two opposite directions. Some say it was too
strong; others that it was too weak. Some
would have us turn our backs on the whole
situation ; others insist that it be solved in a
single stroke.

I think Lord Caradon, speaking for the
British Government, wisely avoided both
these extremes when he stressed the need
to proceed "step by step." It is clear that
the one step we took on April 9 has had a
major effect on the attempt to break the
embargo. We will know in due time whether
further steps are necessary to achieve the
aim which has the overwhelming backing of
the world community: namely, the restora-
tion of the lawful British authority in
Rhodesia in order that all of the people of
that country may be enabled to join in de-
termining their national future.

Let me conclude by expressing two con-
victions which I have long held, but which I
find relevant to this work at the United
Nations.

One is my belief as a lawyer, which was
reinforced during my service on the Su-
preme Court, that law by itself cannot

MAY 9, 1966

753

bring peace and stability. What brings
peace and stability is just law — law that
takes careful account of new facts and
deals adequately with the legitimate griev-
ances that arise. This requires a willingness
to innovate and to work for peaceful change
— because change itself is inevitable, and if
we cannot keep it peaceful then heaven help
us all.

My second conviction is that just law can-
not always simply be imposed. On the
Court the most important and, I must say,
the most satisfying words I could use were
those at the end of an opinion: "It is so
ordered." We can't use those words very
often at the United Nations. Into every

ounce of enforcement we must mix a ton of
persuasion and conciliation and careful
listening. And then we must not e.xpect to
build the new Jerusalem in one day but
must be content to proceed step by step.

When I spoke to the Press Club in 1961, I
remember quoting a favorite passage of
mine by the eminent Spanish philosopher
Salvador de Madariaga, and I want to quote
it again because nothing could better ex-
press my point:

Our eyes must be idealistic and our feet realistic.
We must walk in the right direction but we must
walk step by step.

Now I think the next step is for me to
listen to your questions. Thank you.

International Education Act of 1966

by Charles Frankel

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cultural Affairs ^

h

I am grateful for the privilege of appear-
ing before you in behalf of the proposed In-
ternational Education Act of 1966.' I be-
lieve that this proposed legislation can open
an important new chapter in the history of
American education and in the history of our
country's relations with other nations. Not
only as a member of this administration but
as one who has spent most of his life in
education, and simply as a citizen, I feel par-
ticularly honored to appear before this
group in connection with your consideration
of this significant proposal.

The Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare [John W. Gardner] has already ap-

' Statement made before the Task Force on Inter-
national Education of the House Committee on Edu-
cation and Labor on Mar. 31.

' For text of a message from President Johnson
to the Congress, see Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966,
p. 328.

peared before you to discuss the Interna-
tional Education Act of 1966, which places
special responsibilities on his Department.
In my remarks I propose to focus upon the
significance of this bill as it affects the De-
partment of State and the international re-
lations of this country. From this point of
view, this proposed legislation is important
for at least three reasons.

First, it offers a better chance to Ameri-
can citizens to acquire the education they
need to cope with the facts of international
life.

Second, it strengthens the American ca-
pacity for foreign affairs.

Third, it takes steps that are essential if
this country, in conjunction with other coun-
tries, is to move ahead purposefully in a
great effort to bring the people of the world
closer together in mutual tolerance and un-
derstanding.

754

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

With your permission I should like to say
something about each of these purposes. Let
me begin by addressing myself to the con-
tribution of this proposed program to the
education of Americans.

It is now a truism to which I believe every-
one gives assent that the United States lives
in an international environment and that the
future of our own country is intimately
linked to the destinies of other nations
thousands of miles away. But the full sig-
nificance of this truism is often hidden, per-
haps precisely because we find it so easy
to agree with it.

The fact is that the international environ-
ment of the United States does not begin
at the ocean's edge. This international en-
vironment penetrates almost every corner of
our society. It is revealed in the news we
hear, the coffee we drink, the movies we see,
the political decisions we debate. Indeed, we
hear so much about the rest of the world
that it is very easy to imagine that we know
what we need to know. But this, of course,
is not true. We do not know what we need
to know until we can go behind the noises
we hear and the signals of other peoples'
existence that we receive and get some com-
prehension of what really causes those
noises and what those signals really mean.
An education, to be valid, must give the in-
dividual the information he needs to cope
with important facts in his environment.

Today, for the ordinary American, in-
cluding the American who never goes over-
seas, education must provide a capacity to
deal with the facts of the international en-
vironment. An education without an interna-
tional dimension is an inadequate education
for Americans in this century. One of the
significant points about the legislation you
are considering, I venture to suggest, is that
it takes account of this consideration. It adds
a new dimension to the Federal Govern-
ment's interest in education.

This brings me to the second reason why
I hope that you will give this proposed legis-
lation favorable consideration. In strength-
ening the education of Americans at home,
it also strengthens the American capacity

for foreign affairs. To work effectively in
ventures beyond our borders, we need more
people with specialized skills. But in addition
to their competence as doctors, teachers,
agronomists, or economists, such people must
also have special knowledge of the societies
in which they are going to apply their skills.

They need to have a special sensitivity and
sympathy — a special eye and a special ear —
for the differences in outlook and feeling
that mark the people with whom they must
work. Such special knowledge and sensitivity
are not easy to come by. A difficult educa-
tional effort is required to produce them. A
nation like our own, which wishes to work
collaboratively and in a spirit of equality
with other nations, must take deliberate
steps to insure that such an educational ef-
fort is strong and continuing. That is one
of the purposes, as I understand it, of the
International Education Act of 1966.

Moreover, as I have partly suggested
already, we need not only more specialists
who combine technical skills and interna-
tional sophistication, but we also need a
citizenry that has received, as part of its
general education, an exposure to the com-
plex facts of the international scene. In the
long run, as the President has observed,
a nation's foreign policy can progress no
faster than the curricula of its classrooms.
American schools and colleges have done
much in recent years to improve the study
and teaching of international affairs. But
much more still needs to be done if we wish
to insure for the decades ahead that the
citizens of this country have the awareness
and the resilience to generate and support
enlightened policies and to pursue long-range
policies with the understanding, patience,
and resolution such policies require.

I come now to the third reason for sug-
gesting that the legislation you are consid-
ering is of importance to the United States
in its foreign relations. It is that education
has moved front and center in this nation's
affairs and in every nation's and that close
cooperation between the educational systems
of different countries is one major instru-
ment for building the structure of peace in

MAY 9, 1966

755

diversity which has been the goal of this
administration and those before it.

Today, for the first time since the inven-
tion of writing 5,000 years ago, more than
half of mankind is literate. Nevertheless, in
an era in which the ability to read and write
is increasingly necessary to an individual's
or a society's well-being, 4 out of 10 of the
world's population are illiterate.

Today the desire for education has become
almost universal, and in all countries a larger
number of people than ever before have a
chance to realize this desire. Nevertheless,
equality of educational opportunity remains,
in most parts of the world, only a distant
ideal.

Today ideas, techniques, information, and
works of art travel between the men of dif-
ferent countries with unprecedented speed.
This process has created new possibilities
for cooperation and mutual understanding
among the nations. But it has also created
new sources of tension and misunderstand-
ing. Over the long run the educational sys-
tems of the nations have as much power as
any other human agency to promote under-
standing and sympathy at their roots.

The legislation that is before you today
proposes that we in this country set about
to prepare ourselves to do our part with re-
gard to this situation. It proposes that we
make ourselves ready to join with others in
finding, in the words of William James which
the President quoted in his message, "a
moral equivalent of war." The hope behind
it is that if the teachers and students of
different countries can be brought together,
working purposefully on common projects,
they can educate each other. Given time
they can reduce the influence, it may be
hoped, of such ancient human emotions as
hostility toward the stranger. That is what
our schools have done at home. To be sure,
they have not wholly succeeded. Provincial-
ism and fear of the outsider are perhaps
inevitable facts of human nature. But the
skeptic who doubts what education can do
to reduce the influence of such attitudes
should study the record of what American
schools have done to promote habits of

mutual respect and forbearance between dif-
ferent kinds and groups of people. The vi-
sion that lies behind the legislation you are
considering is that this is possible on the
international scene.

Yet while this is the vision behind the
program, the proposals before you are, I be-
lieve, measured and modest. There are cer-
tain things which these proposals do not
contemplate. They do not suggest that it is
America's duty to educate the world. They
do not commit the American taxpayer to
underwriting the goal of universal educa-
tion everywhere in the world. They do not
propose to accomplish miracles in a year — or
ever. They are addressed, in all humility, to
meeting certain specific needs in our country
so that we will be better able to work with
others to advance education and particularly
the process of mutual international educa-
tion. They look ahead to a shared adventure
with other nations in which, together, we
work to produce school systems that will re-
lease children from the awful handicap of
ignorance and bring them up to look on
people in other nations with understanding
and respect. And this hope is joined to a
sober recognition that education needs time
to achieve its goals.

In sum, from the standpoint of foreign
policy, I endorse this proposed legislation be-
cause it lays the foundation for an interna-
tional effort that gives proper attention to
the crucial role that education can play in
realizing the promise of our time and off-
setting its perils. The legislation you are con-
sidering gives expression to the proposition
that education is a major and enduring
activity of this nation and that educational
cooperation with other nations constitutes an
abiding national interest. It projects to the
forefront of our national policy the convic-
tion that the advancement of education, at
home and abroad, is properly a national ob-
jective of the United States, and it offers a
program that is not a crash program for an
emergency but a deliberate effort to seek
such long-range goals.

Not least, it recognizes the crucial truth
that American educational activity at home

756

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and American educational activity abroad
comprise a single interrelated whole. They
are not separate. Each grows more effective
as it is reinforced by the other. This pro-
gram is offered not as a one-sided American
venture but as a sign of our desire to work
cooperatively with others. Its object is to
strengthen American education so that we
can assist other countries in strengthening
theirs and so that, in this process, our edu-
cation will be strengthened too. In the words
of the President, "The knowledge of our
citizens is one treasure which grows only
when it is shared." ^ A truly international ed-
ucational endeavor cannot be the work of one
country. The passage of the International
Education Act of 1966 would indicate that
this country is prepared to make a contribu-
tion to an international enterprise in which
other nations are invited to join.

Finally, it may be of interest to you if I
say just a few words about the relationship
of the International Education Act of 1966
to the programs in mutual education and
cultural exchange which are conducted by
the Department of State. The programs en-
visaged in the act before you do not in any
way duplicate the activities of the Depart-
ment of State but rather support and com-
plement them. The search for people of high
quality to take part in our programs takes
much of our time and effort. I would hope
and expect that the initiation of programs
such as those contemplated in the Interna-
tional Education Act would make it easier
to find the people we need. Moreover, the
programs in the Department of State have
been aimed, in the main, at individuals apart
from their institutional affiliations and have
been conceived as part of our effort in other
countries. The International Education Act
of 1966 will focus on institutions and on the
needs of American education at home. Ac-
cordingly, from the point of view of the De-
partment of State, the passage of the In-
ternational Education Act will not obstruct
or overlap our efforts. On the contrary, it
will greatly aid these efforts.

' Ibid.

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee
To Meet in July

Press release 91 dated April 19

The fifth meeting of the Joint United
States-Japan Committee on Trade and Eco-
nomic Affairs will be held in Japan July 5
through July 7, 1966. The agenda and de-
tailed arrangements for the meeting will be
announced at a later date.

Liquidation of Banco
Territorial de Cuba

Press release 90 dated April 19

The Department of State has received
through the Government of Switzerland a
note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs
of Cuba dated March 15, 1966, reading in
translation as follows :

The Commission designated by the President of
the National Bank of Cuba to liquidate, pursuant to
Special Provision No. 6 of Law No. 930 of Febru-
ary 23, 1961, all private banks of any kind which,
because they were in a technical state of bankruptcy
or insolvency, were subject on October 13, 1960 to
intervention or other precautionary measures
adopted by the National Bank of Cuba or the Deposit
Insurance Fund, which banks include Banco Terri-
torial de Cuba, S.A., whose administration, for the
purpose of its final liquidation, has been entrusted
to this Commission, hereby issues the following
notice:

"On the date of issuance of tliis notice, the activi-
ties of the said Bank are to be suspended, and its
creditors of all kinds must submit their claims with-
in 90 calendar days of March 15, 1966, after which
any legal action shall be considered to have lapsed,
and all rights the claimants may have shall be re-
garded as waived.

"Holders of obligations, mortgage bonds, and cou-
pons that have matured must deposit with the pro-
vincial offices of the National Bank of Cuba in the
district in which they are domiciled, within 90 cal-
endar days of March 15, 1966, whatever securities
they hold for consideration by the Liquidating Com-
mission. The Provincial Offices shall supply the
official form for submitting such securities. Pay-
ment of interest on each and every obligation and
bond issued by Banco Territorial de Cuba, S.A.,
shall be suspended as of December 31, 1965 as a
result of its liquidation.

"The Liquidating Commission shall have its of-

MAY 9, 1966

757

fice at the Central Office of the National Bank of
Cuba, located at 402 Cuba [Street], Habana."

Anyone desiring to record a claim against
the Liquidating Commission of Banco Ter-
ritorial de Cuba, S.A., is informed that they
should communicate with the Office of Spe-
cial Consular Services of the Department of
State if assistance is required.

Signatures: Ecuador, April 21, 1966; Finland,
April 21, 1966; Federal Republic of Germany,
April 21, 1966; Guatemala, April 12, 1966;
Israel, April 19, 1966; Saudi Arabia, April 21,
1966 ; South Africa, April 20, 1966 ; Switzerland,
April 4, 1966; Union of Soviet Socialist Repub-
lics, April 18, 1966;" United Arab Republic,
April 7, 1966; United States of America, April
4, 1966.

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Finland, April 21, 1966.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency,
as amended. Done at New York October 26, 1956.
Entered into force July 29, 1957. TIAS 3873, 5284.
Accepta7ice deposited: Jordan, April 18, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: Empresa Nacional de Teleconununi-
caciones S.A. of Chile, April 22, 1966.

Trade

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for ac-
ceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8, 1965.'

Ratification deposited: Norway, April 1, 1966.
Signature: Uruguay, March 30, 1966.'

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).
Opened for signature at Washington April 4
through 29, 1966.'

BILATERAL

Australia

Understanding concerning income tax pursuant to
article III, paragraphs 3 and 5 of the memo-
randum of arrangement of March 30, 1966, to
cover reentry experiments in Australia (Sparta).
Effected by exchange of notes at Canberra March
30, 1966. Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Understanding relating to claims (other than con-
tractual claims) resulting from the memorandum
of arrangement to cover reentry experiments in
Australia (Sparta) of March 30, 1966. Effected
by exchange of notes at Canberra March 30, 1966.
Entered into force March 30, 1966.

Mexico

Protocol to amend the agreement of January 29,
1957 (TIAS 4777), concerning radio broadcast-
ing in the standard broadcast band. Signed at
Mexico April 13, 1966. Enters into force on the
date of exchange of ratifications.

Viet-Nam

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of March 21, 1966, as amended (TIAS
5968). Effected by exchange of notes at Saigon
April 14, 1966. Entered into force April 14, 1966.

' Not in force.
' Ad referendum.
" With reservation.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1402 PUBLICATION 8076 MAY 9, \9U

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phaaes of international affairs and
the functions of the Department, Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international a^eements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Sui>er-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Pbice: 62 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

758

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 9. 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1^02

American Repablics

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Elffective
Action (Gordon) 738

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and
Social Process (Mann) 734

Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1966 (proclamation) 746

President Johnson Visits Mexico City (Johnson,
joint statement) 726

Asia. President Johnson Holds Talks With
SEATO Secretary General 748

China. The United Nations: A progfress Report
(Goldberg) 749

Claims and Property. Liquidation of Banco Ter-
ritorial de Cuba (text of Cuban notice) . . . 757

Congress

International Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754

President Hails Congressional Support of Food
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747

Cuba. Liquidation of Banco Territorial de Cuba
(text of Cuban notice) 757

Economic Affairs

Hemisphere Cooperation for Economic and
Social Progress (Mann) 734

Liquidation of Banco Territorial de Cuba (text
of Cuban notice) 757

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet in July 757

Educational and Cultural Affairs. International
Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754

Foreign Aid

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective
Action (Gordon) 738

International Education Act of 1966 (Frankel) 754

President Hails Congressional Support of Food
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747

President Johnson Visits Mexico City (John-
son, joint statement) 726

India

President Hails Congressional Support of Food
Aid to India (Johnson, joint resolution) . . 747

The United Nations: A Progress Report (Gold-
berg) 749

International Organizations and Conferences

Alliance for Progress: Next Steps for Effective
Action (Gordon) 738

President Johnson Holds Talks With SEATO
Secretary General 748

Japan. U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet
in July 757

Mexico. President Johnson Visits Mexico City
(Johnson, joint statement) 726

Pakistan. The United Nations: A Progress Re-
port (Goldberg) 749

Presidential Documents

Pan American Day and Pan American Week,
1966 746

President Hails Congressional Support of Food
Aid to India 747

President Johnson Visits Mexico City .... 726

Southern Rhodesia. The United Nations: A
Progress Report (Goldberg) 749

Treaty Information. Current Treaty Actions . 758

United Nations. The United Nations: A Prog-
ress Report (Goldberg) 749

Viet-Nam. The United Nations: A Progress Re-
port (Goldberg) 749

Name Index

Diaz Ordaz, Gustavo 726

Frankel, Charles 754

Goldberg, Arthur J 749

Gordon, Lincoln 738

Johnson, President 726, 746, 747

Mann, Thomas C 734

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 18-24

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 18 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
72 of March 31, 85 of April 14, and 87 of
April 15.

No. Date Sobject

*88 4/18 Rusk: statement on foreign aid
before Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.

*89 4/19 Harriman: Canadian Press Club,
Toronto (excerpts).

90 4/19 Liquidation of Banco Territorial

de Cuba (text of Cuban notice).

91 4/19 Joint U.S.-Japan Trade Commit-

tee.

t92 4/21 Solomon: Subcommittee on Anti-
trust and Monopoly of Senate
Judiciary Committee.

t93 4/22 CENTO communique.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

I

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. H03

May 16, 1966

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORLD LEADERSHIP
Address by Vice President Humphrey 769

COORDINATION OF POLICY ON POPULATION MATTERS
Statement by Under Secretary Mann 78U

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION MEETS AT ANKARA 775

THE LARGER MEANING OF THE NATO CRISIS
by Under Secretary Ball 762

For index see inside back cover

"The attack that has been launched against NATO deeply
concerns all Western nations. Let us make no mistake about
the fact that the withdrawal of an important power from
participation in the arrangements that give reality to the
Western alliance tvill iveaken the common defense. More
than that, it will iveaken the Western deterrent."

The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis

by Under Secretary Ball

Not long ago a whimsical friend, still un-
der the spell of reading all dozen volumes of
Mr. Toynbee's massive work on the life cycle
of nations and civilization, said to me:
"When America has run its course, I know
what headnote will appear in the history
books. It will be 'The United States — a na-
tion that died of a surfeit of pragmatism.' "

Like a highly seasoned salad this remark
stayed with me for several days. I am afraid
there is a grain of truth in my friend's ir-
reverent observation. We are a pragmatic
people, and — especially in the area where I
toil — pragmatism is the course of least re-
sistance. It is easy — and tempting — to be-
come absorbed in the operational aspects of
foreign relations and to ignore the longer
term implications of policy. But, if America
is to survive as a civilization, if in fact the
world is to survive as a healthy environ-
ment for human beings, then we do have to
remind ourselves of the larger framework
of policy — something better than the habits,
the improvisations, the expedients of years
gone by — or we shall find ourselves repeat-
ing old mistakes in a world where mistakes
by great nations can mean world destruc-
tion.

' Made before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 29 (press
release 101).

Today there is a special temptation to
pragmatism in our relations with Western
Europe, where we are faced once again with
the reappearance of an assertive national-
ism that challenges the whole structure of
our postwar arrangements.

Yet there is no area where it would be
more dangerous for us to become absorbed
merely in the operational aspects of policy,
to make adjustments, accommodations, com-
promises, and concessions without regard to
our great common objectives. For our rela-
tions with Western Europe carry a heavy
freight of history. They form the longest
and persistently the most important ele-
ment of United States foreign policy. We
have benefited greatly from events in
Europe and we have suffered from them.
And, at the end of the day, we cannot for-
get that jealousies, ambitions, and aggres-
sions in Western Europe were responsible
for the two greatest wars of modern history
— cataclysms that created many of the ills
and troubles that harass us today. If we are
to avoid new and even more terrible conflicts,
we must know where we are going and we
must have some sense of how we are to get
there.

We have not always had a sure sense of
direction in these mattei's.

America spent the early years of this
centurv in a state of innocence which, in

762

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

retrospect, seems both attractive and sur-
prising. World War I came upon us while we
had our backs turned, preoccupied as we
were in transforming a continent into a na-
tion. It took us a long time to sort the issues
in that struggle. But in 1917 we entered the
fight, and the weight of our effort turned
the tide of battle. Yet in retrospect it
seems clear enough that we did not compre-
hend the full meaning either of the war or of
our involvement. When we had brought the
boys home again we had a frustrating try
at international peacemaking. Then we
turned our backs on the world in the inter-
ests of what we awkwardly referred to as
"normalcy."

We pretended, in other words, that we
were not a great power and that we had
been wrong in trying to act like one. The
fount of our foreign policy remained the ad-
monitory passages in Washington's farewell
address — advice given more than a century
before to a fledgling Republic. If staying
clear of entangling alliances had been good
enough for the Founding Fathers, it was
good enough for us.

America's policy, as we told the world, was
isolationism — the early 20th-century version
of what would be known today as neutralism
or nonalinement — and we meant to stick by
it.

The Hard Lessons of Two World Wars

The Second World War ended our adoles-
cence. We fought valiantly and well in all
four corners of the earth. When the con-
flict was over, America at long last had
grown up, and we had learned certain hard
lessons the hard way.

I shall not try to review all of those
lessons here tonight, but I think it essential
to mention some of them.

The first was that the United States is
indubitably a great power and, as such, can-
not escape involvement in the world's main
concerns. Moreover, the world has become so
interdependent that our interests are neces-
sarily engaged by any new aggression in any
strategic area of the world — and particularly
in Europe.

Second, we admitted with nagging con-
science that our own neutralism had served
as an encouragement — or at least had posed
no discouragement — to aggressors in Europe.
We could deter aggression in the future only
by making it crystal clear that American
power would be committed instantly and
automatically if any friendly European state
were attacked.

Within months after the end of the war
we began to learn another hard lesson — that
another nation, itself also organized on a
continent-wide basis, was bent on extending
its dominion, and the ideological system it
represented, through force and subversion
around the world. As one after another of
the European states were caught within the
encircling net of the Iron Curtain, we awoke
with a shock to this new and imminent
peril.

Along with our European friends we began
to rethink the mistakes of the past. Together
with them we reached certain conclusions
which we put in treaty or institutional
form. One was the recognition — not of the
theory but the fact — that an attack on one
of the North Atlantic states was an attack
on all. In the case of major aggression
against Europe, the power of the New World
would inevitably be called upon to redress
the balance of the old. That, however, was
not enough by itself. The nations of Europe
that had been occupied, and particularly the
leaders of France, were emphatic in telling
us that Europeans could not endure another
period of liberation. This time they must be
protected, not liberated.

We concluded with them, therefore, that
our Western alliance must be more than an
agreement for liberation. It must be made
an effective deterrent so as to dissuade any
aggressor from reckless adventures. To
achieve this we must create an instrument
for instant collective defense by forces in
being, acting under common command and
common plans.

For this, too, we had the hard lessons of
two world wars to guide us.

In World War I it had taken 4 years for
the Allied Powers to pull themselves to-

MAY 16, 1966

763

gether and agree on a combined command
under Marshal Foch. The obstinate insist-
ence of the individual nation-states on sov-
ereign and separate national commands cost
hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the Second World War the Western
Powers again reaped the tragic consequences
of their unpreparedness and their blind re-
jection of common plans and a common com-
mand. Denmark fell, then Norway, then the
Low Countries, then France. Almost 5
years elapsed before the Allies accumulated
the military strength, unified under the in-
tegrated command of SHAEF, that made it
possible to mount the Normandy invasion
and win the war.

It was against this tragic background that
the Atlantic Powers — inspired particularly
by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schu-
man — undertook in 1950 to transform the
alliance from a classical mutual defense pact
into a full-fledged collective security system.
An integrated command was established
under General Eisenhower. Common plan-
ning was undertaken. Forces were put in
place for the defense of Europe that now
total 2.5 million men. And over the years
that followed the nuclear power of the
United States was targeted against the
Soviet rockets aimed at Europe.

For the first time in history the Western
Powers were acting together with little re-
gard for special national advantage, not
merely to meet but to deter a potential ag-
gressor. In what otherwise would have been
a time of grave peril, Europeans could go
about their affairs without an overhanging
fear of invasion. They did so, and they have
prospered beyond their fondest dreams.

Construction of the Western Alliance

The construction of the Western alliance,
and even more the building of the collective
security system known as NATO, meant a
great national decision for us as Americans
and a great common achievement for the
West. Looking across the Atlantic, we de-
cided that we must work actively with our
European friends in deterring aggression in
Europe. But even more important, we and

they concluded that peace could be per-
manently secured only if steps were taken
to remove the underlying causes that had
created so many disasters in the past.

Of all those causes one stood out above
all others. That was the persistent rivalry
among the individual nation-states of Europe,
each striving in turn to gain dominance by
force over its neighbors. From the time of
the Treaty of Westphalia in the middle of the
17th century for more than a century and a
half, the peace of the world was periodi-
cally disturbed primarily by the efforts of
European nations — and particularly France,
then the largest and strongest — to achieve
hegemony over the rest of the Continent.
Those efforts were thwarted by shifting
coalitions of other European states aided by
the astute diplomacy of Britain, which for
centuries allied itself always on the side of
the weaker group in order to maintain a
balance. These European struggles were not
always confined to the Continent. Through-
out the whole of our colonial life they
tended to spill over into the Western Hem-
isphere, until, when we secured our inde-
pendence, we were able to insulate ourselves
through a policy of isolation made possible
by the Monroe Doctrine and the British
Fleet.

We thus kept aloof from the European
wars of the 19th century while the prepon-
derance of power shifted in Europe. France,
worn out by the exertions of the Napoleonic
era and outstripped by the other major
European powers in population, was de-
feated by the Second Reich, which under
Bismarck's leadership had been created by
Prussia out of 25 German kingdoms, princi-
palities, duchies, and free cities. Yet the
Franco-Prussian War was but a prelude of
things to come. For in the first half of the
20th century the two world wars, which
had their roots in European rivalries,
brought all of us close to disaster.

Against this history it was clear that, if
there was to be peace in Europe and in the
world, the old national rivalries had to be
replaced by something more constructive.
Yet this was nothing America could bring

764

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

about by itself. We could assist the Euro-
peans to rehabilitate themselves through
the Marshall Plan. We could encourage them
to sublimate their national rivalries in a new
unity. But the actual achievement of that
unity v^as something that only the European
peoples could create.

Still the climate vv^as ripe for action. The
peoples of Europe w^ere themselves
thoroughly tired of wars that sprang from
the competing ambitions of nation-states.
And so they began to work brilliantly,
principally under French leadership, on a
whole series of measures: the Schuman Plan,
which created the Coal and Steel Commu-
nity ; the proposal for a European army with-
in a European Defense Community (which,
had it succeeded, would have avoided many
of the problems that haunt us today) ; and
the European Atomic Energy Community.
Most important was the great breakthrough
of the Treaty of Rome that changed the
economic face of Europe by creating a vast
Common Market.

This then was the prospect in the early
part of the 1960's — a Europe making mas-
sive strides toward unity with the strong
prospect that its geographical boundaries
would be expanded to include the United
Kingdom and certain other European na-
tions, a Europe growing prosperous with its
burgeoning Common Market under the pro-
tective umbrella of NATO.

The organization of Europe is, of course,
primarily a matter for Europeans. But it is
a matter that deeply affects the United
States as well. The thousands of Americans
who gave their lives in the Argonne Forest —
or, a quarter of a century later, in the
Battle of the Bulge — have established our
right and indeed our obligation to speak
frankly on issues that so critically involve
both our safety and our future. Our fate
and the fate of Western Europe are tied in-
extricably together. We recognized that on
two occasions when we sent our young men
overseas, and Europe recognized that on
two occasions when it called for our help in
an extreme hour. And, whatever words may
be uttered in the current discussion, Euro-

peans know today that American men and
American might will be there when they
need us. So we are not very much impressed
by specious homilies about doctrine that ob-
scure the point of America's demonstrated
reliability in times of crisis.

We have seen in European progress to-
ward unity the chance for a new and fruit-
ful relationship. As President Kennedy said
in June 1963, in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt,- we "look forward to a united
Europe in an Atlantic partnership — an en-
tity of interdependent parts, sharing equally
both burdens and decisions and linked to-
gether in the tasks of defense as well as the
arts of peace."

The Threat to European Unity

The idea of a united Europe linked in
equal partnership across the Atlantic had
great resonance on both sides of the ocean.
But already there were forces working
against it, in particular the decision of the
government of one European nation-state to
separate itself from the others and to seek
a special position of primacy in Western
Europe. The purposes of that government
should not be a matter for polemics; they
are on the public record, fully expressed or
implied in any number of official state-
ments.

That government has sought to halt the
drive toward European unity in the name of
uniting Europe; to transform the European
Common Market into a mere commercial ar-
rangement by hobbling the powers of the
executive; to prevent other Western Euro-
pean nations from achieving any participa-
tion in the management of nuclear power
so as to preserve its own exclusive position
as the sole nation with nuclear weapons on
the Western European Continent; to reduce
the influence and ultimately the presence of
the United States in Europe; and, finally,
to free itself from obligations to the great
postwar system of European and Atlantic
institutions in order to achieve freedom of
political and diplomatic maneuver that could

' For text, see Bulletin of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

MAY 16, 1966

u

765

permit it to deal, to its own advantage, with
what it has described with a curious im-
partiality as "the two great hegemonies."

The attack that has been launched
against NATO deeply concerns all Western
nations. Let us make no mistake about the
fact that the withdrawal of an important
power from participation in the arrange-
ments that give reality to the Western alli-
ance will weaken the common defense. More
than that, it will weaken the Western deter-
rent. Finally, it is likely to delay and con-
fuse the possibilities of moving toward an
ultimate settlement of the great unfinished
business of Europe. For it is clear to any-
one who has closely followed the events of
the past decade that the gradual changes
taking place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have been hastened, not de-
layed, by the firm and common purpose of
the West. And it is clear also that if the
West ceases to stand firm and unified, if
each individual Western nation seeks to
make a separate deal for itself, the gains we
have achieved will be quickly lost and the
hope for an ultimate European settlement
long deferred.

Obviously the Communist world has un-
dergone major transformations since the
death of Stalin. But the change has not been
without its perils for the West. The Khru-
shchev who preached peaceful coexistence
punctuated his message with attempted black-
mail in Berlin, nuclear threats at the Par-
thenon, and missiles in Cuba. Yet, it is
plainly right to build bridges to the Com-
munist countries, bridges of trade and travel
across barriers that cruelly divic'e a con-
tinent. It is right to welcome the citizens of
East Europe to see for themselves that capi-
talism can yield economic progress and so-
cial justice side by side. These things are
right, and they should be continued.

But those bridges to the East must be
anchored in the solid foundation of a strong
and cohesive Western alliance. For it is onl\
when the security issue is beyond dispute
that lasting progress can be made toward
permanently improved relations with the
Communist states. This is the basis on which

there can be secure movement toward a
political settlement in Europe, leading to
the reunification of Germany in conditions
of peace and freedom and to real progress
toward international arms control — goals
that we and Europe share.

Over and above the attack on NATO there
is, therefore, grave cause for uneasiness in
the resurgence of a self-centered national-
ism. For each country's nationalism is a
force that, particularly in Europe, tends to
create equal and opposite forces in neigh-
boring countries. Ever since the war we
Americans have known that the peace of
the world depended to a great extent on the
gamble that Europe would transform itself,
that the nations of Western Europe would,
after all these centuries, put aside those
corrosive national rivalries that have been
the cause of past disasters and sublimate
their energies in a common purpose and a
new unity. At the same time, we have al-
ways recognized the danger that the Euro-
pean people, with reflexes conditioned by
history, might from time to time be tempted
to lapse into the old bad habits of the past,
to unfurl the dusty banners of other cen-
turies, and to re-create the conditions in
which Europe might again become the cock-
pit of the world.

Concept of Equal Partnership

There are, to be sure, voices even in this
country that tell us almost with satisfaction
that the latter development is inevitable
and knowledgeable men should accept it.
After all, they say, haven't the European
nations regularly, 12 or 13 years after each
war, dissolved their alliances and returned
to their old rivalries?

This sounds strangely like the contention
of the early 1920's that we should return to
"normalcy." For the kind of Eui-ope en-
visaged by these critics is a Europe no more
suitable to the needs of today than would
"normalcy" be for today's America.

What exactly would these men have us
do? The realistic hope for peace in the
world, they contend, is not for a unified
Western Europe but for a Europe of nation-

766

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

states extending from the Atlantic to the
Urals — or, in other words, a Europe in
which each of the middle-sized states would
seek to make its own deal with one or the
other of the "great hegemonies" in the
hope of establishing for itself a first-class
power position while keeping the others in
an inferior role.

Such a Europe — a continent of shifting
coalitions and changing alliances — is not
the hope of the future; it is a nostalgic
evocation. It would mean not progress but
a reversion to the tragic and discredited
pattern of the past — a return to 1914, as
though that were good enough, and with the
same guarantee of instability — yet made
more dangei'ous, not less, by the ideological
drive of the Soviet Union and the existence
of nuclear weapons.

To move toward such a Europe is not the
way to reach a settlement of the unfinished
business of the last war. It is not a way to
remove the Iron Curtain except on terms
that would preserve and exacerbate dis-
crimination and inequality and thus lay the
groundwork for new disasters in the fu-
ture.

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting
peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the
European peoples. For there is a new re-
quirement of size in the world which makes
it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe
are to make their full contribution to world
affairs, they must organize themselves on a
scale commensurate with the requirements
of the modem age. Let us not deceive our-
selves; no matter how adroit diplomacy
may be, it cannot achieve first-power status
for a nation of limited size and resources.

The true course of Western Europe lies
not in fragmentation but in unity — a solid
unity that will bring not varying degrees of
status and citizenship but equality for all. A
united Europe will not need to seek first-
power status; it will have it. And unity,
moreover, will enable the gifted European
peoples to play their major role in the
large affairs of this turbulent world and
make their rich and proper contribution to
civilization.

If Europe unites, the world will no longer
be faced with the dangers of middle-sized
states trying to play a game of maneuver
with one another and with the "hegemo-
nies," after the pattern of the past. There
will be a third large center of power and
purpose — capable, because it is strong, of
bringing about a European settlement, com-
petent to come to terms with the East on a
basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain
and reunify the German people as equal
members of a great community.

As this develops, and only as it develops,
will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full
meaning to the concept of equal partner-
ship. For no longer will the European na-
tions have to fear, as some apparently do,
the preponderance of American weight in
our common political councils or the pre-
ponderance of American industrial strength
in our economic affairs. There will be equal-
ity in a realistic sense — not something en-
acted by international law, not something
the United States has conferred. It will be
an equality founded on unassailable fact,
since a united Europe will command vast
resources of technology and production,
brain power and material.

"We Want a Europe Strong, Not Enfeebled"

Americans join with Europeans in want-
ing this kind of Europe. We want a Europe
strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe
independent in spirit as it is interdependent
in fact. As President Kennedy once said,^ "It
is not in our interest to try to dominate the
European councils of decision. If that were
our objective, we would prefer to see Europe
divided and weak, enabling the United
States to de:.! with each fragment indi-
vidually." But what we look forward to, he
said, is "a Europe united and strong —
speaking with a common voice, acting with
a common will — a world power capable of
meeting world problems as a full and equal
partner."

Perhaps there are some Americans who
would like to see a fragmented Europe, but

» Ibid.

MAY 16, 1966

76T

they have not read history carefully — or if
they have, they have not understood it. Cer-
tainly, it is not the policy of this adminis-
tration any more than it was the policy of
the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Tru-
man administrations to see Europe dis-
united.

For we are prepared to take our chances
on a Western Europe united on principles of
equality, a Europe with a common voice. To
be sure, it will be an independent voice, not
always agreeing with us — but then the
United States has no monopoly of wisdom.
What we can be sure of is that we and our
Western European partners will agree on
the broad outlines of the kind of world we
want, a world of peace and freedom. For we
draw from the deep well of Western civiliza-
tion, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek
together the dignity of the individual and
not the tyranny of the mass.

A Europe so united was the bright hope
and the high accomplishment of the fifties.
It remains the real hope of Europeans and
Americans today. For, as President Johnson
said more than a year ago : *

"The unknown tide of future change is al-
ready beating about the rock of the West.
These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic,
this half-billion people unmatched in arms
and industry, this measureless storehouse
of wisdom and genius can be a fortress
against any foe, a force that will enrich the

life of an entire planet. It is not a question
of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of
moving ahead with the times, and it is a ques-
tion of vision and persistence and the will-
ingness to surmount the barriers of national
rivalry against which our ancestors have al-
ways collided."

U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing
Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk

Statement by Secretary Rusk *

The United States regards the problem of
nuclear sharing as major unfinished busi-
ness. The development of an arrangement
to provide participation for NATO non-
nuclear nations, including the Federal Re-
public of Germany, in the management of
nuclear power is under the most serious
discussion among interested governments.

The United States Government has made
no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic
nuclear force or any other collective ap-
proach to the problem. The position of the
United States remains as stated in the
communique of President Johnson and
Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard December
21, 1965.2

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on Apr. 27.
' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50.

n

5f

768

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN **

.LI

"Leadership today requires understanding of the -problems
we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we
seek. It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead
and inspire others — to lead and inspire in a sense of com-
mon enterprise."

The Responsibilities of World Leadership

Address by Vice President Humphrey ^

It is always a I'isk to speak to the press:
They are likely to report what you say. To-
day I will take that risk, for I have some
thoughts I am quite willing to have repeated.

Today our America stands as the most
powerful, the most prosperous, and the
freest nation in the history of the earth.
And in our power, wealth, and freedom we
stand as leader of the Western World.

As a nation cautioned from the first
against entangling alliances, this role is not
an easy one. And, indeed, to many other na-
tions of the world we remain a relatively
unknown quantity. For it has been only in
recent years that we have ventured into the
world with any real seriousness.

And thus we hear questions asked: Are
we overreaching ourselves? Will we tire of
our tasks? Will our economy be able to sup-
port the burdens we carry at home and
abroad? Are we equal to the role of world
leadership?

I Fair enough questions they are. For the
answers affect the great majority of na-
tions and the great majority of the world's
peoples — not only because of the weight of
our power but because of the things we
stand for. In Tom Paine's words : "The cause

' Made before the Associated Press at New York,
N.Y., on Apr. 25 ; advance text.

of America is in great measure the cause of
all mankind."

In the final analysis the questions asked
about us can only be answered by how we
measure up to the challenges before us.

Today we face three great and interre-
lated tasks in the world: the pursuit of
peace, the effort to narrow the gap between
the rich and poor nations, and the neces-
sity of sustaining an American economy
able to carry a thousand future burdens
here and around the world.

The Search for Peace

Our search for peace finds its best ex-
pression in our support for the kind of
world envisioned in the United Nations
Charter — a world where large and small
nations might live alike in harmony without
threat of external coercion.

No nation has done more for peace than
has ours since World War II. The U.N., the
Marshall Plan, Point 4, the Alliance for Prog-
ress, the Peace Corps, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank, Food for Peace, the
nuclear test ban treaty — these have come
from initiatives worthy of our position of
leadership. These have come from our
search for peace.

But other initiatives, too, have come from

MAY 16, 1966

I

769

our search for peace: firmness in Berlin;
aid to Greece and Turkey; the founding of
NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; resistance to
aggression in Korea; the determination that
nuclear missiles should not be introduced
into the hemisphere. For we have long since
learned that peaceful development cannot
exist in an environment of violence, aggres-
sion, and fear.

Today peace is at stake in Asia. Peace is
at stake in a hundred thousand Asian vil-
lages, in the struggle of peasants against
a millennium of poverty, disease, and de-
spair.

Peace is at stake in a tortured South
Viet-Nam, in the struggle against the classic
power tactics of communism.

We must not lose the peace in either
struggle. That is why we have committed
once more — as we have had to do before —
men, money, and resources to help the na-
tions of Asia help themselves toward se-
curity and independence.

It won't be easy. It will be frustrating
and at times heartbreaking. But if we are
not to deny our leadership, if we are not to
deny the principles in which we believe, we
must stay and see it through. And the free
nations of the world need to know that we
have the vision and the endurance to do so.

Those who threaten their neighbors in
Asia should know it too. They should
know that we will resist their aggression.

Narrowing the Gap Between Rich and Poor

But they should also know that we bear
no consumptive hate against their people,
that we have no design on their sovereignty.
We look only toward the day when all na-
tions may choose to live in harmony with
their neighbors, when they may turn to-
gether their energies to building a better
life for their peoples.

For this is, after all, the second great
task before us — the desperate need to nar-
row the widenino: gap between the rich
and poor nations of the world. I give you
the words of Pope John XXIII in his encyc-
lical Mater et Magistra:

The solidarity which binds all men and makes
them members of the same family requires political
communities enjoying an abundance of material
goods not to remain indifferent to those political
communities whose citizens suffer from poverty,
misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elemen-
tary rights of the human person.

This is particularly true since, given the grow-
ing interdependence among the peoples of the
earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if
glaring economic and social inequality among them
persist. . . .

We are all equally responsible for the under-
nourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to
educate one's conscience to the sense of responsi-
bility which weighs upon each and every one, es-
pecially upon those who are more blessed with this
world's goods.

We sit here today comfortably examining
this situation. But for the disinherited and
left out of this world, it is no matter for
examination: It is a matter of day-to-day
survival.

Today there are families spending their
last day on earth because they haven't the
strength or health to keep going.

But those who remain — and you can be
sure of this — those who remain will take to
the streets, they will turn to any master,
they will tear the fabric of peace to shreds,
unless they have some reason to believe
that there is hope for life and hope for
justice.

To put this on a more immediate and
practical level, let me call to your attention
the foreign aid request now before the Con-
gress.-

The expenditure for the first year of the
Marshall Plan was about 2 percent of our
GNP, and 11 1/2 percent of the Federal budg-
et. Today, thanks to the growth of our
American economy, our foreign aid request
is for only 0.29 percent of our GNP and
about 1.9 percent of the Federal budget —
that is, about 2 cents out of every tax dol-
lar. Yet we hear the same doubts and com-
plaints today that we heard 20 years ago.

If someone has a substitute for foreign
aid, I'd like to hear about it. The investment
we make in foreign aid — in preventive med-

- For text of President Johnson's message, see
Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

770

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

icine, if you will — is certainly less than that
necessary to treat the symptoms of massive
economic crisis and disorder and, yes, of
war.

The Marshall Plan saved Western Europe
and the peace. It created a great new eco-
nomic market for us. But there is more : The
revived nations of Western Europe have not
only repaid their Marshall Plan debts; they
have already provided more aid to the de-
veloping countries than they ever received
from us. The rewards can be just as great
tomorrow in other continents.

If there are questions asked about our
ability to meet this task, I think they must
be answered affirmatively and without equiv-
ocation.

We do not seek to do this task alone nor
should we. But how can we expect others to
follow if we do not lead ?

Fashioning an America Abie To Lead

President Eisenhower described the third
great task we face today : ". . . the firm base
for the problem of leading the world toward
the achievement of human aspirations — to-
ward peace with justice in freedom — must
be the United States."

We must fashion an America so strong,
so free, so able to lead, that there may be
no question about our purposes or our en-
durance. Basic to this is the necessity of
building an economy of growth and oppor-
tunity, yet stable in time when it is tested.

I need not remind this audience of the
Communist belief — I suppose some of them
still hold it — ^that the United States was
teetering on the brink of economic chaos,
that it was just a matter of time until our
production lines would grind to a halt, until
an army of unemployed would seize the
state, until economic warfare among the
Western nations would open the door to
communism.

I think by now some of the Communist
doctrinists have come to realize that Lord
Keynes was speaking to them as well as
others when he wrote: "Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from

intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist."

The American economic miracle is the
world's greatest success story. Last year
alone we increased our GNP by $47 billion,
increased our total personal income by $39
billion, and increased our Federal cash re-
ceipts by ^Si/'o billion.

All this did not happen by accident. Part
of it is certainly due to the influence of Mr.
Keynes and the so-called New Economics.
But I believe the basic, underlying reason
behind our economic success is this : There is
today a creative partnership for prosperity
among those in our society who used to think
of themselves as natural antagonists.

We are dispelling old myths. How long
has it been since we've heard old empty
labels such as "labor boss" and "economic
royalist."

The fact is that American Government,
business, and labor are increasingly united
in the premise that a stronger and better
America will be to the common benefit of
all. Among other things, we are united in
our determination to accomplish something
that no nation has previously dared to try : to
make every citizen in our society a full and
productive member of our society.

And so today we make national invest-
ments in our country and in our people —
investments in productivity', in opportunity,
in enterprise, in greater social justice, in
self-help. That is what our Great Society
programs are all about.

Education, medical care, war against pov-
erty, programs of retraining and redevelop-
ment, better cities and transportation, an
even more productive agriculture, yes, equal-
ity at the ballot box and before the law —
these are the most basic investments of all
in an America able to keep its commitments
both at home and abroad.

As the President has said so often, it is
not a matter of a Great Society or fulfill-
ment of our international responsibilities. It
is not a matter of guns or butter, foreign
aid or domestic education. They are tied to-
gether, and you cannot separate them.

MAY 16, 1966

771

If we can build a society operating on all
its cylinders, others in the world may have
some hope of doing the same. If we cannot,
what hope may others have ?

To make our free system work, to sustain
it, to keep our pledges all the while — this
indeed is the way to erase any doubts the
world may have about our ability to fulfill
the responsibility of leadership.

In closing, may I say a word about the
nature of that responsibility.

Leadership in today's world requires far
more than a large stock of gunboats and a
hard fist at the conference table.

Leadership today requires more than the
ability to go it alone — although we must not
be afraid to do so when necessary.

Leadership today requires understand-
ing of the problems we face, of the resources
at hand, and of the objectives we seek.

It requires the ability, perhaps even more,
to lead and inspire others — to lead and in-
spire in a sense of common enterprise. For as
strong and rich as we may become, our goal
of a just and peaceful world will never be
achieved by America alone.

It will be achieved only when the re-
sources of strong and weak, rich and poor
alike, are allocated, in the most efficient
manner possible, to challenges that are far
too great for any one nation or group of
nations to attempt to overcome.

This, then, is the test of ourselves: not
to march alone but to march in such a way
that others will wish to join us.

I will add one caveat: In none of this
should we expect either friendship or grati-
tude. We have already eaten breakfast to the
accompaniment, in our morning newspapers,
of too many "Yankee Go Home" signs, too
many riots, too many denunciations of our-
selves, to believe that leadership can reward
us with international laurel wreaths.

I think the most we can expect is this:
that those who question us will one day find
no reason to question; that in the world
there may be no doubt that Americans have
the vision, the endurance, and the courage
to stand and see it through for what we be-
lieve in.

Secretary Comments on Peiping's
Militancy in Southeast Asia

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk by John Scali for the
American Broadcasting Company's hour-
long television program, "Red China: Year
of the Gun?" on April 27.

Press release 100 dated April 27

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, who is to blame
for the isolation of China from the free
world? Is our policy at fault?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this goes
back for many years. I think that undoubt-
edly there have been problems on both sides.
But in these more recent years I think that
it is clear that the attitudes in Peiping
have isolated them from most of the rest of
the world. For example, they are having
great difficulties inside the Communist
world. They refused to attend the 23d Con-
gress of the Communist Party in Moscow.
They have had similar difficulties in the
Afro-Asian world. They had a debacle last
year in attempting to work out arrangements
for a second Bandung conference. Their
policies have caused deep divisions between
themselves and almost everyone else.

Now, as far as the United States is con-
cerned, we have been engaged in conversa-
tions with them for more than 10 years. We
have had our 129th bilateral talk with
them — talks that were carried on in Geneva
and in Warsaw. We will be having another
one with them next month. We have been in
closer touch with them, I suppose, than al-
most any government that has diplomatic
relations with them, with the exception pos-
sibly of Moscow.

This is not a deliberate attempt by every-
one else to forget Peiping or to freeze them
out of the total situation. We know they are
there. We know that they ought to be drawn
into the major questions, such as peace in
Southeast Asia, such as disarmament. And
many efforts have been made to bring them
into those discussions. But their own at-
titude has made it very difficult to get them

772

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

into a position of real discussion with those
with whom they bitterly disagree.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how can we be
sure that the Chinese won't miscalculate the
depth of our determination, for example, in
Viet-Nam, unless we have regular sys-
temized discussions with them, perhaps
through diplomatic recognition?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that
formal diplomatic recognition is required for
discussions. I have already indicated we have
had 129 talks with them ourselves and we
will soon have another one. Formal relation-
ships with them run into a very serious and
central obstacle.

You will recall that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had a series of hear-
ings about China, and in connection with
that and in other discussions it has been in-
dicated that we have tried to exchange
newsmen and scholars and doctors and we
have tried to establish some sort of better
contact with Peiping.^

Well, in a very important article in the
People's Daily, signed by "Observer" —
which is the pen name for some very high
official — they said once again publicly that:

So long as the United States Government does
not change its hostile policy toward China and re-
fuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and
the Taiwan Straits, the normalization of Sino-
American relations is entirely out of the question.
And so is the solution of such a concrete question
as the exchange of visits between personnel of the
two countries.

Now, there they said publicly only last
month what we have been saying privately
for 10 years. In effect, that there is nothing
to discuss until we are prepared to sur-
render Formosa, and when we indicate that
we can't surrender these 13 million people
on Formosa as far as we are concerned, then
the conversation gets to be very difficult and
very strained, very formal, very unproduc-
tive.

Mr. Scali: In fighting the war in Viet-

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of
the House Committee on Foreign^ Affairs, see Bul-
letin of May 2, 1966, p. 686.

Nam, do we seek to avoid military moves
which the Chinese might regard as a prel-
ude to an American invasion of the China
mainland?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's only on
the basis of an ideological bias that they
would have any idea that we have an inter-
est in attacking mainland China. There have
been many occasions when we might have
done so, had that been our desire. The
Korean war was such an occasion. The off-
shore islands crisis was another one. South-
east Asia is another one.

Now, the United States is not interested
in war with mainland China. We are not in-
terested in expanding these operations in
Southeast Asia. The escalation of that war
has been a responsibility of Hanoi, en-
couraged and backed by Peiping. It had
moved, for example, the 325th Division of
the North Vietnamese Regular Army from
North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, be-
fore we started bombing North Viet-Nam.

What we are after there is to stop that'
infiltration of men and arms from North
Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. We are not
interested in getting into a war with any-
body, and there would not have been any
shooting there had North Viet-Nam elected
to leave its two neighbors, Laos and South
Viet-Nam, alone. And if they should stop
doing what they are doing, peace could
come very quickly and our troops could come
home.

Mr. Scali: Have the hearings before Sen-
ator Fulbright's committee, Mr. Secretary,
helped you in deciding what next to do in
confronting China?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that the
hearings have been very useful in having
extensive and thoughtful and far-ranging
discussions of the total problem of China. I
think they have brought out the fact that
the policies pursued by Peiping have been
pretty widely rejected throughout the world.
Militancy of Peiping's attitude has caused
very deep divisions inside the Communist
world, quite apart from the problems that
it has caused in the free world. And we
have seen in the past 15 months that Pei-

MAY 16, 1966

773

ping's policy, by and large, has been rejected
right around the globe. They have been
thrown out of five or six African countries.
They have had a major setback in Indonesia.
They objected strenuously to the Tashkent
agreement between India and Pakistan and
the treaty between Japan and Formosa. So
that they have made it very clear that their
policy is harsh and militant, and they are
finding that the rest of the world just can't
adjust itself to that kind of policy and at-
titude.

Mr. Scali: Senator Fulbright, in schedul-
ing his congressional hearings on China, said
he did so because there are some administra-
tion officials who felt that war with China
is inevitable. Do you know any of these
people?

Secretary R^isk: I haven't heard anyone,
senior or junior, say to me they consider
war inevitable. Certainly from our point of
view we have no interest in a war with
mainland China. One does hear out of Pei-
ping itself a discussion of the inevitability
of war, and they have on occasions said that
they would hope that the revisionists —
meaning the Soviets — would not take such a
gloomy view of war. Well, I think most of
the world takes a pretty gloomy view of
war, and ought to.

But I must say that I don't believe that the
leaders in Peiping are imprudent enough to
act as though they consider war inevitable.
They have been somewhat more cautious
and prudent in their actions than they have
been in their words. So I think there is a
prospect that the situation can be stabilized
on a basis of the security of the smaller
countries in Asia and that over time pru-
dence will make itself felt in Peiping.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in trying to de-
cide what China will do, how much room
do we leave for moves which we would re-
gard as irrational, such as the Russian de-
cision, for example, to move offensive mis-
siles into Cuba or, indeed, the Chinese de-
cision to intervene in Korea ?

Secretary Rnsk: Well, there is always a
danger of miscalculation, and it is always
difficult for democracies to get across the

right signals to totalitarian regimes. We
have had a number of instances in the past
where totalitarian leaders have assumed
that somehow at the end of the day de-
mocracies would not do what is required to
defend their security and to maintain free-
dom.

I suppose that it's easy for a regime in
Peiping to misunderstand our own domestic
debates here at home. They may not be
sophisticated enough to know that the
United States is going to meet its commit-
ments and that some of the things they
hear are not really relevant to the basic de-
cision of the counti'y in such matters.

But, again, I do believe that there is in
fact a prudence in Peiping. I do believe their
leaders are rational. I don't expect com-
pletely irrational action from them. I think it
is possible that they may underestimate our
determination, that they may make some
miscalculation on the assumption that some-
how we would not follow through to the end
of the day. But I think, little by little,
they must be getting the impression that
we are serious in Southeast Asia and that
there can be peace just as soon as the in-
filtration of men and arms from the North
stops.

Mr. Scali: As you look ahead, Mr. Secre-
tary, in the years to come, what do you see
in Asia — any real prospect that the Chinese
will somehow moderate their harsh policies
and change their rather primitive view of
the world ?

Secretary Rusk: I think there is some
prospect of that over time. I don't think that
it's a matter that depends upon United
States military action. I think we have cer-
tain specific commitments — Korea, Japan,
Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Aus-
ti'alia. New Zealand, with whom we have de-
fense agreements — where we act jointly
with our allies to insure the safety of those
countries.

But I have great faith in the ordinary
common people in these matters. After all,
people just don't like to be pushed around
too much. And we have seen the reactions
in India when Peiping attacked India. We

774

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

have seen the reactions in Indonesia. We
have seen many demonstrations of the fact
that people don't want vi^hat Peiping is try-
ing to offer or impose upon them.

So I think that over time there will be a
blunting of the revolutionary militancy that

is being preached these days from Peiping,
simply because the world won't have it. The
world won't have it, and they will come to
recognize it.

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Sec-
retary.

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara

The nth session of the Ministerial Coun-
cil of the Central Treaty Organization was
held at Ankara, Turkey, April 20 and 21.
Following are texts of an opening statement
made by Secretary Rusk on April 20 and a
final communique issued at the close of the
meeting, together with remarks made by
Secretary Rusk at the dedication of the
CENTO Microwave Telecommunications
System on April 20 and the transcript of a
press conference he held at Esenboga Air-
port, Ankara, on April 22.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. Prime Minis-
ter, esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentle-
men : Five years ago, here in Ankara, I had
my first opportunity to attend a Ministerial
Council of the Central Treaty Organization
as chairman of the United States observer
delegation. 1 It is a great personal pleasure
to be again" in this impressive capital city
of the Turkish Republic, to review vdth you
the work of the organization, and to reaf-
firm the intention of my Government to
continue its association with the high pur-
poses of the CENTO alliance.

I wish to express my deep appreciation
for the cordial welcome and the thoughtful
hospitality which the Turkish Government
and the Turkish people have extended to the

' For background, see Bulletin of May 22, 1961.
p. 778.

visiting delegations. I also want to express
the thanks of my delegation for the very
gracious message of welcome from the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Turkey, which Mr.
Alpan [Cihat Alpan, Secretary General of
the Office of the President of Turkey] has
conveyed to us this morning. In a sense,
Turkey is year-round host to CENTO, for
Ankara is the site of the headquarters of
the alliance and of the biweekly meetings
of the Council Deputies. The special debt
of gratitude all of us connected with CENTO
owe to Turkey is never far from our
thoughts.

Our plenary sessions later today are to be
held in the historic edifice of the former
Turkish Grand National Assembly, now the
home of the CENTO International Secre-
tariat. That building is filled with memories
of the beginning of the Turkish Republic
under the incomparable Kemal Ataturk. I
am sure that our distinguished Secretary
General and his dedicated staff of the secre-
tariat draw special inspiration from their
daily association with this great shrine of
modern Turkey.

In the 11 years since this organization
was formed, the adversaries who threatened
the region in 1955 have come to understand
that this defensive shield was forged by
CENTO not to threaten anyone but to warn
that efforts to molest or subvert the inde-
pendence of the CENTO countries will be
met with resolution and strength — and with
growing confidence.

MAY 16, 1966

775

The need for this defensive shield con-
tinues. Although they may differ among
themselves, our adversaries have not re-
nounced the Communist world revolution;
they are bent on destroying the type of
world community framed in the Charter of
the United Nations. Indeed, some Commu-
nist leaders continue openly to advocate the
use of force for this purpose, as we have
learned through bitter experience in South-
east Asia. Nations which value their inde-
pendence and freedom therefore, as my
other colleagues have pointed out, dare not
let doviTi their vigilance. If there is, or seems
to be, less danger of war in some parts of
the world, it is because those who would
coerce their neighbors have a healthy re-
spect for the strength and determination of
those whose dedication is to freedom.

Free men everywhere can find much to
admire and to emulate in the record of
progress registered by the peoples of Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan over the past decade.

In Turkey the gross national product in
real terms has grown almost 50 percent;
per capita income has increased about 20
percent. Important gains also have been
made in industrial productivity — the index
now is about 150 percent of the base year
of 1958. The Turkish educational system is
teaching and training more than twice as
many students as it did 10 years ago.

In Iran the budget for education has
groviTi by some 93 percent since 1955, and
the number of students has grown accord-
ingly. Since Iran's Literacy Corps was or-
ganized in 1962, more than 30,000 young
Iranian men have met their obligations of
national service by teaching rural people to
read and write. The successful work of the
corps in the campaign for literacy is now
being mirrored in the companion Health
Corps and the Development Corps. Funda-
mental changes are also being wrought in
the agricultural economy of Iran. One mani-
festation is the total of nearly 50,000 villages
which have been distributed in whole or in
part to more than 1 million farmers, through
the land reform program.

In Pakistan agricultural productivity has

increased 30 percent since 1954. The manu-
facturing index shows an increase of nearly
100 percent. Per capita production of elec-
tricity for public use has increased nearly
21/^ times since 1960. In a decade the num-
ber of elementary schools has increased by
50 percent, and total enrollment has approxi-
mately doubled.

No one will profess that CENTO itself, as
an organization, is directly responsible for
these various gains. What is relevant here
is that, behind the protective shield of
CENTO, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey have been able to register very
substantial progress.

This record of progress and the self-
reliance it engenders have a direct signifi-
cance for CENTO as an organization. Dur-
ing the first decade of CENTO's economic
programs, major attention was directed to
regional capital projects requiring large ele-
ments of assistance from the United King-
dom and the United States. Today most of
those projects are completed or are so near
completion that we, in this Council, shall be
planning the inauguration of many of these
projects over the next few months.

It may be that CENTO will design still
other plans for additional capital projects,
but it is perhaps wise to acknowledge that
the CENTO organization is not now at this
moment drafting new projects on the scale
of the microwave system, which we are
dedicating this afternoon, or the railroad
link, which will be in operation some 18
months hence. I do not cite this prospect
in any spirit of finality but rather with
pride in cooperative accomplishment.

Cooperation has become a habit among the
regional governments — Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey. It has found fruition in many
fields. It owes much to the shared experi-
ence provided through the undramatic but
very intimate personal interchange afforded
by CENTO's technical assistance program.

It is gratifying that this habit of coopera-
tion has reached out beyond CENTO, too.
The Regional Cooperation for Development
Organization, now nearly 2 years old, is
demonstrating that many fields for mutual

776

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

planning and interchange are open to gov-
ernments in the region, without help or
advice from the outside. The United States
congratulates the architects of RCD and
looks for valuable accomplishments to flow
from this new association. We have every
reason to believe that the activities of RCD
and CENTO, separately but with comple-

I- mentary objectives, can play important and
distinct roles in the economic and commer-
cial progress of the region.

President Johnson has expressed our sup-
port for the concept of regional solidarity
in these terms: "Regional cooperation," he
said, "is the best means of economic progress
as well as the best guarantor of political
independence." ^ We are ready to continue

[ and enlarge our support of institutions
which create and preserve a regional unity
of effort in economic and social develop-

; ment.

President Johnson also spoke recently of
our "continuity of purpose in a generation
of change." ^ Here, among old friends and

! allies, I do not think that I need to dwell at
length on our continuity of purpose. What
engages the interest of CENTO most, per-
haps, is the quality and character of the
changes in the work of this alliance. In
speaking of this "generation of change" in
which we live and work together, it is natu-
ral that we think of the younger generation.
It would be hard to find a more universally
accepted precept for planning for our young
people than the familiar goal of a "sound
mind in a sound body." Within the United
States Government, our President, in his
recent messages to the Congress, has pro-
posed a sober and searching review of our
targets in the foreign aid program, taking
account of the basic changes the times de-
mand. The President has highlighted our
new tasks by calling for special attention
to assisting international efforts in educa-
tion, health, and food supply.*

Education, health, and food programs al-
ready claim major attention of the regional
member governments. Educators, agricul-
turalists, and health experts, through
CENTO'S Multilateral Technical Coopera-

tion Fund, are continuously discovering new
ways in which we can assist one another in
coordinating efforts in these essential fields.
Here is the opportunity, and the need, to
refine and focus our efforts.

Of particular interest to CENTO, I be-
lieve, will be the emphasis that we, in the
United States, seek to give to progress in
teacher training, vocational and scientific
education, and publishing of badly needed
textbooks. In the field of public health,
CENTO'S experience in regional cooperation
suggests that the organization could have a
special role in a concerted attack on com-
municable diseases. The war on hunger and
malnutrition demands enormous resources
and ingenuity from every government and
every person who can find a role to play.
Here CENTO has not been laggard. Indeed,
the organization has given high priority to
agriculture, from the first beginnings of this
alliance. Now we should draw on that ex-
perience to enhance the effectiveness of
national campaigns to improve and modern-
ize production and distribution of food.

While considering new opportunities in
these fields, let us pay well-deserved atten-
tion to such sustaining CENTO programs as
the professional military development pro-
gram, the military training exercises, the
countersubversion program, the technical
programs in agriculture, communications,
and the other CENTO activities which con-
tribute to so many solid accomplishments in
the region.

We cannot sketch out a blueprint here
this week which will meet all our needs for
an entire decade. When we meet again next
year, I am certain that we shall consider
then new opportunities and new challenges.
But let us draw strength from our continuity

^ For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on foreign aid, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

' For text of President Johnson's address before
the Foreign Service Institute, see ibid., Apr. 11,
1966, p. 554.

' For texts of President Johnson's messages to
Congress on international education and health and
on food for freedom, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, pp.
328 and 336.

MAY 16, 1966

777

of purpose amid these changes. As for the
United States, I am proud to reaffirm the
determination of my Government to con-
tinue its contribution to the purposes for
which the CENTO organization is dedicated.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 93 dated April 22

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) held their fourteenth ses-
sion in Ankara on April 20 and 21, 1966. Leaders
of the five delegations were:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran

H.E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of
Pakistan

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister
of Turkey

The Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P., Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, United King-
dom

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State,
United States of America

A message of welcome from the President of
Turkey was read at the opening of the meeting. The
leaders of the national delegations expressed their
appreciation for the message and of the warm hos-
pitality extended by the Turkish Government.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, as host, was in
the chair. He welcomed the delegations on behalf
of the Turkish Government. Mr. Caglayangil was
in turn welcomed by the other members to his first
meeting of the Council since he became Foreign
Minister.

The Council expressed its deep regret at the con-
tinued illness of the former President of Turkey,
General Cemal Gursel, and paid tribute to his dis-
tinguished services to Turkey, as a soldier and as
a statesman.

Engaging in a wide-ranging exchange of views on
international developments since its last meeting in
Tehran," the Council agreed that the need for col-
lective security is imperative in present world cir-
cumstances. They reaffirmed their determination to
maintain the defensive strength of CENTO. The
Council recognized that threats of subversion and
aggression against the countries of the reg:ion still
remained. In this regard the Foreign Minister of
Iran drew the Council's attention to subversive
activities in the Persian Gulf area. The Ministers
reaffirmed their sincere desire to contribute to the
utmost to the reduction of international tensions
and to measures of disarmament and the strengthen-
ing of peace.

The Council reviewed the report of the Military
Committee which included a report on CENTO's
joint military exercises. They discussed sugges-
tions for further strengthening of the mutual de-
fense potential of the Alliance.

Taking into consideration existing treaties, the
Ministers expressed their deep concern over the
continuation of the Cyprus conflict with all its in-
herent dangers. They also expressed their earnest
desire for an agreed settlement which would pre-
serve peace in the Island in accordance with the
legitimate interest of all its peoples.

The Ministers deplored the outbreak of hostili-
ties between India and Pakistan. The agreement
to a cease-fire was welcomed as a step towards the
"peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences
between the two countries on Kashmir and other
related matters", contemplated in the Security Coun-
cil's resolution of September 20, 1965," and the
Tashkent Declaration.

The United States Secretary of State and the
British Foreign Secretary gave the Council full ac-
counts of recent developments in Viet-Nam and
Rhodesia respectively.

Pleasure was expressed at the accelerated eco-
nomic development of the regional countries through
their own efforts, and the Council was pleased to
note the extent to which CENTO had been able to
contribute to the strengthening of the region
through sponsorship of joint economic projects, its
cultural programme and the opportunities it was
able to provide for people of the CENTO countries
to meet, confer and work together on productive
joint enterprises.

In approving the report of the Economic Commit-
tee, the Council noted that a number of major joint
communications projects have been completed and
are already in operation. The significant contribu-
tion they are making to the CENTO area was
symbolized during the meeting when members of the
Council participated in the formal dedication of the
CENTO microwave system. The Ministers expressed
pleasure at the very great increase in the telephonic
communication that has taken place since the 3,060-
mile system was opened to traffic in June last. The
Council also noted the completion of the CENTO
road linking Turkey with Iran, and that both the
CENTO airway and the CENTO high frequency
telecommunications link joining London with key
regional cities would be completed this year.

The Ministers approved new directions to guide
cento's economic activities in the years ahead as
submitted by the Economic Committee and con-
gratulated the Committee on their constructive and
realistic recommendations.

The Ministers approved priority for public health
measures which have been or will be selected for

For background, see ibid., May 3, 1965, p. 685.

• For text, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1965, p. 608.

778

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

attention by CENTO in coordination with other
1 international organizations including measures for
the control of epidemic diseases in the area.

The Council agreed that the proposal to expand
and intensify CENTO's multilateral technical co-
operation programme should advance the basic
CENTO economic objective of increasing the techni-
cal self-sufficiency of the region.

The Council decided that their next meeting would
be held in London in April, 1967.

MICROWAVE SYSTEM DEDICATION

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed col-
leagues, and distinguished guests: The suc-
cessful completion of the CENTO Micro-
wave Telecommunications System is not
merely a triumph of technology and engi-
neering. That in itself would be impressive
enough even in this era of breathtaking
scientific achievement. The CENTO micro-
wave system is also a triumph of coopera-
tion.

This new system could never have been
erected without sharing — sharing of tal-
ents, sharing of resources, and sharing a
sense of dedication to the cause of a better
life for all men. This microwave system
clearly was not built by dollars alone but by
dollars working with rials, and rupees, and
liras. The American engineers alone could
not have achieved it.

A host of technicians in Iran, Pakistan,
and Turkey devoted their talents and ener-
gies to achieving this important advance in
our capacity to communicate with one an-
other. I understand that, at the height of
construction activity, about 7,000 men were
at work on the hundreds of interrelated
jobs required.

The implications of this new tool of com-
munication are truly thrilling, but we dare
not regard it as an unmixed blessing. As
ideas and information flow now almost in-
stantaneously from one nation to another,
the minds of our peoples will be stirred to
reach for still greater horizons, and they
will be less patient with delays in fulfill-
ment of their hopes for a better life. In

that sense, our work has only just begun.

With these things in mind, may I now
convey to you a message from the Presi-
dent of the United States.

Message From President Johnson

It gives me particular pleasure today to
send to you, the representatives of the gov-
ernments and peoples of the CENTO al-
liance, and through you to His Imperial
Majesty the Shahanshah, to Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II, to His Excellency Pres-
ident Ayub, and to His Excellency President
Sunay, my personal greetings and those of
the American people. Through the CENTO
Microwave Telecommunications System that
we are now inaugurating, we are all drawn
closer together; closer in time and closer in
bonds of friendship.

Only wath communication can we have
understanding, and we must have under-
standing in order to have peace. Only with
communication can we share knowledge, and
we must share a great deal of knowledge in
order to foster the trade and economic de-
velopment in which all our peoples are so
deeply interested. By building together
this vital new communications link, we
have built an important instrument for the
preservation of peace and for the promotion
of prosperity. We can all be proud of this,
our cooperative accomplishment.

PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 22

Secretar]) Riisk: I wish to express to the
Foreign Minister and to the Mayor and the
Governor my very warm appreciation for
their hospitality during this meeting.

We have had a very good meeting of
CENTO, and, in addition, I have had a
chance to have bilateral discussions with
my colleagues. I want to express also our
good fortune in having such beautiful
weather here during this meeting. It has
been spectacular and it is with some regret
that we leave. I will be happy to take some
of your questions before we depart.

MAY 16, 1966

779

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you describe your
talks that you had last night with Mr.
Bhutto [Zidfikar AH Bhutto, Foreign Min-
ister of Pakistan'] , please?

A. Well, we talked for about 2 hours last
evening and covered a wide range of sub-
jects, not only those of international im-
portance such as the situation in Southeast
Asia and some of our recent contacts on both
sides with China but also on our bilateral
relations. I found the talks very useful, and
I think we made some progress in achiev-
ing a better understanding of some of the
points on which we had minor differences in
the past, but I am sure this conversation
will go on through our regular diplomatic
channels and I will be seeing Mr. Bhutto
again in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization] in June.

Q. But could you say anything — are you
able to say anything at the moment about
military and economic aid to Pakistan ?

A. We did not actually get into that sub-
ject very much because the Minister of Fi-
nance of Pakistan, Mr. [Mohammed]
Shoaib, is now in Washington having dis-
cussions with the International Bank and
with the United States Government; so
that is the forum through which we will dis-
cuss those matters. Mr. Bhutto and I did not
spend much time on that.

Mr. Lincoln [Robert Lincoln, Public Af-
fairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Ankara] : Mrs.
Salus has seven or eight questions on be-
half of the Turkish journalists here. They
got together questions.

Secretary Rusk: All right.

Q. Has CENTO become an organ for de-
fense— regional defense? If it has estab-
lished itself as an organ, then why does the
United States feel it necessary to have bi-
lateral agreements with the regional coun-
tries?

A. Well, first, I would like to express my
own respect for the role which CENTO has
played here these past 10 years. I think
when one looks at the region one can see
that the threats against the region are

somewhat less than they were and the
countries in the region have made some
substantial progress in their own develop-
ment during the 10-year period. The United
States, of course, has close, strong bilateral
relations with all of our allies and all of
those with whom we are closely associated,
as we are with CENTO.

As you know, we are not in a technical
sense a formal member of CENTO. We are
associated with it very closely. I'm, in a
technical sense, here as the head of an ob-
server delegation. But we work very closely
with CENTO and participate actively in all
of its programs and activities, but we do have
strong bilateral relations with the three
regional members of CENTO.

Q. Is there a danger besides communism
in this region that CENTO should take up?
But if there is such a thing — such danger
of another threat rather than communism —
would the United States be taking measures
to prevent it?

A. Well, as far as the United States is
concerned — and I will speak only for us, be-
cause the formal members of the CENTO
can speak for themselves — as far as the
United States is concerned, our association
with CENTO is for the purpose of assisting
in deterring Communist aggression. Now,
we are aware that there are other problems,
and we try to work closely and cooperatively
with our CENTO partners on those other
problems, but those are not strictly on the
basis of our own association with CENTO,
which is limited in character to Communist
aggression.

For example — if I might just illustrate
this last point and perhaps anticipate an-
other one of your later questions — your dis-
tinguished Foreign Minister presented Turk-
ish views on Cyprus with a very great
ability during our CENTO meeting and, of
course, this question was a major topic of
conversation in our bilateral discussions this
morning.

As you know, the United States is very
much interested in the position of the Turk-
ish Cypriots in Cyprus, and we hope very

780

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

much that much more can be done to im-
prove their position with respect to the
common needs of ordinary life and their
sense of safety.

We also work with this problem in the
United Nations. We are the major con-
tributor to the United Nations Force on the
island and, during the last meeting of the
General Assembly, I think you will recall
Turkey and the United States found them-
selves voting together on the resolutions on
Cyprus.

I think I have time for about two more
questions; then I will have to take off.

Q. Did you — during any of your discus-
sions with the Secretary General this morn-
ing— did you come to agreement of princi-
ple to the review of the bilateral agreement
between the ttvo countries? If such agree-
ment has been reached, tvhen may discus-
sions be started?

A. I am happy to say that we did come to
complete agreement on that point, and those
discussions can start here in Ankara for the
convenience of the Turkish Government as
soon as possible. Both sides are ready, and
I would suppose that could be in a few days
as far as we are concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talks with
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, do you
feel that Pakistan might be able to play a
role in settling the Viet-Nam war?

A. Well, we are very much interested in
any opportunity anyone has to maintain
contact with the other side to explore the
possibility of peace. This would include
Pakistan. There are a number of other
governments who have regular contact with
Hanoi and Peiping who are also aware of
our interest in this matter.

But the problem is not really one of a
channel of communication. The problem is
not the diplomatic problem of establishing
contact. The problem is that, despite all of
the contacts that have occurred thus far, we
have not yet seen any intention on the part
of Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over
South Viet-Nam by force. So that is the key

point. There are many contacts. But what
is needed here is a readiness to come to the
conference table and take this problem into
discussion and away from the battlefield.
We do not see, at the present, any readiness
on the part of the other side to come. I
would be at Geneva tomorrow afternoon if
there was anyone there to talk to, literally.

Q. Thank you.

Secretary Rusk: Mr. Minister, I hope that
you will take to your distinguished Presi-
dent and your Prime Minister our great
thanks for your hospitality here. We have
enjoyed it very much.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on
April 15 (press release 87) that Secretary
Rusk would head the U.S. observer delega-
tion to the 14th Ministerial Council session
of the Central Treaty Organization, held at
Ankara April 20-21. Parker T. Hart, U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. observer in
the Council of Deputies, served as alternate
U.S. observer.

Advisers of the delegation included :

Senior Adviser:

Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Advisers:

Scott L. Behoteguy, Economic Coordinator for
CENTO, U.S. AID Mission, Ankara

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

Col. Stanley P. Hidalgo, CENTO Action Officer,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Charles W. Naas, Second Secretary, American Em-
bassy, Ankara

Daniel 0. Newberry, Officer-in-Charge, CENTO
Affairs, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Ashton H. Manhart, U.S. Permanent Mili-
tary Deputy, Central Treaty Organization

Christopher Van Hollen, Counselor for Political
Affairs, American Embassy, Ankara

John Patrick Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary,
Department of State

MAY 16, 1966

781

U.S. and European Officials
Discuss Fire Safety of Ships

DEPAS7TMENT STATEMENT

Press release 96 dated April 25

Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs, will visit Lon-
don, Paris, Rome, Hamburg, and Athens
this week [April 25-30] to discuss with
government officials the problem of fire
safety of passenger ships and to make
clear the importance the Government of the
United States attaches to a satisfactory
resolution of this problem. Mr. Solomon
will be accompanied by Rear Adm. Charles
P. Murphy, Chief of the Office of Mer-
chant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard.

These discussions will precede a meeting,
requested by the United States as an out-
growth of the Yarmouth Castle disaster
last December, of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization's Mari-
time Safety Committee in London May
3-10 to consider the fire-safety problem.

The United States has proposed amend-
ment with respect to fire safety of pas-
senger vessels of the International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
of 1960,1 to which the United States and
44 other countries are parties. After the
Yarmouth Castle disaster, the United States
informed the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), the par-
ent organization of the convention, that
the United States wished to add the subject
of fire safety of passenger vessels to the
agenda of the IMCO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee's meeting scheduled for January 31-
February 4, 1966. Fire safety was dis-
cussed by the Committee, and it was agreed,
at the request of the United States, to de-
vote an extraordinary session of the Com-
mittee beginning May 3 exclusively to the
problem of fire safety of passenger vessels.
The U.S. representative at the February
meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5780.

set forth the following U.S. objectives in
seeking a solution to the fire-safety prob-
lem:

1. To obtain the agreement of all govern-
ments parties to the SOLAS Convention of
1960 that future passenger ships should
conform to the Method I construction stand-
ards of the convention (that is, the use of
noncombustible materials).

2. To revise the "grandfather" provi-
sions, which exempt old ships from meeting
the standards of the convention for new
ships.

3. To require certain improvements in
the standards of the convention for all pas-
senger ships and particularly for those that
do not conform to Method I.

The United States believes that the pro-
posals it has made in more detail in a
paper on fire protection which was circu-
lated through IMCO to the interested gov-
ernments last month would meet the prob-
lem. It is, of course, also prepared to con-
sider other proposals to accomplish the
same results. However, especially in view
of the latest cruise ship fire — ^that of the
Viking Princess on April 8 — the United
States attaches the greatest importance to
providing at the earliest date improved
safety standards for passengers embarking
at U.S. ports.

U.S. DELEGATION TO IMCO MEETING

The Department of State announced on
April 30 (press release 102) that Ambassa-
dor at Large W. Averell Harriman would
present the views of the U.S. Government
on the problem of fire safety of passenger
ships at the opening of an extraordinary
session of the Maritime Safety Committee
of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization at London on May 3.
The United States requested the special
meeting of the Committee earlier this year
as a result of the Yarmouth Castle disaster
last December.

Ambassador Harriman's presence and his
statement will emphasize further the great

782

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

importance the U.S. Government attaches
to a satisfactory solution of the fire-safety
problem as soon as possible.

Adm. Edwin J. Roland, Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard, will head the U.S.
delegation to the forthcoming Maritime
Safety Committee meeting, as he did at the
Committee's previous meeting January 31-
February 4, 1966.

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends

Press release 103 dated April 30

The emergency mission of the United
States petroleum airlift to aid Zambia has
been accomplished and therefore is being
terminated, as is the Canadian airlift. The
other supply routes — through Tanzania,
Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola — by road,
rail, river, lake, and sea, as well as continu-
ing British air transport, are now regarded
as sufficiently well developed to meet Zam-
bia's current petroleum consumption levels
and to continue to build up Zambia's petro-
leum reserves.

Farewell ceremonies to commemorate the
American-Canadian contribution to this
multinational effort were held by the Zam-
bian Government April 30.

The Vice President of Zambia, Mr. Reu-
ben Kamanga, expressed his country's ap-
preciation of the United States and Ca-
nadian airlifts in a broadcast April 21 over
Zambian radio and television. He said in
part:

We have now assured our supplies of petroleum
products and have built up our stocks to the highest
, levels there have ever been in this country. The
, American and Canadian airlifts have made a great
I contribution to meeting our needs and to building
j op our stockpiles. I would like to bid them fare-
1 well and place on record our great appreciation of
i the work that they have done and of the vital con-
; tribution that they have made to the solution of
I our petroleum problems.

Both the Pan American and Trans World
Airlines jets commenced service in the air-
lift in early January of this year, carrying

petroleum products from Leopoldville to
Elisabethville. The products were then
transported from Elisabethville to Zambia
by rail and road. The Congolese Government
as well as many commercial enterprises in
the Congo cooperated actively in carrying on
the airlift. The two United States airlines
have carried more than 3.6 million gallons of
petroleum products in this airlift.

The United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development in late 1965 and early
1966 signed the airlift agreements with Pan
American Airways and TWA.^ The multi-
national transport effort to Zambia was ini-
tiated in order to minimize the impact
upon Zambia of the cessation of petroleum
supplies normally received from and
through Southern Rhodesia.

IVIay 21 Deadline Set for Claims
on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release 99 dated April 26

The American Embassy at Santo Do-
mingo has informed the Department of
State that on April 7, 1966, the Govern-
ment of the Dominican Republic established,
in accordance with Law Number 172 of
April 6, 1966, a special Commission for re-
ceiving, investigating, and processing all
claims for losses resulting from the damage
and destruction of property in the National
District of Santo Domingo as a result of the
civil strife which began on April 24, 1965.

American nationals who desire to file
such claims should write with the least
possible delay to: Comision Depuradora de
Reclamaciones por Daiios de Guerra, Calle
Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas
Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Re-
public.

The Department of State is informed
that claims are required to be filed with the
Commission by May 21, 1966.

• For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 17, 1966,
p. 85, and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

!MAY 16, 1966

783

THE CONGRESS

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters

Statement by Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

It is a pleasure for me to appear here to
discuss with you the position of the Depart-
ment of State on the population growth
aspects of economic and social development
programs abroad.

The Department of State, together with
the Agency for International Development,
has been giving increasing attention to these
problems over the past 5 years. It has par-
ticipated in numerous meetings, both in the
international field and here at home, with
private organizations concerned with popu-
lation grovirth. Its senior officers have
spoken publicly on this subject and have
met with many private groups to exchange
views on the problem.

In some areas the population threatens to
double itself in a generation. The long-term
implications of such increases in population
are sobering. They are a serious challenge
to us if we are to succeed in the long efforts
we have been making to assist a large part
of the world in its orderly economic and
social development.

The problem is summarized very well in
the bill [S. 1676] introduced by the chairman
of this subcommittee and other Members of
the Senate:

. . . (1) the application of public health measures
and the introduction of modern medical life-saving
and life-prolon^ng techniques have contributed to
a doubling of the annual rate of world population
growth within the past eighteen years, and may

be expected to continue to increase rates of such
growth in the future;

(2) population growth is a vital factor in deter-
mining the extent to which economic development
and political stability will prevail in any country,
especially in countries which are in the early stages
of economic and political development;

(3) at present, because of the rapid and continued
growth in population, hundreds of millions of par-
ents are unable to provide adequately for them-
selves and their children;

(4) those nations in which population growth is
most extreme and where the problems arising from
such growth are most acute are, because of economic,
technical, and other considerations, also the nations
least able independently to cope with such growth
and the problems connected therewith. . . .

So much for the problem. What are we
doing about it?

First, we have been active in the formula-
tion and expression of international policies
and programs on population matters. In
1962, for example, we supported a resolution
in the General Assembly which endorsed
United Nations encouragement and assist-
ance to governments "in obtaining basic
data and carrying out essential studies of
the demographic aspects, as well as other
aspects, of their economic and social develop-
ment problems." - We have consistently en-

' Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid
Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations on Apr. 11 (press release 84 dated
Apr. 14).

' For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see
Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

784

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

couraged and supported United Nations ac-
tivities devoted to the study of the nature
and scope of population problems and their
possible solutions. We have, in the United
Nations and on the international scene, un-
derlined our concern about the social conse-
quences of our own population trends and
our interest in learning more — and helping
others to learn more — about population
trends in the developing countries.

We have, however, also been keenly aware
of the many complexities involved in the
population problem and its possible solution.
To the extent we can help other countries in
this field we are ready to do so, but it is
essential to our foreign policy goals that
there be no misunderstanding about the
dimensions of our activities and intentions.
Therefore, as far back as 1962, the Depart-
ment of State made it clear that the United
States did not — and will not — advocate any
specific policy that another country might
follow in approaching its population growth
problems. We stated that the United States
was prepared to help other countries — but
only upon their request — to find possible
sources of information and assistance on
ways to deal with the problem.

Ambassador Stevenson set forth addi-
tional aspects of our policy in the field of
international cooperation when, in a public
speech in 1963, he called upon the United
Nations to be prepared to extend to member
countries technical assistance for surveys on
attitudes toward marriage, child rearing,
and family size. Ambassador Stevenson also
stated that the United Nations, together
with UNESCO and the World Health Orga-
nization, could advise other countries, at
their request, on how best to inform their
nationals about family planning consistent
with the cultural and religious values of the
country concerned. We have supported the
World Health Organization in a research
program on fertility and human reproduc-
tion.

Second, we have continued to expand our
own activities abroad. The guideline for the
greater concentration of resources, both by
the Department of State and the Agency for

International Development, in our interna-
tional programs is to be found in the Presi-
dent's statement in January 1965, when he
said, "I will seek new ways to use our knowl-
edge to help deal with the explosion in world
population and the growing scarcity in
world resources." *

Shortly after the President's statement —
early in March 1965 — the Department sent
an instruction to our embassies around the
world to insure the closest cooperation be-
tween our embassy staffs and those of the
Agency for International Development in
each country in working on population mat-
ters. We stressed to our embassies the con-
tinuing responsible concern of our Govern-
ment in this field. This is consistent with
the proposal in S. 1676 concerning the trans-
mission of data to United States diplomatic
personnel and other mission officers so that
they may be advised with respect to the
problems and their duties.

We also informed them in this circular
that our AID missions abroad were being
supplied with general reference materials
and technical publications dealing with a
wide range of subjects, from demographic
studies to family planning booklets. In each
AID mission abroad there is not only a small
library of reference material and technical
publications but, in virtually all, an officer
who has been designated to coordinate mis-
sion activities in this field. This is consistent
with the suggestion concerning demographic
attaches in S. 1676.

Here at home, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development has organized a Popula-
tion Reference and Research Branch. This
branch serves as the focal point for coordi-
nating all AID operations around the world
in this field. I am informed that AID already
has good files on programs in other coun-
tries. This is consistent with the suggestion
made in S. 1676 for the collection of data on
all foreign population programs whether or
not instituted or assisted by the United
States.

' For text of President Johnson's state of the
Union message, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

MAY 16, 1966

785

Working within this AID framework are
a number of consultants. They advise us on
the demographic, economic, medical, and
public health aspects of the population prob-
lem. But more than that, they maintain con-
tact and coordinate with interested United
States and foreign private institutions and
groups concerned with the population prob-
lem. Dr. [Edgar F.] Berman, for example,
traveled extensively in Latin America when
I was in charge of the Inter-American Bu-
reau, where he sought out and talked with
all those in the public and private sectors in-
terested in the problem. These consultants
are performing a number of the functions
suggested in S. 1676.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
which has merged into one organization the
functions and staffs of the Department and
AID with respect to Latin America, has cre-
ated a Population Unit in its Institutional De-
velopment Office. The AID geographic Bu-
reaus for the other regions also have popu-
lation officers in their health units.

The Department's Office of Research and
Analysis has undertaken several population
research projects. We should be alert to the
possibilities of using this office on additional
research projects.

An increasing amount of AID funds has
been used in support of population programs
in those developing countries which have
asked for our assistance, and AID progi-ams
in this field are scheduled to be increased
substantially over the next few years. Mr.
Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency
for International Development] informed
this subcommittee on April 8 of some of the
principal programs AID has undertaken
abroad: in the Republic of China, Turkey,
Honduras, Pakistan, and in other countries.
Many countries are becoming more aware of
the need for action on their population prob-
lems, and a growing number are seeking ad-
vice and assistance.

We agree with this subcommittee on the
need for a focal point in the Department of
State to undertake policy coordination in all
our programs abroad ; to insure full consid-
eration of our foreign policy objectives, par-

ticularly those of a political nature, in the
carrying out of these programs ; to keep our
embassies fully informed of our thoughts
and plans and, where necessary, to make sure
our posts abroad are giving this serious
problem all the attention it deserves; and,
finally, to maintain close liaison with the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare,
all other United States Government agencies,
and private institutions and organizations
concerned with this problem, as well as with
this subcommittee.

To this end, my own office — that of Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs —
will serve as the needed focal point for pol-
icy matters and coordination. Working under
me will be a Special Assistant for Population
Matters, a position comparable with that of
the special assistants who are now in charge
of such important fields in our international
relationships as fisheries, food for peace,
and labor. Working with me, through a Spe-
cial Assistant for Population Matters, will be
officers representing the bureaus in the De-
partment, as well as the AID offices, which
work on the various aspects of the problem —
for example, the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs, which is in charge of
handling matters with the United Nations
and its specialized agencies. In addition, the
geographic bureaus, particularly those which
cover those areas of the world in which the
population problem is a serious one — Latin
America, the Near East and South Asia, and
the Far East — will, as I have said, designate
one of their senior officers to work with my
office on this subject.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that
the Department has done and will continue
to do everything it can properly do to en-
courage other governments to give this prob-
lem the attention it deserves and to respond
to such requests for assistance as we receive,
subject only to the limitations which Mr.
Bell has already described to this committee
and which I will not repeat here. We have
all the legislative authority we need at this
time. Should the future demonstrate a need
for additional legislation in this field, we
shall not hesitate to ask for it.

786

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Mr. Chairman, we have a vital national in-
terest in this subject and are grateful for
the thought you and your associates are giv-
ing it. I assure you that the Department of
State fully shares your concern and that it
hopes that its increasing efforts in this field,
and those of all of our official and private
institutions, may soon point the way to a
solution of this worldwide problem.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment. Prepared
by the Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations of the Senate Commit-
tee on Government Operations. January 1966. 82
pp. [Committee print.]

Regional and Other Documents Concerning United
States Relations With Latin America. Prepared
by the staff of the Subcommittee on Inter-Ameri-
can Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign
Affairs. January 28, 1966. 330 pp. [Committee
print.]

Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966
— Vietnam. Hearings before the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations. Part I. January 28-
February 18, 1966. 743 pp.

The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues. A study sub-
mitted by the Subcommittee on National Security
and International Operations to the Senate Com-
mittee on Government Operations. February 1966.
14 pp. [Committee print.]

Visit to Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Israel. Report of Senate Delegation Named by
the Vice President To Respond to Certain Official
Invitations from Foreign Parliamentary Bodies
and Governments. By Senator Wayne Morse.
February 10, 1966. 27 pp. [Committee print.]

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part
II. February 15-March 10, 1966. 258 pp.

Third Special Report of the U.S. Advisoi-y Commis-
sion on International Educational and Cultural
Affairs. H. Doc 386. February 22, 1966. 60 pp.

United States-South African Relations. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I. March
1-17, 1966. 253 pp.

Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. Report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected
With Refugees and Escapees, together with in-
dividual views. S. Rept. 1058. March 4, 1966. 35 pp.

Twenty-First Report of the U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on Information. H. Doc. 403. March 7, 1966.
41 pp.

Amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Re-
port (together with supplemental views) to accom-
pany H.R. 12169. S. Rept. 1060. March 9, 1966.
12 pp.

International Health Act of 1966. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 12453. H. Rept. 1317. March 11, 1966.
27 pp.

Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1966.
Report to accompany H.R. 13546. H. Rept. 1316.
March 11, 1966. 24 pp.

Interim Trade Agreement Between the United
States and Canada. Message from the President
transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 411. March
15, 1966. 32 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Spain Conclude
Agreements on Space Cooperation

Press release S2 dated April 14

Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Cas-
tiella and United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk on April 14 exchanged notes
confirming two agreements involving coop-
eration between Spain and the United
States in space. Deputy Administrator Rob-
ert C. Seamans, Jr., represented the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The first agreement provides for con-
tinued use by NASA of its manned space
flight station on Grand Canary Island, while
the second agreement provides for a cooper-
ative Spain-United States scientific sound-
ing-rocket program to measure winds and
temperatures at high altitudes.

The Canary Islands agreement outlines
e.xpansion of facilities at the station to
support the Apollo lunar landing project
and other space exploration programs. The
original agreement of March 1960 ^ estab-
lished the station for one-man Mercury mis-
sions, and it has continued in service for the
two-man Gemini flights. The new agreement
for the three-man Apollo missions and more
advanced programs runs until January 29,
1974.

The Instituto Nacional de Technica Aero-

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
4463 and 5393.

MAY 16, 1966

787

spacial (INTA) representing the Comision
Nacional de Investigacion del Espacio
(CONIE) will continue to be responsible for
the participation of Spanish personnel in
the operation of the station.

The initial function of the Canary Islands
station during Gemini is to support the
astronauts' first orbit. The station picks up
the spacecraft as it goes beyond the range
of tracking from Bermuda, continuing cov-
erage as the flight passes over Africa tovi'ard
Kano, Nigeria.

One of the seven primary stations sup-
porting Gemini, the Canary Islands site is
essential to the entire mission for its real-
time voice communications and telemetry
betvi^een the spacecraft and Mission Control
at Cape Kennedy and Houston.

The Apollo assignment will be equally
vital. Following insertion into orbit over an
Apollo ship in mid-Atlantic, the first data
from the spacecraft will be received by the
Canary Islands station or, if the launch
angle is farther south, by the NASA station
at Ascension Island.

The second agreement, part of a continu-
ing Spanish-U.S. program of cooperation in
space investigation, was confirmed by an
exchange of notes between the Foreign
Minister and the Secretary of State. It
provides that four Nike-boosted rockets
carrying small acoustic grenades will be
launched in Spain.

Acoustic grenades will be ejected and
detonated at regular intervals during the
ascent of the rocket to approximately 56
miles. Average temperature and winds in
the area between grenade detonations will
be determined by measuring the exact time
of detonation of each grenade, the time of
arrival of each sound wave at ground micro-
phones, and the exact position of each
grenade detonation. Thus, the speed of
sound in the area between two detonations
is measured and the wind speed and direc-
tion can be derived from the horizontal
drift.

The agreement is in the form of a memo-
randum of understanding - concluded be-

tween INTA and NASA. The memorandum
provides that INTA will establish a sound-
ing-rocket range, construct grenade-type
payloads, provide two Nike-boosted rockets,
conduct launchings, and analyze and publish
the data obtained. NASA will lend range-
tracking and telemetry equipment and a
launcher, provide two Nike-boosted rockets,
provide a prototype payload, and train
Spanish personnel as needed. INTA and
NASA will each bear the cost of discharg-
ing their respective responsibilities.

The results of the experiments will be
made available to the world scientific com-
munity.

United States and Romania Agree
on 1966 Program of Exchanges

Press release 94 dated April 25

The U.S.-Romanian program of exchanges
for 1966 was agreed upon in an exchange of
letters between Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., the
Acting Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs, and Petre Balaceanu, the Ambas-
sador of the Socialist Republic of Romania,
at the Department of State on April 25.

Most of the specified exchanges are in
the field of education and cultural affairs.
Provisions are also made for exchanges in
public health, science and technology, ex-
hibits, publishing, radio and television, and
performing arts.

Since 1960, U.S.-Romanian exchanges
have been carried out in accordance with
diplomatic notes exchanged every 2 years.
The 1966 program is covered by notes ex-
changed on December 23, 1964. ^

The new program includes provisions for
each country to send to the other 10 gradu-
ate students and researchers, 2 professors of
language and literature, 2 public health
specialists, and 10 cultural specialists.

^ Not printed here.

' For a Department announcement and text of the
U.S. note, see Bulletin of Jan. 18, 1965, p. 87.

788

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

Current Actions

H MULTILATERAL

' ' Commodities — Wheat

Agricultural commodities agreement between the
United States and Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and
the East African Common Services Organization
(EACSO) under title IV of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at
Dar es Salaam February 18, 1966, and at Nairobi
February 19 and 22 and March 4, 1966. Entered
into force March 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment dis-
putes between states and nationals of other states.
Done at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Signature: Korea, April 18, 1966.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Done at Geneva
May 20, 1965."

Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 29,
1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15,
1964.'

Acceptance received: United Arab Republic,
March 11, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949
(TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals.
Done at Washington July 15, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Italy, April 29, 1966.
Entered into force: April 29, 1966.

Safety at Sea

nternational convention for the safety of life at sea,
1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into
force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciation received: Belgium, March 22, 1966.

iatellite Communications System

■upplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: National Telecommunications Council
of Brazil, April 25, 1966.

>ugar

'rotocol for the further prolongation of the inter-
national sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Open for signature at London November 1
through December 23, 1965. Entered into force
January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Feb-
ruary 17, 1966.
Accessions deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1966;
Guatemala, February 9, 1966; " Panama, March
8, 1966.

I/heat

rotocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).

Open for signature at Washington April 4 through

29, 1966.'

Signatures: Argentina, April 26, 1966; Austria,
April 27, 1966; Brazil, April 25, 1966; Canada,
April 28, 1966; Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; El
Salvador, April 26, 1966; France, April 25,
1966; Iceland, April 25, 1966; India, April 28,
1966; Ireland, April 25, 1966; Italy, April 27,
1966; Japan, April 25, 1966; Mexico, April 26,
1966; Netherlands, April 28, 1966; New Zea-
land, April 26, 1966; Norway, April 26, 1966;
Peru, April 28, 1966; Philippines, April 25,
1966; Sierra Leone, April 28, 1966; Spain,
April 27, 1966; Sweden, April 25, 1966;' Vati-
can City State, April 27, 1966; Venezuela;
April 28, 1966; Western Samoa, April 26, 1966.

Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance ■
Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25,
1966.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, April 25, 1966.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended
(TIAS 2856). Effected by exchange of notes at
Kabul April 2 and 4, 1966. Entered into force
April 4, 1966.

China

Agreement amending the agreement of October 19,
1963, concerning trade in cotton textiles, as
amended (TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754, 5820). Ex-
change of notes at Washington April 22, 1966.
Entered into force April 22, 1966.

Spain

Amendment to the agreement of August 16, 1957
(TIAS 3988) for cooperation concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington
November 29, 1965.
Entered into force: April 1, 1966.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Khartoum April 13, 1966. Entered into
force April 13, 1966.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of February 16
and July 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3042, 4309),
and the agreement of October 14, 1958 (TIAS
4117), relating to the loan of certain naval ves-
sels to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes
at Ankara October 14, 1965, and February 28,
1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Belgrade April 11, 1966. Entered into
force April 11, 1966.

' Not in force.

' With a declaration.

' Subject to ratification.

[AY 16, 1966

789

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Address requests direct to the Superintendent
of Documents, except in the case of free publications,
which may be obtained from the Office of Media
Services, Department of State, Washington, B.C.,
20520.

Military Bases in the Philippines — Relinquishment
of Certain Base Lands; Use by the United States of
Certain Other Areas. Agreement with the Philippines.
Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila December 22,
1965. Entered into force December 22, 1965. TIAS
5924. 6 pp. Z<t.

Corregidor — Bataan Memorial. Agreement with the
Philippines. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila
December 22, 1965. Entered into force December 22,
1965. TIAS 5925. 4 pp. 5(f.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with the Ryukyu Islands — Signed at
Washington October 26 and at Naha December 23,
1965. Entered into force December 23, 19G5. With
memorandum of understanding. TIAS 5927. 7 pp. 10^.

Mutual Defense Assistance. Agreement with Luxem-
bourg, amending Annex B to the agreement of Jan-
uary 27, 1950. Exchange of notes — Signed at Luxem-
bourg December 21 and 30, 1965. Entered into force
December 30, 1965. TIAS 5928. 3 pp. 5c.

International Bank for Reconstruction and Develop-
ment. Amendment to the articles of agreement of
December 27, 1945 with Other Governments — Done
at Washington December 16, 1965. Entered into force
December 17, 1965. TIAS 5929. 2 pp. h<:

Maritime Matters — Loan of Vessels. Agreement with
Italy. Exchange of notes — Signed at Rome Decem-
ber 23 and 27, 1965. Entered into force December 27,
1965. TIAS 5930. 4 pp. 5(f.

Desalting. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Jidda November 11 and 19, 1966.
Entered into force November 19, 1965. TIAS 5932.
9 pp. 10<!.

Health and Sanitation — United States Naval Medical
Research Unit. Agreement with Ethiopia — Signed at
Addis Ababa December 30, 1965. Entered into force
December 30, 1965. TIAS 5936. 4 pp. 5((.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon
December 20, 1965. Entered into force December 20,

1965. TIAS 5944. 3 pp. 5(-.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the
United Arab Republic — Signed at Cairo January 3,

1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With ex-
change of notes. TIAS 5950. 11 pp. 10<(.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with the United Arab Republic — Signed
at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force Jan-
uary 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5951.
8 pp. 10^.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Greece Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Greece and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency — Signed at Vienna
June 15, 1964. Entered into force January 13, 1966.
TIAS 5952. 10 pp. 10^.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention — Signed at Washing-
ton December 2, 1946. Adopted at the seventeenth
meeting of the International Whaling Commission,
London, July 2, 1965. Entered into force October 6,
1965, and January 4, 1966. TIAS 5953. 9 pp. 10(f.

Telecommunications — Television Broadcasting in
Viet-Nam. Agreement with Viet-Nam. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Saigon January 3, 1966. Entered
into force January 3, 1966. TIAS 5954. 4 pp. ht

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1403 PUBLICATION 8079 MAY 16, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication iaaued by the Office
of Media Services. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
aKencies of the Government with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
fornisrn relations and on the work of the
Department of Stata and the Foreisn
Service. The Bulletin Includes selected
press releases on forei^ policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and atatementa and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other oftieen of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation Is included concerning treaties
and international a^eements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Balletin la tor sale by the Super-
intendent of Doetunenta, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C., I |,
20402. Pbics: 52 issues, domestic 110,
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents. I %

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

NOTB : Contents of this publication vn
not copyrighted and items contained herein .;
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
nient of State Bulletin as the source will *■'
be appreciated. The Balletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Lit«^, ^^
ature. , ,ii

790

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX Maij 16, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1403

ASIA

The Responsibilities of World Leadership
(Humphrey) 769

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in
Southeast Asia (transcript of television
interview) 772

Atomic Energy. U.S. Position on Nuclear Shar-
ing Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk . . . 768

China. Secretary Comments on Peiping's Mili-
tancy in Southeast Asia (transcript of tele-
vision interview) 772

Claims and Property. May 21 Deadline Set for
Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses 783

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 787

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters
(Mann) 784

Cyprus. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Department and Foreign Service. Coordination
of Policy on Population Matters (Mann) . 784

Dominican Republic. May 21 Deadline Set for
Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses 783

Economic Affairs

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends 783

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire
Safety of Ships 782

Educational and Cultural Affairs. United
States and Romania Agree on 1966 Program
of Exchanges 788

Eorope. The Larger Meaning of the NATO
Crisis (Ball) 762

Foreign Aid

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters
(Mann) 784

The Responsibilities of World Leadership
(Humphrey) 769

Germany. U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Re-
affirmed by Secretary Rusk 768

International Organizations and Conferences

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara
(Johnson, Rusk, communique) 775

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety
of Ships 782

Iran. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Middle East. Central Treaty Organization Meets
at Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . 775

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis (Ball) 762
U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Reaffirmed
by Secretary Rusk 768

Pakistan. Central Treaty Organization Meets
at Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . 775

Presidential Documents. Central Treaty Organi-
zation Meets at Ankara 775

Publications. Recent Releases 790

Romania. United States and Romania Agree
on 1966 Program of Exchanges 788

Science. United States and Spain Conclude
Agreements on Space Cooperation ... 787

Spain. United States and Spain Conclude Agree-
ments on Space Cooperation 787

Treaty Information

Current Actions 739

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety
of Ships 782

United States and Romania Agree on 1966 Pro-
gram of Exchanges 7gg

United States and Spain Conclude Agreements
on Space Cooperation 737

Turkey. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Viet-Nam

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara
(Johnson, Rusk, communique) 775

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in
Southeast Asia (transcript of television in-
terview) 772

Zambia. U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends ... 783

Name Index

Ball, George W 762

Humphrey, Vice President 769

Johnson, President 775

Mann, Thomas C 784

Rusk, Secretary 768, 772, 775

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases; April 25-IVIay 1

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 25 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
82 and 84 of April 14, 87 of April 15, and 93
of April 22.

No. Date Subject

94 4/25 U.S.-Romanian exchange pro-

gram.

95 4/25 Solomon to discuss fire safety of

passenger ships with European
officials.

t96 4/25 Frankel: "The Era of Educational
and Cultural Relations."

t97 4/26 U.S.-China cotton textiles agree-
ment.

198 4/26 MacArthur: "Your Stake in the
Balance-of-Payments Problem."
99 4/26 Claims for property losses in Na-
tional District of Santo Do-
mingo.

100 4/27 Rusk: television interview on Red

China.

101 4/29 Ball : "The Larger Meaning of the

NATO Crisis."

102 4/30 Harriman to present U.S. views

at IMCO meeting (rewrite).

103 4/30 End of U.S. airlift to Zambia.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. HOS

May 16, 1966

THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF WORLD LEADERSHIP
Address by Vice President Humphrey 769

COORDINATION OF POLICY ON POPULATION MATTERS
Statement by Under Secretary Mann 78A

CENTRAL TREATY ORGANIZATION MEETS AT ANKARA 775

THE LARGER MEANING OF THE NATO CRISIS
by Under Secretary Ball 762

For index see inside back cover

"The attack that has been launched against NATO deeply
concerns all Western nations. Let us make no mistake about
the fact that the withdrawal of an important power from
participation in the arrangements that give reality to the
Western alliance will iveaken the common defense. More
than that, it will weaken the Western deterrent."

The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis

by Under Secretary Ball

Not long ago a whimsical friend, still un-
der the spell of reading all dozen volumes of
Mr. Toynbee's massive work on the life cycle
of nations and civilization, said to me:
"When America has run its course, I know
what headnote will appear in the history
books. It will be 'The United States — a na-
tion that died of a surfeit of pragmatism.' "

Like a highly seasoned salad this remark
stayed with me for several days. I am afraid
there is a grain of truth in my friend's ir-
reverent observation. We are a pragmatic
people, and — especially in the area where I
toil — pragmatism is the course of least re-
sistance. It is easy — and tempting — to be-
come absorbed in the operational aspects of
foreign relations and to ignore the longer
term implications of policy. But, if America
is to survive as a civilization, if in fact the
world is to survive as a healthy environ-
ment for human beings, then we do have to
remind ourselves of the larger framework
of policy — something better than the habits,
the improvisations, the expedients of years
gone by — or we shall find ourselves repeat-
ing old mistakes in a world where mistakes
by great nations can mean world destruc-
tion.

' Made before the American Society of Interna-
tional Law at Washington, D.C., on Apr. 29 (press
release 101).

Today there is a special temptation to
pragmatism in our relations with Western
Europe, where we are faced once again with
the reappearance of an assertive national-
ism that challenges the whole structure of
our postwar arrangements.

Yet there is no area where it would be
more dangerous for us to become absorbed
merely in the operational aspects of policy,
to make adjustments, accommodations, com-
promises, and concessions without regard to
our great common objectives. For our rela-
tions with Western Europe carry a heavy
freight of history. They form the longest
and persistently the most important ele-
ment of United States foreign policy. We
have benefited greatly from events in
Europe and we have suffered from them.
And, at the end of the day, we cannot for-
get that jealousies, ambitions, and aggres-
sions in Western Europe were responsible
for the two greatest wars of modern history
— cataclysms that created many of the ills
and troubles that harass us today. If we are
to avoid new and even more terrible conflicts,
we must know where we are going and we
must have some sense of how we are to get
there.

We have not always had a sure sense of
direction in these matters.

America spent the early years of this
century in a state of innocence which, in

762

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

retrospect, seems both attractive and sur-
prising. World War I came upon us while we
had our backs turned, preoccupied as we
were in transforming a continent into a na-
tion. It took us a long time to sort the issues
in that struggle. But in 1917 we entered the
fight, and the weight of our effort turned
the tide of battle. Yet in retrospect it
seems clear enough that we did not compre-
hend the full meaning either of the war or of
our involvement. When we had brought the
boys home again we had a frustrating try
at international peacemaking. Then we
turned our backs on the world in the inter-
ests of what we awkwardly referred to as
"normalcy."

We pretended, in other words, that we
were not a great power and that we had
been wrong in trying to act like one. The
fount of our foreign policy remained the ad-
monitory passages in Washington's farewell
address — advice given more than a century
before to a fledgling Republic. If staying
clear of entangling alliances had been good
enough for the Founding Fathers, it was
good enough for us.

America's policy, as we told the world, was
isolationism — the early 20th-century version
of what would be knov\m today as neutralism
or nonalinement — and we meant to stick by
it.

The Hard Lessons of Two World Wars

The Second World War ended our adoles-
cence. We fought valiantly and well in all
four comers of the earth. When the con-
flict was over, America at long last had
grown up, and we had learned certain hard
lessons the hard way.

I shall not try to review all of those
lessons here tonight, but I think it essential
to mention some of them.

The first was that the United States is
indubitably a great power and, as such, can-
not escape involvement in the world's main
concerns. Moreover, the world has become so
interdependent that our interests are neces-
sarily engaged by any new aggression in any
strategic area of the world — and particularly
in Europe.

Second, we admitted with nagging con-
science that our own neutralism had served
as an encouragement — or at least had posed
no discouragement — to aggressors in Europe.
We could deter aggression in the future only
by making it crystal clear that American
power would be committed instantly and
automatically if any friendly European state
were attacked.

Within months after the end of the war
we began to learn another hard lesson — that
another nation, itself also organized on a
continent-wide basis, was bent on extending
its dominion, and the ideological system it
represented, through force and subversion
around the world. As one after another of
the European states were caught within the
encircling net of the Iron Curtain, we awoke
with a shock to this new and imminent
peril.

Along with our European friends we began
to rethink the mistakes of the past. Together
with them we reached certain conclusions
which we put in treaty or institutional
form. One was the recognition — not of the
theory but the fact — that an attack on one
of the North Atlantic states was an attack
on all. In the case of major aggression
against Europe, the power of the New World
would inevitably be called upon to redress
the balance of the old. That, however, was
not enough by itself. The nations of Europe
that had been occupied, and particularly the
leaders of France, were emphatic in telling
us that Europeans could not endure another
period of liberation. This time they must be
protected, not liberated.

We concluded with them, therefore, that
our Western alliance must be more than an
agreement for liberation. It must be made
an effective deterrent so as to dissuade any
aggressor from reckless adventures. To
achieve this we must create an instrument
for instant collective defense by forces in
being, acting under common command and
common plans.

For this, too, we had the hard lessons of
two world wars to guide us.

In World War I it had taken 4 years for
the Allied Powers to pull themselves to-

MAY 16. 1966

763

gether and agree on a combined command
under Marshal Foch. The obstinate insist-
ence of the individual nation-states on sov-
ereign and separate national commands cost
hundreds of thousands of lives.

In the Second World War the Western
Powers again reaped the tragic consequences
of their unpreparedness and their blind re-
jection of common plans and a common com-
mand. Denmark fell, then Norway, then the
Low Countries, then France. Almost 5
years elapsed before the Allies accumulated
the military strength, unified under the in-
tegrated command of SHAEF, that made it
possible to mount the Normandy invasion
and win the war.

It was against this tragic background that
the Atlantic Powers — inspired particularly
by the French Foreign Minister Robert Schu-
man — undertook in 1950 to transform the
alliance from a classical mutual defense pact
into a full-fledged collective security system.
An integrated command was established
under General Eisenhower. Common plan-
ning was undertaken. Forces were put in
place for the defense of Europe that now
total 2.5 million men. And over the years
that followed the nuclear power of the
United States was targeted against the
Soviet rockets aimed at Europe.

For the first time in history the Western
Powers were acting together with little re-
gard for special national advantage, not
merely to meet but to deter a potential ag-
gressor. In what otherwise would have been
a time of grave peril, Europeans could go
about their affairs without an overhanging
fear of invasion. They did so, and they have
prospered beyond their fondest dreams.

Construction of the Western Alliance

The construction of the Western alliance,
and even more the building of the collective
security system known as NATO, meant a
great national decision for us as Americans
and a great common achievement for the
West. Looking across the Atlantic, we de-
cided that we must work actively with our
European friends in deterring aggression in
Europe. But even more important, we and

they concluded that peace could be per-
manently secured only if steps were taken
to remove the underlying causes that had
created so many disasters in the past.

Of all those causes one stood out above
all others. That was the persistent rivalry
among the individual nation-states of Europe,
each striving in turn to gain dominance by
force over its neighbors. From the time of
the Treaty of Westphalia in the middle of the
17th century for more than a century and a
half, the peace of the world was periodi-
cally disturbed primarily by the efforts of
European nations — and particularly France,
then the largest and strongest — to achieve
hegemony over the rest of the Continent.
Those efforts were thwarted by shifting
coalitions of other European states aided by
the astute diplomacy of Britain, which for
centuries allied itself always on the side of
the weaker group in order to maintain a
balance. These European struggles were not
always confined to the Continent. Through-
out the whole of our colonial life they
tended to spill over into the Western Hem-
isphere, until, when we secured our inde-
pendence, we were able to insulate ourselves
through a policy of isolation made possible
by the Monroe Doctrine and the British
Fleet.

We thus kept aloof from the European
wars of the 19th century while the prepon-
derance of power shifted in Europe. France,
worn out by the exertions of the Napoleonic
era and outstripped by the other major
European powers in population, was de-
feated by the Second Reich, which under
Bismarck's leadership had been created by
Prussia out of 25 German kingdoms, princi-
palities, duchies, and free cities. Yet the
Franco-Prussian War was but a prelude of
things to come. For in the first half of the
20th century the two world wars, which
had their roots in European rivalries,
brought all of us close to disaster.

Against this history it was clear that, if
there was to be peace in Europe and in the
world, the old national rivalries had to be
replaced by something more constructive.
Yet this was nothing America could bring

764

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

about by itself. We could assist the Euro-
peans to rehabilitate themselves through
the Marshall Plan. We could encourage them
to sublimate their national rivalries in a new
unity. But the actual achievement of that
unity was something that only the European
peoples could create.

Still the climate was ripe for action. The
peoples of Europe were themselves
thoroughly tired of wars that sprang from
the competing ambitions of nation-states.
And so they began to work brilliantly,
principally under French leadership, on a
whole series of measures : the Schuman Plan,
which created the Coal and Steel Commu-
nity; the proposal for a European army with-
in a European Defense Community (which,
had it succeeded, would have avoided many
of the problems that haunt us today) ; and
the European Atomic Energy Community.
Most important was the great breakthrough
of the Treaty of Rome that changed the
economic face of Europe by creating a vast
Common Market.

This then was the prospect in the early
part of the 1960's — a Europe making mas-
sive strides toward unity with the strong
prospect that its geographical boundaries
would be expanded to include the United
Kingdom and certain other European na-
tions, a Europe growing prosperous with its
burgeoning Common Market under the pro-
tective umbrella of NATO.

The organization of Europe is, of course,
primarily a matter for Europeans. But it is
a matter that deeply affects the United
States as well. The thousands of Americans
who gave their lives in the Argonne Forest —
or, a quarter of a century later, in the
Battle of the Bulge — have established our
right and indeed our obligation to speak
frankly on issues that so critically involve
both our safety and our future. Our fate
and the fate of Western Europe are tied in-
extricably together. We recognized that on
two occasions when we sent our young men
overseas, and Europe recognized that on
two occasions when it called for our help in
an extreme hour. And, whatever words may
be uttered in the current discussion, Euro-

peans know today that American men and
American might will be there when they
need us. So we are not very much impressed
by specious homilies about doctrine that ob-
scure the point of America's demonstrated
reliability in times of crisis.

We have seen in European progress to-
ward unity the chance for a new and fruit-
ful relationship. As President Kennedy said
in June 1963, in his speech at the Paulskirche
in Frankfurt,^ we "look forward to a united
Europe in an Atlantic partnership — an en-
tity of interdependent parts, sharing equally
both burdens and decisions and linked to-
gether in the tasks of defense as well as the
arts of peace."

The Threat to European Unity

The idea of a united Europe linked in
equal partnership across the Atlantic had
great resonance on both sides of the ocean.
But already there were forces working
against it, in particular the decision of the
government of one European nation-state to
separate itself from the others and to seek
a special position of primacy in Western
Europe. The purposes of that government
should not be a matter for polemics; they
are on the public record, fully expressed or
implied in any number of official state-
ments.

That government has sought to halt the
drive toward European unity in the name of
uniting Europe; to transform the European
Common Market into a mere commercial ar-
rangement by hobbling the powers of the
executive; to prevent other Western Euro-
pean nations from achieving any participa-
tion in the management of nuclear power
so as to preserve its own exclusive position
as the sole nation with nuclear weapons on
the Western European Continent; to reduce
the influence and ultimately the presence of
the United States in Europe; and, finally,
to free itself from obligations to the great
postwar system of European and Atlantic
institutions in order to achieve freedom of
political and diplomatic maneuver that could

' For text, see Bulletin of July 22, 1963, p. 118.

MAY 16, 1966

765

permit it to deal, to its own advantage, with
what it has described with a curious im-
partiality as "the two great hegemonies."

The attack that has been launched
against NATO deeply concerns all Western
nations. Let us make no mistake about the
fact that the withdrawal of an important
power from participation in the arrange-
ments that give reality to the Western alli-
ance will weaken the common defense. More
than that, it will weaken the Western deter-
rent. Finally, it is likely to delay and con-
fuse the possibilities of moving toward an
ultimate settlement of the great unfinished
business of Europe. For it is clear to any-
one who has closely followed the events of
the past decade that the gradual changes
taking place in Eastern Europe and the
Soviet Union have been hastened, not de-
layed, by the firm and common purpose of
the West. And it is clear also that if the
West ceases to stand firm and unified, if
each individual Western nation seeks to
make a separate deal for itself, the gains we
have achieved will be quickly lost and the
hope for an ultimate European settlement
long deferred.

Obviously the Communist world has un-
dergone major transformations since the
death of Stalin. But the change has not been
without its perils for the West. The Khru-
shchev who preached peaceful coexistence
punctuated his message with attempted black-
mail in Berlin, nuclear threats at the Par-
thenon, and missiles in Cuba. Yet, it is
plainly right to build bridges to the Com-
munist countries, bridges of trade and travel
across barriers that cruelly divide a con-
tinent. It is right to welcome the citizens of
East Europe to see for themselves that capi-
talism can yield economic progress and so-
cial justice side by side. These things are
right, and they should be continued.

But those bridges to the East must be
anchored in the solid foundation of a strong
and cohesive Western alliance. For it is onl\
when the security issue is beyond dispute
that lasting progress can be made toward
permanently improved relations with the
Communist states. This is the basis on which

there can be secure movement toward a
political settlement in Europe, leading to
the reunification of Germany in conditions
of peace and freedom and to real progress
toward international arms control — goals
that we and Europe share.

Over and above the attack on NATO there
is, therefore, grave cause for uneasiness in
the resurgence of a self-centered national-
ism. For each country's nationalism is a
force that, particularly in Europe, tends to
create equal and opposite forces in neigh-
boring countries. Ever since the war we
Americans have known that the peace of
the world depended to a great extent on the
gamble that Europe would transform itself,
that the nations of Western Europe would,
after all these centuries, put aside those
corrosive national rivalries that have been
the cause of past disasters and sublimate
their energies in a common purpose and a
new unity. At the same time, we have al-
ways recognized the danger that the Euro-
pean people, with reflexes conditioned by
history, might from time to time be tempted
to lapse into the old bad habits of the past,
to unfurl the dusty banners of other cen-
turies, and to re-create the conditions in
which Europe might again become the cock-
pit of the world.

Concept of Equal Partnership

There are, to be sure, voices even in this
country that tell us almost with satisfaction
that the latter development is inevitable
and knowledgeable men should accept it.
After all, they say, haven't the European
nations regularly, 12 or 13 years after each
war, dissolved their alliances and returned
to their old rivalries?

This sounds strangely like the contention
of the early 1920's that we should return to
"normalcy." For the kind of Europe en-
visaged by these critics is a Europe no more
suitable to the needs of today than would
"normalcy" be for today's America.

What exactly would these men have us
do? The realistic hope for peace in the
world, they contend, is not for a unified
Western Europe but for a Europe of nation-

766

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

states extending from the Atlantic to the
Urals — or, in other words, a Europe in
which each of the middle-sized states would
seek to make its own deal with one or the
other of the "great hegemonies" in the
hope of establishing for itself a first-class
power position while keeping the others in
an inferior role.

Such a Europe — a continent of shifting
coalitions and changing alliances — is not
the hope of the future; it is a nostalgic
evocation. It would mean not progress but
a reversion to the tragic and discredited
pattern of the past — a return to 1914, as
though that were good enough, and with the
same guarantee of instability — yet made
more dangerous, not less, by the ideological
drive of the Soviet Union and the existence
of nuclear weapons.

To move toward such a Europe is not the
way to reach a settlement of the unfinished
business of the last war. It is not a way to
remove the Iron Curtain except on terms
that would preserve and exacerbate dis-
crimination and inequality and thus lay the
groundwork for new disasters in the fu-
ture.

Such a Europe would not secure a lasting
peace nor would it bring fulfillment to the
European peoples. For there is a new re-
quirement of size in the world which makes
it imperative that, if the peoples of Europe
are to make their full contribution to world
affairs, they must organize themselves on a
scale commensurate with the requirements
of the modem age. Let us not deceive our-
selves; no matter how adroit diplomacy

• may be, it cannot achieve first-power status
for a nation of limited size and resources.

The true course of Western Europe lies
not in fragmentation but in unity — a solid
unity that will bring not varying degrees of
status and citizenship but equality for all. A
united Europe will not need to seek first-
power status; it will have it. And unity,
moreover, will enable the gifted European
'- peoples to play their major role in the

* large affairs of this turbulent world and
'= make their rich and proper contribution to

civilization.

If Europe unites, the world will no longer
be faced with the dangers of middle-sized
states trying to play a game of maneuver
with one another and with the "hegemo-
nies," after the pattern of the past. There
will be a third large center of power and
purpose — capable, because it is strong, of
bringing about a European settlement, com-
petent to come to terms with the East on a
basis that will dismantle the Iron Curtain
and reunify the German people as equal
members of a great community.

As this develops, and only as it develops,
will we Atlantic peoples be able to give full
meaning to the concept of equal partner-
ship. For no longer will the European na-
tions have to fear, as some apparently do,
the preponderance of American weight in
our common political councils or the pre-
ponderance of American industrial strength
in our economic affairs. There vsdll be equal-
ity in a realistic sense — not something en-
acted by international law, not something
the United States has conferred. It will be
an equality founded on unassailable fact,
since a united Europe will command vast
resources of technology and production,
brain power and material.

"We Want a Europe Strong, Not Enfeebled"

Americans join with Europeans in want-
ing this kind of Europe. We want a Europe
strong, not enfeebled. We want a Europe
independent in spirit as it is interdependent
in fact. As President Kennedy once said,^ "It
is not in our interest to try to dominate the
European councils of decision. If that were
our objective, we would prefer to see Europe
divided and weak, enabling the United
States to deal with each fragment indi-
vidually." But what we look forward to, he
said, is "a Europe united and strong —
speaking with a common voice, acting with
a common will — a world power capable of
meeting world problems as a full and equal
partner."

Perhaps there are some Americans who
would like to see a fragmented Europe, but

' Ihid.

MAY 16, 1966

767

they have not read history carefully — or if
they have, they have not understood it. Cer-
tainly, it is not the policy of this adminis-
tration any more than it was the policy of
the Kennedy or the Eisenhower or the Tru-
man administrations to see Europe dis-
united.

For we are prepared to take our chances
on a Western Europe united on principles of
equality, a Europe with a common voice. To
be sure, it will be an independent voice, not
always agreeing with us — but then the
United States has no monopoly of wisdom.
What we can be sure of is that we and our
Western European partners will agree on
the broad outlines of the kind of world we
want, a world of peace and freedom. For we
draw from the deep well of Western civiliza-
tion, cherish the same ideals of liberty, seek
together the dignity of the individual and
not the tyranny of the mass.

A Europe so united was the bright hope
and the high accomplishment of the fifties.
It remains the real hope of Europeans and
Americans today. For, as President Johnson
said more than a year ago : *

"The unknown tide of future change is al-
ready beating about the rock of the West.
These fruitful lands washed by the Atlantic,
this half-billion people unmatched in arms
and industry, this measureless storehouse
of wisdom and genius can be a fortress
against any foe, a force that will enrich the

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 866.

life of an entire planet. It is not a question
of arms or wealth alone. It is a question of
moving ahead vdth the times, and it is a ques-
tion of vision and persistence and the will-
ingness to surmount the barriers of national
rivalry against which our ancestors have al-
ways collided."

U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing
Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk

Statement by Secretary Rusk ^

The United States regards the problem of
nuclear sharing as major unfinished busi-
ness. The development of an arrangement
to provide participation for NATO non-
nuclear nations, including the Federal Re-
public of Germany, in the management of
nuclear power is under the most serious
discussion among interested governments.

The United States Government has made
no decision to foreclose a possible Atlantic
nuclear force or any other collective ap-
proach to the problem. The position of the
United States remains as stated in the
communique of President Johnson and
Chancellor [Ludwig] Erhard December
21, 1965.2

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on Apr. 27.

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 10, 1966, p. 50.

768

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

"Leadership today requires understanding of the problems
we face, of the resources at hand, and of the objectives we
seek. It requires the ability, perhaps even more, to lead
and inspire others — to lead and inspire in a sense of com-
mon enterprise."

The Responsibilities of World Leadership

Address by Vice President Humphrey ^

It is always a risk to speak to the press:
They are likely to report what you say. To-
day I will take that risk, for I have some
thoughts I am quite willing to have repeated.

Today our America stands as the most
powerful, the most prosperous, and the
freest nation in the history of the earth.
And in our power, wealth, and freedom we
stand as leader of the Western World.

As a nation cautioned from the first
against entangling alliances, this role is not
an easy one. And, indeed, to many other na-
tions of the world we remain a relatively
unknown quantity. For it has been only in
recent years that we have ventured into the
world with any real seriousness.

And thus we hear questions asked: Are
we overreaching ourselves? Will we tire of
our tasks? Will our economy be able to sup-
port the burdens we carry at home and
abroad? Are we equal to the role of world
leadership?

Fair enough questions they are. For the
answers affect the great majority of na-
tions and the great majority of the world's
peoples — not only because of the weight of
our power but because of the things we
stand for. In Tom Paine's words : "The cause

' Made before the Associated Press at New York,
N.Y., on Apr. 25 ; advance text.

of America is in great measure the cause of
all mankind."

In the final analysis the questions asked
about us can only be answered by how we
measure up to the challenges before us.

Today we face three great and interre-
lated tasks in the world: the pursuit of
peace, the effort to narrow the gap between
the rich and poor nations, and the neces-
sity of sustaining an American economy
able to carry a thousand future burdens
here and around the world.

The Search for Peace

Our search for peace finds its best ex-
pression in our support for the kind of
world envisioned in the United Nations
Charter — a world where large and small
nations might live alike in harmony without
threat of external coercion.

No nation has done more for peace than
has ours since World War II. The U.N., the
Marshall Plan, Point 4, the Alliance for Prog-
ress, the Peace Corps, the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the International Monetary
Fund and World Bank, Food for Peace, the
nuclear test ban treaty — these have come
from initiatives worthy of our position of
leadership. These have come from our
search for peace.

But other initiatives, too, have come from

MAY 16, 1966

769

our search for peace: firmness in Berlin;
aid to Greece and Turkey; the founding of
NATO, CENTO, and SEATO; resistance to
aggression in Korea; the determination that
nuclear missiles should not be introduced
into the hemisphere. For we have long since
learned that peaceful development cannot
exist in an environment of violence, aggres-
sion, and fear.

Today peace is at stake in Asia. Peace is
at stake in a hundred thousand Asian vil-
lages, in the struggle of peasants against
a millennium of poverty, disease, and de-
spair.

Peace is at stake in a tortured South
Viet-Nam, in the struggle against the classic
power tactics of communism.

We must not lose the peace in either
struggle. That is why we have committed
once more — as we have had to do before —
men, money, and resources to help the na-
tions of Asia help themselves toward se-
curity and independence.

It won't be easy. It will be frustrating
and at times heartbreaking. But if we are
not to deny our leadership, if we are not to
deny the principles in which we believe, we
must stay and see it through. And the free
nations of the world need to know that we
have the vision and the endurance to do so.

Those who threaten their neighbors in
Asia should know it too. They should
know that we will resist their aggression.

Narrowing the Gap Between Rich and Poor

But they should also know that we bear
no consumptive hate against their people,
that we have no design on their sovereignty.
We look only toward the day when all na-
tions may choose to live in harmony with
their neighbors, when they may turn to-
gether their energies to building a better
life for their peoples.

For this is, after all, the second great
task before us — the desperate need to nar-
row the widening gap between the rich
and poor nations of the world. I give you
the words of Pope John XXIII in his encyc-
lical Mater et Magistra:

The solidarity which binds all men and makes
them members of the same family requires political
communities enjoying an abundance of material
goods not to remain indifferent to those political
communities whose citizens suffer from poverty,
misery, and hunger, and who lack even the elemen-
tary rights of the human person.

This is particularly true since, given the grow-
ing interdependence among the peoples of the
earth, it is not possible to preserve lasting peace if
glaring economic and social inequality among them
persist. . . .

We are all equally responsible for the under-
nourished peoples. Therefore, it is necessary to
educate one's conscience to the sense of responsi-
bility which weighs upon each and every one, es-
pecially upon those who are more blessed with this
world's goods.

We sit here today comfortably examining
this situation. But for the disinherited and
left out of this world, it is no matter for
examination: It is a matter of day-to-day
survival.

Today there are families spending their
last day on earth because they haven't the
strength or health to keep going.

But those who remain — and you can be
sure of this — those who remain will take to
the streets, they will turn to any master,
they will tear the fabric of peace to shreds,
unless they have some reason to believe
that there is hope for life and hope for
justice.

To put this on a more immediate and
practical level, let me call to your attention
the foreign aid request now before the Con-
gress.^

The expenditure for the first year of the
Marshall Plan was about 2 percent of our
GNP, and IIV2 percent of the Federal budg-
et. Today, thanks to the grovrth of our
American economy, our foreign aid request
is for only 0.29 percent of our GNP and
about 1.9 percent of the Federal budget —
that is, about 2 cents out of every tax dol-
lar. Yet we hear the same doubts and com-
plaints today that we heard 20 years ago.

If someone has a substitute for foreign
aid, I'd like to hear about it. The investment
we make in foreign aid — in preventive med-

' For text of President Johnson's message, see
Bulletin of Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

770

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

icine, if you will — is certainly less than that
necessary to treat the symptoms of massive
economic crisis and disorder and, yes, of
war.

The Marshall Plan saved Western Europe
and the peace. It created a great new eco-
nomic market for us. But there is more : The
revived nations of Western Europe have not
only repaid their Marshall Plan debts; they
have already provided more aid to the de-
veloping countries than they ever received
from us. The rewards can be just as great
tomorrow in other continents.

If there are questions asked about our
ability to meet this task, I think they must
be answered affirmatively and without equiv-
ocation.

We do not seek to do this task alone nor
should we. But how can we expect others to
follow if we do not lead ?

Fashioning an America Able To Lead

President Eisenhower described the third
great task we face today: ". . . the firm base
for the problem of leading the world toward
the achievement of human aspirations — to-
ward peace with justice in freedom — must
be the United States."

We must fashion an America so strong,
so free, so able to lead, that there may be
no question about our purposes or our en-
durance. Basic to this is the necessity of
building an economy of growth and oppor-
tunity, yet stable in time when it is tested.

I need not remind this audience of the
Communist belief — I suppose some of them
still hold it — that the United States was
teetering on the brink of economic chaos,
that it was just a matter of time until our
production lines would grind to a halt, until
an army of unemployed would seize the
state, until economic warfare among the
Western nations would open the door to
communism.

I think by now some of the Communist
doctrinists have come to realize that Lord
Keynes was speaking to them as well as
others when he wrote: "Practical men, who
believe themselves to be quite exempt from

intellectual influences, are usually the slaves
of some defunct economist."

The American economic miracle is the
world's greatest success story. Last year
alone we increased our GNP by $47 billion,
increased our total personal income by $39
billion, and increased our Federal cash re-
ceipts by $81/^ billion.

All this did not happen by accident. Part
of it is certainly due to the influence of Mr.
Keynes and the so-called New Economics.
But I believe the basic, underlying reason
behind our economic success is this : There is
today a creative partnership for prosperity
among those in our society who used to think
of themselves as natural antagonists.

We are dispelling old myths. How long
has it been since we've heard old empty
labels such as "labor boss" and "economic
royalist."

The fact is that American Government,
business, and labor are increasingly united
in the premise that a stronger and better
America will be to the common benefit of
all. Among other things, we are united in
our determination to accomplish something
that no nation has previously dared to try : to
make every citizen in our society a full and
productive member of our society.

And so today we make national invest-
ments in our country and in our people —
investments in productivity, in opportunity,
in enterprise, in greater social justice, in
self-help. That is what our Great Society
programs are all about.

Education, medical care, war against pov-
erty, programs of retraining and redevelop-
ment, better cities and transportation, an
even more productive agriculture, yes, equal-
ity at the ballot box and before the law —
these are the most basic investments of all
in an America able to keep its commitments
both at home and abroad.

As the President has said so often, it is
not a matter of a Great Society or fulfill-
ment of our international responsibilities. It
is not a matter of guns or butter, foreign
aid or domestic education. They are tied to-
gether, and you cannot separate them.

MAY 16, 1966

771

If we can build a society operating on all
its cylinders, others in the world may have
some hope of doing the same. If we cannot,
what hope may others have?

To make our free system work, to sustain
it, to keep our pledges all the while — this
indeed is the way to erase any doubts the
world may have about our ability to fulfill
the responsibility of leadership.

In closing, may I say a word about the
nature of that responsibility.

Leadership in today's world requires far
more than a large stock of gunboats and a
hard fist at the conference table.

Leadership today requires more than the
ability to go it alone — although we must not
be afraid to do so when necessary.

Leadership today requires understand-
ing of the problems we face, of the resources
at hand, and of the objectives we seek.

It requires the ability, perhaps even more,
to lead and inspire others — to lead and in-
spire in a sense of common enterprise. For as
strong and rich as we may become, our goal
of a just and peaceful world will never be
achieved by America alone.

It will be achieved only when the re-
sources of strong and weak, rich and poor
alike, are allocated, in the most efficient
manner possible, to challenges that are far
too great for any one nation or group of
nations to attempt to overcome.

This, then, is the test of ourselves: not
to march alone but to march in such a way
that others will wish to join us.

I will add one caveat: In none of this
should we expect either friendship or grati-
tude. We have already eaten breakfast to the
accompaniment, in our morning newspapers,
of too many "Yankee Go Home" signs, too
many riots, too many denunciations of our-
selves, to believe that leadership can reward
us with international laurel wreaths.

I think the most we can expect is this:
that those who question us will one day find
no reason to question; that in the world
there may be no doubt that Americans have
the vision, the endurance, and the courage
to stand and see it through for what we be-
lieve in.

772

Secretary Comments on Peiping's
Militancy in Southeast Asia

Following is the transcript of an interview
with Secretary Rusk by John Scali for the
American Broadcasting Company's hour-
long television program, "Red China: Year
of the Gun?" on April 27.

Press release 100 dated April 27

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, who is to blame
for the isolation of China from the free
world? Is our policy at fault?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think this goes
back for many years. I think that undoubt-
edly there have been problems on both sides.
But in these more recent years I think that
it is clear that the attitudes in Peiping
have isolated them from most of the rest of
the world. For example, they are having
great difficulties inside the Communist
world. They refused to attend the 23d Con-
gress of the Communist Party in Moscow.
They have had similar difficulties in the
Afro-Asian world. They had a debacle last
year in attempting to work out arrangements
for a second Bandung conference. Their
policies have caused deep divisions between
themselves and almost everyone else.

Now, as far as the United States is con-
cerned, we have been engaged in conversa-
tions with them for more than 10 years. We
have had our 129th bilateral talk with
them — talks that were carried on in Geneva
and in Warsaw. We will be having another
one with them next month. We have been in
closer touch with them, I suppose, than al-
most any government that has diplomatic
relations with them, with the exception pos-
sibly of Moscow.

This is not a deliberate attempt by every-
one else to forget Peiping or to freeze them
out of the total situation. We know they are
there. We know that they ought to be drawn
into the major questions, such as peace in
Southeast Asia, such as disarmament. And
many efforts have been made to bring them
into those discussions. But their own at-
titude has made it very difficult to get them

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

i

into a position of real discussion with those
with whom they bitterly disagree.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, how can we be
sure that the Chinese won't miscalculate the
depth of our determination, for example, in
Viet-Nam, unless we have regular sys-
temized discussions with them, perhaps
through diplomatic recognition?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I don't believe that
formal diplomatic recognition is required for
discussions. I have already indicated we have
had 129 talks with them ourselves and we
will soon have another one. Formal relation-
ships with them run into a very serious and
central obstacle.

You will recall that the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee had a series of hear-
ings about China, and in connection with
that and in other discussions it has been in-
dicated that we have tried to exchange
newsmen and scholars and doctors and we
have tried to establish some sort of better
contact with Peiping.^

Well, in a very important article in the
People's Daily, signed by "Observer" —
which is the pen name for some very high
official — they said once again publicly that:

So long as the United States Government does
not change its hostile policy toward China and re-
fuses to pull out its armed forces from Taiwan and
the Taiwan Straits, the normalization of Sino-
American relations is entirely out of the question.
And so is the solution of such a concrete question
as the exchange of visits between personnel of the
two countries.

Now, there they said publicly only last
month what we have been saying privately
for 10 years. In effect, that there is nothing
to discuss until we are prepared to sur-
render Formosa, and when we indicate that
we can't surrender these 13 million people
on Formosa as far as we are concerned, then
the conversation gets to be very difficult and
very strained, very formal, very unproduc-
tive.

Mr. Scali: In fighting the war in Viet-

' For a statement by Secretary Rusk before the
Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, see Bul-
letin of May 2, 1966, p. 686.

Nam, do we seek to avoid military moves
which the Chinese might regard as a prel-
ude to an American invasion of the China
mainland ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think it's only on
the basis of an ideological bias that they
would have any idea that we have an inter-
est in attacking mainland China. There have
been many occasions when we might have
done so, had that been our desire. The
Korean war was such an occasion. The off-
shore islands crisis was another one. South-
east Asia is another one.

Now, the United States is not interested
in war with mainland China. We are not in-
terested in expanding these operations in
Southeast Asia. The escalation of that war
has been a responsibility of Hanoi, en-
couraged and backed by Peiping. It had
moved, for example, the 325th Division of
the North Vietnamese Regular Army from
North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam, be-
fore we started bombing North Viet-Nam.

What we are after there is to stop that
infiltration of men and arms from North
Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam. We are not
interested in getting into a war with any-
body, and there would not have been any
shooting there had North Viet-Nam elected
to leave its two neighbors, Laos and South
Viet-Nam, alone. And if they should stop
doing what they are doing, peace could
come very quickly and our troops could come
home.

Mr. Scali: Have the hearings before Sen-
ator Fulbright's committee, Mr. Secretary,
helped you in deciding what next to do in
confronting China ?

Secretary Rusk: Well, I think that the
hearings have been veiy useful in having
extensive and thoughtful and far-ranging
discussions of the total problem of China. I
think they have brought out the fact that
the policies pursued by Peiping have been
pretty widely rejected throughout the world.
Militancy of Peiping's attitude has caused
very deep divisions inside the Communist
world, quite apart from the problems that
it has caused in the free world. And we
have seen in the past 15 months that Pei-

MAY 16, 1966

773

ping's policy, by and large, has been rejected
right around the globe. They have been
thrown out of five or six African countries.
They have had a major setback in Indonesia.
They objected strenuously to the Tashkent
agreement between India and Pakistan and
the treaty between Japan and Formosa. So
that they have made it very clear that their
policy is harsh and militant, and they are
finding that the rest of the world just can't
adjust itself to that kind of policy and at-
titude.

Mr. Scali: Senator Fulbright, in schedul-
ing his congressional hearings on China, said
he did so because there are some administra-
tion officials who felt that war with China
is inevitable. Do you know any of these
people?

Secretary Rusk: I haven't heard anyone,
senior or junior, say to me they consider
war inevitable. Certainly from our point of
view we have no interest in a war with
mainland China. One does hear out of Pei-
ping itself a discussion of the inevitability
of war, and they have on occasions said that
they would hope that the revisionists —
meaning the Soviets — would not take such a
gloomy view of war. Well, I think most of
the world takes a pretty gloomy view of
war, and ought to.

But I must say that I don't believe that the
leaders in Peiping are imprudent enough to
act as though they consider war inevitable.
They have been somewhat more cautious
and prudent in their actions than they have
been in their words. So I think there is a
prospect that the situation can be stabilized
on a basis of the security of the smaller
countries in Asia and that over time pru-
dence will make itself felt in Peiping.

Mr. Scali: Mr. Secretary, in trying to de-
cide what China will do, how much room
do we leave for moves which we would re-
gard as irrational, such as the Russian de-
cision, for example, to move offensive mis-
siles into Cuba or, indeed, the Chinese de-
cision to intervene in Korea?

Secretary Rusk: Well, there is always a
danger of miscalculation, and it is always
difficult for democracies to get across the

774

right signals to totalitarian regimes. We
have had a number of instances in the past
where totalitarian leaders have assumed
that somehow at the end of the day de-
mocracies would not do what is required to
defend their security and to maintain free-
dom.

I suppose that it's easy for a regime in
Peiping to misunderstand our own domestic
debates here at home. They may not be
sophisticated enough to know that the
United States is going to meet its commit-
ments and that some of the things they
hear are not really relevant to the basic de-
cision of the country in such matters.

But, again, I do believe that there is in
fact a prudence in Peiping. I do believe their
leaders are rational. I don't expect com-
pletely irrational action from them. I think it
is possible that they may underestimate our
determination, that they may make some
miscalculation on the assumption that some-
how we would not follow through to the end
of the day. But I think, little by little,
they must be getting the impression that
we are serious in Southeast Asia and that
there can be peace just as soon as the in-
filtration of men and arms from the North
stops.

Mr. Scali: As you look ahead, Mr. Secre-
tary, in the years to come, what do you see
in Asia — any real prospect that the Chinese
will somehow moderate their harsh policies
and change their rather primitive view of
the world ?

Secretary Rusk: I think there is some
prospect of that over time. I don't think that
it's a matter that depends upon United
States military action. I think we have cer-
tain specific commitments — Korea, Japan,
Formosa, the Philippines, Thailand, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, with whom we have de-
fense agreements — where we act jointly
with our allies to insure the safety of those
countries.

But I have great faith in the ordinary
common people in these matters. After all,
people just don't like to be pushed around
too much. And we have seen the reactions
in India when Peiping attacked India. We

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

.

k'

have seen the reactions in Indonesia. We
have seen many demonstrations of the fact
that people don't want w^hat Peiping is try-
ing to offer or impose upon them.

So I think that over time there will be a
blunting of the revolutionary militancy that

is being preached these days from Peiping,
simply because the world won't have it. The
world won't have it, and they vdll come to
recognize it.

Mr. Scali: Thank you very much, Mr. Sec-
retary.

Central Treaty Organization IVIeets at Ankara

The nth session of the Ministerial Coun-
cil of the Central Treaty Organization was
held at Ankara, Turkey, April 20 and 21.
Following are texts of an opening statement
made by Secretary Rusk on April 20 and a
final communique issued at the close of the
meeting, together with remarks made by
Secretary Rusk at the dedication of the
CENTO Microwave Telecommunications
System on April 20 and the transcript of a
press conference he held at Esenboga Air-
port, Ankara, on April 22.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

Mr. Secretary General, Mr. Prime Minis-
ter, esteemed colleagues, ladies and gentle-
men: Five years ago, here in Ankara, I had
my first opportunity to attend a Ministerial
Council of the Central Treaty Organization
as chairman of the United States observer
delegation. 1 It is a great personal pleasure
to be again in this impressive capital city
of the Turkish Republic, to review with you
the work of the organization, and to reaf-
firm the intention of my Government to
continue its association with the high pur-
poses of the CENTO alliance.

I wish to express my deep appreciation
for the cordial welcome and the thoughtful
hospitality which the Turkish Government
and the Turkish people have extended to the

' For background, see Bulletin of May 22, 1961,
p. 778.

II

MAY 16, 1966

visiting delegations. I also want to express
the thanks of my delegation for the very
gracious message of welcome from the Pres-
ident of the Republic of Turkey, which Mr.
Alpan [Cihat Alpan, Secretary General of
the Office of the President of Turkey] has
conveyed to us this morning. In a sense,
Turkey is year-round host to CENTO, for
Ankara is the site of the headquarters of
the alliance and of the biweekly meetings
of the Council Deputies. The special debt
of gratitude all of us connected with CENTO
owe to Turkey is never far from our
thoughts.

Our plenary sessions later today are to be
held in the historic edifice of the former
Turkish Grand National Assembly, now the
home of the CENTO International Secre-
tariat. That building is filled with memories
of the beginning of the Turkish Republic
under the incomparable Kemal Ataturk. I
am sure that our distinguished Secretary
General and his dedicated staff of the secre-
tariat draw special inspiration from their
daily association with this great shrine of
modem Turkey.

In the 11 years since this organization
was formed, the adversaries who threatened
the region in 1955 have come to understand
that this defensive shield was forged by
CENTO not to threaten anyone but to warn
that efforts to molest or subvert the inde-
pendence of the CENTO countries will be
met with resolution and strength — and with
growing confidence.

775

The need for this defensive shield con-
tinues. Although they may differ among
themselves, our adversaries have not re-
nounced the Communist world revolution ;
they are bent on destroying the type of
world community framed in the Charter of
the United Nations. Indeed, some Commu-
nist leaders continue openly to advocate the
use of force for this purpose, as we have
learned through bitter experience in South-
east Asia. Nations which value their inde-
pendence and freedom therefore, as my
other colleagues have pointed out, dare not
let down their vigilance. If there is, or seems
to be, less danger of war in some parts of
the world, it is because those who would
coerce their neighbors have a healthy re-
spect for the strength and determination of
those whose dedication is to freedom.

Free men everywhere can find much to
admire and to emulate in the record of
progress registered by the peoples of Turkey,
Iran, and Pakistan over the past decade.

In Turkey the gross national product in
real terms has grown almost 50 percent;
per capita income has increased about 20
percent. Important gains also have been
made in industrial productivity — the index
now is about 150 percent of the base year
of 1958. The Turkish educational system is
teaching and training more than twice as
many students as it did 10 years ago.

In Iran the budget for education has
grown by some 93 percent since 1955, and
the number of students has grown accord-
ingly. Since Iran's Literacy Corps was or-
ganized in 1962, more than 30,000 young
Iranian men have met their obligations of
national service by teaching rural people to
read and write. The successful work of the
corps in the campaign for literacy is now
being mirrored in the companion Health
Corps and the Development Corps. Funda-
mental changes are also being wrought in
the agricultural economy of Iran. One mani-
festation is the total of nearly 50,000 villages
which have been distributed in whole or in
part to more than 1 million farmers, through
the land reform program.

In Pakistan agricultural productivity has

increased 30 percent since 1954. The manu-
facturing index shows an increase of nearly
100 percent. Per capita production of elec-
tricity for public use has increased nearly
2V2 times since 1960. In a decade the num-
ber of elementary schools has increased by
50 percent, and total enrollment has approxi-
mately doubled.

No one will profess that CENTO itself, as
an organization, is directly responsible for
these various gains. What is relevant here
is that, behind the protective shield of
CENTO, the peoples of Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey have been able to register very
substantial progress.

This record of progress and the self-
reliance it engenders have a direct signifi-
cance for CENTO as an organization. Dur-
ing the first decade of CENTO's economic
programs, major attention was directed to
regional capital projects requiring large ele-
ments of assistance from the United King-
dom and the United States. Today most of
those projects are completed or are so near
completion that we, in this Council, shall be
planning the inauguration of many of these
projects over the next few months.

It may be that CENTO will design still
other plans for additional capital projects,
but it is perhaps wise to acknowledge that
the CENTO organization is not now at this
moment drafting new projects on the scale
of the microwave system, which we are
dedicating this afternoon, or the railroad
link, which will be in operation some 18
months hence. I do not cite this prospect
in any spirit of finality but rather with
pride in cooperative accomplishment.

Cooperation has become a habit among the
regional governments — Iran, Pakistan, and
Turkey. It has found fruition in many
fields. It owes much to the shared experi-
ence provided through the undramatic but
very intimate personal interchange afforded
by CENTO's technical assistance program.

It is gratifying that this habit of coopera-
tion has reached out beyond CENTO, too.
The Regional Cooperation for Development
Organization, now nearly 2 years old, is
demonstrating that many fields for mutual

776

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

planning and interchange are open to gov-
ernments in the region, without help or
advice from the outside. The United States
congratulates the architects of RCD and
looks for valuable accomplishments to flow
from this new association. We have every
reason to believe that the activities of RCD
and CENTO, separately but with comple-
mentary objectives, can play important and
distinct roles in the economic and commer-
cial progress of the region.

President Johnson has expressed our sup-
port for the concept of regional solidarity
in these terms: "Regional cooperation," he
said, "is the best means of economic progress
as well as the best guarantor of political
independence." - We are ready to continue
and enlarge our support of institutions
which create and preserve a regional unity
of effort in economic and social develop-
ment.

President Johnson also spoke recently of
our "continuity of purpose in a generation
of change." ^ Here, among old friends and
allies, I do not think that I need to dwell at
length on our continuity of purpose. What
engages the interest of CENTO most, per-
haps, is the quality and character of the
changes in the work of this alliance. In
speaking of this "generation of change" in
which we live and work together, it is natu-
ral that we think of the younger generation.
It would be hard to find a more universally
accepted precept for planning for our young
people than the familiar goal of a "sound
mind in a sound body." Within the United
States Government, our President, in his
recent messages to the Congress, has pro-
posed a sober and searching review of our
targets in the foreign aid program, taking
account of the basic changes the times de-
mand. The President has highlighted our
new tasks by calling for special attention
to assisting international efforts in educa-
tion, health, and food supply.*

Education, health, and food programs al-
ready claim major attention of the regional
member governments. Educators, agricul-
turalists, and health experts, through
CENTO'S Multilateral Technical Coopera-

tion Fund, are continuously discovering new
ways in which we can assist one another in
coordinating efforts in these essential fields.
Here is the opportunity, and the need, to
refine and focus our efforts.

Of particular interest to CENTO, I be-
lieve, will be the emphasis that we, in the
United States, seek to give to progress in
teacher training, vocational and scientific
education, and publishing of badly needed
textbooks. In the field of public health,
CENTO'S experience in regional cooperation
suggests that the organization could have a
special role in a concerted attack on com-
municable diseases. The war on hunger and
malnutrition demands enormous resources
and ingenuity from every government and
every person who can find a role to play.
Here CENTO has not been laggard. Indeed,
the organization has given high priority to
agriculture, from the first beginnings of this
alliance. Now we should draw on that ex-
perience to enhance the effectiveness of
national campaigns to improve and modern-
ize production and distribution of food.

While considering new opportunities in
these fields, let us pay well-deserved atten-
tion to such sustaining CENTO programs as
the professional military development pro-
gram, the military training exercises, the
countersubversion program, the technical
programs in agriculture, communications,
and the other CENTO activities which con-
tribute to so many solid accomplishments in
the region.

We cannot sketch out a blueprint here
this week which will meet all our needs for
an entire decade. When we meet again next
year, I am certain that we shall consider
then new opportunities and new challenges.
But let us draw strength from our continuity

" For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on foreign aid, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

' For text of President Johnson's address before
the Foreign Service Institute, see ibid., Apr. 11,
1966, p. 554.

' For texts of President Johnson's messages to
Congress on international education and health and
on food for freedom, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, pp.
328 and 336.

MAY 16, 1966

777

of purpose amid these changes. As for the
United States, I am proud to reaffirm the
determination of my Government to con-
tinue its contribution to the purposes for
which the CENTO organization is dedicated.

FINAL COMMUNIQUE

Press release 93 dated April 22

The Council of Ministers of the Central Treaty
Organization (CENTO) held their fourteenth ses-
sion in Ankara on April 20 and 21, 1966. Leaders
of the five delegations were:

H.E. Mr. Abbas Aram, Foreign Minister of Iran

H.E. Mr. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Foreign Minister of
Pakistan

H.E. Mr. Ihsan Sabri Caglayangil, Foreign Minister
of Turkey

The Right Honorable Michael Stewart, M.P., Sec-
retary of State for Foreign Affairs, United King-
dom

The Honorable Dean Rusk, Secretary of State,
United States of America

A message of welcome from the President of
Turkey was read at the opening of the meeting. The
leaders of the national delegations expressed their
appreciation for the message and of the warm hos-
pitality extended by the Turkish Government.

The Foreign Minister of Turkey, as host, was in
the chair. He welcomed the delegations on behalf
of the Turkish Government. Mr. Caglayangil was
in turn welcomed by the other members to his first
meeting of the Council since he became Foreign
Minister.

The Council expressed its deep regret at the con-
tinued illness of the former President of Turkey,
General Cemal Gursel, and paid tribute to his dis-
tinguished services to Turkey, as a soldier and as
a statesman.

Engaging in a wide-ranging exchange of views on
international developments since its last meeting in
Tehran,' the Council agreed that the need for col-
lective security is imperative in present world cir-
cumstances. They reaffirmed their determination to
maintain the defensive strength of CENTO. The
Council recognized that threats of subversion and
aggression against the countries of the region still
remained. In this regard the Foreign Minister of
Iran drew the Council's attention to subversive
activities in the Persian Gulf area. The Ministers
reaffirmed their sincere desire to contribute to the
utmost to the reduction of international tensions
and to measures of disarmament and the strengthen-
ing of peace.

The Council reviewed the report of the Military
Committee which included a report on CENTO's
joint military exercises. They discussed sugges-
tions for further strengthening of the mutual de-
fense potential of the Alliance.

Taking into consideration existing treaties, the
Ministers expressed their deep concern over the
continuation of the Cyprus conflict with all its in-
herent dangers. They also expressed their earnest
desire for an agreed settlement which would pre-
serve peace in the Island in accordance with the
legitimate interest of all its peoples.

The Ministers deplored the outbreak of hostili-
ties between India and Pakistan. The agreement
to a cease-fire was welcomed as a step towards the
"peaceful settlement of the outstanding differences
between the two countries on Kashmir and other
related matters", contemplated in the Security Coun-
cil's resolution of September 20, 1965,° and the
Tashkent Declaration.

The United States Secretary of State and the
British Foreign Secretary gave the Council full ac-
counts of recent developments in Viet-Nam and
Rhodesia respectively.

Pleasure was expressed at the accelerated eco-
nomic development of the regional countries through
their own efforts, and the Council was pleased to
note the extent to which CENTO had been able to
contribute to the strengthening of the region
through sponsorship of joint economic projects, its
cultural programme and the opportunities it was
able to provide for people of the CENTO countries
to meet, confer and work together on productive
joint enterprises.

In approving the report of the Economic Commit-
tee, the Council noted that a number of major joint
communications projects have been completed and
are already in operation. The significant contribu-
tion they are making to the CENTO area was
symbolized during the meeting when members of the
Council participated in the formal dedication of the
CENTO microwave system. The Ministers expressed
pleasure at the very great increase in the telephonic
communication that has taken place since the 3,060-
mile system was opened to traffic in June last. The
Council also noted the completion of the CENTO
road linking Turkey with Iran, and that both the
CENTO airway and the CENTO high frequency
telecommunications link joining London with key
regional cities would be completed this year.

The Ministers approved new directions to guide
CENTO's economic activities in the years ahead as
submitted by the Economic Committee and con-
gratulated the Committee on their constructive and
realistic recommendations.

The Ministers approved priority for public health
measures which have been or will be selected for

' For background, see ibid., May 3, 1965, p. 685.

' For text, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1965, p. 608.

778

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

attention by CENTO in coordination with other
international organizations including measures for
the control of epidemic diseases in the area.

The Council agreed that the proposal to expand
and intensify CENTO's multilateral technical co-
operation programme should advance the basic
CENTO economic objective of increasing the techni-
cal self-sufficiency of the region.

The Council decided that their next meeting would
be held in London in April, 1967.

MICROWAVE SYSTEM DEDICATION

Remarks by Secretary Rusk

Mr. Secretary General, esteemed col-
leagues, and distinguished guests: The suc-
cessful completion of the CENTO Micro-
wave Telecommunications System is not
merely a triumph of technology and engi-
neering. That in itself would be impressive
enough even in this era of breathtaking
scientific achievement. The CENTO micro-
wave system is also a triumph of coopera-
tion.

This new system could never have been
erected without sharing — sharing of tal-
ents, sharing of resources, and sharing a
sense of dedication to the cause of a better
life for all men. This microwave system
clearly was not built by dollars alone but by
dollars working with rials, and rupees, and
liras. The American engineers alone could
not have achieved it.

A host of technicians in Iran, Pakistan,
and Turkey devoted their talents and ener-
gies to achieving this important advance in
our capacity to communicate with one an-
other. I understand that, at the height of
construction activity, about 7,000 men were
at work on the hundreds of interrelated
jobs required.

The implications of this new tool of com-
munication are truly thrilling, but we dare
not regard it as an unmixed blessing. As
ideas and information flow now almost in-
stantaneously from one nation to another,
the minds of our peoples will be stirred to
reach for still greater horizons, and they
will be less patient with delays in fulfill-
ment of their hopes for a better life. In

that sense, our work has only just begun.

With these things in mind, may I now
convey to you a message from the Presi-
dent of the United States.

Message From President Johnson

It gives me particular pleasure today to
send to you, the representatives of the gov-
ernments and peoples of the CENTO al-
liance, and through you to His Imperial
Majesty the Shahanshah, to Her Majesty
Queen Elizabeth II, to His Excellency Pres-
ident Ayub, and to His Excellency President
Sunay, my personal greetings and those of
the American people. Through the CENTO
Microwave Telecommunications System that
we are now inaugurating, we are all drawn
closer together; closer in time and closer in
bonds of friendship.

Only with communication can we have
understanding, and we must have under-
standing in order to have peace. Only with
communication can we share knowledge, and
we must share a great deal of knowledge in
order to foster the trade and economic de-
velopment in which all our peoples are so
deeply interested. By building together
this vital new communications link, we
have built an important instrument for the
preservation of peace and for the promotion
of prosperity. We can all be proud of this,
our cooperative accomplishment.

PRESS CONFERENCE, APRIL 22

Secretary Rusk: I wish to express to the
Foreign Minister and to the Mayor and the
Governor my very warm appreciation for
their hospitality during this meeting.

We have had a very good meeting of
CENTO, and, in addition, I have had a
chance to have bilateral discussions with
my colleagues. I want to express also our
good fortune in having such beautiful
weather here during this meeting. It has
been spectacular and it is with some regret
that we leave. I will be happy to take some
of your questions before we depart.

MAY 16, 1966

779

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you describe your
talks tliat you had last night with Mr.
Bhutto [Zulfikar AH Bhutto, Foreigrt Min-
ister of Pakistan], please?

A. Well, we talked for about 2 hours last
evening and covered a vi'ide range of sub-
jects, not only those of international im-
portance such as the situation in Southeast
Asia and some of our recent contacts on both
sides vi^ith China but also on our bilateral
relations. I found the talks very useful, and
I think we made some progress in achiev-
ing a better understanding of some of the
points on which we had minor differences in
the past, but I am sure this conversation
will go on through our regular diplomatic
channels and I will be seeing Mr. Bhutto
again in SEATO [Southeast Asia Treaty
Organization] in June.

Q. But could you say anything — are you
able to say anything at the moment about
military and economic aid to Pakistan?

A. We did not actually get into that sub-
ject very much because the Minister of Fi-
nance of Pakistan, Mr. [Mohammed]
Shoaib, is now in Washington having dis-
cussions with the International Bank and
with the United States Government; so
that is the forum through which we will dis-
cuss those matters. Mr. Bhutto and I did not
spend much time on that.

Mr. Lincoln [Robert Lincoln, Public Af-
fairs Officer, U.S. Embassy, Ankara] : Mrs.
Sahis has seven or eight questions on be-
half of the Turkish journalists here. They
got together questions.

Secretary Rusk: All right.

Q. Has CENTO become an organ for de-
fense— regional defense? If it has estab-
lished itself as an organ, then why does the
United States feel it necessary to have bi-
lateral agreements rvith the regional coun-
tries ?

A. Well, first, I would like to express my
own respect for the role which CENTO has
played here these past 10 years. I think
when one looks at the region one can see
that the threats against the region are

somewhat less than they were and the
countries in the region have made some
substantial progress in their own develop-
ment during the 10-year period. The United
States, of course, has close, strong bilateral
relations with all of our allies and all of
those with whom we are closely associated,
as we are with CENTO.

As you know, we are not in a technical
sense a formal member of CENTO. We are
associated with it very closely. I'm, in a
technical sense, here as the head of an ob-
server delegation. But we work very closely
with CENTO and participate actively in all
of its programs and activities, but we do have
strong bilateral relations with the three
regional members of CENTO.

Q. Is there a danger besides communism
in this region that CENTO should take up?
But if there is such a thing — such danger
of another threat rather than communism —
would the United States be taking measures
to prevent it?

A. Well, as far as the United States is
concerned — and I will speak only for us, be-
cause the formal members of the CENTO
can speak for themselves — as far as the
United States is concerned, our association
with CENTO is for the purpose of assisting
in deterring Communist aggression. Now,
we are aware that there are other problems,
and we try to work closely and cooperatively
with our CENTO partners on those other
problems, but those are not strictly on the
basis of our own association with CENTO,
which is limited in character to Communist
aggression.

For example — if I might just illustrate
this last point and perhaps anticipate an-
other one of your later questions — your dis-
tinguished Foreign Minister presented Turk-
ish views on Cyprus with a very great
ability during our CENTO meeting and, of
course, this question was a major topic of
conversation in our bilateral discussions this
morning.

As you know, the United States is very
much interested in the position of the Turk-
ish Cypriots in Cyprus, and we hope very

780

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

much that much more can be done to im-
prove their position with respect to the
common needs of ordinary life and their
sense of safety.

We also work with this problem in the
United Nations. We are the major con-
tributor to the United Nations Force on the
island and, during the last meeting of the
General Assembly, I think you will recall
Turkey and the United States found them-
selves voting together on the resolutions on
Cyprus.

I think I have time for about two more
questions; then I will have to take off.

Q. Did you — during any of your discus-
sions with the Secretary General this morn-
ing— did you come to agreement of princi-
ple to the review of the bilateral agreement
between the txvo countries? If such agree-
ment has been reached, when may discus-
sions be started?

A. I am happy to say that we did come to
complete agreement on that point, and those
discussions can start here in Ankara for the
convenience of the Turkish Government as
soon as possible. Both sides are ready, and
I would suppose that could be in a few days
as far as we are concerned.

Q. Mr. Secretary, after your talks with
the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, do you
feel that Pakistan might be able to play a
role in settling the Viet-Nam war?

A. Well, we are very much interested in
any opportunity anyone has to maintain
contact with the other side to explore the
possibility of peace. This would include
Pakistan. There are a number of other
governments who have regular contact with
Hanoi and Peiping who are also aware of
our interest in this matter.

But the problem is not really one of a
channel of communication. The problem is
not the diplomatic problem of establishing
contact. The problem is that, despite all of
the contacts that have occurred thus far, we
have not yet seen any intention on the part
of Hanoi to abandon its effort to take over
South Viet-Nam by force. So that is the key

point. There are many contacts. But what
is needed here is a readiness to come to the
conference table and take this problem into
discussion and away from the battlefield.
We do not see, at the present, any readiness
on the part of the other side to come. I
would be at Geneva tomorrow afternoon if
there was anyone there to talk to, literally.

Q. Thank you.

Secretary Ru^k: Mr. Minister, I hope that
you will take to your distinguished Presi-
dent and your Prime Minister our great
thanks for your hospitality here. We have
enjoyed it very much.

U.S. OBSERVER DELEGATION

The Department of State announced on
April 15 (press release 87) that Secretary
Rusk would head the U.S. observer delega-
tion to the 14th Ministerial Council session
of the Central Treaty Organization, held at
Ankara April 20-21. Parker T. Hart, U.S.
Ambassador to Turkey and U.S. observer in
the Council of Deputies, served as alternate
U.S. observer.

Advisers of the delegation included :

Senior Adviser:

Raymond A. Hare, Assistant Secretary of State for
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs

Advisers:

Scott L. Behoteguy, Economic Coordinator for
CENTO, U.S. AID Mission, Ankara

C. Arthur Borg, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

Col. Stanley P. Hidalgo, CENTO Action Officer,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Townsend Hoopes, Deputy Assistant Secretary of
Defense for International Security Affairs

Ernest K. Lindley, Special Assistant to the Secretary
of State

Charles W. Naas, Second Secretary, American Em-
bassy, Ankara

Daniel O. Newberry, Officer-in-Charge, CENTO
Affairs, Department of State

Lt. Gen. Ashton H. Manhart, U.S. Permanent Mili-
tary Deputy, Central Treaty Organization

Christopher Van Hollen, Counselor for Political
Affairs, American Embassy, Ankara

John Patrick Walsh, Deputy Executive Secretary,
Department of State

MAY 16, 1966

781

i

U.S. and European Officials
Discuss Fire Safety of Ships

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT

Press release 95 dated April 26

Anthony M. Solomon, Assistant Secre-
tary for Economic Affairs, will visit Lon-
don, Paris, Rome, Hamburg, and Athens
this week [April 25-30] to discuss with
government officials the problem of fire
safety of passenger ships and to make
clear the importance the Government of the
United States attaches to a satisfactory
resolution of this problem. Mr. Solomon
will be accompanied by Rear Adm. Charles
P. Murphy, Chief of the Office of Mer-
chant Marine Safety, U.S. Coast Guard.

These discussions will precede a meeting,
requested by the United States as an out-
growth of the Yarmouth Castle disaster
last December, of the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization's Mari-
time Safety Committee in London May
3-10 to consider the fire-safety problem.

The United States has proposed amend-
ment with respect to fire safety of pas-
senger vessels of the International Conven-
tion for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS)
of 1960,1 to which the United States and
44 other countries are parties. After the
Yarmouth Castle disaster, the United States
informed the Intergovernmental Maritime
Consultative Organization (IMCO), the par-
ent organization of the convention, that
the United States wished to add the subject
of fire safety of passenger vessels to the
agenda of the IMCO Maritime Safety Com-
mittee's meeting scheduled for January 31-
February 4, 1966. Fire safety was dis-
cussed by the Committee, and it was agreed,
at the request of the United States, to de-
vote an extraordinary session of the Com-
mittee beginning May 3 exclusively to the
problem of fire safety of passenger vessels.

The U.S. representative at the February
meeting of the Maritime Safety Committee

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
6780.

set forth the following U.S. objectives in
seeking a solution to the fire-safety prob-
lem:

1. To obtain the agreement of all govern-
ments parties to the SOLAS Convention of
1960 that future passenger ships should
conform to the Method I construction stand-
ards of the convention (that is, the use of
noncombustible materials) .

2. To revise the "grandfather" provi-
sions, which exempt old ships from meeting
the standards of the convention for new
ships.

3. To require certain improvements in
the standards of the convention for all pas-
senger ships and particularly for those that
do not conform to Method I.

The United States believes that the pro-
posals it has made in more detail in a
paper on fire protection which was circu-
lated through IMCO to the interested gov-
ernments last month would meet the prob-
lem. It is, of course, also prepared to con-
sider other proposals to accomplish the
same results. However, especially in view
of the latest cruise ship fire — that of the
Viking Princess on April 8 — the United
States attaches the greatest importance to
providing at the earliest date improved
safety standards for passengers embarking
at U.S. ports.

U.S. DELEGATION TO IMCO MEETING

The Department of State announced on
April 30 (press release 102) that Ambassa-
dor at Large W. Averell Harriman would
present the views of the U.S. Government
on the problem of fire safety of passenger
ships at the opening of an extraordinary
session of the Maritime Safety Committee
of the Intergovernmental Maritime Con-
sultative Organization at London on May 3. <
The United States requested the special
meeting of the Committee earlier this year
as a result of the Yarmouth Castle disaster j
last December.

Ambassador Harriman's presence and his
statement will emphasize further the great

782

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

importance the U.S. Government attaches
to a satisfactory solution of the fire-safety
problem as soon as possible.

Adm. Edwin J. Roland, Commandant of
the U.S. Coast Guard, will head the U.S.
delegation to the forthcoming Maritime
Safety Committee meeting, as he did at the
Committee's previous meeting January 31-
February 4, 1966.

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends

Press release 103 dated April 30

The emergency mission of the United
States petroleum airlift to aid Zambia has
been accomplished and therefore is being
terminated, as is the Canadian airlift. The
other supply routes — through Tanzania,
Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Malawi, Mozambique, and Angola — by road,
rail, river, lake, and sea, as well as continu-
ing British air transport, are now regarded
as sufficiently well developed to meet Zam-
bia's current petroleum consumption levels
and to continue to build up Zambia's petro-
leum reserves.

Farewell ceremonies to commemorate the
American-Canadian contribution to this
multinational effort were held by the Zam-
bian Government April 30.

The Vice President of Zambia, Mr. Reu-
ben Kamanga, expressed his country's ap-
preciation of the United States and Ca-
nadian airlifts in a broadcast April 21 over
Zambian radio and television. He said in
part:

We have now assured our supplies of petroleum
products and have built up our stocks to the highest
levels there have ever been in this country. The
American and Canadian airlifts have made a great
contribution to meeting our needs and to building
up our stockpiles. I would like to bid them fare-
well and place on record our great appreciation of
the work that they have done and of the vital con-
tribution that they have made to the solution of
our petroleum problems.

Both the Pan American and Trans World
Airlines jets commenced service in the air-
lift in early January of this year, carrying

petroleum products from Leopoldville to
Elisabethville. The products were then
transported from Elisabethville to Zambia
by rail and road. The Congolese Government
as well as many commercial enterprises in
the Congo cooperated actively in carrying on
the airlift. The two United States airlines
have carried more than 3.6 million gallons of
petroleum products in this airlift.

The United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development in late 1965 and early
1966 signed the airlift agreements with Pan
American Airways and TWA.^ The multi-
national transport effort to Zambia was ini-
tiated in order to minimize the impact
upon Zambia of the cessation of petroleum
supplies normally received from and
through Southern Rhodesia.

IVIay 21 Deadline Set for Claims
on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release

dated April 26

The American Embassy at Santo Do-
mingo has informed the Department of
State that on April 7, 1966, the Govern-
ment of the Dominican Republic established,
in accordance with Law Number 172 of
April 6, 1966, a special Commission for re-
ceiving, investigating, and processing all
claims for losses resulting from the damage
and destruction of property in the National
District of Santo Domingo as a result of the
civil strife which began on April 24, 1965.

American nationals who desire to file
such claims should write with the least
possible delay to: Comision Depuradora de
Reclamaciones por Danos de Guerra, Calle
Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas
Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Re-
public.

The Department of State is informed
that claims are required to be filed with the
Commission by May 21, 1966.

• For background, see Bulletin of Jan. 17, 1966,
p. 85, and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157.

MAY 16, 1966

783

THE CONGRESS

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters

Statement by Thomas C. Mann
Under Secretary for Economic Affairs ^

It is a pleasure for me to appear here to
discuss with you the position of the Depart-
ment of State on the population growth
aspects of economic and social development
programs abroad.

The Department of State, together with
the Agency for International Development,
has been giving increasing attention to these
problems over the past 5 years. It has par-
ticipated in numerous meetings, both in the
international field and here at home, with
private organizations concerned with popu-
lation growth. Its senior officers have
spoken publicly on this subject and have
met with many private groups to exchange
views on the problem.

In some areas the population threatens to
double itself in a generation. The long-term
implications of such increases in population
are sobering. They are a serious challenge
to us if we are to succeed in the long efforts
we have been making to assist a large part
of the world in its orderly economic and
social development.

The problem is summarized very well in
the bill [S. 1676] introduced by the chairman
of this subcommittee and other Members of
the Senate:

... (1) the application of public health measures
and the introduction of modern medical life-saving
and life-prolonging techniques have contributed to
a doubling of the annual rate of world population
growth within the past eighteen years, and may

be expected to continue to increase rates of such
growth in the future;

(2) population growth is a vital factor in deter-
mining the extent to which economic development
and political stability will prevail in any country,
especially in countries which are in the early stages
of economic and political development;

(3) at present, because of the rapid and continued
growth in population, hundreds of millions of par-
ents are unable to provide adequately for them-
selves and their children;

(4) those nations in which population growth is
most extreme and where the problems arising from
such growth are most acute are, because of economic,
technical, and other considerations, also the nations
least able independently to cope with such growth
and the problems connected therewith. . . .

So much for the problem. What are we
doing about it?

First, we have been active in the formula-
tion and expression of international policies
and programs on population matters. In
1962, for example, we supported a resolution
in the General Assembly which endorsed
United Nations encouragement and assist-
ance to governments "in obtaining basic
data and carrying out essential studies of
the demographic aspects, as well as other
aspects, of their economic and social develop-
ment problems." ^ We have consistently en-

^ Made before the Subcommittee on Foreign Aid
Expenditures of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations on Apr. 11 (press release 84 dated
Apr. 14).

' For U.S. statements and text of resolution, see
Bulletin of Jan. 7, 1963, p. 14.

784

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

couraged and supported United Nations ac-
tivities devoted to the study of the nature
and scope of population problems and their
possible solutions. We have, in the United
Nations and on the international scene, un-
derlined our concern about the social conse-
quences of our own population trends and
our interest in learning more — and helping
others to learn more — about population
trends in the developing countries.

We have, hov/ever, also been keenly aware
of the many complexities involved in the
population problem and its possible solution.
To the extent we can help other countries in
this field we are ready to do so, but it is
essential to our foreign policy goals that
there be no misunderstanding about the
dimensions of our activities and intentions.
Therefore, as far back as 1962, the Depart-
ment of State made it clear that the United
States did not — and will not — advocate any
specific policy that another country might
follow in approaching its population grovrth
problems. We stated that the United States
was prepared to help other countries — but
only upon their request — to find possible
sources of information and assistance on
ways to deal with the problem.

Ambassador Stevenson set forth addi-
tional aspects of our policy in the field of
international cooperation when, in a public
speech in 1963, he called upon the United
Nations to be prepared to extend to member
countries technical assistance for surveys on
attitudes toward marriage, child rearing,
and family size. Ambassador Stevenson also
stated that the United Nations, together
with UNESCO and the World Health Orga-
nization, could advise other countries, at
their request, on how best to inform their
nationals about family planning consistent
with the cultural and religious values of the
country concerned. We have supported the
World Health Organization in a research
program on fertility and human reproduc-
tion.

Second, we have continued to expand our
own activities abroad. The guideline for the
greater concentration of resources, both by
the Department of State and the Agency for

International Development, in our interna-
tional programs is to be found in the Presi-
dent's statement in January 1965, when he
said, "I will seek new ways to use our knowl-
edge to help deal with the explosion in world
population and the growing scarcity in
world resources." ^

Shortly after the President's statement —
early in March 1965 — the Department sent
an instruction to our embassies around the
world to insure the closest cooperation be-
tween our embassy staffs and those of the
Agency for International Development in
each country in working on population mat-
ters. We stressed to our embassies the con-
tinuing responsible concern of our Govern-
ment in this field. This is consistent with
the proposal in S. 1676 concerning the trans-
mission of data to United States diplomatic
personnel and other mission officers so that
they may be advised with respect to the
problems and their duties.

We also informed them in this circular
that our AID missions abroad were being
supplied with general reference materials
and technical publications dealing with a
wide range of subjects, from demographic
studies to family planning booklets. In each
AID mission abroad there is not only a small
library of reference material and technical
publications but, in virtually all, an officer
who has been designated to coordinate mis-
sion activities in this field. This is consistent
with the suggestion concerning demographic
attaches in S. 1676.

Here at home, the Agency for Interna-
tional Development has organized a Popula-
tion Reference and Research Branch. This
branch serves as the focal point for coordi-
nating all AID operations around the world
in this field. I am informed that AID already
has good files on programs in other coun-
tries. This is consistent with the suggestion
made in S. 1676 for the collection of data on
all foreign population programs whether or
not instituted or assisted by the United
States.

' For text of President Johnson's state of the
Union message, see ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

MAY 16, 1966

785

Working within this AID framework are
a number of consultants. They advise us on
the demographic, economic, medical, and
public health aspects of the population prob-
lem. But more than that, they maintain con-
tact and coordinate with interested United
States and foreign private institutions and
groups concerned with the population prob-
lem. Dr. [Edgar F.] Berman, for example,
traveled extensively in Latin America when
I was in charge of the Inter-American Bu-
reau, where he sought out and talked with
all those in the public and private sectors in-
terested in the problem. These consultants
are performing a number of the functions
suggested in S. 1676.

The Bureau of Inter-American Affairs,
which has merged into one organization the
functions and staffs of the Department and
AID with respect to Latin America, has cre-
ated a Population Unit in its Institutional De-
velopment Office. The AID geographic Bu-
reaus for the other regions also have popu-
lation officers in their health units.

The Department's Office of Research and
Analysis has undertaken several population
research projects. We should be alert to the
possibilities of using this office on additional
research projects.

An increasing amount of AID funds has
been used in support of population programs
in those developing countries which have
asked for our assistance, and AID programs
in this field are scheduled to be increased
substantially over the next few years. Mr.
Bell [David E. Bell, Administrator, Agency
for International Development] informed
this subcommittee on April 8 of some of the
principal programs AID has undertaken
abroad: in the Republic of China, Turkey,
Honduras, Pakistan, and in other countries.
Many countries are becoming more aware of
the need for action on their population prob-
lems, and a growing number are seeking ad-
vice and assistance.

We agree with this subcommittee on the
need for a focal point in the Department of
State to undertake policy coordination in all
our programs abroad; to insure full consid-
eration of our foreign policy objectives, par-

ticularly those of a political nature, in the
carrying out of these programs ; to keep our
embassies fully informed of our thoughts
and plans and, where necessary, to make sure
our posts abroad are giving this serious
problem all the attention it deserves; and,
finally, to maintain close liaison with the De-
partment of Health, Education, and Welfare,
all other United States Government agencies,
and private institutions and organizations
concerned with this problem, as well as with
this subcommittee.

To this end, my own office — that of Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs —
will serve as the needed focal point for pol-
icy matters and coordination. Working under
me will be a Special Assistant for Population
Matters, a position comparable with that of
the special assistants who are now in charge
of such important fields in our international
relationships as fisheries, food for peace,
and labor. Working with me, through a Spe-
cial Assistant for Population Matters, will be
officers representing the bureaus in the De-
partment, as well as the AID offices, which
work on the various aspects of the problem —
for example, the Bureau of International
Organization Affairs, which is in charge of
handling matters with the United Nations
and its specialized agencies. In addition, the
geographic bureaus, particularly those which
cover those areas of the world in which the
population problem is a serious one — Latin
America, the Near East and South Asia, and
the Far East — will, as I have said, designate
one of their senior officers to work with my
office on this subject.

To sum up, Mr. Chairman, I believe that
the Department has done and will continue
to do everything it can properly do to en-
courage other governments to give this prob-
lem the attention it deserves and to respond
to such requests for assistance as we receive,
subject only to the limitations which Mr.
Bell has already described to this committee
and which I will not repeat here. We have
all the legislative authority we need at this
time. Should the future demonstrate a need
for additional legislation in this field, we
shall not hesitate to ask for it.

786

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Mr. Chairman, we have a vital national in-
terest in this subject and are grateful for
the thought you and your associates are giv-
ing it. I assure you that the Department of
State fully shares your concern and that it
hopes that its increasing efforts in this field,
and those of all of our official and private
institutions, may soon point the vi^ay to a
solution of this worldwide problem.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

S9th Congress, 2d Session

The Atlantic Alliance: Allied Comment. Prepared

^by the Subcommittee on National Security and
International Operations of the Senate Commit-
tee on Government Operations. January 1966. 82
pp. [Committee print.]
Regional and Other Documents Concerning United
_: States Relations With Latin America. Prepared
i by the staff of the Subcommittee on Inter-Ameri-

I can Affairs of the House Committee on Foreign

II Affairs. January 28, 1966. 330 pp. [Committee
print.]

Supplemental Foreign Assistance, Fiscal Year 1966
— Vietnam. Hearings before the Senate Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations. Part I. January 28-
February 18, 1966. 743 pp.
The Atlantic Alliance: Basic Issues. A study sub-
mitted by the Subcommittee on National Security
1 and International Operations to the Senate Com-

I mittee on Government Operations. February 1966.
' 14 pp. [Committee print.]

Visit to Japan, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and
Israel. Report of Senate Delegation Named by
the Vice President To Respond to Certain Official
Invitations from Foreign Parliamentary Bodies

ti and Governments. By Senator Wayne Morse.
1 February 10, 1966. 27 pp. [Committee print]

United States Policy Toward Asia. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on the Far East and the Pacific
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part
II. February 15-March 10, 1966. 258 pp.

Third Special Report of the U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on International Educational and Cultural
Affairs. H. Doc 386. February 22, 1966. 60 pp.

United States-South African Relations. Hearings
before the Subcommittee on Africa of the House
Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I. March
1-17, 1966. 253 pp.

Refugee Problems in South Vietnam. Report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee made by its Sub-
committee To Investigate Problems Connected
With Refugees and Escapees, together with in-
dividual views. S. Rept. 1058. March 4, 1966. 35 pp.

Twenty-First Report of the U.S. Advisory Commis-
sion on Information. H. Doc. 403. March 7, 1966.
41 pp.

Amending the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Re-
port (together with supplemental views) to accom-
pany H.R. 12169. S. Rept. 1060. March 9, 1966.
12 pp.

International Health Act of 1966. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 12453. H. Rept. 1317. March 11, 1966.
27 pp.

Supplemental Defense Appropriation Bill, 1966.
Report to accompany H.R. 13546. H. Rept. 1316.
March 11, 1966. 24 pp.

Interim Trade Agreement Between the United
States and Canada. Message from the President
transmitting the agreement. H. Doc. 411. March
15, 1966. 32 pp.

TREATY INFORMATION

United States and Spain Conclude
Agreements on Space Cooperation

Press release 82 dated April 14

Spanish Foreign Minister Fernando Cas-
tiella and United States Secretary of State
Dean Rusk on April 14 exchanged notes
confirming two agreements involving coop-
eration between Spain and the United
States in space. Deputy Administrator Rob-
ert C. Seamans, Jr., represented the National
Aeronautics and Space Administration.

The first agreement provides for con-
tinued use by NASA of its manned space
flight station on Grand Canary Island, while
the second agreement provides for a cooper-
ative Spain-United States scientific sound-
ing-rocket program to measure winds and
temperatures at high altitudes.

The Canary Islands agreement outlines
expansion of facilities at the station to
support the Apollo lunar landing project
and other space exploration programs. The
original agreement of March 1960 ^ estab-
lished the station for one-man Mercury mis-
sions, and it has continued in service for the
two-man Gemini flights. The new agreement
for the three-man Apollo missions and more
advanced programs runs until January 29,
1974.

The Instituto Nacional de Technica Aero-

^ Treaties and Other International Acts Series
4463 and 5393.

MAY 16, 1966

787

I

spacial (INTA) representing the Comisi6n
Nacional de Investigacion del Espacio
(CONIE) will continue to be responsible for
the participation of Spanish personnel in
the operation of the station.

The initial function of the Canary Islands
station during Gemini is to support the
astronauts' first orbit. The station picks up
the spacecraft as it goes beyond the range
of tracking from Bermuda, continuing cov-
erage as the flight passes over Africa toward
Kano, Nigeria.

One of the seven primary stations sup-
porting Gemini, the Canary Islands site is
essential to the entire mission for its real-
time voice communications and telemetry
between the spacecraft and Mission Control
at Cape Kennedy and Houston.

The Apollo assignment will be equally
vital. Following insertion into orbit over an
Apollo ship in mid-Atlantic, the first data
from the spacecraft will be received by the
Canary Islands station or, if the launch
angle is farther south, by the NASA station
at Ascension Island.

The second agreement, part of a continu-
ing Spanish-U.S. program of cooperation in
space investigation, was confirmed by an
exchange of notes between the Foreign
Minister and the Secretary of State. It
provides that four Nike-boosted rockets
carrying small acoustic grenades will be
launched in Spain.

Acoustic grenades will be ejected and
detonated at regular intervals during the
ascent of the rocket to approximately 56
miles. Average temperature and winds in
the area between grenade detonations will
be determined by measuring the exact time
of detonation of each grenade, the time of
arrival of each sound wave at ground micro-
phones, and the exact position of each
grenade detonation. Thus, the speed of
sound in the area between two detonations
is measured and the wind speed and direc-
tion can be derived from the horizontal
drift.

The agreement is in the form of a memo-
randum of understanding - concluded be-

tween INTA and NASA. The memorandum *
provides that INTA will establish a sound-
ing-rocket range, construct grenade-type
payloads, provide two Nike-boosted rockets,
conduct launchings, and analyze and publish ,
the data obtained. NASA will lend range-
tracking and telemetry equipment and a
launcher, provide two Nike-boosted rockets,
provide a prototype payload, and train
Spanish personnel as needed. INTA and
NASA will each bear the cost of discharg- ,
ing their respective responsibilities. •

The results of the experiments will be
made available to the world scientific com-
munity.

United States and Romania Agree
on 1966 Program of Exchanges

Press release 94 dated April 26

The U.S.-Romanian program of exchanges
for 1966 was agreed upon in an exchange of
letters between Walter J. Stoessel, Jr., the
Acting Assistant Secretary for European
Affairs, and Petre Balaceanu, the Ambas-
sador of the Socialist Republic of Romania,
at the Department of State on April 25.

Most of the specified exchanges are in
the field of education and cultural affairs.
Provisions are also made for exchanges in
public health, science and technology, ex-
hibits, publishing, radio and television, and ^
performing arts.

Since 1960, U.S.-Romanian exchanges
have been carried out in accordance with
diplomatic notes exchanged every 2 years.
The 1966 program is covered by notes ex-
changed on December 23, 1964. ^

The new program includes provisions for
each country to send to the other 10 gradu-
ate students and researchers, 2 professors of
language and literature, 2 public health
specialists, and 10 cultural specialists.

" Not printed here.

' For a Department announcement and text of the
U.S. note, see Bulletin of Jan. 18, 1965, p. 87.

788

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Commodities — Wheat

Agricultural commodities agreement between the
United States and Kenya, Tanzania, Uganda, and
the East African Common Services Organization
(EACSO) under title IV of the Agricultural
Trade Development and Assistance Act of 1954,
as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7 U.S.C. 1731—1736),
with memorandum of understanding. Signed at
Dar es Salaam February 18, 1966, and at Nairobi
February 19 and 22 and March 4, 1966. Entered
into force March 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment dis-
putes between states and nationals of other states.
Done at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Signature: Korea, April 18, 1966.

Health

Amendment to Article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Done at Geneva
May 20, 1965.'

Acceptance deposited: Yugoslavia, March 29,
1966.

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization
(TIAS 4044). Adopted at London September 15,
1964.'

Acceptance received: United Arab Republic,
March 11, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949
(TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals.
Done at Washington July 15, 1963.
Ratification deposited: Italy, April 29, 1966.
Entered into force: April 29, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at sea,
1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered into
force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciation received: Belgium, March 22, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: National Telecommunications Council
of Brazil, April 25, 1966.

Sugar

Protocol for the further prolongation of the inter-
national sugar agreement of 1958 (TIAS 4389).
Open for signature at London November 1
through December 23, 1965. Entered into force
January 1, 1966. TIAS 5933.

Ratification deposited: Dominican Republic, Feb-
ruary 17, 1966.
Accessio7is deposited: Ghana, January 24, 1966;
Guatemala, February 9, 1966; " Panama, March
8, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).

Open for signature at Washington April 4 through

29, 1966.'

Signatures: Argentina, April 26, 1966; Austria,
April 27, 1966; Brazil, April 25, 1966; Canada,
April 28, 1966; Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; El
Salvador, April 26, 1966; France, April 25,
1966; Iceland, April 25, 1966; India, April 28,
1966; Ireland, April 25, 1966; Italy, April 27,
1966; Japan, April 25, 1966; Mexico, April 26,
1966; Netherlands, April 28, 1966; New Zea-
land, April 26, 1966; Norway, April 26, 1966;
Peru, April 28, 1966; Philippines, April 25,
1966; Sierra Leone, April 28, 1966; Spain,
April 27, 1966; Sweden, April 25, 1966;' Vati-
can City State, April 27, 1966; Venezuela;
April 28, 1966; Western Samoa, April 26, 1966.

Notifications of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Costa Rica, April 27, 1966; Japan, April 25,
1966.

Acceptance deposited: Japan, April 25, 1966.

BILATERAL

Afghanistan

Agreement extending the technical cooperation pro-
gram agreement of June 30, 1953, as extended
(TIAS 2856). Effected by exchange of notes at
Kabul April 2 and 4, 1966. Entered into force
April 4, 1966.

China

Agreement amending the agreement of October 19,
1963, concerning trade in cotton textiles, as
amended (TIAS 5482, 5549, 5754, 5820). Ex-
change of notes at Washington April 22, 1966.
Entered into force April 22, 1966.

Spain

Amendment to the agreement of August 16, 1957
(TIAS 3988) for cooperation concerning civil
uses of atomic energy. Signed at Washington
November 29, 1965.
Entered into force: April 1, 1966.

Sudan

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Khartoum April 13, 1966. Entered into
force April 13, 1966.

Turkey

Agreement extending the agreement of February 16
and July 1, 1954, as amended (TIAS 3042, 4309),
and the agreement of October 14, 1958 (TIAS
4117), relating to the loan of certain naval ves-
sels to Turkey. Effected by exchange of notes
at Ankara October 14, 1965, and February 28,
1966. Entered into force February 28, 1966.

Yugoslavia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Belgrade April 11, 1966. Entered into
force April 11, 1966.

' Not in force.

' With a declaration.

' Subject to ratification.

MAY 16, 1966

789

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Military Bases in the Philippines — Relinquishment
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5924. 6 pp. b<t.

Corregidor — Bataan Memorial. Agreement with the
Philippines. Exchange of notes — Signed at Manila
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Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

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Desalting. Agreement with Saudi Arabia. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Jidda November 11 and 19, 1965.
Entered into force November 19, 1965. TIAS 5932.
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Health and Sanitation — United States Naval Medical
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Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
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amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon
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1965. TIAS 5944. 3 pp. 5<f.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with the
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1966. Entered into force January 3, 1966. With ex-
change of notes. TIAS 5950. 11 pp. 10<;.

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Agreement with the United Arab Republic — Signed
at Cairo January 3, 1966. Entered into force Jan-
uary 3, 1966. With exchange of notes. TIAS 5951.
8 pp. 10«*.

Atomic Energy — Application of Safeguards by the
IAEA to the United States-Greece Cooperation
Agreement. Agreement with Greece and the Inter-
national Atomic Energy Agency — Signed at Vienna
June 15, 1964. Entered into force January 13, 1966.
TIAS 5952. 10 pp. 10(f.

Whaling. Amendments to the Schedule to the Inter-
national Whaling Convention — -Signed at Washing-
ton December 2, 1946. Adopted at the seventeenth
meeting of the International Whaling Commission,
London, July 2, 1965. Entered into force October 6,
1965, and January 4, 1966. TIAS 5953. 9 pp. 10<f.

Telecommunications — Television Broadcasting in
Viet-Nam. Agreement with Viet-Nam. Exchange of
notes — Signed at Saigon January 3, 1966. Entered
into force January 3, 1966. TIAS 5954. 4 pp. 5*.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1403 PUBLICATION 8079 MAY 16. 19M

The Department of State Bulletin, •
weekly publication issned by the Office
of Media Servicea, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Qovemment with Infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreif^n relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Fordam
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the Preaident and by the Seeretarr of
Stat* and other offie«n of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of ganeral international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currenUy.

The Bulletin U for sale by the Super-
intendent of Doeumenta. U.S. Oovem-

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20402. Fbics: 52 issues, domestic tlO,
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Use of funds for prlntins of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of th«
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1968).

NOTB: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the sonrea will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Litar-
atnre.

790

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

J

INDEX May 16, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1403

ASIA

The Responsibilities of World Leadership
(Humphrey) 769

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in
Southeast Asia (transcript of television
interview) 772

Atomic Energy. U.S. Position on Nuclear Shar-
ing Reaffirmed by Secretary Rusk . . . 768

China. Secretary Comments on Peiping's Mili-
tancy in Southeast Asia (transcript of tele-
I vision interview) 772

Claims and Property. May 21 Deadline Set for
Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses 783

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 787

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters
(Mann) 784

Cyprus. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Department and Foreign Service. Coordination
of Policy on Population Matters (Mann) . 784

Dominican Republic. May 21 Deadline Set for
Claims on Santo Domingo Property Losses 783

Economic Affairs

U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends 783

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire
Safety of Ships 782

Educational and Cultural Affairs. United
States and Romania Agree on 1966 Program
of Exchanges 788

Europe. The Larger Meaning of the NATO
Crisis (Ball) 762

Foreign Aid

Coordination of Policy on Population Matters
(Mann) 784

The Responsibilities of World Leadership
(Humphrey) 769

Germany. U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Re-
affirmed by Secretary Rusk 768

International Organizations and Conferences

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara
(Johnson, Rusk, communique) 775

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety
of Ships 782

Iran. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Middle East. Central Treaty Organization Meets
at Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . 775

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

The Larger Meaning of the NATO Crisis (Ball) 762
U.S. Position on Nuclear Sharing Reaffirmed
by Secretary Rusk 768

Pakistan. Central Treaty Organization Meets
at Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . 775

Presidential Documents. Central Treaty Organi-
zation Meets at Ankara 775

Publications. Recent Releases 790

Romania. United States and Romania Agree
on 1966 Program of Exchanges 788

Science. United States and Spain Conclude
Agreements on Space Cooperation . . . 787

Spain. United States and Spain Conclude Agree-
ments on Space Cooperation 787

Treaty Information

Current Actions 789

U.S. and European Officials Discuss Fire Safety
of Ships 782

United States and Romania Agree on 1966 Pro-
-am of Exchanges 788

United States and Spain Conclude Agreements
on Space Cooperation 787

Turkey. Central Treaty Organization Meets at
Ankara (Johnson, Rusk, communique) . . 775

Viet-Nam

Central Treaty Organization Meets at Ankara
(Johnson, Rusk, communique) 775

Secretary Comments on Peiping's Militancy in
Southeast Asia (transcript of television in-
terview) 772

Zambia. U.S. Airlift to Zambia Ends ... 783

Name Index

Ball, George W 762

Humphrey, Vice President 769

Johnson, President 775

Mann, Thomas C 784

Rusk, Secretary 768, 772, 775

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: April 25-iVlay 1

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to April 25 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
82 and 84 of April 14, 87 of April 15, and 93
of April 22.

No. Date Subject

94 4/25 U.S.-Romanian exchange pro-

gram.

95 4/25 Solomon to discuss fire safety of

passenger ships with European
officials.

t96 4/25 Frankel: "The Era of Educational
and Cultural Relations."

t97 4/26 U.S.-China cotton textiles agree-
ment.

+98 4/26 MacArthur: "Your Stake in the
Balance-of-Payments Problem."
99 4/26 Claims for property losses in Na-
tional District of Santo Do-
mingo.

100 4/27 Rusk: television interview on Red

China.

101 4/29 Ball : "The Larger Meaning of the

NATO Crisis."

102 4/30 Harriman to present U.S. views

at IMCO meeting (rewrite).

103 4/30 End of U.S. airiift to Zambia.

t Held for a later issue of the BULLETIN.

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV. No. U05

May 30, 1966

WORLD TRADE

EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS ACT OF 1966
Letter of Transmittal and Text of Bill 838

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON U.S. TRADE
WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION

8U5

THE JOHNSON TRADE POLICY
Article by William M. Roth 856

BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Statement by Secretary Rusk 830

i

ssvw NOisoa

992 xoa

Ayvaen ongnd

lN3WiyVd30 30N3IDS Itfl DOS:
9 D10-q^'"|

Background of U.S. Policy in Soutiieast Asia

statement by Secretary Rtcsk ^

f

Mr. Chairman, I do have some observa-
tions to make on two points, if I may. They
will be relatively brief and I think informal.

Toward the close of our last hearing on
April 18, 1 believe you, Mr. Chairman, raised
a question about the background of our
policy in Southeast Asia. I referred to a
policy conclusion on the part of the United
States, beginning with the Truman adminis-
tration, that the security of Southeast Asia
was vital to the security of the United
States, and that various actions taken by us,
such as our economic and military assistance
programs and the formation of the SEATO
[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]
treaty, were applications of that underlying
policy.

I was myself in Government during the
Truman administration and well recall the
discussions which were held at the highest
levels of Government in the National Secu-
rity Council as well as the strategic problems
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the committee will search its own and
the public records on this matter during that
period and since, they could surely have no
doubt that it was the judgment that the
security of Southeast Asia was extremely
important to the security interests of the
United States. This was because of the more
than 200 million people in Southeast Asia,
the geography of that area, the important
natural resources of the countries involved,
the relationship of Southeast Asia to the
total world situation, and the effect upon
the prospects of a durable peace.

I emphasize the last point because the

overriding security interest of the United
States is in organizing a stable peace. The
sacrifices of World War II and the almost
unimaginable losses of a world war III un-
derline this central objective of American
policy.

There was also involved the problem of
the phenomenon of aggression. We had
found ourselves in the catastrophe of World
War II because aggressions in Asia, in
Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that
the aggressor would not stop until compelled
to do so. It was the determination of the
United States to learn the lessons of that
experience by moving in the U.N. and other-
wise to try to build an enduring interna-
tional peace.

This primary concern in peace and free-
dom was at the heart of President Truman's
message to the Congress on March 12, 1947,
in which he said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting at-
tempted subjugation by armed minorities or by out-
side pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies In their own way.

That was in connection with the Greek
problem.

In recognizing the governments of Viet-
Nam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1950, the State
Department declared that "this recognition
is consistent with our fundamental policy of
giving support to the peaceful and demo-

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on May 9.

830

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

cratic evolution of dependent peoples toward
self-government and independence. "^

At the time of the attack by North Korea
on South Korea in June 1950, President Tru-
man stated :3

I have similarly directed acceleration in the fur-
nishing of military assistance for the forces of
France and the Associated States in Indochina and
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close
working relations with those forces.

In January 1951, in connection with a visit
by Prime Minister Pleven of France, their
joint statement said:*

The President and the Prime Minister found
themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity
of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations
of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their
security and assure their independence.

Again, in April 1951 President Truman
stated that:^

We believe . . . that all the nations of Asia should
be free to work out their aifairs in their own way.
This is the basis of peace in the Far East and peace
every^vhere else.

This is the theme which, as a matter of
general policy, has been central to the atti-
tude of the United States in the postwar
period insofar as Southeast Asia is con-
cerned. It is reflected in many public decla-
rations by Presidents and Secretaries of
State and in the annual hearings before this
and other committees of the Congress. You
will find this theme in the report of your
own committee and in declarations of mem-
bers of your committee on the floor of the
Senate.

In your committee's report, for example,
on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, your
committee stated that "the U.S. military
assistance for the past three years has been
critically important to the continued survival
of the Associated States as a nation free
from Communist control. Continued assist-
ance is essential if the Communist threat is

'For a Department statement of Feb. 7, 1950,
see Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1950, p. 291.
,jl * For text, see ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.

* For text, see ibid., Feb. 12, 1951, p. 243.

• For text, see ibid., Apr. 16, 1951, p. 603.

to be met successfully and eventually liqui-
dated."

Again, in 1953 your committee's report
stated :

The free world cannot afford to lose the war in
Indochina. But so far neither has the free world
been able to win it. It is of the utmost importance
that the stalemate be ended. Pacification of the
country must be the first objective of our policy.

The Geneva Accords

This underlying policy was given expres-
sion in a variety of ways. We strongly as-
sisted the French and the non-Communist
forces of the Associated States of Indochina
with large economic and military assistance.
Following the Geneva accords of 1954 you
will recall that Under Secretary Bedell
Smith, in speaking for the United States,
said that the United States would refrain
from the threat or the use of force to dis-
turb these accords, "in accordance with
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations dealing with the obligation of mem-
bers to refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force," and,
second, that it "would view any renewal of
the aggression in violation of the aforesaid
agreements with grave concern and as seri-
ously threatening international peace and
security." «

Again, following those Geneva accords, the
Eisenhower administration negotiated and
presented to the Senate the Southeast Asia
treaty, in which is contained a very impor-
tant provision, article 4, paragraph 1 : '

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means
of armed attack in the treaty area against any of
the Parties or against any State or territory which
the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter
designate (that means the protocol states), would
endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that
it will in that event act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Aid to the states which emerged from
Indochina and the Southeast Asia treaty

' For text of the U.S. declaration on Indochina
of July 21, 1954, see ibid., Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.
' For text, see ibid., Sept. 20, 1954, p. 394.

MAY 30, 1966

831

itself were rooted in the underlying convic-
tion that the freedom and safety of these
countries in Southeast Asia were necessary
to the organization of a reliable peace and
other security interests of the United States.
In 1959 President Eisenhower in an ad-
dress at Gettysburg College said : ^

Strate^cally South Viet-Nam's capture by the
Communists would bring their power several hundred
miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining
countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by
a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 mil-
lion people would be lost immediately and that of
150 million others in adjacent lands would be seri-
ously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam
would set in motion a crumbling process that could,
as it progressed, have grave consequences for us
and for freedom.

It would not be correct to put the cart
before the horse and say that economic and
military assistance programs themselves
carried with them undisclosed or unantici-
pated military commitments. We have given
assistance to allies, but the commitment is
in the alliance. We have given assistance to
those with whom we are not allied, and we
have not given assistance in some situations,
which have resulted in situations such as,
for example, Hungary and Tibet.

Congressional Support of U.S. Policy

The simple fact is that we considered
throughout the postwar period that we have
an important stake in the security and inde-
pendence of the nations in Southeast Asia
and we have given effect to that attitude
through assistance programs and, in some
cases, through alliance arrangements. There
has been no mystery about these matters.
They have been fully and exhaustively dis-
cussed with the leadership and the commit-
tees of Congress over the years, and the
Congress has taken action to support that
prevailing policy.

Apart from authorization and appropria-
tions for specific needs, the Congress in
August 1964 voted overwhelmingly for a
resolution on Southeast Asia ® which stated
that:

The United States regards as vital to its national
interest and to world peace the maintenance of
international peace and security in southeast Asia.

The resolution further stated that:

. . . the United States is, therefore, prepared,
as the President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist
any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
defense of its freedom.

That resolution can be rescinded by con-
current resolution of the Congress not sub-
ject to the veto of the President. An attempt
was made in the Senate during the present
session of the Congress to rescind that reso-
lution, but the effort was refused by the
overwhelming majority of the Senate.

Legality of U.S. Efforts in South Viet-Nam

Very briefly, on the second question, Mr.
Chairman, the matter was raised with re-
spect to the legal issues surrounding our
efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made
available to the committee an extensive legal
memorandum on these matters,^" and the
law officers of the Government are available
to discuss this in whatever detail the com-
mittee may wish.

In this brief statement today I shall merely
outline the essence of our view.

Military actions of the United States in
support of South Viet-Nam, including air
attacks on military targets in North Viet-
Nam, are authorized under international law
by the well-established right of collective
self-defense against armed attack.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed
attack from the North through the infiltra-
tion of armed personnel, military equipment,
and regular combat units. This armed attack
preceded our strikes at military targets in
North Viet-Nam.

The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a
member of the United Nations, because of
the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the
lawfulness of collective self-defense of South

Ibid., Apr. 27, 1959, p. 579.
' For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.
For text, see ibid., Mar. 28, 1966, p. 474.

832

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was
not designed to, and does not, limit the right
of self-defense to United Nations members.

Nor does South Viet-Nam's status under
the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of
a temporarily divided state, impair the law-
fulness of the defense against attack from
the other zone.

As in Germany and Korea, the demarcation
line is established by an international agree-
ment, and international law requires that it
be respected by each zone. Moreover, South
Viet-Nam has been recognized as an inde-
pendent entity by more than 60 governments
around the world and admitted to member-
ship in a number of the specialized agencies
of the U.N.

Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to
restrict the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense to regional organizations such
as the OAS [Organization of American
States] .

As required by the U.N. Charter, the
United States has reported to the Security
Council the actions it has taken in exercising
the right of collective self-defense in Viet-
Nam. It has indeed requested the Council
to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis
of the Geneva accords, but the Council has
not been able to act.^^

There is no requirement in international
law for a declaration of war before the right
of individual or collective self-defense can
be exercised.

South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva
accords of 1954 by refusing to engage in
consultations with the North Vietnamese in
1955 with a view to holding general elections
in 1956, as provided for in those accords.
Even assuming that the election provisions
were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did
not agree to them, conditions in the North
clearly made impossible the free expression
of the national will contemplated by the ac-
cords. In these circumstances, at least. South
Viet-Nam was justified in declining to par-

" For text of U.S. statements, see ibid., Feb. 14,
1966, p. 229.

ticipate in planning for a nationwide elec-
tion.

The introduction of U.S. military person-
nel and equipment in South Viet-Nam is not
a violation of the accords. Until late 1961
U.S. military personnel and equipment in
South Viet-Nam were restricted to replace-
ments for French military personnel and
equipment in 1954. Such replacement was
expressly permitted by the accords.

North Viet-Nam, however, had from the
beginning violated the accords by leaving
forces and supplies in the South and using
its zone for aggression against the South.
In response to mounting armed infiltration
from the North, the United States, beginning
in late 1961, substantially increased its con-
tribution to the South's defense. This was
fully justified by the established principle of
international law that a material breach of
an agreement by one party entitles another
party at least to withhold compliance with
a related provision.

The United States has commitments to
assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself
against Communist aggression: In the
SEATO treaty — which I have already men-
tioned and which is similar in form to our
defense commitments to South Korea, Japan,
the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Republic of China — and even earlier in
the Geneva conference we had declared that
we would regard a renewal of Communist
aggression in Viet-Nam with "grave con-
cern."

Since 1954 three Presidents have reaf-
firmed our commitments to the defense of
South Viet-Nam.

Finally, the President of the United States
has full authority to commit U.S. forces in
the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.
This authority stems from the constitutional
powers of the President as Commander in
Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibili-
ties as well for the conduct of foreign rela-
tions. However, it is not necessary to rely
upon the Constitution alone as the source of
the President's authority. The SEATO
treaty, which forms part of the law of the

MAY 30, 1966

833

land, sets forth a United States commitment
to defend South Viet-Nam against armed
attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolu-
tion of August 1964 and in authorization and
appropriation acts in support of the military
effort in Viet-Nam, has given its approval
and support to the President's action.

The Constitution does not require a decla-
ration of war for U.S. actions in "Viet-Nam
taken by the President and approved by the
Congress. A long line of precedents, begin-
ning with the undeclared war with France in
1798-1800 and including actions in Korea
and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed
forces abroad in the absence of a congres-
sional declaration of war.

Mr. Chairman, these were two questions
on which comments have come up before,
and I am sure the committee will pursue
them.

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems

Following is the text of President John-
son's remarks to news correspondents at the
conclusion! of the National Securitij Council
meeting on Viet-Nam on May 10.

We are delighted to welcome back one of
our most dedicated public servants and one
of our most valuable counselors, Ambas-
sador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

Earlier this afternoon he reported to me
privately in some detail about the events in
his area of the world and his evaluation of
the situation there.

He brought back information that we do
not always get from the written cable. I
had a very profitable visit with him. We
had a thorough exchange of viewpoints.

I asked him to join me in the Cabinet
Room and make available to my other coun-
selors here his impressions and judgments
and conclusions, as well as a general review.

This is the first time that he has been
back in almost 9 months. He will be here
through the week. He will spend some time
with Mr. Komer and Mr. Rostow [Robert

Komer and W. W. Rostow, Special Assist-
ants to the President] and some time with
the various people at the table. They will
divide into various groups.

This afternoon we had an agenda that in-
cluded a rather full report from General
Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. Wheeler, Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] on the military
situation in Viet-Nam. We had a discus-
sion of the political and economic situation,
the issues as he sees them — a general re-
port from Ambassador Lodge.

He was followed by a discussion led by
Secretary Rusk on the key political issues, at
the conclusion of which Secretary McNa-
mara supplemented some of General
Wheeler's statements on the military situa-
tion there and the issues involved on his
part.

I reviewed with them some of my views
on Viet-Nam from the day I took over the
Presidency: on education, health, agricul-
ture; the economy of South Viet-Nam; my
Baltimore speech ; ^ the Honolulu confer-
ence ; 2 our desire to get the Government
of South Viet-Nam, General Westmoreland
[Gen. William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Com-
mander in Viet-Nam], and others to co-
operate with Ambassador Lodge and Am-
bassador Porter [William J. Porter, Deputy
U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam] in the efforts
that we were making in this field.

We not only have military problems here,
as everyone knows, but we have political
problems and economic problems.

I have asked one of my most trusted
and able advisers, Mr. Komer, to take
command of this operation and head the
post here, with Secretary Rusk, Secretary
McNamara, and others, in an attempt to
make this economic and political program
effective.

Mr. Komer discussed, at some length, the
key economic issues there. We reviewed
generally the effects of the Honolulu con-
ference; Secretary Freeman's visit with 15

I

' For text, see BULLETIN of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
• For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

834

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of the outstanding people from our universi-
ties and our colleges, who made a thorough
study ; and Secretary Gardner's report.

Mr. Komer will arrange to have certain
task forces meeting throughout the week
while Ambassador Lodge is here.

That is the essence of what took place
this afternoon. I have explained to these
wise men, all of whom I rely on for advice,
to supply me with all the information and
knowledge they had.

I have it now and I have passed as much
of it on to you as I could.

The Obligations of Power

Folloiving is the foreign policy portion of
an address made by President Johnson at the
dedication of Woodroiv Wilson Hall, Wood-
row Wilson School of Public and Internation-
al Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton,
N.J., on May 11 (White House press release;
advance text).

1 As we enter the final third of this cen-
tury, we are engaged once again with the
question of whether democracy can do the
job.

Many fears of former years no longer
seem so relevant. Neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court shows signs of becoming
rubber stamps to the Executive. Moreover
the Executive shows no symptoms of cal-
lous indifference to the ills we must cure if
we are to preserve our vitality. State and
local governments are more alive and more
involved than 30 years ago. And our na-
tion's private enterprise has grown many
times over in size and vitality.

The issue for this generation is a dif-
ferent kind. It has to do with the obliga-
tions of power in the world for a society
that strives, despite its worst flaws, to be
just and humane. Like almost every issue
we face, this is one in which scholars and

i public officials alike have an irrevocable

! stake.

Abroad we can best measure America's
involvement, whatever our successes and
failures, by a simple proposition: Not one
single country where we have helped mount
a major effort to resist aggression — from
France to Greece to Korea to Viet-Nam —
today has a government servile to outside
interests.

There is a reason for this which I believe
goes to the very heart of our society: The
exercise of power in this century has meant
for the United States not arrogance but
agony. We have used our power not will-
ingly and recklessly but reluctantly and
with restraint.

Unlike nations in the past with vast
power at their disposal, the United States
has not sought to crush the autonomy of
her neighbors. We have not been driven by
blind militarism down courses of devastat-
ing aggression. Nor have we followed the
ancient and conceited philosophy of the
"noble lie" that some men are by nature
meant to be slaves to others.

As I look upon America this morning
from the platform of one of her great uni-
versities, I see, instead, a nation whose
might is not her master but her servant.
I see a nation conscious of lessons so re-
cently learned :

— that security and aggression, as well as
peace and war, must be the concerns of her
foreign policy ;

— that a great power influences the world
just as surely when it withdraws its
strength as when it exercises it ;

— that aggression must be deterred where
possible and met early when undertaken;

— that the application of military force,
when it becomes necessary, must be for
limited purposes and tightly controlled.

Surely it is not a paranoid vision of
America's place in the world to recognize
that freedom is still indivisible — still has
adversaries whose challenge must be an-
swered.

Today, of course, that challenge is stern-
est in Southeast Asia. Yet there, as else-

IB MAY 30, 1966

835

where, our great power is tempered by
great restraint. What nation has announced
such limited objectives or such willingness
to remove its military presence once those
objectives are achieved? What nation has
spent the lives of its sons and vast sums of
its fortune to provide the people of a
small, striving nation the chance to elect a
course we might not ourselves choose?

The aims for which we struggle are aims
which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
men of the intellectual world applaud and
serve: the principle of choice over coer-
cion, the defense of the weak against the
strong and aggressive, the right of a young
and frail nation to develop free from the
interference of her neighbors, the ability of
a people — however inexperienced, however
different, however diverse — to fashion a so-
ciety consistent with their ovm traditions
and values and aspirations.

These are all at stake in that conflict. It
is the consequences of the cost of their
abandonment that men of learning must
examine dispassionately. For to wear the
scholar's gown is to assume an obligation to
seek truth without prejudice and without
cliche, even when the results of the search
are at variance with one's own opinions.

That is all we expect of those who are
troubled, even as we are, by the obligations
of power the United States did not seek but
from which she cannot escape.

Twenty-six years ago Archibald Mac-
Leish asked of all scholars and writers and
students of his generation what history
would say of those who failed to oppose the
forces of disorder at loose in Europe.

We must ask of this generation the
same question concerning Asia.

MacLeish reminded that generation of
the answer given by Leonardo when Michel-
angelo indicted him for indifference to the
misfortunes of the Florentines. "Indeed,"
said Leonardo, "indeed, the study of beauty
has occupied my whole heart."

Other studies, no matter how important,
must not distract the man of learning from
the misfortunes of freedom in Southeast
Asia.

While men may talk of the "search for
peace" and the "pursuit of peace," we
know that peace is not something to be dis-
covered suddenly, not a thing to be caught
and contained. Peace must be built, step by
painful, patient step. And the building will
take the best work of the world's best men
and women.

It will take men whose cause is not the
cause of one nation but of all nations, men
whose enemies are not other men but the
historic foes of mankind. I hope that many
of you will serve in this public service for
the world.

Woodrow Wilson knew that learning is
essential to the leadership our world so
desperately needs. Before he came to Prince-
ton, he attended a small college in North
Carolina and went to classes every day be-
neath a portal which bore the Latin inscrip-
tion: "Let learning be cherished where
liberty has arisen."

Today this motto which served a Presi-
dent must serve all mankind. Where liberty
has arisen, learning must be cherished — or
liberty itself becomes a fragile thing. i|

We dedicate this building not only to the
man, not only to the Nation's service, but
to learning in the service of mankind.
There can be no higher mission.

>

'iij

,sli

lb

836

titli

I

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETII

World Trade Week, 1966

A PROCLAMATION'

Expansion of world trade is the principal objec-
tive of the liberal foreign trade policies our Nation
has followed for more than thirty years.

This two-way trade between the United States and
other nations has resulted in many benefits for our
country :

— It has advanced the peaceful progress of our
Nation and the well-being of all Americans by
strengthening the growth of private enterprise and
employment.

— It has provided the American businessman with
increased opportunities to export more United States
products and services.

• — It has given the American consumer a wider
choice of products at competitive prices.

— It has promoted the cause of peace by broaden-
ing the scope of our cooperation with other nations.

— It has been of great importance in helping the
developing nations modernize their economies.

Much remains to be done if we are to achieve a
balanced international economy where all nations,
developed and developing, can share the fruits of
freer trade :

— We must continue to work diligently this year
to bring the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations to
a timely conclusion in a manner that assures the
realization of the hopes and expectations with which
this great effort at trade liberalization Was launched.

— We must intensify our efforts to reduce the
United States balance-of-payments deficit and reach
our goal of equilibrium in our international accounts.

Progress towards accomplishing these objectives is
the aim of World Trade Week.

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby pro-
claim the week beginning May 22, 1966, as World
Trade Week ; and I request the appropriate Federal,
State, and local officials to cooperate in the ob-
servance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educa-
tional, professional, and civic groups, as well as the
people of the United States generally, to observe
World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions,
exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activi-

lifts

living siandnrdsi
...serves pe&te

\^

'No. 3719; 31 Fed. Reg. 6607.

ties designed to promote continuing awareness of
the importance of world trade to our economy and
our relations with other nations.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 29th day
of April in the year of our Lord nineteen
[SEIAL] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the one hundred and ninetieth.

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

MAY 30, 1966

837

East- West Trade Relations Act of 1966

Press release 107 dated May 11

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary Rusk on May 11 transmitted
to the Congress proposed legislation to pro-
vide the President with the authority nec-
essary to negotiate commercial agreements
with the Soviet Union and other nations of
Eastern Europe to increase United States
trade in peaceful goods with these countries.

The proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1966 was sent with identical letters
from the Secretary to Speaker of the House
John W. McCormack and Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the
Senate.

Secretary Rusk's action today was taken
pursuant to instructions of President John-
son on May 3.i At that time, the President
recalled that he had promised in his state
of the Union message to request the pro-
posed authority. The President added :

The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over
a period of time, can influence Eastern European
societies to develop along paths that are favorable
to vyorld peace.

After years of careful study, the time has now
come for us to act, and act we should and act we
must.

With these steps, we can help gradually to create
a community of interest, a community of trust, and
a community of effort. Thus will the tide of human
hope rise again.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 2

May 11, 1966
Dear Mr. Speaker: At the direction of
the President, I am sending to the Congress
proposed legislation to provide the Presi-
dent with the authority necessary to nego-
tiate commercial agreements with the So-
viet Union and other nations of Eastern

Europe to widen our trade in peaceful
goods, when such agreements will serve the
interests of the United States.

This authority is needed so that we may
grasp opportunities that are opening up to
us in our relations with the Soviet Union
and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is
needed, at a time when we are opposing
Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, in order
to carry forward the balanced strategy for
peace which, under four Presidents, our
country has been pursuing toward the Com-
munist nations. It is needed to play our part
with the NATO nations in reducing ten-
sions and establishing normal and lasting
peaceful relations between the West and
East in Europe.

New Opportunities

It is the normal and traditional practice
of the United States to encourage peaceful
trade with other countries — even those with
which we have serious differences. Yet for
nearly two decades, we have put major re-
strictions on our trade with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. We applied
these restrictions only when the Soviet
Union extended control over its Eastern
European neighbors and embarked on a
course of aggressive expansionism. They
properly signified our moral protest against
the subjugation of half a continent and
gave our protest practical economic effect.
Now, however, the hopes that guided our
policy have begun to be realized.

In recent years, there have been substan-
tial changes among the Communist na-

• Bulletin of May 23, 1966, p. 794.
" An identical letter was sent to the President of
the Senate.

838

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions, within themselves, and in their rela-
tions to the nations of Western Europe.
Windows in Eastern Europe are being
gradually opened to the winds of change.
Most of the countries of Eastern Europe
have shown signs of increasing inde-
pendence in guiding their own economic
and political courses. They have shown
greater concern for the needs of their
citizens as consumers. A growing trade in
peaceful goods has sprung up between
Eastern Europe and the Western world.
The Soviet Union itself has recognized this
need for more responsive action in its own
country as well as in Eastern Europe.

This process of change is continuing. It
presents growing opportunities for the
United States and for the cause of freedom.
But we are not now able to take full ad-
vantage of these opportunities. Our trade
policies which once served our national in-
terest no longer do so adequately.

What then is needed ?

The weakness in our position is the out-
dated, inflexible requirement of law that we
impose discriminatory tariffs on the import
of goods from Communist countries. All
imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, excepting Poland and Yugoslavia,
are subject to the original rates of duty in
the United States Tariff Act of 1930. The
President has no authority to negotiate with
any of these countries for the advantages
that we can gain from offering them the
more favorable rates that have been nego-
tiated under reciprocal trade agreements
over the last thirty years and that now
apply to imports from all other nations
with whom we trade. We alone of all the
major Free World countries have so tied our
hands.

The inability of the President to nego-
tiate on this matter sharply reduces his
power to use the great economic power of
our trade as a bargaining instrument.

In the light of this situation, the Presi-
dent said in his 1965 State of the Union
Message :^

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly
beginning to assert their identity. Your government,
assisted by leaders in labor and business, is explor-
ing ways to increase peaceful trade with these coun-
tries and with the Soviet Union. I will report our
conclusions to the Congress.

Accordingly, to supplement the studies
being made in the Government, on Febru-
ary 16, 1965, the President appointed a
Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations
with Eastern European Countries and the
Soviet Union under the Chairmanship of
Mr. J. Irwin Miller. Each member was a
widely respected and experienced leader
from business, labor or the academic world.

The Special Committee made its report to
the President on April 29, 1965.* That re-
port provides a searching and balanced
analysis of this complex and important
subject. It deserves careful study by all
citizens and members of the Congress in-
terested in this subject and in this pro-
posed legislation.

The Special Committee concluded that to
accomplish our purposes in Eastern Europe
we must be able to use our trade policies
flexibly and purposefully. The Committee
recommended, specifically, that the Presi-
dent should be given discretionary authority
to negotiate commercial agreements with
individual Communist countries when he
determines any such agreement to be in the
national interest and to grant them in such
agreements the tariff treatment we apply to
all our other trading partners.

The Administration agrees with this rec-
ommendation of the Special Committee
and this is the principal authority asked in
the proposed legislation.

Benefits of the Legislation

We must consider the potential benefits
and liabilities that may flow from enacting
or failing to enact the proposed legislation.

There is abundant evidence that without
the authority this legislation would provide,
we are losing and will continue to lose sig-
nificant opportunities to influence the course

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 25, 1965, p. 94.

* See p. 845.

i

MAY 30, 1966

839

of events in Eastern Europe. By denying
ourselves the ability to enter into meaning-
ful commercial agreements with these na-
tions, we deprive ourselves of the economic
benefits that will come to us from increas-
ing trade. More important, we deprive our-
selves of a bargaining tool of considerable
strength and utility. We unnecessarily limit
our influence in Eastern Europe relative to
the influence of other nations engaged in or
opening wider trade there.

The enactment of the proposed legislation
would not weaken or injure the position of
the United States in any way. The legisla-
tion does not in itself make any grant or
concession of any kind to the Soviet Union
or any Eastern European country. It would
not weaken our legislation, our policy or our
controls on exports of strategic goods to
Communist countries. Its sole effect would
be to give the President added strength to
negotiate with these Communist countries
to obtain concessions and benefits that will
serve the national interest of our country in
return for granting the same tariff ar-
rangements already available to other
countries.

The benefits of the legislation could be
numerous and valuable.

First, improving our trade relations with
these countries would be profitable in itself.
As their national economies turn more and
more toward consumer needs and desires,
they will become more attractive markets
for our exports. We lead the world in the
efficient production of goods which enrich
the quality of everyday life. We can expect
that new and increasing export opportuni-
ties will open up for American industry,
American agriculture and American labor.
While this trade potential may be modest
for the foreseeable future in relation to
total United States exports, it could, nev-
ertheless, be significant over the years and
of particular importance to American agri-
culture and to certain American industries.

Although any agreement with any indi-
vidual nation will necessarily and properly
open the way for increased sales of that
nation's products to Americans who want

to buy them, we have no reason to fear
such trade. American industry is the most
competitive in the world and thrives on the
stimulus of competition.

Second, authority to relax tariff restric-
tions will give the President the ability to
negotiate more effectively for any of several
objectives important to the United States.
These might include, for example, provi-
sions for the settlement of commercial dis-
putes, the facilitation of travel by United
States citizens, the protection of United
States copyrights, patents and other indus-
trial property rights, assurances to pre-
vent trade practices injurious to United
States labor and industry, settlement of fi-
nancial claims and lend-lease obligations,
more satisfactory arrangements in cultural
and information programs — and others of
our economic, political and cultural objec-
tives. These possibilities are of course only
illustrative and it is improbable that all of
them could be dealt with in a single agree-
ment. We will need to test each negotiation
for the gains to be made in it.

The Congress may be confident that no
agreement will be made under this authority
except in return for benefits of equal im-
portance to the United States. Moreover,
each agreement will include a provision for
suspension or termination upon reasonable
notice, so that the President may — and the
Congress may be certain he would — suspend
or end the obligations of the United States
if he determined the other party were not
carrying out its commitments.

Third, the most important benefits from
any such agreements would develop more
slowly. We cannot expect trade alone to
change the basic nature of the Communist
system in any Eastern European country nor
to settle fundamental differences between
us. We can, however, expect that the many
close relationships normally growing out of
trade will provide opportunities for in-
fluencing the development of their societies
toward more internal freedom and peaceful
relations with the free world.

A healthy grovi^th of trade virill help to re-
duce the present dependence of these East-

840

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

ern European countries on each other and
the Soviet Union. They will be encouraged
to rebuild the friendly ties they have his-
torically had with the West. Independent
action will become more attractive and
more feasible. The conclusion of an agree-
ment with any of these countries will be an
inducement to others to seek the same
benefits.

The very nature of trade, the necessity to
follow established rules of behavior, the in-
creased contact with the West, the increas-
ing use of Western goods, the growing ap-
preciation of their quality and of the effi-
cient methods of their manufacture, the
growing understanding of the skills, oppor-
tunities and earnings of free labor in the
United States and other Western nations,
the greater exposure to the miracles of
American agriculture — all these things could
encourage increasing liberalization of the
internal economies of the Eastern European
nations.

The Soviet Union and other nations of
Eastern Europe are increasingly conscious
of their stake in stability and in improving
peaceful relations with the outside world.
Progress toward normal trade relations will
increase that stake.

Under the terms of the proposed legisla-
tion, each agreement would be only one step
in the process of reducing tensions. Agree-
ments would not be of indefinite duration
but would be subject to periodic review and
to renewal at regular intervals. Each review
could become a new opportunity for a useful
dialogue with a Communist country. Each
renewal could be adapted to encourage the
further peaceful evolution of that individual
country and the improvement of our relations
with it.

There is wide and growing understanding
throughout the country that improved con-
ditions for peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe
would be in the national interest and should
be a proper subject of negotiation with those
countries. Many business, industrial and
agricultural leaders and other expert wit-
nesses who testified in the extensive hear-

ings held on this subject by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that
the United States could benefit from the
possibility of wider peaceful trade with the
Eastern European countries under proper
safeguards. So too have a number of lead-
ing private organizations that have studied
the problem.

To fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities
for the conduct of our foreign policy in this
complex era, the President must have avail-
able to him every appropriate bargaining
tool. Nowhere is this need more critical than
in our relations with the Communist coun-
tries. Granting this flexible authority to the
President would not be a concession to the
Communist world. Rather, it would give him
a valuable instrument of foreign policy to be
used where and when it will advance the in-
terests of the United States.

Conducting a Balanced Strategy

In addition to the gains already stated
which the proposed legislation can help to
realize, it can be an important element in
our balanced strategy for peace.

We are reaffirming in Viet-Nam — as we
have on many earlier battlefields — our de-
termination to aid free and independent na-
tions to defend themselves from destruction
by Communist aggression or subversion. But
determined resistance to such force is only
a part of our strategy to maintain a peace-
ful world.

It has equally been our purpose to demon-
strate to the Communist countries that their
best interests lie in seeking the well-being of
their peoples through peaceful relations with
the nations of the free world. We want the
Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern
Europe to understand that we will go step
by step with them as far as they are willing
to go in exploring every path toward endur-
ing peace. We require only that our willing-
ness and our actions be genuinely matched
by theirs.

We are confident that this policy is sound
even when we are fighting against Com-

MAY 30, 1966

841

munist weapons in Viet-Nam. Indeed, it is
when we are resisting force with force that
it is most important to hold open every possi-
ble avenue to peace. We need to make un-
mistakably clear to all the Communist na-
tions of Eastern Europe that their best
interests lie in economic development and
peaceful trade, not in support of futile at-
tempts to gain advantage through the use of
force.

The Legislation

The proposed legislation contains five
principal provisions.

The first states the purpose of the Act,
particularly to use peaceful trade and re-
lated contacts with Communist countries to
advance the long-range interests of the
United States.

The second authorizes the President to
enter into a commercial agreement with a
Communist country when he determines it
will promote the purposes of the Act, will be
in the national interest and will result in
benefits to the United States equivalent to
those provided by the agreement to the other
party.

The third states some of the benefits we
may hope to gain in such agreements.

The fourth limits each agreement to an
initial period of three years, renewable for
three-year periods. It requires that each
agreement provide for regular consultations
on its operations and on relevant aspects of
United States relations with the other coun-
try. It also requires that each agreement be
subject to suspension or termination at any
time on reasonable notice.

The fifth is the central provision recom-
mended by the responsible groups studying
this matter: the President would have au-
thority to proclaim most-favored-nation
treatment for the goods of Communist na-
tions with which a commercial agreement is
made under the Act. Such MFN treatment
would continue only so long as the agreement
is in effect.

The President would have the authority
to suspend or terminate any proclamation
made pursuant to this Act. The President

should do so whenever he determines that
the other party to the agreement is no longer
fulfilling its obligations under the agree-
ment, or that suspension or termination is in
the national interest.

As part of his negotiating power with re-
spect to a commercial agreement with the
Soviet Union, the President would have au-
thority to terminate the existing provisions
of law excluding certain furs of Soviet origin.

The authority of the Act would not extend
to Communist China, North Korea, North
Viet-Nam, Cuba or the Soviet Zone of Ger-
many.

The bill expressly provides that it does not
modify or amend the Export Control Act or
the Battle Act which together control the
export of military articles and strategic
goods and technology which would ad-
versely affect the national security and wel-
fare of the United States.

The bill does not change in any way exist-
ing laws and regulations prohibiting aid and
limiting credit to Communist countries.

All agreements will be promptly trans-
mitted to both Houses of Congress.

{

Conclusion

In 1958 President Eisenhower made it
clear that "the United States favors the ex-
pansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union"5 and spoke of the importance of trade
as a means of strengthening the possibilities
for independent actions by the countries of
Eastern Europe.

President Kennedy in his first State of the
Union Message * declared his determination
that "we must never forget our hopes for i
the ultimate freedom and welfare of the
peoples of Eastern Europe."

In December, 1964, President Johnson ex-
pressed our wish "to build new bridges to
Eastern Europe — bridges of ideas, educa-
tion, culture, trade, technical cooperation and
mutual understanding for world peace and

" For text of President Eisenhower's letter of
July 14, 1958, to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see
Bulletin of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 200.

• For text, see ibid., Jan. 13, 1961, p. 207.

842

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

prosperity."^ In May of this year, the Pres-
ident again referred to the way in which "the
intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over
a period of time, can influence Eastern
European societies to develop along paths
that are favorable to world peace."

The authority asked in this legislation will
help attain these goals.

In Greece, Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and, now,
Viet-Nam we have tried to convince the
Communist countries that the road of ag-
gression and subversion has a dead end.
This legislation will help us provide the posi-
tive counterpart to that lesson. It will give
the President a vital instrument of negotia-
tion to maintain essential balance in our re-
lations with the Soviet Union and with the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe and
to respond to their growing desire and op-
portunity for wider contacts with the West.
It will thereby serve our own interests and
the cause of peace and stability.
Sincerely yours,

Dean Rusk

TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and security of the
United States by providing authority to negotiate
commercial agreements with Communist countries,
and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "East-West Trade
Relations Act of 1966".

Sec. 2. Statement of Purposes.

The purposes of this Act are —

(a) to use peaceful trade and related contacts
with Communist countries as a means of advancing
the long-range interest of the United States in peace
and freedom;

(b) to promote constructive relations with Com-
munist countries, to contribute to international sta-
bility, and to provide a framework helpful to private
United States firms conducting business relations
with Communist state trading agencies by institut-

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

ing regular govemment-to-govemment negotiations
with individual Communist countries concerning
commercial and other matters of mutual interest;
and

(c) to increase peaceful trade and related con-
tacts between the United States and Communist coun-
tries, and to expand markets for products of the
United States in these countries by creating similar
opportunities for the products of Communist coun-
tries to compete in United States markets on a non-
discriminatory basis.

Sec. 3. Authority To Enter into Commercial
Agreements.
The President may make a commercial agree-
ment with a Communist country providing most-
favored-nation treatment to the products of that
country whenever he determines that such agree-
ment—

(a) will promote the purposes of this Act,

(b) is in the national interest, and

(c) will result in benefits to the United States
equivalent to those provided by the agreement to
the other party.

Sec. 4. Benefits To Be Provided by Commercial
Agreements.
The benefits to the United States to be obtained
in or in conjunction with a commercial agreement
made under this Act may be of the following kind,
but need not be restricted thereto:

(a) satisfactory arrangements for the protec-
tion of industrial rights and processes;

(b) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement
of commercial differences and disputes;

(c) arrangements for establishment or expan-
sion of United States trade and tourist promotion
offices, for facilitation of such efforts as the trade
promotion activities of United States commercial
officers, participation in trade fairs and exhibits,
the sending of trade missions, and for facilitation
of entry and travel of commercial representatives
as necessary;

(d) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
duties or other restrictions on the imports of the
products of the United States, and other arrange-
ments that may secure market access and assure fair
treatment for products of the United States; or

(e) satisfactory arrangements covering other
matters affecting relations between the United
States and the country concerned, such as the settle-
ment of financial and property claims and the im-
provement of consular relations.

Sec. 5. Provisions To Be Included in CoMMsai-
ciAL Agreements.

A commercial agreement made under this Act
shall—

(a) be limited to an initial period specified in the
agreement which shall be no more than three years

MAY 30, 1966

843

from the time the agreement becomes effective;

(b) be subject to suspension or termination at any
time upon reasonable notice;

(c) provide for consultations at regular intervals
for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the
agreement and relevant aspects of relations between
the United States and the other party; and

(d) be renewable for additional periods, each not
to exceed three years.

Sec. 6. Extension of Benefits of Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment.

(a) In order to carry out a commercial agree-
ment made under this Act and notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law, the President may by
proclamation extend most-favored-nation treatment
to the products of the foreign country entering into
such commercial agreement: Provided, That the
application of most-favored-nation treatment shall
be limited to the period of effectiveness of such com-
mercial agreement.

(b) The President may at any time suspend or
terminate any proclamation issued under subsection
(a). The President shall suspend or terminate such
proclamation whenever he determines that — -

(1) the other party to a commercial agreement
made under this Act is no longer fulfilling its obli-
gations under the agreement; or

(2) the suspension or termination of the agree-
ment is in the national interest.

Sec. 7. Advice From Government Agencies and
Other Sources.
Before making a commercial agreement under this
Act, the President shall seek information and advice
with respect to such agreement from the interested
Departments and agencies of the United States Gov-
ernment, from interested private persons, and from
such other sources as he may deem appropriate.

Sec. 8. Transmission of Reports to Congress.

The President shall submit to the Congress an
annual report on the commercial agreements pro-
gram instituted under this Act. Such report shall
include information regarding negotiations, benefits
obtained as a result of commercial agreements, the
texts of any such agreements, and other information
relating to the program.

I

Sec. 9. Limitation on Authority.

The authority conferred by this Act shall not be
used to extend most-favored-nation treatment to
the products of areas dominated or controlled by the
Communist regimes of China, North Viet-Nam, North
Korea, Cuba, or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Sec. 10. Relation to Other Laws.

(a) This Act shall not apply to any agreement
made with a country whose products are receiving,
when such agreement is made, the benefits of trade
agreement concessions extended in accordance with
section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(19 U.S.C. sec. 1861(b)).

(b) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to modify
or amend the Export Control Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
App. sec. 2021 et seq.) or the Mutual Defense As-
sistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. sec. 1611 et
seq.).

(c) The President may by proclamation terminate
headnote 4 to schedule 1, part 5, subpart B of the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77A Stat.
32, 19 U.S.C. sec. 1202) with respect to the products
of any country to which it is applicable upon the
entry into force of a commercial agreement made
under this Act with such countiT-

(d) Any commercial agreement made under this
Act shall be deemed a trade agreement for the pur-
poses of title III of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq.).

(e) The portion of general headnote 3(e) to the
Tariff Schedules of the United States that precedes
the list of countries and areas (77 A Stat. 11; 70
Stat. 1022) is amended to read as follows:

"(e) Products of Communist Couyitries. Notwith-
standing any of the foregoing provisions of this
headnote, the rates of duty shown in column num-
bered 2 shall apply to products, whether imported
directly or indirectly, of the countries and areas that
have been specified in section 401 of the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962, in sections 231 and 257
(e) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or in
actions taken by the President thereunder and as to
which there is not in effect a proclamation under
section 6(a) of the East-West Trade Relations Act
of 1966. These countries and areas are:"

844

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the Soviet Union

The Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations
with East European Countries and the Soviet Union
was created by the President on February 16, 1965.
Its task was to explore all aspects of expanding
peaceful trade in support of the President's policy
of widening- constructive relations with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. That
policy was reaffirmed by the President in his State
of the Union message when he said, "Your govern-
ment, assisted by leaders of labor and business, is
now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with
the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union."

The members of the Committee are:

J. Irwin Miller (Chairman)

Chairman of the Board, Cummins Engine Co., Inc.;
Member, Executive Committee, World Council of
Churches

Eugene R. Black

Chairman, Brookings Institution; Past President,
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment

William Blackie

President, Caterpillar Tractor Co.; Director and
Chairman of the Foreign Commerce Committee,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

George R. Brown

Chairman of the Board, Brown & Root, Inc. ;
Chairman, Board of Trustees, Rice University

Charles W. Engelhard, Jr.

Chairman, Engelhard Industries; Director, For-
eign Policy Association

James B. Fisk

President, Bell Telephone Laboratories; Past Mem-
ber, President's Science Advisory Committee

Nathaniel Goldfinger

Director of Research, AFL-CIO; Trustee, Joint
Council on Economic Education

Crawford H. Greenewalt

Chairman of the Board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours
and Co.; Chairman, Radio Free Europe Fund

William A. Hewitt

Chairman of the Board, Deere and Co.; Trustee,
U.S. Council of the International Chamber of
Commerce

Max F. Millikan
Professor of Economics and Director, Center for

• This report was submitted to President
Johnson on April 29, 1965. It is printed in the
Bulletin at this time because of interest in
this subject resulting from the Department's
proposals to the Congress on East-West trade.

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology; President, World Peace Foundation
Charles G. Mortimer

Chairman, General Foods Corp.; Trustee, Stevens

Institute of Technology
Herman B. Wells

Chancellor, Indiana University; Former U.S.

Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly

Edward R. Fried served as Executive Secretary
to the Committee and James A. Henderson as
Deputy Executive Secretary.

Introduction

The White House,
Washi7igton, D.C., April 29, 1965.
The President

of the United States
Dear Mr. President: You have asked us "to ex-
plore all aspects of the question of expanding
peaceful trade" in support of your policy of "widen-
ing our i-elations" with the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.'

Any useful consideration of the desirable degree
and pattern of peaceful trade relations between our-
selves and these countries must begin with the Soviet
Union itself.
The Government of the Soviet Union has steadily.

' It is understood that policies with respect to trade
with Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-
nam, and Cuba are outside the terms of reference of
this Committee. Our findings and recommendations
do not apply to trade with these countries. The
terms "Communist countries" and "European Com-
munist countries" as used in this report refer to the
nations of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. [Foot-
note in original.]

MAY 30, 1966

845

over many years, by words and deeds, declared its
hostility to our own country. The U.S. Government
and the American people support the most powerful
defense system the world has ever seen in recog-
nition of this fact.

Without this preponderant military power, it
would be idle and even dangerous to explore the
possibilities of expanding peaceful trade, or for that
matter, of any peaceful relations with the Soviet
Union. For the same reason, we rule out from
these considerations any kind of strategic trade that
could significantly enhance Soviet military capa-
bilities and weaken our own position of comparative
military streng^th.

With a secure defense, on the other hand, we can
prudently seek practical means of reducing areas of
conflict between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. Indeed,
we assume the United States has an obligation in
today's nuclear world to pursue such possibilities
as part of its long-term commitment to strengthen
the prospects for peace in the world.

While the Communist threat remains, its nature
constantly changes, because the conditions of men
and nations everywhere are changing. Thus, our
Government must be forever reexamining its poli-
cies, programs, and methods to make certain that
they are appropriate to the times and to the national
purpose.

It is now clear that the ties between the East
European nations and the Soviet Union are neither
quite so numerous nor so strong as they have been
in the past; the forces of nationalism are growing.
Between the Soviet Union and Communist China,
sharp differences have arisen. There is also a fer-
ment in all of the European Communist countries
as they try to cope with the awakening demands of
their people for a better life within the confines of a
system geared more for military power than for
human welfare.

It is an essential part of U.S. strategy to resist
Communist efforts to expand through aggression.
At the same time, we know that the danger of ag-
grression will never be overcome until the Com-
munists change their view of the world and the
goals they ought to seek. Through our attitudes
and actions, therefore, we must aim to influence
these countries toward decisions that stress the at-
tainment of prosperity through peaceful means. To
appear hostile toward all of their objectives de-
prives us of the opportunity to influence the choices
they make as to kinds of objectives or as to means
of achieving them.

The possibilities of "peaceful coexistence" and
mutually advantageous trade do not sound convinc-
ing coming from those who speak of "burying us."
We know very well that coexistence means some-
thing different to Soviet leaders from what it means
to us. Within the framework of a policy so labeled,
they believe they can still pursue hostile actions
against the free world so long as major war does

not result. But they have found it necessary to
change their view of coexistence over the past decade
and the conditions of the modern world will cause
it to change further over the next decade. Much
the same may be said of Soviet motivation and de-
sire, and that of most of the East European nations,
for increased trade with the United States. This
Committee, therefore, has come to believe that in
a longer time perspective the possibilities of "peace-
ful coexistence" — in the genuine meaning of that
expression — can be made to grow. We conclude this
in spite of Soviet professions and not because of
them.

We are aware that the Communists have their
conviction as to how the forces of history will oper-
ate and that they profess to be convinced that time
is on their side. We also have our own conviction.
We believe that men and nations function best in
an open society. There are sig:ns that pressures
for greater openness within Soviet society are mount-
ing. The reasons may be pragmatic rather than
ideological, but they are nonetheless real. The
Soviets want a modem and technically advanced
society. Their own experience shows that the build-
ing of such a society can be severely handicapped by
a closed and tyrannical political order and a rigfid,
centrally directed economic system.

We desire to encourage the growth of forces in
the European Communist countries that will im-
prove the prospects for peace. Within these coun-
tries we seek to encourage independence from Soviet
domination and a rebuilding of historical ties with
the West. In each of these countries, including the
U.S.S.R., we seek an opening up of the society and
a continuing decentralization of power. It is in our
interest to promote a concern with internal standards
of living rather than with external adventure.

We must look at our trade policies toward Euro-
pean Communist countries in that broad context.
Trade is a tactical tool to be used with other policy
Instruments for pursuing our national objectives.

Trade cannot settle the major outstanding issues
between ourselves and the Communists, nor can it,
by itself, accomplish a basic change in the Commu-
nist system. Over time, however, trade negotiations
and trade relations can provide us with useful op-
portunities to influence attitudes in these countries
in directions favorable to our national interest. Trade
involves contact of peoples and exchange of ideas
and customs as well as of goods and services. It
requires the building of mutual trust, and good
faith, and confidence. An expansion of trade would
require from the Communists a growing commit-
ment to international rules and adherence to inter-
national standards for responsible behavior; it can-
not be based on Soviet-imposed conditions or usual
Communist trading practices.

Trade and government-to-government negotiations
which set the framework for trade can be means of
reducing animosities between ourselves and individ-

846

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ual Communist countries and can provide a basis
for working out mutually acceptable solutions to com-
mon problems. A constructive attitude toward trade
can serve as a counterpart to our national deter-
mination to convince these countries through our
deterrent military power that they cannot gain
their objectives through aggression. Properly con-
ceived and wisely administered, a growing trade with
East European nations and the Soviet Union could
become a significant and useful device in the pur-
suit of our national security and welfare and of
world peace.

In sum, trade with the European Communist
countries is politics in the broadest sense — holding
open the possibility of careful negotiation, firm
bargaining, and constructive competition. In this
intimate engagement men and nations will in time
be altered by the engagement itself. We do not fear
this. We welcome it. We believe we are more
nearly right than they about how to achieve the
welfare of nations in this century. If we do our
part, time and change will work for us and not
against us.

These are the general propositions which underlie
the specific findings and recommendations which we
now submit. They are based on excellent briefings
and supporting papers prepared by government
agencies in answer to questions the Committee raised,
on materials submitted to the Committee by inter-
ested private organizations, and on a careful review
of some of the most pertinent published material on
this subject. The members of the Committee have
found that exposure to this source material and
thorough discussion of the issues brought new per-
spectives and fresh judgments. We would emphasize,
on the basis of our experience, that public under-
standing of how trade can best fit into our national
strategy is essential to the effective use of trade
as an instrument of national policy.

Findings

Review of Our Position

1. The United States has a long tradition that
trade is a normal element of relations between coun-
tries. We have departed from that principle rarely
and only for compelling reasons. Indeed, we began
the period following the close of World War II by
treating trade with the U.S.S.R. no differently from
trade with other countries. We did not impose secu-
rity controls on this trade until 1948 and then did so
purposefully in response to aggressive Soviet expan-
sion in Eastern and Central Europe. In the atmos-
phere of the Berlin blockade and the Korean war,
we expanded these controls and gained the coopera-
tion of other principal trading nations in an inter-
national embargo of strategic commodities.

2. When we first applied these controls we were
the predominant source of capital, of advanced in-
dustrial technology, and of exportable resources in

the West. The U.S.S.R. while pursuing an aggres-
sive external policy, operated internally from a
relatively weak and backward industrial base. At
that time, we had both strong cooperation from
other Western nations and a considerable unilateral
capacity to insure that Western resources would not
contribute to the growth of Soviet military power.

3. The underlying situation changed rapidly, par-
ticularly over the past decade, and the process con-
tinues today. The ability of the Western Europeans
to trade, in terms of exportable resources and tech-
nology, grew rapidly in the wake of their dramatic
economic recovery. Moreover, they saw the death of
Stalin and the end of the Korean war as marking
sufficient change in the political climate to justify
resumption of their historic trade with Communist
Europe.

The capacity of Communist countries to trade
across the Iron Curtain also increased, following a
marked growth in the strength of their economies.
They saw in this trade a means of hastening eco-
nomic growth and meeting planned goals. The in-
terest of the East European countries in this trade
was further heightened by the failure of Soviet
attempts to impose a system of integration on their
economies.

4. These developments created pressure on the
part of our allies to ease the internationally agreed
Western restrictions on exports to the East. As a
result, the International Embargo List was grad-
ually reduced. The West European nations reduced
their controls accordingly; the United States did not
do so to the same degree. A growing disparity arose
between the United States and its major industrial
allies in regard to respective attitudes toward the
trade, controls on the trade, and participation in the
trade. This disparity exists today and poses basic
questions about our trade policy. The United States
has three alternatives. It can leave things as they
are. It can eliminate this disparity through action
across the board that would bring U.S. trading
practices into line with those of our allies. Or it can
modify its practices selectively and on a country-by-
country basis. Only the third alternative could offer
new negotiating leverage with individual Communist
countries.

5. The mere existence of these differences in trade
restrictions is sometimes cited as sufficient cause
for changing U.S. export licensing controls to con-
form to those of Western Europe and Japan. In the
Committee's view, this reasoning misses the essen-
tial point. The effectiveness of the U.S. denial of
machinery and equipment to Communist countries
is, of course, diminished by the availability of com-
parable advance technology from Western Europe
and Japan. It is also true that our business firms
are at a disadvantage in Communist markets in
competing with West European firms. Commercial
considerations, however, have not been the determin-
ing factor in framing U.S. policy on this subject

MAY 30, 1966

847

r

and should not be now. It is not the amount of trade
that is important but the politics of offering trade
or of withholding trade.

6. The United States initiated its controls for
political reasons and should be ready to revise them
when it is in the national interest to do so. This
requires careful judgments on the significance of
events, trends, and opportunities in individual Euro-
pean Communist countries and on how our relations
with such countries fit into our overall strategry. It
is on these grounds that we must be concerned to
keep our policies under constant review — and not
simply because we and our European allies may at
a given moment be somewhat out of step.

7. As East European countries have shown signs
of moving toward more independent positions, the
United States has made greater use of trade induce-
ment and less use of trade denial as an instrument
of national policy. We have differentiated our trade
policies toward individual Communist countries in
accordance with the political opportunities they pre-
sent. We responded promptly and effectively in
1948 when Yugoslavia adopted a more independent
position toward the Soviet Union. We took action
in the trade field when Poland, in 1956-57, gave
signs of moving toward somewhat greater autonomy
in Eastern Europe. And we took a modest step
through trade talks in 1964 toward more promising
relations with Rumania in response to an initiative
from the Government of that country.

8. In these terms, the circumstances under which
■we would be willing to expand peaceful trade and
the process of negotiating such trade take on con-
siderable significance. Our Government should be
properly equipped and oriented to negotiate aggres-
sively and confidently vrith European Communist
countries in the trade field as in all other fields
whenever favorable opportunities and circumstances
present themselves or can be created.

The Character of the Trade

9. Trade between the European Communist coun-
tries and free world industrial countries was close to
$3.5 billion each way in 1964. It grew at an average
rate of nearly 10 percent a year over the past decade,
or somewhat more than the rate of growth in the
overall trade of Western industrial countries. The
U.S. share in this trade was small — about one-tenth
of total Western exports to these countries in 1964 —
and even this figure is abnormally high because it
includes large wheat sales which are not likely to be
a normal feature of this trade. For Western Europe,
trade with Eastern Europe has ranged between 3
and 4 percent of total trade. For the United States,
the proportion, even in 1964, was barely 1 percent.

10. The aggregate economic significance of this
trade is small for all the countries concerned. For
example, total imports from the West are for the
Soviet Union only one-half of 1 percent of its gross
national product and for East European countries

2 percent of their combined national product. For
Western Europe, the aggregate significance of this
trade is even less, and for the United States, it is
negligible. U.S. exports to all European Communist
countries this year probably will not reach $200
million, or less than we sell to Switzerland.

11. The trade is of somewhat greater significance
for particular industries in the European Commu-
nist countries. The U.S.S.R. and the East European
countries are interested primarily in buying ad-
vanced or specialized types of machinery, industrial
plants, and industrial processes and technology from
the West to meet specific economic planning goals
or to become self-sufficient in certain industrial
sectors. They also buy metal manufactures and
small quantities of consumer goods. To finance their
purchases they sell to the West mainly industrial
raw materials, minerals including gold, foodstuffs,
steel products, and particularly oil. They also sell
relatively small quantities of manufactured goods.

The trading methods of the European Communist
countries reflect the rigidities of their State-con-
trolled systems. Decisions regarding the level and
composition of both imports and exports are made
in accordance with a national plan and are carried
out by State trading organizations. Bilateral agree-
ments are negotiated on a country-by-country basis.
These agreements specify the categories of goods to
be exchanged and set targets for the volume of that
exchange. They provide for a balance between im-
ports and exports in order to conserve foreign ex-
change. Deficits are met by the sale of gold or
credits.

12. There is little doubt that the European Com-
munist countries are interested in purchasing more
from the United States than they do now — princi-
pally machinery, equipment, complete plants, and
technical data. This advanced technology could pro-
vide the United States with some of its most effec-
tive bargaining leverage for trade negotiations with
Communist countries.

13. If we relaxed some of our restrictions, pur-
chases of European Communist countries from the
United States would probably rise in the short term.
But their lack of foreign exchange would soon limit
this trade. In this sense, foreign exchange, rather
than present U.S. export controls, is the major limi-
tation on the potential for this trade.

If the European Communist countries are to de-
velop a growing trade with the United States, they
will either have to sell more to the United States
or earn more convertible foreign exchange through
favorable trade balances with Western Europe. It
would be more difficult for these countries to ex-
pand exports to the United States than for them to
increase sales to Western Europe, since the United
States is not a good market for their primary mate-
rials and, in particular, would not in the foreseeable
future be a buyer of oil — the largest single Soviet
export.

848

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The U.S.S.R. is likely over the future to seek to
expand its sales of oil in Western Europe and else-
where as one means of earning more foreign ex-
change. Its success will depend on its ability to
produce increasing quantities of oil above its domes-
tic needs and on the willingness of importing coun-
tries to buy more Soviet oil. In the case of Western
Europe, increased purchases of Soviet oil would prob-
ably be tied to increased Soviet purchases of West
European products. Whether through the sale of
oil or other commodities, it is not likely that the
U.S.S.R. and the East European countries will be
able to develop and rely on a large excess of exports
over Imports in their trade with Western Europe to
help finance purchases in the United States.

For this reason, long-term growth in the trade
of the European Communist countries with the
United States is more up to them than up to us.
They would have to be prepared to invest in new
export industries, to learn new marketing methods,
to build dealer and service organizations abroad, and
to develop relations of confidence with U.S. business
firms. Such positive actions move a country to
participate in the world economy and to abide by
generally accepted international practices. They are
intimately related to a nation's world outlook and
are evolutionary in nature. If made, they would
move these countries in directions favorable to our
national security and welfare.

14. The Committee has seen various estimates of
our possible exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe over the next decade; none suggest that this
trade would constitute a significant part of our total
trade. There is no convincing case for any specific
figure, but it is clear that our commercial stake in
this trade is very small. It could grow modestly over
time, but only as our overall relations with these
countries change. In any event, it is dwarfed by
political considerations.

The Two Sides of the Argument

15. With these facts in mind, it is useful to lay
out the main arguments on either side of the issue
of national policy toward expanding peaceful trade
with these countries. Reasonable and thoughtful
people can differ on this question. We have tried
to probe carefully all sides.

16. The case against expanding peaceful trade
with the European Communist countries comes down
to the proposition that these countries are hostile
toward us and we should not strengthen them through
trade. By selling to them goods and services of
any nature, whether wheat or our technologically
advanced machinery and equipment, it is argued
that we help them to solve some of their pressing
internal problems and make it easier for them to
use their limited resources for building up their
military power and strengthening their potential
for subversion abroad. Moreover, this argument
states that by expanding trade vnth these countries

we bestow upon them a kind of respectability and
prestige which will enhance their position in the
developing countries of the world and which they
will use to our ultimate disadvantage. In sum, this
argument holds that the risks of expanding trade
are significant and the gains negligible.

17. The case for expanding peaceful trade comes
down to the proposition that we can use trade to
influence the internal evolution and external be-
havior of Communist countries. Trade provides us
with a policy instrument to encourage the move-
ment toward greater national independence in East-
ern Europe and the trend toward greater concern
for consumer needs in all the European Communist
countries. By refusing to trade we put ourselves in
a posture of hostility that could be at odds with these
developments as well as with other elements of our
overall strategy toward these countries. Our re-
fusal to trade cannot importantly limit Soviet mili-
tary power but it can help to reinforce their doc-
trinal belief in the need for self-sufficiency. A will-
ingness to trade, on the other hand, would be con-
crete evidence of our belief in constructive and
peaceful relations. The benefit done our relations
with the underdeveloped world by evidence that we
genuinely believe in the efficacy and ultimate tri-
umph of open societies far outweighs the disad-
vantages of any enhancement of Soviet legitimacy.
In sum, this argument holds that the gains are sig-
nificant and the risks are negligible.

18. There are persuasive elements in each of these
cases. No one policy is wholly right or wholly
wrong, and any course chosen has its risks. Taking
into account both gains and risks, the Committee
feels that the national interest clearly lies on the
side of a more active use of trade as an instru-
ment of foreign policy.

Trade as an Instrument of Policy

19. Before the United States can consider using
trade with Communist countries to advance our po-
litical ends, however, we must be sure it will not
weaken our military security. Expert opinion on
this subject shows the following:

First, exports of commodities that are closely or
directly related to military use or could signifi-
cantly enhance Communist military capabilities are
strictly controlled. The Committee believes these
controls should continue.

Second, gains from nonmilitary trade vnth the
United States are unlikely to release additional re-
sources for Soviet military expenditures. The
U.S.S.R. accords overriding priority to military ex-
penditures. Any change in total resource avail-
ability in the U.S.S.R. through trade would, under
present policies, affect its civilian economy, not its
military budget.

Third, the U.S.S.R. has an advanced weapons tech-
nology and a military production capability that is
virtually independent of its external economic re-
lations.

MAY 30, 1966

849

In sum, total Western nonstrategic trade, let alone
U.S. trade, could not be expected to alter the funda-
mental relationship between East-West military
capabilities.

20. It is easy to exaggerate many aspects of the
trade question : On the one hand, the possible mili-
tary and economic gains to Communist countries,
and the risk of irremediable security losses; and on
the other hand, the economic gains for U.S. business
from such trade and, in some respects, the political
consequences. Trade is not a one-way grant of
benefits to either party. It involves costs as well
as gains, and it is an exchange from which both
parties must benefit or it will not take place. The
unmatched industrial power of the United States
puts it in a position to use this area of relations
with Communist countries with authority and con-
fidence.

In turn, the Soviet leaders have their own special
prejudices regarding this trade. They tend to ex-
aggerate its importance to the United States and
the interest it holds for U.S. business. They have
long believed we would be forced to seek markets
in Communist countries to cope with depressions.
And this belief is related to their standard assump-
tion that "orders from Wall Street" must bring
U.S. policy around. The fact is that peaceful trade
cannot grow without an improvement in the under-
lying conditions that form the foundation for trade.

21. In the Committee's view, the time is ripe to
make more active use of trade arrangements as
political instruments in relations with Communist
countries. Trade should be brought into the policy
arena. It should be offered or withheld, purpose-
fully and systematically, as opportunities and cir-
cumstances warrant. This requires that the Presi-
dent be in a position to remove trade restrictions
on a selective and discretionary basis or to reimpose
them, as justified by our relations with individual
Communist countries.

Trade moves should be adapted to circumstances
in individual Communist countries and used to gain
improvements in, and to build a better foundation
for our relations with these countries. As oppor-
tunities arise, the United States should enter into
Govemment-to-Government negotiations with individ-
ual Communist countries on this front, bargaining
as "Yankee traders" for reciprocal advantages.

22. Specifically, if individual Communist coun-
tries are interested in expanding peaceful trade with
us, the United States should be prepared and able
to negotiate the terms under which such trade could
grow. These negotiations would set the framework
for trade and should be designed to strengthen the
U.S. political and commercial position. The trade
itself would be carried out by private U.S. firms
dealing directly with Communist State trading
agencies.

To deal with problems arising from differences in
our economic systems, the United States should use

its leverage to obtain, among other things, these con-
cessions in matters related to trade: Satisfactory
assurances regarding the arbitration of commercial
disputes in third countries; appropriate arrange-
ments for the protection of patents and other indus-
trial property; agreement on procedures to avoid
dumping and other forms of market disruption; and
the settlement of financial claims. In the case of
the U.S.S.R., such financial claims negotiations
would have to include an arrangement for a satis-
factory settlement of lend-lease obligations. The
United States should also seek: The establishment
or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices;
the facilitation of entry, travel, and accommodation
of commercial representatives; the improvement of
consular relations; and agreement on copyrights.

Whenever possible, we should use such negotia-
tions to gain agreement or understandings on such
matters as library and informational facilities, em-
bassy quarters, the establishment of consulates, the
jamming of broadcasts, the distribution of Govern-
ment and other publications, and the initiation or
expansion of cultural and technical exchanges.

In these ways, we could use trade negotiations to
open up new avenues of peaceful engagement with
Communist countries and create new opportunities
to influence their development. This would not be
a once and for all proposition — but a regular proc-
ess in which we could make trade an asset that
could be used over and over again.

23. As its part of the negotiating bargain, the
United States must be prepared to remove trade
restrictions on a selective basis. Within security
limitations, the U.S. Government should adopt a
flexible export licensing policy. It should use its
discretionary authority in the field of commercial
credits, and it should be in a position to offer in-
dividual Communist countries the opportunity to sell
on normal competitive terms in the U.S. market.

24. In its trade negotiations with the Communist
countries, the United States should strive to free the
trade itself as much as possible from rigidities and
Government intervention and make it increasingly
responsive to market forces. The United States
should insist that payments be made in convertible
currencies and should oppose any governmental link-
age of exports and imports. Termination and can-
cellation provisions in our trade agreements would
give us adequate leverage to police the trade.

Trade with the United States should put pressure
on Communist countries to move away from the
rigid bilateralism that characterizes their usual
trade arrangements. It should encourage them to
become more heavily engaged in the network of
world trade and committed to the Western practices
that govern most of this trade.

25. U.S. aims in these negotiations must be po-
litical; we seek to encourage moves toward the ex-
ternal independence and internal liberalization of
individual Communist nations. We are not inter-

850

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

I

ested in fostering animosities among European Com-
munist nations. Our long-term purpose in our
dealings with these countries must be to create an
atmosphere in which they will inevitably find that
their interests are more and more linked to peaceful
relations with the Free World. We must hold to
these kinds of purposes in our trade negotiations
with European Communist countries. They are not
only necessary to make the effort worthwhile, but
they form the only base on which our trade can, in
fact, grow.

26. The major specific issues involve our policies
on export licenses, on the sale of technology, on
credits, and on the granting of most-favored-nation
tariff treatment. Before discussing them, the Com-
mittee would emphasize that these issues are part
of an interrelated whole and that U.S. policies on
each should be formulated and applied with this in
mind. For example, the United States cannot ex-
jiect political advantages from the isolated use of
export licensing controls on a case-by-case basis.
Trying to negotiate in this way would be a waste
of U.S. bargaining power. On the other hand, the
coordinated use of all the potential assets — export
licensing, MFN and guarantees of commercial credit
— in periodic Government-to-Govemment trade ne-
gotiations with individual Communist countries would
put the United States in the best possible position
to get the most advantageous results from such
negotiations.

Export Licensing

27. Issues in export licensing arise mainly in
regard to commodities and technology which the
United States restricts for export to Communist
countries but which are not included in the Inter-
national Embargo List. Many of these products
and industrial plants are freely exported from West-
ern Europe and Japan. They are not closely related
to military production or use and therefore are in
the area of peaceful trade. As a group, they are of
interest to the European Communist countries and
would make a contribution to their economies insofar
as they could be purchased only from the United
States, or purchased from the United States in more
advanced design, better quality, or lower cost than
from other Western countries.

28. The United States should adopt a flexible and
selective policy in respect to licensing the export of
commodities and technology. We should be pre-
pared to relax our controls, country by country in
support of negotiations to obtain concessions and
achieve better relations. Conversely, we should
tighten our controls, should relations deteriorate.

29. The language of the Export Control Act and
the declaration of policy expressed by the Congress
in that Act is consistent with this approach. As
stated in the Act, "it is the policy of the United
States to use its economic resources and advantages
in trade with Communist-dominated nations to fur-

ther the national security and foreign policy objec-
tives of the United States." The Act gives the
President full discretion to apply controls on trade
with Communist nations to carry out this policy.
The criteria for applying controls were rephrased in
a 1962 amendment, but the effect of this amendment
is by no means clear. Given this ambiguity, there
has been a tendency among those charged with the
administration of trade controls to give more em-
phasis to the restrictive rather than to the discre-
tionary provisions of the statute.

30. The Committee believes this is unwise and not
required by the law. The Act comes up for renewal
this year. It should be renewed with emphasis
placed on the possibilities for using trade and
export licensing for constructive as well as for
restrictive purposes. In light of the new and chang-
ing political circumstances in Eastern Europe and
the U.S.S.R., more regard should be given to the
use of this tool to influence our future relations
with these countries.

The Question of Technology

31. Communist countries are mainly interested in
buying our best machinery, our advanced industrial
plants, and our latest technical data.

It can be argued that sales or licenses in these
categories should not be permitted because they
would permit the Soviet bloc nations to allocate more
of their scarce research and development talent to
the military, and would thus harm the relative posi-
tion of the United States.

Insofar as a reasonable equivalent can be ob-
tained from other Western nations or Japan, this
argument has little force. In the smaller number of
cases, where a nonstrategic technical advantage is
obtainable only from the United States, the possible
effect on Soviet military capabilities, as pointed out
above, is negligible. On the other hand, the power
to release for trade items of nonstrategic but ad-
vanced technology can be used by the President as
an effective trade tool for accomplishing foreign
policy objectives.

For reasons which follow, however, we doubt that
the Communist countries will be successful in buying
a large amount of advanced technology from the
United States. This may lead to some irritation and
disillusionment on their part. But in the end, bar-
gaining in this field may force the Communist na-
tions to face up to meeting the conditions that a
genuine trade in technology requires.

32. The Committee does not believe that many
U.S. firms would be interested in selling their most
advanced technology to European Communist coun-
tries. In the normal course of trade, business firms
protect their most advanced technology and bargain
hard for satisfactory terms for such technology as
they are willing to sell. These practices would hold
all the more for trade with Communist countries.

Some U.S. industries and firms that support heavy

MAY 30, 1966

851

research and development programs refuse to sell
their industrial processes or to build complete plants
for sale to others. Money alone will not buy their
know-how. They are willing to exchange their proc-
esses for what they consider equivalent technology
from other firms. Such an exchange of technology
between a U.S. firm and a Soviet State organization
would be feasible in only a very few instances. Or
such firms are sometimes willing to build their own
plants abroad embodying their technology. The
possibility of a private U.S. firm's establishing a
subsidiary or entering into a joint venture in the
U.S.S.R. is beyond our present vision; it may not be
so farfetched in some East European countries.

Many U.S. firms are prepared to license their
technology in Western Europe and elsewhere in the
free world. Most are reluctant to do so in the
U.S.S.R. since they do not have confidence in the
licensing arrangement or in the protection of their
technology afforded by Soviet law. As in the case
of the trade in goods, the flow of technology will in-
evitably depend on development of common ground
rules and of relationships of trust. The recent Soviet
expression of interest in joining the International
Patent Convention is of significance in this con-
nection.

In some cases Western managerial methods and
organization are integral to Western technology. It
would not be enough for the Communists to import
the plant itself; they probably would need Western
technicians to install the equipment and supervise
initial operation. They might even have to adapt
their operating methods to its design to use it
efficiently.

In other cases the use of Western plants or proc-
esses is limited for lack of a wide range of support-
ing industries to supply components and a serious
shortage of managerial and technical talent. Modern
plants cannot easily be operated or maintained, let
alone duplicated, outside the industrial milieu for
which they were designed.

Where U.S. firms are willing to sell technology,
it is frequently their second best or in the process
of becoming so. For the importing country, gearing
up for a new type of production takes time. In a
fast-moving field where technology is perishable,
this method of operation can become a way of im-
porting obsolescence.

In essence, the importation of technology involves
much the same calculation as the decision to import
anything else. Whether technology seems worth
purchasing depends on the price. Whether it turns
out to be advantageous depends on the efficiency
with which it is injected into the system. In today's
world no country can continue to rely heavily on the
pirating of importation of technology to improve
its relative industrial position. To do so may appear
to be cheap in the short run, but could turn out to
be a sure way of perpetuating second-class indus-
trial status.

33. In view of all these considerations, the Com-
mittee believes the United States should treat the
trade in nonstrategic technology in the same way as
other trade. The President should use his authority
to permit the sale of nonstrategic technology in
support of U.S. trade negotiations with individual
Communist countries. The decision to permit the
sale is a Government decision to be made on foreign
policy grounds. The decision to sell and the terms of
sale of such machinery and equipment should be
left to the individual U.S. business firm.

Credits

34. Credits can become an issue if U.S. trade with
Communist countries expands. Most U.S. firms
would not extend credits to Communist countries
without Government guarantees. As matters stand
now, the President can authorize the Export-Import
Bank to guarantee commercial credits to a Com-
munist country when he determines that guarantees
to such a country are in the national interest The
terms of such credits must be within the range of
common-commercial practices, but in any event, it is
U.S. Government policy to limit such credits to 5
years. This limit is also consistent with the Berne
Union — a long-standing, though informal agreement,
reached by leading insuring and guaranteeing insti-
tutions in the field of international credit. The
Committee believes we should hold to this position.
It is recommended further that the President make
appropriate use of his powers in this area to secure
recognition of the validity of any financial claims
outstanding and to obtain reasonable settlements of
such claims.^ These claims are considerable in
amount and consist largely of expropriated American
properties and defaulted bond issues, and in the
case of the U.S.S.R., of course, of lend-lease obli-
gations.

35. It is sometimes argued, particularly in West-
ern European countries, that credits in excess of 5
years should be extended to the East for industrial
plants that are normally amortized over a lengthy
period. Some of these countries are guaranteeing
such credits. As further justification for this posi-
tion, the point is made that Communist governments
have proven to be excellent credit risks and thereby
are justified in asking for long-credit terms.

36. The Committee sees considerable danger in
this line of reasoning. Among other things, it could
easily lead to a credit race among Western suppliers
and already shows some signs of doing so. There is
no necessary relationship between the decision of
Communist countries to purchase capital equipment
and their future ability to earn foreign exchange to
pay for such purchases. Medium- and short-term

" Mr. Black believes that reasonable settlements of
these claims should be obtained prior to extension of
any Government-guaranteed commercial credit.
[Footnote in original.]

852

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

credits can be justified to meet temporary payment
imbalances. But permitting these countries to pile
up long-term debt could enable them to put their
creditors under substantial pressure to accept un-
wanted commodities in lieu of defaults and could
amount to a subsidy for their economies.

Apart from the commercial risks, it is important
to recognize that long-term credits could run counter
to the central purpose of this trade and reduce its
potential political benefits. If Communist countries
are strongly interested in purchasing United States
or any other Western capital equipment on a scale
substantially beyond their near-term capacity to
finance, they should be obliged to face up to the
implications of that position. The appropriate course
for them to follow would be to divert resources to
their export industries and to devote greater effort
to design and marketing activities for sales in the
West. Long-term credits enable these countries to
postpone such decisions and transfer the burden of
adjustment to Western capital markets, rather than
to accept the responsibilities of growing interde-
pendence with the free world.

We should not be concerned if a more restricted
policy on credit would put U.S. firms at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to those of some
other Western countries in negotiating with Com-
munist authorities. The United States should set
an example ; it should not be party to a practice that
enables the Communists to play off one Western
country against another.

Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment

37. Most-favored-nation tariff treatment is nor-
mally granted by the United States to all countries.
Exports from countries not granted MFN tariff
treatment are subject to the high duties of the
United States Tariff Act of 1930. Present legisla-
tion prohibits granting MFN tariff treatment to all
Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Poland.
This prohibition places a serious barrier in the way
of expanding peaceful trade with the other European
Communist countries because it denies them normal
competitive terms in their attempts to sell to us.

38. The prohibition against granting MFN de-
prives the President of a valuable bargaining tool.
Vesting discretionary authority in the President to
grant as well as withdraw such tariff treatment
would be the single most important step in per-
mitting the Government to use trade more effective-
ly as an instrument for shaping our relations with
these countries. Without this tool any initial moves
we might make in this direction would soon come
to a halt. With it we could hope to maintain the
momentum of change in a direction favorable to our
interests.

39. The principal arguments against affording
MFN treatment to these countries are: (a) We
would get no tariff concessions in return. Tariff
rates in Communist countries have only nominal

significance since foreign trade is dependent on the
decisions of State trading authorities and not on
market forces; (b) Communist countries should not
receive MFN since they are not prepared to open
their markets to world competition on the basis of
established trading rules; (c) MFN would make it
easier for them to dump their products in our mar-
kets; and (d) MFN is not so important to them
because they export mainly primary products and
the tariff discrimination they face for these prod-
ucts is not nearly so great as it is for industrial
products.

40. These arguments in the Committee's view are
outweighed by the advantages we would gain from
a discretionary policy on this issue. The conces-
sions the United States would seek for MFN would
not be simply in tariff rates but in the overall con-
ditions we could negotiate for expanded trade. The
problem of Communist dumping is the kind of prob-
lem that can be handled in the course of Govern-
ment-to-Government trade negotiations. If these
countries are to make a serious effort to market
their products in the United States, they will have
to be assured of being able to compete on normal
terms in the U.S. market.

41. MFN should not be granted to Communist
countries automatically, or as a matter of right, or
for an indefinite period. In these respects there
should be a basic distinction between the MFN we
grant by statute to free world countries and the
MFN we would grant to Communist countries as
part of specific trade understandings. It would be
granted only for the duration of such agreements
and subject to periodic review. As a bargaining
asset, it is uniquely well adapted to U.S. policy
objectives. Discretionary authority to grant MFN
would allow the President to go much farther in
differentiating among Communist countries. It
would also symbolize our interest in encouraging
these countries to move toward more open trading
systems on an evolutionary basis. And it would
demonstrate to these countries the advantages of
better relations with the United States and the dis-
advantages of a deterioration in this relationship.

Trade and Strategy

42. Our trade policies are but a small part of our
overall strategy toward European Communist coun-
tries. One aspect of this strategy, as we mentioned
earlier, is to make clear that we will oppose and
frustrate any actions that menace the peace of
the world. Another aspect is to demonstrate that
both sides can benefit from peaceful exchange, and
in so doing, to influence and encourage those Com-
munist leaders who are moving away from the view
that military confrontation is inevitable. At the
very time we must pursue the first aspect of our
strategy even to the point of crisis, such as in
Vietnam, we should also be willing to pursue the
second as concrete evidence of the United States

MAY 30, 1966

i

853

Reprints of the Report to the President of
the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Rela-
tions With East European Countries and the
Soviet Union (Department of State publica-
tion 8061, 22 pp.) may be obtained from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C,
20Jf02, for 15 cents each.

dedication to the cause of peace.

Trade relations and trade negotiations can be a
highly effective means of communicating this point.
The United States can use trade to convey its true
image and intentions: That it favors mutually bene-
ficial relations; and that it is willing to go as far
as Communist nations are willing to go in estab-
lishing a set of intergovernmental relations that
conform to international standards. But the United
States is justified in insisting on evidence as it
moves step by step along this road. Along with
such activities as cooperation in water desalinization,
the exchange of visits of Heads of State, and tech-
nical and cultural exchanges, trade negotiations can
give us a way of testing Communist intentions and
can give them a way of testing U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

1. The Committee believes that peaceful trade in
nonstrategic items can be an important instrument
of national policy in our country's relations with in-
dividual Communist nations of Europe. Political,
not commercial or economic considerations, should
determine the formulation and execution of our
trade policies.

2. The United States should in no case drop its
controls on strategic items that could significantly
enhance Communist military capabilities.

3. In respect to nonstrategic trade, the United
States should use trade negotiations with individual
Communist countries more actively, aggressively,
and confidently in the pursuit of our national wel-
fare and world peace.

4. We should not, however, remove our present
restrictions on this trade either automatically or
across the board. Communist countries are chang-
ing, in varying degrees and in different ways. We
should adapt our trade policies to the political cir-
cumstances and opportunities that present them-
selves from time to time in the individual countries.
At present significantly greater trade opportunities
exist in certain East European countries than in
the Soviet Union.

5. Negotiations with each of these countries should
involve hard bargaining, from which the U.S. Gov-
ernment should expect to receive satisfactory assur-
ances regarding the removal of commercial obstacles
arising from differences in our economic systems.
We should bargain for agreements on matters re-
lated to trade, such as reasonable settlements of out-

standing financial claims and procedures to avoid
dumping, and, as appropriate, understandings on a
variety of cultural, informational, and other mat-
ters at issue between us.

6. Provision should be made in trade agreements
with Communist countries for frequent review at
specific intervals. This would provide the oppor-
tunity to negotiate for new gains and to settle
additional matters of disagreement.

7. An aim of American policy in trade negotia-
tions with Communist countries should be to bring
their trade practices into line with normal world
trade practices.

8. To accomplish these purposes, we must be able
to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully in
support of such negotiations. The President should
have the authority to remove or, if necessary, im-
pose trade restrictions as required for the achieve-
ment of our foreign policy objectives.

9. In administering export controls, the determi-
nation of what is strategic should be made primarily
by the Department of Defense. The power to with-
hold or release nonstrategic goods or advanced
technology for trade should be exercised by the
President as an instrument for accomplishing for-
eigTi policy objectives.

10. The President should be given discretionary
authority to grant or withdraw most-favored-nation
tariff treatment to and from individual Communist
countries when he determines it to be in the na-
tional interest. There should be a distinction be-
tween this MFN tariff treatment and the MFN tariff
treatment we grant by statute to free world coun-
tries. It should be granted to Communist countries
only for the duration of the trade agreement of which
it is a part, and it should be subject to periodic
review.

11. The President should continue to exercise his
authority to allow Government-guaranteed commer-
cial credits up to 5 years duration, if such terms are
normal to the trade and if they are considered to
further the national interest.

12. Trade with Communist countries should not be
subsidized, nor should it receive artificial encourage-
ment. The U.S. Government should decide the per-
mitted scope of the trade in terms of security
considerations. Within these limits, the amount of
trade that takes place should be left to U.S. busi-
ness and the U.S. consumer to decide. In terms of
foreign policy considerations, however, It should be
recognized that trade with European Communist
nations can be as much in the national interest as
any other trade.

13. In view of the changes now taking place and
of changes that will continue to take place in the
Communist societies, the United States should, at
regular intervals, review its total trade policies to-
ward the whole Communist world to ensure that they
remain consistent with, and effective in support of,
foreign policy objectives.

I

854

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

14. If trade with Communist countries is to be
used for these objectives, the U.S. public, the Con-
gress and the executive branch must have a thor-
ough understanding of the problem, the opportuni-
ties that trade affords, and U.S. national objectives
in this field. The U.S. Government should take
every opportunity to make explicit what it intends
to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should
act to remove any stigma from trade with Com-
munist countries where such trade is determined to
be in the national interest. The foreign policy ad-
vantages of such trade to the United States are not
widely enough appreciated. With greater public
awareness of both facts and objectives, the United
States will be in a stronger position to use this
trade as it must be used — for national purposes and
to support national policy.

In conclusion, we emphasize that these findings and
recommendations constitute a long-term strategy.

The intimate engagement of trade, over a con-
siderable period of time, when taken with the process
of change already under way, can influence the
internal development and the external policies of
European Communist societies along paths favor-

able to our purpose and to world peace. Trade is
one of the few channels available to us for con-
structive contacts with nations with whom we find
frequent hostility. In the long run, selected trade,
intelligently negotiated and wisely administered,
may turn out to have been one of our most powerful
tools of national policy.

The members of your Committee have found this
assignment difficult, challenging, and important
We hope this report will be useful to you and to the
Nation.

Respectfully submitted, (signed)

J. Irwin Miller, Chairman
Eugene R. Black
William Blackie
George R. Brown
Charles W. Engelhard, Jr.
James B. Fisk
Nathaniel Goldfinger'
Crawford H. Greenewalt
William A. Hewitt
Max F. Millikan
Charles G. Mortimer
Herman B. Wells

'Statement of Comment by Mr. Goldfinger

I have reservations about several issues in the
Report and respectfully submit the following com-
ments.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that I am
not opposed to the expansion of economic and finan-
cial relations with the Soviet bloc under all condi-
tions. However, I am concerned about the conditions.

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and its
European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our
Nation's foreign policy. Therefore, the Report should
have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect
of this issue.

There is also inadequate caution in the Report
about the risk of exporting American technology —
particularly advanced technology — to those coun-
tries. In centrally planned, totalitarian states, mili-
tary and economic factors are closely related. There
is no reason to believe that the export of American
machinery and equipment to those countries will
necessarily redound to the benefit of their peoples.

Moreover, in our readiness to engage in bilateral
trade negotiations with individual countries of the

Soviet bloc, we should have no illusions about the
ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist atti-
tudes and policies. Neither is trade, as such, a sure
force for peace, as indicated by the two World Wars
between trading nations.

Recognition of these realities should result in
greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo
concessions than is contained in the Report. In my
opinion, there should be no expansion of trade,
extension of Government-guaranteed credit or most-
favored-nation tariff treatment without political
quid pro quo concessions from them.

The Report's discussion of most-favored-nation
tariff treatment omits or only briefly deals with
several thorny problems concerning potential im-
ports from those countries — such as goods produced
by slave labor, dumping, market disruption, inter-
national fair labor standards and the need for an
adequate trade adjustment assistance mechanism
at home.

In conclusion, I believe that considerations of
national security and international policy objectives
should have top priority in evaluating trade rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc — over any temporary or
marginal commercial advantages that may exist.

MAY 30, 1966

855

". . . an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy
in action — at the bargaining table, in administrative deci-
sions, in legislation." This is how William M. Roth, Deputy
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in this article
hosed on a recent speech he made, describes U.S. trade policy
under President Johnson's leadership.

The Johnson Trade Policy

by William M. Roth

What is the trade posture of the Johnson
administration?

Both the words and deeds indicate a rec-
ord of quiet, steady accomplishment in the
liberalization of world trade — whether cal-
culated in volume, dollars, or in the progres-
sive dismantling of protective barriers.

President Johnson's attitude on trade
policy is perhaps best summed up in his let-
ter to the Congress last October transmitting
the ninth annual report on the trade agree-
ments program.' He said :

The policy of two-way trade expansion and lib-
eralization, initiated with the Trade Agreements
Act of 1934 and continued by evei-y Administration
since that time, has brought great benefits to this
country. In general, U.S. goods have enjoyed pro-
gressively easier access to foreign markets. Low-cost,
high-quality U.S. exports, sold and used in every
corner of the world, have provided immediate evi-
dence of the vitality of our free enterprise system.
Our processors have gained ready access to essential
raw materials, and have profited from the stimulus
of keener competition. Consumers have enjoyed the
wide range of choice which the world market pro-
vides.

But we have only begun. We must build on past
success to achieve greater well-being for America,
and for all the world's peoples. In particular, we
must make every effort to assure the success of
the current Geneva negotiations, known as the Ken-
nedy Round.

The sixth round of tariff negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade — the Kennedy Round — is of great
significance both economically and polit-
ically.

European rumors that the United States
may have lost its enthusiasm for these im-
portant trade negotiations are wide of the
mark. They are contradicted time and time
again — by the words of the President and
by those of his principal economic advisers.
More than anything, however, they are con-
tradicted by the record of this country's
leadership in pressing for meaningful nego-
tiations in Geneva and by the offers, in
both industry and agriculture, that the
United States has made. We suspect, there-
fore, that such rumors are tactical moves
in a negotiation of great complexity and of
tremendous economic and political impor-
tance. Certainly, most of our negotiating
partners are well aware of the deep and
urgent commitment of this country to the
successful outcome of the Kennedy Round.

In his state of the Union message - Presi-
dent Johnson reemphasized this commit-
ment. "We will work," he said, "to
strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce
barriers to trade . . . ." And in his Economic
Report ^- the President said :

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 761.
' For excerpts, see ibid., Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.
" For excerpts, see ihid., Feb. 21, 1966, p. 290.

856

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The year 1966 is the year when the world can take
a giant step forward in liberalizing international
trade by successfully concluding the Kennedy Round
of negotiations to reduce trade barriers on all classes
of products. The resulting growth of world trade
and world income will benefit all countries, develop-
ing as well as industrial. The United States will
bend every effort to get meaningful negotiations
back on the track. This great venture in international
cooperation must not fail.

These words clearly indicate a commit-
ment to the principle of freedom of inter-
national competition and express the funda-
mental trade policy of President Johnson
and of his administration. They also reaf-
firm the mandate of our negotiators in
Geneva. This ambitious effort, the greatest
in the 20-year history of GATT trade nego-
tiations, will not fail because of any lack of
will or determination on the part of the
United States.

Although the six member states of the
European Economic Community reached an
impasse in their internal negotiations last
June and the Geneva negotiations had
come to a virtual standstill at the turn of
the year, the Six have now resumed their
internal dialog. Differences remain, but it
seems reasonable to assume that they will
achieve agreement to resume the develop-
ment of their dynamic Common Market and
to restore momentum to the trade negotia-
tions.

The sixth round of trade negotiations must
be concluded under our present authority,
with a significant and balanced reduction in
world trade barriers on a fully reciprocal
basis. There are no practical alternatives if
global trade expansion is to be achieved.
The Kennedy Round is multilateral in the
truest sense, involving all the world's prin-
cipal trading nations.

Failure in these negotiations will invite a
reversion to divisive trade practices among
nations, with protectionism given strong en-
couragement and economic nationalism and
regionalism new impetus. We must maintain
and accelerate the momentum of trade lib-
eralization and expansion which has contrib-
uted 80 greatly to the buoyant economies
of the postwar industrialized world and

which holds the greatest potential for rapid
development of the emerging nations. That
is what the Kennedy Round is about.

other Trade Initiatives

It is not only in the Geneva negotiations
that the Johnson administration has given
compelling evidence of its trade posture. A
number of recent actions and proposals ex-
pose a consistent intent to see that Ameri-
can markets are open and remain open to
fair competition from abroad.

First, the President has recently acted to
end special escape-clause protection on lead
and zinc, clinical thermometers, and safety
pins, judging that this extra protection can
no longer be justified. In a fourth case he
ordered a substantial modification of the
extra protection afforded stainless steel
table flatware.

These actions are based on investigations,
ordered by President Johnson, of the neces-
sity of continuing special protection for these
industries. Although an industry may need a
temporary shield in some instances, the ad-
ministration believes special protective
measures should be employed only when im-
ports are clearly causing serious disruption.
Such cases should be under constant review
and the protection removed when no longer
necessary.

On the legislative side the Johnson ad-
ministration has shown its dedication to a
policy of liberal world trade. Over adminis-
tration opposition the 88th Congress passed
a bill establishing stringent marking re-
quirements on imported wood products. Pres-
ident Johnson vetoed it in December 1963,
stating in his veto message* that the "bill
would raise new barriers to foreign trade
and invite retaliation against our ex-
ports. . . ." It was his first major deci-
sion on an issue of national trade policy and
his first use of the veto.

In line with this policy the Johnson ad-
ministration has continued to resist success-
fully the enactment of protectionist meas-
ures. In the last session of the Congress it

' For text, see ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 129.

MAY 30, 1966

857

i

made known its opposition to the so-called
Orderly Marketing Act of 1965, which would
have required the imposition of quotas when
imports reached certain levels, and to a bill
to amend the Anti-Dumping Act, which
would have rendered that act a highly pro-
tectionist instrument. These bills did not re-
ceive even preliminary consideration by the
committees concerned. This was also true of
three other bills: One which would have
provided for an increase in tariffs on im-
ports of salmon, another which would have
required the labeling of labels, and a third
which would have required the marking of
containers manufactured in the United States
in part with foreign steel.

On the positive side, the 89th Congress in
its first session took several significant ac-
tions at the request of the administration.
The President sought and obtained repeal of
the so-called Saylor amendment to the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1965,
which imposed a complete prohibition on the
use of any foreign articles in the construc-
tion of highways and railroads under the act.
The Congress also met the President's re-
quest for legislation to implement the U.S.-
Canadian agreement ^ providing duty-free
treatment of automotive products traded be-
tween the two countries, which previously
had had serious trade problems in these
products.

This same Congress also passed legisla-
tion enabling the United States to carry
out its obligations under the International
Coffee Agreement of 1962," an agreement
designed to bring more stability to coffee
prices. The development programs of cof-

'For text, see ibid., Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; for
statements made by President Johnson after sign-
ing the Automotive Trade Products Act of 1965 and
texts of a proclamation and Executive order pur-
suant thereto, see ibid., Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

• For text, see Treaties and Other International
Acts Series 5505; for a statement made by President
Johnson on May 24, 1965, see Bulletin of June
14, 1965, p. 975.

fee-producing countries have suffered seri-
ous setbacks from the wildly fluctuating
prices of this vital export commodity.

In January 1966 the Senate passed a
previously approved House bill to suspend
duties on certain tropical hardwoods pend-
ing completion of the Kennedy Round ac-
tion on them, as another step toward assist-
ing developing countries.

i

New Legislation

Significantly, this year President John-
son announced in his state of the Union
message that, in keeping with our policy of
building bridges to Eastern Europe, he
would request that Congress grant him
discretionary authority to remove special
tariff restrictions against goods from East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union when
such action is in the national interest.

The President also will shortly request
an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act
to liberalize the tests which a firm or group
of workers must satisfy in order to become
eligible for adjustment assistance. To date,
all petitions for adjustment assistance have
been denied because of what we now realize
to be unnecessarily demanding tests written
into the law. The amendment will substan-
tially relax these tests while still requiring
a demonstration that tariff concessions
have played a role in causing increased im-
ports and have, in turn, led to economic
injury.

We hope that this year the Congress will
approve legislation to permit the United
States to implement the Agreement on the
Importation of Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Materials, commonly known as the
Florence Agreement.' Purpose of the agree-
ment, as President Johnson noted in his
letter ^ requesting congressional considera-

' For bacliground and text of the agreement, sea
ibid., Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422.

' For text, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 1015.

858

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tion of the measure, is "to promote the
' growth of international understanding by-
reducing trade barriers to the flow of
knowledge in all directions across all fron-
tiers."

This record adds up to an impressive
demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in
action — at the bargaining table, in adminis-
trative decisions, in legislation.

In summary, there are three elements of
President Johnson's trade policy.

First, while it is acknowledged that im-
port competition can be disruptive and that
Government assistance to help industries
adjust to this kind of competition is war-
ranted, such assistance should restrain im-
ports only as a last resort and restraints
should be ended as soon as they have served
their purpose.

Second, the United States seeks and sup-
ports, in and beyond the current negotia-
tions, measures that will expand world
trade, including trade with the developing
countries and the countries of Eastern
Europe.

Third, the Johnson trade policy commits
the United States to the vigorous use of the
full powers of the Trade Expansion Act to
achieve a successful outcome of the GATT
negotiations at Geneva. Its negotiators will
bargain hard to conclude, on a fully recipro-
cal basis, a significant and balanced reduc-
tion in world trade barriers. The result, in
both industry and in agriculture, will be
mutually beneficial to all participants.

These three elements serve the common
objective of expanding trade. The Johnson
trade policy thus continues the liberal world
trade orientation that has characterized
United States policies since the early 1930's
— policies that have had since that time the
consistent support of the leaders of both
major political parties.

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified
of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments

Following is the text of a letter from Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Thomas C. Mann to Maritime Administrator
Nicholas Johnson.

May 4, 1966

Dear Mr. Johnson : I am writing with re-
gard to a Resolution of the Security Council
of the United Nations adopted on April 9,
1966.1 That Resolution, No. 221, relates to
shipments of oil to Southern Rhodesia and
provides in part:

"Calls upon all States to ensure the diver-
sion of any of their vessels reasonably be-
lieved to be carrying oil destined for Rho-
desia which may be en route for Beira;

"Calls upon the Government of the United
Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if
necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil des-
tined for Rhodesia."

The Government of the United States
voted for Resolution No. 221 in the Security-
Council and supports the efforts of the
United Kingdom to end the illegal, unilateral
declaration of independence by the Smith re-
gime in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly,
we wish to advise all owners of United States
flag ships to take all necessary steps to pre-
vent their ships of United States registry
from carrying oil to Beira destined for
Rhodesia.

We should appreciate your having this
letter and any other notice you believe appro-
priate published in the Federal Register.^

Sincerely yours,

Thomas C. Mann

' For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 1966, p. 718.
• 31 Fed. Reg. 6878.

MAY 30, 1966

859

"/ asked an old gentleman tvhat he thought of all the
changes xvhich were taking place, and I shall never forget
his ansiver: 'I cannot understand lohy ive have been sleeping
so long.' " That phrase, Mr. Berger says, "eloquently sums
up the great changes noiv going on in Korea."

Korea— Progress and Prospects

by Samuel D. Berger

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^

I am well acquainted with Chung-Ang Uni-
versity, but this is my introduction to Long
Island University. I am very pleased to be
here, and especially pleased to take part in
this symposium. A unique relationship has
developed between the United States and
Korea in these last 20 years, and this con-
ference is, in a sense, a recognition of and a
tribute to that relationship.

Although we have had diplomatic relations
with Korea since 1883, Korea was hardly
known to Americans as recently as 20 years
ago. Missionary work, which dates from the
1880's, had brought Korea into the homes
and thinking of a limited circle. A handful of
Koreans who had come to the United States
during the Japanese occupation nurtured a
dream that Korea might one day be free,
but they were little knov^m in the American
community. A few scholars had made some
studies of Korean history, culture, and life,
usually in conjunction with general studies
of the Orient. An occasional tourist would
visit Korea and write his impressions. This
was almost the sum total of our acquaint-
ance.

The Korean people knew as little of us as
we of them. A self-imposed isolation, fol-

lowed by an enforced isolation, had cut
Korea off from most other countries and
especially from the West. Historically,
Korean contacts with the world were limited
to China and to Japan, or to the maraud-
ers from beyond the Yalu who threatened
Korea during much of its long history.

War and the accidents of history have
brought our two countries together in ways
that no one could have foreseen 20 years
ago. Korea is now a part of our history, as
we are of Korea's. The chain of events that
brought us together were :

' Address made before the Conference and Sym-
posium of Korean Culture at the Brooklyn Center of
Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 7.

The Second World War.

The fateful decision made during that war
to divide Korea at the 38th parallel as a
matter of convenience to provide for the sur-
render of Japanese prisoners of war.

The even more fateful decision of the
Soviet leaders not to cooperate with the
Western Allies to build a durable peace but
to follow Lenin's doctrine of exploiting the
chaos, confusion, and disorder after the war
in order to extend communism. In Korea a
Communist regime was installed by the So-
viet Army.

The American decision to withdraw our
military forces from the Republic of Korea
in 1949, leaving only a few military advisers
and instructors.

The subsequent invasion from the north

*l

860

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

on June 25, 1950, which led to our return,
to the United Nations action, and to our pres-
ence in Korea ever since.

In the perspective of history, two deci-
sions, more than any other, dramatize the
revolution in American foreign policy from
our traditional isolation to an acceptance of
international responsibilities. And curiously,
both of these involve peninsulas which have
been fought over for centuries as invading
nations vied to extend their domains. The
first was the Truman Doctrine of March
1947, in which we took over from our ex-
hausted British allies their commitment to
support the independence of Greece against
Communist aggression. This was the fore-
runner of NATO and our deep involvement
in Europe. The other was President Tru-
man's decision to come to the support of the
Republic of Korea in June 1950, which set
the basis for our subsequent policies in the
general area of Asia.

Interchange of People, Experience, Ideas

If we knew little about Korea and they
little about us 20 years ago, that is no longer
the case today. Over a million Americans
have fought or stood guard on Korean soil,
along with Koreans, to defend the independ-
ence of that nation. Tens of thousands of
Korean soldiers, sailors, and airmen have
been brought to the United States for mili-
tary training. Thousands of American
civilians have visited or worked in every con-
I ceivable capacity in Korea, and tens of
thousands of Korean civilians have come to
America for study and training.

These figures and numbers do not begin
to convey the width and depth of the inter-
change which has taken place — of people,
of experience, and of ideas. English has be-
come the compulsory second language in
Korean education, and wherever I traveled
in Korea, even on the most remote island,
I was invariably accosted by one or more
young students anxious to try out their Eng-
lish. Koreans are good linguists, and even
now I receive letters from students I have
met all over Korea.

Our military relations have done far more

than produce one of the most highly trained
and effective military forces in the free
world. For a modern military force con-
sists not only of fighting men but re-
quires a great range and variety of profes-
sions, vocations, and skills. Doctors, sur-
geons, and nurses are needed, as are lawyers
and engineers, experts in communication,
transport, procurement, supply, budget and
fiscal matters, and disbursement. Men
must be trained in organization, manage-
ment, and planning. Men must be trained
as pilots and navigators, as drivers, motor
and airplane mechanics, welders, crane and
bulldozer operators, metalworkers, and radio
and telephone repairmen, and in scores of
other occupations.

This military training has made the Ko-
rean Armed Forces a vast reservoir of
supply of skills and talents which were
transferable to civilian life and which are
now contributing so much to the building of
a modern Korea.

Nor have the civilians been neglected.
Through the exchange program and through
technical assistance to Korean education,
thousands of Koreans have been trained in
economics, banking, government, journal-
ism, political science, engineering, medi-
cine, law, public health, agriculture, busi-
ness administration, and other fields.

A "Developed" People

The thirst of Koreans for education and
training is one of the happiest memories I
have of my 3 years' stay in Korea. Korea
may be an undeveloped nation in an eco-
nomic and industrial sense, but the Ko-
reans are not an undeveloped people.

The separate kingdoms and tribes of
Korea were unified into a nation about
1,300 years ago, and they have successfully
maintained a national tradition ever since.
They withstood Chinese and Japanese in-
cursions or invasions, and they absorbed
and survived a Mongolian occupation. Their
long history as a nation testifies to their
hardiness and their great inner resources of
will, independence, and spirit.

I have an old map of Korea dating from

MAY 30, 1966

861

r

an exploration by Ortelius in 1540. It is
perhaps the first map ever made of Korea
by a European. It shows Korea as an island,
and the inscription reads: "Not much is
known about the people of this island,
known as Koreans, except that they are
very tall and superb soldiers."

The 18th and 19th centuries were tragic
ones in Korean history, as the Yi Dynasty,
energetic and progressive in its early years,
went into decline. The feudal system showed
no ability to adjust and change. By the
end of the 19th century, corruption, a per-
sistent tendency toward factionalism, and
an inability to produce effective govern-
ment had so weakened this pi'oud and
capable people that Korea was no longer
able to withstand the pressures of her
stronger imperial neighbors. The stirrings
toward change and democracy in the late
19th century were snuffed out by the
Japanese occupation.

But the essential characteristics of the
people could not be obliterated. They are
an energetic people, hard working, with
ambition, and quick to learn. The literacy
rate is one of the highest in the world —
93 percent. Education is universal, and
parents of every class will make every
sacrifice to put their children into
university.

Problems Confronting Korea After 1945

There are nations with vast natural re-
sources, but they seem unable to do much
with them. Other nations with few natural
resources make astonishing progress. The
answer, of course, lies with the people, and
the problems which confronted the Korean
people after 1945 were enormous.

The tragic division of Korea deprived the
people of the South of the great natural re-
sources of water power and minerals which
lie north of the 38th parallel. The South
has traditionally been agricultural. Three
million refugees fled south after 1946.

The savage North Korean invasion in
1950 which carried the Communists to the
perimeter around Pusan in the southeast,

and the retreat to the north, destroyed
much of Korea and a great part of Seoul.
Transport, bridges, communications, houses,
and shops were destroyed on wholesale scale.

In the early years after the Korean war
our aid had of necessity to be concentrated
on the repair of the basic structure, as well
as helping to feed and clothe the people. Of
$2 billion in economic aid, $300 million
went into railways, another $700 million
into power, communications, fertilizer,
mining.

By 1960 the basic infrastructure had
been restored, and some 200 new factories
had been built.

But there was a missing element in
Korea. There was no effective government.
The government of Syngman Rhee seemed
incapable of dealing with the massive prob-
lems of inflation, corruption, smuggling,
tax evasion, or the black market. Many of
the new factories remained idle because
they lacked capital or competent manage-
ment. Commercial exports totaled about
$30 million a year, and Korea relied on
United States grants for 90 percent of its
foreign exchange requirements.

Dissatisfaction with the Rhee govern-
ment's ineffectiveness and authoritarian
ways grew rapidly in the late fifties, and
when that government resorted to a rigged
election in 1960 to stay in power, the stu-
dents and then the people moved into the
streets in protest.

The next government — properly and
fairly elected — seemed incapable of grasp-
ing the nettle of power and dealing with the
basic ills. In May 1961 a military coup
took power. It announced at the outset its
determination to reform and modernize
Korea and to restore constitutional proc-
esses and hold elections. It has made much
progress on the first pledge and fulfilled
the second pledge in the fall of 1963.

The transformation of Korea in the last
5 years has been astonishing. Korea, for the
first time in many centuries, has a driving
and effective government. It has made mis-
takes, and it has yet to resolve many prob-

862

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lems, but the progress in every direction
has been such that there is now hope and
confidence in Korea's future.

Korea's Domestic Achievements

I want to describe some of the main
achievements of the last 4 years :

— Serious inflation has been a plague in
Korea, as elsewhere. Serious inflation
undermines economic and political stability.
The military government tried to do too
much in too short a time, and the result
was more inflation. In May 1964 Korea
went through still another devaluation, but
by then the leaders of Korea had learned
a basic lesson. An austere credit and finan-
cial policy was instituted, and for the past
2 years price inflation has been held within
reasonable bounds. The price increase last
year was about 6V2 percent.

— A sophisticated exchange rate system,
with a floating exchange rate, is being op-
erated with a great measure of success.
Foreign exchange reserves, which were dan-
gerously depleted, have been built back to a
safe level.

— Vigorous campaigns against tax eva-
sion and smuggling, which deprive the state
of revenue, have been pressed. Tax collec-
tions are increasing.

— A sensible interest rate policy on time
deposits has brought a flood of savings
into the commercial banks and drastically
reduced the scope of operations for the
moneylenders.

— Most of the factories built with Amer-
ican loans are now functioning and many
of them flourishing. New factories for
fertilizer, cement, plywood, and pharma-
ceuticals are coming into production. In
1965 industrial production rose by 19
percent.

— Electric power production totaled 40,-
000 kilowatts when the Communists cut
the transmission lines from North Korea
in 1948. It has increased manyfold since
that time and doubled since 1960 to nearly
800,000 kilowatts. Plans are in train to

raise it to li/^ million kilowatts in the
next 4 years. Forty-five thousand rural
households were tied into the power system
last year. The target this year is an addi-
tional 60,000.

— Crop production has increased by
60 percent since 1960. Land reclamation
and bench terracing have made astonishing
progress. Arable land will be increased by
about 20 percent by 1970, and the time is
not far off when Korea will grow enough
food for its own. needs. At the same time
reforestation is moving ahead, and ener-
getic action is being taken against illegal
timber cutting.

— Mining production has increased by 60
percent since 1960.

The progress made in economic growth
and exports has put Korea well to the
front compared with other less developed
nations. The annual economic growth rate
has averaged 8 percent in each of the last
3 years. Commercial exports rose from $33
million in 1960 to $180 million last year and
are expected to approach $270 million in
1966. In contrast with 1961 Korea now
furnishes more than half of her foreign ex-
change requirements through her own ef-
forts. Koreans themselves now speak of
economic independence in 5 years.

With these achievements, our grant aid
has come down from $173 million in 1961 to
$70 million last year and will continue to
fall. More and more of our help is taking
the form of loans to build factories and in-
dustries, and development loans have risen
from $6.5 million in 1961 to about $49 mil-
lion in 1965. In keeping with this policy
President Johnson, during the state visit
last year of President Park Chung Hee,
pledged to make $150 million available in
development loan funds.^

In still another important area there has
been progress. Korea has a very high rate
of population growth, 2.9 percent a year.
In 1963 the Government for the first time
made provision for family planning in its

' Bulletin of June 14, 1965, p. 950.

MAY 30, 1966

863

budget and has each year increased its ap-
propriations for clinics, advisory services,
contraceptive devices, and publicity. The
aim is to bring the population growth rate
down to 1.5 percent by 1980, if not earlier.
Three years ago the Government, in-
spired by Dr. Paul Crane of the Presby-
terian Medical Center in Chongju, at last
began to deal with hookworm, a wide-
spread and debilitating parasite that can
easily be overcome by proper composting.
The Ministries of Agriculture, Education,
and Public Health are pressing this cam-
paign, and Korea should be freed of this
disease in a decade. It will have the most
important physical and psychological ef-
fects in terms of energy and a sense of
well-being.

Progress in Foreign Affairs

These are some of the main achievements
on the domestic side. But there has been
much progress in foreign affairs as well :

— Five years ago Korea had diplomatic
relations with 15 countries. The number is
now 78. A new and flourishing Foreign
Service Institute, which the Asia Founda-
tion helped finance, is now training Korean
diplomats. It takes its place alongside a
new Administrative Staff College, where
civil servants are being trained in admin-
istration.

— Last December relations between Korea
and Japan were normalized after 15 years of
off-again, on-again negotiations. Under the
terms of the settlement the troublesome
controversy over fishing rights has been
resolved. On the financial side, the long-
standing claims problem has been settled
through the Japanese agreement to provide
$300 million in grant assistance; $200 mil-
lion in long-term government-to-government
loans; and $300 million in commercial cred-
its, for a total of $800 million over 10 years.

— Korea has joined the just-organized
Asian Development Bank with a subscription
of $30 million.

— In 1963 France and Italy provided a

large loan for the creation of a deep-sea
fishing fleet, and Germany has provided
credits for industrial development.

— Private foreign companies are begin-
ning to look with interest on investment in
Korea, and some have already begun to
provide equity capital.

In June, at Korean initiative, there will be
an Asian ministerial conference in Seoul,
evidence of the growing interest in discuss-
ing Asian problems in a regional context and
of Korea's growing stature in the interna-
tional community.

The most notable demonstration of Korea's
willingness and ability to play a role in inter-
national affairs was the decision taken last
year in response to a request from the
Government of South Viet-Nam for combat
troops: 21,000 were sent, and a further
decision was taken this year to send an
additional 22,000. Even before these historic
decisions, Korea had provided a 130-man
military hospital unit and karate instructors
to South Viet-Nam.

These actions were a reflection of Korea's
deep sense of obligation to those who had
come to her assistance in her hour of need,
of her willingness to take part in collective
action against Communist aggression, and of
her recognition that there vdll be no peace
or stability in Asia unless Communist ag-
gression is checked. Few Koreans have not
been seared in one way or another by the
Communists, and the Korean response to
South Viet-Nam's call comes from burning
personal memories of what communism
means.

I

Emergence of Effective Government

In the political realm, the Korean consti-
tution and election laws have come to grips
with what has been a persistent problem in
Korean political life — the multiplication of
political parties and the tendency toward
division. Three principles were incorporated *
in the political system in the 1963 elections
to produce greater cohesion and discipline:

1. No candidate may run for the national

864

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

legislature as an independent. Each must be
' a member of a political party.

2. If an elected member of the legislature
resigns from his party, he forfeits his seat.
This has restrained individual resignations
and shifts.

3. However, if a party expels a member,
he does not lose his seat. This imposes a
discipline on the party.

These were purely Korean institutional in-
ventions, and they have produced more sta-
bility and discipline in political party life
than Korea has ever known.

I do not want to leave you with the im-
pression that all problems have been solved
or are on the way to solution in Korea. There
is still too much unemployment and under-
employment. The need for housing is very
great. Agriculture is still at the mercy of
the weather, and there is need for more
irrigation. The decision to restore elections
for local government has yet to be made.
The standard of living is rising, but it is still
low for too many families. (I would point
out here that North Korean defectors who
come to South Korea are astonished at the
^ high standard compared with the North.)
' What we are seeing in Korea in these last
few years is the emergence of effective
government — something which Korea has
not known for many generations — a govern-
ment with the capacity to make plans and
develop programs and carry them out. Lit-
erate, energetic, and hard-working people
can do much for themselves, but it takes
effective, forward-looking government to
produce an environment that encourages
rapid progress, offers hope for the future,
and liberates the creative energies of the
people for constructive purposes.

Many Koreans have contributed to this

achievement — men from the armed forces

and from civilian life, working together to

; convert Korea into a modern nation. Among

them the man who stands out is President
Park Chung Hee, who led the military coup
in 1961 and then in 1963 fulfilled his pledge
to hold elections. He is providing purposeful,
courageous, and imaginative leadership to a
long-suffering people, bringing organization
and direction to bear on the problems of
Korea. And the results are promising. The
foundations of economic and political sta-
bility and growth are being laid.

I can best describe what is happening by
telling the story of a visit I made to a small
village of about a hundred families. The
Korean Government has been making a
valiant effort in the rural areas to introduce
new concepts and ways of doing things. This
village was being taught to work together,
to develop diversified crops, to plant fruit
trees, to re-lay paddy fields for more effi-
cient cultivation, to use commercial fertilizer
and better seed, to raise rabbits, pigs,
chickens, and mushrooms. A young man
from the village, who had been a junior
officer in the armed forces, was elected
village chief. He had plans and programs,
charts and records, and enthusiasm. And
the village was responding.

I asked an old gentleman what he thought
of all the changes which were taking place,
and I shall never forget his answer: "I can-
not understand why we have been sleeping
so long."

That phrase eloquently sums up the great
changes now going on in Korea. There is a
growing faith in the ability of Koreans to
solve their problems. There is a growing
excitement that Korea is now on the way to
a new and more hopeful life. There is a
growing confidence in the future.

By the strange workings of history we
have played a part in that awakening, and
we will continue to play a part — by support-
ing the Koreans in their defense and by
supporting their efforts to build a new
modern society in Korea.

MAY 30, 1966

865

i

A Call for Release of American Prisoners
Held by Communist China

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^

I am deeply honored this evening to be
able to participate in this testimonial dinner
to Bishop James E. Walsh. Bishop Walsh
was 75 years old a week ago today. Thirty-
seven of those years he has spent in China,
during a period when the Chinese people
have endured virtually unceasing struggle,
revolution, and war.

Bishop Walsh arrived in China while the
warlords were still vying for power and
pillaging China for their personal profit. He
was there before the Chinese Communist
Party was founded and was a witness to the
years during which the Republic of China
waged its desperate battle against an
internal enemy in the form of the Commu-
nist insurgency and the external Japanese in-
vader.

After the Communists seized power on the
mainland, they effectively halted all the
work of the Catholic Church. Bishop Walsh
could well have left any time during these
early years. The Communists, recognizing
the symbol that he represented for many
Chinese Catholics, repeatedly attempted to
persuade the Bishop to abandon his post.
But Bishop Walsh insisted that his duty lay
with his parishioners, whom he was unwill-
ing to desert.

Finally the Chinese Communists arrested
the Bishop, and, after 2 years of interroga-
tion, he was sentenced in March 1960 to 20

years' imprisonment on the palpably unjusti-
fied charges of "espionage and subversion."

Bishop Walsh has been in prison now for
6 years, displaying personal courage and
faith in God and man. His behavior has
been an inspiration to all of us. The Chinese
Communists have been repeatedly ap-
proached not only by the United States
Government but by other governments and
private individuals with pleas and requests
that Bishop Walsh be allowed to go free. I
regret that so far Peking has coldly re-
buffed these approaches, as well as parallel
efforts made on behalf of the four other
Americans it holds prisoner on similar
charges.^

The United States Government deeply re-
grets that despite the agreement •■* reached
between ourselves and Peking in 1955 for the
exchange of citizens who wished to return
home — including those in prison — there are
still Americans held in Chinese prisons. The
United States has repeatedly offered to
facilitate the return to Communist China of
any Chinese in the U.S. — including convicted
criminals in prison — who wishes to leave.
We will continue this policy, and we will
continue to press Peking to carry out the
1955 agreement. Until it does, we have no
alternative but to exercise patience and
mobilize our vigilance. For nothing is eternal

* Address made at the Bishop James E. Walsh
testimonial dinner at Baltimore, Md., on May 7 (press
release 106).

"The four other American prisoners are: John
Thomas Downey, Richard Fecteau, H. F. Redmond,
and Capt. Philip Smith, USAF.

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

866

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

about the policies and attitudes of any coun-
try, including Communist China.

Doctrine of World Revolution

Today we find the Chinese Communists
dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose doc-
trine of world revolution, committed to bring
China onto the world stage as a great power.
Communist Chinese ambitions envisage not
merely the restoration of influence in the
neighboring areas of Asia but ultimately
Communist totalitarian regimes throughout
the area. In pursuing its objectives Peking
has not refrained from the use of force, al-
though recently it has drawn back when a
major conflict appeared likely.

More critical than any direct and overt
use of force has been the Chinese Commu-
nist encouragement, training, financing, and
equipping of revolutionaries and insurrec-
tionaries in a whole series of countries under
the slogan of supporting "wars of national
liberation." They have followed this course
in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia. The
fact that their efforts have failed more
often than they have succeeded and that
Peking has increasingly isolated itself in the
world by these policies is no reason for
indifference or complacency.

Although the war in Viet-Nam is basically
a North Vietnamese ambition and operation,
the Chinese Communists, in their propa-
ganda, in their direct material support for
North Viet-Nam, and in their fervent op-
position to any efforts at a peaceful settle-
ment, have attempted to make Communist
success in Viet-Nam the key to the victory
of the "Mao Tse-tung road to revolution."
As we assist the South Vietnamese to pre-
serve their right to determine their own
future without external interference, we at
the same time act to prevent the success of
the expansionist designs of Communist
China.

It is in the vital interest of the free na-
tions of Asia themselves and of all those
who value peace and self-determination in
the area to resist Peking's attempts to im-
pose its system and influence on its neigh-

bors. The United States would welcome the
opportunity to live at peace with all coun-
tries in Asia. We have repeatedly indicated
to Peking, both by word and by caution in
our actions, that we want no war with the
Chinese Communists. But we shall never be
expelled by force from this area. Nor shall
we desist for one moment from our efforts
to assist in every useful way — economic, so-
cial, and political, as well as military — the
free nations of Asia to work out their oviTi
destinies without having an alien system
imposed on them by force.

Hostility Toward United States

The Chinese Communist hostility toward
the United States, which has lain at the core
of their foreign policy for 17 years, now
rests on two beliefs: that the U.S. is, in
Marxist terms, the "enemy of all the people
in the world" and consequently of the Chi-
nese Communist authorities, who today con-
sider themselves the ideological preceptors
of "all the people of the world"; and that
the U.S., in terms of Chinese Communist
national interests, is blocking the expansion
of Chinese influence in Asia. These attitudes
and ambitions are held tenaciously by the
present leaders of Communist China. They
seem unable to understand that independent
nations in Asia and Africa are unwilling to
adopt the "Chinese" model or succumb to
Chinese Communist influence. They have
not yet realized the true implications of the
series of major setbacks for Peking's foreign
policy over the last year.

The present leaders in Peking fear that
their heirs will not pursue zealously the
goals of Chinese communism. They are wor-
ried that the tedium of daily life and the
cynicism about the soundness of the regime's
policies, which have increasingly become
apparent on the mainland in recent years,
will ultimately cause a significant shift in
the policies of a new generation of leaders.

Bishop Walsh once wrote that "future
events are uncertain and it is best always
to wait until they actually occur — the only
time we can be sure — especially in China."

MAY 30, 1966

867

I am in full agreement with this wise maxim,
and I would be the last to predict quick
changes in Communist China. We can be
under no illusions that, for the present, Pe-
king is anything but hostile toward the
United States or wishes us anything but ill.
Nor can we expect that major concessions
to Chinese Communist demands for power
and influence at the present time will reap
anything but further and more insistent
demands. Our opposition to the admission
of Communist China to the United Nations is
based not merely on the impossible condi-
tions it has stated for its participation in the
United Nations but on the basic conflict be-
tween its policies and actions and the pur-
poses of the U.N. Charter as well as the
obligations of constructive participation in
U.N. deliberations.

Channels of Communication With Peking

Nevertheless we must continue to keep
firmly in our minds the need to work toward
a time when the historic ties of friendship
between ourselves and the people of main-
land China can be restored, when Americans
and Chinese can freely travel between each
other's countries, when trade and cultural
relations can develop, and when China is
willing to live at peace with the United
States, its neighbors, and other countries of
the world.

We have ourselves taken a series of uni-
lateral steps which offer Peking the oppor-
tunity to escape from its present isolation
and to live at peace with the world. We have
gradually expanded the categories of Ameri-
can citizens who may travel to Communist
China and indicated our willingness to per-
mit American academic institutions to invite
Chinese Communist scholars and scientists
to visit their campuses. We have in the past
indicated that, if the Communist Chinese
were interested in purchasing grain, we
would consider such sales. We have agreed
to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen
to come to the United States and have al-
lowed Chinese Communist publications to be
purchased freely by American libraries.

Peking has given only negative reactions
to our offers; indeed, it has made it abun-
dantly clear that it will not accept them. But
we do want to keep open channels of contact
and communication for a time when the
Chinese Communists may be more willing to
respond. This, in part, is the reason for our
desire to maintain our direct diplomatic
contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and for
our expressed willingness to sit down and
discuss the critical problems of disarmament
with Peking.

We remain absolutely firm in our deter-
mination to defend our allies, including the
Republic of China on Taiwan, from the use
of force, direct or indirect, against their
territory by Peking, to preserve the position
of the Republic of China in the U.N., and to
assist those countries of Asia that seek our
help to strengthen their political, economic,
and social foundations. Our effort to join
with the free nations of Asia in containing
and preventing the expansion of Communist
China is not only a struggle against aggres-
sion and subversion in the Western Pacific
but part and parcel of our continuing efforts
to achieve a world order in which all nations
can enjoy peace and well-being without fear
of domination by others.

But we have made it abundantly clear that
we do not intend to attack Communist China,
that we do not want war, and, as Secretary
Rusk said recently,* that we do not believe
either in the "fatal inevitability of war with
Communist China" or "the existence of an
unending and inevitable state of hostility
between ourselves and the rulers of main-
land China."

There are many ways in which Peking
could at some point indicate that it recog-
nizes our sincerity in seeking peace. The
freeing of Bishop Walsh and the other four
American citizens now held in Communist
China to return to their families and friends,
for instance, would be most gratifying to all
Americans and would be regarded as evi-
dence of Peking's desire for friendlier rela-

' Ihid., May 2, 1966, p. 686.

868

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions with the American people. I know that
ail of you join with me in hoping that at
some point the leaders in Peking will see
more clearly that the best interests of the
mainland Chinese lie in pursuing peace and
a course of friendship and amity with all
countries and peoples.

Communist China Conducts
Third Nuclear Test

Department Statement ^

Nearly a year has passed since Commu-
nist China exploded its second nuclear
device. The third test occurred today [May
9] in Sinkiang and comes as no surprise.
As you know, a Department of State spokes-
man noted on April 28 that such a test
should be expected soon.

Today's test was an atmospheric test,
with a yield in the same general range as
previous Chinese tests. Further evaluation
must await collection and analyses of the de-
bris in the atmosphere.

This test, of course, is part of the delib-
erate and costly Chinese Communist pro-
gram to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The United States Government continues
to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Com-
munist leaders for the desires and well-being
of people throughout the world who may suf-
fer from the ill effects of atmospheric nu-
clear testing, which most of the world has
banned by adherence to the limited test ban
treaty.^

The United States reaffirms its defense
commitments in Asia and the assurances
given by President Johnson on October 18,
1964,3 of our strong support to nations that
do not seek national nuclear weapons if they
need our support against any threat of nu-
clear blackmail.

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on May 9.
' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

State, Justice Improve Procedures
on Visas for Conference Guests

The Departments of State and Justice have
agreed on improved administrative machin-
ery to expedite granting visas to guests of
international conferences held in the United
States, it was announced on May 3 (Depart-
ment of State press release 104).

The change in procedure is in accord with
the wishes of the President. On February 2,
he called on the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General "to explore ways to remove
unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to
guests invited from abroad" to attend inter-
national conferences.

At present almost all persons invited from
non-Communist countries are allowed to at-
tend international conferences held in the
United States. However, those who are or
have at any time been members of a Com-
munist or Communist-front organization are
first denied visas and then subjected to de-
lays of up to 6 weeks while the Departments
of State and Justice process an application
for an individual waiver of the provision of
law excluding all past or present Commu-
nists. The delays and embarrassment in-
volved in obtaining permission to enter the
United States for even 5 days under the
present procedure have caused some guests
to abandon plans to attend conferences, have
made the United States a less attractive loca-
tion for international conferences, and have
marred this country's image as a free and
open society.

Under the new procedure, upon receipt of
the description of a proposed international
conference, the Secretary of State may rec-
ommend to the Attorney General that the
national interest requires a group waiver of
the provision of law which would otherwise
automatically exclude all persons invited to
the conference who had at any time been
associated with a Communist party. If the
Attorney General grants a group waiver, our
embassies and consulates abroad will then
be able to issue a visa promptly to any in-
vitee who is otherwise eligible.

Visas will, of course, continue to be denied

MAY 30, 1966

869

in any individual case in which there is rea-
son to believe that a particular invitee's visit
to the United States would be contrary to
our national interest, or might endanger the
national security, or might be inconsistent
with existing international agreements.

Additional Foreign Passports
Vaiid Beyond Expiration Date

Sudan and Viet Nam ^
Validity of Foreign Passports

Sudan and Viet Nam are added to the
list of countries which have entered into
agreements with the Government of
the United States whereby their passports
are recognized as valid for the return of
the bearer to the country of the foreign issu-
ing authority for a period of at least six
months beyond the expiration date specified
in the passport.

This notice amends Public Notice 238 of
November 17, 1964 (29 F.R. 16097). ^

Philip B. Heymann,

Acting Administrator, Bureau of

Security and Consular Affairs.

April 27, 1966.

Current Treaty Actions

' Public Notice 244; 31 Fed. Reg. fi704.

" For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 890.

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization shall be held not less than once in 3
years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June
14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956.
TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29,
1965; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Ara-
bia, February 25, 1966.
Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to in-
crease membership of the council from 21 to 27.
Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force
July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29,
1965; Luxembourg, October 3, 1963; Rwanda,
November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February
25, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol,
and convention with final protocol and regulations
of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS
5881).

Ratifications deposited: Finland, December 17,
1965; Mali, December 18, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite sys-
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered
into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington Augrust 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.
Signature: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

I

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1405 PUBLICATION 8086 MAY 30, 1966

The Department of State BuJIetin, ft
weekly publication lasned by the Office
of Media Senricea. Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, prorides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on forei^rn policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other ofiioen of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreementa to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of jceiier&l international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin la for tale by the Super-
intendent of Docomenta. U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington. D.O.,
20402. Pbicb: 52 issues, domestic $10,
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funda for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1060).

notb: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The BoUetin is Indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Litar*
ature.

870

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May SO, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. U05

American Principles. The Obligations of Power
(Johnson) 835

Asia

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia
(Rusk) 830

A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held
by Communist China (Bundy) 866

The Obligations of Power (Johnson) .... 835

Atomic Energy. Communist China Conducts
Third Nuclear Test (Department statement) . 869

China

A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held
by Communist China (Bundy) 866

Communist China Conducts Third Nuclear Test
(Department statement) 869

Congress

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia
(Rusk) 830

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

Economic Affairs

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

The Johnson Trade Policy (Roth) 856

Korea — Progress and Prospects (Berger) . . 860

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified of Ban on
Rhodesian Oil Shipments (letter to Maritime
Administrator) 859

World Trade Week, 1966 (proclamation) . . 837

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Korea —
Progress and Prospects (Berger) .... 860

Europe

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

Foreign Aid. Korea — Progress and Prospects
(Berger) 860

Korea. Korea — Progress and Prospects (Ber-
ger) 860

Passports

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond Ex-
piration Date (public notice) 870

State, Justice Improve Procedures on Visas for
Conference Guests 869

Presidential Documents

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems 834

The Obligations of Power 835

World Trade Week, 1966 837

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Shipowners Formally
Notified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments
(letter to Maritime Administrator) .... 869

Sudan. Additional Foreign Passports Valid Be-
yond Expiration Date (public notice) . . 870

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 870

U.S.S.R.

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

United Nations. U.S. Shipowners Formally No-
tified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments
(letter to Maritime Administrator) . . . 859

Viet-Nam

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia
(Rusk) 830

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems (Johnson) . 834

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond

■ Expiration Date (public notice) 870

Name Index

Berger, Samuel D 860

Bundy, William P 866

Johnson, President 834, 835, 837

Mann, Thomas C 859

Roth, William M 856

Rusk, Secretary 830, 838

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 9 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 104
of May 3 and 106 of May 7.

No. Date

107 5/11

flOS 5/12

*109 5/13

fllO 5/13

till 5/14

Subject

Rela-

Rusk: East-West Trade
tions Act of 1966.

ITU seminar on earth-station
technology (rewrite).

Personnel assignments in re-
search and analysis of Viet-
namese and Chinese affairs.

Warsaw Convention : announce-
ment of U.S. withdrawal of
denunciation.

Warsaw Convention : text of U.S.
note.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. HOIf

Maij 23, 1966

PRESIDENT MARKS POLAND'S NATIONAL MILLENNIUM;

CALLS FOR WIDER EAST-WEST CONTACTS

Remarks by President Johnson 79U

PEACE AND JUSTICE AMONG NATIONS: THE AGENDA

OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 798

YOUR STAKE IN THE BALANCE-OF-PAYMENTS PROBLEM
by Assistant Secretary MacArthur 812

THE SHARING OF THE GOOD LIFE
Article by W. W. Rostow 803

For index see inside back cover

". . . I am today instructing the Secretary of State . . .
to send to the Congress legislation making it possible to ex-
pand trade between the United States and Eastern Europe.
The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over a period
of time, can influence Eastern European societies to de-
velop along paths that are favorable to tvorld peace."

President Marks Poland's National Millennium;
Calls for Wider East-West Contacts

REMARKS BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON i

Senator Muskie, members of the Cabinet,
Members of the Congress, distinguished
guests and friends: Senator Muskie, I en-
joyed hearing so much what you had to say,
and I am deeply honored by this gesture of
the Polish-American Committee.

I am well aware of the historical signifi-
cance of this beautiful work of art. For
hundreds of years the Black Madonna has
brought strength to the brave citizens of
Poland. It has been a symbol both of great-
ness and of hope. As much as I treasure
the gift, I feel that others will treasure it
with me. So I am asking Archbishop Krol
to put it on permanent display at the
Catholic Church in Panna Maria, Texas,
the first Polish church in the United States.

I accept it with great gratitude and with
much pleasure because, I might add inci-
dentally— and it hasn't always been inci-
dentally— those who attend that church and
I have always had something in common
every election year.

I accept it with this pledge that so long
as I am allowed to serve as your President,
I will never cease to work for closer ties.

' Made in the White House Rose Garden on May 3
(White House press release; as-delivered text).
Senator Edmund S. Muskie, on behalf of Ameri-
cans of Polish descent, presented to President John-
son a replica of the Polish Black Madonna, a symbol
of Polish independence and patriotism.

for closer friendship, and for closer coopera-
tion between the United States of Amer-
ica and Poland.

Today as we meet here at the 1,000th an-
niversary of Polish Christianity and na-
tionhood, it is also the 175th anniversary of
a document that holds a place of honor
among the noble statements of human
rights, the Polish Constitution of 1791.

All men who revere liberty acknowledge
their indebtedness to those landmarks in
the struggle for individual freedom.

That is why I have asked you to come
here to the Rose Garden today.

Life has never been easy for the people
of Poland. Time and again she has endured
the unwelcome intrusion of her larger and
her more powerful neighbors. Time and
again she has endured suffering and sacri-
fice, only to recover and to rebuild. In all
of this her proud and resourceful people
left an indelible mark on Western civiliza-
tion.

We, in America, owe a very special debt
to Poland, for almost two centuries ago her
sons joined our ovm Revolution and Polish
patriots fought under the American flag.

Nor can we forget the millions of Polish
immigrants whose personal faith and whose
tenacious labor helped to tame this conti-
nent. Our national heritage is rich with the
gifts of Polish people.

Our debt and our long ties with the peo-

794

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

pie of Poland give us a very special inter-
est in their problems and in their future.

Twice in this century Poland has been
devastated by vv'ar, yet her people have re-
mained loyal to the ancient faith and to the
human values that it represents. Even as we
meet today, they are meeting by the hun-
dreds of thousands at the historic monastery
of Jasna Gora. Led by a great Polish
Cardinal, they are offering prayers of hope
and thanksgiving which reflect their endur-
ing belief in God and in their national
destiny.

In Poland, and in other countries in East-
ern Europe, new ideas are winning friends.
Windows are opening to the world — only
slightly in many places, but they are open-
ing.

And despite the severe limitations on its
national freedom, limitations that prevent
many Polish-Americans from celebrating
this day on Polish soil, the ancient spirit of
Poland is not dead. Her people still yearn
for a lively future in Europe and among
the community of nations.

We see this, for one thing, in economic
policy.

Poland, and some of her neighbors in
Eastern Europe, are sensing the vigor of
individual enterprise. Men are coming to
understand that decentralized decisionmak-
ing is proving more efficient than highly
centralized state control.

Profits are coming to be understood as a
better measure of productivity and personal
incentive as a better spur to effective ac-
tion on behalf of the national economy.

How hopeful these signs are, we cannot
yet say.

I will be meeting with our distinguished
Ambassador very shortly, and we will be
reviewing all the problems and concerns in
that part of the world. There is no greater
American today, no one performing a more
valuable service than our own distinguished
Ambassador John Gronouski, who is return-
ing home.

We can only trust that they foreshadow
a new reliance upon, if not a new under-
standing of, the individual as the most im-
portant element of society.

If they reflect the willingness to respond
to reality, if they signal a readiness to sift
ideas for their own worth rather than to
dismiss them as politically impure, if they
reflect a gradual rebirth of reason and open
discourse among men, then seeds exist for
genuine confidence that things, indeed, may
yet change.

For this reason, it is not vain, on this day
of great memories, for us to also think of
great dreams and to speak of great hopes.

Hopes for the Future of Europe

Chief among them is the future of
Europe.

So vast are the resources of that conti-
nent, so important its policies to the rest of
the world, so vital its prosperity to the en-
tire world economy that Americans ignore
the future of Europe only at the expense of
peace and progress on both continents.

Men and nations must labor long to bring
to reality a Europe free of artificial politi-
cal barriers that block the free movement
of people, of ideas, and of commerce; a
Europe that is secured by international in-
spected arms control arrangements that
remove the age-old fears of East and West
alike ; a Europe of interdependent friends in
which the strength of each adds to the
strength of all; a Europe in which the peo-
ple of every nation know again the responsi-
bilities and the rewards of free political
choices.

Not because we have treasure to gain or
territory that we desire to acquire but be-
cause we have common roots and common
interest, the United States of America today
seeks to help build that kind of Europe.

It was in that spirit that the Marshall
Plan was offered 19 years ago, and it is still
the spirit of American policy.

Our guiding principles are these:

First, our alliance with Western Europe,
we believe, is in the common interest of all
who seek peace. It is a charter for chang-
ing needs and not a relic of past require-
ments.

It was and it continues to be a basis for

MAY 23, 1966

795

security, solidarity, and advance in Eu-
rope. It remains our conviction that an in-
tegrated Atlantic defense is the first neces-
sity and not the last result of the building
of unity in Western Europe, for expanding
partnership across the Atlantic, and for rec-
onciling differences with the East.

As v^^e revise the structure of NATO to
meet today's realities, we must make sure
that these forward-looking purposes are
served and are served well.

Second, we believe that the drive for
unity in Western Europe is not only desir-
able but necessary. Every lesson of the
past and every prospect for the future
argue that the nations of Western Europe
can only fulfill their proper role in the
world community, if increasingly they act
together. From this base of collaboration,
fruitful ties to the East can best be built.

Third, we will encourage every construc-
tive enrichment of the human, cultural, and
commercial ties between Eastern Europe
and the West.

Fourth, we will continue to seek ways to
improve relations between the people of
Germany and their fellow Europeans to the
East and to move toward a peaceful settle-
ment of the division of Germany on the
principle of self-determination.

Fifth, we welcome growing participation
by the nations of Eastern Europe in com-
mon efforts to accelerate economic growth
in the developing areas of the world and to
share in the worldwide war on poverty,
hunger, and disease among the peoples of
the world.

Bridging the Gulf Between East and West

It was almost 2 years ago at the George
Marshall Memorial Library in nearby Lex-
ington, Virginia, when I said that we must
continue to build bridges across the gulf
which has separated us from Eastern Eu-
rope." Since that time, we have taken limited
steps forward along what will no doubt be
a very long road.

In Poland alone, we have dedicated an

* For text, see Bulletin of June 15, 1964, p. 922.

American-financed children's research hos-
pital in Krakow; increased support for
CARE, Church World Services, and Amer-
ican Relief for Poland in their food and
medical programs for hospitals and needy
individuals. We have reached an understand-
ing between our National Academy of
Sciences and the Polish Academy of Science
on an important exchange program similar
to the ones that we have reached with Ro-
mania, Yugoslavia, and the Soviet Union.

We have invited Poland to cooperate in our
satellite program.

We have increased by 44 percent in the
second half of 1965 the number of Polish
visitors who come to the United States for
academic, scientific, and technical purposes.
We have increased by more than $200,000
the sale in Poland of American books, news-
papers, plays, motion pictures, and television
programs. Our international media guaran-
tee program with Poland is the largest in
the world.

These have all been taken under the direc-
tion of one of our greatest Americans, as I
mentioned a few moments ago, who will
report back to the President and the Cabinet
in the next few days, John Gronouski.

These are all small steps. But, as Cicero
once said, "The beginnings of all things are
small." From these, we will take other
steps to help revive the intellectual, com-
mercial, and cultural currents which once
crisscrossed Europe, from London to Buda-
pest, from Warsaw to Paris, from Frankfort
to Krakow, from Prague to Brussels.

As one additional step, and as I pledged in
my state of the Union message,^ I am today
instructing the Secretary of State, Mr. Rusk,
to send to the Congress legislation making it
possible to expand trade between the United
States of America and Eastern Europe. The
intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over :
a period of time, can influence Eastern j
European societies to develop along paths \
that are favorable to world peace.

After years of careful study, the time has
now come for us to act, and act we should
and act we must.

796

For excerpts, see ibid., Jan. 31, 19GG, p. 150.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

With these steps, we can help gradually
to create a community of interest, a com-
munity of trust, and a community of effort.
Thus will the tide of human hope rise again.

It is a good occasion that has brought us
together here today.

In issuing this proclamation, I am asking
all of the American people to join in the
observance of historic events which have in-
spired man's long walk on this earth.

May we draw new resolve, even now, from
the Polish Millennium and Constitution Day.

PROCLAMATION 3720 «

Commemoration of Poland's National
AND Christian Millennium

May 3 marks an important anniversary for free-
dom-loving people the world over. It was on this
date, 175 years ago, that the patriots of Poland
adopted a Constitution that stirred the hopes of the
Polish people.

But this year, May 3 takes on a significance that
is truly unique. It marks the 1000th anniversary
of Polish Christianity and Polish nationhood.

Ten centuries ago today, Poland became a part of
the community of Western nations. Ten centuries
ago today, Poland entered the mainstream of West-
em thought and Western culture.

It was this tradition that gave birth to the Polish
Constitution of 1791. The Christian expression of the
dignity of man found its ultimate expression in the
cause of freedom and national independence.

It was no accident that this great political docu-
ment came into being just four years after the Amer-
ican Constitution — or that the two were so similar
in content and spirit. The same spark of freedom
that flared into the American Revolution also burned
in the hearts of the Polish people. Our Revolution

was theirs, and to these shores, to help in our
struggle, came two great champions of liberty:
Tadeusz Kosciuszko and Kazimierz Pulaski.

The rest is history: a triumph for America — for
the most part tragedy for Poland. Today, after
nearly two centuries of struggle, of invasion, of
foreign domination, of partition — and always of
bravery — love for national independence and for the
basic rights of man still lies deep in the hearts of
the Polish people.

The spark of freedom has never been extinguished.

And through it all, the historic ties between our
two great nations have remained as a symbol of
friendship and hope. Today, on this anniversary,
we reaffirm that friendship and pledge ourselves to
that hope.

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, President
of the United States of America, do hereby pro-
claim this day. May 3, 1966, as Poland's National
and Christian Millennium Day on which we spirit-
ually unite ourselves with the people of Poland and
those gathered today at Jasna Gora and wherever
they might be observing this historical event. I in-
vite the American people to observe this day with
appropriate ceremonies and activities and particu-
larly to join with Americans of Polish heritage in
their continued celebrations throughout this memo-
rable year, both in America and in Poland.

In witness whereof, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this third day of
May in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the one hundred and ninetieth.

* 31 Fed. Reg. 6679.

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

MAY 23, 1966

797

Peace and Justice Among Nations: The Agenda
of the International Community

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations^

It is a great source of satisfaction to me
to have this opportunity once again to ad-
dress the Economic Club of Detroit. At the
United Nations I feel a closer link with De-
troit than you might suppose. It is my job
to speak at the U.N. for all the American
people: management and labor, white and
Negro, farmer and city dweller — a united
America, bearing, as you know, a very
heavy responsibility in the community of
nations.

We could not bear that responsibility if
our ideals and our purposes were not backed
by the material might and engineering mas-
tery of the great midwestern cities that I
know so well, among them Detroit, Pitts-
burgh, and my native Chicago. It can truly
be said that our country's voice in the coun-
cils of the world — and at the United Na-
tions— is great because our universal prin-
ciples of human freedom are wedded to the
most brilliant technology and the mightiest
industrial plant in human history.

I am conscious, too, of a more somber
fact. With all our ideals, our good will, and
our technical wizardry, we have yet to find
the answer to one overriding problem:
how to build a framework of peace in this
changing, turbulent, very imperfect world.
This goal of a secure peace is, I am con-

vinced, the deep desire of the American peo-
ple. It has the highest priority of all the
problems on the President's desk, and at
the United Nations it is the purpose of my
most concentrated efforts.

America's industrial might is of course
militarily essential, but this is far from
saying that its importance in world affairs
is primarily military. It is not. I believe
the far greater destiny of American indus-
try is to serve the arts of peace, abroad as
well as at home. Indeed it already does so
in every continent of the world and can do
so in still greater measure the more we can
dissolve the barriers of misunderstanding
and political conflict. No segment of Amer-
ican society has a greater stake than does
American industry in the creation of a
peaceful, reliable framework of law and
order for the community of nations.

I may add that we who speak for the
United States in the U.N. insist that this
international framework must be made re-
liable not only for relations between gov-,
ernments but also for private enterprise.
Last fall in the General Assembly's eco-
nomic committee the opportunity arose for
the United States to express its views on
the role of private enterprise in interna-
tional development.^ Although our delega-

' Address made before the Economic Club of
Detroit, Mich., on May 2, 1966 (U.S./U.N. press
release 4845 dated Apr. 30).

■ For a statement by U.S. Representative James
Roosevelt in Committee II (Economic and Financial)
on Oct. 15, 1965, see Bulletin of Nov. 15, 1965;
p. 798. '

798

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIK' }h

i

tion was already very ably represented on
that committee, I thought the subject was
important enough to warrant my speaking
on it as head of the delegation.

In my statement ^ I pointed out that the
Assembly has been on record for years as
holding that the sovereignty of nations
over their own territory and resources does
not impair the rights and duties of states
under international law — nor does it dimin-
ish the importance of international coop-
eration in economic development, or of par-
ties to agreements respecting such agree-
ments.

I then went on to emphasize the some-
times neglected facts of life about the in-
dispensable part that private enterprise
plays in the development of nations. I
pointed out that affiliates of American
companies abroad produced over $37 billion
in goods in the year 1964 and that in the
process they were a major source of wages,
tax revenues, export earnings, import sav-
ings, and all-important technical and man-
agerial skills which represent enormous
benefits to the host countries. I pointed
out that their earnings were about the same
percentage of invested capital as in the
United States and that a great part of
these earnings were reinvested abroad. I
ended by saying :

The United States has two hands available for co-
operation with the developing countries. One is the
hand of public assistance and public policy; the other
is private enterprise. We want to help — and with
both hands.

These propositions, of course, are as fa-
miliar to you as they are to me. But I can
assure you they are not as well understood
by some members of the United Nations as
they are by the members of the Economic
Club of Detroit. The United Nations is not
a club of like-minded nations; it is more
like a frontier where many different opin-
ions and doctrines clash. And the fact
that in our society we are accustomed to

' For text, see U.S. delegation press release 4750
dated Dec. 14, 1965.

MAY 23, 1966

free and open debate gives us something of
an advantage at the U.N. over those who do
not have the same tradition. Now and
then we get a chance to change a few
minds, and that is one of the reasons why
I find my work exciting.

"Chronic"' International Quarrels

Of course, it is because of this very in-
clusiveness that the United Nations prog-
ress toward peace often seems painfully
slow. Among the U.N.'s 117 members are
nearly all the major competing centers of
power and doctrine in the world. And we
have on our agenda, as a consequence, most
of the world's difficult and dangerous in-
ternational quarrels.

Some of these are "chronic" cases like
the Korean and Israeli-Arab disputes, which
came to the U.N. in the acute stage long
ago and have yet to be finally settled. An-
other such case flared up again last fall:
the long-smoldering dispute between India
and Pakistan over Kashmir. The Security
Council was the main center of world
diplomacy that brought about a cease-fire
and a withdrawal of the very formidable
armed forces that were engaged on both
sides.

That Kashmir emergency — which, inci-
dentally, was my own baptism of fire in the
Security Council — was significant for sev-
eral reasons. For one thing, it illustrates
how very stubborn and slow to subside
some international conflicts are. I used to
think labor-management issues were stub-
born, but at least strikes do come to an end
and contracts are signed sooner or later.
Some conflicts at the U.N., including Kash-
mir, have been on the books almost from
its founding. There is no miracle that can
end them quickly, any more than a doctor
can cause a broken bone to knit overnight.

A second fact worth noting is that the
Soviet Union joined with the rest of the Se-
curity Council in calling for a cease-fire and
then invited the two sides to Tashkent to
agree on the withdrawal of forces. The fact

799

that Moscow, whatever its reasons, saw its
interest in a step toward peace in South
Asia running parallel to the interest of the
community of nations, is something of a
new development — and one which, without
exaggerating its magnitude, we should cer-
tainly welcome. I wonder how many of us
10 years ago would have predicted that
Russia, whose foreign policy had so long
consisted largely of stirring up disputes in
the outside world, would start extending
its good offices to settle them.

Third and last, Kashmir illustrates the
close connection that I mentioned between
peace and economic progress. Nowhere is
i-apid economic development, especially in
agriculture, more urgently needed than in
the subcontinent of South Asia. American
private enterprise, as many of you know,
already plays a big part in this development
effort and can do much more. One of the
main dangers is that the limited energies
and resources of Pakistan and India might
again be diverted from this first-
priority task into warlike channels. Thus
what we are trying to achieve at the U.N.
in war prevention is directly related to
America's hope for the peaceful economic
development of that very important and
populous region of the world.

U.N. Action on Southern Rhodesia

Most recently our peace efforts at the
U.N. have been focused on the crisis in
Rhodesia, which Secretary-General U Thant
the other day called "one of the most diffi-
cult and dangerous situations in which the
United Nations has been asked to intervene
in recent times."

The trouble has been long in the making,
but it reached the crisis stage last Novem-
ber when the minority government broke
away prematurely from Britain, the lawful
sovereign, in order to set up a state founded
on the rule of 220,000 whites over 4 million
blacks. This was a highly dangerous step,
taken in the face of the strong anticolonial
"winds of change," to use the phrase of

former Prime Minister Harold Macmillan,
that have been blowing through Africa in
the past decade.

We strongly supported the Security Coun-
cil in its successive resolutions to bring this
danger to an end, including the resolution
of April 9 ^ authorizing Britain to inter-
cept oil tankers attempting to break the
U.N. embargo. The British, as you know,
made use of this authority promptly and
effectively.

This was a historic step for the United
Nations and an entirely legal one. Article
39 of the charter gives the Security Council
the duty to determine, among other things,
when there is a threat to peace and the
further duty of deciding what to do about
it. Pursuant to this article the Council
wisely and properly found that the im-
minent and flagrant arrival of tankers in
defiance of the embargo and in support of
the rebel regime constituted a provocation
which was a threat to peace.

Some people disagree with this finding. ■
But when 94 percent of the people of
Rhodesia are denied their rights because of
their race, when their aspirations are inex-
tricably interwoven with those of the en-
tire continent, and when this situation has
aroused the strongest emotions on every
side — such a situation cannot under the
plain provisions of the U.N. Charter be dis-
missed as an internal matter. I don't think
anybody conversant with Africa can deny «
for a moment the incendiary nature of this
situation. Article 39 does not require the
Security Council to hold its hand until the
fire has broken into open flames.

Legally, then, the United Nations action
on Rhodesia was justifiable. But a further
question arises, not of law but of policy:
namely, whether American support of the
United Nations action, and indeed our vig-
orous stand on the whole Rhodesian ques-
tion, serves the United States national in-
terest. It is important to think out this

' For background and text of the resolution, se€| j..
Bulletin of May 2, 1966, p. 713. . •

800

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

question, because we have had plenty of
criticism from both sides: those who would
have the Rhodesian regime brought down
at a single stroke and those who counsel a
complete hands-off policy.

U.S. Stake in Rhodesian Crisis

What is the United States stake in this
Rhodesian crisis? Why do we feel it so im-
portant to take a strong stand on it?

First, the basic issue in Rhodesia is a
moral one: to restore the constitutional au-
thority in order that all of the people of
Rhodesia may be enabled to join in determin-
ing their national future. Our country,
founded on the proposition that all men are
created equal and currently engaged in a
vigorous nationwide program to make that
equality real for our own Negro citizens,
cannot honorably adopt a double standard
on what is happening in Rhodesia.

Second, our history also gives us a strong
anticolonial tradition. This is the teaching
of our own Revolution. In recent times we
have supported decolonization and self-de-
termination in the Philippines, India, Pak-
istan, Indonesia, and indeed throughout the
world; and it is this same principle of self-
determination which we are upholding in
South Viet-Nam. We cannot stand aside
and see these same principles turned into a
mockery in Rhodesia.

Third, as a founder of the United Na-
tions and a principal architect of the U.N.
Charter, we have a special obligation to see
that the charter's provisions concerning
human rights and self-determination are
upheld. These provisions are not merely
exhortations; they are solemn treaty obli-
gations.

Fourth, we have a practical interest in
maintaining friendly relations with the
newly independent countries of Africa, for
whom this Rhodesian issue is of the highest
importance.

Fifth and last, but not least, the success
of a rebellion aimed at creating a new
white minority state in southern Africa
would inevitably harden the lines of politi-

MAY 23, 1966

cal conflict and would tend to stir interra-
cial violence on that continent.

A failure to resolve the Rhodesian crisis
with justice to the African majority would
inevitably strengthen the hand of extrem-
ism, violence, and racism in the heart of
Africa. Moderate African leaders, who
have recently gained ground in several
countries, might lose ground again. Such a
prospect is not in the interest of African
development and progress nor of world peace
and security, nor is it in the interest of the
United States.

For all these reasons the United States, in
dealing with the Rhodesian question, intends
to remain true to its best traditions — know-
ing that in so doing we also most effectively
uphold our national interests. We shall con-
tinue to proceed step by step, weighing both
the legality and the wisdom of each step as
we go in the light of the situation and of
the United Nations Charter.

Now we seem to be approaching a new
round of talks between Britain and the
Rhodesian authorities. We hope these dis-
cussions will bring closer a peaceful solu-
tion which will protect the rights of all the
people of Rhodesia — indeed, no other kind
of solution has a chance to endure.

Tlie U.N. and Viet-Nam

Now let me comment briefly on the con-
flict in Viet-Nam.

Our pursuit of a just and honorable
peace in Viet-Nam is just as energetic and
unremitting as our military effort to help
South Viet-Nam repel aggression and in-
filtration. In that pursuit of peace we
have taken repeated initiatives in the U.N.
We have persuaded the Security Council to
put the matter on its agenda and to help us
explore all possible avenues toward a just
peace.^ We have informed all the other 116
members of the U.N. of the 14 points in
our peace proposals," including our will-

" For background, see ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 229.
' Ibid., p. 225.

801

I

ingness to negotiate without preconditions
or on the basis of the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962. Our position is firm in sub-
stance but flexible in method — and that
flexibility contrasts clearly with the nega-
tive stand of Hanoi and Peking.

All these steps in the United Nations
have been valuable to us in making our
peaceful intentions clear to the govern-
ments and peoples of the world. The United
Nations is thus an important world center
of diplomatic communication which may yet
help us find a settlement in Viet-Nam that
is honorable and just.

But we should have no illusions about the
limits on what the United Nations can be
expected to undertake in the Vietnamese
situation. In particular, we must candidly
face the fact that the United Nations is not
going to join, as it did in Korea, in the
military defense of Viet-Nam against ag-
gression. The Soviet Union has made
clear that it will not repeat its famous
blunder of 1950 when its boycott of the Se-
curity Council left the Council free to act
in defense of South Korea. Moreover, many
of the new members of the U.N., rightly or
wrongly, are unwilling to take a position on
a matter in dispute between the great
powers.

Some people have asked the question :
Why does the United States take a stand
on Rhodesia when so many U.N. members
seem unwilling to take a stand on Viet-
Nam? I will say in candor that we would
of course have welcomed United Nations
support in Viet-Nam. But if we were to re-
fuse to make use of the United Nations in
cases where action is possible and is mani-
festly in the interest of the United States —
as in Kashmir and in Rhodesia — simply be-
cause such action is not possible in another
part of the world, I submit that such a
course would be self-defeating. The United
Nations cannot be expected to achieve all

its aims — no institution has ever done that.
Let us use it for all it is worth and
strengthen it whenever we can — not forgo
its help because that help is less than we
hoped.

It is my impression that most of us in
America are long on idealism and short on
patience. That may be partly a virtue, be-
cause we are used to getting things done
faster than most other nations. But, as the
old saying goes, "the impossible takes a
little longer" — and the agenda of the inter-
national community has plenty of problems
in the "impossible" category.

Let us therefore avoid the roller-coaster
view of world affairs, plunging from high-
est hopes one day to deep despair the next.
It is said that the Communists pride them-
selves on their long-term thinking and their
patience and persistence. If they can be pa-
tient and persistent for their cause, how
much more ought we to be for ours, which
holds so much more promise for humanity!

In pursuing that cause I believe we have
found, and will continue to find, incalcula-
ble value in the United Nations. But we
should not look on it as a miracle worker or
as some sort of international babysitter to
free us from our responsibilities. Sir Win-
ston Churchill once said the U.N. was de-
signed "not to take us to heaven but to keep
us from going to the other place." I believe
it is designed to do that and far more — if
its loyal members, including ourselves, live
up to the highest purposes of its charter.

It is an institution in which nations
gradually learn, through painstaking ef-
forts, to minimize their disputes and maxi-
mize the aims and interests they hold in
common. There is no other or easier way
to build the framework of peace and justice
among nations which the American busi-
ness community, the working man, and,
indeed, Americans in all walks of life so
earnestly and prayerfully desire.

k
tie

ill
h

802

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

i

"He is one of the most onginal thinkers that I know of,"
President Johnson said on March SI tvhen he announced
that Mr. Rostow would come to the White House as his
Special Assistant. "I shall look to him," the President
added, "as a catalyst for ideas and programs on the various
continents of the world." This article is based on an address
Mr. Rostow made February 15 at Moravian College, Bethle-
hem, Pa., when he was Counselor of the Department of
State and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council.

The Sharing of the Good Life

by W. W. Rostow

Among the many themes on which one
might base a discussion of the impact of eco-
nomic growth, there is one which was ex-
pressed with some elegance by Aristotle. He
I wrote:

' It is plain that the state is not determined merely
I by community of place and by the exchange of mu-
tual protection from harm and of good offices. These
things must, indeed, exist, if there is to be a city,
' yet the existence of all of them does not at once
' constitute a state; there must be, both in households
i and families, a sharing of the good life, in a form
I at once complete and self-sufficient.

I The sharing of the good life, I have con-
cluded, is the most fundamental clue to a

i civilized society and to the quality of the en-

I vironment in a regime of self-sustained
growth.
But what is the good life? And what is

I sharing?

I Evidently the good life is a relative no-
tion, varying with a society's values and

I stage of development; and sharing itself is

I not a simple concept.

There are, in fact, three distinct mean-
ings that can be attached to the notion of
sharing in the life of a society: One is a
material meaning, another is psychological,
the third is political.
First, there is the sharing of the goods

and services which a society is capable of
producing. Given the technology, natural re-
sources, and capacity for organization of a
society — and the material possibilities they
generate — does the individual enjoy what he
regards as fair access to the good life in this
material sense? What are the criteria by
which goods and services are distributed?
Are these criteria themselves judged to be
fair?

In the classic traditional societies the
share granted each individual (or family)
was generally controlled by two related ri-
gidities : one technical, the other social.

Traditional societies developed within rel-
atively static technological possibilities.
Looked at closely, their economic history
was not, in fact, as static as we sometimes
suppose ; but, nevertheless, there was a ceil-
ing on technology. And this was instinc-
tively and widely understood. Such societies
were suffused with the notion that the life
of the grandchildren was not likely to differ
greatly from that of the grandparents. There
would be good and bad harvest years, times
of war and of plague, times of good and cor-
rupt administration. Man had to make the
most of the good times, suffer through the
bad — occasionally reflecting his desperation

I MAY 23, 1966

803

in the blind anguish of peasant revolts. But
there was a kind of fatalism about the long-
run prospects for material well-being, taking
the society as a whole.

Within that framework there tended to de-
velop in the more complex traditional soci-
eties fairly rigid social classes associated
with fixed functions in the society, fixed
duties, and relatively fixed levels of income.
And these hierarchies of status and income
were given a certain legitimacy — often an
imputed divine legitimacy — by the character
of the political system as a whole, whether
it was a Middle Eastern empire, a Greek
city-state, or a barony in medieval Western
Eui'ope. Whatever the particular form,
these societies assumed that some were born
to rule, others to serve — even in the ancient
Greek democracies which assumed slavery
as a requirement.

Once again, looked at closely, the systems
of social status and income in traditional
societies were not nearly as static as they
sometimes appear in contemporary doctrines
or modern textbooks. There was almost al-
ways one form or another of what we would
call upward social mobility; that is, the op-
portunity for the relatively poor but capable
person to move up to a higher level of power
and income, whether through intellectual
capacity, the church, military life, or com-
merce.

Nevertheless, there is truth in the classical
view that traditional societies were per-
vaded, for the vast majority of the human
beings involved, by a sense that social
hierarchies were static and legitimate. It was
within them that men struggled to do the
best they could for themselves and their
children.

Both the static horizons of welfare and
the legitimacy of fixed social and material
status were, of course, permanently violated
by the Nevd:onian revolution and the indus-
trial revolution which followed and was de-
rived from it.

Starting slowly in a relatively small por-
tion of the world in the 17th and 18th cen-
turies, but spreading out now to embrace
foreseeably every corner of the globe, are

two revolutionary assumptions: the assump-
tion that man has the capacity to manipu-
late nature in such a way as to raise his
own and his society's level of income and
welfare and that it is legitimate as well as
possible for man to envisage higher social
status and income for his children than for
himself, without depriving others of higher
status and income.

These dynamic revolutionary assumptions
have required a new concept of social legiti-
macy. It centers around the simple but
powerful notion of equality of opportunity;
namely, that all men deserve, within the law,
an equal chance to develop their talents in
ways which will permit them the highest
level of income and the highest social stat-
ure which their capacities permit and their
interests and tastes would entertain.

r

standards of Aspiration

Societies which have been touched and
moved by the scientific revolution and the
related process of grow^th stand, of course, at
different stages. The process of absorption
of modern technology takes time. At any
particular moment, the degree of absorption
— the degree of modernization — will differ
as among nations and even, regionally and
sectorally, within nations.

But whether one is dealing with human
beings fresh in from the tribal countryside
on the edge of an expanding African coastal
city, or the northeast of Brazil, or Watts,
the power and reality of these standards of
expectation and legitimacy can be perceived.

As this revolutionary standard of expec-
tations spreads, how do men set their tar-
gets? How do they define feasible goals for
themselves and their children?

On the whole, what is remarkable is the
good sense of human beings in setting what
might be called their operational standards
of aspiration. I do not believe, for example,
that the peoples in developing nations are
mainly moved by an urgent desire to be as
rich as Americans. Of course, moving pic-
tures and the level of life of the wealthiest
sector of the population have their effect.
But, on balance, the citizens in developing

804

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN j,

nations act as if they instinctively under-
stood something of the stages of economic
growth. They want a better life for them-
selves— in terms of the realistic opportunities
of their own society at its existing and fore-
seeable level of development — and, espe-
cially, they want a better life for their chil-
dren. Whether in relatively sophisticated
Mexico or the mountain regions of Viet-Nam
or among Negroes of the contemporary
United States, that is why education exer-
cises such attraction : Education is the indis-
pensable foundation for the individual's eco-
nomic and social forward movement in an
environment of economic growth.

Sharing the good life in a material sense
comes, then, to creating an environment in
which men increasingly feel that material
progress is the society's normal condition
and that a reasonable opportunity for shar-
ing that progress will be open to them and
their children, within their inherent indi-
vidual capacities.

Progress from where they stand, rather
than a convulsive reaching for material
standards beyond their foreseeable reach, is
the critical aspect of this dimension of shar-
ing the good life.

IPsychological Problems of Development

But more is involved in the good life than
lan environment of shared material progress.

In all the circumstances of which we know,
men have felt a need to be participants in
the social fabric and institutions of their
common life. They need to belong.

In traditional societies a sense of pyscho-
logical participation derived from a known
and stable role in the institutions of a
structured social and cultural life: the fam-
ily, the clan or tribe, the guild, the reli-
gious and other rituals of the community.
i But, with the coming of growth, the prob-
lem of participation becomes more complex
and acquires a new psychological dimension.

The introduction into a traditional society
of enclaves of growth — for that is how it
always begins — sets in motion a complex
process at every level : political, social, eco-
nomic, and psychological. Traditional in-

MAY 23, 1966

stitutions are strained, distorted, trans-
formed, or supplanted as the imperatives of
modernization assert themselves. Develop-
ing societies are, by definition, divided so-
cieties. And, indeed, as Lucian Pye drama-
tized in his study of contemporary Burma,
men's minds are divided by the transition
to modernization between the shaken, but
still comforting, canons of the traditional
past and the exciting but uncertain impera-
tives of modern life and organization.

The most fundamental problem in the
contemporary world is not the gap between
rich and poor nations ; it is the gap between
the rich and poor parts of developing na-
tions.

That division is real, but in a dynamic
transitional society it is not clean cut. In
fact, some of the greatest problems arise
among those who straddle, as it were, the
two worlds, who are close to but not yet
fully incorporated in the modernized part
of the developing nation, or who are still
mainly caught up in the relatively tradi-
tional part of a developing nation but are
tempted, bedeviled, and frustrated by the
presence around them of elements of mod-
ernization.

Some of the most difficult social and
psychological problems of development arise,
for example, in the slums of the great
cities of developing nations ; for, from 18th-
century Manchester to 20th-century Sao
Paulo, the cities have exercised a magnetic
attraction. And in the countryside it is
often not the wholly untouched regions
which are uneasy: It is the rural areas
where some elements of modernization have
taken hold — where the roads and Coca Cola
trucks and transistor radios have come
through — ^but where these harbingers of
modernization have not been matched by a
solid and satisfactory modernization of the
essentials of rural life.

There is a rich literature which describes
the problems of social and psychological
disorientation which can afflict those who
are somewhere between the traditional and
the modern life.

One of the most vivid examples is that of

805

*

a brilliant young African economist, D. K.
Chisiza, who died in a tragic accident in
1962. In his classic little monograph Africa
— What Lies Ahead he analyzes the reasons
why Africans oscillate between urban jobs
and their villages. He suggests six reasons:
because they feel lonely in urban areas; be-
cause towns subject them to a sense of in-
security; because they have obligations to
their people "back home" which can be
filled only in person; because they find it
difficult to adjust themselves to the mode of
life of the urban areas; because a good
many of them feel that one cannot bring up
children properly in towns; because their
goals are realized quickly.

Obviously what is lacking for such tran-
sitional people is a framework of modern
institutions in which they can find a digni-
fied and reasonably ordered place in an in-
herently dynamic life.

Writing about Latin America in the
January 1966 issue of Foreign Affairs,
George Lodge evoked well in a different
setting what is involved in the transition
from a traditional to a modern society.
First, he quotes Bishop McGrath, the leader
of a remarkable exercise in rural mod-
ernization in Panama :

Imagine the Church in the paternal framework,
(writes Bishop McGrath) in which everything was
in its place; God in Heaven, the King in Spain, the
governor in the province, the patron on the farm,
each farmhand in his house with his woman and
children, and the priest who came and attended
spiritually to the needs of the people.

And Lodge adds: "Except for the King
in Spain this is still a true picture of life
in many areas of Latin America." But he
then goes on to detail the types of new or-
ganizations emerging — or which must
emerge — to make modernization a working
reality: a modernized church, workers' or-
ganizations, managerial organizations, rural
cooperatives, and all the rest.

I shall have something more to say about
the role of such institutions in creating a
sense of belonging in a modern setting.
But something even more basic than insti-
tutions is missing.

The more we examine the records of the

past and the experience of the present in
the adjustment to modernity, the more it
becomes clear that the critical moment is
not when men begin to share the material
benefits of modernization. The critical mo-
ment is when men feel that they have be-
come active agents in fashioning their ovim
destiny.

I have seen Andean villages where income
per head could not have much exceeded
$75 a year but where, for the first time,
their citizens had become engaged, with
their own labor and at their own choice, in
building a feeder road, a school, a church,
or an irrigation ditch. Those people were,
in a true sense, sharing a critical dimen-
sion of the good life. They knew that
with their own hands and wills they were
reshaping their own environment.

On the other hand, I have seen men at
much higher levels of income, semiemployed,
living in urban slums, trapped by a lack of
training or the inadequate pace of indus-
trialization, with no way of shaping their
future other than to be mobilized from
time to time by cynical politicians in some
mass demonstration.

Closer to home, I know that many of my
colleagues at work in our poverty program
are convinced that the key to its success lies
in creating a situation in which those we
seek to help feel that at last they can take
hold of their own destiny and move for-
ward: The institutions designed to offer
equality of opportunity in our highly dy-
namic society have failed to grip and sup-
port a significant margin of Americans.

As President Johnson said in his address
at Howard University in June 1965 :

In far too many ways American Negroes have
been another nation: deprived of freedom. . . .
Freedom is the right to share, share fully and equal-
ly, in American society — to vote, to hold a job, to
enter a public place, to go to school. It is the right
to be treated in every part of our national life as a
person equal in dignity and promise to all others.

It was out of such insights throughout
the hemisphere and on the world scene as
a whole that the Inter-American Commit-
tee on the Alliance for Progress, on which
I have the privilege to serve as the United

806

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

states member, quoted in a letter to the
Presidents of the American Republics the
following passage from the encyclical letter
of Pope John XXIII:

Special effort . . . must be made to see to it that
workers in underdeveloped areas are conscious of
playing a key role in the promotion of their personal
socioeconomic and cultural betterment. For it is a
mark of good citizenship to shoulder a major share
of the burden connected with one's own development.

And, the CIAP letter added, this meant
we must focus our policies of assistance in
the Alliance for Progress not merely on
building houses or other physical installa-
tions but that "we should seek out, stimulate
and expand local institutions capable of
carrying forward" enterprises in the fields
of housing, rural modernization, educa-
tion, and health.

It should not, of course, surprise us that
this sense of fashioning one's own destiny
should prove of critical significance in
reconciling the imperatives of moderniza-
tion with the canons of the good life. It is
the essence of modernization, reaching back
to the Nevd;onian revolution, that it is rooted
in man's belief that his environment can be
at least partially controlled, that he is no
longer the passive or reactive victim of
blind forces beyond his control. It follows
directly that men will not feel modern —
they will not be truly modern men — if they
are simply granted by benign governments
or other institutions some of the material
benefits of a more abundant life.

The conclusions, then, to this second ob-
servation on the conditions for a good life
are simple. They are two. First, man must
feel he is participating personally in the
transformation and modernization of his
way of life. But, second, this means that
an institutional framework must be pro-
vided within which he can exert these new
possibilities — whether it is a farm coop-
erative, a village public works program, a
self-help housing development in the slums,
a building and loan association, a school, or
a labor union.

In short, in an environment of growth,
as in a traditional society, men must be-

long. Loneliness remains the greatest vul-
nerability of the human condition. But men
must belong to institutions which are so de-
signed as to permit them to be active
agents in the modernization of their ovsm
lives.

The Political Dimension of Sharing

I turn now to the third dimension of
sharing which the fact of growth poses for
a society : its political dimension.

Politics is the exercise of power through
government. Whether one considers an an-
cient Chinese dynasty or an advanced so-
ciety in the contemporary world, govern-
ments must exercise power in three major
directions :

1. To protect the society's territorial in-
tegrity or, more generally, to secure or ad-
vance the nation's interests in the interna-
tional arena of power as those interests are
defined by those who wield effective power,

2. To provide for the general welfare as
welfare and the government's responsibility
for welfare are generally defined within the
society.

3. To preserve the constitiitional order;
that is, to maintain public order, orderly
change, and legitimate succession by some
enforcible balance between public constraint
and individual freedom of action and ex-
pression of opinion.

The tasks of national security, the norms
of welfare, the character and solidity of the
constitutional order, and the balances struck
between the maintenance of public order and
the freedom of the citizenry have varied
over the centuries in particular societies
and among societies in particular periods.

But the heart of politics and of political
debate lies in these three fundamental
tasks, from ancient times down to the elec-
tion issues of nations in the contemporary
Atlantic world, from simple tribes to elab-
orate industrial societies, from advanced
democracies to totalitarian dictatorships.

The issue here is: How shall the voice of
the people be heard in deciding these
fundamental questions? How shall the peo-

MAY 23, 1966

807

pie participate? How shall the people share
in the benefits and responsibilities of gov-
ernment as growth transforms the political
process?

The degree and character of popular par-
ticipation in the political process in tradi-
tional societies have varied, of course, with
their complexity and the cultures from
which they arose. Some societies devel-
oped at the village or tribal level, for ex-
ample, a local political life with quite
widespread participation. But, as I sug-
gested earlier, such societies tended to lo-
cate ultimate authority in a central figure
to whom often a divine origin was im-
puted, which established the legitimacy re-
quired for a smooth and acceptable trans-
fer of power.

Power, in fact, was exercised in such so-
cieties by many more than the king or em-
peror. Complex traditional societies devel-
oped elaborate bureaucratic structures; and,
as we all know, significant experiments in
political democracy conducted in Greece and
Rome have left a permanent mark on our
civilization. But those actively engaged in
exercising power were, in traditional so-
cieties, almost always an exceedingly nar-
row group compared to the total population.

This did not mean that the views of the
population at large were wholly irrelevant
to the political process. Virtually all sys-
tems of government in the past and at pres-
ent claim the consent of the governed; but
the registering of consent in traditional so-
cieties tended to be, except at moments of
mass upheaval, relatively passive, and mass
upheaval occurred only when the narrow
political elite lost its unity and grip on ef-
fective power.

In the classic dynastic cycle of China,
for example, a dynasty's performance in of-
fering the peasantry peace, land, reduced
taxes, and public works was an accepted
criterion of its health and legitimacy. But
the discontent of the peasantry was not the
active agent of its overthrow when it
failed to perform. It was a new group of
leaders, backed, perhaps, by the literate
critics and administrators, who started the

808

regional revolts which yielded the new
dynasty, mobilizing the people along the
way to overthrow their predecessors.

With traditional societies, then, we start
in a world of limited and essentially passive
participation in the political process.

Consequences of Modernization

Modernization has three major conse-
quences, all of which tend to force a widen-
ing of the active political arena.

First, the old political institutions, usu-
ally rooted in rural life, tend to be strained,
diluted, or broken by the gathering power of
the cities and the drive for participation
and authority of those who gain wealth
and stature in urban life, a drive backed by
doctrines which explicitly challenge the
stabilizing rules and beliefs of the tradi-
tional dispensation.

Second, by expanding the range of com-
munications and raising the average level
of education, modernization expands the
circle of those technically capable of par-
ticipating in the political process and deter-
mined to assert their prerogatives.

Third, the technical activities which go
with modernization — industrial, commer-
cial, agricultural, and administrative — bring
new issues into political life which make
more of the life of the society directly de-
pendent on the decisions of government and
which also focus the interests and attention
of the new groups on government as the
source of important advantages or con-
straints.

Taken together, these three inherent char-
acteristics of modernization produce the
kind of widened but unstable transitional
politics which we can see, with many varia-
tions, in developing nations around the
world; and it is not difficult to find
parallel transitional stages in the political
history of the presently more advanced in-
dustrial states.

One cannot too strongly emphasize the
variety of political experiences through
which nations have passed in the transition
from traditional to modern politics. But
there is one characteristic which is almost

?
DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

universally shared, from the United States
of the 1780's down to the contemporary
developing world: that is, the problem of
reconciling the rise of factionalism that ac-
companies enlarged participation in poli-
tics with the imperatives of orderly and ef-
fective government.

The concern with faction rooted in re-
gional, economic, class, and other interests
was the central anxiety of our Founding
Fathers, reflected, for example, in the de-
bates of the Philadelphia Convention, in
Madison's Federalist Paper No. 10, and, in-
deed, in Washington's farewell address.

In the contemporary developing world a
first approximation of what might be called
participational politics also involves the
grouping of men around regional, economic,
religious, class, and other narrow inter-
ests. These often yield multiple, shallowly
rooted, but highly assertive, parties. These
tend to press — one in competition with the
other — against an inherently overburdened
and fragile central government, seeking ad-
vantage without assuming responsibility for
an effective national policy.

It is this disorderly factional tendency
which tends to create the conditions of
chaos which open the way to military
coups and dictatorships; for they prevent
governments from performing acceptably
the three abiding tasks of national author-
ity, those of security, welfare, and the pres-
ervation of constitutional order.

Role of National Political Parties

There is, evidently, no single, simple
formula for striking a proper balance be-
tween the inevitably widened participation
that comes with the process of grovi^th and
effective government. But it is worth noting
that one aspect of our own political ex-
perience may prove highly relevant to the
resolution of this dilemma in the contem-
porary world; that is, the emergence of
large national political parties.

It is a famous irony that the Founding
Fathers greatly feared political parties.
They believed parties would strengthen
and perpetuate factionalism. But it was

the emergence of the Federalist and the
Republican Parties in the first decades of
our national life that, in fact, overcame
factionalism to an important degree, and
our two-party system has subsequently pro-
vided a major underpinning for the po-
litical stability we have enjoyed, except for
the Civil War, for some 175 years.

Why should this be so? What functions
do large parties perform?

The emergence of large national parties
as voluntaiy, private institutions formally
— at least, outside the formal constitutional
process — forces men with different, narrow
interests to negotiate with one another and
to come to minimum compromise agree-
ments as a condition for seeking the ad-
vantages of political office on a national level.
They provide, therefore, an initial founda-
tion on which an elected president can carry
forward a national policy. And once in office,
the existence of the party tie helps maintain
a certain minimum discipline over the mem-
bers of his party, since they have to face
foreseeably an election together.

It is precisely these two functions — the
negotiation of compromises on a national
basis and the maintenance of minimum re-
straint and self-discipline in the face of na-
tional needs — which are most weakly per-
formed in the transitional politics of con-
temporary developing nations. And it is in-
teresting that some of the most stable de-
veloping nations are those which have cre-
ated large, but not monopolistic, political
parties. (I am not considering here the case
of one-party systems. Communist or other-
wise.)

Many factors deep in Indian historj- and
culture, as well as in the experience of
British rule, have shaped the contemporary
political life of that nation; but I believe it
is the existence of the Congress Party, now
almost a century old, which explains more
than any other single element the extraordi-
nary tour de force of continued democratic
politics in an impoverished continental na-
tion of 450 million. Such national parties
are also the key to the stability of Mexico
in the past quarter century and to the rela-

MAY 23, 1966

809

tively hopeful evolution of Tunisia, Tan-
zania, and Korea.

What is involved here is a translation
into politics of the same two principles re-
quired to create a sense of sharing in the
modernization of the individual's social and
economic life. As I have suggested, a sense
of belonging for the individual involved in-
stitutions which both permitted participa-
tion in modernization and the assumption of
some personal responsibility for the moderni-
zation of one's own life. In politics, what is
required is the emergence of institutions
which permit a sense of effective representa-
tion in the political process, but this demands
also the assumption of responsibility by those
institutions and ultimately by the citizen him-
self for the emergence of a viable national
policy.

There are quite concrete and technical
reasons in an environment of growth why
participation requires responsibility as well
as the right to press special interests. Gov-
ernment, even in the most free enterprise of
societies, has played in the past and plays
in the present a critical role in economic
grov?th: in building the physical infra-
structure for a modem society, notably
transport facilities; in developing modern
educational institutions; in maintaining the
stability of the currency; in mounting poli-
cies that will insure a viable balance of pay-
ments; in generating the tax resources
necessary for the conduct of modern gov-
ernment.

All these activities involve difficult
choices: the setting of priorities in an en-
vironment of scarce resources. All legiti-
mate demands cannot be immediately met.
The politics of modernization is, therefore,
inevitably a challenge to the wisdom, sense
of community, and sense of responsibility of
all who would share more widely in the po-
litical process. It is only when a sense of
both responsibility and participation in the
modernization process is widespread — from
the cabinet minister to the private business-
man, from the civil servant in a govern-
ment office to the farmer, from the banker
to the industrial worker — that the process

moves forward with its full potential and
in tolerable balance.

For the fundamental fact about mod-
ernization is that it is a great national ad-
venture. It is not a job for any one group.
It is not carried forward successfully by un-
restrained class struggle but by restraining
compromises in terms of perceived larger
national interests.

The art of politics in a growing society is,
therefore, the art of suffusing simultane-
ously both a sense of participation and a
sense of responsibility. It is a many-faceted
art; but the emergence of large national
political parties, large enough to embrace a
majority but still required to compete in
free elections, may be an important device
for its successful practice in the world of
contemporary developing nations.

These imperatives, as nearly as we can
perceive, hold for all stages of growth. The
balancing of liberty and order, freedom and
responsibility, is as external and universal
a problem as one can pose. The task of get-
ting that effective consensus among indus-
try, government, and labor required to
bring Latin American inflation under con-
trol is not essentially different from the
kind of subtle exercise we have had to con-
duct in our society at income levels 6 to 10
times higher in order to achieve and main-
tain the wage guidelines policy launched 5
years ago. That policy — the most basic
protection of both our price level and our
balance-of-payments position — requires, in
fact, the attentive making (and remaking)
of consensus in our national life at a most
sensitive point.

Responsibility of the Individual

What, then, can we conclude about the
quality of life in an environment of eco-
nomic growth?

By adopting the attitudes and developing
the techniques of modern science, man
broke up the framework, the institutions,
and the canons of traditional societies. He
broke through the fatalistic ceilings and ex-
pectations about what life might offer;
and, in this environment of unlimited

t

I

810

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

horizons of his own creation, he substituted
the criteria of equality of opportunity (in-
cluding universal suffrage) for fixed social
and economic status, economic growth for
fixed levels of welfare, and political par-
ticipation for authoritarian government.

To share the good life in this new dy-
namic and egalitarian environment re-
quires that man share not merely in the
widened material possibilities that growth
provides but that he share also the re-
sponsibility of unfolding those possibilities
in his own time and place in a reasonably
orderly sequence, while maintaining a po-
litical life capable of meeting the three in-
escapable functions of government. This in
turn demands, as growth proceeds and new
technologies are incorporated into the so-
ciety, an endless creation and modification
of institutions; for the complex and inher-
ently specialized functions of a growing so-
ciety cannot be carried out either by the in-
stitutions of the traditional society or by
men acting alone.

But at the heart of the matter is the new
role of the individual, the role of responsi-
bility he assumed with the Newtonian revo-
lution. In all its technological and indus-
trial consequences, that revolution widened
— and goes on widening — the range of pos-
sibilities for men to give effect to their
talents. Man asserted his primacy over a
physical world which over all previous cen-
turies had limited narrowly the physical
and intellectual possibilities of most human
beings on earth. But he took on himself
simultaneously the burden of endless inno-

vation and adaptation to innovation; and
innovation is painful as well as creative.

President Kennedy used to recall often —
it was perhaps his most fundamental judg-
ment about life — the old Greek definition of
happiness as the maximum exercise of a
man's capacities against standards of ex-
cellence.

In ancient Greece, and in all premodem
societies, that was a definition that could
be relevant to the life of only a small
minority. The vast majority were destined
to struggle defensively for life itself against
man's most primitive and persistent ene-
mies— hunger, disease, and ignorance.

What growth has done is ultimately to
make that exalted, burdensome, challenging
definition of happiness accessible to all
men; but it laid on man simultaneously the
need to work through institutions with his
fellow men — locally, nationally, regionally,
and ultimately on a world basis.

The technology which underlies the proc-
ess of growth has, thus, simultaneously
lifted fi-om man many traditional burdens,
imposed on him the endless creative burdens
of innovation and an environment of inno-
vation, and challenged him as never before
to learn to live at peace with his fellow
men. President Johnson recently has noted
that if man is not yet prepared to regard
all his fellow men as brothers, he must, for
his own safety, come to regard them as
fellow citizens of a world community which
modern weapons and modern means of com-
munication have rendered smaller than our
nations used to be, only a little while ago.

MAY 23, 1966

811

Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Problem

by Douglas MacArthur II

Assistant Secretary for Congressional Relations^

It is a great privilege and pleasure to
participate in the annual convention of the
Young Presidents. It is a privilege because
the Young Presidents are known in many
countries as a vigorous, progressive, and
forward-looking group of young business
leaders — leaders who are contributing sub-
stantially to an expansion of economic ac-
tivity which should bring with it rising levels
of well-being for many peoples. It is a
pleasure to be here because it gives me the
opportunity to see again many old friends
from your distinguished group with whom I
have had the good fortune to meet and dis-
cuss common problems in many different
parts of the world since my first formal
meeting with the YPO in Tokyo in 1958.

When I was invited to address this lunch-
eon gathering it was suggested that I talk
about "Your Stake in the Balance-of-Pay-
ments Problem" and how business, labor, and
government can cooperate to expand our
exports. This subject seems most appropri-
ate, not only because of the unique contribu-
tion American business and industry can
make through increased exports and re-
straint in investment abroad but also be-
cause of the stake every single American
has in the successful solution of our balance-
of-payments problem. And find a solution
we must, for not only is our economic well-
being involved but also our ability to meet

' Address made before the annual meeting of the
Young Presidents Organization at Phoenix, Ariz., on
Apr. 26 (press release 98).

certain essential commitments on which our
security and indeed our survival so heavily
depend.

For we live in a turbulent, dangerous, and
changing world in which, unhappily, there
are certain nations which preach a militant
doctrine of world revolution and are trying
to impose their system on free peoples by
threats, subversion, and the use of force.

How is this challenge to free societies to
be met? How is peace to be maintained?

We and certain other nations have learned
from sad experience in two world wars that
nations do not survive the onslaught of a
powerful aggressor nor is peace maintained
just because people want it that way. We
have learned the hard way that if aggression
is to be deterred and peace maintained, the
collective approach to security by free peo-
ples holds the best chance of success. And
so we have joined with about 40 other like-
minded nations in collective security ar-
rangements which involve the stationing of
substantial numbers of our armed forces
abroad. These vitally important arrange-
ments for our own security are essential but
necessarily involve considerable drain on our
foreign exchange and hence contribute to
our balance-of-payments problem.

But collective military security arrange-
ments by themselves are not enough. Even
if aggression is deterred, we and other in-
dustrially developed nations with high living
standards also realize that we cannot exist
as individual islands of prosperity and plenty
in a world of hunger, poverty, misery, and

812

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

disease — a world in which vacuums of chaos
would soon be filled by aggressive and dan-
gerous systems. Indeed, economic and mili-
tary foreign aid is basic to U.S. security, for
without it many countries would have been
subverted or overrun.

And so we and a number of other devel-
oped countries have foreign aid programs to
help lesser developed nations help them-
selves to stabilize their economies. For with-
out economic stabilization and progress there
can be little hope for political and social
stability.

These economic aid programs by which we
work to bring stability, peace, and progress
to vitally important areas of the world are,
like our contributions to collective defense,
an integral part of our overall program to
insure the security and well-being of our
country, but they also necessarily involve a
relatively modest but nonetheless additional
foreign exchange increment.

Some people ask why, even with our neces-
sary security and aid programs, we should
have an adverse balance of payments when
we have such a substantial surplus of ex-
ports over imports. The answer is that our
deficit stems from our dollar outflows not
only to meet our essential overseas defense
and foreign aid commitments but also to pay
for our steadily expanding imports, the
travel abroad of U.S. citizens, and American
investments and loans overseas. We unques-
tionably have our work cut out for us to
close the adverse dollar gap, and the de-
mands of the Viet-Nam conflict will not make
the problem any easier.

And finally, in discussing the need to
increase our exports, I think everyone
agrees that the American economy has
reached that state of development where in-
creased exports are absolutely essential to
the long-term growth and prosperity of our
United States economy. Without it we will
inevitably face economic stagnation and
withering, with all the implications which
that implies for our future prosperity and
well-being.

How then do we expand our access to
world markets? There is no quick answer.

no easy gimmick, for expanded exports de-
pend not on any single factor but on the
attitudes and actions of three principal sec-
tors of our national life — Government, labor,
and business and industry. And so I would
like to outline my own personal views of the
interrelated responsibilities and roles of
American Government, labor, and industry
in expanding our exports.

Government Aid to U.S. Exporters

The first responsibility of the United
States Government in helping American
business in foreign markets is to make it
possible for our businessmen to do business.
You can have the best product in the world,
but if a country won't let it come in, you
obviously have no market for that product
— until the barrier is removed. So we in
Government are working, with the help of
our friends in business and industry, to
remove or reduce the barriers to trade. They
include both tariff and nontariff barriers.

Our greatest effort to lower or eliminate
these barriers is being concentrated at Ge-
neva in the so-called Kennedy Round of
tariff negotiations. The recent European
Common Market crisis regrettably delayed
the negotiating schedule. However, we re-
main prudently hopeful that the negotiations
will reach a successful conclusion that will
result in both a substantial lowering of
tariffs and an expansion of international
trade.

In addition to this multilateral effort, we
are constantly attempting to reduce barriers
on a bilateral basis. But to do this effec-
tively, we need your help. We need to pin-
point the problems. Therefore, American
businessmen should present their trade and
investment problems to us here at home or
to our Foreign Service posts overseas as
soon as they arise so that we can help. 'WTiile
we can't promise solutions to all of them, we
have had considerable success in many in-
stances.

I must frankly state that some years ago
not all of our Government services always
did as much as they perhaps could to help
American business abroad. However, there

MAY 23, 1966

813

has been a great change in attitude and out-
look in the last few years, and a series of
steps have been taken to strengthen Govern-
ment support for American business abroad.

There is a new and much-needed emphasis
on assisting American businessmen. We are
encouraging closer relationships between
business and Government so that we can
bring Government's views to the business
community and business views more directly
into the foreign economic policymaking proc-
ess. By our knowing your views — and you
ours — we feel we can better arrive at policies
which will further our commercial interests.
These views, incidentally, are important to
us not only in our own intragovernmental
discussions but also in our participation in
the many international organizations which
deal with matters affecting business. And
these cover virtually everything including
tariffs, nontariff discriminations, labeling,
patents, and the movement of commercial
samples from one country to another.

Your Government also assists American
business in its promotional activities. We
provide specific aids to the U.S. businessman
in his effort to enter and stay competitive
in foreign markets. For example, the De-
partment of Commerce, utilizing informa-
tion from the Foreign Service and other
sources, offers a number of services to help
you find overseas markets. These include a
wide variety of overseas business reports,
trade lists, and other reports to help you
establish contact with agents.

There are also other facilities offered by
your Government which exporters may find
useful. One of these is our trade-fair pro-
gram. In the last 6 months of 1965 alone
the Commerce Department operated 12 full-
scale exhibits abroad, and projected sales for
the American firms that participated should
run over $40 million.

In addition, we have permanent U.S. trade
centers in six major commercial cities over-
seas which reported sales of almost $36
million for the last 6 months of 1965. The
Government also helps maintain sales dis-
play centers in smaller markets abroad, in

which small manufactured items are ex.
hibited on a rotating basis for the purpose
of obtaining agents for American manufac-
turers.

Mobile trade fairs provide another tech-
nique where Government and business co-
operate together to promote sales of U.S.
products abroad. And for sometime we have .
also been sending or encouraging Govern- |
ment-sponsored or private trade missions to
other countries.

The President and Secretary Rusk have
personally given much time and thought to
improve the backstopping that the State
Department, our embassies, and Foreign
Service give to American businessmen. I
thought you might be interested in the fol-
lowing extract from one of Secretary Rusk's
recent personal letters to our ambassadors
abroad, dealing with our responsibility to
give the American public the best possible
service :

One especially significant aspect of this respon-
sibility is our need to maintain a close and continu-
ing relationship with the American business com-
munity. International business operations are essen-
tial to the achievement of our foreign policy goals.
We want to bring U.S. foreign policy views and
issues to the business community — encouraging sup-
port at home and abroad. We also want to bring
business views more directly into the foreign eco-
nomic policy-making process.

You are also well aware of the intensive com-
mercial competition we face from other industrial-
ized nations. Even with an over-all increase in our
exports, there has been a gradual reduction in our
share of foreign markets. Our trade surplus dimin-
ished this past year. We must do more to expand
our exports. Fulfillment of some of our most critical
international responsibilities will depend on this.

Responsibility of Labor ^^

So much then for our Government's basic
responsibilities to develop a sound national
and international trade policy, to assist
American business abroad, and to negotiate
downward the tariff and nontariff barriers
that hinder our exports. But even if trade
barriers were negotiated down to zero, Amer-
ican goods would still not sell in world mar-
kets (1) unless they are competitive with

S14

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

European, Japanese, and other foreign prod-
ucts in terms of price and quality, and (2)
unless a truly imaginative and effective
effort is made to sell our wares abroad. This
is where the role and responsibility of
American labor and business come into the
picture.

Insofar as labor is concerned, it seems
evident that, if we are to continue to sell our
products, we cannot afford wage-price spirals
that price our goods out of world markets.
As industries in Europe and Japan merge or
in other ways expand their production to
supply the great world market, including the
Common Market, their unit-production costs
will fall, making price competition tougher
than ever for us. Therefore, if we are to
continue to sell our products at competitive
prices, our wage increases will, in general,
have to be absorbed by increased productiv-
ity rather than by higher prices.

And, of course, the entire increase in pro-
ductivity cannot be devoted solely to wage
increases. A fair share must be reserved to
business and industry for both profit and
research and plant modernization that are
such essential elements in our ability to
compete in world markets.

The workmanship that American labor
puts into our fine products must, of course,
continue to be of the highest caliber. For
shoddy workmanship will result in either
products that cannot compete quality-wise
or in increased production costs because of
too large a percentage of rejections by
American industry's fine quality-control pro-
grams.

And both labor and business working to-
gether have an inescapable obligation and
indeed a vital self-interest to put an end to
the periodic strikes that tie up our ports and
waterfronts and strangle our foreign trade.
For each time our ports are struck we lose
thousands of customers abroad — foreign cus-
tomers who frankly tell us they will no
longer go on depending on such an unde-
pendable source of supply as ours because
they have their own contracts and deadlines
to meet.

American Business Has a Key Role

Finally, what is the contribution that
American business and industry can make
to our balance-of-payments problem? The
answer is, I think, that American business
has a key role. For direct exports and Amer-
ican sales abroad will in large measure de-
cide whether our long-term balance-of-pay-
ments problem can be brought into manage-
able proportions or whether more severe
measures that we have hoped to avoid will
be required.

Today the hard fact of life is that we are
not doing as well with our exports as we can
or we should. Although as a nation we are
the world's largest exporter — and indeed our
exports have been increasing — we are not
holding our share of world exports. Last year,
through September, our percentage share of
world exports dropped as other countries'
foreign sales expanded faster than our own.

To put it another way, U.S. firms gen-
erally now export a smaller proportion of the
total percentage of their goods and services
than producers in any other industrialized
country in the world. And our failure to
enlarge — indeed even to maintain — our
share of world exports occurs at a time when
there are greater opportunities to sell in
foreign markets than ever before.

There has been a tremendous expansion
of economic and industrial activity abroad,
including Europe and Japan, accompanied by
a very substantial increase in consumer
spending — in some cases amounting to al-
most 50 percent in the last few years. The
old basic wages and salaries in such countries
often left little margin for much additional
consumer spending after the three basic
imperatives of life — food, shelter, and cloth-
ing— were met. Now, however, greatly in-
creased consumer spending is going into a
wide variety of consumer goods and gadg-
etry — goods that make life more pleasant,
the home more attractive, leisure time more
fun to spend; more and better clothing; and
an improved diet with substantially higher
protein content.

The overseas market for consumer goods

MAY 23, 1966

815

holds especially rich promise, particularly
for a wide variety of items that are pro-
duced by medium- or small-sized American
industries. Trained in a competitive, con-
sumer-oriented economy at home, U.S. busi-
ness is uniquely equipped to do more busi-
ness in the growing consumer market
abroad. However, to exploit this great new
foreign market, American business will have
to be much more imaginative and active. It
will require American business to devote the
same imagination, boldness, and skill to for-
eign markets that it does to our own great
domestic common market of our 50 States.

We cannot — and must not — regard this
great new foreign market as simply a place
to get rid of surplus production for the
American market. One of the keys to suc-
cess in selling abroad is to offer what our
foreign friends want and to present it in a
way that appeals, rather than just trying to
sell them what the American people want.
We must pay greater attention to tailoring
our products for the taste of our foreign
consumers. And we must present them in
ways that will increase their sales appeal,
such as labeling them in the language of the
country where they are to be sold.

And while you are exploring the poten-
tialities of foreign markets, don't overlook
the opportunities for peaceful trade with the
countries of Eastern Europe. President
Johnson last year asked a distinguished
group of business, labor, and academic lead-
ers to explore all aspects of expanding
peaceful trade with the Communist countries
of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. In
its report to the President,- this committee
expressed the belief that "peaceful trade in
nonstrategic items can be an important in-
strument of national policy in our country's
relations with individual Communist nations
of Europe."

In his state of the Union message this
year,-'' the President said he would ask Con-
gress "for authority to remove the special
tariff restrictions which are a barrier to
increasing trade" between our country and
these countries of Eastern Europe. Bridges

of trade to Eastern Europe could influence
the evolution of Eastern European Commu-
nist countries and encourage the movement
toward greater national independence.

In sum, every American businessman,
whether working for a large or small com-
pany, should understand that his own future
and that of his company depends on a steady
expansion of our exports. For exports bring
profit to companies in addition to helping
solve our balance-of-payments problem. The
businessman who says he is not interested in
the export market because his order book
is full with American orders is blind. He
does not realize that if we do not expand our
exports, if we do not solve our balance-of-
payments problem, our entire economy is
threatened and he will not be spared when
the time of accounting arrives. Even if there
is not an immediate overseas market for his
product, he nonetheless has the most vital
interest in encouraging exports; he has the
obligation to keep looking to see whether a
market abroad can be found for his product.

Penetrating Foreign Mari<ets

In closing, I would like to say a brief word
about different ways to penetrate foreign
markets. These include selling products i
abroad through import-export houses; es-
tablishing foreign sales branches with full-
time personnel, warehouses, and service
staffs; setting up manufacturing facilities
abroad through an entirely U.S.-owned sub-
sidiary branch or in partnership with local
businessmen; or by licensing arrangements
which provide a steady income from royal-
ties with little capital outlay. Which method
to choose must be carefully studied and se-
lected on a case-by-case basis.

American industries operating abroad face
many corporate and other complex local
problems. They require not only the best
corporate planning available but also the
very best men they can get to live and work

- Text of the report, dated Apr. 29 and released by
the White House on May 6, 1965, is scheduled to be
reprinted in the Bulletin of May 30, 1966.

'■' For excerpts, see ihid., Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

816

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

abroad. It is no longer sufficient for an
American business representative abroad to
have only mastery of his product or its pro-
duction. He must be sensitive to the politi-
cal, social, and psychological environment in
which he is operating. He must be tactful
as well as firm. He must understand that
the method of approach and of doing busi-
ness is often different abroad than in the
United States.

To succeed today an American business-
man abroad must be an understanding and
respected member of the community in
which he works, without losing his integrity
as an American. He must be able to pass
Dale Carnegie's course with a good mark.

American business also has a unique role
in seeing to it that American products are
competitive, quality-wise, in world markets.
Your research and development programs
are more important than ever because our
principal industrial competitors — Western
Europe and Japan — have a larger pool of
technically and scientifically skilled talent
that in the future will make an increasing
contribution to industrial products and tech-
niques.

In conclusion, let me say again that, while
the balance-of-payments challenge we face
is immense, I am not pessimistic. We will, of
course, be up against much stronger indus-
trial competition, particularly from our Eu-
ropean and Japanese friends. However, I
for one believe that competition brings ad-
vantages, not disadvantages. Certainly our
country has grown strong as our industries
have vied with each other in the keenest
kind of competitive effort within our free
enterprise system.

I am convinced that we have the capability
of continuing not only to compete but to
expand our share of world markets if there
is the will and energy and if we all do our
part. Therefore, let each of us — Govern-
ment, labor, and business — face up to the
challenge and attack our problems with the
same resolution and the same imagination
as our forebears who made this country the
great country that it is today.

U.S. and China Amend
Cotton Textile Agreement

Press release 97 dated April 2<
DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The amendment of the bilateral agree-
ment concerning trade in cotton textiles of
October 19, 1963,i between the Governments
of the United States and the Republic of
China was announced on April 26.

The amendment was accomplished by an
exchange of notes between Assistant Secre-
tary of State Anthony M. Solomon and Am-
bassador Chow Shu-Kai of the Republic of
China.

The amendment provides for the following
modifications applicable to trade during the
last 2 years of the agreement beginning on
October 1, 1965:

1. Certain adjustments in specific cate-
gory ceilings.

2. Provision for 5 percent flexibility among
certain categories, subject to the aggregate
and applicable group limits of the agreement.

3. Establishment of joint ceilings for cer-
tain categories.

4. The notes effecting the amendment also
include certain other technical revisions in
the provisions of the agreement.

TEXT OF U. S. NOTE

April 22, 1966
EXCELLENCY: I have the honor to refer to the re-
cent discussions held in Washington, D.C. between
representatives of our two governments concerning
the cotton textile agreement between our two gov-
ernments effected by exchange of notes at Taipei on
October 19, 1963, as amended. In accordance vidth
these discussions, the Government of the United
States of America understands that the agreement,
as amended, shall, insofar as concerns the third
and fourth agreement years, be revised retroactively
to October 1, 1965, to read as follows:

(1) The Government of the Republic of China
shall limit its exports to the United States in all
categories of cotton textiles for the third agreement
year beginning October 1, 1965 to an aggregate
limit of 58,432,500 square yards equivalent.

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series 5482.

MAY 23, 1966

817

(2) Within this overall ceiling, the following
group ceilings shall apply for the third agreement
year:

(a) Apparel categories
(Categories 39-63)

(b) All other categories
(Categories 1-38 and
64)

21,719,250 syds.

36,713,250 syds.

(3) Within the applicable group ceilings the fol-
lowing specific ceilings shall apply for the third
agreement year.

(a) Apparel categories

Categories

41-42

85,664 doz.

Category

44

16,538 doz.

IF

45

9,923 doz.

II

46

248,063 doz.

•1

47

27,563 doz.

If

50

134,505 doz.

w

51

216,090 doz.

II

52

137,813 doz.

II

53

11,025 doz.

II

54

23,153 doz.

II

57

110,250 doz.

II

59

27,563 doz.

II

60

20,837 doz.

II

62

25,900 lbs.

II

63

137,813 lbs.

(b) All other

categories

Category

5

994,510 syds'

tt

6

630,000 syds

if

9

18,742,500 syds

n

15

551,250 syds

99

18 & 19

1,033,594 syds

If

22 & 23

2,050,000 syds

»

24 & 25

2,000,000 syds

>»

26

3,373,650 of which not
more than 2,000,000
syds shall be in duck

»»

28

937,125 pes

>»

30

1,653,750 pes

»

32

246,500 doz.

99

34

111,750 pes

>»

35

74,350 pes

t9

64

130,400 lbs.

(4) During the third and fourth agreement years
and within the applicable group ceilings, the specific
ceilings specified in paragraph 3, other than those
for duck and for categories 5, 6, 45, 46, 50, 51, 52,
53, 54, and 60, may be exceeded by not more than
5 percent.

(5) Within the group ceilings for each group the

' Except that exports in Category 5 may amount
to 75 percent of the total amounts permitted to be
exported in Categories 5 and 6 provided the total
exports in these two categories do not exceed the
total limits provided for these two categories. [Foot-
note in original.]

square yard equivalent of any shortfalls occurring
in exports in the categories given specific ceilings
may be used in any category not given a specific
ceiling. In the event the Government of the Re-
public of China desires to export during the third
agreement year more than 385,875 square yards
equivalent in any category not given a specific ceil-
ing, it shall request consultations with the Govern-
ment of the United States on this question. The
United States Government shall agree to enter into
such consultations and, during the course thereof,
shall provide the Government of the Republic of
China with information on the condition of the
United States market in the category in question.
Until agreement is reached, the Government of the
Republic of China shall limit its exports in the
category in question during the third agreement
year at an annual level not in excess of 385,875
square yards equivalent.

(6) The limitations on exports established in para-
graphs 1, 2, 3, 5 and 8 shall, for the fourth agree-
ment year, be increased by five percent over the
corresponding limitations for the preceding year.

(7) During the third and fourth agreement years,
annual exports from the Republic of China to the
United States shall be spaced as evenly as practi-
cable, taking into account seasonal factors.

(8) The Government of the Republic of China
shall limit its exports of items made of corduroy in
categories 46, 50 and 51, to a total annual ceiling of
no more than 4,410,000 square yards for the third
agreement year. In the event concentration in ex-
ports from the Republic of China to the United
States of America of items of apparel made up of
corduroy in categories other than 46, 50 and 51 or
items of apparel made up of other cotton fabrics
causes or threatens to cause market disruption in the
United States, the Government of the United States
may call for consultations with the Government of
the Republic of China in order to reach a mutually
satisfactory solution to the problem. The Govern-
ment of the Republic of China shall agree to enter
into such consultation and, during the course thereof,
the Government of the Republic of China shall limit
its exports of the items in question at an annual level
of 105 percent of its exports during the twelve-month
period immediately preceding the month in which
consultations are requested.

(9) Each Government agrees to supply promptly
any available statistical data requested by the other
Government. In particular, the Governments agree
to exchange monthly data on exports and imports of
cotton textiles from the Republic of China to the
United States. In the implementation of this agree-
ment, the system of categories and the factors for
conversion into square yard equivalents set forth in
the annex to the agreement of October 19, 1963, shall
apply.

(10) During the term of this agreement, the
United States Government shall not invoke the pro-

818

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

cedures of Article 3 of the Long-Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles
done at Geneva on February 9, 1962 to limit importa-
tion of cotton textiles from the Republic of China
into the United States.

(11) The Governments agree to consult on any
question arising in the implementation of this agree-
ment. In particular, in the event that, because of a
return to normalcy of market conditions in the
United States, the Government of the United States
relaxes measures it has taken under the Long-Term
Arrangements for any of the categories, consultation
may be requested by the Government of the Republic
of China to remove or modify ceilings established
for such categories by this agreement.

(12) If the Government of the Republic of China
considers that as a result of limits and ceilings speci-
fied in this agreement the Republic of China is being
placed in an inequitable position vis-a-vis a third
country, the Government of the Republic of China
may request consultations with the United States
Government with a view to taking appropriate re-
medial action such as a reasonable modification of
this agreement.

(13) The various adjustments to the export limi-
tations agreed to in the agreement of October 19,
1963 and subsequent amendments together with the
adjustments agreed to as a result of the overship-
ment of certain cotton textiles during the second
agreement year based on statistics available as of
January 14, 1966, are combined as follows:

(a) The export limitations specified in paragraphs
1, 2, 3, and 6 as may be modified pursuant to para-
graph 4 shall be reduced as follows:

3rd Agree-

4 th Agree-

ment Year

ment Year

5

(syds)

431,716

59,531

6

(syds)

630,000

6,935

9

(syds)

376,596

322,796

15

(syds)

11,039

9,462

18/19

(syds)

49,683

32,229

22/23

(syds)

31,669

27,146

26

(syds)

67,785

58,101

Duck

(syds)

725,189

NONE

41/42

(doz)

2,800

1,300

43

(doz)'

1,400

700

45

(doz)

300

200

46

(doz)

UAM

1,200

50

(doz)

19,006

500

51

(doz)

200

100

54

(doz)

1,962

60

(doz)

6,395

1,800

62

(lbs)

3,900

2,900

63

(lbs)

11,900

5,900

64

(syds)'

91,300

45,700

(b) During the third agreement year only, up to
100,000 lbs. of sweatshirts may be exported, within
the applicable group ceiling, in excess of the ap-
plicable limitation for category 62.

(14) In addition to the adjustments indicated in

paragraph 13, and based on the statistics available
as of January 14, 1966, the Government of the
United States of America charged against the levels
of exports permitted under the agreement for the
third agreement year the following quantities in
the categories indicated:

Category

9

1,880,189 syds

15

162,699 syds

19

179 syds

26

(excluding
duck)

166,000 syds.

41/42

1,368 doz.

43

6,138 doz.

44

66 doz.

49

1,911 doz.

55

3,473 doz.

62

772 lbs.

63

34,089 lbs.

These amounts are attributable to exports before
October 1, 1965 which were in excess of the levels
permitted for the second agreement year. When the
control of trade is shifted to an export control basis
exercised by the Government of the Republic of
China, the Government of the Republic of China
need not count these quantities as exports during
the third agreement year.

(15) The details of shifting the implementation
of this agreement to an export control basis, includ-
ing the timing of such a shift, and any additional
adjustments in the export limitations which may
accompany this shift will be the subject of mutually
satisfactory administrative adjustments.

(16) This agreement shall continue in force
through September 30, 1967; provided that either
Government may propose revisions in the terms of
the agreement no later than 90 days prior to the
beginning of a new agreement year; and provided
further that either Government may terminate this
agreement effective at the beginning of a new agree-
ment year by written notice to the other Govern-
ment given at least 90 days prior to the beginning
of such new agreement year.

I shall appreciate receiving your Excellency's con-
firmation of the above understanding. This note and
your Excellency's note of confirmation on behalf
of the Government of the Republic of China " shall
constitute, insofar as concerns the third and fourth
agreement years, a revision of the agreement be-
tween our two governments.

Accept, your Excellency, the renewed assurances
of my highest considerations.

Anthony M. Solomon

• To be deducted from group ceiling for apparel.
[Footnote in original.]

' To be deducted from group ceiling for "all other
categories." [Footnote in original.]

" Not printed here.

MAY 23, 1966

819

THE CONGRESS

Problems Resulting From the Internationalization of Business

statement by Anthony M. Solomon
Assistant Secretary for Economic Affairs^

It is a pleasure for me to appear here this
morning and to participate in the first
phase of the subcommittee hearings on in-
ternational antitrust issues. In accordance
with your wishes, I will not discuss anti-
trust problems as such but will review in a
general way developments in international
trade and foreign trade policy with the pur-
pose of providing a framework within
which antitrust issues can be examined.

Let me begin by stating briefly the main
elements of our foreign trade policy. We
believe in competition. We see it as a
powerful spur to productivity, to research,
development, and innovation, to the intro-
duction and dissemination of new technol-
ogy and new ideas. We believe accordingly
that foreign, like domestic, trade should be
conducted on a competitive basis, in a free
and open world trading system with mini-
mum restrictions on the flow of goods,
services, and capital across national bound-
aries. We know from experience that the
wider the area of trade freedom, the larger
the possibilities for specialization and
growth.

Consistent with this belief, we have di-
rected our efforts in the postwar period to
the progressive reduction of barriers to
trade and payments; and we are now en-

gaged in negotiations for the most ambi-
tious liberalization of international trade in
history, the Kennedy Round. The Kennedy
Round is the culmination of trade negotia-
tions we began 30 years ago when eco-
nomic grovi^th was throttled by high trade
barriers, high unemployment, and a restric-
tive international monetary system.

Our efforts in the postwar period have
borne fruit. The response of world trade to
the progressive reduction of barriers has
been spectacular. Since 1948 its value has
tripled, increasing faster than world in-
come. The industrial countries have been
the main beneficiaries. The grovvi;h in the
trade of the low-income countries has un-
fortunately lagged.

I would like to note briefly certain inno-
vations in the Kennedy Round and the
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 2 that au-
thorizes it. In the Kennedy Round we rec-
ognize the special problems of the less de-
veloped countries; the industrial countries
will not ask for reciprocity from them in-
consistent with their development needs.
We recognize that the problem of injury to
domestic producers from foreign competi-
tion should be met insofar as possible by
helping domestic producers to become more
competitive. The provisions in the Trade
Expansion Act for trade adjustment assist-

' Made before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and
Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
on Apr. 21 (press release 92).

^ For a summary of the act, see Bulletin of Oct.
29, 1962, p. 656.

820

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ance in the event of injuiy are a significant
new element in our foi-eign trade policy,
and we would hope to see these provisions
broadened and strengthened. Finally, we hope
through the Kennedy Round to reduce non-
tariff as well as tariff barriers to interna-
tional trade. In short, our foreign trade
policy is fully consistent with the ob-
jectives of our antitrust laws. These laws
seek to prevent private restraints on our
commerce. They are a logical corollary to
our foreign trade policy, which seeks to re-
duce both governmental and private re-
straints on commerce.

Growth of Regional Trade Groupings

The question arises, however, whether
our liberal trade policy, which had its
origin in the thirties, is really appropriate
to the world of the sixties or whether cer-
tain new developments call the policy into
question. I refer to the growth of regional
trade groupings not only in Europe but also
throughout the developing world and
Oceania.

In Central and South America, in vari-
ous parts of Africa, the Middle East, and to
a lesser extent Asia, developing countries
are moving toward special trade arrange-
ments among themselves, including full or
partial free-trade areas, customs unions,
and common markets. The movement is
slow and painful, but the direction is clear.
Australia and New Zealand are contemplat-
ing special trade arrangements. In West-
ern Europe, where the integration move-
ment had its initial impetus, two major
groupings have come into being: the Com-
mon Market of the Six ^ and the European
Free Trade Association comprising the so-
called "Outer Seven." *

All these trade groupings are inherently
discriminatory. That is, they provide for
the dismantling of barriers to trade within

^ The six members of the European Economic
Community (the Common Market) are: Belgium,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy,
Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.

' Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.

the grouping but maintain tariff barriers
against third countries. How do we recon-
cile our policy of open nondiscriminatory
trade with developments that appear to
move in a contrary direction ?

First, let me note that the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the
GATT, which establishes a code of conduct
for international trade among its more
than 60 members and which embodies the
principle of equality of treatment, does,
nevertheless, provide exceptions from this
principle for customs unions and free-trade
areas. The exceptions reflect the wide-
spread view that the trade-creating effects
of regional groupings offset the disadvan-
tages to third countries of the commercial
discrimination they suffer. In other words,
a successful regional economic grouping
would benefit the trade of nonmembers as
well as members, although in different
degree. Moreover, regional economic inte-
gration can have a politically unifying force
of significance.

U.S. Attitude Toward EEC and EFTA

Our attitude toward these regional group-
ings reflects both economic and political
considerations. As to Europe, political con-
siderations are dominant in our thinking.
Over the past 15 years, the United States
has supported the concept of a united
Western Europe as an integral part of our
Atlantic and NATO policies. We believe
that a united Europe is necessary for an
Atlantic partnership in which the United
States and Europe share common responsi-
bilities as equals.

The European Common Market of the
Six is the core and principal expression of
the European unity movement. The crisis
to which it was subjected in June of last
year was surmounted in January. While it
is too early to be certain, we believe that
the idea of European integration which the
Common Market symbolizes is too powerful
to be abandoned. We have, of course, al-
ways recognized an element of trade dis-
crimination inherent in the Common Mar-
ket idea, but we have believed strongly that

MAY 23, 1966

821

the political advantages of a united Europe,
able to play a full and equal role in
strengthening the free world and keeping it
free, far outweighed the trade disadvan-
tages to us.

The European Free Trade Association
does not have the same ambitious goals of
economic integration and political unity as
the European Economic Community. We
would hope that it would be possible for
members of the European Free Trade As-
sociation in the years ahead to accept the
goals of political unity and the full integra-
tion of their economies into the European
Economic Community. One of EFTA's
members, Austria, is currently engaged in
negotiations that could result in close as-
sociation with the European Economic Com-
munity. The possibility of British entry
into the Common Market has been revived,
and, should negotiations be resumed, other
nations such as Ireland, Denmark, and Nor-
way would almost surely follow.

We believe that the internal trade lib-
eralization that has taken place within the
EFTA can facilitate the entry of these
countries into the EEC in due course and
end the artificial separation among part-
ners in the Atlantic alliance. For our part,
we do not favor discriminatory trade blocs
within the Atlantic community that are
purely commercial in purpose and have no
broader political goal. We would be op-
posed, therefore, to a merger of the EEC
and EFTA having only a commercial char-
acter. We do believe that the participation
of the United Kingdom and other Euro-
pean states in a fully integrated Western
Europe is essential.

Problems of Developing Countries

Our attitude toward regional groupings
among less developed countries is based on
different and predominantly economic con-
siderations. We believe that regional inte-
gration among neighboring less developed
countries that are at roughly the same level
of development can be a positive force for
economic growth and stability. It can also
be a force for political cohesion.

The developing countries of Latin Amer-
ica, Africa, and Asia depend overwhelmingly
on the export of raw materials for the earn-
ings they need for development, and in each
of these countries one or two commodities
play a dominant role. This overdependence
on commodity trade makes the developing
countries peculiarly vulnerable. Their
earnings are slow growing and subject to
wide fluctuations, with destabilizing effects
on their economies and their development
efforts. The answer to their vulnerability
is to diversify their agriculture and develop
their industry. But industry, if it is to be
efficient and not of the overprotected, hot-
house variety, requires markets of economic
size, large enough to permit the scale of op-
erations and intraindustry specialization on
which growth and efficiency depend.

The developing countries have tried to de-
velop industry on a national basis, each
country shielding its infant enterprises be-
hind protective walls. The result, by and
large, has been high-cost, inefficient indus-
try with little growth potential. However,
by joining together with their neighbors
and dismantling the trade barriers among
them, they can produce for a wider regional
or subregional market. In the larger market
their industry would not be limited as it is
today to light consumer goods. They could
move in time to more complex intermediate
and capital goods. Shielded for a time by
their outer tariff walls from the export
competition of the advanced countries, en-
terprises would be exposed to more tolerable
competition within the broader regional
market and would reach a competitive posi-
tion in international markets much earlier
and much more effectively. And, not unim-
portantly, foreign investment would be
stimulated to locate within the grouping.

We must recognize, of course, that com-
petition is not the life style of many de-
veloping countries. We in the United States
view regional integration of developing
countries as a force for growth, not only be-
cause it permits economies of scale and
specialization but equally because it would
increase competition.

822

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

In a large market, there is room for
many firms of economic size to produce the
same product competitively. But in many
low-income countries competition is not part
of the ideology of the business community
nor of government leaders, and integration
is not regarded as an opportunity for com-
petitive exploitation of larger markets.
Planned complementarity is the objective —
planning to avoid competition rather than
to encourage it. This antipathy to competi-
tion reflects in part the desire to avoid
creating redundant capacity on the sim-
plistic view that competition is wasteful of
capital, the scarcest resource in developing
countries, and in part the need to insure
that each country in the trade bloc gets its
share of new enterprises.

We can hope that over time experience
will lead to a better appreciation of the con-
tribution of competition to economic growth,
but we should not expect early results. We
would also hope that the external barriers
to shield the regional enterprises would be
gradually reduced to expose these enter-
prises slowly but systematically to external
competition. But here, too, we should not
be sanguine of early results. Infant indus-
tries getting special protection do not like
to grow up.

Corporate Mergers in Europe

In Western Europe there is growing
business and also governmental interest in
the creation of larger European firms.
Mergers seem to be increasing considerably,
including mergers with American firms.
These developments reflect adjustment to
the opportunities of the EEC-wide market
as well as a feeling that larger European
firms are needed to compete more effectively
with American firms in world markets.
While the EEC wants to facilitate the de-
velopment of "European-sized" firms, it is
also anxious to see mergers stop short of
monopolization in the Common Market. The
same desire for larger firms, and concern at
the same time to prevent monopoly, are dis-
cernible in the United Kingdom Govern-
ment.

I think it is fair to say that in Western
Europe there has been increasing apprecia-
tion of the value of competition and rec-
ognition of the inhibiting effects of restric-
tive business practices on economic growth.
Major pieces of legislation have been en-
acted in Europe in the past 15 years to
curb private restraints on trade. Particu-
larly important, the Treaty of Paris creat-
ing the European Coal and Steel Com-
munity has very explicit antitrust features,
as does the Treaty of Rome establishing the
European Common Market. On balance,
regionalism in Europe has called greater at-
tention to the problem of private restraints
and the desirability of associating the re-
moval of government obstacles to trade
with the removal of private restraints.

European Regionalism and U.S. Trade

It might be of interest at this point to
consider what effect the trend toward re-
gional groupings has had, and can be ex-
pected to have, on our export sales and in-
vestment flows. Because regional groupings
among the developing countries are still in
a formative stage in the main, an examina-
tion of sales and investment in these areas
would not be especially revealing. We can,
however, look at our experience in Western
Europe.

Our export trade with the European Com-
mon Market has expanded even beyond our
best expectations. The economic growth rate
of the EEC has exceeded 5 percent a year
since its inception, and United States sales
to the EEC have more than doubled in the
7 years since its founding. By contrast,
United States exports worldwide increased
a little more than 50 percent in the same
period. In 1965 United States sales to the
EEC reached a new high of almost $5 billion,
exceeding by more than ?1.5 billion our im-
ports from the Community. United States
agricultural exports to the Community were
about $1.5 billion in 1965, an increase of
80 percent since the EEC was founded in
1958.

The upsurge of trade and business activ-
ity among the EFTA nations has benefited

MAY 23, 1966

823

us through a significant rise of United
States exports to the seven members, averag-
ing over 10 percent a year since 1959. How-
ever, in 1965 United States exports rose more
slowly than imports from EFTA. This was
probably attributable in large measure to
the booming United States economy. It
may be, however, that the discrimination
against outside competition as the free-
trade area nears completion is beginning to
make itself felt.

While our exports have done well, it is in
our interest and that of other trading na-
tions to encourage the European Com-
munity to follow liberal, outward-looking
trade policies so as to reduce to a minimum
the discrimination inherent in European
integration. Some of the EFTA countries
find their chief markets in the EEC, and
for them, too, it is a matter of primary im-
portance that the EEC external tariff come
down. The Kennedy Round can play a
major role in this respect. It is primarily
the power of the idea of European integra-
tion rather than the outer tariff wall that
holds the Six together. We can hope, there-
fore, that these external barriers will be
gradually reduced as world trade barriers
are reduced.

Given the natui'e and proliferation of
regional groupings today, it is by the re-
ciprocal reduction of trade barriers that we
can reduce the discrimination we would
otherwise face. Thus, our liberal trade
policy serves our commercial interests as
well in the sixties as it has for the past three
decades.

The development of regional trade blocs
in Western Europe was a powerful incen-
tive to the establishment of United States
affiliates there. The book value of United
States direct investments in the EEC rose
from $1.9 billion in 1958 to $5.4 billion in
1964. In the other countries of Western
Europe, the United Kingdom in particular,
the book value of our direct investments
rose from $2.7 to $6.7 billion in the same
period.

The reasons for this major outflow of

capital and reinvestment of earnings in
Europe are many, and research would be
needed to assess the relative weights of the
factors involved. Among the factors that
influenced United States companies to es-
tablish affiliates to produce abroad rather
than to export directly must certainly have
been the desire to move inside the tariff
walls. But other factors were doubtless op-
erative, including importantly the booming
growth rate in these Communities and the
higher rates of return on manufacturing
enterprises that prevailed in Europe at least
through 1961. Let me note parenthetically
that rates of return on manufacturing in-
vestments in Europe and the United States
appear now to be quite similar and both
have turned sharply upward. The desire to
be close to the market so as to be able to
respond more effectively to local tastes and
specifications and the logistics of transport
will no doubt continue to be major influences
in the decision to locate abroad.

It would not be legitimate, therefore, to
conclude that regional groupings as such,
because of their stimulus to internal market
growth and their outer tariff walls, are the
sole factor or even the primary factor in-
fluencing direct investment flows. But they
are doubtless an important element.

Multinational Corporations

In addition to these factors, I think we
all realize that the requirements of economic
efficiency are leading over time to firms of
increasingly larger size, frequently with in-
ternational connections. The world has
shrunk, not only in political but also in eco-
nomic terms. It is becoming more and more
the case that few countries can support
through their own markets alone the large-
scale and technically advanced industrial
units capable of meeting modern world
competition. Both marketing and produc-
tion internationally are increasingly neces-
sary, and economic interdependence is grow-
ing correspondingly. Thus more and more
United States firms are engaging in over-
seas operations, though the bulk of direct in-

824

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

vestment abroad is still accounted for by a
limited number of United States companies.

American corporations today are "multi-
national" entities. This is the term of art
that some are using to describe the grow-
ing internationalization of business. The
multinational corporation looks to the world
as its market, regards its funds as a pool
for use anywhere in the world, exports to
some countries, establishes affiliates in oth-
ers, exports from its affiliates to yet other
countries and back to the United States as
well. The forward plans of these com-
panies are global. It is no longer a ques-
tion whether to locate in Illinois or in Kan-
sas. Although American owTied and based,
the multinational United States company
sees the world as its oyster.

As our firms and foreign firms do more
and more business outside of their own
borders, antitrust problems and policies
that have purely domestic effects become
fewer and fewer. Our firms are affected in
their foreign operations not only by United
States antitrust laws but also by the laws
and procedures of the countries in which
they locate. It becomes increasingly impor-
tant to consider how these varying laws
and procedures interact, what their effects
are on the operations of our businessmen,
and how effective they are in preventing
restraints on commerce.

In the Organization for Economic Coop-
eration and Development, the OECD, there
is a Committee of Experts on Restrictive
Business Practices. This Committee is the
successor to an earlier "Group" of Experts
on Restrictive Business Practices created
in 1953 as a "project" of the European
Productivity Agency. The OECD Commit-
tee, with broader terms of reference than
its predecessor, is considering, among other
things, the question of restrictive business
arrangements adversely affecting interna-
tional trade — how serious the problem is
and what methods of cooperation to deal
with it may be appropriate. We hope it
will become increasingly active and pro-
ductive. As a result of the deliberations of

the OECD Committee, it may be possible
for member countries to develop coordi-
nated policies and procedures.

Your subcommittee has already con-
tributed materially to public understanding
of international developments and issues in
the antitrust field. The hearings you are
now initiating should be most helpful in in-
creasing the ability of our Government to
deal with the complex problems created by
the increasing internationalization of busi-
ness in the world today.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

Vietnam — Shipping Policy Review. Hearings before
the Subcommittee on Merchant Marine of the
House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fish-
eries. Part 1, February 8-March 10, 1966, 266 pp.;
Part 2, March 16-30, 1966, 260 pp.

World War on Hunger. Hearings before the House
Committee on Agriculture. February 14-18, 1966.
172 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part I.
March 16-24, 1966. 228 pp.

Atlantic Union Resolutions. Hearings before the In-
ternational Organizations Affairs Subcommittee
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on
S. Con. Res. 64 and S. Res. 128. March 23-24,
1966. 210 pp.

Indian Food Problem. Message from the President.
H. Doc. 417. March 30, 1966. 4 pp.

Safety of Life at Sea. Report on the Yarmouth
Castle Disaster. House Committee on Merchant
Marine and Fisheries. H. Rept. 1445. April 20,
1966. 28 pp.

Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Report of the
House Committee on Wavs and Means to accom-
pany H.R. 13103. H. Rept. 1450. April 26, 1966.
179 pp.

Plugging the Dollar Drain: Cutting Federal Ex-
penditures for Research and Related Activities
Abroad. Twenty-Sixth Report by the House Com-
mittee on Government Operations. H. Rept. 1453.
April 27, 1966. 23 pp.

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Report to ac-
company S. Res. 179. S. Rept. 1141. April 28, 1966.
3 pp.

The Use of Excess Property by the U.S. Foreign
Aid Program in Latin America. Twenty-Eighth
Report by the House Committee on Government
Operations. H. Rept. 1466. April 29. 1966. 37 pp.

Temporary Suspension of Duty on Certain Forms
of Copper. Report to accompany H.R. 12676. H.
Rept. 1472. May 4, 1966. 10 pp.

MAY 23, 1966

825

TREATY INFORMATION

«D

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Maritime Matters

Amendments to the convention on the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization (TIAS
4044). Adopted at London September 15, 1964.^
Acceptance received: Tunisia, March 28, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966.'
Signatures: Australia, Belgium and Luxembourg,*

Greece, Nigeria, Portugal, Southern Rhodesia,

United Kingdom, April 29, 1966.
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:

Greece, April 29, 1966.

BILATERAL

Bolivia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes.
Signed at La Paz April 22, 1966. Entered into
force April 22, 1966.

' Not in force.

' Signature is given in the name of the Belgo-
Luxembourg Economic Union.

1

Congo (Leopoidville)

Agreement amending the agricultural commoditiea
agreement of July 19, 1965. Effected by exchange
of notes at Leopoidville April 22 and 25, 1966.
Entered into force April 25, 1966.

Indonesia

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Sign-
ed at Djakarta April 18, 1966. Entered into force j "
April 18, 1966.

Morocco

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes April 21, 1966. En-
tered into force April 21, 1966.

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of April 23, 1965. Effected by ex-
change of notes April 21, 1966. Entered into force
April 21, 1966.

Paraguay

Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Asuncion April 27, 1966. Entered into
force April 27, 1966.

Spain

Agreement relating to the loan of one helicopter
carrier to Spain. Effected by exchange of notes at
Madrid April 21, 1966. Entered into force April
21, 1966.

Tunisia

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of February 17, 1965, as amended
(TIAS 5767, 5908). Effected by exchange of notes
at Tunis April 29, 1966. Entered into force April
29, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1404 PUBLICATION 8082 MAY 23, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Servicea, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
BRencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international sf^eements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of genera] international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Docnmenta, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.G.,
20402. Pbice: 62 issues, domestic tlO.
foreign $15 ; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pulH
lication approved by the Director of tllS
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966)<

NOTs : Contents of this publication »r«
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

826

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 23, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. HOi.

China. U.S. and China Amend Cotton Textile
Agreement (Department announcement, U.S.
note) 817

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign
Policy 825

Problems Resulting From the Internationaliza-
tion of Business (Solomon) 820

Economic Affairs

President Marks Poland's National Millennium;
Calls for Wider East-West Contacts (John-
son, proclamation) 794

Problems Resulting From the Internationaliza-
tion of Business (Solomon) 820

The Sharing of the Good Life (Rostow) ... 803

U.S. and China Amend Cotton Textile Agree-
ment (Department announcement, U.S. note) 817

Your Stake in the Balance-of-Payments Prob-
lem (MacArthur) 812

Europe

President Marks Poland's National Millennium;
Calls for Wider East-West Contacts (John-
son, proclamation) 794

Problems Resulting From the Internationaliza-
tion of Business (Solomon) 820

Poland. President Marks Poland's National
Millennium; Calls for Wider East- West Con-
tacts (Johnson, proclamation) 794

Presidential Documents. President Marks Po-
land's National Millennium; Calls for Wider
East-West Contacts 794

Southern Rhodesia. Peace and Justice Among
Nations: The Agenda of the International
Community (Goldberg) 798

Treaty Information

Current Actions 826

U.S. and China Amend Cotton Textile Agree-
ment (Department announcement, U.S. note) 817

United Nations. Peace and Justice Among Na-
tions: The Agenda of the International Com-
munity (Goldberg) 798

Viet-Nam. Peace and Justice Among Nations:
The Agenda of the International Community
(Goldberg) 798

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J 798

Johnson, President 794

MacArthur, Douglas II 812

Rostow, W. W 803

Solomon, Anthony M 820

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 2-8

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 2 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 92 of
April 21 and 97 and 98 of April 26.

No. Date Subject

tl04 5/3 Visa procedures for international

conference participants.
tl05 5/3 Harriman: IMCO Maritime Safety

Committee.
tl06 5/7 Bundy: Bishop James E. Walsh

testimonial dinner, Baltimore,

Md.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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South Vietnamese people to build the social links and services and the common institutions wi
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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV. No. U05

May 30, 1966

WORLD TRADE

EAST-WEST TRADE RELATIONS ACT OF 1966
Letter of Transmittal and Text of Bill 838

REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON U.S. TRADE
WITH EAST EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND THE SOVIET UNION 8A5

THE JOHNSON TRADE POLICY
Article by William M. Roth 856

BACKGROUND OF U.S. POLICY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA
Statement by Secretary Rusk 830

For index see inside hack cover

Background of U.S. Policy in Soutlieast Asia

statement by Secretary Rtisk

Mr. Chairman, I do have some observa-
tions to make on two points, if I may. They
will be relatively brief and I think informal.

Toward the close of our last hearing on
April 18, I believe you, Mr. Chairman, raised
a question about the background of our
policy in Southeast Asia. I referred to a
policy conclusion on the part of the United
States, beginning with the Truman adminis-
tration, that the security of Southeast Asia
was vital to the security of the United
States, and that various actions taken by us,
such as our economic and military assistance
programs and the formation of the SEATO
[Southeast Asia Treaty Organization]
treaty, were applications of that underlying
policy.

I was myself in Government during the
Truman administration and well recall the
discussions which were held at the highest
levels of Government in the National Secu-
rity Council as well as the strategic problems
considered by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

If the committee will search its own and
the public records on this matter during that
period and since, they could surely have no
doubt that it v/as the judgment that the
security of Southeast Asia was extremely
important to the security interests of the
United States. This was because of the more
than 200 million people in Southeast Asia,
the geography of that area, the important
natural resources of the countries involved,
the relationship of Southeast Asia to the
total world situation, and the effect upon
the prospects of a durable peace.

I emphasize the last point because the

overriding security interest of the United
States is in organizing a stable peace. The
sacrifices of World War II and the almost
unimaginable losses of a world war III un-
derline this central objective of American
policy.

There was also involved the problem of
the phenomenon of aggression. We had
found ourselves in the catastrophe of World
War II because aggressions in Asia, in
Africa, and in Europe had demonstrated that
the aggressor would not stop until compelled
to do so. It was the determination of the
United States to learn the lessons of that
experience by moving in the U.N. and other-
wise to try to build an enduring interna-
tional peace.

This primary concern in peace and free-
dom was at the heart of President Truman's
message to the Congress on March 12, 1947,
in which he said:

I believe that it must be the policy of the United
States to support free peoples who are resisting at-
tempted subjugation by armed minorities or by out-
side pressures.

I believe that we must assist free peoples to work
out their own destinies in their own way.

That was in connection with the Greek
problem.

In recognizing the governments of Viet-
Nam, Laos, and Cambodia in 1950, the State
Department declared that "this recognition
is consistent with our fundamental policy of I
giving support to the peaceful and demo-

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreigrn
Relations on May 9.

830

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

cratic evolution of dependent peoples toward
self-government and independence."*

At the time of the attack by North Korea
on South Korea in June 1950, President Tru-
man stated:^

I have similarly directed acceleration in the fur-
nishing of military assistance for the forces of
France and the Associated States in Indochina and
the dispatch of a military mission to provide close
working relations with those forces.

In January 1951, in connection with a visit
by Prime Minister Pleven of France, their
joint statement said:*

The President and the Prime Minister found
themselves in complete agreement as to the necessity
of resisting aggression and assisting the free nations
of the Far East in their efforts to maintain their
security and assure their independence.

Again, in April 1951 President Truman
stated that:^

We believe . . . that all the nations of Asia should
be free to work out their affairs in their own way.
This is the basis of peace in the Far East and peace
everywhere else.

This is the theme which, as a matter of
general policy, has been central to the atti-
tude of the United States in the postwar
period insofar as Southeast Asia is con-
cerned. It is reflected in many public decla-
rations by Presidents and Secretaries of
State and in the annual hearings before this
and other committees of the Congress. You
will find this theme in the report of your
own committee and in declarations of mem-
bers of your committee on the floor of the
Senate.

In your committee's report, for example,
on the Mutual Security Act of 1952, your
committee stated that "the U.S. military
assistance for the past three years has been
critically important to the continued survival
of the Associated States as a nation free
from Communist control. Continued assist-
ance is essential if the Communist threat is

' For a Department statement of Feb. 7, 1950,
see Bulletin of Feb. 20, 1950, p. 291.
' For text, see ibid., July 3, 1950, p. 5.
' For text, see ibid., Feb. 12, 1951, p. 243.
' For text, see ibid., Apr. 16, 1951, p. 603.

to be met successfully and eventually liqui-
dated."

Again, in 1953 your committee's report
stated :

The free world cannot afford to lose the war in
Indochina. But so far neither has the free world
been able to win it. It is of the utmost importance
that the stalemate be ended. Pacification of the
country must be the first objective of our policy.

The Geneva Accords

This underlying policy was given expres-
sion in a variety of ways. We strongly as-
sisted the French and the non-Communist
forces of the Associated States of Indochina
with large economic and military assistance.
Following the Geneva accords of 1954 you
will recall that Under Secretary Bedell
Smith, in speaking for the United States,
said that the United States would refrain
from the threat or the use of force to dis-
turb these accords, "in accordance with
Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United
Nations dealing with the obligation of mem-
bers to refrain in their international rela-
tions from the threat or use of force," and,
second, that it "would view any renewal of
the aggression in violation of the aforesaid
agreements with grave concern and as seri-
ously threatening international peace and
security." "

Again, following those Geneva accords, the
Eisenhower administration negotiated and
presented to the Senate the Southeast Asia
treaty, in which is contained a very impor-
tant provision, article 4, paragraph 1 : "

Each Party recognizes that aggression by means
of armed attack in the treaty area against any of
the Parties or against any State or territory which
the Parties by unanimous agreement may hereafter
designate (that means the protocol states), would
endanger its own peace and safety, and agrees that
it will in that event act to meet the common danger
in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Aid to the states which emerged from
Indochina and the Southeast Asia treaty

' For text of the U.S. declaration on Indochina
of July 21, 1954, see ibid., Aug. 2, 1954, p. 162.
' For text, see ibid., Sept 20, 1954, p. 394.

MAY 30, 1966

831

itself were rooted in the underlying convic-
tion that the freedom and safety of these
countries in Southeast Asia were necessary
to the organization of a reliable peace and
other security interests of the United States.
In 1959 President Eisenhower in an ad-
dress at Gettysburg College said : *

Strategically South Viet-Nam's capture by the
Communists would bring their power several hundred
miles into a hitherto free region. The remaining
countries in Southeast Asia would be menaced by
a great flanking movement. The freedom of 12 mil-
lion people would be lost immediately and that of
150 million others in adjacent lands would be seri-
ously endangered. The loss of South Viet-Nam
would set in motion a crumbling process that could,
as it progressed, have grave consequences for us
and for freedom.

It would not be correct to put the cart
before the horse and say that economic and
military assistance programs themselves
carried with them undisclosed or unantici-
pated military commitments. We have given
assistance to allies, but the commitment is
in the alliance. We have given assistance to
those with whom we are not allied, and we
have not given assistance in some situations,
which have resulted in situations such as,
for example, Hungary and Tibet.

Congressional Support of U.S. Policy

The simple fact is that we considered
throughout the postwar period that we have
an important stake in the security and inde-
pendence of the nations in Southeast Asia
and we have given effect to that attitude
through assistance programs and, in some
cases, through alliance arrangements. There
has been no mystery about these matters.
They have been fully and exhaustively dis-
cussed with the leadership and the commit-
tees of Congress over the years, and the
Congress has taken action to support that
prevailing policy.

Apart from authorization and appropria-
tions for specific needs, the Congress in
August 1964 voted overwhelmingly for a
resolution on Southeast Asia ® which stated
that:

The United States regards as vital to its national
interest and to world peace the maintenance of
international peace and security in southeast Asia. |l

The resolution further stated that:

. . . the United States is, therefore, prepared, ■,
as the President determines, to take all necessary
steps, including the use of armed force, to assist
any member or protocol state of the Southeast Asia
Collective Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
defense of its freedom.

That resolution can be rescinded by con-
current resolution of the Congress not sub- ,^,
ject to the veto of the President. An attempt
was made in the Senate during the present
session of the Congress to rescind that reso-
lution, but the effort was refused by the
overwhelming majority of the Senate.

Legality of U.S. Efforts in South Viet-Nam

Very briefly, on the second question, Mr.
Chairman, the matter was raised with re-
spect to the legal issues surrounding our
efforts in South Viet-Nam. We have made
available to the committee an extensive legal
memorandum on these matters,!" and the
law officers of the Government are available
to discuss this in whatever detail the com-
mittee may wish.

In this brief statement today I shall merely
outline the essence of our view.

Military actions of the United States in
support of South Viet-Nam, including air
attacks on military targets in North Viet-
Nam, are authorized under international law
by the well-established right of collective
self-defense against armed attack.

South Viet-Nam is the victim of armed
attack from the North through the infiltra-
tion of armed personnel, military equipment,
and regular combat units. This armed attack
preceded our strikes at military targets in
North Viet-Nam.

The fact that South Viet-Nam is not a
member of the United Nations, because of
the Soviet Union's veto, does not affect the
lawfulness of collective self-defense of South

'Ibid., Apr. 27, 1959, p. 579.

' For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

' For text, see ibid.. Mar. 28, 1966, p. 474.

832

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN 1

Viet-Nam. The United Nations Charter was
not designed to, and does not, limit the right
of self-defense to United Nations members.

Nor does South Viet-Nam's status under
the Geneva accords of 1954, as one zone of
a temporarily divided state, impair the law-
fulness of the defense against attack from
the other zone.

As in Germany and Korea, the demarcation
line is established by an international agree-
ment, and international law requires that it
be respected by each zone. Moreover, South
Viet-Nam has been recognized as an inde-
pendent entity by more than 60 governments
around the world and admitted to member-
ship in a number of the specialized agencies
of the U.N.

Nothing in the U.N. Charter purports to
restrict the exercise of the right of collective
self-defense to regional organizations such
as the OAS [Organization of American
States] .

As required by the U.N. Charter, the
United States has reported to the Security
Council the actions it has taken in exercising
the right of collective self-defense in Viet-
Nam. It has indeed requested the Council
to seek a peaceful settlement on the basis
of the Geneva accords, but the Council has
not been able to act."

There is no requirement in international
law for a declaration of war before the right
of individual or collective self-defense can
be exercised.

South Viet-Nam did not violate the Geneva
accords of 1954 by refusing to engage in
consultations with the North Vietnamese in
1955 with a view to holding general elections
in 1956, as provided for in those accords.
Even assuming that the election provisions
were binding on South Viet-Nam, which did
not agree to them, conditions in the North
clearly made impossible the free expression
of the national will contemplated by the ac-
cords. In these circumstances, at least. South
Viet-Nam was justified in declining to par-

" For text of U.S. statements, see ibid., Feb. 14,
1966, p. 229.

ticipate in planning for a nationwide elec-
tion.

The introduction of U.S. military person-
nel and equipment in South Viet-Nam is not
a violation of the accords. Until late 1961
U.S. military personnel and equipment in
South Viet-Nam were restricted to replace-
ments for French military personnel and
equipment in 1954. Such replacement was
expressly permitted by the accords.

North Viet-Nam, however, had from the
beginning violated the accords by leaving
forces and supplies in the South and using
its zone for aggression against the South.
In response to mounting armed infiltration
from the North, the United States, beginning
in late 1961, substantially increased its con-
tribution to the South's defense. This was
fully justified by the established principle of
international law that a material breach of
an agreement by one party entitles another
party at least to withhold compliance with
a related provision.

The United States has commitments to
assist South Viet-Nam in defending itself
against Communist aggression: In the
SEATO treaty — which I have already men-
tioned and which is similar in form to our
defense commitments to South Korea, Japan,
the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Republic of China — and even earlier in
the Geneva conference we had declared that
we would regard a renewal of Communist
aggression in Viet-Nam with "grave con-
cern."

Since 1954 three Presidents have reaf-
firmed our commitments to the defense of
South Viet-Nam.

Finally, the President of the United States
has full authority to commit U.S. forces in
the collective defense of South Viet-Nam.
This authority stems from the constitutional
powers of the President as Commander in
Chief and Chief Executive, with responsibili-
ties as well for the conduct of foreign rela-
tions. However, it is not necessary to rely
upon the Constitution alone as the source of
the President's authority. The SEATO
treaty, which forms part of the law of the

MAY 30, 1966

833

land, sets forth a United States commitment
to defend South Viet-Nam against armed
attack, and the Congress, in a joint resolu-
tion of August 1964 and in authorization and
appropriation acts in support of the military
effort in Viet-Nam, has given its approval
and support to the President's action.

The Constitution does not require a decla-
ration of vi^ar for U.S. actions in Viet-Nam
taken by the President and approved by the
Congress. A long line of precedents, begin-
ning with the undeclared w^ar with France in
1798-1800 and including actions in Korea
and Lebanon, supports the use of U.S. armed
forces abroad in the absence of a congres-
sional declaration of war.

Mr. Chairman, these were two questions
on which comments have come up before,
and I am sure the committee will pursue
them.

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems

Following is the text of President John-
son's remarks to news correspondents at the
conclusion of the National Security Council
meeting on Viet-Nam on May 10.

We are delighted to welcome back one of
our most dedicated public servants and one
of our most valuable counselors. Ambas-
sador [Henry Cabot] Lodge.

Earlier this afternoon he reported to me
privately in some detail about the events in
his area of the world and his evaluation of
the situation there.

He brought back information that we do
not always get from the vn-itten cable. I
had a very profitable visit with him. We
had a thorough exchange of viewpoints.

I asked him to join me in the Cabinet
Room and make available to my other coun-
selors here his impressions and judgments
and conclusions, as well as a general review.

This is the first time that he has been
back in almost 9 months. He will be here
through the week. He will spend some time
with Mr. Komer and Mr. Rostow [Robert

Komer and W. W. Rostow, Special Assist-
ants to the President] and some time with
the various people at the table. They will
divide into various groups.

This afternoon we had an agenda that in-
cluded a rather full report from General
Wheeler [Gen. Earle G. ^Vheeler, Chair-
man, Joint Chiefs of Staff] on the military
situation in Viet-Nam. We had a discus-
sion of the political and economic situation,
the issues as he sees them — a general re-
port from Ambassador Lodge.

He was followed by a discussion led by
Secretary Rusk on the key political issues, at
the conclusion of which Secretary McNa-
mara supplemented some of General
Wheeler's statements on the military situa-
tion there and the issues involved on his
part.

I reviewed with them some of my views
on Viet-Nam from the day I took over the
Presidency: on education, health, agricul-
ture; the economy of South Viet-Nam; my
Baltimore speech ; ^ the Honolulu confer-
ence ; - our desire to get the Government
of South Viet-Nam, General Westmoreland
[Gen. William C. Westmoreland, U.S. Com-
mander in Viet-Nam], and others to co-
operate with Ambassador Lodge and Am-
bassador Porter [William J. Porter, Deputy
U.S. Ambassador to Viet-Nam] in the efforts
that we were making in this field.

We not only have military problems here,
as everyone knows, but we have political
problems and economic problems.

I have asked one of my most trusted
and able advisers, Mr. Komer, to take
command of this operation and head the
post here, with Secretary Rusk, Secretary
McNamara, and others, in an attempt to
make this economic and political program
effective.

Mr. Komer discussed, at some length, the
key economic issues there. We reviewed
generally the effects of the Honolulu con-
ference; Secretary Freeman's visit with 15

^ For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 26, 1965, p. 606.
* For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

834

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

f!

of the outstanding people from our universi-
ties and our colleges, who made a thorough
study ; and Secretary Gardner's report.

Mr. Komer will arrange to have certain
task forces meeting throughout the week
while Ambassador Lodge is here.

That is the essence of what took place
this afternoon. I have explained to these
wise men, all of whom I rely on for advice,
to supply me with all the information and
knowledge they had.

I have it now and I have passed as much
of it on to you as I could.

The Obligations of Power

Follotving is the foreign policy portion of
an address made by President Johnson at the
dedication of Woodroiv Wilson Hall, Wood-
roiv Wilson School of Public and Internation-
al Affairs, Princeton University, Princeton,
N.J., on May 11 (White House press release;
advarbce text).

f As we enter the final third of this cen-
tury, we are engaged once again with the
question of whether democracy can do the
job.

Many fears of former years no longer
seem so relevant. Neither Congress nor the
Supreme Court shows signs of becoming

1 rubber stamps to the Executive. Moreover
the Executive shows no symptoms of cal-
lous indifference to the ills we must cure if
we are to preserve our vitality. State and
local governments are more alive and more
involved than 30 years ago. And our na-
tion's private enterprise has grown many
times over in size and vitality.

The issue for this generation is a dif-
ferent kind. It has to do with the obliga-
tions of power in the world for a society

' that strives, despite its worst flaws, to be
just and humane. Like almost every issue
we face, this is one in which scholars and
public officials alike have an irrevocable
stake.

Abroad we can best measure America's
involvement, whatever our successes and
failures, by a simple proposition : Not one
single country where we have helped mount
a major effort to resist aggression — from
France to Greece to Korea to Viet-Nam —
today has a government servile to outside
interests.

There is a reason for this which I believe
goes to the very heart of our society: The
exercise of power in this century has meant
for the United States not arrogance but
agony. We have used our power not will-
ingly and recklessly but reluctantly and
with restraint.

Unlike nations in the past with vast
power at their disposal, the United States
has not sought to crush the autonomy of
her neighbors. We have not been driven by
blind militarism down courses of devastat-
ing aggression. Nor have we followed the
ancient and conceited philosophy of the
"noble lie" that some men are by nature
meant to be slaves to others.

As I look upon America this morning
from the platform of one of her great uni-
versities, I see, instead, a nation whose
might is not her master but her servant.
I see a nation conscious of lessons so re-
cently learned :

— that security and aggression, as well as
peace and war, must be the concerns of her
foreign policy ;

— that a great power influences the world
just as surely when it withdraws its
strength as when it exercises it ;

— that aggression must be deterred where
possible and met early when undertaken;

— that the application of military force,
when it becomes necessary, must be for
limited purposes and tightly controlled.

Surely it is not a paranoid vision of
America's place in the world to recognize
that freedom is still indivisible — still has
adversaries whose challenge must be an-
swered.

Today, of course, that challenge is stern-
est in Southeast Asia. Yet there, as else-

MAY 30, 1966

835

where, our great power is tempered by
great restraint. What nation has announced
such limited objectives or such willingness
to remove its military presence once those
objectives are achieved? What nation has
spent the lives of its sons and vast sums of
its fortune to provide the people of a
small, striving nation the chance to elect a
course we might not ourselves choose?

The aims for which we struggle are aims
which, in the ordinary course of affairs,
men of the intellectual world applaud and
serve: the principle of choice over coer-
cion, the defense of the weak against the
strong and aggressive, the right of a young
and frail nation to develop free from the
interference of her neighbors, the ability of
a people — however inexperienced, however
different, however diverse — to fashion a so-
ciety consistent with their own traditions
and values and aspirations.

These are all at stake in that conflict. It
is the consequences of the cost of their
abandonment that men of learning must
examine dispassionately. For to wear the
scholar's gown is to assume an obligation to
seek truth without prejudice and without
cliche, even when the results of the search
are at variance with one's own opinions.

That is all we expect of those who are
troubled, even as we are, by the obligations
of power the United States did not seek but
from which she cannot escape.

Twenty-six years ago Archibald Mac-
Leish asked of all scholars and writers and
students of his generation what history
would say of those who failed to oppose the
forces of disorder at loose in Europe.

We must ask of this genei-ation the
same question concerning Asia.

MacLeish reminded that generation of
the answer given by Leonardo when Michel-
angelo indicted him for indifference to the
misfortunes of the Florentines. "Indeed,"
said Leonardo, "indeed, the study of beauty
has occupied my whole heart."

Other studies, no matter how important,
must not distract the man of learning from
the misfortunes of freedom in Southeast
Asia.

While men may talk of the "search for
peace" and the "pursuit of peace," we ,
know that peace is not something to be dis- |
covered suddenly, not a thing to be caught
and contained. Peace must be built, step by
painful, patient step. And the building will
take the best work of the world's best men
and women.

It will take men whose cause is not the
cause of one nation but of all nations, men
whose enemies are not other men but the
historic foes of mankind. I hope that many
of you will serve in this public service for
the world.

Woodrow Wilson knew that learning is
essential to the leadership our world so
desperately needs. Before he came to Prince-
ton, he attended a small college in North
Carolina and went to classes every day be-
neath a portal which bore the Latin inscrip-
tion: "Let learning be cherished where
liberty has arisen."

Today this motto which served a Presi- >
dent must serve all mankind. Where liberty !
has arisen, learning must be cherished — or
liberty itself becomes a fragile thing.

We dedicate this building not only to the
man, not only to the Nation's service, but
to learning in the service of mankind.
There can be no higher mission.

836

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

World Trade Week, 1966

A PROCLAMATION^

Expansion of world trade is the principal objec-
tive of the liberal foreign trade policies our Nation
has followed for more than thirty years.

This two-way trade between the United States and
other nations has resulted in many benefits for our
country :

— It has advanced the peaceful progress of our
Nation and the well-being of all Americans by
strengthening the growth of private enterprise and
employment.

— It has provided the American businessman with
increased opportunities to export more United States
products and services.

— It has given the American consumer a wider
choice of products at competitive prices.

— It has promoted the cause of peace by broaden-
ing the scope of our cooperation with other nations.

— It has been of great importance in helping the
developing nations modernize their economies.

Much remains to be done if we are to achieve a
balanced international economy where all nations,
developed and developing, can share the fruits of
freer trade :

— We must continue to work diligently this year
to bring the Kennedy Round of trade negotiations to
a timely conclusion in a manner that assures the
realization of the hopes and expectations with which
this great effort at trade liberalization was launched.

— We must intensify our efforts to reduce the
United States balance-of-payments deficit and reach
our goal of equilibrium in our international accounts.

Progress towards accomplishing these objectives is
the aim of World Trade Week.

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby pro-
claim the week beginning May 22, 1966, as World
Trade Week ; and I request the appropriate Federal,
State, and local officials to cooperate in the ob-
servance of that week.

I also urge business, labor, agricultural, educa-
tional, professional, and civic groups, as well as the
people of the United States generally, to observe
World Trade Week with gatherings, discussions,
exhibits, ceremonies, and other appropriate activi-

' No. 3719 ; 31 Fed. Reg. 6607.

lifts ^

livmg simndmrdsr
...serves pea€^

ties designed to promote continuing awareness of
the importance of world trade to our economy and
our relations with other nations.

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand
and caused the Seal of the United States of America
to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 29th day
of April in the year of our Lord nineteen
[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Inde-
pendence of the United States of America
the one hundred and ninetieth.

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

MAY 30, 1966

837

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966

Press release 107 dated May 11

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Secretary Rusk on May 11 transmitted
to the Congress proposed legislation to pro-
vide the President with the authority nec-
essary to negotiate commercial agreements
with the Soviet Union and other nations of
Eastern Europe to increase United States
trade in peaceful goods with these countries.

The proposed East-West Trade Relations
Act of 1966 was sent with identical letters
from the Secretary to Speaker of the House
John W. McCormack and Vice President
Hubert H. Humphrey, President of the
Senate.

Secretary Rusk's action today was taken
pursuant to instructions of President John-
son on May 3.i At that time, the President
recalled that he had promised in his state
of the Union message to request the pro-
posed authority. The President added :

The intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over
a period of time, can influence Eastern European
societies to develop along paths that are favorable
to virorld peace.

After years of careful study, the time has now
come for us to act, and act we should and act we
must.

With these steps, we can help gradually to create
a community of interest, a community of trust, and
a community of effort. Thus will the tide of human
hope rise again.

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL 2

May 11, 1966
Dear Mr. Speaker: At the direction of
the President, I am sending to the Congress
proposed legislation to provide the Presi-
dent with the authority necessary to nego-
tiate commercial agreements with the So-
viet Union and other nations of Eastern

Europe to widen our trade in peaceful
goods, when such agreements will serve the
interests of the United States.

This authority is needed so that we may
grasp opportunities that are opening up to
us in our relations with the Soviet Union
and the countries of Eastern Europe. It is
needed, at a time when we are opposing
Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, in order
to carry forward the balanced strategy for
peace which, under four Presidents, our
country has been pursuing toward the Com-
munist nations. It is needed to play our part
with the NATO nations in reducing ten-
sions and establishing normal and lasting
peaceful relations between the West and
East in Europe.

New Opportunities

It is the normal and traditional practice
of the United States to encourage peaceful
trade with other countries — even those with
which we have serious differences. Yet for
nearly two decades, we have put major re-
strictions on our trade with the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe. We applied
these restrictions only when the Soviet
Union extended control over its Eastern
European neighbors and embarked on a
course of aggressive expansionism. They
properly signified our moral protest against
the subjugation of half a continent and
gave our protest practical economic effect.
Now, however, the hopes that guided our
policy have begun to be realized.

In recent years, there have been substan-
tial changes among the Communist na-

' Bulletin of May 23, 1966, p. 794.
' An identical letter was sent to the President of
the Senate.

838

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions, within themselves, and in their rela-
tions to the nations of Western Europe.
Windows in Eastern Europe are being
gradually opened to the winds of change.
Most of the countries of Eastern Europe
have shown signs of increasing inde-
pendence in guiding their own economic
and political courses. They have shovra
greater concern for the needs of their
citizens as consumers. A growing trade in
peaceful goods has sprung up between
Eastern Europe and the Western world.
The Soviet Union itself has recognized this
need for more responsive action in its own
country as well as in Eastern Europe.

This process of change is continuing. It
presents growing opportunities for the
United States and for the cause of freedom.
But we are not now able to take full ad-
vantage of these opportunities. Our trade
policies which once served our national in-
terest no longer do so adequately.

What then is needed?

The weakness in our position is the out-
dated, inflexible requirement of law that we
impose discriminatory tariffs on the import
of goods from Communist countries. All
imports from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe, excepting Poland and Yugoslavia,
are subject to the original rates of duty in
the United States Tariff Act of 1930. The
President has no authority to negotiate with
any of these countries for the advantages
that we can gain from offering them the
more favorable rates that have been nego-
tiated under reciprocal trade agreements
over the last thirty years and that now
apply to imports from all other nations
with whom we trade. We alone of all the
major Free World countries have so tied our
hands.

The inability of the President to nego-
tiate on this matter sharply reduces his
power to use the great economic power of
our trade as a bargaining instrument.

In the light of this situation, the Presi-
dent said in his 1965 State of the Union
Message :'

In Eastern Europe restless nations are slowly
beginning to assert their identity. Your government,
assisted by leaders in labor and business, is explor-
ing ways to increase peaceful trade with these coun-
tries and with the Soviet Union. I will report our
conclusions to the Congress.

Accordingly, to supplement the studies
being made in the Government, on Febru-
ary 16, 1965, the President appointed a
Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations
with Eastern European Countries and the
Soviet Union under the Chairmanship of
Mr. J. Irwin Miller. Each member was a
widely respected and experienced leader
from business, labor or the academic world.

The Special Committee made its report to
the President on April 29, 1965.* That re-
port provides a searching and balanced
analysis of this complex and important
subject. It deserves careful study by all
citizens and members of the Congress in-
terested in this subject and in this pro-
posed legislation.

The Special Committee concluded that to
accomplish our purposes in Eastern Europe
we must be able to use our trade policies
flexibly and purposefully. The Committee
recommended, specifically, that the Presi-
dent should be given discretionary authority
to negotiate commercial agreements with
individual Communist countries when he
determines any such agreement to be in the
national interest and to grant them in such
agreements the tariff treatment we apply to
all our other trading partners.

The Administration agrees with this rec-
ommendation of the Special Committee
and this is the principal authority asked in
the proposed legislation.

Benefits of the Legislation

We must consider the potential benefits
and liabilities that may flow from enacting
or failing to enact the proposed legislation.

There is abundant evidence that without
the authority this legislation would provide,
we are losing and will continue to lose sig-
nificant opportunities to influence the course

For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 26, 1965, p. 94.

* See p. 845.

MAY 30, 1966

839

of events in Eastern Europe. By denying
ourselves the ability to enter into meaning-
ful commercial agreements with these na-
tions, we deprive ourselves of the economic
benefits that will come to us from increas-
ing trade. More important, we deprive our-
selves of a bargaining tool of considerable
strength and utility. We unnecessarily limit
our influence in Eastern Europe relative to
the influence of other nations engaged in or
opening wider trade there.

The enactment of the proposed legislation
would not weaken or injure the position of
the United States in any way. The legisla-
tion does not in itself make any grant or
concession of any kind to the Soviet Union
or any Eastern European country. It would
not weaken our legislation, our policy or our
controls on exports of strategic goods to
Communist countries. Its sole effect would
be to give the President added strength to
negotiate with these Communist countries
to obtain concessions and benefits that will
serve the national interest of our country in
return for granting the same tariff ar-
rangements already available to other
countries.

The benefits of the legislation could be
numerous and valuable.

First, improving our trade relations with
these countries would be profitable in itself.
As their national economies turn more and
more toward consumer needs and desires,
they will become more attractive markets
for our exports. We lead the world in the
efficient production of goods which enrich
the quality of everyday life. We can expect
that new and increasing export opportuni-
ties will open up for American industry,
American agriculture and American labor.
While this trade potential may be modest
for the foreseeable future in relation to
total United States exports, it could, nev-
ertheless, be significant over the years and
of particular importance to American agri-
culture and to certain American industries.

Although any agreement with any indi-
vidual nation will necessarily and properly
open the way for increased sales of that
nation's products to Americans who want

to buy them, we have no reason to fear
such trade. American industry is the most
competitive in the world and thrives on the
stimulus of competition.

Second, authority to relax tariff restric-
tions will give the President the ability to
negotiate more effectively for any of several
objectives important to the United States.
These might include, for example, provi-
sions for the settlement of commercial dis-
putes, the facilitation of travel by United
States citizens, the protection of United
States copyrights, patents and other indus-
trial property rights, assurances to pre-
vent trade practices injurious to United
States labor and industry, settlement of fi-
nancial claims and lend-lease obligations,
more satisfactory arrangements in cultural
and information programs — and others of
our economic, political and cultural objec-
tives. These possibilities are of course only
illustrative and it is improbable that all of
them could be dealt with in a single agree-
ment. We will need to test each negotiation
for the gains to be made in it.

The Congress may be confident that no
agreement will be made under this authority
except in return for benefits of equal im-
portance to the United States. Moreover,
each agreement will include a provision for
suspension or termination upon reasonable
notice, so that the President may — and the
Congress may be certain he would — suspend
or end the obligations of the United States
if he determined the other party were not
carrying out its commitments.

Third, the most important benefits from
any such agreements would develop more
slowly. We cannot expect trade alone to
change the basic nature of the Communist
system in any Eastern European country nor
to settle fundamental differences between
us. We can, however, expect that the many
close relationships normally growing out of
trade will provide opportunities for in-
fluencing the development of their societies
toward more internal freedom and peaceful
relations with the free world.

A healthy growth of trade will help to re-
duce the present dependence of these East- I

840

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ern European countries on each other and
the Soviet Union. They will be encouraged
to rebuild the friendly ties they have his-
torically had with the West. Independent
action will become more attractive and
more feasible. The conclusion of an agree-
ment with any of these countries will be an
inducement to others to seek the same
benefits.

The very nature of trade, the necessity to
follow established rules of behavior, the in-
creased contact with the West, the increas-
ing use of Western goods, the growing ap-
preciation of their quality and of the effi-
cient methods of their manufacture, the
growing understanding of the skills, oppor-
tunities and earnings of free labor in the
United States and other Western nations,
the greater exposure to the miracles of
American agriculture — all these things could
encourage increasing liberalization of the
internal economies of the Eastern European
nations.

The Soviet Union and other nations of
Eastern Europe are increasingly conscious
of their stake in stability and in improving
peaceful relations with the outside world.
Progress toward normal trade relations will
increase that stake.

Under the terms of the proposed legisla-
tion, each agreement would be only one step
in the process of reducing tensions. Agree-
ments would not be of indefinite duration
but would be subject to periodic review and
to renewal at regular intervals. Each review
could become a new opportunity for a useful
dialogue with a Communist country. Each
renewal could be adapted to encourage the
further peaceful evolution of that individual
country and the improvement of our relations
with it.

There is wide and growing understanding
throughout the country that improved con-
ditions for peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union and the countries of Eastern Europe
would be in the national interest and should
be a proper subject of negotiation with those
countries. Many business, industrial and
agricultural leaders and other expert wit-
nesses who testified in the extensive hear-

ings held on this subject by the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and the House
Foreign Affairs Committee concluded that
the United States could benefit from the
possibility of wider peaceful trade with the
Eastern European countries under proper
safeguards. So too have a number of lead-
ing private organizations that have studied
the problem.

To fulfill his Constitutional responsibilities
for the conduct of our foreign policy in this
complex era, the President must have avail-
able to him every appropriate bargaining
tool. Nowhere is this need more critical than
in our relations with the Communist coun-
tries. Granting this flexible authority to the
President would not be a concession to the
Communist world. Rather, it would give him
a valuable instrument of foreign policy to be
used where and when it will advance the in-
terests of the United States.

Conducting a Balanced Strategry

In addition to the gains already stated
which the proposed legislation can help to
realize, it can be an important element in
our balanced strategy for peace.

We are reaffirming in Viet-Nam — as we
have on many earlier battlefields — our de-
termination to aid free and independent na-
tions to defend themselves from destruction
by Communist aggression or subversion. But
determined resistance to such force is only
a part of our strategy to maintain a peace-
ful world.

It has equally been our purpose to demon-
strate to the Communist countries that their
best interests lie in seeking the well-being of
their peoples through peaceful relations with
the nations of the free world. We want the
Soviet Union and the nations of Eastern
Europe to understand that we will go step
by step with them as far as they are willing
to go in exploring every path toward endur-
ing peace. We require only that our willing-
ness and our actions be genuinely matched
by theirs.

We are confident that this policy is sound
even when we are fighting against Com-

MAY 30, 1966

841

munist weapons in Viet-Nam. Indeed, it is
when we are resisting force with force that
it is most important to hold open every possi-
ble avenue to peace. We need to make un-
mistakably clear to all the Communist na-
tions of Eastern Europe that their best
interests lie in economic development and
peaceful trade, not in support of futile at-
tempts to gain advantage through the use of
force.

The Legislation

The proposed legislation contains five
principal provisions.

The first states the purpose of the Act,
particularly to use peaceful trade and re-
lated contacts with Communist countries to
advance the long-range interests of the
United States.

The second authorizes the President to
enter into a commercial agreement with a
Communist country when he determines it
will promote the purposes of the Act, will be
in the national interest and will result in
benefits to the United States equivalent to
those provided by the agreement to the other
party.

The third states some of the benefits we
may hope to gain in such agreements.

The fourth limits each agreement to an
initial period of three years, renewable for
three-year periods. It requires that each
agreement provide for regular consultations
on its operations and on relevant aspects of
United States relations with the other coun-
try. It also requires that each agreement be
subject to suspension or termination at any
time on reasonable notice.

The fifth is the central provision recom-
mended by the responsible groups studying
this matter: the President would have au-
thority to proclaim most-favored-nation
treatment for the goods of Communist na-
tions with which a commercial agreement is
made under the Act. Such MFN treatment
would continue only so long as the agreement
is in effect.

The President would have the authority
to suspend or terminate any proclamation
made pursuant to this Act. The President

should do so whenever he determines that
the other party to the agreement is no longer
fulfilling its obligations under the agree-
ment, or that suspension or termination is in
the national interest.

As part of his negotiating power with re-
spect to a commercial agreement with the
Soviet Union, the President would have au-
thority to terminate the existing provisions
of law excluding certain furs of Soviet origin.

The authority of the Act would not extend
to Communist China, North Korea, North
Viet-Nam, Cuba or the Soviet Zone of Ger-
many.

The bill expressly provides that it does not
modify or amend the Export Control Act or
the Battle Act which together control the
export of military articles and strategic
goods and technology which would ad-
versely affect the national security and wel-
fare of the United States.

The bill does not change in any way exist-
ing laws and regulations prohibiting aid and
limiting credit to Communist countries.

All agreements will be promptly trans-
mitted to both Houses of Congress.

Conclusion

In 1958 President Eisenhower made it
clear that "the United States favors the ex-
pansion of peaceful trade with the Soviet
Union"5 and spoke of the importance of trade
as a means of strengthening the possibilities
for independent actions by the countries of
Eastern Europe.

President Kennedy in his first State of the
Union Message ^ declared his determination
that "we must never forget our hopes for
the ultimate freedom and welfare of the
peoples of Eastern Europe."

In December, 1964, President Johnson ex-
pressed our wish "to build new bridges to
Eastern Europe — bridges of ideas, educa-
tion, culture, trade, technical cooperation and
mutual understanding for world peace and

' For text of President Eisenhower's letter of
July 14, 1958, to Soviet Premier Khrushchev, see
Bulletin of Aug. 4, 1958, p. 200.

• For text, see ibid., Jan. 13, 1961, p. 207.

842

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

prosperity."^ In May of this year, the Pres-
ident again referred to the way in which "the
intimate engagement of peaceful trade, over
a period of time, can influence Eastern
European societies to develop along paths
that are favorable to world peace."

The authority asked in this legislation will
help attain these goals.

In Greece, Berlin, Korea, Cuba, and, now,
Viet-Nam we have tried to convince the
Communist countries that the road of ag-
gression and subversion has a dead end.
This legislation will help us provide the posi-
tive counterpart to that lesson. It will give
the President a vital instrument of negotia-
tion to maintain essential balance in our re-
lations with the Soviet Union and with the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe and
to respond to their growing desire and op-
portunity for wider contacts with the West.
It will thereby serve our own interests and
the cause of peace and stability.
Sincerely yours.

Dean Rusk

TEXT OF PROPOSED LEGISLATION

A BILL

To promote the foreign policy and security of the
United States by providing authority to negotiate
commercial agreements with Communist countries,
and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Repre-
sentatives of the United States of America in Con-
gress assembled,

Sec. 1. Short Title.

This Act may be cited as the "East-West Trade
Relations Act of 1966".

Sec. 2. Statement of Purposes.
The purposes of this Act are —

(a) to use peaceful trade and related contacts
with Communist countries as a means of advancing
the long-range interest of the United States in peace
and freedom;

(b) to promote constructive relations with Com-
munist countries, to contribute to international sta-
bility, and to provide a framework helpful to private
United States firms conducting business relations
with Communist state trading agencies by institut-

' For text, see ibid., Dec. 21, 1964, p. 876.

ing regular government-to-govemment negotiations
with individual Communist countries concerning
commercial and other matters of mutual interest;
and

(c) to increase peaceful trade and related con-
tacts between the United States and Communist coun-
tries, and to expand markets for products of the
United States in these countries by creating similar
opportunities for the products of Communist coun-
tries to compete in United States markets on a non-
discriminatory basis.

Sec. 3. Authority To Enter into Commercial
Agreements.
The President may make a commercial agree-
ment with a Communist country providing most-
favored-nation treatment to the products of that
country whenever he determines that such agree-
ment—

(a) will promote the purposes of this Act,

(b) is in the national interest, and

(c) will result in benefits to the United States
equivalent to those provided by the agreement to
the other party.

Sec. 4. Benefits To Be Provided by Commercial
Agreements.
The benefits to the United States to be obtained
in or in conjunction vdth a commercial agreement
made under this Act may be of the following kind,
but need not be restricted thereto:

(a) satisfactory arrangements for the protec-
tion of industrial rights and processes;

(b) satisfactory arrangements for the settlement
of commercial differences and disputes;

(c) arrangements for establishment or expan-
sion of United States trade and tourist promotion
offices, for facilitation of such efforts as the trade
promotion activities of United States commercial
officers, participation in trade fairs and exhibits,
the sending of trade missions, and for facilitation
of entry and travel of commercial representatives
as necessary;

(d) most-favored-nation treatment with respect to
duties or other restrictions on the imports of the
products of the United States, and other arrange-
ments that may secure market access and assure fair
treatment for products of the United States; or

(e) satisfactory arrangements covering other
matters affecting relations between the United
States and the country concerned, such as the settle-
ment of financial and property claims and the im-
provement of consular relations.

Sec 5. Provisions To Be Included in Commer-
cial Agreements.

A commercial agreement made under this Act
shall—

(a) be limited to an initial period specified in the
agreement which shall be no more than three years

MAY 30, 1966

843

from the time the agreement becomes effective;

(b) be subject to suspension or termination at any
time upon reasonable notice;

(c) provide for consultations at re^lar intervals
for the purpose of reviewing the operation of the
agreement and relevant aspects of relations between
the United States and the other party; and

(d) be renewable for additional periods, each not
to exceed three years.

Sec. 6. Extension of Benefits of Most-Favored-
Nation Treatment.

(a) In order to carry out a commercial agree-
ment made under this Act and notwithstanding the
provisions of any other law, the President may by
proclamation extend most-favored-nation treatment
to the products of the foreign country entering into
such commercial agreement: Provided, That the
application of most-favored-nation treatment shall
be limited to the period of effectiveness of such com-
mercial agreement.

(b) The President may at any time suspend or
terminate any proclamation issued under subsection
(a). The President shall suspend or terminate such
proclamation whenever he determines that —

(1) the other party to a commercial agreement
made under this Act is no longer fulfilling its obli-
gations under the agreement; or

(2) the suspension or termination of the agree-
ment is in the national interest.

Sec. 7. Advice From Government Agencies and
Other Sources.

Before making a commercial agreement under this
Act, the President shall seek information and advice
with respect to such agreement from the interested
Departments and agencies of the United States Gov-
ernment, from interested private persons, and from
such other sources as he may deem appropriate.

Sec. 8. Transmission of Reports to Congress.

The President shall submit to the Congress an
annual report on the commercial agreements pro-
gram instituted under this Act. Such report shall
include information regarding negotiations, benefits
obtained as a result of commercial agreements, the
texts of any such agreements, and other information
relating to the program.

Sec. 9. Limitation on Authority.

The authority conferred by this Act shall not be
used to extend most-favored-nation treatment to
the products of areas dominated or controlled by the
Communist regimes of China, North Viet-Nam, North
Korea, Cuba, or the Soviet Zone of Germany.

Sec. 10. Relation to Other Laws.

(a) This Act shall not apply to any agreement
made with a country whose products are receiving,
when such agreement is made, the benefits of trade
agreement concessions extended in accordance with
section 231(b) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
(19 U.S.C. sec. 1861(b)).

(b) Nothing in this Act shall be deemed to modify
or amend the Export Control Act of 1949 (50 U.S.C.
App. see. 2021 et seq.) or the Mutual Defense As-
sistance Control Act of 1951 (22 U.S.C. sec. 1611 et
seq.).

(c) The President may by proclamation terminate
headnote 4 to schedule 1, part 5, subpart B of the
Tariff Schedules of the United States (77 A Stat.
32, 19 U.S.C. sec. 1202) with respect to the products
of any country to which it is applicable upon the
entry into force of a commercial agreement made
under this Act with such country.

(d) Any commercial agreement made under this
Act shall be deemed a trade agreement for the pur-
poses of title III of the Trade Expansion Act of
1962 (19 U.S.C. sec. 1901 et seq.).

(e) The portion of general headnote 3(e) to the
Tariff Schedules of the United States that precedes
the list of countries and areas (77A Stat. 11; 70
Stat. 1022) is amended to read as follows:

"(e) Products of Communist Countries. Notwith-
standing any of the foregoing provisions of this
headnote, the rates of duty shown in column num-
bered 2 shall apply to products, whether imported
directly or indirectly, of the countries and areas that
have been specified in section 401 of the Tariff
Classification Act of 1962, in sections 231 and 257
(e) (2) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, or in
actions taken by the President thereunder and as to
which there is not in effect a proclamation under
section 6(a) of the East- West Trade Relations Act
of 1966. These countries and areas are:"

1

844

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
Witli East European Countries and the Soviet Union

The Special Committee on U.S. Trade Relations
with East European Countries and the Soviet Union
was created by the President on February 16, 1965.
Its task was to explore all aspects of expanding
peaceful trade in support of the President's policy
of widening constructive relations with the coun-
tries of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. That
policy was reaffirmed by the President in his State
of the Union message when he said, "Your govern-
ment, assisted by leaders of labor and business, is
now exploring ways to increase peaceful trade with
the countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union."

The members of the Committee are:

J. Irwin Miller (Chairman)

Chairman of the Board, Cummins Engine Co., Inc.;
Member, Executive Committee, World Council of
Churches

Eugene R. Black

Chairman, Brookings Institution; Past President,
International Bank for Reconstruction and De-
velopment

William Blackie

President, Caterpillar Tractor Co.; Director and
Chairman of the Foreign Commerce Committee,
U.S. Chamber of Commerce

George R. Brown

Chairman of the Board, Brown & Root, Inc.;
Chairman, Board of Trustees, Rice University

Charles W. Engelhard, Jr.
Chairman, Engelhard Industries; Director, For-
eign Policy Association

James B. Fisk

President, Bell Telephone Laboratories ; Past Mem-
ber, President's Science Advisory Committee

NATHANIEL GOLDFINGER

Director of Research, AFL-CIO; Trustee, Joint

Council on Economic Education
Crawford H. Greenewalt

Chairman of the Board, E. I. du Pont de Nemours

and Co.; Chairman, Radio Free Europe Fund
William A. Hewitt

Chairman of the Board, Deere and Co.; Trustee,

U.S. Council of the International Chamber of

Commerce
Max F. Millikan

Professor of Economics and Director, Center for

• This report was submitted to President
Johnson on April 29, 1965. It is printed in the
Bulletin at this time because of interest in
this subject resulting from the Department's
proposals to the Congress on East-West trade.

International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of

Technology; President, World Peace Foundation
Charles G. Mortimer

Chairman, General Foods Corp.; Trustee, Stevens

Institute of Technology
Herman B. Wells

Chancellor, Indiana University; Former U.S.

Delegate to the United Nations General Assembly

Edward R. Fried served as Executive Secretary
to the Committee and James A. Henderson as
Deputy Executive Secretary.

Introduction

The White House,
Washington, B.C., April 29, 1965.
The President

of the United States
Dear Mr. President: You have asked us "to ex-
plore all aspects of the question of expanding
peaceful trade" in support of your policy of "widen-
ing our relations" with the countries of Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union.'

Any useful consideration of the desirable degree
and pattern of peaceful trade relations between our-
selves and these countries must begin with the Soviet
Union itself.

The Government of the Soviet Union has steadily.

' It is understood that policies with respect to trade
with Communist China, North Korea, North Viet-
nam, and Cuba are outside the terms of reference of
this Committee. Our findings and recommendations
do not apply to trade with these cour tries. The
terms "Communist countries"' and "European Com-
munist countries" as used in thii report refer to the
nations of Eastern Europe and the U.S.S.R. [Foot-
note in original.]

MAY 30, 1966

845

over many years, by words and deeds, declared its
hostility to our own country. The U.S. Government
and the American people support the most powerful
defense system the world has ever seen in recog-
nition of this fact.

Without this preponderant military power, it
would be idle and even dangerous to explore the
possibilities of expanding peaceful trade, or for that
matter, of any peaceful relations with the Soviet
Union. For the same reason, we rule out from
these considerations any kind of strategic trade that
could significantly enhance Soviet military capa-
bilities and weaken our own position of comparative
military strength.

With a secure defense, on the other hand, we can
prudently seek practical means of reducing areas of
conflict between ourselves and the U.S.S.R. Indeed,
we assume the United States has an obligation in
today's nuclear world to pursue such possibilities
as part of its long-term commitment to strengthen
the prospects for peace in the world.

While the Communist threat remains, its nature
constantly changes, because the conditions of men
and nations everywhere are changing. Thus, our
Government must be forever reexamining its poli-
cies, programs, and methods to make certain that
they are appropriate to the times and to the national
purpose.

It is now clear that the ties between the East
European nations and the Soviet Union are neither
quite so numerous nor so strong as they have been
in the past; the forces of nationalism are growing.
Between the Soviet Union and Communist China,
sharp differences have arisen. There is also a fer-
ment in all of the European Communist countries
as they try to cope with the awakening demands of
their people for a better life within the confines of a
system geared more for military power than for
human welfare.

It is an essential part of U.S. strategy to resist
Communist efforts to expand through aggression.
At the same time, we know that the danger of ag-
gression will never be overcome until the Com-
munists change their view of the world and the
goals they ought to seek. Through our attitudes
and actions, therefore, we must aim to influence
these countries toward decisions that stress the at-
tainment of prosperity through peaceful means. To
appear hostile toward all of their objectives de-
prives us of the opportunity to influence the choices
they make as to kinds of objectives or as to means
of achieving them.

The possibilities of "peaceful coexistence" and
mutually advantageous trade do not sound convinc-
ing coming from those who speak of "burying us."
We know very well that coexistence means some-
thing different to Soviet leaders from what it means
to us. Within the framework of a policy so labeled,
they believe they can still pursue hostile actions
against the free world so long as major war does

not result. But they have found it necessary to
change their view of coexistence over the past decade
and the conditions of the modern world will cause
it to change further over the next decade. Much
the same may be said of Soviet motivation and de-
sire, and that of most of the East European nations,
for increased trade with the United States. This
Committee, therefore, has come to believe that in
a longer time perspective the possibilities of "peace-
ful coexistence" — in the genuine meaning of that
expression — can be made to grow. We conclude this
in spite of Soviet professions and not because of
them.

We are aware that the Communists have their
conviction as to how the forces of history will oper-
ate and that they profess to be convinced that time
is on their side. We also have our own conviction.
We believe that men and nations function best in
an open society. There are signs that pressures
for greater openness within Soviet society are mount-
ing. The reasons may be pragmatic rather than
ideological, but they are nonetheless real. The
Soviets want a modern and technically advanced
society. Their own experience shows that the build-
ing of such a society can be severely handicapped by
a closed and tyrannical political order and a rigrid,
centrally directed economic system.

We desire to encourage the growth of forces in
the European Communist countries that will im-
prove the prospects for peace. Within these coun-
tries we seek to encourage independence from Soviet
domination and a rebuilding of historical ties with
the West. In each of these countries, including the
U.S.S.R., we seek an opening up of the society and
a continuing decentralization of power. It is in our
interest to promote a concern with internal standards
of living rather than with external adventure.

We must look at our trade policies toward Euro-
pean Communist countries in that broad context.
Trade is a tactical tool to be used with other policy
instruments for pursuing our national objectives.

Trade cannot settle the major outstanding issues
between ourselves and the Communists, nor can it,
by itself, accomplish a basic change in the Commu-
nist system. Over time, however, trade negotiations
and trade relations can provide us with useful op-
portunities to influence attitudes in these countries
in directions favorable to our national interest. Trade
involves contact of peoples and exchange of ideas
and customs as well as of goods and services. It
requires the building of mutual trust, and good
faith, and confidence. An expansion of trade would
require from the Communists a growing commit-
ment to international rules and adherence to inter-
national standards for responsible behavior; it can-
not be based on Soviet-imposed conditions or usual
Communist trading practices.

Trade and govemment-to-government negotiations
which set the framework for trade can be means of
reducing animosities between ourselves and individ-

846

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ual Communist countries and can provide a basis
for working out mutually acceptable solutions to com-
mon problems. A constructive attitude toward trade
can serve as a counterpart to our national deter-
mination to convince these countries through our
deterrent military power that they cannot gain
their objectives through aggression. Properly con-
ceived and wisely administered, a growing trade with
East European nations and the Soviet Union could
become a significant and useful device in the pur-
suit of our national security and welfare and of
world peace.

In sum, trade with the European Communist
countries is politics in the broadest sense — holding
open the possibility of careful negotiation, firm
bargaining, and constructive competition. In this
intimate engagement men and nations will in time
be altered by the engagement itself. We do not fear
this. We welcome it. We believe we are more
nearly right than they about how to achieve the
welfare of nations in this century. If we do our
part, time and change will work for us and not
against us.

These are the general propositions which underlie
the specific findings and recommendations which we
now submit. They are based on excellent briefings
and supporting papers prepared by government
agencies in answer to questions the Committee raised,
on materials submitted to the Committee by inter-
ested private organizations, and on a careful review
of some of the most pertinent published material on
this subject. The members of the Committee have
found that exposure to this source material and
thorough discussion of the issues brought new per-
spectives and fresh judgments. We would emphasize,
on the basis of our experience, that public under-
standing of how trade can best fit into our national
strategy is essential to the effective use of trade
as an instrument of national policy.

Findings

Review of Our Position

1. The United States has a long tradition that
trade is a normal element of relations between coun-
tries. We have departed from that principle rarely
and only for compelling reasons. Indeed, we began
the period following the close of World War II by
treating trade with the U.S.S.R. no differently from
trade with other countries. We did not impose secu-
rity controls on this trade until 1948 and then did so
purposefully in response to aggressive Soviet expan-
sion in Eastern and Central Europe. In the atmos-
phere of the Berlin blockade and the Korean war,
we expanded these controls and gained the coopera-
tion of other principal trading nations in an inter-
national embargo of strategic commodities.

2. When we first applied these controls we were
the predominant source of capital, of advanced in-
dustrial technology, and of exportable resources in

the West. The U.S.S.R. while pursuing an aggres-
sive external policy, operated internally from a
relatively weak and backward industrial base. At
that time, we had both strong cooperation from
other Western nations and a considerable unilateral
capacity to insure that Western resources would not
contribute to the grovrth of Soviet military power.

3. The underlying situation changed rapidly, par-
ticularly over the past decade, and the process con-
tinues today. The ability of the Western Europeans
to trade, in terms of exportable resources and tech-
nology, grew rapidly in the wake of their dramatic
economic recovery. Moreover, they saw the death of
Stalin and the end of the Korean war as marking
sufficient change in the political climate to justify
resumption of their historic trade with Communist
Europe.

The capacity of Communist countries to trade
across the Iron Curtain also increased, following a
marked growth in the strength of their economies.
They saw in this trade a means of hastening eco-
nomic growth and meeting planned goals. The in-
terest of the East European countries in this trade
was further heightened by the failure of Soviet
attempts to impose a system of integration on their
economies.

4. These developments created pressure on the
part of our allies to ease the internationally agreed
Western restrictions on exports to the East. As a
result, the International Embargo List was grad-
ually reduced. The West European nations reduced
their controls accordingly; the United States did not
do so to the same degree. A growing disparity arose
between the United States and its major industrial
allies in regard to respective attitudes toward the
trade, controls on the trade, and participation in the
trade. This disparity exists today and poses basic
questions about our trade policy. The United States
has three alternatives. It can leave things as they
are. It can eliminate this disparity through action
across the board that would bring U.S. trading
practices into line with those of our allies. Or it can
modify its practices selectively and on a country-by-
country basis. Only the third alternative could offer
new negotiating leverage with individual Communist
countries.

5. The mere existence of these differences in trade
restrictions is sometimes cited as sufficient cause
for changing U.S. export licensing controls to con-
form to those of Western Europe and Japan. In the
Committee's view, this reasoning misses the essen-
tial point. The effectiveness of the U.S. denial of
machinery and equipment to Communist countries
is, of course, diminished by the availability of com-
parable advance technology from Western Europe
and Japan. It is also true that our business firms
are at a disadvantage in Communist markets in
competing with West European firms. Commercial
considerations, however, have not been the determin-
ing factor in framing U.S. policy on this subject

MAY 30, 1966

847

and should not be now. It is not the amount of trade
that is important but the politics of offering trade
or of withholding trade.

6. The United States initiated its controls for
political reasons and should be ready to revise them
when it is in the national interest to do so. This
requires careful judgments on the significance of
events, trends, and opportunities in individual Euro-
pean Communist countries and on how our relations
with such countries fit into our overall strategy. It
is on these grounds that we must be concerned to
keep our policies under constant review — and not
simply because we and our European allies may at
a given moment be somewhat out of step.

7. As East European countries have shown signs
of moving toward more independent positions, the
United States has made greater use of trade induce-
ment and less use of trade denial as an instrument
of national policy. We have differentiated our trade
policies toward individual Communist countries in
accordance with the political opportunities they pre-
sent. We responded promptly and effectively in
1948 when Yugoslavia adopted a more independent
position toward the Soviet Union. We took action
in the trade field when Poland, in 1956-57, gave
signs of moving toward somewhat greater autonomy
in Eastern Europe. And we took a modest step
through trade talks in 1964 toward more promising
relations with Rumania in response to an initiative
from the Government of that country.

8. In these terms, the circumstances under which
we would be willing to expand peaceful trade and
the process of negotiating such trade take on con-
siderable significance. Our Government should be
properly equipped and oriented to negotiate aggres-
sively and confidently with European Communist
countries in the trade field as in all other fields
whenever favorable opportunities and circumstances
present themselves or can be created.

The Character of the Trade

9. Trade between the European Communist coun-
tries and free world industrial countries was close to
$3.5 billion each way in 1964. It grew at an average
rate of nearly 10 percent a year over the past decade,
or somewhat more than the rate of growth in the
overall trade of Western industrial countries. The
U.S. share in this trade was small — about one-tenth
of total Western exports to these countries in 1964 —
and even this figure is abnormally high because it
includes large wheat sales which are not likely to be
a normal feature of this trade. For Western Europe,
trade with Eastern Europe has ranged between 3
and 4 percent of total trade. For the United States,
the proportion, even in 1964, was barely 1 percent.

10. The aggregate economic significance of this
trade is small for all the countries concerned. For
example, total imports from the West are for the
Soviet Union only one-half of 1 percent of its gross
national product and for East European countries

2 percent of their combined national product. For
Western Europe, the aggregate significance of this
trade is even less, and for the United States, it is
negligible. U.S. exports to all European Communist
countries this year probably will not reach $200
million, or less than we sell to Switzerland.

11. The trade is of somewhat greater significance
for particular industries in the European Commu-
nist countries. The U.S.S.R. and the East European
countries are interested primarily in buying ad-
vanced or specialized types of machinery, industrial
plants, and industrial processes and technology from
the West to meet specific economic planning goals
or to become self-sufficient in certain industrial
sectors. They also buy metal manufactures and
small quantities of consumer goods. To finance their
purchases they sell to the West mainly industrial
raw materials, minerals including gold, foodstuffs,
steel products, and particularly oil. They also sell
relatively small quantities of manufactured goods.

The trading methods of the European Communist
countries reflect the rigidities of their State-con-
trolled systems. Decisions regarding the level and
composition of both imports and exports are made
in accordance with a national plan and are carried
out by State trading organizations. Bilateral agree-
ments are negotiated on a country-by-country basis.
These agreements specify the categories of goods to
be exchanged and set targets for the volume of that
exchange. They provide for a balance between im-
ports and exports in order to conserve foreign ex-
change. Deficits are met by the sale of gold or
credits.

12. There is little doubt that the European Com-
munist countries are interested in purchasing more
from the United States than they do now — princi-
pally machinery, equipment, complete plants, and
technical data. This advanced technology could pro-
vide the United States vnth some of its most effec-
tive bargaining leverage for trade negotiations with
Communist countries.

13. If we relaxed some of our restrictions, pur-
chases of European Communist countries from the
United States would probably rise in the short term.
But their lack of foreign exchange would soon limit
this trade. In this sense, foreign exchange, rather
than present U.S. export controls, is the major limi-
tation on the potential for this trade.

If the European Communist countries are to de-
velop a growing trade with the United States, they
will either have to sell more to the United States
or earn more convertible foreign exchange through
favorable trade balances with Western Europe. It
would be more difficult for these countries to ex-
pand exports to the United States than for them to
increase sales to Western Europe, since the United
States is not a good market for their primary mate-
rials and, in particular, would not in the foreseeable
future be a buyer of oil — the largest single Soviet
export.

848

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

The U.S.S.R. is likely over the future to seek to
expand its sales of oil in Western Europe and else-
where as one means of earning more foreign ex-
change. Its success will depend on its ability to
produce increasing quantities of oil above its domes-
tic needs and on the willingness of importing coun-
tries to buy more Soviet oil. In the case of Western
Europe, increased purchases of Soviet oil would prob-
ably be tied to increased Soviet purchases of West
European products. Whether through the sale of
oil or other commodities, it is not likely that the
U.S.S.R. and the East European countries will be
able to develop and rely on a large excess of exports
over imports in their trade with Western Europe to
help finance purchases in the United States.

For this reason, long-term growth in the trade
of the European Communist countries with the
United States is more up to them than up to us.
They would have to be prepared to invest in new
export industries, to learn new marketing methods,
to build dealer and service organizations abroad, and
to develop relations of confidence with U.S. business
firms. Such positive actions move a country to
participate in the world economy and to abide by
generally accepted international practices. They are
intimately related to a nation's world outlook and
are evolutionary in nature. If made, they would
move these countries in directions favorable to our
national security and welfare.

14. The Committee has seen various estimates of
our possible exports to the U.S.S.R. and Eastern
Europe over the next decade; none suggest that this
trade would constitute a significant part of our total
trade. There is no convincing case for any specific
figure, but it is clear that our commercial stake in
this trade is very small. It could grow modestly over
time, but only as our overall relations with these
countries change. In any event, it is dwarfed by
political considerations.

The Two Sides of the Argument

15. With these facts in mind, it is useful to lay
out the main arguments on either side of the issue
of national policy toward expanding peaceful trade
with these countries. Reasonable and thoughtful
people can differ on this question. We have tried
to probe carefully all sides.

16. The case against expanding peaceful trade
with the European Communist countries comes down
to the proposition that these countries are hostile
toward us and we should not strengthen them through
trade. By selling to them goods and services of
any nature, whether wheat or our technologically
advanced machinery and equipment, it is argued
that we help them to solve some of their pressing
internal problems and make it easier for them to
use their limited resources for building up their
military power and strengthening their potential
for subversion abroad. Moreover, this argument
states that by expanding trade with these countries

we bestow upon them a kind of respectability and
prestige which will enhance their position in the
developing countries of the world and which they
will use to our ultimate disadvantage. In sum, this
argument holds that the risks of expanding trade
are significant and the gains negligible.

17. The case for expanding peaceful trade comes
down to the proposition that we can use trade to
influence the internal evolution and external be-
havior of Communist countries. Trade provides us
with a policy instrument to encourage the move-
ment toward greater national independence in East-
ern Europe and the trend toward greater concern
for consumer needs in all the European Communist
countries. By refusing to trade we put ourselves in
a posture of hostility that could be at odds with these
developments as well as with other elements of our
overall strategy toward these countries. Our re-
fusal to trade cannot impoi-tantly limit Soviet mili-
tary power but it can help to reinforce their doc-
trinal belief in the need for self-sufficiency. A will-
ingness to trade, on the other hand, would be con-
crete evidence of our belief in constructive and
peaceful relations. The benefit done our relations
with the underdeveloped world by evidence that we
genuinely believe in the efficacy and ultimate tri-
umph of open societies far outweighs the disad-
vantages of any enhancement of Soviet legitimacy.
In sum, this argument holds that the gains are sig-
nificant and the risks are negligible.

18. There are persuasive elements in each of these
cases. No one policy is wholly right or wholly
wrong, and any course chosen has its risks. Taking
into account both gains and risks, the Committee
feels that the national interest clearly lies on the
side of a more active use of trade as an instru-
ment of foreign policy.

Trade as an Instrument of Policy

19. Before the United States can consider using
trade with Communist countries to advance our po-
litical ends, however, we must be sure it will not
weaken our military security. Expert opinion on
this subject shows the following:

First, exports of commodities that are closely or
directly related to militai'y use or could signifi-
cantly enhance Communist military capabilities are
strictly controlled. The Committee believes these
controls should continue.

Second, gains from nonmilitary trade with the
United States are unlikely to release additional re-
sources for Soviet military expenditures. The
U.S.S.R. accords overriding priority to military ex-
penditures. Any change in total resource avail-
ability in the U.S.S.R. through trade would, under
present policies, affect its civilian economy, not its
military budget.

Third, the U.S.S.R. has an advanced weapons tech-
nology and a military production capability that is
virtually independent of its external economic re-
lations.

MAY 30, 1966

849

In sum, total Western nonstrategic trade, let alone
U.S. trade, could not be expected to alter the funda-
mental relationship between East-West military
capabilities.

20. It is easy to exaggerate many aspects of the
trade question: On the one hand, the possible mili-
tary and economic gains to Communist countries,
and the risk of irremediable security losses; and on
the other hand, the economic gains for U.S. business
from such trade and, in some respects, the political
consequences. Trade is not a one-way grant of
benefits to either party. It involves costs as well
as gains, and it is an exchange from which both
parties must benefit or it will not take place. The
unmatched industrial power of the United States
puts it in a position to use this area of relations
with Communist countries with authority and con-
fidence.

In turn, the Soviet leaders have their own special
prejudices regarding this trade. They tend to ex-
aggerate its importance to the United States and
the interest it holds for U.S. business. They have
long believed we would be forced to seek markets
in Communist countries to cope with depressions.
And this belief is related to their standard assump-
tion that "orders from Wall Street" must bring
U.S. policy around. The fact is that peaceful trade
cannot grow without an improvement in the under-
lying conditions that form the foundation for trade.

21. In the Committee's view, the time is ripe to
make more active use of trade arrangements as
political instruments in relations with Communist
countries. Trade should be brought into the policy
arena. It should be offered or withheld, purpose-
fully and systematically, as opportunities and cir-
cumstances warrant. This requires that the Presi-
dent be in a position to remove trade restrictions
on a selective and discretionary basis or to reimpose
them, as justified by our relations with individual
Communist countries.

Trade moves should be adapted to circumstances
in individual Communist countries and used to gain
improvements in, and to build a better foundation
for our relations with these countries. As oppor-
tunities arise, the United States should enter into
Government-to-Government negotiations with individ-
ual Communist countries on this front, bargaining
as "Yankee traders" for reciprocal advantages.

22. Specifically, if individual Communist coun-
tries are interested in expanding peaceful trade with
us, the United States should be prepared and able
to negotiate the terms under which such trade could
grow. These negotiations would set the framework
for trade and should be designed to strengthen the
U.S. political and commercial position. The trade
itself would be carried out by private U.S. firms
dealing directly with Communist State trading
agencies.

To deal with problems arising from differences in
our economic systems, the United States should use

its leverage to obtain, among other things, these con-
cessions in matters related to trade: Satisfactory
assurances regarding the arbitration of commercial
disputes in third countries; appropriate arrange-
ments for the protection of patents and other indus-
trial property; agreement on procedures to avoid
dumping and other forms of market disruption; and
the settlement of financial claims. In the case of
the U.S.S.R., such financial claims negotiations
would have to include an arrangement for a satis-
factory settlement of lend-lease obligations. The
United States should also seek: The establishment
or expansion of trade and tourist promotion offices;
the facilitation of entry, travel, and accommodation
of commercial representatives; the improvement of
consular relations; and agreement on copyrights.

Whenever possible, we should use such negotia-
tions to gain agreement or understandings on such
matters as library and informational facilities, em-
bassy quarters, the establishment of consulates, the
jamming of broadcasts, the distribution of Govern-
ment and other publications, and the initiation or
expansion of cultural and technical exchanges.

In these ways, we could use trade negotiations to
open up new avenues of peaceful engagement with
Communist countries and create new opportunities
to influence their development. This would not be
a once and for all proposition — but a regular proc-
ess in which we could make trade an asset that
could be used over and over again.

23. As its part of the negotiating bargain, the
United States must be prepared to remove trade
restrictions on a selective basis. Within security
limitations, the U.S. Government should adopt a
flexible export licensing policy. It should use its
discretionary authority in the field of commercial
credits, and it should be in a position to offer in-
dividual Communist countries the opportunity to sell
on normal competitive terms in the U.S. market.

24. In its trade negotiations with the Communist
countries, the United States should strive to free the
trade itself as much as possible from rigidities and
Government intervention and make it increasingly
responsive to market forces. The United States
should insist that payments be made in convertible
currencies and should oppose any governmental link-
age of exports and imports. Termination and can-
cellation provisions in our trade agreements would
give us adequate leverage to police the trade.

Trade vnth the United States should put pressure
on Communist countries to move away from the
rigid bilateralism that characterizes their usual
trade arrangements. It should encourage them to
become more heavily engaged in the network of
world trade and committed to the Western practices
that govern most of this trade.

25. U.S. aims in these negotiations must be po-
litical; we seek to encourage moves toward the ex-
ternal independence and internal liberalization of
individual Communist nations. We are not inter-

850

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ested in fostering animosities among European Com-
munist nations. Our long-term purpose in our
dealings with these countries must be to create an
atmosphere in which they will inevitably find that
their interests are more and more linked to peaceful
relations with the Free World. We must hold to
these kinds of purposes in our trade negotiations
with European Communist countries. They are not
only necessary to make the effort worthwhile, but
they form the only base on which our trade can, in
fact, grow.

26. The major specific issues involve our policies
on export licenses, on the sale of technology, on
credits, and on the granting of most-favored-nation
tariff treatment. Before discussing them, the Com-
mittee would emphasize that these issues are part
of an interrelated whole and that U.S. policies on
each should be formulated and applied with this in
mind. For example, the United States cannot ex-
pect political advantages from the isolated use of
export licensing controls on a case-by-case basis.
Trying to negotiate in this way would be a waste
of U.S. bargaining power. On the other hand, the
coordinated use of all the potential assets — export
licensing, MFN and guarantees of commercial credit
— in periodic Government-to-Govemment trade ne-
gotiations with individual Communist countries would
put the United States in the best possible position
to get the most advantageous results from such
negotiations.

Export Licensing

27. Issues in export licensing arise mainly in
regard to commodities and technology which the
United States restricts for export to Communist
countries but which are not included in the Inter-
national Embargo List. Many of these products
and industrial plants are freely exported from West-
ern Europe and Japan. They are not closely related
to military production or use and therefore are in
the area of peaceful trade. As a group, they are of
interest to the European Communist countries and
would make a contribution to their economies insofar
as they could be purchased only from the United
States, or purchased from the United States in more
advanced design, better quality, or lower cost than
from other Western countries.

28. The United States should adopt a flexible and
selective policy in respect to licensing the export of
commodities and technology. We should be pre-
pared to relax our controls, country by country in
support of negotiations to obtain concessions and
achieve better relations. Conversely, we should
tighten our controls, should relations deteriorate.

29. The language of the Export Control Act and
the declaration of policy expressed by the Congress
in that Act is consistent with this approach. As
stated in the Act, "it is the policy of the United
States to use its economic resources and advantages
in trade with Communist-dominated nations to fur-

ther the national security and foreign policy objec-
tives of the United States." The Act gives the
President full discretion to apply controls on trade
with Communist nations to carry out this policy.
The criteria for applying controls were rephrased in
a 1962 amendment, but the effect of this amendment
is by no means clear. Given this ambiguity, there
has been a tendency among those charged with the
administration of trade controls to grive more em-
phasis to the restrictive rather than to the discre-
tionary provisions of the statute.

30. The Committee believes this is unwise and not
required by the law. The Act comes up for renewal
this year. It should be renewed with emphasis
placed on the possibilities for using trade and
export licensing for constructive as well as for
restrictive purposes. In light of the new and chang-
ing political circumstances in Eastern Europe and
the U.S.S.R., more regard should be given to the
use of this tool to influence our future relations
with these countries.

The Question of Technology

31. Communist countries are mainly interested in
buying our best machinery, our advanced industrial
plants, and our latest technical data.

It can be argued that sales or licenses in these
categories should not be permitted because they
would permit the Soviet bloc nations to allocate more
of their scarce research and development talent to
the military, and would thus harm the relative posi-
tion of the United States.

Insofar as a reasonable equivalent can be ob-
tained from other Western nations or Japan, this
argument has little force. In the smaller number of
cases, where a nonstrategic technical advantage is
obtainable only from the United States, the possible
effect on Soviet military capabilities, as pointed out
above, is negligible. On the other hand, the power
to release for trade items of nonstrategic but ad-
vanced technology can be used by the President as
an effective trade tool for accomplishing foreign
policy objectives.

For reasons which follow, however, we doubt that
the Communist countries will be successful in buying
a large amount of advanced technology from the
United States. This may lead to some irritation and
disillusionment on their part. But in the end, bar-
gaining in this field may force the Communist na-
tions to face up to meeting the conditions that a
genuine trade in technology requires.

32. The Committee does not believe that many
U.S. firms would be interested in selling their most
advanced technology to European Communist coun-
tries. In the normal course of trade, business firms
protect their most advanced technology and bargain
hard for satisfactory terms for such technology as
they are willing to sell. These practices would hold
all the more for trade with Communist countries.

Some U.S. industries and firms that support heavy

MAY 30, 1966

851

'I

research and development programs refuse to sell
their industrial processes or to build complete plants
for sale to others. Money alone will not buy their
know-how. They are willing to exchange their proc-
esses for what they consider equivalent technology
from other firms. Such an exchange of technology
between a U.S. firm and a Soviet State organization
would be feasible in only a very few instances. Or
such firms are sometimes willing to build their own
plants abroad embodying their technology. The
possibility of a private U.S. firm's establishing a
subsidiary or entering into a joint venture in the
U.S.S.R. is beyond our present vision; it may not be
so farfetched in some East European countries.

Many U.S. firms are prepared to license their
technology in Western Europe and elsewhere in the
free world. Most are reluctant to do so in the
U.S.S.R. since they do not have confidence in the
licensing arrangement or in the protection of their
technology afforded by Soviet law. As in the case
of the trade in goods, the flow of technology will in-
evitably depend on development of common ground
rules and of relationships of trust. The recent Soviet
expression of interest in joining the International
Patent Convention is of significance in this con-
nection.

In some cases Western managerial methods and
organization are integral to Western technology. It
would not be enough for the Communists to import
the plant itself; they probably would need Western
technicians to install the equipment and supervise
initial operation. They might even have to adapt
their operating methods to its design to use it
efficiently.

In other cases the use of Western plants or proc-
esses is limited for lack of a wide range of support-
ing industries to supply components and a serious
shortage of managerial and technical talent. Modern
plants cannot easily be operated or maintained, let
alone duplicated, outside the industrial milieu for
which they were designed.

Where U.S. firms are willing to sell technology,
it is frequently their second best or in the process
of becoming so. For the importing country, gearing
up for a new type of production takes time. In a
fast-moving field where technology is perishable,
this method of operation can become a way of im-
porting obsolescence.

In essence, the importation of technology involves
much the same calculation as the decision to import
anything else. Whether technology seems worth
purchasing depends on the price. Whether it turns
out to be advantageous depends on the efficiency
with which it is injected into the system. In today's
world no country can continue to rely heavily on the
pirating of importation of technology to improve
its relative industrial position. To do so may appear
to be cheap in the short run, but could turn out to
be a sure way of perpetuating second-class indus-
trial status.

33. In view of all these considerations, the Com-
mittee believes the United States should treat the
trade in nonstrategic technology in the same way as J
other trade. The President should use his authority \
to permit the sale of nonstrategic technology in
support of U.S. trade negotiations with individual
Communist countries. The decision to permit the
sale is a Government decision to be made on foreign
policy grounds. The decision to sell and the terms of
sale of such machinery and equipment should be
left to the individual U.S. business firm.

Credits

34. Credits can become an issue if U.S. trade with
Communist countries expands. Most U.S. firms
would not extend credits to Communist countries
without Government guarantees. As matters stand
now, the President can authorize the Export-Import
Bank to guarantee commercial credits to a Com-
munist country when he determines that guarantees
to such a country are in the national interest. The
terms of such credits must be within the range of
common-commercial practices, but in any event, it is
U.S. Government policy to limit such credits to 5
years. This limit is also consistent with the Berne
Union — a long-standing, though informal agreement,
reached by leading insuring and guaranteeing insti-
tutions in the field of international credit. The
Committee believes we should hold to this position.
It is recommended further that the President make
appropriate use of his powers in this area to secure
recognition of the validity of any financial claims
outstanding and to obtain reasonable settlements of
such claims.^ These claims are considerable in
amount and consist largely of expropriated American
properties and defaulted bond issues, and in the
case of the U.S.S.R., of course, of lend-lease obli-
gations.

35. It is sometimes argued, particularly in West-
ern European countries, that credits in excess of 5
years should be extended to the East for industrial
plants that are normally amortized over a lengthy
period. Some of these countries are guaranteeing
such credits. As further justification for this posi-
tion, the point is made that Communist governments
have proven to be excellent credit risks and thereby
are justified in asking for long-credit terms.

36. The Committee sees considerable danger in
this line of reasoning. Among other things, it could
easily lead to a credit race among Western suppliers
and already shows some signs of doing so. There is
no necessary relationship between the decision of
Communist countries to purchase capital equipment
and their future ability to earn foreig:n exchange to
pay for such purchases. Medium- and short-term

' Mr. Black believes that reasonable settlements of
these claims should be obtained prior to extension of
any Government-guaranteed commercial credit.
[Footnote in original.]

852

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

credits can be justified to meet temporary payment
imbalances. But permitting these countries to pile
up long-term debt could enable them to put their
creditors under substantial pressure to accept un-
wanted commodities in lieu of defaults and could
amount to a subsidy for their economies.

Apart from the commercial risks, it is Important
to recogrnize that long-term credits could run counter
to the central purpose of this trade and reduce its
potential political benefits. If Communist countries
are strongly interested in purchasing United States
or any other Western capital equipment on a scale
substantially beyond their near-term capacity to
finance, they should be obliged to face up to the
implications of that position. The appropriate course
for them to follow would be to divert resources to
their export industries and to devote greater effort
to design and marketing activities for sales in the
West. Long-term credits enable these countries to
postpone such decisions and transfer the burden of
adjustment to Western capital markets, rather than
to accept the responsibilities of growing interde-
pendence with the free world.

We should not be concerned if a more restricted
policy on credit would put U.S. firms at a com-
petitive disadvantage relative to those of some
other Western countries in negotiating with Com-
munist authorities. The United States should set
an example; it should not be party to a practice that
enables the Communists to play off one Western
country against another.

Most-Favored-Nation Tariff Treatment

37. Most-favored-nation tariff treatment is nor-
mally granted by the United States to all countries.
Exports from countries not granted MFN tariff
treatment are subject to the high duties of the
United States Tariff Act of 1930. Present legisla-
tion prohibits granting MFN tariff treatment to all
Communist countries except Yugoslavia and Poland.
This prohibition places a serious barrier in the way
of expanding peaceful trade with the other European
Communist countries because it denies them normal
competitive terms in their attempts to sell to us.

38. The prohibition against granting MFN de-
prives the President of a valuable bargaining tool.
Vesting discretionary authority in the President to
grant as well as withdraw such tariff treatment
would be the single most important step in per-
mitting the Government to use trade more effective-
ly as an instrument for shaping our relations with
these countries. Without this tool any initial moves
we might make in this direction would soon come
to a halt. With it we could hope to maintain the
momentum of change in a direction favorable to our
interests.

39. The principal arguments against affording
MFN treatment to these countries are: (a) We
would get no tariff concessions in return. Tariff
rates in Communist countries have only nominal

significance since foreign trade is dependent on the
decisions of State trading authorities and not on
market forces; (b) Communist countries should not
receive MFN since they are not prepared to open
their markets to world competition on the basis of
established trading rules; (c) MFN would make it
easier for them to dump their products in our mar-
kets; and (d) MFN is not so important to them
because they export mainly primary products and
the tariff discrimination they face for these prod-
ucts is not nearly so great as it is for industrial
products.

40. These arguments in the Committee's view are
outweighed by the advantages we would gain from
a discretionary policy on this issue. The conces-
sions the United States would seek for MFN would
not be simply in tariff rates but in the overall con-
ditions we could negotiate for expanded trade. The
problem of Communist dumping is the kind of prob-
lem that can be handled in the course of Govern-
ment-to-Government trade negotiations. If these
countries are to make a serious effort to market
their products in the United States, they will have
to be assured of being able to compete on normal
terms in the U.S. market.

41. MFN should not be granted to Communist
countries automatically, or as a matter of right, or
for an indefinite period. In these respects there
should be a basic distinction between the MFN we
grant by statute to free world countries and the
MFN we would grant to Communist countries as
part of specific trade understandings. It would be
granted only for the duration of such agreements
and subject to periodic review. As a bargaining
asset, it is uniquely well adapted to U.S. policy
objectives. Discretionary authority to grant MFN
would allow the President to go much farther in
differentiating among Communist countries. It
would also symbolize our interest in encouraging
these countries to move toward more open trading
systems on an evolutionary basis. And it would
demonstrate to these countries the advantages of
better relations with the United States and the dis-
advantages of a deterioration in this relationship.

Trade and Strategy

42. Our trade policies are but a small part of our
overall strategy toward European Communist coun-
tries. One aspect of this strategy, as we mentioned
earlier, is to make clear that we will oppose and
frustrate any actions that menace the peace of
the world. Another aspect is to demonstrate that
both sides can benefit from peaceful exchange, and
in so doing, to influence and encourage those Com-
munist leaders who are moving away from the view
that military confrontation is inevitable. At the
very time we must pursue the first aspect of our
strategy even to the point of crisis, such as in
Vietnam, we should also be willing to pursue the
second as concrete evidence of the United States

MAY 30, 1966

853

Reprints of the Report to the President of
the Special Committee on U.S. Trade Rela-
tions With East European Countries and the
Soviet Union (Department of State publica-
tion 8061, 22 pp.) may he obtained from the
Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, Washington, D. C,
20102, for 15 cents each.

dedication to the cause of peace.

Trade relations and trade negotiations can be a
highly effective means of communicating this point.
The United States can use trade to convey its true
image and intentions: That it favors mutually bene-
ficial relations; and that it is willing to go as far
as Communist nations are willing to go in estab-
lishing a set of intergovernmental relations that
conform to international standards. But the United
States is justified in insisting on evidence as it
moves step by step along this road. Along with
such activities as cooperation in water desalinization,
the exchange of visits of Heads of State, and tech-
nical and cultural exchanges, trade negotiations can
give us a way of testing Communist intentions and
can give them a way of testing U.S. intentions.

Recommendations

1. The Committee believes that peaceful trade in
nonstrategic items can be an important instrument
of national policy in our country's relations with in-
dividual Communist nations of Europe. Political,
not commercial or economic considerations, should
determine the formulation and execution of our
trade policies.

2. The United States should in no case drop its
controls on strategic items that could significantly
enhance Communist military capabilities.

3. In respect to nonstrategic trade, the United
States should use trade negotiations with individual
Communist countries more actively, agg:ressively,
and confidently in the pursuit of our national wel-
fare and world peace.

4. We should not, however, remove our present
restrictions on this trade either automatically or
across the board. Communist countries are chang-
ing, in varying degrees and in different ways. We
should adapt our trade policies to the political cir-
cumstances and opportunities that present them-
selves from time to time in the individual countries.
At present significantly greater trade opportunities
exist in certain East European countries than in
the Soviet Union.

5. Negotiations with each of these countries should
involve hard bargaining, from which the U.S. Gov-
ernment should expect to receive satisfactory assur-
ances regarding the removal of commercial obstacles
arising from differences in our economic systems.
We should bargain for agreements on matters re-
lated to trade, such as reasonable settlements of out-

standing financial claims and procedures to avoid
dumping, and, as appropriate, understandings on a
variety of cultural, informational, and other mat-
ters at issue between us.

6. Provision should be made in trade agreements
with Communist countries for frequent review at
specific intervals. This would provide the oppor-
tunity to negotiate for new gains and to settle
additional matters of disagreement.

7. An aim of American policy in trade negotia-
tions with Communist countries should be to bring
their trade practices into line with normal world
trade practices.

8. To accomplish these purposes, we must be able
to use our trade policies flexibly and purposefully in
support of such negotiations. The President should
have the authority to remove or, if necessary, im-
pose trade restrictions as required for the achieve-
ment of our foreign policy objectives.

9. In administering export controls, the determi-
nation of what is strategic should be made primarily
by the Department of Defense. The power to with-
hold or release nonstrategic goods or advanced
technology for trade should be exercised by the
President as an instrument for accomplishing for-
eign policy objectives.

10. The President should be given discretionary
authority to grant or withdraw most-favored-nation
tariff treatment to and from individual Communist
countries when he determines it to be in the na-
tional interest. There should be a distinction be-
tween this MFN tariff treatment and the MFN tariff
treatment we grant by statute to free world coun-
tries. It should be granted to Communist countries
only for the duration of the trade agreement of which
it is a part, and it should be subject to periodic
review.

11. The President should continue to exercise his
authority to allow Government-guaranteed commer-
cial credits up to 5 years duration, if such terms are
normal to the trade and if they are considered to
further the national interest.

12. Trade with Communist countries should not be
subsidized, nor should it receive artificial encourage-
ment. The U.S. Government should decide the per-
mitted scope of the trade in terms of security
considerations. Within these limits, the amount of
trade that takes place should be left to U.S. busi-
ness and the U.S. consumer to decide. In terms of
foreign policy considerations, however, it should be
recognized that trade with European Communist
nations can be as much in the national interest as
any other trade.

13. In view of the changes now taking place and
of changes that will continue to take place in the
Communist societies, the United States should, at
regular intervals, review its total trade policies to-
ward the whole Communist world to ensure that they
remain consistent with, and effective in support of,
foreigrn policy objectives.

854

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

14. If trade with Communist countries is to be
used for these objectives, the U.S. public, the Con-
gress and the executive branch must have a thor-
ough understanding of the problem, the opportuni-
ties that trade affords, and U.S. national objectives
in this field. The U.S. Government should take
every opportunity to make explicit what it intends
to do and what it seeks to accomplish. It should
act to remove any stigma from trade with Com-
munist countries where such trade is determined to
be in the national interest. The foreign policy ad-
vantages of such trade to the United States are not
widely enough appreciated. With greater public
awareness of both facts and objectives, the United
States will be in a stronger position to use this
trade as it must be used — for national purposes and
to support national policy.

In conclusion, we emphasize that these findings and
recommendations constitute a long-term strategy.

The intimate engagement of trade, over a con-
siderable period of time, when taken with the process
of change already under way, can influence the
internal development and the external policies of
European Communist societies along paths favor-

able to our purpose and to world peace. Trade is
one of the few channels available to us for con-
structive contacts with nations with whom we find
frequent hostility. In the long run, selected trade,
intelligently negotiated and wisely administered,
may turn out to have been one of our most powerful
tools of national policy.

The members of your Committee have found this
assignment difficult, challenging, and important.
We hope this report will be useful to you and to the
Nation.

Respectfully submitted, (signed)

J. Irwin Miller, Chairman
Eugene R. Black
William Blackie
George R. Brown
Charles W. Engelhard, Jr.
James B. Fisk
Nathaniel Goldfinger •
Crawford H. Greenewalt
William A. Hewitt
Max F. Millikan
Charles G. Mortimer
Herman B. Wells

'Statement of Comment by Mr. Goldfinger

I have reservations about several issues in the
Report and respectfully submit the following com-
ments.

At the outset I wish to make it clear that I am
not opposed to the expansion of economic and finan-
cial relations with the Soviet bloc under all condi-
tions. However, I am concerned about the conditions.

Trade relations with the Soviet Union and its
European satellites should be viewed as a tool of our
Nation's foreign policy. Therefore, the Report should
have placed greater emphasis on the political aspect
of this issue.

There is also inadequate caution in the Report
about the risk of exporting American technology —
particularly advanced technology — to those coun-
tries. In centrally planned, totalitarian states, mili-
tary and economic factors are closely related. There
is no reason to believe that the export of American
machinery and equipment to those countries will
necessarily redound to the benefit of their peoples.

Moreover, in our readiness to engage in bilateral
trade negotiations with individual countries of the

Soviet bloc, we should have no illusions about the
ability of trade, in itself, to alter Communist atti-
tudes and policies. Neither is trade, as such, a sure
force for peace, as indicated by the two World Wars
between trading nations.

Recognition of these realities should result in
greater emphasis on the principle of quid pro quo
concessions than is contained in the Report. In my
opinion, there should be no expansion of trade,
extension of Government-guaranteed credit or most-
favored-nation tariff treatment without political
quid pro quo concessions from them.

The Report's discussion of most-favored-nation
tariff treatment omits or only briefly deals with
several thorny problems concerning potential im-
ports from those countries — such as goods produced
by slave labor, dumping, market disruption, inter-
national fair labor standards and the need for an
adequate trade adjustment assistance mechanism
at home.

In conclusion, I believe that considerations of
national security and international policy objectives
should have top priority in evaluating trade rela-
tions with the Soviet bloc — over any temporary or
marginal commercial advantages that may exist.

MAY 30, 1966

855

". . . an impressive demonstration of a dynamic trade policy
irb action — at the bargaining table, in administrative deci-
sions, in legislation." This is how William M. Roth, Deputy
Special Representative for Trade Negotiations, in this article
based on a recent speech he made, describes U.S. trade policy
under President Johnson's leadership.

The Johnson Trade Policy

by William M. Roth

What is the trade posture of the Johnson
administration?

Both the words and deeds indicate a rec-
ord of quiet, steady accomplishment in the
liberalization of world trade — whether cal-
culated in volume, dollars, or in the progres-
sive dismantling of protective barriers.

President Johnson's attitude on trade
policy is perhaps best summed up in his let-
ter to the Congress last October transmitting
the ninth annual report on the trade agree-
ments program.* He said:

The policy of two-way trade expansion and lib-
eralization, initiated with the Trade Agreements
Act of 1934 and continued by every Administration
since that time, has brought great benefits to this
country. In general, U.S. goods have enjoyed pro-
gressively easier access to foreign markets. Low-cost,
high-quality U.S. exports, sold and used in every
corner of the world, have provided immediate evi-
dence of the vitality of our free enterprise system.
Our processors have gained ready access to essential
raw materials, and have profited from the stimulus
of keener competition. Consumers have enjoyed the
wide range of choice which the world market pro-
vides.

But we have only begun. We must build on past
success to achieve greater well-being for America,
and for all the world's peoples. In particular, we
must make every effort to assure the success of
the current Geneva negotiations, known as the Ken-
nedy Round.

The sixth round of tariff negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs

and Trade — the Kennedy Round — is of great
significance both economically and polit-
ically.

European rumors that the United States
may have lost its enthusiasm for these im-
portant trade negotiations are wide of the
mark. They are contradicted time and time
again — by the words of the President and
by those of his principal economic advisers.
More than anything, however, they are con-
tradicted by the record of this country's
leadership in pressing for meaningful nego-
tiations in Geneva and by the offers, in
both industry and agriculture, that the
United States has made. We suspect, there-
fore, that such rumors are tactical moves
in a negotiation of great complexity and of
tremendous economic and political impor-
tance. Certainly, most of our negotiating
partners are well aware of the deep and
urgent commitment of this country to the
successful outcome of the Kennedy Round.

In his state of the Union message ^ Presi-
dent Johnson reemphasized this commit-
ment. "We will work," he said, "to
strengthen economic cooperation, to reduce
barriers to trade . . . ." And in his Economic
Report 3 the President said :

' For text, see Bulletin of Nov. 8, 1965, p. 761.
• For excerpts, see ibid., Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.
' For excerpts, see ibid., Feb. 21, 1966, p. 290.

856

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

• The year 1966 is the year when the world can take
a giant step forward in liberalizing international
trade by successfully concluding the Kennedy Round
of negotiations to reduce trade barriers on all classes
of products. The resulting growth of world trade
and world income will benefit all countries, develop-
ing as well as industrial. The United States will
bend every effort to get meaningful negotiations
back on the track. This great venture in international
cooperation must not fail.

These words clearly indicate a commit-
ment to the principle of freedom of inter-
national competition and express the funda-
mental trade policy of President Johnson
and of his administration. They also reaf-
firm the mandate of our negotiators in
Geneva. This ambitious effort, the greatest
in the 20-year history of GATT trade nego-
tiations, will not fail because of any lack of
will or determination on the part of the
United States.

Although the six member states of the
European Economic Community reached an
impasse in their internal negotiations last
June and the Geneva negotiations had
come to a virtual standstill at the turn of
the year, the Six have now resumed their
internal dialog. Differences remain, but it
seems reasonable to assume that they will
achieve agreement to resume the develop-
ment of their dynamic Common Market and
to restore momentum to the trade negotia-
tions.

The sixth round of trade negotiations must
be concluded under our present authority,
with a significant and balanced reduction in
world trade barriers on a fully reciprocal
basis. There are no practical alternatives if
global trade expansion is to be achieved.
The Kennedy Round is multilateral in the
truest sense, involving all the world's prin-
cipal trading nations.

Failure in these negotiations will invite a
reversion to divisive trade practices among
nations, with protectionism given strong en-
couragement and economic nationalism and
regionalism new impetus. We must maintain
and accelerate the momentum of trade lib-
eralization and expansion which has contrib-
uted so greatly to the buoyant economies
of the postwar industrialized world and

which holds the greatest potential for rapid
development of the emerging nations. That
is what the Kennedy Round is about.

other Trade Initiatives

It is not only in the Geneva negotiations
that the Johnson administration has given
compelling evidence of its trade posture. A
number of recent actions and proposals ex-
pose a consistent intent to see that Ameri-
can markets are open and remain open to
fair competition from abroad.

First, the President has recently acted to
end special escape-clause protection on lead
and zinc, clinical thermometers, and safety
pins, judging that this extra protection can
no longer be justified. In a fourth case he
ordered a substantial modification of the
extra protection afforded stainless steel
table flatware.

These actions are based on investigations,
ordered by President Johnson, of the neces-
sity of continuing special protection for these
industries. Although an industry may need a
temporary shield in some instances, the ad-
ministration believes special protective
measures should be employed only when im-
ports are clearly causing serious disruption.
Such cases should be under constant review
and the protection removed when no longer
necessary.

On the legislative side the Johnson ad-
ministration has shown its dedication to a
policy of liberal world trade. Over adminis-
tration opposition the 88th Congress passed
a bill establishing stringent marking re-
quirements on imported wood products. Pres-
ident Johnson vetoed it in December 1963,
stating in his veto message* that the "bill
would raise new barriers to foreign trade
and invite retaliation against our ex-
ports. . . ." It was his first major deci-
sion on an issue of national trade policy and
his first use of the veto.

In line with this policy the Johnson ad-
ministration has continued to resist success-
fully the enactment of protectionist meas-
ures. In the last session of the Congress it

• For text, see ibid., Jan. 27, 1964, p. 129.

MAY 30, 1966

857

made known its opposition to the so-called
Orderly Marketing Act of 1965, which would
have required the imposition of quotas when
imports reached certain levels, and to a bill
to amend the Anti-Dumping Act, which
would have rendered that act a highly pro-
tectionist instrument. These bills did not re-
ceive even preliminary consideration by the
committees concerned. This was also true of
three other bills: One which would have
provided for an increase in tariffs on im-
ports of salmon, another which would have
required the labeling of labels, and a third
which would have required the marking of
containers manufactured in the United States
in part with foreign steel.

On the positive side, the 89th Congress in
its first session took several significant ac-
tions at the request of the administration.
The President sought and obtained repeal of
the so-called Saylor amendment to the
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1965,
which imposed a complete prohibition on the
use of any foreign articles in the construc-
tion of highways and railroads under the act.
The Congress also met the President's re-
quest for legislation to implement the U.S.-
Canadian agreement ^ providing duty-free
treatment of automotive products traded be-
tween the two countries, which previously
had had serious trade problems in these
products.

This same Congress also passed legisla-
tion enabling the United States to carry
out its obligations under the International
Coffee Agreement of 1962," an agreement
designed to bring more stability to coffee
prices. The development programs of cof-

'For text, see ibid., Feb. 8, 1965, p. 191; for
statements made by President Johnson after sign-
ing the Automotive Trade Products Act of 1965 and
texts of a proclamation and Executive order pur-
suant thereto, see ibid., Nov. 15, 1965, p. 793.

' For text, see Treaties and Other International
Acts Series 5505; for a statement made by President
Johnson on May 24, 1965, see Bulletin of June
14, 1965, p. 975.

fee-producing countries have suffered seri-
ous setbacks from the wildly fluctuating
prices of this vital export commodity.

In January 1966 the Senate passed a
previously approved House bill to suspend
duties on certain tropical hardwoods pend-
ing completion of the Kennedy Round ac-
tion on them, as another step toward assist-
ing developing countries.

New Legislation

Significantly, this year President John-
son announced in his state of the Union
message that, in keeping with our policy of
building bridges to Eastern Europe, he
would request that Congress grant him
discretionary authority to remove special
tariff restrictions against goods from East-
ern Europe and the Soviet Union when
such action is in the national interest.

The President also will shortly request
an amendment to the Trade Expansion Act
to liberalize the tests which a firm or group
of workers must satisfy in order to become
eligible for adjustment assistance. To date,
all petitions for adjustment assistance have
been denied because of what we now realize
to be unnecessarily demanding tests written
into the law. The amendment will substan-
tially relax these tests while still requiring
a demonstration that tariff concessions
have played a role in causing increased im-
ports and have, in turn, led to economic
injury.

We hope that this year the Congress will
approve legislation to permit the United
States to implement the Agreement on the
Importation of Educational, Scientific and
Cultural Materials, commonly known as the
Florence Agreement.' Purpose of the agree-
ment, as President Johnson noted in his
letter * requesting congressional considera-

' For background and text of the agreement, see
ibid., Sept. 21, 1959, p. 422.

' For text, see ibid., June 21, 1965, p. 1015.

858

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tion of the measure, is "to promote the
growth of international understanding by
reducing trade barriers to the flow of
knowledge in all directions across all fron-
tiers."

This record adds up to an impressive
demonstration of a dynamic trade policy in
action — at the bargaining table, in adminis-
trative decisions, in legislation.

In summary, there are three elements of
President Johnson's trade policy.

First, while it is acknowledged that im-
port competition can be disruptive and that
Government assistance to help industries
adjust to this kind of competition is war-
ranted, such assistance should restrain im-
ports only as a last resort and restraints
should be ended as soon as they have served
their purpose.

Second, the United States seeks and sup-
ports, in and beyond the current negotia-
tions, measures that will expand world
trade, including trade with the developing
countries and the countries of Eastern
Europe.

Third, the Johnson trade policy commits
the United States to the vigorous use of the
full powers of the Trade Expansion Act to
achieve a successful outcome of the GATT
negotiations at Geneva. Its negotiators will
bargain hard to conclude, on a fully recipro-
cal basis, a significant and balanced reduc-
tion in world trade barriers. The result, in
both industry and in agriculture, will be
mutually beneficial to all participants.

These three elements serve the common
objective of expanding trade. The Johnson
trade policy thus continues the liberal world
trade orientation that has characterized
United States policies since the early 1930's
— policies that have had since that time the
consistent support of the leaders of both
major political parties.

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified
of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments

Following is the text of a letter from Under
Secretary of State for Economic Affairs
Thomas C. Mann to Maritime Administrator
Nicholas Johnson.

May 4, 1966

Dear Mr. Johnson : I am writing with re-
gard to a Resolution of the Security Council
of the United Nations adopted on April 9,
1966.1 That Resolution, No. 221, relates to
shipments of oil to Southern Rhodesia and
provides in part:

"Calls upon all States to ensure the diver-
sion of any of their vessels reasonably be-
lieved to be carrying oil destined for Rho-
desia which may be en route for Beira ;

"Calls upon the Government of the United
Kingdom to prevent by the use of force if
necessary the arrival at Beira of vessels
reasonably believed to be carrying oil des-
tined for Rhodesia."

The Government of the United States
voted for Resolution No. 221 in the Security
Council and supports the efforts of the
United Kingdom to end the illegal, unilateral
declaration of independence by the Smith re-
gime in Southern Rhodesia. Accordingly,
we wish to advise all owners of United States
flag ships to take all necessary steps to pre-
vent their ships of United States registry
from carrying oil to Beira destined for
Rhodesia.

We should appreciate your having this
letter and any other notice you believe appro-
priate published in the Federal Register.^

Sincerely yours,

Thomas C. Mann

' For text, see Bulletin of May 2, 1966, p. 718.
' 31 Fed. Reg. 6878.

MAY 30, 1966

859

"/ asked an old gentleman what he thoiight of all the
changes ivhich were taking place, and I shall never forget
his ansiver: 'I cannot understand why we have been sleeping
so long.' " That phrase, Mr. Berger says, "eloquently sums
up the great changes noiv going on in Korea."

Korea— Progress and Prospects

by Samuel D. Berger

Depiity Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs i

I am well acquainted with Chung-Ang Uni-
versity, but this is my introduction to Long
Island University. I am very pleased to be
here, and especially pleased to take part in
this symposium. A unique relationship has
developed between the United States and
Korea in these last 20 years, and this con-
ference is, in a sense, a recognition of and a
tribute to that relationship.

Although we have had diplomatic relations
with Korea since 1883, Korea was hardly
known to Americans as recently as 20 years
ago. Missionary work, which dates from the
1880's, had brought Korea into the homes
and thinking of a limited circle. A handful of
Koreans who had come to the United States
during the Japanese occupation nurtured a
dream that Korea might one day be free,
but they were little known in the American
community. A few scholars had made some
studies of Korean history, culture, and life,
usually in conjunction with general studies
of the Orient. An occasional tourist would
visit Korea and write his impressions. This
was almost the sum total of our acquaint-
ance.

The Korean people knew as little of us as
we of them. A self-imposed isolation, fol-

' Address made before the Conference and Sym-
posium of Korean Culture at the Brooklyn Center of
Long Island University, Brooklyn, N.Y., on May 7.

lowed by an enforced isolation, had cut
Korea off from most other countries and
especially from the West. Historically,
Korean contacts with the world were limited
to China and to Japan, or to the maraud-
ers from beyond the Yalu who threatened
Korea during much of its long history.

War and the accidents of history have
brought our two countries together in ways
that no one could have foreseen 20 years
ago. Korea is now a part of our history, as
we are of Korea's. The chain of events that
brought us together were :

The Second World War.

The fateful decision made during that war
to divide Korea at the 38th parallel as a
matter of convenience to provide for the sur-
render of Japanese prisoners of war.

The even more fateful decision of the
Soviet leaders not to cooperate with the
Western Allies to build a durable peace but
to follow Lenin's doctrine of exploiting the
chaos, confusion, and disorder after the war
in order to extend communism. In Korea a
Communist regime was installed by the So-
viet Army.

The American decision to withdraw our
military forces from the Republic of Korea
in 1949, leaving only a few military advisers
and instructors.

The subsequent invasion from the north

860

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

on June 25, 1950, which led to our return,
to the United Nations action, and to our pres-
ence in Korea ever since.

In the perspective of history, two deci-
sions, more than any other, dramatize the
revolution in American foreign policy from
our traditional isolation to an acceptance of
international responsibilities. And curiously,
both of these involve peninsulas which have
been fought over for centuries as invading
nations vied to extend their domains. The
first was the Truman Doctrine of March
1947, in which we took over from our ex-
hausted British allies their commitment to
support the independence of Greece against
Communist aggression. This was the fore-
runner of NATO and our deep involvement
in Europe. The other was President Tru-
man's decision to come to the support of the
Republic of Korea in June 1950, which set
the basis for our subsequent policies in the
general area of Asia.

Interchange of People, Experience, Ideas

If we knew little about Korea and they
little about us 20 years ago, that is no longer
the case today. Over a million Americans
have fought or stood guard on Korean soil,
along with Koreans, to defend the independ-
ence of that nation. Tens of thousands of
Korean soldiers, sailors, and airmen have
been brought to the United States for mili-
tary training. Thousands of American
civilians have visited or worked in every con-
ceivable capacity in Korea, and tens of
thousands of Korean civilians have come to
America for study and training.

These figures and numbers do not begin
to convey the width and depth of the inter-
change which has taken place — of people,
of experience, and of ideas. English has be-
come the compulsory second language in
Korean education, and wherever I traveled
in Korea, even on the most remote island,
I was invariably accosted by one or more
young students anxious to try out their Eng-
lish. Koreans are good linguists, and even
now I receive letters from students I have
met all over Korea.

Our military relations have done far more

than produce one of the most highly trained
and effective military forces in the free
world. For a modern military force con-
sists not only of fighting men but re-
quires a great range and variety of profes-
sions, vocations, and skills. Doctors, sur-
geons, and nurses are needed, as are lavv^yers
and engineers, experts in communication,
transport, procurement, supply, budget and
fiscal matters, and disbursement. Men
must be trained in organization, manage-
ment, and planning. Men must be trained
as pilots and navigators, as drivers, motor
and airplane mechanics, welders, crane and
bulldozer operators, metalworkers, and radio
and telephone repairmen, and in scores of
other occupations.

This military training has made the Ko-
rean Armed Forces a vast reservoir of
supply of skills and talents which were
transferable to civilian life and which are
now contributing so much to the building of
a modern Korea.

Nor have the civilians been neglected.
Through the exchange program and through
technical assistance to Korean education,
thousands of Koreans have been trained in
economics, banking, government, journal-
ism, political science, engineering, medi-
cine, law, public health, agriculture, busi-
ness administration, and other fields.

A "Developed" People

The thirst of Koreans for education and
training is one of the happiest memories I
have of my 3 years' stay in Korea. Korea
may be an undeveloped nation in an eco-
nomic and industrial sense, but the Ko-
reans are not an undeveloped people.

The separate kingdoms and tribes of
Korea were unified into a nation about
1,300 years ago, and they have successfully
maintained a national tradition ever since.
They withstood Chinese and Japanese in-
cursions or invasions, and they absorbed
and survived a Mongolian occupation. Their
long history as a nation testifies to their
hardiness and their great inner resources of
will, independence, and spirit.

I have an old map of Korea dating from

MAY 30, 1966

861

an exploration by Ortelius in 1540. It is
perhaps the first map ever made of Korea
by a European. It shows Korea as an island,
and the inscription reads: "Not much is
known about the people of this island,
known as Koreans, except that they are
very tall and superb soldiers."

The 18th and 19th centuries were tragic
ones in Korean history, as the Yi Dynasty,
energetic and progressive in its early years,
went into decline. The feudal system showed
no ability to adjust and change. By the
end of the 19th century, corruption, a per-
sistent tendency toward factionalism, and
an inability to produce effective govern-
ment had so weakened this proud and
capable people that Korea was no longer
able to withstand the pressures of her
stronger imperial neighbors. The stirrings
toward change and democracy in the late
19th century were snuffed out by the
Japanese occupation.

But the essential characteristics of the
people could not be obliterated. They are
an energetic people, hard working, with
ambition, and quick to learn. The literacy
rate is one of the highest in the world —
93 percent. Education is universal, and
parents of every class will make every
sacrifice to put their children into
university.

Problems Confronting Korea After 1945

There are nations with vast natural re-
sources, but they seem unable to do much
with them. Other nations with few natural
resources make astonishing progress. The
answer, of course, lies with the people, and
the problems which confronted the Korean
people after 1945 were enormous.

The tragic division of Korea deprived the
people of the South of the great natural re-
sources of water power and minerals which
lie north of the 38th parallel. The South
has traditionally been agricultural. Three
million refugees fled south after 1946.

The savage North Korean invasion in
1950 which carried the Communists to the
perimeter around Pusan in the southeast,

and the retreat to the north, destroyed
much of Korea and a great part of Seoul.
Transport, bridges, communications, houses,
and shops were destroyed on wholesale scale.

In the early years after the Korean war
our aid had of necessity to be concentrated
on the repair of the basic structure, as well
as helping to feed and clothe the people. Of
$2 billion in economic aid, $300 million
went into railways, another $700 million
into power, communications, fertilizer,
mining.

By 1960 the basic infrastructure had
been restored, and some 200 new factories
had been built.

But there was a missing element in
Korea. There was no effective government.
The government of Syngman Rhee seemed
incapable of dealing with the massive prob-
lems of inflation, corruption, smuggling,
tax evasion, or the black market. Many of
the new factories remained idle because
they lacked capital or competent manage-
ment. Commercial exports totaled about
$30 million a year, and Korea relied on
United States grants for 90 percent of its
foreign exchange requirements.

Dissatisfaction with the Rhee govern-
ment's ineffectiveness and authoritarian
ways grew rapidly in the late fifties, and
when that government resorted to a rigged
election in 1960 to stay in power, the stu-
dents and then the people moved into the
streets in protest.

The next government — properly and
fairly elected — seemed incapable of grasp-
ing the nettle of power and dealing with the
basic ills. In May 1961 a military coup
took power. It announced at the outset its
determination to reform and modernize
Korea and to restore constitutional proc-
esses and hold elections. It has made much
progress on the first pledge and fulfilled
the second pledge in the fall of 1963.

The transformation of Korea in the last
5 years has been astonishing. Korea, for the
first time in many centuries, has a driving
and effective government. It has made mis-
takes, and it has yet to resolve many prob-

862

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lems, but the progress in every direction
has been such that there is now hope and
confidence in Korea's future.

Korea's Domestic Achievements

I want to describe some of the main
achievements of the last 4 years :

— Serious inflation has been a plague in
Korea, as elsewhere. Serious inflation
undermines economic and political stability.
The military government tried to do too
much in too short a time, and the result
was more inflation. In May 1964 Korea
went through still another devaluation, but
by then the leaders of Korea had learned
a basic lesson. An austere credit and finan-
cial policy was instituted, and for the past
2 years price inflation has been held within
reasonable bounds. The price increase last
year was about 61/^ percent.

— A sophisticated exchange rate system,
with a floating exchange rate, is being op-
erated with a great measure of success.
Foreign exchange reserves, which were dan-
gerously depleted, have been built back to a
safe level.

— Vigorous campaigns against tax eva-
sion and smuggling, which deprive the state
of revenue, have been pressed. Tax collec-
tions are increasing.

— A sensible interest rate policy on time
deposits has brought a flood of savings
into the commercial banks and drastically
reduced the scope of operations for the
moneylenders.

— Most of the factories built with Amer-
ican loans are now functioning and many
of them flourishing. New factories for
fertilizer, cement, plywood, and pharma-
ceuticals are coming into production. In
1965 industrial production rose by 19
percent.

— Electric power production totaled 40,-
000 kilowatts when the Communists cut
the transmission lines from North Korea
in 1948. It has increased manyfold since
that time and doubled since 1960 to nearly
800,000 kilowatts. Plans are in train to

raise it to IV2 million kilowatts in the
next 4 years. Forty-five thousand rural
households were tied into the power system
last year. The target this year is an addi-
tional 60,000.

— Crop production has increased by
60 percent since 1960. Land reclamation
and bench terracing have made astonishing
progress. Arable land will be increased by
about 20 percent by 1970, and the time is
not far off when Korea will grow enough
food for its own needs. At the same time
reforestation is moving ahead, and ener-
getic action is being taken against illegal
timber cutting.

— Mining production has increased by 60
percent since 1960.

The progress made in economic growth
and exports has put Korea well to the
front compared with other less developed
nations. The annual economic growth rate
has averaged 8 percent in each of the last
3 years. Commercial exports rose from $33
million in 1960 to $180 million last year and
are expected to approach $270 million in
1966. In contrast with 1961 Korea now
furnishes more than half of her foreign ex-
change requirements through her own ef-
forts. Koreans themselves now speak of
economic independence in 5 years.

With these achievements, our grant aid
has come down from $173 million in 1961 to
$70 million last year and will continue to
fall. More and more of our help is taking
the form of loans to build factories and in-
dustries, and development loans have risen
from $6.5 million in 1961 to about $49 mil-
lion in 1965. In keeping with this policy
President Johnson, during the state visit
last year of President Park Chung Hee,
pledged to make $150 million available in
development loan funds.^

In still another important area there has
been progress. Korea has a very high rate
of population growth, 2.9 percent a year.
In 1963 the Government for the first time
made provision for family planning in its

• Bulletin of June 14, 1965, p. 960.

MAY 30, 1966

863

budget and has each year increased its ap-
propriations for clinics, advisory services,
contraceptive devices, and publicity. The
aim is to bring the population growth rate
down to 1.5 percent by 1980, if not earlier.
Three years ago the Government, in-
spired by Dr. Paul Crane of the Presby-
terian Medical Center in Chongju, at last
began to deal with hookworm, a wide-
spread and debilitating parasite that can
easily be overcome by proper composting.
The Ministries of Agriculture, Education,
and Public Health are pressing this cam-
paign, and Korea should be freed of this
disease in a decade. It will have the most
important physical and psychological ef-
fects in terms of energy and a sense of
well-being.

Progress in Foreign Affairs

These are some of the main achievements
on the domestic side. But there has been
much progress in foreign affairs as well :

— Five years ago Korea had diplomatic
relations with 15 countries. The number is
now 78. A new and flourishing Foreign
Service Institute, which the Asia Founda-
tion helped finance, is now training Korean
diplomats. It takes its place alongside a
new Administrative Staff College, where
civil servants are being trained in admin-
istration.

— Last December relations between Korea
and Japan were normalized after 15 years of
off-again, on-again negotiations. Under the
terms of the settlement the troublesome
controversy over fishing rights has been
resolved. On the financial side, the long-
standing claims problem has been settled
through the Japanese agreement to provide
$300 million in grant assistance; $200 mil-
lion in long-term government-to-government
loans; and $300 million in commercial cred-
its, for a total of $800 million over 10 years.

— Korea has joined the just-organized
Asian Development Bank with a subscription
of $30 million.

— In 1963 France and Italy provided a

I

large loan for the creation of a deep-sea
fishing fleet, and Germany has provided
credits for industrial development.

— Private foreign companies are begin-
ning to look with interest on investment in
Korea, and some have already begun to
provide equity capital.

In June, at Korean initiative, there will be
an Asian ministerial conference in Seoul,
evidence of the growing interest in discuss-
ing Asian problems in a regional context and
of Korea's growing stature in the interna-
tional community.

The most notable demonstration of Korea's
willingness and ability to play a role in inter-
national affairs was the decision taken last
year in response to a request from the
Government of South Viet-Nam for combat
troops: 21,000 were sent, and a further
decision was taken this year to send an
additional 22,000. Even before these historic
decisions, Korea had provided a 130-man
military hospital unit and karate instructors
to South Viet-Nam.

These actions were a reflection of Korea's
deep sense of obligation to those who had
come to her assistance in her hour of need,
of her willingness to take part in collective
action against Communist aggression, and of
her recognition that there will be no peace
or stability in Asia unless Communist ag-
gression is checked. Few Koreans have not
been seared in one way or another by the
Communists, and the Korean response to
South Viet-Nam's call comes from burning
personal memories of what communism
means.

Emergence of Effective Government

In the political realm, the Korean consti-
tution and election laws have come to grips
with what has been a persistent problem in
Korean political life — the multiplication of
political parties and the tendency toward
division. Three principles were incorporated
in the political system in the 1963 elections
to produce greater cohesion and discipline:

1. No candidate may run for the national

864

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

legislature as an independent. Each must be
a member of a political party.

2. If an elected member of the legislature
resigns from his party, he forfeits his seat.
This has restrained individual resignations
and shifts.

3. However, if a party expels a member,
he does not lose his seat. This imposes a
discipline on the party.

These were purely Korean institutional in-
ventions, and they have produced more sta-
bility and discipline in political party life
than Korea has ever knovvTi.

I do not want to leave you with the im-
pression that all problems have been solved
or are on the way to solution in Korea. There
is still too much unemployment and under-
employment. The need for housing is very
great. Agriculture is still at the mercy of
the weather, and there is need for more
irrigation. The decision to restore elections
for local government has yet to be made.
The standard of living is rising, but it is still
low for too many families. (I would point
out here that North Korean defectors who
come to South Korea are astonished at the
high standard compared with the North.)

What we are seeing in Korea in these last
few years is the emergence of effective
government — something which Korea has
not known for many generations — a govern-
ment with the capacity to make plans and
develop programs and carry them out. Lit-
erate, energetic, and hard-working people
can do much for themselves, but it takes
effective, forward-looking government to
produce an environment that encourages
rapid progress, offers hope for the future,
and liberates the creative energies of the
people for constructive purposes.

Many Koreans have contributed to this
achievement — men from the armed forces
and from civilian life, working together to
convert Korea into a modern nation. Among

them the man who stands out is President
Park Chung Hee, who led the military coup
in 1961 and then in 1963 fulfilled his pledge
to hold elections. He is providing purposeful,
courageous, and imaginative leadership to a
long-suffering people, bringing organization
and direction to bear on the problems of
Korea. And the results are promising. The
foundations of economic and political sta-
bility and growth are being laid.

I can best describe what is happening by
telling the story of a visit I made to a small
village of about a hundred families. The
Korean Government has been making a
valiant effort in the rural areas to introduce
new concepts and ways of doing things. This
village was being taught to work together,
to develop diversified crops, to plant fruit
trees, to re-lay paddy fields for more effi-
cient cultivation, to use commercial fertilizer
and better seed, to raise rabbits, pigs,
chickens, and mushrooms. A young man
from the village, who had been a junior
officer in the armed forces, was elected
village chief. He had plans and programs,
charts and records, and enthusiasm. And
the village was responding.

I asked an old gentleman what he thought
of all the changes which were taking place,
and I shall never forget his answer: "I can-
not understand why we have been sleeping
so long."

That phrase eloquently sums up the great
changes now going on in Korea. There is a
growing faith in the ability of Koreans to
solve their problems. There is a growing
excitement that Korea is now on the way to
a new and more hopeful life. There is a
growing confidence in the future.

By the strange workings of history we
have played a part in that awakening, and
we will continue to play a part — by support-
ing the Koreans in their defense and by
supporting their efforts to build a new
modern society in Korea.

MAY 30, 1966

865

A Call for Release of American Prisoners
Held by Communist China

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs ^

I am deeply honored this evening to be
able to participate in this testimonial dinner
to Bishop James E. Walsh. Bishop Walsh
was 75 years old a week ago today. Thirty-
seven of those years he has spent in China,
during a period when the Chinese people
have endured virtually unceasing struggle,
revolution, and war.

Bishop Walsh arrived in China while the
warlords were still vying for power and
pillaging China for their personal profit. He
was there before the Chinese Communist
Party was founded and was a witness to the
years during which the Republic of China
waged its desperate battle against an
internal enemy in the form of the Commu-
nist insurgency and the external Japanese in-
vader.

After the Communists seized power on the
mainland, they effectively halted all the
work of the Catholic Church. Bishop Walsh
could well have left any time during these
early years. The Communists, recognizing
the symbol that he represented for many
Chinese Catholics, repeatedly attempted to
persuade the Bishop to abandon his post.
But Bishop Walsh insisted that his duty lay
with his parishioners, whom he was unwill-
ing to desert.

Finally the Chinese Communists arrested
the Bishop, and, after 2 years of interroga-
tion, he was sentenced in March 1960 to 20

years' imprisonment on the palpably unjusti-
fied charges of "espionage and subversion."

Bishop Walsh has been in prison now for
6 years, displaying personal courage and
faith in God and man. His behavior has
been an inspiration to all of us. The Chinese
Communists have been repeatedly ap-
proached not only by the United States
Government but by other governments and
private individuals with pleas and requests
that Bishop Walsh be allowed to go free. I
regret that so far Peking has coldly re-
buffed these approaches, as well as parallel
efforts made on behalf of the four other
Americans it holds prisoner on similar
charges.-

The United States Government deeply re-
grets that despite the agreement ^ reached
between ourselves and Peking in 1955 for the
exchange of citizens who wished to return
home — including those in prison — there are
still Americans held in Chinese prisons. The
United States has repeatedly offered to
facilitate the return to Communist China of
any Chinese in the U.S. — including convicted
criminals in prison — who wishes to leave.
We will continue this policy, and we will
continue to press Peking to carry out the
1955 agreement. Until it does, we have no
alternative but to exercise patience and
mobilize our vigilance. For nothing is eternal

I

' Address made at the Bishop James E. Walsh
testimonial dinner at Baltimore, Md., on May 7 (press
release 106).

" The four other American prisoners are : John
Thomas Downey, Richard Fecteau, H. F. Redmond,
and Capt. Philip Smith, USAF.

' For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 19, 1955, p. 456.

866

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

about the policies and attitudes of any coun-
try, including Communist China.

Doctrine of World Revolution

Today we find the Chinese Communists
dedicated to a fanatical and bellicose doc-
trine of world revolution, committed to bring
China onto the world stage as a great power.
Communist Chinese ambitions envisage not
merely the restoration of influence in the
neighboring areas of Asia but ultimately
Communist totalitarian regimes throughout
the area. In pursuing its objectives Peking
has not refrained from the use of force, al-
though recently it has drawn back when a
major conflict appeared likely.

More critical than any direct and overt
use of force has been the Chinese Commu-
nist encouragement, training, financing, and
equipping of revolutionaries and insurrec-
tionaries in a whole series of countries under
the slogan of supporting "wars of national
liberation." They have followed this course
in Africa, Latin America, and in Asia. The
fact that their efforts have failed more
often than they have succeeded and that
Peking has increasingly isolated itself in the
world by these policies is no reason for
indifference or complacency.

Although the war in Viet-Nam is basically
a North Vietnamese ambition and operation,
the Chinese Communists, in their propa-
ganda, in their direct material support for
North Viet-Nam, and in their fervent op-
position to any efforts at a peaceful settle-
ment, have attempted to make Communist
success in Viet-Nam the key to the victory
of the "Mao Tse-tung road to revolution."
As we assist the South Vietnamese to pre-
serve their right to determine their oviti
future without external interference, we at
the same time act to prevent the success of
the expansionist designs of Communist
China.

It is in the vital interest of the free na-
tions of Asia themselves and of all those
who value peace and self-determination in
the area to resist Peking's attempts to im-
pose its system and influence on its neigh-

bors. The United States would welcome the
opportunity to live at peace with all coun-
tries in Asia. We have repeatedly indicated
to Peking, both by word and by caution in
our actions, that we want no war with the
Chinese Communists. But we shall never be
expelled by force from this area. Nor shall
we desist for one moment from our efforts
to assist in every useful way — economic, so-
cial, and political, as well as military — the
free nations of Asia to work out their own
destinies without having an alien system
imposed on them by force.

Hostility Toward United States

The Chinese Communist hostility toward
the United States, which has lain at the core
of their foreign policy for 17 years, now
rests on two beliefs: that the U.S. is, in
Marxist terms, the "enemy of all the people
in the world" and consequently of the Chi-
nese Communist authorities, who today con-
sider themselves the ideological preceptors
of "all the people of the world"; and that
the U.S., in terms of Chinese Communist
national interests, is blocking the expansion
of Chinese influence in Asia. These attitudes
and ambitions are held tenaciously by the
present leaders of Communist China. They
seem unable to understand that independent
nations in Asia and Africa are unwilling to
adopt the "Chinese" model or succumb to
Chinese Communist influence. They have
not yet realized the true implications of the
series of major setbacks for Peking's foreign
policy over the last year.

The present leaders in Peking fear that
their heirs will not pursue zealously the
goals of Chinese communism. They are wor-
ried that the tedium of daily life and the
cynicism about the soundness of the regime's
policies, which have increasingly become
apparent on the mainland in recent years,
will ultimately cause a significant shift in
the policies of a new generation of leaders.

Bishop Walsh once wrote that "future
events are uncertain and it is best always
to wait until they actually occur — the only
time we can be sure — especially in China."

MAY 30, 1966

867

I am in full agreement with this wise maxim,
and I would be the last to predict quick
changes in Communist China. We can be
under no illusions that, for the present, Pe-
king is anything but hostile toward the
United States or wishes us anything but ill.
Nor can we expect that major concessions
to Chinese Communist demands for power
and influence at the present time will reap
anything but further and more insistent
demands. Our opposition to the admission
of Communist China to the United Nations is
based not merely on the impossible condi-
tions it has stated for its participation in the
United Nations but on the basic conflict be-
tween its policies and actions and the pur-
poses of the U.N. Charter as well as the
obligations of constructive participation in
U.N. deliberations.

Channels of Communication With Peking

Nevertheless we must continue to keep
firmly in our minds the need to work toward
a time when the historic ties of friendship
between ourselves and the people of main-
land China can be restored, when Americans
and Chinese can freely travel between each
other's countries, when trade and cultural
relations can develop, and when China is
willing to live at peace with the United
States, its neighbors, and other countries of
the world.

We have ourselves taken a series of uni-
lateral steps which offer Peking the oppor-
tunity to escape from its present isolation
and to live at peace with the world. We have
gradually expanded the categories of Ameri-
can citizens who may travel to Communist
China and indicated our willingness to per-
mit American academic institutions to invite
Chinese Communist scholars and scientists
to visit their campuses. We have in the past
indicated that, if the Communist Chinese
were interested in purchasing grain, we
would consider such sales. We have agreed
to allow Chinese Communist newspapermen
to come to the United States and have al-
lowed Chinese Communist publications to be
purchased freely by American libraries.

Peking has given only negative reactions
to our offers; indeed, it has made it abun-
dantly clear that it will not accept them. But
we do want to keep open channels of contact
and communication for a time when the
Chinese Communists may be more willing to
respond. This, in part, is the reason for our
desire to maintain our direct diplomatic
contacts with the Chinese in Warsaw and for
our expressed willingness to sit down and
discuss the critical problems of disarmament
with Peking.

We remain absolutely firm in our deter-
mination to defend our allies, including the
Republic of China on Taiwan, from the use
of force, direct or indirect, against their
territory by Peking, to preserve the position
of the Republic of China in the U.N., and to
assist those countries of Asia that seek our
help to strengthen their political, economic,
and social foundations. Our effort to join
with the free nations of Asia in containing
and preventing the expansion of Communist
China is not only a struggle against aggres-
sion and subversion in the Western Pacific
but part and parcel of our continuing efforts
to achieve a world order in which all nations
can enjoy peace and well-being without fear
of domination by others.

But we have made it abundantly clear that
we do not intend to attack Communist China,
that we do not want war, and, as Secretary
Rusk said recently,'* that we do not believe
either in the "fatal inevitability of war with
Communist China" or "the existence of an
unending and inevitable state of hostility
between ourselves and the rulers of main-
land China."

There are many ways in which Peking
could at some point indicate that it recog-
nizes our sincerity in seeking peace. The ,
freeing of Bishop Walsh and the other four
American citizens now held in Communist
China to return to their families and friends,
for instance, would be most gratifying to all
Americans and would be regarded as evi-
dence of Peking's desire for friendlier rela-

• Ibid., May 2, 1966, p. 686.

868

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tions with the American people. I know that
all of you join with me in hoping that at
some point the leaders in Peking will see
more clearly that the best interests of the
mainland Chinese lie in pursuing peace and
a course of friendship and amity with all
countries and peoples.

Communist China Conducts
Third Nuclear Test

Department Statement ^

Nearly a year has passed since Commu-
nist China exploded its second nuclear
device. The third test occurred today [May
9] in Sinkiang and comes as no surprise.
As you know, a Department of State spokes-
man noted on April 28 that such a test
should be expected soon.

Today's test was an atmospheric test,
with a yield in the same general range as
previous Chinese tests. Further evaluation
must await collection and analyses of the de-
bris in the atmosphere.

This test, of course, is part of the delib-
erate and costly Chinese Communist pro-
gram to acquire a nuclear weapon.

The United States Government continues
to deplore the disregard of the Chinese Com-
munist leaders for the desires and well-being
of people throughout the world who may suf-
fer from the ill effects of atmospheric nu-
clear testing, which most of the world has
banned by adherence to the limited test ban
treaty.2

The United States reaffirms its defense
commitments in Asia and the assurances
given by President Johnson on October 18,
1964,3 of our strong support to nations that
do not seek national nuclear weapons if they
need our support against any threat of nu-
clear blackmail.

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on May 9.

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 12, 1963, p. 239.
' For text, see ibid., Nov. 2, 1964, p. 610.

State, Justice Improve Procedures
on Visas for Conference Guests

The Departments of State and Justice have
agreed on improved administrative machin-
ery to expedite granting visas to guests of
international conferences held in the United
States, it was announced on May 3 (Depart-
ment of State press release 104) .

The change in procedure is in accord vdth
the wishes of the President. On February 2,
he called on the Secretary of State and the
Attorney General "to explore ways to remove
unnecessary hindrances in granting visas to
guests invited from abroad" to attend inter-
national conferences.

At present almost all persons invited from
non-Communist countries are allowed to at-
tend international conferences held in the
United States. However, those who are or
have at any time been members of a Com-
munist or Communist-front organization are
first denied visas and then subjected to de-
lays of up to 6 weeks while the Departments
of State and Justicfe process an application
for an individual waiver of the provision of
law excluding all past or present Commu-
nists. The delays and embarrassment in-
volved in obtaining permission to enter the
United States for even 5 days under the
present procedure have caused some guests
to abandon plans to attend conferences, have
made the United States a less attractive loca-
tion for international conferences, and have
marred this country's image as a free and
open society.

Under the new procedure, upon receipt of
the description of a proposed international
conference, the Secretary of State may rec-
ommend to the Attorney General that the
national interest requires a group waiver of
the provision of law which would otherwise
automatically exclude all persons invited to
the conference who had at any time been
associated with a Communist party. If the
Attorney General grants a group waiver, our
embassies and consulates abroad will then
be able to issue a visa promptly to any in-
vitee who is otherwise eligible.

Visas will, of course, continue to be denied

MAY 30, 1966

869

in any individual case in which there is rea-
son to believe that a particular invitee's visit
to the United States would be contrary to
our national interest, or might endanger the
national security, or might be inconsistent
with existing international agreements.

Additional Foreign Passports
Valid Beyond Expiration Date

Sudan and Viet Nam ^
Validity of Foreign Passports

Sudan and Viet Nam are added to the
list of countries which have entered into
agreements with the Government of
the United States whereby their passports
are recognized as valid for the return of
the bearer to the country of the foreign issu-
ing authority for a period of at least six
months beyond the expiration date specified
in the passport.

This notice amends Public Notice 238 of
November 17, 1964 (29 F.R. 16097). ^

Philip B. Heymann,

Acting Administrator, Bureau of

Security and Consular Affairs.

April 27, 1966.

Current Treaty Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

' Public Notice 244; 31 Fed. Reg. 6794.

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 21, 1964, p. 890.

Protocol amending articles 48(a), 49(e), and 61 of
the convention on international civil aviation
(TIAS 1591) by providing that sessions of the
Assembly of the International Civil Aviation Or-
ganization shall be held not less than once in 3
years instead of annually. Done at Montreal June
14, 1954. Entered into force December 12, 1956.
TIAS 3756.

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29,
1965; Rwanda, November 15, 1965; Saudi Ara-
bia, February 25, 1966.
Protocol amending article 50(a) of the convention on
international civil aviation (TIAS 1591) to in-
crease membership of the council from 21 to 27.
Done at Montreal June 21, 1961. Entered into force
July 17, 1962. TIAS 5170.
Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29,
1965; Luxembourg, October 3, 1963; Rwanda,
November 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February
25, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with final
protocol, general regulations with final protocol,
and convention with final protocol and regulations
of execution. Done at Vienna July 10, 1964 (TIAS
5881).

Ratifications deposited: Finland, December 17,
1965; Mali, December 18, 1965.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite sys-
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered
into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.
Signature: Thailand, May 12, 1966.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1405 PUBLICATION 8086 MAY 30, 19&6

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication Issued by the Office
of Media Serrices, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
agencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreicn relatione and on the work of the
Department of Stata and the Fordtm
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Seerctarr of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concemiug treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of Internationa] relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin Is for sale by the Supei^
intendent of Doonmenta, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.O.,
20402. Peice: 52 issues, domestic tlO,
foreign $15; single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this ptllv
lication approved by the Director of the
Burean of the Budget (January 11, 1968).

KOTB; Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

870

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX May 30, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. U05

t American Principles. The Obligations of Power

(Johnson) 835

Asia

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

(Rusk) 830

A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held

by Communist China (Bundy) 866

The Obligations of Power (Johnson) .... 835
Atomic Energy. Communist China Conducts

Third Nuclear Test (Department statement) . 869
China
A Call for Release of American Prisoners Held

by Communist China (Bundy) 866

Communist China Conducts Third Nuclear Test

(Department statement) 869

Congress

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia

(Rusk) 830

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,

text of proposed legislation) 838

Economic Affairs

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

The Johnson Trade Policy (Roth) 856

Korea — Progress and Prospects (Berger) . . 860

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

U.S. Shipowners Formally Notified of Ban on
Rhodesian Oil Shipments (letter to Maritime
Administrator) 859

World Trade Week, 1966 (proclamation) . . 837

Educational and Cultural Affairs. Korea —
Progress and Prospects (Berger) .... 860

Europe

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
' With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

Foreign Aid. Korea — Progress and Prospects
(Berger) 860

Korea. Korea — Progress and Prospects (Ber-
ger) 860

Passports

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond Ex-
piration Date (public notice) 870

State, Justice Improve Procedures on Visas for
Conference Guests 869

Presidential Documents

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems 834

The Obligations of Power 835

World Trade Week, 1966 . . .- 837

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Shipowners Formally
Notified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments
(letter to Maritime Administrator) .... 859

Sudan. Additional Foreign Passports Valid Be-
yond Expiration Date (public notice) . . 870

Treaty Information. Current Actions . . . 870

U.S.S.R.

East-West Trade Relations Act of 1966 (Rusk,
text of proposed legislation) 838

Report of the Special Committee on U.S. Trade
With East European Countries and the So-
viet Union (text) 845

United Nations. U.S. Shipowners Formally No-
tified of Ban on Rhodesian Oil Shipments
(letter to Maritime Administrator) . . . 859

Viet-Nam

Background of U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia
(Rusk) 830

NSC Reviews Viet-Nam Problems (Johnson) . 834

Additional Foreign Passports Valid Beyond
Expiration Date (public notice) 870

Name Index

Berger, Samuel D 860

Bundy, William P 866

Johnson, President 834, 835, 837

Mann, Thomas C 859

Roth, William M 856

Rusk, Secretary 830, 838

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 9-15

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 9 which appear
in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 104
of May 3 and 106 of May 7.

No. Date Subject

107 5/11 Rusk: East-West Trade Rela-
tions Act of 1966.

tl08 5/12 ITU seminar on earth-station
technology (rewrite).

*109 5/13 Personnel assignments in re-
search and analysis of Viet-
namese and Chinese affairs.

tllO 5/13 Warsaw Convention: announce-
ment of U.S. withdrawal of
denunciation.

till 5/14 Warsaw Convention: text of U.S.
note.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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II

THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. U06

June 6, 1966

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 17 882

THE ERA OF EDUCATIONAL AND CULTURAL RELATIONS
by Assistant Secretat-y Frankel 889

U.S. DISCUSSES PROPOSED SAFEGUARDS FOR CUTOFF AND TRANSFER

OF FISSIONABLE MATERIAL AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS DESTRUCTION

Statement by William C. Foster 901

SECURITY IN THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD
by Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara 87i

For index see inside back cover

I

"The plain, blunt truth is that contemporary man still
conceives of war and peace in much the same stereotyped
terms that his ancestors did. The fact that these ancestors,
both recent and remote, were conspicuously unsuccessful
at avoiding war, and enlarging peace, doesn't seem to
dampen our capacity for cliches." (

Security in the Contemporary World

by Robert S. McNamara
Secretary of Defense ^

Any American would be fortunate to visit
this lovely island city, in this hospitable
land. But there is a special satisfaction for
a Secretary of Defense to cross the longest
border in the world and realize that it is
also the least armed border in the world. It
prompts one to reflect how negative and
narrow a notion of defense still clouds our
century.

There is still among us an almost eradi-
cable tendency to think of our security
problem as being exclusively a military
problem — and to think of the military prob-
lem as being exclusively a weapons-system
or hardware problem.

The plain, blunt truth is that contem-
porary man still conceives of war and peace
in much the same stereotyped terms that his
ancestors did. The fact that these ancestors,
both recent and remote, were conspicuously
unsuccessful at avoiding war, and enlarg-
ing peace, doesn't seem to dampen our
capacity for cliches.

We still tend to conceive of national se-
curity almost solely as a state of armed
readiness: a vast, awesome arsenal of
weaponry.

' Address made before the American Society of
Newspaper Editors at Montreal, Canada, on May 18.

874

We still tend to assume that it is
primarily this purely military ingredient
that creates security.

We are still haunted by this concept of
military hardware.

But how limited a concept this actually is
becomes apparent when one ponders the
kind of peace that exists between the
United States and Canada.

It is a very cogent example. Here we are,
two modern nations, highly developed tech-
nologically, each with immense territory,
both enriched with great reserves of natural
resources, each militarily sophisticated; and
yet we sit across from one another, divided
by an unguarded frontier of thousands of
miles, and there is not a remotest set of cir-
cumstances, in any imaginable time frame
of the future, in which our two nations
would wage war on one another.

It is so unthinkable an idea as to be
totally absurd. But w% is that so ?

Is it because we are both ready in an in-
stant to hurl our military hardware at one
another? Is it because we are both zeroed
in on one another's vital targets? Is it be-
cause we are both armed to our technologi-
cal teeth that we do not go to war? The
whole notion, as applied to our two coun-
tries, is ludicrous. .

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Canada and the United States are at
peace for reasons that have nothing what-
ever to do vi^ith our mutual military readi-
ness. We are at peace — truly at peace — be-
cause of the vast fund of compatible beliefs,
common principles, and shared ideals. We
have our differences and our diversity — and
let us hope for the sake of a mutually re-
vsrarding relationship we never become
sterile carbon copies of one another. But
the whole point is that our basis of mutual
peace has nothing whatever to do with our
military hardware.

Now this is not to say, obviously enough,
that the concept of military deterrence is
no longer relevant in the contemporary
world. Unhappily, it still is critically rele-
vant with respect to our potential ad-
versaries. But it has no relevance what-
ever between the United States and Canada.

We are not adversaries. We are not
going to become adversaries. And it is not
mutual military deterrence that keeps us
from becoming adversaries. It is mutual re-
spect for common principles.

Now I mention this — as obvious as it all
is — simply as a kind of reductio ad ab-
surdum of the concept that military hard-
ware is the exclusive or even the primary
ingredient of permanent peace in the mid-
20th century.

In the United States over the past 5
years, we have achieved a considerably im-
proved balance in our total military posture.
That was the mandate I received from
Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and with
their support, and that of the Congress, we
have been able to create a strengthened
force structure of land, sea, and air com-
ponents— with a vast increase in mobility
and materiel and with a massive superiority
in nuclear retaliatory power over any com-
bination of potential adversaries.

Our capabilities for nuclear, conventional,
and countersubversive war have all been
broadened and improved; and we have ac-
complished this through military budgets
that were in fact lesser percentages of our
gross national product than in the past.

From the point of view of combat readi-

ness, the United States has never been
militarily stronger. We intend to maintain
that readiness.

But if we think profoundly about the
matter, it is clear that this purely military
posture is not the central element in our se-
curity. A nation can reach the point at
which it does not buy more security for it-
self simply by buying more military hard-
ware. We are at that point.

The decisive factor for a powerful na-
tion— already adequately armed — is the
character of its relationships with the world.

In this respect, there are three broad
groups of nations: first, those that
are struggling to develop; secondly, those
free nations that have reached a level of
strength and prosperity that enables them
to contribute to the peace of the world; and
finally, those nations who might be
tempted to make themselves our adversaries.
For each of these groups, the United States,
to preserve its own intrinsic security, has
to have distinctive sets of relationships.

First, we have to help protect those de-
veloping countries which genuinely need
and request our help and which, as an es-
sential precondition, are willing and able to
help themselves.

Second, we have to encourage and achieve
a more effective partnership with those na-
tions who can and should share interna-
tional peacekeeping responsibilities.

Third, we must do all we realistically can
to reduce the risk of conflict with those
who might be tempted to take up arms
against us.

Let us examine these three sets of rela-
tionships in detail.

The Developing Nations

First, the developing nations. Roughly
100 countries today are caught up in the
difficult transition from traditional to mod-
ern societies. There is no uniform rate of
progress among them, and they range from
primitive mosaic societies — fractured by
tribalism and held feebly together by the
slenderest of political sinews — to relatively

JUNE 6, 1966

875

sophisticated countries well on the road to
agricultural sufficiency and industrial com-
petence.

This sweeping surge of development, par-
ticularly across the whole southern half of
the globe, has no parallel in history. It has
turned traditionally listless areas of the
world into seething cauldrons of change.
On the whole, it has not been a very peaceful
process.

In the last 8 years alone there have been
no less than 164 internationally significant
outbreaks of violence, each of them spe-
cifically designed as a serious challenge to
the authority, or the very existence, of the
government in question. Eighty-two dif-
ferent governments have been directly in-
volved.

What is striking is that only 15 of these
164 significant resorts to violence have been
military conflicts between two states. And
not a single one of the 164 conflicts has
been a formally declared war. Indeed, there
has not been a formal declaration of war —
anywhere in the world — since World War
II.

The planet is becoming a more dangerous
place to live on, not merely because of a po-
tential nuclear holocaust but also because of
the large number of de facto conflicts and
because the trend of such conflicts is grow-
ing rather than diminishing. At the begin-
ning of 1958, there were 23 prolonged in-
surgencies going on about the world. As of
February 1, 1966, there were 40. Further,
the total number of outbreaks of violence
has increased each year: In 1958, there
were 34; in 1965, there were 58.

The Relationship of Violence and Economic Status

But what is most significant of all is
that there is a direct and constant rela-
tionship between the incidence of violence
and the economic status of the countries
afflicted. The World Bank divides nations
on the basis of per capita income into four
categories: rich, middle-income, poor, and
very poor.

The rich nations are those with a per
capita income of $750 per year or more.

The current U.S. level is more than $2,700.
There are 27 of these rich nations. They
possess 75 percent of the world's wealth,
though roughly only 25 percent of the
world's population.

Since 1958, only one of these 27 nations
has suffered a major internal upheaval on
its own territory. But observe what hap-
pens at the other end of the economic scale.
Among the 38 very poor nations — those
with a per capita income of under $100 a
year — not less than 32 have suffered sig-
nificant conflicts. Indeed, they have suf-
fered an average of two major outbreaks of
violence per country in the 8-year period.
That is a great deal of conflict. What is
worse, it has been predominantly conflict of
a prolonged nature.

The trend holds predictably constant in
the case of the two other categories: the
poor and the middle-income nations. Since
1958, 87 percent of the very poor nations,
69 percent of the poor nations, and 48 per-
cent of the middle-income nations have suf-
fered serious violence.

There can, then, be no question but that
there is an irrefutable relationship between
violence and economic backwardness. And
the trend of such violence is up, not down.

Now, it would perhaps be somewhat re-
assuring if the gap between the rich nations
and the poor nations were closing and eco-
nomic backwardness were significantly re-
ceding. But it is not. The economic gap is
widening.

By the year 1970 over one-half of the
world's total population will live in the in-
dependent nations sweeping across the
southern half of the planet. But this hun-
gering half of the human race will by then
command only one-sixth of the world's
total of goods and services. By the year
1975 the dependent children of these na-
tions alone — children under 15 years of age
— will equal the total population of the de-
veloped nations to the north.

Even in our own abundant societies, we
have reason enough to worry over the
tensions that coil and tighten among under-
privileged young people and finally flail

876

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

out in delinquency and crime. What are
we to expect from a whole hemisphere of
youth where mounting frustrations are
likely to fester into eruptions of violence
and extremism?

Annual per capita income in roughly half
of the 80 underdeveloped nations that are
members of the World Bank is rising by a
paltry 1 percent a year or less. By the end
of the century these nations, at their present
rates of growth, will reach a per capita in-
come of barely $170 a year. The United
States, by the same criterion, will attain a
per capita income of $4,500.

The conclusion to all of this is blunt and
inescapable: Given the certain connection
between economic stagnation and the inci-
dence of violence, the years that lie ahead
for the nations in the southern half of the
globe are pregnant with violence.

U.S. Security and the Newly Developing World

This would be true even if no threat of
Communist subversion existed — as it clearly
does. Both Moscow and Peking, however
harsh their internal differences, regard the
whole modernization process as an ideal en-
vironment for the growth of communism.
Their experience with subversive internal
war is extensive, and they have developed
a considerable array of both doctrine and
practical measures in the art of political
violence.

What is often misunderstood is that Com-
munists are capable of subverting, manipu-
lating, and finally directing for their own
ends the wholly legitimate grievances of a
developing society.

But it would be a gross oversimplifica-
tion to regard communism as the central
factor in every conflict throughout the un-
derdeveloped world. Of the 149 serious in-
ternal insurgencies in the past 8 years, Com-
munists have been involved in only 58 of
them — 38 percent of the total — and this in-
cludes seven instances in which a Communist
regime itself was the target of the uprising.

Whether Communists are involved or not,
violence anywhere in a taut world transmits

sharp signals through the complex ganglia
of international relations; and the security
of the United States is related to the se-
curity and stability of nations half a globe
away.

But neither conscience nor sanity itself
suggests that the United States is, should,
or could be the global gendarme. Quite the
contrary. Experience confirms what human
nature suggests: that in most instances of
internal violence the local people themselves
are best able to deal directly with the situa-
tion within the framework of their own
traditions.

The United States has no mandate from
on high to police the world and no inclina-
tion to do so. There have been classic cases
in which our deliberate nonaction was the
wisest action of all. Where our help is not
sought, it is seldom prudent to volunteer.
Certainly we have no charter to rescue
floundering regimes who have brought
violence on themselves by deliberately re-
fusing to meet the legitimate expectations
of their citizenry.

Further, throughout the next decade ad-
vancing technology will reduce the require-
ments for bases and staging rights at par-
ticular locations abroad, and the whole pat-
tern of forward deployment will gradually
change.

But, though all these caveats are clear
enough, the irreducible fact remains that
our security is related directly to the se-
curity of the newly developing world. And
our role must be precisely this: to help pro-
vide security to those developing nations
which genuinely need and request our help
and which demonstrably are willing and
able to help themselves.

Security and Development

The rub comes in this: We do not always
grasp the meaning of the word "security"
in this context. In a modernizing society,
security means development.

Security is not military hardware, though
it may include it. Security is not military
force, though it may involve it. Securitv is

JUNE 6, 1966

877

not traditional military activity, though it
may encompass it.

Security is development. Without devel-
opment, there can be no security. A develop-
ing nation that does not in fact develop
simply cannot remain "secure." It cannot
remain secure for the intractable reason
that its own citizenry cannot shed its human
nature.

If security implies anything, it implies a
minimal measure of order and stability.
Without internal development of at least a
minimal degree, order and stability are
simply not possible. They are not possible
because human nature cannot be frustrated
beyond intrinsic limits. It reacts because it
must.

Novi^, that is vi^hat vfe do not always un-
derstand, and that is also what govern-
ments of modernizing nations do not always
understand. But by emphasizing that se-
curity arises from development, I do not say
that an underdeveloped nation cannot be
subverted from within, or be aggressed upon
from without, or be the victim of a combina-
tion of the two. It can. And to prevent any
or all of these conditions, a nation does re-
quire appropriate military capabilities to
deal with the specific problem. But the
specific military problem is only a narrow
facet of the broader security problem.

Military force can help provide law and
order but only to the degree that a basis for
law and order already exists in the devel-
oping society: a basic willingness on the
part of the people to cooperate. The law and
order is a shield, behind which the central
fact of security — development — can be
achieved.

Now we are not playing a semantic game
with these words. The trouble is that we
have been lost in a semantic jungle for too
long. We have come to identify "security"
with exclusively military phenomena, and
most particularly with military hardware.
But it just isn't so. And we need to ac-
commodate to the facts of the matter if we
want to see security survive and grow in
the southern half of the globe.

Development means economic, social, and

878

political progress. It means a reasonable
standard of living, and the word "reason-
able" in this context requires continual re-
definition. What is "reasonable" in an ear-
lier stage of development will become "un-
reasonable" in a later stage.

As development progresses, security pro-
gresses. And when the people of a nation
have organized their own human and nat-
ural resources to provide themselves with
what they need and expect out of life — and
have learned to compromise peacefully
among competing demands in the larger
national interest — then their resistance to
disorder and violence will be enormously
increased.

Conversely, the tragic need of desperate
men to resort to force to achieve the inner
imperatives of human decency will diminish.

Military and Economic Spheres of U.S. Aid

Now, I have said that the role of the
United States is to help provide security to
these modernizing nations, providing they
need and request our help and are clearly
willing and able to help themselves. But
what should our help be? Clearly, it should
be help toward development.

In the military sphere, that involves two
broad categories of assistance.

We should help the developing nation
with such training and equipment as is nec-
essary to maintain the protective shield be-
hind which development can go forward.
The dimensions of that shield vary from
country to country, but what is essential is
that it should be a shield and not a capacity
for external aggression.

The second, and perhaps less understood
category of military assistance in a mod-
ernizing nation, is training in civic action.
Civic action is another one of those se-
mantic puzzles. Too few Americans — and
too few officials in developing nations —
really comprehend what military civic ac-
tion means.

Essentially, it means using indigenous
military forces for nontraditional military
projects, projects that are useful to the

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

local population in fields such as education,
public works, health, sanitation, agricul-
ture— indeed, anything connected with eco-
nomic or social progress.

It has had some impressive results. In
the past 4 years the U.S.-assisted civic ac-
tion program, worldwide, has constructed
or repaired more than 10,000 miles of
roads, built over 1,000 schools, hundreds of
hospitals and clinics, and has provided
medical and dental care to approximately 4
million people.

What is important is that all this was done
by indigenous men in uniform. Quite apart
from the developmental projects themselves,
the program powerfully alters the negative
image of the military man as the oppres-
sive preserver of the stagnant stattis quo.

But assistance in the purely military
sphere is not enough. Economic assistance
is also essential. The President is deter-
mined that our aid should be hardheaded
and rigorously realistic, that it should deal
directly with the roots of underdevelop-
ment and not merely attempt to alleviate
the symptoms. His bedrock principle is
that U.S. economic aid — no matter what
its magnitude — is futile unless the country
in question is resolute in making the pri-
mary effort itself. That will be the cri-
terion, and that will be the crucial condi-
tion for all our future assistance.

Only the developing nations themselves
can take the fundamental measures that
make outside assistance meaningful. These
measures are often unpalatable — and fre-
quently call for political courage and de-
cisiveness. But to fail to undertake painful,
but essential, reform inevitably leads to far
more painful revolutionary violence. Our
economic assistance is designed to offer a
reasonable alternative to that violence. It is
designed to help substitute peaceful progress
for tragic internal conflict.

The United States intends to be com-
passionate and generous in this effort, but
it is not an effort it can carry exclusively
by itself. And thus it looks to those nations
who have reached the point of self-sustain-
ing prosperity to increase their contribution

to the development and, thus, to the security
of the modernizing world.

Sharing Peacekeeping Responsibilities

And that brings me to the second set of
relationships that I underscored at the out-
set; it is the policy of the United States to
encourage and achieve a more effective
partnership with those nations who can,
and should, share international peacekeep-
ing responsibilities.

America has devoted a higher proportion
of its gross national product to its military
establishment than any other major free-
world nation. This was true even before
our increased expenditures in Southeast
Asia. We have had, over the last few years,
as many men in uniform as all the nations
of Western Europe combined, even though
they have a population half again greater
than our own.

Now, the American people are not going
to shirk their obligations in any part of the
world, but they clearly cannot be expected to
bear a disproportionate share of the com-
mon burden indefinitely. If, for example,
other nations genuinely believe — as they
say they do — that it is in the common in-
terest to deter the expansion of Red China's
economic and political control beyond its
national boundaries, then they must take a
more active role in guarding the defense
perimeter.

Let me be perfectly clear. This is not to
question the policy of neutralism or non-
alinement of any particular nation. But it
is to emphasize that the independence of
such nations can, in the end, be fully safe-
guarded only by collective agreements
among themselves and their neighbors.

The plain truth is the day is coming
when no single nation, however powerful,
can undertake by itself to keep the peace
outside its own borders. Regional and in-
ternational organizations for peacekeeping
purposes are as yet rudimentary, but they
must grow in experience and be strength-
ened by deliberate and practical cooperative
action.

JUNE 6, 1966

879

In this matter, the example of Canada is
a model for nations everywhere. As Prime
Minister Pearson pointed out eloquently in
New York just last week: Canada "is as
deeply involved in the world's affairs as
any country of its size. We accept this be-
cause we have learned over 50 years that
isolation from the policies that determine
war does not give us immunity from the
bloody, sacrificial consequences of their fail-
ure. We learned that in 1914 and again in
1939. . . . That is why we have been proud
to send our men to take part in every
peacekeeping operation of the United Na-
tions— in Korea, and Kashmir, and the
Suez, and the Congo, and Cyprus."

The Organization of American States in
the Dominican Republic, the more than 30
nations contributing troops or supplies to
assist the Government of South Viet-
Nam, indeed even the parallel efforts of the
United States and the Soviet Union in the
Pakistan-India conflict — these efforts, to-
gether with those of the U.N., are the first
attempts to substitute multinational for
unilateral policing of violence. They point
to the peacekeeping patterns of the future.

We must not merely applaud the idea.
We must dedicate talent, resources, and
hard practical thinking to its implementa-
tion.

In Western Europe, an area whose bur-
geoning economic vitality stands as a monu-
ment to the wisdom of the Marshall Plan,
the problems of security are neither static
nor wholly new. Fundamental changes are
under way, though certain inescapable re-
alities remain. The conventional forces of
NATO, for example, still require a nuclear
backdrop far beyond the capability of any
Western European nation to supply, and
the United States is fully committed to
provide that major nuclear deterrent.

However, the European members of the
alliance have a natural desire to participate
more actively in nuclear planning. A cen-
tral task of the alliance today is, therefore,
to work out the relationships and institu-
tions through which shared nuclear plan-
ning can be effective. We have made a

practical and promising start in the Special
Committee of NATO Defense Ministers.

Common planning and consultation are
essential aspects of any sensible substitute
to the unworkable and dangerous alterna-
tive of independent national nuclear forces
within the alliance. And even beyond the
alliance we must find the means to prevent
the proliferation of nuclear weapons. That
is a clear imperative.

There are, of course, risks in nonpro-
liferation arrangements, but they cannot be
compared with the infinitely greater risks
that would arise out of the increase in na-
tional nuclear stockpiles. In the calculus of
risk, to proliferate independent national
nuclear forces is not a mere arithmetical
addition of danger. We would not be merely
adding up risks. We would be insanely
multiplying them.

If we seriously intend to pass on a world
to our children that is not threatened by
nuclear holocaust, we must come to grips
with the problem of proliferation. A rea-
sonable nonproliferation agreement is feasi-
ble. For there is no adversary with whom
we do not share a common interest in avoid-
ing mutual destruction triggered by an ir-
responsible nth power.

Dealing With Potential Adversaries

That brings me to the third and last set
of relationships the United States must deal
with: those with nations who might be
tempted to take up arms against us.

These relationships call for realism. But
realism is not a hardened, inflexible, un-
imaginative attitude. The realistic mind is
a restlessly creative mind, free of naive de- '
lusions but full of practical alternatives.
There are practical alternatives to our cur-
rent relationships with both the Soviet
Union and Communist China.

A vast ideological chasm separates us
from them — and to a degree separates them
from one another. There is nothing to be
gained from our seeking an ideological rap-
prochement; but breaching the isolation of
great nations like Red China, even when

880

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

that isolation is largely of its own making,
reduces the danger of potentially cata-
strophic misunderstandings and increases
the incentive on both sides to resolve dis-
putes by reason rather than by force.

There are many ways in which we can
build bridges toward nations who would cut
themselves off from meaningful contact
with us. We can do so with properly bal-
anced trade relations, diplomatic contacts,
and in some cases even by exchanges of
military observers. We have to know where
it is we want to place this bridge, what
sort of traffic we want to travel over it, and
on what mutual foundations the whole
structure can be designed.

There are no one-cliff bridges. If you
are going to span a chasm, you have to rest
the structure on both cliffs. Now cliffs,
generally speaking, are rather hazardous
places. Some people are afraid even to look
over the edge. But in a thermonuclear
world, we cannot afford any political acro-
phobia.

President Johnson has put the matter
squarely: By building bridges to those who
make themselves our adversaries, "we can
help gradually to create a community of in-
terest, a community of trust, and a com-
munity of effort." 2

With respect to a "community of effort"
let me suggest a concrete proposal for our
own present young generation in the
United States.

It is a committed and dedicated genera-
tion. It has proven that in its enormously
impressive performance in the Peace Corps
overseas and in its willingness to volunteer
for a final assault on such poverty and
lack of opportunity that still remain in our
own country.

As matters stand, our present Selective
Service System draws on only a minority of
eligible young men. That is an inequity.

It seems to me that we could move to-
ward remedying that inequity by asking

■ Bulletin of May 23, 1966, p. 794.

every young person in the United States to
give 2 years of service to his country —
whether in one of the military services, in
the Peace Corps, or in some other volun-
teer developmental work at home or abroad.
We could encourage other countries to do
the same, and we could work out exchange
programs — much as the Peace Corps is al-
ready planning to do.

While this is not an altogether new sug-
gestion, it has been criticized as inap-
propriate while we are engaged in a shoot-
ing war. But I believe precisely the op-
posite is the case. It is more appropriate
now than ever. For it would underscore
what our whole purpose is in Viet-Nam —
and indeed anywhere in the world where
coercion, or injustice, or lack of decent op-
portunity still holds sway. It would make
meaningful the central concept of security —
a world of decency and development where
every man can feel that his personal horizon
is rimmed with hope.

Mutual interest, mutual trust, mutual ef-
fort— those are the goals. Can we achieve
those goals with the Soviet Union, and
with Communist China? Can they achieve
them with one another?

The answer to these questions lies in the
answer to an even more fundamental ques-
tion. Who is man?

Is he a rational animal ? If he is, then the
goals can ultimately be achieved. If he is
not, then there is little point in making the
effort.

All the evidence of history suggests that
man is indeed a rational animal but with a
near infinite capacity for folly. His history
seems largely a halting, but persistent, ef-
fort to raise his reason above his animality.
He draws blueprints for utopia. But never
quite gets it built. In the end he plugs away
obstinately with the only building material
really ever at hand — his ovra part-comic,
part-tragic, part-cussed, but part-glorious
nature.

I, for one, would not count a global free
society out. Coercion, after all, merely cap-
tures man. Freedom captivates him.

JUNE 6, 1966

881

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 17

Press release 114 dated May 17

I have no formal statement today. But I
would like to comment briefly on the meet-
ings we have had this week with Mr. George
Thomson, a member of the British Govern-
ment, who has been making a trip around
a number of the NATO capitals to talk
about the present issues before NATO.

We have seen a high degree of unanimity
among the Fourteen and their attitude to-
ward the recent announcements by France
of certain withdrawals and certain actions
which France proposes to take in NATO.^

A number of issues are being discussed
among the Fourteen in the North Atlantic
Council in Paris and among governments.

Some of these are multilateral in char-
acter, such as the transfer or location of
SACEUR [Supreme Allied Command Eu-
rope] Headquarters, the NATO military
headquarters. Others are bilateral, such as
some of the discussions — some of the ar-
rangements we have with France on bases
and pipelines and things of that sort.

We would anticipate that discussions with
France would be undertaken as soon as a
little further clarification is obtained.

We have reason to believe that the atti-
tude of the Fourteen will be unified and they
will be working together on these matters.

It would not be right to speculate along
the lines of some speculation that I have
seen that there are major differences or any
significant differences between us, for ex-

' For text of a joint declaration by the United
States and 13 other NATO members, see liuLLETiN
of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536; for U.S.-French exchanges
of aide memoire, see ibid., Apr. 18, 1966, p 617, and
May 2, 1966, p. 699.

882

ample, and our friends in Britain on these
matters, or indeed among the other members
of the alliance.

We have greatly valued Mr. Thomson's
visit and feel that his excursion among the
NATO capitals has been a very useful thing
for the alliance as a whole.

Now I will take your questions.

Q. Mr. Secretary, yesterday one of the
Buddhist leaders, Tri Quang, addressed a
request to the President, according to press
reports, for assistance in his efforts in Viet-
Nam. Can you tell us what the President's
reply is?

A. Well, our representative in Hue has
seen Tri Quang and has informed him that
our attitude is that everyone should do their
best to resolve their differences in South
Viet-Nam and permit the processes for es-
tablishing a constitutional government to go
forward.

We believe that in this situation it is very
important that all of those elements who join
in rejecting what Hanoi and the National
Liberation Front are trying to do to South
Viet-Nam should set aside lesser differences
and pull themselves together for a national
effort.

Now, when the military leadership last
January 15 announced that they themselves
wished to move toward a constitutional gov-
ernment, when they reaffirmed that at Hon-
olulu, and where we were able to give it our
own support and good wishes, we felt that
was a major step in moving toward a type
of consolidation in South Viet-Nam that we
have not seen for the past 20 years.

Now, we do know, all of us, that there are
some differences there that are longstanding

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

— those between the Buddhists and the
Catholics, those between the Annamese and
the Cochin Chinese; perhaps some differ-
ences with the million refugees who came
from North Viet-Nam back in 1955 and 1956
to escape that regime up there. We are
aware of those differences and the impor-
tance of the issues involved to the people
concerned.

But what is needed here is a basic con-
stitutional agreement among all of these
elements in order that they can have a free
nation, a free society, a democratic society
which can get on with the great revolutionary
tasks in the economic and social field that
are so desperately needed by the people in
the countryside.

You can be sure that all of our influence
will be used to try to persuade all elements
there to set aside their lesser issues in order
to get on with the great national tasks con-
fronting the country.

Political Situation in South Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your
estimate of the effect, if any, of Marshal
Ky's [South Vietnamese Prime Minister
Nguyen Cao Ky'\ action in Da Nang on the
political situation in general, and on the
progress toward elections in particular?

A. Well, I think there may be some further
disagreements expressed in one form or
another between now and the elections for
the constituent assembly.

I do note that the committee which is
working on the electoral procedures for
electing a constituent assembly continues in
session, is continuing its work. We hope that
they will complete that work and that the
arrangements for the election of a constitu-
ent assembly can shortly be announced.

But it is important for everyone to act
with good will and restraint in order to let
that process go forward.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you give us your
thoughts on whether General Ky was justi-
fied in moving his troops into Da Nang?

I A. I would not want to pass a judgment

on that. He felt and the Directorate felt that
it was necessary for the Government to re-
store its writ in Da Nang. They moved to do
so. This is something on which they made
the judgment. As you know, this was not a
joint operation; it did not involve the United
States — United States forces. But I would
not wish to pass judgment on it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, have we said anything
to Marshal Ky comparable to what we have
said to Tri Quang in a direct way?

A. What I have just outlined is our atti-
tude toward any of these, what I call, lesser
differences, something that we have been
saying to anyone and everyone whose ear we
could get, with whom we are in touch, and
that means a great many of them.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some observers in Viet-
Nam have expressed the view that Premier
Ky's action may lead to a civil war of the
kind that could jeopardize the entire Ameri-
can presence in Viet-Nam. Do you read it
that way?

A. I do not see that prospect at the present
time. There are considerable elements there
who have not been in favor of the attitude
expressed by Tri Quang, for example. When
the Buddhist Institute called for a big rally
— when was it ? — yesterday, I think they had
something like a thousand people there, out
of a city of 2V2 million.

The principal geographical area which is
in control of the so-called resistance forces
is now the town of Hue, which is the extreme
northern part of the country. The back
country around Hue is not apparently in the
same mood as the people inside the town.

So I would not expect that this would lead
to civil war. There could be civil strife of
one sort or another. But we do not see the
sides being drawn for a major conflict among
the South Vietnamese around the country.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are you anticipating in
this situation considerable tension at Hue if
the Central Government tries to exert its
authority there in terms of what you would
call civil strife?

JUNE 6, 1966

883

A. Well, I would not want to speculate on
whether the Government might take any
action with respect to Hue or what the
effect would be were it to do so.

Thus far I am glad to be able to report
that the organized units in that area are not
battling each other. They are at something
of a standoff. They are not intermingling
with each other by force. And we would
hope that these leaders could work these
matters out without that kind of strife.

Q. Mr. Secretary, would you think that
the NATO Council could remain in Paris
even after the removal of SACEUR to an-
other place, and did you reach any under-
standing with Mr. Thomson on the subject?

A. Well, it would not be for Mr. Thomson
and us to sit down, as a party of two, to
resolve a question of that sort. That is a
matter being discussed in the NATO Coun-
cil, and I have no doubt that it will be dis-
cussed further at the ministerial meeting in
Brussels in early June. It is possible that it
might be resolved then. But I would not
want to try to anticipate an answer there.
That is a matter on which the governments
are consulting now.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you are not saying that
the United States does not have a position
on that question, are you?

A. No.

Q. What is the United States' position?

A. Well, if I had wanted to say that, I
would have said it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, does the administration
intend to continue in its efforts to placate
Mr. Nasser [President Gamal Abdel Nasser,
President of the United Arab Republic] with
food, particularly in view of the recent rash
of insults and threats from Cairo?

A. Well, we have certain requests in front
of us at the present time which we are
studying against the background of the en-
tire situation. I wouldn't want to anticipate
what the final results of that might be. We

are concerned about some of the things that
have been said there recently and the gen-
eral state of relationships between ourselves
and the U.A.R. Government on matters of
great concern to us, such as Viet-Nam and
other issues.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in view of the serious-
ness of the Chinese cJiarge last Thursday
IMay 12], hoiv do you read the relative si-
lence from Peiping since that time on the
issue of alleged intrusion into Chinese air-
space ?

A. Well, I think you will probably see some
tickers on that later this afternoon. They
are beginning to come in. The Chinese have
returned to the charge. The only informa-
tion that we have is information made avail-
able in Saigon the other day.

Peiping's Disarmament Proposals Inadequate

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that same connection,
Chou En-lai claimed that the United States
has turned down or rejected an offer by him
or by China to agree not to strike each other
first in a nuclear attack. Would you have
any comment on that?

A. Well, we are aware of their proposal
on that. But we did not — and that proposal
has been made by others and it has been
made publicly from time to time. But we did
not accept the Chinese Communist proposal
because we believe that these disarmament
measures should be carried out under strict
and effective international control so that all
parties can be assured of honoring their ob-
ligations. Mere declarations on such matters
would not be adequate.

And so we are very much concerned about
that, that any measures that involve the
prohibition or the control of nuclear weapons
should deal with the question of verification
and inspection. We have ourselves put for-
ward some very far-reaching proposals
about limiting nuclear weapons and freezing
and possibly reducing nuclear weapons de-
livery vehicles. You recall that the first
Chinese proposal was made in connection

884

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

with their own nuclear tests. They had re-
fused to sign the nuclear test ban treaty,
and they have made certain suggestions
which seem to be an attempt to soften the
impact upon world opinion of their gross
failure to cooperate in a worldwide effort to
limit the further spread of these weapons.

Now, we have suggested that they ought
to be associated with a preparatory commit-
tee, the so-called exploratory group, which
might try to work out arrangements for a
world disarmament conference. But we have
had no indication from the Chinese that
they are willing to do that. They have not
responded constructively on those occasions
when we ourselves have raised the disarma-
ment question in our bilateral talks. We are
prepared to sit down with them, as we have
said many times, to talk about disarmament,
such problems as the proliferation of nu-
clear weapons, but we can't take up these
great issues of war and peace solely on the
basis of unverified declarations which may
or may not mean anything.

We have had a fairly recent agreement
with Peiping, the agreement of 1962 on Laos,
and we can't find that Peiping has lifted a
finger to assure that that agreement is
complied with. Indeed, we have every rea-
son to believe that they have encouraged its
violation, both in terms of keeping North
Vietnamese troops in Laos, contrary to the
agreement, and using Laos as an infiltration
route into South Viet-Nam, contrary to the
agreements. So we would like to see an
organized peace, arrangements which can be
reliable, in order to get on with these great
tasks of disarmament and assuring the
safety and the independence of countries
large and small.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred to the
Chinese returning to the charge about the
alleged penetration of their border. Is there
anything further that can be said? The
original United States response essentially
amounted to a "No comment." Has investi-
gation revealed anything further?

A. I think there was a statement from

Saigon on that matter which carried the
information available at that time on the
basis of debriefing and other types of infor-
mation. There is nothing to add to what
was said the other day from Saigon.

NLF Interference Not Welcomed

Q. Mr. Secretary, before the American
troop buildup in Viet-Nam, even officials of
the administration were heard to say that a
troop buildup there would be poised on a
foundation of quicksand as far as our politi-
cal stability in the Vietnamese Government
is concerned, and critics of the administra^
tion have made the same point since the
buildup. Do you feel that these views of
events of the past 6 weeks Jiave been proved
correct ?

A. I don't recall officials talking about
quicksand. Of course there have been prob-
lems there all along in this direction, but I
think the element which holds them together
at the end of the day is their common rejec-
tion of what Hanoi and the National Libera-
tion Front are trying to do to them. And it
would be interesting to see what response
will be made to the attempt in the last 24
hours or so of the National Liberation Front
to get in on this matter in South Viet-Nam
and to try to throw its support to the so-
called resistance forces.

I think there will be a number of those
who have been opposed to the present gov-
ernment in Saigon who would not welcome
this attempt by the National Liberation
Front to get in on it, because we have found
in our contacts with the leaders of all of
these groups that they do have a common
interest in seeing to it that the effort of
Hanoi to take over the country by force does
not succeed. And I think that — certainly
our hope is that — that common element
would cause them to sort these problems out
and assure the stability which is verj' im-
portant.

Q. Mr. Secretary, in that connection. Sena-
tor Fulbright said today before the National
Press Club that he did not find it very per-

JUNE 6, 1966

885

suasive to proclaim a desire for a compro-
mised peace while, he says, "we are escalat-
ing the war by such acts as bombing the
biggest North Vietnamese electrical plant."
What do you say to that?

A. Well, I think the record on this is to
me pretty clear and pretty persuasive. We
held off striking the North for 4 years or
so, during which there was increasing infil-
tration from the North, including elements
of the regular forces from North Viet-Nam.
The 325th North Vietnamese Division came
from North Viet-Nam into South Viet-Nam
before we started the bombing of North
Viet-Nam.

Since that time, there have been two
pauses, so-called, two suspensions of the
bombing to provide some exploration of the
possibilities for a peaceful settlement. Both
those efforts came to nothing, even though
many governments in different parts of the
world made a major effort, certainly during
the 37-day pause over the turn of this year,
to move this matter toward peace.

Now, bombing is going on in the South.
We haven't bombed anybody's embassy in
Hanoi, but they have bombed our Embassy
in Saigon. Arms continue to flow. Men
continue to come. We have tried all over
the earth to find an answer to the question,
What else would stop if the bombing
stopped? What would the other side do?
What would their reciprocal action be?
Would this be a step toward peace? Or
would they simply take advantage of any
such effort to build up their infiltration and
to step up as much as possible their military
effort?

So we are where we were before. We
would like to know what else would happen.
Now, I think it isn't as easy now to speculate
about this as it might have been earlier,
because we have had — we have tried it out.
We have tried it out on two occasions. So
we would like to have some indication from
the other side that something else would
happen that would move this matter toward
peace before we feel that we can stop the
bombing in North Viet-Nam.

East-West Relations

Q. Mr. Secretary, we know it is something
of a wrench to talk about NATO when you
have a war going on in Viet-Nam. But,
given the fact that both NATO and the
Warsatv Pact are in a certain degree of dis-
array 21 years after the end of World War
II, do you foresee that the ioorld is moving
into a situation where it will be possible in
the next year or so to open up the European
dialog between the two sides and possibly
come to some new conclusions or develop
the detente; or are toe totally frozen because
of the war in Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think there is no doubt that
Viet-Nam contributes to a general atmos-
phere which makes it somewhat more diffi-
cult to explore particular and further points
of possible agreement between Eastern Eu-
rope and, say. Western Europe and ourselves.
I think this is partly true because Peiping
has been bitterly criticizing and abusing
Moscow and leaving the impression that any
effort made by Moscow to talk sense with
the West or to reach new points of agree-
ment will be looked upon as a betrayal of
Hanoi. But I don't believe myself that we
should approach it from that point of view.

I think we should continue to explore, as
we have been doing, with representatives of
Eastern Europe, including the Soviet Union,
what could be done on particular points —
whether disarmament, or in trade, or what-
ever it might be.

Now, we do believe that the possibilities
for far-reaching agreements between the
NATO countries and the Warsaw Pact coun-
tries are greater if there is unity and soli-
darity in NATO. I myself do not believe
that if the nation-states of the West go off
and pursue divergent policies and are unable
to act together that we can resolve such
questions as disarmament, or the German
question, or these other great issues be-
tween the East and West.

I think that the solidarity of NATO has
had a good deal to do vdth reducing tension
in Europe, in reducing the sense of threat
from Eastern Europe and making possible

886

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

such agreements as, say, the nuclear test
ban treaty. So I would like to emphasize
that I think that the 14 members of NATO
in no sense are indifferent to the possibilities
of improving the East- West relations. Indeed,
solidarity has great advantages from just
that point of view, and we hope to explore
that fully in the months to come, despite
Viet-Nam.
Yes, sir.

Review of Vietnamese Situation

Q. Does the recent revietv at the White
Hoiise,^ with Lodge [U.S. Ambassador to
South Viet-Nam Henry Cabot Lodge"], of the
Vietnamese situation indicate the need for
any kind of a change in our policy or action
there ?

A. No. This review, which we were,
happily, able to have with Ambassador
Lodge this past week, went right through a
very long agenda and gave attention to a
great many details, as well as to some of
the larger questions. I think the greater
part of the time was spent on economic and
social questions and how to get on as effec-
tively as possible with the conclusions
reached at Honolulu.^ Obviously, we were
interested in and concerned about the more
recent developments surrounding the differ-
ences about the constitutional process in
which they are now engaged.

But I did not, before he came, anticipate
the need for major changes in policy, nor did
those emerge in the course of our discus-
sions. It was a broad review of a great many
things, with heavy emphasis on the civilian
side.

Q. Mr. Secretary, a large number of
Members of Congress are reporting that no
matter how understandable it may be — the
turmoil in Viet-Nam, from your point of view
— the American people are getting some-

^ For remarks made by President Johnson follow-
ing a National Security Council meeting on May 10,
see ibid.. May 30, 1966, p. 834.

^ For background, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

tvhat restive about the idea of shedding
American blood on behalf of people who, for
one reason or another, good or bad, don't
seem to be able to settle their own quarrels.
I wonder if you could tell us how, and in
what way, you are conveying this idea to
all the factions in South Viet-Nam?

A. Well, I think it should be obvious to
our friends in South Viet-Nam that there is
a restiveness here. And when the American
people are called upon to make a major ef-
fort to support the independence, the safety,
of a country like South Viet-Nam, that their
own attitude, their ovra solidarity, their own
effort, are crucial elements in the combined
determination. That is being conveyed to
them. As a matter of fact, they can read
it for themselves. But that is being con-
veyed to them and is a part of our effort
to emphasize to them that it is very impor-
tant that they get on with this constitu-
tional process and set aside some of these
issues that appear to be secondary to the
issue of achieving a safe country, about
which they can perhaps quarrel at their
leisure later on.

Q. Mr. Secretary?

A. Yes.

Q. Could you amplify a little bit the
reasons for Mr. Lodge's visit to Seoul on his
way back to Saigon ? Is that an alliance that
needs some firming up, or would you —

A. No. As you know, Korea has a very
large number of troops in South Viet-Nam
and is in the process of sending more. We
felt that it was desirable for him to stop by
there briefly on his way back in order to
bring them up to date on what has been
happening in South Viet-Nam and in order
to give them a chance to go into any ques-
tions they might wish to raise.

This is a matter, it seems to me, of a
perfectly normal consultation between our-
selves and Korea, given the fact that we are
sharing the burdens there both on the mili-
tary side and in other respects in Asia.

Q. Thank you.

JUNE 6, 1966

887

President Comments on Internal
Developments in Viet-Nam

Statement by President Johnson ^

We are watching the situation in Viet-
Nam very closely. We believe everything
possible should be done to bring the various
factions to an understanding of the need for
unity while the constitutional process is mov-
ing forward. That is what our people are try-
ing to do.

General [William C] Westmoreland and
Ambassador [Henry Cabot] Lodge are both
in Viet-Nam now. We are in very close con-
tact with them by cable, and our lower-level
people have other communication.

The South Vietnamese are trying to build
a nation. They have to do this in the teeth of
Communist efforts to take the country over
by force. It is a hard and a frustrating job,
and there is no easy answer, no instant solu-
tion to any of the problems they face.

We are not in Viet-Nam to dictate what
form of government they should have. We
have made it abundantly clear that it is our
wish to see them increasingly able to man-
age their own affairs with the participation
of an ever broader share of the population.
We regret any diversion from that task and
from efforts to defeat the Communist at-
tempt to take over South Viet-Nam.

I will, of course, during the day and the
week, and all the time that I am in this of-
fice, until we have a satisfactory solution of
our problems in that area of the world, be in
close touch with the Secretary of State, the
Secretary of Defense, Mr. Rostow [Walt

W. Rostow, Special Assistant to the Presi-
dent] and other experts, both here and out
there.

I know of nothing that I could add that
would contribute to improving the situation.
Therefore, I think I have said about all that
I can on that general subject today.

Mr. Harriman To Supervise U.S.
Actions on POW's in Viet-Nam

statement by Robert J. McCloskey ^

The Secretary has informed me that he
has asked Governor Harriman [Ambassador J
at Large W. Averell Harriman] to assume
general supervision of Department actions
concerning prisoners held by both sides in
the conflict in Viet-Nam. Gk)vernor Harri-
man's recent discussions in Geneva with the
International Committee of the Red Cross
were his first actions in this capacity.

Now, the continuing policy of the United
States Government is to do everything pos-
sible to assist and protect Americans held by
North Viet-Nam and by the Viet Cong, to
obtain their release at the earliest possible
time, to encourage full compliance with the
Geneva conventions of 1949 on the protec-
tion of war victims, and to reduce to a min-
imum in Viet-Nam the inherent inhumanity
of war.- Governor Harriman will insure the
determined and effective pursuit of this pol-
icy.

' Read by the President at his news conference
at the White House on May 21.

' Made to news correspondents on May 18. Mr.
McCloskey is Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public
Affairs.

" For the text of a letter from Secretary Rusk
to Samuel Gonard, President of the International
Committee of the Red Cross, see Bulletin of Sept
13, 1965, p. 447.

888

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

". . . we are in an era which has been fundamentally af-
fected by certain new phenomena on the human scene, which
have propelled educational and cultural relations to the
forefront of international relations. If I am right, tve are
entering an era that can properly be called 'the era of
educational and cultural relations' "

The Era of Educational and Cultural Relations

hy Charles Frankel

Assistant Secretary for Educational and Cvltural Affairs ^

It is my pleasant though somewhat im-
posing duty to give the concluding lecture in
a distinguished series devoted to the human
aspects of international relations. In inviting
me to take part, Dean [Edmund A.] Gullion
suggested that I might deliver not only the
last lecture but a summary lecture which
might perhaps draw the various themes on
which you have touched into focus. I do not
know whether I shall succeed, but it seems
to me that a lecture on the subject of educa-
tional and cultural relations may well meet
this purpose. For it seems to me that educa-
tional and cultural affairs draw together
what is most distinctive and new about the
current international scene and offer in-
struments for diplomacy and foreign policy
whose potential ability is enormous and has
as yet only begun to be felt.

Educational and cultural affairs, indeed,
are not simply instruments of foreign policy.
If the considerations I wish to put before you
have any validity, they are an essential part
of what foreign policy today is all about.
They enter into the definition of its ends and

purposes and are not simply instruments for
the achievement of ends that have been
defined without regard to them. For we are
in an era which has been fundamentally
affected by certain new phenomena on the
human scene, which have propelled educa-
tional and cultural relations to the forefront
of international relations.

If I am right, we are entering an era that
can properly be called "the era of educa-
tional and cultural relations." And I believe
that President Johnson's recent initiatives in
this area — his address at the Smithsonian
Institution in September,- his message to
Congress at the beginning of February ,3 and
his submission for consideration by the Con-
gress of the International Education Act of
1966 — are expressions of and responses to
this era and efforts to stimulate a movement
in our country which will help it to accommo-
date to what this era requires of it.

Educational and cultural relations between
different peoples are, of course, not peculiar
to our time. The first great epics in Western
literature are devoted to the theme. The

' Edward L. Bernays Foundation Lecture at the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts Uni-
versity, Medford, Mass., on Apr. 25 (press release
96).

' For text, see Bulletin of Oct. 4, 1965, p. 550.

' For text of President Johnson's message to Con-
gress on international education and health, see
ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 328.

JUNE 6, 1966

889

Trojan War appears to have been provoked
by an excessively eager exercise in cultural
exchange — the abduction of Helen. And the
Bible contains one episode after another of
cultural exchange, and a variety of comments
about it. By failing to resist the temptation
of the Serpent, Adam and Eve, after all,
found themselves transported from the Gar-
den of Eden to a quite different way of life.
This is only the first in a long series of
instances in which people have identified cul-
tural exchange as the work of the Devil.

On a somewhat less cosmic level, we now
have reason to believe that even before the
Roman Empire laid out its roads there was
an extraordinary commerce between East
and West. The traces of pre-Roman Celtic
civilization can be found from Britain to the
Balkans.

Christianity, as we know, is a standing
monument to cultural exchange. St. Paul was
a Greek-speaking Roman Jew; St. Augus-
tine moved in the course of his life from
North Africa to Britain and sampled, among
other points of view, Eastern Manicheism,
Greek Skepticism, and Platonism. And at its
high point medieval Christianity was en-
riched by the scholars, teachers, and stu-
dents from many countries who gathered to-
gether at the great centers of Christian
learning such as Paris.

Nor has cultural exchange been a purely
intellectual or abstract phenomenon. As a
result of Marco Polo's voyages, what we now
know as spaghetti came to Italy, and the diet
and economy of that country were substan-
tially changed. Legend has it that coffee and
croissants, that delectable combination, was
one of the lasting contributions of the Turk-
ish invasions of Europe. The croissant is the
Turkish crescent; and when the Turks were
beaten back from the gates of Vienna in
1683, it is reported, they left strange green
beans scattered around in their abandoned
camps. Vienna was never the same. Whether
this particular event is legendary or not, it
does point to an important and unduly
neglected truth; namely, that war has been
one of the principal instrumentalities of
cultural diffusion and that, after a war,

victors and vanquished have a way of ex-
changing their vices.

In the modern world, as we know, cultural
exchange has become deliberate, planned,
and widespread. The European nations for
some centuries deliberately transported
their cultures, or bits of their cultures, to
the colonial areas. And well-established na-
tions like the Japanese and the Turks, in an
effort to avoid being Europeanized at the di-
rection of the Europeans, systematically
sent their leaders and young people to vari-
ous parts of Europe and North America,
combing the West for ideas and techniques
and adapting them to their own uses.

To speak of educational and cultural rela-
tions, then, is certainly not to speak of any-
thing peculiarly new or contemporary. It is
to speak of an aspect of human history
that has been present from the time that
different groups of human beings first came
into contact with one another. And as I have
already suggested, these relations have been
a consequence of war between human groups
as well as of peaceful relations between
them. A strong argument can even be made
that most wars have been important in the
long run only for the cultural exchanges
they have initiated. In any case, whether in
war or in peace, cultural exchange has been
a major executive agent in the changes that
constitute human history. A powerful school
of anthropologists has maintained, indeed,
that contact with external cultures is the
most important single cause — some have
even insisted, the only cause — of the move-
ment out of social inertia into social change.

Nevertheless, there is a difference, and a
difference of the greatest significance, I be-
lieve, in cultural relations as we know them
today. Broadly speaking, I venture to sug-
gest, we may distinguish three great stages
in the history of cultural exchange.

In the first stage, which covered the long-
est period in human history, cultural ex-
change was simply an accidental byproduct
of the contact between different groups. It
was not usually sought, and it was frequently
resisted.

In the second stage, cultural exchange —

890

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

or, at any rate, the triumph of one's own
culture over the culture of others — was not
accidental but was deliberately sought and
promoted. It was a motive as well as a con-
sequence of war, of commerce, of imperial
organization and imperial rivalry, and the
preponderant influence over it was exercised
by government or government-sponsored
activities or by churches. This is the period
of the great explorations and of colonization,
which came to its climax in the 19th
century.

Characteristics of the New Era

The third stage is the one in which we
have now entered. It is marked by an extraor-
dinary flow of cultural traffic — of people,
news, ideas, ideologies, fashions, machines,
and passions — between almost all the human
groups in the world. This cultural exchange,
a good part of which is not deliberately
planned or intended, goes farther and pene-
trates more deeply than any kind of cultural
exchange known in the past. And while
efforts can and have been made to resist the
flow of this traffic, it is probably not funda-
mentally resistible but is an almost auto-
matic consequence of changes in the char-
acter of human thought and work and in the
conditions of human travel and communica-
tion. Most of us in most parts of the world
simply live in a physical, psychological, and
moral neighborhood that has an interna-
tional color and dimension, and we live in
such a neighborhood whether we know it or
not, or like it or not.

Moreover, this is not all that characterizes
this third, relatively new, stage in the his-
tory of cultural relations. What also char-
acterizes it is that organized social institu-
tions— churches, universities, foundations,
voluntary associations, and governments —
also play a heavier role than ever as ini-
tiators and regulators of the cultural traffic.
In brief, in this third stage cultural exchange
is the accidental but at the same time the in-
exorable consequence of the accelerating con-
tact of different human groups, and it is also
deeply affected by deliberately adopted social
policies, official and unofficial.

Finally, this cultural exchange has a new
quality. Not only do the powerful nations
impose themselves on the attention of the
less powerful, but the less powerful impose
themselves on the attention of the more
powerful. A century ago, an untutored in-
habitant of an Asiatic city was likely to be
made sharply aware every day that there
really was a Europe, but a worker in a
European factory might well not have the
fact that Asia existed clearly in focus in his
mind. That is not likely to be the case today.
The flow of information, attention, and
trouble is in both directions, and the flow is
between cultures and peoples which have in
the past regarded themselves as remote in
history, experience, and destiny.

As in the case of any other so-called
"stage" or "era" in history, we can, of
course, trace the sources or prototypes of
this new era to places and times fairly far
back in the past. In the Middle Ages, the
Catholic Church promoted the idea of a
European culture, crossing over the moun-
tains and transcending even the intense
feudal loyalties of the period. To some ex-
tent, and particularly through its support
of learning, the church promoted not only
this idea but indeed also its realization in
practice.

In the postmedieval era, science and the
organization of learned societies also fos-
tered cultural exchanges, as did the gradual
growth of the conception that humanists
and scholars had a common vocation and a
common audience. In the period of great
imperial rivalries, artists, writers, philos-
ophers, scientists, and students came and
went as individuals to and from the great
capitals of Europe. And in the 19th century,
at the height of the period of cultural im-
perialism, in which the richer nations moved
out toward the poorer ones, a very powerful
countertendency emerged in the great flow of
the poor and persecuted and unlettered from
the Old World to the New.

Nevertheless, the most decisive character-
istics of the new era of cultural relations
have emerged only recently. In the present
century, and particularly in the last 20

JUNE 6, 1966

891

years, we have entered a period in which the
internal history of every nation and the in-
timate daily experience of growing numbers
of individuals have been vitally affected by
certain radical changes. Among them are the
revolution in knowledge and in the place
that the man of knowledge occupies in
society, the extraordinary revolution in the
technology of travel and communication, the
advent of the school as a major instrument
of social development and social control, and
the rapid and now almost universal accept-
ance of the egalitarian language and moral
outlook of democracy. Whatever the practice
of a people or a government may be and
however various or even bizarre their in-
terpretations of democracy may seem, there
is hardly a people or a government in the
world today which would not try to explain
and justify its behavior in what it presents
as democratic terms.

In these factors we have the major sources
of the new era of cultural relations. They are
of such magnitude that they imply a new era
in international relations as well. They have
changed the nature and conditions of na-
tional power, the character and function of
diplomacy, and the very terms, I believe, in
which the conception of "national interest"
must be defined.

The Revolution in Knowledge

The revolution in knowledge, which is the
first of the factors that affect the present
scene, has had a number of significant con-
sequences that are relevant to our present
scene. In the first place, the massive devel-
opment of science as a social institution —
as a set of arrangements for acquiring,
communicating, and assessing information
— has advanced and solidified the growth of
an international community of coworkers
whose standards and temper of mind and,
not infrequently, whose loyalties transcend
purely parochial barriers. Given the exist-
ence of science, even if of nothing else, in-
ternational affairs are not simply an arena
for rivalry, disagreement, and misunder-
standing. They are also an arena in which

some men speak the same language, seek the
same goals, and have worked out a pro-
cedure for the rational resolution of dif-
ferences of opinion.

Moreover, these men of science have new
prestige and influence. For in the last few
decades, the traditional relationship between
science and technology has been altered. In
the past, major technological innovations —
like the wheel, the compass, or the steam
engine — were often developed without the
immediate support of any large body of
basic theoretical research. Often, these tech-
nological innovations themselves provided
instruments and analogies which were used
by scientists.

Today, however, basic theoretical research
is the indispensable prerequisite for the
overwhelming proportion of technological
inventions. Research and development is a
major component of a modern industrial es-
tablishment. The power of the American
industrial establishment, for example, prob-
ably turns more than anything else on our
capacity to devote large numbers of people
and large amounts of capital to basic re-
search and development.

Science more than ever before, therefore,
is an engine which drives human history
along its imperfectly charted road. And
with this change there has also come, quite
naturally, a new role and influence for sci-
entists and for their typical institutions like
the laboratory and the university.

It is no longer possible, therefore, for any
country that desires to prosper, and under-
stands the conditions for such prosperity
that must now be met, to ignore the peculiar
demands and the peculiar mores of the
learned community. And under the pres-
sure of scientific standards of workman-
ship, these demands and these mores are
becoming increasingly alike in all countries,
increasingly transnational and interna-
tional. Indeed, not the least of these de-
mands is that the scientific communities of
the different nations, if only in their own
self-interest, must remain in touch with
each other.

892

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Moreover, we must not imagine that the
changes which science has brought are only
in the field of physical innovation. It is
more than evident that the application of
new technologies involves great changes in
human behavior and the organization of so-
ciety and that they demand a degree of
flexibility and a capacity for quick adapta-
tion on the part of the human animal beyond
anything that has been demanded of this
animal in the past. Indeed, many technical
innovations are actually innovations in the
field of human organization. The assembly
line and traffic controls are only more
obvious examples. And these changes in the
ways in which human beings organize their
joint ventures have come to be influenced
increasingly by fundamental research in the
social sciences.

It is true that we continue to depend
much more on hunch, on ingenuity, and on
folk wisdom in arranging our social affairs
than we do in the physical sciences. Never-
theless, it is reasonably plain, I think, that
just as the complexities and pressures of
modern life have been generated very largely
by organized research, the answers to these
complexities and pressures, if we find them
at all, are also likely to come in large part
from organized research. And because or-
ganized research is increasingly interna-
tional in its methods and practical conse-
quences, this means, in effect, that we have
systematized and galvanized the process of
cultural exchange.

I do not take this, however, to be an op-
timistic utterance. It defines a problem; it
does not offer a solution. For we have a
natural interest in maintaining diversity in
the world. A great many people in a great
many nations resist such changes. A large
number of them, given the preeminence of
the United States in science and technology,
blame these changes on us, even though
they are rather the products of a secular
change in human knowledge and in the re-
lation of man to his environment. Not least,
technology makes trouble because it makes
trouble so visibly and noisily and communi-
cates its impact so quickly and so far.

Ease of Communication

The revolution in the technology of travel
and communication, indeed, is in itself a
second major factor in the emergence of the
new era in international affairs that I am
attempting to describe. It has made the re-
porting of news itself a major influence on
what actually happens. It has made foreign
places realities at the breakfast table every
morning. It has put the decisionmakers
under extraordinary pressure to make deci-
sions fast and to make half a dozen at once.
It has placed a premium on planning and
on the capacity to deliberate carefully about
hypothetical problems, because the chance
to deliberate about real ones is generally
likely to be short and not very sweet. And
not least, it fosters the impression that we
know what is going on and why in other
places because we see so much and hear so
much about them.

A particularly troublesome example of
this may well be our present relations with
Western Europe. The natural flow of peo-
ple, information, and ideas between the
United States and Western Europe may well
encourage the belief in many people's minds
on each side of the Atlantic that they have
an accurate understanding of the other
side. Certainly, a reasonably large part of
the news in European newspapers, for ex-
ample, is devoted to the American domes-
tic scene. But understanding does not con-
sist in grasping isolated bits of information,
numerous as they may be. It consists in
knowing how to connect these bits
and pieces of information, in being able to
place them in the context that explains and
illuminates them and guides us in drawing
proper inferences from them.

And this understanding in depth cannot
be brought into being by a series of reports
flashed out into the night. It requires a
slower process of education, personal com-
munication, and systematic discourse among
those who have the greatest influence in
shaping the fundamental categories and
habits of thought of a population. Pre-
cisely because the peoples of the Atlantic

JUNE 6, 1966

893

area hear so much and see so much of each
other, there is a strong necessity for system-
atic programs of educational and cultural
exchange across the Atlantic. There is a job
for schools and universities to do, and for
teachers and students, and it is probably a
larger job than before.

Role of the School in Social Development

The job of teachers, students, and educa-
tional institutions is perhaps even more
evident when we turn to the developing
nations. For it is plain, to begin with the
most elementary fact, that if we are to have
fruitful and mutually beneficial relations
with the people of these nations, we must
know more about them. Not enough of us
know very much, and too many of us know
nothing at all. It is in response to this sim-
ple fact that a basic element of the Presi-
dent's new program in international educa-
tion is the International Education Act of
1966, a proposal whose intention is to
strengthen the intellectual capacity and
cultural imagination which we Americans
can bring to any of our activities overseas.

But an even more powerful imperative
stands behind the steps that the United
States Government is now taking to sharpen
and increase its efforts in international
education. It is the imperative presented
by a secular change in social structures of
the greatest significance. The family, tra-
ditional religious organizations, and the
neighborhood community have in the past
been the most powerful social agencies with
regard to the formation of human attitudes
and the control of human behavior.

In both modern and modernizing societies,
however, the power of these agencies must
now be supplemented. They cannot by
themselves cope with the pace of change or
the disturbances of industrialization and
urbanization. Neither are they capable of
training people in the skills a modern econ-
omy requires or in the attitudes and na-
tional perspective which spell the difference
today between a viable and unviable society.
The school — primary, secondarj', or ad-
vanced— has in consequence been projected

to the forefront of contemporary history.
It has become an indispensable agency of
social development and control.

The school is fundamental in our foreign
relations because investment in human
beings is an indispensable investment for
development. It is fundamental because
education is not only a capital investment
but provides a consumer's good which a
mounting number of people everywhere are
demanding with greater and greater
urgency for themselves or their children.
It is fundamental because only the school
can provide individuals with the means to
understand and control their experience
with all the elements it contains that signal
the existence and importance of distant
places in the world.

Last but not at all least, the school is
fundamental because close association be-
tween the schools of different countries is a
primary means for creating, for the long
run, patterns of mutual respect and for-
bearance on the international scene. The
close relation of education to development
has been emphasized by the President in his
recent message to the Congress, and is re-
flected in the greater emphasis which the
Agency for International Development is
going to give to education, along with health
and food production, in its programs.* But
beyond the recognition of education as an
instrument of development, there is an ad-
ditional feature of the President's program
that is equally important. Educational co-
operation with other nations is conceived as
part of the enduring national interest of the
United States, a necessity for us and for
others in building a firmer structure for
peace.

The President's program is addressed not
only to the emergency situation of the de-
veloping nations but to an aspect or char-
acteristic of the human scene today that is
going to be present even if — and after — the
problems of the developing nations begin to
recede. It adds a new dimension to the

' For text of President Johnson's message on for-
eign aid, see ibid., p. 320.

894

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Federal Government's interest in educa-
tion. That is why an important responsi-
bility for the program has been lodged in
the Cabinet department with the gen-
eral and abiding responsibility for education,
the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare.

Advent of Democracy

These considerations take me to the final
characteristic of the present international
scene which has pushed educational and
cultural relations to the foreground. It is
the advent of democracy and of the lan-
guage of liberty, equality, and fraternity
as the fundamental legitimation, real or
professed, for contemporary government and
for the struggles and aspirations of the in-
habitants of this planet.

International affairs can no longer be
conducted and no longer are conducted as
affairs between the high and mighty, the
crowned heads and elected presidents, alone.
The heads of government speak over the
heads of their fellows to the citizens who
are the presumed source of authority. Every
important move in foreign policy involves
an effort not only to move another govern-
ment but to move public opinion. And dis-
tant though public opinion may seem from
the councils where the decisions are made,
it has its effect, if not immediately then in
the long run.

In the long run, international educational
and cultural relations play a decisive role in
the flow of public opinion. They work per-
haps less dramatically than the more rapid
techniques for effecting changes in opinion,
and these latter, of course, cannot be
neglected. But opinion is generally a reflec-
tion of character and outlook, of long train-
ing and education, and not simply of the
most recent information that one receives.
If public opinion in our nation and in the
world is to be consistent with the interests
of peace and of mutual tolerance between
diverse systems and cultures, a substantial
effort must be made in the field of mutual
education and cultural exchange.

It is, of course, possible to adopt alterna-
tive approaches to this state of affairs. At
least once before, the nations of Europe
were faced by a secular shift in the condi-
tions of national security and power. This
occurred when improvements in navigation
made it possible for them to move out into
the open seas. They met this test by estab-
lishing a system of commercial rivalry and
warfare with whose effects we are still
struggling. In the emerging era of educa-
tional and cultural relations, the solidifica-
tion of a system of educational and cul-
tural warfare and ideological recrimination
is of course a possibility. The school sys-
tems of the world, past and present, have
made their contributions to chauvinism and
insularity.

But there is an alternative. In an era in
which men demand equality, in which the
citizens of nations long subject insist on
looking you in the eye, it is possible — and it
is necessary — to seek cultural exchange on
a basis of equality and in the spirit that
each nation has as much to learn as to
teach. It is possible — and it is necessary —
to act on the principle that, where education
is concerned, where a people's deepest values
are at issue, the ear as well as the mouth
should be brought into play.

Educational and cultural relations today,
if they are to serve the common causes of
humanity and if they are to serve our most
enduring national interest, require a deli-
cate touch and a cooperative international
approach. They cannot rest on the presump-
tion that our nation or any nation has a
mission to educate the world.

Guidelines for the New Era

Chaucer wrote of the clerk of Oxford:
"And gladly wolde he lerne and gladly
teche." This is the spirit of the initiatives
in international education that have recently
been launched by President Johnson. They
represent an effort on our part to make our-
selves ready for a cooperative enterprise in
which we will join with other nations, if they
desire.

What are the basic guidelines for educa-

JUNE 6, 1966

895

tional and cultural policy in this emerging
era of educational and cultural relations?
They are implicit, I think, in what I have
said.

Educational and cultural programs should
be bilateral or multilateral wherever possi-
ble, not unilateral.

They should rest on the established prin-
ciple in all free educational systems that
there is a difference between education and
propaganda, and they must exemplify this
principle in practice.

Their success should be measured against
long-term goals, not short-term ones.

They should be geared, for practical rea-
sons as well as for reasons of policy, to the
needs, interests, and modes of behavior of
the people most immediately concerned:
scholars, teachers, artists, students.

They should be conceived and im-
plemented as continuing programs, as re-
sponses to imperatives that are now perma-
nent on the human scene. They should not be
viewed primarily as a means for the
achievement of passing objectives.

Finally, the educational and cultural pro-
grams of the Federal Government, though
they are indispensable, should properly be
viewed only as elements in a larger national
enterprise. They should not be and cannot
be substitutes for nongovernmental efforts.
Their main purpose, properly, is further to
release and stimulate the energies of the
non-Federal and private sectors of our
country, which are already leading the ef-
fort in international education and cultural
exchange.

The Test and the Opportunity

This lecture, as you know, is the last in a
series of lectures devoted "to the human as-
pects of international relations." I confess
that, as a man who has spent most of his life
as a professional teacher of philosophy, I
had the temptation to ask the kind
of troublesome question about this theme
that has made philosophy notorious. For in-
ternational relations, after all, are relations

between nations, and nations are composed
of human beings. Even diplomats probably
qualify as members of the species. What
can possibly be meant, then, by speaking of
the human aspects of international rela-
tions as though there were some aspects of
international relations that were not human?

But there is, of course, a meaning that
can be given this question. There are those,
past and present, who have held that rela-
tions between nations must be measured by
principles that transcend human interests.
They have insisted that states or nations
are superior things unto themselves, whose
significance and destiny are not meant to be
measured by the fate of the individual
human beings who compose them. And in
this century as much as ever, and perhaps
more than ever, the language in which for-
eign policy is justified has become increas-
ingly abstract. Moreover, much of what we
have known and still know as "foreign re-
lations" is official and formal. It is not the
kind of relation that individuals have to
their immediate neighbors, and often the
same rules do not seem to apply.

To speak of "the human aspects of inter-
national relations" is to call attention to
what is unstructured and unformalized, to
what is a matter of personal psychology or
social outlook, and to the intercourse be-
tween individuals and groups in different
nations that takes place because the people
concerned want it to and not because officials
have said that it must. Educational and
cultural relations are therefore a very large
part of what we mean by "the human aspects
of international relations." Today, an alert
and responsive government cannot help but
have a larger interest in them.

The dangers are plain. Government
officials, even professors of philosophy on
leave of absence, should be carefully
watched at any time, and certainly when
they suggest that they have an interest in
matters that belong above all to private
taste, judgment, and conscience, or to the
free community of scholars and teach-
ers. Yet a government policy in the field of

896

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

international education and cultural ex-
change is an inescapable imperative today,
as inescapable as a policy on defense or
commerce or outer space. It is inescapable
because there has been a change in the
human environment.

The response that a government gives to
this imperative will test its alertness to new
necessities and to something more besides.
It will test its fidelity to a liberal view of
human civilization. For, in the end, the free
exchange of ideas, the free movement of
people, the meeting of individuals as individ-
uals without regard to the borders — none of
these are simply instruments of national
policy. The national policy of a free and
civilized government is one instrument for
achieving such ideals.

In brief, we are well into an era in in-
ternational relations that deserves to be rec-
ognized as qualitatively new. It will test
government, but it will test a great many
people who are not in government as well ;
and it will test the capacity of people in
and out of government to work together. But
it is more than a test; it is an opportunity
to go farther with ideals that have lit the
history of our civilization and to appreciate
them more deeply.

There is, however, a somber — or, at any
rate, not entirely encouraging — aspect to the
thesis I have put before you. If it is true
that the era of educational and cultural rela-
tions implies that the human aspects of in-
ternational relations will become even more
pronounced than in the past, I am not sure
that I have left you with an entirely reas-

• Reprints of Mr. Frankel's address will
soon be available from the Superintendent of
Documents, U.S. Government Printing Of-
fice, Washington, D.C. 20^02.

suring thought. The only consolation I have
to offer is that it would be even less cheer-
ful to say to you that our future was not at
all in our hands.

Department To Hold Foreign Policy
Conference for Educators

The Department of State announced on
May 19 (press release 115) that it will hold a
National Foreign Policy Conference for Edu-
cators in Washington, June 16 and 17. The
Secretary of State is extending invitations to
educators in the 50 States, the District of
Columbia, and Puerto Rico.

Secretary Rusk will address the confer-
ence. Among other officials expected to
participate are Douglass Cater, Special As-
sistant to the President; William P. Bundy,
Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern
Affairs; and Charles Frankel, Assistant
Secretary of State for Educational and Cul-
tural Affairs.

The conference will highlight current for-
eign policy issues and provide a forum for
discussion of world affairs with high-rank-
ing officers of the Department of State and
other Government agencies. There will be an
opportunity during the concurrent seminars
on the afternoon of June 17 to exchange
views on the role of education in foreign af-
fairs. Seminar panelists vdll include leaders
of American education and Government of-
ficials. Topics that will be covered in the
panels are science and foreign policy, eco-
nomic development and population pressures,
foreign policy decision-making, international
organizations, world affairs in teacher edu-
cation, and case studies in teaching world
affairs.

JUNE 6, 1966

897

United States Role in a Changing Africa

statement by Joseph Palmer 2d
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs ^

After a long absence, it is a great pleas-
ure to appear once again before this sub-
committee to discuss our relations with
Africa. In the short time since assuming
my duties as Assistant Secretary, I have
been closely engaged in reviewing and up-
dating myself on developments in this rap-
idly changing area of the world.

WTien I first went to Africa 25 years
ago, I felt that far-reaching change was in
prospect. The liberation of Ethiopia and
the former Italian colonies, the exposure of
so many African troops to nationalist as-
pirations in South Asia, and the wartime
emphasis on self-determination all seemed
to me to be setting the stage for the liquida-
tion of the old colonial system in ways
which I felt were both just and inevitable.

Over the intervening years Africa has in-
deed transformed dramatically. New na-
tions have emerged with startling rapidity,
and Africa's leaders have been suddenly
faced with the challenging problem of con-
verting traditional societies into 20th-cen-
tury states. Progress inevitably has been
uneven as local problems have complicated
the situation. In many areas of the con-
tinent, however, substantial advancement
has been made toward achieving the basic
aspirations of the African people for a bet-
ter way of life.

* Made before the Subcommittee on Africa of
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on May 10.

In certain parts of Africa, change has
been accompanied by instability when the
constituted authority failed to satisfy the
hunger of the people for speed in moving
ahead and, in some cases, resorted to au-
thoritative, alien systems which were not re-
sponsive to national aspirations. The mili-
tary, or groups backed by the military, as-
sumed power in Algeria, Congo (Leopold-
ville), Dahomey, Central African Republic,
Upper Volta, Nigeria, and Ghana. In some
instances the army stepped in at the request
of the governing authority to reestablish
order in a chaotic situation; in other cases
they came to power because an impasse ex-
isted among contending political forces.

In these circumstances of change the
Africans have continued to demonstrate
that they do not want to lose their hard-
won independence to a new form of foreign
domination nor, as individualists, do they
wish to subject themselves to regimenta-
tion. Although the Communists have made
strenuous efforts to exploit Africa's prob-
lems, they have, by and large, signally
failed to subvert the African Continent.
Evidences of the extent of Soviet penetra-
tion that had taken place in Ghana were
revealed after Nkrumah's overthrow, in-
cluding evidence of facilities obviously in-
tended as bases for subversion in surround-
ing nations. Since the coup in Ghana, So-
viet and Chinese technicians have been
asked to leave. In Dahomey and the Cen-

898

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tral African Republic official Chinese Com-
munist missions were also asked to depart.

Change is likely to continue to be the key-
note to Africa, where powerful historical
forces — based on concepts of majority rule,
self-determination, the freedom and dignity
of the individual, and economic and social
justice and progress — characterize the as-
pirations of the people. The fact that these
are free-world concepts has given us a tre-
mendous advantage in building a viable re-
lationship with Africa.

The realization of these principles is not
simple in conditions of poverty, low literacy,
and widespread disease. But there is
abundant evidence that the African spirit of
determination and perseverance is active
and is prevailing. Success will not come
quickly. The primary motivating forces
must continue to develop from within the
continent.

Our role must be one of responsiveness,
of understanding, and of patience. We
must not expect quick solutions in Africa to
problems that have taken much time to
achieve in other parts of the world. We must
appreciate that the nations of Africa are
seeking to express themselves in their own
way and that this will doubtless involve
further experimentation and change.

In short, the problems of nation-building
in Africa — as elsewhere — are not easy and
no one appreciates this more than the
Africans. But problems also create oppor-
tunities, and it is in this positive and con-
structive sense that I believe Africa is dedi-
cated to realizing its great potential. And it
is in this same spirit of opportunity that we
in the more highly developed countries of
the free world must show ourselves re-
sponsive to Africa's needs and aspirations
in a timely and effective manner.

American policy toward Africa has been
both principled and realistic, providing Af-
ricans with a friendly noncolonial and non-
Communist association. U.S. assistance and
other relationships, along with those of
Europe and international donors, have per-
mitted African nations to chart an inde-

pendent course for progress in beneficial
associations with the free world.

We are deeply concerned, of course, with
developments in southern Africa, most im-
mediately in Southern Rhodesia. As you
know, representatives of the British Gov-
ernment and the Southern Rhodesian re-
gime are just starting exploratory talks in
London to see whether a basis for negotia-
tions genuinely exists. I shall not, there-
fore, comment further on this situation ex-
cept to express the fervent hope that early
means can be found to terminate this sterile
rebellion and restore constitutional pro-
cedures, thus opening the way to majority
rule based on government by the consent of
the governed.

The Department's policy views about
South Africa were given to the subcommit-
tee by my distinguished predecessor. Gov-
ernor Williams, on March 1.^ I have read
this statement carefully and agree fully
with it. It only remains for me to welcome
the initiative the subcommittee has taken in
looking into the United States-South Afri-
can relationship and to say how helpful
these hearings should be in increasing pub-
lic awareness of the vital questions of prin-
ciple and practice that are involved in the
South African situation.

The basic tenets of our African policy
reach back far into our past, namely sup-
port for self-detei-mination, government by
the consent of the governed, racial dignity
and equality, respect for genuine nonaline-
ment, unity, African solutions to African
problems, and political, economic, and social
progress. It will be my determined effort
to give constructive and meaningful applica-
tion to these living principles in the timely
manner that the fast-moving situation in
Africa requires. By so doing, I am confi-
dent we shall continue to develop a true
community of interest between Africa and
the United States, a close relationship based
on mutual advantage, mutual respect, and
mutual devotion to principle.

^ For text, see Bulletin of Mar. 21, 1966, p. 430.

JUNE 6, 1966

i899

United States Calls for Treaty
on Exploration of the Moon

Following is the text of a statement by
President Johnson xvhich was read to news
correspondents at San Antonio, Tex., on May
7 hy the White House Deputy Press Secre-
tary, together with the text of a letter from
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, to Kurt Waldheim,
chairman of the U.N. Committee on the
Peaceful Uses of Outer Space.

STATEMENT BY PRESIDENT JOHNSON

Just as the United States is striving to
help achieve peace on earth, we want to do
what we can to insure that explorations of
the moon and other celestial bodies will be
for peaceful purposes only. We want to be
sure that our astronauts and those of other
nations can freely conduct scientific in-
vestigations of the moon. We want the re-
sults of these activities to be available for
all mankind.

We want to take action now to attain
these goals. In my view, we need a treaty
laying dovim rules and procedures for the ex-
ploration of celestial bodies. The essential
elements of such a treaty would be as fol-
lows:

The moon and other celestial bodies should
be free for exploration and use by all coun-
tries. No country should be permitted to ad-
vance a claim of sovereignty.

There should be freedom of scientific in-
vestigation, and all countries should coop-
erate in scientific activities relating to celes-
tial bodies.

Studies should be made to avoid harmful
contamination.

Astronauts of one country should give any
necessary help to astronauts of another
country.

No country should be permitted to station
weapons of mass destruction on a celestial
body. Weapons tests and military maneuvers
should be forbidden.

I am convinced that we should do what we

can — not only for our generation, but for
future generations — to see to it that serious
political conflicts do not arise as a result of
space activities. I believe that the time is
ripe for action. We should not lose time.

I am asking Ambassador Goldberg, in
New York, to seek early discussions of such
a treaty in the appropriate United Nations
body.

LETTER FROM AMBASSADOR GOLDBERG

U.S. /U.N. press release 4861

May 9, 1966
Excellency: I have the honor to bring
to your attention the following announcement
by President Johnson on the need for a
treaty governing the exploration of the
moon and other celestial bodies :

[Text of President Johnson's statement of May 7.]

This proposal of my Government is based
on our long-standing concern with the peace-
ful uses of outer space. You may recall that
over seven years ago the United States in-
scribed the first item to appear on the Gen-
eral Assembly's agenda concerning the
peaceful uses of outer space and introduced
a draft resolution * sponsored by 20 States.
This became the first outer space action
taken by the Assembly. It was introduced in
the First Committee by the then Majority
Leader of the United States Senate, Senator
Lyndon B. Johnson of Texas.^

Action since that time has been hearten-
ing to all of those who believe in the role of
the United Nations as a source of interna-
tional law and peaceful development. Reso-
lution 1721,3 of December 20, 1961, set forth
the essential legal principles applicable to
outer space in an enlightened fashion that
has no precedent in any previous age of ex-
ploration. One of these principles was that
international law, including the Charter of
the United Nations, applies to outer space.

' For text, see Bulletin of Jan. 5, 1959, p. 32.

'Ibid., Dec. 15, 1958, p. 977.

" For text, see ibid., Jan. 29, 1962, p. 185.

900

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Another principle is that outer space and
celestial bodies are free for exploration and
use by all States in conformity with inter-
national law, and are not subject to national
appropriation. Building on this foundation,
Resolution 1962,* approved by the Assembly
on December 13, 1963, set forth a number
of additional points that will be remembered
gratefully centuries from now.

Our current proposal for a treaty is de-
signed to be another great step forward in
the cooperative development of outer space

' For text, see ibid.. Dec. 30, 1963, p. 1005.

for peaceful uses. Because of its significance
and urgency, I would greatly appreciate
your taking the necessary steps for an early
convening of the Legal Subcommittee of the
Committee on Outer Space.

I should like to take this occasion, Excel-
lency, to express our continued appreciation
for the admirable way in which you have
presided over the work of this most impor-
tant Committee and to assure you of our
continued desire to extend the utmost coop-
eration in this field which is so important
to the future of mankind.

Arthur J. Goldberg

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Discusses Proposed Safeguards for Cutoff and Transfer
of Fissionable Material and Nuclear Weapons Destruction

Statement by William C. Foster^

In directing the attention of this confer-
ence to collateral measures, we are recog-
nizing the urgency of achieving some real
progress in our efforts to halt the nuclear
arms race. We are seeking to accomplish
such reductions as are possible in today's
world, while awaiting agreement on how we
can make progress toward general and com-
plete disarmament.

' Made before the Conference of the 18-Nation
Committee on Disarmament at Geneva on Apr. 14
(U.S./U.N. press release 4836 dated Apr. 21). Mr.
Foster is Director of the U.S. Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency and head of the U.S. delega-
tion to the conference.

When we come to discuss the provisions
of article III in the U.S. draft treaty on
nonproliferation,^ we shall be dealing with
the safeguards that we seek to have nations
accept in connection with their peaceful ap-
plications of nuclear energy. Whenever we
discuss safeguards, the question inevitably
arises as to a balance between the obliga-
tions to be undertaken by the nuclear-
weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon
states.

My discussion today deals precisely with
the safeguards that would apply to the

= For text, see Bulletin of Sept. 20, 1965, p. 474.

JUNE 6, 1966

901

nuclear-weapon states under our proposal to
halt the production of fissionable material
for weapons use, to transfer a total of
100,000 kilograms of U-235 to peaceful uses
under safeguards, and to destroy the thou-
sands of nuclear weapons from which to ob-
tain the material for such a transfer. The
stated offer includes a willingness to add
Plutonium in agreed amounts obtained from
the destroyed weapons to the transfer to
peaceful uses, if the Soviet Union will do
likewise. Thus the total amount of fission-
able material transferred to peaceful pur-
poses would be somewhat greater than
100,000 kilograms.

I stress this measure for two reasons.
First, this measure is indeed most germane
to the nonproliferation treaty that we are
considering. I should point out that the
U.S. position has not changed, that the
entry into force of a nonproliferation treaty
should not be conditioned upon entry into
force of other measures which have been
proposed to halt the nuclear arms race. At
the same time, the United States recog-
nizes that if we are to halt the nuclear
arms race — not just for a moment but
lastingly — we must have a program of re-
lated measures in addition to a nonprolifera-
tion treaty, and we must begin to work on
them in the same detail as we have on a
nonproliferation treaty.

This necessity is recognized both in the
fifth paragraph of the preamble and in the
second paragraph of article VI of the U.S.
draft treaty. In the preamble the parties to
the treaty would express their desire "to
achieve effective agreements to halt the
nuclear arms race, and to reduce arma-
ments, including particularly nuclear ar-
senals." Article VI provides that after a pe-
riod of time, which is to be agreed, follow-
ing entry into force of the treaty two-
thirds of the parties may call a conference
of signatories "in order to review the op-
eration of the Treaty." I believe one of the
topics the parties would be entitled to con-
sider in this review would be how well we
were carrying out the intention expressed

in the preamble of halting the arms race
and reducing nuclear arsenals.

The second reason for emphasizing today
the cutoff, transfer, and demonstrated de-
struction proposal is that it provides an ex-
cellent example of the kind of safeguards
which nuclear-weapon states should be
called upon to accept as part of the task of
halting the arms race.

Problem of Adequate Verification

The problem of adequate verification of
arms control measures has consistently
thwarted our efforts to reach agreement.
It is not altogether surprising that this
should be so. From time to time within the
U.S. Government, as we have studied pos-
sible courses of action in the direction of
disarmament, we have had to consider how
the intentional or inadvertent disclosure of
classified information could be used against
us militarily, and we recognize that other
states may have similar concerns. For its
part, however, the Soviet Union has
branded virtually all of our efforts to design
arrangements providing necessary assur-
ances as attempts to gain an opportunity
for espionage, apparently without any real
analysis of the relative need and simplicity
of these verification proposals.

We continue to hope that the Soviet
Union will soon recognize that there is
quite another perspective in which inspec-
tion for verification can and should be
viewed. A state cannot responsibly enter
into international commitments which limit
its own freedom of action in important se-
curity areas unless it feels confident that
its own restraint is being matched by the
other parties to the agreement. Let us face
this squarely. We are involved in an area
where fundamental security interests are
at stake: the area of nuclear weapons de-
fense.

The United States earnestly seeks nu-
clear arms control measures to increase its
own security and the security of other
states. But for these measures to have their
desired effect of increasing international

902

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

stability and decreasing the chances of a
nuclear war ever taking place, it is essential
that a party have reasonable confidence
that the other parties are carrying out their
end of the bargain. In the case of an
agreement where purely national means of
verification are not deemed adequate, we
seek to define and obtain only the minimum
amount of inspection needed to let the par-
ties know that the agreement is being ful-
filled.

In the case of the cutoff in production
of fissionable material and destruction of
weapons, the necessary associated verifica-
tion measures are simple, practical, and un-
obtrusive. There is absolutely no basis for
attempting to dismiss them as a scheme for
espionage.

However, the United States does not
propose any arms control measure merely
because the verification would be simple and
practical. We seek measures that have in-
trinsic value — that will contribute to peace
and security and to our ultimate goal of
general and complete disarmament.

Most delegations here have acknowledged
the importance of the cutoff and weapons
destruction measure, but some delegations
have voiced opinions that would seem to
deny that what we are proposing is signifi-
cant. To assert that the cutoff, transfer,
and weapons destruction proposal "has noth-
ing in common with disarmament" amounts
to stating that slowing down has nothing to
do with stopping. Had the cutoff of produc-
tion of fissionable materials been negotiated
when it was first proposed,^ the U.S.
arsenal of weapons today would have been
a fraction of its present size. Without a
halt in the near future, nuclear stockpiles
are bound to grow ever larger, adding to the
vast amounts of potential death and de-
struction.

Our proposal goes beyond a halt, signifi-
cant as that is, and seeks an initial reduc-
tion in these nuclear stocks. To assert that

^ For text of a letter of Mar. 1, 1956, from Pres-
ident Eisenhower to Soviet Premier Bulganin, see
ibid.. Mar. 26, 1956, p. 514.

"only obsolescent weapons would be de-
stroyed" is to overlook the fact that a halt
in production and the destruction of thou-
sands of weapons adds up to a net reduc-
tion of these weapons. Included in the
weapons to be destroyed would be bombs
and warheads of a class that have a death-
dealing potential the world fortunately has
not experienced. Furthermore, the fission-
able material in them, with a half-life of
700 million years in the case of U-235 and
24,000 years in the case of plutonium, will
virtually never be obsolete as sources of
great amounts of energy — whether used
peacefully or in weapons.

We challenge also the validity of the So-
viet assertion that the destroyed weapons
would simply be replaced by utilizing the
large remaining stocks of fissionable ma-
terials. Is the Soviet Union saying they
have overproduced fissionable material be-
yond their weapon requirements to the ex-
tent that 40,000 kilograms of U-235 would
not be missed? If so, we would be pleased
for them to propose an increase in the
amount to be transferred by their side. In
proposing a transfer of 60,000 versus 40,-
000 kilograms the United States has sought
to reach numbers great enough to make
substantial cuts into the total stocks avail-
able for weapons. At the same time our pro-
posal would not place either side in an intol-
erable situation of uncertainty in view of
the limited amount of information that
would be disclosed by the system of verifica-
tion that we are proposing.

Suggested Inspection Methods

Let me now describe the kinds of safe-
guards that the United States believes are
appropriate to the significance of the cut-
off, transfer, and weapons destruction pro-
posal. In doing so, I will not attempt to de-
scribe the complete system of safeguards.
Rather I shall give a few additional details
regarding the kinds of inspection that our
studies have shown to be adequate. We
would emphasize that these descriptions are
to stimulate discussion and are not intended

JUNE 6, 1966

903

to present a fixed position. We welcome
further discussion on the topic of inspection
for verification of this measure. We are
certain that the generation of helpful ideas
to provide adequate assurances that agree-
ments are being honored is not a capability
to be found exclusively in any one country.

Our technical specialists have studied, for
example, the problem of verifying that plu-
tonium production reactors shut down in
compliance with either a production cutoff
or reciprocal plant-by-plant reductions re-
main shut down between visits of inspec-
tors. Two alternatives have been investigated.
In one case, access would be permitted to
the working faces of the reactor itself. In
the other, access would be permitted only
to the exterior of the reactor building or
buildings.

When access is permitted to the reactor,
we believe visits by inspectors to the reactor
could be scheduled at intervals separated by
several months, requiring perhaps a week's
time at the initial visit and 1 or 2 days for
subsequent visits.

The shutdown monitoring system they
would utilize basically includes four simple
concepts :

First, target material is placed in a re-
actor core to become radioactive in the
event of reactor operation.

Second, a "safing tape" or wire fixes the
location of the target material within the
reactor so as to be subject to the reactor's
neutron flux, if any.

Third, the tape is so fabricated that it is
unique and hence any substitution of the
tape can be detected.

Fourth, an exterior seal at each end of
the channel containing the tape provides
the inspection team assurance that the wire
or tape vvall have remained in its fixed loca-
tion between inspections.

The target material — for example, cobalt
— is introduced into the safing tape and
would be activated approximately linearly
with exposure to neutrons. The resulting
radioactivity, if any, could be read with
standard radiation detection meters.

This system is described in further detail

in a working paper which we are submit-
ting today with the request that it be circu-
lated as a document of the 18-Natlon
Committee on Disarmament.'* Again I
would emphasize that it is not our intent to
insist on this or any other inspection
method or procedure at this time. We offer
the paper so that the details of what we
have been studying can be considered and
commented on by others.

We have studied possible alternative pro-
cedures where access might be limited to the
exterior of the reactor buildings. Such a
limit could possibly be the external fences
surrounding the buildings, if such fences
were vdthin 100 or 200 meters of the build-
ings themselves.

Under such circumstances, we believe
there is a reasonable chance that a reactor
could be monitored satisfactorily by grant-
ing near-continuous random access to the
perimeter fence. Such access would have to
be available on about 1 hour's notice at
any time. The field inspectors would be
equipped with neutron and gamma ray de-
tectors as well as equipment sensitive to
radiation in the infrared portion of the
spectrum. Each of these devices is of
standard design and all are familiar to
qualified electronic technicians the world
over.

The inspection procedures we describe
could be utilized by whatever inspection or-
ganization was charged vdth carrying out
the inspections. The International Atomic
Energy Agency has already developed some
procedures for monitoring reactors in op-
eration, and more needs to be done in this
area. The working paper (ENDC/134)
tabled by the U.S. in June 1964 outlines the
procedures we believe to be necessary to
monitor other facilities that would be in-
volved in a cutoff of production of fission-
able material for weapons.^ We are con-
tinuing to study these suggested methods in
order to provide greater detail at some fu-

' ENDC/174.

" For a statement by Mr. Foster on June 25, 1964,
see Bulletin of July 27, 1964, p. 125.

904

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ture occasion, and we hope that other na-
tions are also giving careful consideration
to these problems.

Demonstrated Destruction of Weapons

Our proposal to destroy nuclear weapons
to obtain fissionable material for transfer
to peaceful uses is another example where
the procedures we have suggested for con-
sideration are designed to take proper ac-
count of the need to protect the sensitive
elements of the design of nuclear weapons.
These suggested procedures have been out-
lined before,^ but let me describe in some-
what more detail the kind of demonstration
process we have in mind. Again I would
emphasize that the United States does not
intend to prejudice future discussion of this
subject by advocating any one method of
demonstrated destruction. Rather, it is our
intent to encourage discussion by providing
enough detail to focus attention on the kinds
of problems that must be worked out if we
are to reach agreements in which all par-
ties can participate with confidence.

A facility for demonstrated destruction
of nuclear weapons would probably consist
of a receiving compound, buildings for
weapons disassembly enclosed by a security
fence, and an assay laboratory for verifying
the actual amounts of fissionable materials
yielded by the destruction process. In this
way, the total proposal — including cutoff,
destruction, and transfer aspects — is keyed
to the fissionable material.

Prior to the introduction of a batch of
weapons for processing, inspection person-
nel would make a walk-through tour of the
complete facility to observe that no weapon
components or materials were inside. A
batch of weapons would then be moved into
the receiving compound and inspectors
would be permitted visual access to the ex-
terior of the weapons, affording an oppor-
tunity to count them and perhaps also to
weigh them.

' For a U.S. statement in the U.N. General As-
sembly on Sept. 23, 1965, see ibid., Oct. 11, 1965,
p. 578.

At this point, inspectors would retire
beyond the security fence but continue to
have access to the perimeter affording an
opportunity to check all movements of ma-
terial into and out of the external fences.

As a result of the disassembly and de-
struction process, fissionable material would
be brought out through the security fence
from time to time to an assay laboratory
where it would be carefully weighed, its iso-
tope composition determined, and then
placed under IAEA or equivalent interna-
tional safeguards to assure its use for peace-
ful purposes only. Nonnuclear components
would be reduced to a state of rubble that
would not disclose classified information
and would be shipped out of the facility for
final disposal. Such disposal could be, for
example, deep ocean burial.

At the conclusion of the processing of a
batch of weapons, inspectors would again
be granted access to the inside of the entire
facility to observe that no material had
been withheld. This is a simple, straight-
forward procedure which allows no possi-
bility for espionage, requires no visits to
other sites or installations, and in fact pro-
tects that information properly classified in
the interests of national security.

In conclusion, let me express the hope
that in going into some detail about the op-
erations of the type of inspection system
which the United States would wish to
have considered in connection with meas-
ures to halt the arms race and reduce nu-
clear arsenals, we have made it clear that
we are sincere in attempting to provide for
only that verification necessary to meet
the security needs of the countries partici-
pating. We apply this principle both to
non-nuclear-weapon states and to states
possessing nuclear weapons.

The obligation of all of us to reach an ac-
cord that can reduce the nuclear threat re-
quires compromise by all sides. We hope
that our remarks today will be viewed in a
spirit of accommodation which will result
in the acceptance of reasonable safeguards
by the nuclear-weapon states. We further
believe that the non-nuclear-weapon states

JUNE 6, 1966

905

represented here will agree that such safe-
guards are in no way less appropriate than
those we would seek to have accepted by
them. We would welcome further comments
on this proposed measure from all delega-
tions and particularly from those non-
nuclear-weapon states which have stressed
the need to make a start in reducing exist-
ing nuclear arsenals.

United States Presents Views
on Security Council Procedures

Following is the text of a letter from
Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Representative to
the United Nations, to Moussa Leo Keita,
President of the U.N. Security/ Council dur-
ing April.

April 21, 1966
Dear Mr. President: I have the honor
to refer to the situation which arose be-
tween April 7 and 9 following the request
of the Deputy Permanent Representative of
the United Kingdom of April 7, 1966 for an
urgent meeting of the Security Council on an
emergency related to the oil embargo in
Southern Rhodesia.

The views of my Government on the re-
sponsibility of the President under the Char-
ter, the Provisional Rules, and established
practice with respect to convening the Coun-
cil in circumstances such as prevailed on
that occasion are set out below. I referred
to this planned statement of views at the
1277th meeting of the Council on April 9.'
1. The Security Council is given primary
responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, according to
Article 24 of the Charter, "in order to en-
sure prompt and effective action". It is re-
quired by Article 28 to "be so organized as to
be able to function continuously". These two
Articles establish the responsibility of the
Council to be available for emergency action
to maintain peace and security. The Provi-

BULLETIN of May 2, 1966, p. 713.

sional Rules of Procedure of the Security
Council are designed and must be in-
terpreted so as to ensure that the Council can
fulfill the responsibilities these Articles
place upon it.

2. The dominant paragraph of the Provi-
sional Rules of the Security Council accord-
ingly is Rule 2, which states that "The Presi-
dent shall call a meeting of the Security
Council at the request of any member of the
Security Council". The Rule is mandatory
and does not give the President the choice
of convening or not convening the Council
when a member so requests. This has been
made clear on numerous occasions. At the
654th meeting of the Council on 27 December
1953, for example, the Distinguished Rep-
resentative of Pakistan stated :

The calling of a meeting is not entirely in the
President's hands. The President is the custodian
of the Rules of Procedure. He is in a certain sense
the servant of the Council and I am perfectly sure
that Sir Gladwyn Jebb knows that he or his colleagues
could request the President to call the meeting and
that the President, under the circumstances, would
have no alternative but to call the meeting.

Even if a majority of Council members are
opposed to a meeting, the meeting must be
held. Those members opposed to the meet-
ing may express their views on the Agenda
when the meeting is convened, may seek to
adjourn the meeting, or to defeat proposals
submitted to it, but the President is bound
to convene the Council on a request under
Rule 2, unless that request is not pressed. •

3. Subject to Rule 2, the President is given,
under Rule 1, the authority and responsibil-
ity to set the time of a meeting. In so doing
the President acts not as a representative
of his country but as a servant of the Coun-
cil, and he does not exercise an arbitrary or
unfettered discretion. His decision must be
related to the requirements of Articles
24 and 28 and of Rule 2 and to the urgency
of the request and situation. A request for
an urgent meeting must be respected and de-
cided upon on an urgent basis, and the tim^
ing established responsive to the urgency of
the situation.

This position was clearly stated by the

906

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

President of the Council at the 746th meeting
on October 28, 1956 in the following words :

. . . Under the Rules of Procedure the President
is required to call a meeting of the Security Coun-
cil at the request of any member or members of the
Council. When a meeting is requested as a matter
of urgency, the President is required to convene the
meeting as a matter of urgency. . . . The Security
Council is an organ that functions continuously,
there has to be provision for convening it imme-
diately, whenever necessary.

This meaning is also underlined by Rule
8 which indicates that in contrast to the
normal rule requiring circulation of an Agen-
da at least three days before a meeting, "in
urgent circumstances it may be communi-
cated simultaneously with the notice of the
meeting".

4. The President customarily has con-
sulted and is expected to consult members
of the Council on their views as to the tim-
ing of a meeting; in circumstances of ur-
gency he may also convene the Council with-
out consultation when this might entail an
inadvisable delay. In either case it is his re-
sponsibility to set the time of the meeting
in keeping with the urgency of the request
and of the factual situation. The President's
obligation to act promptly on urgent re-
quests is, of course, further underlined if on
consultation he finds that a majority favor
an immediate convening of the Council.

Although the President may receive views
on scheduling a meeting from non-members
of the Council whose interests are "specially
affected", notably parties to a dispute before
the Council, the views of the members
must be guiding, as they are on all pro-
cedural questions in the Council.

This was clearly recognized in a member-
ship case before the Council at its 1034th
meeting on May 7, 1963 when the Repre-
sentative of Iraq, after commenting that the
meeting had been set "contrary to the wish
of several members of the United Nations
who are directly concerned", recognized that
"the members of the Council are sovereign
and are not bound by any desires expressed
outside its membership".

In responding to these remarks the Dis-

tinguished Representative of Morocco re-
ferred to the consultations he had held and
stated :

It is customary that as a result of preliminary
consultations one does reach a consensus of opinion,
and in this case, out of courtesy to the members of
the Council in return for their courtesy to me, I had
no further argument with which to insist on request-
ing postponement of this meeting. Therefore, having
heard the request addressed by the Representative of
Iraq to me and to the members of the Council regard-
ing postponement, I wish to assure the Representa-
tive of Iraq that all members have shown every
goodwill and have been extremely courteous in all
the preliminary consultations. But the current which
emerged from those consultations has to be taken
into account too, and that is why it is not possible
for me to do anything other than to show courtesy
in turn.

I hope that the Representative of Iraq will take
note of this fact. I feel sure that if he had been in
my place, he too would have wished to defer to the
wishes of the members of the Security Council.

The above principles and practices are, of
course, applicable to the case at issue. In this
instance the Council was faced with a re-
quest for an urgent meeting by a member;
known facts about the situation which the
request sought to redress indicated that Se-
curity Council action might be too late if not
taken in a matter of hours rather than days.
The majority of members of the Council,
when consulted, supported an urgent session
on the same day (April 7) as the request.
Members were officially notified that the
President had set the meeting for 5 p.m.
Thursday. They were later notified, without
further consultation, that it had been can-
celled, and in the ensuing confused situation
some members were under the impression
that it had been reinstated. More than a
majority of members felt sufficiently
strongly about the urgency of the situation
thereupon to convey in writing through the
Secretary General their continued views in
favor of a meeting that day. Although the
explanation for further delay was based on a
desire for more consultation, the majority
of members were not consulted on the tim-
ing of the meeting finally decided upon, al-
though non-members apparently were. Nor
were they informed of the reasons for the
cancellation or for the new timing estab-

JUNE 6, 1966

907

lished at 48 hours after the initial request.
The United States does not believe this
process, in the circumstances which pre-
vailed, met with the criteria that have been
described for the convening of the Council
under conditions of urgency and we cannot
accept it as a precedent for future action.
Inasmuch as these are views which I would
have expressed in the Council but refrained
from expressing in the interests of more
rapid attention to the business at hand, I
would be grateful if they could be referred
to the appropriate office of the Secretariat
of the Council for inclusion in the next com-
pilation of the Repertoire of the Practice of
the Security Council, and I request that this
letter be circulated as a document of the
Council.

Sincerely yours,

Arthur J. Goldberg

Letters concerning B-52 incident over Spain.

U.S.S.R., S/7151, February 18, 1966, 3 pp.;

United States, S/7169, February 26, 1966, 2

pp.
Letters on inclusion of Viet-Nam on Council

agenda. Bulgaria, S/7174, March 3, 1966, 2

pp.; France, S/7173, February 28, 1966, 1 p.;

Mali, S/7176/Rev. 1, March 3, 1966, 2 pp.
Situation in Dominican Republic:

Reports by the Secretary-General. S/7032/
Add. 15, February 17, 1966, 3 pp.; Add. 16,
February 25, 1966, 1 p.; Add. 17, February
28, 1966, 3 pp.; Add. 18, March 1, 1966, 2
pp.; Add. 19, March 2, 1966, 1 p.; Add. 20,
March 4, 1966, 2 pp.; Add. 21, March 7,
1966, 2 pp.; Add. 22, March 14, 1966, 2 pp.;
Add. 23, March 18, 1966, 4 pp.; Add. 24,
March 23, 1966, 3 pp.

Cables from the Organization of American
States. S/7148, February 17, 1966, 7 pp.;
S/7163, February 23, 1966, 12 pp.; S/7217,
March 22, 1966, 5 pp.; S/7227, March 29,
1966, 6 pp.

Exchange of letters between the Secretary-
General and the permanent representative of
Brazil. Brazil, S/7171, February 28, 1966, 2
pp.; Secretary-General, S/7179, March 4,
1966, 1 p.

Current U.N. Documents:
A Selected Bibliography

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Mimeographed or processed documents (such as those
listed below) may be consulted at depository librar-
ies in the United States. U.N. printed publications
may be purchased from, the Sales Section of the
United Nations, United Nations Plaza, N.Y.

Security Council

Communications concerning the "First Solidarity
Conference of the Peoples of Asia, Africa and
Latin America." Cuba, S/7134, February 11, 1966,
3 pp.; Mongolia, S/7178, March 2, 1966, 2 pp.;
U.S.S.R., S/7152, February 19, 1966, 2 pp.

Letter of February 11 from the permanent repre-
sentative of Mexico addressed to the Secretary-
General concerning nonintervention. S/7142. Feb-
ruary 15, 1966. 6 pp.

Letters of February 16 and 25 from the acting
permanent representative of Thailand addressed
to the President of the Security Council concerning
Cambodia. S/7147, February 16, 1966, 2 pp.;
S/7166, February 25, 1966, 2 pp.

Communications concerning territories under Portu-
guese administration. Bulgaria, S/7149, February
17, 1966, 2 pp.; Ethiopia, S/7209, March 16,
1966, 3 pp.

Reports from the Secretary-General concerning
India-Pakistan dispute. S/6719, Add. 5 and
Corr. 1, February 17, 1966, 15 pp.; Add. 6,
February 26, 1966, 1 p.; S/6699/Add. 12,
February 23, 1966, 2 pp.

Office for Relations With Canada
Established by Department

Department Announcement '

An Office for Relations With Canada has been
established within the Bureau of European Affairs.
This action constitutes concrete recognition of the
increasing importance and complexity of U.S.-Ca-
nadian relations as set forth in the Merchant-Heeney
report of June 28, 1965."

The Canadian desk previously had been located
in the Office of British Commonwealth and North-
em European Affairs in the Bureau of European
Affairs.

Establishment of the new office is consistent with
the reorganization of the geographic bureaus of the
Department of State as announced by the Secretary
on March 4.'

Rufus Z. Smith is director of the new office.

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on May 3.

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 2, 1965, p. 193.
' For text, see ibid.. Mar. 28, 1966, p. 508.

908

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Confirmations

The Senate on May 9 confirmed the following
nominations:

W. Tapley Bennett, Jr., to be Ambassador to Por-
tugal.

Findley Bums, Jr., to be Ambassador to the Hash-
emite Kingdom of Jordan. (For biographic details,
see Department of State press release 113 dated
May 17.)

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Agreement for the application of safeguards by the
International Atomic Energy Agency to the bi-
lateral agreement between the United States and
Argentina of June 22, 1962, as amended (TIAS
5125, 5660), for cooperation concerning civil uses
of atomic energy. Signed at Vienna December 2,
1964.
Entered into force: March 1, 1966.

Aviation

Protocol relating to amendment to convention on
international civil aviation (to increase number
of parties which may request holding an extraor-
dinary meeting of the Assembly). Adopted at
Rome September 15, 1962."

Ratifications deposited: Algeria, November 29,
1965; China, January 31, 1966; Rwanda, No-
vember 15, 1965; Saudi Arabia, February 25,
1966.
Convention on offenses and certain other acts com-
mitted on board aircraft. Done at Tokyo September
14, 1963.'
Signature: Norway, April 19, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Signature: Chad, May 12, 1966.

Maritime Matters

Convention for the unification of certain rules with
respect to assistance and salvage at sea. Signed
at Brussels September 23, 1910. Entered into
force for the United States March 1, 1913.
Adherence deposited: Iran, April 26, 1966.

' Not in force.

' Subject to ratification.

International convention for the unification of cer-
tain rules relating to bills of lading for the car-
riage of goods by sea, with protocol of signature.
Done at Brussels August 25, 1924. Entered into
force for the United States December 29, 1937,
subject to understandings.
Accession deposited: Iran, April 26, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptance deposited: Poland, April 29, 1966.

Trade

Declaration on provisional accession of Tunisia to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done
at Tokyo November 12, 1959. Entered into force
May 21, 1960; for the United States June 15,
1960. TIAS 4498.
Acceptance : Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Protocol to the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade embodying results of 1960—61 tariff con-
ference. Done at Geneva July 16, 1962. Entered
into force for the United States December 31,
1962. TIAS 5253.
Acceptance : Peru, March 18, 1966.

Declaration on provisional accession of the United
Arab Republic to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva November 13,
1962. Entered into force January 9, 1963; for the
United States May 3, 1963. TIAS 5309.
Acceptance: Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Declaration on provisional accession of Iceland to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva March 5, 1964. Entered into force April 19,
1964; for the United States November 20, 1964.
TIAS 5687.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Uruguay,
March 11, 1966.

Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro-
visional accession of Argentina to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 18,
1960, as extended (TIAS 5184, 5266). Done at
Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force
November 25, 1964; for the United States Decem-
ber 18, 1964. TIAS 5733.

Acceptances : Ghana, April 5, 1966; Niger, April 6,
1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Second proces-verbal extending declaration on pro-
visional accession of Svritzerland to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of November 22,
1958, as extended (TIAS 4461, 4957). Done at
Geneva October 30, 1964. Entered into force for
the United States December 18, 1964. TIAS 5734.
Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Kenya, De-
cember 20, 1965; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of the United Arab Republic to the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade of No-
vember 13, 1962 (TIAS 5309). Done at Geneva
October 30, 1964. Entered into force November 25,
1964; for the United States December 18, 1964.
TIAS 5732.

Acceptances: Ghana, April 5, 1966; Niger, April 6,
1966; Uruguay, March 11, 1966.

Protocol amending the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade to introduce a part IV on trade and
development and to amend annex I. Open for
acceptance, by signature or otherwise, at Geneva
from February 8 until December 31, 1965.'
Acceptances: Chad, April 5, 1966;' Rwanda, May

2, 1966.
Ratification deposited: Niger, April 18, 1966.

JUNE 6, 1966

909

i

Third proces-verbal extending declaration on pro-
visional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva De-
cember 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6,
1966.

Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;' Canada,
February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25,
1966; Ghana, April 5, 1966; Malawi, March 21,
1966; New Zealand, March 25, 1966; Niger,
April 6, 1966; Pakistan, March 2, 1966; Upper
Volta, April 7, 1966;' Uruguay, March 11, 1966.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21,
1966.
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Iceland to the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December 14,
1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965; for
the United States December 30, 1965.
Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;' Canada,
February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25,
1966; Malawi, March 21, 1966; New Zealand,
March 25, 1966; Niger, April 6, 1966; Uruguay,
March 11, 1966.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21,
1966.
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva Decem-
ber 14, 1965. Entered into force December 28,
1965; for the United States December 30, 1965.
Acceptances: Austria, March 25, 1966;' Canada,
February 18, 1966; Denmark, February 25,
1966; Ghana, April 5, 1966; Malawi, March 21,
1966; New Zealand, March 25, 1966; Niger,
April 6, 1966; Pakistan, March 7, 1966.
Ratification deposited: Netherlands, February 21,
1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966.'

Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance:
Mexico, May 17, 1966.

BILATERAL

Canada

Agreement amending and extending the agreement
of July 20 and August 23 and 31, 1960 (TIAS
4593), for the loan of a submarine to Canada.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 11, 1966. Entered into force May 11, 1966.

Honduras

Agreement supplementing the agreement of April 22
and June 10, 1955 (TIAS 3270), relating to in-
vestment guaranties. Effected by exchange of
notes at Tegucigalpa February 24 and April 30,
1966. Entered into force April 30, 1966.

Japan

Arrangement providing for Japan's contribution for
United States administrative and related expenses
for Japanese fiscal year 1966 under the mutual
defense assistance agreement of March 8, 1954
(TIAS 2957). Effected by exchange of notes at
Tokyo April 20, 1966. Entered into force April 20,
1966.

Pakistan

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreements of November 26, 1958, as amended
(TIAS 4137, 4257, 5331, 4353, 4426, 4469, 5606,
4794) ; April 11, 1960, as supplemented (TIAS
4470, 4579, 4720, 4743, 4772, 4778, 4794, 4829);
October 14, 1961, as amended (TIAS 4852, 5228,
5415, 5524, 5707). Effected by exchange of notes
at Karachi March 30, 1966. Entered into force
March 30, 1966.

Philippines

Understanding relating to uses of the Special Fund
for Education. Effected by exchange of notes at
Manila April 26, 1966. Entered into force April 26,
1966.

' Not in force.

' Subject to ratification.

i

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1406 PUBLICATION 8090 JUNE 6, 1966

The Department of State Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
affenciea of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreian
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreign policy, issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addressee made by
the President and by the Secretary of
State and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international atn'eements to which the
United States Is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documenta, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
20402. Price : 62 Issues, domestic $10.
foreign $16 ; single copy 80 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 1966).

XOTE : Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

910

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX June 6, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. U06

Africa. United States Role in a Changing
Africa (Palmer) 898

Atomic Energy. U.S. Discusses Proposed Safe-
guards for Cutoff and Transfer of Fission-
able Material and Nuclear Weapons Destruc-
tion (Foster) 901

Canada. Office for Relations With Canada
Established by Department 908

China. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
May 17 882

Congress

Confirmations (Bennett, Bums) 909

United States Role in a Changing Africa
(Palmer) 898

Department and Foreign Service

Confirmations (Bennett, Bums) 909

Office for Relations With Canada Established
by Department 908

Disarmament

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 17 882
U.S. Discusses Proposed Safeguards for Cut-
off and Transfer of Fissionable Material and
Nuclear Weapons Destruction (Foster) . . 901

Educational and Cultural Affairs

Department To Hold Foreign Policy Conference
for Educators 897

The Era of Educational and Cultural Relations

(Frankel) 889

Foreign Aid

The Era of Educational and Cultural Relations
(Frankel) 889

Security in the Contemporary World (Mc-
Namara) 874

International Organizations and Conferences.

U.S. Discusses Proposed Safeguards for Cut-
off and Transfer of Fissionable Material and
Nuclear Weapons Destruction (Foster) . . 901

Jordan. Burns confirmed as Ambassador . . . 909

Korea. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
May 17 882

Military Affairs. Security in the Contemporary
World (McNamara) 874

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk's News Conference of May 17 ... . 882

Portugal. Bennett confirmed as Ambassador . 909

Presidential Documents

President Comments on Internal Developments

in Viet-Nam 888

United States Calls for Treaty on Exploration

of the Moon 900

Public Affairs. Department To Hold Foreign
Policy Conference for Educators 897

Science. United States Calls for Treaty on
Exploration of the Moon (Goldberg, John-
son) 900

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 909

United Nations

Current U.N. Documents 908

United States Calls for Treaty on Exploration

of the Moon (Goldberg, Johnson) .... 900

United States Presents Views on Security

Council Procedures (Goldberg) 906

Viet-Nam

Mr. Harriman To Supervise U.S. Actions on

POW's in Viet-Nam (McCloskey) .... 888

President Comments on Internal Developments

in Viet-Nam (Johnson) 888

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 17 882

Name Index

Bennett, W. Tapley, Jr 909

Bums, Findley, Jr 909

Foster, William C 901

Frankel, Charles 889

Goldberg, Arthur J 900, 906

Johnson, President 888, 900

McCloskey, Robert J 888

McNamara, Robert S 874

Palmer, Joseph 2d 898

Rusk, Secretary 882

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 16-22

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Release issued prior to May 16 which ap-
pears in this issue of the Bulletin is No. 96
of April 25.

No. Date Snbject

tll2 5/17 U.A. Johnson: U.S. Seminar on
Earth Station Technology,
Washington, D.C.

♦113 5/17 Burns sworn in as Ambassador
to Jordan (biographic details).

114 5/17 Rusk: news conference of May 17.

115 5/19 National foreign policy confer-

ence for educators (rewrite).

tH6 5/20 U.S.-Argentine trade and eco-
nomic talks.

*117 5/20 U.A. Johnson: Dyess Air Force
Base, Abilene, Tex.

fllS 5/20 Guinea and Tunisia added to
countries where U.S. citizens
may buy local currency from
U.S. Government.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

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United States Policy Toward Communist Clilna

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THE OFFICIAL WEEKLY RECORD OF UNITED STATES FOREIGN POLICY

THE

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BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. 1407

June 13, 1966

ORGANIZING THE PEACE FOR MAN'S SURVIVAL
Address by Secretary Rusk 926

SECRETARY RUSK'S NEWS CONFERENCE OF MAY 27 918

THE RULE OF LAW IN AN UNRULY WORLD
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 936

THE UNITED STATES AND AFRICA : A UNITY OF PURPOSE
Address by President Johnson 9H

For index see inside hack cover

". . . none of us can be content when we measure what
is being done against what could be done. We are anxious
to work with you to fulfill your ambitions. Working with
others, we are prepared to help build ^vith you a modern
Africa."

I

The United States and Africa: A Unity of Purpose

Address by President Johnson '■

Three years ago yesterday the heads of
your governments signed the Charter of the
Organization of African Unity. It was a
memorable day for your continent and for
all the modem world into which Africa has
emerged as an indispensable partner.

The charter signed on that day declares
that "it is the inalienable right of all people
to control their own destiny," that "free-
dom, equality, justice and dignity are essen-
tial objectives ... of the African peoples."
It pledged to harness the natural and human
resources of Africa for the total advance-
ment of your peoples.

My country knows what those words
mean. To us, as to you, they are not ab-
stractions. They are a living part of our
experience as men and as nations. They
sum up the basic aspirations which your
people and mine share in common : to secure
the right of self-government, to build strong
democratic institutions, and to improve the
level of every citizen's well-being.

We have learned that these aspirations
are indivisible. If it takes self-determination
to become a free nation, it also takes a
climate of regular growth to remain one.
And that means the wise development of
human and natural resources.

' Made at a White House reception on May 26
marking the third anniversary of the Organization
of African Unity (White House press release; as-
delivered text). For an article on the OAU, see
Bulletin of May 3, 1965, p. 669.

Whether nations are 5 years old or 190
years old, the striving for these goals never
really ends. No nation ever completes the
task of combining freedom with responsibil-
ity, liberty with order — and applying these
principles, day after day, to our new prob-
lems.

Because these principles are imbedded in
the hearts of Africans and Americans alike,
I have asked you to come here today to join
me in commemorating the founding of the
Organization of African Unity.

It is a good occasion to reaffirm a unity
of purpose that transcends two continents.

As your charter and as our Declaration of
Independence set forth, we believe that gov-
ernments must derive their just powers from
the consent of the governed. This is the core
of political freedom and the first principle
of nation-building.

In the past 15 years belief in self-deter-
mination has fired the swift momentum of
Africa toward full participation in the com-
munity of nations. It has been a truly re-
markable era in which more than 30 nations
have emerged from colonialism to inde-
pendence.

The road has not been traveled without
difficulty. Its end is not even yet in sight.
There have been ups and downs — and of
course there will be more. But as one of
your distinguished ambassadors has pointed
out, "What matters most about new nations

914

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

is not that they have growing pains but
that they are in fact growing."

There is in Africa today an increasing
awareness that government must represent
the true will of its citizens. Across the con-
tinent the majority of people prefer self-
government with peril to subservience with
serenity.

This makes all the more repugnant the
narrow-minded, outmoded policy which in
some parts of Africa permits the few to rule
at the expense of the many. The United
States has learned from lamentable per-
sonal experience that domination of one race
by another leads to waste and injustice. Just
as we are determined to remove the rem-
nants of inequality from our midst, we are
also with you — heart and soul — as you try
to do the same.

We believe, as you do, that denial of a
whole people's rights to shape their national
future is morally wrong. We also know it is
politically and socially costly. A nation in
the 20th century cannot expect to achieve
order and sustain growth unless it moves —
not just steadily but rapidly — in the direc-
tion of full political rights for all of its
peoples. It has taken us time to learn this
lesson. But having learned it, we must not
forget it.

The Government of the United States
cannot, therefore, condone the perpetuation
of racial or political injustice anywhere in
the world. We shall continue to provide our
full share of assistance to refugees from
social and political oppression.

Principles Guiding U.S. Policy

As a basic part of our national tradition
we support self-determination and an or-
derly transition to majority rule in every
quarter of the globe. These principles have
guided our American policy from India to
the Philippines, from Viet-Nam to Paki-
stan. They guide our policy today toward

■ Rhodesia.

H We are giving every encouragement and
support to the efforts of the United King-
dom and the United Nations to restore legiti-

mate government in Rhodesia. Only when
this is accomplished can steps be taken to
open the full power and responsibility of
nationhood to all the people of Rhodesia —
not just 6 percent of them.

The disruptive effects of current sanctions
fall heavily upon Zambia, adding a difficult
burden to that young Republic's efforts to
strengthen its national life. I have informed
President Kenneth Kaunda that we will
work with him in trying to meet the eco-
nomic pressures to which his country is
being subjected.

The foreign policy of the United States is
rooted in its life at home. We will not
permit human rights to be restricted in our
own country. And we will not support
policies abroad which are based on the rule
of minorities or the discredited notion that
men are unequal before the law. We will
not live by a double standard, professing
abroad what we do not practice at home or
venerating at home what we ignore abroad.

Our dreams and our vision are of a time
when men of all races will collaborate as
members of the same community, working
with one another because their security is
inseparable, and because it is right and
because it is just. This vision requires ever-
increasing economic and social opportunity.

Regional Cooperation in Africa

I know the enormous tasks that Africa
faces in fulfilling its aspirations. I know
how compelling is her need to apply modern
science and technology to enrich the life of
her people.

Much has been accomplished in the years
since independence came to many members
of your organization. You are proving what
can be done when freedom and determina-
tion are joined with self-help and external
assistance. We have been particularly heart-
ened by the impetus toward regional co-
operation in Africa.

The world has now reached a stage where
some of the most effective means of eco-
nomic growth can best be achieved in large
units commanding large resources and large
markets. Most nation-states are too small.

JUNE 13, 1966

915

when acting alone, to assure the welfare of
all of their people.

This does not mean the loss of hard-
earned national independence. But it does
mean that the accidents of national bounda-
ries do not have to lead to hostility and
conflict or serve as impossible obstacles to
progress.

You have built new institutions to express
a new sense of unity. Even as you grapple
with the problems of early nationhood, you
have sought out new possibilities of joint
action: the OAU itself, the Economic Com-
mission for Africa, the African Develop-
ment Bank, and subregional groupings such
as the Economic Community of Eastern
Africa.

Assistance To Speed Growth

Growth in Africa must then follow the
inspiration of African peoples. It must stem
from the leadership of African govern-
ments. Assistance from others can provide
the extra resources to help speed this
growth.

Such assistance is already under way.
In the last 5 years aid from all external
sources has amounted to over $8 billion —
the United States of America has extended
approximately 2 billion of that 8 billion.

But none of us can be content when we
measure what is being done against what
could be done. We are anxious to work with
you to fulfill your ambitions. Working with
others, we are prepared to help build with
you a modern Africa.

I can think of many missions on which
America and Africa can work together.

First to strengthen the regional economic
activities that you have already begun.

My country has offered the African De-
velopment Bank technical assistance funds
to finance surveys of project possibilities
and loan funds for capital projects. We are
ready to assist the regional economic com-
munities through technical assistance and
through the financing of capital projects.
These will help to integrate the various
economic regions.

916

Second, to increase the number of trained
Africans.

We have been devoting a large part of
our aid funds for Africa to education. This
proportion will increase.

This year we are assisting in the develop-
ment and staffing of 24 colleges and uni-
versities. We are financing graduate and
undergraduate training for over 2,000 Afri-
can students in the United States. Alto-
gether, almost 7,000 African students are
studying with us now. We are helping some
40 secondary and vocational training insti-
tutions in Africa. We are aiding 21 teacher
training institutions while also providing
thousands of teachers, mostly through our
Peace Corps.

But these efforts are not enough. One of
the greatest needs is to overcome the frus-
tration of many qualified students who are
unable to obtain a higher education. To
help meet that problem we propose:

— to assist your effort to make certain
African universities regional centers of
training and professional excellence;

— to explore with your governments an
African student program for deserving stu-
dents to attend African universities.

Third, to develop effective communications
systems for Africa.

Africa is an immense continent embracing
37 states with still more to emerge. Their
communications links were formed in colonial
times and tie them more to the outside world
than to each other. Africa's continental
development needs a modern communica-
tions system to meet the regional require-
ments.

The United States has already financed
several capital projects for communications
facilities. We have provided technical as-
sistance to communication services in a
number of countries. I have authorized new
surveys looking to the widening of existing
telecommunications.

Communication satellites offer a striking
opportunity to make even greater advances.
To use these satellites effectively, ground
stations must be built to bridge the conti-

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

nent. They would provide the essential links
. between the satellite and the conventional
networks. The United States is prepared to
assist in the building of these stations. We
will examine the need for additional ground
links to enable Africa to secure greater
benefits from these satellites.

These immediate actions illustrate some
of the opportunities for cooperative effort.
Other possibilities deserve early study:

Africa's great distances require more
modern road, rail, and air links. The conti-
nent's great lakes and rivers could provide
an enormous internal transport network.

The development of regional power grids
offers an exciting possibility for regional
cooperation and national growth.

Opportunities for investment are still
largely untapped despite the fact that Afri-
can countries have welcomed private enter-
prise.

Africa's farm production does not meet the
nutritional needs of its fast growing popu-
lation.

African territories may need special help
in training their people and in strengthen-
ing their institutions as they move toward
self-government.

So we want to explore these and other
ways to respond to African needs. I have
instructed the Secretary of State and other
American officials to review our ovvti de-
velopment policies and programs in Africa.
We shall be seeking new ideas and advice
from American scholars, businessmen, and
experts concerned with Africa's problems.
Our Ambassador to Ethiopia, Ed [Edward
M.] Korry, will be working full time in the
weeks ahead to follow through these initia-
tives. We wish to discuss new cooperative
approaches and ideas with African govern-
ments, as well as with other governments
and international groups.
I The United States wants to respond in
any way that will be genuinely helpful :
from the private American citizen to a
combination of many nations, from a bi-
lateral effort with a single African country
to regional programs.

Above all, we wish to respond in ways

that will be guided by the vision of Africa
herself, so that the principles we share — the
principles which underlie the OAU Charter
— come to life in conformity with the cul-
ture and aspirations of the African peoples.

Learning From Africa

It once was said of Americans that "With
nothing are we so generous as advice. . . .
We prefer being with people we do things
for to being with people who do things for
us." But it is no longer a case of what we
can do for or even with the people of Africa.
We have come to recognize how much we
have to learn from you. As one of the great
Africans, Dr. James Aggrey, wrote : "If you
go to Africa expecting something from us,
and give us a chance to do something for
you, we will give you a surprise."

As we have deepened our relations with
you, we have learned that Africa has never
been as dark as our ignorance of it; that
Africa is not one place and one people but
a mosaic of places and peoples with different
values and different traditions; that the
people of Africa want to decide for them-
selves the kind of nations they wish to build.

We have learned not only about you but
we have learned about ourselves. We have
learned more about our debt to Africa and
about the roots of so many of our American
cultural values and traditions.

The human enterprise of which we are
all a part has grown through contacts be-
tween men of different tribes, different
states, and different nations. Through those
contacts we have learned new ideas, new
insights into ourselves, new ways of looking
at the universe of nature, and — most impor-
tantly— new understanding of man's rela-
tion to his brothers.

It is this knowledge that endures. It is
this deepening appreciation and respect for
the diversity of the world — each man and
nation in it — that increases the possibilities
for peace and order.

Your Excellencies, I hope that during your
stay in our country you will look in on the
African programs at our universities, foun-
dations, and institutes. These programs are

JUNE 13, 1966

917

contributing to the mutual understanding
we both seek.

In this connection, American publishers
have produced hundreds of books about
Africa in recent years. One of the most
recent is this handsome volume on African
art in American museums and private col-
lections. This book was prepared for the
U. S. Information Service in Africa, and it
will help increase the understanding and the
appreciation of your rich cultural heritage.

I would like you to accept a personal copy
of this book as a memento of our meeting
here in the East Room at the White House
today.

The Organization of African Unity has
become an important organ for building
that peace and order. On this third anni-
versary my countrymen join me in asking
you to come here this afternoon and join
me in saluting you and the people that you
so ably represent.

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 27

Press release 129 dated May 27

I told you last time ^ that I hoped to meet
with you again before I go to the NATO
meeting.

I plan to leave Tuesday for a trip that
will take me first to brief visits to Finland
and Norway. I had hoped to make those
visits last year, but those had to be canceled
at the last moment. I am looking forward,
of course, to a chance to visit both those
countries, with whom my relations have
been very good over the years.

Then I shall go to the NATO meeting in
Brussels for the spring ministerial meeting,
and on the way back I shall stop in Bonn
briefly, where I shall visit the President and
the Chancellor and have luncheon with the
Foreign Minister before returning to Wash-
ington.

The Brussels meeting will have important
matters to consider as a result of the deci-
sion of the French Government to withdraw
from many of the activities of the NATO
organization and to insist that other NATO
governments remove their personnel and
facilities from French soil.

The French Government's decisions pre-

' For text of Secretary Rusk's news conference of
May 17, see Bulletin of June 6, 1966, p. 882.

sent the NATO ministers with problems to
be solved but also with an occasion for ex-
amining the future course of the alliance
and of the organization that gives reality to
the alliance's commitments.

Apart from certain immediate practical
problems that will require ministerial guid-
ance, we shall also discuss measures directed
to all three of NATO's objectives : to provide
an effective defense of the Atlantic area;
to maintain a powerful deterrent against
aggression; and finally to preserve that
unity of action necessary to the settlement
of the great problems that still divide East
and West.

I look forward to the occasion of this
meeting and to the discussions that we shall
be having there. While I hope we can make
some solid progress and take some specific
decisions on certain points, we cannot ex-
pect to solve all of our problems or make all
of the decisions that will be required over
the months ahead through a continuing
process of review and consultation.

And of course there will be a series of
talks with the French Government on a
number of points that have been raised by
the recent announcement of French deci-
sions.

I am ready for your questions, gentlemen.

918

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Search for Reduction of Tensions

Q. Mr. Secretary, with respect to your
third category of the measures to be dis-
cussed, the maintenance of unity to settle
East-West questions, do you have anything
you could tell v^ of a positive nature about
anything new you plan to propose in that
respect?

A. Well, I think it will be more positive
than informative.

We have emphasized in NATO over the
years that NATO is a defensive organiza-
tion, that it has no desire to attack the East
or to make relations with the East more
difficult. And we have again over the years
indicated that as far as the West is con-
cerned that we are prepared to try to search
for a solution of some of the larger out-
standing problems that divide East and
West.

Now, we do believe that it is important
for Western Europe, the United States, the
members of NATO, to continue that search
for points at which there can be some re-
duction of tension. Obviously, there have
been some major difficulties. And in the
background is the unresolved problem of the
unification of Germany. But we shall go
over these in considerable detail at the
Brussels meeting to see whether or not there
might be some initiatives that we can take
in the West to do something about it.

Now, there are some other things that we
ourselves can do. For example, I would
hope that the Senate could proceed with the
consular agreement with the Soviet Union.-
We would hope that despite the clouds that
hang over the situation because of Viet-
Nam that we could make some headway on
the East- West trade legislation which we
have sent to the Congress.^

We can understand that there is an at-
mosphere of tension because of Viet-Nam.
It is serious and dangerous. But when Viet-
Nam is settled, as it must be, there is still
another world that has to be considered,
still major problems that are going to re-

" For background, see ibid., Aug. 30, 1965, p. 375.
' Ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 838.

quire attention. And we would hope that
we could get on with some of those prob-
lems, whether in disarmament or direct
East-West relations, even though Viet-Nam
is still unresolved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, some of us have gotten
the impression that not only the Congress
but the administration itself has been re-
luctant to press for congressional approval
of the consular treaty. They kind of threw
in the towel rather quickly on East-West
trade; the air agreement with the Russians
is stalled. Can we interpret your remarks
just now as an indication that we are com-
ing alive on the executive side on these
issues?

A. Well, there is no doubt about the atti-
tude of the executive branch of the Govern-
ment on these questions. When we sent
these matters down to the Congress, we
hoped for action on them. What we would
not like to see is for such matters to come
up and be defeated. It is really a case of
counting the votes, quite frankly. And we
would like to be in a position where the
prospect is that these matters can move
forward.

Unification of Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, what do you think about
the contention by Senator IFrank] Church
that the reunification of Germany can only
be a result of a detente in Europe and not
vice versa?

A. Well, I do not know of any question
which could contribute more to a detente than
a resolution of the question of the unifica-
tion of Germany. Certainly if you look back
over this past period, since the end of World
War II, this has been the great unresolved
problem between East and West. The ability
or the opportunity of the, say, 17 million
Germans living in the Soviet Zone, for
example, to decide their future has a major
bearing on what happens to literally hun-
dreds of millions of people, both in the
NATO and the Warsaw Pact countries.

If we could find a permanent settlement
of that problem in Central Europe, it not

JUNE 13, 1966

919

J

only would open the way for a stabilized
security in that area, but it would also open
the door to very far-reaching possibilities
in the disarmament field. That does not
mean that we will not look for other points,
as we should, on which some agreement can
be reached. We had hoped that the discus-
sions on disarmament in Geneva could make
some headway.

But I would not want myself to say that
the question of reunification should be put
off indefinitely into the future until some-
how everything else is right, because my
guess is that some things won't come right
until that basic and elementary question in
the heart of Europe has been solved.

Q. Mr. Secretary, do you think that Gen-
eral de Gaulle's visit, forthcoming visit, to
Russia is going to help or hinder progress
along the road to the detente iro Russia?

A. I really don't know. I think you should
put that question in Paris. I don't know what
the effect of that visit will be.

Situation in Viet-Nam

Q. Mr. Secretary, General Larsen {Maj.
Gen. Stanley R. Larsen^ was quoted today
here in Washington as saying that there are
now something like 10 regiments of North
Vietnamese and Viet Cong in Cambodia, pre-
paring ivhat looks like a monsoon offensive.
Can you tell us whether this jibes with
your information, and could you also com-
ment on the aftermath of the political dis-
turbances in Saigon and other cities?

A. On the first point, I have not had that
information. I will try to find a way to ask
General Larsen about it.

We do know that Cambodia has been used
by the Viet Cong — and I suspect also some
elements of the North Vietnamese — for in-
filtration into South Viet-Nam; and on oc-
casion we know, from direct contact with
them, they have used Cambodia as a sort of
safe haven in the course of action originat-
ing in South Viet-Nam.

We have been very much interested in the
suggestion that has been made, I think more
than once, by Prince Sihanouk that the In-

ternational Control Commission should
strengthen its personnel and its capabilities
in order to assure the neutrality and the
territorial integrity of Cambodia.

As far as we are concerned, we support
fully both the neutrality and the territorial
integrity of Cambodia. We have no interest
in seeing Cambodia become involved in this
situation. But the Viet Cong and the North
Vietnamese apparently have been abusing
the neutrality of Cambodia by involving
Cambodian space in some of their opera-
tions.

We think this ought to be a manageable
problem. We think that it could be resolved
if the right machinery — and I suppose that
would be the ICC — could be strengthened I j
to make its presence felt and to assure both
sides that Cambodia is not involving itself or
permitting itself to be involved in the prob- '
lem in Viet-Nam.

Your second question had to do with the J
present political situation. I think that there
is nothing that we know behind the scenes *
that adds very much to what you know from i *
the press reports. t '

President Johnson has indicated that our M
feeling is that these leaders in South Viet- j"
Nam should be in touch with each other and
should try to find a basis on which they can
resolve what we would call their lesser prob-
lems in order to be unified on the major "J
problem, which is fending off the effort of "
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese to ^
seize the country by force. °

As you know, there have been talks be-
tween the different elements in recent days. ^^
And we would hope that somehow they
would come to some conclusions that would (o
make it clear that the real problem there is in
the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese and jt
not internal dissension in South Viet-Nam «
itself.

The committee drafting plans for the elec- ^
tion in September is very far advanced in ,j
its work. It will be completing its action al- ^^
most any time now. They have continued ^j
their efforts right through these appear-
ances of — and realities of some dissent there, jj

We believe that it is important for them ,{

920

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

to proceed with the elections for a
constituent assembly so that you have a
representative group from all sections and
all elements in the population, they can draft
a constitution and move toward that gov-
ernment which Prime Minister [Nguyen
Cao] Ky in January indicated South Viet-
Nam ought to have : that is, a constitutional
government based upon popular elections.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you say, sir,
whether the situation in Hue, where there
has been an evacuation of some American
personnel, still is in a state of suspense and
uncertainty, or has this situation been al-
tered any by the talks which took place be-
tween General Thi \_Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh
Thi] and Premier Ky?

A. I think that in the case of Hue our
personnel were evacuated from there be-
cause certain irresponsible elements re-
sorted to violence and those who had au-
thority did not seem to be able to assure the
security of American personnel. I think
some of those irresponsible elements, Mr.
[Murrey] Marder, have been trying to put
pressure on the government indirectly by
putting pressure on the United States. We
know that that is not going to succeed as
far as we are concerned.

On the other hand, we felt that it would
be better for us to withdraw our own
civilians out of Hue in this present circum-
stance and see what comes out of these talks
that have been in process.

U.S. Forces in Germany

Q. Mr. Secretary, I would like to go hack
to the NATO area for a moment and ask you
what you think of suggestions in Congress
for reducing the number of American divi-
sions in Germany.

A. Well, we have indicated that our forces
will remain there as long as they are needed
and wanted. And we have also indicated to
the NATO Council that we do not anticipate
withdrawing major units from NATO.

Now, we will, of course, go through our
annual review of the entire situation
of NATO, the nature of the possible threats

that might be directed against NATO, the
total military situation.

But at the present time I would think that
unless there is some major change in the
situation, some significant change through-
out the European scene, that there would not
be major reductions in our forces contem-
plated.

Q. Mr. Secretary, also NATO, do you
think it would be opportune at a later stage
to transfer the North Atlantic Council from
Paris ?

A. Well, that is a matter that will be dis-
cussed by the ministers in Brussels. And I
would not want to anticipate the judgment
of the Fourteen by indicating a judgment of
one, because this is a matter that ought to be
reached on the basis of discussion among the
Fourteen.

Q. Mr. Secretary, what's in prospect in
the way of what has been sometimes re-
ferred to as a "blue ribbon" panel to rede-
fine national goals and our machinery for
dealing with them?

A. Well, I have heard a number of sug-
gestions about "blue ribbon" panels. I think
that this is one that I hadn't really focused
on.

Q. Well, I'm referring to —

A. Are you referring to China now?

Q. Mr. Secretary, they just published an
exchange of correspondence betiveen the
commander in chief of the Veterans of
Foreign Wars and President Johnson, in
ivhich President Johnson — the commander in
chief suggested a "blue ribbon" panel to re-
define, cus I have said, and the President re-
plied at the end of his letter, "We are
undertaking steps in this direction which
I trust will commend themselves to you."

A. Well, I have already indicated earlier
that we have a number of panels working on
different subjects. We have had a review of
the China situation going on for quite some
time. The President has an advisory com-
mittee of distinguished citizens in the gen-
eral foreign policy field, and we consult in-

JUNE 13, 1966

921

dividually and in groups as well as some-
times all together. And I indicated that we
were contemplating drawing together some-
what more formally advisers that would be
related to each of our geographic bureaus
and major problem areas. I think perhaps
those steps, of which the President is fully
informed, would be what he was contemplat-
ing when he made that reply.

Q. Mr. Secretary, is there a special group
that is doing the policy on China? You
mentioned this once before, about 2 weeks
ago, that there was.

A. We have had an interdepartmental
group working for quite some time now, I
think at least a year, examining all aspects
of the problem, and they in turn have been
in touch with many people outside. They
visited a number of the universities and
talked to some of the specialists and this has
been a very comprehensive examination and
is continuing on the problems posed by the
regime in Peiping.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there have been reports
that the fighting in South Viet-Nam has
slackened off considerably, and the mon-
soon offensive at least hasn't developed as
of Jf o'clock this afternoon. Do you knotv of
any political reasons why these lack of in-
cidents ?

A. We don't see any change in the pattern
of operations from which one could draw
any major political conclusions. There has
been some reduction in recent weeks of what
might be called large-scale attacks by the
Viet Cong and North Vietnamese forces. But
that has happened in earlier years in the
period just preceding the monsoon.

Now, whether this simply repeats that ex-
perience and they are regrouping or bracing
themselves for further action during the
monsoon period, I just don't know. It may be
that in certain areas they have been waiting
out some of the political turmoil that has
been going on, for example, in the First
Corps area. But there has not been a sig-
nificant reduction of terrorist incidents, of
sabotage attacks, and incidents of that sort.
Nor have we had more than 1 or 2 weeks

that have been free from an attack by an
organized unit of the Viet Cong, such as a
company or battalion.

So I think it's much too soon to draw any
conclusions. I do not see any political con-
clusions to be drawn from the pattern that
we have seen in the last 6 or 8 weeks.

Q. Can I follow that by asking more
specifically ivhether we have had any fresh
signals from Hanoi?

A. No.

Flexibility in Foreign Aid

Q. Mr. Secretary, how do you feel about
the limitations written into the report of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the
aid bill?

A. Well, we hope very much that the
Senate will not accept certain of the amend-
ments that have been adopted in the com-
mittee thus far. For example, the limitation
on the number of countries that could re-
ceive, say, development loans or technical
assistance seem to us to be very un-
fortunate.

Now, we understand the general desire on
the part of many people to take countries off
of the aid list as soon as it is possible to do
so. And I think there are some 27 countries
who have at one time or another received
aid who are no longer receiving aid. So we
are all in favor of people graduating from
the aid program.

But an arbitrary use of numbers doesn't
take into account the artificiality of the
structure of the world community of states.
For example, 500 million people in India can
be dealt with through one government; and
when we are trying to be helpful to 500
million people there, there is one govern-
ment on the list. But when you want to be
of some assistance to about half that many
people in the entire continent of Africa, you
have over 35 governments to deal with.

Now, this is not of our making. This is a
matter of historical development. So we
think that it would be very unfortunate to
put an arbitrary ceiling on the number of
countries without taking into account the re-

922

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

lation between governments and people.

Similarly with technical assistance. I think
a limitation of some 40 countries on that
list was imposed by the committee thus
far. Well, now, technical assistance basically
is a way to open up our universities and our
medical schools and our technical institu-
tions for the training of the young people
who are so desperately needed by the de-
veloping countries and assisting them and
their institutions in this matter of training
the essential manpower and leadership that
are required if they are to make any prog-
ress.

This goes right back to President Tru-
man's Point 4 idea. And we shouldn't close
up these opportunities to those who desper-
ately need them.

It's a relatively minor financial problem.
It's a very small problem. And it seems to
me that it is ungracious of this great nation
to start closing the doors of our institutions,
based upon some arbitrary ceiling with re-
spect to numbers.

I am also concerned that the existing 5-
year authorization for development loans
and for the Alliance for Progress may be
reduced to 1 year. We asked, as you know,
for a 5-year authorization for the entire
aid program, largely on the suggestions of
some of the members of the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. We have had 5-year
authorizations since 1961 or -2 for the de-
velopment loan program and the Alliance for
Progress. I think to retreat from that and
to go back to a 1-year authorization would
be unfortunate. And there are one or two
other points.

But there has never been any question
here about our readiness to meet with the
committee as often and as frequently as the
committee would wish and to have full hear-
ings and discussions about any aspect of our
aid program. But we do feel there should be
a flexibility and there should be some longer
range indication of the intent of the United
States Government in these fields so that
we can negotiate more earnestly and more
responsibly with foreign governments who
are all working on longer term bases, 5-year
plans, that kind of thing, who must discuss

their longer range plans with other govern-
ments and with such institutions as the In-
ternational Bank.

And, of course, we are urging our friends
abroad, the other industrialized countries, to
commit themselves to larger and longer
term aid programs. So we would like to
have our bargaining position strengthened in
this field rather than diminished.

Q. Mr. Secretary, there appear to he im-
portant developments between Indonesia and
Malaysia coming along in dropping confron-
tation. Simultan-eously there are indications
from Indonesia that they could use about
$1.3 billion in economic assistance. What role
do you see the United States may play or
being able to play in this?

A. Well, of course on the resolution of the
difficulties between Indonesia and Malaysia,
no one could be more pleased than we if
those matters could be resolved. We have
been encouraged by the fact that representa-
tives of the two countries are in touch with
each other. My guess is that they are likely
to be able to resolve these matters better
without us than with us, and we are per-
fectly prepared to cheer from the sidelines
on something like this and wish them well.

On the questions of aid, there are some
very serious economic problems faced by
Indonesia. They have substantial problems
of debt and they have some problems of
inflation. And we would suppose that they
would be discussing these problems with a
number of governments and institutions in
the weeks and months ahead.

We ourselves feel that it would be for
them to take the initiative on these matters
and to consult other governments and inter-
national bodies on the basis of plans for
bringing their economy into more order and
to resolve their problems on a somewhat
longer range basis.

We would hope to be able to play our
part when this time comes, but we would
be one of several who I think would be in-
terested in doing so under the right circum-
stances.

Q. Mr. Secretary, are the casualties that
we are taking note in Viet-Nam kind of a

JUNE 13, 1966

923

holding operation, at best, or can we make
real military progress there in spite of the
unstable political base?

A. Well, the political problem thus far
has been centered in the northeast corner
of the First Corps, and at the present time
primarily in the town of Hue and with a cer-
tain group in Saigon. The rest of the coun-
try has been proceeding in more or less nor-
mal fashion : the southern part of the First
Corps and the Second, Third, and Fourth
Corps areas.

On the military side, operations have been
normal, although the problem has continued
to be that of finding the other fellow. You
don't have the pattern of a great land war
in Asia, that some people sometimes talk
about, with an enemy you can't find. And
in some areas, apparently, the Viet Cong
has been lying low here in recent weeks, for
whatever reason.

So on almost any given day there will be
between 20 and 30 operations of battalion
size or larger on the initiative of the Gov-
ernment and allied forces; and on almost
every day about two-thirds of those opera-
tions would be all South Vietnamese; the
others would be U.S. or Korean or com-
bined. Operations still go on. We have not
had major fixed battles recently, because
the engagements simply haven't worked out
on that pattern; but the military opera-
tions continue to go forward.

Q. We could make permanent military
progress there of a substantial nature, even
given a continuance of the political volatility
at its present level?

A. Well, what we very much hope for is
that as the military operations succeed that
there would be a capability of filling in be-
hind the military operations with civilian
government, with rural programs, with local
organization, with police forces, in order to
consolidate the areas in which military suc-
cesses have been achieved.

I think, as a matter of fact, at the pres-
ent time, it has not been possible for us to
fill in behind the military operations of the
South Vietnamese and allied forces with
such permanent institutions as the military

operations might permit. This is a matter of
training cadres — a lot more of those are
going into the field; it is a matter of train-
ing police — that's being done in larger
numbers.

I don't believe that throughout the coun-
try as a whole, Mr. [Jesse] Cook, that the
present type of civil or political dissent has
had a major effect on either one of these
problems, partly because of the rather lim-
ited geographic nature of the political dis-
sent.

Yes, sir.

Cuban Incursions Into Guantanamo Base

Q. Mr. Secretary, the Cuban government
fleiv some correspondents to Guantanamo
today in an effort to support its contention
that the Pentagon version of the shooting
of the Cuban soldier was not true. Could
you comment on that ?

A. Well, we have had since, as you
know, a second incident of some Cubans
coming into the base area, with some ex-
change of fire. We are protesting that
through the available channels.^ We have
had a few of these incidents since about
March of this year. And my hope is, and
my advice would be, that these incidents
ought to be stopped by Cubans staying out
of the base area. It would be better for all
concerned if they should do so.

Q. Mr. Secretary, you referred a moment
ago to certain areas where you say the
enemy seems to be "lying loio." Is there any
evidence that in those certain areas the
lying low is the product of a local truce be-
tiveen the two sides ?

A. No; we haven't seen evidence of that,
We have had reports of certain individual
Viet Cong infiltrators into some of these
areas of disturbance. But it is not our im-
pression that these so-called "resistance
forces" are working with or for or in sup-
port of the Viet Cong. Their principal lead-
ers have repudiated the offer of the Viet
Cong to give them support. j

* See p. 934.

924

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

No, I think that — well, perhaps I should
not go too far in trying to judge what is in
the other fellow's mind. I did point out that
in previous years, at this period, just before
the monsoon really got started, there has
been a sort of drop in organized military
action. It was resumed again during the
monsoon. And I think it would be natural
that some of them, say, up in the First
Corps area, might just want to wait it out
a little bit and see what happened out in
Hue and Da Nang.

Chinese Nuclear Tests

Q. Mr. Secretary, the estimated force of
the Chinese nuclear tests seems to be
going up these days with each new an-
nouncement by the AEC [Atomic Energy
Commission^. Could you tell us what the
latest estimate is, as to the force of this
test, and has the size of the explosion
changed in any way the previous estimates
on ivhen the Chinese might have a stockpile
of nuclear weapons?

A. Well, on the first one, I would have
to refer you to the announcements of the
AEC on that matter. This had to do, I
think, with the pulling together of detailed
information from many different sources,
and some later estimate that was, I think,
more accurate than I think some of the
earlier estimates could be, based upon the
nature of the information.

On the second point, I should think that
it indicates that they are proceeding with
their weapons program, that they are mak-
ing progress on it, that we should expect
that they will go on from this to additional
tests, and that, now that they have it, they
will try to make something out of it.

Q. Mr. Secretary, could you amplify at
all, sir, on your remarks concerning Cam-
bodia? I realize you said you were not
familiar with the statement made by Gen-
eral Larsen at the Pentagon. But it cer-
tainly did leave the impression that the
Cambodian situation is rising to a state of
considerable danger. In your references to
the ICC and the possibility of expanding its

role, were you referring to a continuing
state of feeling about that or any additional
area of concern?

A. Well, we have made it clear to all con-
cerned that we would be glad to see the ICC
increase its activity, strengthen its person-
nel, get some mobility, put itself in a posi-
tion to get into different parts of the coun-
try to have a look when the situation called
for it, in order to assure everybody that
Cambodia's neutrality is not being violated
in this situation.

No, I did comment that I do not have in-
formation that would coincide with that
that General Larsen gave. I will check
with him to see whether he has some in-
formation that I have not had. But we are
aware that the Viet Cong have been using
Cambodia.

Yes.

Q. Mr. Secretary, since the still contro-
versial May 12th incident, have any steps
been taken to make sure that American
planes do not intrude again into Chinese
airspace ?

A. Oh, they have instructions not to in-
trude into Chinese airspace.

Q. Have there been any instances in
which our planes have intruded into Chinese
airspace, sir?

A. Not according to the briefings we get
from the pilots. I think there was an over-
flight— wasn't there? — over Hainan. I think
we pointed out there was a navigational
error over Hainan. But there is contra-
dictory evidence on some of these matters.
In any event, we have nothing to add about
this last incident.

It is true that we do not instruct our pilots
to overfly China.

Q. Well, is there contradictory evidence
on the May 12th one, Mr. Secretary?

A. Well, the Chinese—

Q. I mean beyond the Chinese.

A. Well, no, I have said all that I can say
on that. Because we had a full debriefing
from our people involved, and I have nothing
to add on that.

JUNE 13, 1966

925

"It is much too dangerous to let antagonists draw the wrong
concliision, much too dangerous for any to believe that ag-
gression succeeds upon aggression, much too dangerous to
be negligent about one's commitments, much too dangerous
to be indifferent to peace."

Organizing the Peace for Man's Survival

ADDRESS BY SECRETARY RUSKi

• • • • •

The central object of our foreign policy-
can be simply stated, to "secure the Bless-
ings of Liberty to ourselves and our Pos-
terity." Some may state it in other ways
but I suspect without significant improve-
ment. But one must add, in a modern
world, that we must prevent a major war if
possible. I recall that in August 1945, when
learning of the atomic bomb, a professional
officer on the General Staff exclaimed to a
group of us, "War has devoured itself and
can no longer serve any political purpose."
And so our effort must be to organize the
peace and not merely hope for it — and to
eliminate war and not merely wish that it
would go away.

And it is no longer possible to do that by
defenses and policies confined to the North
American Continent, the Western Hemi-
sphere, the North Atlantic Basin, or any
other geographical area. General George C.
Marshall recognized this fundamental
change in our security problem in his final
biennial report as Chief of Staff of the
Army. He pointed out that the war just
concluded would be the last in which we
would have space and time to arm after hos-

* Made before the Council on Foreign Relations at
New York, N.Y., on May 24; as-delivered text. (Ex-
cerpts from the advance text were released as De-
partment of State press release 122 dated May 24.)

tilities broke out, that the technique of war
has brought the United States, Its homes,
and factories into the front line of world
conflict, and that therefore we are now con-
cerned with the peace of the entire world.

He was led to that conclusion by inter-
continental planes and fission bombs, but
since then have come intercontinental
rockets and thermonuclear warheads. The
range and speed and power of modem
weapons compel us to be concerned with
the earth as a whole, and indeed even
with adjacent areas of space.

There are some who have not revised
their thinking in the light of the realities of
modern weapons and communications, who
cling to the obsolete notions of a bygone
age, who think that what happens next door
is necessarily more important than what
happens halfway around the world. Some
of them can see across the Atlantic, but the
Pacific is too broad for them, even though
it can be crossed in less time than could the
Atlantic before the Second World War.

One of the notions which has come do^vn
to us from a simpler time is the idea of a
sphere of influence. It has a certain super-
ficial appeal. Lacking here the time for a
more thorough analysis, I would merely
suggest that there are some questions which
need a searching answer. Who is to deter-
mine how many of these orbits of influence
there are to be? Which are to be the master

I

926

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

nations and which the satellites? And what
happens when the master nations intrude
on each other's self-designated orbits? Quite
apart from the political and moral problems
involved, it would be hard to devise a
scheme more likely to lead to major conflict,
and surely history does not certify as a
structure for peace.

I see no rational or realistic alternative
to a world order which recognizes the
right of every nation, large or small, under
institutions of its own choosing, to live in
peace, free of coercion or threats from
others, including its next door neighbors.
And that is the kind of world order en-
visaged in the preamble and articles 1 and
2 of the United Nations Charter — a docu-
ment drafted while the greatest and most
destructive war in history was still raging,
when we and others were thinking deeply
about the tragic lessons of the past and how
to prevent another and still more frightful
conflagration. Such a world order is the
abiding goal of American policy. And we
believe that it is in harmony with the as-
pirations and interests of a great majority
of mankind.

Is this just a visionary dream? Gentle-
men, it had better not be, because mankind
cannot afford a war fought with thermo-
nuclear weapons. We shall not have a chance
to apply lessons learned from world war
III. If civilization is to survive, those les-
sons must be seen and applied in advance
in order to prevent it.

The achievement of a peaceful world
order that is safe for freedom is not only
our abiding goal but our daily concern. Most
of the vast activity of the Department of
State and related agencies is directed to
that end. We work toward it not only
through the United Nations and its spe-
cialized agencies but through a growing
array of regional and functional organiza-
tions and other cooperative arrangements,
through treaties and other international
agreements, through negotiation and con-
sultations, and by promoting exchanges of
knowledge and people. Beneath the crises
these constructive efforts proceed, day and

night, and most of them are seldom men-
tioned in the daily press. But in Raymond
Fosdick's phrase, they are spinning "the in-
finity of threads which bind peace together."

Obstacles to Organizing Peace

One obstacle to organizing a reliable
peace is, of course, excessive nationalism.
In some cases this has appeared among
those who only lately have achieved na-
tional independence and have not discov-
ered that what nations — especially small
ones— can achieve in isolation is severely
limited. It has appeared also among a few
who would try to recapture the glories of a
vanished and, in part, imaginary past rather
than face squarely the realities of the pres-
ent and the requirements of the future.

But another and much more formidable
obstacle to the sort of world we are trying
to build is presented by those who are com-
mitted to a different scheme for organiz-
ing the affairs of mankind. And it is some-
times said that the underlying crisis of
our time in this postwar period arises from
the fundamental conflict between those who
would impose their blueprint on mankind
and those who believe in self-determina-
tion— between coercion and freedom of
choice.

And significant changes have occurred
within the Communist world. It has ceased
to be monolithic, and evolutionary influences
are visible in most of the Communist states.
But the leaders of both the principal Com-
munist nations are committed to the pro-
motion of the Communist world revolution,
even while they disagree — perhaps bitterly
— on questions of tactics.

If mankind is to achieve a peaceful world
order safe for free institutions, it is of
course essential that aggression be elim-
inated— if possible by deterring it or, if it
occurs, by repelling it. The clearest lesson
of the 1930's and -40's is that aggression
feeds on aggression. I'm aware that Mao
and Ho Chi Minh are not Hitler and Mus-
solini, but we should not forget what we
have learned about the anatomy and physi-
ology of aggression. We ought to know

JUNE 13, 1966

927

better than to ignore the aggressor's openly
proclaimed intentions or to fall victim to
the notion that he will stop if you let him
have just one more bite or speak to him a
little more gently.

Are there not many of us in this room
who are a little skeptical when ideas are put
forward in the 1960's as new ideas which
were the conventional wisdom when we
ourselves were students more than 30 years
ago and led to the great catastrophe of
World War II, with its tens of millions of
casualties right around the globe? And
skeptical that the revival of those ideas can
prevent the casualties in the hundreds of
millions of world war III? It's too far
away, it's not our war. Anyhow the aggres-
sor has been treated rudely and therefore
he is something of a psychological problem
and you must be kind to him. Or if he
takes another bite, perhaps he'll be satis-
fied and will not take another. Do you re-
member all those — 1930's — leading directly
into World War II?

I believe it is widely understood that a
thermonuclear aggression would not be a
rational act. And I believe it is generally
realized that aggression by moving masses
of conventional forces across frontiers
would entail the gravest risks. But what
the Communists, in their familiar upside
down language, call "wars of national lib-
eration" are advocated and supported by
Moscow as well as by Peiping. And the
assault on the Republic of Viet-Nam is a
critical test of that technique of aggression.

It is as important to deter this type of
aggression in Southeast Asia now as it
was to defeat it in Greece 19 years ago.
The aggression against Greece produced the
Truman Doctrine, a declaration of a gen-
eral policy of assisting other free nations
who were defending themselves against ex-
ternal attacks or threats. A clear under-
standing that aggression must not be al-
lowed to succeed produced our support of
Iran and our aid to Turkey and Greece, our
aid to Western Europe, the Berlin airlift,
the North Atlantic Treaty and the other de-
fensive alliances and military establishments

of the free world, the decision to repel the
aggression against Korea, and the decision
to assist the peoples of Southeast Asia to
preserve their independence.

The "Why" of Our Commitment I

In the discussion of our commitment in
Southeast Asia, three different aspects are
sometimes confused — why we made it, how
we made it, and the means of fulfilling it.

The "why" was a determination that the
peace and security of that area are ex-
tremely important to the security of the
United States. That determination was made
first before the Korean war by President
Truman on the basis of protracted analysis
in the highest councils of the Government.
The problem was reexamined at least twice
during his administration and at intervals
thereafter. And the main conclusion was
always the same. It was based on the natural
resources and the strategic importance of
the area, on the number of nations and
peoples involved, more than 200 million, as
well as on the relationship of Southeast
Asia to the world situation as a whole and
to the prospects for a durable peace. Those
of both parties — or of no party — who have
had to bear the responsibilities of protecting
the security of the United States during the
last 20 years have never regarded South-
east Asia and Viet-Nam as "obscure" or
"remote" or "unimportant."

The "How" of the Commitment

The "how" of the commitment consists of
various acts and utterances by successive
Presidents and Congresses, of which the
most solemn is the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty,- signed in 1954 and
approved by the Senate in early 1955 with
only one dissenting vote. I do not find it
easy to understand how anyone could have
voted for that treaty — or even read it —
without realizing that it was a genuine col-
lective defense treaty.

It says in article IV that each party rec-

" For text and protocol, see Bulletin of Sept. 20,
1954, p. 393.

928

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ognizes that "aggression by means of armed
attack in the treaty area" — which by pro-
tocol included the nations which came out
of French Indochina — "would endanger its
own peace and safety, and agrees that it
will in that event act to meet the common
danger in accordance with its constitutional
processes." And, in his testimony before the
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary of
State Dulles said specifically that this clause
covered an armed attack "by the regime of
Ho Chi Minh." There was never any doubt
about it when this treaty was signed. Article
IV binds each party individually ; it does not
require a formal collective finding. And that
too was made plain when the treaty was
under consideration and has been reiterated
on various occasions since then.

Now the assertion that we have only re-
cently discovered the SEATO Treaty is just
untrue. I have referred to it frequently my-
self, beginning with a public statement in
Bangkok in March 1961 •'' that the United
States would live up to its obligations under
that treaty and would "continue to assist
free nations of this area who are struggling
for their survival against armed minorities
directed, supplied, and supported from with-
out," just as we would assist those under
attack by naked aggression. President Ken-
nedy referred to our obligations under
SEATO on a number of occasions, including
his last public utterance, and President
Johnson has done so frequently.

In April 1964 the SEATO Council of
Ministers declared ^ that the attack on the
Republic of Viet-Nam was an aggression
"directed, supplied and supported by the
Communist regime in North Vietnam, in
flagrant violation of the Geneva accords of
1954 and 1962." They declared also that the
defeat of that "Communist campaign is es-
sential" and that the members of SEATO
should remain prepared to take further steps
in fulfillment of their obligations under the
treaty. Only France did not join in these
declarations.

A few days later, in this city, President
Johnson said that : ^

The statement of the SEATO allies that Com-
munist defeat is "essential" is a reality. To fail to
respond . . . would reflect on our honor as a na-
tion, would undermine worldwide confidence in our
courage, would convince evei-y nation in South Asia
that it must now bow to Communist terms to survive.
... So let no one doubt (he said) that we are in
this battle as long as South Viet-Nam wants our
support and needs our assistance to protect its free-
dom.

The resolution of August 1964," which the
House of Representatives adopted unani-
mously and the Senate with only two nega-
tive votes, said that "the United States re-
gards as vital to its national interest and to
world peace the maintenance of international
peace and security in Southeast Asia." It
also said that "the United States is, there-
fore; prepared, as the President determines,
to take all necessary steps, including the use
of armed force, to assist any member or
protocol state of the Southeast Asia Collec-
tive Defense Treaty requesting assistance in
defense of its freedom."

Fulfilling Our Commitment

Now the third aspect is the means of ful-
filling our commitment. These have changed
with the nature of the problem and as the
dimensions of the aggression have grown.
The decision to commit American forces into
combat was made by the President with
understandable sobriety and reluctance and
only because it became necessary to cope
with the escalation of the aggression by the
other side.

I have no doubt that a large majoritj' of
the governments of the free world are sym-
pathetic to our efforts in Southeast Asia
and would be deeply concerned were they
to fail. And gallant troops from the Re-
public of Korea, Australia, and New Zealand
are fighting at the side of our forces and
those of the Republic of Viet-Nam. And
Thailand and Laos are fully engaged in the
larger issues of Southeast Asia.

'Ibid.. Apr. 17, 1961, p. 547.

' For text of a communique of Apr. 15, 1964, see
ibid.. May 4, 1964, p. 692.

= Ibid., May 11, 1964, p. 726.

» For text, see ibid., Aug. 24, 1964, p. 268.

JUNE 13, 1966

929

You are familiar with our far-reaching,
persistent efforts to bring the other side to
the peace table. We shall continue those ef-
forts. I have on occasion seen some signs
carried by friends who greet me as I travel
about — "Peace in Viet-Nam." But they seem
not to understand that the President has
carried that sign into all corners of the
earth — repeatedly, repeatedly, repeatedly. I
would be in Geneva tomorrow, literally, if
there was anybody there with whom to ne-
gotiate peace. But I'm also confident that the
United States will continue to do what may
be necessary to assure that aggression in
Southeast Asia does not succeed.

When the other side becomes convinced
that they cannot achieve its purpose by
force, then peace will come — and I think
peace will come. But in our policy toward
our adversaries or possible adversaries, the
prevention or defeat of aggression is only
the first step. We welcome, and ought to
welcome, every opportunity for agreements
or understandings which settle or blunt dis-
putes, without sacrificing the vital interests
of our allies and other free peoples. And so
we continue most earnestly to seek reliable
agreements and arrangements to control and
reduce armaments.

And we welcome the evident desires of
most of the governments and peoples of
Eastern Europe for more normal relation-
ships with the peoples of the West. The
President hopes very much that Congress
will grant the broader authority he has re-
quested, for example, in negotiating trade
agreements with those nations.'

Now it is true that Viet-Nam hangs as a
cloud over what are called East-West rela-
tions. But I would hope that we on our side
would not let that cloud become so dark as
to paralyze our search for further points of
agreement, even with those with whom we
cannot agree as far as Viet-Nam is con-
cerned. We know that these same obstacles
apply in Eastern Europe. But we must
think of the day when Viet-Nam is settled

' For text of a letter from Secretary Rusk to the
Congress, together with proposed legislation, see
ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 838.

and remind ourselves that there is a world
whose business must be transacted, there is
a peace to be built, and that we should get
on with it in whatever way we can — in
trade or exchange, or in disarmament, or
wherever we can find points, large or small,
on which we and those in Eastern Europe
can agree.

And we're glad that the terror has been
lifted in many of the Communist nations,
and we have welcomed these trends toward
more personal freedom. And we'll welcome,
and shall do what we can to promote,
friendly and natural relationships between
the peoples of the Communist world and
ourselves.

Wide Understanding of Basic U.S. Policy

In my years as Secretary of State, I have
found that the central objectives of Amer-
ican policy are widely understood and re-
spected and supported. I believe that a
great majority of governments and peoples
realize that we seek nothing for ourselves
except the right to live in freedom. I don't
believe there is any government that seri-
ously believes that we're trying to take away
from them anything that is theirs. There is
no acre of ground which we covet, no people
or population which we should like to annex.
I believe a great majority of them want this
sort of world order that we and they are
trying to build and in which all men can live
in peace and freedom and in fraternal asso-
ciation.

It's no accident that we took the lead in
organizing the United Nations and many of
its related institutions and have been the
largest financial contributor to these insti-
tutions. At the end of the Second World
War we demobilized the most powerful
armed forces in the world, indeed so rapidly
that by 1946 we did not have a division or
an air group ready for combat. We offered
to share our atomic monopoly with the en-
tire world and eliminate nuclear weapons
from the arsenals of the world for purposes
of peace. We supported Iran when its in-
tegrity and independence were threatened;

930

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and when Greece and Turkey were threat-
ened, we assisted them. We assisted West-
em Europe to recover from the war and to
move on to unprecedented levels of well-
being, and joined in organizing NATO and
other alliances for the defenses of the free
world.

When free Berlin was threatened, we
organized an airlift which enabled it to
live, and without war. We negotiated a
peace of reconciliation with our enemies re-
cently engaged in so bitter a war — Japan
and Germany. We played a major role in
repelling the Communist aggression against
the Republic of Korea.

We took the lead in organizing a great
cooperative undertaking in the Western
Hemisphere, the Alliance for Progress. We
have encouraged and assisted many other
cooperative undertakings for human welfare
right around the globe, with 11,000 of our
young people today serving in every conti-
nent in the Peace Corps. We've extended
economic and technical assistance to most of
the developing countries, to the extent of
some $120 billion of assistance. And this
has included many billions of dollars in food,
without which millions of our fellow men
would have starved.

And since the end of the Second World
War, our Armed Forces have suffered more
than 165,000 casualties in the defense of
freedom.
I Those are some of the things the Ameri-
can people have done in the last two decades.
Why? It's very simple — to build a little
peace, to sustain the freedom of man, to
lift the burdens of misery and ignorance
and disease, and to bring some of this tur-
bulence under law.

We are being tested today in a trouble-
some and dangerous situation in Southeast
Asia. But we've been there before, and
why? Because the power of the United
States is harnessed to the decent purposes
of the American people.

If there has been one principal change in
our experience before World War II, and
our experience since, it is that we've faced
the utter and overwhelming necessity of

organizing a peace. It is much too dangerous
to let antagonists draw the wrong conclu-
sion, much too dangerous for any to believe
that aggression succeeds upon aggression,
much too dangerous to be negligent about
one's commitments, much too dangerous to
be indifferent to peace.

There are some burdens — there are some
burdens — and the American people have
demonstrated their willingness to bear the
necessary burdens in this postwar period:

Burdens of firmness to demonstrate that
aggression must be stopped at its earliest
stages, before it grows into a great con-
flagration.

But also the burdens of restraint, for
there is too much power in the world simply
to be furious — and therefore an airlift in-
stead of ground divisions into Berlin; and
the wide-open door to a peaceful settlement
of the Cuban missile crisis; and 4 years
without bombing North Viet-Nam during
increasing infiltration, including the infiltra-
tion of the organized units of the North Viet-
namese army.

Firmness, for which we must be grateful
to those men in uniform who perform their
professional tasks with such courage and
confidence on every day of the week. But the
patience to try to keep the fury of man under
control and to keep in mind that our genuine
purpose is to make peace possible, to organize
it, in order that man himself can survive.

QUESTION-AND-ANSWER PERIOD

John J. McCloy, Moderator:^ Thank you,
Mr. Secretary, for that very fine and sober
analysis of our foreign policy. We take re-
newed confidence in the fact that you are
guiding our conduct in international affairs.

Now, a number of questions have been sent
up to the platform. The Secretary hasn't
seen these questions. I don't believe we'll
have time to answer them all. I have selected
some that I think are particularly pertinent.

' Mr. McCloy is chairman of the Council on For-
eign Relations.

JUNE 13, 1966

931

and with your indulgence, Mr. Secretary,
I'll read them to you and then you see if
you care to reply to them.

The first que.stion I have is : How serious
is the civil war in South Viet-Nam?

Secretary Ricsk: It would always be hoped
that those who agree in their opposition to
the National Liberation Front and to the
effort of Hanoi to take over South Viet-Nam
by force would tie themselves together in a
common effort in order to take care of that
overriding problem and postpone until later
the lesser differences they have among
themselves. We do not find among any of
these groups in South Viet-Nam, except the
Viet Cong itself, an interest in accepting the
program of the Liberation Front or of Hanoi.

Last January the military government of
South Viet-Nam announced that it wished
to move to a constitutional system. This
was on their initiative. They indicated that
they hoped that during this calendar year a
constitution would be drafted and submitted
to the people for approval and that perhaps
next year there would then be, under that
constitution, a national assembly. In the
course of discussion over the last several
months, that time schedule has been fore-
shortened, but it is expected that in Sep-
tember there would be elections throughout
the country for a constituent assembly in
order to move South Viet-Nam toward a
constitutional government.

The issue, therefore, of the present gov-
ernment is a temporary one by the solemn
declaration of the present government itself.
We believe that this constituent process can
go forward. The committee devising plans
for the elections will probably finish its job
this week. The government has just, in the
last 24 hours, reaffirmed its dedication to
the idea of elections in September, and on
the basis of those elections, there can gather
those who represent all sections and seg-
ments of the population, with the possible
exception of the Viet Cong, who've already
announced that they will have nothing to do
with the election.

Now there are longstanding differences

— historical, regional, religious, social —
among some of the elements there, but I
would emphasize that what they have in
common is a rejection of the plans of the
Liberation Front and of Hanoi. We have
made it clear to them that we hope and ex-
pect that they will put aside these lesser
differences in order to work in unity. And
all of our efforts, private and public, will
be directed to that end.

I think we may see some further indica-
tions of dissent in that country, but there
seems to be a pretty general acceptance that
elections ought to take place, can take place,
and perhaps come to that basic constitu-
tional agreement which is so important to
the unity of the whole.

Moderator: Another question I have: What
would be our response if a duly elected gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam requested and
insisted that we withdraw?

Secretary Rusk: I do not expect that to
happen. When we commit ourselves to elec-
tions, as we did in our 14 points over the
turn of the year," we commit ourselves to
the results of those elections, but we do not
see indications at the present time that
under free elections the South Vietnamese
people would want us to withdraw and open
the way for the seizure of the country by
the Viet Cong and Hanoi. So this is to a very
considerable extent a hypothetical question,
but, nevertheless, on the hypothesis, we're
committed to the results of free elections,
whatever they are.

Moderator: The United States Senator,
speaking lately at the Council against the
administration's policies, said the United
States should not escalate but should retreat
to a defendable coastal enclave. Is there
anything wrong with this?

Secretary Rusk: Yes. This is a curious
notion that somehow we can take charge of
the process of escalation. For 4 years, as I
intimated earlier, we held off bombing
North Viet-Nam, despite the increasing
buildup of infiltration of men and arms from

' For text, see ibid., Feb. 14, 1966, p. 225.

932

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the North into South Viet-Nam. The 325th
regular division of the North Vietnamese
army moved into South Viet-Nam before
we started bombing the North, over the
turn of the year 1964-65. We have offered
many times to talk about stopping this war.
We have asked many times what else would
happen if we stopped the bombing. We
never got an answer. But even so, we tried
on two separate occasions in the last 18
months to find out by stopping the bombing,
and the answers in both cases were very
clear.

Do not suppose that under present cir-
cumstances if we ourselves deescalate, the
other side will deescalate. If they are pre-
pared to do so, our contacts are such that we
could find that out on very short notice
indeed. Therefore, when you talk about
withdrawing into certain enclaves, you're
talking about drawing into enclaves in the
face of every prospect of further extension
of effort by the North by military means. I
would suppose that that means greater casu-
alties. I would suppose that would mean the
seizure of South Viet-Nam by military
means from the North, outside of the en-
claves, and a reduction of your enclaves
piecemeal at their convenience. Now, we
have an enclave in Cuba, but Castro has
Cuba; and six enclaves in South Viet-Nam
would not in themselves prevent the other
side, if they put in sufficient military ef-
fort, from seizing the country.

If this particular suggestion is looked upon
as a step on the way out, then it should be
described as such so it can be judged on
that basis. But to speak of it in terms of
either military or political profit seems to
me to ignore the attitude of the other side
and to show no prospect of bringing this
matter to a conclusion.

Moderator: I'll put two more questions to
you. I think a good many of the questions
that have come up have already been an-
swered. One is: Could you tell us something
about the projected meeting of foreign min-
isters of Japan and South Korea, Taiwan,
Philippines, and a number of other Asian

countries mentioned in European papers? I
don't know much about that — maybe you
can speak —

Secretary Rmk: We've been very much
interested in the drawing together of coun-
tries in the regions themselves to build, on
a basis which they themselves might dis-
cover, regional solidarity without the com-
plicating presence of the United States. For
example, the ASA association [Association
of Southeast Asia] between the Philippines,
Malaysia, and Thailand. We're very pleased
to see Japan organize a meeting of minis-
ters of, I think, eight countries to talk about
economic development in Southeast Asia.
The ministers are considering another meet-
ing shortly in Korea to talk about the gen-
eral problems of the area. We not only do
this in Asia; we do so in Africa and other
areas. It is partly because we believe that
regional solidarity itself offers mutual sup-
port and assurance and mutual cooperation
that will be a useful part of the total struc-
ture of building some peace in the world.

We do not ourselves go around looking for
business in crises in which we can intervene.
If you look at the last 70 crises that have
occurred, for example, in the world, you will
find that we were involved in about 5 or
6 of them. We would be glad to see re-
gional organizations, such as the OAU [Or-
ganization of African Unity] in Africa, or
regional groupings in the Far East build up
their own ties among themselves to achieve
common purposes without entangling those
efforts with what might be called the spe-
cial interests, or perhaps the diverting in-
terests, of the United States.

So we welcome these developments. We
hope they will be extended and strength-
ened; and we see very considerable benefit
coming from them, partly because one can
see in Latin America, Africa, and in the Far
East a rising strength of the voices of
moderation, the voices of moderation that
can have decent respect to the kind of world
community that we have seen outlined in
the United Nations Charter. So we'd be glad
to take our chances on those developments

JUNE 13. 1966

933

and give them our sympathetic if somewhat
distant support — I say distant because we
don't want to get in the way.

Moderator: I think one other question
that came up you've just answered because
it dealt with the same subject, but in respect
of Africa. There's also one other question
— this will be the last. Would you care to
comment on U Thant's remarks today in
Atlantic City and its implications for U.S.
policy in Viet-Nam? Have you had an op-
portunity to see what he said?

Secretary Rusk: I've only seen the tickers
summarizing the Secretary-General's state-
ment. One of our disappointments has been
that Hanoi and Peiping have not responded
to any machinery for discussing the prob-
lems of Southeast Asia. They've rejected the
idea that the United Nations has anything
whatever to do with the present situation
in Southeast Asia. They said that the Ge-
neva machinery is the more appropriate
machinery. When we say, all right, let's
convene that machinery, they say, no, we
don't want to do that either. So we say, all
right, let's talk bilaterally. No, they don't
want to do that. Well if you don't want to
do that, let's talk through intermediaries to
see what's going on and to see if we can
find any points of contact. They don't want
to do that.

I think the point of deescalation, which
the Secretary-General mentioned, is one
that ought to be pursued further. We've
tried ourselves to pursue it for about 2
years. How can we reduce the mounting
violence, how can we disengage, how can we
get back to the agreements of 1954 and
1962? Now those efforts will continue, but
I think we ought not to tease ourselves on
this kind of problem. There is no gimmick,
there is no pure device, there is no formula
which is going to move us toward peace if
Hanoi, with the backing of Peiping, is de-
termined to seize South Viet-Nam by force.
When all that is said has been said, when all
of the frosting is off the cake, you've got
to answer the question: If they keep com-
ing, do you get out of the way, or do you
meet them? We shall meet them.

U.S. Calls on Cuba To Prevent
Incursions Into Guantanamo Base

DEPARTMENT STATEMENT^

On May 27 the Department presented to
the Czechoslovakian Embassy, in charge of
diplomatic representation for Cuba in the
United States, a note calling attention to two
recent incursions by uniformed, armed Cuban
military personnel within the perimeter of
the United States Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. We are releasing the text of this
note.

Today representatives of the Czechoslo-
vakian Embassy, acting on instructions from
the Cuban Government, returned the note to
the Department. It can only be assumed that
Castro's reaction to the note is further evi-
dence of his need to divert attention from
the failures of his regime and increasing
popular dissatisfaction in Cuba.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

PreS3 release 130 dated May 28

The Department of State wishes to call to
the attention of the Embassy of the Czech-
oslovak Socialist Republic, in charge of dip-
lomatic and consular representation for Cuba
in the United States, two recent incursions
by uniformed, armed Cuban military person-
nel within the perimeter of the United States
Naval Base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, on
the evenings of May 21 and May 23. The
Department of State wishes to request that
the Embassy transmit to the Government
of Cuba the protest of the Government of
the United States against these provocative
actions which are described below:

(a) At approximately 1910 hours (Guan-
tanamo Naval Base time) on May 21, a Ma-
rine sentry stationed along the Eastern fence
line of the Naval Base detected an armed,
uniformed Cuban soldier within the base
boundary and challenged him. The Cuban
soldier refused to halt. The Marine sentry

' Read to news correspondents by a Department
spokesman on May 28.

934

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

fired a warning shot, and, upon the Cuban
soldier's continued failure to halt, fired a
second shot. The Marine sentry observed
that the Cuban soldier appeared to have
been vi^ounded by the second shot.

(b) At approximately 2400 hours (Guan-
tanamo Naval Base time) on May 23, a pa-
trol comprised of three Marines sighted at
least five armed and uniformed Cuban sol-
diers approximately 100 meters inside the
Base boundaiy along the Northwestern fence
line of the Naval Base. After being chal-
lenged, the Cuban soldiers opened fire on the
Marine patrol which returned the fire. The
Cuban soldiers moved away to the West and
returned to the Cuban side of the boundary
fence.

The above incursions were but the latest
in a series of such incidents which began in
March of this year. The Government of the
United States assumes that the Government
of Cuba is aware of these happenings and
must accept responsibility for them.

The Government of the United States
wishes to stress to the Government of
Cuba that a deliberate, unauthorized en-
trance by Cuban military personnel into the
Guantanamo Naval Base is a serious matter.
Such incursions, if continued, can only result
in further grave and regrettable conse-
quences. The Government of the United
States therefore calls upon the Government
of Cuba to take steps to assure that they
are not repeated.

Department of State

Washington,

May 27, 1966.

U.S. Relinquishes 99-Year Lease
to Atkinson Field in Guyana

Press release 124 dated May 26

The Government of the United States on
May 26 relinquished its 99-year lease to
Atkinson Field, a World War II airbase in
Guyana, South America, and to other leased
areas in the new nation. An announcement
of the turnover of the base to the Govern-
ment of Guyana was made at ceremonies
at Georgetown, the capital of Guyana, shortly
after the former British colony became in-
dependent.

The United States acquired the long-term
leases in British Guiana from the United
Kingdom in 1941. Atkinson Field was de-
activated at the end of World War II, and
the only significant United States use since
that date has been for infrequent aerial
survey missions.

Under an agreement reached with Prime
Minister Forbes Bumham of Guyana, the
United States will have certain rights to
use Atkinson Field for a period of 17
years subject to cancellation thereafter by
written notice 1 year in advance. Delmar
Carlson, Charge d'Affaires, who has been
nominated as first American Ambassador to
Guyana, signed for the United States. At-
kinson Field is used as Guyana's interna-
tional airport, and the Governments of the
United States and Guyana agreed in 1965
to spend $1.5 million in building a new
terminal building and constructing new run-
ways and other improvements.

JUNE 13, 1966

935

The Rule of Law in an Unruly World

I

hy Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations '

To participate in this series of lectures
would be a privilege in itself, but the privi-
lege is all the greater because of the great
man whom we thus commemorate. Adlai
Stevenson was a warm and wise friend to
many of us, including myself. He often told
me he had a wish to become a teacher. That
wish never came true formally, but in a
larger sense he taught the whole world. His
rare qualities won him a place in the hearts
of university people, both faculties and stu-
dents, such as has been attained by scarcely
any other man in our public life. For all
these reasons, the establishment of this lec-
tureship under the aegis of his friend and
United Nations colleague. Dean Andrew Cor-
dier, is a most fitting memorial.

Although it fell to me to succeed Governor
Stevenson at the United Nations, it does not
seem to me that we who come after him
stand in his shadow ; rather, we stand in his
light, and from that light we draw inspira-
tion and reassurance.

My theme this evening is one of which I
think Adlai Stevenson would have approved :
the rule of law in an unruly world. Not only
from his legal training and practice but
from the whole inclination of his personality,
he acquired an abiding concern for peace
among men and for the law and the institu-
tions which serve peace. He served the

' Adlai Stevenson Memorial Lecture at the School
of International Affairs, Columbia University, New
York, N.Y., on May 18 (U.S./U.N. press release
4860 /Corr. 1).

United Nations at its birth in San Francisco,
in its infancy when the first rules of proce-
dure were written and tested in London, and
in its turbulent years of growth on the East
River. He saw in it an expression of the
same ideals of ordered freedom that under-
lie the American Republic: the same belief
in the equality of all men, before God and
before the law. And he knew that those
ideals, like the great documents that embody
them, exist not to be kept in a glass case
and admired by tourists but to be put to
work in the real world, where order grows
strong by trying its muscles against dis-
order.

I hold the same beliefs. When I left the
Supreme Court to enter on my new duties
at the United Nations, I made a statement -
which may have sounded to some like mere
rhetorical flourish; but it was entirely seri-
ous. The statement was that I was moving
from one area dedicated to the rule of law
to another dedicated to the same principle
and that, to my mind, the effort to bring
the rule of law to govern the relations be-
tween sovereign states — the central effort
of the United Nations — is the greatest adven-
ture in history.

These beliefs come naturally to me from
a lifetime in the law and in the pursuit of
the just resolution of conflicts through due
process. The rule of law among nations is
obviously more difficult than here at home;
but it is even more necessary, and we have

' For text, see Bulletin of Aug. 9, 1965, p. 240.

986

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ample proof that it is possible — indeed in
some measure it is an accomplished fact.

My purpose in this discussion, then, is to
suggest in what sense and to what extent
the rule of law is today a fact among na-
tions and how, in our own American interest,
we should seek to widen the areas of inter-
national relations that are susceptible to it.
This is, I know, a subject of great interest
to scholars and students of international
affairs, here at Columbia as elsewhere. I do
not propose to rival their scholarly work, but
perhaps I can lend some encouragement by
testifying that this subject is of great in-
terest not only to scholars but to practition-
ers, too.

I am well aware that there are other
views of this subject, even among people
who have wide experience of diplomacy and
world politics. We hear it said that what
nations really respect is not law but political
power. Besides, we are told, this is an age
of revolutions, of deep splits of values be-
tween East and West and between North and
South. And since law derives from values,
this revolutionary era is said to be going
through what one distinguished critic calls
"a withdrawal of the legal order," in which
sheer power is more decisive than ever in
international affairs and law, especially that
of the United Nations, has become little more
than a mockery.

Law and Power

My own reading of the facts leads me to
a very different conclusion, as I shall explain
in a moment. But before specifically dis-
cussing international law, I would first like
to make three observations about law in
general.

First, we must beware of framing the
argument in such a way that law and power
become antithetical. In real life, law and
power operate together. Power not ruled by
law is a menace, but law not served by power
is a delusion. Law is thus the higher of the
two principles; but it cannot operate by
itself.

This is true particularly of the United
Nations, whose charter is lofty in purpose

but realistic in method. It recognizes the
facts of power, as all good law does. But as
far as possible, it subjects power to law:
to an agreed rule of conduct and to proce-
dures for putting that rule into effect in
particular cases. And we Americans should
not forget that since the rule is embodied
in the charter, which is a treaty to which
we are a party, it is thus a part of the
supreme law of the United States under our
Constitution. Our fidelity to it is therefore
not a matter of convenience but of binding
commitment, to continue even when it is
inconvenient.

My second broad point is that law cannot
be derived from power alone. Might does
not make right. On the contrary, law springs
from one of the deepest impulses of human
nature. No doubt the contrary impulses to
fight and dominate often prevail, but sooner
or later law has its turn. In one of the de-
cisive moments in the history of law. King
John thought he could impose his arbitrary
will by force; but the barons who mustered
superior force preferred to substitute an
agreed rule — Magna Carta — for any man's
arbitrary will. Thus, the king became sub-
ject to the law, and new proof was given of
the strong human impulse toward law and
the peace that law brings. In American his-
tory, this impulse has been especially strong
from the beginning, and found its highest
expression in our written Constitution.

My third point flows from the second.
Because law responds to a human impulse,
it rests on much more than coercion. Law
must have the police power, but it is by no
means synonymous or coterminous with
police power. It is much larger in its con-
ception and in its reach. It builds new insti-
tutions and it produces new remedies: It
tames the forces of change and keeps them
peaceful. People obey the law not only out of
fear of punishment but also because of what
law does for them: the durability and re-
liability it gives to institutions, the reciproc-
ity that comes from keeping one's word, and
the expectation, grounded in experience, that
the just processes of law will right their
wrongs and grievances. All the police power

JUNE 13, 1966

937

in creation could not long uphold a system of
law that did not meet these affirmative
expectations.

Examples in Our Domestic Scene

With these thoughts in mind, I turn now to
the contention of the distinguished critic just
referred to, that there has been a with-
drawal of the legal order in this chaotic and
revolutionary age. He has sought to bolster
his case by citing two aspects of our domes-
tic life — with both of which I have had con-
siderable experience. Before turning to the
world scene, let me therefore discuss these
two examples briefly.

The first example given is the inadequacy
of police forces to solve the problem of crime
and violence in our cities. But this argument,
if I may say so, contradicts itself, for good
law, as we have seen, does not manifest itself
solely in police forces and jails but also in
just and equitable provision for the righting
of wrongs. Any judge knows that the
great majority of juvenile crimes are com-
mitted not by spoiled children of rich or
middle-class parents but by the young vic-
tims of longstanding and deep-rooted evils:
poverty, racial discrimination, and the re-
jection of society's values that these condi-
tions so often breed. Any prison warden in
a big city knows how high a proportion of
his cells are filled with the poor, semi-
literate youth of our racial ghettos. These
evils were not created yesterday; they will
not all be cured tomorrow; and even when
they are cured the destructive attitudes they
have generated are likely to persist for
years. In the back lots of city slums, we are
reaping the weeds that have germinated
during generations of complacent neglect.

Much of the answer to such conditions as
these lies in the law: not the law of the
police blotter, inescapable though that may
be, but the laws that govern education, jobs,
housing, and public facilities of all kinds. It
is up to the law promptly to create these
facilities where they are lacking and
promptly to secure equal access to them
where race prejudice has customarily de-

nied such access. Such an affirmative body
of law is being written and applied today.
In it lies much of our hope for domestic
peace and stability in future decades.

The second example given was in the field
of United States labor-management relations,
in which the role of law was pictured as be-
ing of minor importance. Actually, the last
30 years have seen a remarkable growth of
labor law, and indeed it is my e.xperience in
precisely that area that gives me confidence
in the possibilities of a comparable growth of
the rule of law in the international realm.
For in the affairs of labor and management
also, revolutionary forces are at work:
rapidly changing technology and working
conditions, and the dying out of obsolete jobs.
Moreover, as in international disputes, the
stakes are often large and the contending
forces are powerful.

In our free enterprise system, the law is
properly reticent about the actual terms of
labor contracts, which the parties are ex-
pected to settle freely. But our laws do not
allow freedom to the contending parties to
menace the national health and safety. The
powers of government in such cases include
factfinding, mediation, conciliation, manda-
tory "cooling off" periods — and finally, co-
ercion.

All through the Second World War, the
War Labor Board enforced its orders, where
necessary, by both legal and military means.
Few of us old enough to remember will for-
get the heavy fine imposed on the Mine-
workers' Union and John L. Lewis, or the
picture of a major industrialist being car-
ried out in his office chair by soldiers in
uniform.

Nor is this power confined to wartime. In
recent years we have seen Congress pass an
arbitration law to prevent a crippling na-
tional strike of railroad firemen; and that
law was upheld in the courts. And more
than 95 percent of labor contracts contain
an arbitration clause under which arbitral
awards are enforcible in the courts. This is
scarcely a picture of the breakdown of law
in labor-management relations.

These domestic examples contain clues to

938

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the nature and value of law among nations.
First, good law involves the necessary mini-
mum of coercion and a maximum of affirma-
tive, creative action — political, social, and
economic — to correct the wrongs that under-
lie much of the violent conflict of our time.
Second, where disputes threaten to get out of
hand and injure the entire community, the
community must possess the machinery to
contain the dispute and prevent the injury.

Functions of Law Among Nations

When we study the functions of law among
nations, we find both these propositions re-
peated on a larger scale. The international
institutions that exist to give effect to them
are much weaker and less cohesive than
those of a national government. But we
cannot afford not to use them to the full,
because the consequences of international
war, under modern circumstances, are even
more unacceptable than those of civil insur-
rection. Our hope for world peace depends
on our ability to extend to the international
sphere a dual concept of law, both creative
and coercive.

This extension of law into the interna-
tional realm is not going to be achieved in
one great Utopian stroke of the pen. In the
United Nations Charter, and in age-old
norms of international law, the community of
nations already has a set of fundamental
rules which do not need to be rewritten so
much as they need to be observed. Our task,
therefore, is to make greater use of existing
machinery and existing norms — to build on
them and to broaden out the areas of inter-
national relations that are susceptible to
them.

To keep the matter in perspective, let us
first recall that the areas of international
law and order are already very broad — and
they are constantly broadening to fit the
emerging common interests of nations. With-
out law, international mail would not be de-
livered; shortwave broadcasts would droviTi
each other out; ships, or aircraft, would
collide in the night; international business
contracts could be violated with impunity;

travelers would lack the protection of their
governments; infectious diseases and insect
pests would cross frontiers all the time ; and
even we diplomats — who are supposedly full-
time practitioners of power politics — would
be unable to carry on our business.

These many functions of the international
order are so familiar as almost to be taken
for granted. Many of them long antedate the
United Nations. But it would be a great mis-
take to underrate them or to dismiss them
as merely "technical" and "nonpolitical."
They are bridges of common interest among
nations, and the sum of these common in-
terests is one of the great unseen inhibitors
of political conflict and international vio-
lence. The specialized agencies of the U.N.,
and all its economic, social, and technical
programs, continue to extend these bridges
year by year. They are defended not by
forcible sanctions but by an incentive just as
powerful in its own way : the long-term self-
interest of each member.

The United Nations and its agencies,
through their economic, technical, and social
programs, continue to add to this system of
bridges. In doing so, they serve not only
the technical convenience of nations but also
their desperate need to cure the evils from
which lawless action springs : poverty, illit-
eracy, hunger, disease, and deprivation of
human rights. I believe that this multilat-
eral system must be strengthened further
wherever possible.

U.N. System of Peace and Security

Now I turn to the most difficult area,
where law directly confronts political con-
flict and violence among nations.

The basic law here is in article 2, para-
graph 4, of the United Nations Charter: "All
members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force
against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state." As the charter
embodies this law, so the United Nations as
an organization should be, ideally, the court
of last resort in seeing that it is adhered to.
I say "last resort" because the charter itself

JUNE 13, 1966

939

imposes on member states the prior duty to
seek peaceful settlement of disputes through
"negotiation, enquiry, mediation, concilia-
tion, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort
to regional agencies or arrangements, or
other peaceful means of their own choice."

The f ramers of the charter did not assume
that even when these remedies had been ex-
hausted the Security Council would always
be able to meet its responsibilities. By pro-
viding for a great-power veto, they recog-
nized the divisions of power and the paraly-
sis that these divisions might cause. For
situations in which the U.N. was unable to
act, they reaffirmed in article 51 the inher-
ent right of individual or collective self-de-
fense against aggression. The U.N. is
certainly the preferred policeman, but where
it cannot act, individual states must accept
the responsibility — as the United States and
others are doing in Viet-Nam today.

This United Nations system of peace and
security, then, depends upon the individual
actions of states as well as the collective
actions of the organization. It is a fragile
system, to be sure, but the record of its
achievements in the past 20 years proves it
far from impotent. In Korea it successfully
met open, full-scale aggression. In the Mid-
dle East, in Kashmir, in Cyprus, it has kept
smoldering conflicts under control — and
when they leapt out of control, it has created
new instruments to put out the flames. In
the Congo it prevented a newborn nation,
lacking most of the practical essentials of
nationhood, from being torn apart, recolo-
nized, or turned into a great-power battle-
ground in the heart of Africa. And right
now in Rhodesia, in a most complex and
dangerous situation, the United Nations is
exerting its influence for a lawful transition
to self-government by all the people — which
is the only possible and just basis for Rho-
desian independence.

It is easy for a critic to say, "Well, some
of these problems are nearly as old as the
U.N. itself, and they aren't settled yet."
This is quite true, and it points up the
frustrating difference between the domestic

and the international realm. On the Court,
I soon learned that the most satisfying
words are four in number, and they appear
at the end of a Court decision: "It is so
ordered." Many of the greatest conflicts the
U.N. must handle — the "chronic cases" on
the international sick list — cannot, we have
learned, be cured by issuing orders. Often
the greatest success we can hope for is to
prevent a relapse into violence until the dis-
putants work the poison out of their systems.
That process is normally measured in years
and sometimes in generations.

These frustrations are all the more severe
because the era in which the United Nations
was destined to function turned out to be
not a tranquil era but one of revolutionary
turmoil. Yet the organization has faced that
turmoil. It has contributed to the settle-
ment, or at least the defusing, of some of the
most dangerous problems of the cold war —
including the Berlin blockade, aggression in
Korea, the Cuban missile crisis, and the
nuclear weapons tests. In the other great
revolutionary movement of our time, the
passage of so many colonial dependencies
into nationhood, the U.N. has provided a
framework that could contain the sudden
expansion of the community of nations and
the often explosive tensions which that ex-
pansion brought with it.

Let me examine with you some of the
ways in which the U.N. has already devel-
oped and adapted the body of law and proce-
dure in order to cope with these great
political tensions.

On the closing day of the charter confer-
ence in San Francisco on June 26, 1945,
President Truman spoke of the future of the
new charter in these words:

This charter, like our own Constitution, will be
expanded and improved as time goes on. No one
claims that it is now a final or a perfect instru-
ment. It has not been poured into any fixed mold.
Changing world conditions will require readjust-
ments— but they will be readjustments of peace and
not of war.

President Truman's comparison of the
charter and our Constitution was correct.

I

940

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Indeed, it could be extended, because in
both cases the readjustments of which he
spoke can be achieved by either of two
methods: amendment or evolution. Since
amendment of the charter is an even more
difficult process than amendment of our
Constitution, development of the charter's
broad provisions has taken place in an
evolutionary way. This fact does credit both
to those who drafted the charter and to
those who have applied it to emerging situa-
tions. Indeed, it could be said of the charter
'what our Supreme Court, in Weems v.
United States, said of the Constitution :

Time works changes, brings into existence new
conditions and purposes. Therefore, a principle
to be vital must be capable of wider application
than the mischief which gave it birth. This is pe-
culiarly true of constitutions. They are not ephemeral
enactments, designed to meeting passing occasions.
They are, to use the words of Chief Justice Mar-
shall, "designed to approach immortality as nearly
as human institutions can approach it." The future
is their care and provision for events of good and
bad tendencies of which no prophecy can be made.
In the application of a constitution, therefore, our
contemplation cannot be only of what has been but
of what may be.

The United Nations Charter has been ap-
plied in precisely this way. Under it, for
example, a great variety of influential bodies
have been created, such as the committee
on the implementation of the declaration on
colonialism, the U.N. Emergency Force, the
International Law Commission, the highly
productive regional economic commissions,
and many others. All these have become
part of the U.N. institutional structure, posi-
tively responsive to the strongly felt needs
of the time.

Moreover, the effective reach of the orig-
inal U.N. organs, particularly the Security
Council, the General Assembly, and the Secre-
tariat, has been increased substantially over
the years by new practices — each adapted
to meet new necessities as they arose, each
forming a precedent for the future. For
example :

— It has been established that a perma-
nent member's abstention in the Security
Council does not constitute a veto.

— From the mediating and conciliating
powers under chapter VI of the charter and
the powers to deal with threats to peace and
security under chapter VII, there has de-
veloped a highly important capacity to dis-
patch U.N. peacekeeping forces and other
lesser forms of U.N. "presence" to Kashmir,
the Middle East, Cyprus, and numerous
other points of international danger.

— Under the "Uniting for Peace" resolu-
tion it has been established that the General
Assembly, convoked in emergency session by
a veto-free majority of the Security Council,
may undertake large-scale peacekeeping
tasks which the Security Council itself could
not undertake because of the veto.

— It has further been established that the
Secretary-General, whom the charter calls
the U.N.'s "chief administrative officer," is
also its chief diplomatist and conciliator and
its chief executive with wide discretionary
powers under the charter and the mandates
of duly adopted resolutions.

"International Law in Embryo"

In addition to these innovations in the
working of the organization itself, the United
Nations contributes to the growth of law in
another way. Some of its resolutions have
turned out to be international law in embryo.
This is true of a number of famous resolu-
tions in the field of human rights, which —
most notably the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights — laid down principles later
incorporated and refined in binding conven-
tions. We hope it will also be true of Presi-
dent Johnson's new proposal for a treaty on
the peaceful use of outer space, which we
laid before the U.N. Committee on Outer
Space last week for its consideration.'* This
proposal, too, draws on certain principles
embodied in earlier U.N. resolutions and
declarations.

Other General Assembly resolutions on
peace and security questions, even though
they have no binding legal force, may pro-
vide a basis for peacekeeping operations.

' Ibid., June 6, 1966, p. 900.

JUNE 13, 1966

941

and in any event, carry with them the weight
of world opinion. If a party to a dispute
acts contrary to such a U.N. resolution, it
thereby assumes a considerable political
burden to justify its action. How great that
burden is depends very much on how many
members, and which members, voted and
spoke for the resolution in the General
Assembly.

The U.N. has had to learn the hard way
that words on paper can have force and
effect only if there lies behind them the
requisite political commitment. The World
Court duly rendered an advisory opinion
that peacekeeping costs incurred in the Mid-
dle East and the Congo were "expenses of
the Organization" and that a member's
failure to pay its share was therefore sub-
ject to the loss of vote under article 19. The
General Assembly gave its verbal acceptance
of this opinion in a resolution overwhelm-
ingly adopted. Yet this very provision, hav-
ing been accepted in words, proved for polit-
ical reasons to be unenforcible in fact.

Nor can the Assembly force the growth
of law beyond the realities of the time.
Attempts to recodify the law of the charter
have not thus far borne much fruit, chiefly
because what is needed most is not a new
statement of law but better compliance with
the law that already exists.

Sometimes a proposal made in the Assem-
bly is couched in legal terms but is essen-
tially political in content and purpose. Last
fall, for instance, the Soviet Union intro-
duced a resolution on "nonintervention" as
a platform from which to attack United
States policy in Viet-Nam. This maneuver
failed of its purpose when other delegations
added language condemning many forms of
intervention, including indirect aggression
and subversion by proxy. The amended reso-
lution passed by 109 votes to 0, and it is a
good political document." But because of the
tactical necessities of political compromise,
its text was too imprecise and inconsistent
to be adequate as a statement of interna-
tional law.

Maintaining the Integrity of the U.N.

Before closing, I want to turn for a mo-
ment from the U.N.'s actions themselves —
successful or not, as the case may be — to the
procedures by which those actions are taken.
I must report candidly that a real danger to
the U.N. as an organization, and to the rule of
law of which it is the highest embodiment,
arises from a recent tendency to jettison nor-
mal parlimentary procedure for the sake
of short-term political gains.

This was especially apparent last Decem-
ber at the end of the 20th General Assem-
bly. Certain delegations, understandably
impatient with the pace of decolonization,
presented a draft resolution calling for
strong measures against colonialism. One of
its provisions concerned military bases, a
subject clearly and undeniably related to
international peace and security, which un-
der the charter is explicitly classed as an
important question subject to the two-thirds
majority requirement. Yet the General As-
sembly declared this resolution, including
the part on military bases, adopted by a
simple majority.

What primarily disturbed us was not the
substance of the resolution — with much of
which we could agree — ^but the flouting of
due process. When procedures laid down in
the charter are not adhered to, the charter's
integrity is impaired. Rules of procedure
may seem to be dull things, but they are
not : They are dikes against the flood of dis-
order. The observance of them, as I said in
the Assembly at the time, is of the essence
of liberty. It was my duty to point out to
the Assembly the danger not just to some
members but to all members, and to the
organization itself, if the rules are not fol-
lowed. And I announced that the United
States would regard the resolution in ques-
tion as having been illegally adopted and
therefore as null and void." In taking this
position, we were not repudiating an action
of the Assembly; on the contrary, we were

* For text, see ibid., Jan. 24, 1966, p. 164.

•^ For text of Ambassador Goldberg's statement
in the General Assembly on Dec. 17, 1965, see U.S.
delegation press release 4762.

942

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

following a familiar principle of law ; namely
that unconstitutional action is no action.

It is clear that this impatience with rules
arises from a passionate desire to achieve
certain political objectives without delay —
in this case, to make a declaration against
colonialism; and I can readily understand
the impatience with the vestiges of that
system shown by those who have lived under
it. This, as well as the fact that no consti-
tution or laws, including our own, command
universal observance, should teach us a
measure of modesty and patience. But we
cannot let patience deteriorate into a habit
of laxity, or modesty into a condoning of
clear violations of the charter; for what is
at stake is the integrity of the world insti-
tution that serves us all.

Such, then, is my report on the extent of
the rule of law today in the international
realm, and specifically in the affairs of the
United Nations. The daily headlines from
every quarter of the globe are sufficient
reminder of how tenuous that rule is. But,
as Adlai Stevenson said, "Let none of us
mock its weakness, for when we do we are
mocking ourselves."

The World Law We Seek

Our efforts to extend the rule of law,
through means both formal and informal,
are continuing and will not be abandoned.

This year, the General Assembly will con-
sider anew how best to improve its capabili-
ties for keeping the peace — and how its
peacekeeping activities should be financed.

It is our hope that a treaty on outer space
will soon be written.

Human rights conventions, conceived and
drafted in the United Nations, are before the
United States Senate for ratification.* It is
my hope that they will be ratified, because
the delay in doing so only confuses our
friends and provides ammunition to our foes.

Very soon, the World Court will render
judgment on one of its most historic cases,
that dealing with the status of South-West

• For background and texts of conventions, see
Bulletin of Aug-. 26, 1963, p. 320, and Feb. 7, 1966,
p. 212.

Africa. All member states must respect and
implement the Court's decision when it is
made — particularly the parties, which in-
deed are bound to do so under article 94 of
the charter.

In Geneva the long search continues for
treaties banning the underground testing of
nuclear weapons and the proliferation of
these weapons among nations.

All these are important ongoing efforts to
extend and strengthen the rule of law
among nations.

Our eyes are wide open to the difficulties.
The genius of the United Nations is that its
lofty principles are tempered by realism.
They have been put to the test in conflicts
of naked power and have been proved ef-
fective in enough cases to show their worth.
To become increasingly effective, they must
be applied with imagination and common
sense to the real problems of our turbulent
and revolutionary era. The more turbulent
and revolutionary the world situation is, the
more vital it is that we increasingly perfect
the rule of law — not only its restraint of vio-
lence but also its remedies against injustice.

I believe the existence of the U.N. during
the past 20 years, beset with the dangers of
war and the persistent pressures of revolu-
tionary change in every continent, has been
a decisive blessing to mankind. It has been
a meeting ground between East and West
when hardly any common interests could be
perceived save the interest in sheer survival.
And today it affords coherent framework
and a place of dignity and influence to some
50 nations, newly born from the colonial
age. It is their international home, their
badge of legitimacy, their disinterested
helper and adviser, their training ground in
the arts of diplomacy — the visible sign of
their stake in the community of nations.

There are still some who dream of an
international utopia in which a few civilized
states could use their power to settle the
affairs of the world, much as the major
powers of Europe did in the century after
the Congress of Vienna. But we should re-
member that, when the rule of the Concert
of Europe finally fell apart, world war en-

JUNE 13, 1966

943

sued. This happened in great part because,
in large areas of the world, the international
order of the 19th century did not redress
grievances but merely submerged them —
until in our own century they erupted in
revolution and world war.

The world law we seek will be different.
It will extend impartially to white and black,
north and south, old and new. It will still
be imperfect; it will still depend for its
effectiveness on the willingness of the
stronger nations to put their power at its
service. But it will embrace in a spirit of
equality all the races and cultures of the
world and it will address itself to the real
troubles of mankind: poverty, inequality,
and the deprivation of rights. In that re-
spect, it will surpass even the hundred
years' peace of the Congress of Vienna,
which was based on the subjection or im-
potence of half the world's peoples.

Our nation derives its great influence in
the world not only from great physical power
but also from the fact that our basic law and
our national outlook are premised on the
equality and dignity of all men. The way to
peace in this turbulent age is to keep to
that national vision; to work with all our
might for the establishment of a structure
of law that will be reliable and just to all
nations. For though law alone cannot assure
world peace, there can be no peace without
it. Our national power and all our energies
should operate in the light of that truth.

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds Initial Meeting

Following is the text of an announcement
lohich ivas released at Buenos Aires and
Washington after the meeting of the Joint
U.S.-Argentine Trade and Economic Com-
mittee at Washington May 17-19.

Press release 116 dated May 20

The Joint Argentine-United States Trade
and Economic Committee held its initial
meeting in Washington from May 17 to May

19, 1966, to discuss problems in these fields
affecting the two countries. The Delegation
of Argentina was headed by the Secretary of
State for Industry, don Y. Alfredo Concep-
cion, and the United States Delegation by
Mr. Joseph A. Greenwald, Deputy Assistant
Secretary for International Trade Policy.
The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-
American Affairs, Mr. Lincoln Gordon, par-
ticipated in the inaugural session.

The discussions were held in an atmos-
phere of complete cordiality, and both Dele-
gations agree that the talks have been of
mutual benefit. Important problems involv-
ing bilateral commercial and economic rela-
tions were discussed as well as the present
international economic situation and the mul-
tilateral trade negotiations currently taking
place.

Special attention was devoted to the world
food situation, particularly trends in food
production, consumption and requirements.
Both sides were in agreement on the impera-
tive necessity of developing plans for food
aid which take into account the various fac-
tors bearing on the problem. The important
role which the Argentine Republic can fill
was recognized, given its potential for the
production of foodstuffs. The two Delega-
tions agreed on the desirability of exploring
the possibilities of cooperation in this field.

The prospects for the investment of pri-
vate capital in Argentina were considered
in detail, and it was agreed that there
exist favorable opportunities for United
States citizens and companies. It was agreed
to increase cooperation in devising means to
encourage investment in Argentina, a policy
supported by the United States and Argen-
tine Governments. In seeking means of
achieving this objective, consideration is to
be given, among others, to agreements on
double taxation.

Bilateral commercial relations were con-
sidered with regard to the need for bringing
about a general increase in the level of trade,
particularly in Argentine exports to the
United States. With reference to particular
factors related to the exportation of certain
Argentine products, it was agreed to con-

944

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tinue conversations to develop solutions to
the problems which have impeded their
marketing in the United States.

The Committee will meet periodically and
will hold its next meeting in Buenos Aires at
a time mutually agreeable to the two Gov-
ernments.

Treasury Department To Control
Blocked Foreign Assets in U.S.

White House press release dated May 13

The President announced on May 13 the
consolidation, in the Department of the
Treasury, of jurisdiction over all foreign
property in the United States which is
"blocked" or "frozen."

The Treasury Department already admin-
isters controls over the property of North
Viet-Nam, North Korea, Communist China,
Cuba, and the nationals of those countries.
Today's consolidation, accomplished by an
Executive order ^ effective on May 15, 1966,
will transfer from the Department of Justice
to the Department of the Treasury jurisdic-
tion over the foreign assets which were
blocked during World War II and which still
remain blocked.

The World War II blocking control pro-
gram was initiated in the Treasury Depart-
ment in April 1940. At the end of the war
it was transferred to the Office of Alien
Property, Department of Justice. The pro-
spective termination of the Office of Alien
Property makes necessary the reassignment
of responsibility for the administration of
the remaining frozen assets to the Treasury
Department.

No changes in the licensing policies appli-
cable to these assets are being made by the
Treasury Department. All outstanding or-
ders, regulations, rulings, instructions, li-
censes, and other public documents issued
with respect to this blocked property and in
force on May 15, 1966, will continue in full
effect until they are revoked or modified by

'Executive Order 11281; 31 Fed. Reg. 7215.

the Treasury Department. License applica-
tions not acted upon by the Office of Alien
Property before May 15, 1966, will be proc-
essed by the Treasury Department in accord-
ance with existing procedures without the
necessity of filing new applications.

Inquiries with respect to blocked prop-
erty should be addressed to the Office of
Foreign Assets Control, Department of the
Treasury, Washington, D. C, 20220. Matters
relating to the World War II vesting pro-
gram of the Office of Alien Property will
remain within the jurisdiction of the De-
partment of Justice.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2d Session

U.S. Policy With Respect to Mainland China. Hear-
ings before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee. March 8-30, 1966. 657 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before
the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Part II,
March 29-April 5, 1966, 193 pp.; Part III, April
6-20, 1966, 147 pp.

Emergency Food for India. Hearing before the
House Agriculture Committee on H.J. Res. 997.
March 31, 1966. 21pp.

Report of Examination of Financial Statements,
Panama Canal Company, Fiscal Years 1965 and
1964. H. Doc. 427. April 25, 1966. 10 pp.

The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on National Security and International
Operations of the Senate Government Operations
Committee. Part I, April 27, 1966. 34 pp.

Chamizal Treaty National Memorial, El Paso, Tex.
Report to accompany H.R. 7402. H. Rept. 1496.
May 9, 1966. 12 pp.

Donation of Two Obsolete German Weapons to the
Federal Republic of Germany. Report to accom-
pany H.R. 11980. H. Rept. 1518. May 10, 1966.
3 pp.

Pan American Institute of Geography and History.
Report to accompany S.J. Res. 108. S. Rept. 1156.
May 11,1966. 19 pp.

Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Report to
accompany S. Res. 179. S. Rept. 1155. May 11,
1966. 2 pp.

Technical Amendments to the Act Creatmg the At-
lantic-Pacific Interoceanic Canal Study Commis-
sion. Report to accompany S. 2469. H. Rept. 1537.
May 17, 1966. 10 pp.

International Education Act of 1966. Report to ac-
company H.R. 14643. H. Rept. 1539. May 17,
1966. 24 pp.

Review of the Administration of the Trading With
the Enemy Act. Report to accompany S. Res. 251.
S. Rept. 1169. May 18, 1966. 5 pp.

Duty-Free Treatment for Certain Corkboard In-
sulation. Report to accompany H.R. 8376. S. Rept.
1170. May 18, 1966. 3 pp.

JUNE 13, 1966

945

Interaction of Science and Technology and Foreign Affairs

Statement by Herman PoUack

Acting Director, International Scientific and Technological Affairs ^

If'

The Department of State is pleased to
have an opportunity to testify on H.R.
13696. This bill, which would broaden and
clarify the functions of the National Science
Foundation, reflects in part the very consid-
erable interest of this committee in a more
active role for the National Science Founda-
tion in international affairs and in the
support of international scientific activi-
ties. The Department of State welcomes
this interest and would welcome a more
active role for the National Science Founda-
tion in the international field.

The requirement that activities supported
by the National Science Foundation must
strengthen science in the United States
tends to obscure its authority to support
international scientific activities which are
designed to improve our foreign relations
and attain our foreign policy objectives. As
I have stated in previous testimony to this
committee, these ends are not incompatible.
We understand the consequence of the pro-
posed revision of section 3(2) is to remove
the ambiguity concerning the authority of
the National Science Foundation to engage
in international activities at the request of
the Secretary of State. The Department of
State believes this clarification of congres-
sional intent is timely and desirable.

The authority which this subsection will
make available will make it possible to deal

' Made before the Subcommittee on Science, Re-
search and Development of the House Committee on
Science and Astronautics on Apr. 19.

more decisively than heretofore with the
opportunities afforded by scientific and
technological developments for international
cooperation and the pursuit of United States
foreign policies. It will permit positive ac-
tion in the so-called "gray areas" which
have thus far proven difficult to come to
grips with. Furthermore, it will make pos-
sible the inauguration of new bilateral and
multilateral scientific relationships which
could prove to be of overriding advantage
to United States national interest, broadly
conceived.

Since the committee is considering the
functions and activities of the National
Science Foundation, I would like to use the
occasion to discuss several related matters
of interest to the Department of State.

Preparing for Scientific Progress

The first of these relates to the fact that
science and technology are hurtling the
world into a future for which it is philo-
sophically and politically ill prepared. The
peaceful atom and its potential interna-
tional implications, the impact of evolv-
ing space technology on weather predic-
tion and control, the movement of man into
the oceans illustrate typical developments
which appear to be outpacing man's politi-
cal readiness to deal with them. In its
14th annual report, the National Science
Foundation stated :

Understanding of man in relation to other men
as individuals, groups, and nations — the domain of

946

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the social sciences — has not kept pace with man's
knowledge and mastery of the physical universe, and
is urgently needed in a world of increasing popula-
tions, emerging nations, and growing tensions.

Yet there is very little scholarly effort
being devoted to the philosophical and po-
litical preparation of the w^orld for the in-
credible technological progress that is tak-
ing place. In short, there is an urgent and
imperative need for focusing multidisci-
plinary attention on creating the environ-
ment which will assure that the scientific
and technological progress under way and
that which lies ahead of us will be used for
mankind's benefit rather than become a
source of new and possibly intractable in-
ternational problems.

This, of course, is not a novel point of
view, and much thought has been given to
the responsibility of the scientists for the
social, economic, and political consequences
of their discoveries. I do not wish at this
time to join in the discussion of how large
a share of this responsibility the scientists
should bear but, rather, wish to suggest
that it is perhaps not inappropriate for the
National Science Foundation, which is so
clearly charged with the promotion of
science, to take on major responsibility for
the promotion of academic interest and
activity on the international consequences
of scientific progress. Specifically, we would
welcome a source of vigorous leadership
backed up by financial resources that would
encourage universities and research or-
ganizations to develop capacities in the
field of the social sciences that could be
beneficially devoted to the consideration of
what might be called international accom-
modation to scientific and technological
progress.

Such activity on the part of the National
Science Foundation would appear to be au-
thorized by the proposed new section 3(b)
if the Department of State is correct in its
understanding that the applied research au-
thorized by that section applies to the so-
cial as well as the natural sciences. We
find an eloquent statement of the need for
an interdisciplinary approach to national

and international problems in the Direc-
tor's statement accompanying the 15th an-
nual report of the National Science Founda-
tion, when he stated :

A continuing issue — one that can only be attacked
and never disposed of — is that of using the methods
and findings of the pure and applied sciences to
help deal with pressing social problems of an in-
creasingly complex society. In general, the major
problems which loom large before the Nation are al-
most all related in one way or another to science
and technology. But there is rarely a social problem
which is the exclusive concern of a single scientific
discipline, in the traditional sense of the term.
Many problems can be dealt with in part by chem-
istry, or in part by other fields within the physical
sciences; some problems clearly require the atten-
tion of engineers and social scientists. . . .

Search for Qualified People

The second matter I wish to discuss
arises from the Department's search for
scientific talent qualified to serve as policy
officers in the Department and as scientific
attaches abroad. It is now widely appreci-
ated that an adequate understanding of
scientific and technological considerations
is essential if the officers of the Department
of State are to deal effectively with inter-
national policy questions which have their
origin in or are heavily affected by such
considerations. This is a conclusion that
the Department had earlier come to with
respect to a wide range of other subjects,
especially in the economic field, that are
now recognized as part of the fabric of in-
ternational affairs.

The need for policy-oriented scientific
and technical competence is not met by
having a cluster of such talent in my office
or scattered at a dozen and a half missions
abroad. It must permeate the entire or-
ganization, for the interactions are occurring
in almost every aspect of the Department's
work and in every corner of the globe. In
effect, in addition to the need for a staff of
full-time scientific attaches, the Foreign
Service could make good use of 50 or more
officers who could bring a measure of pro-
fessional competence to scientific subjects
with international policy implications.

Thus, there is an urgent and growing

JUNE 13, 1966

947

need, utterly out of balance with the sup-
ply, for people who are well trained not
only in basic scientific concepts and their
applications but also in their social, politi-
cal, and economic implications.

Until the present time, the few indi-
viduals who might claim to possess these
attributes have had to work out a personal
program of self-training. This is not suf-
ficient. Carefully directed systematic train-
ing programs need to be designed for
scientists interested in the sociopolitical en-
vironment and the nonscientists interested
in science and technology.

Beginning Efforts

On the latter, the Department has a num-
ber of steps under way to prepare its officers
for work in this field.

Two months ago Secretary Rusk inau-
gurated a scientific and technological ex-
change program in cooperation with NASA,
AEC, NSF, and the Department of Com-
merce.- Under this plan, officers are being
assigned to tours of duty with each other's
agencies to increase the understanding of
the nonscientist for the implications of
science and the understanding of the scientist
for the implications of international relations
within the contexts of the missions of the
various agencies. Last month the third of an
ongoing series of seminars on science, tech-
nology, and foreign affairs was conducted.
On this occasion the participants were 20
handpicked, high-quality, middle-grade offi-
cers of the Department.

The Department is also now actively seek-
ing individuals with scientific training as
entrants into the career Foreign Service.

This year the Department has also in-
stituted a series of Secretary's "Science
Briefings" as another step toward increas-
ing the understanding within the Depart-
ment of the important relationships be-
tween science and technology and foreign
affairs. The initial briefing in February of
this year, attended by the Secretary, Under

Secretaries, and other principal officers of
the Department, was on the subject of
desalination.

Approximately a year ago the Depart-
ment designated science officers at Foreign
Service missions at which a scientific at-
tache was not located. This concept, which
has worked very well in several posts,
offers considerable promise for the future
provided an adequate supply of qualified
Foreign Service officers can be developed.^

These efforts to equip the Department's
officers with a capacity to deal usefully
with the interaction of scientific and tech-
nological subject matter and foreign affairs
are but a beginning, and much more will
have to be done. At the same time an in-
creasing effort will have to be made to re-
cruit scientific and engineering personnel
with understanding and talent for working
in the policy field. I can testify that such
persons are exceedingly scarce. Their non-
scientific skills are developed more by ac-
cident than by design.

Need for New Body of Knowledge

It is only within the past 5 years or so
that our institutions of higher learning
have established programs in "science and
society" or "science and public policy"
which would provide an educational base
for preparation of scientists for work on
policy questions. The most celebrated of
these is Dean [Don K.] Price's graduate
seminar at Harvard. Courses of study in
this area are also now available at the Case
Institute, MIT, Purdue University, the
Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy,
Princeton, Columbia, and possibly several
other universities.

Again, the surface has been barely
scratched. I suggest that consideration be
given to the possibility that the National
Science Foundation provide encouragement
and leadership which will result in the
large-scale development of undergraduate
and graduate programs for the training of

" For background, see Bulletin of Mar. 21, 1966,
p. 470.

' For an article on "The United States Scientific
Attache Program" by William Howard Taft III, see
ibid., Jan. 25, 1965, p. 113.

948

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

scientists and engineers for work in policy
fields. This objective would be facilitated if
it were made clear that such activity is en-
compassed in the words "education in the
sciences," which are embodied in this leg-
islation in several places.

This effort would help to create a new
body of knowledge now lacking in this field,
which lies neither within the discipline of
the natural or the social sciences but which
is being born as a union of the two. A truly
interdisciplinary effort should be encour-
aged in which the scientist and his non-
scientist colleagues work together to com-

bine the resources of science and technology
and those of domestic and foreign policy.

In summary the Department of State be-
lieves that the changes contemplated by the
revised language in H.R. 13696 will provide
a substantial increase in the ability of the
United States Government to make effective
use of its scientific and technological capa-
bilities in support of international policies
and objectives. In this general connection
moving ahead on the two areas of activity
discussed above would in the Department's
opinion represent constructive steps to be
taken at this time.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

Seminar on Communication Satellite Earth-Station Technology

A seminar on communication satellite
earth-station technology, under the auspices
of the International Telecommunication Un-
ion, was held at the Department of State
May 16-27. Following is the text of a state-
ment made before the seminar on May 16
by U. Alexis Johnson, Deputy Under Secre-
tary for Political Affairs, together tvith a
Department announcement of the seminar.

STATEMENT BY MR. JOHNSON

Press release 112 dated May 16

It is a great pleasure to welcome you to
the Department of State on the occasion of
our seminar on communication satellite
earth-station technology.

While we have had considerable experience
in this country with technical cooperation
programs, we undertake today for the first

time the presentation of an extended seminar
under the auspices of the International Tele-
communication Union. We have wanted to do
this for a long time. The seminar approach
affords an opportunity to explore a single
subject in depth and to provide in an orderly
way all available information on that subject.
At the same time it provides a firsthand op-
portunity for a free exchange of ideas, the
generation of pertinent questions, and per-
haps, in some degree, progress toward an-
swers to these questions. In any event this
is a cooperative effort, and we hope to bene-
fit from your presence in the same way that
we hope you will benefit from your experi-
ence here.

At the outset we considered the possibil-
ity of holding a seminar on any one of a
number of currently important topics. Very
quickly, however, our choice narrowed down

JUNE 13, 1966

949

to the general subject of satellite communi-
cations. In a world where those of us who
are not technicians find it increasingly diffi-
cult to grasp fully the startling advances of
scientific technology, few developments have
appealed more dramatically to the imagina-
tion of all people than man's first steps into
space. Communication by earth-satellite re-
lays is an application of space technology
which has already passed from the experi-
mental to the practical. At the same time it
offers the promise of rewards still dimly
understood by most of us.

In recognition of this potential we have
been engaged for several years in the pro-
motion and establishment of a single global
communication satellite system, owned by
many nations, accessible to all members of
the International Telecommunication Union.
The initial germ of this concept has become
a reality. Today 49 countries, many of which
are represented here, share in the ownership
and operation of the space segment of a
satellite system through membership in an
international consortium. These 49, shortly
to be joined by others, represent at least 90
percent of the potential international tele-
communications traffic which a global satel-
lite system might serve in the next few
years. The Department of State takes pride
in the role it has played in the negotiation
of the international agreements which have
made this consortium a reality.^ The coun-
tries represented here should take pride in
the role they have taken in making the con-
sortium an effective instrument.

Under the international agreements the
Communications Satellite Corporation is the
entity designated by law to participate for
the United States. In addition, it acts as man-
ager of the system for the consortium. I
need hardly add that the corporation, or
COMSAT as it is more familiarly kno\vn,
has played a major role in the proceedings
which commence this afternoon. The advent
of commercial satellite communication was
assured in April 1965 when Early Bird suc-

' For background and texts of agreements, see
Bulletin of Aug. 24, 1964, p. 281.

cessfully entered its orbit. Less than 3
months later inaugural ceremonies cele-
brated the beginning of actual commercial
operations. I am told that Early Bird has a
capability of transmitting 240 simultaneous
telephone conversations or 6,200 teletype
messages, or, as many of us have seen
dramatically demonstrated on one or another
of several historic occasions, live television.
I am further told that Early Bird is only the
forerunner of more advanced satellites to
come. Commercial service will be expanded,
using more versatile spacecraft, over the
Atlantic and Pacific by the fall of this year.
Plans are already under way for far larger
satellites having a capacity of approximately
twelve hundred two-way voice channels, five
times the capacity of Early Bird.

Difficult though it may be for some of us
to grasp the complexities of earth satellites
and their delicately tuned packages, I under-
stand that the earth stations which transmit
and receive communications to and from
communication satellites represent perhaps
an even more crucial element of the total
system. On the one hand, they must be able
to detect the faint satellite signals and boost
their power tens of billions of times. On the
other, they must transmit strong signals for
the satellite to repeat. The more we con-
sidered the possibilities of the field, the
more it appeared to us that earth stations
and their technology should be our choice
for the topic of our seminar. This was es-
pecially true since many of you may expect
to acquire earth-station facilities in the not
too distant future.

As all of you know, one of the first and
largest stations in the United States was
constructed by the American Telephone and
Telegraph Company in 1962 at Andover,
Maine. This facility has served under the
direction of COMSAT as the North American
Early Bird Link. In addition, COMSAT is
building earth stations in Hawaii and the
State of Washington for the establishment
of service with Japan, Australia, and other
nations of the Pacific. Stations abroad are
already located in England, France, West
Germany, and Italy. Canada has a new sta-

950

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

^

tion at Mill Village, Nova Scotia, which those
of you who are from other countries will be
able to visit after the close of our program
; here. Programs are under way or under
active consideration which by 1968 will as-
sure the completion of earth-station facili-
ties in a number of additional countries in
Asia, Latin America, and Africa. By that
time global coverage will essentially be
achieved.

Very probably the technology of earth
stations will play an important part in the
plans of the communications interests which
you represent. Our purpose here is to pro-
vide you with as much information as possi-
ble from our own experience to assist you in
meeting problems of earth stations in your
own countries. At the same time we hope
to learn from you the kinds of problems
which such projects might be expected to
encounter. So for the next 2 weeks we will
all be students and teachers together in a
school established uniquely for this purpose.

The Department of State is honored to
have you here. Obviously, however, we in
the Department do not count among our num-
bers those best qualified to assist you with
the technical sessions. Accordingly, we have
called upon other Government agencies and,
more especially, upon the United States
communications industry for their coopera-
tion, their support, and their technical re-
sources. Their response and their generosity
have been most gratifying.

COMSAT itself has acted as program co-
ordinator. However, our contributions to the
program have originated not only with
COMSAT but with a considerable number of
industry sources. More than 45 faculty
members, if I may use that term, will pre-
sent lectures. This same faculty will be
available to deal with your questions and to
discuss any matters of particular interest
which you may wish to raise with them.

Under the coordination of the Department
of Commerce, a number of exhibits related
to topics of the seminar are displayed in
adjoining rooms. They will remain on view
throughout the seminar, and we trust that

they, too, will contribute to your experience
here.

The National Aeronautics and Space Ad-
ministration, in coordination with the indus-
try, has arranged a program of field trips
which will follow the 2-week period of the
seminar. We hope that as many of you as
possible will take advantage of this program,
which will include visits to earth-station in-
stallations and pertinent equipment manu-
facturing plants.

At the request of the Vice President of
the United States I should like to read the
following message which he has addressed
on this occasion to you, our distinguished
visitors from other countries.

I greatly regret that I am unable to be with you
today. You represent countries sharing our interest
in an exciting new application of space technology:
global communication through earth satellites. I am
confident that the great expansion of global com-
munication promised by this capability will go far
to foster the g:rowth of cultural and trade exchanges
so important to the development of peace and un-
derstanding among peoples throughout the world.
I wish you every success in your endeavors and
hope that you will find this seminar helpful and
rewarding.

There is little I can add to the words of
the Vice President. Ladies and gentlemen,
I bid you welcome to Washington and to the
Department of State. May your stay be
satisfying and may you return to your homes
with new insights on the future of satellite
communication and the ways it may affect
the lives of all of us.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

The Department of State announced on
May 12 (press release 108) that the United
States would be host for communications
experts from about 40 countries and all con-
tinents at a seminar on satellite communica-
tions earth-station technology. The sem-
inar, under the auspices of the International
Telecommunication Union, will be held May
16-May 27 in the International Conference
Suite at the Department of State. It will be
followed by a week of field trips which will

JUNE 13, 1966

951

I

enable the visitors from abroad to see
earth-station installations and pertinent
equipment manufacturing plants in this
country.

The purpose of the seminar is to provide
new and developing countries with basic
knowledge and practical information on
earth-station economic and technical re-
quirements, as well as access requirements
to the satellite which will be useful to them
in their respective earth-station programs.

Participants will include senior telecom-
munications administration officials and
senior technical personnel who will be re-
sponsible for earth-station planning, con-
struction, financing, and operation. In ad-
dition, as many as 300 experts from U.S.
Government and industry are expected to
attend the various sessions as observers in
order to bring themselves up to date with
the present state of the fast-developing art
of communications via satellite.

U.S. Asks International Action
on Passenger-Ship Fire Safety

Statement by W. Averell Harriman
Ambassador at Large ^

Three months ago this Committee met and
considered the pressing problem of the fire
safety of passenger vessels. The subject had
been forcibly brought to world attention be-
cause of the burning not long before of
the Yarmouth Castle, with its tragic loss
of the lives of 90 passengers and crew. This
followed by less than 2 years the burning of
another cruise vessel, the Lakonia, with the
loss of 12.5 lives. Even since the Committee's
last meeting, the cruise ship Viking Princess
was gutted by fire.

These disasters have made clear that
something must be done. We must take

* Made at the opening session of the Intergovern-
mental Maritime Consultative Organization's Mari-
time Safety Committee at London on May 3 (press
release 105, advance text). For background, see
Bulletin of May 16, 1966, p. 782.

major and serious action to improve the
safety standards of a number of the pas-
senger ships which are sailing the seas as
well as to improve standards of those to be
built.

There have always been risks in sailing
the seas, and there will always be some
risk; but we cannot accept complacently the
risks that we do not have to accept, nor can
we fail to act to meet those risks that we can
see and avoid or minimize. Another Yar-
mouth Castle is not necessary, and we must
take action to avoid that possibility.

This Committee and the countries it rep-
resents responded as we hoped they would
respond, and you are now meeting in an
extraordinary session to deal with this
problem.

This organization, the Intergovernmental
Maritime Consultative Organization, has in
the past made a fine record of progress in
meeting the problems of safety and other
technical problems in the maritime field. It
has been ready to exercise leadership in
pressing for ever-improving standards of
safety and technical development. Yet recent
events show that we cannot rest on this
record. Much remains to be done.

There is no group of persons in the world
— it probably would not be possible to as-
semble an international group better quali-
fied to deal with safety of life at sea than
the group that is assembled in this room
today. I am sure that the Maritime Safety
Committee and the subcommittee advisers
who are present represent the most capable
of the world's experts in this field.

We have come to lay before you the prob-
lem we now face. And, as my distinguished
colleague. Admiral Roland [Adm. Edwin J.
Roland, head of the U.S. delegation] told
you in February, we do not think this Com-
mittee or IMCO has any task more im-
portant or more urgent to deal with than im-
proving the fire safety of passenger vessels.

Early in March we sent to the organization
and to the member governments a series of
specific proposals to amend the Convention
for Safety of Life at Sea - in order to deal

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5780.

952

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

^ ' with this matter. These proposals ^ deal pri-
« marily with the construction of ships, and the
central element of our ideas is the use of
, materials that do not burn readily. It is
not my purpose to deal with these proposals
in detail. That is for the experts. I am sure
: you have all read and studied our proposals,
and I will of course leave it to Admiral Ro-
land and his colleagues to give any clarifi-
cations that may be wanted. I am here to
emphasize to you the serious political as-
pects of the problem and to appeal through
you to your governments and to those gov-
ernmental agencies responsible for the po-
litical decisions involved in our taking ade-
quate action.

We have proposed certain amendments to
the convention, but we enter this meeting
with open minds as to the technical details
of these amendments but not as to our ob-
jectives. I would be less than frank and do
a disservice to our deliberations if I were not
to emphasize the serious concern on the part
of my Government, the United States Con-
gress, and the American people as a whole
and the requirement for adequate action.
There may be other ways of meeting the
problem than those specific ways we have
proposed; there may be other amendments
or other concepts that can contribute to
safety.

One thing that is very striking to the
layman, however — and I am sure the ex-
perts would agree — is that the Convention for
Safety of Life at Sea was intended and
designed to improve safety of life at sea,
and it cannot be permitted to stand as an
obstacle now to further advances to safety.
The convention of 1960 took a long step for-
ward; but man progresses and aspires to
better things and is capable of better things,
and men are not and should not be satisfied
now with what seemed good enough even
a few years ago. The work this Committee
undertakes today must reflect the experi-
ence and knowledge gained in the interven-
ing period.

Since this Committee met in February

Not printed here.

there has been another passenger ship dis-
aster by fire: The ship Viking Princess
burned almost totally on a cruise from our
State of Florida. The Viking Princess was
manned by fine officers and a fine crew ; and
thanks to their courage and their compe-
tence, the ship was abandoned without loss
of life directly due to fire, although two
elderly persons died from the shock of the
experience. I wish to give the master of the
Viking Princess and his crew the thanks of
my Government and the American people for
those many Americans they saved.

From the standpoint of maritime safety,
the Viking Princess episode is an outstanding
example of the importance of a well-trained
crew. We would never belittle the impor-
tance of the crew to safety; quite the con-
trary, we hope the maritime nations of the
world will take inspiration from this ex-
ample and continue their efforts in this area.

But there is another lesson to be learned
from the Viking Princess. That lesson is
that there is much to be done to improve
construction and structural standards for
safety. Particularly we think it affirms the
need for construction with noncombustible
materials. Despite its sprinkler system and
despite its fine crew, this ship burned. Had
the fire occurred in rough weather, the re-
sult almost certainly would have been an
appalling tragedy. And we do not see how
we can or why we should continue to accept
these risks.

The American concern, the concern of the
public and of the Congress and of the execu-
tive branch, has been focused primarily on the
older ships and on round-trip cruises which
sail from and return to our ports and which
carry American citizens predominantly. The
cruise trade, which was virtually unknown
until a few decades ago, has grown to be a
major part of the ocean passenger-ship busi-
ness. We want it to stay that way and in-
crease, but with increased safety. We can-
not tolerate the prospect of another Yarmouth
Castle disaster.

My statement would not be complete if
I did not tell you that there is strong senti-
ment in the United States — and there has
been legislation proposed to the United

JUNE 13, 1966

953

1

states Congress — to control the safety stand-
ards of cruise vessels unilaterally under our
laws. The Congress feels, and rightly so,
a responsibility for the safety of our citizens
embarking in ships at our ports. This con-
cern is expressed by the presence here of
several distinguished Members of Congress
as advisers to the U.S. delegation. We do not
want unilateral action. We want to handle
this problem internationally. We are count-
ing on your understanding and assistance to
achieve satisfactory action.

Although the major concentration in the
United States is on the safety of passengers
and crews on cruise ships, our concern is
not so confined. Life at sea should be af-

forded the maximum practical protection on
all types of vessels with all flags. The world
looks to IMCO for leadership in this area,
and we are certain that all of your govern-
ments join us in this aim.

In conclusion, I want to thank this dis-
tinguished group for your attention and to
express the confident hope that your delib-
erations will result in constructive action to
meet the problem that concerns us all. The
United States has made proposals which we
believe are appropriate. The Committee may
have other proposals, and we are ready to
listen. However, we are here to face the
problem and we must agree on effective
recommendations to deal with it.

^

n

I

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and U.K. Amend
Bermuda Air Agreement

The Department of State announced on
May 27 (press release 127) that the Gov-
ernments of the United States and the
United Kingdom had on that day concluded
at Washington an exchange of diplomatic
notes 1 amending the air services agreement
between the United States and United King-
dom dated February 11, 1946, as amended
(usually referred to as the Bermuda Agree-
ment) ?■ The notes were signed on behalf of
the United States by Anthony M. Solomon,
Assistant Secretary of State for Economic
Affairs, and on behalf of the United King-
dom by Sir Patrick Dean, Ambassador to the
United States.

The agreement is the result of negotia-
tions which took place at Washington from

' For texts, see Department of State press release
127 dated May 27.

* Treaties and Other International Acts Series
1507, 1640, 1714, 3338, 3675, 3719.

February 28 to April 23, 1966. The talks
represented the most far-reaching review of
the Bermuda Agreement that the two Gov-
ernments have undertaken since that agree-
ment was originally signed. The British
delegation was under the chairmanship of
Robert Burns, Deputy Secretary of the
Ministry of Aviation. The U.S. delegation
was headed by Frank E. Loy, Deputy As-
sistant Secretary for Transportation and
Telecommunications, Bureau of Economic
Affairs, Department of State.

The new agreement provides for a gen-
eral updating and expansion of the routes
exchanged by the two countries; routes cur-
rently operated are retained, while those
not operated have in many cases been de-
leted. In addition, important new routes
have been added for both countries.

The principal new routes gained by the
United Kingdom are the following: (a) a
trunk route from London via New York,
San Francisco, Honolulu, and Fiji to Aus-
tralasia; (b) the addition of islands in the
eastern Caribbean, and of Guyana, to an ex-

954

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

II

isting U.K. trunk route via New York; (c)
the addition of Chicago to the U.K. polar
route to Los Angeles terminating on the
U.S. West Coast (without traffic rights be-
'tween Chicago and the West Coast) ; (d)
the addition of points in the Yucatan Penin-
sula on the route between British Hon-
duras, the Cayman Islands, and Miami; and
(e) a new route from Hong Kong via Taipei
to Okinawa and beyond to Japan (without
traffic rights between Okinawa and Japan).

The principal new U.S. routes include : (a)
new access to Hong Kong over a North Pa-
cific route via Tokyo; (b) new access to
Hong Kong from the west over a trans-
atlantic route; (c) improved access to Hong
Kong from Sydney (which will permit the
establishment of an economic round-the-
Pacific tourist service by U.S. airlines) ;
(d) the extension of the present U.S. route
via Fiji to Australia onward to South Asia
and points in Europe other than the United
Kingdom; (e) the addition of Paris, Switzer-
land, and Italy, for cargo and mail only, on
certain U.S. airline services via the United
Kingdom, without traffic rights between the
new points and the United Kingdom; (f)
the addition of Scandinavian points and
Paris to the U.S. polar route from the West
Coast to London (without traffic rights be-
tween Paris and London) ; (g) expansion of
existing routes from the United States via
the Bahamas to points in the Caribbean and
South America, so described as to afford
U.S. airlines a high degree of flexibility in
serving the Caribbean area and including a
New York-Bahamas-Jamaica route.

The following route grants were made
reciprocally: (a) each side granted to the
other a new nonstop route from Miami to
London, on which operations are not to
begin before January 1, 1970; (b) the New
York-Nassau route descriptions will be
amended for both countries to read "New
York-Bahamas," thus making possible serv-
ices from New York to many different
points in the Bahamas, rather than to Nas-
sau alone; (c) the two sides exchanged
local service routes in the eastern Caribbean
island chain; (d) confirmation of Boston as

being available on routes between the U.S.A.
and Bermuda.

The two delegations agreed, furthermore,
that discussions should take place in the
near future concerning a possible exchange
of local service routes in the southwest
Pacific area centered around Fiji and Amer-
ican Samoa.

The two Governments believe that this
accord constitutes a significant forward step
in the development of effective worldwide
air services in accordance with the princi-
ples of the Bermuda Agreement and that
it is in the interests both of the traveling
public and of the air transport industry.

U.S. To Continue Adherence
to Warsaw Convention

The United States Government on May lA
formally withdrew its notification of termi-
nation of adherence to the Warsaw Conven-
tion for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Transportation by
Air. 1 Following is a Department announce-
ment of May IS, together vnth the text of a
U.S. note from Albert W. Sherer, Jr.,
Charge d'Affaires ad interim at the U.S.
Embassy at Warsaw, to Adam Rapacki,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland.

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

Press release 110 dated May 13

The Department of State, in consultation
and with the concurrence of the Civil Aero-
nautics Board, the Federal Aviation Agency,
the Department of Commerce, and the De-
partment of Defense, has concluded that the
interests of the United States traveling pub-
lic and of international civil aviation would
be best served by continuing within the
framework of the Warsaw Convention under
a plan the essential features of which are:

' For texts of a Department announcement and
the notice of denunciation, see Bulletin of Dec. 6,

1965, p. 923; for background, see also ibid., Apr. 11,

1966, p. 580.

JUNE 13, 1966

955

First. The limits of international carrier
liability for passengers will be increased
from $8,300 to $75,000 per person. Those
travelers who wish to carry greater protec-
tion will be free to take out additional in-
surance to cover their needs. There will be
no limit on liability where the carrier is
guilty of willful misconduct.

Second. Airlines in international travel
will be absolutely liable up to $75,000 per
passenger regardless of any fault or negli-
gence. Recovery by those who need it most
will thus be maximized and expedited. Long
and costly lawsuits will be unnecessary in
many cases.

Third. International airlines carrying well
over 90 percent of Americans in international
travel are participating in the plan. The rec-
ommendation of the Senate Foreign Rela-
tions Committee that no airline operating
within the United States remain outside the
plan has been substantially complied with.
Those United States airlines which initially
declined to come within the plan have now in-
dicated their agreement to accept an increase
in liability from $8,300 to $75,000.

Fourth. This is an interim arrangement
terminable on 12 months' notice. In the
months ahead public hearings will be held
for the purpose of determining the definitive
United States position in preparation for
further international discussions concerning
the Warsaw Convention.

Fifth. The international carriers who have
notified the Civil Aeronautics Board of their
acceptance of the interim arrangements are :
Aeronaves, Air Canada, Air France, Air
India, Aer Lingus, Alitalia, BEA, BOAC,
Canadian Pacific, CMA, El Al, Icelandic,
Iberia, Japan Air Lines, KLM, Lufthansa,
Olympic, Philippine Airlines, Qantas, Sa-
bena, SAS, Swissair, Varig, and VIASA;
American, Braniff, Continental, Eastern,
Northeast, Northwest, Pan American, Pana-
gra, TWA, and Western. The following U. S.
airlines mainly engaged in domestic carriage
which have accepted the increased limits of
liability but not the feature of absolute lia-
bility are : Delta, National, and United. It is

expected that other carriers will join the ^'
plan.

Sixth. Those guilty of sabotage and per-
sons claiming on their behalf will not be en-
titled to recover any damages.

By acceptance of the plan the United
States and all of the other participating
countries have assured the continuation of
the uniform system of law governing air-
lines, shippers, and passengers and have
demonstrated again the viability of the sys-
tem of international cooperation in civil avia-
tion and in international law.

WITHDRAWAL OF DENUNCIATION

Press release 111 dated May 14

Excellency: I have the honor, on instructions
from my Government, to give formal notification
to the Government of the Polish People's Republic
of the withdrawal by the United States of America
of the notice of denunciation submitted on November
15, 1965 of the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transpor-
tation by Air and the Additional Protocol relating
thereto signed at Warsaw on October 12, 1929.

At the time the notice under Article 39 was sub-
mitted, the United States Government stated that
that action was taken solely because of dissatisfac-
tion with the low limits of liability for death or
personal injury provided in the Convention, even
as those limits would be increased by the Protocol
to amend the Convention done at The Hague on
September 28, 1955. Since that time, intensive nego-
tiations among carriers and among governments
have succeeded in establishing a new interim ar-
rangement in accordance with Article 22(1) of the
Convention, whereby participating carriers have
agreed, in cases of the death, wounding, or other
bodily injury of a passenger, to limits of liability
of $75,000 per passenger inclusive of legal fees and
costs (or $58,000 exclusive of legal fees and costs
in case of a claim brought in a State where provi-
sion is made for separate award of legal fees and
costs) and have agreed not to avail themselves in
any such cases of any defense under Article 20(1)
of the Convention, or the Convention as amended by
the Hague Protocol. This arrangement is applicable
to all international transportation by the carrier
as defined in the Convention or the Convention as
amended by the Hague Protocol which according
to the contract of carriage includes a point in the
United States of America as a point of origin,
point of destination, or agreed stopping place.

I

956

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

In view of the acceptance of this arrangement by
the great majority of the world's international air-
lines, including all principal carriers serving the
United States, the conditions which led the United
States to serve its notice of November 15 have sub-
stantially changed. Accordingly, the United States
of America believes that its continuing objectives
of uniformity of international law and adequate
protection for international air travelers will best
be assured within the framework of the Warsaw
Convention. The United States of America looks
forward to participation by all carriers and gov-
ernments in the provisional arrangement described
above and to its acceptance on a world-wide basis.
Further, the Government of the United States looks
forward to continued discussions looking to an up-
to-date and permanent international agreement on
the important issues dealt with in the Warsaw Con-
vention.

My Government would appreciate it if the Gov-
ernment of the Polish People's Republic would in-
form the Government of each of the High Contract-
ing Parties to the Convention of this notification.

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Aviation

Convention on international civil aviation. Done at
Chicago December 7, 1944. Entered into force
April 4, 1947. TIAS 1591.
Adherence: Singapore, May 20, 1966.

Convention on the international recognition of rights
in aircraft. Done at Geneva June 19, 1948. Entered
into force September 17, 1953. TIAS 2847.
Adherence deposited: Tunisia, May 4, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965."
Signature: Austria, May 17, 1966.

Fisheries

International convention for the conservation of
Atlantic tunas. Done at Rio de Janeiro May 14,
1966. Enters into force upon the deposit of in-
struments of ratification, approval, or adherence
by seven governments.
Signature: United States, May 14, 1966.

Northwest Atlantic Fisheries

Protocol to the international convention for the
Northwest Atlantic fisheries of February 8, 1949
(TIAS 2089), relating to harp and hood seals.
Done at Washington July 15, 1963. Entered into
force April 29, 1966.
Proclaimed by the President: May 23, 1966.

Postal Matters

Constitution of the Universal Postal Union with
final protocol, general regulations with final pro-
tocol, and convention with final protocol and reg-
ulations of execution. Done at Vienna July 10,
1964. Entered into force January 1, 1966. TIAS
5881.

Ratifications deposited: Ireland, March 4, 1966;
Switzerland, February 4, 1966.

Safety at Sea

International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1948. Done at London June 10, 1948. Entered
into force November 19, 1952. TIAS 2495.
Denunciations effective as of May 26, 1966: Den-
mark, Finland, Federal Republic of Germany,
Japan, Kuwait, Netherlands, Norway, United
Kingdom, United States, Vieti-Nam, Yugoslavia.
International convention for the safety of life at
sea, 1960. Done at London June 17, 1960. Entered
into force May 26, 1965. TIAS 5780.
Acceptances deposited: Argentina, Lebanon, April
27, 1966.
International regulations for preventing collisions
at sea. Approved by the International Conferenco
on Safety of Life at Sea, London, May 17-June 17,
1960. Entered into force September 1, 1965. TIAS
5813.
Acceptance deposited: Argentina, April 27, 1966.

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a

global commercial communications satellite system.

Done at Washington August 20, 1964. Entered

into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.

Approval deposited: Brazil, May 24, 1966.

Accession deposited: Malaysia, May 19, 1966.
Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,

1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS

5646.

Signature: Director-General, Telecommunications
Department of Malaysia, May 25, 1966.

War

Geneva convention relative to treatment of prisoners

of war;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of

wounded and sick in armed forces in the field;
Geneva convention for amelioration of condition of
wounded, sick and shipwrecked members of armed
forces at sea ;
Geneva convention relative to protection of civilian
persons in time of war.

Dated at Geneva August 12, 1949. Entered into
force October 21, 1950; for the United States
February 2, 1956. TIAS 3364, 3362, 3363, and
3365, respectively.
Adherence deposited: Honduras, December 31,
1965.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Interna-
tional Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115). Open
for signature at Washington April 4 through 29,
1966.'
Notification of undertaking to seek acceptance or

approval: Ecuador, May 18, 1966.
Notification of undertaking to seek accession:

Libya, May 19, 1966.

' Not in force.

JUNE 13, 1966

957

BILATERAL

France

Agreement relating to the reciprocal granting of
authorizations to permit licensed amateur radio
operators of either country to operate their sta-
tions in the other country. Effected by exchange
of notes at Paris May 5, 1966. Enters into force
July 1, 1966.

Greece

Agreement amending the agreement of July 17, 1964
(TIAS 5618), relating to trade in cotton textiles.
Effected by exchange of notes at Washington
May 23, 1966. Entered into force May 23, 1966.

Nicaragua

Agreement relating to investment guaranties. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Managua May 9,
1966. Enters into force on date of notification from
Government of Nicaragua that agreement has been
approved in conformity with constitutional pro-
cedures.

Sierra Leone

Agreement to facilitate the conduct of litigation with
international aspects in either country. Effected
by exchange of notes at Freetown March 31 and
May 6, 1966. Entered into force May 6, 1966.

United Kingdom

Agreement amending the air services agreement of
February 11, 1946, as amended (TIAS 1507, 1640,
1714, 3338, 3675, 3719). Effected by exchange of
notes at Washington May 27, 1966. Entered into
force May 27, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S.
Government Printing Office, Washiyigton, D.C.,
20i02. Address requests direct to the Superintend-
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lications, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.

Foreign Consular Offices in the United States — 1966
(Revised). Complete and official listing of foreign
consular offices in the United States, together with
their jurisdictions and recognized personnel. Pub.
7846. Department and Foreign Service Series 128.
86 pp. 35^.

Maritime Matters — Liability During Private Opera-
tion of N.S. Savannah. Agreement with Italy. Ex-
change of notes — Dated at Rome December 16, 1965.
Entered into force December 16, 1965. TIAS 5938.
3 pp. 5^.

Investment Guaranties. Agreement with Thailand,
amending the agreement of August 27 and Septem-
ber 1, 1954, and terminating the amending agreement
of August 27, 1957. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Bangkok December 22, 1965. Entered into force De-
cember 22, 1965. With memorandum of understand-
ing. TIAS 5940. 6 pp. 5<i.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. LIV, NO. 1407 PUBLICATION 8094 JUNE 13, 1966

The Department of State BnUetln, •
weekly publication luned by the Office
of Media Serricea, Bnreaa of Public Af-
fain. proTidea the pnblio and intereated
agenciea of the QoTemment with Infor-
mation on deTOlopmenta in the field of
foreign reiationa and on the work of the
Department of Stat* and tile Foralsn
Service. The Bolletin inolndea aeleeted
preu releases on foreign policy, issned
by the White Hooae and the Department,
and statement* and addresses made by
the President and by th« Secretary of
State and othar officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articlea on rarl-
oaa phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is inclnded concerning treaties
and international agreement* to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations doooments, and legislatiTe mate-
rial In the field of International reiationa
are listed enrrantly.

The Bulletin ia for sale by the Supei^
intendent of Doeomenta, U.S. Oorem-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.O.,
20402. Pkiob: 62 issnes, domestle tlO.
foreign $16; single copy 30 cent*.

Use of funds for printing of thi* pub-
lication approved by the Director of th«
Bureau of the Budget (Jannary 11, 1000).

notb: Contents of this publication an
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the soure* will
be appreciated. The Bulletin la |pd«»«i
In the Beaders' Guide to Periodical Liter-
ature.

958

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

INDEX June 13, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. lJi.07

Africa. The United States and Africa: A Unity
of Purpose (Johnson) 914

American Principles. Organizing the Peace for
Man's Survival (Rusk) 926

Argentina. U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee
Holds Initial Meeting 944

Aviation

U.S. and U.K. Amend Bermuda Air Agreement 954

U.S. To Continue Adherence to Warsaw Con-
vention (text of U.S. note) 955

Cambodia. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of May 27 918

China. Secretary Rusk's News Conference of
May 27 918

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foi-eign
Policy 945

Interaction of Science and Technology and For-
eign Affairs (Pollack) 946

Cuba

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 27 918
U.S. Calls on Cuba To Prevent Incursions Into

Guantanamo Base (text of note) .... 934
Department and Foreign Service. Interaction of
Science and Technology and Foreign Affairs
(Pollack) 946

Economic Affairs

Treasury Department To Control Blocked For-
eign Assets in U.S 945

U.S. and U.K. Amend Bermuda Air Agreement 954

U.S.-Argentine Trade Committee Holds Initial
Meeting 944

U.S. Asks International Action on Passenger-
Ship Fire Safety (Harriman) 952

U.S. To Continue Adherence to Warsaw Con-
vention (text of U.S. note) 965

Foreign Aid

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 27 918
The United States and Africa: A Unity of Pur-
pose (Johnson) 914

Germany. Secretary Rusk's News Conference
of May 27 918

Guyana. U.S. Relinquishes 99-Year Lease to
Atkinson Field in Guyana 935

International Organizations and Conferences

Seminar on Communication Satellite Earth-
Station Technology (U. Alexis Johnson) . . 949

U.S. Asks International Action on Passenger-
Ship Fire Safety (Harriman) 952

Military Affairs. U.S. Relinquishes 99-Year
Lease to Atkinson Field in Guyana .... 935

North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Secretary
Rusk's News Conference of May 27 . . . 918

Presidential Documents. The United States and
Africa: A Unity of Purpose 914

Publications. Recent Releases 958

Science

Interaction of Science and Technology and
Foreign Affairs (Pollack) 946

Seminar on Communication Satellite Earth-
Station Technology (U. Alexis Johnson) . . 949

Treaty Information

Current Actions 957

U.S. and U.K. Amend Bermuda Air Agreement 954
U.S. To Continue Adherence to Warsaw Con-
vention (text of U.S. note) 955

United Kingdom. U.S. and U.K. Amend Ber-
muda Air Agreement 954

United Nations. The Rule of Law in an Unruly

World (Goldberg) 936

Viet-Nam

Organizing the Peace for Man's Survival

(Rusk) 926

Secretary Rusk's News Conference of May 27 918

Name Index

Goldberg, Arthur J 936

Harriman, W. Averell 952

Johnson, President 914

Johnson, U. Alexis 949

Pollack, Herman 946

Rusk, Secretary 918, 926

No.

Date

tll9 5/23

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 23-29

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 23 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos. 105
of May 13, 108 of May 12, 110 of May 13,
m of May 14, 112 of May 16, and 116 of
May 20.

Subject

U.S.-Greek bilateral cotton tex-
tile agreement amended.

Requirements for passports.

William C. Herrington awarded
Superior Service Award.

Rusk: Council on Foreign Rela-
tions, New York (excerpts).

Bundy : Economic Club of Detroit.

Relinquishment of U.S. lease to
Atkinson Field, Guyana.

P.L. 480 currency for sale to U.S.
tourists in Ceylon (rewrite).

Stockberger Award awarded to
Arthur Goldberg.

U.S.-U.K. air services agreement
amended (rewrite).

Rusk: "Mason and Jefferson Re-
visited," Williamsburg, Va. (ex-
cerpts) .

Rusk: news conference of May 27.

U.S. note to Cuba on Guantanamo
base.

Treaty of amity and economic re-
lations with Thailand.

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

*120
*121

5/23

5/24

*122

5/24

tl23
124

5/25
5/26

tl25

5/26

*126

5/27

127

5/27

tl28

5/28

129
130

5/27
5/28

tl31

5/20

it OOVCRNMINT PRINTING OPPICBi I9«S XOI-9S>/S2

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United States Policy Toward Communist China

We must continue to contain Communist aggression in Asia, as in Europe, but at the sa
time, "we must continue to make it plain that, if Peiping abandons its belief that force is
best way to resolve disputes and gives up its violent strategy of world revolution, we would v
come an era of good relations." This is how Secretary of State Dean Rusk summarized I
policy toward Communist China in a major statement before the Subcommittee on the Far E
and the Pacific of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. This pamphlet is the full text of tl
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3^

THE

DEPARTMENT

OF

STATE

BULLETIN

Vol. LIV, No. H08

June 20, 1966

VIET-NAM AND U.S. OBJECTIVES IN THE FAR EAST
by Assistant Secretary Bundy 965

THE FOREIGN ASSISTANCE PROGRAM FOR LATIN AMERICA IN 1967
Statement by Assistant Secretary Gordon 977

A WORLD SOCIETY OF EQUALITY AND BROTHERHOOD
by Ambassador Arthur J. Goldberg 971

MEMORIAL DAY, 1966
Address by President Johnson 962

For index see inside back cover

"In Viet-Nam the United States is committed to a decent
and limited purpose: to defeat aggression and to let the
people of Viet-Nam decide in peace their own political fu-
ture. So I pledge to those who have died there and to those
who have been wounded there, to those who are now fight-
ing there and to those who may yet fight there, that we shall
help the people of South Viet-Nam see this through."

Memorial Day, 1966

Address by President Johnson ^

There is a special roll of honor that I
would like to call today:

Lt. Col. Seldon R. Edner of San Jose, Cali-
fornia

1st Lt. George B. Smith of Los Angeles,
California

1st Lt. Leland Williams of Taylor County,
Texas

1st Lt. Revier Harding of Fort Worth,
Texas

Staff Sergeant William Goodwin of Ta-
coma, Washington

Lt. Col. Alfred Medendorp of Grand
Rapids, Michigan

Lt. Col. Frank Lynn of Chicago, Illinois

Maj. Rudolf Anderson of Del Rio, Texas

Specialist Fourth Class James T. Davis of
Livingston, Tennessee

Who were these men?

Edner was the first American killed in
Greece, where in 1947 we decided to help the
people of that country resist aggression.

Smith and Williams were killed in the air-
lift which prevailed over the blockade of
Berlin in the winter of 1948 and 1949.

' Made at Arlington National Cemetery on May
30 ; as-delivered text.

Harding and Goodwin were the first
American soldiers killed in the struggle
against aggression in Korea.

Medendorp and Lynn were killed on Kin-
man Island, when in 1958 aggression was
attempted in the Taiwan Straits.

Anderson was the airman shot down over
Cuba during the crisis of 1962, when an ef-
fort was made to place offensive weapons
on that island.

Davis was the first American killed in the
resistance to aggression in Viet-Nam.

These men represent all those Americans
who have risked their lives — and lost them —
in the peacebuilding efforts since 1945.

They were sent on their missions because
this nation believes that peace is not some-
thing that just happens.

Peace does not come just because we wish
for it.

Peace must be fought for. It must be
built stone by stone.

In the first half of this century we learned
that there can be no peace if might makes
right — if force used by one nation against a
weaker nation is ever permitted to succeed.
We have learned that the time to stop ag-
gression is when it first begins. And that

962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

is one reason that we are in South Viet-Nam
today.

Modern weapons and means of communi-
cations, even more than common aspirations,
have created a single world community.
There is no going back. This is the way it
will be as far ahead as any of us can see.
We can only go forward to help make that
community one in which nations respect the
rights of other nations and live at peace with
one another.

For the American interest will be well
served if our children grow up in a world
of independent nations capable of assuming
collective responsibility for the peace. Our
interest — and the interest of world peace —
will not be served if nations continue to vio-
late the independence of other nations.

So, as our men and our allies today fight in
Southeast Asia, we are working on many
fronts to build a mosaic of peace and human
progress.

We are working to strengthen the Atlantic
world and, from that firm base, to build
bridges of cooperation to the East.

We are trying to assist the governments
and peoples of Latin America, Asia, and
Africa to work together to lift the burdens
of poverty and ignorance and disease.

We ache to turn all our energies — more of
our resources — and all our talents to building
that kind of world community.

But there will be no community to build if
aggression achieves in Viet-Nam what it has
been denied from Greece to Korea to Berlin.

The Conflict in South Viet-Nam

The conflict in South Viet-Nam is con-
fusing for many of our people.

The aggression there does not take the
form of organized divisions marching bra-
zenly and openly across frontiers.

It takes the form of men and equipment
coming down from the North on foot or in
trucks through jungle roads and trails or
on small craft moving silently through the
water at night.

It takes the form of well-organized assas-
sination, kidnaping, intimidation of innocent

citizens in remote villages. Last year, more
than 12,000 South Vietnamese civilians were
murdered or kidnaped by terrorists.

That kind of aggression is just as real and
just as dangerous for the safety and inde-
pendence of the people of South Viet-Nam
as was the attack on South Korea in June
of 1950.

Without the flow of men and equipment
from the North, the war would soon end.
But what our people see looks on the surface
to some of them more like a civil war than
external aggression. Peace will never come
to the world if the outcome of this kind of
aggression — insurgency mounted from out-
side a nation — is accepted as a substitute
or tantamount to free elections.

The Turmoil of Transition

There is a second source of confusion. The
people of South Viet-Nam are now in the
midst of a historic transition. They are try-
ing to form, for the first time, a constitu-
tional government that represents their own
traditions and values.

Their country has deep in its history
strong regional feelings — and equally strong
religious groupings — which have sometimes
been in conflict. As they try now to forge a
constitutional system these differences seem
to emerge sharply. Various groups clash as
they seek to influence the shape of things to
come. Turmoil results.

It is tragic, in the present turmoil, that
some choose acts of desperation to express
their political beliefs. This unnecessary loss
of life only obscures the progress that is be-
ing made toward a constitutional govern-
ment. It only clouds the sacrifices of thou-
sands of lives that have already been made
for the cause of independence and political
hope in South Viet-Nam.

Seldom has a people been called upon to
build a nation and to wage war against exter-
nally supported aggression at the same time.
But I believe that South Viet-Nam is moving
toward a government that will increasingly
reflect the true will of its people.

That day will come sooner if the South

JUNE 20, 1966

963

Vietnamese keep their internal quarrels and
differences within bounds and concentrate
on taking together their first steps toward
constitutional government.

But there will be no transition to the poli-
tics of compromise and to the secret ballot if
the external aggression against South Viet-
Nam is not now defeated.

"We Must Persevere"

Our policy is devoted to that end. As
President Kennedy said just 2 months be-
fore his life was taken, ". . . we want the
war to be won, the Communists to be con-
tained, and the Americans to go home." -

We have sought to bring the conflict in
Viet-Nam from the battlefield to the confer-
ence table. Twice we have stopped the bomb-
ings of military targets in North Viet-Nam
as a sign of our desire to negotiate. And we
waited and listened for 37 days — to get no
satisfactory reply.

We have sought the help of the United Na-
tions in arranging international peace talks.
We have sent emissaries to more than 40 na-
tions asking them to urge our adversaries
to reason with us. We have sent word pri-
vately to Hanoi and to Peking of our willing-
ness to talk without conditions. We have told
them that there are ways to end the blood-
shed.

' At a news conference on Sept. 12, 1963.

Nothing has happened. Infiltration from
the North has continued at an even higher
pace. The fighting, as we speak, goes on.
The infiltration is stepped up. The hordes
come marching in.

So, until peace comes or the Communists
are willing to talk about peace, we must per-
severe.

I know of no time in our history when our
brave men in arms have performed with
greater skill and courage than they have
performed in Viet-Nam. They went into
combat in a difficult climate, against a thor-
oughly professional enemy, in an unfamiliar
kind of war. From the first day of combat
they have not failed us once.

In Viet-Nam the United States is commit-
ted to a decent and limited purpose: to
defeat aggression and to let the people of
Viet-Nam decide in peace their own political
future.

So I pledge to those who have died there
and to those who have been wounded there,
to those who are now fighting there and to
those who may yet fight there, that we shall
help the people of South Viet-Nam see this
through.

On this Memorial Day it is right for us
to remember the living and the dead for
whom the call of their country has meant
much pain and sacrifice.

And so today I remind all of my fellow
countrymen that a grateful Nation is deeply
in their debt.

964

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Viet-Nam and U.S. Objectives in tiie Far East

by William P. Bundy

Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs i

My topic today is tiie problems that con-
front the United States in the Far East and
the policies which we are pursuing there.
I would prefer to spend a large share of
my time talking about such constructive
though underreported matters as the growth
of regional ties through such activities as
multination cooperation in the development
of the Mekong Valley. Yet I know the situa-
tion in Viet-Nam is necessarily at the front
of our thoughts.

Our policy in the Far East, which has
been consistent and bipartisan through the
administrations of Presidents Truman,
Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson is based
on our vital national interests in that area.

Geography makes us a Pacific power.
We care about the Far East partly because
a nation with our traditions and our pres-
ent power could hardly do otherwise. We
also know in our hearts that it makes a
great deal of difference to our most con-
crete national interests that the vast poten-
tial and talent of the Far East should be de-
veloped in healthy nations and that the
Far East should not go through a second
stage — as Europe had to do — of waves of
domination by a power or grouping of
powers that must at the end be met at
the cost of vast human misery. We fought

'- Address made before the Economic Club of De-
troit at Detroit, Mich., on May 23 (press release
123 dated May 25).

the military leaders of Japan in World
War II to prevent a hostile nation from
aggressively expanding and dominating
Asia, and more recently we have assisted
first the Government of Korea and now the
Government of Viet-Nam for that same
reason.

We have, of course, specific interests in
the Far East such as trade and investment,
and we have military base rights and needs
related to our role in assisting in the security
of the area. But neither of these is an end
in itself. The first will, we believe, flourish
if the nations of the area are able to de-
velop in freedom; the second must now be
maintained but will over time, we hope, be-
come susceptible of reduction and indeed,
wherever possible, of elimination.

Our objective in the Far East is simple,
at least to state: There, as throughout the
world, we wish to see independent nations
developing as they see fit in accordance
with their own traditions. We may hope
that their development will be toward de-
mocracy and economic systems that enlist
the initiative of the individual, but we have
long since outgrown the notion that we pos-
sess any blueprint which can be applied in
any pat sense to other nations, particularly
to less developed states with ancient and
differing cultures. The free peoples of Asia
have that same objective and generally un-
derstand that an American role is necessary
even though they — as we — may look to the

JUNE 20, 1966

965

day when that involvement, at least in its
military aspect, may be reduced and the
area have its own balance of power.

Three central problems exist in varying
degrees in virtually all free countries of the
Far East.

First, there is the problem of the security
of individual nations. A grave threat to
that security is posed by Communist China,
driven by a combination of nationalistic
and imperialistic motives and a very virulent
version of primitive Communist ideology
and uniting with other Communist nations
with their own ambitions, especially North
Viet-Nam.

Second is the problem of the economic
and social development of individual na-
tions, nations with a considerable talent
and capacity for growth. In the last decade,
we have been greatly encouraged by seeing
what Asiatic nations can do if they have se-
curity: Japan, the highest sustained growth
rate in the world; Korea, multiplying ex-
ports sixfold in the last 5 years and con-
trolling inflation; great improvement in the
Republic of China, Thailand, and the Philip-
pines. The free nations of the area are
moving forward.

There is certainly nothing like a one-to-
one ratio between economic development
and political progress, but clearly without a
large measure of the former, the latter is in-
finitely more difficult. And as Secretary
[of Defense Robert S.] McNamara pointed
out the other day,'* economic backwardness
and destructive violence have a very close
relation.

Third is the problem of political develop-
ment, of the maturing of a healthy spirit of
nationalism free of the scars of local rival-
ries and particularly of past colonial dom-
ination.

Our role is essential to the preservation of
the security of the area. In March I visited

* For text of Secretary McNamara's address at
Montreal, Canada, on May 18, see Bulletin of June
6, 1966, p. 874.

the Far East for 3 weeks. Without excep-
tion, the leaders of the free nations told me
that our role was vital and that what we
were doing in Viet-Nam was of critical im-
portance to their continuing capacity to re-
main free from foreign domination.

Emergence From Colonial Control

Viet-Nam represents in a very acute form
the security, the economic and social, and
now, of course, in the most visible manner
the political and nationalistic problems of
the area. I will not attempt to detail the
complex history of the Vietnamese struggle
and of our role in it. I think that you can
obtain the best factual narrative in Robert
Shaplen's book The Lost Revolution. While
I believe that Shaplen's criticisms of past
United States policies exaggerate our ability
to control the situation, the book very ac-
curately frames the central issue, the
emergence and fight for survival of genuine
non-Communist nationalism.

The Vietnamese problem stems from an
unfortunate history of emergence from co-
lonial control: a failure by France to train
the Vietnamese for the practice of self-
government and a failure to promise a time-
table for independence. Those failures in
turn created a Communist security threat,
for leadership in the nationalist movement
fell to the toughest and most disciplined
group, the Communist minority. Non-Com-
munist nationalists within the reach of the
Communists were dealt with ruthlessly and
the leaders assassinated. These develop-
ments in turn have retarded and made in-
finitely more difficult a process of political
and economic development which would nor-
mally have lent itself to rapid and relatively
easy progress.

No one doubts that post-1954 Viet-Nam
has had political difficulty and would have
had such difficulty in the absence of Com-
munist action. President Diem, who was an
ardent nationalist in many ways comparable
to Syngman Rhee in Korea, proved himself
the kind of man so often necessary to set

966

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

a country on its feet; but he nonetheless be-
came narrower and narrower in his theories
and application of government, began to
lose touch with and finally lost the support
of his people.

That change in Diem would undoubtedly
have created internal discontents and diffi-
culties. Yet had the North left the South
alone, we could have looked, I think, to
some process akin to what has taken place
in Korea. There Syngman Rhee was even-
tually replaced, first by a popular but in-
effective government, then by a military
dictatorship, and then by the free, elected
democratic government which exists there
today. That is what I think would have
happened in South Viet-Nam. North Viet-
Nam did not wish it so.

Aggression From Hanoi

Hanoi thought it saw in Diem's increas-
ing difficulties a fruitful opportunity for
aggression. In preparation for such an open-
ing, it had violated the 1954 accords by
leaving behind in the South a network of
cadres and had hidden thousands of weap-
ons. Some appreciation of the scope of
Communist preparations may be found in
the discovery of 3,561 caches of weapons
between September 1954 and June 1959.

Hanoi began to infiltrate thousands of
well-trained cadres into South "Viet-Nam.

A special report of the International Con-
trol Commission set up to supervise the
Geneva accords, dated June 1962, sustained
complaints made by South Viet-Nam against
North Viet-Nam, concluding that the evi-
dence showed "beyond reasonable doubt"
that North Viet-Nam had sent arms and
men into South Viet-Nam.

By the end of 1964 a total of over 40,000
men had been infiltrated from the North.
Before 1964, as detailed prisoner interroga-
tions had shovvTi, the bulk of the men in-
filtrated were native South Vietnamese who
had gone north in 1954 to receive special
training in sabotage and guerrilla warfare
and then been reintroduced into the South.

In early 1964, for the first time native
North Vietnamese began to appear in sig-
nificant numbers in the South. Beginning,
as we now know, in the middle of 1964 vdth
the first organized units entering in De-
cember, North Viet-Nam began to send
south not merely individual North Vietnam-
ese but organized units — battalions, regi-
ments, and divisions — of its own army.
Hanoi obviously was trying for a knockout
blow during 1965.

At that point, after so many years of
provocation, the United States began care-
fully measured and precisely restrained
aerial attacks in the North and introduced
its own regular combat units into South
Viet-Nam. We knew, and had always known,
that in the last analysis the South Vietnam-
ese must win their own struggle to de-
termine their future. But, in quite simple
terms, it had become clear that the vicious
arithmetic of guerrilla warfare would have
brought victory to the Viet Cong and
their North Vietnamese masters without
these measures on our part.

Morale tlie Determining Factor

Today the military picture is an encour-
aging one. We are making considerable
gains though the weight of our arms is only
beginning to be felt. While the basic areas
of control have not changed significantly,
there no longer exists, as there did a year
ago, the possibility — indeed, at that time
the probability — of a Communist military
victory. If we were to assume that the
morale and fighting effectiveness of the
opposing forces was a constant, then we
could perhaps anticipate only continued es-
calation on both sides. But I would suggest,
on the basis of my study of comparable
situations — Greece, Malaya, the Philippines
— that the underlying determinant of this
conflict will be morale.

I was in Greece as a young lawyer during
the heart of that conflict. I remember the
desperate situation of late 1947 and early
1948. Then in 1948 the Yugoslavs broke

JUNE 20, 1966

967

with the Russians and closed their section
of the border. The Greek Communists
were still able to obtain aid from neighbor-
ing Albania and Bulgaria, but their morale
had been weakened and finally broke. By
the end of 1949 the guerrilla war was over.
Incidentally, Greece also had many changes
of government during that conflict, and the
Greek Communist forces at one point called
themselves the National Liberation Front.

I am not suggesting anything as rapid as
that is now in prospect in Viet-Nam. I am
saying that there are traces of cracks in
Viet Cong morale that could at some point
become critical. The evidence of systematic
prisoner interrogation that is now available
shows that the percentage of Viet Cong
prisoners asserting their confidence in ulti-
mate or even short-term victory is ex-
tremely low. A year ago it was very high.
Confidence in victory must be a critical in-
gredient in the life of men leading the kind
of life these men lead. They are being
severely hurt by aggressive allied ground
moves. They are no longer safe anywhere;
at any moment our troops may suddenly
descend in helicopters, or they may be
strafed or even bombed by planes they are
unable to see. There are no longer any safe
retreats where they can rest and regroup.
There has been a slow steady growth in the
number of Viet Cong who defect to the
Government. There are many other straws
in the wind, and almost all point in the
same direction.

On the other hand, on the Government
side, the common testimony of all observers
is that morale is far better than it was a
year ago. There is a sense, a real sense,
that progress is possible and is being made,
and this has been reflected in a clear im-
provement on the part of South Vietnamese
forces.

I believe bombing of the North is essen-
tial to our effort both because of its cutting
down, making vastly more costly, and de-
laying the infiltration of men and supplies

and because it places pressure on Hanoi to
come to the conference table. Nevertheless,
though I believe that bombing must con-
tinue, we should realize that this struggle
will eventually be decided in the South.

The Political Struggle

Most on our minds at this moment is the
political struggle within South Viet-Nam.
We can get some perspective on this struggle
by noting the different ways in which
power has changed hands in South Viet-
Nam during the last 21/0 years. The changes
range from the very crude physical coup of
General [Nguyen] Khanh to the virtual
consensus that produced the Huong govern-
ment and to the civilian government of Dr.
[Phan Huy] Quat, which found itself in 1
such difficulty that it eventually asked the
military to take over. That request, and
not any coup, was the origin of the Ky J
government. ■

Prime Minister Ky on January 15 of this
year announced a timetable that would
have placed a new constitution before the
voters in 1966 and pledged that elections
for the legislature would be held during J
1967. ^

With that announcement, serious politics
began in South Viet-Nam. Tri Quang and
his supporters, whose power base is largely
in central Viet-Nam and who, while having
ties to other Buddhist groups, are very far
from being the Buddhists, prepared to take
action. Their decision was made before
Honolulu 3 and before the dismissal of Gen-
eral Thi [Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi].
General Thi's dismissal did play a part be-
cause it added another element of discon-
tent which Tri Quang and his followers
skillfully exploited. Strident opposition
groups took to the streets calling for elec-
tions and a constitution in the near future.

" For background on meeting of U.S. and South
Vietnamese leaders at Honolulu Feb. 6-8, see ihid.,
Feb. 28, 1966, p. 302.

968

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN

I
I

The Government eventually went ahead and
carried out its previous promises by con-
vening a National Political Congress during
the week of April 13, in which the Buddhists
participated.

That congress was a remarkable event.
From it emerged a virtually unanimous
feeling and agreement, on the part of po-
litical leaders of all types, that in spite of
the obstacles it was preferable to begin
the process of constitution-making, of cre-
ating a legitimate base for the Government,
rather than to continue with the previous
uncertain situation. The Government and
political leaders made their own decision to
hold an election for a constituent assembly
this fall. We fully support that determina-
tion.

There are many difficult problems raised
by the holding of an election in a war-torn
country. Yet, last May the Vietnamese held
elections for municipal and provincial coun-
cils. Despite the Viet Cong efforts to pre-
vent voting, approximately two-thirds of
the potential voters in the areas controlled
by the Government registered, and of those
who registered 73 percent actually voted.
The figures for voting in an American off-
year election range from 33 to 47 percent
of eligible voters. So I think that Vietnam-
ese accomplishment was truly remarkable
considering the obstacles.

However, those local elections, fought
primarily on the basis of local issues, are
vastly different from the oncoming na-
tional elections. Nevertheless, despite the
difficulties involved, the consensus in South
Viet-Nam is that elections should be held.

A natural question is the degree to which
Tri Quang and his struggle movement is
anti-American or represents a desire to dis-
continue the war or ask us to leave. I do not
think that there is any likelihood of a freely
elected legislature asking us to leave. I
base that comment on a number of factors.

One of the most significant facts is that
over the long period of time before and
after the overthrow of Diem and up to and

including the current struggle, despite all
their quarrels and difficulties, which are
after all the birth pangs of a nation, there
has never been a single political leader of
any consequence in South Viet-Nam who
has ever gone over to the Viet Cong. So
far as we can tell, although there has been
some Communist participation in the strug-
gle movement, it has not been significant.

Recently a prominent American student
leader, a man who had strong reservations
about our policy in Viet-Nam, went to
Viet-Nam and traveled throughout the coun-
try to obtain an insight into Vietnamese
student opinion. He spoke with students at
Hue, the center of Buddhist dissidence, and
elsewhere. He concluded that 9 out of 10
of the Vietnamese students want no part
whatsoever of any compromise arrangement
that would admit the Viet Cong to the Gov-
ernment of South Viet-Nam.

The struggle forces in Hue over the week-
end rejected reported offers of help from the
National Liberation Front in saying "the
first and immediate national reaction of the
popular struggle forces for revolution is to
reject if not utterly to deride this foolish
proposal."

There are many other bits and pieces
which fit together into an overall picture.
The Vietnamese are a highly nationalistic
people. There are frictions as there must be
when there is a foreign presence as large
as ours is. But what I think is striking is
that despite these frictions, no observer
that I know of has detected any deep senti-
ment among the Vietnamese for asking us to
leave before we finish the job. As Tri
Quang himself has said, "It is agreed by all
that the struggle against communism here
must be made with the assistance of the
Americans."

The Viet Cong do not anticipate the elec-
tion of a national assembly which will ask
us to leave. For this reason, no doubt, they
will do what they can to interfere with the
elections.

So let us keep the present political diffi-

JUNE 20, 1966

969

culties in perspective. They are serious, and
it is obvious that the South Vietnamese
themselves must develop unity of action as
well as purpose, and attain a degree of ef-
fectiveness in their Government that will
enable them to cope with the situation, par-
ticularly with such presently serious prob-
lems as inflation and with the necessarily
slow and grinding process of restoring order
in the countryside as the military situation
improves. The necessary unity and effec-
tiveness have been significantly impaired
by the political crises of the last 2 months.
Those political crises must be resolved, and
we are using every bit of our influence to
that end at this moment.

Yet we must recall always that the proc-
ess of creating a broadly based govern-
ment is an immensely difficult one. It was
in Korea in 1963. Although the parallel
is more remote, it was in our own confed-
eration period before our ov?n Constitution
was made. As a South Vietnamese visiting
this country put it the other day, there is
bound to be trouble and confusion if a na-
tion seeks a democratic base. As he said,
there would be no trouble and confusion
under Communist rule but nothing to live
for either.

The Stakes in South Viet-Nam

So I think we should go on and must go
on. I think we are making great progress
on the military side. Although there are
grave dangers on the political side, there
also exist the possibilities of lasting gains.

For the stakes remain very great. There
is the stake in helping to keep free the 15

million people of South Viet-Nam from the
oppression and terror that would be their
lot under the domination of Hanoi and
helping them to fight for the opportunity to
develop their o^vn future.

There is in addition the strategic stake;
for, without accepting the pat simplicities
of the domino theory, none of us can doubt
that preservation of the independence of
Thailand, of Malaysia, of Singapore and
Burma — and behind them, in the long run,
Indonesia, India, the Philippines, and Aus-
tralia— would become infinitely more diffi-
cult if this venture succeeds in South Viet-
Nam.

There is the deep stake in preventing the
success of what in this instance is a North
Vietnamese effort fully supported by Com-
munist China, which would advance the
Communist Chinese view of the need for
violence and which, if successful, would not
only impel the Chinese Communists toward
new aggression but might conceivably in-
duce the Russians to resume a more violent
general posture.

Finally, of course, there is the world-
wide stake of showing that reliance on a
United States commitment — in this case a
commitment developed over the years and
now very strongly expressed — is justified.

These are the crucial stakes and the rea-
sons why we shall continue to do what is
necessary to insure that Viet-Nam will be
able to stand on its own feet and determine
its own future. We will do so for the sake
of the Vietnamese and for the sake of our
overall policy in the Far East and indeed
for the sake of the things we stand for
throughout the world.

970

DEPARTMENT OP STATE BULLETIN .[

i

A World Society of Equality and Brotherhood

by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative to the United Nations ^

Men have prayed for the dignity of the
individual and for peace all through recorded
history — and, in all likelihood, long before
that, too. Yet it becomes more and more evi-
dent that we will not deserve nor receive
God's most precious gift unless we also root
out and eliminate all causes and instances of
inequality and of man's inhumanity to man.

Up to now the human society which has
managed to smash the atom and to conquer
space has not succeeded in this most basic
of its earthly tasks. The "fire of freedom
and human rights" envisioned by Thomas
Jefferson to cleanse the world has still not
burned through the cords of oppression and
prejudice that bind so much of our civiliza-
tion to the past.

It is about the effort to break with the
past — the effort to advance world society out
of the shadow of discrimination and intoler-
ance into the daylight of genuine equality
and brotherhood — that I wish to speak to
you tonight.

This is an effort wholly as vital to civili-
zation as that of finding an effective means
to end war; indeed, we shall end the threat
of holocaust and doom on no other terms.
And I can but repeat here what President
Kennedy once said with all of his eloquence
and depth of feeling: ^

' Made before the American Jewish Committee at
Washington, D.C., on May 12 (U.S./U.N. press
release 4855).

" Bulletin of July 1, 1963, p. 2.

And is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a
matter of human rights — the right to live out our
lives without fear of devastation, the right to breathe
air as nature provided it, the right of future gen-
erations to a healthy existence?

Our nation's commitment to the cause of
peace, therefore, necessitates a completely
wholehearted dedication to the achievement
of full human rights for all of our citizens
not only in words but in deeds.

I have always profoundly believed — and I
have not changed my mind in the 9 months
since I have become the United States Rep-
resentative to the United Nations — that the
most important aspect of American foreign
policy is the perfection of its domestic so-
ciety.

I said at the U.N.,^ and I repeat here to-
night, that the test of any country's dedi-
cation to human rights is not just what it
says in the General Assembly for all the
world to hear but in what it does at home
for all the world to see. There can be no
public face looking one way at the U.N. and
a private face looking the other way at home.

In short, the better we do in civil liberties
at home, the more persuasively our voice
speaks in the councils of the world.

I hasten to add, however, that putting our
domestic house in order by attacking discrim-
ination and poverty and by assuring every
citizen of his right to equal opportunity
should not be motivated just because it will
help our image abroad. We must do it be-

' Ibid., Oct. 11, 1965, p. 578.

JUNE 20, 1966

971

cause it is just and because it is right. And
we must do it because our Constitution com-
mands that it shall be done.

This is not to say that our domestic atti-
tude toward civil rights does not have pro-
found implication on our relations with other
countries. No subject is more in the fore-
front of our foreign affairs.

U.S. Achievements in Area of Civil Rights

The world notes and long remembers both
our achievements and our shortcomings in
the area of civil rights. The name of Earl
Warren is a household word in Asia and
Africa, and the message of Brown v. the
Board of Education has hurdled the barriers
that separate us from Moscow and Peking.
I do not believe that we or history can
ever accord sufficient honor to our Supreme
Court for its role in establishing the legal
foundation and the moral tone for this basi-
cally peaceful revolution in American life
and values. I can make this tribute without
embarrassment because the landmark de-
cisions of Brown v. the Board of Education,
and of Baker v. Carr, preceded my service on
the Court.

There were men of good will who ques-
tioned whether judicial activism in enforcing
our constitutional commands for equality
would not paralyze the executive and legis-
lative branches in their coordinate respon-
sibilities. The record of the decade since
Broivn has shown those fears to be un-
founded.

Stimulated — or, if you will, prodded — by
the Court decisions, both the legislative and
the executive branches have responded to
the constitutional call after 100 years of in-
action, and, as a consequence, we have seen
the greatest volume of civil rights legislation
since the days of the Reconstruction.

Now the Congress has before it a new civil
rights bill; for, as President Johnson has
pointed out, the job before us is far from
finished, and there are still remaining evils
of prejudice that must come under the juris-
diction of the law.

The highest manifestation of our American
democracy and indeed the genius of our Con-

stitution is nothing less than the means by
which the majority imposes restraints upon
itself in order to protect the rights of mi-
norities. The bill submitted by the President
is another such manifestation, and it is vital
that it be enacted in all of its essential parts
if we would move closer to our goal of being
a society that really practices what we
preach.

In recognizing those in our Government
who have led the way in our civil rights
struggle we cannot overlook our private citi-
zens, and perhaps leading all the rest here
are America's Negro citizens themselves.
They are playing their role under the great-
est difficulty with great fortitude and with
great patience.

But it is not enough to cry "patience" to
the aggrieved parties. Theirs is the obliga-
tion to eschew violence, but this obligation
must be marked by the discharge of the
obligation that lies on all of us to grant the
justice that is sought. And we must be ever
mindful that constitutional guarantees are
not merely hopes to some future enjoyment
but warrants for the here and now.

We rightly think of law as a stabilizing
influence — if not the most important factor
promoting stability — in our society. We
must not forget that the law promotes such
stability and order not simply because it is
law promulgated by authority but, rather,
because in large measure it satisfies the rea-
sonable expectations of those who live under
it. When people's just expectations are sat-
isfied, the law is accepted and respected and
a peaceful, orderly, and harmonious society
is possible. When these expectations are
not fulfilled, confidence in the law is dimin-
ished, people are alienated from the law and
society, and instability, unrest, and even vio-
lence can replace order. And one of the most
reasonable expectations of any person is to
have his legitimate grievances redressed.
And the most legitimate of all grievances is
being denied one's constitutional civil rights.
Justice Brandeis was surely right when
he said that "the greatest menace to freedom
is an inert people." By their determined
action, their wise and responsible leadership,
their devotion to America's oldest and proud-

972

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

\

est traditions of free speech and peaceful
assembly, the Negro people have strength-
ened and ennobled freedom for all of us.

And not the least of the proud achieve-
ments of the American Jewish Committee is
that it has responded to the call of the Negro
people in supporting it and helping make the
American dream of liberty and justice for
all a concern of every citizen.

Now having said this, I must also say
what we all know: that we are not entirely
free of prejudice and bigotry in this coun-
try. Although we have done much, there is
still more to be done. The denial of equal
opportunity, spanning many generations
past, does not wear off in a day, a year,
or a decade. And it will not be enough to
accord equality prospectively; we must pay
the price necessary to redress past inequities.
And it is to this problem that we must now
turn our thoughts, our energies, and our cre-
ative powers if we are not to make civil
mockery out of civil rights.

This is the task now before us at home —
to wipe out by legal means the last vestige
of discrimination and prejudice. But even as
we do, we must reach into areas where the
law cannot reach.

Law can create a healthier climate for
brotherhood and it can move us closer to its
realization, but brotherhood, like the law of
which the prophet Jeremiah wrote, must be
"written upon men's hearts."

U.N. Human Rights Conventions

But even as we air out the dark closets
in which discrimination has hidden so long
and put our house in order, we must work
in concert with other members of the United
Nations to answer the international cry for
human freedom here and now.

There should be no question of the United
States answer. We are for human rights at
home. We must be for human rights abroad.
We must keep pace on the international
scene with the outstanding record compiled
in our domestic civil rights achievements.
Therefore, all the more important is the rati-
fication of the U.N.'s human rights conven-
tions, which are pending before the Senate.

The Senate, which has the constitutional
duty to advise and consent before this na-
tion undertakes any treaty obligations, has
had four conventions submitted to it. The
first, the convention that would make geno-
cide an international crime, one we took a
leading role in formulating, was submitted
by President Truman in 1949.^

Three others on slavery, forced labor, and
the political rights of women — all dealing
with rights covered by our Constitution or
by Federal law — were submitted by President
Kennedy nearly 3 years ago.^

We supported each of these conventions in
the United Nations, and indeed some of their
provisions were suggested by us. We spoke
in favor of them and we voted for them, for
we are deeply concerned with each of the
human rights they defend; and indeed our
Constitution requires that they be protected.
Our delay in ratifying these conventions has
confused our friends and provided ammuni-
tion against us by our foes.

Tonight I reaffirm the support of our Gov-
ernment for these conventions. It remains
the position of our Government that they
should be ratified.

I should like to add here that your very
able president, Morris Abram, as the United
States Representative on the U.N.'s Human
Rights Commission, has played a key role in
the formulation of another U.N. convention,
one on racial discrimination."

Our Government is now reviewing this
convention, not out of any disagreement with
its purposes and aims but out of understand-
able concern that nothing in it should quali-
fy our constitutional commitment to free
speech and a free press.

In my personal view, nothing in this con-
vention poses any such danger. And it is my
personal hope that, when the review is com-
pleted, the United States will also sign this
convention and that it will be submitted for
early ratification by the Senate.

I want to emphasize here that I am not

* For background, see ibid., July 4, 1949, p. 844.
'Ibid., Aug. 26, 1963, p. 322.

" For text, see U.N. doc. A/C.3/L. 1327; for back-
ground, see Bulletin of Feb. 7, 1966, p. 212.

JUNE 20, 1966

973

voicing any criticism over the past. There
have been honest differences of opinion over
whether we should ratify human rights con-
ventions, but these differences clearly do not
stem from any lack of bipartisan support for
the aims they embody. Rather they have their
genesis in honest doubts by some that the
principles of federalism permit us to partici-
pate in them.

However, it is my very strong belief that
all the U.N. conventions submitted to the
Senate are consistent with our Constitution
and that we need have no fears that they
contravene our domestic laws, which are
more protective of human rights than any-
thing the conventions provide.

Indeed, the criticism to which we have
been subjected by Communist governments
for our delay in ratification is hypocritical,
to say the least. Their constitutional safe-
guards for human rights are still largely
rhetoric although I am happy to note some-
what improved in practice over the days of
the Stalin terror.

Our constitutional safeguards are law en-
forced by judicial decisions which vindicate
the principle that the individual is entitled to
protection against the state itself.

Our constitutional safeguards for human
rights are judicial decisions and executive
action.

Human Rights an International Concern

For those who wonder if human rights is
a subject for international concern, or who
question why we should take the trouble to
participate in conventions that spell out what
is already American law and tradition, I
think the answer is quite simple.

We will build an international community
of respect for law and justice only if we
recognize that human rights are at the core
of all we do. And surely there is something
truly significant about worldwide progress
in recognizing the interrelationship between
the destruction of human freedom at home
and that of overt aggression abroad. We
have only to bear in mind the events leading
up to World War II as proof of that inter-
relationship.

I would point out, too, that there ia an in-
consistency in our having ratified the Char-
ter of the United Nations, which spells out
human rights as one of the main purposes of
the organization, and then hesitating to rat-
ify conventions that give the charter force.

Above all, though, I believe ratification is
entirely in the United States national inter-
est. Concern for the welfare of all people
is a vital aspect of our foreign policy, but
other countries will not take our views
seriously unless we demonstrate our willing-
ness to join the international community in
international commitments to safeguard hu-
man rights.

For we are a powerful nation not only be-
cause of military might but, perhaps even
more, because we are a moral leader. What
we do, therefore, cannot fail but to influence
others who look to us for leadership. If we
do not consider it important to sign the con-
ventions, why should they? And more im-
portantly, why should they implement the
conventions?

I believe, finally, that just as it is in the
United States interest to encourage the use
of multilateral institutions and machinery to |
help raise the living standards of economi-
cally underdeveloped nations, so is it in the
United States interest to do so in the reabn
of human rights.

We, and those who care as we do about
the freedom of the individual and of his
spirit, may thereby find success together.
Our being empowered to try would be an
appropriate complement to the human rights
record Congress has already written here at
home.

A little more than a year ago when I ad-
dressed this organization last, I said that
with concern for human rights firmly em-
bedded in our national life and in our hearts,
Americans should be willing to compete with
the Communist world not in material things
— in which we are obviously superior — but
we should be willing to compete in the market
of human values and in the protection and
realization of individual liberties, for in this
area we are preeminent. This we owe to the
great vision and faith of the Founding

974

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Fathers, who wrote the Bill of Rights, to the
American people, who would not ratify the
Constitution without it, and to the Supreme
Court, which day by day gives it fresh force
and vitality.

I can but reaffirm tonight what I said to
you before, for competition in ideals is the
real challenge of our age, and in it no nation,
no individual, can be neutral. The final meas-
ure of our success — or our failure — in this
competition will be the extent to which we
help improve the lot of man and upgrade his
dignity and thereby contribute not only to
the building of our own Great Society here
at home but everywhere in the world.

For we do not believe that our vision of
that Great Society is exclusively American.
We do believe it belongs to all mankind, and
we embrace the aspirations of a better life
in which human misery and discrimination
will one day be banished not because of our
limited nationality but out of our common
humanity.

P.L. 480 Currencies Available
for Sale to U.S. Tourists

The Department of State (press release
118) and the Treasury Department an-
nounced on May 20 that United States citi-
zens visiting Guinea may purchase that
country's currency from the United States
Embassy at Conakry and that U.S.-owned
balances of Tunisian currency also may now
be purchased by American visitors to that
country from the Central Bank of Tunisia.
United States citizens should specifically
request that bank to sell them dinars from
the United States Government's account.

In addition, on May 26 the Department
of State (press release 125) and the Treas-
ury Department announced that United
States citizens visiting Ceylon may purchase
that country's currency from the United
States Embassy at Colombo.

Sales in the three countries will be made
at the official rate of exchange.

Balances of the currencies of the three
countries became available for sale to United

States travelers when Ceylon, Guinea, and
Tunisia were added to the list of countries
where official United States holdings of local
currencies have become larger than required
to meet the needs of the United States Gov-
ernment and where appropriate procedures
were established. The currencies have been
received by the United States from the sale
of surplus agricultural commodities.

To reduce the outflow of dollars from the
United States and thereby reduce the United
States balance of payments deficit, the
United States Government urges American
tourists to purchase local currencies from
United States holdings abroad in the six
countries where they are available. When
local currencies are purchased in this way
the dollars stay in American accounts, and
there is no outflow of dollars to foreign
holders, although the transactions take place
abroad.

In Ceylon and Guinea the local currency
may be purchased at the United States Em-
bassies in each country in exchange for
United States currency, personal checks
drawn on a bank in the United States, or for
United States travelers checks. Purchasers
must present their passports for identifica-
tion. The same dollar instruments will ap-
ply in Tunisia, except that the purchases
must be made at the Central Bank.

This brings to six the number of coun-
tries where American travelers may pur-
chase local currencies from officially owned
United States balances. The United States
has been selling Indian rupees and Israeli
and Egyptian pounds to United States citi-
zens in those countries for some time.

The United States owns working balances
in the local currencies of other countries, in
Western Europe, Latin America, Africa, and
the Far East; however, in most cases, these
balances are not even adequate to cover of-
ficial United States expenses.

As additional sales of United States agri-
cultural products are made for foreign cur-
rencies, and as United States official re-
quirements change, arrangements for sales
to private United States citizens will be ne-
gotiated where possible and advantageous.

JUNE 20, 1966

975

United Nations Day, 1966

A PROCLAMATION'

1966 marks the twenty-first anniversary of the
signing of the United Nations Charter.

Since 1945 successive administrations have re-
affirmed this nation's commitment to the purposes
of the United Nations.

For more than two decades the United States has
worked to help the UN improve its peacekeeping ca-
pacity, expand its programs of economic develop-
ment, and promote social justice and human rights.

The UN has been effective in containing local dis-
putes which, if unchecked, could have led to general
war. It has assisted scores of nations in meeting the
challenges of the technological revolution. Above all,
the UN has proved to be a place where constructive
dialogues between rich and poor nations can lead to
better understanding in today's world, and the prom-
ise of a fuller life for future generations.

Because we know that institutions, like men, must
remain ever ready to cope with recurring crises, we
will continue to do our share in keeping the UN's
operations relevant to its problems, realistic in ap-
proach, and responsible in action.

Effective public support for the United Nations
depends upon a sober appraisal of its accomplish-
ments, and upon a sympathetic understanding of the
problems, as well as the potential, of the world or-
ganization.

The General Assembly of the United Nations has
resolved that October twenty-fourth, the date of the
coming into force of the United Nations Charter in
1945, should be dedicated each year to making known
the purposes, principles, and accomplishments of the
United Nations:

Now, THEREFORE, I, LYNDON B. JOHNSON, Presi-
dent of the United States of America, do hereby
proclaim Monday, October 24, 1966, as United Na-
tions Day, and urge the citizens of this Nation to
observe that day by means of community programs
which will contribute to a realistic understanding of
the aims, problems, and achievements of the United
Nations and its associated organizations.

I also call upon officials of the Federal and State
Governments and upon local officials to encourage
citizen groups and agencies of communication — press,
radio, television, and motion pictures — to engage
in special and appropriate observance of United
Nations Day this year in cooperation with the
United Nations Association of the United States of
America and other interested organizations.

In WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my
hand and caused the Seal of the United States of
America to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 11th day
of May in the year of our Lord nineteen

[seal] hundred and sixty-six, and of the Independ-
ence of the United States of America the

one hundred and ninetieth.

^ No. 3725; 31 Fed. Reg. 7107.

By the President:
Dean Rusk,
Secretary of State.

Mr. Kaiser Named U.S. National
Chairman for United Nations Day

Following is the text of a letter from
President Johnson to Edgar F. Kaiser
which was released by the White House on
May 11.

White House press release dated May 11

Dear Mr. Kaiser: I appreciate greatly
your consenting to serve this year as U.S.
National Chairman for United Nations Day.

UN Day should have special significance
for Americans. The United States has pro-
vided both birthplace and homeplace for the
United Nations; the UN has enjoyed warm
bipartisan support from five U.S. Presidents,
from the Congress and from an overwhelm-
ing majority of the American people. Support
for the United Nations has been a major ele-
ment of U.S. foreign policy since 1945.

As UN Day Chairman, I know that you,
with the cooperation of the various State
Governors, Mayors and other local officials,
will encourage appropriate observances of
this commemorative event throughout the
country. This year the United Nations is
twenty-one years old, and Americans should
join other peoples of the world in welcoming
it to majority.

I am happy that I can count on your out-
standing talents and ability for this impor-
tant job.

Sincerely,

Lyndon B. Johnson

i

976

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

THE CONGRESS

The Foreign Assistance Program for Latin America in 1967

Statement by Lincoln Gordon

Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs ^

President Johnson has set the course for
U.S. participation in the monumental task
of helping to create modern democratic so-
cieties in Latin America. In Mexico City,
less than 3 weeks ago, the President an-
nounced - that he will in the months ahead
join with Latin American leaders in explor-
ing a new meeting at the very highest level
"to examine our common problems and to
give the Alliance for Progress increased
momentum," to "give necessary impulse . . .
to new and additional initiatives."

It will take time, faith, and stubborn effort (he
said) to achieve together the goals that we set our-
selves in the Charter of Punta del Este 5 years ago,
but this we must do. This we will do. There is no
other way, in our time and in this hemisphere, to
show what free men and what free nations can do
working together.

Nor is it necessary to stress the vital im-
portance to United States security of the
success of this effort. If our own children
are to live lives of fulfillment and freedom,
then a way must be found for the children
of Latin America to do the same.

Our hemisphere cannot continue indef-
initely half rich and half poor. No one ex-

' Made before the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations on May 2. Mr. Gordon is also U.S. Coordi-
nator for the Alliance for Progress.

' For text of President Johnson's address at
Mexico City on Apr. 15, see Bulletin of May 9, 1966,
p. 727.

pects a rapid closing of this gap, but Latin
America rightly seeks its reduction through
a process of accelerated and self-sustaining
growth, together with a sense of greater
control over its own economic destiny. This
will require revolutionary changes, and the
processes of such change — economic, social,
and political — are already well begun. There
are some who contend that this must be a
violent and bloody revolution. This is the
doctrine of the Chinese Communists and of
the recent Tricontinent Conference of Ha-
vana. It is also the view of non-Com-
munists who look to the Mexican Revolu-
tion of 1910 as a model for all to follow.

I do not accept this view. Mexican prog-
ress in the last 20 years has been ad-
mirable, but it is a fact that nowhere in
Latin America today is there a social struc-
ture as rigid as that of pre-1910 Mexico. In
the last half century there have taken place
in the world an explosion of scientific and
technical knowledge and an almost equally
dramatic advance in understanding of eco-
nomic growth. Our task is to help Latin
America bring these new tools to bear in
the cause of accelerated progress and social
justice — to achieve revolutionary ends by
peaceful means. There is no reason to
emulate the violence which in Mexico two
generations ago cost 1 million lives in a then
population of 15 million, or more recently in

JUNE 20, 1966

977

Cuba has cost a suffering nation its hopes
for freedom without even beginning to meet
its minimum material goals.

The Alliance for Progress is not merely a
declaration of faith that this can be done.
It is also a definition of goals and of ways
and means to pursue those goals by na-
tional self-help and international coopera-
tion. After 5 years, it can be said with con-
fidence that both the goals and the methods
are essentially sound. This is the consid-
ered opinion of all the governments con-
cerned and of responsible leadership
throughout the hemisphere. Men no longer
discuss whether there should be an Alliance.
But they are rightly dissatisfied with the
rate of progress, even though it has ad-
vanced substantially during the past 2 years.
They and we are seeking for ways to in-
tensify the effort and to move more rapidly
— and together — from plans to action and
to results.

There are no simple shortcuts to eco-
nomic and social progress. The Alliance
must be comprehensive and sustained for
the long haul. The bill before this commit-
tee is the minimum required for our own
continued effective participation in this
inter-American effort during the coming
years.

Political Situation

On the political front the hemisphere
shows a decided trend toward greater stabil-
ity and strengthening of democratic insti-
tutions as well as economic grov(^h. There
are some fragile situations, to be sure. We
know how swiftly adverse circumstances
can develop. But the general trend is en-
couraging. The philosophy of the Alliance
for Progress is making economic and social
progress the central concern of political
movements and of the new generation of po-
litical leaders. Development, stabilization,
and reform are becoming the key issues of
public life. There is also increasing aware-
ness of the necessity to build democratic
Institutions at the grassroots level and to
create the opportunity for democracy to

develop through expanded economic oppor-
tunity and increased social mobility.

More countries are adopting develop-
ment programs built upon the determination
of people to help themselves. As they work
together and build schools, cooperatives,
trade unions, local water systems, and meet-
ing centers, people are learning the rudi-
ments of self-government by confronting
the economic and social problems of their
own communities. There is an increasing
appreciation of the necessity for full citizen
involvement in national development efforts.

In Chile, Peru, Mexico, Bolivia, Venezuela,
El Salvador, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and the
Dominican Republic, there are community
action programs designed to harness the
energies of the people to improve their
own lives.

Reviewing the political events of the past
year, it is clear that there is a growing de-
termination in the hemisphere to develop
and improve democratic procedures and po-
litical stability. Reform-minded constitu-
tional governments are demonstrating that
political freedom and economic development
can go hand in hand. And in the few cases
of de facto governments, most of them are
moving their countries rapidly toward elec-
tions and a return to constitutionality. In
short, while the political practice in the
hemisphere still falls short of stable repre-
sentative democracy, this is increasingly re-
spected as the pattern which should be
sought in reality as well as on paper.

Much progress has also been made in
combating Communist subversion. Vene-
zuela, Peru, Colombia, and Central America
have been able to reduce their guerrilla
problems. Elsewhere in the hemisphere,
the Communists show little, if any, gain
from their efforts. This is due to several
factors.

Public and official awareness of the dan-
ger has increased as Communist designs
become more evident. Castro's repeated
failures at home and his clumsiness in ex-
ternal relations have lost him most of the
sympathy and appeal that he once enjoyed.
Conflicts within the Communist movement

978

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

have weakened its effectiveness. The in-
ternal security capabilities of the Latin
American countries also have steadily in-
creased, supported by our military and po-
lice assistance programs. Continued vigi-
lance and systematic preventive effort on
this front, however, is essential. At the
Havana Tricontinent Conference the Com-
munists made clear that Latin America is
to be a principal target for subversion and
armed aggression. They should be taken at
their word.

We are encouraged by the progress in es-
tablishing a climate in the Dominican Re-
public propitious for the elections sched-
uled June 1. Over the past few months
violence has been sharply reduced. Eco-
nomic activity is picking up. Three candi-
dates— all former Presidents — are cam-
paigning actively. In the task of preparing
for elections, President [Hector] Garcia
Godoy is receiving the full cooperation of
all elements of the OAS [Organization of
American States] in the Dominican Re-
public: the Ad Hoc Committee, the Inter-
American Peace Force, the Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, and the
Technical Electoral Advisory Committee. A
team of OAS observers is being invited for
the election itself. The OAS is firmly com-
mitted to free and fair elections in the Do-
minican Republic and to the peaceful trans-
fer of power to the newly elected govern-
ment on July 1. We fully support this OAS
commitment.

Progress Under the Alliance

This last year has been a year of hope
and achievement under the Alliance for
Progress. In addition to material advances
of real significance, there has been con-
tinued progress in the creation of a sound
institutional base for more rapid economic
development. The basic concepts of the
Alliance have become the dominant philoso-
phy in the hemisphere. Self-help, system-
atic mobilization of domestic resources,
rational priorities for investment programs,
creation of modern institutions as a base

for more productive private enterprise, and
reforms looking toward greater efficiency
and broader social justice — these are not
only the commitments of governments but
in increasing measure the actual practice.
Latin America has also been helped by
more favorable price and market conditions
for several basic commodities. Were this
situation to change, the economic situation
could deteriorate quickly.

At the fourth annual ministerial meeting
of the Inter-American Economic and Social
Council in Buenos Aires 4 weeks ago,^

1 had the opportunity to speak with col-
leagues from throughout the hemisphere.
There was agreement that, while progress
has been encouraging, especially in the last

2 years, there is no cause for complacency.
Action on agricultural development and tax
reform, it was agreed, has not proceeded
quickly enough. Unemployment and under-
employment are desperate problems, par-
ticularly among the people flocking into the
urban centers in search of better lives.
Ways must be found to strengthen the
markets for Latin American exports of raw
materials and to expand and diversify their
exports generally. Production of food and
of manufactured goods must be increased.
The population increase may nullify too
much of what is being accomplished in eco-
nomic development. And more rapid prog-
ress is needed in the integration movement
both in the Central American Common
Market and in the Latin American Free
Trade Association.

The meeting at Buenos Aires drew up
an action program of the most important
things we would all like to see accom-
plished in the coming year in the
hemisphere.

It set in motion procedures which will en-
able it a year hence to review in depth the
steps that have been taken during the year
to carry forward this program. The pro-
gram includes immediate steps to be taken
to improve Latin American planning opera-

' For a statement by Mr. Gordon at the meeting,
see ibid., May 9, 1966, p. 738.

JUNE 20, 1966

979

tions, accelerate agricultural modernization
and tax reform, stimulate the private sector,
accelerate the integration movement, and
secure a better interrelationship between
trade and aid. Strong recommendations
were also made for action in the education
and health fields. In the course of the year
the Inter-American Committee on the Al-
liance for Progress (CIAP) will review the
progress made during its country-by-coun-
try reviews of performance and will serve
as an increasingly effective multilateral ex-
ecutive agent to guide the actions of the
participating governments.

All of us now recognize that the full
achievement of the goals of the Charter of
Punta del Este will take more than the 10
years originally envisaged. As Secretary
Rusk has told you, our Latin American col-
leagues were both heartened and challenged
when President Johnson proposed through
the Secretary at the Rio Conference last
November that the Alliance for Progress be
extended on the basis of continued effective
self-help actions by our partner nations and
their own undertaking to join in mutual
assistance commitments.'*

The understandings reached at Rio are of
great importance. There for the first time
the Latin American countries formally rec-
ognized that the development efforts of
each affect the development of all and the
security of the entire hemisphere. Accord-
ingly, they are now prepared to see that the
obligation of self-help be recognized as a
treaty commitment to the other members of
the Alliance and in addition are prepared
to assume treaty commitments to help one
another.

We can already begin to see possibilities
along this latter line. Mexico has made
some significant commitments to Central
America, pledging $5 million of credit to
the Central American Bank and the pur-
chase of $1 million of the Bank's bonds.

' For texts of an address by Secretary Rusk be-
fore the Second Special Inter-American Conference
on Nov. 23, 1965, a message from President John-
son, and documents adnnted at the conference, see
ibid., Dec. 20, 1965, p. 985.

Venezuela has undertaken technical assist-
ance programs in several countries, and
Brazil and Argentina are sharing in multi-
national projects of special interest to some
of their neighbors. Governments in a posi-
tion to do so are investing a portion of their
reserves in the Inter-American Development
Bank.

Further, it was agreed at Rio that the
OAS Charter should be revised by incor-
porating in it the principles for advancing
hemisphere development that were adopted
by the American nations at Punta del
Este in 1961.^ As the members of this
committee know, there has been some dis-
agreement as to the precise language which
should be incorporated in the revised
charter. This does not, however, reflect
any basic divergence of principle, and I am
confident that the remaining differences
can be resolved in the near future.

Economic Integration

Latin American economic integration is
one of the most important trends in the
hemisphere. The Central American Com-
mon Market — within which trade has in-
creased 123 percent in 2 years — is helping
to illustrate the benefits that can come
when Latin American countries work to-
gether. The Latin American Free Trade
Association, which in 1965 more than dou-
bled intra-Association trade over the 1959-
1961 volume, illustrates by its difficulties
with tariff reduction and trade agreements
some of the hard decisions that must be
made to secure continued progress in this
movement.

The Inter-American Development Bank
will soon broaden those of its activities that
contribute to economic integration. Follow-
ing up on a CIAP suggestion that a re-
gional fund for multinational preinvest-
ment studies be created, the IDB has com-
pleted studies for the establishment of such
a fund. Many projects are waiting in the
wings for which such preinvestment

H

' For text of the Charter of Punta del Este, see
ibid., Sept. 11, 1961, p. 463.

980

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

studies might be appropriate, notably in the
fields of river basin development, transpor-
tation, and telecommunications.

The United States supports the integra-
tion efforts of the nations of Latin America.
We will continue to work with the IDB to
assure that high priority is given to proj-
ects that promise further integration of
Latin American development efforts. Such
integration will not only advance economic
development but will help to lessen political
tensions within the hemisphere.

Multilateral Assistance

The Charter of Punta del Este is itself a
multilateral framework which serves as the
basis for all U.S. aid to Latin America. In
addition, AID [Agency for International
Development] assistance to Latin America
will continue to be responsive to the several
multilateral institutions and arrangements
that have been created to make external as-
sistance in Latin America more effective.
As Mr. Bell [David E. Bell, AID Admin-
istrator] has already told this committee,
the Inter-American Committee on the
Alliance for Progress has become an
increasingly vigorous organization for
multilateral leadership and coordination.
CIAP's annual review of each country's
program and progress is a checkpoint that
provides perspective on progress to aid re-
cipients and suppliers alike. Pledges of
performance to CIAP by Latin American
nations weigh heavily in U.S. determina-
tions to make assistance available. CIAP
does not, however, formally approve na-
tional economic plans.

In keeping with the spirit of the amend-
ment suggested by this committee's chair-
man, we would be happy to see a legislative
reference to CIAP, providing that develop-
ment loans under the Alliance should be ap-
plied to social and economic development
projects and programs which are in keeping
with the findings of the Inter-American
Committee on the Alliance for Progress in
its annual review of national development
activities.

The key multilateral financial institution
of the Alliance is the Inter-American De-
velopment Bank. The Bank has been steadily
increasing the scale and effectiveness of its
operations. The World Bank has also been
increasing its support for Latin American
development. These international agencies,
however, are complements to, and not sub-
stitutes for, the continuing direct assist-
ance of the United States. Within the con-
cept of the Alliance, each contributes its
own unique skills to economic development
in Latin America, and we and they are work-
ing increasingly together to maximize the
effectiveness of our joint efforts.

Two less formal arrangements — known
as consultative groups — have been coordi-
nating development assistance on an even
broader multilateral basis. The U.S. is a
member of each. One is for Colombia and
is sponsored by the World Bank. The other
assists Ecuador and is sponsored by the
Inter-American Development Bank. Similar
consultative groups are being considered
for other Latin American nations.

Fiscal Year 1967 AID Program

In keeping with the approach to foreign
aid that he instituted 2 years ago, the
President has requested an overall AID pro-
gram that is the bare minimum required to
support United States policies in relation to
the developing world. For the AID partici-
pation in the Alliance for Progress, this
means a program in fiscal year 1967 of
$500 million for development loans, $95
million for technical cooperation, and $33.2
million for supporting assistance. As he
did last year, the President has made it
plain that should circumstances arise that
require additional United States funds for
the Alliance for Progress, he will submit a
supplemental appropriation request to the
Congress.

The President has reemphasized United
States determination that the basis for our
assistance will be support to countries en-
gaged in serious efforts to mobilize and
apply their own resources to development.

JUNE 20, 1966

981

The nations of Latin America under the
Alliance for Progress have been in the fore-
front of the developing areas of the world
in taking steps of this character.

In his foreign aid message to the Con-
gress on February 1, 1966, the President
said :*

The keynote of the Alliance for Progress has al-
ways been self-help. The pattern of our assistance
. . . demonstrates our determination to help those
who help themselves.

The Congress is now considering legisla-
tion calling for a commitment of United
States human and financial resources and
food and fiber to help spur a revolution in
education, attack with new intensity the
problems of communicable diseases, and
make available the agricultural skills and
scientific advances that have made United
States agriculture the most flourishing in
the world. If hunger, illiteracy, and disease
are to be eliminated, more resources, theirs
and ours, must be applied to agriculture,
education, and health. In Latin America,
AID is already doing much in these fields,
especially in the building of effective insti-
tutions that will become permanent ele-
ments of Latin American development. Here
are some examples of such efforts :

— Through an AID contract with a group
of associated Midwestern universities, the
National University of Colombia and the
Colombian Agricultural Institute will ex-
pand and improve the faculties of three
agricultural colleges, reorienting the teach-
ing toward applied research and extension.
United States professors will assist in a
modernization process whose ultimate ob-
jective is to increase and diversify agricul-
tural production. The Ford, Kellogg, and
Rockefeller foundations and the World Bank
are also contributing to or plan to con-
tribute to this program.

— Contract technicians from the Uni-
versity of North Carolina have helped Peru
establish an outstanding land-grant-type col-
lege at the National Agricultural University

• For text, see ibid., Feb. 28, 1966, p. 320.

at La Molina. Eighty percent of the faculty
is now teaching on a full-time basis, a
raritj' in Latin American universities. The
United States has loaned $4 million to help
finance a $9 million expansion of the physi-
cal facilities at La Molina, enrollment in
which is steadily increasing.

— Some 10,000 farmers are expected to
benefit from AID's loan to Chile for fer-
tilizer imports. This loan supports an im-
portant part of Chile's overall program to
increase agricultural production, which in-
cludes more favorable pricing policies,
agrarian reform, and improved farm credit
and marketing systems.

— As a short-term measure to increase the
productivity of Brazil's farms and provide
more food for its growing population, AID
has made available a $15 million loan to
Brazil for fertilizer imports. Local cur-
rency derived from sale of the fertilizer is
used in a selective agricultural credit pro-
gram designed to increase basic foodstuff
production.

— AID is working with the five Central
American national universities in develop-
ing an integrated university system to serv-
ice the region. Progress is being made to-
ward the development of regional schools in
sanitary engineering, veterinary medicine,
and business administration.

— During the next year, AID is planning
to grant the Pan American Health Or-
ganization $1.3 million for malaria eradica-
tion, in addition to loans made in this field
to several participating countries.

— AID will continue to respond favorably
to requests from the nations of Latin Amer-
ica for assistance in population matters.
In fiscal year 1965 AID provided $400,000
to the Latin American Center for Economic
and Social Development in Santiago, Chile,
headed by the Reverend Roger E. Veke-
mans, S.J., to establish a center for the
study of family and population, and nearly
$200,000 for research and training in fam-
ily sociologj' to Notre Dame University
[South Bend, Ind.].

982

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

ll

m AID Lending Program

* Program lending will again be a major
method of providing economic assistance to
Latin America by AID in fiscal year 1967.
The program loan technique provides dou-
ble dividends. Through letters of credit
established with U.S. banks, the dollars
provide exchange for imports from the
United States by the private sector of the
borrowing countries. The local currencies
received by the borrowing governments
against sale of the dollars are then in-
vested in development activities of high
priority for which domestic resources are
inadequate, including the initiation or
strengthening of key developmental insti-
tutions. For example, low-cost housing is
constructed and mortgage insurance sys-
tems are strengthened; educational oppor-
tunities and facilities are enlarged; more
credit is made available for agricultural
modernization; campaigns are waged
against disease; supplies of electric power
are enlarged and new roads are built to
serve farmers and open new areas for
settlement.

The value of the program loan in eco-
nomic development is well illustrated by the
U.S. experience in Brazil, Colombia, and
Chile, countries to which the U.S. this year
has made program loans totaling $295 mil-
lion. In September 1965 the Government of
Colombia instituted a comprehensive eco-
nomic reform program that included sub-
stantial readjustment in exchange rates,
new taxes, a balanced budget, a start to-
ward liberalization of imports, and an anti-
inflationary monetary policy. These ac-
tions led to negotiations by Colombia with
a consultative group headed by the World
Bank and including the United States and
the IMF [International Monetary Fund],
at the conclusion of which AID agreed to
make a program loan of up to $65 million
in four segments. The Colombian economy
is now moving forward.

Brazil and Chile are using program loans
to support their measures of stabilization.

reform, and modernization, to bolster the
private sector, and to expand public invest-
ment in roads, water and sewer systems,
power plants, education, and agriculture.
In Brazil the Castello Branco administra-
tion reduced the annual inflation rate from
140 percent in the first quarter of 1964 to
45 percent during 1965, with a downward
trend during the year. At the same time, it
pulled Brazil back from the brink of inter-
national bankruptcy and brought about a
resumption of growth — to a rate of approxi-
mately 5 percent in 1965 — after 2 years of
near stagnation.

Under President [Eduardo] Frei, Chile
is demonstrating that a developing country
can achieve progressive reforms within a
democratic framework. In the first year of
Chile's "revolution in liberty," primary and
secondary school enrollment increased 20
percent, primary school teachers in the
classroom increased 150 percent, and tax re-
form and improved tax administration
provided 23 percent more in government
revenue. The rate of inflation was de-
creased from 38 percent in 1964 to 26 per-
cent in 1965. Also, in 1965 alone approxi-
mately 4,000 families were settled on their
own land, nearly as many as during the
preceding 35 years. Chile, which will soon
receive a large foreign exchange bonus as a
result of a 50-percent increase in the price
of copper, has indicated it will use much of
this windfall to pay off short-term foreign
debts and will studiously avoid its diversion
into increased consumption or its monetiza-
tion as an additional source of inflation-
ary pressure.

Other Country Assistance

In the context of adequate self-help by the
Peruvians, expansion of U.S. assistance to
Peru is being considered. Peru is taking
significant steps forward: Since passage
of a comprehensive agrarian reform law in
1964, more than 200,000 people have bene-
fited from the distribution of 1.5 million
acres. An imaginative community develop-

JUNE 20, 1966

983

1

ment program has had considerable impact
among Indian mountain peasants.

Another expected major recipient of U.S.
assistance in fiscal year 1967 is the Domini-
can Republic.

The information ^ distributed to the mem-
bers of this committee recounts country by
country the program proposed for fiscal
year 1967. In previous years we have
shown country totals as a range betvi^een
two figures. Although we are not doing so
this year, the efficient use of our re-
sources, the uncertainty as to the time by
which specific feasible projects will be ready
for support, and other factors make it es-
sential to retain flexibility in the admin-
istration of the foreign assistance program.

Two specific development programs — the
housing guaranty program and the use of
the mission directors' special development
activities fund — warrant special mention.

Housing Guaranties

The Congress has provided housing guar-
anty authority for U.S. investments in hous-
ing programs in Latin America. To date 30
projects have been authorized in 14 countries
with guaranties totaling $162 million. These
provide for 28,500 dwelling units, 14,000 of
which are under construction and 5,200
of which are occupied. Letters of reserva-
tion have been issued for three additional
projects with 3,000 units and $16 million in
guaranties; 17 other projects with 14,000
units and guaranties of $62 million are under
review.

The Foreign Assistance Act of 1965 in-
creased the available guaranty authority
from $250 to $400 million and added four
new programs — credit institutions, lower in-
come housing, housing sponsored by free
labor unions and cooperatives, and local
participation — to the original pilot demon-
stration housing program. Constraints in the
money market and the executive branch's
strenuous effort to reduce the U.S. balance-
of-payments deficit have had a decided im-

' Not printed here.

pact on the implementation of the program.
As part of its current effort the President's
Committee on the Balance of Payments has
established guidelines on the available au-
thority providing that $240 million in guar-
anty authority may be used for the demon-
stration program and $100 million for the
four new programs — $30 million in fiscal
year 1967 and $70 million in fiscal year 1968.

Special Development Fund

The use of the special development fund
has paid dividends far beyond the amount
that has been invested. Each mission director
is authorized to use up to $50,000 in support
of small, high-impact activities vrithout prior
Washington approval and without separate
bilateral negotiations on each activity.

A small AID contribution to a cooperative,
to a community development activity, to a
rural irrigation project, or to a local effort
generated by a Peace Corps volunteer has re-
sulted in development (and also in good will)
far in excess of the amount of U.S. assist-
ance invested. In Bolivia $250 worth of
cement enabled a community to finish con-
struction of a wing on a children's hospital,
itself a self-help project. In Costa Rica 195
hand pumps were made available to rural
communities that lacked potable water. Axes
and machetes were provided for Indian com-
munities in Nicaragua so that they might
clear land for the production of subsist-
ence crops. In Peru four hand sprayers and
insecticides were given to a coffee-raising
cooperative in a colonization area where the
crop was in danger of being destroyed by in-
sects.

Non-Federal Initiatives

The U.S. contribution to the Alliance con-
sists in growing measure of the work and
the concern of private individuals, private
enterprise and organizations, and other non-
Federal institutions. For example, under the
Partners of the Alliance program, 30 States
have cooperative arrangements with coun-
terparts in 14 Latin American nations.
Teachers are exchanged; books, equipment,

984

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and other resources flow between the Part-
ners groups. Nearly 70 U.S. colleges and uni-
versities have had contracts with AID to give
assistance in Latin America. The American
Institute for Free Labor Development is
sponsoring housing programs and labor train-
ing institutes. Assistance to the cooperative
movement in Latin America has been given
by the Cooperative Leagues of the U.S.A.,
the Credit Union National Association, and
the National Rural Electric Cooperative As-
sociation. The National League for Insured
Savings Associations has helped inaugurate
savings and loan associations in several
Latin American countries. Each year, more
non-Government organizations and individ-
uals from the United States are taking part
in the Alliance. Their contributions add ma-
terially to Latin American economic develop-
ment and inter-American cooperation.

Latin America and U.S. Balance of Payments

The committee may be considering the
possible influence of U.S. aid disbursements
on our balance of payments. Official data,
including recent Department of Commerce
estimates of the U.S. balance-of-payments
position, show that Latin America is not a
problem area as far as potential dollar
leakages to Europe and Japan from AID
disbursements are concerned.

On the contrary, the triangular payments
results have been working to the favor of
the United States. Latin America has been
running a trade and overall balance-of-pay-
ments surplus with Western Europe
and Japan, and in 1965 several of the
larger Latin American countries used a pay-
ments surplus with Europe and Japan to fi-
nance a balance-of-payments deficit with the
United States.

While there has been some increase from
very low levels in the gross foreign exchange
reserve position of Latin America, the gold
component of the area's reserves has been
reduced by $125 million during the last 3
years according to data published by the In-
ternational Monetary Fund. Thus our Latin
American friends have been helpful to the
United States payments problem by their

willingness to sell some of their gold to our
Treasury at a time when other countries in
the world were converting dollar holdings to
gold.

Military Assistance Program

Secretary [of Defense Robert S.] Mc-
Namara has already testified in detail in sup-
port of the proposed military assistance
program in Latin America in fiscal year 1967.
I should like to join in support of that pro-
gram. The objectives of the military assist-
ance are being met. Latin American armed
forces are developing an increased capability
to meet internal security threats. They are
contributing to development through civic
action projects, at the same time demon-
strating that the military will support and
encourage the development of democratic
institutions. President Johnson said at
Mexico City that the United States will con-
tinue to concentrate its assistance mainly in
economic and social fields and to encourage
the nations of Latin America where possible
to limit their outlays for military purposes.
The modest military assistance program re-
quested this year is in keeping with the
policy stated by the President.

Conclusion

Significant advances have been made dur-
ing the first 5 years of the Alliance for
Progress. Although we may have been overly
optimistic at Punta del Este 5 years ago, a
strong groundwork for further progress has
been laid.

Most encouraging, Latin America has
achieved a 2.5 percent or better increase in
per capita gross national product during the
last 2 years, and eveiy evidence is that at
least this will be accomplished again in 1966.
And behind these general economics figures
there are the physical and human achieve-
ments: the tying together of farm and city
by new roads, the attack on disease, the new
opportunities for schooling and vocational
and professional training, the introduction of
modern industry and the skills that go with
it — in short, the movement of once stagnant

.lUNE 20, 1966

985

•ocieties into participants in the contempo-
rary world.

The President has requested a 5-year au-
thorization for the forei^ economic assist-
ance program, including the Alliance for
Progress. Congressional approval of this re-
quest would give encouragement to the de-
veloping countries in initiating and carrying
out their own sustained multiyear efforts to
accomplish specific goals of economic de-
velopment, reform, and stabilization. In the
case of the Alliance, a long-term authoriza-
tion would follow the precedent already
established by the Congress in 1962.

The importance of an increasingly pros-

perous, stable, and democratically governed
Latin America to a world environment con-
ducive to our own liberty and prosperity
should not require mention. Yet it is an
unhappy fact that at various times in our
history, preoccupation with other regions
has made us forget this elementary truth.
The Alliance for Progress was a compact
with our sister nations which should put for-
ever behind us any recurrence of such pe-
riods of neglect.

The program the President has proposed
in support of the Alliance for Progress is
both feasible and essential. I recommend
and urge your favorable consideration.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

U.S. Urges Security Council Unity on Riiodesian Problem

Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg

U.S. Representative in the Security Coundl ^

Our consideration of the Rhodesian prob-
lem, it seems to me, should be governed by
one paramount consideration, and that is
that this Council must not convert a victory
of purpose and achievement which has
characterized this Council in dealing with
this problem into a defeat of disagreement
and disunity.

In this Council we are unanimously re-
solved that the goal of self-determination
for the majority in Southern Rhodesia is
one we all share and that this Council is

' Made in the Security Council on May 18
(U.S./U.N. press release 4861).

united in the conviction that the illegal
declaration of independence of the Smith
regime shall not succeed. We have the obli-
gation, all of us, therefore, to consider to-
gether what our course of action shall be
so that this regime shall not receive en-
couragement but, on the contrary, shall at
each step of the way know that the inter-
national community is at one in its commit-
ment to the principle of majority rule in
Southern Rhodesia and in its commitment
that the illegal declaration of independence,
which we all condemn, shall not prevail.

I have been much impressed by what the
distinguished foreign ministers and the rep-

I

986

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

I

resentatives of the foreign ministers of
' Africa have had to say on this subject. And
; I have been much impressed by what my
^i colleague, our distinguished colleague, Chief
] Adebo [S. 0. Adebo of Nigeria], has had
'j to say on this subject, and I have listened
>j with great interest to the other declarations
■ that have been made. Chief Adebo made, I
tj think, a very pertinent point. In soberly
' considering where we stand and where we
I shall now go, what is important is what we
i do, and this is more important, indeed, than
: rhetoric and adjectives and debating points
that may be scored in considering this
situation,
f I should like to recall to this Council
what my country, as a firm supporter of
what this Council has declared, has done
with a single objective in mind, and that is
to achieve the goal of self-determination for
the majority in Southern Rhodesia. And
these are actions — and actions in this area
are far more important than broad and
sweeping phrases which have to do, I think,
more with other issues than the issues
which confront us in Southern Rhodesia.

My country has at considerable cost taken
a number of major steps in line with the
Security Council resolution of November
20.^ It has been said by one of our dis-
tinguished colleagues that there is a collu-
sion between Washington and London. I
plead guilty to that charge, but in quite a
different sense. There is a collusion be-
tween Washington and London and every
member of this Council that the illegal
declaration of independence shall not suc-
ceed. And the steps we have taken have
been in implementation of the collusion
which we all share, a justifiable collusion
in terms of our commitments under the
charter. It is a strange way to make a con-
spiracy to take open actions for all the
world to see which operate to the great
cost and disadvantage of nations like my
own, which seek to trade freely with vari-
ous countries of the world. It is a strange
conspiracy that these steps should result in

' For text, see Bulletin of Dec. 6, 1965, p. 916.

substantial financial loss to our country as
well as to other countries in pursuance of
our obligations under the United Nations
Charter.

U.S. Response to U.N. Resolution

I should like to start with the first and
basic point. In the diplomatic field, like
other U.N. member states, we have refused
to recognize the Smith regime. This is not
an insubstantial fact, that all of the nations
of the world, member states of the United
Nations and those who are not member
states, have responded to this call of the Se-
curity Council and have refused to recog-
nize the legitimacy of the Smith regime in
Rhodesia. We ought to take satisfaction in
the fact that we all recognize our interna-
tional responsibilities and the declaration of
the Security Council and that we have iso-
lated that regime from the normal inter-
course that takes place between states en-
titled to international recognition.

But we have gone beyond this — and I
take no praise or credit for this — we have
responded to the Security Council's resolu-
tion.

We have taken economic action, costly
economic action, involving a wide variety of
steps. And they reflect the broad nature of
the economic links which under a constitu-
tional regime Southern Rhodesia enjoyed
with the United States, a major trading
country. We have, when the Security Coun-
cil acted, immediately suspended action on
applications for United States Government
loans and guarantees to our businessmen
who carry on trade with Rhodesia. And
we are issuing no further investment guar-
antees for investment in Southern Rhodesia.
Concerning steps to reduce our import
trade with Southern Rhodesia, we have
talked to our firms which formerly im-
ported asbestos and lithium, two major
products, from Southern Rhodesia, and we
have their agreement at our request to find
other sources, and indeed they are engaged
and have found other sources.

The United States Government has in-
formed United States companies that it rec-

JUNE 20, 1966

987

ognizes the legal authority of the British
Government to take steps to bar purchases
of Southern Rhodesian chrome and tobacco,
again two principal products of Rhodesia,
and has told them that they should and
must comply with the relevant British
Orders-in-Council.

We have suspended the 1965 and 1966
Southern Rhodesian sugar quotas, and we
have gone so far as to bar a shipment
which was at the time already on the high
seas, bound for the United States.

On the export side, we have instituted a
total embargo on the shipment of military
equipment to Southern Rhodesia, as well as
of United States petroleum and petroleum
products. And more recently, in keeping
with the economic embargo which this
Council called for, we have announced steps
to cut off virtually all American exports of
consequence, the only exceptions being of
humanitarian importance and not signifi-
cant from the standpoint of the Rhodesian
economy.

In addition to these direct measures de-
signed to bring unilateral declaration of in-
dependence to an end, we joined the United
Kingdom and other countries in establishing
an airlift of petroleum products to Zambia
in order to aid that landlocked nation in
maintaining its economy.'

Now we say this not to reap credit for
this but merely to say that this is a concrete
manifestation by actions, not words, of the
loss in trade, the loss of dollars, we are will-
ing to accept in support of the principles of
legality, democracy, and self-determination
in Africa and in support of the decisions
made by this Council.

Soviet Accusations Refuted

Now, Mr. President, I have heard what
has been said and I would like to point out
that these facts are open, as they are in a
democratic society. We have made them

'For background, see ibid., Jan. 17, 1966, p. 85;
Jan. 31, 1966, p. 157; and May 16, 1966, p. 783.

known and they are readily verifiable. We do
not ask that our statements of actions con-
cerning Southern Rhodesia be accepted on
faith ; rather the aforementioned steps taken
in actual implementation of our policies were
announced at the time, and they are public
information, and they are evidence of our
Government's policy toward Southern
Rhodesia and of our deep-rooted concern
that the illegal regime shall not prevail and
that the voice of the international com-
munity in this matter should be heard.

And I need hardly observe that they con-
stitute the only sound basis for judgment
rather than allegations and adjectives made
in this chamber this morning by the
distinguished representative of the Soviet
Union. The accusations of bad faith against
my Government by Ambassador [Niko-
lai T.] Fedorenko will not, I am sure, de-
flect the attention of this Council from the
fact that the economic measures we have
taken in response to Resolution 217 of the
Security Council have perhaps hurt the
Smith regime far more than the words that
have been spoken by the Soviet Union, be-
cause it is actions in this area and not
mere rhetoric which will bring Mr. Smith's
regime to heel.

And I would like to say that in my 10
months of experience here it has not been
my desire to enter into the stale polemics
characteristic of another era with my dis-
tinguished colleague of the Soviet Union,
Rather, I would like to join with him and
the members of this Council in determining
how in a realistic way we can achieve
what we voted for, and that is that this il-
legal declaration shall not succeed. And to
me it is far more important that we focus
on that problem as responsible members of
the Security Council rather than to engage
in an exchange of debating points about
old-fashioned concepts which no longer have
any application in the modern world.

Now, my Government's views about
Southern Rhodesia are these — and they are
very plain and simple :

988

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

We regard Southern Rhodesia to involve
a basically moral issue, and we say this for
all the world to hear. We want to see con-
stitutional authority restored in Rhodesia so
that all of its people — white and black —
can join in determining the nation's future.
And if my Soviet colleague used the term
"one man, one vote," I should like to recall
to him that that phrase was used by a dis-
tinguished colleague of mine in the Supreme
Court in the United States in an opinion in
which I joined and which represents our
nation's commitment and our policy, not
only for ourselves but for all countries in the
world, including his own. We in this coun-
try are ourselves engaged in a vigorous
nationwide effort to eliminate certain ele-
ments of inequality which we frankly admit
have existed in the past with respect to our
Negro citizens. And in these circumstances
we could hardly pretend to ignore the deep
and widespread inequality existing in
Southern Rhodesia.

Second, the birth of our own nation has
given us a strong anticolonial orientation.
We have supported decolonialization and
genuine self-determination of people
throughout the world. And we did so re-
cently and with full vigor, as members of
this Council will recall, in the Philippines,
in India, in Indonesia, in Africa, and in
other parts of the world. And it is our firm
conviction that we cannot stand aside and
see this principle turned upside down in
Rhodesia.

And third, as a founding member of the
United Nations, we believe and we conceive
that we have a special obligation to see the
charter provisions on human rights upheld.
Now, for us in the United States, these
provisions are not mere exhortations but
are solemn treaty obligations which, by
virtue of express language of our Constitu-
tion, are the supreme law of our land.

And fourth, the success of a rebellion in
Rhodesia creating a white minority state,
we recognize, would have merely hardened
the lines of political conflict in Africa

which all of us would deplore.

For these very powerful reasons the
United States Government opposes the uni-
lateral declaration of independence, and we
oppose it as strongly today as we did when
it was first issued. We oppose its underly-
ing principle — the denial of an orderly
transition to majority rule. And this we con-
ceive to be the basic issue which this
Council must deal with.

The British Position

The Government of the United Kingdom,
as the responsible political authority, has
stated in the most categoric terms through
its Prime Minister that the principle and in-
tention of unimpeded progress to majority
rule have to be maintained and guaranteed;
that there will have to be guarantees
against retrogressive amendment to the Con-
stitution; that there will have to be im-
mediate improvements in the political status
of the African population ; that there will be
progress toward ending racial discrimina-
tion; and, what is more important and
basic in this declaration, that the British
Government would need to be satisfied that
any basis proposed for independence was
acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a
whole; and finally, that there must be ade-
quate insurance that, regardless of race,
there is no oppression of majority by
minority or of minority by majority.

Those declarations, the six points of
Prime Minister Wilson, have been reaf-
firmed to us here today by the United
Kingdom's distinguished representative to
the Security Council, Lord Caradon, on the
most solemn authority of his Government.

We support the application of these prin-
ciples, sound principles, to the solution of
the Rhodesian rebellion, and for this rea-
son we have supported the United Kingdom
in its efforts to restore constitutional pro-
cedures in Rhodesia.

If I remember correctly, at the last meet-
ing of the Security Council, my distin-

JUNE 20, 1966

989

guished friend, Ambassador Fedorenko, re-
ferred to the special relationship which
exists between the United States and the
United Kingdom. I do not apologize for this
relationship. I think it is a relationship
which is founded upon some common con-
victions our two countries hold, and that is
a common commitment to freedom to the
rule of law and to democratic processes.
And I personally am very proud of that re-
lationship, because I remember in my own
time and in the time of all of us some prin-
ciples for which the United Kingdom stood
firm when it stood alone in the great chal-
lenge to freedom which was made by the
Nazi regime. And if we have a special rela-
tionship, it is in recollection of that inci-
dent as well as many others in the proud
history of our two countries. As long as
these principles which have been enunci-
ated— principles of majority rule — continue
to govern the efforts of the United Kingdom,
which we all recognize to be the responsible
authority for bringing constitutional rule
and majority rule to Southern Rhodesia,
we believe that the sensible, the realistic
course for the Security Council is to facili-
tate and not obstruct their application.

Talks at London

Now, reference has been made to the
talks which are now going on in London.
We are all experienced people. There was
only one conclusion which can logically be
drawn from what Lord Caradon has told us
has been the reason for such talks, and that
is that the Smith regime, evidently feeling
the pinch from the economic restrictions
as applied against it by most of the mem-
ber states of this organization, has indi-
cated a desire to discuss the question of ne-
gotiations with the United Kingdom. Is
this not why we adopted the resolution that
we did in November?

Now these are not negotiations. They are
talks. And these talks are now under way
in London, designed to determine whether

or not there is a prospect of entering into
negotiations with objectives which would be
within the framework of the principles I
have just reiterated. And I should like to
remind this body, in which I take such
great pride in being a part, that, when a
Prime Minister of a democratic country re-
iterates to its supreme parliamentary body
his attachment to those principles, he is
making a commitment of the profoundest
significance not only to that parliamentary
body but, since it is a free one covered ade-
quately by the world press, to all of the
world at large.

The United States is confident that, if
negotiations flow out of such talks, the
United Kingdom will be guided by the
principles which it has publicly announced
and to which it is committed and that it
will pursue any such negotiations only if
these principles can be preserved.

We all have recognized from the outset
the primacy of British responsibility for
Rhodesia. And rather than question the
good faith of the United Kingdom, I have
no hesitancy in saying that what it has done
has demonstrated its good faith on this
question. It has done so at great expense
and sacrifice by those who have earned
their livelihood — the British workingmen —
in trade with Rhodesia. It was the United
Kingdom, we must recall, itself, who in
deference to international responsibility in
this area introduced the recent resolution in
this Council calling for action under chap-
ter VII to prevent a wholesale breach of the
oil embargo by tanker vessels chartered by
Rhodesian interests.*

It is a very peculiar conspiracy, I must
say, if the United Kingdom comes to this
Council and says that we will use our in-
ternational force under the sanction of this
Council to prevent a breach of the oil em-
bargo. Let us welcome many more of that
type of conspiracy.

The United Kingdom has maintained con-

' For background and text of resolution, see ibid.,
May 2, 1966, p. 713.

990

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tinuous pressures on the Rhodesian au-
thorities. And if in consequence a request
is now made for talks, it would be the height
of folly for the United Kingdom summarily
to reject it without establishing whether it
is made in good faith.

It has been my lifelong experience that,
where talks are requested, it is the counsel
of wisdom to pursue whether or not talks
can lead to meaningful results. I would
say that, under the broad context of what
we have declared, it is the duty of the
United Kingdom to investigate any pros-
pect of peaceful resolution of this problem
consistent with the principles to which we
are all dedicated. We must remind ourselves
that the main objective of this organization
and the Council under the charter is to
bring about the solution of international
problems by peaceful, not violent, means.

The United States therefore believes that
this Council should and must remain united
in dealing with the problem of Rhodesia.
To fall apart would only give support to the
Smith regime, and we do not want to sup-
port him. And, therefore, it is our belief
that the only constructive procedure for
this Council at this stage is to remain
seized of this agenda item, this resolu-
tion," which out of proper concern for the
situation our African colleagues have of-
fered, and then to follow with close atten-
tion the progress of the talks now going on
in London and to determine whether or not
they show any prospect of advance toward
the proper solution of the Rhodesian mat-
ter. And certainly we have the right to ex-
pect the United Kingdom to keep this Coun-
cil adequately informed so that the Council
can determine, being seized of the matter,
in light of the circumstances, what further
appropriate steps may be required to achieve
the goal we all support.

' U.N. doc. S/7285/Add.l. On May 23 the draft
resolution was put to a vote and received 6 votes
in favor, 1 against, with 8 abstentions (U.S.), and
was not adopted, having failed to obtain the required
majority.

DEPARTMENT AND FOREIGN SERVICE

Confirmations

The Senate on May 27 confirmed the follovring
nominations :

Jacob D. Beam to be Ambassador to the Czecho-
slovak Socialist Republic. (For biographic details,
see White House press release dated May 19.)

Eugene M. Locke to be Ambassador to Pakistan.
(For biographic details, see Department of State
press release 134 dated June 16.)

Elliott P. Skinner to be Ambassador to the Re-
public of Upper Volta. (For biographic details, see
White House press release (San Antonio, Tex.)
dated May 8.)

John W. Tuthill to be Ambassador to Brazil. (For
biographic details, see Department of State press
release 138 dated June 8.)

TREATY INFORMATION

U.S. and Thailand Sign Treaty
of Amity and Economic Relations

Press release 131 dated May 29

Conclusion of a treaty of amity and eco-
nomic relations between the United States
and Thailand was announced on May 29.
Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman signed the
treaty for Thailand and Ambassador Gra-
ham Martin signed for the United States at
Bangkok on May 29.

The stability and growing prosperity of
Thailand and its commitment to freedom
despite political and military pressures from
outside make the future of this country a
matter of particular interest to all who want
peace in Southeast Asia. The new treaty re-
flects the friendship and close cooperation
between Thailand and the United States in

JUNE 20, 1966

991

all spheres, especially the determination of
both nations to encourage trade and invest-
ment as significant elements of economic
growth and political understanding. The
treaty records the acceptance by both coun-
tries of a body of principles designed to fur-
ther already existing close relations along
mutually beneficial lines.

The treaty replaces and terminates an old
treaty of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion which entered into force on October 1,
1938. The new treaty contains 14 articles.
It is the short, simplified type of general
treaty that the United States has been ne-
gotiating with a number of countries but con-
tains the general substance of the normal
treaty of friendship, commerce, and naviga-
tion. Each of the two countries:

(1) agrees to accord within its territories
to citizens and corporations of the other
treatment no less favorable than it accords
to its own citizens and corporations with re-
spect to carrying on commercial and indus-
trial activities ;

(2) formally endorses high standards re-
garding the protection of persons, their
property and interests ;

(3) recognizes the need for special atten-
tion to the stimulation of the international
movement of investment capital for eco-
nomic development ; and

(4) affirms its adherence to the principles
of nondiscriminatory treatment of trade and
shipping.

In addition, there was an exchange of
notes relating to the rights and privileges of
consular officers.

The conclusion of this treaty represents
a further step in the program being pursued
by the United States for the extension and
modernization of its commercial treaty struc-
ture and the establishment of conditions
favorable to foreign investment.

The treaty will be transmitted as soon as
possible to the Senate for advice and consent
to ratification. When the ratification proc-
esses of both Goverimients have been com-
pleted, it will enter into force 1 month after
exchange of ratifications.

992

U.S. and Greece Amend
Cotton Textile Agreement

I

Press release 119 dated Ha7 23

DEPARTMENT ANNOUNCEMENT

A revision of the 1964 bilateral agree-
ment concerning trade in cotton textiles
between the Governments of the United
States and Greece ^ was announced on May
23 by the Department of State.

The revision is embodied in an exchange
of notes which took place at Washington be-
tween Assistant Secretary of State for Eco-
nomic Affairs Anthony M. Solomon and
Minister of Commerce Emmanuel Kothris of
Greece.

The revision provides for the following
changes in the agreement :

1. Extension for 3 years, through August
31, 1970.

2. Establishment of a joint ceiling for
yarn categories.

3. Provision to transfer to the yarn group
unused yardage in the other groups.

In addition, it was agreed that 2 million
pounds of yarn may be exported from Greece
to the United States during the agreement
year which began on September 1, 1965,
without being charged against the limita-
tions of the agreement.

TEXT OF U.S. NOTE

May 23, 1966
Excellency: I have the honor to refer to our dis-
cussions concerning the exports of cotton textiles
from Greece to the United States and to the cotton
textile agreement between our two Governments ef-
fected by an exchange of notes dated July 17, 1964.
I propose that the amended agreement, effective
as of September 1, 1965, shall read as follows:

"1. The Government of Greece shall limit annual
exports to the United States in all categories of
cotton textiles for the twelve-month period begin-
ning September 1, 1964, in accordance with the
following:

' Treaties and Other International Acts Series
5618.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

(a) Yarn (categories 1-4) 1 million pounds.

(b) Fabrics and made-up goods (categories 5-38,
64) 1 million square yards equivalent.

(c) Apparel (categories 39-63) 200,000 square
yards equivalent.

2. The limitation on yam may be exceeded in any
agreement year after August 31, 1965 by the amount
by which exports of other cotton textiles from Greece
to the United States are less than the sum of the
limitations applicable to fabrics, made-up goods and
apparel for that year.

3. Within the ceiling for fabrics and made-up
goods, exports in any one category shall not exceed
200,000 square yards equivalent in any agreement
year except by mutual agreement of the two Gov-
ernments.

4. In the second and succeeding twelve-month
periods for which any limitation or ceiling is in force
under this agreement, the level of exports permitted
under such limitation or ceiling shall be increased by
five percent over the corresponding level for the
preceding twelve-month period.

5. The Government of Greece shall space exports
in the yam categories 1, 2, 3 and 4 as evenly as
practicable within an agreement year except that
exports in this group of categories may be permitted
to reach 75 percent of the annual level during the
first six months of the first agreement year.

6. In the event of undue concentration in exports
from Greece to the United States of yam in cate-
gories 2, 3 or 4, the Government of the United States
of America may request consultation with the Gov-
ernment of Greece in order to reach a mutually sat-
isfactory solution to the problem. The Government
of Greece shall enter into such consultations when
requested. Until a mutually satisfactory solution is
reached, the Government of Greece shall limit the ex-
ports from Greece to the United States of yarn in
the category in question starting with the twelve-
month period beginning on the date of the request
for consultation. This limit shall be one hundred five
percent of the exports from Greece to the United
States of that category of yam during the most
recent twelve-month period preceding the request
for consultation for which statistics are available
to our two Governments on the date of the request.

7. Each Government agrees to supply promptly
any available statistical data requested by the other
Government. In the implementation of this agree-
ment, the system of categories and the factors for
conversion into square yards equivalent set forth
in the Annex hereto " shall apply.

8. For the duration of this agreement, the Gov-
ernment of the United States shall not invoke the
procedures of Articles 6(c) and 3 of the Long-Term
Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Cotton Textiles done at Geneva on February 9, 1962

to request restraint on the export of cotton textiles
from Greece to the United States.

9. The Governments agree to consult on any
questions arising in the implementation of this
agreement.

10. The agreement shall continue in force through
August 31, 1970. As used herein, the term "agree-
ment year" means a twelve-month period from Sep-
tember 1 through August 31. Either Government
may propose revisions in the terms of the agree-
ment, or may terminate the agreement at any time
giving notice of at least 30 days prior to that pro-
posed revision or termination."

In addition, in view of the special circumstances
mentioned in our discussion I propose that, on a one-
time basis, an additional two million pounds of yam
may be exported from Greece to the United States
during the twelve-month period beginning Septem-
ber 1, 1965 without being charged against the limi-
tations of the agreement.

If these proposals are acceptable to the Govern-
ment of Greece, I shall appreciate receiving your
note to this effect. This note and Your Excellency's
note'' indicating the acceptability of these proposals
on behalf of the Government of Greece shall con-
stitute an amendment to the agreement.

Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurances of my
highest consideration.

For the Secretary of State:
Anthony M. Solomon

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

Atomic Energy

Amendment of article VI.A.3 of the Statute of the
International Atomic Energy Agency of October
26, 1956 (TIAS 3873). Done at Vienna October
4, 1961. Entered into force January 31, 1963.
TIAS 5284.
Acceptance deposited: Luxembourg, June 1, 1966.

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Signatures: Kenya, May 24, 1966; Netherlands,
May 25, 1966.

Healtli

Amendment to article 7 of the Constitution of the
World Health Organization of July 22, 1946, as
amended (TIAS 1808, 4643). Adopted at Geneva
May 20, 1965.'

Acceptances deposited: India, May 10, 1966; Ku-
wait, May 11, 1966; Niger, May 9, 1966; Upper
Volta, May 6, 1966.

' Not printed here.

' Not in force.

JUNE 20, 1966

993

Satellite Communications System

Agreement establishing interim arrangements for a
global commercial communications satellite sys-
tem. Done at Washington August 20, 1964. En-
tered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS 5646.
Accession deposited: Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Special agreement. Done at Washington August 20,
1964. Entered into force August 20, 1964. TIAS
5646.

Signature: Telecommunications Department of
Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Supplementary agreement on arbitration (COM-
SAT). Done at Washington June 4, 1965.'
Signature: Telecommunications Department of
Singapore, June 3, 1966.

Wheat

Protocol for the further extension of the Inter-
national Wheat Agreement, 1962 (TIAS 5115).
Open for signature at Washington April 4 through
29, 1966.'

Acceptances deposited: Belgium,' June 2, 1966;
Canada, May 20, 1966.

BILATERAL

India

Agreement supplementing the agreement of Sep-
tember 19, 1957, as amended (TIAS 3900, 4368),
relating to investment guaranties. Effected by ex-
change of notes at New Delhi February 2, 1966.
Entered into force February 2, 1966.

United Kingdom

Amendment to the agreement of June 15, 1955, as
amended (TIAS 3321, 3359, 3608, 4078, 5397,
5693, 5829), for cooperation on civil uses of atomic
energy. Signed at Washington June 2, 1966.
Enters into force on the date on which each Gov-
ernment shall have received from the other writ-
ten notification that it has complied with all statu-
tory and constitutional requirements for entry
into force.

Agreement for cooperation in the civil power appli-
cation of atomic energy. Signed at Washington
June 2, 1966. Enters into force on the date on
which each Government shall have received from
the other written notification that it has complied
with all statutory and constitutional requirements
for entry into force.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

I

' Not in force.

• Deposited in the name of the Belgo-Luxembourg
Economic Union.

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U^.
Government Printing Office, Washington, B.C.,
20Jt02. Address request direct to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, except in the ca^e of free pub-
lications, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington, '
D.C., 20520. ■

Quiet Warriors — Supporting Social Revolution in
Viet-Nam. Illustrated publication describing the
achievements and often hazardous lives of U.S. civil-
ians who "toil unarmed and out of uniform" helping
and teaching the strife-torn people of South Viet-
Nam to build the social links and services and the
common institutions without which no people can
have and be a nation. Pub. 8041. Far Eastern Series
140. 48 pp. 40«;.

Alien Amateur Radio Operators. Agreement with the
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ire-
land. Exchange of notes — Signed at London Novem-
ber 26, 1965. Entered into force November 26, 1965.
TIAS 5941. 3 pp. hi.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Iceland, amending the agreement of
December 30, 1964. Exchange of notes — Signed at
Reykjavik January 25, 1966. Entered into force Jan-
uary 25, 1966. TIAS 5955. 3 pp. 5(f.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN VOL. IIV, NO. 1408 PUBLICATION 8096 JUNE 20, 1966

The Department of Stat* Bulletin, a
weekly publication issued by the Office
of Media Services, Bureau of Public Af-
fairs, provides the public and interested
Bffencies of the Government with infor-
mation on developments in the field of
foreign relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Foreign
Service. The Bulletin includes selected
press releases on foreigm policy. Issued
by the White House and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by the Secretary of
Stata and other officers of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on vari-
ous phasefl of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is included concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Publications of the Department, United
Nations documents, and legislative mate-
rial in the field of international relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
intendent of Documents, U.S. Govern-

ment Printing Office, Washington, D.C..
20402. Price : B2 issues, domestic $10, 1
foreign $15 : single copy 30 cents.

Use of funds for printing of this pub-
lication approved by the Director of the
Bureau of the Budget (January 11, 19(6).

kotb: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
may be reprinted. Citation of the Depart-
ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is indexed
in the Readers' Guide to Periodical Liter- '
ature.

994

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

"INDEX June 20, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. 1408

American Principles. A World Society of Equal-
ity and Brotherhood (Goldberg) 971

American Republics. The Foreign Assistance
Program for Latin America in 1967 (Gordon) 977

Brazil. Tuthill confirmed as Ambassador . . . 991

Ceylon. P.L. 480 Currencies Available for Sale
to U.S. Tourists 975

Congress

Confirmations (Beam, Locke, Skinner, Tuthill) . 991

The Foreigrn Assistance Program for Latin
America in 1967 (Gordon) 977

Czechoslovakia. Beam confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 991

Department and Foreign Service. Confirmations
(Beam, Locke, Skinner, Tuthill) 991

Economic Affairs

P.L. 480 Currencies Available for Sale to U.S.
Tourists 975

U.S. and Greece Amend Cotton Textile Agree-
ment (Department announcement, U.S. note) 992

U.S. and Thailand Sign Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations 991

Foreign Aid. The Foreign Assistance Program
for Latin America in 1967 (Gordon) .... 977

Greece. U.S. and Greece Amend Cotton Textile
Agreement (Department announcement, U.S.
note) 992

Guinea. P.L. 480 Currencies Available for Sale
to U.S. Tourists 975

Human Rights. A World Society of Equality
and Brotherhood (Goldberg) 971

Pakistan. Locke confirmed as Ambassador . . 991

Presidential Documents

Mr. Kaiser Named U.S. National Chairman for
United Nations Day 976

Memorial Day, 1966 962

United Nations Day, 1966 976

Publications. Recent Releases 994

Southern Rhodesia. U.S. Urges Security Council
Unity on Rhodesian Problem (Goldberg) . . 986

Thailand. U.S. and Thailand Sign Treaty of
Amity and Economic Relations 991

Treaty Information

Current Actions 993

U.S. and Greece Ajnend Cotton Textile Agree-
ment (Department announcement, U.S. note) 992

U.S. and Thailand Sign Treaty of Amity and
Economic Relations 991

Tunisia. P.L. 480 Currencies Available for Sale
to U.S. Tourists 975

United Nations

Mr. Kaiser Named U.S. National Chairman for
United Nations Day (Johnson) 976

United Nations Day, 1966 (proclamation) . . 976

U.S. Urges Security Council Unity on Rhode-
sian Problems (Goldberg) 986

Upper Volta. Skinner confirmed as Ambassa-
dor 991

Viet-Nam

Memorial Day, 1966 (Johnson) 962

Viet-Nam and U.S. Objectives in the Far East
(Bundy) 965

Name Index

Beam, Jacob D 991

Bundy, William P 965

Goldberg, Arthur J 971, 986

Gordon, Lincohi 977

Johnson, President 962, 976

Locke, Eugene M 991

Skinner, Elliott P 991

Tuthill, John W 991

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: May 30-June 5

Press releases may be obtained from the Of-
fice of News, Department of State, Washing-
ton, D.C., 20520.

Releases issued prior to May 30 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
118 of May 20, 119 of May 23, 123 of May 25,
125 of May 26, and 131 of May 29.

No. Date Subject

tl32 5/31 Visa procedures for Cuban refu-
gees.

tl33 6/3 Delegation to NATO Council
meeting.

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Around the Comer

Preparing Today's Students To Meet Tomorrow's World Problems

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relatively steady advance, man's achievements — and his problems — have suddenly shot up on
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BULLETIN

Vol LIV, No. U09

June 27, 1966

WHERE NATO STANDS
Statement by Secretary Rusk 998

NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL MEETS AT BRUSSELS
Arrival Statement by Secretary Rusk and Text of Communique 1001

OUR INTERNATIONAL PATENT POLICY AND THE WORLD PATENT CRISIS
Special Article by Harvey J. Winter 1006

TWO PERSPECTIVES ON EAST-WEST TRADE

Deputy Assistant Secretary Braderman at the American
Management Association, New York City 1013

Ambassador McGhee at the Uebersee-Club, Hamburg, Germany 1019

For index see inside back cover

Where NATO Stands

statement by Secretary Rusk

It is a pleasure for me to be before this
subcommittee and to pay my respects to the
public service you are rendering in your far-
reaching and thorough examination of the
present situation in NATO.

I think the most useful thing for me to do
today would be to discuss with you in some
detail the NATO ministerial meeting at
Brussels, from which I have just returned.

It might be convenient, Madam Chairman
[Edna F. Kelly], if you saw fit to put the
communique ^ of this meeting into the record
at this point.

By briefing you on this meeting, I will in
effect also be telling you where NATO now
stands and what seems to lie ahead.

The meeting had some very specific tasks.
You are all aware that earlier this year the
Government of France announced that it
was withdrawing from participation in
NATO's military activities. This meant pri-
marily that it would no longer assign its
forces in Germany to NATO.

The French Government also announced
its decision that NATO and United States
military establishments and bases should
leave France.

Thus, the problems facing the Brussels
meeting were these: to close ranks and fill
the gaps left in NATO by the impending
withdrawal of French forces; to relocate
the NATO installations that must now leave

' Made before the Subcommittee on Europe of the
House Committee on Foreign Affairs on June 13
(press release 143).

= See p. 1001.

France; to take advantage of this relocation
to reorganize NATO's higher military struc-
ture on a more efficient basis ; to determine
to what extent arrangements could be
worked out for French cooperation with
NATO on a basis acceptable to the other 14
countries; to demonstrate that NATO was
not an outmoded defender of the status quo
but was relevant to the eventual settlement
of East-West differences; and, of course, to
transact the normal business of the alliance.

I am most pleased to be able to inform
you that the meeting succeeded in reaching
these objectives to the fullest extent that
might have been hoped.

The Group of Fourteen, that is, the NATO
countries minus France, which held its owa
separate meetings at Brussels, gave a dis-
play of unity of purpose and showed an
ability to unite for action that provided
irrefutable evidence that the 14 countries
consider NATO to be as essential as ever.

The Fourteen agreed on the relocation of
NATO's principal military headquarters,
SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied
Powers Europe] and AFCENT [Allied
Forces Central Europe], and of the NATO
Defense College.

You may have seen the announcement
from Belgium that the Belgian Cabinet has
now decided to invite SHAPE to Belgium
and will submit that question to its Parlia-
ment. It is anticipated that the consolidated
AFCENT headquarters will be in Benelux,
or possibly in Germany, and that the NATO
Defense College will move to Italy.

The Fourteen also agreed on a streamlining

998

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

of NATO's top military structure, involving
the abolition of the Standing Group and the
creation of an integrated international mili-
tary staff.

On the question of the seat of the North
Atlantic Council, again, the Fourteen
showed a will to unity and a readiness for
decision that fully met my expectations. It
was agreed that the measures taken by the
French Government create a situation in
which the Council, if it remains in Paris,
will be physically separated from all the
military organisms of NATO after the de-
parture of the military headquarters from
France. There was also agreement on the
importance of close cooperation between the
political and the military institutions of
NATO and that their collocation is one of the
principal factors to be kept in mind when a
decision is made on this question. The min-
isters therefore decided that, while awaiting
the result of the negotiations which will
take place on the connected questions, other
eventual locations for the Council should be
examined. I believe that when all of the
factors are studied over the next few
months, the Fourteen will agree to move the
Council if it is clearly evident that this
needs to be done.

Questions Between France and NATO

The question of arrangements between
French forces and NATO forces proved to
be the most difficult one that arose. The
representative of France initially took the
position at the meeting that political ques-
tions were for negotiation between France
and Germany and that the questions posed
between France and NATO as a whole were
entirely technical and military in nature
and should be worked out between French
and NATO military commanders. The Four-
teen, including the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, did not agree with this view, since
the questions between France and NATO
are, in the first instance, clearly political
in nature, involving as they do the extent
to which France is committed to act with
the other allies in a crisis and the extent
to which France will enter into effective

command arrangements in time of war.

After considerable discussion, France
agreed with the Fourteen that, and here I
quote from the communique:

(a) The questions which need to be settled jointly
between the Allies as a consequence of French com-
munications will in the first instance be discussed in
the Council in permanent session.

(b) Prominent among these questions are the tasks
and missions of French forces in Germany, including
their cooperation with NATO forces and command
arrangements.

(c) Other questions such as French participation
in NADGE [NATO Air Defense Ground Environ-
ment] and NATO infrastructure projects will be dis-
cussed in the same way.

(d) The Council in permanent session may, of
course, make any arrangements it wishes for discus-
sion of these questions. It may, for example, decide
to set up smaller groups to deal with some or all of
the questions. When the political problems have been
discussed and sufficient agreement reached on them,
the elaboration of the necessary military arrange-
ments will be referred to discussions between the
French High Command and SACEUR [Supreme
Allied Commander Europe].

(e) If the Council in permanent session can make
no progress, discussion will be resumed at Ministerial
level.

All of the matters of which I have just
been talking were approved by the plenary
Council, including France.

I do not wish to suggest that the political
problems raised by the France-NATO crisis
have been solved. It remains to be seen
whether political discussion in the Perma-
nent Council on France's relationship to
NATO will be productive and what France
means in saying that it wishes to remain a
party to the North Atlantic Treaty.

Another result of the meeting was the
demonstration by the Fourteen that France
was expected to stand aside when the North
Atlantic Council considers matters involving
those alliance activities in which France has
ceased to participate.

Search for Better East-West Relations

The meeting was not confined to dealing
with the France-NATO crisis.

NATO has, of course, been actively con-
cerned over the years with an improvement
in East-West relations and with creating an

JUNE 27, 1966

999

atmosphere more conducive to ultimate reso-
lution of the fundamental European issues
left over from World War II. It was clearly
the sense of the ministers at Brussels that,
even if the immediate outlook for new con-
crete agreements or arrangements is not al-
together encouraging, the West should make
it evident beyond any question that it seri-
ously desires improved relationships and
continues to hope that unremitting efforts
on our side may evoke eventually favorable
responses from the East. If there is to be
genuine progress toward the eventual settle-
ment of the tragic division of East from
West, and particularly, the tragic division of
Germany, the 14 countries at Brussels recog-
nized that they must stand together. I want
to underscore this point. There was no dis-
agreement among the Fourteen that the
progress we seek in our relations with the
East will come as a function of our unity.

In this connection I suggested to the Coun-
cil that it instruct the permanent represent-
atives to continue to examine closely the
prospects for healthy developments in East-
West relations and to consider further ini-
tiatives which might be usefully undertaken
by members of the North Atlantic pact, in
addition to the numerous activities that are
already being carried on. This was agreed,
and the permanent representatives will re-
port on the matter to the ministers.

I hope that member governments will be
forthcoming in consulting intimately and
frequently on these matters. There will be
further consultation about the nature of the
threat from the East, its implications for
the West, the nature of the changes occur-
ring m Eastern Europe and their implica-
tions for the West. We shall also need to
identify those areas where further points
of agreement may be developed and in so
doing further the process of trying to build
a peace. The permanent representatives will
take this up as a matter of continuing busi-
ness.

In addition, very important and construc-
tive regular alliance business was done. I

would like particularly to mention the fol-
lowing :

The Council heard a report from the
Special Committee studying nuclear mat-
ters. The Committee will continue its ac-
tivities and is expected to make a final
report to the December ministerial meeting.

The organization that deals with coopera-
tive research, development, and production
was revamped, and conditions now seem
promising for important interallied cooper-
ation in this respect.

Attention was paid to the need of Greece
and Turkey for support in their efforts to
contribute to the common defense. Addi-
tional countries indicated a readiness to
help.

I called to the attention of the Council the
importance of the NATO Parliamentarians
Conference and stressed the need as empha-
sized by our own congressional members to
strengthen the Conference's executive secre-
tariat. I consider this a most useful activity
that contributes a great deal to public un-
derstanding of and participation in the
alliance.

Finally, although time was limited, I told
our allies of the latest developments in the
Dominican Republic and in Viet-Nam.

The Outlook for NATO

To sum up: I want to reiterate that the
Brussels meeting provided a most impressive
demonstration of the great value all mem-
bers of the North Atlantic alliance except
France continue to attach to NATO. I am
persuaded that the allies will do whatever
is necessary to preserve this system which
they consider essential to their security.
They hope that France will cooperate in this
endeavor, but if it will not, the rest of us
are prepared and determined to carry on.
They are eager to put to use the strength
NATO provides in order to improve East-
West relations. They do not expect a grand
European settlement in the near future, but
they hope that if the East is prepared to
cooperate, it will be possible through trade,
cultural contacts, and scientific and tech-

1000

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

nological exchanges to create a more favor-
able East-West atmosphere so as to facilitate
eventual settlement of the fundamental,
hard problems that continue to divide Eu-
rope.

Thus, the outlook for NATO, though un-
clear as far as France is concerned, is in no
way cause for pessimism.

North Atlantic Council
Meets at Brussels

The North Atlantic Council held its regu-
lar ministerial ^meeting at Brussels June
7-8. Following are the texts of a statement
made by Secretary Rusk upon his arrival at
Brussels on June U and the communique is-
sued at the close of the meeting on June 8,
together with a list of the members of the
U.S. delegation.

STATEMENT BY SECRETARY RUSK

I am glad to return to this beautiful capital
city of a nation to which the people of the
United States are tied by deep sentiments
and common interests and ideals.

Five years ago I participated for the first
time as U.S. representative to a NATO
meeting, in Oslo in 1961. Since then I have
attended all regular meetings of the foreign
ministers of the North Atlantic Council held
in various NATO capitals.

None, I believe, has been the subject of
such intense preparation as this one — the
37th ministerial meeting of the Atlantic
alliance.

The present meeting takes place at a time
when members of the alliance must face de-
cisions that will affect the well-being of the
Atlantic community for years to come. One
of our number has decided to withdraw from
the integrated organization which has been
built with so much care. The other 14 have
responded vdth a clear declaration of intent
to carry on, to maintain and strengthen our
partnership for peace.^

However, certain practical readjustments
must be made.

All of us realize that some of these will
be inconvenient. But this will not prevent us
from taking the hard decisions. I am confi-
dent all of us are prepared to make the
effort that will be required of us to safe-
guard the peace. Only by maintaining our
cohesion and our ability to act collectively
for the common good can we effectively
develop opportunities to achieve lasting
settlements that will guarantee the peace
and security of the NATO and adjacent
areas.

TEXT OF COMMUNIQUE

Press release 140 dated June 9

1. The Council met in Ministerial Session
in Brussels, the 7th and 8th of June, 1966.

2. The Council reviewed the state of the
Alliance. After a frank exchange of views,
the Ministers agreed that the maintenance
of the Atlantic Alliance is as necessary
today as ever, in order to safeguard the
freedom and the common heritage of their
peoples founded on the principles of democ-
racy, individual liberty and the rule of law.
The first aim of the Atlantic Alliance is the
common defense of all member countries;
to this end its members are pledged, sepa-
rately and jointly, by means of continuous
and effective self-help and mutual aid, to
maintain and develop their individual and
collective capacity to resist armed attack.

3. The Ministers agreed to examine, in the
light of the principles and obligations of the
Treaty, and in a cooperative manner, the
problems raised by the French memoranda
of last March,2 in order to reach as soon
as possible solutions acceptable to all con-
cerned and which assure continued security.
At this meeting the Council :

(a) Noted the statement made by Mr. [J.

' For text, see Bulletin of Apr. 4, 1966, p. 536.

' For texts of exchanges of aide memoire between
the United States and France, see ibid., Apr. 18,
1966, p. 617, and May 2, 1966, p. 699.

JUNE 27, 1966

1001

A. H.] Luns at the discussions which had
taken place on the 6th of June among the
fourteen Ministers;

(b) Agreed to transfer the military head-
quarters of NATO from France ;

(c) Extended a unanimous invitation to
the Benelux countries to provide a new site
for SHAPE ;

(d) Agreed that some simplification of
the command structure should be carried
out. This will be achieved in the first in-
stance in the centre by combining under a
single Commander and in one headquarters
the staffs now divided between the Head-
quarters of the Commander-in-Chief, Cen-
tral Europe, and the Commanders-in-Chief
of the Land and Air Forces in Central
Europe. This headquarters will be moved to
a new location either in Benelux or Germany ;

(e) Agreed that further studies will be
necessary in order to establish the precise
requirements and the possibilities of hospi-
tality in the different countries, noted that
the Benelux countries, the Federal Republic,
the Secretary General and the NATO mili-
tary authorities had been requested to un-
dertake these studies forthwith ; and further
noted that as soon as the required informa-
tion was available, final decisions would have
to be taken as a matter of urgency ;

(f) Extended a unanimous invitation to
Italy to provide a new site for the NATO
Defense College ;

(g) Agreed that the Standing Group will
be abolished and replaced by appropriate
alternative arrangements, including an inte-
grated international military staff;

(h) Noted the statement by Mr. Luns in
connection with the site of the Council and
also the statement of the French Foreign
Minister on this subject.

4. With regard to the procedures for nego-
tiation, the Ministers agreed that :

(a) The questions which need to be settled
jointly between the Allies as a consequence
of French communications will in the first
instance be discussed in the Council in per-
manent session.

(b) Prominent among these questions are
the tasks and missions of French forces in

Germany, including their cooperation with
NATO forces and command arrangements.

(c) Other questions such as French par-
ticipation in NADGE [NATO Air Defense
Ground Environment] and NATO infra-
structure projects will be discussed in the
same way.

(d) The Council in permanent session
may, of course, make any arrangements it
wishes for discussion of these questions. It
may, for example, decide to set up smaller
groups to deal with some or all of the ques-
tions. When the political problems have been
discussed and sufficient agreement reached
on them, the elaboration of the necessary
military arrangements will be referred to
discussions between the French High Com-
mand and SACEUR [Supreme Allied Com-
mander Europe] .

(e) If the Council in permanent session
can make no progress, discussion will be re-
sumed at Ministerial level.

5. In reviewing the international situation
the Ministers discussed the relations of their
countries with the Soviet Union and the East
European countries.

6. In view of the basic aims of the Soviet
Union, the level of its armed forces, and its
continuing allocation of a high proportion of
economic and technological resources for
military purposes, the Ministers concluded
that it is imperative for the West to main-
tain adequate forces for deterrence and de-
fense.

7. The Ministers had an extended discus-
sion about the main problems affecting
European security. They reaffirmed the
terms of their Declaration of the 16th of De-
cember, 1958 with regard to Berlin.^ They
regretted the absence of progress on the im-
portant question of German reunification
and the continued attempts to discredit the
Federal Republic of Germany. Taking note
of the positive initiative taken by the Ger-
man Government in their note of 25 March,
1966 * the Ministers reaffirmed that the solu-
tion of the German problem is one of the

' For text, see ibid., Jan. 5, 1959, p. 4.
' Not printed here.

1002

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

central issues in East-West relations, and
they agreed on the necessity of a continued
and unrelenting search for a peaceful solu-
tion that would give satisfaction to the Ger-
man people's fundamental right to reunifica-
tion.

8. The defensive nature of the North At-
lantic Treaty is indisputable. It is clearly
stated in the undertaking by the signatories
to uphold the principles of the United Na-
tions Charter by refraining from the use of
force to settle international disputes. Fur-
thermore, the defensive character of the Al-
liance has been repeatedly proved by the
restraint and moderation shov^'n by its mem-
bers in the last seventeen years, even when
confronted by provocation and hostile actions
affecting the Treaty area. Owing to the con-
ditions of security created and maintained
by an effective common defense of the
North Atlantic area, political consultation
among partners allows initiatives to be taken
which can contribute not only to the stability
of East-West relations but also to the gen-
eral well-being of mankind.

9. If progress is to be made with regard
to the complex problems of a European
settlement, a determination to resolve the
issues must exist on all sides. The peaceful
ending of the division of Europe remains a
principal purpose of the Alliance, the objec-
tive being a Europe that will once again be
one, and a Germany that will once again be
united.

10. Meanwhile, member countries are
seeking further to improve relations be-
tween the peoples of Eastern Europe and
Western Europe, and to diminish mutual
suspicions and fears. They are convinced
that further tangible results could now be
obtained in the cultural, economic, scientific
and technical fields.

11. The Ministers directed the permanent
representatives to continue to examine
closely the prospects of healthy developments
in East-West relations, and to prepare a full
report on these questions for meetings to be
attended, as far as is practicable, by the
Foreign Ministers of the various countries.
This report, which should deal with all

possible initiatives in this field, would cover,
inter alia, problems connected with Euro-
pean security and German reunification.

12. The Ministers expressed their continu-
ous interest in progress towards general,
complete and controlled disarmament. They
expressed great concern over the problem of
nuclear proliferation in its world-wide im-
plications and their determination to con-
tinue their efforts to solve this problem. In
particular the governments concerned in the
18-Power Geneva Conference reaffirmed
their intention to do their utmost to achieve
positive results.

13. With regard to Greek-Turkish rela-
tions, tlie Ministers took note of the Sec-
retary General's report on the "watching
brief" and confirmed their support for the
continuation of his activities in this respect.
They welcomed the announcement made by
the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey
to the effect that "the Governments of
Greece and Turkey, inspired by a sincere de-
sire to facilitate a peaceful and agreed solu-
tion of the Cyprus problem and to improve
their relations, have decided to proceed to
contacts and exchanges of views on the
Cyprus question and on Greek-Turkish rela-
tions. The procedure to be followed during
these contacts will be decided in common."
The Ministers reiterated their appreciation
of the continued presence of the United Na-
tions force in Cyprus and expressed their
support of the efforts of the United Nations
for safeguarding peace and improving the
situation in the island.

14. The Ministers reaffirmed their desire
to promote economic cooperation in the
spirit of Article 2 of the North Atlantic
Treaty. They acknowledged the need to join
efforts in order to promote research in the
scientific, technical and production fields,
and achieve a wider cooperation and ex-
change of information so that in a world of
rapid scientific progress the gap in techno-
logical achievement between Europe and
North America can be narrowed.

15. All economically advanced countries,
those of East and West alike, have a com-
mon responsibility to cooperate in attacking

JUNE 27, 1966

1003

the fundamental problems confronting the
developing countries. Progress towards po-
litical settlements and disarmament will
contribute to this end by releasing resources
and energies which are so badly needed for
the advancement of human welfare.

16. The Council, agreeing that efforts
should be continued to supply Greece and
Turkey with defense assistance within the
framework of the Alliance, in order to help
them maintain an effective contribution to
the common defense, adopted a resolution
recommending wider participation in this
aid program.

17. The Ministers received a progress re-
port on the activities of the Special Com-
mittee of Defense Ministers which was cre-
ated by the Council in 1965.^ A further
report will be submitted to the Council dur-
ing the Ministerial session in December.

18. In view of the importance of science
and technology to the military strength of
the Alliance and the economic vitality of its
members, the Ministers noted with satis-
faction the recently agreed improvements
in procedures for cooperation among mem-
bers of the Alliance in research, development
and production of military equipment. They
encouraged member countries to bring suit-
able projects forward for cooperative action.

19. They noted that a meeting of Defense
Ministers will be convened in July to review
and carry forward the institution of force
planning procedures for projecting and ad-
justing annually a five-year program.

20. A meeting of the Council at the
Ministerial level will be held in December
1966.

Advisers

Richard W. Boehm {deputy coordinator), Officer-
in-Charge, Political Affairs, Office of Atlantic
Political and Military Affairs, Department of
State

Dixon Donnelley, Assistant Secretary of State for
Public Affairs

Brig. Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, U.S.A.F., Director,
European Region, Office of the Assistant Secre-
tary of Defense for International Security Affairs

Philip J. Farley, Deputy U. S. Representative on
the North Atlantic Council, Paris

John I. Getz, Deputy Director, Office of Political
Affairs, U. S. Mission to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and European Regional Or-
ganization, Paris

Robbins P. Oilman, Officer-in-Charge, Defense
Policy Affairs, Office of Atlantic Political and
Military Affairs, Department of State

John A. Hooper, Defense Adviser and Defense Rep-
resentative, U. S. Mission to the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization and European Regional Or-
ganizations, Paris

Ridgway B. Knight, American Ambassador to Bel-
gium

J. Robert Schaetzel (coordinator) , Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for European Affairs

Ronald I. Spiers, Director, Office of Atlantic Politi-
cal and Military Affairs, Department of State

Edward J. Streator, Jr., Staff Assistant to the Sec-
retary of State

Llevk'ellyn E. Thompson, Ambassador at Large, De-
partment of State

George S. Vest, Deputy Director, Office of Atlantic
Political and Military Affairs, Department of
State

Sccreta/ry of Delegation

William G. Jones, Director, Office of International
Conferences, Department of State

U.S. Support for Central American
Common Market Reaffirmed

1

U.S. DELEGATION

Preas release 133 dated June 3

Representative

Dean Rusk, Secretary of State (chairman)

U.S. Representative on the North Atlantic Council

Harlan Cleveland

° For text of a final communique issued at the
close of a meeting of the Special Committee on Nov.
27, 1965, see BULLETIN of Dec. 13, 1965, p. 939.

Statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated June 3

On this fifth anniversary of the Central
American Common Market, we salute our
Central American friends for what they
have accomplished by placing the common
good of the region above more narrow in-
terests.

The facts speak for themselves: Trade
between the five partner nations has more

1004

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

than quadrupled since the Common Market
came into being 5 years ago. In 1960 intra-
regional trade amounted to $32 million; in
1965 it amounted to $130 million.

This is a triumph for idealism plus good
business sense.

It is no coincidence that in 1965 the Cen-
tral American region as a whole achieved
an increase of 21/4 percent in gross na-
tional product per capita, which is the
yearly minimum target of the Alliance for
Progress. This achievement stems from the
same spirit of enlightened statesmanship
and imaginative self-help which has made
the Central American Common Market one
of the brightest success stories in Latin
American development.

We hail the Central American Common
Market as a giant stride toward the eventual
goal of Latin American regional economic
integration. What it has accomplished in
so short a time should serve as a stimulus
for the achievement of the larger goal. We
pledge our continuing support for this young,
progressive Central American institution
and for the Latin American regional move-
ment, which are so fully in keeping with the
Charter of Punta del Este.

President Hails Success of Free
Elections in Dominican Republic

Following is the text of a message from
President Johnson to Hector Garcia Godoy,
Provisional President of the Dominican Re-
public.

White House press release dated June 2

June 2, 1966

Few Presidents have had a more compli-
cated task than the one you successfully
accomplished yesterday.

You led the Dominican people from the
turbulence of civil strife to the tranquility
of free elections. There can be no greater
tribute.

On behalf of the United States Govern-
ment and people I express sincere admira-
tion for your wisdom, courage and tenacity.

New Procedures To Admit Cuban
Refugees From Third Countries

Following is a joint announcement issued
by the Departments of State and Justice on
May 31.

Press release 132 dated May 31

Under new procedures Cuban refugees in
Spain, Mexico, and other countries who are
the parents, spouses, or minor children of
Cuban refugees in the United States will
be granted admission to this country vdth-
out the labor certificate required for a visa.^

The Departments of State and Justice
agreed upon the procedures in carrying out
the President's pledge of October 3, 1965,^ to
the people of Cuba "that those who seek
refuge here will find it."

The new procedures will use the Attorney
General's authority under section 212 (d)
(5) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
to parole into the United States people
without visas. Up to now, the authority has
been limited to refugees coming directly
from Cuba to the United States.

A number of Cuban refugees have fled
and are continuing to flee to third countries
although members of their immediate fami-
lies are in the United States in parole or in-
definite voluntary departure status. There-
after family reunion within the United States
in some cases has been prevented by the re-
quirement of section 212(a) (14) of the new
law that they obtain a labor certification.
The result has been that many of the parents,
spouses, or minor children of Cubans who
have been paroled into the United States
for an indefinite stay have been separated
from their closest relatives.

This situation will be remedied by an
extension of the present "parole" procedures
to permit the reunion of all such families,
just as the Immigration and Nationality Act
now makes special provision for the imme-
diate families of citizens and resident aliens.

^ For procedures established on Nov. 6, 1965, for
the movement of Cuban refugees to the United
States, see Bulletin of Nov. 29, 1965, p. 850.

= Ihid., Oct. 25, 1965, p. 661.

JUNE 27, 1966

1005

"// the international community, including governments and
private interests in the developing and developed countries,
can cooperate . . . the United States is convinced that the
patent system tvill continue to play a very important role in
the future in the economic development of all nations," corir-
cludes Harvey J. Winter, Adviser in the Department's Inter-
national Business Practices Division, in this article written
especially for the Bulletin.

Our International Patent Policy and the World Patent Crisis

by Harvey J. Winter

In 1965 the United States celebrated the
175th anniversary of the enactment of its
patent system.

When the law setting up the patent sys-
tem was enacted in 1790, the economy of the
United States was predominantly agrarian,
and, naturally, for some decades to come at-
tention was focused almost entirely on the
domestic patent field. In the latter half of
the 19th century, as foreign commerce in-
creased, American firms and those of other
industrialized countries recognized that it
was necessary to obtain patent protection
not only in their own country but also
abroad in order to protect foreign markets.

The diversity of national patent laws and
the discriminatory character of many of
these laws at that time were painfully appar-
ent to the patent owner seeking protection
outside his own country, essentially because
prior to the creation of the Paris Union in
1883, there was no sound basis for the inter-
national protection of industrial property
rights.

Stephen Ladas in his monumental work
on international protection of industrial
property points out that, although there
were no less than 69 bilateral arrangements
negotiated during the second half of the 19th

century which had specific provisions in
them on the protection of industrial prop-
erty, these arrangements were generally un-
satisfactory.i It became apparent that the
answer to this problem was a multilateral
convention which would establish some gen-
eral principles for the protection of indus-
trial property in each member state. After
preliminary meetings in 1878 and 1880, the
International Conference of 1883 negotiated
the Convention of Union of Paris for the
Protection of Industrial Property (Paris
Convention). 2 The convention came into ef-
fect in 1884, and the United States has been
a party to it since 1887.

International Patent Arrangements

The Paris Convention applies to industrial
property in its broadest sense, including pat-
ents, trademarks, trade names, industrial de-
signs, utility models, indications of source,
and appellations of origin. Member states of
the convention guarantee to one another
under various convention provisions "na-

' Stephen P. Ladas, The International Protection
of hidustrial Property (Cambridge, Harvard Uni-
versity Press, 1930), pp. 54-69.

" Treaties and Other International Acts Series
4931.

1006

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

tional treatment" and certain special rights.
In addition to these basic provisions other
clauses establish certain principles of uni-
. form law to be followed by member states.
Under the "national treatment" provisions,
each member state guarantees to the na-
tionals of each other member state the same
treatment it gives its own nationals.

Undoubtedly the most important special
right member states grant one another is the
"right of priority." Thus, when a first appli-
cation is filed in one of the convention states,
the applicant may, within a specified period
of time (12 months in the case of patents),
apply for protection in any of the other
member states; these later applications will
then be treated as if they had been filed
on the same date as the first application.

Finally, a few uniform principles, or com-
mon rules, of law are laid down in the con-
vention which all member states must fol-
low. For example, in the field of patents,
patents granted in different member states
for the same invention are independent of
each other; that is, any action taken in one
state with regard to a patent cannot be taken
into account in another state on the cor-
responding patent.

There have been five revisions of the
Paris Convention since 1883, the latest being
the Lisbon revision in 1958. The United
States has adhered to all five revisions.

As of March 1, 1966, the Paris Convention
had 74 member states, including develop-
ing and developed countries in every area of
the world. It is truly a worldwide conven-
tion. Among the states that have recently
adhered to the convention, it is significant to
note the adherence of the Soviet Union ef-
fective as of July 1, 1965.3 The United
States views this adherence as an important
action with respect to our trade and
industrial property relations with the
U.S.S.R.

The United States regards the Paris Con-
vention as the keystone of the structure of
our foreign industrial property relations. Not
only is the convention significant from the

point of view of guaranteeing certain rights
and establishing minimum standards of pro-
tection in the member states, but meet-
ings of convention countries are becoming
more important as a forum for discussing
patent problems of mutual interest to mem-
ber countries and even for nonmember de-
veloping nations. These meetings are spon-
sored by the United International Bureaus
for the Protection of Industrial and Intel-
lectual Property, known as BIRPI, in its in-
creasingly active and effective role as the
secretariat for the Paris Convention.

An important diplomatic conference will
be held at Stockholm in 1967 to deal vdth
two specific aspects of that convention.

In the first place the Stockholm confer-
ence will consider the structural reorgani-
zation of BIRPI in connection with its ad-
ministration of the Paris Convention, the
Berne Copyright Convention, and other in-
dustrial and intellectual property arrange-
ments. The United States supports in prin-
ciple the proposal for a new administrative
structure for BIRPI. This support is based
on our belief that the modernization of
BIRPI or its successor organization, tenta-
tively called the International Intellectual
Property Organization, will provide an ad-
ministrative framework which will strength-
en international cooperation and assist in the
attainment of the principal objectives of the
conventions under its administration.

Secondly, the conference will consider a
possible limited revision of the Paris Con-
vention with respect to inventors' cer-
tificates which exist alongside patents in the
Soviet Union and some of the other Eastern
European countries.* A meeting of a Com-

' For background, see Bulletin of May 17, 1965,
p. 758.

* In those countries which have inventors' certifi-
cates, patents are also issued and the conditions
to be fulfilled for issuance are the same for both.
However, the rights and obligations arising from
an inventor's certificate differ markedly from those
of a patent. As regards a patent, the patentee is
allowed to exploit it or to license it for use by others.
In the case of an inventor's certificate, the holder
has no right to exploit the invention and no right
to grant licenses to others; instead these rights be-
long to the state. If the state uses the invention,
however, it must compensate the owner [author's
note].

JUNE 27, 1966

1007

mittee of Experts was held at Geneva in
March 1965. This committee, which included
the United States, agreed that the Stock-
holm conference should consider a possible
amendment of article 4 of the Paris Conven-
tion in order that applications for inventors'
certificates in a country granting such cer-
tificates shall be treated in the same manner
as applications for patents for the purpose
of the right of priority in another convention
country. The matter is now being studied
in connection with this Government's prep-
aration for the Stockholm conference.

Another multilateral patent arrangement
which should be noted is the Buenos Aires
Convention on Inventions, Patents, Designs
and Industrial Models of 1910,^ to which 13
Latin American countries and the United
States are parties. This convention essen-
tially adopted the principles of the Paris Con-
vention on national treatment and the right
of priority. Since the convention is the only
basis for our relations in the patent field with
10 of 13 Latin American member states
which are not also parties to the Paris Con-
vention, the Buenos Aires Convention is an
important and integral part of our interna-
tional patent relations.

Today's Patent Crisis

Although the Paris and Buenos Aires Con-
ventions are important as vehicles for
limited harmonization in the patent field,
these conventions were not designed nor in-
tended to deal with many of our current pat-
ent problems. Effective action must be taken
to deal with the so-called world patent crisis
of today if the patent system itself is to
continue to perform its basic function of
stimulating technological innovation and eco-
nomic growth.

There are a number of factors contribut-
ing to this crisis. In the first place, there has
been an unprecedented expansion of interna-
tional trade during the past two decades.
Second, there has been at the same time a
rapid acceleration of technological progress.

' Treaties Series 595.

Third, the increasing number of newly in-
dependent nations want and need the tech-
nology that is essential to their economic
growth.

The United States is convinced that this
patent crisis cannot be resolved by national
action alone. It can be dealt with far more
effectively, and in the long run more eco-
nomically, through international coopera-
tive solutions. We are not alone in this
conclusion. Many other nations are equally
convinced that international cooperation is
absolutely essential to finding a solution not
only to the problems of today but to the
even more difficult ones of the years to
come. Without such cooperation, indeed,
the nations of the world will face a weak-
ening and possibly even a withering away
of the patent system itself.

In recent years the very substantial
increase in the total number of patent ap-
plications filed throughout the world can
be attributed in large part to multiple
filings of the same invention in a number
of countries. Further patent applications
filed on the same invention in countries
which have an "examination system" (i.e.,
the invention is examined to determine
whether it meets certain conditions for pat-
entability) must be separately filed, prose-
cuted, and examined in each country.
Roughly half of the estimated 650,000 ap-
plications filed in 1965 were duplicates or
substantial duplicates of other applications
filed elsewhere.

This duplication of effort required in
prosecuting and examining applications for
the same invention in more than one country
is the first of two basic problems confront-
ing developed countries in the international
patent field.

The applicant who must undertake the
task of obtaining protection on his inven-
tion throughout today's international mar-
keting areas is faced not only with the
burden of prosecuting the same application
in several countries but also with the addi-
tional burden of prosecuting each applica-
tion under different national patent laws
and procedures. United States applicants

1008

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

struggle with this problem on nearly 90,000
applications filed each year in foreign coun-
tries. And the same problem assumes equally
major proportions for British, French, Ger-
man, Swiss, and other foreign applicants
who file widely outside their own country.
The complex maze of divergent patent laws
and procedures through which the applicant
seeking foreign protection for his invention
must find his way is, then, the second basic
problem that developed countries must at-
tempt to resolve.

International Cooperation a Solution

Steps have been taken in recent years
both nationally and regionally to solve these
problems. Several countries have already
made or are presently considering changes
in their patent laws. In addition, many
countries, including the United States, have
initiated changes in their procedures and
practice aimed at increasing examining ef-
ficiency and have increased personnel in an
effort to control backlogs.

But none of these steps alone will provide
a long-term solution to the problems of the
patent offices or to the problems of the ap-
plicants. Thus the member states of the
Council of Europe and the Scandinavian
countries have for some time recognized the
need for seeking solutions to certain inter-
national patent problems among themselves
and in cooperation with other developed
countries, including the United States.

This Government also strongly favors in-
ternational cooperation as the only practical
and realistic means of dealing with such
problems. Further, we wholeheartedly agree
with the remarks made on October 20,
1965, by John R. Shipman, a well-known
patent attorney from private industry, at
the Department of State's "International
Day" program in connection with the 175th
anniversary of the U.S. patent system. He
emphasized that the responsibility for seek-
ing improvements in the patent system
through international cooperation "does not
rest solely with the Patent Office or the
governments but must be shared by in-

ventors, attorneys, industry, and all who
use or profit from the system."

Areas for Cooperation

The long-range goal of the United States
in the international patent field is the de-
velopment of an international system under
which a single patent would be effective in
many countries. Although this might be
regarded as a Utopian goal, note should be
taken of the Nordic Patent System providing
for mutual recognition of patents granted
by the four national patent offices and the
proposed European Patent Convention under
which there would be a single patent for the
six Common Market countries. The Nordic
system is scheduled to come into effect this
year and the European convention is under
consideration.

As initial steps directed toward the solu-
tion of the fundamental patent problems of
developed countries, the United States, pri-
marily through the Patent Office of the
Department of Commerce and in coordina-
tion with the Department of State, is de-
veloping programs along three lines :

(1) cooperation between patent offices in
the field of documentation ;

(2) the exchange of search results and
other information concerning corresponding
patent applications ;

(3) the harmonization of laws and pro-
cedures with other countries.

In the field of documentation the United
States Patent Office actively participates in
the International Committee on Informa-
tion Retrieval Among Examining Patent
Offices, known as ICIREPAT. ICIREPAT
programs are directed toward the develop-
ment and maintenance of mechanical search
systems for shared use by the member
countries. Most examining countries par-
ticipate in ICIREPAT activities, and a
number of systems have already been
adopted for shared use.

Further, the Patent Office is well along
with its study of the feasibility of the
United States adopting the International
Patent Classification established by the

JUNE 27, 1966

1009

European Convention on the International
Classification of Patents for Inventions.
The adoption of this classification would
greatly facilitate international cooperation
in the field of mechanized searching, and,
perhaps more importantly, it would be a
steppingstone in the path toward our long-
range goal in the international patent field.

If progress is to be made toward the
resolution of some of the immediate problems
in the international patent field and also
toward our long-range goal, then the re-
quirement of effective documentation must
be met. Some national patent offices today
have comprehensive search files of issued
patents and technical publications which
are used in the determination of whether
an invention is "new." However, since the
cost of maintaining an up-to-date world-
wide search file is substantial, it is likely
that only a rather limited number of pat-
ent offices will be willing to pay the cost
of maintaining such a file.

Fortunately, there is a central search
office which expects to be able to handle
the searching requirements of those patent
offices which do not have a worldwide
search file, namely the International Pat-
ent Institute at The Hague. This will en-
able patent offices with limited search files
to participate in cooperative programs of
exchanging patent information among
various patent offices. Looking toward the
future the Institute is actively studying
how a thorough search of worldwide litera-
ture can best be carried out, taking into
account all factors including that of lan-
guages.

Also in the field of documentation, the
U.S. Patent Office is cooperating with
BIRPI, the secretariat for the Paris Conven-
tion, in studying the feasibility and de-
sirability of establishing a World Patent
Index which would correlate corresponding
patents and applications for patents on the
same invention in different countries. The
index would be of primary value to industry
but might also be of assistance in the

proper maintenance of patent office search
files.

In the area of exchanges of search re-
sults on patent applications between examin-
ing patent offices, the patent offices of the
United States and Germany have recently
completed an exchange of search results on
a trial basis of 1,000 corresponding applica-
tions filed in each country. The results are
currently being utilized and evaluated in
both patent offices.

Presently, the United States is consider-
ing arrangements for similar exchanges
with a limited number of interested coun-
tries. Should such exchanges prove suc-
cessful these bilateral arrangements might
be broadened to cover multilateral ex-
changes among a number of countries and
thus further eliminate duplication of effort
among examining patent offices.

These exploratory exchanges of search
results are, of course, only the first step of
several that could be taken toward the de-
velopment of a truly international patent
system. However, the important thing is
that this first step is being taken. Further
steps which could evolve into an interna-
tional system were spelled out last year by
the United States Commissioner of Patents,
Edward J. Brenner, at ceremonies cele-
brating the 175th anniversary of the U.S.
patent system. However, as the Commis-
sioner noted, it would be possible to omit
some of these steps and thus "leapfrog"
into a type of international system such as
the proposed Nordic Patent System.

The possibilities for progressing toward
an international patent system with a central
office, or regional offices for groups of
countries, will, of course, be greatly enhanced
if there is a substantial degree of harmoni-
zation of the laws and procedures of the
developed countries.

We recognize that harmonization will be a
difficult task since the patent laws in most
countries are deep rooted. On the other hand,
a number of countries today, including the
United States, are taking a long and hard look

1010

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

at their patent laws from this point of view
not only in terms of their domestic interests
but also with an eye on the laws and proposed
laws of other countries. There is a practical
and realistic basis for the interest of the
United States in harmonization. We do not
want to be isolated from the mainstream of
international patent developments.

One instrument of international patent
harmonization is already in existence, that
is, the Council of Europe's Convention on the
Unification of Certain Points of Substantive
Law on Patents for Inventions. Although no
government has ratified this convention to
date, it is a significant milestone on the road
to harmonization. If and when the conven-
tion does come into force, the Council of
Europe can thereafter invite any member
state of the Paris Convention to accede to it.
Further, a countiy may, of course, harmo-
nize its patent law vdth that set forth in the
Council of Europe Convention without acced-
ing to it. Thus, the Nordic Patent System is
in accord with this convention. The conven-
tion also might become one starting point for
a broader effort to negotiate a completely
new international patent agreement.

The U.S. Patent Office is presently making
a number of important studies of our patent
law and procedures in relation to harmoni-
zation with foreign laws and procedures, in-
cluding a comparative analysis of our patent
law and the Council of Europe Convention
on this subject. Joint studies on harmoniza-
tion are planned with foreign patent offices.
Such studies also might very usefully be
carried out on a multilateral basis through
the secretariat for the Paris Convention.
I Particular mention also should be made of
the very important work and studies being
undertaken by the President's Commission
on the Patent System created by Executive
Order 11215 of April 10, 1965. The preamble
to the Executive order stresses, among other
things, the necessity for the Government to
take "a leading role in international coopera-
tion for the protection of industrial prop-
erty." The work of this Commission will be
of great assistance to the Government not

only as regards our domestic goals but also
our foreign policy objectives in the interna-
tional patent field.

Patent Problems of Developing Countries

Although the developing countries are
confronted to some degree with the same
problems of the industrialized nations in the
international patent field, the more immedi-
ate problems of developing countries are re-
lated to their interest in and need for tech-
nology. These countries know that tech-
nology is an important element in economic
development and that much of it is pro-
tected by patents owned by firms in the
industrialized nations.

Developing countries have been most con-
cerned about the effect that patents may
have on the transfer of technology from in-
dustrialized nations. In this connection a
number of developing countries introduced
a resolution in the General Assembly of the
United Nations in 1961 asking the Secretary-
General to undertake a study on this subject.
In 1964 the Secretary-General issued a
comprehensive and useful report « on the
subject which emphasizes that "the ques-
tion of patents can be best seen in the
broader context of facilitating the transfer
of technology, patented and unpatented, to
the developing countries, and enhancing the
ability of the latter to adopt and use such
foreign technology in the implementation of
their development programmes."

In June 1964 the United Nations Confer-
ence on Trade and Development approved a
recommendation on the "transfer of tech-
nology" which, among other things, called
on industrialized countries to encourage the
holders of patented and nonpatented tech-
nology to facilitate the transfer of such
technology to developing countries.'' As a
matter of policy, this Government recog-
nizes that the transfer of technology to de-

•U.N. doc. E/3861/Rev.l.

' For texts of the preamble and recommendations
contained in the Final Act, see BULLETIN of Aug. 3,
1964, p. 150.

JUNE 27, 1966

1011

veloping countries is essential to the eco-
nomic growth of these countries.

Most American technology is privately
owned, and in this connection it is important
to note that, under our bilateral foreign as-
sistance program, we encourage not only the
transfer of patented and unpatented tech-
nology to developing countries but, in addi-
tion, goods and capital. This transfer is en-
couraged through United States guaranty
insurance for investments in developing
countries. Government grants for surveys of
investment needs and opportunities, and
Government grants and loans to these coun-
tries. Further, the Department of Commerce
provides direct assistance to foreign busi-
nessmen seeking U.S. investment participa-
tion, technical assistance, and licensing ar-
rangements. In addition, provisions in our
various tax treaties with developing coun-
tries are designed to provide favorable
treatment to payments for the use of pat-
ents and related technology.

The importance of patents and related
technology to the economic growth of de-
veloping countries, which has been high-
lighted in the Secretary-General's report and
other studies, undoubtedly has been a factor
in stimulating a number of countries to un-
dertake or consider a revision of their pat-
ent laws. As a matter of general policy, the
United States has pointed out to these coun-
tries that revisions tending to restrict or re-
duce the value of patent rights could have an
adverse effect on the ability of the country
to attract foreign investment and facilitate
the inflow of technology. Further, we have
continued to emphasize the real importance
of foreign investment as a direct cause and
stimulus for technological development and
economic growth.

At the same time, this Government
recognizes that particular countries may
undertake a revision of their patent laws in
order to meet their specific needs. The
United States has on occasion commended to
developing countries for consideration the
BIRPI publication Model Laiv for Developing
Countries on Inventions. The Model Law
Committee, composed of representatives of 22

1012

developing countries, adopted a recommen-
dation which, among other things, expressed
the view that the Model Law "respects the
special needs of developing countries and
represents a useful model for legislation in
these countries."

We believe that private interests in the
United States also have a role to play in this
area. Many American firms doing business
in developing countries are generally famil-
iar with the needs and problems of these
countries in relation to patents. If these
firms can devise ways and means of alleviat-
ing such needs and problems, the pressures
for restrictive patent legislation will be con-
siderably lessened.

A Period of "Creative Ferment"

It is clear that the international patent
field is in a period of "creative ferment" —
to use the descriptive phrase of the National
Association of Manufacturers "Conference
on World Patent Systems" (June 11, 1965) .
What the effect of this "creative ferment"
will be on the patent system is uncertain. As
far as the United States is concerned, our
policies in the international patent field re-
flect the belief that the patent system has
been and will continue to be an important
element in the economic grovvi;h not only of
the United States but of the world at large.
The universality of modem patent laws
which are not limited by geography, poli-
tics, or economic systems suggest that many
other nations share this view.

But there are extremely complex prob-
lems that must be faced up to in the years
ahead. These problems which directly affect
the aspirations of both developed and de-
veloping countries cannot be solved by gov-
ernments alone. The advice and assistance
of industry and the legal profession is es-
sential. If the international community, in-
cluding governments and private interests in
the developing and developed countries, can
cooperate in resolving these problems, the
United States is convinced that the patent
system will continue to play a very important
role in the future in the economic develop-
ment of all nations.

li

t

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

United States Policy on East-West Trade

by Eugene M. Braderman

Deputy Assistant Secretary for Commercial Affairs and Business Activities ^

It is a privilege for me to have this oppor-
tunity to discuss with you some aspects of
East-West trade from the viewpoint of the
Department of State. Because this is a
rather complex and sensitive issue with for-
eign policy implications going beyond purely
commercial considerations, the Depart-
ment of State — and indeed the administra-
tion— welcomes public discussion of this sub-
ject. Our East-West trade policy will be suc-
cessful largely to the degree that it is un-
derstood and supported by the American
people.

East- West trade can be a misleading term.
Let me, therefore, make it clear at the out-
set that I am speaking only of the possibil-
ity of expanding peaceful trade with the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe and
the Soviet Union. We have no intention of
modifying in the least our embargo on
arms and other military items and equip-
ment to any Communist country. We believe
it would be useful to liberalize trade only in
nonstrategic peaceful goods.

Furthermore, we do not include Com-
munist China, North Korea, North Viet-
Nam, and Cuba in the proposed expansion of
peaceful trade. So long as these Commu-
nist countries continue their aggressive poli-
cies the United States will continue its total
embargo against them. With respect to
Cuba, however, there is an exception to

* Address made before the American Management
Association at New York, N.Y., on June 8 (press
release 136 dated June 7).

permit some small transactions in food and
medicines on humanitarian grounds.

What I would like to do this morning is,
first, to review briefly with you where we
are today and how and why we got there
and, second, to indicate where we expect to
go.

Our policy in regard to trade with coun-
tries having Communist governments has as
one of its most important premises the fact
that these countries differ very considerably
among themselves, both in their internal
systems and in their relations with one an-
other and with the non-Communist world.
In consequence. United States policy ex-
presses itself in different ways toward dif-
ferent Communist countries according to the
circumstances at a given time.

Historically, the United States has con-
sidered trade in peaceful goods a normal
and desirable part of its relations with other
countries. We also normally have not decided
whether or not to trade with a country on
the basis of whether we approved or dis-
approved of its forms of government or con-
duct. Thus, we traded with the Soviet Union
even before we recognized it. In 1935, after
recognition, we concluded a bilateral com-
mercial agreement with the U.S.S.R. which
continued in force with some modifications
until it was terminated in 1951.

As part of our opposition to Communist
aggression, in 1948 we found it desirable for
the first time to apply instruments of
economic denial in a time of cold war. The
United States imposed controls on strategic

JUNE 27, 1966

1013

trade with the Soviet Union and the coun-
tries it then dominated in Eastern Europe.
Other principal trading nations of the free
world joined us in establishing a system of
parallel strategic controls. These are com-
monly called the COCOM controls, COCOM
standing for Consultative Group/Coordinat-
ing Committee. Japan and all the NATO
countries except Iceland cooperate in these
strategic controls on trade and financial
transactions with Communist countries (the
Soviet Union, the Soviet-oriented countries
of Eastern Europe, and the Communist coun-
tries of the Far East) .

At times these COCOM controls have been
intensified, as during the Korean war, or
they have been revised in the light of de-
velopments, such as the improvement in the
international atmosphere following the death
of Stalin. As Secretary Rusk has pointed
out:*

From the beginning we have adjusted our policies
toward trade with Communist countries to the pre-
vailing realities of our political and military rela-
tions with those countries.

United States trade policy toward Com-
munist countries is a key aspect of total
United States policy toward international
communism. It must be examined and judged
in this context.

Secretary Rusk has described our overall
policy toward international communism as
having three objectives:*

To prevent the Communists from extending their
domain; and to make it costly, dangerous, and futile
for them to try to do so;

To achieve agreements or understandings which
could reduce the dangers of a devastating war; and

To encourage trends within the Communist world
making for an evolution toward greater national in-
dependence, peaceful cooperation, and open societies.

To advance these objectives we must be
flexible in applying our trade policy as well
as other elements of our total policy. In
some instances the behavior of a Communist
country will warrant our denying trade with

' For Secretary Rusk's statement before the Sen-
ate Foreign Relations Committee on Mar. 13, 1964,
see Bulletin of Mar. 30, 1964, p. 474.

'Ibid.

it completely, as now is the case for the Com-
munist countries of the Far East and vir-
tually so for Castro Cuba.

Developments in Eastern Europe

In other instances it best serves the United
States interest to encourage trade with a
Communist country. For example, this might
be the case if we note signs of internal
liberalization or improvement in relations
with the United States or with other Western
countries. The most notable example of such
a policy is provided by Yugoslavia, which
asserted its independence of the Soviet Union
in 1948. At that time, the then otherwise
still monolithic Soviet bloc broke off its trade
with Yugoslavia in reprisal for this unprece-
dented rebellion against Soviet authority.
The United States and other Western coun-
tries stepped in with both economic and
military aid to help Yugoslavia maintain its
independence of the bloc. Today about 65
percent of Yugoslavia's trade is with non-
Communist countries.

Yugoslavia also is in the early stage of an
economic reform program designed to effect
basic economic changes which the United
States Government considers significant and
worthy of support. Yugoslavia is a member
of the International Bank and the Inter-
national Monetary Fund and has cooperated
closely with the IMF in developing Yugoslav
economic policies. Yugoslavia participates
actively in the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development. It has been a
provisional member of the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade since 1962. Now
it is negotiating full contracting party status
in the GATT.

All these developments are consistent with
Yugoslavia's policy of remaining independent
of the control of any other country. The
Yugoslav example of internal liberalization,
independence in domestic and foreign affairs,
and its relatively more prosperous society
compared with most other East European
countries have encouraged the movement to-
ward greater independence and internal
change which is evident in those countries
today.

1014

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

Poland, since the death of Stahn, has
shown more independence in its internal af-
fairs and external relations, although events
there have followed a very different course
from those in Yugoslavia. Not all the de-
velopments in Poland have been to our liking,
nor has there been a steady and uninter-
rupted trend in the direction of what we
would regard as improvement. Nevertheless,
Polish agriculture has not been forced down
the road of collectivization; Polish intellec-
tual life has been vigorous and in some ways
unorthodox; the influence of religious insti-
tutions and beliefs remains strong ; and travel
to the West is comparatively free. Poland
is relatively open to influences from the
West; the United States carries on an ex-
tensive information program there, and
Americans can maintain wide contacts with
the people of Poland. The jamming of the
Voice of America and other free world broad-
casts has been discontinued.

Poland has, during these years, built up a
wide range of commercial as well as cultural
relations with the West. The United States
responded to the changes in Polish policies
with sales of agricultural products through
P.L. 480 programs and credits through the
Export-Import Bank. We have adopted a
more liberal policy in licensing exports to
Poland. In connection with a claims settle-
ment we restored most-favored-nation treat-
ment to imports from Poland. As a result,
trade in both directions has grown and
Poland is paying its debts to the United
States Government.

Romania, which has the fastest industrial
growth rate among the East European Com-
munist countries, for the past few years has
demonstrated a desire to expand its relations
with the West. It also successfully rejected
proposals of the Communist Council for Eco-
nomic Mutual Assistance which would have
restricted its industrial expansion and would
have subordinated its economic interests to
the needs of other Communist countries.

In 1964 the United States and Romania
concluded negotiations in Washington to in-
crease trade and improve relations between
the two countries.^ Consequently, we are

now following a more liberal export policy
toward Romania also. Romania, in turn, has
given assurances that it will not permit
the reexport of United States goods or tech-
nology and will protect industrial property
rights and processes. As a result of these
developments, Romania has expanded its
commercial relations not only with the
United States but also with other free world
countries.

In Czechoslovakia and Hungary there also
have been growing trends toward expanded
relations with the West and some internal
liberalization.

In Bulgaria there have been some faint
stirrings of change. In Albania they seem
nonexistent.

In the Soviet Union, too, some economic
reforms have been put into effect within the
past year. The emphasis on profit as a prime
indicator of economic performance, which
had been tested in 1964 in certain factories
in Kiev, Lvov, Gorky, and Moscow, has
attracted particular attention in the West.
Under this system, of course, profits will
accrue to the state, not to private individ-
uals, for redistribution as new investments
and incentive rewards. While I would not
wish to suggest that the Soviet Union is
advancing toward capitalism, it is important
to note that even there the winds of change
are blowing. One of the most interesting
developments in the Soviet Union recently
has been their decision to embark on a pro-
gram for increasing automobile production
with all that implies in terms of related
facilities and sources.

Expansion of East-West Trade

These varying programs and experiments
with economic reform have been accompanied
by efforts by these European Communist
countries to expand their trade with non-
Communist countries. In 1964, the latest
year for which complete statistics are avail-
able, trade between the free world and the
European Communist countries, including
the Soviet Union, was about $5.5 billion each

* For text of a joint communique, see ibid., June 15,
1964, p. 924.

JUNE 27, 1966

1015

way. But the United States share in this
trade was small. United States exports to
these Communist countries represented only
1.3 percent of our total exports in 1964. Our
total imports from these countries was only
one-half of 1 percent of our total imports.

The greater growth of Western European
trade with the Eastern European Commu-
nist countries stems from geography, centu-
ries-old traditional trading patterns, and a
greater interest on the part of Western
European importers than on the part of
American importers. The Communist coun-
tries also have been able to sell Western
Europe and Japan more than enough to
finance their purchases from them.

Up until this year the reverse was true in
the case of the United States. Our sales to
these Communist countries regularly have
greatly exceeded our purchases from them.
Our exports to them in 1964, bolstered by
our sale of about $259 million worth of
surplus agricultural commodities, climbed to
$340 million. Our imports from these Com-
munist countries were $99 million that year.
In 1963 our exports to the Soviet Union and
Eastern European Communist countries
totaled about $167 million and our imports
from them about $81 million. Last year,
however. United States exports to these
countries totaled somewhat more than $139
million while our imports from them rose to
more than $137 million.

It is quite clear that the European Com-
munist countries would like to buy agri-
cultural and some consumer products, ma-
chinery, equipment, complete plants, and
advanced technology from the United States.
With relaxation of our restrictions on trade
in peaceful goods, some deals certainly
would be concluded by American business-
men rather than by competitors in friendly
countries. But we would not expect U.S.
exporters to do a land office business. Over
the long run the volume of our sales would
probably be limited by the Communist
countries' ability to sell to us. And our
American market requires products and
marketing methods that are more sophisti-

cated and varied than most of those they
now offer in trade.

Proposed Legislation

As you may know. President Johnson last
year asked a distinguished group of business,
labor, and academic leaders to explore all
aspects of expanding peaceful trade with the
Soviet Union and the Eastern European
Communist countries. In its report to the
President,^ this committee — often called the
Miller committee after its chairman, J. Irwin
Miller, chairman of the board of the Cum-
mins Engine Company — concluded that polit-
ical, not commercial or economic, considera-
tions should determine the formulation and
execution of our trade policies. It expressed
the belief that "peaceful trade in non-
strategic items can be an important instru-
ment of national policy in our country's rela-
tions with individual Communist countries of
Europe."

More particularly, the committee recom-
mended the coordinated use of all the poten-
tial American assets — export licensing, most-
favored-nation tariff authority, and guar-
antees of commercial credit — in "periodic
Government-to-Govemment trade negoti-
ations with individual Communist countries"
as a means of getting the most advanta-
geous results possible from such negoti-
ations. The committee identified tariffs as
the principal potential bargaining area
where the President is denied any pos-
sibility of negotiating flexibility under pres-
ent law and where new legislation would be
required. In the other areas — export li-
censing and credit guarantees — there is al-
ready sufficient discretion provided to the
President.

Early last month, President Johnson in-
structed Secretary of State Rusk to transmit
to the Congress the administration's pro-
posed legislation to permit an expansion of
peaceful trade between the United States and
the Communist countries of Eastern Europe
and the Soviet Union. The Secretary did so

' For text, see ibid. May 30, 1966, p. 845.

1016

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

on May 11,« and the East-West Trade Rela-
tions Act has been introduced into both
houses.

The proposed act would give the President
authority to use trade policy toward coun-
tries in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union
as a flexible tool in the conduct of relations
with these countries. It would be a com-
panion to existing provisions of law which
use the negative power of trade denial: the
Export Control Act, the Battle Act, and re-
strictive provisions of other laws. The pro-
posed legislation would equip the President
to use the positive aspects of trade to serve
our national objectives.

The major substantive provision would be
authority to extend most-favored-nation
(MFN) tariff treatment to certain individ-
ual Communist countries when this is de-
termined to be in the national interest. The
authority could be exercised only in a com-
mercial agreement with a particular country
in which such MFN treatment would be
granted in return for equivalent benefits to
the United States. MFN treatment for the
products of any country would stay in effect
only so long as the commercial agreement
with that country would be in effect.

Such an agreement would set the frame-
work for trade. Trade itself would depend
on the decisions of individual firms. Such
agreements would not provide for balancing
trade levels and for bilateral clearing of
financial accounts. In the broad sense the
primary purpose of a bilateral agreement
incorporating the nondiscriminatory tariff
provision would be to afford the United
States an opportunity to advance United
States interests with respect to individual
Communist countries through the medium of
periodic trade negotiations.

Clearly of interest to the United States
would be such matters as provision for pro-
tection of industrial property, provision for
settlement of commercial disputes, the pro-
motion of trade and tourism, improvement
of consular relations, settlement of outstand-

'Ibid., p. 838.

ing claims, and other matters generally in
the field of trade and commerce.

The act would provide that before the
President would enter into any agreement
under the act, he should seek information
with respect to it from all of the United
States Government agencies concerned, in-
terested private persons, and other appro-
priate sources. Since the act would not
authorize negotiation on individual tariffs
and would not authorize reductions in tariffs
below the prevailing most-favored-nation
rates, there is no special provision for pre-
negotiation procedures. However, the pro-
cedures for adjustment assistance and es-
cape-clause relief set forth in the Trade Ex-
pansion Act would be applicable in the case
of articles imported in increased quantities
as a result of most-favored-nation tariff
treatment extended to a country in ac-
cordance with an agreement pursuant to the
act. Antidumping laws and all other laws
for the protection of United States industry,
agriculture, and labor would remain in full
effect. In addition, problems of interest to
American businessmen could be dealt with
under the consultation procedures or in the
periodic negotiations to be provided for in
agreements under the act.

Any initial agreement would be limited to
3 years and could be renewed for periods not
to exceed 3 years each. Any agreement
could be suspended or terminated at any
time on reasonable notice. MFN would ap-
ply only while an agreement was in effect.
The President would be directed to suspend
or terminate MFN whenever he determined
that the other party was no longer fulfilling
its obligations under the agreement or that
the suspension or termination was in the na-
tional interest.

In anticipation of an understandable ques-
tion, let me say that there is no contradic-
tion between our military action to help the
South Vietnamese repel the aggression
against their country and our willingness to
consider the mutual advantages of increased
trade with Eastern Europe. We are no
longer facing a monolithic Communist bloc

JUNE 27, 1966

1017

systematically and zealously pursuing an
agreed-upon and supposedly unchanging
blueprint for world conquest. Rather, we
have witnessed in the past few years growing
disagreements among Communist nations,
not only the split between the Soviet Union
and Communist China but a growing prag-
matism and awareness of national self-
interest in Eastern Europe.

A willingness on our part to trade with
these Eastern European countries under
proper conditions can play a small but im-
portant role in influencing the continuing
policy debates that take place in their gov-
ernments and academic communities. The
possibility of more trade with the United
States is not in itself likely to change
perceptibly the policies of the Soviet Union
with its huge economy. It can, however, be
of more than marginal importance for some
of the Eastern European countries. With
their limited resources, their evolution to-
ward independence can be encouraged by ex-
panding trade with the West.

As I have indicated, we should not exag-
gerate the possibilities of trade with Eastern
Europe and the Soviet Union. Nevertheless,
there will be economic advantage to us in
more trade with this part of the world.
Certain of our industries and our agri-
culture undoubtedly will be able to make
significant sales.

Our "Balanced Strategy for Peace"

At least equally important, however, is the
basic economic and political message we
wish to transmit. There is now a great
debate going on in the Communist world as
to how best to conduct their relations with
the free world. There are those, such as
Communist China, who advocate predomi-
nantly aggressive tactics involving military
force and subversion, and there are those
who are less militant and favor peaceful
ideological and economic competition. We are
giving our answer to aggression in Viet-
Nam, where we intend to make it clear that
force will not be allowed to succeed. We
would, of course, prefer peaceful economic
or ideological competition.

It may seem inconsistent to talk of in-
creasing trade with the Russians when it is
apparent that they as well as the Chinese are
sending weapons to North Viet-Nam. But I
think it is not as inconsistent as it may
seem, because our basic purpose is to con-
vince the Russians both that aggression can-
not succeed and that they have most to gain
by living in peace with us. It is in our in-
terest, at the same time we are stopping
Communist aggression in Viet-Nam, to dem-
onstrate that we are in fact willing to engage
in peaceful trade and that the Soviets' true
interests lie in that direction. As Secretary
Rusk pointed out in transmitting the East-
West trade relations bill to the Congress,
this demonstration is an important element
in our "balanced strategy for peace."

With respect to the Soviet Union, we do
not believe expanded peaceful trade would
increase its military capability. The United
States Government will continue to use its
export licensing authority to prevent the
sale of goods and technology which would
prove detrimental to the national security
and welfare of the United States. The sale
of peaceful goods and technology would de-
pend upon decisions by American business-
men as to whether they would find such
sales profitable and upon the Soviet Union's
interest in obtaining them and its ability to
pay for them in real resources of value to us.

Finally, I would like to say a few words on
an aspect of existing as well as future East-
West trade which I believe is of proper con-
cern to all Americans. It is the problem of
threats and campaigns of economic intimida-
tion that have been directed against some
who engage in lawful, peaceful business
with Communist countries.

An example of this problem was provided
last fall when certain organized pressure
groups sought, by economic intimidation, to
compel American cigarette companies to dis-
continue the purchase of Yugoslav tobacco.
Your Government attached such importance
to the principles involved in this case that
the Secretaries of State, Defense, and Com-
merce sent a joint letter to the six major
American tobacco companies clearly stating

1018

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

the Government's views.' Without repeating
all the points made in this letter, I would
like to quote a portion. It stated :

. . . your (Jovemment regards commerce in peace-
ful goods with the countries of Eastern Europe, in-
cluding the Soviet Union, as completely compatible
with our national interest. No American business
enterprise should be penalized for purchasing or
selling such goods. In fact, any individuals or
groups that seek to intimidate, boycott, blacklist,
use or threaten economic reprisals against such
American enterprises for carrying on lawful trade
with Eastern European countries act harmfully
and irresponsibly. To yield to such groups is to
encourage capricious interference with the vital
processes of our Constitutional Government — inter-
ference that would at the end of the road make it
impossible for our country to conduct a coherent
foreign policy.

In conclusion, let me cite a statement by-
Secretary Rusk * which makes very clear the
importance we attach to the proposed legis-
lation.

"To fulfill his Constitutional responsibili-
ties for the conduct of our foreign policy in
this complex era," the Secretary stated,
"the President must have available to him
every appropriate bargaining tool. No-
where is this need more critical than in our
relations with the Communist countries.
Granting this flexible authority to the Pres-
ident would not be a concession to the
Communist world. Rather, it would give
him a valuable instrument of foreign policy
to be used where and when it will advance
the interests of the United States."

East-West Trade^A Realistic Appraisal

by George C. McGhee

Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany i

East- West trade is a subject which, in the
past months, has come more and more to oc-
cupy the thoughts of the leaders of both of
our nations. It is one which we hope can
make an important contribution to a lessen-
ing of world tension. It seems to me espe-
cially appropriate to speak on this subject
in this city.

Hamburg became a pioneer in East-West
trade when, in 1229 as a leading member of
the Hanseatic League, it concluded a treaty
with Novgorod and established trading
rights with that city. For many centuries
thereafter Hamburg played a prominent role

Tor text, see ibid., Nov. 1, 1965, p. 700.
'Ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 838.

^ Address made before the Uebersee-Club at Ham-
burg, Germany, on March 31.

in promoting trade with its partners, from
London and Antwerp in the West, to Cracow
and Vitebsk in the East. Today, Hamburg's
commercial ties reach from one corner of
the globe to the other. Hamburg grew and
prospered — and contributed to the grovd;h
and prosperity of Germany — because it be-
lieved that the promotion of world trade
would provide benefits for all mankind and
lead to greater understanding among peo-
ples, notwithstanding differences in their
political and economic outlook.

More recently, Hamburg has in the post-
war years moved vigorously and successfully
in the renewed pursuit of these same goals.
Despite the tragic division of Europe, which
separates Hamburg from much of its natural
hinterland, Hamburg now handles, I am

JUNE 27, 1966

1019

told, more Czechoslovakian goods, for ex-
ample, than it did in the years before the
war. I noted with great interest that in
1965 Hamburg was represented at the fairs
in Posen and Budapest, the German Indus-
trial Fair in Bucharest, and the Chemical
Fair in Moscow. The establishment last
spring of a Standing Committee on Trade
with the East by the Hamburg Chamber of
Commerce seems to me to be a further indi-
cation of this great city's interest in ex-
panding its ties with that area.

But, most of all, it seems appropriate to
speak on this subject to you, the business
leaders of Hamburg. You, perhaps better
than anyone else, are in a position to under-
stand not only the advantages but also the
problems and tasks that face us in further-
ing trade with the Eastern European coun-
tries. We Americans often find conflicting
reactions to our trade policy. One day we
hear the accusation that we are too negative
in our approach to the question of trade
with the Communist countries. On the same
day we might also hear the contrary accusa-
tion: that we are planning to displace the
Western European countries, and especially
Germany, from their traditional position in
the commerce between Eastern European
countries and the Western World.

On closer examination, I hope you will find
that our points of view on the question of
trading with the Eastern European coun-
tries have more similarities than differences.
In any event, I shall state the American
point of view and let you make the com-
parisons.

Let me at the outset make certain distinc-
tions in order to prevent any possible mis-
understanding. There are certain areas and
countries toward which United States trade
policy is totally negative: These are the
Communist-governed mainland of China,
North Korea, North Viet-Nam, and Cuba,
with which virtually all trade, shipping, and
financial transactions are prohibited. We
have maintained a total embargo since 1950
against all transactions with Communist
China and North Korea, and since 1954

we have embargoed exports to North Viet-
Nam. Similarly, the United States em-
bargoed all imports from Cuba and nearly
all exports to Cuba. This is to reduce the
ability of the Castro regime to export vio-
lence and subversion to other Latin American
countries and to threaten the security of the
Western Hemisphere.

One additional distinction must be made
to avoid misunderstanding. When I speak
of improving trade relations with the East-
ern European countries, I am not speaking
of the Soviet Zone. We do not encourage
and do not intend to encourage trade with
the zone, even of nonstrategic goods. We do
not provide any credit guarantees for ex-
ports to the zone and have no intention to
do so. We have not permitted the regime
in Eastern Germany to establish a trade
office in the United States, and we do not
intend to do so. The United States main-
tains strict controls on trade with the zone.
They are much stricter than those main-
tained by any other country and more re-
strictive than our controls on exports to the
Communist countries of Eastern Europe.
We understand that trade with the Eastern
part of Germany has a very special signifi-
cance for the Federal Republic, and we con-
sider it appropriate to consult fully with the
Federal Republic with respect to our com-
mercial dealings in the zone.

We have not, however, sought to prohibit
all private trade with the zone. U.S. exports
to the zone over the past 5 years have av-
eraged $8.7 million per year. These sales
are largely agricultural products; nonagri-
cultural exports have averaged only $114
million. Our average imports from the zone
were even less than our average exports,
about ?4.4 million per year. Except for the
last 2 years, when there have been larger
than normal sales of U.S. agricultural com-
modities to the zone, our sales there have
been less than 2 percent of the total sales of
NATO countries to the area. We seek no
increase above this level.

What concerns us here today, therefore,
is the policy of the United States with

1020

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

respect to trade with the Soviet Union and
with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Ro-
mania, and Bulgaria.

It is interesting to take a close look at
what trade with these countries actually
means to us today and to attempt to analyze
what it could mean under different circum-
stances. Last year little more than one-half
of 1 percent of total United States imports
came from these countries; the value was
about $130 million. We found markets in
those countries for less than one-half of 1
percent of our total exports ; the actual value
was $126 million. In 1937, nearly 30 years
ago, when our total trade volume was only
a fraction of what it is today, the actual
values for United States imports and ex-
ports to Eastern Europe were about 3 per-
cent of our total trade.

By comparison, these areas accounted for
approximately 12 percent of the trade of
Germany in 1937; today they account for
about 31/2 percent of the trade of the terri-
torially smaller Federal Republic. I do not
want to burden you with statistics, but it
is well to keep these figures in mind when
we speak about increasing the flow of trade.
They may serve as guideposts when we ask
ourselves what possibilities exist for im-
proving our trade relations.

Encouraging Peaceful Trade

The impression seems to exist that when
President Johnson, in May of 1964, first
spoke of building bridges to Eastern Eu-
rope,* or when in his recent state of the Un-
ion address * he spoke of improving trade
relations with Eastern Europe, he was an-
nouncing a reversal of U.S. policy. This was
not the case. What he did was to give new
emphasis to a basic policy of the United
States: that trade is a normal element of
relations between countries. We carried on

' For remarks made by President Johnson at the
dedication of the George C. Marshall Research Li-
brary at Charlottesville, Va., on May 23, 1964, see
Bulletin of June 15, 1964, p. 922.

^ For excerpts, see ibid., Jan. 31, 1966, p. 150.

trade with the Soviet Union long before we
were prepared to give formal diplomatic
recognition to the Soviet government. In
the boom years of 1926-30 it reached an
average annual export volume of $78 million
compared with $44 million last year. In 1937
our trade with the U.S.S.R. was almost ex-
actly one-third as large as our trade with
Germany. Last year it was one-thirtieth of
our trade with the Federal Republic.

We would have been glad to resume a
normal trade relationship with the U.S.S.R.
after World War II. It was Soviet Russia
that chose to separate itself in 1947 from
the Western countries. It set up subservient
regimes in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hun-
gary, Romania, and Bulgaria while the Red
Army was still encamped in these countries.
It forced these satellite regimes to reject,
against their own judgment, the Marshall
Plan — which had been offered to them on
the same terms as it was offered to Western
European countries. It organized the econo-
mies of these countries to serve the needs
and interests of the Soviet Union.

The aggressive expansion of Soviet Rus-
sian control in Eastern Europe, the estab-
lishment in the Soviet Zone of Occupation
of Germany of the most obedient vassal
regime of them all, the attempt to take over
the free sectors of Berlin by military bluff
and blockade, the progressive increase in
Soviet military power at a time when the
Western Allies had dismantled their World
War armies in the hope that peace would
follow those years of war, and finally the
aggression against South Korea in 1950 —
all these events led to measures to control
Western trade with the so-called Soviet bloc.
Such measures were not taken by the United
States alone but also by her allies in NATO
and by Japan and other free-world coun-
tries.

Comprehensive controls were established
by the 15 countries which joined together
in an informal consultative group. Their
purpose was, and is, to assure that strategic
commodities — goods which increase the
military potential — do not reach the Soviet

JUNE 27, 1966

1021

Union or the other areas under its domina-
tion. The definition of what is strategic has
varied from time to time. The definition
followed by the United States has generally
been more inclusive than that agreed to by
the Allies. United States controls have
tended to be stricter and to affect a longer
list of commodities. The lists of embargoed
or controlled commodities have been sub-
mitted to periodic reviews and revision. One
such review of the international lists began
in Paris in November of last year and is
not yet concluded. The basic principle, how-
ever, remains: to deny to the Communist
countries those military and strategic goods
which would endanger the security of the
West and the peace of the world.

When we speak of encouraging and ex-
panding trade with the Communist areas
we are, therefore, not speaking of trade in
these strategic commodities. We are speak-
ing only of enlarging the possibilities for
the exchange of goods which are designed
to improve the living conditions of the
people of the Eastern European countries,
which will make available to them a more
abundant supply of commodities of good
quality at a reasonable price. We have not
in the past tried to deny such goods to these
Communist areas. What is new — call it a
new policy, if you wish — is the decision to
give active encouragement to such trade, to
take steps to remove some of the obstacles
which hinder trade in both directions.

Hopeful Trends in Eastern Europe

There has been some comment that we
intend to establish closer commercial con-
nections with the southeastern European
countries in order to disrupt their affilia-
tions with one another or with the Soviet
Union. This is not the case. It is, however,
a fact that the Eastern European countries,
including the Soviet Union, have conducted
most of their trade with one another. The
position which the Western countries, spe-
cifically the NATO countries, have occupied
in the total trade pattern of the East Euro-

pean countries has been relatively minor.
But it appears likely that this pattern will
change, as the countries of Eastern Europe
increasingly find that Moscow- or "Soviet
bloc"-oriented trade policies do not ade-
quately supply their needs or provide mar-
kets for their productive capacities.

The progressive tendency on the part of
Eastern European countries to expand and
diversify their economic and commercial re-
lations has, therefore, resulted from a recog-
nition of their needs and their self-interest.
It has not been the result of a Western
effort to divide them through trade or po-
litical influence. Interestingly, this tendency
has been accompanied by subtle changes in
the political and economic structure and a
loosening of centralized control, which have
tempted us to think in terms of a tendency
toward a cracking apart of the once mono-
lithic Soviet bloc.

In looking at Eastern Europe it is appar-
ent that the slow but steady trend toward di-
versity and autonomy, or what Raymond
Aron has called national affirmation, has
gone on. Only Albania, the hermit of Europe,
and the Soviet Zone of Germany, whose im-
prisoned residents have no chance to man-
age their own affairs, have been unable to
pursue increasingly independent policies
based on their own immediate interests. The
men in power in the other states, notwith-
standing their allegiance to Marxism, have
displayed a noticeable propensity to act as
representatives of their own nations. Each
has championed his country's unique culture
and striven to fulfill its own special require-
ments. I believe each has sought to gain a
greater degree of freedom of action. We
shall watch with interest where this trend
will lead.

One hopeful result of this "national af-
firmation" may be that Eastern European
states, and their leaders, can again make a
constructive contribution to the interna-
tional political scene. Efforts such as this
are desirable — indeed essential — if a safer
and more hopeful situation is to be created

I

1022

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

in Europe and in the world.

Can we in the West play a constructive
role in advancing these hopeful trends in
Eastern Europe? The answer is certainly
"Yes" — but this "Yes" is dependent upon
our ability to understand the nature of the
individual differences which exist in East-
ern Europe. It depends also on our capacity
to devise programs flexible enough to be
responsive to this diversity. One kind of
diversity arises from the different stages of
economic development through which each
of these countries is passing. Romania, for
example, is at the stage of industrialization
where it has been possible to continue with
relatively simple central planning methods.
Czechoslovakia, on the other hand, is begin-
ning to face the same difficulties encoun-
tered in the most complex developed indus-
trial economies. None of these economies
can easily dispense with price and market
mechanisms, which the doctrinaire Marxists
reject as capitalistic. They are now evi-
dently seeking in one degree or another to
adapt their systems to this simple fact.

A second kind of economic diversity re-
lates to land. Poland has not followed its
Communist neighbors by collectivizing agri-
culture. There are other differences in the
manner in which agriculture is managed
among those East European countries that
have collectivized. It would be a mistake for
us to assume that their policies are identical
or immune to further changes based on the
requirements of the individual economic sys-
tems.

Political Diversity

The third, and most interesting, category
of diversity is in the political and intellec-
tual field. Although political life in each
state has remained concentrated in a single
party, each of these parties has become
increasingly responsive to purely national
aspirations. More importantly there has
been — in some countries more than others —
a relaxation of the restrictions on writing,
speaking, and traveling. Whatever form this

diversity takes and whatever results it
achieves, its very existence and the stirring
which underlies it are proof that the na-
tional identity of these states was not de-
stroyed by nearly two decades of Soviet
dominance.

The peoples of Eastern Europe are pat-
ently not convinced that all of the social and
economic institutions built up in the Soviet
Union since 1917 are worth emulating. It is
clear that the regimes owe whatever popu-
larity they enjoy not to the Marxist ortho-
doxy they still preach but to the extent they
have been able to identify themselves with
national goals and the national welfare. In
terms of commerce this means that every
government of Eastern Europe, at least to
some degree, now decides for itself what its
trade and cultural relations with the West
will be. Moreover, it makes these decisions
in accordance with its own requirements and
circumstances.

There are, of course, some built-in re-
straints. There is, in the first place, the
ideological discipline created by a leadership
which believes in Marxism. There is also
the fact that the economies of Eastern Eu-
rope have traditionally been linked to one
another — and to the U.S.S.R. Moreover,
they share a similarity in trading practices
resulting from their membership in the
Communist trade and currency system. The
Communist states of Eastern Europe would
find it very difficult to leave this system.
In a word, the margin of autonomy which
each of the East European states possesses
is real, but it is narrow.

In the light of these complexities and
subtle balances I believe that we in the West
must be particularly careful to avoid two
pitfalls. First, our policies must not be
aimed at exacerbating relations between in-
dividual East European states and the Soviet
Union. We seek, as Vice President Hum-
phrey told the NATO Parliamentarians in
New York last October,* to overcome the

' Ibid., Oct. 25, 1965, p. 650,

JUNE 27, 1966

1023

divisions of Europe — not to create new ones.
Secondly, I believe that we should not over-
rate the possibilities of utilizing economic
means to gain immediate political ends. We
are, however, confident that a willingness
to make certain adjustments to permit a
greater flow of trade v«ll help to build a
foundation for better relations between us
and the Eastern European countries.

Some Special Problems for the U.S.

Let me now point frankly to some of the
special problems which must be resolved, if
we are to hope to bring about a greater
commercial exchange between the United
States and Eastern Europe. These problems
are in several respects different and more
difficult than the problems which you face
in your business dealings with the East here
in Germany. We are under no illusions that
our export possibilities can be significantly
expanded without great effort on our side.

As you know — and as we are constantly
reminded in our own official export promo-
tion activities — American manufacturers
are far less export-minded than German
industry. Our principal market is the do-
mestic market. Some manufacturers, of
course, depend quite heavily on foreign
markets, but few, if any, concentrate on
Eastern Europe. In most cases the line of
least resistance leads the exporter first to
the American market and Canada, then to
Western Europe, and perhaps last to the
Communist countries. If we are to increase
our exports to these countries, the United
States Government must play a role — per-
haps the dual role of scout and publicist.

In September of last year a group of
American businessmen traveled to Romania
and Poland under the auspices of the United
States Department of Commerce. They went
there to make a firsthand study of trade
prospects. They found opportunities, but
they also reported that considerable pioneer-
ing efforts must be made by American ex-
porters to develop these opportunities. More
trade missions to Eastern Europe will be

required to increase our knowledge of the
techniques of doing business there. In this
respect you German businessmen, who have
a long tradition of trading with Eastern
Europe, and other European businessmen
have an advantage which it will not be easy
for us to overcome.

It is, of course, true that certain Ameri-
can products are much in demand in the
Communist countries. These tend to be the
more sophisticated products of modern tech-
nology, which we are not yet prepared to
share with those countries and which are
still affected by our unilateral export con-
trols.

The most important hurdle is the lack of
foreign exchange available to the Commu-
nist countries. Their purchases from the
United States already exceed their sales to
us by a considerable although varying
amount. Their purchases of grain in 1964,
for example, resulted in a trade deficit with
the United States of about $240 million.
For the same reason, their deficit with
Canada was over $400 million. It appears
that this was not an exceptional occurrence
but may be repeated from time to time. The
current year will be another year of heavy
grain imports by Eastern Europe, although
a smaller amount may be purchased from
the United States. A substantial increase
in our imports from Eastern Europe would
be necessary to balance trade accounts.

Greater U.S. imports of East European
goods, on the other hand, face three major
obstacles: a relatively inflexible demand for
the bulk commodities and raw materials
which these countries have traditionally of-
fered, quality deficiencies in the manufac-
tured goods which they hope to sell in larger
amounts, and a differential tariff rate. We
do not have quota limits for the products of
Eastern Europe. However, with the excep-
tion of Poland and Yugoslavia, we apply to
them the full customs duty rates of the 1930
Tariff Act, without the benefit of the reduc-
tions which we have made in all the tariff
negotiations which have been held since

1024

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

L

1934. In other words, they do not have the
benefit of most-favored-nation treatment.
For manufactured goods, particularly, this
can be an unsurmountable handicap.

The President has indicated his intention
to seek legislation which would authorize
him to undertake negotiations, on a selective
basis, with the countries of Eastern Eu-
rope.'^ In such negotiations we would expect
to exchange concessions in the field of im-
port tariff rates for equivalent commitments
by the other side. Legislation of this kind
has been proposed by several important and
representative groups of American business-
men, including the National Foreign Trade
Council and the Committee for Economic
Development. The President's Special Com-
mittee on U.S. Trade Relations with East
European countries and the Soviet Union,
which made its report '^ to the President in
April of last year, similarly recommended
such legislation. Each of these groups has
also supported the retention of export con-
trols over strategic commodities and con-
tinued restraint in granting commercial
credits to the Communist countries.

In your country and in mine the business-
man has often been the pioneer, the man
who has led the way for the politicians in
the capitals. Such men exist in Germany
(many are in this room), in the United
States, and throughout the free world.
Their initiative is needed — indeed indis-
pensable— if we are to make progress in the
difficult area of trade with Eastern Europe.
But it is somewhat romantic, and perhaps
dangerous, to believe that the businessman
working alone can take great strides in deal-
ing with the Communist functionaries of
Eastern Europe. The businessman needs the
support provided by a sound national policy.
Without such a policy, there can only be
false starts and disappointments.

What I am suggesting is that the business-
man and his government work together to

' For background, see ibid., May 30, 1966, p. 838.
° For text, see ibid., p. 845.

insure that commercial activities coincide
with the national interest. You, as export-
ers and foreign traders, have many connec-
tions in foreign countries and have fre-
quently traveled to those countries, includ-
ing the countries of Eastern Europe. You
have no doubt frequently had the experience
of developing a genuine respect and liking —
on a personal basis — for a foreign busi-
ness associate and of thinking better of his
country because you think well of him. If
such business friendships can be multiplied,
it is my hope that existing tensions may be
eased and ill will reduced.

Embargo on U.S. Trade With Communist China

Before I close this speech, I believe I owe
this group a fuller explanation of the rea-
sons and purposes for the total embargo on
American trade with the Communist coun-
tries of the Far East, which I have only men-
tioned in passing. The U.S. press and con-
gressional reaction to the recent decision of
the Federal Republic to give a credit guar-
antee for a very large and important busi-
ness deal with Red China also makes this
appropriate.

You already know from the press that the
United States is not enthusiastic about the
reported contract to build a DM600 million
steel mill in China, of which German firms
will have a share of about DM300 million.

Part of the argument for freer trade with
the Communist world is that a willingness
to trade is evidence of a desire to promote
constructive and harmonious relations. But
there needs to be some evidence that the
other side also has such a desire. So far,
the Chinese Communists have given no such
evidence. The Peking regime has exported
subversion to Viet-Nam, Laos, Thailand, Ma-
laysia, and as far as Africa. The regime
blatantly expresses its readiness to engage
in military aggression — and has proven it
in Korea and on the northern border of
India. At the time of the recent unfortunate
clash between India and Pakistan, Peking
was fanning the fires of war there. These

JUNE 27, 1966

102.5

actions by Peking have justified in our
minds the continuation of our total embargo,
not only on trade but on all transactions.

We recognize that other countries see the
question differently. We know from experi-
ence that it is difficult to deny opportunities
to your own industry when neighboring
countries are not prepared to do likewise.
We appreciate that a multilateral trade
embargo depends for its effectiveness on co-
operation among the suppliers. The COCOM
rules and Berne Union guidelines serve that
purpose. It is true that when the German
Government first approached us regarding
the steel mill project, we reluctantly did not
object since there was no formal violation
of COCOM or Berne Union rules involved.
However, in light of the current U.S. in-
volvement in Viet-Nam and in light of our
assessment of Peking's continued aggres-
siveness, we could not help but be disap-
pointed at a decision to promote the sale to
Communist China of a large steel rolling
mill. It should not have surprised anyone
that there has been a public reaction in the
United States. We have our sensitive points
just as you have yours.

I would recommend for further reflection
by all of our friends and allies these com-
ments made by Secretary of State Rusk:^

"We would hope that our friends in West-
ern Europe who have been engaging in
these conversations about a steel mill would,
when the time comes for action, take into
account the problem of peace in the Pacific
Ocean area and consider whether in fact
Peiping is willing to live at peace with its
neighbors in the Pacific. Trade, as such, is
not an insuperable obstacle. . . . But we
are concerned about anything that would
lead Peiping to believe that their policy is
successful or anything that would add to
the strength of Peiping until there is some
indication of change in their policy."

' For transcript of a television interview with
Secretary Rusk on Mar. 20, see ibid., Apr. 11, 1966,
p. 565.

President Johnson Urges Senate
To Ratify ILO Convention 122

statement by President Johnson

White House press release dated June 2

I have today transmitted to the Senate,
with the request for the advice and consent
of that body for its ratification. Convention
122 of the International Labor Organization
concerning employment policy. This conven-
tion, adopted at the International Labor Con-
ference in 1964, is thoroughly in accord with
this nation's economic and legislative goals.

ILO Convention 122 provides that each
member state shall declare and pursue, as a
major national goal, an active policy de-
signed to promote full and productive and
freely chosen employment. A major aim of
this policy, as enunciated in the convention,
is the fullest possible opportunity for suita-
ble employment irrespective of race, color,
sex, religion, political opinion, national ab-
straction, or social origin.

The Government of the United States can
and does wholeheartedly associate itself
with the philosophy and intent of Conven-
tion 122.

The convention parallels our own Em-
ployment Act of 1946. That act declared the
continuing policy and responsibility of the
Federal Government to be the use of all
practical means to foster and promote con-
ditions under which there will be afforded
useful employment opportunities — including
self-employment — for all those able, willing,
and seeking to work, and to promote maxi-
mum employment.

This policy has been strengthened by a
number of our country's statutory and ad-
ministrative actions. The 1964 Manpower
Report declared the aim of the Government
to insure all men the self-respect and eco-
nomic security that flows from full use of
their talents.

This aim, reiterated in the 1965 Man-
power Report, has been given much impetus

1026

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

in recent legislation. The Manpower Devel-
opment and Training Act of 1962, the Eco-
nomic Opportunity Act of 1964, the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 with its equal employ-
ment provisions, and the Public Works and
Economic Development Act of 1965 — all are
directed toward the goal of affording all
our workers the opportunity of participat-
ing in our economic life on a full and non-
discriminatory basis.

It is in the spirit of this philosophic and
legislative history that I express the hope
that the Senate of the United States will,
in its wisdom, give favorable consideration
to ratification by our Government of Con-
vention 122 of the International Labor Or-
ganization.

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee
To Meet at Kyoto July 5-7

The Department of State announced on
June 9 (press release 141) that the fifth
meeting of the Joint United States-Japan
Committee on Trade and Economic Affairs
would be held in Kyoto July 5 through 7.

The Committee was established following
the meeting between the late United States
President John F. Kennedy and the late
Japanese Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda.* Its
first meeting was held in Hakone in Novem-
ber 1961, the second meeting in Washing-
ton in December 1962, the third meeting
in Tokyo in January 1964, and the fourth
meeting in Washington in July 1965.^

At the coming fifth meeting Japan will
be represented by Etsusaburo Shiina, Min-
ister for Foreign Affairs; Takeo Fukuda,
Minister of Finance; Eiichi Sakata, Min-

' For background, see Bulletin of Feb. 1, 1965,
p. 134.

' For texts of joint communiques issued at the
conclusion of the meetings, see ihid., Nov. 27, 1961,
p. 891; Dec. 24, 1962, p. 959; Feb. 17, 1964, p. 235;
and Aug. 9, 1965, p. 247.

ister of Agriculture and Forestry; Takeo
Miki, Minister of International Trade and
Industry; Torata Nakamura, Minister of
Transport; Hisao Kodaira, Minister of La-
bor; and Aiichiro Fujiyama, Director-Gen-
eral of the Economic Planning Agency.

The United States will be represented by
Secretary Rusk ; Stewart L. Udall, Secretary
of the Interior ; Orville L. Freeman, Secretary
of Agriculture ; John T. Connor, Secretary of
Commerce;W.WillardWirtz, Secretary of La-
bor ; Joseph W. Barr, Under Secretary of the
Treasury; and Arthur W. Okun, member,
President's Council of Economic Advisers.

Ryuji Takeuchi, Japanese Ambassador to
the United States, and Edwin 0. Reischauer,
United States Ambassador to Japan, will
also be present at the meeting.

The agenda of the meeting is as follows:

I. Economic situation in Japan and the
United States (including the financial,
monetary, and balance-of-payments situa-
tion)

A. Economic situation in the United
States

B. Economic situation in Japan

II. Developments in trade and economic
relations between Japan and the United
States

A. Expansion of Japan-United States
trade relations

B. Developments in Japan-United States
economic relations

III. Developments in international trade
and economic relations

A. Kennedy Round negotiations

B. Trade with less developed countries
and the United Nations Conference on
Trade and Development

C. East-West trade

IV. Cooperation in the economic develop-
ment of less developed countries

A. Aid policies and activities of Japan
and the United States

B. Economic cooperation for Asian de-
velopment

V. Other matters

JUNE 27, 1966

1027

U.S. Supports Viet-Nam Request
for U.N. Election Observers

Following is an excerpt from an address ^
made by Arthur J. Goldberg, U.S. Repre-
sentative to the United Nations, in which he
comments on U.S. support of the South
Vietnamese Government's request for U.N.
observers of the forthcoming elections there.

One important step in the process of self-
determination is the forthcoming election
for a constituent assembly. In this phase
there can be a most important role for the
United Nations; namely, to provide impar-
tial international observers to check on the
validity of this election. The South Viet-
namese Government has made a request to
Secretary-General U Thant for such observ-
ers, and the United States strongly sup-
ports that request. For our own part, I
repeat what I have said before: that the
United States is prepared to accept and
abide by the results of these elections — as
well as the reunification elections contem-
plated by the Geneva agreements — whatever
these results may be.

Date Extended for Filing Claims
on Santo Domingo Property Losses

Press release 139 dated June 8

The American Embassy at Santo Domingo
has informed the Department of State that
the Government of the Dominican Republic
by Law Number 243 of May 31, 1966, ex-
tended the date for filing claims with the
Special War Claims Commission to June 30,
1966.

American nationals who have not previ-
ously filed their claims for losses resulting
from damage to or destruction of property
in the National District of Santo Domingo
as a result of the civil strife which began

' Made at The Catholic University of America
at Washington, D.C., on June 5. For text, see
U.S. /U.N. press release 4868 dated June 4.

on April 24, 1965, and who now desire to
file a claim, should write with the least
possible delay to: Comision Depuradora de
Reclamaciones por Daiios de Guerra, Calle
Las Damas esq. El Conde (Altos de Rentas
Internas), Santo Domingo, Dominican Re-
public.

The Department of State is informed that
claims are required to be filed on official
forms of the Commission.

Congressional Documents
Relating to Foreign Policy

89th Congress, 2cl Session

International Education. Hearings before the Task
Force on Education and Labor of the House Com-
mittee on Education. March 30-April 7, 1966.
453 pp.

Foreign Assistance, 1966. Hearings before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee. April 6-May 11,
1966. 741 pp.

Foreign Assistance Act of 1966. Hearings before
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Part
IV, April 21-28, 1966, 168 pp.; Part V, May 3-5,
1966, 151 pp.

Europe Today. Report to the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations by Senator Frank Church on a
study mission, May 1966, 8 pp. [Committee print.]

The Atlantic Alliance. Hearings before the Subcom-
mittee on National Security and International
Operations of the Senate Committee on Govern-
ment Operations. Part 2. May 5-6, 1966. 57 pp.

The Secretary of State and the Problem of Coordi-
nation— New Duties and Procedures of March 4,
1966. Prepared by the Subcommittee on National
Security and International Operations of the
Senate Committee on Government Operations. May
9, 1966. 23 pp. [Committee print.]

United Nations Financial Situation: Background
and Consequences of the Article 19 Controversy
Over the Financing of U.N. Peacekeeping Opera-
tions. Report of the chairman of the Subcommittee
on International Organizations and Movements
of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, to-
gether with hearings before the subcommittee,
March 29 and April 19, 1966. May 14, 1966. 139
pp. [Committee print.]

Continued Suspension of Duty on Heptanoic Acid.
Report to accompany H.R. "10998. S. Rept. 1171.
May 18, 1966. 2 pp.

Duty-Free Treatment of Certain Natural Graphite.
Report to accompany H.R. 11653. S. Rept. 1172.
May 18, 1966. 3 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duty on Certain Copying
Shoe Lathes. Report to accompany H.R. 12262. S.
Rept. 1173. May 18, 1966. 2 pp.

Continued Suspension of Duty on Crude Chicory and
Reduction in Duty on Ground Chicory. Report to
accompany H.R. 12463. S. Rept. 1174. May 18,
1966. 2 pp.

1028

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND CONFERENCES

United States Favors Creation of a U.N.
High Commissioner for Human Rights

statements by Morris Abram ^

STATEMENT OF MARCH 25

Our field of work — human rights — is one
of frustration. On the one hand we keenly
feel the urgency of our task, and, on the
other hand, we know only too well our
limitations. The Commission's means, and
indeed those of all organs of the United
Nations, are simply insufficient to the mag-
nitude of the task of promoting "universal
respect for, and observance of, human rights
and fundamental freedoms for all," as the
U.N. Charter provides.

There is a natural progression in the
development of any new concept of inter-
national cooperation. In the beginning there
must be developed a general consensus of
the principles to be accepted and applied.
During the past 20 years the United Nations
has made great progress in arriving at this
consensus in the human rights field. We
have been able to move from international
declarations of principles to conventions set-
ting up legally binding obligations which
apply to them. This is a remarkable achieve-
ment, but it is limited by the scope of the
subjects covered, by the absence of imple-

' Made during the 22d session of the U.N. Com-
mission on Human Rights. Mr. Abram is U.S. Rep-
resentative in the Conmiission. The statements have
been condensed by Mr. Abram; full texts are avail-
able as U.S./ U.N. press releases 4826, 4828, and 4829.

mentation features in many particular con-
ventions, and the cumbersome nature of the
remedies which apply to conventions in
general.

As I have indicated, substantial consensus
has developed on some principles. As I have
also indicated, some conventions have been
written, but ratifications have not kept pace
with their adoption by the U.N. And, of
course, for the reasons I have already sug-
gested and others, conventions have their
inherent limitations as a means of protect-
ing human rights.

In candor, we are bound to admit that
more remains to be done than has been
accomplished thus far in the promotion of
human rights through international action.
The pace of human rights development — in
the member states and in the international
organizations — has quickened. The time has
come when we must honestly survey the
opportunities and the means of achieving
them in however modest a way.

At the outset we are met by a fact that
we cannot ignore, the juridical fact of na-
tional sovereignty. Only through internal
reform can human rights violations be reme-
died. Because we reject the use of physical
force, moral force is the chief international
instrument for the promotion of human
rights, however inadequate it may be. How-
ever, the adequacy of moral force is pro-
portionate to the means at hand to sharpen

JUNE 27, 1966

1029

its focus, to increase its visibility, to insti-
tutionalize it, and to elevate the platform
from which it is exercised.

We have computerized many aspects of
society, but we have not invented, and I
believe we never shall invent, a mechanical
or electronic substitute for conscience.
Therefore, the institution we should develop
must be centered in human beings, hope-
fully in an exceptional man who would
occupy a very unusual and exceptional of-
fice. There is, I believe, great potential in
embodying the cause of human rights in a
single person, a person who has earned
respect and trust, in whom all have confi-
dence of the sort that is not generally
enjoyed by faceless committees or other
groups where people are usually expected
to represent their national or ideological
interests.

I do not see this office as one of organic
power. I see the High Commissioner for
Human Rights as possessed of keen eyes and
ears and persuasive voice and with a con-
science so alert, a reputation for objectivity
so recognized, as to command the respect of
all states. And since he would act in most
matters on the request of a government or
of a U.N. body, he could not assume powers
beyond those delegated by the member
states or U.N. organs.

Successful and enduring institutions of
government and society, whether at the na-
tional or international level, are not created
in an instant, even by the wisest of men.
Such institutions are the product of experi-
ence. The proposal for a High Commissioner
embodies a valid concept. I would not pres-
ently attempt to completely delineate his
authority. Experience must show us how
such an office should develop.

A High Commissioner could render many
services to the Commission on Human
Rights, other U.N. bodies, and to member
states without duplicating responsibilities
and tasks already assigned. He could apply
his expert knowledge to assist interested
governments in establishing institutions,
such as the Ombudsman. He could also
maintain information about the status of

ratification and implementation of human
rights conventions, and he could advise ap-
propriate national authorities about more
effective use of such instruments. He could
assist the Secretary-General on request, as
an intermediary in inflamed situations. He
might, for example, be useful to U.N. com-
mittees dealing with problems in dependent
territories. He could collate the vast amount
of information submitted on human rights
and formulate fruitful generalizations about
human rights situations throughout the
world.

I believe, however, that the High Commis-
sioner should be established with essen-
tially advisory authority. More precise ju-
risdiction can be explored after govern-
ments have had experience in working with
him. Experience will no doubt demonstrate
some areas in which his mandate should be
expanded and others in which it should be
limited. As time passes, the High Commis-
sioner may by common consent come to
occupy a place and play a role which cannot
now be forecast.

The day may come when such an office
may be able to prevent bloodshed or even
help belligerent powers come to a peaceful
accommodation otherwise impossible. Many
international crises today involve human
rights issues, whether those crises arise
from religious, ethnic, or racial disputes or
from attempts by one country, or one group
within a country, to impose its will or eco-
nomic and social system by force on another
country or group within a country. In each
case, widespread denials of human rights
may ensue. It would not be difficult to ac-
cumulate a list of instances in which either
the deprivation of human rights or the fear
of such deprivation has contributed to con-
flicts in which the United Nations has be-
come involved.

No one claims that such a Commissioner
will be a panacea for our frustrations as we
survey our unmet needs in the international
protection of human rights. It is, however,
a proposal, modest, innovative, and possessed
of great potential. How can we possibly fail
to grasp the opportunity to move forward?

1030

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

STATEMENT OF MARCH 28

Mr. Chairman, I am certain that all of
those who have spoken before me so elo-
quently and so carefully, with such preci-
sion and with such thoughtfulness on behalf
of the proposal of Costa Rica,^ have demon-
strated the seriousness with which this pro-
posal is viewed by so many peoples. I did
not anticipate the reaction of my friend,
the distinguished representative from the
U.S.S.R., Mr. [P. D.] Morosov, who placed
the matter in a context different from the
context in which we had discussed it to
date. Because the U.S.S.R. had joined in
unanimous approval by the General Assem-
bly plenary of a study of the proposal which
we are now considering, I was surprised
when the U.S.S.R. dealt with the proposi-
tion in a different way in this forum. He
said of it that it was "intolerable," and he
said the purpose of those who advanced it,
and, I presume, those who support it, was to
divert the Human Rights Commission from
its true purpose and its legitimate functions.

We believe that reform cannot take place
in a society which regards itself as perfect.
For, as the precondition for reform, there
must be the critical self-examination which
recognizes and admits the imperfections in
society. There can be no change, we believe,
in a society which already considers itself
completely perfect, which represents itself
as a paradise without any imperfections.

Now, Mr. Chairman, on the merits I do
not view, and I do not think any of my
colleagues here have ever viewed, the pro-
posed High Commissioner for Human
Rights as a kind of superorganization or
superinstitution. We see the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights as an office not
of organic power so much as of moral power.
And, Mr. Chairman, for my country we
welcome the establishment of moral power
and moral authority outside of the United
States. We do not believe that article 2,
paragraph 7, of the charter in any way
inhibits the United Nations from the estab-
lishment of a moral force.

' U.N. doc. E/CN. 4895.

The distinguished representative of the
U.S.S.R. said in his concluding remarks:
"Let us leave matters of implementation as
they have been for a thousand years." In
these thousand years people have been tor-
tured on the rack, burned at the stake,
eviscerated, and made victims of mass
slaughter. Because things have not been
right for a thousand years, and because we
have the capacity to improve and to learn
and to grow, we are not content entirely
with the old forms and the old institutions.

The United States believes that we have
the capacity, the opportunity, the need to
provide an institutional foundation for
moral authority and conscience. And it is
for those reasons that we support ardently
the proposal which emanated from Costa
Rica.

STATEMENT OF MARCH 30

Mr. Chairman, my delegation has now
heard a considerable variety of opinion re-
garding the proposal for a U.N. High Com-
missioner for Human Rights. We believe,
and are very happy to notice, that a general
consensus is emerging from our discussion,
at least a consensus among a very large
number of delegations. I have listened with
considerable interest and attention to the
remarks of those few delegates who have
serious reservations about the merits of the
proposal. I have heard it said, for example,
that the responsibilities of the High Com-
missioner for Human Rights would exceed
the capacity of one man and therefore there
was some reluctance in one delegation to
support the proposal.

Some have said that it would be more
appropriate to use the Secretary-General
instead of a High Commissioner for Human
Rights. May I point out that the support
which the office of the Secretary-General
has behind it today is something that was
not established through one act of organic
foundation but that this office has grown
in power and prestige because of the felt
necessities of the times and because of the
experience that member states have had in

JUNE 27, 1966

1031

dealing with that office — and, I might also
add, because of the high stature and char-
acter of the men who have occupied that
office.

Those who feel that the Secretary-Gen-
eral might do the job are recognizing, it
seems to me, the inherent validity of having
an office occupied by a single individual.
The analogy is perfectly clear here; the
Secretary-General's Office is an office occu-
pied by an exceptional man, and the func-
tions and usefulness of the office have illus-
trated precisely the role in international life
that a single man who is independent of
national instructions can play.

Some have said perhaps the work should
be entrusted to a Deputy Secretary-General.
This proposal has the danger of involving
the High Commissioner for Human Rights
in the administrative apparatus. The worst
thing that one can do with an office of this
nature, an office based on moral authority,
is to involve it in all kinds of administrative
shrouds.

Some have said that perhaps the function
some of us envisage for the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights could be carried
out by a body of experts. Mr. Chairman,
my experience is that experts coming from
the various states are seldom able, as is the
Secretary-General, for example, to vault
above their national origins, their national
viewpoints, their national ties.

Mr. Chairman, some have said that they
look with the gravest suspicion upon this
proposal because, if the office is to be occu-
pied by one man, they presume that the one
man will not come from their ideological,
political, social, or economic system. Of
course one man can't come from all systems.
But the Secretary-General has proved that
one man can be above all systems in terms
of his ability to grasp broad concepts for
the general good.

I say on behalf of my country that, know-
ing full well that a High Commissioner for
Human Rights could not conceivably be tied
to the United States and granting that the
High Commissioner for Human Rights
might be chosen from a country with a dif-

ferent form of social organization, the
United States does not believe that its
integrity, its existence, its sovereignty,
would be challenged thereby; we do not
believe that a man chosen by the Secretary-
General and confirmed, for example, by the
General Assembly, would be a man who
would be prejudiced or subjective in his
judgments. My country is prepared to have
such a man appointed.

Now, Mr. Chairman, the distinguished
representative of the Soviet Union has said
that if the office of the High Commissioner
for Human Rights is created, if it is finally
approved by the General Assembly, then his
delegation will disassociate itself from the
process. He has said that they would not
finance it and would not contribute to it. I
further understand that they have taken the
position that they will not work with any
ad hoc committee of this group established
to study further the role of such a High
Commissioner. I regret this with all my ,
heart. |

The United Nations is a collective process.
We work under democratic procedures.
Sometimes we are able to persuade our
colleagues, and sometimes not. However, I
should have thought that the democratic
process is central to human rights. In the
field of human rights I should have thought
there would not have arisen any suggestion
of boycott by any group merely because its
will had not prevailed after fair discussion
and majority vote.

How can we have a collective process?
How can we have international institutions
in which states are represented and work
together if every time one particular group
does not get its way it tries, like Samson,
to bring down the whole house rather than
abide by the decision of the majority?

Therefore, I appeal to the representative
of the Soviet Union to reconsider and I hope
very much that we will have the advice of
the distinguished representatives of the So-
viet Union in the Working Group on this
important item.

Mr. Chairman, we are, I think, entitled to
the consultation, the best thoughts, ideas,

1032

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

and proposals of every state represented
around this table. It is only in the context
of honest debate, honest disagreement, hon-
est discussion, full consultation, that we can
make our job worthy of the purposes for
which we strive. If, after an honest discus-
sion and a free exchange of ideas, the ideas
that we believe in do not prevail, let me
assure you that we will not pick up our
marbles and leave the game. We will abide
by the judgment, the democratic judgment,
of our peers.

I have been a party to many discussions
here with those who have a different view-
point. Because of the desire to accommodate
the widest possible consensus, we have tried
to reach mutually agreeable results.

I plead therefore for the cooperation of
all members to reach a consensus on this
very important proposal, a proposal so
fraught with hope and possibility and so
necessary in view of the times in which we
live.^

TREATY INFORMATION

Current Actions

MULTILATERAL

i Aviation

Convention for the unification of certain rules re-
lating to international transportation by air and
additional protocol. Done at Warsaw October
12, 1929. Entered into force February 13, 1933;
for the United States October 29, 1934. 49 Stat.
3000.

Notice of denunciation withdrawn: United States,
May 14, 1966.

' On Mar. 30 the Commission decided to establish
a working group of nine states (Austria, Costa Rica,
Dahomey, France, Jamaica, Philippines, Senegal,
United Kingdom, and United States) to study the
Costa Rican proposal and report the results to the
Commission at its 23d session.

JUNE 27, 1966

Finance

Convention on the settlement of investment disputes
between states and nationals of other states. Done
at Washington March 18, 1965.'
Senate advice and consent to ratification: May

16, 1966.
Ratified \by the President of the United States:

June 1, 1966.
Signature: Malagasy Republic, June 1, 1966.

Trade

Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Iceland to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December
14, 165. Entered into force December 28, 1965;
for the United States December 30, 1965.
Acceptances: Brazil, April 28, 1966; Federal Re-
public of Germany, Mav 3, 1966; South Africa,
May 6, 1966; Turkey, April 29, 1966.
Third proces-verbal extending declaration on provi-
sional accession of Tunisia to the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva De-
cember 14, 1965. Entered into force January 6,
1966.

Acceptances: Brazil, April 28, 1966; Federal Re-
public of Germany, April 19, 1966; = Turkey,
April 29, 1966.
Proces-verbal extending declaration on provisional
accession of Yugoslavia to the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade. Done at Geneva December
14, 1965. Entered into force December 28, 1965;
for the United States December 30, 1965.
Acceptances : Brazil, April 28, 1966; Turkey, April
29, 1966.
Protocol for accession of Switzerland to the Gen-
eral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Done at
Geneva April 1, 1966.'

Acceptances : Austria, May 5, 1966;" Peru, May 9,
1966; Switzerland, May 4, 1966;' United States,
May 4, 1966.

BILATERAL

Burma

Agreement on the use of kyats accrued under title
I of the Agricultural Trade Development and
Assistance Act of 1954, as amended. Signed at
Rangoon June 1, 1966. Entered into force June
1, 1966.

Denmark

Agreement amending the air transport agreement
of December 16, 1944, as amended (58 Stat. 1458,
TIAS 3014, 4071). Effected by exchanges of
notes at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into
force June 7, 1966.

India

Agreement amending the agricultural commodities
agreement of September 30, 1964, as amended
(TIAS 5669, 5729, 5793, 5846, 5875, 5895, 5913,
5965). Effected by exchange of notes at New
Delhi May 27, 1966. Entered into force May 27,
1966.

Israel

Agricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-

' Not in force.

' Subject to ratification.

1033

sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1701-1709), with an exchange of notes.
Signed at Washing-ton June 6, 1966. Entered into
force June 6, 1966.
Agricultural commodities agreement under title IV
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454;
7 U.S.C. 1731-1736), with exchange of notes.
Signed at Washington June 6, 1966. Entered into
force June 6, 1966.

Malagasy Republic

Agreement amending the agreement of October 7,
1963 (TIAS 5473), providing for the establish-
ment and operation of a space vehicle tracking
and communications station in Madagascar. Ef-
fected by exchange of notes at Tananarive April
27 and May 2, 1966. Entered into force May 2,
1966.

Norway

Agreement amending the air transport agreement of
October 6, 1945, as amended (59 Stat. 1658, TIAS
3015, 4072). Effected by exchange of notes at
Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into force
June 7, 1966.

Pakistan

Agrricultural commodities agreement under title I
of the Agricultural Trade Development and As-
sistance Act of 1954, as amended (68 Stat. 454; 7
U.S.C. 1701-1709), with exchange of notes. Signed
at Karachi May 26, 1966. Entered into force
May 26, 1966.

Poland

Agreement concerning trade in cotton textiles. Ef-
fected bv exchange of notes at Washington Mav
18 and 20, 1966. Entered into force May 20, 1966.

Sweden

Agreements amending the air transport agreement
of December 16, 1944, as amended (58 Stat. 1466,
TIAS 3013, 4073). Effected by exchanges of
notes at Washington June 7, 1966. Entered into
force June 7, 1966.

PUBLICATIONS

Recent Releases

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Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C.,
S0U02. Address requests direct to the Superintend-
ent of Documents, except in the case of free pub-
lications, which may be obtained from the Office of
Media Services, Department of State, Washington,
D.C., 20520.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title IV.

Agreement with Yugoslavia, amending the agree-
ments of April 28 and October 29, 1964. Exchange
of notes — Signed at Belgrade December 29 and 30,

1965. Entered into force December 30, 1965. TIAS
5945. 2 pp. 5«#.

World Meteorological Organization. Amendments to
article 13 and certain other articles of the convention
of October 11, 1947. Adopted by the fourth congress
of the World Meteorological Organization, at the
seventh and sixteenth plenary meetings, Geneva,
April 11 and 27, 1963. Entered into force April 11,
1963, with respect to article 13; entered into force
April 27, 1963, with respect to renumbered article 13
and certain other articles. TIAS 5947. 18 pp. 20<f.

Agricultural Commodities — Sales Under Title FV.

Agreement vrith Yugoslavia, amending the agree-
ment of November 22, 1965. Exchange of notes —
Signed at Belgrade January 21, 1966. Entered into
force January 21, 1966. TIAS 5948. 2 pp. hi.

Agricultural Commodities. Agreement with Viet-
Nam, amending the agreement of May 26, 1965, as
amended. Exchange of notes — Signed at Saigon
January 17, 1966. Entered into force January 17,

1966. TIAS 5949. 3 pp. 5(f.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BUllETIN VOL IIV, NO. 1409 PUBIICATION 8101

JUNE 27, 1966

Thu Departmsnt of Bt*t< Bulletin, ■
weeltly pnblfPAtlon liwned by the Office
of MMia Services, Borean of Public Af-
faln proTideB the pnbtio and interested
•Renciefl of the GoTemment vith infor-
matinn on deTelopments in the field of
foreiirn relations and on the work of the
Department of State and the Forelsn
Service. The Bulletin Inelndee selected
press releases on foreign policy, issned
by the White Honse and the Department,
and statements and addresses made by
the President and by tha Secretary of
State and other officer* of the Depart-

ment, as well as special articles on yari-
ons phases of international affairs and
the functions of the Department. Infor-
mation is incladed concerning treaties
and international agreements to which the
United States is or may become a party
and treaties of general international in-
terest.

Pnbiicationa of the Department. United
Kstions documents, and lecialative mate-
rial in the field of International relations
are listed currently.

The Bulletin is for sale by the Super-
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Non: Contents of this publication are
not copyrighted and items contained herein
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ment of State Bulletin as the source will
be appreciated. The Bulletin is Indexed
In the Readers' Quids to Periodical Liter-
ature.

1034

DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

INDEX June 27, 1966 Vol. LIV, No. H09

American Republics. U.S. Support for Central
American Common Market Reaffirmed
(Johnson) 1004

China. East-West Trade — A Realistic Ap-
praisal (McGhee) 1019

Claims and Property. Date Extended for Fil-
ing Claims on Santo Domingo Property
Losses 1028

Congress

Congressional Documents Relating to Foreign

Policy 1028

President Johnson Urges Senate To Ratify

ILO Convention 122 1026

Where NATO Stands (Rusk) 998

Cuba. New Procedures To Admit Cuban Refu-
gees From Third Countries 1005

Dominican Republic

Date Extended for Filing Claims on Santo

Domingo Property Losses 1028

President Hails Success of Free Elections in

Dominican Republic (Johnson) 1005

Economic Affairs

East-West Trad e — A Realistic Appraisal

(McGhee) 1019

Our International Patent Policy and the World

Patent Crisis (Winter) 1006

U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet at

Kyoto July 5-7 1027

United States Policy on East-West Trade

(Braderman) 1013

U.S. Support for Central American Common

Market Reaffirmed (Johnson) 1004

Europe

East-West Trad e — A Realistic Appraisal

(McGhee) 1019

North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels

(Rusk, communique) 1001

United States Policy on East-West Trade

(Braderman) 1013

Where NATO Stands (Rusk) 998

France

North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels

(Rusk, communique) 1001

Where NATO Stands (Rusk) 998

Germany. East-West Trade — A Realistic Ap-
praisal (McGhee) 1019

Human Rights. United States Favors Creation
of a U.N. High, Commissioner for Human
Rights (Abram) 1029

International Organizations and Conferences.

President Johnson Urges Senate To Ratify

ILO Convention 122 1026

Japan. U.S.-Japan Trade Committee To Meet

at Kyoto July 5-7 1027

Labor. President Johnson Urges Senate To

Ratify ILO Convention 122 3026

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

North Atlantic Council Meets at Brussels

(Rusk, communique) 1001

Where NATO Stands (Rusk) 998

Passports. New Procedures To Admit Cuban

Refugees From Third Countries 1005

Poland. United States Policy on East-West

Trade (Braderman) 1013

Presidential Documents

President Hails Success of Free Elections in

Dominican Republic 1005

President Johnson Urges Senate To Ratify

ILO Convention 122 1026

U.S. Support for Central American Common

Market Reaffirmed 1004

Publications. Recent Releases 1034

Refugees. New Procedures To Admit Cuban

Refugees From Third Countries 1005

Romania. United States Policy on East-West

Trade (Braderman) 1013

Treaty Information. Current Actions .... 1033

U.S.S.R.

East-West Trad e — A Realistic Appraisal

(McGhee) 1019

United States Policy on East-West Trade

(Braderman) 1013

United Nations

United States Favors Creation of a U.N. High

Commissioner for Human Rights (Abram) . 1029

U.S. Supports Viet-Nam Request for U.N.

Election Observers (Goldberg) 1028

Viet-Nam. U.S. Supports Viet-Nam Request

for U.N. Election Observers (Goldberg) . . 1028

Yugoslavia. United States Policy on East-
West Trade (Braderman) 1013

Name Index

Abram Morris 1029

Braderman, Eugene M 1013

Goldberg, Arthur J 1028

Johnson, President 1004, 1005, 1026

McGhee, George C 1019

Rusk, Secretary 998, 1001

Winter, Harvey J 1006

No.

Date

Check List of Department of State
Press Releases: June 6-12

Press releases may be obtained from the
Office of News, Department of State, Wash-
ington, D. C. 20520.

Releases issued prior to June 6 which ap-
pear in this issue of the Bulletin are Nos.
132 of May 31 and 133 of June 3.

Sabjeet

Locke sworn in as Ambassador to

Pakistan (biographic details).
Amendment of air transport

agreements with Denmark,

Norway, Sweden.
Braderman: "U.S. Policy on

East-West Trade."
Bennett sworn in as Ambassador

to Portugal (biographic de-
tails).
Tuthill sworn in as Ambassador

to Brazil (biographic details).
Extension of date for claims,

National District of Santo

Domingo.
NATO communique of June 8.
U.S.-Japan Trade and Economic

Committee ( rewrite ) .
H a r r i m a n : "The Growing

Strength of Freedom."

* Not printed.

t Held for a later issue of the Bulletin.

*134

6/6

tl35

6/7

136

6/7

*137

6/7

*138

6/8

139

6/8

140
141

6/9
6/9

tl42

6/10

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